DRŽAVNA POTPORA – BELGIJA

Državna potpora SA.54915 (2019/N) – Mehanizam za razvoj kapaciteta

Poziv na podnošenje primjedaba u skladu s člankom 108. stavkom 2. Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije

(Tekst značajan za EGP)

(2020/C 346/03)

Dopisom od 21. rujna 2020. koji se navodi na izvornom jeziku u nastavku ovog sažetka Komisija je obavijestila Belgiju da je odlučila pokrenuti postupak utvrđen člankom 108. stavkom 2. Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije u vezi s prethodno navedenom mjerom.

Zainteresirane strane mogu u roku od mjesec dana od datuma objave ovog sažetka i dopisa u nastavku podnijeti primjedbe o mjeri u vezi s kojom Komisija pokreće postupak, na sljedeću adresu:

Europska komisija Directorate-General Competition State Aid Greffe 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel BELGIQUE/BELGIË Faks: + 32 22961242 Stateaidgreffe@ec.europa.eu

Belgija će biti obaviještena o tim primjedbama. Povjerljivo postupanje s identitetom zainteresirane strane koja podnosi primjedbe i/ili s dijelovima dostavljenih primjedbi može se zatražiti u pisanom obliku, navodeći razloge zahtjeva.

SAŽETAK

1. Postupak

Belgija je prethodno prijavila mjeru 3. srpnja 2019. S belgijskim je nadležnim tijelima razmijenjeno nekoliko upitnika te su organizirani sastanci kako bi se raspravilo o spisu prethodne prijave. Belgija je prijavila mjeru 19. prosinca 2019.

2. Opis mjere u vezi s kojom Komisija pokreće postupak

Cilj je predloženog mehanizma za razvoj kapaciteta (CRM) osiguranje sigurnosti opskrbe, kako je određeno standardom pouzdanosti Zakona o električnoj energiji od 29. travnja 1999. Belgija je utvrdila rizik za sigurnost opskrbe zbog predstojećeg postupnog gašenja nuklearnih elektrana 2025.

U belgijskom mehanizmu za razvoj kapaciteta, operator prijenosnog sustava (OPS) kupuje kapacitet od pružatelja kapaciteta u obliku opcija pouzdanosti. Pružatelji kapaciteta odabrani na dražbi prodaju opcije pouzdanosti operatoru prijenosnog sustava i zauzvrat dobivaju fiksnu naknadu za kapacitet. Kad god referentna cijena (tj. cijena električne energije za dan unaprijed) prelazi prethodno utvrđenu razinu, takozvanu izvršnu cijenu, pružatelj kapaciteta mora operatoru prijenosnog sustava (OPS) vratiti razliku između referentne cijene i izvršne cijene.

OPS organizira dražbu za mehanizam za razvoj kapaciteta u funkciji razine resursa kapaciteta potrebnih da bi se zajamčila odgovarajuća razina adekvatnosti resursa radi ispunjenja standarda pouzdanosti. Dražba kapaciteta održava se svake godine radi isporuke za četiri godine na „dražbi g. – 1”. Dodatna dražba za jednu godinu unaprijed održava se u godini koja izravno prethodi godini isporuke glavne dražbe („dražba g. – 1”).

Troškovi mehanizma za razvoj kapaciteta (tj. oni nastali za financiranje plaćanja kapaciteta pružateljima) financirat će se na temelju „obveze pružanja javne usluge” putem OPS-ovih mrežnih tarifa.

Pravna je osnova mjere Zakon o električnoj energiji od 29. travnja 1999. o organizaciji belgijskog tržišta električne energije, izmijenjen zakonom objavljenim 16. svibnja 2019. u belgijskom Službenom listu („Belgisch Staatsblad”/„Moniteur belge”). Donijet će se akti sekundarnog zakonodavstva u obliku kraljevskih uredbi i tržišnih pravila kojima se dodatno razrađuju modaliteti mehanizma za razvoj kapaciteta. Nacrti ovih tekstova dostupni su na internetskoj stranici Ministarstva energetike (1).

