JUDGMENTBY-1: NEWMAN J
JUDGMENT-1:
NEWMAN J: This is an application for relief by way of judicial review to
quash a judgment of Judge Southan and justices given in the Harrow
Crown Court on 29 June 1998.
The proceedings were brought by U. Centre Sarl (U.) pursuant to s 97
of the Trade Marks Act 1994, being an appeal by an aggrieved person
against an order for forfeiture made in the Brent Magistrates Court
on 18 February 1998. The London Borough of B. and H. T. S. Service
(the local authority) had applied for and obtained an order in the Brent
Magistrates' Court for the forfeiture of 9,312 pairs of jeans, having an
approximate value of £ 200,000, bearing the L. S. trademark. U. is a
company registered in France and it carries on a wholesale business from
premises in Marseilles. There have been numerous proceedings, both
criminal and civil, in France, in respect of this consignment of jeans,
extending over nearly nine years.
This court is concerned with two judgments of the Tribunal de Grande
Instance of Marseilles. In the first, L. S., the trademark proprietor, claimed
against U. that the jeans infringed its trademark because they were not
made by L. S.. The action failed. In the second set of proceedings L. S.
obtained an ex parte order in the nature of a freezing injunction which
enabled it to seize the jeans. The court set aside the order on a hearing
between the parties on the ground that the issue was res judicata by
reason of the previous judgment of the court. The jeans went into free
circulation in France. U. entered into a contract of sale of the jeans to a
company called K. Ltd, and the jeans were exported to England. The local
authority was enlisted at the request of L. S. and issued two informations
dated 20 November 1997 against K. Ltd: (1) a summons alleging an
offence contrary to s 92(1) of the 1994 Act, and (2) a summons alleging
an offence contrary to s 1(1)(b) of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968. On
the same day the local authority issued two complaints whereby it applied
for forfeiture of the jeans. The complaints were made respectively by
reference to the provisions of the 1994 Act and the 1968 Act.
The informations were not proceeded with because an understanding was
reached between the local authority and K. Ltd, including agreement that
K. would not oppose an application for forfeiture, which the local authority
intimated it intended to make.
The application commenced with the consideration of a preliminary
point. It does not appear that the point was drafted. I infer from the
judgment that its ambit evolved from the character of the argument
before the court. The Crown Court confined itself to consideration of the
question whether the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, which
implemented the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1968 (set out in Sch 1 to the
1982 Act) (the Brussels Convention), applied to the proceedings in the
magistrates' court. The judgment records that U. submitted that having
regard to the judgments in the French courts, which had been registered
in this jurisdiction, the magistrates' court acting in the exercise of its
civil jurisdiction was not entitled to make an order for forfeiture of the
jeans. The argument as to whether the jurisdiction under s 97 of the 1994
Act was civil or criminal was advanced for both sides by reference to the
character of the proceedings before the magistrates. The judgment of the
court, having recited the arguments advanced and the provisions which it
had to consider, concluded:
'In our view once proceedings have been brought the order by the
magistrates was an order which they were entitled to make within
their powers under s 97(2)(a) and being made on application by the
respondents in court on the basis that the agreement between the
parties to the criminal proceedings, it was made within the criminal
jurisdiction of the court. In view of our finding we do not need to go on to
consider the many interesting questions which might have arisen under
the Convention, but would have to go on to consider in the course of a
rehearing the evidence on other issues which may be outstanding.'
With respect, the agreement reached between the local authority and K.
was irrelevant to the issue, which has to be determined by reference to
the 1982 Act and the Brussels Convention.
Mr Alan Tyrrell QC, who appears for U. in this court and who appeared
below, asked the court to adjourn the hearing so that the judgment could
be tested in the High Court.
