LIVRE BLANC concernant la révision du règlement (CEE) n° 4056/86 déterminant les modalités d'application des règles européennes de concurrence aux transports maritimes {SEC(2004) 1254}

(présenté par la Commission)

1. Introduction

1.1. Objet du présent Livre blanc

1. Le présent Livre blanc vise à présenter de possibles propositions d'action communautaire en matière de concurrence dans les transports maritimes. En particulier, il examine l'opportunité de maintenir, de modifier ou d'abroger les dispositions en vigueur du règlement (CEE) n° 4056/86. Il analyse, en outre, la question de savoir s'il conviendrait de remplacer l'exemption par catégorie actuellement accordée aux conférences maritimes en vertu de ce règlement par d'autres instruments communautaires (comme une nouvelle exemption par catégorie ou une série de lignes directrices), qui couvriraient tout nouveau cadre de coopération commerciale entre opérateurs de services de ligne sur les trafics à destination et en partance de l'UE (outre les formes de coopération existantes, comme les consortiums et les alliances).

1.2. Le règlement (CEE) n° 4056/86 du Conseil

2. Le règlement (CEE) n° 4056/86 du Conseil déterminant les modalités d'application des articles 81 et 82 du traité aux transports maritimes (ci-après «le règlement 4056/86») [1] avait initialement une double fonction. D'une part, il contenait des dispositions procédurales dotant concrètement la Commission des instruments nécessaires à des enquêtes efficaces et à la bonne application des règles européennes de concurrence dans le secteur des transports maritimes. D'autre part, il prévoyait, pour ce secteur, un certain nombre de dispositions matérielles. La plus importante de ces dispositions matérielles est l'exemption par catégorie de l'interdiction énoncée à l'article 81, paragraphe 1, du traité applicable à certaines catégories d'accords, de décisions ou de pratiques concertées entre conférences maritimes. La première fonction du règlement 4056/86 est devenue superflue le 1er mai 2004, lorsque le règlement (CE) n° 1/2003 du Conseil [2] est devenu applicable, introduisant des dispositions communes d'application des règles européennes de concurrence dans presque tous les secteurs, y compris le secteur des transports maritimes (à quelques exceptions près), et abrogeant du même coup les dispositions procédurales du règlement 4056/86. En revanche, les dispositions matérielles du règlement 4056/86 n'ont, à ce jour, jamais été modifiées. Après la suppression du régime procédural spécifiquement applicable aux transports maritimes en matière de concurrence, l'étape suivante consiste logiquement à se demander si, dans les conditions actuelles du marché, les dispositions matérielles susmentionnées restent justifiées.

[1] Règlement (CEE) n° 4056/86 du Conseil, du 22 décembre 1986, déterminant les modalités d'application des articles 85 et 86 [nouveaux articles 81 et 82] du traité aux transports maritimes, JO L 378 du 31.12.1986, p. 24, modifié par le règlement (CE) n° 1/2003 du Conseil, du 16 décembre 2002 (JO L 1 du 4.1.2003, p. 1).

[2] Règlement (CE) n° 1/2003 du Conseil, du 16 décembre 2002 (JO L 1 du 4.1.2003, p. 1).

1.3. La révision

3. La révision doit être replacée dans son contexte européen global. Le Conseil européen de Lisbonne de mars 2000 avait ainsi invité la Commission à «accélérer la libéralisation dans des secteurs tels que le gaz, l'électricité, les services postaux et les transports» [3]. La révision a aussi été inspirée par un rapport du secrétariat de l'OCDE, publié en avril 2002, qui préconisait d'envisager la suppression de l'exemption des règles antitrust pour la fixation des prix et les discussions sur les taux [4].

[3] SN 100/1/100.

[4] Rapport du secrétariat de l'OCDE d'avril 2002: «Politique de la concurrence dans le transport maritime de lignes régulières», pp. 80 à 88, disponible sur: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/43/18114169.pdf.

4. La révision porte essentiellement sur l'exemption par catégorie dont bénéficient actuellement certaines pratiques restrictives des conférences maritimes, notamment la fixation des prix et la régulation de l'offre. Mais elle couvre aussi d'autres dispositions du règlement 4056/86: l'exclusion de certains services maritimes, à savoir le cabotage (services maritimes nationaux) et les services de tramp (services non réguliers), des dispositions d'application des règles de concurrence, la disposition sur les ententes techniques et la disposition sur les conflits de droit.

5. Depuis l'adoption du règlement 4056/86 il y a 18 ans, le marché des transports maritimes de ligne a changé. En particulier, les transporteurs offrant ce type de services en dehors d'une conférence (opérateurs indépendants) ont accru leur part de marché sur la plupart des routes à destination et en partance de l'UE. En outre, des formes opérationnelles de coopération entre transporteurs (n'impliquant pas de fixation des prix), comme les consortiums et les alliances, se sont développées Enfin, les contrats confidentiels conclus sur une base individuelle entre transporteurs et chargeurs, comme les contrats de services individuels, ont enregistré une forte progression. Cette évolution pose la question de savoir si l'exemption par catégorie dont bénéficient les accords de fixation des prix et de régulation des capacités conclus par les conférences maritimes reste justifiée au titre de l'article 81, paragraphe 3, du traité.

6. Il a été convenu avec les États membres [5] que la révision se ferait en trois étapes: 1) enquête, 2) document de la Commission et 3) proposition législative. Le processus a été engagé en mars 2003, avec la publication d'un document de consultation, qui est disponible sur: . Au total, la Commission a reçu trente-six contributions, émanant d'opérateurs de services de ligne (transporteurs), d'usagers (chargeurs et transitaires), des États membres, d'associations de consommateurs et autres parties intéressées. Une équipe d'économistes de l'Université Érasme de Rotterdam a été chargée de l'aider à traiter ces réponses. Celles-ci, ainsi que le rapport final de l'équipe «Érasme», ont été mis en ligne sur le site web de la Commission. À la suite d'une audition publique organisée en décembre 2003, la direction générale de la concurrence a exposé les résultats du processus de consultation et son analyse préliminaire dans un document de discussion. Ce document, qui a servi de base à un débat avec les États membres en mai 2004, a également été publié sur: .

[5] Comité consultatif ad hoc du 25 mars 2002.

1.4. Questions en jeu

7. La révision du règlement 4056/86 soulève essentiellement les questions suivantes:

(a) En l'état actuel du marché, l'exemption par catégorie dont bénéficient les accords de fixation des taux de fret et de régulation de l'offre et du marché conclus par les conférences maritimes se justifie-t-elle encore au titre de l'article 81, paragraphe 3, du traité?

(b) Dans la négative, serait-il nécessaire et opportun d'adopter d'autres instruments communautaires (comme une nouvelle exemption par catégorie ou une série de lignes directrices), qui couvriraient tout nouveau cadre de coopération commerciale entre opérateurs de services de ligne sur les trafics à destination et en partance de l'UE (outre les formes de coopération existantes, comme les consortiums et les alliances)?

(c) L'exclusion du cabotage et des services de tramp des dispositions d'application des règles de concurrence contenues dans le règlement (CE) n° 1/2003 est-elle toujours justifiée?

(d) Existe-t-il une raison valable de maintenir l'exception spécifiquement applicable aux ententes purement techniques, prévue dans le règlement 4056/86?

(e) Existe-t-il une raison valable de maintenir la disposition relative aux conflits de droit prévue dans le règlement 4056/86?

2. L'exemption par catégorie accordée aux conférences maritimes

8. Le règlement 4056/86 prévoit l'application, sous réserve de certaines conditions et obligations, d'une exemption dite «par catégorie» aux accords, décisions et pratiques concertées liant certains ou tous les membres d'une ou de plusieurs conférences maritimes, telles que définies à son article 1er, paragraphe 3, point b), lorsqu'ils ont pour objet la fixation des taux et les conditions de transport et couvrent, en outre, l'une au moins des formes de coopération suivantes:

- la coordination des horaires des navires ou de leurs dates de voyage ou d'escale;

- la détermination de la fréquence des voyages ou des escales;

- la coordination ou la répartition des voyages ou des escales entre les membres de la conférence;

- la régulation de la capacité de transport offerte par chacun des membres;

- la répartition entre les membres du tonnage transporté ou de la recette.

9. Il découle du règlement 4056/86 lui-même, de la pratique décisionnelle de la Commission et de la jurisprudence de la Cour que cet acte prévoit une exemption par catégorie de «caractère tout à fait exceptionnel» [6], puisque la fixation des prix et la régulation des capacités, normalement considérées comme des restrictions caractérisées de la concurrence [7], sont exemptées pour une durée illimitée et qu'aucun seuil de part de marché n'est fixé. De fait, on ne peut expliquer le règlement qu'en le replaçant dans son contexte historique.

[6] Voir l'affaire T-86/95, Compagnie générale maritime, Rec. 2002, p. II-1011, points 254, 393 et 484.

[7] On considère généralement que les restrictions caractérisées sont des restrictions de la concurrence par objet qui relèvent de l'article 81, paragraphe 1, du traité et ne remplissent pas les conditions d'exemption énoncées à son article 81, paragraphe 3.

10. Les conférences maritimes ont essayé d'interpréter l'exemption par catégorie au sens large, en considérant notamment que les accords de non-utilisation de capacités [8] et de fixation du prix des services d'acheminement terrestre [9] relevaient de son champ d'application. Ni la Commission, ni la Cour n'ont cependant accepté cette interprétation. En effet, l'exemption par catégorie déroge à l'article 81, paragraphe 1, du traité et doit donc être interprétée au sens strict [10]: les objectifs poursuivis par les autres dispositions du traité ne peuvent être pris en considération que dans la mesure où ils peuvent être intégrés dans les quatre conditions de son article 81, paragraphe 3 [11].

[8] Voir les décisions TAA, EATA et TACA révisé du 14 novembre 2002 (JO L 26 du 31.1.2003, p. 53) et le communiqué de presse de la Commission IP/02/1677 du 14.11.2002.

[9] Voir les décisions TAA, FEFC, TACA et TACA révisé du 14 novembre 2002 (JO L 26 du 31.1.2003, p. 53) et le communiqué de presse de la Commission IP/02/1677 du 14.11.2002.

[10] Voir les affaires jointes T-191/98 et T-212/98 à T-214/98, TACA, Rec. 2003 non encore publié, point 568.

