JUDGMENT-1:
MORISON J:
Background
1. The background to the applications with which I must deal is as follows.
2. There are three sets of proceedings which have been started within this
jurisdiction:
(1) 2000 Folio 626, between C. Containers N.V. and the C. Group as
claimants and Mr. and Mrs. P. and K. Enterprises S.A. as defendants which
was commenced on June 1, 2000 [the 2000 action];
(2) 2001 Folio 1353 between C. Containers N.V. and the same three
defendants as in the 2000 action [the 2001 action];
(1) Claim No HQ01X04865 started in the Queen's Bench Division, but
which is transferred to this Court, between C. Equipment (Bermuda) Ltd.
and Mr. P. [the QB Action].
3. Actions 2000 and 2001 are complaints by the claimants, who are in
the container leasing business, that they were defrauded by Mr. P., who
was then a director or de facto director of them both. They say, in the
2000 action, that in 1994 [between July 21 and Nov. 24] he caused to
be paid into a bank account, which his wife had opened in the name
"Mrs. Margit P./C." at the Amersham and Bucks, branch of Bar. Bank, five
separate payments, in total amounting to U.S.$2.6 m., received from one
of the claimants' customers, "Co.". The claimants allege that the money
was paid out of the account for the purpose of making improvements
to a property known as the Old Rectory in Amersham, which is formally
owned by the third defendant. The claimants say that the third defendant
is effectively Mr. P.. Until April, 1997 he owned K.'s shares through an
intermediary company but since that date he owns the shares through
a "Foundation" he created under Austrian law, which, as I understand it,
is similar to a Liechtenstein Anstalt. In the 2001 Action, C. Containers,
the only claimant, says that at the direction of Mr. P. its moneys, namely
U.S.$400,000 were paid from its account at the London Branch of Bank of
America into the account in Amersham, and that a further U.S.$100,000
was paid from the London Branch account into Mr. P.'s own personal
bank account in Austria. The claimant further says that the latter amount
was used by Mr. P. for his own benefit and that the U.S.$400,000 was
expended on making improvements to the K. property in Amersham.
4. In the QB action, the C. claimant, who is not domiciled in a Convention
country, sues on a judgment entered by the Supreme Court of New York
given on Feb. 8, 2000 against Mr. P. for the sum of U.S.$1,280,795.72
plus interest. These proceedings arose from Mr. P.'s failure to make the
payments due under two promissory notes dated July 14, 1997. The
maturity date was Dec. 31, 1997. The Notes provided for proceedings
under them to be brought in the New York State or Federal Court for the
State of New York and Mr. P. expressly submitted to that jurisdiction.
Having been duly served with the proceedings in New York Mr. P. failed
to participate and a default judgment was entered against him for the
total sum of U.S.$6,583,665.72 on Feb. 8, 2000. The claimant was able
to satisfy part of that judgment by taking over K.'s shares in the C. group
which leaves outstanding the sums claimed in the action. Enforcement
proceedings were also brought in Switzerland and an attachment order
was made in relation to shares which K. held in the C. group. The
foundation challenged the attachment order on the grounds that K.'s
shares had been bought by the foundation and it, and not Mr. P., held the
shares in C.. The judgment of the Swiss Appellate Court is informative:
As the sequestration case was brought against Stephen P., it should be
asked whether Mr. P. and the Foundation are one and the same party,
which would enable the Foundation's property to be sequestrated.
. . .
In the case in point, it should be pointed out that Stephen P. is the
founder of the Foundation that it is the founder who appoints and
dismisses the members of the foundation council . . .
That it is the members of the foundation council who appoint the
beneficiary . . . That the founder can modify the supplementary
foundation memorandum that the beneficiary or beneficiaries are
entitled to the payment of dividends . . . That the founder can revoke the
foundation even after it has been recorded in the companies books
It is thus clear that the founder, that is to say Stephen P. has total control
over the Foundation whose strings he pulls and that, in fact, he can
dispose of its wealth. . ..
The proof that Stephen P. has total control over the Foundation is
confirmed by the fact that the K. shares, belonging to Stephen P., were
sold to the Foundation by a company represented by one of the directors
of that Foundation.
It is therefore appropriate to consider that there is financial identity
between Stephen P. and the Foundation so that the sequestration of the
shares belonging to the Foundation is justified.
