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Briselē, 22.12.2005

COM(2005) 703 galīgā redakcija

KOMISIJAS PAZIŅOJUMS

„Turpmākas vadlīnijas attiecībā uz valstu kvotu sadales plāniem ES emisijas kvotu tirdzniecības sistēmas tirdzniecības periodam no 2008. līdz 2012. gadam”

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KOMISIJAS PAZIŅOJUMS

„Turpmākas vadlīnijas attiecībā uz valstu kvotu sadales plāniem ES emisijas kvotu tirdzniecības sistēmas tirdzniecības periodam no 2008. līdz 2012. gadam” (Dokuments attiecas uz EEZ)

1. IEVADS

1. Šajā paziņojumā dalībvalstīm sniegtas vadlīnijas valstu kvotu sadales plāniem otrajam tirdzniecības periodam (no 2008. līdz 2012. gadam). Šis paziņojums neveido daļu no emisijas kvotu tirdzniecības direktīvas („direktīva”)[1] pašreiz veiktās pārskatīšanas, to ievērojot, Komisija 2006. gada jūnijā Eiropas Parlamentam un Padomei iesniegs ziņojumu, tostarp attiecīgus priekšlikumus ES emisijas kvotu tirdzniecības sistēmas („ES ETS”) darbības uzlabošanai. Sagatavojot šo pārskatu, Komisija atzīst ieinteresēto pušu ieguldījumu dažādos jautājumos, kuri attiecas uz ES ETS darbību un ietekmi.

2. Šīs vadlīnijas papildina Komisijas 2004. gada 7. janvāra vadlīnijas[2] direktīvas III pielikumā minēto kritēriju ieviešanai. Iepriekšējais vadlīniju dokuments jo sevišķi ietver III pielikumā minēto kritēriju interpretācijas un mijiedarbības tehnisku analīzi un izskaidro to lomu Komisijas veiktajā valstu kvotu sadales plānu novērtējumā. Svarīgākie pirmā vadlīniju dokumenta secinājumi ir apkopoti 3. pielikumā.

3. Komisija uzskata, ka ir nepieciešams sniegt papildu vadlīnijas, lai pieredze, kas gūta, īstenojot valstu kvotu sadales pirmo posmu, būtu ievērota saskaņoti. Komisija vēlas atzīmēt, ka direktīvas III pielikumā minēto kritēriju vispārējais raksturs ļauj tos interpretēt dažādi un pauž dalībvalstu un daudzu ieinteresēto pušu viedokli, ka ir nepieciešamas papildu vadlīnijas[3], lai otrajā tirdzniecības posmā nodrošinātu valstu kvotu sadales plānu lielāku saskaņotību.

4. Kopumā dalībvalstis un ieinteresētās puses arī uzsver aizvien pieaugošo nepieciešamību panākt sadales noteikumu labāku saskaņošanu. Komisija uzskata, ka otrajā tirdzniecības posmā ir jāpanāk lielāka savstarpēja saskaņotība, līdz pat tādam apjomam, kādu pieļauj dalībvalstu atšķirīgie sasniegumi ceļā uz Kioto mērķu sasniegšanu. Turklāt pēc 2012. gada ir vēlams saskaņošanu turpināt. Komisija izvērtēs šos jautājumus ES ETS stratēģiskā pārskata kontekstā. Pamatojoties uz šo ziņojumu, Komisija nāks klajā ar nepieciešamajiem priekšlikumiem, lai uzlabotu sistēmas darbību, vienlaicīgi saglabājot reglamentējošo stabilitāti.

5. Komisija aicina dalībvalstis izstrādāt vienkāršākus plānus otrajam tirdzniecības periodam. Vienkārši sadales plāni sekmē ieinteresēto pušu labāku izpratni par šo līdzekli, kā arī veicina pārredzamību un prognozējamību. Dalībvalstīm jātiecas pēc tā, lai otrajam posmam paredzētie valstu kvotu sadales plāni būtu iespējami vienkārši, jo īpaši sadales metodes un noteikumi attiecībā uz jauniem tirgus dalībniekiem un iekārtu slēgšanu. Dalībvalstīm ir kritiski jānovērtē to noteikumu nepieciešamība un iedarbīgums, kuri ietverti valstu kvotu sadales plānu pirmajā posmā un jāsaglabā tikai tie, kuri ir ārkārtīgi svarīgi.

6. Lai vēl vairāk uzlabotu plānu pārredzamību, Komisija ir izstrādājusi un pievienojusi virkni tabulu[4], kurās vienotā veidā apkopota daļa pamatinformācijas, kas iekļauta valstu kvotu sadales plānā. Komisija uzskata šīs tabulas par valstu kvotu sadales plānu otrā posma neatņemamu sastāvdaļu un cer, ka dalībvalstis to ievēros. Turklāt Komisija aicina dalībvalstis turpināt izmantot vienotu formātu[5], kas tika izstrādāts pirmajai virknei valstu kvotu sadales plānu, lai tāpat kā pirmajā posmā nodrošinātu pilnīgi saskaņotu visu plānu novērtējumu.

2. PIEREDZE, KAS IEGūTA, īSTENOJOT KVOTU SADALES PLāNUS PIRMAJā POSMā (2005-2007) UN VISPāRēJA PIEREDZE OTRAJAM POSMAM (2008-2012)

7. Pirmajā posmā valstu kvotu sadales process ilga aptuveni 15 mēnešus, sākot no paziņošanas termiņa 2004. gada 31. martā, līdz Komisijas pēdējā lēmuma pieņemšanai 2005. gada 20. jūnijā. Tas bija ievērojami ilgāk, nekā paredzēts direktīvā. Apstiprināšanas process ievērojami ieilga pirmajā tirdzniecības periodā, kas sākās 2005. gada 1. janvārī. Dažu plānu novēlota paziņošana, apstiprinājums vai pabeigšana valsts līmenī radīja neskaidrības ne vien attiecīgo valstu iestādēm un attiecīgajiem uzņēmumiem, bet arī visiem kvotu tirgus dalībniekiem visā Eiropā. Tādējādi tiek uzsvērts, cik svarīgi ir savlaicīgi ziņot par pabeigtiem valsts kvotu sadales plāniem otrajam sadales posmam. Komisija uzskata, ka 9. panta 3. punktā paredzētais trīs mēnešu periods var sākties vienīgi tad, kad ir iesniegts valsts kvotu sadales plāns. Tādējādi dalībvalstīm tiek atgādināts par saistībām ievērot termiņu 2006. gada 30. jūnijā, lai nodrošinātu otrā sadales procesa pabeigšanu, tostarp no tā izrietošo galīgā lēmuma pieņemšanu attiecībā uz valstu kvotu sadales plānu laicīgi, pirms 2008. gada 1. janvārī sākas otrais tirdzniecības periods. Komisija neapstiprinās labojumus valstu kvotu sadales plānos, par kuriem paziņots pēc termiņa 2006. gada 31. decembrī, kā noteikts Direktīvas 11. panta 2. punktā, izņemot tos, kas jāveic saskaņā ar attiecīgo Komisijas lēmumu attiecībā uz valsts kvotu sadales plānu.

8. Atzīstot pirmo posmu par mācību posmu, Komisija pragmatiski novērtēja pirmā perioda valstu kvotu sadales plānus. Pirmajā valstu kvotu sadales procesā izkristalizējās daži raksturīgi elementi, kuru rezultāts bija izvēles iespēju un pieeju konverģence visās dalībvalstīs (sīkāku informāciju skatīt 4. pielikumā).

- Ir sekmīgāk jāizmanto emisijas kvotu tirdzniecība, lai sasniegtu Kioto mērķus ar viszemākajām izmaksām.

- Kvotu sadalei visumā ir bijis ierobežotāks raksturs attiecībā uz elektroenerģijas ražotājiem, nekā citām nozarēm, uz kurām attiecas šī sistēma.

- Dalībvalstis, kurās ir ievērojams faktisko emisiju pārsniegums, ievērojot Kioto mērķus, paredz iegādāties ievērojamu daudzumu Kioto vienību.

- Kvotu tirgus attīstībai ir nozīmīga retrospektīvu korekciju neapstiprināšana.

- Daži kvotu sadales plāni ir sarežģītāki, nekā tas nepieciešams, un tie nav pietiekoši pārredzami.