3. Ocjena mjere

3.1. Postojanje potpore u smislu članka 107. stavka 1. UFEU-a

Komisija smatra da se mehanizam za razvoj kapaciteta financira iz državnih sredstava jer se financira iz prihoda od parafiskalnog nameta koji je nametnula država, a kojima se upravlja i koje se raspodjeljuje u skladu s odredbama zakonodavnog akta. Komisija napominje da uspješni ponuditelji na temelju prijavljenog mehanizma ostvaruju prihode koje ne bi dobili da na tržištu električne energije, pod uobičajenim gospodarskim uvjetima, samo prodaju električnu energiju i pomoćne usluge. Osim toga, mjerom se dodjeljuje prednost samo određenim poduzećima koja mogu pomoći u rješavanju utvrđenog problema adekvatnosti kapaciteta, a natječu se s drugim proizvođačima električne energije. Stoga će se prijavljenom mjerom dodijeliti gospodarska prednost poduzetnicima koji se nalaze u sličnom činjeničnom i pravnom položaju kao i drugi proizvođači električne energije. Zbog toga je mjera selektivna. Proizvodnja električne energije i veleprodajna i maloprodajna tržišta električne energije djelatnosti su koje su u cijelom EU-u otvorene tržišnom natjecanju. Stoga svaka prednost koju poduzeća iz tog sektora ostvare državnim sredstvima potencijalno može utjecati na trgovinu unutar Unije i narušiti tržišno natjecanje. Komisija na temelju toga zaključuje da je ta mjera državna potpora u smislu članka 107. stavka 1. UFEU-a.

3.2. Zakonitost potpore

Prijavljivanjem plana prije njegove provedbe, belgijska su nadležna tijela ispunila svoju obvezu u skladu s člankom 108. stavkom 3. UFEU-a.

3.3. Spojivost mjere

Komisija je procijenila spojivost mjere s unutarnjim tržištem na temelju uvjeta utvrđenih u odjeljku 3.9. Smjernica o državnim potporama za zaštitu okoliša i energiju za razdoblje 2014.–2020. (2) (EEAG), u kojima su utvrđeni konkretni uvjeti za dodjelu potpore za adekvatnost proizvodnje i primjenjuju se od 1. srpnja 2014. Komisija je 2. srpnja 2020. donijela Komunikaciju kojom se EEAG produljuje do 31. prosinca 2021. te kojom se one izmjenjuju (3).

3.3.1. Cilj od zajedničkog interesa i nužnost potpore

Belgija je utvrdila postojanje potrebe za mehanizmom za razvoj kapaciteta u istraživanju adekvatnosti i fleksibilnosti koje je 2019. objavio OPS Elia (4). Istraživanjem je utvrđeno postojanje rizika za belgijsku adekvatnost resursa, pozivajući se na nacionalni standard pouzdanosti opisan osobito u scenariju „EU-HiLo” (visoki utjecaj – mala vjerojatnost), kojim se pretpostavlja situacija u kojoj je nedostupno nekoliko francuskih nuklearnih elektrana (povrh „normalne” nedostupnosti). Komisija smatra da se upotreba scenarija EU-HiLo u mehanizmu razvoja kapaciteta koji se odnosi na cijelo tržište ne čini prikladnom za određivanje razine problema adekvatnosti resursa jer se time riskira precjenjivanje značaja ovog problema i narušavanje tržišta električne energije. Nacionalno regulatorno tijelo (CREG) kritiziralo je metodologiju upotrijebljenu u istraživanju koje je proveo OPS Elia (5).

Komisija stoga sumnja u to jesu li belgijska nadležna tijela dovoljno precizno utvrdila te pravilno analizirala i kvantificirala problem adekvatnosti resursa, osobito u pogledu točaka 221. i 222. EEAG-a.

3.3.2. Prikladnost potpore

Komisija sumnja u prikladnost mjere prema točki 226. EEAG-a, s obzirom na to da restriktivni način izračunavanja pragova ulaganja koji mjera propisuje rezultira višegodišnjim ugovorima (od 3, 8 ili 15 godina). Pragovi uzimaju u obzir instalirani kapacitet (tj. maksimalni kapacitet za koji je postrojenje dizajnirano) umjesto smanjenog kapaciteta (tj. njihovu unaprijed određenu stopu dostupnosti i njihov doprinos cilju adekvatnosti resursa). Komisija smatra da ova značajka može spriječiti pošteno tržišno natjecanje između tehnologija koje jednako pridonose adekvatnosti resursa i potpuno odvratiti od sudjelovanja prije svega nestalne tehnologije s čimbenicima velikog smanjenja kapaciteta (osobito obnovljive izvore energije sunca i vjetra).