5. I am very doubtful whether K. is, in fact, to be regarded as a separate
legal entity from Mr. P., but must, for present purposes treat K. as
separate, even though the foundation and Mr. P. may safely be regarded
as one and the same. Dr. Sa. is the appointed legal representative of
K. and he has made witness statements which are before the Court.
His statement that neither Mr. or Mrs. P. have an influence on the
management of K. is, I think, unlikely to be true once the corporate veil
has been examined and penetrated, but Mr. Sa. has not been cross-
examined and, however sceptical, I must, I think, take his statement
at face value. Relevant to the issues before me is the fact that K. is a
Panamanian joint stock company to whom the provisions Brussels/Lugano
Convention do not apply.
6. Mr. Sch., a director of Co., Mr. P. and a Mr. Friedberg, an Austrian
solicitor, were investigated and prosecuted for fraud by the Vienna Public
Prosecutor. Part of the "indictment" related to the matters raised in the
2000 action. Mr. Sch. and Mr. P. gave conflicting accounts about how the
U.S.$2.6 m. came to be paid. Mr. P. said that the Amersham account was
opened expressly to enable Mr. Sch. to transfer moneys out of Austria
and after the moneys were transferred they were paid back to him,
alternatively, the moneys were paid by Mr. Sch. by way of loan to Mr.
P., who had tax difficulties. Mr. Sch. claimed that the U.S.$2.6 m. was
a genuine trade debt owed by Co. to the C. companies. Both Mr. Sch.
and Mr. P. were convicted of fraud and in the latter's case he has been
sentenced to nine years imprisonment. An appeal is pending and the
conviction apparently does not take effect until after the appeal has been
determined; yet pending the appeal Mr. P. is in custody and, I accept, this
has caused some difficulty for his legal representatives in this country. Mr.
Flower told me that he has had to take his instructions from Mrs. P..
7. The 2000 action was commenced on June 1, 2000, and, on Mar. 29,
2001, I made a freezing order against the first two defendants' assets
within the jurisdiction which specifically included any assets held by K. [or
another of Mr. P.'s vehicles: Po. S.A., whose exact position is unclear] and
I also gave the claimants permission to join K. in the proceedings. On May
22, 2001 I made a further order permitting service on K. in Switzerland.
The P.s disputed the Court's jurisdiction and the matter came back before
Mr. Justice Moore-Bick in June, 2001 but the action and their application
to dismiss it on jurisdictional grounds was stayed. In accordance with the
liberty to apply to restore the action, the stay was lifted by Mr. Justice
Cresswell in March, 2002. The P.'s application is for an order declaring
that the Court has no jurisdiction over them or alternatively that the
action be stayed pending the determination of proceedings brought
against C. Group S.A. by Co. Container Leasing in the Luxembourg
Courts. Those proceedings were commenced in Luxembourg two months
after the 2000 action was started here, namely on Aug. 8, 2000. In
those proceedings, Co. say that the U.S.$2.6 m. was paid by them to
C. and they seek to recover the moneys. Their claim is that as a result
of fraud by Mr. P. a proportion of Co.'s capital towards the purchase of
containers from C. was wrongfully paid into the Amersham bank account
and reference is made in those proceedings to the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission inquiry report that concluded that Co. paid the
U.S.$2.6 m. to bank accounts under the control of Mr. P. rather than to
C.. K. also applies for an order asking the Court to declare that it has no
jurisdiction over them and, in the alternative that these proceedings be
stayed until after the Luxembourg proceedings.
8. In relation to the 2001 action, the P.s apply for an order that the Court
declares that it has no jurisdiction over them as they are domiciled in
Austria and the claimants do not have a claim in rem against them within
the meaning of art. 16(1) of the Brussels Convention. They say that
the issues in relation to action 2000 are identical to the issues in this
action. K. also make an application seeking an order that the Court has
no jurisdiction to try the case against them and asking for the claim to be
struck out or stayed.
9. In relation to the QB action, Mr. P. applies to have the action
transferred to the Com-mercial Court and I indicated that that application
was granted. He also asked for an order declaring that the Court
has no jurisdiction to try the claim or if it does it is not a convenient
forum. He maintains that the only basis for seeking to enforce the
judgment here is because of K.'s assets within this jurisdiction (which
the claimant says is really Mr. P.'s). He says that at some stage in the
Luxembourg proceedings a decision will have to be made about the true
relationship between Mr. P. and K. and it would be better to wait until
those proceedings are complete. Any judgment of a Luxembourg Court
will be readily enforceable here.
