WRITTEN QUESTION E-3302/97 by Angela Sierra González (GUE/NGL) to the Commission (20 October 1997)

Subject: Accidents and refineries

On 14 September 1997 a tragic oil refinery fire in the port of Visakhapatam (Gulf of Bengal - India) caused dozens of deaths and serious injuries, and led to the destruction of the petrochemical complex and the evacuation of over 150 000 residents of the surrounding area.

This event calls into question the safety of such installations and their proximity to centres of population.

Santa Cruz de Teneriffe (Canaries - Spain) is a city with installations such as an oil refinery within its precincts.

Does the Commission know the cause of the accident which took place in the Indian refinery?

In how many European cities are petrochemical installations and, more specifically, refineries, located within the city precincts?

What safety standards does the Commission believe are necessary to guarantee the safety and well-being of the population? How compatible are installations such as oil refineries with the presence of large resident populations?

Has the Commission drawn up any rules on safety in these installations, and if so, to what extent are these rules complied with? If not, does the Commission believe that specific regulations for these installations should be drawn up?

Answer given by Mrs Bjerregaard on behalf of the Commission (26 November 1997)

Council Directive 82/501/EEC of 24 June 1982 on the major-accident hazards of certain industrial activities ((OJ L 230, 5. 8. 1982. Directive as amended by Directive 87/216/EEC (OJ L 85, 28. 3. 1987), Directive 88/610/EEC (OJ L 336, 7. 12. 1988) and Directive 91/692/EEC (OJ L 377, 31. 12. 1991). )) (the so-called Seveso Directive) aims at the prevention of major accidents and the limitation of the consequences of such accidents. The Directive obliges the operators of hazardous installations, including petrochemical installations such as oil refineries, to take all appropriate safety measures and to inform the enforcement authorities.

Following a fundamental review of over 10 years experience with the Directive, including the analysis of accidents which occurred worldwide during this time, a new Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances ((OJ L 10, 14. 1. 1997. )) (the so-called Seveso II Directive) was adopted by the Council in December 1996. Member States have up to two years to implement the Directive. From February 1999, this Directive will replace the 1982 Directive.

The Seveso II Directive builds upon the existing Directive but contains important new elements such as an obligation for operators of hazardous installations to put into effect safety management systems and for the Member States to take into account the aim of the Directive in their land-use planning policies. The inclusion of this provision, following the Bhopal accident, can be regarded as a major step forward in the process of major accident mitigation. In the long term, land-use planning policies will ensure that appropriate distances between hazardous installations and residential areas are maintained. Where such installations already exist in the vicinity of residential areas, the Directive calls for consideration of additional technical measures so as not to increase the risks to people.

Furthermore, in order to fulfil its information obligations towards the Member States and to learn from past accidents, the Commission has established the major-accident reporting system (MARS) and the Community documentation centre on industrial risks (CDCIR) at its joint research centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy. MARS is a computer-based register and information system containing accident information supplied by the Member States. The CDCIR is a library containing documentation concerning analyses of causes of accidents, lessons learned from accidents and information about preventive measures. This information can be assessed by public authorities as well as the industries concerned (http://mtrls1.jrc.it:80/mahb/).

The Commission has requested information on the cause and the circumstances of the oil refinery fire in the port of Visakhapatam in India to ensure that any information available and lessons learned can be disseminated.