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EN Official Journal of the European Union CE 84/868

(2004/C 84 E/0960)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0751/04

by José García-Margallo y Marfil (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(11 March 2004)

Subject: Streamlining the Commission's coordination of Member States' economic policies

The Commission's attempts to streamline the coordination and consistency of Member States' economic and employment policy guidelines have to date not always produced very concrete or functional results. In spite of these attempts, the process by which the economic policies of the Member States are coordinated remains extremely bureaucratic, complicated and long-winded, and provides very little room for public debate, either at European or national level.

Does the Commission intend to undertake a genuine revision of its methods for monitoring and coordinating the economies of the Member States, after having conducted a real consultation with the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, in order to allow the democratic deficit to be reduced?

Answer given by Mr Solbes Mira on behalf of the Commission

(14 April 2004)

The Commission has recently announced an initiative for enhancing economic governance in the EU. This was prompted by the 25 November 2003 Ecofin Council conclusions which showed the need for better and more effective economic governance. In this context, the Commission is exploring options that could help raise the effectiveness of economic governance including a new balance between the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) and the Stability and Growth Pact as instruments to coordinate economic policy. This new initiative is evidence of the fact that the methods for monitoring and coordinating economic policies of Member States are updated and revised if and when needed. The initiative follows last year's reform of policy coordination in the context of streamlining the economic and employment guidelines. The Commission believes that it is conducive both to greater policy coherence through better aligned coordination instruments and enhanced effectiveness through increased focus on implementation: the new three-year coordination cycle helps Member States to better implement EU policy guidance that is focused on key policy issues and derived from thorough analysis and debate.

Policy coordination is a learning-by-doing process and the experiences with streamlining of the economic and employment policy guidelines are only one year old. The Commission will carefully consider additional steps deemed appropriate and discuss the matter with all the parties concerned.
EN Official Journal of the European Union CE 84/353

(2004/C 84 E/0410)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0285/04

by Alexander de Roo (Verts/ALE) to the Commission

(6 February 2004)

Subject: Landfill on Malta

The Maltese Government intend to establish a new temporary landfill very close to the neolithic temple complex of Mnajdra, which is designated as a Unesco heritage site.

According to a report, commissioned by Friends of the Earth Malta, the site selection process took six days (from 3 to 9 June 2003) without any representation from the Museums Department.

The Maltese Minister remarked that an EIA on the project could be completed in three to four months, establishing a precedent in the field of EIAs in Malta, and giving a new definition to the term ‘multi-seasonal’. The company SLR Consulting accepted to undertake the EIA within this timeframe.

The Hydrological Risk Assessment presented by SLR uses a model to establish the risk of contaminants finding their way out of the sealing lining. The model erroneously assumes a situation where the ‘lining always operates as designed’.

Regarding air quality, there are strong contradictions: SLR state that ‘no data are available to assess the potential for these deposition rates of gas to impact on stone’ but somehow still go on to conclude that ‘the potential for impact on the archaeological features including the World Heritage Sites and Misqa tanks will be negligible’.

Does the European Commission know that the proposal contradicts policy with regard to siting of landfills?

Does the Commission know that the interim landfill is not designed for hazardous waste?

What does the Commission intend doing to stop the Maltese authorities from enacting their plans for this landfill sited near the Unesco World Heritage sites?

Answer given by Mrs Wallström on behalf of the Commission

(18 March 2004)

In the accession negotiations, Malta gave its commitment to meet the provisions of the Landfill Directive (1) from 1 May 2004 onwards.

The Maltese Government has informed the Commission that the temporary landfill will comply with the provisions of the Landfill Directive, and that the environment impact assessment would also be made in conformity with the EU legislation. While the decision of where to locate the landfill remains with the national authorities, the Maltese authorities are aware that it must meet the requirements of the Landfill Directive, in particular those concerning the protection of nature and cultural heritage given in Annex I of the Directive. The Maltese Government has also informed the Commission that the temporary landfill will only be used for non-hazardous household waste.

The Commission will be monitoring Malta's progress with the transposition and implementation of the Landfill Directive and the commitments given during negotiations. Once Malta becomes a Member State then the Commission will ensure compliance with this Directive in the same way as it does for all other Member States.

(1) Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste, OJ L 182, 16.7.1999.
1.