3. TURPMāKA ATSEVIšķU JAUTāJUMU UZRAUDZīBA VALSTU KVOTU SADALES PLāNU OTRAJā PERIODā

3.1. Progress Kioto mērķu sasniegšanā

9. 2005. gada Progresa ziņojumā[6] Komisija ir novērtējusi dalībvalstu paveikto Kioto mērķu sasniegšanā. Salīdzinot 2003. gada faktisko emisiju apjomu ar laikā periodā no 2008. līdz 2012. gadam atļauto emisiju apjomu, lielam skaitam dalībvalstu konstatē neatbilstību – dažām pat diezgan ievērojamu. Šobrīd var uzskatīt, ka jo īpaši Austrija, Beļģija, Dānija, Itālija, Īrija, Luksemburga, Nīderlande, Portugāle, Slovēnija, Somija, Spānija un Vācija pietiekami neievēro tām noteiktos Kioto mērķus. Šajās dalībvalstīs otrajā tirdzniecības periodā jādara vairāk, lai ievērotu Kioto mērķus, taču tas nenozīmē, ka arī citās valstīs nav jāveic turpmāki pasākumi. Maz ticams, ka neatbilsmes var pilnīgi novērst, pieprasot emisiju samazinājumus ar tirdzniecību nesaistītajās nozarēs vai uzticoties Kioto vienību iegādei, ir lietderīgāk jāizmanto ES ETS priekšrocības, lai pilnībā īstenotu emisijas kvotu tirdzniecības potenciālu.

3.2. Maksimālā apjoma noteikšana

10. Saskaņā ar III pielikuma 3. kritēriju (skatīt 2. pielikumu, kas pievienots šim dokumentam saistībā ar direktīvas III pielikumu), piešķiramo kvotu daudzumam ir jāatbilst to darbību potenciālam, tostarp tehnoloģiskajam potenciālam, uz kurām attiecas šī emisijas samazināšanas sistēma. Tas nozīmē, ka attiecīgā ekonomiskā un tehniskā potenciāla apvienojums emisiju samazināšanai nosaka maksimālo apjomu valsts līmenī.

11. Divi svarīgākie nosacījumi, kas ietekmē emisiju tendences, ir ekonomiskā (IKP) izaugsme (lielāka izaugsme izraisa lielāku emisiju apjomu) un oglekļa intensitāte (emisijas uz vienu IKP vienību, samazinot emisiju skaitu, kurās ir augsta oglekļa intensitāte). Patiesībā, jo ātrāk attīstās ekonomika, jo ātrāk tiek ieviestas jaunas tehnoloģijas un ātrāk notiek kapitāla aprite, tādējādi palielinās ražīgums un samazinās oglekļa intensitāte. Aizvien pieaugošā pakalpojumu nozares loma un sekundārās nozares lomas mazināšanās, kāda novērota Eiropas valstu ekonomikās, vēl jo vairāk veicina šādu ietekmi. Turklāt ES ETS ieviešana un oglekļa cenas noteikšana tirdzniecības nozarē ES līmenī sekmēs turpmāku oglekļa intensitātes samazināšanos.

12. Vēsturiski (laika posmā no 1990. līdz 2000. gadam) oglekļa intensitātes samazinājumi ir līdzsvarojuši vai pat atsvēruši ekonomisko izaugsmi, kas nozīmē, siltumnīcas efektu izraisošo gāzu emisiju daudzums saglabājies nemainīgs vai samazinājies. Turpmāk sniegtajā tabulā norādīts, ka minētajai iezīmei ir tendence saglabāties stabilai turpmākās desmitgades laikā (2000. līdz 2010. gads). Ir jāuzsver, ka aprēķinos, kas attiecas uz laika periodu no 2000. līdz 2010. gadam, nav ietvertas tās iniciatīvas, kuras ieviestas ES ETS pirmajā darbības posmā, tādējādi nav iespējams novērtēt patieso oglekļa intensitātes samazinājumu šajā periodā.

A tabula: faktiskie un plānotie IKP pieauguma rādītāji un oglekļa intensitātes tendences[7]

IKP ikgadējās izmaiņas, izteiktas procentos | Uzlabojums attiecībā uz oglekļa ikgadējo intensitāti, izteikts procentos | Kopējā neto ietekme uz emisiju ikgadējām tendencēm, izteikta procentos |

Faktiskā izaugsme (1990. – 2000. gads) |

ES25 | 2.0 | 2.3 | -0.3 |

ES 15 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 0.1 |

Jaunās dalībvalstis | 1.7 | 3.9 | -2.2 |

Plānotā izaugsme(2000. – 2010. gads) |

ES25 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 0.3 |

ES 15 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 0.3 |

Jaunās dalībvalstis | 3.8 | 3.6 | 0.2 |

Piezīme: * oglekļa intensitāte raksturo attiecību starp CO2 emisijām un IKP.

13. Analizējot ekonomisko un tehnoloģisko potenciālu emisiju samazināšanai, Komisija izvērtē ikgadējo IKP pieauguma un oglekļa intensitātes samazinājuma likmes. Šo divu rādītāju apvienojuma rezultātā iegūst emisiju samazinājuma ikgadējo potenciāla likmi. Sākot ar faktisko emisiju apjomu attiecīgajā gadā (piem., 2003. gads), pieņemot, ka nozarē, uz kuru attiecas emisiju kvotu tirdzniecība, emisiju apjoms ir nemainīgs, un ka šai nozarei ir tāds pats potenciāls emisiju samazināšanai kā visai ekonomikai kopumā, var iegūt maksimālo apjomu, kāds noteikts saskaņā ar III pielikuma 3. kritēriju.

14. Tādējādi pirmajam posmam noteiktais maksimālais apjoms ir sākumpunkts, lai noteiktu un novērtētu kopējo daudzumu otrajā posmā gan ES, gan dalībvalstu līmenī. Ņemot vērā 1. kritēriju, dažām dalībvalstīm ir jāsamazina pirmā posma maksimālie līmeņi, lai ievērotu Kioto mērķi. Citām dalībvalstīm ir jāsaglabā pirmā posma maksimālie līmeņi, lai plāns atbilstu emisiju samazinājuma potenciālam (3. kritērijs). Attiecīgi ETS maksimālajam gada apjomam ES līmenī otrajā posmā jābūt mazākam par pirmā posma maksimālo apjomu.

15. Vairākām dalībvalstīm ir jānovērš neatbilstība starp faktiskajām emisijām 2003. gadā un emisijām, kas atļautas saskaņā ar Kioto mērķi. Šīm dalībvalstīm konstatētā neatbilstība kopumā ir 296,5 miljoni tonnu CO2 ekvivalenta. Tādējādi šis skaitlis raksturo emisiju pārsniegumu, kas dalībvalstīm joprojām jāsamazina, izmantojot to rīcībā esošos līdzekļus, lai nodrošinātu atbilsmi Kioto mērķiem.

16. Dalībvalstīm, kurās konstatēta neatbilsme Kioto mērķu sasniegšanā, jātiecas līdzsvaroti piemērot turpmāk minētos pasākumus: (i) kvotu samazinājums otrajā posmā, (ii) papildu pasākumu veikšana ar kvotu tirdzniecību nesaistītajās nozarēs, ko potenciāli papildina (iii) valdības veikta Kioto vienību iegāde. Līdzsvarota šo pasākumu īstenošana ir priekšnoteikums tam, lai samazinājumus būtu iespējams veikt praksē un lai tie būtu ekonomiski lietderīgāki.

17. Pielikuma 1. tabulā norādīta tās nozares emisiju daļa, uz kuru attiecas emisiju kvotu tirdzniecība, un kas izteikta procentos no tā kvotu daudzuma, kas piešķirts pirmajā posmā, salīdzinot ar faktiskajām emisijām 2003. gadā. ES līmenī šī daļa sasniedz 45%. Ja darbības nozare, uz kuru attiecas emisiju kvotu tirdzniecība, varētu sniegt līdzvērtīgu ieguldījumu emisiju samazināšanā dalībvalstīs, novēršot neatbilstību, tad otrajā posmā kopējā kvotu sadale ES25 valstīs būtu par 6% mazāka kā pirmajā posmā, kā rezultātā vidējā kvotu sadale gadā būtu 2,063 miljardi. Lai sasniegtu Kioto mērķus, samazinājums, kas būtu mazāks par 6%, nozīmētu to, ka tām darbības nozarēm, uz kurām neattiecas emisijas kvotu tirdzniecība, būtu jāveic nopietnāki centieni.

3.3. Pamatojums paredzamajai valdību veiktajai Kioto vienību iegādei

18. Ņemot vērā tirgus attīstības stāvokli un šķēršļus Kioto vienību iegādē, dalībvalstīm ir ļoti lielas grūtības iegādāties vēlamo pirkumu vajadzīgajā apjomā. Dalībvalsts lēmums iegādāties Kioto vienības, izmantojot sabiedriskus fondus (tādā pat apmērā kā tad, ja to veic uzņēmumi, ievērojot Saistošās direktīvas noteikumus), atvieglo iespēju samazināt emisijas valstī.

