WRITTEN QUESTION P-0527/97 by Jup Weber (ARE) to the Commission (14 February 1997)

Subject: Derailment of a train transporting nuclear waste near the Luxembourg border

A train travelling from northern Germany with a cargo of nuclear waste was derailed at 6.30 am on Monday, 4 February 1997 at Perl Apach (France), near the border with Luxembourg. According to the French authorities which carried out checks on the spot, the levels of radioactivity measured after the accident were in line with the levels authorized when the train started its journey.

According to some reports, the cargo of irradiated nuclear waste was travelling to Dunkerque (France) en route to the Sellafield reprocessing facility in the United Kingdom.

Was the Commission informed of the route the train was taking? How can the Commission explain the fact that a train of this kind, starting its journey in northern Germany, took a route which does not appear to comply with the principle of proximity, which would imply taking the most direct route in order to minimize the risks involved?

Can the Commission confirm that the levels of radioactivity recorded at the accident site prove that there was no leakage of radioactive material, however small?

The class B containers used for this kind of journey are designed to withstand falls of up to 9 metres. Do the rail routes chosen reflect a prohibition on using any lines where the possibility of a drop of more than 9 metres cannot be ruled out (bridges, mountainous regions, etc)? To what degree do these containers withstand the impact caused by the derailment of a train travelling at normal speeds?

When this route was planned, was account taken of the availability of emergency and security services, and the need to avoid densely occupied urban areas?

Joint answer to Written Questions P-0527/97 and P-0528/97 given by Mr Papoutsis on behalf of the Commission (4 April 1997)

The derailment at Apach was on French territory, so an enquiry was made by the 'Société nationale des chemins de fer français' in close relation with the technical support organisations of the French ministry of transport. Investigation on site did not indicate any deficiency of the means of transport or mechanical overloading of the railway structure. Also the hypothesis of damage by a third party could be excluded. Analysis of the broken rail found at the scene of the derailment revealed a material failure, although the final origin of the defect is not yet known.

In accordance with the requirements of the transport licence the Member States involved and the railway supervision offices in Germany and France were notified sufficiently in advance (2 days in Germany and 3 days in France) of the departure and precise routing of the shipment. Since the safe transport of radioactive materials is ensured by the resistance of the package providing sufficient protection in accident conditions there are generally no routing restrictions. The routing resulted from physical protection measures which are within the competence of Member States, but which took account of all risks (radiological and non-radiological) including normal and accident conditions.

Approval of packages used for the transport of irradiated nuclear fuel (type B packages) is based on a number of tests of the mechanical resistance of the package. One of these is the impact test involving a drop from a height of 9 metres on to an unyielding surface. Such a test corresponds to considerably greater heights than 9 metres on real surfaces, postulating an equivalent damage to the package. Several assessments of package behaviour have demonstrated under simulated full scale accident conditions the adequacy of the transport regulations to cope with real accident conditions on railway networks ((Environmental impact of accidents involving radioactive material shipping systems - Sandia Lab Report (IAEA, AG 940 - WP 22 - 1996) and the CEGB's Flask accident impact studies (IAEA, AG - 940 - WP 8 - 1996). )).

Immediately after the derailment an exclusion zone was established to allow checks for contamination or an increased radiation level. According to information received by the Commission no leak or increase in the radiation level was observed. The French and the German authorities confirm there was no damage to the packages during the derailment. The usual emergency response planning was in place and the nearest local authorities, including those of Luxembourg and Germany, as well as the 'préfet de département' and the 'ministère de l'Interieur' were notified. At no time was evacuation of the public necessary during the recovery work.

The maximum radiation level taking into account the contribution of gamma and neutron radiation at any point on the conveyance was far below the maximum values imposed by the International carriage of dangerous goods by rail regulations ((Council Directive 96/49/EC of 23 July 1996 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States with regard to the transport of dangerous goods by rail - OJ L 235, 17.9.1996. )) (class 7 - radioactive material). The remedial actions following the incident were organised and carried out in compliance with the radiation protection provisions applicable to activities involving a hazard from ionizing radiation in non-accidental situations ((Council Directive 80/836/Euratom and by Directive 84/467/Euratom amending the Directives laying down the basic safety standards for the health protection of the general public and workers against the dangers of ionizing radiation - OJ L 246, 17.9.1980 and OJ L 265, 5.10.1984. )).

Studies have confirmed the adequacy of the necessary transport emergency response measures and the benefits of the arrangements for the Member States ((Handbook for the CEC database on transport emergencies involving radioactive materials (1992 - contract work) and Review of the benefits in Member State's Arrangements for transport emergencies involving radioactive materials (1993 - contract work). )).