The Commission is in the process of verifying the data sent in the report mentioned by the Honourable Member. However, the Commission did not yet receive official data on packaging recycling from Portugal for the year 2002. Pursuant to Commission Decision 97/138/EC (1) these data must be submitted by 30 June 2004. The data for recycled packaging waste submitted by Quercus for 2002 significantly differ from the official figures for the years 1998 to 2001. According to the official 2001 data submitted by Portugal, a total of 484,225 tons of packaging waste was recycled, whereas the data by Quercus only indicate a total of 193,502 tons of packaging waste recycling. Correspondingly, the officially reported recycling rate for 2001 is 38 % whereas the recycling rate for 2002 reported by Quercus is 15 %. The report submitted by Quercus does not give an explanation for this difference which is, however, unlikely to be only due to different reference years. Whereas the above data refer to recycling, according to Directive 94/62/EC (2) (as amended by Directive 2004/12/EC (3)) the only target applicable to Portugal by 2001 is a target of 25 % for recovery or incineration at waste incineration plants with energy recovery. The data submitted by Portugal for 2001 indicate that a total of 667 916 tonnes of packaging would fall into this category. The resulting rate for recovery or incineration at waste incineration plants with energy recovery is 52 %. For this reason, the Commission currently does not have sufficient elements to believe that Portugal has failed to achieve its 2001 target. However, the Commission will verify the official 2002 data and any other relevant information which might be submitted in future. The Quercus report also refers to other issues (transparency, Green Dot fees, supermarkets, re-use, industrial packaging, medical packaging, more favourable treatment of certain companies and packaging types, and the situation in the Azores). However, these matters fall under the responsibility of national authorities and the Commission currently cannot identify any elements that would infringe the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive or other pieces of Community legislation.
EN Official Journal of the European Union CE 88/263

(2004/C 88 E/0268)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0984/04

by Piia-Noora Kauppi (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(30 March 2004)

Subject: The role of tiredness in road accidents

According to the Finnish Road Safety Organisation (Suomen Liikenneturva), the statistics compiled by fatal road accident investigation boards indicate that 12 % of head-on collisions with a fatal outcome are due to drivers falling asleep. The true figure is likely to be higher still, as many accidents which are actually caused by tiredness are attributed to some kind of error in the handling of the vehicle. A survey in Norway has shown that as many as one third of all head-on collisions and run-off-the-road accidents were due in one way or another to tiredness, whereas for example alcohol or drugs are involved in only 11 % of accidents.

One of the priorities of the Commission's transport policy is promoting transport safety. When seeking practical ways of improving road safety, how will the Commission take account of the prevalence of accidents caused by tiredness? Has the Commission investigated – and if not, will it investigate – the role of tiredness in road accidents throughout the EU?

Answer given by Mrs de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(30 April 2004)

The Commission is aware of the figures quoted by the Honourable Member which show that tiredness plays an important role in road accidents.

Tiredness is an important consideration in the legislation on the working hours and the driving and rest periods of professional drivers (1) for which the Commission has recently made several proposals, including one on roadside inspections which is currently before Parliament and the Council (2).

The Commission is supporting research projects such as the AWAKE (3) project under the 5th Framework Programme, which aims to improve our understanding of the causes, other than just lack of sleep, of tiredness leading to road accidents, and to develop technology to detect hypo-vigilance and alert the driver.

The Commission will continue to promote research in this field.

(1) In particular Regulations (EEC) No 3820/85 and 3821/85, OJ L 370, 31.12.1985, and Directive 2002/15/EC, OJ L 80, 23.3.2002.

(2) COM(2003) 628 final.

(3) Assessment of driver vigilance and Warning According to traffic risK Estimation.
EN Official Journal of the European Union CE 84/526

(2004/C 84 E/0601)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0015/04

by Christopher Huhne (ELDR) to the Commission

(16 January 2004)

Subject: Apple orchards

Can the Commission state whether any EU legislation has stipulated or resulted in the restriction of British apple growers from planting new orchards of English apples? In particular, Cox's apples.

Answer given by Mr Fischler on behalf of the Commission

(23 February 2004)

Recipients of Community aid for grubbing up apple, pear, peach and nectarine trees for the 1990/1991 to 1992/1993, 1994/1995, 1995/1996 and 1997/1998 marketing years had to undertake ‘to refrain for a period of 15 years, first, from planting any apple trees (other than cider-apple trees), pear trees (other than perry-pear trees), peach trees and/or nectarine trees on the areas of [their] holding affected by the grubbing up operation and, second, from extending the other areas of [their] holding planted with apple trees (other than cider-apple trees), pear trees (other than perry-pear trees), peach trees and/or nectarine trees’ (1). This requirement, not aimed at any particular variety of dessert apple, was necessary in order to give the grubbing up operations the full economic effect desired and avoid wasting Community funds.

(1) See Article 3(2) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2467/97 of 11 December 1997 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/97 on the improvement of the Community production of apples, pears, peaches and nectarines, OJ L 341, 12.12.1997.
EN Official Journal of the European Union CE 88/570

(2004/C 88 E/0581)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-1104/04

by Francesco Speroni (NI) to the Commission

(5 April 2004)

Subject: Fig bananas

What were the reasons for excluding fig bananas from the scope of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2257/94 (1) of 16 September 1994 at that time and are these reasons still valid?

