EN Official Journal of the European Union CE 84/29

(2004/C 84 E/0033)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-2530/03

by Gabriele Statiner (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(22 July 2003)

Subject: Eurostat Task Force

On 9 July 2003, in the wake of the accusations made against Eurostat and in response to a proposal from Mr Kinnock, Vice-President, the Commission decided to set up a Task Force which is to take over the internal and external investigations hitherto conducted by OLAF. Pursuant to the Commission decision, the Task Force will be headed by Mr Peter Zangl, an EU official who is not on the staff of OLAF but Deputy Director-General in the Information Society DG.

Can the Commission indicate why, in opting to follow the proposals of its Vice-President, it has in this way interfered in the independence of OLAF which is guaranteed by the legislator (in Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1)) and by the Commission itself (in Commission Decision 1999/352/EC (2))?

Can the Commission indicate in particular the manner in which the Director of OLAF was involved in its Decision of 9 July 2003 and the extent to which its actions comply with the provision that, in the performance of his investigative duties, the Director of OLAF must neither seek nor take instructions from the Commission?

In its judgments of 10 July 2003 in Cases C-11/00 and C-15/00, the European Court of Justice emphasised the special importance of the independence of OLAF's investigations.

That being the case, has the Commission assessed the risk that any officials or undertakings concerned by the Task Force's investigations may contest the regularity of those investigations?

Joint answer

to Written Questions E-2515/03, E-2516/03 and P-2530/03

given by Mr Kinnock on behalf of the Commission

(8 October 2003)

The Honourable Members will be aware that, the Commission is entitled at any time to have audits, verifications and ad hoc analyses of its departments' financial activities carried out in order to check compliance with the Financial Regulation and internal rules of good administrative practice. Such audits and verifications can enable the Commission to detect systemic shortcomings and draw the appropriate conclusions in organisational terms.

Furthermore, as part of the follow-up to the budget discharge — and at Parliament's request — the Commission is scrutinising a number of contracts concluded by Eurostat with private companies with a view to determining the nature and scope of the contractual relationships involved. The review covers certain past contracts and contracts that continued.

It was also in this context that the multidisciplinary Task Force was set up on 9 July 2003 and its remit spelled out in full by the Commission on 23 July. The Task Force is to report on the following points:

— the financial circuits in operation at Eurostat;

— authorisation procedures;

— day-to-day arrangements for the management of outside contractors;

— instructions regarding corrective measures given by management and action taken.

The job of the Task Force is explicitly to provide the Commission with the information necessary for it to take any management and organisation measures that are required in order to ensure that the Financial Regulation and the associated rules of good administrative practice are observed. The Commission has in no way sought to compromise the independence of OLAF.

The role and objectives of the Task Force are therefore not the same as those of OLAF. Under Article 1(3) of Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office, OLAF has the task of ‘investigating [within the Institutions, bodies, offices and agencies established by, or on the basis of, the Treaties] … serious matters relating to the discharge of professional duties such as to constitute a dereliction of the obligations of officials and other servants of the Communities liable to result in disciplinary or, as the case may be, criminal proceedings, or an equivalent failure to discharge obligations on the part of members of Institutions and bodies …’. That said, there is nothing to prevent the work of the Task Force being used by OLAF in so far as its activities complement investigations being undertaken by OLAF.

The Commission is indeed required by Article 7(1) of Regulation 1073/1999 to inform OLAF of possible cases of fraud or corruption or any other illegal activity.

It follows that the activities of the task force are not liable to encroach on OLAF's powers or compromise the independence of its investigation. In any event, the Director of OLAF and the Head of the Task Force liase regularly, and the Director of OLAF has the power to ensure that OLAF's independence is fully protected.

The Commission cannot therefore see how the setting-up of the Task Force could interfere with the exercise of OLAF's powers or jeopardise the independence of its Director-General, to whom the Commission has not issued any instruction but who has agreed to the necessary link set up between the Task Force and OLAF. The Commission cannot see what risk the creation and operation of the task force could represent for the legality of OLAF's investigation.

The Commission has been informed by OLAF that the OLAF Supervisory Committee has been consulted without delay after the Commission's decision by the Director-General of OLAF. The consultation is ongoing.

(1) OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 20.