WRITTEN QUESTION E-2527/02

by Giles Chichester (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(11 September 2002)

Subject: Kozloduy nuclear power plant

In view of the importance of ensuring the safety of nuclear installations and given the complexity of the factors which lead to the closure of a nuclear power plant and the implications of doing so, particularly in the countries applying for accession to the European Union, could the Commission explain why it is not basing its assessment of units 1-4 of the nuclear power plant at Kozloduy on the IAEA's conclusions? Has the Commission adopted different criteria from the IAEA? If so, why and what are those criteria? Who drew them up? Who took the decision to apply other criteria, and when? Has the Commission based its decision on expert reports drawn up by the IAEA? If not, why not? Who checked the qualifications of these experts? Which installations did these experts visit and for how long? From which budget were the fees of these experts paid and on whose authorisation?

Joint answerto Written Questions E-2527/02 and P-2718/02given by Mr Verheugen on behalf of the Commission

(29 October 2002)

In response to the question submitted by the Honourable Member, the Commission recalls that the G-7 Nuclear Safety Working Group qualified certain reactor types, namely those of RBMK and VVER 440/230 designs, as lacking safety-related design features, resulting in deviations that cannot be wholly overcome by upgrading measures.

The Commission recalls that Bulgaria committed itself, in the Understanding signed in 1999, to the early closure of units 1-2 of the Kozloduy NPP by the end of 2002 and to the closure of units 3-4 prior to their originally foreseen dates of 2008 and 2010 respectively. The Commission stated that it understood this to mean in 2006 at the latest. The demand for Bulgaria to commit to the early closure of Units 1-4 of the Kozloduy NPP is now part of the EU common negotiating position on the Energy Chapter adopted by the Member States as Negotiating Parties at the Accession Conference. Recently the Bulgarian Government announced that it intended to close units 3-4 in 2006, in line with the EU common position, and it requested a peer review of these units.

As regards the recent IAEA report on Kozloduy Units 3 and 4, this followed an IAEA expert mission, carried out from 24 to 28 June 2002. This mission complemented three previous IAEA missions in the design and operational areas, in order to assess all previous recommendations and suggestions made for Kozloduy NPP Units 3 and 4 including design safety, seismic safety and operational safety. In the majority of the operational issues the Safety Review Mission recognised meaningful improvements, revealing the aim of the Kozloduy management and staff to continuously improve operational safety. Both the review team and the Kozloduy NPP recognise that for many issues improvement is an evolving process and the present attitude towards safety modernisation needs to be kept alive in the future. Nevertheless, the Report does not address to what extent the original design deficiencies have been sufficiently compensated through results of the modernisation programme.

The Commission also recalls that it was under the auspices of the Council that a Report on Nuclear Safety in the Context of Enlargement was elaborated in June 2001(1), followed by a Peer Review Status report in June 2002. Details of the Kozloduy NPP modernisation programme that has been going on in the last years were taken into consideration, and the report indicated that the current safety improvement programme on units 3-4 would help to limit original deviations and to ensure their operation during the period until their early closure. In both instances, the situation and developments regarding nuclear safety in candidate countries were undertaken by an ad-hoc formation of the Council Group on Atomic Questions,

namely the Working Party on Nuclear Safety (WPNS). The Member States, as expressed in the Council Report on Nuclear Safety in the Context of Enlargement, held the view that this evaluation exercise did not lead to any transfer of competencies from the Member States to the Community. In this report, Member State experts confirmed the need for firm closure commitments in view of existing deviations from safety requirements and practices widely applied within the Union.

(1) http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/01/st09/09181-a1en1.pdf.