19. Iepriekš minēto iemeslu dēļ valdību vēlmei iegādāties Kioto vienības ir nepieciešams pamatojums, lai nodrošinātu to, ka valsts emisiju kvotu sadales plāni atbilst III pielikuma 1. kritērijam. Tādēļ šim aspektam ir nozīmīga loma, novērtējot pirmā perioda plānus. Dažas dalībvalstis nebija sniegušas paredzamā pirkuma pietiekamu pamatojumu pirmā posma valsts emisiju kvotu sadales plānā, un daži maksimālie līmeņi bija attiecīgi samazināti. Katrai dalībvalstij, kura paļaujas uz to, ka valdība iegādājas Kioto vienības, ir precīzi jāmotivē tās centieni un jāsniedz pierādījumi, kas apliecina progresu, kas nodrošināts, iepērkot šīs vienības, kaut arī tas ir jau minēts valsts emisijas kvotu sadales plāna pirmajā posmā. Komisijas veiktais novērtējums pamatosies uz tiem kritērijiem, kas izklāstīti 5. pielikumā, un tā stingri izvērtēs visus aspektus. Ja dalībvalsts nebūs pienācīgi izpildījusi visus kritērijus, Komisija pieprasīs proporcionālu ierosinātā maksimālā apjoma samazinājumu.

3.4. Citu stratēģiju un pasākumu pamatojums

20. Ir svarīgi sniegt to panākumu pamatojumu, kas panākti, dalībvalstīm īstenojot papildu stratēģijas un pasākumus, lai nodrošinātu valstu kvotu sadales plānu atbilsmi Direktīvas III pielikuma 1. kritērijam. Valstu kvotu sadales plānu pirmajā posmā dalībvalstis minēja virkni esošo un papildu stratēģiju un pasākumu. Katrai dalībvalstij, kuras darbības pamatā ir papildu stratēģijas un pasākumi, ir jāpamato to ietekme un jāsniedz informācija par sasniegumiem, kas gūti tos īstenojot vai pieņemot[8] pat tad, ja tas ir jau minēts valsts emisijas kvotu sadales plāna pirmajā posmā. Komisijas veiktais novērtējums pamatosies uz tiem kritērijiem, kas izklāstīti 6. pielikumā, un tā stingri izvērtēs visus aspektus. Ja dalībvalsts nebūs pienācīgi izpildījusi visus kritērijus, Komisija pieprasīs proporcionālu ierosinātā maksimālā apjoma samazinājumu.

3.5. Vadlīnijas attiecībā uz 12. kritēriju – darbības veicēju ierobežojumi attiecībā uz kopējas īstenošanas (KĪ) mehānismu un tīras attīstības mehānisma (TAM) saskaņotu ievērošanu

21. Direktīvas III pielikuma 12. kritērijā, kurā grozījumi izdarīti ar Saistošo direktīvu,[9] ir noteikts sekojošais: „Plānā jānosaka maksimālais CERs un ERUs apjoms, ko darbības veicēji var izmantot saskaņā ar Kopienas sistēmu, un kas izteikts procentos no tā kvotu daudzuma, kāds piešķirts katrai iekārtai. Procentuālajai daļai jāatbilst dalībvalsts papildu saistībām, kas noteiktas saskaņā ar Kioto protokolu un tiem lēmumiem, kas pieņemti saskaņā ar ANO Vispārējo konvenciju par klimata pārmaiņām (UNFCCC) vai Kioto protokolu.”

22. 12. kritērijs ir obligāts tādā nozīmē, ka valsts emisijas kvotu sadales plānā jānosaka maksimālais CERs un ERUs daudzums, ko darbības veicēji var izmantot atbilstības nodrošināšanai.

23. 12. kritērijā paredzēts, ka noteiktajai procentuālajai daļai jāatbilst dalībvalstu papildu saistībām, kas noteiktas Kioto protokolā, un lēmumiem, kas pieņemti saskaņā ar UNFCCC vai Kioto protokolu. Marakešas nolīgumos paredzēts, ka „attiecīgo mehānismu lietojums jāpapildina ar valstī veiktām darbībām” [10] . Nedz Kioto protokols, nedz UNFCCC, nedz arī lēmumi, kas pieņemti saistībā ar tiem, nesniedz papildu saistību kvantitatīvo rādītāju definīciju[11]. Ir arī jāatzīmē, ka Kioto protokola pušu konferenču laikā Monreālā tika pieņemti daudzi nozīmīgi lēmumi, lai sekmētu tīras attīstības mehānisma (TAM) izmantošanu, attiecībā uz kuru ieguldījumu varētu sniegt ES emisiju kvotu tirdzniecība.

24. Papildu prasība ir jāpiemēro dalībvalsts kopējām siltumnīcas efektu izraisošo gāzu emisijām, bet ne emisijām atsevišķās nozarēs. Tādēļ valdības plānotā Kioto vienību iegāde ir jāņem vērā, novērtējot šīs prasības izpildi.

25. Komisija uzskata, ka dalībvalstis ir tiesīgas izvēlēties, vai nu piemērot ierobežojumu katrai iekārtai atsevišķi, vai arī visām iekārtām kopā. Lai panāktu lielāku elastību, dalībvalstīm ir ieteicams attiecināt ierobežojumu uz visu tirdzniecības periodu un uz visām iekārtām kopumā.

3.6. Jautājumi, kas saistīti ar jauniem tirgus dalībniekiem un iekārtu slēgšanu

26. Komisija uzskata, ka ir priekšlaicīgi izdarīt secinājumus un noteikt labāko praksi attiecībā uz jauniem tirgus dalībniekiem un iekārtu slēgšanu. Sīkāka informācija ir sniegta 7. pielikumā.

3.7. Turpmākas vadlīnijas par kvotu sadali nozares un uzņēmuma līmenī

27. Nosakot kvotu sadali uzņēmuma līmenī otrajā posmā, Komisija uzskata, ka ir nepieciešams, lai dalībvalstis nepamatotos uz pirmā posma emisiju datiem vai citiem pirmā posma datiem. Citādi tie uzņēmumi, kuri ir aktīvi samazinājuši emisijas pirmajā tirdzniecības periodā nepamatoti ir nostādīti nelabvēlīgākā stāvoklī, otrajā posmā saņemot mazāku kvotu skaitu, salīdzinot ar tiem uzņēmumiem, kuri nav samazinājuši emisijas pirmajā periodā.

28. Nepamatojoties uz pirmā posma emisiju datiem vai citiem pirmā posma datiem, ir iespējams novērtēt dažu uzņēmumu savlaicīgi veiktus pasākumus, kas īstenoti, lai izvairītos no rezervju veidošanas, vai arī jebkurus citus pasākumus savlaicīgas darbības veikšanai.

29. Lai mazinātu sarežģītību un administratīvo slodzi Komisija uzskata, ka nav nepieciešams saglabāt īpašus nosacījumus attiecībā uz emisiju apstrādi iekārtu līmenī.

30. Kā iepriekš jau tika minēts, nedrīkst pārvērtēt nepieciešamību vienkāršot valstu kvotu sadales plānus otrajā posmā, salīdzinājumā ar pirmo posmu. Vienkāršāki sadales noteikumi nozares un uzņēmumu līmenī sekmē kvotu sadales procesa pārredzamību un samazina izmaksas, jo īpaši to mazo un vidējo uzņēmumu izmaksas, uz kuriem attiecas šī sistēma.

3.8. Turpmākas vadlīnijas attiecībā uz citiem sadales aspektiem

31. Salīdzinošs novērtējums ES līmenī nav pietiekami attaisnojoša sadales metode, kādu varētu izmantot otrajā posmā. Tomēr dalībvalstis valsts līmenī var atzīt par lietderīgu salīdzinošo novērtējumu kvotu sadalei dažās nozarēs iekārtas līmenī un attiecībā uz jauniem tirgus dalībniekiem, piemēram, elektrības nozarē. Komisija pārskata kontekstā izvērtēs šādas pieredzes rezultātus. Komisija ir ieinteresēta noskaidrot, vai ir iespējams iegūt papildu datus salīdzināmās analīzes veikšanai un vai dalībvalstis apzinās papildu administratīvo slodzi.