[11] Voir à cet effet les implications de l'affaire T-17/93, Matra, Rec. 1994, p. II-595, point 139, et de l'affaire 26/76, Metro, Rec. 1977, p. 1875, point 43.

2.1. Appréciation

11. Les règles européennes de concurrence ont été forgées dans l'idée que la concurrence garantit l'offre des meilleurs services au consommateur, aux prix les plus abordables. C'est pourquoi le traité part du principe qu'il ne doit pas y avoir de distorsion de la concurrence et que toute exception à cette règle doit être justifiée. Les accords qui restreignent la concurrence au sens de l'article 81, paragraphe 1, du traité (comme les accords de fixation des prix et de régulation des capacités) ne peuvent ainsi être exemptés que s'ils remplissent les quatre conditions cumulatives énoncées à l'article 81, paragraphe 3, du traité, à savoir:

1) l'accord considéré doit contribuer à améliorer la production ou la distribution de produits ou à promouvoir le progrès technique ou économique (efficacité);

2) les consommateurs doivent recevoir une partie équitable du profit qui en résulte (répercussion);

3) les restrictions doivent être indispensables pour atteindre les objectifs poursuivis (indispensabilité); et

4) l'accord ne doit pas donner aux parties la possibilité, pour une partie substantielle des produits en cause, d'éliminer la concurrence (non-élimination de la concurrence).

12. L'application de l'article 81, paragraphe 3, du traité à certaines catégories d'accords via un règlement d'exemption par catégorie part du principe selon lequel les accords restrictifs relevant de ce règlement remplissent chacune des quatre conditions énoncées dans cet article.

13. La justification de l'exemption par catégorie accordée aux conférences maritimes est contenue dans le 8e considérant du règlement 4056/86: pour l'essentiel, celui-ci considère que les conférences maritimes jouent un rôle stabilisateur de nature à garantir des services fiables, qui ne pourraient être assurés par des moyens moins restrictifs. À cet égard, le Tribunal de première instance a toutefois fait valoir que «le Conseil n'a pas affirmé (et n'aurait d'ailleurs pu le faire) que la notion de stabilité a plus d'importance que la question de la concurrence» [12].

[12] Affaire T-395/94, TAA, Rec. 2002, p. II-00875, point 261.

14. Il convient de noter que la justification avancée dans le 8e considérant du règlement 4056/86 n'était pas fondée sur l'expérience qu'aurait pu acquérir la Commission dans l'application de l'article 81, paragraphe 3, aux conférences maritimes [13]. Dans ce contexte, la principale question qui se pose dans le cadre de la révision consiste à savoir si, au regard des conditions cumulatives de l'article 81, paragraphe 3, la justification invoquée dans le règlement 4056/86 pour la fixation des prix et la régulation de l'offre par les conférences maritimes peut (encore) être réputée valable en l'état actuel du marché. Dans la négative, l'exemption par catégorie n'aurait plus de justification légale et devrait donc être abolie ou modifiée. Aux fins de cette appréciation, les parties ont été invitées à soumettre des éléments de preuve factuels.

[13] À titre de comparaison, voir notamment le règlement (CE) n° 823/2000 sur les consortiums (JO L 100 du 20.4.2000, p. 24), le règlement (CE) n° 1400/2002 sur les véhicules automobiles (JO L 203 du 1.8.2002, p. 30) et le règlement (CE) n° 2790/1999 sur les accords verticaux (JO L 336 du 29.12.1999, p. 21), dans lesquels la Commission fait explicitement référence à l'expérience qu'elle a acquise dans les secteurs concernés et qui lui a permis de déterminer les catégories d'accords pouvant être considérées comme remplissant normalement les conditions énoncées à l'article 81, paragraphe 3.

15. Ainsi qu'on l'explique plus en détail en annexe, il ressort de la consultation que les quatre conditions cumulatives pouvant justifier l'exemption des accords de fixation des prix et de régulation de l'offre et du marché conclus par les conférences maritimes ne semblent plus remplies. Aucune donnée économique ne permet de conclure que les considérations en vertu desquelles l'exemption par catégorie avait été justifiée lors de son adoption en 1986 se vérifient toujours en l'état actuel du marché et au regard des quatre conditions cumulatives de l'article 81, paragraphe 3.

3. Autres formes de coopération entre compagnies maritimes de ligne

3.1. Introduction

16. Les conférences ne sont pas l'unique forme d'organisation entre opérateurs de services de ligne. Ces services peuvent également être assurés dans le cadre de consortiums et d'alliances. Les activités des consortiums font l'objet d'une exemption par catégorie en vertu de l'article 81, paragraphe 3, du traité, aux conditions et sous réserve des obligations prévues dans le règlement (CE) n° 823/2000. Les transporteurs peuvent également décider de fusionner leurs activités, auquel cas celles-ci doivent être évaluées conformément aux règles (nationales ou communautaires) applicables en matière de contrôle des opérations de concentration.

3.2. Les accords de discussion

17. Parmi les formes de coopération possibles entre compagnies maritimes de ligne, autres que celles existant déjà sur les trafics à destination et en partance de l'UE, on pourrait notamment citer les accords dits de discussion. De tels accords existent, en particulier, sur les trafics avec les États-unis et les trafics à destination et en partance de l'Australie [14]. Un accord de discussion est une sorte d'accord cadre permettant aux transporteurs qui sont membres d'une conférence et aux autres de coordonner souplement leur comportement concurrentiel sur le marché en ce qui concerne les taux de fret et d'autres conditions de service. Le champ d'application et le contenu sont variables. Les accords de discussion prévoient généralement l'échange d'informations commercialement sensibles entre concurrents et devraient donc respecter la jurisprudence constante de la Cour en matière d'échange d'informations. Mais il y a plus important encore: comme le montre la situation aux États-unis, leur souplesse intrinsèque rend les accords de discussion attrayants pour les compagnies traditionnellement indépendantes. Étant ainsi susceptibles de supprimer toute exposition des conférences maritimes à une véritable concurrence externe, ils pourraient se révéler encore pires que ces dernières en termes de concurrence.

[14] Pour une description plus approfondie de la situation dans ces pays, voir l'annexe du présent document.

18. Cependant, d'autres formes de coopération entre compagnies maritimes de lignes peuvent être envisagées qui seraient compatibles avec le droit communautaire de la concurrence.

3.3. La proposition de l'ELAA

19. La European Liners Affairs Association (ELAA) a présenté à la Commission une proposition de nouvelle «structure réglementaire» pour les services de ligne à destination et en partance de l'UE [15], qui pourrait - selon elle - remplacer le règlement 4056/86 [16]. La Commission a pris note de cette proposition, mais tient à souligner que ce n'est le fruit d'aucune négociation, ni d'aucun accord avec ses services. Ce document reflète simplement ce que l'ELAA estime être un cadre approprié pour la coopération commerciale entre compagnies maritimes de ligne. Fondamentalement, l'ELAA propose [17]:

[15] Dans sa proposition, l'ELAA définit les services de transport maritime de ligne comme «le transport de marchandises effectué de manière régulière sur une route ou des routes particulières entre des ports et selon des horaires et des dates de voyage annoncés au préalable et disponible même sur une base occasionnelle à tout usager de transport moyennant paiement, ainsi que les activités connexes» (à titre de comparaison, voir l'article 2, paragraphe 2, du règlement (CE) n° 823/2000).

[16] La proposition finale de l'ELAA, du 6 août 2004, est disponible (en anglais uniquement) sur: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/maritime/elaa_proposal/elaa_proposal_6_august_2004_en.pdf.

[17] Pour une description plus détaillée, voir l'annexe.

- l'échange et la discussion, entre compagnies, de données agrégées sur l'utilisation des capacités et la taille du marché, par trafic et sur une base «région à région et zone à zone» (données vieilles d'un mois);

- l'échange, la discussion et l'évaluation de données agrégées sur les fluctuations des marchandises par trafic (données vieilles d'un mois);

- la discussion et l'évaluation de données agrégées sur l'offre et la demande par trafic/par marchandise (les prévisions d'évolution de la demande par trafic et par marchandise seraient publiées);

- la possibilité, pour les compagnies, de connaître leur part de marché par trafic, par région et par port (sur la base de données agrégées vieilles d'un mois);

- l'établissement (sur la base de données agrégées vieilles d'un trimestre) d'un indice des prix différencié par type d'équipement (par exemple, frigorifique ou pour vrac sec) et/ou par trafic, qui serait publié;

- le calcul du surfret et des frais accessoires sur la base de formules transparentes, qui seraient publiées (le détail en serait discuté avec les chargeurs).

3.4. Observations préliminaires sur la proposition de l'ELAA

20. La Commission salue la volonté manifestée par les transporteurs de réfléchir à une organisation future des transports maritimes de ligne autre que l'actuel système de conférences. En fait, le secteur lui-même a laissé entendre qu'aujourd'hui, certains transporteurs ne sont plus autant intéressés par les activités exemptées au titre du règlement 4056/86 (notamment la fixation des prix et la régulation de l'offre et du marché) que par le «processus de discussion» qui va avec. Il va toutefois sans dire que toute proposition de nouveau cadre de coopération entre compagnies maritimes de ligne devra être soigneusement examinée au regard de sa compatibilité avec les règles européennes de concurrence.

21. La Commission est bien consciente que les transporteurs membres d'une conférence ont pris l'habitude d'exercer des activités qui, dans tout autre secteur économique, auraient normalement été proscrites en vertu des règles européennes de concurrence. Du fait de cette position privilégiée, certains auront peut-être du mal à s'adapter à une situation dans laquelle ils seront tenus de se conformer à ces règles comme les entreprises de n'importe quel autre secteur. Dans ces circonstances, on peut aussi comprendre que, dans une perspective commerciale, les transporteurs cherchent à obtenir une suppression progressive du régime actuel ou, au moins, un autre régime qui reste proche du régime actuel et tienne compte au mieux de leur situation particulière. Il convient cependant de rappeler que toute poursuite du traitement particulier accordé, en vertu des règles européennes de concurrence, au secteur des transports maritimes de ligne par rapport à d'autres secteurs à haute intensité de capital et où les coûts fixes sont élevés et la demande fluctuante (comme les transports aériens), devrait être motivée de façon convaincante. En outre, il faudrait tenir compte de l'impact de tout autre régime envisagé sur l'ensemble du secteur des transports maritimes de ligne, c'est-à-dire considérer les intérêts non seulement des transporteurs membres d'une conférence, mais aussi ceux de leurs concurrents (opérateurs indépendants), de leurs clients (chargeurs) et du consommateur final. L'ELAA a fait valoir que sa proposition bénéficierait à l'ensemble du secteur, aux transporteurs aussi bien qu'à leurs clients. À cet égard, la Commission invite expressément toutes les parties intéressées, notamment les chargeurs (les associations comme l'ESC et les chargeurs indépendants), à en commenter les divers volets.