Should other varieties of bananas, such as red bananas, also be excluded?

Answer given by Mr Fischler on behalf of the Commission

(30 April 2004)

We have already pointed out in the answer to Written Question P-3283/03 (2) that the only varieties covered by the quality standards in Annex I to Commission Regulation (EC) No 2257/94 of 16 September 1994 laying down quality standards for bananas are those of the Musa (AAA) spp subgroups Cavendish and Gros Michel.

Thus no banana variety not in these subgroups is subject to these quality standards. This rules out fig bananas, and also red bananas, which belong to the Figue Rose subgroup of group AAA.

When the quality standards were drawn up these products were excluded because of their highly specific characteristics and the way in which they are marketed, which differs from that for bananas of the Cavendish and Gros Michel subgroups.

Bananas of these varieties still of course have to meet the general foodstuff marketing requirements (plant and public health standards, labelling rules etc.).

(1) OJ L 245, 20.9.1994, p. 6.

(2) OJ C 78 E, 27.3.2004, p. 255.
EN Official Journal of the European Union CE 84/173

(2004/C 84 E/0213)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0196/04

by Ward Beysen (NI) to the Commission

(29 January 2004)

Subject: Temporary agency workers directive

Does the definition of ‘pay’ exclude pensions, other financial benefits and overtime? If so, does the Commission intend to expressly exclude these items in the proposed directive?

If the aforementioned items are not expressly excluded from the proposed Directive, is it intended that their application (or exclusion) should be determined by Member States or by collective agreements? If so, does the Commission intend to expressly state this intention in the proposed directive?

Does the Commission intend the comparison of basic working and employment conditions to be made on the basis of an overall comparison rather than an item-by-item comparison?

Does the Commission intend to make it clear in the proposed directive that temporary workers should be paid according to their qualifications, expertise and the nature of the job — meaning that in some circumstances temporary workers could be paid less than permanent workers?

Answer given by Mrs Wallström on behalf of the Commission

(4 March 2004)

The Honourable Member questions the Commission about certain provisions in the proposed directive on working conditions for temporary agency workers.

Regarding the definition of salary, the Commission noted that during their negotiations in the Council the Member States deemed it necessary to point out that the principle of non-discrimination does not apply to occupational social security schemes, including occupational pension and health insurance schemes and financial contribution schemes. On the other hand it has always been very clear that overtime is included in the definition of salary. Providing for the contrary or granting such an exemption has not at any time been considered.

With regard to general working and employment conditions, reference should be made to the amended Commission proposal. The principle of non-discrimination has essentially been reformulated in such a manner as to rule out any alternative. The same basic working and employment conditions that the worker would have enjoyed if he/she had been recruited directly by the user undertaking to hold the same job, should be applied to the temporary agency worker. From now on, the point of reference is the post held by the temporary agency worker. Their situation is no longer comparable to that of any similar worker employed by the user undertaking. On the other hand, the basic working and employment conditions that should be set are those that the user undertaking would have had to apply if, instead of employing an agency temp, it had decided to recruit directly, for an identical period of time
EN Official Journal of the European Union CE 84/312

(2004/C 84 E/0360)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-0134/04

by Mario Borghezio (NI) to the Commission

(20 January 2004)

Subject: Collapse of Parmalat and insufficient checks by Bankitalia

The financial collapse of the Italian Parmalat group highlighted a serious lack of checks by Bankitalia regarding the Parmalat group's relations with the Italian banking system. The stock market watchdog, Consob, expressed its disappointment at being denied access by the Italian central bank to data held by Bankitalia's risks bureau on Parmalat's position.

Will the Commission adopt a clear position regarding the tasks that still need to be carried out, uniformly, by the central banks of Member States?

Does not the Commission feel that there is a need to set up truly independent authorities in each Member State to guarantee and protect the rights of savers?

Answer given by Mr Bolkestein on behalf of the Commission

(4 March 2004)

The Commission notes that a criminal investigation by the Italian Courts to assess responsibilities in the failure of the Parmalat group is still ongoing. Moreover, the discussions in Italy on whether, and to what extent, the activity of Banca d'Italia had an impact on the efficiency of the controls are still continuing. Therefore, the Commission considers it premature and inappropriate to express a view on this specific case.

On a broader perspective, it is the responsibility of Member States to decide how the supervision of banks, other financial institutions and listed companies should be organised to achieve the objective of efficient prudent supervision, market integrity and transparency, necessary to ensure the protection of savers, investors and the stability of financial system, on the basis of the principles and provisions laid down in the EU Banking Directives (1) and the EU securities, accounting and audit directives and regulations. These principles include provisions on co-operation and exchange of information between supervisory authorities as well as the obligation of professional secrecy in supervision.

