V
(Atzinumi)
PROCEDŪRAS, KAS SAISTĪT AS AR KONKURENCES POLITIKAS ĪSTENOŠANU
EIROPAS KOMISIJA
VALSTS ATBALSTS – SLO VĒNIJA
Valsts atbalsts SA.33229 2018/C (ex 2017/N-3) – Nova Ljubljansk a Bank a d.d. pārs trukturēšanas 
saistību grozījumi
Uzaicinājums iesniegt piezīmes saskaņā ar Līguma par Eiropas Savie nības darbību 108. pant a 
2. punktu
(Dokuments attiecas uz EEZ)
(2018/C 121/03)
Ar 2018. gada 26. janvā ra vēstuli, kas tās autentiska jā valodā pievienota šim kopsavilk umam, Komisi ja 
paziņoja Slovēnijai savu lēmumu sākt LESD 108. panta 2. punktā noteikt o procedūr u attiecībā uz 
iepr iekšminēto pasākumu.
Piezīmes par pasākumu, attiecībā uz kuru Komisi ja sāk procedūr u, ieinte resētās personas var iesniegt viena 
mēneša laikā no šā kopsavilk uma un tam pievienotās vēstules publicēšanas dienas, nosūtot tās uz šādu adresi:
Europe an Commission
Director ate-Gener al for Competition
State Aid Greffe
1049 Bruxelles/Br ussel
BELGIQUE/BELGIË
Fakss: + 32 22961242
Šīs piezīmes tiks paziņotas Slovēnijai. Ieinte resētā persona, kas iesniedz piezīmes, var, norādot pieprasījuma 
iemeslus, raks tveidā pieprasīt, lai tās identitāte netiktu atklāta.
PASĀKUMU APRAK STS
Komisija ar 2013. gada 18. decembra lēmumu paziņoja, ka saderīgi ar iekšējo tirgu ir šādi valsts atbalsta pasākumi NLB 
labā:
i)pirmā rekapitalizāci ja EUR 250 miljonu apmērā, kas tika apstipr ināta pagaidu kārtā lēmumā veikt glābšanu, kurš tika 
pieņemts 2011. gada 7. mar tā;
ii)otrā rekapitalizāci ja EUR 383 miljonu apmērā, kas tika apstipr ināta pagai du kārtā otrajā lēmumā veikt glābšanu un sākt 
procedūr u, kurš tika pieņemts 2012. gada 2. jūlijā;
iii)trešā rekapitalizācija EUR 1 558 miljonu apmērā; un
iv)samazinātas vērtības aktīvu nodošana valsti j piederošai “sliktajai” bankai ar piedomājamu atbalsta elementu 
EUR 130 miljonu apmērā.6.4.2018. LV Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis C 121/15
Komisijas paziņojums, ka šie pasākumi ir saderīgi ar iekšējo tirgu, pamatojās uz Slovēnijas iestāžu iesniegto 
pārstr ukturēšanas plānu un saistību uzskaitījumu. Vairākas no šīm saistībām bija vaja dzīgas bankas dzīvotspējas 
atjaunošanai. Novērtējot NLB galīgo pārstr ukturēšanas plānu, Komisi ja atgādināja, ka tā “pauda bažas par to, vai NLB 
lēmumu pieņemšanas process (p.m. jo īpaši attiecībā uz jaunu aizdevumu piešķiršanu un esošo aizdevumu 
pārstr ukturēšanu) ir salāgots ar tirgus normām, un jo īpaši par iespējamām uzņēmuma pārvaldības problēmām, kas ir 
saistītas ar valsts kā galvenā akcionāra iejaukšanos bankas ikdienas darbībā”. Komisija uzsvēra, ka viens no 
pārstr ukturēšanas plānā risināmaji em jautājumiem attiecās uz to, lai nākotnē “valsts neiete kmētu NLB ikdienas darbību”.
Izdarot pozitīvu secinājumu par bankas ilgter miņa dzīv otspēju, Komisi ja ņēma vērā vairākas saistības, kuras uzlaboja NLB 
riska pārvaldību un kreditēšanas politiku un nostipr ināja tās korporatīv o pārvaldību. Komisi jas novēr tējumā par bankas 
dzīv otspēju izšķiroša nozīme bija arī tam, ka Slovēnija apņēmās ne vēlāk kā līdz 2017. gada 31. decembr im pārdot 75 % — 
1 NLB akciju vai alter natīvi līdz 2017. gada 30. novembri m iecelt atsavināšanas pilnvar nieku, kuru pilnva ro atsavināt NLB 
ārvalstu meitassabiedrības Balkānu valstīs.
2013. gada lēmumā arī secināts, ka NLB pārstr ukturēšanas periods ilgtu līdz 2017. gada beigām un ka vairākas 
pārstr ukturēšanas saistības ir piesaistītas pārstr ukturēšanas perioda beigām.
Slovēnija 2017. gada 13. aprīlī paziņoja grozītās saistības: vismaz 50 % no NLB akcijām tiktu pārdotas līdz 2017. gada 
beigām, bet atlikušās akci jas (t. i., visas akci jas, izņemot bloķējošo mazākumu, kas ir 25 % + 1 akcija) – līdz 2018. gada 
beigām. Atsavināšanas saistības (ja Slovēni ja nespētu laikus pārdot 50 % bankas akci ju) joprojām ir daļa no saistībām. 
Komisija ar 2017. gada 11. maija lēmumu secināja, ka minētās grozītās saistības joprojām nodrošina NLB atbalsta saderību 
ar iekšējo tirgu.
Slovēnijas iestādes 2017. gada 8. jūni jā vienpu sīgi nolēma apturēt NLB akci ju pārdošanu.
Komisija konstatē, ka 50 % NLB akci ju pārdošanai noteiktais termiņš – 2017. gada 31. decembr is – ir pagājis. Turklāt 
Slovēnija nav līdz 2017. gada 30. novembr im iecēlusi atsavināšana s pilnva rnieku, kura uzdevums ir pārdot NLB ārvalstu 
meitassabiedrības Balkānu valstīs.
Slovēnijas iestādes 2017. gada 21. decembrī oficiāli paziņoja grozītās 2013. gada pārstr ukturēšanas lēmuma saistības:
—Slovēnija paziņoja par nodomu 2018. gadā uzsākt savas NLB akci ju daļas samazināšanu līdz 25 % + 1 akcijai un to 
pabeigt 2019. gadā,
—lai Komisi jai dotu pārliecību, ka NLB korporatīv o pārvaldību ikdienas darbībā pa šo laiku neiete kmēs valsts, Slovēni jas 
iestādes ierosina iecelt neatkarīgu pilnvar nieku (blind trustee),
—Slovēnija arī ierosina no 2017. gada 31. decembra vairs nepiemērot nekādas saistības, kas noteiktas 2013. gada lēmumā 
(ar 2017. gada grozošā lēmuma grozījumiem), izņemot iepr iekš minētās pārdošanas saistības.
PASĀKUMU NOVĒRTĒJUMS
Komisija 2013. gada 18. decembra lēmumā jau secināja, ka i)–iv) punktā aprakstītie pasākumi ir valsts atbalsts. Šis 
novē rtējums nav mainījies. Minētajā lēmumā Komisi ja arī secināja, ka valsts atbalsta pasākumi NLB labā ir saderīgi ar 
iekšējo tirgu, jo tie ir nepieciešami, lai novē rstu nopietnus traucējumus Slovēni jas tautsaimniecībā LESD 107. panta 
3. punkta b) apakšpunkta nozīmē. Komisi ja secināja, ka pārstr ukturēšanas plāns un ar to saistītās pārstr ukturēšanas 
saistības ļautu atjaunot NLB dzīv otspēju, vienlaikus pietiekami risinot slog a sadales un konkurences jautājumus. Komisija, 
pamatojo ties uz grozīta jām saistībām, 2017. gada 11. maija grozošajā lēmumā apstipr ināja šo saderības analīzi.C 121/16 LV Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis 6.4.2018.