32. Komisija uzsver, ka dalībvalstis var izmantot pārdošanu izsolē, otrajā tirdzniecības periodā nosakot cenu 10% robežās, kā noteikts direktīvas 10. pantā. Aizvien biežāka šādu izsoļu organizēšana dotu iespēju dalībvalstīm un Komisijai iegūt lielāku pieredzi, īstenojot šādu sadales veidu, un apkopot praktisko pieredzi stratēģiskajā pārskatā. Komisija atgādina dalībvalstīm, ka izsolēs gūtos ienākumus var izmantot arī, lai segtu sistēmas administratīvās izmaksas un valdību izdevumus, iegādājoties Kioto vienības. Ja dalībvalstis pieņem lēmumu kvotas pārdot izsolē, Komisija aicina tās savlaicīgi raksturot izsoles procesa detaļas, ieteicams to veikt jau valsts kvotu sadales plānā, jo īpaši nosakot laika grafiku un attiecīgos apjomus.

33. Ņemot vērā sabiedrisko apspriešanos, kas paredzēta direktīvas 9. panta 1. punktā, 11. panta 2. punktā un III pielikuma 9. kritērijā, Komisija pieprasa dalībvalstīm norādīt attiecīgus termiņus, lai nodrošinātu efektīvāku sabiedrisko apspriešanos attiecībā uz valstu kvotu sadales plāna otro posmu. Dalībvalstīm jācenšas savlaicīgi pabeigt sabiedrisko apspriešanos, ievērojot direktīvas 11. panta 2. punktu un III pielikuma 9. kritēriju, lai ievērotu termiņu 2006. gada 31. decembrī. Tā kā laika trūkums, lai sagatavotos otrajam tirdzniecības posmam, ir mazāks, kā gatavojoties pirmajam tirdzniecības posmam, Komisija ir pārliecināta, ka dalībvalstis pienācīgi izpildīs šo prasību, veicot to uz pašu atbildību un ievērojot diskrētumu.

4. DIREKTīVAS I PIELIKUMA DARBīBAS JOMAS SKAIDROJUMS

4.1. Sadedzināšanas iekārtas

34. Ciktāl tas attiecas uz sadedzināšanas iekārtas jēdziena skaidrojumu direktīvas I pielikumā, Komisija atzīmē, kas dažas dalībvalstis valsts kvotu sadales plāna pirmajā posmā ir pamatojušās uz tādu definējumu, kas ietver visus sadegšanas procesus, kuri atbilst noteiktajai jaudai, neskatoties uz to, vai enerģija ir iegūta sadegšanas procesā, vai arī tā ir cita ražošanas procesa neatņemama daļa. Citas dalībvalstis izmantojušas mazāk aptverošus skaidrojuma veidus, izslēdzot dažus vai visus tos sadegšanas procesus, kuri ir cita ražošanas procesa neatņemama daļa.

35. Komisija vērtē šādu situāciju kā ļoti neapmierinošu No iekšējā tirgus pozīcijām vērtējot, ir jānovērš, ka, piemērojot vienu un to pašu direktīvu, līdzvērtīgas iekārtas dažās dalībvalstīs tiek ietvertas, bet citās nē. Otrajā tirdzniecības posmā ir svarīgi visās dalībvalstīs nodrošināt konsekventu sadedzināšanas iekārtu skaidrojumu un panākt to iekļaušanu, lai izvairītos no nozīmīgiem konkurences kropļojumiem visā iekšējā tirgū.

36. Komisija uzskata, ka 8. pielikumā sniegtais sadedzināšanas iekārtas skaidrojums, ir atbilstošs. Tā izprot, ka dažām dalībvalstīm būtu jāiekļauj vēl virkne papildiekārtu, tostarp lielas iekārtas, kuras ražo ievērojamu emisiju daudzumu, kā arī iekārtas, kuras ražo niecīgus emisiju daudzumus. Tomēr, ievērojot turpmākajā nodaļā noteikto, Komisija atzīst, ka nav lietderīgi iekļaut tos papildu sadedzināšanas procesus, ko parasti veic nelielās sadedzināšanas iekārtās. Lai novērstu neatbilstības otrajā tirdzniecības periodā, visām dalībvalstīm jebkurā gadījumā ir jāiekļauj sadedzināšanas procesi, tostarp tie, kuros izmantots krekings, tie, kuru rezultātā rodas melnais ogleklis, tie, ar kuru palīdzību veic blakusproduktu sadedzināšanu[12] un tie, kurus veic krāsnīs[13] un tērauda rūpnīcās[14], ko parasti veic lielākās iekārtās, un kuri rada ievērojamu daudzumu emisiju. Komisija patur tiesības veikt visus nepieciešamos pasākumus, lai novērstu būtiskus sagrozījumus. Sīka informācija par Komisijas sniegto sadedzināšanas iekārtu skaidrojumu ietverta 8. pielikumā.

4.2. Mazās iekārtas

37. Dalībvalstis un ieinteresētās puses ir paudušas zināmas bažas attiecībā uz mazo iekārtu iekļaušanu, kā noteikts direktīvā, paziņojot, ka izmaksas, kas jāveic, lai šajā sistēmā iekļautu mazās iekārtas, pārsniedz ieguvumus. Komisija atzīst, ka izvērtējot ES ETS saskaņā ar direktīvas 30. pantu, ir nepieciešami turpmāki apsvērumi attiecībā uz ieguvumiem un izmaksām, kas rodas, iesaistot dažas mazās iekārtas.

38. Komisija uzsver, ka dažas dalības izmaksas, kuras jāsedz mazajām iekārtām, ir fiksēti vienreizēji maksājumi, kas jāveic pirmajā tirdzniecības posmā, un turpmāk vairs nav jāveic. Tā kā kārtējo izmaksu segšana ir galvenokārt saistīta ar ikgadējiem maksājumiem par uzraudzību, ziņošanu un emisiju pārbaudi, Komisija īpašu uzmanību velta tam, lai pašreiz veiktajā pārskatā par uzraudzību un ziņošanas vadlīnijām konkretizētu potenciālu mazo iekārtu izmaksu ietaupījumiem. Komisijas mērķis ir nodrošināt, lai pārskatītās vadlīnijas stātos spēkā līdz 2008. gada 1. janvārim, kas vienlaicīgi ir arī diena, kad sākas otrais tirdzniecības periods.

39. Turklāt Komisija atkārtoti uzsver, cik svarīgi otrajā tirdzniecības periodā ir izmantot vienkāršākus sadales noteikumus, lai mazās iekārtas no tā iegūtu, kā arī izvērtēt citus aspektus, tostarp uzraudzību un sadali, lai mazinātu šādu iekārtu dalības izmaksas. Komisija ir pārliecināta, ka tas vēl vairāk uzlabos attiecību starp šādu iekārtu ieguvumiem un izmaksām, piedaloties ES ETS.

40. Komisija aicina dalībvalstis pētīt 9. pielikumā noteiktās iespējas, gatavojoties valstu kvotu sadales plānu otrajam posmam. Tā gatavojas pārskatā plašāk izvērtēt direktīvas darbības jomu attiecībā uz mazo iekārtu iekļaušanu, tostarp iespēju ierosināt direktīvas grozījumus, lai ļautu dažas mazas iekārtas neiekļaut ES ETS otrajā tirdzniecības periodā. Šajā kontekstā Komisija apsver iespēju neiekļaut tādas sadedzināšanas darbības, kuras nesasniedz noteiktu robežvērtību, piemēram, līdz 3 MW, lai noteiktu tā dēvēto kopējo jaudu. Komisija arī izvērtē iespēju izslēgt tā dēvētā summēšanas noteikuma daļu, kas paredz, ka ir jāsaskaita tā jauda, kas iegūta darbībās, kuras veic viens un tas pats operators tajā pašā iekārtā.

ANNEX

Annex 1: Background data

Member State | 2003 national greenhouse gas emissions | Allowed emissions annual average 2008-12 under Kyoto Protocol | ETS share[15] | First phase cap annual average 2005-07 according to Commission decisions[16] |

Austria | 91.6 | 68.3 | 36.0% | 33.0 |

Belgium | 147.7 | 135.8 | 42.6% | 62.9 |

Cyprus | 9.2 | n.a. | 62.0% | 5.7 |

Czech Republic | 145.4 | 176.8 | 67.1% | 97.6 |

Denmark | 74.0 | 55.0 | 45.3% | 33.5 |

Estonia | 21.4 | 40.0 | 88.6% | 19.0 |

Finland | 85.5 | 70.4 | 53.2% | 45.5 |

France | 557.2 | 568.0 | 28.1% | 156.5 |

Germany | 1017.5 | 986.1 | 49.0% | 499.0 |

Greece | 137.6 | 139.6 | 54.1% | 74.4 |

Hungary | 83.2 | 114.3 | 37.6% | 31.3 |

Ireland | 67.6 | 61.0 | 33.0% | 22.3 |

Italy | 569.8 | 477.2 | 40.8% | 232.5 |

Latvia | 10.5 | 23.3 | 43.4% | 4.6 |

Lithuania | 17.2 | 46.9 | 71.2% | 12.3 |

Luxembourg | 11.3 | 9.2 | 29.8% | 3.4 |

Malta | 2.9 | n.a. | n.a. | 2.9 |

Netherlands | 214.8 | 200.3 | 44.4% | 95.3 |

Poland | 384.0 | 531.3 | 62.3% | 239.1 |

Portugal | 81.2 | 75.4 | 47.0% | 38.2 |

Slovakia | 51.7 | 66.0 | 59.0% | 30.5 |

Slovenia | 19.8 | 18.8 | 44.3% | 8.8 |

Spain | 402.3 | 329.0 | 43.4% | 174.4 |

Sweden | 70.6 | 75.2 | 32.5% | 22.9 |

UK | 651.1 | 657.4 | 37.7% | 245.3 |

Total | 2190.8 |

Note: All emission figures are in million tonnes CO2 equivalent.

