WRITTEN QUESTION E-2988/01

by Daniela Raschhofer (NI) to the Commission

(29 October 2001)

Subject: Protection of vulnerable installations against terrorist threats

The extraordinary meeting of the European Council, held on 21 September 2001 in Brussels, and the Parliament resolution of 4 October 2001 dealt in detail with the implications of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. It has now become clear that a new threat has emerged to public security.

First and foremost, the measures taken to protect vulnerable installations must be reviewed. The head of the Reactor Safety Commission in the Federal Republic of Germany, Hahn, has stated in public that nuclear power stations can now only be protected by means of military measures. Steps of this kind are already being discussed in specialist bodies and ministries in the Member States.

In view of the terrorist threat which has now emerged, could the Commission answer the following questions:

1. What is the current position regarding the measures taken to protect vulnerable installations in the Member States (industrial plants dealing with dangerous products, nuclear power stations, reprocessing plants)?

2. What measures are being planned in the Member States in order to guarantee the protection of such vulnerable installations against the background of the new terrorist threat?

3. What is the Commission's standpoint on this new situation? Is it planning any measures of its own?

Answer given by Mrs Wallström on behalf of the Commission

(7 January 2002)

1. Quickly after the 11 September events, the Commission, with full backing from Member States moved to anticipate entry into force of a new Civil Protection Mechanism (foreseen for 1 January) co-ordinated by the Commission, which reinforces the EU civil protection capabilities.

In light of the events, the co-operation was extended to include:

- The pooling of expertise in the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical fields (NBC experts), available 24 hours a day to assist any country that requests help;

- Enhanced co-operation on information-sharing concerning antidotes, vaccines, antibiotics, and access to hospital treatment for any victims of such attacks;

- Creation of a system of immediate and systematic exchange of information relating to accidents or threats of terrorist attack;

- Creation of a Civil Protection monitoring and information centre in the Commission.

2. The extraordinary meeting in Knokke (Belgium) on 11 and 12 October 2001 focused on the response expected from Civil Protection authorities in case of major terrorist attacks inside or outside the Union. The Directors General of Civil Protection from the Member States, from the European Economic Area and from the candidate countries recalled that the response to be given in the wake of a terrorist attack remains the responsibility of the Member States.

They informed the Commission that the national emergency plans were currently being reviewed to take into account the new challenges which have arisen, in particular since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. They also underlined that the information to the public is a vital part of their responsibilities, thus enabling citizens to react purposefully in any situation.

3. In response to the Ghent European Council conclusions, the Commission has presented a Communication(1) on Civil Protection State of preventive alert against possible emergencies. This Communication presents the basis for co-ordinating an optimal response by the Community to all types of emergencies. It sets out the main lines of action desirable for improved co-operation across the European Union. It is a contribution to the joint response from the Commission and the Council to the challenges laid down by the Heads of State.

Moreover, in the same line, it has been decided to organise a dedicated workshop in December under the Belgian Presidency; the latter will be entrusted with setting up a short, medium and long term working programme in this field.

Specifically with regard to nuclear installations, the authorities of the Member States and candidate countries have, since 11 September 2001, strengthened physical protection measures already in force for installations at risk, especially for nuclear installations. These measures come under the national powers of the police. The Member States and the candidate countries have furthermore prohibited overflying of nuclear installations (if it was not already the case). In this regard, it should be underlined that the nuclear industry, because of non-proliferation and radioprotection concerns, is one of the sectors of industrial activity where safety and security standards are extremely strict.

Reprocessing plants, such as those at Sellafield and La Hague, require particular attention because of the high concentration of radioactive materials held in large quantities, notably uranium or plutonium left over from spent fuels. Therefore the vulnerability of these installations must be considered in the context of the actual radioprotection consequences of a terrorist act.

(1) COM(2001) 707 final.