ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja C 37/50

RIIGIABI – ÜHENDKUNINGRIIK

Riigiabi SA.15373 (2013/C-18) (ex 2013/NN) – Järelevalve olemasoleva abikava „Enterprise Capital Funds” (ettevõtluse kapitalifondid) üle (C17/2004)

Kutse märkuste esitamiseks vastavalt Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikli 108 lõikele 2

(EMPs kohaldatav tekst)

(2014/C 37/05)

Käesoleva kokkuvõtte järel autentses keeles esitatud 20. novembri 2013. aasta kirjas teatas komisjon Ühendkuningriigile oma otsusest algatada Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikli 108 lõikega 2 ettenähtud menetlus eespool nimetatud abi/meetme kohta.

Huvitatud isikud võivad saata oma märkused meetme kohta, mille suhtes komisjon algatab menetluse, ühe kuu jooksul alates käesoleva kokkuvõtte ja sellele järgneva kirja avaldamisest järgmisel aadressil:

European Commission Directorate-General Competition State Aid Registry 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel BELGIQUE/BELGIË Faks: (32 2) 296 1242

Märkused edastatakse Ühendkuningriigile. Märkusi esitavad huvitatud isikud võivad kirjalikult taotleda neid käsitlevate andmete konfidentsiaalsust, täpsustades taotluse põhjused.

KOKKUVÕTE

1. MENETLUS

Ettevõtluse kapitalifondide kava (SA.15373) kiideti komisjoni poolt heaks 3. mail 2005 EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 3 punkti c (nüüd ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõike 3 punkt c) alusel ning eelkõige sellal kehtinud 2001. aasta riskikapitalisuuniste (1) alusel pärast ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamist (C 17/2004 (ex N 566/03)).

18. oktoobri 2006. aasta kirjas kohustusid Ühendkuningriigi ametiasutused võtma asjakohaseid meetmeid oma kõigi olemasolevate riskikapitalikavade suhtes.

2011. aastal valiti ettevõtluse kapitalifondide kava kontrollitavate riigiabikavade nimekirja (SA.15373 (ex 2011/MX)). Leiti, et Ühendkuningriik ei olnud võtnud asjakohaseid meetmeid, et viia ettevõtluse kapitalifondide kava kooskõlla 2006. aasta riskikapitalisuunistega. 16. juuni 2013. aasta e-kirjas esitasid Ühendkuningriigi ametiasutused teabe olemasoleva kava rakendamise kohta, mida täiendati 12. juulil 2013.

2. PRAEGUSE ETTEVÕTLUSE KAPITALIFONDIDE KAVA KIRJELDUS

Avaliku ja erasektori investeeringuid ühendava ettevõtluse kapitalifondide kava eesmärk oli parandada VKEde juurdepääsu laienemiskapitalile terves Ühendkuningriigis. Avaliku sektori investeering võis olla kuni kaks korda suurem kui ettevõtluse kapitalifondi poolt erasektorist kogutud kapital. Ettevõtluse kapitalifondide avaliku ja erasektori investorite kasumi ja kahjumi jaotus tugines loogikale, et kahjumi korral jagati see erainvestoritega võrdsetel alustel, samas kui kasumi korral ei jagatud seda võrdse kohtlemise põhimõtte alusel (st teatavat kasumimäära ületava kasumi korral said erainvestorid kasumist suurema osa). Selle mehhanismiga tagati, et ettevõtluse kapitalifondid olid riigiabist hoolimata suunatud kasumile.

Ettevõtluse kapitalifondid võisid abikõlblikesse VKEdesse investeerimiseks kasutada omakapitali- ja kvaasiomakapitaliinstrumente vahemikus 250 000 kuni 2 miljonit Ühendkuningriigi naela (357 000 kuni 2,9 miljonit eurot). Puhtakujulised võlainvesteeringud olid kava raames konkreetselt keelatud. Jätkuinvesteeringud olid lubatud tingimusel, et VKEde poolt ettevõtluse kapitalifondidest ja teistelt omakapitali investeerijatelt hangitud omakapitalirahastamise kogusumma ei ületanud 2 miljonit naela (2,9 miljonit eurot). Seda ülemmäära ületavad jätkuinvesteeringud olid vajaduse korral lubatud üksnes pärast vähemalt kuue kuu möödumist ja lahjenduse vältimiseks tohtisid need moodustada kuni 10 % iga ettevõtluse kapitalifondiga seotud kapitalist. Ettevõtluse kapitalifondide kava raames loodi 12 fondi, neist 7 pärast 18. augustit 2007, st pärast kuupäeva, enne mida oleksid Ühendkuningriigi ametiasutused pidanud asjakohased meetmed (pärast riskikapitalisuuniste jõustumist 18. augustil 2006) vastu võtma. Kõnealused fondid investeerisid 94 ettevõttesse.