Tagad Komisija konstatē, ka vismaz vienas būtiskas pārstr ukturēšanas saistības nav izpildītas. Proti, ir pagājis 50 % NLB 
akci ju pārdošanai notei ktais termiņš – 2017. gada 31. decembr is. Turklāt Slovēnija nav līdz 2017. gada 30. novembri m 
iecēlusi atsavināšanas pilnvarnieku, kura uzdevums ir pārdot NLB ārvalstu meitassabiedrības Balkānu valstīs.
Komisija norāda, ka pārstr ukturēšanas lēmumu var grozīt, ja grozījumi balstās uz jaunām saistībām, kuras var uzskatīt par 
līdzvēr tīgām sākotnējām saistībām. Šādā situācijā esošie atbalsta pasākumi joprojām būtu saderīgi uz LESD 107. panta 
3. punkta b) apakšpunkta pamata tikai tad, ja paliktu spēkā sākotnējā lēmuma vispārējais līdzsvars. Lai saglabātu sākotnējo 
līdzsvar u, grozītās saistības nedrīk stētu nega tīvi ietekmēt atbalsta saņēmēja dzīv otspēju, un vispārējam saistību kopumam 
joprojām ir jābūt līdzvēr tīgam slog a sadales un kompensējošo pasākumu ziņā, ņemot vērā pārstr ukturēšanas paziņojuma 
prasības.
Tomēr konkrētajā lietā Komisi jai ir nopietnas šaubas, vai grozītās saistības, ko paziņojusi Slovēni ja, ir līdzvēr tīgas saistībām, 
kas atļautas ar Komisi jas 2013. gada 18. decembra lēmumu un 2017. gada 11. maija grozošo lēmumu.
Pirmkār t, Komisi ja atgādina, ka Komisijas 2013. gada 18. decembra lēmuma daļa, kas attiecās uz dzīv otspēju, bija lielā mērā 
balstīta uz NLB īpašumtiesību struktūras izmaiņām. 2013. gadā Slovēnijas iestādes patiešām apņēmās novē rst valsts ietekmi 
uz NLB ikdienas darbību. Tomēr , ņemot vērā grozītās saistības, ko paziņojusi Slovēnija, Komisi jai ir nopietnas šaubas, vai 
NLB ilgtermiņa dzīv otspēju ir iespējams nodrošināt bez šādas īpašumtiesību maiņas.
Turklāt, neraugoties uz to, cik izšķiroša pagātnē izrādījās vājā korporatīvā pārvaldība, Komisi ja secina, ka pat 
pārstr ukturēšanas periodā Slovēnijas iestādes nav pārliecinoši pierādījušas, ka šī problēma tiek efektīvi risināta. Komisi ja 
šajā ziņā norāda uz bankas uzraudzības padomes sastāva lielo mainību pēdējos gados.
Otrkār t, attiecībā uz Slovēni jas priekšlikumu iecelt neatkarīgu pilnvar nieku Komisi jai ir šaubas par to, vai neatkarīg a 
pilnvar nieka iecelšana varētu atrisināt NLB dzīv otspējas problēmas tādā pašā mērā kā paliek oša īpašumtiesību maiņa. Šajā 
sakarā Komisi ja norāda, ka īpašumtiesību maiņa mudinātu visos bankas līmeņos tiekties pēc vērtības maks imālas 
palielināšanas.
Visbeidzot, Komisi ja norāda uz vairākām nozīmīgām praktiskām problēmām, kas saistītas ar neatkarīgā pilnva rnieka 
iecelšanu. Šāda pilnvar nieka atlase un iecelšana acīmredzami ir laikietilpīgs process. Ir arī apšaubāms, vai neatkarīgs 
pilnvar nieks, kuru Slovēni jas iestādes var atlaist, ja tas nedarbojas Slovēnijas kā akcionāra interesēs, var pilnībā nodrošināt 
vajadz īgo neatkarību. Šajā procesā vaja dzīgi arī vairāki regulatīvi apstipr inājumi, un tas nozīmē, ka Slovēni ja pat nespēj 
stingr i apņemties tiešām iecelt neatkarīgu pilnvarnieku. Lai vai kā, 2018. gada 1. janvārī (t. i., tūlīt pēc akci ju pārdošanas 
termiņa beigām 2017. gada 31. decembrī) neatkarīgais pilnvar nieks nebija iecelts, un tas neizbēg ami nozīmē, ka būs 
pārtraukums, kura laikā nedz notiks bankas akci ju pārdošana, nedz banka atradīsies neatkarīga pilnva rnieka kontrolē.
Pama tojoties uz iepr iekš minēto , Komisijai ir nopietnas šaubas, vai priekšlikums iecelt neatkarīgu pilnvar nieku ir līdzvēr tīgs 
pārdošanas saistībām. Ņemot vērā pārdošanas saistību svarīgumu, šķiet ļoti grūti atrast patiesi līdzvēr tīgu pasākumu.
Turklāt Komisi ja ir izdarījusi sākotnēju secinājumu, ka akci ju pārdošanas kavēšanās faktiski paildzina pārstr ukturēšanas 
periodu, kam bija jābeidzas 2017. gada 31. decembrī. Vispārīgi runājot, Komisi ja atgādina, ka pārstr ukturēšanas periodam 
katrā gadījumā vajadz ētu būt pēc iespējas īsākam.6.4.2018. LV Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis C 121/17
Tā kā vairākas saistības bija loģiski piesaistītas pārstr ukturēšanas periodam, Komisi ja sākotnēji uzskata, ka līdz ar 
pārdošanas term iņu būtu jāpagar ina arī citu pārstr ukturēšanas saistību termiņš. Proti, NLB darbība tirgū turpināsies ilgāk , 
bet tās ilgter miņa dzīvotspēja šajā laikā nebūs pilnībā nodrošināta. Tas varētu radīt konkurences izkropļojumus, nepelnīti 
kaitējot konkurentiem, kuri nesaņem atbalstu, vai konkurentiem, kuri saņem atbalstu un cītīgi īsteno savu pārstr ukturēšanas 
plānu un saistības. Tāpēc Komisija uzskata, ka nolūkā saglabāt pašreizējo saistību līdzsvar u Slovēni jas iestādēm vaja dzētu 
ierosināt papildu pasākumus, ar kuriem kompensē pārstr ukturēšanas procesa kavēšanos. Patlaban Komisi jai ir šaubas par 
to, vai Slovēnijas piedāvātā kompensā cija par šo pārstr ukturēšanas procesa vispārējo kavēšanos ir pietiekama. Komisi ja 
apšauba, ka Slovēnija nevarētu vēl uzlabot NLB dzīvotspēju, ievērojami samazinot atsavināšanas term iņus, atkār toti mainot 
pārdošanas procesa kārtību un/vai neatkarīgo pilnvar nieku pārveidojot par pilnībā pilnvarot u atsavināšanas pilnvar nieku. 
Komisija arī apšauba, ka Slovēnijai nebūtu jāapsver turpmāki strukturāli pasākumi attiecībā uz NLB, piemēram, konkrētu 
meitassabiedrību atsavināšana, jaunu darbību ierobežojumi un/vai citi ar rīcību saistīti pasākumi.C 121/18 LV Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis 6.4.2018.
VĒSTULES TEK STS
The Commission wishes to inform Slovenia that, having examined the information supplied by your author ities on the 
measures refer red to above, it has decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’).