3.5. Conclusion

22. Si l'exemption par catégorie actuellement applicable aux accords de fixation des prix et de régulation des capacités conclus par les conférences maritimes est abrogée, cette abrogation aura essentiellement pour effet de rendre les conférences maritimes sur les trafics à destination et en partance de l'UE, telles que définies dans le règlement 4056/86, incompatibles avec l'article 81 du traité [18]. La question est de savoir quel type d'instrument juridique de droit communautaire il serait nécessaire d'adopter fournissant des orientations sur l'applicabilité de l'article 81 aux autres formes de coopération entre opérateurs de services de ligne. Naturellement, l'opportunité d'un tel instrument juridique et la forme à lui donner dépendraient très fortement du contenu du cadre de coopération envisagé et, en particulier, de la question de savoir s'il implique des restrictions de la concurrence au sens de l'article 81, paragraphe 1, du traité et, dans l'affirmative, si les conditions d'une exemption au titre de l'article 81, paragraphe 3, peuvent être réputées remplies.

[18] Au moins toute conférence maritime au sens d'un groupe d'au moins deux transporteurs exploitants de navires assurant des services de ligne auxquels sont appliqués des taux de fret uniformes ou communs (voir, à titre de comparaison, la définition contenue à l'article 1er, paragraphe 3, point b), du règlement 4056/86).

23. La Commission invite les tiers à lui soumettre leurs observations, d'une part, sur la nécessité d'un nouvel instrument juridique applicable à un éventuel nouveau cadre de coopération commerciale entre compagnies maritimes de ligne et, d'autre part, sur la forme que cet instrument pourrait revêtir.

4. Cabotage et services de tramp

24. Les services internationaux de tramp, tels que définis à l'article 1er, paragraphe 3, point a), du règlement 4056/86, et les services de transport maritime assurés exclusivement entre des ports d'un seul et même État membre (cabotage), comme prévu à l'article 1er, paragraphe 2, du règlement 4056/86, sont actuellement exclus des dispositions d'application des règles européennes de concurrence, conformément à l'article 32, points a) et b), du règlement (CE) n° 1/2003 [19], [20].

[19] Le 1er mai 2004, le règlement (CE) n° 1/2003 a remplacé les dispositions procédurales du règlement 4056/86. Depuis cette date, l'exclusion du cabotage et des services de tramp du champ d'application du règlement 4056/86 a, en fait, perdu toute signification concrète.

[20] Pour éviter toute confusion, il convient de rappeler que les règles matérielles de concurrence (les articles 81 et 82 du traité) s'appliquent aussi à ces services. L'exclusion est limitée à leurs dispositions d'application (en d'autres termes, le règlement (CE) n° 1/2003 ne s'applique pas au tramp, ni au cabotage).

25. Ainsi qu'on l'explique plus en détail en annexe, aucun argument crédible n'a été avancé pour justifier pourquoi ces services devraient bénéficier d'autres dispositions d'application que celles que le Conseil a retenues pour tous les autres secteurs de l'économie. Aucune explication n'a non plus été fournie quant aux conséquences négatives que le secteur pourrait légitiment craindre d'un changement procédural. Sur cette base, la Commission propose de faire entrer le cabotage et les services de tramp dans le champ d'application des dispositions générales du règlement (CE) n° 1/2003. Cependant, aux fins d'aider le secteur des services de tramp à évaluer notamment leurs accords de pool, la Commission examinera la possibilité de clarifier la situation d'une manière qui reste à déterminer.

5. Ententes techniques

26. L'article 2 du règlement 4056/86 autorise les transporteurs maritimes à conclure des accords qui ont seulement pour objet et pour effet de mettre en oeuvre des améliorations techniques ou une coopération technique. Ces accords ne relèvent pas de l'article 81, paragraphe 1, du traité. L'article 2 précité est illustré par certains exemples (normes ou types pour les navires et le matériel, coordination des horaires de transports sur des itinéraires successifs, etc.).

27. Comme l'annexe l'explique plus en détail, l'exception spécifiquement applicable aux ententes techniques revêt un caractère purement déclaratoire, ainsi que la Cour de justice européenne l'a confirmé. C'est pourquoi le présent document propose de l'abroger, comme le Conseil l'a fait plus tôt cette année dans le secteur des transports aériens.

6. Conflit de droit

28. L'article 9 du règlement 4056/86 prévoit une procédure qui devrait être mise en oeuvre au cas où l'application du règlement entraînerait un conflit avec le droit d'un pays tiers. La Commission devrait alors consulter les autorités compétentes de ce pays tiers et, le cas échéant, demander au Conseil de l'autoriser à ouvrir des négociations. Si cette disposition a été incluse à l'origine dans le règlement 4056/86, c'est apparemment à cause de l'impression que, du fait des caractéristiques du transport maritime international, l'application du règlement pourrait conduire à des conflits avec les législations et réglementations de certains pays tiers et avoir des conséquences dommageables pour des intérêts commerciaux et maritimes importants de la Communauté (15e considérant du règlement 4056/86).

29. Comme l'annexe l'explique plus en détail, aucun conflit de droit n'a eu lieu dans le passé, et il est improbable qu'il s'en produise jamais, même si l'exemption par catégorie accordée aux conférences maritimes était totalement abrogée. Par conséquent, le maintien de la disposition y afférente ne semble pas justifié.

7. Conclusions

30. Il découle des considérations qui précèdent que les réponses à apporter aux différentes questions posées sont les suivantes:

(a) En l'état actuel du marché, l'exemption par catégorie dont bénéficient les accords de fixation des prix et de régulation de l'offre et du marché conclus par les conférences maritimes se justifie-t-elle encore au titre de l'article 81, paragraphe 3, du traité?Aucune donnée économique ne permet de conclure que les considérations en vertu desquelles l'exemption par catégorie avait été justifiée lors de son adoption en 1986 se vérifient encore en l'état actuel du marché et au regard des quatre conditions cumulatives de l'article 81, paragraphe 3. Se fondant sur ce constat, la Commission envisage de proposer d'abroger l'exemption par catégorie actuellement accordée aux conférences maritimes.

(b) Dans la négative, la Commission envisage-t-elle de remplacer l'exemption par catégorie actuellement accordée aux conférences maritimes et applicable aux services de ligne sur les trafics à destination et en partance de l'UE par un instrument de nature juridique différente ? La Commission examinera les propositions formulées par l'industrie ainsi que toutes les parties intéressées, en vue de prendre position, au moyen d'un instrument juridiquement approprié, quant à des formes alternatives de coopération entre compagnies maritimes de lignes. ELAA a formulé des propositions concrètes à ce sujet. Avant de prendre position, la Commission invite toutes les parties intéressées à lui faire part de leurs commentaires, accompagnés le cas échéant d'autres propositions alternatives.

(c) L'exclusion des services de tramp et du cabotage (services maritimes nationaux) des dispositions d'application des règles de concurrence contenues dans le règlement (CE) n° 1/2003 est-elle toujours justifiée? Aucun argument crédible n'a été avancé pour justifier pourquoi ces services devraient bénéficier d'autres dispositions d'application que celles que le Conseil a retenues pour tous les autres secteurs de l'économie. Aucune explication n'a non plus été fournie quant aux conséquences négatives que le secteur pourrait légitiment craindre d'un changement procédural. Sur cette base, la Commission envisage de proposer de faire entrer le cabotage et les services de tramp dans le champ d'application du règlement (CE) n° 1/2003. La Commission clarifiera la situation s'agissant de l'application des règles de concurrence aux services de tramp.

(d) Existe-t-il une raison valable de maintenir l'exception spécifiquement applicable aux ententes purement techniques? La disposition sur les ententes techniques prévue à l'article 2 du règlement 4056/86 revêt un caractère purement déclaratoire, ainsi que la Cour l'a confirmé. La Commission envisage de proposer de l'abroger, comme le Conseil l'a fait plus tôt cette année dans le secteur des transports aériens.

(e) Existe-t-il une raison valable de maintenir la disposition relative aux conflits de droit prévue dans le règlement 4056/86? Aucun conflit de droit n'a eu lieu dans le passé et le maintien de l'article 9 du règlement 4056/86 ne semble pas justifié. Cependant, avant d'arrêter sa position, la Commission souhaiterait inviter les parties intéressées, et notamment ses homologues internationaux, à lui soumettre leurs observations concernant l'éventuelle nécessité d'une disposition sur les conflits de droit.

8. Proposition d'action

31. Au regard des conclusions qui précèdent, la Commission propose:

- D'envisager d'abroger les dispositions matérielles du règlement 4056/86 aujourd'hui en vigueur, en particulier l'exemption par catégorie accordée aux conférences maritimes et l'exception applicable aux ententes techniques;

- d'examiner quel type d'instrument juridique pourrait être nécessaire pour remplacer le règlement 4056/86 et de faire une proposition appropriée à cet égard, en prenant en considération la compétitivité des compagnies maritimes de lignes communautaires dans un contexte global.