Although Mr Tyrrell was minded to argue on this application that should
the court be satisfied that within the meaning of the Brussels Convention
the forfeiture proceedings in the Crown Court were civil, it should also rule
as to what effect the French judgments should have in the proceedings
in the Crown Court, he ultimately accepted in the face of the combined
opposition of the court and Mr Mehigan QC, that such a course was not
open to him. The Crown Court decided only one point. If U. succeeds
in this application the matter must go back to the Crown Court for
the Crown Court to consider, along with all the other material in the
case, which the parties wish to place before the court, what effect the
judgments have on the issues which the court must determine. It follows
that the only question which arises on this application is whether the
proceedings in the Crown Court are civil or not, within the meaning of the
1982 Act and the Brussels Convention.
The proceedings in the Crown Court
Section 97 of the 1994 Act provides as follows:
'(1) In England and Wales or Northern Ireland where there has come
into the possession of any person in connection with the investigation or
prosecution of a relevant offence -- (a) goods which, or the packaging of
which, bears a sign identical to or likely to be mistaken for a registered
trade mark, (b) material bearing such a sign and intended to be used for
labelling or packaging goods, as a business paper in relation to goods, or
for advertising goods, or (c) articles specifically designed or adapted for
making copies of such a sign, that person may apply under this section
for an order for the forfeiture of the goods, material or articles.
(2) An application under this section may be made -- (a) where
proceedings have been brought in any court for a relevant offence relating
to some or all of the goods, material or articles, to that court; (b) where
no application for the forfeiture of the goods, material or articles has been
made under paragraph (a), by way of complaint to a magistrates' court.
(3) On an application under this section the court shall make an order for
the forfeiture of any goods, material or articles only if it is satisfied that a
relevant offence has been committed in relation to the goods, material or
articles.
(4) A court may infer for the purposes of this section that such an offence
has been committed in relation to any goods, material or articles if it is
satisfied that such an offence has been committed in relation to goods,
material or articles which are representative of them (whether by reason
of being of the same design or part of the same consignment or batch or
otherwise).
(5) Any person aggrieved by an order made under this section by a
magistrates' court, or by a decision of such a court not to make such an
order, may appeal against that order or decision -- (a) in England and
Wales, to the Crown Court; (b) in Northern Ireland, to the county court...
(6) Subject to subsection (7), where any goods, material or articles are
forfeited under this section they shall be destroyed in accordance with
such directions as the court may give.
(7) On making an order under this section the court may, if it considers it
appropriate to do so, direct that the goods, material or articles to which
the order relates shall (instead of being destroyed) be released, to such
person as the court may specify, on condition that that person -- (a)
causes the offending sign to be erased, removed or obliterated, and (b)
complies with any order to pay costs which has been made against him in
the proceedings for the order for forfeiture.
(8) For the purposes of this section a "relevant offence" means an offence
under section 92 above (unauthorised use of trade mark, &c. in relation to
goods) or under the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 or any offence involving
dishonesty or deception.'
Thus s 97 of the 1994 Act entitles any person to apply for forfeiture where
that person has come into the possession of goods in connection with the
investigation or prosecution of a relevant offence. There does not have to
have been a prosecution to conviction, nor even an existing prosecution.
An investigation will be sufficient if combined with possession. The right
to apply for forfeiture conferred by s 97 of the 1994 Act is obviously of
particular value to the trading standards service of a local authority, for it
will, in a variety of circumstances, be a person coming into possession of
goods in the circumstances envisaged by the section. Important though
the power may be to a local authority it is nevertheless capable of being
exercised by any person, for example the registered trademark proprietor
or the licensee of the trademark, so long as the qualifying circumstances
set out by the section exist.
Sections 16, 17, 18 and 19 of the 1994 Act confer specific rights upon the
proprietor of a registered trademark to apply to the court for similar relief.
Section 19(1) provides:
'Where infringing goods, material or articles have been delivered up in
pursuance of an order under section 16, an application may be made to
the court -- (a) for an order that they may be destroyed or forfeited to
such person as the court may think fit, or (b) for a decision that no such
order should be made.'
Sub-section (3) provides:
'Provision shall be made by rules of court as to the service of notice on
persons having an interest in the goods, material or articles, and any
such person is entitled -- (a) to appear in proceedings for an order under
this section, whether or not he was served with notice, and (b) to appeal
against any order made, whether or not he appeared...'
It follows that relief by way of forfeiture can be obtained by a registered
trademark proprietor or licensee, according to his choice, in proceedings
commenced in the High Court (ss 16-19 of the 1994 Act) or in the
magistrates' court (s 97 of the 1994 Act).