The issues
10. There are, therefore three principal issues for the Court at this stage:
(A) does the Court have jurisdiction against the P.s and K. in the 2000
action, and if so what effect do the Luxembourg proceedings have on this
action;
(B) does the Court have jurisdiction against the P.s and K. in the 2001
action, and if so what effect do the Luxembourg proceedings have on this
action;
(C) is this court a convenient forum for the hearing of the QB action
and should it be stayed pending the completion of the Luxembourg
proceedings.
A. The 2000 action
11. Before turning to the submissions which the parties make I must
first refer in more detail to the nature of the claims made in the action,
because the jurisdiction issues depend upon a proper analysis of them.
At the outset it should be acknowledged that if, as the criminal Courts
have adjudged, both Mr. Sch. and Mr. P. have been dishonest it is difficult
for both Co. and C. to know precisely how they came to be defrauded
since both men effectively ran both companies, as I understand it. The
allegation against them is they used their companies' moneys as their
own to use for their own private purposes. The problems in understanding
precisely what the C. claim amounts to in the 2000 action stems, I think,
from this difficulty. Were the payments by Co. into the Amersham bank
account payments intended for C. but diverted by Mr. P. to his own use,
so that C. were the victims, or were they payments improperly made by
Mr. Sch. from Co.'s bank accounts intended for the private benefit of Mr.
Sch. and/or Mr. P. so that Co. and not C. were the victim; and, in any case
where has the money gone to?
12. The re-amended particulars of claim assert that
(A) Mr. P. was the chief executive officer of the second claimant to whom
he owed a fiduciary duty to account.
(B) K. is beneficially owned and controlled by Mr. P. and is used by him as
a vehicle for the ownership of assets including the property in Amersham.
(C) Mrs. P. opened the Bar. Bank account in Amersham and
(D) between July 21, 1994 and Nov. 24, 1994 "Mr. P. procured that
customers of the Claimants [namely Co.] pay into the Account five
separate payments totalling U.S.$2.6 m. . . . on the basis that the
Account belonged to the First or second Claimant."
(E) "These payments were made without the knowledge or authority of
the Claimants and were not made for their benefit."
(F) In support of their case the claimants rely upon two documents:
first a letter on C. paper purporting to confirm receipt of the monies
"as unallocated payments during 1995" which could be called on for
repayment by Co., and secondly a fax which has an obscure meaning:
. . .according to your wishes we herewith confirm that we will transfer
the [U.S.$2.6 m] which we received on 31 December 1995 to you. In the
case that containers should be bought with this money we would require
written confirmation from Co. in order not transfer the money.
The claimants say that the letter and fax were sent without the knowledge
or authority of the claimants.
(G) Between July 27, 1994 and Nov. 6, 1995 the moneys in the account
were expended in making improvements to the property and thereafter
the account was closed on the instructions of Mrs. P..
(H) [Co.]
. . .have claimed that the Claimants are liable to reimburse the Funds and
threatened to commence legal proceedings for that sum. The Claimants
have denied that they received the Funds or any part of it and that they
are liable in respect of that sum or any part of it.
(J)
. . .In failing to safeguard the Funds and in sending the Letter and the Fax
Mr. P. acted dishonestly and fraudulently in breach of his said duties:
(1) Mr. P. allowed the payments in the Account to be dealt with for
his own benefit and/or that of Mrs. P. and not for the benefit of the
Claimants;
(2) Mr. P. knew that the Claimants did not know of the intended payments
into the Account purportedly for the Claimants and had not consented to
them;
(3) Mr. P. sent the Letter and the Fax to prevent or delay action by
[Co.] to recover the monies from the Claimants and/or prevent or delay
discovery of the fraud by the Claimants.
(K) Mrs. P. dishonesty received the funds or dishonestly knowingly
assisted Mr. P.'s breach of fiduciary duty by opening the account and
allowing the funds to be paid out. As particulars of this allegation the
claimants allege that there was no reason other than to defraud the
claimants that the Amersham bank account was opened in the name Mrs.
Margit P./C..
(L) the claimants have suffered loss and damage namely -
. . .the amount of any liability (which the Claimants deny) to [Co.] arising
from the said payments and/or the Letter or the Fax. In any event the
Claimants have incurred legal costs in investigating the payment and the
Letter and the Fax and the potential claims arising from them.