Annex 2: Criteria for national allocation plans referred to in Articles 9, 22 and 30 of Annex III of the Directive

1. The total quantity of allowances to be allocated for the relevant period shall be consistent with the Member State's obligation to limit its emissions pursuant to Decision 2002/358/EC and the Kyoto Protocol, taking into account, on the one hand, the proportion of overall emissions that these allowances represent in comparison with emissions from sources not covered by this Directive and, on the other hand, national energy policies, and should be consistent with the national climate change programme. The total quantity of allowances to be allocated shall not be more than is likely to be needed for the strict application of the criteria of this Annex. Prior to 2008, the quantity shall be consistent with a path towards achieving or over-achieving each Member State's target under Decision 2002/358/EC and the Kyoto Protocol. |

2. The total quantity of allowances to be allocated shall be consistent with assessments of actual and projected progress towards fulfilling the Member States' contributions to the Community's commitments made pursuant to Decision 93/389/EEC. |

3. Quantities of allowances to be allocated shall be consistent with the potential, including the technological potential, of activities covered by this scheme to reduce emissions. Member States may base their distribution of allowances on average emissions of greenhouse gases by product in each activity and achievable progress in each activity. |

4. The plan shall be consistent with other Community legislative and policy instruments. Account should be taken of unavoidable increases in emissions resulting from new legislative requirements. |

5. The plan shall not discriminate between companies or sectors in such a way as to unduly favour certain undertakings or activities in accordance with the requirements of the Treaty, in particular Articles 87 and 88 thereof. |

6. The plan shall contain information on the manner in which new entrants will be able to begin participating in the Community scheme in the Member State concerned. |

7. The plan may accommodate early action and shall contain information on the manner in which early action is taken into account. Benchmarks derived from reference documents concerning the best available technologies may be employed by Member States in developing their National Allocation Plans, and these benchmarks can incorporate an element of accommodating early action. |

8. The plan shall contain information on the manner in which clean technology, including energy efficient technologies, are taken into account. |

9. The plan shall include provisions for comments to be expressed by the public, and contain information on the arrangements by which due account will be taken of these comments before a decision on the allocation of allowances is taken. |

10. The plan shall contain a list of the installations covered by this Directive with the quantities of allowances intended to be allocated to each. |

11. The plan may contain information on the manner in which the existence of competition from countries or entities outside the Union will be taken into account. |

12. The plan shall specify the maximum amount of CERs and ERUs which may be used by operators in the Community scheme as a percentage of the allocation of the allowances to each installation. The percentage shall be consistent with the Member State’s supplementarity obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and decisions adopted pursuant to the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol. |

Annex 3: Key messages from the first allocation guidance document

In January 2004, the Commission provided guidance to assist Member States in the preparation of the national allocation plans[17]. The guidance contained in that document on the implementation of the then eleven[18] criteria in Annex III to the Directive remainsrelevant for the second trading period 2008-2012. The Commission therefore wishes to reiterate the main elements.

Criterion (1) – Kyoto commitments The Commission understands “likely to be needed” as forward-looking and linked to the projected emissions of covered installations as a whole, given that this criterion refers to the total quantity of allowances to be allocated. The Commission understands the reference to the “strict application of the criteria in this annex” to comprise the criteria with a mandatory character or containing mandatory elements - i.e. criteria 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. In order to satisfy this requirement and fulfil all mandatory criteria and elements, a Member State should not allocate more than is needed, or warranted, by the most constraining of these criteria. It follows that any application of the optional elements of Annex III may not lead to an increase in the total quantity of allowances. |

Criterion (2) – Assessments of emissions developments Pursuant to Decision 280/2004/EC concerning a mechanism for monitoring Community greenhouse gas emissions and for implementing the Kyoto Protocol , the Commission undertakes an annual assessment of each Member State’s actual emissions and projected emissions for the period 2008-2012, in total and by sector and by gas. Criterion 2 requires the total quantity of allowances to be allocated to be consistent with these assessments. Consistency will be deemed as ensured, if the total quantity of allowances to be allocated to covered installations is not more than would be necessary taking into account actual emissions and projected emissions contained in those assessments. |

Criterion (3) – Potential to reduce emissions A Member State should determine the total quantity of allowances resulting from the application of criterion 3 by comparing the potential of activities covered by the scheme to reduce emissions with the potential of activities not covered. The criterion will be deemed as fulfilled if the allocation reflects the relative differences in the potential between the total covered and non-covered activities. |

Criterion (4) – Consistency with other legislation Criterion 4 concerns the relationship between allocations under Directive 2003/87/EC and other Community legislative and policy instruments. Consistency between allowance allocations and other legislation is introduced as a requirement in order to ensure that the allocation does not contravene the provisions of other legislation. In principle, no allowances should be allocated in cases where other legislation implies that covered emissions had or will have to be reduced even without the introduction of the emissions trading scheme. Similarly, consistency implies that if other legislation results in increased emissions or limits the scope for decreasing emissions covered by the Directive account should be taken of this increase. |

Criterion (6) – New entrants Under criterion 6, the national allocation plan should contain information on the manner in which new entrants will be able to begin participating in the emissions trading scheme in a Member State. The guidance proposes three ways in which new entrants can begin participating in the emissions trading scheme: by buying allowances in the market, by buying them in an auction, or by receiving them for free from a reserve set aside by the Member State. Having new entrants buy allowances in the market or in an auction is in accordance with the principle of equal treatment. |

Criterion (10) – List of installations This criterion will be deemed as fulfilled, if a Member State has respected its obligation to list all the installations covered by the Directive. A Member State has to indicate the total quantity of allowances intended to be allocated to each installation. |

Annex 4: Summary of experience gained from allocation plans for the first phase (2005-2007) and general lessons for the second phase (2008-2012)

1. More use of emissions trading is necessary to meet the Kyoto targets cost-effectively. Some Member States rely to a large degree on reductions in the non-trading sectors or on government purchase of Kyoto unit credits in the pursuit of their Kyoto targets. The intended government purchase of Kyoto units and the foreseen reduction efforts in the non-trading sectors have served in the first allocation phase as buffers resulting in moderate use of emission trading. In some Member States too much of the reduction effort may have been shifted to the non-trading sectors. Maintaining this imbalance would make Kyoto compliance more costly than necessary. Given that emissions trading is the most cost-effective instrument at hand, it should be used more in the second allocation round and beyond.

2. Allocations have in general been more restrictive for power generators than other sectors covered by the scheme. In most Member States, the allocation to the power generating sector, in relation to projected needs, has been more restrictive, i.e. more environmentally ambitious, than the allocations to the other sectors covered by the scheme.

3. Member States experiencing considerable excess in actual emissions with respect to their Kyoto targets intend to purchase a substantial amount of Kyoto units. Eight Member States announced in the first phase national allocation plans their intention to purchase with government funds in total some 500 to 600 million Kyoto units. Given the general outlook for Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the envisaged volume will be very challenging to realise. Furthermore, the Linking Directive will add private-sector demand to government demand for such credits. The Commission considers it as a matter of priority to improve the functioning of these mechanisms.

4. The non-acceptance of ex-post adjustments is essential for the allowance market development. The Commission did not approve the so-called ex-post adjustments envisaged by a number of Member States for the first trading period. This plays a vital role in the development of an efficient and liquid allowance market. The good functioning of the allowance market depends crucially on a stable and predictable allocation for the entire trading period in order to create stable incentives for installations to reduce emissions. For compliance purposes, companies can use the full flexibility of the scheme, be it via the allowance market or via company-internal transfers across borders.

5. Some allocation plans are more complex than necessary and not sufficiently transparent. In the first national allocation plans, some Member States created a complex set of special allocation rules: all Member States provided for a new entrants reserve and most also for some kind of administrative provision in the case of closure of an installation (i.e. no further allocation of allowances for the remainder of the ongoing trading period once an installation is closed). The design of new entrants and closure rules differs in detail. This contributes to a high degree of complexity and intransparency in the internal market and may result in unnecessary distortions of competition. Member States should consider simplifying all rules which they have added themselves and which are not essential for the functioning of the scheme. Simpler rules will help make national allocations plans more transparent.