Ühendkuningriigi ametiasutuste poolt esitatud tõendite põhjal järeldab komisjon, et kolm ettevõtluse kapitalifondi tegid lahjenduse vältimiseks jätkuinvesteeringuid 7 ettevõttesse. Komisjon mõistab, et kava lubas ettevõtluse kapitalifondidel kasutada eesõiguse mehhanismi, mille raames said kapitalifondid kasutada oma portfelli kuuluvate investeerimisobjektide poolt emiteeritud uute aktsiate omandamise esimese valiku õigust, et takistada erainvestoritel sellistesse ettevõtetesse investeerimist, millega need oleksid lahjendanud kapitalifondide osalust. Ühendkuningriigi ametiasutused aga märkisid, et sellist mehhanismi ei ole praktikas kunagi kohaldatud ning et nad kohustuvad seda ka tulevikus mitte kasutama.

3. HINDAMINE

Hindamine tekitas komisjonis kahtlusi, kas ettevõtluse kapitalifondide kava on kooskõlas praeguste riskikapitalisuunistega, eelkõige seoses järgmisega:

a) Mitme investeerimisobjekti investeerimiskõlblikkus

Riskikapitalisuunistega (punkt 4.3.2) piiratakse riskikapitali investeerimine järgmiselt: 1) väikeettevõtted laienemisetapini või 2) keskmise suurusega ettevõtted tegevuse alustamise etapini, sõltumata investeerimisobjekti asukohast (st kas abi saavas või mittesaavas piirkonnas) või 3) keskmise suurusega ettevõtted laienemisetapini, kui nad asuvad abi saavates piirkondades.

Komisjon märgib, et kuus investeerimisobjekti näisid olevat laienemisetapis, kuna nad olid ettevõtluse kapitalifondide esimese investeeringu ajal tegelenud majandustegevusega märkimisväärne arv aastaid. Eespool nimetatud kuuest investeerimisobjektist neli olid investeerimise ajal väikeettevõtted, seega toimusid investeeringud vastavalt riskikapitalisuuniste piirangutele. Kaks ettevõtet (Reevoo ja Interactive Investors) olid ettevõtluse kapitalifondi investeeringu ajal aga keskmise suurusega ettevõtted, (2) kuna nad ületasid töötajate arvu künnise (4). Võttes lisaks arvesse nende asukohta Londonis (abi mittesaav piirkond), oleks tohtinud neisse investeerida üksnes tegevuse alustamise etapini.

Praeguses uurimisetapis on kahtlusi kõnealuse kahe investeeringu kokkusobivuses 2006. aasta riskikapitalisuunistega, kuna turutõrge ei ole piisavalt tõendatud. Kolmandaid isikuid kutsutakse üles esitama märkusi nende hiliste investeeringute ja turutõrke olemasolu kohta, nagu on nõutud 2006. aasta riskikapitalisuunistes.

b) Kapitali asendustehingute kasutamine

Ühendkuningriigi ametiasutuste poolt esitatud tõenditele tuginedes mõistab komisjon, et fond […] (*) investeeris ühte juhtkonnapoolsesse ettevõtte ülevõtmisse, mille puhul kaasati ettevõttevälist riskikapitali (buyin management buyout (BIMBO)). Sihtettevõte Andante Travels oli investeeringu tegemise ajal müügiga tegelenud 28 aastat. Investeeringu tegemise ajal oli ettevõttel […] (*) töötajat ja aastakäive oli […] (*).

Riskikapitalisuuniste alusel on ülevõtmis- ja kapitali asendustehingud keelatud. Seetõttu tuleks kontrollida selle tehingu mõju konkurentsile, lubades kolmandatel isikutel esitada selle kohta märkusi.

Eeltoodut arvestades asub komisjon esialgsele seisukohale, et eespool nimetatud ettevõtluse kapitalifondide investeeringud andsid mitmele investeerimisobjektile majandusliku eelise, kuna neisse tehti investeeringuid / nad said abi, mis ei olnud kooskõlas 2006. aasta riskikapitalisuunistes sätestatud eeskirjadega. Praeguses etapis on komisjonil kahtlusi, kas sellist abi saab pidada siseturuga kokkusobivaks.

Vastavalt nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 659/1999 artiklile 14 võib ebaseaduslikult antud abi selle saajalt tagasi nõuda.