- d'étudier soigneusement la proposition de l'ELAA exposée dans le présent document, à la lumière des observations présentées à ce sujet par les tiers intéressés, ainsi que toute autre proposition qui serait présentée par l'industrie ou les tiers intéressés;

- De proposer de modifier le règlement (CE) n° 1/2003, de manière à inclure le cabotage et les services de tramp dans son champ d'application;

- d'examiner attentivement la question de savoir si le maintien d'une disposition sur les conflits de droit est justifié;

9. Invitation à présenter des observations

32. La Commission invite les États membres, toutes les autres institutions et les parties intéressées à lui soumettre leurs observations sur le présent Livre blanc dans les deux mois suivant sa publication, en écrivant:

par la poste à l'adresse suivante:

Direction générale de la concurrence

Commission européenne

Unité D2 (transports)

Livre blanc sur la révision du régime applicable aux transports maritimes

Rue Joseph II 70, 2/237

1049 Bruxelles

par courrier électronique à l'adresse suivante:

COMP-D2-REVIEW4056@cec.eu.int

Pièce jointe: document de référence

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Annex to the WHITE PAPER on the review of Regulation 4056/86, applying the EC competition rules to maritime transport {COM(2004)675 final}

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Liner shipping conferences 3

2. International developments regarding liner conferences 4

2.1.1. Introduction 4

2.1.2. United States 4

2.1.3. Australia 5

2.1.4. The OECD 6

3. The block exemption for liner conferences in Regulation 4056/86 6

3.1. Relevant provisions 6

3.2. Assessment 8

3.2.1. Legal and economic framework 8

3.2.2. Burden of proof 9

3.2.3. Outcome of the consultation on the block exemption 9

3.2.4. The four cumulative criteria of Article 81(3) 10

3.2.4.1. Efficiencies 10

3.2.4.2. Consumer benefits 11

3.2.4.3. Indispensability 11

3.2.4.4. No elimination of competition 12

3.2.5. Conclusion on Article 81(3) EC 13

4. Impact of withdrawal of the block exemption on the market 13

4.1. Introduction 13

4.2. Impact assessment 14

4.2.1. Effect on trade 14

4.2.2. Effect on investment and fleet 16

4.2.3. Effect on innovation 19

4.2.4. Effect on consumer prices 19

4.2.5. Effect on employment 20

4.2.6. Experience from other liberalised markets 20

4.2.7. Position of EU carriers in global context 21

4.3. Conclusion 22

5. Other forms of liner shipping co-operation 22

5.1. Introduction 22

5.2. Discussion agreements 22

5.3. Comments 23

5.4. The ELAA proposal 24

5.4.1. Main elements 24

5.4.2. Details 24

5.5. Preliminary comments on the ELAA Proposal 28

5.5.1. General remarks 28

5.5.2. Differences of the ELAA proposal compared to present conference activities 28

5.5.3. Capacity forecasting 32

5.5.4. Commodity developments 33

5.5.5. Market shares 33

5.5.6. Price index 33

5.5.7. Formulae for surcharges and ancillary surcharges 34

5.6. Conclusion 34

6. Cabotage and tramp services 35

6.1. Relevant provisions 35

6.2. Outcome of the consultation 35

6.3. Assessment 36

6.3.1. General remarks 36

6.3.2. Cabotage 37

6.3.3. Tramp 37

6.3.4. Conclusion 38

7. Technical agreements 38

7.1. Relevant provision 38

7.2. Outcome of the consultation 39

7.3. Assessment 39

7.4. Conclusion 40

8. Conflict of laws 40

8.1. Relevant provision 40

8.2. Outcome of the consultation 40

8.3. Assessment 40

8.4. Conclusion 41

1. Liner shipping conferences

1. Liner shipping conferences exist since 1875. They are associations of ship-owners (carriers, providing liner shipping services to transport users (shippers)) served by a secretariat. The ship-owners set common or uniform freight rates and make a common policy on the discounts or rebates which may be offered to shippers. Furthermore, they may share the cargo between themselves in various ways and coordinate timetables. Conferences themselves do not bring about the joint operation of liner shipping services. [21] Rather the members of the conference do, either on an individual basis or in co-operation with other liner service providers (e.g. in a operational co-operation form such as a consortia). [22]

[21] Compare TACA decision of 16 September 1998, OJ L 95 of 9.4.1999, p. 1) para 93-95.

[22] A consortia is a form of operational co-operation between liner companies, see for consortia para 38.

2. There are currently about 150 liner shipping conferences world-wide, of which 28 operate on trades to and from the EU. [23] The conferences on the three main trades to and from the EU (that is the transatlantic trade, the Europe-Eastern Asia trade and the Europe-Australia/New Zealand trade) [24] are respectively the Trans Atlantic Conference Agreement (TACA) [25], the Far Eastern Freight Conference (FEFC) [26] and the Europe Australia New Zealand Conferences (TEANZC) [27]. Their members include both European and non-European liner shipping carriers, e.g. 4 out of the 7 TACA members, 4 out of the 15 FEFC members and 6 out of the 7 TEANZC members are European carriers.

[23] OECD Secretariat report of April 2002, Competition policy in liner shipping, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/46/2553902.pdf. p. 19. and ELAA submission of 18 June 2003 to DG Competition's consultation paper available at [www.europa.eu.int/comm./competition/antitrust/review/submissions/elaa.pdf.

[24] These trades are ranked first (Far East-Europe), second (Transatlantic route, with the US), and sixth (Australia and New Zealand) of all trades to and from the EU.

[25] The 7 members of TACA are: AP Moller/Maersk (DA), Atlantic Container Line AB (US), Hapag-Lloyd Container Line GmbH (DE), Mediterranean Shipping Co S.A. (SWISS), Nippon Yusen Kaisha NYK Line (Japan), Orient Overseas Container Line (China) and P&O Nedlloyd Limited (UK/NL). See www.tacaconf.com

[26] The 15 members of FEFC are: ANL Container Lines Pty Ltd (Australian but fully owned subsidiary to CMA CGM France), CMA CGM SA (FR), APL Co Pte Ltd. (Singapore), Egyptian International Shipping Co., Hapag-Lloyd Container Linie GmbH (DE), Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. (Korea), Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. (Japan), Maersk SeaLand (DA), Malaysia International Shipping Corporation Berhad, Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd (Japan), Nippon Yusen Kaisha (Japan), Norasia Container Lines Ltd (Hong Kong), Orient Overseas Container Line (Hong Kong), P & O Nedlloyd Ltd (UK-NL)., Yangming Marine Transport Corporation (Taiwan). See www.fefclondon.com

[27] The 7 members of TEANZC are: Australia National Line - ANL, Consortium Hispania Lines (ES), Contship Containerlines (UK), Hamburg-Suedamerikanische Dampfschiffahrts Gesellschaft Eggert & Amsinck (DE), Hapag Lloyd (DE), Lloyd Triestino (IT). P&O Containers (UK-NL). See http://www.anl.com.au.

3. Conferences secretariats organise the meetings of the members of the conference and monitor trade conditions by collecting statistics of trade volumes and prices which are supplied to the secretariat by the members of the conference. The data collected and information exchanged may differ depending on the trade. According to the European Liners Affairs Association (ELAA), an organisation which was specifically established in May 2003 to represent the carriers' position on the review of Regulation 4056/86, the following data are provided by members to the secretariat and the following topics are discussed at the meetings for the three main EU conferences respectively: [28]

[28] ELAA response of 18 June 2003 to the consultation paper, page 68, available at [www.europa.eu.int/comm./competition/antitrust/review/submissions/elaa.pdf

Table 1:

>REFERENCE A UN GRAPHIQUE>

4. It is useful to note that the activities of conferences operating on trades to and from the EU have changed over the years. In the past, some conferences have, apart from fixing the maritime tariff, also been involved in price fixing covering the inland leg of multi-modal transport. Furthermore, some conferences concluded capacity non-utilization agreements, agreed on freight forwarder remuneration, prohibited or restricted individual service contracting by their members and/or agreed on prices and surcharges with independent operators (non-conferences). In a number of Commission decisions and Court judgments these activities were considered to be illegal under EC competition law and the conferences concerned were ordered to abandon these practices. [29]

[29] See in particular Commission decisions of 19 October 1994 (TAA, OJ L 376 of 31.12.1994 p. 1), 21 December 1994 (FEFC, OJ L 378 of 31.12.1994 p. 17), 16 September 1998 (TACA, OJ L 95 of 09.04.1999, p. 1), 30 April 1999 (EATA, OJ L 193 of 26.07.1999), 16 May 2000 (FETTSCA, OJ L 268 of 20.10.200, p. 1). For the Court judgments see in particular: Case T-86/95, Companie Générale Maritime, [2002] ECR II-1011, Case T-395/94, TAA [2002] ECR II-00875, Case T-86/95, FEFC, [2002] ECR II01011, joined Cases T-191/98 and T-212/98 to T-214/98 TACA [2003] ECR -not yet reported.

5. Notably in its most recent decision as regards liner shipping services, the Revised TACA decision of 14 November 2002, the Commission has set a number of principles which should be emulated by all conferences operating on EU liner shipping trades: 1) conferences should refrain from inland price-fixing, 2) no restrictions should be placed on the right of conference members to enter into individual contracts with transport users, 3) collective regulation of capacity by members of a conference is only permissible where it is necessary in order to adapt to a short-term fluctuation of demand, and it must not be combined with a price increase. [30]

[30] Revised TACA decision of 14 November 2002 (OJ L 26 of 31.01.2003, p. 53) and Commission press release of 14.11.2022, IP/02/1677.

2. International developments regarding liner conferences

2.1.1. Introduction

6. Most OECD countries have traditionally granted some form of anti-trust immunity or exemption to liner conferences. Some of the Community's main trading partners, such as the United States and Australia, have conducted reviews of their own liner shipping regimes.

2.1.2. United States [31]

[31] Canada has also recently re-examined the case for antitrust immunity or exemption. The outcome, as laid down in the amended Shipping Conferences Exemption Act, is largely similar to the United States.

7. On 1 May 1999 the Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA) entered into force, substantially amending the United States 1984 Shipping Act. Two pro-competitive changes in particular were introduced: (1) carriers were no longer required to make public all essential terms of service contracts and (2) conferences could no longer prohibit their members from entering into individual service contracts. The Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) is in charge of monitoring agreements between carriers under the Shipping Act. [32]

[32] See for further details www.fmc.gov.

8. The US reform has brought the US liner shipping competition regime closer to its current EC counterpart (Regulation 4056/86, as interpreted by the Commission and the Court of Justice). US law allows shipping lines to enter into agreements (on price fixing; or capacity regulation) similar to those allowed by the EU liner conference block exemption. However, there are still differences between US and EU law, the main one being that the US allows shipping lines to enter into "discussion agreements", i.e. to agree voluntary guidelines for prices and capacity, outside, the framework of conferences. The EU does not, because of the risk that effective competition between conferences and independent lines would be much reduced or eliminated altogether (see para 91 below).

2.1.3. Australia

9. Part X of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 ("the TPA") provides for a limited exemption for international liner cargo shipping conferences. Essentially, Part X allows lines, under certain conditions and obligations, to enter into co-operative arrangements, including the joint provision of services and agreements on capacity, service levels and prices charged.