3.3.3. Učinak poticaja

Cilj je mjere ostvariti sigurnost opskrbe održavanjem dovoljne količine dostupnog kapaciteta. Bez proporcionalnog mehanizma za razvoj kapaciteta vjerojatno ne bi bilo dovoljno kapaciteta za ostvariti sigurnosti opskrbe jer se predviđa da znatan dio elektrana neće ostvariti dovoljne prihode na isključivo energetskom tržištu da bi pokrile svoje troškove. Uz to, obveza povrata uloženih sredstava stvara financijski poticaj za dostupnost u vrijeme oskudice. Povrh toga, Belgija je uvela postupak praćenja dostupnosti prije i tijekom razdoblja isporuke te odgovarajuća ispitivanja i penale kako bi osigurala poštovanje obveze dostupnosti. Komisija stoga donosi preliminarni zaključak da mjera u načelu ima poticajni učinak.

3.3.4. Proporcionalnost

Komisija traži pojašnjenja je li mjera proporcionalna u skladu s odjeljkom 3.9.5. EEAG-a. Komisija sumnja: i. temelji li se konkurentni natječajni postupak na nediskriminirajućim kriterijima zbog pragova ulaganja spomenutih u prethodnom odjeljku 3.3.2.; ii. je li metodologija za određivanje krivulje potražnje koja je upotrijebljena za izračun količine kapaciteta koji se treba nabaviti na svakoj dražbi proporcionalna jer se može temeljiti na nerealnoj osjetljivosti EU-HiLo ili drugim osjetljivostima koje pretpostavljaju dodatnu nedostupnost francuskih nuklearnih elektrana.

3.3.5. Izbjegavanje negativnog učinka na tržišno natjecanje i trgovinu

Belgija će uvesti srednje ograničenje cijene kapaciteta u kategoriji jednogodišnjih ugovora da bi se izbjegla neočekivana dobit. Slijedom toga, ti kapaciteti neće smjeti davati ponude po cijeni većoj od ovog ograničenja, niti će dobiti dražbovnu cijenu koja ga premašuje. Nije predviđena pojedinačna procjena kapaciteta kako bi im se u slučaju većih troškova odobrilo odstupanje.

U mehanizmu za razvoj kapaciteta neizravni inozemni kapaciteti podliježu srednjem ograničenju cijena. Komisija zauzima preliminarno stajalište da će odsutnost višegodišnjih ugovora zajedno s primjenom srednje cijene spriječiti ove kapacitete da ponude svoje stvarne troškove na dražbi u slučaju da su veći od srednjeg ograničenja cijene. Stoga ih se na taj način može u potpunosti odvratiti od sudjelovanja u mehanizmu za razvoj kapaciteta. Komisija smatra da ovo predstavlja diskriminaciju stranih kapaciteta, kršeći točku 232. EEAG-a.

Štoviše, točkom 233. podtočkom (c) EEAG-a propisano je da mehanizmi razvoja kapaciteta ne bi trebali „biti u suprotnosti s odlukama o ulaganju koje su prethodile mjeri”. Međutim, postojanje srednje cijene moglo bi za posljedicu imati sprečavanje postojećih kapaciteta da u ponudi navode stvarne troškove, dok s druge strane neće imati ni mogućnost da se prijavljuju za dodjelu višegodišnjih ugovora, što bi dovelo do njihova isključenja iz mehanizma za razvoj kapaciteta pa čak i do napuštanja tržišta električne energije. Komisija stoga traži dodatne informacije kako bi procijenila učinak srednjeg ograničenja cijene i njegovu kompatibilnost s ovom točkom EEAG-a.

Belgija je objasnila da će dodijeliti prihode od zagušenja koji proizlaze iz dodjele prekograničnih karata (tj. prava pristupa stranim pružateljima kapaciteta da sudjeluju u mehanizmu za razvoj kapaciteta) kako je predviđeno člankom 19. stavkom 2. Uredbe (EU) 2019/943 Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća (6). Komisija smatra da su potrebne dodatne informacije kako bi se procijenila spojivost mehanizma za razvoj kapaciteta s točkom 233. podtočkom (a) EEAG-a, odnosno da bi se osiguralo da će se prihodi od zagušenja upotrebljavati kako bi mehanizam za razvoj kapaciteta pružio pravi poticaj za ulaganje u osiguravanje interkonekcijskih kapaciteta.