1.PROCEDURE
(1) On 14 Januar y 2011, the Slovenian author ities notif ied a EUR 250 million State recapitalisation of Nova Ljubljanska 
Banka d.d. (‘NLB’ or ‘the Bank’). By decision of 7 March 2011 (1) (‘first rescue decision’), the Commission author ised a 
first recapitalisation aid in favour of NLB for a period of six months and upon the submission of a restr uctur ing plan. 
By decision of 2 July 2012 (2) (‘the second rescue and opening decision’), the Commission approved the second 
recapitalisation of NLB and at the same time opened an in-dept h investig ation raising doubts regarding the ability of 
the Bank to retur n to viability and the provision of sufficient burden-shar ing and measures limiting distor tions of 
competition based on the restr uctur ing plan which had been submitted to it.
(2) By decision of 18 December 2013 (‘the 2013 Decision’) (3), the Commission approve d State aid to NLB on the basis 
of a restr uctur ing plan and a list of commitments from the Slovenian author ities. Slovenia committed for instance to 
sell 75 %-1 share of NLB by 31 December 2017 at the latest (‘the sale commitment’) or alternatively to divest NLB’s 
foreign subsidiar ies in the Balkans (‘the divestment commitment’).
(3) On 13 Apr il 2017, Slovenia notified amended commitments, inter alia, to mak e the sale of the shares of NLB more 
gradual. On 11 May 2017, the Commission concluded that those amended commitments still ensured the 
compatibility of the aid grante d to NLB with the inter nal marke t (‘the 2017 Amendment Decision’) (4).
(4) On 8 June 2017 (5), the Slovenian author ities decided to put the sale of shares of NLB on hold. On 9 June 2017, the 
Slovenian Minister of Finance informed the Commission by phone of that decision.
(5) On 20 September 2017, the Slovenian author ities submitt ed a non-paper proposing to first sort out an ongoing 
litigation in Croatia vis-à-vis NLB and the old Ljubljanska Banka (see recital (31) below) before proceeding with the 
sale of shares of NLB.
(6) On 6 November 2017, the Slovenian author ities submitt ed another non-paper proposing to set up an NLB-financed 
fund, which com petitors of NLB could use to finance SMEs with a weak capital position.
(7) On 21 November 2017, Slovenia submitted another non-paper proposing to appoint an independent ‘blind trustee’ 
in the management board of NLB until 75 %-1 share of NLB would be sold. The Slovenian author ities and the 
Commission discussed these non-papers several times.
(8) On 21 December 2017, the Slovenian author ities formally notif ied the amended commitments which are descr ibed 
in recitals (41) and (43).
(9) By lette r dated 21 December 2017, Slovenia agreed exceptiona lly to waive its rights deriving from Article 342 TFEU 
in conjunction with Article 3 of Regulation 1/1958 (6) and to have the present decision adopt ed and notif ied in 
English.
2.FACTU AL BACKGROUND
2.1. Descr iption of the benef iciar y
(10) A detailed descr iption of NLB can be found in recitals (11) to (22) of the 2013 Decision.6.4.2018. LV Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis C 121/19
(1) Commission Decision in Case SA.32261 (2011/N) — Slovenia — Rescue recapitalisation in favour of NLB, OJ C 189, 29.6.2011, 
p. 2.
(2) Commission Decision in Case SA.34937 (2012/C) (ex 2012/N) and SA.33229 (2012/C) (ex 2011/N) — Second recapitalisation of 
NLB and Restr uctur ing of NLB, OJ C 361, 22.11.2012, p. 18.
(3) Commission Decision in case SA.33229 (2012/C) (ex 2011/N) — Slovenia — Restr uctur ing of NLB, OJ, L 246, 21.08.2014, p. 28.
(4) Commission Decision in case SA.33229 (2017/N-2) — Slovenia — Amendment of the restr uctur ing decision of NLB, OJ C 254, 
11.07.2017, p. 2.
(5) See the follo wing press release: http://www .vlada.si/en/media_room/governm ent_press_releases/press_release/ar ticle/138_regular_ -
government_session_gov ernment_rejects_minimum_offer_pr ice_f or_nlb_59951/
(6) Regulation No 1 determi ning the language s to be used by the European Economic Community , OJ 17, 6.10.1958, p. 385.
(11) At the end of Sept ember 2017 (7), the Bank repor ted total assets and risk weight ed assets (‘RWA’) of respectively 
EUR 12 billion and EUR 8.1 billion. In the first nine months of 2017, NLB realised an after-tax profit of 
EUR 184 million, up from EUR 92 million in the same period of 2016. This profit translat ed into an (annualised) 
retur n on equity (‘RoE’) after tax of 15.9 %.
(12) At the end of Sept ember 2017 NLB’s non-perf orming exposures ratio still amounts to 8.3 %, down from 10 % at the 
end of December 2016 and its core equity tier 1 ratio was 16.3 % (8), (9). After the burden shar ing of subordinated 
debt instr uments in 2012/2013, NLB has not yet issued new subordinated debt. At the end of Sept ember 2017, 
deposits represent more than 90 % of funding and the loan-to -deposit ratio amounte d to 72 %.
(13) NLB still owns foreign subsidiar ies in the Balkans, which represent in total EUR 3.8 billion in assets and 
EUR 82.7 million in after-tax profit (10).
Table 1
Key financial figures of NLB’s foreign subsidiar ies in the Balk ans
FYR oMBosnia 
subsidiar y 1Bosnia 
subsidiar y 2Kosov o Montenegro Serbia
NLB stake % 87 % 100 % 97 % 81 % 99 % 100 %
Market share 15.8 % 18.6 % 5.4 % 15 % 11.9 % 1.3 %
Prof it after tax (EUR mil-
lion)38.0 20.1 5.3 11.0 4.2 4.1
Total assets (EUR mil-
lion)1 167 674 525 553 486 343
(14) Further more, NLB has a stake in insurance comp any NLB Vita which, when publishing results for the first nine 
months of 2017, had total assets of EUR 452 million and a result after tax of EUR 4.8 million. By monitoring repor t 
of 30 November 2017, the Monit oring Trustee informed the Commission that NLB was still actively involved in 
leasing in 2017 through its leasing subsidiar y (11). The liquidation of this leasing subsidiar y was approve d at the end 
of 2017. NLB has now also approve d the establishment of a new leasing compan y in the beginning of 2018.
(15) The ownership structure of NLB has undergone several chang es in the past years. In 2002, the Belgian bank KBC 
acquired 34 % of NLB (12) and KBC and the Slovenian State signed a shareholders’ agreement guaranteei ng KBC seats 
in NLB’s managem ent and super visor y boards (13). In that shareholder agreement, KBC under took not to increase its 
invest ment until the end of 2005. How ever , when in 2006 KBC was not able to increase its stake in NLB, KBC 
decided to no longe r consider its existing stake as strategic in nature but recate gorised it as a financ ial participation. 
KBC comp letely exited NLB in 2013 (14). As of end 2013, the Slovenian State has become again the 100 % owner of 
NLB, thereby turning back NLB’s (par tial) privatisation of 2001/2002.C 121/20 LV Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis 6.4.2018.
(7) Financial figures mentioned in recitals (11) and (12) are based on the consolidated financial statemen ts of the Bank as available on: 
https://www .nlb.si/nlb/nlb-por tal/eng/invest or-relations/financial-repor ts/prezentacija-nlb-3q2017.pdf
(8) As a result of the ECB’s […] applicable SREP decision (‘Super visor y Review and Evaluation Process’) of the ECB, NLB has to comply 
with a total capital ratio of 12.75 % (which consists of Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 requirements and also the capital conser vation buffer of 
1.25 %).