KIRJA TEKST

„The Commission wishes to inform the United Kingdom that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the measure referred to above, it has decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereafter "TFEU"). 1. PROCEDURE (1) The Enterprise Capital Funds ("ECFs") scheme (SA.15373) was approved by the Commission on 3 May 2005 under Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty (now Article 107(3)(c) TFEU) and in particular on the basis of the Risk Capital Guidelines of 2001 ("RCGs of 2001") (5), in force at the time, after opening a formal investigation procedure (C 17/2004 (ex N 566/03)). (2) In September 2006, following a meeting with the UK authorities, the services of the Commission informed the UK authorities that the ECFs scheme was not in line with the Risk Capital Guidelines adopted in August 2006 (hereafter "RCGs of 2006") and invited them to take appropriate measures to bring the ECFs scheme in line with them. (3) By letter of 18 October 2006, the UK authorities committed to take appropriate measures concerning all their existing risk capital schemes. (4) In 2011, the ECFs scheme was selected for the State aid monitoring exercise (SA.15373 (ex 2011/MX)). It was found that the UK had failed to take appropriate measures to bring the ECFs scheme in line with the RCGs of 2006. (5) A meeting took place on 21 May 2013 between the Commission services and the UK authorities where the former proposed that the monitoring case and several changes to the scheme, which were subsequently notified on 21 August 2013 (SA.36428) by the UK authorities, be treated separately in two cases but parallel in time. (6) By e-mail of 16 June 2013, the Commission services received information on the implementation of the existing scheme. The information was updated by e-mail of 12 July 2013. (7) Two teleconferences took place on 1 and 2 July 2013 to discuss several elements of the case, and a meeting took place on 6 August 2013 where the UK authorities clarified several aspects of the operations that took place under the existing scheme. 2. DESCRIPTION OF THE EXISTING ECFS SCHEME (DECISION OF 2005) (8) Combining public and private investment, the ECFs scheme aimed at improving access to expansion capital for SMEs throughout the UK. Public investment was limited to two times the private capital raised by the fund, i.e. minimum one third of an ECF fund was to be provided by private investors. (9) The distribution of the profits and losses between public and private investors in the ECFs was based on the logic that, on the downside, the losses were distributed on equal terms with the private investors being fully exposed, while on the upside the distribution of the profits was non pari passu, i.e. private investors received most of the profits notably above a certain profitability rate. (6) This mechanism ensured that ECFs were commercially oriented while entailing state aid. (10) According to the rules of the scheme (7), an ECF may invest expansion capital in any company: — that meets the EU definition of an SME; — where the purpose of the relevant investment, or the application of the proceeds of such investment by the relevant company or undertaking, is predominantly related to or for the benefit of the economy of the UK; — whose equity or other securities are not, at the time of investment, listed on a recognised stock exchange (such as the London Stock Exchange) or otherwise quoted on a non-recognised exchange, i.e. AIM, Ofex or any other market on which prices are quoted publicly; — where the trade of such company is a qualifying trade as defined in Paragraph 4, Schedule 28B of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988, or where the company is undertaking research and development with a view to carrying on a qualifying trade (8). (11) ECF funds invested in eligible SMEs by means of equity and quasi-equity instruments between £250,000 (€357,000) and £2m (€2.9m). Pure debt investments were explicitly forbidden under the scheme (9). (12) Follow-on investments were permitted so long as the total equity funding raised by the SMEs from ECFs and other equity investors was no more than the £2m (€2.9m) limit. (13) Follow-on investments in excess of the above limit, i.e. £2m (€2.9m), were permitted, where necessary, only after a period of at least 6 months and to prevent dilution, subject to an upper limit of 10% of each ECF’s committed capital. (14) From the evidence provided by the UK authorities, the Commission understands that three ECFs, made follow-on anti-dilution investments in 7 companies. The Commission understands that the scheme allowed the ECFs to use a "pre-emption mechanism" whereby the ECFs could exercise a right of first refusal to acquire new shares issued by any investee in the ECF's portfolio, in order to prevent private investors from investing in such companies and thereby dilute the ECF's shareholding. However, the UK authorities have indicated that such a mechanism has never been applied in practice and that they committed not to make use of it in the future. (15) The ECFs scheme was initially approved for a period of 10 years, until 2 May 2015, and was intended to be self-financing over the medium term. For the first year of its operation, the UK allocated €65m to cover the cash-flow cost of the initial public participation. (16) 12 funds were created under the ECFs scheme, out of which 7 were created after 18 August 2007 that is, the date after which the scheme should have been aligned with the RGCs of 2006. The pre-2007 funds invested in 67 companies, while the post 2007 funds invested in 94 companies. Therefore, a total of 161 undertakings have benefited from the scheme. 