3.3.6. Usklađenost mjere potpore s usko povezanim odredbama zakonodavstva Unije

Ako mjera državne potpore obuhvaća aspekte koji su nerazdvojno povezani s predmetom potpore i koji krše ostale odredbe zakonodavstva Unije, takvo kršenje moglo bi utjecati na ocjenu usklađenosti te državne potpore. S tim u vezi, Komisija donosi preliminarni zaključak da mehanizam financiranja mehanizma za razvoj kapaciteta ne uvodi nikakva ograničenja koja bi kršila članak 30. ili članak 110. UFEU-a jer će Belgija dopustiti sudjelovanje stranih kapaciteta u mehanizmu za razvoj kapaciteta. Međutim, Komisija sumnja u to je li mehanizam za razvoj kapaciteta u skladu s člankom 22. stavkom 1. točkom (c) i člankom 24. stavkom 1. Uredbe (EU) 2019/943, s obzirom na to da se i nacionalno istraživanje adekvatnosti i fleksibilnosti i referentni scenarij upotrijebljen za utvrđivanje kapaciteta koji će se ponuditi na dražbi temelje na pretpostavkama o inozemnoj opskrbi električnom energijom (dodatna nedostupnost francuskih nuklearnih elektrana).

U skladu s člankom 16. Uredbe Vijeća (EU) 2015/1589 (7) od primatelja se može osigurati povrat svake nezakonite potpore.

TEKST DOPISA

(1) https://economie.fgov.be/fr/themes/energie/securite-dapprovisionnement/mecanisme-de-remuneration-de

(2) SL C 200, 28.6.2014., str. 1.

(3) Vidjeti Komunikaciju C(2020) 4355 final (SL C 224, 8.7.2020., str. 2.).

(4) https://www.elia.be/fr/actualites/communiques-de-presse/2019/06/20190628_press-release-adequacy-and-flexibility-study-for-belgium-2020-2030

(5) https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/etude-f1957

(6) SL L 158, 14.6.2019., str. 54.

(7) SL L 248, 24.9.2015., str. 9.

(8) Regulation No 1 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community (OJ 17, 6.10.1958, p. 385).

(9) Wet tot wijziging van de wet van 29 april 1999 betreffende de organisatie van de elektriciteitsmarkt, teneinde een capaciteitsvergoedingsmechanisme in te stellen” / “Loi modifiant la loi du 29 avril 1999 relative à l'organisation du marché de l'électricité portant la mise en place d'un mécanisme de rémunération de capacité.

(10) Projet d’arrêté royal fixant la méthode de calcul du volume de capacité nécessaire et des paramètres nécessaires pour l’organisation des enchères dans le cadre du mécanisme de rémunération de capacité — Finaal voorstel van koninklijk besluit tot vaststelling van de berekeningsmethode van het noodzakelijke capaciteitsvolume en de parameters die nodig zijn voor de organisatie van de veilingen in het kader van het capaciteitsvergoedingsmechanisme

(11) Projet d’arrêté royal relatif à l’établissement des critères et modalités d'éligibilité à la procédure de préqualification en ce qui concerne les règles relatives au seuil minimal et au cumul des mesures d’aides — Ontwerp van koninklijk besluit betreffende de criteria en nadere regels voor het in aanmerking komen voor de prekwalificatieprocedure voor wat betreft de regels inzake de minimumdrempel en de combinatie van steunmaatregelen

(12) Proposition d’arrêté royal fixant les seuils d’investissements et les critères d’éligibilité des coûts d’investissement en vue du classement des capacités dans les catégories de capacités — Voorstel van koninklijk besluit tot vaststelling van de investeringsdrempels en de criteria voor het in aanmerking komen van investeringskosten met het oog op de klassering van capaciteiten in capaciteitscategorieën

(13) Projet d’arrêté royal relatif à l’établissement des conditions auxquelles les détenteurs de capacité étrangère directe et indirecte peuvent participer à la procédure de préqualification dans le cadre du mécanisme de rémunération de capacité — Ontwerp van koninklijk besluit houdende vaststelling van de voorwaarden waaronder houders van rechtstreekse en onrechtstreekse buitenlandse capaciteit kunnen deelnemen aan de prekwalificatieprocedure in het kader van het capaciteitsvergoedingsmechanisme

(14) https://economie.fgov.be/fr/themes/energie/securite-dapprovisionnement/mecanisme-de-remuneration-de

(15) See: https://www.elia.be/en/public-consultation/20200828_public-consultation-crm-functioning-rules

(16) LOLE95 refers to a 95th percentile standard according to which during severe conditions with a chance of 5 % of occurring (i.e. a very cold winter that occurs once in 20 years), the LOLE must be inferior to the given standard, which is, in the case of Belgium, 20 hours.