(1) Directive 2000/12/EC of the Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, OJ L 126, 26.5.2000.
EN Official Journal of the European Union CE 84/642

(2004/C 84 E/0723)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0632/04

by Marco Cappato (NI) to the Commission

(3 March 2004)

Subject: Hunger strike by Tunisian journalist Abdallah Zouari

The Tunisian journalist Abdallah Zouari, sentenced on 29 August 2003 to 13 months' imprisonment for ‘defamation’ and ‘failure to comply with an administrative decision’, has been on hunger strike for 20 days. On 17 February 2004, his family learned that the Tunisian prison authorities had, for the second week running, refused them permission to visit him in prison.

As far back as 2002, regarding a previous arrest of Mr Zouari (joint reply to Written Questions E-2526/02, E-2597/02 and E-2629/02 (1)), the Commission expressed ‘doubts concerning the re-arrest of Mr Abdallah Zouari and the legitimacy of the administrative measure behind it’.

Has the Commission moved to call on its office in Tunis to request a prison visit to Mr Zouari? If not, does the Commission intend to do so in the next few days?

What conclusions has the Commission drawn about the ‘legitimacy of the administrative measure’ used in Mr Zouari's case, over which it had expressed doubts?

Does the Commission intend to intervene with the Tunisian authorities to call for the release of political dissidents, in particular the journalists Hamadi Jebali and Abdallah Zouari, who were arrested for expressing their opinion?

Answer given by Mr Patten on behalf of the Commission

(1 April 2004)

The Commission is in regular contact with Member States on human rights issues in Tunisia, and as the Honourable Member points out, has been following closely the cases of Abdallah Zouari and Hamadi Jebali. As a source of information the Commission is in regular contact with Tunisian independent civil society organisations.

The Commission has ongoing concerns about aspects of the administration of justice in Tunisia and is engaged in a regular dialogue with the Tunisian authorities on these questions, ‘inter alia’ in the framework of the Association Agreement and the European Neighbourhood Policy. Moreover, an ambitious Mediterranean-European Development Agreement (MEDA) programme, currently in preparation, in support of Tunisian reform plans for the judiciary may include prison administration issues.

The Commission has learned that Mr Zouari has now brought an end to his hunger strike, and thanks the Honourable Member for the information that the Tunisian prison authorities have prevented Mr Zouari from receiving visits from his family. The Commission intends to bring this to the attention of Member States with a view to discussing options for action, including the possibility of a prison visit.

(1) OJ C 155 E, 3.7.2003, p. 26.
EN Official Journal of the European Union CE 88/261

(2004/C 88 E/0266)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0980/04

by Luigi Vinci (GUE/NGL) to the Commission

(30 March 2004)

Subject: Instructions from the Army High Command in Turkey

In January, with the subsequent approval of Military Headquarters, the Army High Command in Turkey instructed its own intelligence services and provincial governments to gather information on members of the public and organisations in favour of Turkey entering the European Union, in favour of the United States or with Satanist and Masonic links and on Internet groups, minorities, children of well-off families, etc. In the High Command's view, all such persons and organisations could become involved in separatist or subversive activities.

This initiative has been fiercely criticised in the Turkish press.

Despite the brutally anti-democratic nature of this intrusion, which is hostile to Turkey's entry to the European Union and, furthermore, is in breach of Turkish law, The Turkish Government does not appear to have raised any objections.

What are the Commission's views on this matter, and what action does it intend to take in response to this behaviour with a view to upholding the Copenhagen principles in general and to facilitating the democratisation process within Turkey agreed between the Turkish Government and the European Union?

Answer given by Mr Verheugen on behalf of the Commission

(30 April 2004)

The Commission is aware of the events to which the Honourable Member refers.

Under the revised Accession Partnership as adopted by the Council of Ministers on 19 May 2003, there is a priority for Turkey to align civilian control of the military with practice in Member States.

In its last Regular Report of November 2003 (1), the Commission noted that ‘the Armed Forces in Turkey exercise influence through a series of informal mechanisms. At various occasions, military members of the National Security Council expressed their opinions about political, social and foreign policy matters in public speeches, statements to the media and declarations.’

On 16 March 2004, the Turkish General Staff published a Statement concerning the above-mentioned facts denying any intention of the army to give specific orders to compile any blacklist of people according to their politicai view or lifestyle. The statement indicated however that it was the duty of the Armed forces to carry out activities against ‘separatist and fundamentalist threats’. These facts triggered a debate in the Turkish Parliament in the course of which the question was raised of the compatibility of this type of intelligence gathering with the principle of freedom of thought.

The Commission will continue to follow the developments related to civil-military relations in Turkey in light of the Copenhagen political criteria and where necessary raise it directly with the Turkish authorities.

(1) COM(2003) 676 final.