The Brussels Convention, in company with other conventions, was
incorporated into English law by s 2 of the 1982 Act. Section 3 of the
1982 Act provides:
'(1) Any question as to the meaning or effect of any provision of the
Brussels Conventions shall, if not referred to the European Court in
accordance with the 1971 Protocol, be determined in accordance with the
principles laid down by and any relevant decision of the European Court.
(2) Judicial notice shall be taken of any decision of, or expression of
opinion by, the European Court on any such question.
(3) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the following
reports (which are reproduced in the Official Journal of the Communities),
namely -- (a) the reports by Mr. P. Jenard on the 1968 Convention and
the 1971 Protocol; and (b) the report by Professor Peter Schlosser on
the Accession Convention; and (c) the report by Professor Demetrios I
Evrigenis and Professor KD Kerameus on the 1982 Accession Convention;
and (d) the report by Mr Martinho de Almeida Cruz, Mr Manuel Desantes
Real and Mr P Jenard on the 1989 Accession Convention, may be
considered in ascertaining the meaning or effect of any provision of the
Brussels Conventions and shall be given such weight as is appropriate in
the circumstances.'
In this case the meaning and effect of art 1 of the Brussels Convention is
in issue. Article 1 provides:
'This Convention shall apply in civil and commercial matters whatever
the nature of the court or tribunal. It shall not extend, in particular, to
revenue, customs or administrative matters. The Convention shall not
apply to...'
Under the heading 'Recognition and Enforcement' the Brussels Convention
provides:
'Article 25
For the purposes of this Convention, "judgment" means any judgment
given by a court or tribunal of a Contracting State, whatever the
judgment may be called, including a decree, order, decision or writ of
execution, as well as the determination of costs or expenses by an officer
of the court.
Recognition
Article 26
A judgment given in a Contracting State shall be recognized in the other
Contracting States without any special procedure being required. Any
interested party who raises the recognition of a judgment as the principal
issue in a dispute may, in accordance with the procedures provided for in
Sections 2 and 3 of this Title, apply for a decision that the judgment be
recognized...
Article 29
Under no circumstances may a foreign judgment be reviewed as to its
substance.'
The provisions of the Brussels Convention relating to civil and commercial
matters extend so as to require, where necessary, consideration to be
given to the character of the judgment in respect of which enforcement
may be sought and to the character of the proceedings in which
enforcement may be required. No issue arises in respect of the two
judgments which, as I have stated, have been duly registered under the
1982 Act. The issue arises as to whether the Brussels Convention applies
to the proceedings in the Crown Court. Case law exists in connection with
the characterisation of judgments but no case has been brought to my
attention where specific consideration has been given to the character
of the proceedings in which enforcement is sought. The point, though
drawn to my attention, can have no bearing on the approach, nor suggest
differing approaches must be adopted, when interpreting the same words
in the same article.
Before I turn to consider the material which has been placed before me,
which includes the reports specified in s 3(3) of the 1982 Act, I should set
out the hallmarks of proceedings by way of forfeiture under s 97 of the
1994 Act. The scheme and purpose of the forfeiture provisions (including
ss 16-19) of the 1994 Act is to prevent infringing articles entering into
circulation in the market to the prejudice of the registered trademark
proprietor and to the prejudice of traders and consumers, who may be
induced to deal with the counterfeit items. It is common for there to be
contractual complexity underlying the sale of goods in the market and
as a result a number of persons may acquire an interest in the goods
and a right to be heard before an order for forfeiture is made or, if made,
upheld on appeal. Although for the magistrates to have jurisdiction under
s 97 of the 1994 Act the person in possession must be in possession for
the purposes of prosecution or investigation into a relevant offence, the
forfeiture order cannot be regarded as a penalty or an essential part of
the prosecution of the criminal offence. The forfeiture process comprises
a court procedure for working out the consequences of the commission
of a criminal offence in connection with goods, having regard to the
commercial and proprietary interests of persons who have entered into
transactions in connection with the goods in question. Section 97 of
the 1994 Act provides a means whereby persons can apply to the court
to protect their private interests. Additionally, it avails local authorities
in the conduct of their functions. Section 93 of the 1994 Act imposes
a duty on every local weights and measures authority to enforce the
provisions of s 92 of that Act. In the discharge of that duty the authority
will regularly come into the possession of infringing goods in the course
of the investigation or prosecution of a relevant offence. But the local
authority have a duty to prosecute, and do not have a duty to apply for
forfeiture, although it is plainly a great convenience for them to be able
to do so, in order to avoid being in possession of an enormous number of
infringing objects.