(M)
Further, . . . in the event that the Claimants are liable to [Co.] Mr. and
Mrs. P. are liable to make restitution to the Claimants of the Funds or their
proceeds and/or are liable to account to the Claimants as constructive
trustees of the Funds and/or their proceeds.
(N)
Further or alternatively the Claimants are entitled to trace the Funds in
equity into the [Amersham] Property of which they claim a proportionate
share, alternatively a charge over the Property to secure their personal
claims against the First and Second Defendants together with interest
thereon.
13. In the prayer for relief, the claimants claim against the P.s a
declaration that they are liable to make restitution to the claimants
of the U.S.$2.6 m. and are liable to account as constructive trustees
and compensation in that sum. They also seek a declaration that the
claimants are entitled to a share in the property in the proportion by
which the value of the property was increased by the use of the funds.
Thus, the claim appears to be both a proprietary claim, involving a claim
for restitution and a tracing remedy against the personal defendants for
breach of fiduciary duty and fraud, and, in the case of the wife, dishonest
knowing assistance, and, what might be called a contingent claim in the
event that Contrim succeeds against C. in the Luxembourg action.
The arguments
14. The personal defendants submit that there is no jurisdiction in the
English Court. Their arguments may be summarized in this way:
(1) The personal defendants say they are domiciled in Austria and I must
proceed on that basis.
(2) The Court does not have jurisdiction under art. 5(3) of the Brussels
Convention ["in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi delict in the
courts where the harmful event occurred"] because this article must be
construed restrictively otherwise it provides a mechanism for defeating [a
derogation from] the primary rule that defendants should be sued in the
Courts of their domicile: Kleinwort Benson v Glasgow Council, [1997] 4 All
E.R. 641 at p. 646g.
(3) The place where the harmful event occurred is either the place
where the damage occurred or the place where the event occurred
which resulted in that damage but "that term cannot however be
construed so extensively as to encompass any place where the adverse
consequences of an event that has already caused actual damage can
be felt. Consequently that term cannot be construed as including the
place where . . . the victim claims to have suffered financial damage
consequential on initial damage arising and suffered by him in another
contracting state." see Marmari v Lloyd's Bank Plc, [1995] E.C.R. I-2719.
A Court has jurisdiction under art. 5(3) if it is the Court of the place
"where the event giving rise to the damage, and entailing tortious,
delictual or quasi delictual liability, directly produced its harmful effects
upon the person who is the immediate victim of that event": see also
Kalfelis v Schroder, [1988] E.C.R. 5565 and Dumez France v Hessische
Landesbank (Helaba) Case C-220/88, [1990] E.C.R. I-49. In short, the
damage must have been suffered directly and primarily in the jurisdiction
of this Court.
(4) The claimants case based upon an alleged "failure to safeguard" the
moneys is artificial. What the claimants are really complaining about
is the procuring by Mr. P. of the payment of funds from Co. into the
Amersham bank account. The funds were extracted from Co. outside
England and Wales and in Austria. The moment that Co. lost control of the
money in Austria the personal defendants became liable to C. regardless
of where the money was placed. It was mere happenstance that the
moneys were transferred here; the centre of gravity of the complaint
is Austria where the initial harm occurred. The loss to the claimants is
contingent upon Co. having a good claim against them: the payment
of moneys out of the Amersham account has caused no loss to the
claimants.
(5) A claim for restitution based upon unjust enrichment does not fall
within art. 5 [see the Kleinwort Benson case] because it is not a claim
which relates to tort.
15. K. also submitted that this Court should not take jurisdiction over the
action. Mr. Moser, of Counsel, submitted that the claimants were changing
their case. They had started the proceedings on the basis that this Court
had exclusive jurisdiction; whereas now the claimants characterized the
proceedings as "protective" or "in the nature of a part 20 claim" and that
Luxembourg appeared to be the logical place for pursuing the relief in
the 2000 action, and for that purpose the claimants had already started
a procedure in the Luxembourg Court equivalent to a Part 20 claim over
against the three defendants to the Action, asserting that that appeared
to be the logical place for the trial of the issues between Co., C., the two
personal defendants and K.. Therefore it was submitted that this Court
should -
(1) decline jurisdiction as the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a
merely "protective action" in relation to a mere "contingent liability" and
discharge the Mareva relief which was granted on the basis that there was
substance to the claim which now appeared empty. It would be open to
the claimants to start purely protective action in this country in support
of actions begun, substantively, in another contracting state. But this was
not a true protective action "since [the claimants] seek to vary the legal
situation of an asset" [par. 8 of Counsel's skeleton argument].
