EN Official Journal of the European Union CE 88/667

(2004/C 88 E/0686)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-4051/03

by Hiltrud Breyer (Verts/ALE) to the Commission

(12 January 2004)

Subject: Export of nuclear facilities to the People's Republic of China

The plutonium contained in fuel rods used in civilian nuclear reactors in China cannot be used for MOX production because no reprocessing plant is available. Military stocks of plutonium are not sufficient to run the MOX factory economically. It is also doubtful whether existing nuclear reactors can operate with MOX fuel rods. Leading experts consider it possible that the plant can be converted to process weapons-grade plutonium.

The IAEA takes the view that it has no legal power to guarantee the effective monitoring of imported nuclear facilities, and that it does not have the necessary resources in terms of staff and funds.

1. What information does the Commission have on the purpose for which the Hanau nuclear fuel rod factory, the SNR-300 and its reactor core are to be used in China?

2. Does the Commission consider it possible that the plant, components and nuclear fuel to be supplied as part of this deal could be used for military purposes, directly or indirectly?

3. How does the Commission currently assess the compatibility of the export plans with Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 (1), the EU arms embargo still in force against China and other international commitments on preventing the proliferation of goods which can be used for military purposes?

4. Does the Commission share the IAEA's view that it is not possible to monitor military use of the plant effectively, and what conclusions does it draw for the application of the arms embargo against China?

Answer given by Mr Patten on behalf of the Commission

(24 February 2004)

The Commission is aware of the possible export by Germany of a Mox Fuel Fabrication Plant to China. It is also aware that China expressed a wish to acquire SNR 300 fuel elements. However, the Commission has no official information as to why China is interested in this material and equipment. In fact, the MOX fabrication process is not designed to contribute to the production of a nuclear weapon but rather represents an important step to reduce Plutonium via its consumption in nuclear Light Water Reactors.

The export in question is covered by Council Regulation (EC) No1334/2000 of 22 June 2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of Dual-Use items and technology, hereafter ‘Dual-Use Regulation’, and is therefore subject to a license requirement. The item is listed in Annex I (0B005). The relevant provisions here are Articles 3 and 8 of the Dual-Use Regulation.

Under Article 3(1) of the Dual-Use Regulation, an authorisation is required for all goods listed in Annex I. The Commission believes that the MOX plant mentioned in the question technically corresponds to the item listed under 0B005 of Annex I of the Dual-Use Regulation. Consequently, an authorisation would be required under Article 3(1).

According to the information available to the Commission, the German licensing authority received an inquiry from the German company Siemens, as to whether a license for an export of the factory to China would be granted. To the best of the Commission's knowledge, a decision has not yet been issued. However, the decision to grant or refuse such a license is a sovereign one. The Regulation only lists in its Article 8, in a non comprehensive manner, certain issues that must be considered by the Member States in making the decision. The Commission has no authority to intervene. Only once the decision has been taken, could other Member States eventually question such a decision but the conditions for such action are strictly defined by the Regulation.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the responsible authority to monitor nuclear facilities and the Commission has not been informed of the IAEA declaration. However, China is one of the five nuclear weapon States defined by the Non Proliferation Treaty. The IAEA can therefore only perform checks on a two-sided voluntary basis. In addition, the cost/benefit effectiveness of such checks would have to be evaluated. Furthermore, the Commission would like to point out that China is a member of the Zangger Committee, which is a Committee to control the export of nuclear material.

Regarding the EU arms embargo on China, the European Council of 12 December 2003 invited the General Affairs Council to re-examine the question. A first discussion took place at the January 2004 General Affairs Council. Work in the relevant Council groups is ongoing and a decision is not expected before March 2004.

(1) OJ L 159, 30.6.2000, p. 1.