(17) These values are to be considered as preliminary.

(18) https://www.plan.be/uploaded/documents/201709280927450.Addendum_CBA.pdf

(19) OJ C 121, 6.4.2018.

(20) https://www.elia.be/fr/actualites/communiques-de-presse/2019/06/20190628_press-release-adequacy-and-flexibility-study-for-belgium-2020-2030

(21) See State aid decision C(2018) 589 final, in case SA.48648 (2017/NN) — Belgium — Strategic Reserve.

(22) The ‘EU-BASE’ scenario takes into account the latest known policies of all modelled European countries (nuclear and coal trajectories, expected new built gas generation, demand-side response and storage developments, capacity mechanisms, flow based, rules of the Clean Energy package, expected grid development…).

(23) https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/etude-f1957

(24) See State aid decision C(2016) 7086 final in case SA.39621 2015/C.

(25) https://economie.fgov.be/sites/default/files/Files/Energy/Mecanisme-remuneration-capacite-Note-E2-02-10-2019.pdf

(26) Albrecht, Johan, Hamels, S., & Thomas, L. (2017). Le trilemme énergétique: une exploration du paysage Belge de l’electricité en l'An 2030. Gent: Skribis., https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/8560302; Study by Energyville: https://www.energyville.be/sites/energyville/files/downloads/2018/gp_bbl_iew_report_-_v2018_03_06_final.pdf

Study by the Federal Planning Bureau: https://www.plan.be/admin/uploaded/201802260841090.OPREP201802.pdf

(27) https://eepublicdownloads.blob.core.windows.net/public-cdn-container/clean-documents/sdc-documents/MAF/MAF_2018_Methodology_and_Detailed_Results.pdf

(28) https://eepublicdownloads.blob.core.windows.net/public-cdn-container/clean-documents/sdc-documents/MAF/2019/MAF%202019%20Appendix%201%20-%20Detailed%20Results%2C%20Sensitivities%20and%20Input%20Data.pdf

(29) A ‘Coal Phase-out’ sensitivity is performed. In total, around 23,6 GW of generating capacity were removed from the 2025 Base-Case scenario, mainly through reductions in lignite and hard coal capacities.

(30) https://eepublicdownloads.blob.core.windows.net/public-cdn-container/clean-documents/sdc-documents/MAF/2019/MAF%202019%20Appendix%203%20-%20Country%20Comments.pdf

(31) https://www.benelux.int/files/4515/8998/1576/PENTAreport_FINAL.pdf

(32) Like for MAF 2019, ‘for 2025 a need of 2,5 GW new capacity is thus assumed in this study to be delivered under the CRM in 2025 in order to reach adequacy for Belgium.’

(33) ‘For the “Low Gas Sensitivity” in PLEF for Belgium, the assumed new capacity of 2,5 GW was removed from the PLEF “Base Case”’. ‘Belgian and French gas capacities are respectively 2,5 GW and 2,2 GW lower than in the base case. For Austria (1,2 GW less gas capacity), the Netherlands (1,6 GW less gas capacity) and Luxemburg (0,1 GW less gas capacity)’

(34) ‘For the Low Nuclear / CH NTC sensitivity, nuclear capacity is 1 700 MW lower in France and 1190 MW lower in Switzerland. For all other countries, the installed capacity is unchanged compared to the base case. Additionally, NTCs between Switzerland and the neighbouring zones are reduced in order take account increasing unscheduled flows through Switzerland due to the fact that Switzerland may not be included in the flow-based market coupling (FBMC) in 2025.’

(35) See also recital (38) below.

(36) SA.48648 Belgian Strategic Reserve (OJ C 121, 6.4.2018).

(37) https://ec.europa.eu/energy/consultations/consultation-belgiums-market-reform-plan_en

(38) Commission opinion C(2020) 2654 final: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/markets-and-consumers/capacity-mechanisms_en

(39) https://economie.fgov.be/sites/default/files/Files/Energy/Belgian-electricity-market-Final-implementation-plan-CRM-22062020.pdf

(40) https://www.elia.be/en/grid-data/grid-development/investment-plan/federal-development-plan-2020-2030.