(2) the action does not disclose a true cause of action but only a
contingent case;
(3) England is not the convenient forum for the litigation between the
claimants and K.. K. is a Panamanian company with its control located
in Switzerland and Austria. Where a defendant is not domiciled in a
contracting state the concept of forum non conveniens is still in play:
Sarrio v Kuwait Investment Authority, [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 113 and this
is consistent with art. 4 of the Convention which expressly leaves the
national Court with its own jurisdictional rules in such a case. Criminal
proceedings which include an element of civil jurisdiction are under way
in Austria; there are proceedings in Luxembourg relating to the same
issues as in this action; all the relevant witnesses are likely to be located
in Austria or Switzerland; any judgment of the Austrian or Luxembourg
Courts are readily enforced here;
(4) there is no jurisdiction over the first two defendants and thus nothing
upon which to hang the joinder of the third defendant. Counsel submitted
that there was an analogy to be drawn with the French proceedings
known as action paulienne whereby a creditor may seek to set aside a
transaction entered into by a debtor to defeat the creditor's due claim,
which is an action not falling within art. 5(3). I should say at once that
I regard the analogy as false and unhelpful. The essence of this type of
French action is not to establish the liability of a defendant but rather to
render ineffective as against his creditor the disposition which the debtor
has made. Here the action is to establish the liability of K.;
(5) no good cause of action has been demonstrated against K.. There is
no adequate pleading of a constructive trust or a breach of it and the case
for saying that K. is simply the alter ego of Mr. P. depends on the law of
the place of incorporation.
16. The claimants say that the claim falls within art. 5(3). It is an
allegation of fraud made against the personal defendants for diverting
monies directed to the claimants for their own personal gain. If the
claimants were beneficially entitled to the monies then the defendants
received them as trustees for the claimants and have fraudulently broken
that trust in England. Where did the harmful event occur? Answer:
England as that was the place where the fraud occurred and the trust
was broken. The assistance was rendered within this jurisdiction, this is
the place where the bank account was manipulated for the benefit of the
defendants and contrary to the rights of the claimants and falls within art.
5(3): see the decision of Casio Computer Ltd. v Sayo and Others Dec.
20, 2000 per Mr. A. Mann, Q.C. sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge.
However, it would be the claimants' intention to ask the Court for a stay
pending the determination of the action started in Luxembourg.
The decision
17. While initially attracted to it, Mr. Flower's analysis of the pleadings,
which placed great emphasis on the allegation that the payments "were
not made for their [the claimants'] benefit", does not make sense in
the context of the pleading as a whole. If the claimants are only saying
that the moneys were never intended to be theirs then it is difficult to
understand other parts of the pleading and the claim for relief. I am
satisfied that looked at overall, as the pleading stands, there is a claim
to the moneys and the right to trace them into K.'s property. But I
also accept Mr. Flower's description of the pleading as "confused". On
this basis I am satisfied that the claim is not properly to be described
as merely contingent, but I well see the force of the argument to the
contrary.
18. If the case is that funds were diverted from C. to the defendants
that diversion occurred in this country. The loss and damage occurred
both when the monies were paid into the Amersham account and were
removed from it and put into the property. But in any event the place
where the harmful acts occurred was England even if it could be said
that the damage occurred when the money left the Co. bank accounts in
Austria. There is a sufficient close connection between what happened
in this country and the damage sustained. Without the bank account
here the fraud could not have been perpetrated: the knowing assistance
occurred here and a claim for knowing assistance is a claim which may
fall within art. 5(3) if the assistance could be said to be the harmful act
and England was the place where it occurred. What the defendants are
being accused of [at least in part of the claim] is the tort of converting
the property of C. to their own use. And that tort was committed here.
Mr. Flower's submission was dependent upon him successfully establishing
that the claim was no more than a Part 20 claim or an action falling within
art. 24. But, I regard the claim as comprising a properly pleaded case of
embezzlement or conversion although it seeks also to fulfil another role.
