WRITTEN QUESTION E-3443/00

by Carmen Fraga Estévez (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(7 November 2000)

Subject: Fourth fisheries protocol with Greenland and Council mandate

On 13 September 2000 the Commission signed a new (fourth) fisheries protocol with Greenland, Article 11 of which provides for financial compensation on the Community side of 42 820 000. However, the text of the protocol does not differentiate between the part of that amount

corresponding to payment for the catch possibilities offered by Greenland and the other part intended for development cooperation. The Council's negotiating mandate established the need to differentiate these two headings, since it is considered that the financial compensation is overestimated in respect of the real catch possibilities offered; this differentiation is included in a joint statement of conclusions but is not referred to in the agreement text as such, as should have been called for under the Council mandate.

In view of the above, can the Commission explain the reasons which have led it to sign a protocol whose text is not compatible with the guidelines of the mandate, given also that the other agreements and protocols signed differentiate clearly between financial compensation for catch possibilities and the (duly broken down) sums paid under such headings as cooperation?

Joint answer to Written Questions E-3443/00, E-3444/00, E-3445/00, E-3446/00, E-3447/00 and E-3448/00 given by Mr Fischler on behalf of the Commission

(19 December 2000)

The Commission considers that the Greenland fourth protocol as initialled conforms to the negotiating directives that were adopted by Council on 4 August 2000. As for the financial compensation structure, the Community attempted to include in the protocol a distinction between the genuine fisheries part and the rest. From the outset, the Greenlandic delegation adamantly opposed this option in order, they said, to maintain the stability of the financial relationship and not to prejudge the outcome of the review foreseen in Article 14 of the protocol. In view of this situation, the Community made a unilateral statement assessing at 28 million the value of the genuine fisheries components as they stand at present. The Greenlandic delegation questioned the appropriateness of attempting a selective calculation of the value of certain quotas which, they said, would not be in harmony with the total nature of the relationship hitherto known.

The financial compensation in the fourth protocol was maintained, in real terms, at a level equivalent to that of the third protocol. The Council directives clearly stated that one of the objectives of the negotiations was to ensure the closeness and stability of the co-operation between the Community and Greenland.

A table giving information on catches by species, Member State and year is being sent direct to the Honourable Member and to Parliament's Secretariat.

No requirement on Greenland to provide information on the use of Community funding has been included in the fisheries agreement. The Community was not able to achieve its goal of structuring the financial compensation in such a way that the genuine fisheries part can be distinguished from the rest. Consequently, any reference to use of funds corresponding to development assistance was not possible. In any case, this issue will be addressed in detail during the mid-term review foreseen in the fourth protocol. It is clear that the Greenlandic delegation did not want to prejudge in any way the outcome of the mid-term review by agreeing to such fundamental changes at this time.

The historical origins of the agreements with countries of the Northern hemisphere and the Southern hemisphere are very different. In the case of Greenland, the introduction of licence fees would have implied that also fishermen from Norway, Iceland and Faeroe Islands would have to pay such fees as they, through the arrangement with Greenland, are subject to the same regime as Community fishermen. This, in turn, might have caused these countries to introduce licence fees for Community fishermen fishing in their waters under Community agreements with these countries. This illustrates that a unilateral licence fee system is inappropriate in the context of reciprocal arrangements concerning fisheries in the same waters and where management of common stocks plays an important role. Alternatively, asking only Community fishermen to pay licence fees would introduce a new discrimination between them and others fishing in the same waters and under the same regime.

The Commission receives, through a variety of channels, and takes into account the opinions and comments of many social sectors.

Greenland objected to the introduction of licence fees as a matter of principle and for a variety of practical reasons but mainly because it would introduce insecurity for Greenland in the total compensation under the agreement.

Article 10 (second paragraph) makes reference to co-operation in the context of regional fisheries organisations in which both parties might be members. The spirit of the article is to re-affirm and strengthen co-operation efforts.

The Greenland authorities exercise all sovereign rights, including control and enforcement, in the Greenland exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The article does not introduce any new or additional control or enforcement obligations for the Community or the Member States in the Greenland EEZ.