(41) These percentages are based on the definitions used by the Interconnection Target Experts Group (ITEG), i.e. interconnection rate = Total import / Total generation capacity, with total import implying “maximum power flow that the cross-border asset can transmit in accordance with system security criteria.

(42) https://www.elia.be/fr/users-group/implementation-crm

(43) https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/avis-a2030

(44) ‘The use of a Hi-Lo scenario, in which extreme events are assumed to be the base case, can hardly be considered to be a “statistically normal year”. On the contrary, a Hi-Lo scenario implies, by definition, an exceptional situation. The CREG does not deny that extreme situations may actually occur, but these must be included with their probability in a probabilistic simulation. Instead, Elia’s security of supply analyses based on a Hi-Lo scenario involves a calculation of an average LoLE with a statistically anomalous base assumption (i.e. “low probability”).’

(45) https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/note-z2024

(46) https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/proposition-e2064

(47) Expected Energy Not Served: forecast of annual demand that cannot be provided by resources available on the energy market, expressed in MWh

(48) https://www.plan.be/admin/uploaded/201403170843050.WP_1403.pdf

(49) https://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Electricity/Infrastructure_and_network%20development/Infrastructure/Documents/CEPA%20study%20on%20the%20Value%20of%20Lost%20Load%20in%20the%20electricity%20supply.pdf

(50) Other elements of the CREG’s proposal can be found here: https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/proposition-e2064

(51) https://economie.fgov.be/fr/themes/energie/securite-dapprovisionnement/mecanisme-de-remuneration-de

(52) See article 23 of regulation (EU) 2019/943

(53) See article 24 of regulation (EU) 2019/943

(54) https://economie.fgov.be/sites/default/files/Files/Energy/AR-methode-de-calcul-volume-de-capacite-parametres-encheres-mecanisme-de-remuneration-de-capacite-Annexe-1-Rapport-de-consultation.pdf; notably: ‘La DG Énergie constate que globalement, CBS soutient la méthode alternative telle que proposée par la DG Énergie. En particulier, CBS apprécie également que la possibilité soit prévue pour que des sensibilités HiLo puissent être prises en compte et que des volumes de balancing soient intégrés’, and ‘le paragraphe 4 de l’article 4 déroge des propositions précédentes d’Elia, en ce sens que la possibilité subsiste de tenir compte d’évènements HiLo, mais qu’il s’agit à présent d’une possibilité parmi d’autres. Elia peut se retrouver dans cette approche plus ouverte’. [‘DG Energy notes that, overall, CBS supports the alternative method proposed by DG Energy. In particular, CBS appreciates the possibility of taking into account HiLo sensitivities and that balancing volumes are integrated’, and ‘Article 4 (4) derogates from earlier proposals from Elia, in the sense that the possibility remains to take account of HiLo events, but is now one of several options. Elia supports this approach, which it find more open.’]

(55) Net-CONE represents the revenues that the best new entrant technology would need to earn in the capacity market to compensate for its ‘missing money’ in the energy market for 1 year. It is calculated by removing market revenues and ancillary service revenues from the Gross-CONE.

(56) The CREG launched a public consultation from 1 July 2020 to 13 July 2020 on a proposal of values of the CONE for a short-list of reference technologies, the WACC and the correction factor X (see recital (58)(b)).

(57) Considering CCGT, OCGT and Diesels in the short-list of reference technology and assuming average values for gross-CONE, energy market revenues and ancillary services revenues

(58) https://www.elia.be/en/public-consultation/20200505_public-consultation-on-the-scenarios-sensitivities-and-data-for-the-crm

(59)

‘2.2.1 French nuclear availability- The first sensitivity is in line with the 10-year Adequacy and Flexibility study 2020-30 (Elia, 2019) and is presented in § 2.6.8. It includes a nuclear availability reduced by 4 units in winter.’

(60) https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/proposition-c2105

(61) https://economie.fgov.be/sites/default/files/Files/Energy/avis-dg-energie-projet-proposition-2105-signed.pdf

(62) https://www.creg.be/fr/consultations-publiques/consultation-publique-relative-au-projet-de-proposition-2086-relative-au

(63) Elia launched a public consultation on the scenarios, sensitivities and data for the CRM parameter calculation for the Y-4 Auction for Delivery Period 2025-2026 (see recital (58)(a)).

