WRITTEN QUESTION P-1723/98

by Undine-Uta Bloch von Blottnitz (V) to the Commission

(19 May 1998)

Subject: Limit value exceeded in the transport of radioactive waste

DSIN, the French safety authority, has recorded radioactive contamination on the surface of transport containers for radioactive substances and on the surfaces of the vehicles which in some cases are far in excess of the permitted limit values. These dangerous contamination levels have been recorded not only on consignments within France but also on cross-border consignments to France from other Member States, and from third countries.

1. Does the Commission have any information on this? If so, what information exactly?

2. Since when has the Commission been in possession of this information, from whom did it receive the information and when?

3. What further action will the Commission take to protect workers in companies transporting radioactive materials from the dangers of this increased level of radiation?

4. Given the recent evidence of limit values being exceeded, how effective does the Commission regard the rules on radiation protection and the monitoring of these rules within the European Union?

Answer given by Mrs Bjerregaard on behalf of the Commission

(24 June 1998)

The Commission first received information on this matter from the French Office de protection contre les rayonnements ionisants on 30 April 1998. Since then the Commission has regularly received and continues to receive further information as it becomes available from the French authorities and operators involved. Contact has also been made with other Member States. Extensive information regarding the levels and extent of contamination of the transport flasks and the actual or potential exposure of workers and members of the public has been received both in writing and at a meeting on 18 May 1998 of the Commission's standing working group on the safe transport of radioactive material.

Limits for non-fixed surface contamination specific to transport containers, resulting from Council Directive 94/55/EC of 21 November 1994 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States with regard to the transport of dangerous goods by road(1) and Council Directive 96/49/EC of 23 July 1996 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States with regard to the transport of dangerous goods by rail(2), have indeed been exceeded in certain cases as regards localised "hot spots" on the surfaces of the spent fuel casks and within the housings in which they are transported. However, the available information clearly indicates that neither workers nor members of the public have received doses in excess of the limits of radiation exposure laid down in the Community basic safety standards directive for the health protection of the general public and workers against the dangers of ionizing radiation. Monitoring of workers has shown no indication of any significant intakes of contamination. This finding is consistent with the conservative basis on which the surface contamination limits have been derived. If the removable contamination over 100 cm2 is attributable to caesium 137 and is ingested in its entirety, the dose to the recipient would be appreciably less than 1 % of the annual limit for a member of the public.

Member States are responsible for ensuring the application of the above Community directives. In the present case the authorities reacted appropriately to the situation which they uncovered, thus fulfilling their responsibilities. Moreover, the results of the French investigations show that, even with the deviations from the requirements which took place, no overexposure of workers or the public occurred. The standing working group meeting of 18 May 1998 discussed the French experience in depth and the lessons learned were communicated to Member States' authorities. A need for the extension of the International nuclear events scale to allow the significance of transport events to be communicated to the public was particularly noted. No other action is foreseen by the Commission, subject to any points arising from the completion of Member States' investigations and confirmation of steps they will take to avoid any repetition of the situation.

(1) OJ L 319, 12.12.1994.

(2) OJ L 235, 17.9.1996.