Annex 5: Information requested to assess substantiation of intended government purchase of Kyoto units

Member States must substantiate the intended government purchase of Kyoto units and are requested to provide the following information in the national allocation plan:

(1) indicate the amount of Kyoto units planned to be purchased for compliance with the Kyoto target and any changes in this amount compared to the first national allocation plan;

(2) indicate the type of Kyoto units planned to be purchased, along with their respective projected or contracted purchase price;

(3) demonstrate the existence of relevant national legislation and budget allocations;

(4) provide information on the progress to date in realising the planned purchases, in particular the quantity of Kyoto units for which emission reduction purchase contracts have been signed at the time of notification of the second national allocation plan;

(5) indicate the envisaged time schedule of still to be effected purchases;

(6) outline the administrative arrangements put in place for realising the planned purchases, such as national programmes or purchase tenders for purchasing Kyoto units;

(7) indicate details about the contributions of multilateral or private carbon purchase funds and the expected delivery of credits;

(8) demonstrate the existence of contingency measures applicable in the event that planned purchases and signed purchase agreements result in the delivery of a lower than expected amount of Kyoto units.

Annex 6: Information requested to assess substantiation of other policies and measures

Member States must substantiate the effects of implemented and additional policies and measures and are requested to provide the following information in the national allocation plan:

(1) indicate the implemented policies and measures it considers as significant in sectors not covered by the EU ETS. For sectoral framework policies implemented (e.g. rural development plan, waste management plan) the plan has to provide the individual measures included that are considered to lead to greenhouse gas emission reductions. For cross-sectoral policies and measures, the plan has to indicate in which way those measures affect emissions in the trading and non-trading sectors. The information provided has to include the year in which the implementation showed full effect;

(2) indicate additional policies and measures not yet implemented at the time of notification which the Member State considers as significant. The plan has to present information on the status of planning or adoption of relevant legislation, agreements, incentive programmes, etc. and has to address the period for which full additional reduction effects are expected;

(3) indicate the approximate level of current greenhouse gas emissions represented by the activity targeted by each policy or measure and include quantified annual emissions reductions for the period 2008 to 2012 for the policies and measures indicated under the two preceding bullets. If no quantitative estimation of effects is available, the plan should explain why this information could not be provided and should include additional information why the policy or measure is considered to provide significant emission reduction effects;

(4) provide assumptions and methodologies used for the quantification of the effects of indicated policies and measures and provide references to sources for this information;

(5) present quantitative indicators to demonstrate the effectiveness of the policy or measure under the first requirement;

(6) indicate how policies and measures presented under the first two requirements are reflected in the greenhouse gas emissions projections presented in the plan;

(7) indicate any developments and trends of the activities targeted by the policies and measures provided under the first two requirements that could potentially counteract the reduction effects, e.g. increased production capacities or growing trends in consumption patterns;

(8) indicate any overlapping effects among important measures (e.g. effects of cross-sectoral measures and sectoral measures on the same activity) and how such double-counting effects have been eliminated in the estimation of quantitative reduction effects.

Annex 7: Issues related to new entrants and closures

1. The Commission notes that in the first trading period all Member States have set aside allowances for new entrants in a reserve and most adopted some form of closure provisions. The Commission did not raise objections to these administrative provisions and rules to the extent that they were not tantamount to ex-post adjustments.

2. The Commission notes further a multitude of detailed provisions governing new entrants reserves and closures, including transfer rule arrangements, adopted by Member States in the first allocation phase. This contributes to a high degree of complexity and intransparency in the internal market and may result in distortions of competition. At this stage, there is however insufficient practical experience with regard to the practical application of these rules.

3. For this reason, the Commission considers it premature to draw conclusions and identify best practice. In the case of new entrants’ reserves and closure and transfer provisions being maintained in the second trading period, the Commission recommends Member States ensure in particular that the new entrants reserve not be replenished upon exhaustion, that allowances not allocated to closed installations be cancelled or auctioned, and that there be no allocation at projected needs to new installations.

4. In the review report in June 2006[19], the Commission will consider alternative options (including the set-up of an EU-level new entrant reserve accompanied by EU-wide administrative rules on closure and cross-border transfer) to achieve further harmonisation with respect to new entrants and closure provisions.

Annex 8: Definition of combustion installation

1. The Commission considers the interpretation including all combustion processes, i.e oxidation of fuels, fulfilling the specified capacity to be the correct interpretation of Annex I of the Directive, for the following notable reasons:

2. Firstly, the term “combustion” is used in a wide range of Community legislation including not only the Emissions Trading Directive and the IPPC-Directive, but also the LCP-Directive[20] and the Sulphur in Liquid Fuels-Directive[21]. The meaning of combustion in the context of the Emissions Trading Directive has to be interpreted within the framework of other Community legislation where definitions are included.

3. The Sulphur in Liquid Fuels-Directive in its Article 2(5) and the LCP-Directive in its Article 2(7) define ‘combustion plant’ as “any technical apparatus in which fuels are oxidised in order to use the heat thus generated”. The LCP-Directive lists in the same Article a range of combustion plants which are specifically excluded from the scope of the LCP-Directive. The Emissions Trading Directive does not provide for such exclusion.[22]

4. Given that the Emissions Trading Directive makes no similar specific exclusions, the types of combustion installations excluded by Article 2(7) of the LCP-Directive are included within the scope of the Emissions Trading Directive where the threshold is met or exceeded.

5. Further guidance in support of this conclusion comes from Annex I of the Emissions Trading Directive itself. Annex I specifically excludes municipal and hazardous waste incineration facilities from the scope of the scheme. The combustion of e.g. hazardous waste is clearly an integrated part of the normal process undertaken by hazardous waste incinerators. If, in the absence of this specific exclusion, the Directive were to be interpreted as not applying to such installations where combustion takes place as an integrated part of the installation’s processes, municipal and hazardous waste installations would not need to have been specifically excluded as they would in any case have fallen outside its scope. Their specific exclusion is further confirmation that it is the presence of a combustion process with a rated thermal input exceeding 20MW that determines the Directive’s coverage of stationary combustion installations.

6. It is also commonly accepted that the term “combustion installation” for the purposes of the IPPC-Directive covers not just the power generation industry but also other industries where fuels are burned. Thus the heading “Energy industries” in the context of the IPPC Directive does not imply a narrow restriction of coverage of the term “combustion installations” to combustion processes that produce energy independently, but rather also includes combustion processes taking place as an integrated part of another production process. The heading “Energy activities” used in the Emissions Trading Directive, if anything, would be broader, so at least the same conclusion would apply. This therefore provides additional support for the argument that “combustion installations” in the Emissions Trading Directive not only covers combustion installations that are part of the energy industry, but also combustion installations in other industry sectors, including sectors that are not explicitly listed in its Annex I.

7. It is well-established that industries can fall under more than one activity category of the IPPC-Directive. Integrated steel works for example carry out several Annex I activities, and refineries include combustion installations of more than 50MW. Considering the similarities between the IPPC-Directive and the Emissions Trading Directive, there is no reason to take a different approach to the interpretation of the latter in this respect. In particular, a different approach cannot be justified by the separate listing of the steel and cement industries, given that both produce substantial CO2 emissions from (chemical) processes in addition to their emissions from combustion.

8. In the light of the above points, any installation, which includes one or more piece of stationary technical apparatus in which a combustion process takes place and that together on the same site and under the responsibility of the same operator has a rated thermal input exceeding 20MW, is therefore subject to the Emissions Trading Directive. This includes apparatus where the heat is used in another piece of apparatus, through a medium such as electricity or steam, and apparatus where the heat resulting from combustion is used directly within that apparatus, for example, for melting, drying, flares or units providing heat input to chemical reactors. The purpose to which the product of an activity is put should not be a determining characteristic as to whether or not an installation is subject to the Directive, as this would introduce subjectivity into its scope. Energy produced by combustion may be in the form of electricity, heat, hot water or steam, and the distance between the production of energy and its eventual use is not relevant for competent authorities to decide whether or not an installation is subject to the Emissions Trading Directive.

Annex 9: Interpretation issues related to the smallest installations

1. The Commission draws Member States’ attention to the fact that the so-called aggregation clause[23] contained in the second paragraph of Annex I of the Directive should be interpreted carefully so as to not cover certain small installations, without prejudice to the interpretation of such or similar wording in other Community legislation. In particular, the wording “under the same subheading” contained in this clause should be understood in the sense that a single activity falling simultaneously under several subheadings, e.g. both under “energy activities” and under a specific sectoral activity covered by Annex I of the Directive, such as “mineral industry”, is considered under the more specific sectoral subheading. Multiple activities of the same type should then be aggregated on the basis of that specific sectoral subheading, and not on the basis of all of the different possible activity descriptions that could apply. There is no basis for aggregating activities that fall under a different subheading, even though they may be part of the same installation.

2. Furthermore, flexibility at the discretion of Member States comes also from the wording “and/or” in the provision governing the manufacture of ceramic products in Annex I of the Directive. If Member States want to use this flexibility the Commission notes that this provision can be interpreted in a restrictive way so as to require the simultaneous presence of all mentioned sub-elements for the second trading period, again without prejudice to the interpretation of such or similar wording in other Community legislation. In this context, the Commission draws the attention of Member States to the Declaration of the Council and the Commission of 4 September 1996[24] supporting an interpretation of the same wording contained in Annex I of the IPPC-Directive, that it is up to Member States to decide as to whether one of the two criteria or both criteria need to be fulfilled at the same time.

Annex 10: Set of NAP common format summary tables

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Explanatory comments on NAP Common Format summary tables

Note: Grey fields are filled in automatically when using the Excel spreadsheets.

Table I: NAP summary table – target calculation

General description:

The purpose of this table is to provide an overview of key data relevant for NAP assessment. The gap (row C) between the Kyoto target (row A) and actual greenhouse gas emissions in 2003 (row B) is presented with necessary corresponding reduction measures (quantified in the fourth column of rows F-H, and totalled in row I). The gap is also expressed as the difference between the Kyoto target (row A) and the projected annual average total greenhouse gas emissions from 2008-2012 (row D). This figure is indicated in row E.

Specific remarks:

The second column makes a cross-reference to other data tables.

The fourth column refers to emissions or effects on emissions from measures recorded in the third column.

All rows with the exception of rows B and C contain annual averages relating to the second trading period 2008 to 2012.

Table IIa: NAP Summary table – Basic data

General description:

Table IIa gives an overview of historic and expected trends in various factors crucial to the calculation of a Member State’s potential to reduce emissions: namely, real GDP (row A), greenhouse gas emissions (row B) and carbon intensity (row C).

All three factors are expressed both in absolute numbers and in a trend index, with 2003 being the base year (2003=100).

Specific remarks:

In order to have a complete picture, the Commission invites Member States to provide annual data from 1990 to 2012. While re-stating some date in the public domain, Table IIa is of added value as an integral part of the NAP ensuring transparency and easy access to this information for stakeholders and other Member States.

Member States are required to indicate the sources of the information used, separately per year where relevant.

For the period 2008 to 2012, the Commission prefers annual data to better understand the development of these figures over time. In case a Member State can justify why such annual data are not available, the Commission would also accept the submission of only annual averages for the period 2008 to 2012, to be indicated in the respective column.

Table IIb: NAP Summary table – Basic data on electricity sector

General description:

Table IIb indicates the basic data for the electricity sector. The purpose is to obtain a comprehensive picture of total domestic electricity production (row A), imports (row B) and exports (row C), the electricity trade balance (row D, constituting the difference between rows B and C) as well as the shares of different fuels (gas, oil, coal, nuclear energy, and renewable energy) in total domestic electricity production (rows E-I).

Specific remarks:

Imports and exports (rows B and C) need to be disaggregated into the most important countries to/from which the export/import takes place, as well as a row with the remainder to other countries, and the total figure. These figures will allow the Commission to cross-check the plausibility of indications by individual Member States of their respective exports and imports, which would naturally need to be compatible with each other.

Member States are required to indicate the sources of the information used (separately per year where relevant) and are encouraged to provide annual data also for the period 2008 to 2012.

If a Member State can justify why such annual data are not available, the Commission requires explanation and at least the submission of data for a recent year and annual averages for the period 2008 to 2012. Similarly, Member States should provide data on the fuel mix as accurately as possible.

Naturally, the future fuel mix will depend on estimates, amongst others, of the allowance price. Member States are requested to indicate their respective estimates in the explanations in the NAP and also in Table X.

Member States should introduce also the target pursuant to Directive 2001/77/EC in Table 2b for the year 2010.

Table III: NAP Summary table – Recent and projected greenhouse gas emissions per common reporting format sector (without taking into account additional policies and measures in Table VI)

General description:

Table III relates recent and projected greenhouse gas emissions per common reporting format sector, as further specified by the numbers for the respective sub-sectors in the second column. Where indicated, the emissions should be indicated for total greenhouse gases and CO2 in the EU ETS.

The Commission recognises the technical difficulty to complete this table but stresses the importance of bringing together the categories in the UNFCCC-based common reporting format with the categories under EU ETS reporting.

Specific remarks:

The second column indicates the sub-sectoral reference under the Common Reporting Format (CRF).

The Commission recognises that some Member States may not have all the data available to complete Table III. If a Member State can justify why such annual or sectoral data is not available, the Commission requires at least the submission of data for a recent year and annual averages for the period 2008 to 2012 for as many sectors as possible, as well as aggregate figures (total and total in ETS).

CO2 emissions in the ETS sector depend on estimates, amongst others, on the allowance price. Member States are requested to indicate their respective estimates in the explanations in the NAP and also in Table X.

Table IV: NAP Summary table – Recent and projected CO 2 emissions in sectors covered by the EU emissions trading scheme

General description:

Table IV looks more specifically at the recent and projected CO2 emissions by installation or sector covered by the EU ETS, relating them to the activities mentioned in Annex I of the Directive. Certain activities have been aggregated where separate information is likely not to be available or necessary for the Commission’s assessment.

Specific remarks:

Emissions from combustion installations shall be calculated without emissions from installations also covered under the specific sectors of Annex I of the Directive being indicated in rows B-J. As a matter of example, where a combustion installation is also covered by the category “installations for the production of cement clinker …” under the subheading “mineral industry” of Annex I of the Directive, emissions from that installation should fall under the entry “cement producing installations” in row E of Table IV, and should be omitted from row A “combustion installations”. Moreover, emissions from these combustion installations shall be disaggregated into the most important activities to be identified by each Member State, including flaring, integrated steelworks, crackers and furnaces.

For the period 2008 to 2012, the Commission prefers annual data to better understand the development of all sectors. Where a Member State can justify the absence of such annual data for certain sectors, the Commission requires at least the submission of data for a recent year and annual averages for the period 2008 to 2012 in as many sectors as possible. If a Member State can show this to be appropriate, certain sectors may be (dis-)aggregated; in particular coke ovens (row C) with metal ore roasting, sintering, pig iron and steel producing installations (row D). Where such data are not available on an annual basis, the Commission requires a justification and at least the submission of data for a recent year as well as annual averages for the period 2008 to 2012 for as many sectors as possible, as well as aggregate figures (total and total in ETS).

The amount entered in row J, column XI correlates to Table III, row O, last column. The amount entered in row K, column XI correlates to Table III, row N, last column.

Table V: NAP Summary table – Proposed allocation in relation to first period allocation (without additional policies and measures) in the sectors covered by the EU emissions trading scheme

General description:

For installations or sectors covered by the EU ETS, Table V indicates 2003 and 2004 actual emissions (columns i and ii) as well as the proposed second period allocation in relation to first trading period allocation (columns iii and iv). Column v indicates the proposed second period allocation as a percentage of the first period allocation. The same sectoral specification is used as in Table IV.

Specific remarks:

Emissions from combustion installations shall be calculated without emissions from installations covered also under the specific sectors of Annex I of the Directive being indicated in rows B-J. As a matter of example, where a combustion installation is also covered by the category “installations for the production of cement clinker …” under the subheading “mineral industry” of Annex I of the Directive, emissions from that installation should fall under the entry “cement producing installations” in row E of Table IV, and should be omitted from row A “combustion installations”. Moreover, emissions from these combustion installations shall be disaggregated into the most important activities to be identified by each Member State, including flaring, integrated steelworks, crackers and furnaces.

For the period 2008 to 2012, the Commission prefers annual data to better understand the development of all sectors. Where a Member State can justify why such annual data is not available for all sectors, the Commission requires at least the submission of data for a recent year and annual averages for the period 2008 to 2012 in as many sectors as possible, as well as aggregate figures (total and total in ETS). If a Member State can show it to be appropriate, certain sectors may be (dis-)aggregated; in particular coke ovens (row C) with metal ore roasting, sintering, pig iron and steel producing installations (row D).