10. Part X defines a conference quite broadly, ranging from full conferences to non-binding discussion agreements, as well as technical agreements covering slot swapping and rationalisation of sailings. The agreements must be registered at the Department of Transport and Regional Services. [33]

[33] There are a number of discussion agreements that operate in several Australian trades which are currently registered under Part X, including the Asia-Australia Discussion Agreement (AADA). The exemption granted to this agreement is currently being re-examined by the Australian Competition Authority (ACCC). See position paper of the ACCC of April 2004, available at www.accc.gov/au.

11. In 1999 a review of the TPA Part X performed by the Productivity Commission (an advisory body to the Government) was carried out. As a result, in 2000 amendments where made to the Part X of the TPA. Part X would be retained but the Minister for Transport and Regional Services and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), would be granted increased powers to identify and address concerns about anti-competitive behaviour (including undertaking on its own initiative an investigation with a public benefit test) and to deal with concerns about the operation of agreements which potentially cover a large proportion of a trade.

12. Currently, the Productivity Commission is undertaking, on the request of the Government, another review of the exemption system in Part X to see if it is still beneficial to the Australian community. The Productivity Commission has released in June 2004 an issues paper, inviting third parties to comment and is expected to issue its final report by the end of the year. [34]

[34] See for further details www.pc.gov.au/.

2.1.4. The OECD

13. As part of the OECD's general Regulatory Reform Programme, [35] the OECD Secretariat presented a "Discussion document on regulatory reform in international maritime transport" [36] in May 1999. The document recommended inter alia that agreements to set common rates should no longer receive automatic antitrust immunity or exemption. It was then discussed at a joint workshop of the OECD's Maritime Transport Committee and Competition Law and Policy Committee in May 2000, at the end of which the OECD Secretariat decided to produce a draft report for discussion at a second workshop in 2001.

[35] The Programme is a result of the request by Ministers in 1995 that the OECD should embark on a study of the reform of regulatory regimes in OECD countries. The review of liner shipping has a parallel in a similar OECD review of air cargo transport.

[36] DSTI/DOT/MTC(99)8, 19.5.1999.

14. The draft report, circulated in November 2001, made, inter alia, the following findings of particular interest for EC maritime competition policy:

- The liner shipping industry is not 'unique' in the sense that its cost structure does not differ substantially from that of other transport industries and shipping lines do not suffer from exceptionally low returns on investment when compared to other scheduled transport providers. There is therefore no evidence that the industry needs to be protected from competition by anti-trust immunity for price-fixing and rate discussions;

- There is no evidence that the conference system (with anti-trust immunity or exemption for price-fixing) leads to more stable freight rates or more reliable shipping services than would be the case in a fully competitive market. On the contrary, the OECD finds support for the view that the most competitive markets provide the greatest stability.

15. In the light of its findings, the draft Report came to the conclusion that countries should:

- Re-examine anti-trust exemptions for common pricing and rate discussions, with the goal of removing them, except where specifically and exceptionally justified;

- Have the discretion to retain exemptions for other operational arrangements so long as these did not result in excessive market power.

16. Following discussion at an OECD Workshop in December 2001, the OECD Secretariat published its final report on 16 April 2002. [37] The report essentially endorsed the above findings. In particular, it found that it had not been established that collective price-fixing, whether by conferences or within discussion agreements, was an indispensable pre-requisite for stable freight rates and regular scheduled services. [38]

[37] DSTI/DOT(2002)2, 16.4.2002.

[38] Report, pages 69 and 76.

3. The block exemption for liner conferences in Regulation 4056/86

1.1. Relevant provisions

17. Article 3 of Regulation 4056/86 provides for a so-called block exemption for agreements, decisions and concerted practices of all or part of the members of one or more liner conferences, as defined in Article 1(3)(b) of Regulation 4056/86, that have as their objective the fixing of rates and conditions of carriage, and that, in addition, cover one or more of the following forms of co-operation:

- the co-ordination of shipping timetables, sailing dates or dates of calls;

- the determination of the frequency of sailings or calls;

- the co-ordination or allocation of sailings or calls among members of the conference;

- the regulation of the carrying capacity offered by each member;

- the allocation of cargo or revenue among members.

18. Article 4 of the Regulation attaches a condition to the exemption: the above agreements must not cause detriment to ports, transport users or carriers by applying rates and conditions of carriage which vary without justification according to the country of origin or destination or port of loading or discharge. In addition, various obligations are attached to the block exemption (Article 5). Lines must consult with transport users; while they may institute loyalty arrangements, such arrangements must contain safeguards for transport users. Transport users must also be free to make their own arrangements concerning inland transport and quayside services. Tariffs and other conditions applied by the conference must be made available to transport users on request, or must otherwise be available for examination.

19. Failure to observe the above and other conditions may cause the Commission to withdraw from the conference the benefit of the block exemption. It may also lead to the imposition of fines.

20. The justification for the block exemption for liner conference agreements is given in the eighth recital of the preamble to Regulation 4056/86, which states:

Whereas provision should be made for block exemption of liner conferences; whereas liner conferences have a stabilising effect, assuring shippers of reliable services; whereas they contribute generally to providing adequate efficient scheduled maritime transport services and give fair consideration to the interests of users; whereas such results cannot be obtained without the co-operation that shipping companies promote within conferences in relation to rates and, where appropriate, availability of capacity or allocation of cargo for shipment, and income; whereas in most cases conferences continue to be subject to effective competition from both non-conference scheduled services and, in certain circumstances, from tramp services and from other modes of transport; whereas the mobility of fleets, which is a characteristic feature of the structure of availability in the shipping field, subjects conferences to constant competition which they are unable as a rule to eliminate as far as a substantial proportion of the shipping services in question is concerned.

21. The legislator has thus assumed in the past that price-fixing and capacity regulation within conferences leads to stability of freight rates, and that stability assures shippers of reliable scheduled maritime transport services.

22. It follows from the Regulation itself, from the decisional practice of the Commission and the case law of the Court that Regulation 4056/86 contains a "wholly exceptional" block exemption [39], because it exempts price fixing and capacity regulation, which are normally regarded as hard-core restrictions [40], for an unlimited duration and does not contain any market share thresholds. Indeed, the Regulation can only be explained in its historical context.

[39] See e.g. Case T-86/95, Companie Générale Maritime, [2002] ECR II-1011, para 254, 393 and 484.

[40] Hard-core restrictions are generally considered as restrictions of competition by object caught by Article 81(1) of the Treaty, which generally do not fulfil the conditions for an exemption under Article 81(3) of the Treaty.

23. Liner conferences have sought to interpret the block exemption in broad terms. In particular, liner conferences considered capacity non-utilization agreements [41] and inland price fixing [42] to be covered by the block exemption. This has however not been accepted by the Commission, nor by the Court. Indeed, the block exemption derogates from Article 81(1) of the Treaty and should therefore be interpreted narrowly [43]. Goals pursued by other Treaty provisions can be taken into account only to the extent that they can be subsumed under the four conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty. [44]

[41] See TAA, EATA, Revised TACA decisions of 14 November 2002 (OJ L 26 of 31.01.2003, p. 53) and Commission press release of 14.11.2022, IP/02/1677.

[42] See TAA, FEFC, TACA, Rev TACA decisions of 14 November 2002 (OJ L 26 of 31.01.2003, p. 53) and Commission press release of 14.11.2022, IP/02/1677.

[43] Joined Cases T-191/98 and T-212/98 to T-214/98 TACA [2003] ECR -not yet reported, para 568.

[44] See to that effect implicitly para 139 of Case T-17/93, Matra, ECR [1994] II-595 and Case 26/76, Metro (I), [1977] ECR 1875, para 43.

1.2. Assessment

3.2.1. Legal and economic framework

24. The EU competition rules are modelled on the presumption that competition provides the best services to the consumer at the most affordable prices. For that reason, the starting point under the Treaty is that competition should not be distorted and that any exemption from that rule needs to be justified. Agreements which restrict competition within the meaning of Article 81(1) of the Treaty (such as price fixing and capacity regulation agreements) could only be exempted if they fulfil the four cumulative conditions laid down in Article 81(3) of the Treaty, namely:

1) the agreement must contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or contribute to promoting technical or economic progress (efficiency),

2) consumers must receive a fair share of the resulting benefits (pass-on),

3) the restrictions must be indispensable to the attainment of these objectives (indispensability), and finally

4) the agreement must not afford the parties the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question (no elimination of competition).

25. The application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of agreements by way of a block exemption regulation is based on the presumption that restrictive agreements that fall within its scope fulfil each of the four conditions laid down in Article 81(3) of the Treaty.

26. As said above, the justification of the liner conference block exemption is provided for in recital 8 of the preamble of Regulation 4056/86, which in essence assumes that conferences bring stability, assuring reliable services which could not be achieved by less restrictive means. In this regard the Court of First Instance stated that "the Council did not assert (and indeed could not have asserted) that stability is more important than competition". [45]

[45] Case T-395/94, TAA [2002] ECR II-00875, para 261.

27. It should be noted that the justification in recital 8 of Regulation 4056/86 has not been based on experience of the Commission in applying Art 81(3) to liner conferences [46]. In this regard, the core question examined in the review process is whether, in light of the cumulative conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, the justification for price fixing and supply regulation by liner conferences in Regulation 4056/86 could (still) be said to be valid in light of the present market circumstances. If not, there would no longer be a legal justification for the block exemption, which consequently would have to be either abolished or revised. To that end parties have been invited to provide factual evidence.

[46] To compare, see for example Regulation 823/2000 on Consortia (OJ L 100 of 20.04.2000 p. 24), Regulation 1400/2002 on motor vehicles and Regulation 2790/1999 on vertical agreements (OJ L 336 of 29.12.1999, p. 21), in which the Commission explicitly referred to the experience acquired in the sector concerned which enabled it to define categories of agreements which could be regarded as normally satisfying the conditions laid down in Article 81(3).

3.2.2. Burden of proof

28. In this context supporters of the block exemption (notably ELAA) have emphasised that the burden of proof in the review of Regulation 4056/86 would be at least a shared one and that the Commission should show that a possible revocation or amendment of the liner conference block exemption is justified. [47] Naturally, it follows from Article 253 of the Treaty that, when proposing (changes to existing) legislation the Commission shall motivate its proposals. This implies e.g. that if the Commission proposes to repeal the present block exemption for liner shipping conferences it will have to explain the reasons why price fixing and supply regulation by the conferences would, in the present market circumstances, no longer be exemptable from the prohibition of Article 81(1) of the Treaty.