Further, it must be said that a local authority has a public interest, which
it can serve by making an application for forfeiture, namely the protection
of many individuals who may be prejudiced should the infringing articles
enter into the market. Although properly regarded as a public interest,
it represents a right and power to act in the public interest by bringing
proceedings to protect the collective body of private interests, too
numerous and unidentified for it to be practical to envisage proceedings
being taken by them. That said, the circumstances of possession are not
unique to the local authority, and the form of relief by way of forfeiture
has no specific public authority character.
European law
Both sides drew my attention to the case of LTU
Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co KG v Eurocontrol Case 29/76
[1976] ECR 1541. Mr Mehigan in addition drew my attention to the case
of Netherlands State v Reinhold Ruffer Case 814/79 [1980] ECR 3807
and Bavaria Fluggesellschaft Schwabe & Co KG v Eurocontrol Joined cases
9/77 and 10/77 [1977] ECR 1517. In the LTU Lufttransportunternehmen
GmbH & Co KG v Eurocontrol judgment, a German company, LTU
Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co KG, asserted that charges claimed
by Eurocontrol, namely the European Organisation for the Safety of Air
Navigation, in respect of which an order for payment had been obtained in
the Belgian courts, were charges claimed by public law. The Belgian court
declared that it had jurisdiction on the ground that the payment of the
charges in the dispute arose out of an activity of the defendant which was
deemed to be commercial and it ordered LTU to pay the sum plus interest.
Eurocontrol sought to enforce the judgment through the Dusseldorf court
and the Court of Justice of the European Communities was requested to
give a preliminary ruling on the question --
'whether, for the purposes of interpreting of the concept "civil and
commercial matters" within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 1
of the Convention... the law to be applied is the law of the State in which
judgment was given (in this instance Belgium) or the law of the State in
which the order for enforcement is to be issued.' (See [1976] ECR 1541 at
1550 (para 1).)
The judgment in its material part states as follows:
'3... As Article 1 serves to indicate the area of application of the
Convention it is necessary, in order to ensure, as far as possible, that
the rights and obligations which derive from it for the Contracting States
and the persons to whom it applies are equal and uniform, that the terms
of that provision should not be interpreted as a mere reference to the
internal law of one or other of the States concerned. By providing that
the Convention shall apply "whatever the nature of the court or tribunal"
Article l shows that the concept "civil and commercial matters" cannot be
interpreted solely in the light of the division of jurisdiction between the
various types of courts existing in certain States. The concept in question
must therefore be regarded as independent and must be interpreted by
reference, first, to the objectives and scheme of the Convention and,
secondly, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of the
national legal systems.
4. If the interpretation of the concept is approached in this way, in
particular for the purpose of applying the provisions of Title III of the
Convention, certain types of judicial decision must be regarded as
excluded from the area of application of the Convention, either by reason
of the legal relationships between the parties to the action or of the
subject-matter of the action. Although certain judgments given in actions
between a public authority and a person governed by private law may fall
within the area of application of the Convention, this is not so where the
public authority acts in the exercise of its powers. Such is the case in a
dispute which, like that between the parties to the main action, concerns
the recovery of charges payable by a person governed by private law to
a national or international body governed by public law for the use of
equipment and services provided by such body, in particular where such
use is obligatory and exclusive. This applies in particular where the rate
of charges, the methods of calculation and the procedures for collection
are fixed unilaterally in relation to the users, as is the position in the
present case where the body in question unilaterally fixed the place of
performance of the obligation at its registered office and selected the
national courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the performance of the
obligation.' (See [1976] ECR 1541 at 1551 (paras 3-4).)
The court therefore concluded that having regard to these criteria the
judgment given in the action was excluded from the area of application of
the Brussels Convention.
