WRITTEN QUESTION E-3447/00

by Carmen Fraga Estévez (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(7 November 2000)

Subject: Fourth fisheries protocol with Greenland and participation of vessel owners in its financing

Despite the fact that in all of the southern fisheries agreements the Commission has progressively increased the financial participation of vessel owners in the costs of agreements, to a level currently varying between 17 % and 25 % of the total cost, it now appears that once again, in the new fisheries protocol signed with Greenland, vessel owners benefiting on an exclusive basis from the protocol are asked to pay nothing at all.

In view of this, can the Commission explain its reasons for consenting once again to a situation of discrimination of this nature as between vessel owners from the northern and southern Member States?

Is the Commission aware that it is encouraging a climate of opinion in which it can be said quite openly that the Commission is dividing the Community's vessel owners into first-class and second-class categories, thus giving certain fleets the sensation of being abandoned and producing a total credibility breakdown as regards the Commission's fisheries policies?

What, in the Commission's view, is the meaning of the comments in the joint statement of conclusions to the effect that Greenland is not willing to contemplate any new system in this connection?

It may be presumed that if a third country receives the financial compensation which it considers desirable it is not for that country to discuss the internal distribution of that compensation to be made by the EU. It follows that if, in the southern agreements, vessel owners are obliged to bear part of the financial burden it is because the Commission has preferred that option. Can the Commission explain why this should be so in some cases and not others?

Joint answer to Written Questions E-3443/00, E-3444/00, E-3445/00, E-3446/00, E-3447/00 and E-3448/00 given by Mr Fischler on behalf of the Commission

(19 December 2000)

The Commission considers that the Greenland fourth protocol as initialled conforms to the negotiating directives that were adopted by Council on 4 August 2000. As for the financial compensation structure, the Community attempted to include in the protocol a distinction between the genuine fisheries part and the rest. From the outset, the Greenlandic delegation adamantly opposed this option in order, they said, to maintain the stability of the financial relationship and not to prejudge the outcome of the review foreseen in Article 14 of the protocol. In view of this situation, the Community made a unilateral statement assessing at 28 million the value of the genuine fisheries components as they stand at present. The Greenlandic delegation questioned the appropriateness of attempting a selective calculation of the value of certain quotas which, they said, would not be in harmony with the total nature of the relationship hitherto known.

The financial compensation in the fourth protocol was maintained, in real terms, at a level equivalent to that of the third protocol. The Council directives clearly stated that one of the objectives of the negotiations was to ensure the closeness and stability of the co-operation between the Community and Greenland.

A table giving information on catches by species, Member State and year is being sent direct to the Honourable Member and to Parliament's Secretariat.

No requirement on Greenland to provide information on the use of Community funding has been included in the fisheries agreement. The Community was not able to achieve its goal of structuring the financial compensation in such a way that the genuine fisheries part can be distinguished from the rest. Consequently, any reference to use of funds corresponding to development assistance was not possible. In any case, this issue will be addressed in detail during the mid-term review foreseen in the fourth protocol. It is clear that the Greenlandic delegation did not want to prejudge in any way the outcome of the mid-term review by agreeing to such fundamental changes at this time.

The historical origins of the agreements with countries of the Northern hemisphere and the Southern hemisphere are very different. In the case of Greenland, the introduction of licence fees would have implied that also fishermen from Norway, Iceland and Faeroe Islands would have to pay such fees as they, through the arrangement with Greenland, are subject to the same regime as Community fishermen. This, in turn, might have caused these countries to introduce licence fees for Community fishermen fishing in their waters under Community agreements with these countries. This illustrates that a unilateral licence fee system is inappropriate in the context of reciprocal arrangements concerning fisheries in the same waters and where management of common stocks plays an important role. Alternatively, asking only Community fishermen to pay licence fees would introduce a new discrimination between them and others fishing in the same waters and under the same regime.

The Commission receives, through a variety of channels, and takes into account the opinions and comments of many social sectors.

Greenland objected to the introduction of licence fees as a matter of principle and for a variety of practical reasons but mainly because it would introduce insecurity for Greenland in the total compensation under the agreement.

Article 10 (second paragraph) makes reference to co-operation in the context of regional fisheries organisations in which both parties might be members. The spirit of the article is to re-affirm and strengthen co-operation efforts.

The Greenland authorities exercise all sovereign rights, including control and enforcement, in the Greenland exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The article does not introduce any new or additional control or enforcement obligations for the Community or the Member States in the Greenland EEZ.