WRITTEN QUESTION E-2019/00

by Gerhard Hager (NI) to the Commission

(21 June 2000)

Subject: Smuggled plutonium and lithium 6 Euratom safeguards

On 17 December 1999, the Working Party for Physical Analyses and Measuring Procedures (ARGE-PhAM), acting on behalf of the Hanau Public Prosecution Service, registered a complaint with Mr Prodi, President of the Commission, concerning Euratom safeguards following investigations by the German authorities into the seizure of plutonium/lithium in Munich in August 1994.

In this connection:

1. Does the Commission consider it conducive to an objective inquiry into the allegations if the authority in question is itself given the task of carrying out fresh investigations?

2. What internal Euratom procedures are in place for investigating alleged shortcomings specifically relating to safeguards? Who is responsible for investigating which sections and what are the relationships between the members of staff involved?

3. Who was responsible for the investigation in this case?

4. To what extent are the Euratom authorities required to cooperate with national investigations?

5. Was the plant in Hanau investigated by Euratom staff in person and what form did these investigations take?

Answer given by Mrs de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(7 September 2000)

The Commission would first wish to clarify that the complaint registered by the Working Party for Physical Analyses and Measuring Procedures (ARGE-PhAM) was not made on behalf of or in agreement with the German authorities investigating the seizure of plutonium/lithium to which the Honourable Member refers. Moreover, the Commission's Euratom Safeguards Office (ESO) has not undertaken any investigations upon its own initiative.

Indeed, following the seizure of material in question, a German court case was filed against a nuclear operator. Investigations were launched by the Hanau Public Prosecution Service which, as part of these investigations, requested ARGE-PhAM to examine the technical aspects of the case.

In general, co-operation between the Commission and the Member States on safeguards matters is subject to the provisions of the Euratom Treaty. However, in relation to measures aimed at combating illicit trafficking of nuclear material, a particular agreement was reached with the German authorities, with the objective of providing support rapidly and pragmatically. An exchange of letters of 1992 between the German government and the Commission, agreed that the Commission would provide, on specific request of the German authorities, the necessary technical and administrative expertise.

It was in line with these agreements, that the ESO was invited in this specific case by the Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit (BMUR) to provide assistance and expertise. ESO, acting as the focal point between the German authorities and the Commission, provided the necessary support in close collaboration with the JRC Institute for Trans Uranium Elements (ITU) in Karlsruhe which concentrated on the scientific aspects.

Following meetings in Luxembourg on the ARGE-PhAM findings (held in May 1998 and in May 1999), ITU and ESO concluded that at least two serious mistakes in methodology had been made by ARGE-PhAM. The Commission informed the BMUR of these findings. BMUR fully supported this view and as a result proceeded to inform the Public Prosecution Service in Hanau. The latter subsequently decided to terminate the investigation and proceedings (mid 1999).

The disagreement with these findings expressed by ARGE-PhAM in their complaint is therefore in no way supported by the German authorities.

The Commission nevertheless further analysed the complaint made by ARGE-PhAM but could not identify any new aspects additional to the elements discussed already in 1998 and 1999. In particular, there was no evidence that a more formal internal inquiry would lead to new facts or findings.

Since, as pointed out above, the Commission had originally been requested by the BMUR to provide assistance and expertise, there was no intention nor any reason from the Commission's side to initiate an internal inquiry.

Finally, the Commission would remark that the relevant internal Commission procedures apply to all Commission services. There are no internal Euratom procedures for investigating alleged shortcomings specifically relating to Euratom safeguards.