(64) Derived from Figure 2-63, page 83 of the Adequacy and Flexibility Study for Belgium 2020 -2030. Note that for the OCGT technology, the values for units >25 are used, as there are OCGT units in the Belgian control zone that are older than 25 years.

(65) Derived from Section 4.4.5. Fixed costs under LTSA, page 36 of the Pöyry study in the context of CONE determination for the I-SEM

(66) Derived from data published on the Elia website regarding contracted volumes and prices for strategic reserves (https://www.elia.be/en/suppliers/supplier/energy-purchases/strategic-reserve-volume-and-prices), considering the average activation price for SDR winter period 2015-2016 for a 4h activation (hence corresponding to a 40 % derating), and assuming one availability test of 15 minutes per year, as follows:

(67) Considering the derating factor range for ‘large scale thermal’ varies between 85 and 95 %, as illustrated in Figure 4-5 of the Adequacy and Flexibility Study for Belgium 2020-2030, a derating factor of 90 % is applied for the CCGT, OCGT and Turbojet technology. For the Market Response technology, a range is used from 30 % (2h availability; low) — 40 % (4h availability; mid) — 55 % (8h availability; high) to take into account the variety of possibilities included in the Market Response technology.

(68) Calculated as follows:

(69) Based on estimations done in the context of the Adequacy and Flexibility Study for Belgium 2020-2030. The revenue estimations considered in this calibration exercise are derived based on a reference scenario for 2025. Furthermore, it is considered that by means of intervention, missing money is covered such that the — in the study so-called ‘not-viable gap’ — is filled, meaning that sufficient capacity is assumed in the system in 2025 to meet the adequacy requirements. The yearly inframarginal rents from the electricity market (MID values) are derived as P50 revenues from a probabilistic simulation. For the LOW and HIGH values, for the sake of this indicative calibration a range of 20 % around the estimated revenues is considered.

(70) Derived from the data published on the Elia website regarding capacity auctions for the balancing services (https://www.elia.be/en/grid-data/balancing/capacity-auction-results), considering the overall average of average procurement prices for all auctions related to delivery periods from January 2017 until December 2019. Note that only mFRR reservation fees below 10EUR/MW/h are taken into account towards the overall average value, as prices above this cut-off point are considered to represent periods with adequacy issues and therefore not representative for this analysis. The LOW/MID/HIGH values are calculated as 60/75/90 % of the overall average value, to account for variable costs associated with the reservation of mFRR, such as for instance a cost for making a bid. The net revenues from the provision of frequency-related balancing services, in order to avoid double counting and consider only net revenues, have been considered to the following extent:

— FCR revenues are not considered, since Batteries are likely to become the dominant technology to provide FCR. The Batteries technology is not considered for the calibration of the intermediate price cap, as they are considered to derive a positive business case from the provision of FCR.

— aFRR revenues are not considered, as it is assumed that technologies who provide aFRR arbitrage between the provision of aFRR and selling energy. Therefore, aFRR reservation fees are assumed not to represent a net revenue on top of the inframarginal rents earned on the energy market.

— mFRR revenues are considered relevant for the Turbojet (assumed to provide mFRR standard product) and Market response (assumed to provide mFRR flex product) technologies, as they typically provide these services currently in the market. More specifically, revenues for Turbojet and Market response are determined by a percentage of the average mFRR reservation fee or the inframarginal rent from the energy market, according to whichever of both leads to the highest value.

(71) Projet d’arrêté royal relatif à l’établissement des critères et modalités d'éligibilité à la procédure de préqualification en ce qui concerne les règles relatives au seuil minimal et au cumul des mesures d’aides

(72) The threshold for instance corresponds to the size of the larger existing units in the Belgian market and thereby such volume can be critical to create a competitive effect.

(73) Capacity providers are only eligible for capacity contracts up to their eligible volume, defined as their reference power (taking into account the opt-out volumes) multiplied by the derating factor.

(74) Arrêté royal fixant la méthode de calcul du volume de capacité nécessaire et des paramètres nécessaires pour l’organisation des enchères dans le cadre du mécanisme de rémunération de capacité.