(9) […] a commitment of the 2013 Decision (‘the capital repa yment mechanism’), which obliges NLB to repa y for the fiscal year 2017 
the lower of (i) 100 % of the excess capital above the applicable minimum capital requirement on the consolidated level under 
European and Slovenian law (including Pillars 1 and 2) plus a buffer of 100 basis points or (ii) the net income of the relevant year .
(10) Source data: see link footnote 7.
(11) The leasing subsidiar y of NLB in Slovenia was included in the list of non-core subsidiar ies to be divested, as mentioned in 
commitment 4 of the 2013 Decision.
(12) That 2001/2002 privatisation process of NLB was also descr ibed in the regular repor ts (1999, 2000, 2001, 2002) from the 
Commission on Slovenia’s progress towards accession. On page 37-38 of its 2002 repor t, the Commission noted that: ‘In May 
2001, after long dela ys, the government adopt ed a privatisation programme to sell NLB and NKBM. … The privatisation was 
launch ed in Sept ember 2001 and although there has been interest from various renowned foreign strategic invest ors, the 
government interrupted the privatisation process of NKBM and the sale was halted as political resistance increased and conditions 
were judged to be unsatisfact ory. The gover nment still intends to sell NKBM, but it is not yet clear when and under what conditions. 
The privatisation of NLB went ahead but under altered conditions introduced by the gover nment during the privatisation process, 
causing one of the foreign bidders to withdraw .’
(13) https://www .nlb.si/kbc-nv-belgium-no w-a-ke y-shareholder -in-nova-lj
(14) The transaction to exit NLB was signed in 2012. Completion of the agreement was finalised after the approv al of the Slovenian 
comp etition author ity obtained in March 2013. See the following press release: https://www .kbc.com/fr/system/ files/doc/about-us/ 
2012_Sale_NLB_en.pdf
2.2. State aid measures in favour of NLB
(16) By means of the 2013 Decision and based on the commitments offere d by Slovenia, the Commission declared the 
follo wing State aid measures in favour of NLB comp atible with the internal marke t:
(i)a first recapitalisation of EUR 250 million, temporar ily approved in the first rescue decision;
(ii)a second recapitalisation of EUR 383 million, temporar ily approved in the second rescue and opening decision;
(iii) a third recapitalisation of EUR 1 558 million; and
(iv) a transf er of impaired assets to a State-owned bad bank with an implied aid element of EUR 130 million (15).
(17) In total, NLB received State aid of EUR 2 321 million equivalent to 20 % of its RWA as of December 2012.
2.3. The commitments in the 2013 Decision
(18) When assessing the final restr uctur ing plan, the Commission recalled in recital (76) of the 2013 Decision that in the 
formal investigation procedure it had ‘raised doubts whether the decision-making process in NLB was in line with 
marke t norms and in particular about possible corporate gove rnance issues relate d to the intervention of the State as 
main shareholder (16) into the day-to -day business of NLB’. In recital (126) and (127) of that Decision, the 
Commission repeated that one of the issues that the restr uctur ing plan had to address was that ‘the State would not 
influence NLB’s day-to -day business.’
(19) In order to be able to establish the long-term viability of the Bank, the Commission took into account a number of 
commitments which improved NLB’s risk management and credit policies. Commitment (10.1) for instance ensures 
that NLB would price its loans based on a pricing policy establishing a minimum RoE for all its loans (‘the RoE 
commitment’). This commitment limited the possibility for the Bank to lend at rates which a prudent marke t 
invest or would not accept (for instance as a result of external influences). An analogous commitment (i.e. 
commitment (10.3)) ensured that NLB would behave in a marke t conf orm manner when restr uctur ing loans.
(20) Other commitments in the 2013 Decision which relate to corporate gover nance include the following:
‘(9.5) all members of the super visor y board shall pass the “fit and proper test”, i.e. they shall be reliable and avail of 
the necessar y professional skills to properly assess and monitor NLB’s business. Slovenia will not inter vene in 
the appointment of super visor y board members and executives over and above its own nominees and its 
shareholder rights under ordinar y Slovenian corporate law;
(9.6) two thirds of the seats and voting rights on the super visor y board and its committees shall be allocated to 
independent exper ts, i.e. persons who are neither currently emp loyed nor have been emplo yed 24 months 
prior to their appointment by the Slovenian gove rnment and who do not currently hold nor have held 24 
months prior to their appointment a leadership or managing function within a Slovenian political party; […]
(9.8) NLB will follo w a prudent, sound business policy geared towards sustainability while imp lementing the 
planned measures. NLB will further review its internal incentive schemes and remuneration policy and take 
steps to ensure that they do not encourage unreasonable risk-taking, that they are geared towards long-term 
and sustainable goals, and are transparent. The remuneration of board members and leading employees of the 
Bank shall particularly take into account the relevant person’s contr ibution to the Bank’s economic position 
and the necessity of marke t-oriented salar y levels so as to be able to emplo y particularly suitable individuals 
who can achieve a sustainable business development. NLB’s remuneration policies and practices will be 
com pliant with the European Banking Author ity’s “Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices” 
published on 10 December 2010. The variable annual remuneration will be limited as follows:
(a)managem ent board: five monthly salar ies;6.4.2018. LV Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis C 121/21
(15) The diffe rence between the transfer price (EUR 617 million) and the market value (EUR 486 million) of the impaired assets.
(16) Also other international institutions have established a clear link between the Bank’s problems in 2012/2013 and corporate 
governance issues and the relat ed desirability of a privatisation. The IMF 2017 Article IV repor t reads for instance as follows: “The 
privatization of the two remaining large state banks is of key impor tance to ensure that they continue to operate on commercial 
principles, expand into new activities, and reduce costs. This is especially impor tant given the histor y of connected lending practices 
that prevailed in Slovenian state-o wned banks prior to the 201213 crisis. After the sale of NKBM in 2016, the author ities are 
prepar ing to privatize the largest bank (NLB) via an Initial Public Offe ring (“IPO”) in 2017. Staff suppor ted the sale but expressed 
concer n about the restr iction that no private investor can have more than the state’s 25 percent stak e. Dropping the restr iction 
would allow strategic investors to take a controlling stake and further impro ve the bank’s perf ormance.” (International Monetar y 
Fund’s countr y repor t no. 17/125, May 2017, 2017 Article IV consultation — press release; staff repor t, available on: 
https://www .imf.org/~/media/Files/…/CR/2017/cr17125.ashx)
(b)emp loyees perf orming special work (17) emp loyed in the front offic e function: five monthly salar ies;
(c)emp loyees perf orming special work emp loyed in other functions: three monthly salar ies.
The payment of at least 50 % of the variable remuneration will be deferr ed over the period of three years.
(9.9) Notwithstanding the commitment of paragraph 9.8 above , in any case, for the whole restr uctur ing period, 
the total remuneration to any board member and emplo yee perfo rming special work will be restr icted to an 
appropr iate level. The total remuneration of any such individual will not exceed 15 times the national average 
salar y in Slovenia or 10 times the average salar y of NLB The restr ictions refer red to above will continue to 
apply until the end of the restr uctur ing period.
(9.10) Slovenia will ensure that each state-o wned bank shall remain a separate economic unit with independent 
powers of decision within the meaning of the EC Merg er Regulation and the Jurisdictional Notice.’
(21) Finally , the Commission in its viability assessment also crucially relied on the fact that Slovenia committed to 
partially sell the shares of NLB (18), in line with existing case practice and case law (19), (20).
(22) Concretely , Slovenia provided the Commission with the commitment that it would reduce its shareholding in NLB to 
25 % plus one share (‘Bloc king Minor ity’) by 31 December 2017. If Slovenia had not entered into (a) binding sale and 
purchase agreement(s) for the sale of its shareholding in NLB exceeding the Blocking Minor ity by 31 December 
2017, Slovenia and NLB should grant to the Divestiture Truste e (appointed in accordance with paragraph 19) an 
exclusive mandate to sell NLB’s participations in the following banking subsidiar ies, for a minimum price not lower 
than […]: NLB banka, Belgrade (Republic of Serbia), NLB Monte negrobanka, Podgor ica (Republic of Montenegro), 
NLB Prishtina, Prishtina (Republic of Kosovo), NLB Razvojna banka, Banja Luka (Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina), NLB Tutunska banka, Skopje (For mer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), NLB Banka, Tuzla (Republic 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina). The sale process would be conducted by the Divestiture Truste e appointed in 
accordance with paragraph 19 of the commitment catalogue.
(23) The abovementioned paragraph 19 provid ed that Slovenia at the latest on 30 November 2017 (21) had to propose to 
the Commission for approval a list of one or more potent ial divestiture truste es who would then be emp owered to 
divest the Balkan subsidiar ies thereby triggerin g an ownership chang e for those subsidiar ies.
(24) A number of the commitments related to divestments or sales of activities have mean while been implement ed (22). 
How ever , other commitments are still monitor ed closely by the Commission with the help of a monitori ng trustee:
—reduction of the balance sheet (commitment 1)
—reduction of costs (commitment 2)
—reduction of credit business in certain sectors (commitment 7)
—business with foreign clients (commitment 8)
—no positive discr imination of State owned comp anies (commitment 11)
—behavi oural measures such as an aggressive behavi our ban (commitment (12.1); a capital repa yment mec hanism/ 
dividend ban (commitment (12.2) and an acquisition ban (commitment 12.4))
—conditions for recapitalising subsidiar ies (if needed) (commitment 16)
(25) The 2013 Decision explains that NLB’s restr uctur ing period will last until end 2017 and link s a number of measures 
to the end of the restr uctur ing period.C 121/22 LV Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis 6.4.2018.
(17) As defined in the commitment catalogue
(18) Commitment 14 of the 2013 Decision
(19) See for instance the follo wing Commission Decisions: (a) Decision of 12 May 2009 in case C 43/2008 — Germany — Restr uctur ing 
of West LB AG, OJ L 345, 23.12.2009, p. 1; (b) Decision of 20 December 20 in case SA. 35490 — Spain — Restr uctur ing of Liber 
bank, OJ C 96, 4.4.2013, p. 7; (c) Decision of 2012 December 2012 in case SA.34536 — Spain — Restr uctur ing and 
recapitalisation of Banco CEISS, OJ C 96, 4.4.2013, p. 1; (d) Decision of 20 December 2012 in case SA.35488 — Spain — 
Restr uctur ing of Banco Mare Nostr um, OJ C 96, 4.4.2013, p. 6.
(20) In case T-457/09 Westfälisch-Lippischer Sparkass en- und Giroverband v Commission, ECLI:EU:T :2014:683, para. 391, the General Cour t 
confir med that a viability-relat ed sale of shares commitment did not infringe Article 345 TFEU on ownership neutrality: ‘[t]heref ore, 
it must be held that Article 295 EC [meanwhile Article 345 TFEU] does not prevent the Commission from making the author isation 
of State aid to an under taking to be restr uctured subject to that under taking’s sale, where this is intended to ensure its long-term 
viability’.
(21) As stated in commitment 19 of the 2013 Decision: Slovenia must propose to the European Commission for approv al, no later than 
one month before the deadlines a list of one or more persons whom it proposes to appoint as Divestiture Trustee. The deadline to 
propose a Divestiture Trustee was thus November 30 2017.
(22) Commitment 3 (sale of participations), commitment 4 (divestment of non-core subsidiar ies), commitment 5 (sale of joint venture 
participations), commitment 6 (sale of participations in banks).
2.4. The commitments in the 2017 Amendment Decision
(26) On 13 Apr il 2017, Slovenia formally notified a request to change some of the commitments underlying the 2013 
Decision. In view of the deal size of the transaction and the shor t remaining time to sell 75 % - 1 share of the Bank , 
Slovenia notif ied a more gradual sale schedule: at least 50 % of the shares in NLB would be sold before the end of 
2017 and the remainder (i.e. all shares but a blocking minor ity of 25 % + 1 share) by the end of 2018 (‘the amended 
sale commitment’). The divestment commitment (in case Slovenia would fail to timely sell 50 % the Bank) continued 
to be a part of the commitments. The balance sheet commitment was clarified and Slovenia also notif ied additional 
commitments so as to preser ve the balance of the 2013 Decision. Slovenia proposed for instance to exte nd NLB’s 
acquisition ban until end 2019.
(27) Concretely , Slovenia committed to the followi ng:
‘(14) [reduction of State’s shareholding and foreign banking subsidiar ies] Slovenia will reduce its shareholding in 
NLB to 25 % plus one share (“Blocking Minor ity”) as follows:
(a)by at least 50 % by 31 December 2017. If Slovenia has not entered into (a) binding sale and purchase 
agreement(s) for the sale of its shareholding in NLB by at least 50 %, Slovenia and NLB shall grant to the 
Divestiture Truste e an exclusive mandate to sell NLB’s participations in (its foreign Balkan (23)) banking 
subsidiar ies for a minimum price not lower than […].
(b)having sold at least 50 % of its shareholding in NLB in accordance with subparagraph (14 a), Slovenia will 
further reduce its shareholding to the Blocking Minor ity by 31 December 2018. If Slovenia has not entered 
into (a) binding sale and purc hase agreement(s) for the sale of its shareholding in NLB exceeding the 
Block ing Minor ity by 31 December 2018, Slovenia shall grant to the Divestiture Trustee (appointed in 
accordance with paragraph 19) an exclusive mandate to reduce the Slovenia’s shareholding in NLB to the 
Block ing Minor ity for the then prevailing marke t price…’
(28) When assessing whether the proposed modificatio ns to the restr uctur ing plan called into question the conclusion 
reac hed in the 2013 Decision as to NLB’s viability , the Commission noted in recital (33) of the 2017 Amendment 
Decision that Slovenia would remain committed to divest 50 % of NLB before end 2017 and the second tranche of 
25 % - 1 share in 2018. The more gradual sale of shares was accom panied by additional commitments. The 
Commission concluded the proposed amendments to the commitments would not negati vely affect the viability of 
the Bank . In its assessment, the Commission also relied to an impor tant extent on the prolongation of the acquisition 
ban, which was discussed both under the burden shar ing and distor tion of competition comp atibility sections. Based 
on those commitments, the Commission concluded that the comp atibility of the State aid with the internal marke t 
could be confir med.
2.5. The inter rupted sale process (24)
(29) On 13 July 2015, Slovenia’s National Assembly endorsed a strategy to manage State investments, also with details on 
NLB’s divestment process. This strate gy provided for instance that the Slovenian author ities would keep a Blocking 
Minor ity in NLB and that none of the private invest ors of NLB would own a bigger share in the Bank than Slovenia.
(30) In the beginning of 2016, the Slovenian Sovereign Holding (‘SSH’) who holds the State’s financ ial participations, 
started the selection process of a financial advisor to sell the shares of NLB and signed on 1 Apr il 2016 an 
enga gement lette r with Deutsc he Bank . In the beginning of May 2016, Deutsc he Bank advised in a feasibility study to 
sell the shares of NLB by means of an initial public offer ing (‘IPO’). In later months, the SSH and its financ ial advisor 
proceeded with the selection of legal advisors, the due diligenc e of NLB and the draf ting of the IPO prospectus and 
the presentations. In Sept ember 2016 however , the SSH decided to postpone the sales process until the first half of 
2017. In the first half of 2017, the Commission approve d a more gradual sale process and Slovenia and NLB 
organised road show s with institutional investors.