3. OUTCOME OF THE MONITORING (17) The ECFs scheme was monitored by the Commission services in the light of (1) the Commission's decision of 2005 approving the measure and (2) the RCGs of 2006. (18) The assessment led to the conclusion that the scheme was not in line with the RCGs of 2006 as the UK authorities should have taken appropriate measures within 12 months from their entry into force, i.e. as from 18 August 2007, which they failed to do. The issue of appropriate measures arose with respect to ECFs that received public capital after 18 August 2007i.e. after the date by which the UK authorities should have adopted appropriate measures, at the latest, following the entry into force of the RCGs of 2006 on 18 August 2006. In practice, this meant that only the funds created after the end of the transitional period would need to comply with the RCGs of 2006, whilst the already existing risk capital funds could continue to operate under the rules established by the RSGs of 2001. (19) For the reasons explained in section 4 below, the Commission has doubts with respect to the compliance of the ECFs scheme's implementation with the RCGs of 2006, and particularly with respect to: a) Eligibility for investment of several investees; b) Use of capital replacement operations. 4. ASSESSMENT 4.1. Existence of State aid (20) In the decision of 2005 the Commission concluded that State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU is present at the level of the investors and at the level of the beneficiary SMEs. Therefore, through the implementation of the ECF scheme, the companies that are the object of the current monitoring case have received State aid in the sense of the above mentioned article. The UK authorities do not contest this conclusion. 4.2. Eligibility for investment of several investees (21) Since the creation of the scheme, the ECFs invested in 161 companies, of which 94 were investments made after 18 August 2007. Out of the 94 companies, 40 companies had not had sales at the time of the first investment. Of the remaining 54 companies, 6 appear to have been in their expansion stage since, at the moment of ECF's first investment, they had had commercial activities for a significant number of years. (22) The RCGs of 2006 (Point 4.3.2) limit the investment of risk capital to: (1) small enterprises up to the expansion stage and irrespective of their location, i.e. located in assisted or non-assisted areas (2) medium-size enterprises up to the start-up stage, irrespective of their location, and (3) medium-sized enterprises up to the expansion stage located in assisted areas. (23) The Commission notes that four out of the six above mentioned companies fulfil the definition of small enterprises at the moment of the investment. Therefore, although they seem to have been companies in their expansion stage, given their size, the investments were made in accordance with the limits set out in the RCGs of 2006. (24) The two other companies, Interactive Investors and Reevoo (10) exceeded, at the moment of the first investment, the threshold for a small enterprise (12). Therefore, at the moment of the investment, the two companies qualified as medium enterprises. Moreover, given their location in London, which is a non-assisted area, they could have received investment only up to the start-up phase (13). (25) Consequently, the Commission expresses doubts with respect to the compatibility of the aid for the investments into the two companies as they qualified as medium size enterprises, were in their expansion stage and were located in non-assisted areas. (26) The Commission may declare compatible measures providing finance for medium-sized enterprises in their expansion stage located in non-assisted areas, subject to a detailed assessment (balancing) of the individual case under Chapter 5 of the RCGs of 2006, including any evidence of market failure. At this stage of the investigation, the compatibility of the aid for these two investments with the RCGs of 2006 seems doubtful as there is limited evidence with respect to the market failure they faced. Third parties are invited to submit comments notably on the existence of a market failure with respect to such late-stage development companies as well as any other information relevant for making an in-depth assessment of the aid measure at issue under Section 5 of the RCG 2006. 4.3. Use of a capital replacement transaction (27) Based on the evidence provided by the UK authorities, the Commission understands that the fund […] invested in one buy-in management buy-out (14) (BIMBO). The target company, Andante Travels, had 28 years of commercial activities at the moment of the investment. At the moment of the investment, the company employed […] persons and had an annual turnover of […]. (28) Under the RCGs of 2006 the venture capital and risk capital measures refer to new/fresh capital being provided to the investees. Since they have limited impact on the cash/balance sheet of an investee, capital replacement operations are not foreseen as compatible measures under the Guidelines. Hence, in its practice the Commission considers them as not covered by the Guidelines (15), irrespective of the location of the investee, i.e. assisted or not-assisted area. In order to further assess the conditions in which the operation took place and to test its impact on competition, the Commission has decided to open the formal investigation procedure with respect to the above BIMBO operation and invites third parties to present comments on it. 5. CONCLUSION (29) Based on the foregoing analysis, the Commission considers that the ECFs may have granted aid outside of the scope of the approved scheme without prior notification. Therefore it has decided to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 108(2) TFEU in relation to funding decisions by the ECFs as to the following elements: a) Eligibility for investment into Reevoo and Interactive Investor; b) Use of one capital replacement transaction, namely the above BIMBO that benefited Andante Travels. (30) The Commission requires the United Kingdom and all interested parties, within one month from the receipt of this letter, to provide all documents, information and data needed for assessing the compatibility of the above-mentioned measures with Article 107(3)(c) TFEU.. (31) The Commission wishes to remind the authorities of the United Kingdom that Article 108(3) TFEU has suspensory effect, and would draw their attention to Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient. (32) The Commission informs the authorities of the United Kingdom that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.”

