WRITTEN QUESTION P-0596/96 by Hiltrud Breyer (V) to the Commission (6 March 1996)

Subject: Framework agreement between Euratom and Minatom on the supply of highly enriched uranium (HEU)

The EU is planning to obtain HEU in large quantities to fuel test reactors. Since the United States is not prepared to supply HEU to operators of test reactors in the EU, Euratom - or, to be more precise, the Euratom Supply Agency - has entered into negotiations with the Russian Minatom.

1. Has a framework agreement on the supply of HEU already been concluded between Euratom and Minatom? If so, what does the agreement comprise, and in what form? If not, what does Euratom intend the agreement to cover, and under what conditions? Can the text of the agreement or draft agreement or the outcome of the exploratory talks be made known to Parliament, or to the questioner? If not, why not?

The United States is accusing the EU, or the local operators of research reactors, of violating international non-proliferation treaties and creating a market for weapons-grade uranium by procuring HEU.

2. Does the Commission also take the view that such an agreement is in breach of international conventions and undermines the efforts of the United States to take weapons-grade fissile material out of circulation? How does the EU plan to justify itself vis-à-vis the USA?

3. Is the Commission aware of the danger that an agreement of this kind could create a new market for HEU and thereby encourage unsafe countries of origin to produce HEU rather than simply offering surplus capacity from former arms stocks, or that it could create a precedent on the basis of which other countries (Pakistan, India, Iraq, Korea) could also build themselves HEU-fuelled reactors?

4. What is the Commission's and/or Euratom's attitude to the United States' RERTR (Reduced Enrichment in Research and Test Reactors) programme? Does the Commission support the programme's objective of minimizing or, if possible, completely eliminating the civil use of HEU?

5. Is the Commission aware of the substance of a discussion between Al Gore and Viktor Chernomyrdin on the subject of HEU from Russia, and of what was agreed between the two politicians?

6. Will the Commission/Euratom bring their influence to bear to persuade the operators of the reactor in Petten and the planned FRM-II in Garching (Munich) to forgo the use of HEU and not to boost the trade in HEU?

Answer given by Mr Papoutsis on behalf of the Commission (1 April 1996)

1. To ensure the supply of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for research reactors operating with this type of fuel, the Commission plans to lay down a general framework for possible supplies from Russia. The framework will be drawn up in accordance with the provisions of the Euratom Treaty and Article 22 of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 24 June 1994.

2. The Commission does not accept the Honourable Member's view that the purchase of HEU could be in breach of international agreements and would undermine the United States' efforts to withdraw weapons grade fissile material from circulation. As an equal partner, the Community does not consider it has to justify its choices in this area to the United States.

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to point 5 of its answer to her question 11/96. ((OJ C 161 of 5.6.1996, p. 35. ))

3. The Commission believes that by purchasing HEU from Russia it is contributing to reducing surplus military stocks in the country, and thus reducing the danger of countries regarded as unsafe obtaining supplies.

4. The United States has been seeking to reduce the number of research reactors around the world using HEU. The United States reduced enrichment for research and test reactors (RERTR) programme is being supported by Community research reactor operators and by the Commission. Many research reactors in the Community have been or will be converted to using low enriched uranium. Nevertheless for a small number of special purpose reactors in the Community conversion is not feasible with the types of fuel currently available. A similar situation exists in the United States for some of its research reactors which the United States government continues to supply.

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to point 3 of Written Question E-2919/95 ((OJ C 51, 21.2.1996. )) by Mrs Bloch von Blottnitz.

5. The Commission is aware of a recent meeting between Mr Gore and Mr Chernomyrdin, but does not know what was said.

6. It is not within the Commission's remit to impose a type of operation on a reactor, nor to impose or ban any specific type of fuel.

If the Petten reactor were operated with less enriched fuel it could not perform the task assigned to it. In addition, there is no alternative fuel available for high flux reactors (HFR) either in Europe or in the United States.