WRITTEN QUESTION E-1672/99

by Arlindo Cunha (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(22 September 1999)

Subject: EC-Greenland Fisheries Protocol

In view of the fact that, under the Third Fisheries Protocol with Greenland, the European Community's annual fishing possibilities are systematically underused by Germany (the main beneficiary Member State), what is the Commission intending to do in order to make the most of what are valuable fisheries resources in non-Community waters and ones which make the agreement with Greenland the most expensive of all the Community's fisheries agreements?

Joint answer to Written Questions E-1669/99, E-1670/99, E-1671/99 and E-1672/99 given by Mr Fischler on behalf of the Commission

(9 November 1999)

Both the 1985 Agreement on fisheries between the European Economic Community, on the one hand, and the Government of Denmark and the local Government of Greenland, on the other as well as the current Third Protocol covering the period 1995 to 2000 will expire on 31 December 2000. However, the 1985 Agreement will be renewed automatically for an additional period of six years (i.e. for the period 2001 to 2006) if no notice of termination is given at least nine months prior to the expiry of the current period (i.e. prior to 31 March 2000). In this case, it would suffice to negotiate a successor protocol laying down the catch quotas and the financial compensation for the additional period in question.

In view of these deadlines, a process of exploratory talks with Greenland, with the Member States as well as within the Commission, has already been started. This process has, however, not yet reached a stage which would allow the Commission to specify the possible form and contents of the instrument which will govern fisheries relations between the Community and Greenland in the period following 31 December 2000.

Documentary material giving detailed information on both the catch quotas agreed under the three protocols with Greenland for each of the periods 1985 to 1989, 1990 to 1994 and 1995 to 2000 as well as the corresponding catches of the Member States concerned is sent direct to the Honourable Member and to Parliament's Secretariat.

Under-utilisation of catch quotas in Greenland waters is a complex phenomenon which was already observed in the period of the first protocol and which has persisted ever since. The main reason for this is biological. In view of this complexity, the Court of justice ruled, in its judgement given on 13 October 1992 in Case C-63/90, Portugal v. Council, that under the principle of relative stability, under-utilisation alone offers no valid motive for a re-allocation of the catch quotas concerned to other interested Member States.

In general terms, the Commission is of the opinion that available catch quotas in third country waters under a fisheries agreement must be utilised in a rational and optimal manner and that appropriate mechanisms making transfers of unused or under-utilised catch quotas to other interested Member States possible should be designed without prejudice to the principle of relative stability. The controversy revolves around the question as to what level of interference in the quota management of Member States is permissible under the principle of relative stability. This topic will have to be addressed in the framework of the impending overall cost-benefit analysis of fisheries agreements, which is to be presented to the Fisheries Council on 26 October 1999.