WRITTEN QUESTION E-1733/00

by Erik Meijer (GUE/NGL) to the Commission

(31 May 2000)

Subject: Availability of information on firms manufacturing and storing fireworks, and inclusion of such firms on the risk list of directive 96/82/EC (Seveso II)

On Saturday, 13 May 2000 there was a major disaster in the Mekkelholt district of the city of Enschede (Netherlands) caused by the explosion of the storage facility at SE Fireworks which resulted in a large number of deaths and injuries.

The following three questions are asked:

1. Immediately after the disaster a discussion was launched on the risk posed by this sort of firm to its surroundings. This is the second time within ten years that a disaster has occurred with a firework factory; in 1991 a factory exploded in the town of Culemborg.

According to the Ministry of Housing, Regional Planning and the Environment, there are 19 major firework firms in the Netherlands with a capacity of 100-1500 tonnes (SE Fireworks had a capacity of 100 tonnes). These firms are not on the list of firms posing a serious threat to the environment which have to meet the requirements of directive 96/82/EC (Seveso II).

The Seveso directive imposes certain obligations on firms to prevent serious risks and accidents for firms and their surroundings. Can the Commission confirm that firework firms are not on the list of risk firms?

2. If so, does the Commission agree that in view of the serious nature of the disasters which can occur with firework firms these firms should be covered by the European Seveso II directive? Is the Commission prepared to take the necessary steps in this direction?

3. Does the Commission agree that throughout the EU there should be as much transparency as possible, for the benefit of local residents, local councillors, the media and disaster control experts, on the existence of risk firms and the permits issued by the authorities to such firms, because such transparency can contribute to more informed decision-making on the siting of such firms and can speed up the process of fighting fires and evacuating local residents?

Answer given by Mrs Wallström on behalf of the Commission

(20 July 2000)

1. While it is true that the original Seveso Directive (Council Directive 82/501/EEC of 24 June 1982 on the major-accident hazards of certain industrial activities(1)) contained a list of potentially dangerous industrial activities in which the manufacture and storage of fireworks did not figure, a different approach for fixing the scope was chosen in the Seveso II Directive (Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances(2)). This Directive has fully replaced the Seveso II Directive since 3 February 1999.

The Seveso II Directive solely relates to the presence of dangerous substances in establishments. Moreover, the list of dangerous substances in Annex I has been reduced from 180 to around 50 substances in favour of an enlarged and more systematic list containing generic categories, such as toxic, explosive or flammable. With these changes, the scope of the Directive has been broadened and simplified. The manufacture and storage of pyrotechnic substances is for the first time covered by the Directive within certain threshold limits.

However, according to information received from the Dutch authorities, the establishment S.E. Fireworks in Enschede was not covered by the Seveso II Directive because the threshold limits set by the Directive were not met. The Seveso II Directive, like its predecessor, follows a two-tier approach meaning that two different qualifying quantities (threshold limits) apply for each named substance and for each generic category of substances mentioned in Annex I of the Directive. It is assumed that the risk of a major-accident hazard increases with the quantities of substances present at the establishment. The threshold levels for pyrotechnic substances are 50 tonnes (lower tier) and 200 tonnes (upper tier).

2. After a full investigation of the accident, the Commission will evaluate the qualifying quantities assigned to pyrotechnic substances and make proposals for amendments to the Seveso II Directive, if appropriate. This process will be carried out in close co-operation with the Member States, the Parliament and other interested parties.

3. The Commission does indeed agree that throughout the Community there should be as much transparency as possible in decision-making on the siting of hazardous industrial establishments.

Therefore, the Seveso II Directive contains a new provision recognising that the implications of major-accident hazards should be taken into account in the land-use planning policies of the Member States. These are obliged to pursue the aim of the Directive, i.e. the prevention of major accidents and the limitation of their consequences for man and the environment, through controls on the siting of new establishments, modifications to existing establishments and new developments such as transport links, locations frequented by the public and residential areas in the vicinity of existing establishments. In the long term, land-use planning policies shall ensure that appropriate distances between hazardous establishments and residential areas are maintained. Member States shall also ensure that all competent authorities and planning authorities responsible for decisions set up appropriate consultation procedures. The inclusion of this provision can be regarded as a major step forward in the process of major accident mitigation.

Moreover, the visualisation of risk in geographical maps is important. In the context of industrial risk management, maps can create a visual and thus immediate understanding with regard to hypothetical major accidents and their effect on the immediate surroundings. Therefore, the major accident hazards bureau established within the Joint research centre of the Commission is developing a Seveso plants information retrieval system (SPIRS). The objective of SPIRS

is to establish a map of all Seveso plants in the Community and to support Member States in their risk management related decision-making processes by providing a flexible tool to rank the risk potential of such plants.

(1) OJ L 230, 5.8.1982, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 10, 14.1.1997, p. 13.