[47] See in particular the ELAA technical paper on burden of proof of 3.12.2003.

3.2.3. Outcome of the consultation on the block exemption

29. In broad terms the reactions that were received to the Commission's Consultation Paper of 2003 could be divided in two groups: those who are in support of maintaining the liner conference block exemption (essentially the carriers) and those who would like to see it repealed (basically the shippers and a leading consumer association).

30. In essence, the supporters of the block exemption argue that the liner shipping industry, because of its specific features (such as high fixed costs, high investment risks, inelastic demand and supply, asymmetries in demand etc) would be inherently unstable and that this would require special treatment under EU competition law. According to this argument, price fixing by liner conferences provide for stability in a large sense, which could not be achieved to a similar extent by alternatives such as consortia and service contracting. Stability would be to the benefit of all actors involved.

31. Opponents contest that there is evidence of stability and even question the relevance of the concept of stability. Rather, reliable shipping services would be what matters to consumers. Furthermore, they contest the alleged benefits of price fixing for consumers and favour a free competitive market for liner shipping services. The respective positions have been summarized in more detail in the Discussion Paper, which has been posted on the Commission's web-site.

32. The argument of the supporters of the block exemption is based on the notion of "destructive competition", and is not new. It has been advanced by carriers in various liner shipping cases that the Commission examined under the EC competition rules. [48] In these cases the Commission has explained why it is not convinced of the applicability of this economic concept to liner shipping. There is no concrete evidence that the liner shipping industry should be treated substantially different than other global capital intensive industries. [49] Any explanation or justification for price fixing and supply regulation by liner shipping conferences should be considered in light of the four cumulative conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty. The argument of the carriers that the liner shipping industry is unique and would require special treatment cannot imply that the conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty do not apply. Rather, the argument should be considered within the framework of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, notably its first condition

[48] See TACA decision of 16 September 1998 (OJ L 95 of 09.04.1999, p. 1), para 332-367, EATA decision of 30 April 1999 (OJ L 193 of 26.07.1999) para 107-142.

[49] For a more detailed discussion of the economic theories in this regard reference is made to the above mentioned discussion paper, available on DG Competition's web-site [www.europa.eu.int/comm./competition/antitrust/others/maritime/review_4056.pdf].

3.2.4. The four cumulative criteria of Article 81(3)

3.2.4.1. Efficiencies

33. The first condition of Article 81(3) requires that the agreement produces economic benefits, in terms of e.g. cost efficiencies or qualitative efficiencies such as new or improved liner shipping services. Only objective benefits can be taken into account. Cost savings arising from mere exercise of market power, such as price fixing, cannot be taken into account [50]. ELAA appears to argue that conferences improve maritime services by providing stability in terms of rate stability and stability of supply.

[50] Commission Notice - Guidelines on the application of Article Article 81(3) of the Treaty (OJ C 101 of 27.04.2004 p. 97) .

34. Carriers have relied in this context mainly on the alleged price stability that conferences would achieve. The data which have been provided in this regard are however not conclusive. Shippers have even contested the relevance of the concept of price stability as such in the context of Article 81(3).

35. It is questionable whether price stability as such could be regarded as sufficient for the fulfilment of the first condition of Article 81(3). Price stability only becomes relevant if it is read in conjunction with the concept of "reliable services", meaning the maintenance over time of a scheduled service providing shippers with the guarantee of a service suited to their needs. [51] As the Commission has indicated in its Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) [52], there must be a sufficient and direct causal link between the agreement and the claimed efficiencies. Whatever may have been the force of the justifications that led at the time to the block exemption of price fixing by liner conferences, it is doubtful whether it can be maintained today that the provision of reliable services result directly from the conference price fixing. In this regard, it should be recalled that conference members increasingly offer services on the basis of service contracts. [53] It is not excluded that under the current market circumstances price stability and reliability of services are mainly brought about by such contracts. Moreover, the increase of both internal price competition within conferences and external competition by independent operators have not changed significantly the overall level of reliability of liner shipping services. It would therefore appear that the alleged causal link between the restrictions (i.e. price fixing, supply and market regulation) and the claimed efficiencies (reliable services) is too tenuous to meet the first condition of Article 81(3) of the Treaty.

[51] See TAA decision of 19 October 1994 (OJ L 376 of 31.12.1994, p. 1), para 388. See also FEFC decision of 21 December 1994 (OJ L 378 of 31.12.1994 p. 17), para 129: reliable services are those which are of a reasonable quality, such that the shipper's goods come to no harm, and at the same price irrespective of which day and which line is chosen to carry the cargo. Reliability in the supply of transport services is the maintenance over time of a scheduled service, providing shippers with the guarantee of a service suited to their needs.

[52] Commission Notice - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, para 73-83 (OJ C 101 of 27.04.2004, p. 97).

[53] Service contracts, such as e.g. individual service contracts (ISCs) on the transatlantic trade, are contracts by which a shipper undertakes to provide a minimum quantity of cargo to be transported by an individual carrier over a fixed period of time and the carrier commits to a certain rate or rate schedule as well as a defined service level.

3.2.4.2. Consumer benefits

36. The second condition of Article 81(3) requires that, if liner conferences were to achieve economic benefits, a fair share of these benefits should be passed on to consumers. Consumers must be compensated for the negative effects resulting from the restrictions of competition. In case of hard-core restrictions, such as horizontal price fixing, it is clear that the negative effects are serious and that any positive effect must therefore be very clear-cut.

37. None of the benefits that have been identified by the carriers would appear to at least neutralize the negative effects for consumers of conference price fixing. In this regard weight should also be given to the fact that consumers themselves fail to see any benefits of price fixing by conferences. [54] The OECD Secretariat concluded in its report that conference price-fixing leads to rates being set at the level necessary to cover the average cost of the least efficient member of the conference. Under this system, efficient members of the conference reap benefits stemming from rates that are above their costs, while the cost savings and efficiency gains of these carriers are not passed on to shippers.

[54] See for further details the DG Competition discussion paper para 26 and 95-103.

3.2.4.3. Indispensability

38. Under the third condition of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, even if there were economic benefits to the benefit of consumers, it will have to be established that the restrictions of competition are indispensable, i.e. reasonably necessary and proportionate to produce these economic benefits. The test is basically whether there are less restrictive alternatives than conference price fixing which would assure reliable liner services to the benefit of consumers.

39. In this regard account should be given to the growing importance of independent operators and the increase of service contracting between carriers and shippers, in particular individual service contracts, both showing that reliable liner shipping services can be provided by carriers totally or partially outside the conferences framework.

40. It has not been contested that independent operators, which operate outside conferences on all main trades to and from Europe, are capable of providing reliable liner shipping services outside conferences. The fact that the market share of independents has since the adoption of the block exemption generally increased on the main trades, to the detriment of conferences, indicates that the liner services provided for by independents achieve at least equal efficiency gains. The existence of reliable liner shipping services by independents shows therefore that the restrictions of competition by conferences are not indispensable for the promotion of technical or economic progress of liner shipping services [55].

[55] Compare the TAA decision of 19 October 1994 (OJ L 376 of 31.12.1994 p. 1), para 485 and the FEFC decision of 21 December 1994 (OJ L 378 of 31.12.1994, p. 17) ,para 121, where the Commission, with regard to inland carrier haulage services, concluded that collective price fixing was not essential for the provision of these services since many independent carriers offered equivalent or similar services outside the framework of a conference and without fixing prices in common with any other line for the provision of carrier haulage services.

41. Also service contracts contribute to stable and reliable services. The importance of service contracting, in particular individual service contracts, has increased significantly since changes were made in US Law [56] and the Commission in its 1998 TACA decision removed barriers to conclude such contracts. [57] Service contracts are generally less restrictive than price fixing by liner shipping conferences. The benefits of service contracts in terms of assuring shippers of reliable services are generally accepted. The Commission has explicitly recognized that service contracts provide benefits to shippers, e.g. they allow for special services tailored to particular needs. Furthermore, because the price negotiated is established in advance and does not fluctuate for a predetermined period (usually up to one year), service contracts can contribute to price stability -if that is what an individual shipper wants. Service contracts also help to reduce search costs and can offer "all-in"" prices, thereby removing the uncertainty as to the level of surcharges to be imposed. [58]

[56] The US Ocean Shipping and Reform Act (OSRA) of 1998 allowed shippers and carriers on US trades to enter into confidential contracts without prior notice.

[57] On the transatlantic trade the vast majority of liner shipping cargo (up to 90%) is nowadays transported through service contracts (ISCs). Also on the Europe/Australia and New Zealand trade the majority (75-80%) of cargo, according to ELAA, moves under contracts. (ELAA submission of 18 June 2003 available http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/review/submissions/elaa.pdf. According to the ELAA service contracts are common on all trades (ELAA submission of 30 June 2004 to the Commission's consultation document on Regulation 823/00.

[58] TACA decision of 16 September 1998 (OJ L 95 of 09.04.1999 p. 1, para 472-476.

42. Even in so far as there would be felt a need for cooperation, operational co-operation agreements between shipping lines such as consortia and alliances show that there are less restrictive forms of cooperation than liner conference price fixing and market regulation. Alliances establish co-operation among a group of carriers over certain major trade routes, which can be described as global. These agreements cover a wide range of forms of operational co-operation, e.g. space chartering, slot charter and schedule/sailing arrangements and they aim at the integration of each participant's services into one whole. These alliances do however not include common pricing.

43. Liner consortia are industrial co-operation agreements between liner shipping companies aimed primarily at supplying jointly organised services by means of various technical, operational or commercial arrangements. [59] Thanks to consortia agreements, ship owners can organise jointly the services they supply (in particular container liner shipping) and thus provide users with a better service while rationalising their maritime transport activities and securing economies of scale and cost reductions. [60]

[59] In many cases, members of a consortium are also members of a conference. However, a consortium can also be composed entirely of otherwise independent lines or it can include both conference and non-conference members. Consortia are under certain conditions covered by the block exemption of Regulation 823/2000, provided that they do not fix prices.

[60] The Consortia block exemption will expire on 25 April 2005 and DG COMP has in May 2004 published a paper on its web-site in order to consult the industry and Member States on possible options for the future regime of consortia. The consultation paper is published against the background of the ongoing review of the Maritime Regulation. What possible consequences the on-going review process of the Maritime Regulation might entail for the Consortia Block Exemption cannot yet be foreseen. Accordingly and awaiting the results of the review of the Maritime Regulation renewal of Regulation 823/2000 (with only minor modifications that are independent from the Review of Regulation 4056/86) would appear the most appropriate option at this stage.