Netherlands State v Reinhold Ruffer
In the Reinhold Ruffer case a vessel belonging to Reinhold Ruffer collided
with another vessel in the Bight of Watum and sank. According to the
terms of a treaty between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the
Federal Republic of Germany, it was provided that the Netherlands should
be responsible for the administration of the waterways in the Bight of
Watum, which involved the removal of wrecks. The Netherlands state
removed the wreck. After selling the wreck there remained a balance of
florins which the Dutch state claimed. The court held that the concept of
'civil and commercial' matters within the meaning of the first paragraph
of art 1 of the Brussels Convention did not include actions brought by the
agent responsible for administering public waterways against the person
having liability in law to recover the costs incurred in the removal of a
wreck carried out by, or at the instigation of, the administering agent
in the exercise of its public authority. The court placed no weight upon
the distinction relied upon, namely that the recovery was sought in the
civil courts and not in some form of administrative process. The court
concluded that the claim was outside the application of the Brussels
Convention. The second Eurocontrol case, Bavaria Fluggesellschaft
Schwabe & Co KG v Eurocontrol, was brought to my attention as
confirming the jurisprudence of the first, and it was in fact relied upon in
the Reinhold Ruffer case as an accurate statement of the jurisprudence in
the Court of Justice.
The reports of Mr Jenard and Professor Schlosser
Counsel observed that the reports and the cases reflect consideration of
the character of a judgment for the purposes of the Brussels Convention
where enforcement is concerned as opposed to the character of the
proceedings in which enforcement may be claimed. The observation is
apt, but has no bearing, in my judgment, upon the approach the court
must adopt, which must be identical whichever aspect of the Brussels
Convention is under consideration. Mr Jenard (see OJ 1979 C59 p 1 at p
9) points out in his report:
'III CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS
The Committee did not specify what is meant by "civil and commercial
matters", nor did it point to a solution of the problem of classification
by determining the law according to which that expression should be
interpreted.'
He goes on to state:
'... it follows from the text of the Convention that civil and commercial
matters are to be classified as such according to their nature, and
irrespective of the character of the court or tribunal which is seised of the
proceedings or which has given judgment. This emerges from Article 1,
which provides that the Convention shall apply to civil and commercial
matters "whatever the nature of the court or tribunal". The Convention
also applies irrespective of whether the proceedings are contentious or
non-contentious... The Convention covers civil proceedings brought before
criminal courts, both as regards decisions relating to the jurisdiction, and
also as regards the recognition and enforcement of judgments given by
criminal courts in such proceedings...'
A little later in the report, Mr Jenard observes:
'The Convention also applies to civil or commercial matters brought before
administrative tribunals.'
Mr Jenard sets out in his report a formula adopted by a committee to the
Brussels Convention which was as follows:
'The expression "civil or commercial matters" is very wide and does
not include only those matters which fall within the jurisdiction of civil
tribunals and commercial tribunals in countries where administrative
tribunals also exist. Otherwise there would be a wholly unjustifiable
inequality between the Contracting States: service abroad of judicial
instruments could take place on a wider scale for countries which do not
have administrative tribunals than for countries which have them. In brief,
the Convention is applicable from the moment when private interests
become involved...' (See OJ 1979 C59 p 1 at pp 9-10.)
It is pointed out by Mr Jenard that the ideal solution would certainly have
been to apply the Brussels Convention to all civil and commercial matters.
However problems relating to the conflict of laws in respect of property
rights gave rise to difficulties in that regard. He states:
'The solution adopted implies that all litigation and all judgments relating
to contractual or non-contractual obligations which do not involve the
status or legal capacity of natural persons, wills or succession, rights in
property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, bankruptcy or social
security must fall within the scope of the Convention, and that in this
respect the Convention should be interpreted as widely as possible.' (See
OJ 1979 C59 p 1 at p 10.)
Professor Schlosser
The report of Professor Schlosser in 1978 was given to mark the accession
of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom and
Northern Ireland to the Brussels Convention (OJ 1978 L304 p 1). In his
report the Professor states:
'The distinction between civil and commercial matters on the one hand
and matters of public law on the other is well recognised in the legal
systems of the original Member States and is, in spite of some important
differences, on the whole arrived at on the basis of similar criteria. Thus
the term "civil law" also includes certain important special subjects which
are not public law, especially, for example, parts of labour law. For this
reason the draftsmen of the original text of the 1968 Convention, and the
Jenard report, did not include a definition of civil and commercial matters
and merely stated that the 1968 Convention also applies to decisions of
criminal and administrative courts, provided they are given in a civil or
commercial matter, which occasionally happens. In this last respect, the
accession of three new Member States presents no additional problems.