(31) On 29 May 2017 the Slovenian author ities rejected a motion by the SSH to prot ect NLB from the negative impact of 
litigation in Croatia. The litigation relates to pending Croatian cour t cases (25) related to foreign currency deposits 
[…] followi ng the break -up of Yugoslavia.
(32) On 8 June 2017, the Slovenian author ities decided to halt the sale process of NLB.6.4.2018. LV Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis C 121/23
(23) The full list of subsidiar ies is listed in recital (22).
(24) Based to a large extent on the Monitoring Trustee repor t dated 13 July 2017.
(25) A large number of cour t cases are still pending. On 23 November 2017, the cour t of second instance (County Cour t) in Zagreb 
adjudg ed one of Zagrebačka banka’s lawsuits against Ljubljanska banka NLB to the detr iment of Ljubljanska banka and NLB. See: 
http://www .mf.gov .si/en/media_room/news/3349/
(33) As regards the general marke t climate and the IPO climat e in 2017, the Eurosto xx Banks index rose by 15 % between 
12 December 2016 and 12 December 2017 (26). There were also a large number of privatisation transactions that 
were concluded successfully , including IPOs or secondar y offer ings (27) of financial institutions.
2.6. The Apr il 2016 monitorin g trustee ad hoc repor t on corporate governance
(34) In Apr il 2016, the monitoring trustee prepared — at the request of the Commission — an ad hoc repor t on NLB’s 
corporate gover nance commitments. This repor t followed a period of high turnover among the members of NBL ’s 
super visor y board.
(35) The repor t explained that ‘In Januar y 2015, the Bank of Slovenia request ed an additional assessment in terms of the 
collective suitability of the super visor y board. The assessment of the collective suitability show ed that the 
super visor y board has inadequate ly expressed comp etences in the following areas: strategy and development, 
corporate banking, retail banking, risk managem ent and human resources managem ent. It also stated that the 
super visor y board lacks the variability in terms of gender , senior ity, banking exper ience and exper ience from abroad, 
and that the number of members of the super visor y board in comparable companies is nine.’
(36) In order to increase the number of members of the super visor y board and to fill also a number of vacancies, the SSH 
appointed on 9 Febr uary 2016 five new super visor y board members. The ad hoc repor t comments as follows on 
those five members:
‘in fact […] out of five new super visor y board members […] considered as conditionally suitable by the exte rnal 
body of the SSH, but the Management Board of the SSH decided that the concer ns are of minor impor tance, that the 
[…] extensive knowledg e of banking law and could valuably contr ibut e to the work of the super visor y board.’
‘Some of the new members of the super visor y board have previous banking exper ience gained at NLB. In one case, 
the new member of the super visor y board was engaged as CEO in one of the subsidiar ies of NLB until 31 December 
2015’
‘After the election at the general meeting of shareholders, the SSH sent the “fit and proper” test to the Bank of 
Slovenia. Follo wing the request of the Bank of Slovenia in the lette r dated 27 Januar y 2016, NLB also prepared the 
“fit and proper tests” for four newly elected members of the super visor y board, i.e. Jank o Gedr ih, Anton Ribnikar , 
Anton Macuh and Primoz Karpe. On 15 Apr il 2016, three of the new members of the super visor y board, i.e. Jank o 
Gedr ih, Anton Ribnikar and Anton Macuh, gave irrevocable resignation with immediate effect. Primoz Karpe […].’
(37) Table 2 summar ises the changes in the super visor y board since 2015. Over that period, 10 members of the 
super visor y board have resigned or have been recalled and the average tenure of the current members of the 
super visor y board amounts to only 15 months.
Table 2
Members of NLB’s super visor y board in 2015-2017
Members of super visor y 
board in 2015-2017Appointment 
dateResignation / 
recall datePeriod in place Cur rent member?
Gorazd Podbevšek 11/06/2013 10/02/2016 2 years 8 months No
Tit A. Erker 11/06/2013 03/08/2016 3 years 2 months No
Uroš Ivanc 11/06/2013 3 years 10 
monthsNo (4 year term expired)
Miha Košak 11/06/2013 10/02/2016 2 years 8 months No
Sergeja Slapničar 11/06/2013 20/03/2017 9 months No
Peter Groznik 04/11/2014 27/08/2015 9 months Yes (resigned in 2015, but 
rejoined in Sept ember 2017)
Andreas Klingen 07/04/2015 2 years 9 months Yes
Jank o Gedr ih 10/02/2016 15/04/2016 2 months NoC 121/24 LV Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis 6.4.2018.
(26) See: https://www .stoxx.com/index-details?symbol=SX7E
(27) Transactions in 2017 include, inter alia, the fully subscr ibed IPOs of Unica ja and Allied Irish Bank and secondar y offerin gs of ABN 
Amro and a.s.r . in the Netherlands.
Members of super visor y 
board in 2015-2017Appointment 
dateResignation / 
recall datePeriod in place Cur rent member?
Anton Ribinkar 10/02/2016 15/04/2016 2 months No
Anton Macuh 10/02/2016 15/04/2016 2 months No
Primož Karpe 15/04/2016 1 year 9 months Yes
Dr Lazslo Urban 11/02/2016 1 year 11 
monthsYes
David Kastelic 04/08/2016 08/09/2017 1 year 1 month No
David E. Simon 04/08/2016 1 year 5 months Yes
Alexander Bayr 04/08/2016 1 year 5 months Yes
Matjaž Titan 04/08/2016 21/04/2017 9 months No
Vida Šeme Hočevar 08/09/2017 4 months Yes
Simona Kozjek 08/09/2017 4 months Yes
Peter Groznik 08/09/2017 4 months Yes
3.POSITION OF SLO VENIA
(38) Slovenia recalls that the 2013 Decision provided that the sale commitment was meant to ‘signif icantly reduce the 
external influence in the Bank’s management and business activities (28)’.
(39) Slovenia highlights that — with the exception of the amended sale commitment — Slovenia and NLB have so far 
imp lemented all the other State aid commitments.
(40) Slovenia also considers that NLB is now fully viable and it points in this regard to NLB’s RoE of 15.9 % and its core 
equity tier 1 ratio of 16.3 % (29). Slovenia considers that the corporate gover nance of NLB has been changed 
significantly and that now there is no State influence on the day-to -day business of NLB.
(41) Slovenia explains that it wants to amend the sale commitment a second time in the follo wing manner:
—Slovenia wants to launc h the divestment of its shareholding in NLB to 25 % + 1 share in 2018 and to comp lete it 
in 2019.
—in order to give the Commission comf ort that the corporate gove rnance of NLB will in the meantime remain 
with no State influence on the day-to-da y business, the Slovenian author ities propose to nominate a ‘blind 
trustee’ (30).
—Slovenia also proposes that all commitments as defined in the 2013 Decision (as amended by the 2017 
Amendment Decision) cease to apply from 31 December 2017, with the excep tion of the sale commitment as 
descr ibed in this recital.