44. The argument has been advanced that the success of consortia is closely linked to the activities which take place within conferences. Such argument is difficult to accept under EU competition law. The consortia block exemption does not allow horizontal price fixing and it covers both consortia operating within a liner conference and consortia operating outside such conferences. In competition policy terms the argument rather reinforces the general concern that the existence of the conference system combined with the growth in operational co-operation through consortia and alliances could possibly raise the potential for sensitive market information to spill over to other non-Conference market actors.

45. These alternatives already available on the market show that shipping lines do not need any longer to engage in price-fixing, supply and market regulation to provide reliable shipping services.

3.2.4.4. No elimination of competition

46. Finally, the fourth condition of Article 81(3) requires that the conference should remain subject to effective competitive constraints.

47. Competitive constraints on conferences can come from independent operators. Agreements between conference and non-conference members do not benefit from the block exemption and the Commission has in the past intervened to avoid that such agreements would undermine competition between independent and conference carriers. In general, independent operators have increased their market share on the main trades to and from Europe. [61] However, the importance of the competitive constraints from independent operators on a particular trade, depends also on their capacity to compete and their incentive to do so.

[61] For example, on the Transatlantic trade the market share of independents has increased from about 39% in 1994 to about 52% in 2001 (Revised TACA decision of 14 November 2002 (OJ L 26 of 31.01.2003, p. 53), para 45 and table 1).

48. Service contracting between individual shippers and members of the conference is another source of competition. In the past liner conferences have sought to limit effective competitive constraints from individual contracting. The Commission has acted against this in order to ensure that there are no restrictions on conference members as regards their freedom to negotiate and enter into service contracts with shippers. [62] As a result, individual contracting has increased importantly in recent years, for example, on the Transatlantic trade nowadays only 10 % of the cargo carried by the TACA conference members is moved under the conference tariff. [63]

[62] E.g. TACA decision of 16 September 1998 (OJ L 95 of 09.04.1999, p. 1) .

[63] Also on the Europe/Australia and New Zealand trade the vast majority (75-80%) of cargo, according to the ELAA, moves under service contracts.

49. However, given the increasing number of links between carriers (i.e. consortia, alliances, vessel-sharing arrangements and slot-charters) determining the extent to which a particular conference is subject to effective, internal and external, competition can be a very complex exercise, even if the conference in question does not have a substantial market share. In any event, such an assessment would necessarily have to be made on a trade by trade basis.

3.2.5. Conclusion on Article 81(3) EC

50. The four cumulative conditions to justify an exemption for liner conference price fixing, supply and market regulation would appear to be no longer fulfilled. There is no conclusive economic evidence that the assumptions on which the block exemption was justified at the time of its adoption in 1986 are, in the present market circumstances and on the basis of the four cumulative conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, still justified.

4. Impact of withdrawal of the block exemption on the market

1.3. Introduction

51. Under EC competition law price agreements and agreements on supply and market regulation between competitors are restrictive of competition by object. It follows from the above that, in the present market circumstances, there seems to be no justification under the EC competition rules to exempt these type of agreements by liner conferences from the prohibition of Article 81(1) of the Treaty. The present "wholly exceptional" regime for liner conferences, compared to other (capital intensive) industries, seems no longer justified under EC competition law.

52. The overall objective of removing the present "wholly exceptional" regime for liner conferences would be to make the liner shipping industry on trades to and from the EU more competitive, to the benefit of consumers. Bringing liner shipping conferences under a normal competitive regime is expected to have important pro-competitive effects on liner shipping services in terms of increased economic efficiencies (less efficient lines will be forced to become more efficient due to competitive pressure) and, in a competitive market, these efficiencies are expected to be passed on to shippers (e.g. in terms of more competitive prices and better quality of service) and the ultimate consumers.

53. Based on the above, it would appear that the present block exemption in favour of liner conferences should be repealed.

54. In this regard there are in essence two policy options. The first option would be to repeal the present block exemption and not replace it by any other instrument. This would bring the whole liner shipping industry on equal footing as most other industrial sectors and would imply that conference members, like any other shipping carrier, will have to carry out a self-assessment as to whether their activities would fall within the scope of Article 81(1) of the Treaty and, if so, whether they would fulfil the conditions for an exemption under Article 81(3) of the Treaty. Lines would be assisted in this regard by the decisional practice of the Commission, various guidelines issued by the Commission and the case law of the Court.

55. The second option would be to repeal the present block exemption, but in parallel explore the need and possibilities to replace it with an instrument recognising the compatibility with Article 81 of the Treaty of other forms of cooperation of liner services operating to and from the EU, in addition to forms of co-operation for which there exists already a legal framework (e.g. consortia, mergers). This option will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter.

56. Hereinafter the possible impact (positive and negative) on liner shipping services on trades to and from the EU the first option (i.e. simple withdrawal of the present block exemption), are examined. On subjects where the impact assessments is limited to a static analysis of the current situation, there are no indications that the withdrawal of the block exemption will have any effect on the respective issue in future. Once the Commission will have a more concrete picture of possible alternatives for liner conference price fixing, supply and market regulation, in light of the comments from interested third parties on the White paper, it will carry out a more in-depth impact assessment, in line with the Commission's Communication on impact assessment (COM(2002) 276 final)

1.4. Impact assessment

57. As a preliminary remark it should be noted that an assessment of the impact on liner shipping services, in terms of economic, social and environmental consequences, in a situation without the present block exemption would necessarily be largely hypothetical. [64] Indeed, traditionally in all jurisdictions liner conferences have been granted some form of immunity or exemption from the competition rules and none of the competent authorities who looked into it or who are reviewing this (e.g. US, Canada, Australia, Japan) have removed that immunity/exemption so far.

[64] This is also recognized by e.g. ELAA: .. "a critical problem in examining both the effectiveness of the conference system and possible substitutes for it is one of history. The liner conference has been a fact of life in European (and, indeed, worldwide) shipping for centuries, and as such very little empirical evidence of alternatives exists. Economic theory and examples from other industries with similar characteristics must be called upon in order to forecast how liner shipping, its pricing structure and stability might function without conferences.".... (CI March 2004, page 37).

58. Hereinafter, on the basis of facts and developments on the liner shipping market an impact assessment has been carried out, notably in terms of the likely effect on trade, investment and fleet, innovation, consumer prices, employment. Furthermore, experience from other liberalised markets has also be taken into account.

4.2.1. Effect on trade

59. Sea transport [65] is responsible for about 45% of EU25 external trade in value terms and about 75% in volume terms. Container transport by sea accounts for approximately 40% of EU25 external trade by sea in value terms (and between 9% [imports] - 28% [exports] in volume terms). Finally, sea containers make up for 6% of all EU25 imports in volume terms (18% in value terms) and 21% of all EU25 exports (see table 1). Conferences have market shares between 40%-70% [66] on the major trades.

[65] Including deep sea and short sea transport. For data on EU 15 see EU Energy and Transport in Figures - Statistical Pocketbook 2003, European Commission, DG Energy and Transport.

[66] See ELAA Response to the Commission Consultation Paper dated 18 June 2003, p. 48.

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60. The origin of imports of goods by sea of EU15 in 2002 were equally shared between America, Africa, the other European countries and Asia. [67] However, the trend differed slightly when focusing on exports, for which the volumes handled were always inferior to imports. America took the largest share (40%), Asia also had a larger share in the exports of the EU15 than in the import (25%), while the opposite was true for Africa (17%) and other European countries (17%).

[67] The import shares based on volume in tons were: America 26%, Africa 25%, other Europe 23% and Asia 21%.

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61. Conferences are predominant on deep sea routes between Europe and Asia, America and Australia. Hence EU trade with these regions would consequently be most affected by any regulatory change. On the other hand, routes in the Mediterranean, North, Baltic and Black Sea are typical short-sea shipping routes, where conferences are less important. Consequently, the considerable EU trade with North Africa, Near East or other European Countries would be less affected by regulatory change.

62. Petroleum products and solid mineral fuels represent the largest part (42%) of total volume of goods imported by sea by EU15 from extra EU partners in 2002. In terms value of imports the group "machinery, transport equipment, manufactured and miscellaneous articles" had the largest share. For exports from the EU15 to non-EU members, petroleum products were also the most important category in terms of volume (32%), while "machinery, transport equipment, manufactured and miscellaneous articles" had again the largest share in total value of goods. In extra EU trade, the volume of goods exported by EU15 was three times lower than the volume of imports. However, the respective values of the goods exported and imported by EU15 were almost the same, which can be explained by the fact that Member States export goods with higher value than the good they import. [68]

[68] Statistics in focus - theme 6/7 - 4/2004: Intra-and Extra-EU trade by sea.

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63. It should be noted that while some of the goods can practically only be transported by bulk carriers such as petroleum, chemicals or solid mineral fuels, most of the remaining goods can be carried by either bulk, specialised or container carriers, e.g. foodstuff or machinery.

4.2.2. Effect on investment and fleet

64. Investment decisions in vessel capacity depend on the complex supply and demand conditions on four different markets that are the global freight market, the charter market and the market for new and second-hand vessels. Rising freight rates indicate capacity shortage and consequently prices for second-hand and charter vessels increase. When second-hand and charter rates climb, building new vessels become more attractive and carriers start to invest before new-building prices also start to rise. However, when the new capacity arrives on the market with a two-year time-lag, demand for ocean transport might have dropped or carriers might have overestimated demand. Thus freight rates will fall again. If this cyclical nature of the container vessel market remains undisturbed from any co-ordination or collective action, it might generate a continuous flow of companies entering and exiting the market. Inefficient carriers leave the market by selling their vessels and new efficient companies are able to enter the market, which promotes overall efficiency in the long-run.

65. Entry into the liner shipping market is however more difficult since it requires a minimum number of container vessels. The basic mechanisms are nevertheless the same. It is very questionable whether co-ordinated action or planning of conferences as regards capacity and freight rates is able to adjust imbalances on all four markets simultaneously and whether the result of conference action is superior to free competition.

