WRITTEN QUESTION E-3148/02

by Sebastiano Musumeci (UEN) to the Commission

(4 November 2002)

Subject: Pakistani terrorists in the Mediterranean

According to information obtained by the Italian police a ghost ship the Cristi with a group of Islamic terrorists linked to Osama Bin Laden on board is allegedly heading through the Mediterranean towards Europe with a view to carrying out terrorist attacks.

Both the Italian secret services and their counterparts from the US Navy are endeavouring to intercept the ghost ship, which reportedly belongs to the shipping firm Nova Spirit Incorporation, whose headquarters are in Delaware, USA, but which also has offices in Romania.

On 19 February and 4 August 2002, in Trieste and Gela, Sicily, respectively, the vessels Twillinger and Sara also apparently belonging to Nova Spirit Incorporation were impounded. On board were, respectively, eight and 15 Pakistanis, claiming to be crewmen, who were found to be in possession of false passports and telephone numbers of persons already wanted by the police for arms trafficking.

According to the inquiry carried out by the Italian police, the 15 Pakistanis arrested on the Sara in Gela may be members of Laskar i Jhangui, a terrorist group which has concluded a pact with al-Qa'ida with a view to carrying out attacks in Europe.

The Commission:

- What steps can it take to establish whether the news released by the Italian police through the Caltanissetta police chief is accurate?

- In the light of the Communication from the Commission to the Council and Parliament entitled Towards the integrated management of the external borders of the Member States' of the European Union(1), what practical steps can realistically be taken to combat the ferrying of Islamic terrorists to Europe by means of vessels which act as huge taxis and which pose a serious threat to the security of the Western world?

(1) COM(2002) 0233 final.

Answer given by Mr Vitorino on behalf of the Commission

(4 December 2002)

The Commission does not have the legal power to check the authenticity of police reports released by the authorities of the Member States responsible for maintaining public order and safeguarding internal security.

The Commission would, however, recall the ideas set out in its communication Towards the integrated management of the external borders of the Member States, to which the Honourable Member refers.

Bearing in mind conclusion No 42 of the Laeken European Council (14/15 December 2001), one of the objectives announced by that Communication was to propose mechanisms for working and cooperation at European Union level which will permit practitioners of the checks at the external borders to come together around the same table to coordinate their operational actions in the framework of an integrated strategy which takes progressively into account the multiplicity of aspects to the management of the external borders. This multiplicity is illustrated by the definitions of security at external borders, internal security in the common area of freedom of movement and management of external borders which are annexed to the Commission communication. The definitions refer to terrorism as one of the various threats which should prompt the Member States to move towards more integrated management of their external borders.

It can be stressed that the Plan for the management of the external borders of the Member States(1) adopted by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs, JHA) on 13 June 2002 is very broadly based on the Commission communication. In particular, all the definitions proposed in the annex to the communication were adopted as they stood by the Council. The line of thought and action proposed by the Commission communication

underlies the structure of the Plan adopted by the Council and, from the outset, lends it an ambition going beyond the simple fight against illegal immigration: () The control and surveillance of borders contribute to managing flows of persons entering and leaving that area and helps protect our citizens from threats to their security. Besides, they contribute a fundamental element in the fight against illegal immigration.

As one of the aspects of integrated management of external borders likely to contribute to the fight against terrorism, the Commission communication recommends the adoption of an common integrated risk evaluation based on a multidisciplinary definition of indicators considered as relevant to external borders. To that end, the Commission has advocated synergy between Europol and the police cooperation bodies. The Plan for the management of external borders adopted by the Council has made it a common objective, while the Seville European Council (21/22 June 2002) called for the preparation, before June 2002, of a common risk analysis model, in order to achieve common integrated risk assessment. The risk of terrorist infiltration will certainly be included among the indicators of common risk assessment affecting external borders.

The Commission also suggests that a procedure or code of conduct be developed in order to enable an exchange and permanent processing of information and intelligence between the services responsible for the control and surveillance of external borders and the security services of the Member States operating within their borders. Here, the Communication states that the intelligence services of a Member State should be able to supply all border guard services and consulates of the Member States without delay with sufficiently relevant and precise information to enable them to exercise targeted surveillance of certain types of individuals, of objects, of geographical origins or modes of transport for a given period. This scenario appears closely akin to the situation described by the Honourable Member.

In the longer term, the Commission communication suggests using technological innovations and gives as an example the Galileo system with a view to improving the surveillance of coastlines by satellite.

(1) OJ L 161, 19.6.2002.