(1) EÜT C 235, 21.8.2001, lk 3.

(2) Ettevõtluse kapitalifondi esimese investeeringu ajal oli Reevoo tegelenud majandustegevusega 9 aastat, seal töötas […] () inimest ja ettevõtte aastakäive oli […] (*). Ettevõte Interactive Investors oli majandustegevusega tegelenud 11 aastat, seal töötas […] (*) inimest ja ettevõtte aastakäive oli […] (*).

(3) Selle teabe suhtes kehtib ametisaladuse hoidmise kohustus.

(4) 2003/361/EÜ - Euroopa Liidu Teataja L 124/39. Komisjoni 6. mai 2003. aasta soovituse, mis käsitleb mikroettevõtete, väikeste ja keskmise suurusega ettevõtete määratlust, lisa artikli 2 kohaselt töötab keskmise suurusega ettevõttes 50-250 inimest ja tema aastakäive ei ületa 50 miljonit eurot ja/või aastabilanss 43 miljonit eurot. Ettevõte on väikeettevõte, kui seal töötab alla 50 inimese ning aastakäive ja/või bilanss ei ületa 10 miljonit eurot.

(5) OJ C 235, 21.8.2001, p. 3.

(6) The government receives a prioritised return equivalent to the interest charged on the balance of outstanding loans to the fund (at the time 4.3%). Once the government has received its prioritised return, outstanding loans may then be repaid to the government and the private investors under the terms specified in the ECFs' partnership agreement. All further distributions to investors are to be divided between the government and all other private investors in a fixed profit-sharing ratio.

(7) Enterprise Capital Fund – Guidance for applicants http://www.capitalforenterprise.gov.uk/files/Guidance%20for%20Prospective%20ECF%20Managers%20-%20V2.pdf

(8) A trade will not qualify if one or more excluded activities together make up a 'substantial part' of that trade. The main excluded activities are: (1) dealing in land, financial instruments, or in goods other than in the course of an ordinary trade of retail or wholesale distribution; (2) financial activities, property development, or providing legal or accountancy services; (3) leasing (including letting assets on hire, except in the case of certain ship-chartering activities); (4) receiving royalties or licence fees, except where these arise from an intangible asset such as a patent or know-how, most or all of which has been created by the company (or one of its subsidiaries); (5) farming, market gardening, or forestry; (6) operating or managing hotels, guest houses, hostels, or nursing or residential care homes; and (7) providing services to another company in certain circumstances where the other company's trade consists to a substantial extent in excluded activities. Source: Enterprise Capital Funds – Guidance for applicants

(9) ECF's Partnership agreement, Point 3.6: "[ECF] may not acquire Investments in a Portfolio Company… (d) in loan finance or debt instruments with no associated equity securities."

(10) At the moment of the first investment Reevoo had 9 years of commercial activity; it employed […] () persons and had an annual turnover of […]. Interactive Investors had 11 years of commercial activity; it employed […] persons and had an annual turnover of […];Source: UK authorities

(11) Covered by the obligation of professional secrecy;

(12) See Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124 of 20.5.2003, p. 36), Annex I, Article 2(2) (50 employees).

(13) The Commission also notes that Reevoo had been backed by well-known venture capital firms, i.e. […] and […] (Source: UK authorities) which puts in question whether the company faced any market failure.

(14) Management buy-out is a form of replacement capital through which one or more managers of a company take control of the company's capital by acquiring the majority of shares from the actual owner(s). When the buyer is an outsider of the company who will become manager once the operation is completed, the transaction is called management buy-in. A BIMBO occurs when existing management, along with outside managers, decide to buyout a company. Buy-in management buyout (BIMBO) is a form of a buyout that incorporates characteristics of both a management buy-out and a management buy-in.

(15) See, e.g., Case SA.36489 (2013/N), recital (41)