(42) Slovenia explains that it proposes a longe r deadline for the sale commitment because it is also in the process of 
divesting 100 % of its shareholding in Abanka, the number three bank in the countr y […].6.4.2018. LV Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis C 121/25
(28) Recital (131) of the 2013 Decision
(29) Based on latest financial figures as available on: https://www .nlb.si/nlb/nlb-por tal/eng/invest or-relations/financial-repor ts/ 
prezentacij a-nlb-3q2017.pdf
(30) The ‘blind trustee’ refers to an independent trustee whic h would exercise , in the name of and on behalf of Slovenia as a shareholder 
of NLB, all usual regular compet encies of a shareholder . The terms of the appointment of the trustee are outlined in recital (43)
(43) As regards the blind trustee, Slovenia explains that it will be assigned to an independent exper t on the following 
terms:
a)The blind truste e would be nominated by Slovenia on the basis of a public inter national tender . The nomination 
procedure would be concluded no later than [March 1-June 30] 2018 […], to be decided upon and be approved 
by the existing super visor y board. The mandate of the blind truste e would be regulate d in a contract between 
Slovenia, the SSH and the blind truste e.
b)The concrete terms of enga gement of such blind truste e need to be elaborated together with the Commission and 
the ECB to guarante e strong est safegua rds against State’s interference in the day-to-da y operations of NLB.
c)Before the appointment of such blind trustee, Slovenia will obtain a formal approval or non-objection from the 
Commission as well as the ECB (as required by applicable respective comp etency regulations) as regards the 
follo wing:
i.the cont ent of the public international tender ,
ii.the content of the contract to be concluded between Slovenia, the SSH and the blind truste e (the blind 
trustee’s term s of engagement),
iii.the selecte d blind trustee.
d)The blind trustee would exercise, in the name of and on behalf of Slovenia as a shareholder of NLB, all usual 
regular comp etencies of a shareholder with the follo wing exceptions (to be detailed in the blind trustee’s terms of 
enga gement):
—while taking care that all lega l, accounting and other regulator y requirements are complie d with in full, the 
blind trustee shall orient itself by the existing NLB Group Strat egy 2016-2020 and dividend payment included 
in it;
—the blind truste e will not be compet ent to decide on the amendments to the statute s of NLB without prior 
approva l from the SSH;
—the blind trustee will not be compet ent to effect the disposal of any part of the State’s shareholding in NLB;
—the blind truste e should follow existing accounting policies as set in the existing NLB Group Strate gy 2016- 
2020.
e)The blind trustee should exercise its rights independently but with due skill, care and diligenc e, in the best interest 
of Slovenia as a shareholder of NLB.
f)Slovenia will set business performance indicator s to be achieved by the blind trustee in the contract between 
Slovenia, the SSH and the blind truste e. Slovenia can dismiss the blind truste e if the blind truste e does not exercise 
the rights in the best interest of Slovenia as a shareholder of NLB. In this case the nomination procedure of a new 
blind truste e should be perf ormed.
(44) Slovenia considers that the proposed amendments, and specific ally the appointment of a blind trustee, provide the 
strongest possible assurances that the risk of the State’s influence in the day-to -day business of NLB is neutralised and 
that business decisions will be taken solely by the manag ement of the Bank.
(45) Slovenia considers that the proposed packag e of commitments would not affect the assessment of burden-shar ing as 
made in the 2013 Decision and the 2017 Amendment Decision and would equivalently limit the distor tions of 
competition. Slovenia states that additional commitments imposed on NLB would not contr ibute to the aim of the 
initial commitment to imp lement a business-or iented corporate governance structure, but would rather impede the 
overall aim to restor e NLB’s viability in the long-t erm.
4.ASSESSMENT
4.1. Existenc e of aid
(46) According to Article 107(1) TFEU, State aid is any aid grante d by a Member State or through State resources in any 
form whatsoever which distor ts, or threat ens to distor t, comp etition by favouring certain under takings, in so far as it 
affects trade between Member States.
(47) In the 2013 Decision, the Commission already concluded that the measures descr ibed in recital (16) represent State 
aid (31). That assessment remains unchang ed.C 121/26 LV Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis 6.4.2018.
(31) See section 8.1 of the 2013 Decision.
4.2. Compatibility of the aid
(48) In the 2013 Decision, the Commission concluded that the State aid measures in favour of NLB were comp atible with 
the inter nal mark et since they were necessar y to remedy a serious disturbance in the Slovenian economy in the 
meaning of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. The Commission concluded that the restr uctur ing plan and the associated 
restr uctur ing commitments would allow NLB to retur n to long-t erm viability , while also sufficiently addressing 
burden shar ing and competition issues. The Commission confir med this compatibility analysis in the 2017 
Amendment Decision on the basis of amended commitments.
(49) The Commission obser ves that at least one important restr uctur ing commitment has not been complie d with. 
Indeed, the deadline to sell 50 % of NLB’s shares by 31 December 2017 has elapsed […]. Moreove r, Slovenia has not 
proposed a divestiture trustee to sell NLB’s foreign Balkan subsidiar ies by 30 November 2017.
(50) The Commission theref ore concludes that Slovenia has imp lemented the aid measures descr ibed in recital (16) in an 
unlawful manner .
(51) As regards comp liance with other commitments of the 2013 Decision and the 2017 Amendment Decision (32), the 
monitoring trustee will provid e the Commission with a repor t — by 31 May 2018 at the latest — with information 
allowi ng the Commission to verify compliance with those commitments at the end of 2017.
(52) As regards Slovenia’s non-compliance with the amended sale commitment (or the divestment commitment), the 
Commission obser ves that Slovenia has not provided the Commission with a proper justif ication for the non- 
complia nce. Dur ing the administrative procedure descr ibed in recitals (4) to (8) above, the Slovenian author ities 
repeat edly refer red to ongoing litigation with Croatia.
(53) The Commission also obser ves that for the entire year 2017, the IPO market and the marke t for corporate activity 
was open as is also illustrate d by the information in recital (33). Theref ore, the Commission concludes that there is 
no reason why the sale process could not have been implemented.
(54) The Commission also notes that Slovenia notified on 21 December 2017 an amended commitment catalogue, which 
risks dela ying the sale of the shares of NLB until 31 December 2019. Slovenia proposes to appoint a blind truste e for 
the period during which NLB’s shares are not sold to comp ensate for this dela y.
(55) The Commission obser ves that a restr uctur ing decision can be amended where the amendment does not entail any 
additional aid and the amendment is based on new commitments which can be considered equivalent to those 
originally provid ed. In that situation, the existing aid measures would remain compatible on the basis of Article 107 
(3)(b) TFEU if the overall balance of the original decision remains intact. In order to preser ve the original balance, the 
altered commitments should not nega tively affect the viability of the aid benef iciar y, with the overall set of 
commitments remaining equivalent in term s of burden-shar ing and compensat ory measures taking into account the 
requirements of the Restr uctur ing Communication (33).
(56) In the case at hand, however , the Commission has serious doubts that the amended commitments notified by 
Slovenia are equivalent to the commitments author ised in the 2013 Decision and the 2017 Amendment Decision.
(57) Firstly , the Commission recalls that the viability section of the 2013 Decision was crucially based on a chang e in 
NLB’s owner ship structure. In 2013, the Slovenian author ities had indeed committed to eliminate the State’s 
influence on NLB’s day-to-da y operations. Howeve r, in view of the amended commitments notified by Slovenia, the 
Commission has serious doubts whether , in the absence of such an ownership chang e, the long-term viability of NLB 
can be assured.
(58) The Commission obser ves that also other elements point at viability problems in the long term (34). NLB has for 
instance not yet restar ted to issue new subordinated debt capital. NLB also still has a high level of non-perform ing 
loans. Finally , in spite of the prominent record of poor corporate gover nance in the past, the Commission obser ves 
that even in the restr uctur ing period, the Slovenian author ities have not convinci ngly show n that such problems 
have been effectively addressed. The Commission refers in this rega rd to the high turnover in the Bank’s super visor y 
board and to the issues surrounding the nomination of Mr. Jank o Gedr ih, Mr. Anton Ribnikar and Mr. Anton Macuh 
as refer red to in recital (36) (35).6.4.2018. LV Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis C 121/27
(32) The Commission recalls that 2017 Amendment Decision already contained a number of commitments (inter alia, the acquisition 
ban) whic h were applicable beyond 2017.
