(2004/C58E/137) WRITTENQUESTIONE-2012/03
byGlynFord(PSE)totheCommission
(17June2003)
Subject:Secondmentofstaff
CouldtheCommissionindicatethenumberofstaffithasonsecondmenttoinstitutionsandorganisations
to which it gives subsidies? Could the Commissionalsoprovide a list ofinstitutions where staff are
currentlyonsecondmentandindicatewhatstepsarebeingtakentoensurethattherelationshipisnot
abused?
AnswergivenbyMrKinnockonbehalfoftheCommission
(22September2003)
Tableswiththenumberofstaffonsecondmenttoinstitutionsandorganisationsandtheamountofgrants
that was committed for those of them to whom it was applicable in 2002 are sent directly to theHonourableMemberandtotheSecretariatoftheParliament.
Thesefiguresclearlydemonstratethattherelationshipisnotabused.Inrelationtosecondmentsinthe
interestoftheservice,theHonourableMemberwillnoticethatinthevastmajorityofcases,onlyoneCommissionofficialissecondedperhostinstitution/organisation,asituationwhichisinkeepingwiththeinterestsoftheCommission.
Inrelationtosecondmentsattherequestoftheofficialconcerned,itshouldbeborneinmindthatthe
relevant officials are fully paid by the host institution/organisation so that any net impact on theCommission(and,therefore,theUnion)budgetiseithermarginalornon-existent.
(2004/C58E/138) WRITTENQUESTIONE-2014/03
byRobertGoebbels(PSE)totheCommission
(17June2003)
Subject:DistortionofcompetitionwithregardtoCO 2emissionrights
Thepoliticalagreementonthetradingofgreenhousegasemissionrightsprovidesforatradingsystemto
comeintoeffectin2005.Initially,itwillcoverCO 2emissionsfromlargeindustrialandenergyplants.
However, because implementing procedures vary from sector to sector and from undertaking toundertakingwithinoneandthesamecountryaswellasfromcountrytocountry,theimplementationoftheEuropeanDirectivemaywellresultindistortionsofcompetitionwithintheEuropeanUnion.Whatismore,theimplementationthereofmaywellpenaliseEuropeanindustryvis-à-visindustryinotherpartsoftheworld,especiallytheUnitedStatesofAmerica,whichhasnotsigneduptotheKyotoProtocol.Thecaseoftheironandsteelindustryisparticularlystrikingifweconsiderthataninconsistentapplicationoftrading quotas may entail a sale price increase of up to 15%. It is self-evident that that sector’scompetitivenessonexternalmarketswouldbeseriouslyjeopardised.
HastheCommissiongivenanythoughttothepossibilityofanironandsteelgroupretainingtheemission
rightsrelatingtositeswhicharenolongeroperationalandwhichmaybetransferredtoothersites?
DoestheCommissionintendtotakeaccountoftherecoveryofblast-furnacegasessoldbyironandsteel
groupstotheelectricitysectors?
How does the Commission intend to protect the iron and steel industry in Europe from foreign
competitorswhodonothavetobearsuchadditionalcosts?6.3.2004EN C58E/121 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanUnion
AnswergivenbyMrsWallströmonbehalfoftheCommission
(13August2003)
TheDirectiveestablishingaschemeforgreenhousegasemissionallowancetradingwithintheCommunity
andamendingCouncilDirective96/61/EC,enablestransfersofallowanceswithintheinternalmarket,anda transfer of production capacities can, therefore, be accompanied by a corresponding transfer ofallowancesbothwithinandacrossMemberStatebordersduringatradingperiod.Itisalsorelevantinthiscontextthattheannualallocationofallowanceswithrespecttoaninstallationcanonlybemadetoa
holderofagreenhousegasemissionspermitrelatingtothatinstallation.
TheDirectivemakestheoperatorofaninstallationaccountableonlyfordirectemissionsreleasedon-site.
ActivitiesofoperatorstoindirectlyreducegreenhousegasemissionsdonotfallunderthescopeoftheDirective.Therefore,ifironandsteelgroupsrecoverblast-furnacegasesinordertosellthemtooperatorsofcombustioninstallations,thegasesarenotemittedintotheatmosphereatthesiteofthoseironandsteelcompanies.Ifthegaseslatergiverisetoemissionsfrominstallationsbelongingtotheelectricitysector,theywillhavetobetakenintoaccountthere.
Emissionsallowancetradingisaninstrumentusedtocontributetotheimplementationofthetargets
acceptedbytheCommunityanditsMemberStatesundertheKyotoProtocol.TheCommunityandtheMemberStatesratifiedtheKyotoProtocolintheknowledgethataddressingclimatechangeinthiswaywouldinvolvecertaincostsatleastintheshortterm.ItistruethattheUnitedStatesasanimportanttrading partner has decided not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol,and that developing countries have noemissionlimitationcommitmentsundertheProtocol.Atthesametime,otherimportanttradingpartnersoftheUnionhaveundertakenemissionlimitationobligationsundertheKyotoprotocol,includingforexamplealltheAccessionCountries,Canada,JapanandSwitzerland.ThesecountrieswillhenceequallyincurcostsformeetingtheirKyototargets.
TheCommunityemissionstradingschemeisexpectedtoreducethecostsfortheUnioneconomyof
implementingtheobligationsundertheKyotoProtocolbyensuringthatemissionreductionsareachievedwheretheyarecheapest.On23July,theCommissionpresentedtotheCouncilandtheParliamentaproposaltoallowcreditsfromtheprojectmechanismsundertheKyotoProtocol(JointImplementation,
CleanDevelopmentMechanisms)tobeconvertedintoallowancesundertheCommunityschemewhich
willleadtofurthersignificantcostsavings.ThisproposalagainunderlinestheCommission’scommitmenttothemostcost-effectiveimplementationoftheKyotoProtocol.
(2004/C58E/139) WRITTENQUESTIONE-2023/03
byHerbertBösch(PSE)totheCommission
(17June2003)
Subject:CommercialrelationsbetweentheCommissionandGIM
Inher Written QuestionE-4099/97(1),MrsWinifredEwing askedtheCommissioninearly 1998for
informationaboutitscommercialrelationswithGeographicInformationManagement(GIM),acompanywithofficesinBelgiumandLuxembourg.InthatQuestion,MrsEwingdrewtheCommission’sattentiontothefactthat99%ofGIMBelgium’sshareswere ownedbyGIMLuxembourg andthat75%ofGIMLuxembourg’sshareswereownedbyacompanynamedKivalConsultants,locatedintheBahamas.
UnderBahamianlaw,itisimpossibletoverifytheshareholdershipofthecompanyandidentifythemajor
shareholders.
Nevertheless,itisclearthattheCommissionhasmaintaineditscommercialrelationswithGIM.CantheCommissionindicatehowmanycontractsithasawardedtoGIMsince1998,thetotalvalueof
thosecontractsandtheproceduresinaccordancewithwhichthecontractswereawarded?C58E/122 EN6.3.2004 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanUnion