WRITTEN QUESTION E-3977/98

by W.G. van Velzen (PPE) to the Commission

(4 January 1999)

Subject: Telecommunications and the political independence of NRAs

Mr Müller, the German Minister of Telecommunications, recently "advised" Deutsche Telekom AG to withdraw its proposal for tariffs for access by third parties to the "last mile" (cf. Financial Times, 28/ 29 November 1998), which Deutsche Telekom AG duly did. As a result, the German regulator was not able to deliver an opinion as scheduled on Monday, 30 November on the tariffs which Deutsche Telekom AG's competitors can charge for access to subscriber' connections.

1. Does the Commission feel that the German minister's intervention was a violation of the political independence of NRAs as defined in European legislation (cf. directive 97/51/EC(1) of 6 October 1997, which is a follow-up to directive 90/387/EC(2))?

2. If not, where, in the Commission's opinion, should the line be drawn between the political independence of NRAs, as set out in the abovementioned directive, and the powers of the national governments?

Answer given by Mr Bangemann on behalf of the Commission

(24 February 1999)

1. The Community directives relating to telecommunications services define the independence of national regulatory authorities (NRAs) in terms of the need to separate the regulatory function from the activities of operators. The principal requirements are laid down in the services and framework directives(3). The first is the legal and functional independence of the NRA from network operators and service or equipment providers. The same directives also impose separation of the control and regulatory function where Member States retain ownership or significant control of the incumbent operator.

In Germany, regulatory tasks are assigned to the "Regulierungsbehörde für Post und Telekommunikation", while the federal ministry for Economics retains the policy-making function. Separation of the regulatory function from the operations of the incumbent operator is ensured by the fact that responsibility for the state's holding in Deutsche Telekom is vested in the Finance ministry.

In the case in question, and given the above, it is a matter for the German authorities to decide how ministers exercise their policy-making powers, provided there is no possibility for the Finance minister to influence the decisions of the NRA.

2. In the light of the explanation of the provisions of the directives on the independence of NRAs given above, the Commission would not wish to seek to prescribe limits on policy-making powers. In the case of Germany, however, it would simply draw attention to the fact that the "Regulierungsbehörde für Post und Telekommunikation" has already adopted a number of decisions relating to interconnection, preselection, number portability and local loop tariffs which amply demonstrate its independence in line with the directives.

(1) OJ L 295, 29.10.1997, p. 23.

(2) OJ L 192, 24.7.1990, p. 1.

(3) In particular in Article 5bis of Council Directive 90/387/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the internal market for telecommunications services through the implementation of open network provision (ONP) (OJ L 192, 24.7.1990), as added by Directive 97/51/EC of the Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 amending Directives 90/387/EEC and 92/44/EEC for the purpose of adaptation to a competitive environment in telecommunications (OJ L 117, 7.5.1997).