But as regards the main distinction referred to earlier, considerable
difficulties arise.' (See OJ 1979 C59 p 71 at p 82 (para 23).)
The Professor here had in mind the fact that in the United Kingdom and
Ireland the distinction commonly made in the original member states
between private and public law was hardly known. Under the heading
'Civil and Criminal Law' the Professor stated as follows:
'The Working Party considered it obvious that criminal proceedings and
criminal judgments of all kinds are excluded from the scope of the 1968
Convention, and that this matter needed, therefore, no clarification in
the revised text (see paragraph 17). This applies not only to criminal
proceedings stricto sensu. Other proceedings imposing sanctions for
breaches of orders or prohibitions intended to safeguard the public
interest also fall outside the scope of civil law. Certain difficulties may
arise in some cases in classifying private penalties known to some
legal systems like contractual penalty clauses, penalties imposed by
associations, etc. Since in many legal systems criminal proceedings
may be brought by a private plaintiff, a distinction cannot be made by
reference to the party which instituted the proceedings. The decisive
factor is whether the penalty is for the benefit of the private plaintiff
or some other private individual. Thus the decisions of the Danish
industrial courts imposing fines, which are for the benefit of the plaintiff
or some other aggrieved party, certainly fall within the scope of the 1968
Convention.' (See OJ 1979 C59 p 71 at p 84 (para 29).)
The argument
Mr Mehigan for the local authority submitted that the proceedings in
the Crown Court were either (a) administrative; or (b) criminal and
were therefore outside the scope of the Brussels Convention. As to the
administrative character of the proceedings he submitted that they were
taken by a public authority acting in the exercise of its public authority
powers and, on the basis of the jurisprudence in Europe to which I
have referred, the answer was clear. As to the criminal character of
the proceedings, having regard to the requirement that there be the
investigation or prosecution of a relevant offence, and the requirement
that there can only be a forfeiture order made if the court is satisfied that
the relevant offence has been committed, it should be concluded that they
are criminal proceedings. Additionally, he prays in aid the observation
made by the editors of the Current Law Statutes that s 97 of the 1994 Act
represents the criminal counterpart to the civil powers conferred under
ss 16-20 of that Act. He also argues that the action has been taken by
the local authority in support of the public interest to prevent counterfeit
articles entering into the market.
In the Reinhold Ruffer case and the Eurocontrol cases do not support
the argument he advances. Those cases involve actions taken by public
authorities, which were peculiarly the power of the public authority
to take by virtue of their status as a public authority and in respect
of matters governed by their public authority duties. Although a local
authority is bound to prosecute, or has a duty to prosecute, it does
not have a duty to bring forfeiture proceedings, nor does it have any
exclusive status in bringing such proceedings. The relief it obtains enures
to the benefit of the private interests of individuals. In my judgment
the proceedings are predominantly concerned with private interests.
Further, relief is granted according to the proper determination of private
interests. Professor Schlosser gives by way of example the fines in the
industrial court in Belgium as comprising a pointer to the character of
the proceedings. Having considered the principles laid down by relevant
decisions of the Court of Justice and the reports of Mr Jenard and
Professor Schlosser I am satisfied that the Crown Court proceedings are
civil and not criminal or administrative.
I was treated to a limited survey of what the position might be under
domestic law and such perusal was, in so far as it is a national law
forming part of the corpus of national laws in the European Union,
permissible. Suffice it to say that by closely similar reasoning to the
above, I am satisfied that had the matter required a decision under
domestic law, the proceedings by way of forfeiture would have been
properly categorised as civil. There is a close parallel to the position which
arises in interpleader proceedings and another parallel in the provisions of
the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979.
It follows that in my judgment the correct answer to the preliminary
point which has been argued before me is that the forfeiture proceedings
pursuant to s 97 of the 1994 Act and an appeal by way of an aggrieved
person to the Crown Court in respect of a forfeiture order are proceedings
to which the Brussels Convention applies, being proceedings in a civil
matter.
DISPOSITION:
Application allowed.