19. Accordingly, applying the principles which Mr. Gadd adumbrated as
the proper approach to the application of art. 5(3), and for which the
Court is grateful, I am of the view that this Court does have jurisdiction
against the personal defendants despite the assumed fact that they are
domiciled in Austria. I can see no good reason why it should not exercise
it. As to forum non conveniens I regard the position of K. as hopeless on
this point. K. are properly joined in the action. They are a front for Mr.
P. and hold monies and property belonging either to the claimants or to
the Co. Group. I think it particularly important that the Court should not
dismiss the proceedings whilst the defendants are engaged in a process of
disputing jurisdiction.
20. The claimants' intention to join the defendants into the Luxembourg
proceedings, does, I think, bring art. 22 into play. Co. sues C. through
the agency of Mr. P. and asks for its money back. C. says that it never
received the moneys and the payment received by Mr. P. was not a
payment made for a business purpose and he was not acting in his
capacity as a director of C. at the time. But C. wish to go on and say
that if it was a business payment and they are liable to Co. then they
are entitled to pass on that liability to Mr. and Mrs. P., and trace the
moneys into K.. Therefore, by joining Mr. and Mrs. P. and K. into the
Luxembourg proceedings as, in our terms, Part 20 defendants, action
2000 and the Luxembourg action will be "related" within the meaning of
art. 22. That art. gives the Court, other than the Court first seised, the
possibility of staying an action until after the related proceedings have
been determined. But that right is not given to the Court first seised.
As I see the position, this Court is the Court first seised; whereas the
Luxembourg Court is not. This Court does not have the power under art.
22 to stay its action pending determination of the Luxembourg action
and I should not make such an order. On the other hand, in purely case
management terms it would be sensible for the issue between C. and
Co. as to the circumstances of the payment out of Co.'s account into
the Amersham account were determined first. That is not an issue in
the English action. The timescale of the Luxembourg proceedings is not
within my knowledge: I anticipate that the present defendants will wish
to continue their procedural objections and I can anticipate a challenge to
the Luxembourg Court's jurisdiction, in one form or another. But I shall
make directions in this case in due course and the timing of the trial here
will be kept under review.
21. The procedural mess involved in this case is to be deplored. The
sooner that the facts are determined the better. If the C. group are the
victim of a fraud then that should be established as soon as possible.
I reject the suggestion that England is not a convenient forum for the
trial of the action so far as K. is concerned. Much of what Mr. Moser
submitted is specious. K. is a necessary and proper party to be joined; it
formally holds title to property which belongs in part to the claimants. If
their claim is a good one. K.'s controller presently stands convicted and
sentenced for serious fraud and has used K. as his vehicle. England is a
convenient forum.
Action 2001
22. In my view there is no arguable complaint about the Court's
jurisdiction to try this action. This is a straightforward complaint of
misuse of the claimants' moneys lodged in their bank account located
in England. The allegation is that Mr. P. organized two payments out of
that account otherwise than for the benefit of the claimants: the first was
paid into the Amersham account and the second into Mr. P.'s personal
account in an Austrian Bank. In other words, this is an allegation that Mr.
P. stole the claimants' money in England. Mr. Flower says that there is
no connection between the sums paid out to the Austrian bank account
and this country. I disagree. The fraud occurred here in relation to
moneys located here. I do not regard these proceedings as related to the
Luxembourg proceedings within the meaning of art. 22. The parties are
different, the nature of the fraud is different. This action should proceed
and I shall give appropriate directions.
The QB action
23. I can see no arguable grounds for staying this action or declining
jurisdiction. The fact that Mr. P. may wish to contend that the property
nominally owned by K. does not belong to him and that that may also
be an issue in Luxembourg is nothing to the point. Once a judgment
has been entered in a foreign country the judgment creditor may take
enforcement proceedings wherever the judgment debtor's assets may be
located. Multiple proceedings in different jurisdictions is normal and not
oppressive. Issues common to more than one enforcement action does
not give any right to a stay whilst the Courts of another country decide
the point. It would be convenient for this action to proceed here and I
shall give directions.
24. This judgment is being handed down on the last day of term. The
essence of the judgment is that I dismiss the defendants' challenges to
the jurisdiction of this Court; I decline to grant a stay of action 2000 but I
will make appropriate directions in that and the other actions.
25. The order giving effect to this judgment together with matters such
as costs and further directions will have to be dealt with on a separate
occasion and I direct the claimants' solicitors to fix an appointment before
me for that purpose as soon as practicable.
DISPOSITION:
Applications dismissed.