WRITTEN QUESTION E-3164/02

by Marjo Matikainen-Kallström (PPE-DE)and Christian Rovsing (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(5 November 2002)

Subject: Nuclear energy in Bulgaria

We refer to the seminar in the European Parliament at which the future of the Bulgarian nuclear plants at Kozloduy was discussed on 1 October 2002, and to the answer given by Mr Verheugen on behalf of the Commission on 23 September 2002 to Written Question E-2121/02(1) tabled by Mrs Matikainen-Kallström and Dr Adam.

At the Parliament seminar, the Director of Nuclear Safety of the IAEA presented the report of a recent expert safety mission. This concluded that the safety standards achieved at Kozloduy 3 and 4 had now reached the same level as units of the same vintage operating in the EU.

In his answer to the previous written question Mr Verheugen suggested that the Kozloduy NPP units 3 and 4 continued to harbour a number of deviations from safety requirements.

Could the Commission now clearly give its opinion on the report of the IAEA? In particular could it specify which are the safety standards referred to by Mr Verheugen in his answer (if they are different to those used by the IAEA)? Could the Commission also spell out the precise nature of the deviations mentioned in the reply?

(1) OJ C 242 E, 9.10.2003, p. 6.

Answer given by Mr Verheugen on behalf of the Commission

(19 December 2002)

The Commission would like to inform the Honourable Members that Chapter 14 Energy of the accession negotiations was provisionally closed for Bulgaria on 18 November 2002, reaching an agreement between the Member States and Bulgaria on nuclear safety in this country, notably as far as Kozloduy units 3 and 4 are concerned.

In the Commission's view this new information supersedes the questions raised by the Honourable Members, since these questions were related to issues in discussion before this agreement was reached.

As to these specific questions, the Commission first recalls that it has no mandate to give an opinion on a report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Commission will therefore limit its response to recall the following facts.

The Commission also refers to the answer given to Written Question P-2718/02 by Mr Linkohr(1) on the same subject:

- The IAEA report to which the Honourable Members refer does not conclude that all safety standards achieved at Kozloduy 3 and 4 have now reached the same level as at units of the same vintage operating in the Union. The exact wording of this report is that the plant operational safety () has reached a level that corresponds to the level of plants of the same vintage worldwide. The Commission recalls that the European concerns regarding Kozloduy units 3 and 4 are focused on the original design-safety deficiencies of the unit-type VVER 440/230, that is in operation in Kozloduy units 1 to 4. The comparative quotation made by the Honourable Members, therefore, does not address the issue which is at the core of the European concerns regarding Kozloduy units 3 and 4.

- As regards design safety of units 3 and 4, the Commission recalls that this report of the IAEA on Kozloduy Units 3 and 4 followed an IAEA expert mission, carried out from 24 to 28 June 2002. This mission complemented three previous IAEA missions in the design and operational areas, in order to assess all previous recommendations and suggestions made for Kozloduy NPP Units 3 and 4 including design safety, seismic safety and operational safety. Nevertheless, based on a review of previous recommendations, by its very nature this report does not conclude on whether the improvements made to the design safety fully compensate the original design flaws, in particular the lack of a containment for this unit type, through results of the modernisation programme. The exact wording of this report on this issue is that regarding Units 3 and 4, in the course of the Modernisation Programme, the main safety functions were improved to the level, or in some cases beyond the level, which meets the IAEA initial recommendations.

- Finally, the Commission recalls the results of the Report on Nuclear Safety in the Context of Enlargement elaborated in June 2001(2), followed by a Peer Review Status report in June 2002, both of which were elaborated under the auspices of the Council. The situation and developments regarding nuclear safety in candidate countries were undertaken by an ad-hoc formation of the Council Group on Atomic Questions, namely the Working Party on Nuclear Safety (WPNS). Details of the Kozloduy NPP modernisation programme, that has been ongoing over the last years, were taken into consideration and the report indicated that the current safety improvement programme on units 3 and 4 will help limit original deviations and ensure their operation during the period until their early closure. In this report, Member State experts confirmed the need for firm closure commitments in view of existing deviations from safety requirements and practices widely applied within the Union.

(1) OJ C 268 E, 1.11.2003, p. 13.

(2) http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/01/st09/09181-a1en1.pdf.