Table VI: NAP Summary table – Reductions expected by policies and measures other than the EU emissions trading scheme and which have not been taken into account for the "with measures" projection presented in Table III (Mt CO 2 eq)

General description:

Table VI gives account of greenhouse gas emissions reductions expected by policies and measures other than the EU ETS, which have not been taken into account for the “with measures” projection presented in Table III.

It classifies such measures into three categories: “under implementation” (columns i-iii), “adopted” (columns iv-vi), and “planned” (columns vii-ix).

“Under implementation” means that the implementation is ongoing, and that the measure is not taken into account for the "with measures" projections presented in Table III.

“Adopted” means that the measure has been adopted by the final instance at the relevant local, regional or national level, but it is not yet implemented.

“Planned” means that the measure is at least mentioned in a formal government document, but not adopted.

Each of these three categories is again subdivided into three columns: the expected average annual reduction (2008-12), on the one hand, in ETS sectors (columns i, iv and vii), and, on the other hand, in non-ETS sectors (columns ii, v and viii). The third sub-column (iii, vi and ix, respectively) indicates the year, in which the full or a substantial part of the effects of the respective measure can be expected (not necessarily the first year of implementation).

The rows shall contain the measures to be specified in the second column.

Specific remarks:

The Commission recognises that for some measures the disaggregation of the expected reductions into those occurring outside and inside the ETS presents a technical difficulty. It is however an important element for the Commission’s assessment.

Table VII: NAP Summary table – Government’s planned use of Kyoto units (Mt CO 2 eq) and status of implementation

General description:

Table VII gives a detailed overview on the government’s planned use of Kyoto units and the status of their implementation.

It subdivides the Kyoto units into ERUs from JI projects, CERs from CDM projects, and AAUs and other units from international emissions trading. The last column indicates the total of the three types combined.

The status of implementation is presented in the rows, as follows.

Rows A and B indicate the sum across the various degrees of implementation, with row A giving the total amount in the period 2008 to 2012 and row B the annual average in that period per type of Kyoto unit and as a total. The total annual average across all three forms of Kyoto units is equal to row H of Table I.

Row C indicates the most advanced degree of implementation, i.e. the quantity of units already paid for.

Row D gives a lesser degree of implementation, which is the quantity of units contracted, but yet unpaid (delivery pending start of UN ITL). Units partially paid for should be proportionally distributed between rows C and D.

Row E relates to the quantity with the lowest degree of implementation, i.e. the units neither bought nor contracted by the date of notification (Row E = Row A – Row C – Row D).

Rows F and G give additional information on the full budget appropriated to the first commitment period (2008-12), both the one currently available for 2006 (row F) and the one committed up to 2012 (row G).

Row H indicates the implied future price of Kyoto units, which is the sum of rows F and G, divided by the total planned purchase in row A.

Specific remarks:

The Commission prefers Member States to specify the breakdown into ERUs, CERs, and AAUs and others. In case a Member State can justify why such a breakdown is not feasible, the Commission requires at least the submission of separate figures for ERUs and CERs on the one hand and AAUs and others on the other hand.

Table VIII: NAP Summary table – Details on new entrants, closures and auctioning

Table VIII contains various questions relating to important information on new entrants, auctioning and closures. The questions should be self-explanatory.

Table IX: NAP Summary table – Further details on new entrants

Table IX asks for further details on a selected new entrant, e.g. a power plant with a rated thermal input of 100 MW.

In one scenario (second column) the fuel used is coal, while in the other (third column) it is gas.

Member States are then requested to fill in row 4 (forecast number of operating hours/year in the period 2008 to 2012), where such a forecast is relevant for the allocation under the new entrants rule of the Member State, and row 5 (annual allowance allocation in 2008 to 2012).

This information will allow the Commission to better assess the standards used in the allocation to new entrants and at the same time provide for more transparency.

Table X: NAP Summary table – Important assumptions on annual averages

In Table X, Member States are requested to quantify for the years 2005-12 their key assumptions on annual average figures underlying the establishment of the NAP, in particular for:

- the EU allowance price (in Euro);

- the price for crude oil (Brent);

- the price for natural gas;

- the coal price; and

- the exchange rate (for those Member States outside the Euro-zone).

Member States should use and specify common market standards for fuel prices, including the currency used. They should indicate in detail sources of data and methodologies. This information is necessary in order to ensure comparability of data and transparency.

Member States are invited to indicate further assumptions considered important and useful for the Commission’s assessment.

[1] Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2003. gada 13. oktobra Direktīva 2003/87/EK, ar kuru nosaka sistēmu siltumnīcas efektu izraisošo gāzu emisijas kvotu tirdzniecībai Kopienā un groza Padomes Direktīvu 96/61/EK, OV L 275, 25.10.2003., 32.–46. lpp., kurā grozījumi izdarīti ar Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2004. gada 27. oktobra Direktīvu 2004/101/EK, ar ko groza Direktīvu 2003/87/EK, ar kuru nosaka sistēmu siltumnīcas efektu izraisošo gāzu emisijas kvotu tirdzniecībai Kopienā, ievērojot Kioto protokola projektu mehānismus, OV L 338, 13.11.2004, 18. lpp.

[2] KOM(2003) 830 galīgais.

[3] 2005. gada 1. decembrī Padome aicināja Komisiju darīt visu iespējamo un sniegt vadlīnijas, lai pietiekami savlaicīgu sagatavotos otrajam valstu kvotu sadales plānam.

[4] Sk. 10. pielikumu.

[5] KOM(2003) 830 galīgais, 25.-29. lpp.

[6] Komisijas sagatavotais Progresa ziņojums par sasniegto, īstenojot Kopienai noteiktos Kioto protokola mērķus, 2005. gada 15. decembris, KOM(2005) 655.

[7] Avots: Eiropas Komisija, Enerģētikas un transporta ģenerāldirektorāts, Eiropas enerģijas un transporta tendences līdz 2030. gadam, 2. papildinājums, 2003. gada 2. janvāris, skatīt šādu web lapu: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/figures/trends_2030/index_en.htm

[8] Tādēļ Komisija uzsver, ka jānodrošina kvotu sadales plānu pilnīga atbilstība dalībvalstu saistībām, kas noteiktas saskaņā ar Direktīvu 2001/77/EK par tādas elektroenerģijas pielietojuma veicināšanu iekšējā elektrības tirgū, kas ražota, izmantojot neizsīkstošos enerģijas avotus, OV L 283, 27.10.2001., 33. lpp.

[9] Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2004. gada 27. oktobra Direktīva 2004/101/EK, ar ko groza Direktīvu 2003/87/EK, ar kuru nosaka sistēmu siltumnīcefektu izraisošo gāzu emisijas kvotu tirdzniecībai Kopienā, ievērojot Kioto protokola projektu mehānismus, OV L 338, 13.12.2004, 18. lpp.

[10] Lēmums 15/KP.7, 1. pants.

[11] Komisijas priekšlikums attiecībā uz Saistošo direktīvu, kas paredzēts šādai kvantitatīvus rādītājus raksturojošai definīcijai (KOM(2003) 403).

[12] Iekļaujot ārzonas iekārtas.

[13] Attiecinot to arī uz akmens vates ražošanu.

[14] Attiecinot to uz velmētavām, ierīcēm siltuma ekonomēšanai, rūdīšanas krāsnīm un kodināšanas iekārtām.

[15] The ETS share is calculated as the first period cap divided by 2003 national greenhouse gas emissions.

[16] These figures do not account for changes to the number of installations subsequent to the respective Commission decision (e.g. opt-ins or opt-outs of installations).

[17] Commission Communication COM (2003) 830 final, 7.1.2004.

[18] Directive 2004/156/EC (“the Linking Directive”) added a criterion 12 to Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC.

[19] As provided for by Article 30(2) of the Directive

[20] Directive 2001/80/EC on the limitation of emissions of certain pollutants into the air from large combustion plants, OJ L 309, 27.11.2001, p. 1.

[21] Directive 1999/32/EC relating to a reduction in the sulphur content of certain liquid fuels, OJ L 121, 11.05.1999, p. 13.

[22] Certain activities that are specifically excluded by the LCP-Directive are also excluded from the Emissions Trading Directive, such as “(h) any technical apparatus used in the propulsion of a vehicle, ship or aircraft” because the Emissions Trading Directive only applies to stationary technical units (Article 3(e)). The Emissions Trading Directive therefore covers neither transportation in general nor greenhouse gas emissions arising from traffic on the site of an installation.

[23] “2. The threshold values given below generally refer to production capacities or outputs. Where one operator carries out several activities falling under the same subheading in the same installation or on the same site, the capacities of such activities are added together.”

[24] Council Declaration of 4 September 1996 on Directive 96/61/EC of the Council on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control, 9388/96, Interinstitutional dossier No. 00/0526 (SYN)