(75) Based on Figure 4-5 of the latest Belgian Adequacy and Flexibility Study for Belgium 2020 — 2030 by Elia-https://www.elia.be/-/media/project/elia/elia-site/company/publication/studies-and-reports/studies/13082019adequacy-and-flexibility-study_en.pdf

(76) https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/proposition-c1907

(77) The volume that a CMU is obliged to make available during availability tests and availability monitoring.

(78) The CMU’s capacity that is actually available during the availability monitoring mechanism or the availability test.

(79) The maximum power (in MW) that the Delivery Point can inject into (or take off) the Elia grid for a certain quarter-hour, taking into account all technical, operational, meteorological or other restrictions known at the time of notification to Elia with the Daily Schedule, without taking into account any participation of the Delivery Point in the provision of balancing services.

(80) Projet d’arrêté royal relatif à l’établissement des conditions auxquelles les détenteurs de capacité étrangère directe et indirecte peuvent participer à la procédure de préqualification dans le cadre du mécanisme de rémunération de capacité (Draft royal decree on the establishment of the conditions under which holders of direct and indirect foreign capacity can participate in the prequalification procedure within the framework of the capacity remuneration mechanism).

(81) ‘Nominated electricity market operator (NEMO)’ means an entity designated by the competent authority to perform tasks related to single day-ahead or single intraday coupling — see article 2 Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

(82) https://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/none&leftmenu=no&language=fr&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/flwb/flwbn.cfm? lang=F&legislat=55&dossierID=1220

(83) https://www.creg.be/sites/default/files/assets/Publications/Decisions/Z1109-10FR.pdf

(84) Case 76/78 Steinike & Weinlig v Germany [1977] ECR 595, paragraph 21; Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 58; Case C-706/17 Achema [2019] paragraph 47 and following.

(85) Case C-345/02, Pearle and Others [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:448.

(86) Case C-677/11, Doux Élevage and Coopérative agricole UKL-ARREE [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:348.

(87) Case C- 405/16 P, Federal Republic of Germany v European Commission [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:268 , paragraph 68.

(88) See case C- 405/16 P, Federal Republic of Germany v European Commission [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:268, paragraphs 68 and 72; case C-706/17 Achema and Others [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:407, paragraph 57 and case T-217/17 FVE Holýšov I and Others v Commission [2019] ECLI:EU:T:2019:633, paragraph 111.

(89) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 11 July 1996, SFEI and Others, C-39/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 60; Judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 April 1999, Spain v Commission, C-342/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:210, paragraph 41.

(90) See notably Regulation (EC) no714/2009, Directive 2009/72/EC, Regulation (EU) no2019/943 and Directive (EU) 2019/944.

(91) OJ C 200, 28.6.2014, p. 1, as corrected by the corrigendum adopted by the Commission in OJ C 290, 10.8.2016, p. 11.

(92) See Communication C(2020) 4355 final — In particular, in point (16) of the EEAG, the following sentence has been added: ‘These Guidelines shall, however, apply to undertakings which were not in difficulty on 31 December 2019 but became undertakings in difficulty in the period from 1 January 2020 to 30 June 2021.’

(93) COM(2016) 752 final .https://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/capacity_mechanisms_final_report_en.pdf

(94) SA.4864 Belgian Strategic reserve (OJ C 121, 6.4.2018).

(95) SA.42011 Italian capacity mechanism (OJ C 158, 4.5.2018) (see recitals 79 and 80)

(96) SA.44464 Irish Capacity Mechanism (OJ C 121, 6.4.2018) (see recital 50); SA.46100 Polish capacity mechanism (OJ C 462, 21.12.2018) (see recitals 46, 47, 48); see SA.35980 British capacity market (OJ L 70, 6.3.2020) (see recital 70)

(97) SA.44464 Irish Capacity Mechanism (OJ C 121, 6.4.2018) (see recital 50); see SA.35980 British capacity market (OJ L 70, 6.3.2020) (see recital 71)

(98) Available at https://www.elia.be/fr/users-group/implementation-crm

(99) See recital (25) of the Commission Decision in State aid SA.40029 (2014/N) ‘Reintroduction of the winding-up scheme, compensation scheme, Model I and Model II — H1 2015’ (OJ C 136, 24.4.2015, p. 4). See recital (29) of Commission Decision in State aid SA.42215 (2015/N) ‘Prolongation of the Greek financial support measures (art. 2 law 3723/2008)’ (OJ C 277, 21.8.2015, p. 11).

(100) Case C-213/96 Outokumpu [1998] I-1777, paragraph 30.