WRITTEN QUESTION E-2858/97 by Patricia McKenna (V) to the Commission (11 September 1997)

Subject: Comparison between the proposed completion of Khmelnitski Unit 2 and Rovno Unit 4 (K2/R4) in Ukraine and the ongoing completion project on the Temelin reactors in the Czech Republic

Bearing in mind that the Temelin reactors are of the same basic original design as the Ukrainian Khmelnitski and Rovno nuclear reactors (Soviet VVER-1000), and that the project to complete the two reactors in the Czech Republic using a mixture of Eastern and Western technologies and safety systems has run into endless difficulties, so that unit one is presently scheduled to start in 1999/2000, which would be 8 years later than originally planned (in 1987, start date from Czech Government was 1992), and the project is $2.2 billion overbudget at the last count (1986 estimate by Czech Government $1 billion, 1997 estimate is $3.2 billion), mainly due to the need for a new Instrumentation and Control System, re-cabling, and other factors relating to meeting Three Mile Island, Browns Ferry Fire and Chernobyl accident criteria, and considering that there are no apparent plans at the moment at K2/R4 for a full Probabilistic Safety Assessment or a new Instrumentation and Control System or the full separation of power and control cabling (although all of these are being carried out at Temelin), are high costs and long lead times currently being avoided by not including these safety features in the proposed project, and can the Commission be certain that such changes would not have to be introduced into the K2/R4 project at a later stage to meet proper safety criteria, thereby giving rise to exactly the same problems as at Temelin?

Answer given by Mr Van den Broek on behalf of the Commission (10 October 1997)

For the two reactors at Rovno 4 and Khmelnitsky 2 (R4/K2) results of probabilistic safety assessments (PSA) on similar reactors have been used. A full scope PSA is foreseen on the basis of the modernised installation.

The instrumentation and control (I& C) as foreseen in the original project has a certain number of shortcomings which have been identified through assessment and operating experience. They are subject to specific corrective measures.

At Temelin, the choice has been made to replace fully the I& C. It is uncertain whether the result would be better than the solution retained for R4/K2.

The separation between cabling for I& C and cabling for power supply is not a safety related requirement. On the other hand the separation of the redundant trains of safety systems needs to be achieved either by geographical or physical separation. Both principles will be used concurrently at R4/K2 to achieve independence of trains.

As for the general question as to whether the lessons from the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents are taken into account, it can be confirmed that is indeed to the case the extent that these lessons are relevant.

Riskaudit, an organisation composed of independent technical safety organisations from France and Germany, has evaluated the full modernisation programme proposed by the operating organisation with the assistance provided, under the Tacis programme, by Community operating and engineering organisations. This review is done on the basis of guidelines produced by the International atomic energy agency (IAEA) and on the basis of approved practices in similar reactors operating in the Community and has led to the conclusion that the resulting modernisation programme, which includes the recommendations made by Riskaudit, completed by additional specific measures by the Ukrainian organisations, represents the state of the art and is fully consistent in itself.