66. Vessel chartering has become a widespread practice in liner shipping. Recent figures show that charter owners now account for 45% of the current fleet and nearly 60% of vessel orders [69]. There are two different charter markets: the long-term and short-term charter market. The latter market covers all time and voyage charter contracts of up to two years. It mainly serves to fill capacity gaps at short notice, comparable to a rental car in case of a breakdown or accident.

[69] In the early Nineties only about 18% of tonnage of the top30 carriers were chartered. By 2000, the proportion had risen to 40% and currently 45%. See Lloyd's List, 29 July 2004, p. 5.

67. The long-term charter market is of greater importance to carriers. Carriers may decide to own or charter a vessel. In the case of long-term charter, carriers enter into a legally binding contract of more than two years, typically between five and ten years, before the vessels is being built. A large number of shipowners that charter out vessels are benefiting from tax incentives and are not active in the liner shipping market. Hence, long-term charter can be seen as a flexible way of vessel financing.

68. However, when a carrier is able to obtain a long-term charter contract over a relatively limited period of five years, it can substantially mitigate its investment risk. Thus, carriers with a well-balanced portfolio of owned vessels and long-term charter contracts of different durations are not bearing a great investment risk while at the same time these carriers are able to react independently (i.e. outside of conference co-ordination) to capacity imbalances at relatively short notice.

69. Carriers attempt to mitigate their investment risk through their participation in conferences. This might however lead to the so-called "moral hazard" phenomenon: a carrier might invest in "too much capacity" which is not in accordance with supply and demand projections on the market. In this case a carrier relies on the conference price-setting system which ensures that freight rates are only partly or with a certain time-lag reflecting supply and demand conditions on the market. While such a strategy could be profitable for a single carriers, it might lead to overcapacity in the market when a larger number of carriers follow this strategy. Under these circumstances conferences would systematically provide poorer market results than free competition.

70. The OECD [70] affirms that liner shipping industry has record of over-investing heavily in new capacity. Recent data of Containerization International [71] appears to confirm this trend. In 2003, the global container fleet grew by 10% and slot capacity by 18%. In November 2003, 500 ships were on order and the world fleet was expected to grow another 8% in 2004 and 8.5% in 2005. Only a few experts however expected transport demand to rise that much.

[70] See OECD report (2002), p. 47-49.

[71] Containerization International, November 2003, p. 57-61.

71. Many conference and non-conference carriers follow the path of ordering new and larger vessels in order to achieve economies of scale which would allow them potentially to cut costs. A number of experts however hint at the trade-off between capacity vessel and transhipment costs, i.e. economies of scale brought by larger vessels can be easily wiped out by increasing transhipment costs. It therefore appears that the industry's conventional wisdom regarding economies of scale is not necessarily as well founded as carriers might hope to believe. [72]

[72] See OECD report (2002), p. 49.

72. In conclusion: it is not evident that capacity co-ordination under the conference system is capable of delivering a better market outcome than an entirely competitive market organisation.

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73. Five out of the top 20 and three out of the top five container service operators are of European origin. These top 20 carriers are operating about two thirds of the world capacity, which is relatively fragmented for a global and capital intensive industry. A more competitive environment in the fragmented liner shipping market may lead to more concentration, i.e. mergers and take-overs.

74. Mergers might generate efficiency gains in terms of economies of scale and scope, learning economies, enhanced technical progress or improving the efficiency of management. On the other hand, mergers may have anti-competitive effects such as the unilateral increase of market power or greater risk of collusion due to a reduction of market players.

75. While more concentration in liner shipping may well lead to considerable efficiency gains, it is questionable whether a single liner shipping operator could exercise more market power than a conference or whether a liberalised but more concentrated liner shipping market would be more prone to collusion than the conference system. In addition, EU merger control aims at preventing mergers that "significantly impede effective competition". Hence, it is not excluded that in the long and medium term transport users and consumers might even gain from increased concentration within a liberalised market.

76. It is difficult to anticipate the outcome of concentration processes since most of the carriers are parts of larger corporate entities. Profitability and financial strength of an individual carrier might make it less vulnerable to a take-over. On the other hand, larger corporate entities might be less guided by profitability of carriers as a single business unit, but by their overall business strategy, e.g. diversification or vertical integration strategies, or the profitability of the entire door-to-door logistics service. Moreover, it should be noted that a number of carriers "still lack the ability to accurately track and assign costs on a specific, rather than average basis" and pricing regimes are based on average costs [73]. Average cost pricing and inaccurate cost assignment may adulterate profitability calculations of inter-modal services and hence the profitability of a carriers within a larger business entity.

[73] OECD report (2002), p. 47.

4.2.3. Effect on innovation

77. Competition is generally associated with static efficiency gains in terms of better price-output combinations. In the long-term competition also contributes to dynamic efficiency gains, i.e. cost savings, research, innovation of new products and services. However, in order to innovate or carry out research firms usually require sufficient financial resources or a considerable market size.

78. Liner shipping is characterised by relatively low concentration rates in general as well as on a trade-by-trade basis [74]. Most of the major carriers are parts of larger corporate business entities and are vertically integrating (e.g. dedicated container terminals, information technology, integrated global logistics services) [75]. Although container transport has seen technical progress over the last decades, for instance increasing vessel sizes, it is more than likely that competition will further accelerate technical progress in liner shipping. Experience from liberalisation of other sectors shows that a liberalised liner shipping sector will see reinforced horizontal concentration, i.e. inefficient firms will leave the market or will be taken over by competitors, as well as vertical integration, both tendencies together lead to more innovation and a quicker dissemination of innovation, e.g. inter-modal solutions. Liner shipping companies will become big enough to carry research and to innovate and there will also be an incentive to use these innovations in vertically integrated inter-modal logistics chains.

[74] Annex to the Consultants' report, p. 95-96.

[75] Consultants' report, p. 3.

4.2.4. Effect on consumer prices

79. According to ECSA "the transport cost element in shelf price of consumer goods has reached a marginal level in percentage: TV set 2%, 1 kg coffee 1.2%, bottle of whisky 0.5%, vacuum cleaner 1.3%, cassette recorder 1% and 250cc motor cycle 1.4%." [76] Such a view suggest that there is no impact on consumer prices at all since the transport cost share is relatively limited. It neglects however long-term effects of "too high" transport costs. Transport costs can significantly influence investment decisions in upstream or downstream markets. In the manufacturing industry for instance transport cost of 1.4% for a motorcycle can be decisive when it comes to deciding whether to build the motor cycle in Europe or Asia. In addition, a large part of liner shipping companies' customers are logistics providers for which ocean transport is a major part of their overall costs.

[76] ESCA answer to Consultation Paper dated 13 June 2003, p. 5.

4.2.5. Effect on employment

80. By far the biggest share of all global seafarers (approximately 700000) are Philipinos (28%), followed by Russians and Ukrainians. There is no indication however that repealing the block exemption will have any effect on the supply and demand conditions for seafarers. There is growing shortage of sailors in the European Union. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the EU lost 40% of its seamen. There is a desperate need for merchant shipping officers. Between now and 2006 the EU will be some 36 000 sailors short. [77]

[77] COM (2001) 0370, White Paper, "European transport policy for 2010 : time to decide ", p 40.

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4.2.6. Experience from other liberalised markets

81. By increased competitive pressure, deregulation of economic sectors has encouraged firms to be more efficient and helped boost the productivity of entire industries. Increased efficiency leads to lower prices for consumers and business. Prices have fallen significantly and often swiftly where regulatory reforms strengthened competition. Deregulation of the electricity and road and air transport sector in Europe as generally lead to price reductions from 10% to over 30%, while the telecommunication sector has seen price drops of up to 70%. [78]

[78] OECD Report on Regulatory Reform - Syntesis (1997), p. 11-12.

82. Following European airline liberalisation low-cost carriers have become major players in European aviation and had captured 12% of all intra-EU capacity by the end of 2002. Many of the biggest fare reductions were available on intra-European services, especially in Germany and the UK. This followed from some full service airlines restructuring their fares to meet increasing threat from the low-cost sector. [79]

[79] DG TREN - Analysis of the European air transport industry 2002, Final Report December 2003, Contract number: B2-7040B-S07.17962.

83. The implementation of the European telecommunications regulatory package introduced competition to the sector, which is bringing prices for consumers down overall. Incumbents' long distance calls are down 11% in price since 2000 and 45% down since 1998. Overall average monthly expenditure for national calls went down from EUR85.57 to EUR68.54 for business users between 1998 and 2001. Incumbents' international calls are also further down in price, by 21% since 2000 for business users.

84. New entrants' prices are in most cases considerably lower, with one new entrant in Germany offering prices 75% lower than the incumbent's for long-distance, for example, and reductions for local calls of up to 29%. New entrants in Belgium, France, Spain and the United Kingdom charge between 36% and 56% less than the incumbent for long-distance calls. There has also been a trend, that prices are starting to reflect the actual cost of providing the service.

85. The strength of competition in the telecoms sector is evident from the fact that the whole population of twelve Member States can choose between more than five operators for long distance and international calls. For local calls, six Member States report that the whole population has a choice of more than five operators. [80]

[80] COM (2001) 706, 7th Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package.

4.2.7. Position of EU carriers in global context

86. Although in liner shipping relevant markets are determined on a trade-by-trade basis, liner shipping has a global context. It has been advanced in this regard that repealing the EU block exemption could affect European carriers more than non-European carriers since the latter could more easily move their services to other trades, where they would still be subject to immunity/exemption from the competition rules. In this regard the following remarks could be made.

87. First, repealing the block exemption for liner conferences in Regulation 4056/86 will affect all carriers that are part of conferences on trades to and from the EU. These carriers are both EU and non-EU carriers (see para 2 above). Less efficient carriers may perhaps have an incentive by changes in regulatory regime to move their operations to other more regulated, non-EU trades. The resulting capacity gap would be filled by more efficient carriers since freight rates would be expected to rise in the short term. In the long term however, due to competitive forces, freight rates would drop even below the initial freight rates since EU trades are served by more cost-efficient, competing carriers. Hence, it is not to be expected that carriers in general, whether EU or non-EU, would decide to leave trades to and from the EU. To the contrary, it might be expected that EU trades will be served more cost-efficient. Secondly, the regulatory context in which liner carriers operate is not static. In fact, various jurisdictions have or are reviewing the respective immunity/exemption and it is not to be excluded that they will end or substantially limit the present privileges granted to liner conferences. [81]

[81] In Australia the Productivity Commission, the Australian Government's principal review and advisory body on microeconomic policy and regulation,