(33) Commission Communication on the retur n to viability and the assessment of restr uctur ing measures in the financial sector in the 
current crisis under the State aid rules, OJ C 195, 19.8.2009, p. 9.
(34) The Commission considers the bank’s capital ratio and funding structure (as descr ibed in recitals (11) and (12)) are positive elements 
in the current financials, but do not address the long-ter m viability issues that the sale commitment woul d address.
(35) See section 2.6 of the present Decision.
(59) Secondly , as rega rds Slovenia’s proposal to appoint a blind trustee, the Commission has serious doubts as to whether 
the blind trustee could address NLB’s viability problems to the same exte nt as a permanent ownership chang e. In this 
cont ext, the Commission notes that an ownership change would steer the Bank — at all its levels — to value 
maximising behavio ur and would not pursue other shor t-ter m or long-term political objectives. An ownership 
change (with respect to the owner of a bank at the time that it was in difficulty and received State aid for its 
restr uctur ing, irrespective of whether that owner was the State or a private person) is also crucial in terms of viability 
because it is doubtful that such owner can credibly turn around the bank towards viability . Such ownership change is 
also imp ortant for reasons of moral hazard.
(60) The Commission also recalls that corporate gove rnance arrang ements in the case of NLB […] have proven rather 
ineffec tive. Recital (15) explains that KBC, when being a large shareholder of NLB, was represented at the Bank’s 
managem ent and super visor y board. This however was in itself not sufficient to prevent State interference. The 
Commission also obser ves even in the restr uctur ing period structural corporate gover nance weaknesses (36).
(61) Finally , the Commission also points at a number of imp ortant practical problems related to the appointment of the 
blind truste e. Selecting and appointing such a trustee is a time consuming process. It is also questionable whether a 
blind trustee who can be dismissed by the Slovenian Author ities (see recital 43 (f)) if he does not exercise his duties in 
the best interest of Slovenia as a shareholder can indeed fully live up to the required independence. It also requires a 
number of regulatory approvals, which implies that Slovenia cannot ensure with full certainty that a blind trustee 
will eventually be appoint ed. The Commission also obser ves that Slovenia only wants to appoint such a blind trustee 
after the publication of the 2017 accounts, while there does not seem to be an objective rationale for waiting so 
long. A blind truste e would probably need some time to familiar ise himself or herself with the Bank and its practices. 
Finally , the blind trustee will not be appointed on 1 Januar y 2018 (i.e. immediately after the expir y of the deadline 
for the sale of shares on 31 December 2017), which inevitably implies that there will be a gap during which neither 
will the shares of the comp any have been sold nor will the comp any be controlled by a blind truste e.
(62) Based on the above , the Commission has serious doubts that the blind trustee proposal is equivalent to the sale 
commitment. Given the impor tance of the sale commitment, it also seems very difficult to find a measure which is 
genuinely equivalent.
(63) The Commission also has come to the preliminar y conclusion that the dela y of the sale of shares de facto prolongs the 
restr uctur ing period. As a number of commitments were logically linked to the restr uctur ing period (see recital (25)), 
the Commission at first sight believes that a prolong ation of the deadline for the sale of shares should go hand in 
hand with a prolonga tion of other restr uctur ing commitments. Indeed, NLB will be active in the marke t for a longer 
period without having fully ensured its long-t erm viability . This could be a source of disto rtions of comp etition, 
unduly harming non-aided competit ors or aided competit ors who diligently implement their restr uctur ing plan and 
commitments. Theref ore, in order to preser ve the balance of the existing commitments, the Commission believes 
that the Slovenian author ities should present additional measures to comp ensate for the dela yed restr uctur ing 
process. At this stage , the Commission doubts that Slovenia has offered suffi cient comp ensation for this general 
dela y of the restr uctur ing process. The Commission doubts whether Slovenia could not further imp rove NLB’s 
viability by substantially reducing the last proposed divestment deadlines, by further changing the modalities of the 
sales process as descr ibed in recitals (29) and (30) and/or by conve rting the blind truste e in a fully empo wered 
divestiture truste e. The Commission also doubts whether Slovenia should not consider further structural measures 
for NLB such as divestments of certain subsidiar ies and/or behavi oural measures. There are also doubts whether new 
initiatives such as the liquidation of the leasing comp any and subsequent establishment of a new leasing 
compan y (37) infringe the spirit of the commitment to divest the Bank’s non-core subsidiar ies.
(64) As regards the timeline of the sale of shares, the Commission recalls that point 15 of the Restr uctur ing 
Communication explicitly provides that the restr uctur ing period should be as shor t as possible. How ever , the 
Slovenian author ities did not provid e in their notif ication any valid justifi cation for the further dela y of the sale of 
shares. As regard s the argument that Slovenia cannot run the sale of shares of NLB in parallel with the privatisation 
of Abanka, the deadline for sale of which is mid-2019 and thus posteri or to the deadline initially committed to by 
Slovenia (38) for the sale of shares of NLB, the Commission obser ves that the two privatisations follow a diffe rent 
process (an IPO vs. a trade sale) and theref ore also target different invest ors which are generally operating 
inter nationally . Moreove r, the Commission also obser ves that other Member States also committed to large 
corporate restr uctur ings simultaneously for a number of bank s (39).C 121/28 LV Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis 6.4.2018.
(36) See recital (58).
(37) See recital (14).
(38) See commitment 38 of Commission Decision in Case SA.38522 (2014/N) — Restr uctur ing aid for Banka Celje/Abanka, OJ C 393, 
17.02.2015, p. 11.
(39) Referring to commitments (including significant divestments) by Spain for the restr uctur ing plans of Spanish banks in 2012/2013 
and by Greece for the restr uctur ing plans of the four large Greek banks in 2014/2015.
(65) The Commission obser ves that the current Slovenian proposal only contains a sale of shares commitment (with a 
longer deadline) and no longer contains the alternative divestment commitment. The Commission obser ves that this 
is diffe rent and signif icantly weak er from the existing commitment and did not find any justificati on for this 
diffe rence.
(66) Finally , the Commission also notes that a number of the commitments underlying the 2017 Amendment Decision 
are applicable beyond 2017. The Commission take s in particular note of the acquisition ban prolonga tion until 
2019. The amended commitments (see recital (41)) sugg est that the Slovenian author ities do not intend to live up to 
those commitments anymore . The Commission invites the Slovenian author ities to clarify this matter .
(67) The Commission invit es Slovenia and interested parties to comment on the preliminar y findings of recitals 0 to (66).
5.CONCL USION
(68) The Commission concludes that, by breaching the commitments descr ibed in recital (49), Slovenia grante d unlawful 
aid. Further more, in rega rd to the proposed amendments descr ibed in recitals (41) and (43), the Commission raises 
serious doubts as to the comp atibility of the aid with the inter nal market based on the information availa ble at this 
time.
6.DECISION
In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, requests Slovenia to submit its comments and to provid e all 
such information as may help to assess the com patibility of the measures, within one month of the date of receipt of 
this lette r. It requests your author ities to forward a copy of this lette r to the recipient of the aid immediately .
The Commission would draw your attention to Article 16 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 
laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(OJ L 248, 24.9.2015, p. 9), which provides that where nega tive decisions are taken in cases of unlawful aid, this aid 
may be reco vered from the recipient.
The Commission warns Slovenia that it will inform interest ed parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful 
summar y of it in the Official Jour nal of the European Union. It will also inform interest ed parties in the EFTA 
countr ies which are signatori es to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the 
Offi cial Jour nal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Author ity by sending a copy of this 
lette r. All such interested parties will be invit ed to submit their comments within one month of the date of such 
publication.
Slovenia exceptionally accep ts that the present decision be adop ted and notif ied in the English languag e, for reasons 
of urgency . 6.4.2018. LV Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis C 121/29