[2020] IEHC 689  
THE HIGH COURT  
[Record No. 2019/16 FJ.]  
BETWEEN  
HENRY ALEXANDER BROM PTON GWYN -JONES  
APPLICANT  
AND 
RICHARD WILLIAM MCDO NALD  
RESPONDENT  
JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Barr delivered electronically on the 22nd day of  December, 
2020  
Introduction  
1. On 31st October, 2017, the respondent obtained a judgment against the applicant in the 
Sofia City Court in the Republic of Bulgaria in the sum of €42 5,926, together with costs of 
circa €16,500, plus interest pursuant to Bulgarian statute law from 2nd March, 2 016 until 
payment. That judgment was confirmed by a judgment of the Court of Appeal in Bulgaria 
on 6th Decembe r, 2018. By a judgment delivered on 10th October, 2019, the Supreme 
Court of Cassation in Bulgaria refused to permit the applicant any further app eal against 
the original judgment or the determination of the Court of Appeal.  
2.  In this application, the applicant seeks a number of reliefs, w hich can be summarised in 
the following way: - 
(a) The applicant seeks an order from the court refusing recogni tion or enforcement of 
the judgment obtained by the respondent against him in the Courts of Bulgaria, on 
the grounds that to do so would be contra ry to public policy in Ireland; in 
particular, because it would enable the respondent to perpetrate a fraud on  the 
applicant.  
(b) In the alternative, the applicant seeks an order from the court staying the 
recognition or enforcement of the Bulgarian judgme nt against him, pending the 
outcome of arbitration proceedings currently pending before the International Cour t 
of Arbitration of the ICC, wherein the arbitral tribunal will determine the liabilities of 
the parties in connection with a series of contracts concerning the purchase of a 
shopping centre in Sofia, Bulgaria and related contracts, including certain loan 
contracts on which the Bulgarian judgment was grounded.  
Background  
3. In order to properly understand the grounds on which the applicant moves t he application 
herein, it is necessary to set out the background to the commercial disputes between the 
parties . It is the applicant’s case that in or about 2007, he was approached by the 
respondent with an investment proposition concerning investment in t he development of 
a shopping centre in Sofia, Bulgaria. In essence, the applicant states that he was told by 
the respondent that in order to proceed with the venture, it would be necessary for them 
to make an investment of €20m. It was represented to the a pplicant that if he were to 
put up €15m, the respondent stated that he would put up the remaining €5m from his 
own funds. The applicant maintains that he agreed to this proposal and put up the funds 
via a company controlle d by him called Gort Holdings Ltd,  which was registered in 
Guernsey.  
4. The applicant states that he made that investment relying on the represe ntations that had 
been made by the respondent, in particular, that he would have “ skin in the game ” by 
investing €5m of his own money. In additio n, it was a requirement of the bank which was 
providing the mortgage over the purchase of the shopping centre, that a personal 
guarantee would be given by the applicant. Accordingly, he gave a personal guarantee to 
Piraeus Bank (Bulgaria) of €20m. The appl icant states that he only provided that personal 
guarantee on the basis of the fraudulent representations made to him by the respondent.  
5. It is the applicant’s case that in the events which transpired, the respondent did not 
invest €5m of his own funds in the project and the applicant has lost the entire of his 
investment, which is said to stand at present at €2 2m and he also remains personally 
liable on foot of the guarantee to Piraeus Bank.  
6. That is a greatly simplified version of the dispute betwee n the applicant and the 
respondent herein concerning the purchase of the shopping centre, which was known as 
Burgas Plaza. The complexity of the arrangements actually entered into, can be seen by 
virtue of the fact that in a second set of arbitration proce edings commenced by the 
applicant in January, 2020 arising out of the collapse of the whole Burgas Plaza 
invest ment, those proceedings were instituted against eleven separate respondents. 
However, for the purposes of this judgment, the simple outline of th e essential dispute 
between the parties as given above, will suffice.  
7. The judgment issued by the Sofia City  Court, which is at the heart of the present 
application, arose out of two simple loan contracts. The first of these was a written 
contract enter ed into between the applicant and the respondent on 28th March, 2011. It 
provided that the respondent would len d the applicant the sum of €122,000, which was to 
be repaid by 31st December, 2011. It was a very brief contract running to only eight 
short para graphs. It was signed by each of the parties. The second loan agreement was 
dated 26th April, 2011. Under it, t he respondent lent the applicant the sum of €303,926, 
which was to be repaid by 31st December, 2011. It had the same terms as the previous 
agreem ent and was also signed by each of the parties. Each of the loan agreements 
contained an exclusive jurisdiction  clause, which gave jurisdiction to the Courts of 
Bulgaria to determine any disputes arising out of the contract. Each of the contracts 
provided that it was to be governed by the law of Bulgaria.  
8. It was accepted by the applicant that he had entered int o these loan agreements. He 
stated that they were in connection with certain advertising contracts that had been 
entered into in relation to the rental of advertising space within the Burgas Plaza 
Shopping Centre, whereby the respondent’s company would hav e that advertising space 
for rent and it was envisaged that the loan would be repaid from the profits that would 
accrue due to the rental of such  space.  
9. When the loans were not repaid by the applicant, the respondent instituted proceedings 
before the B ulgarian Courts. On 5th October, 2017, a hearing was held before the Sofia 
City Court, where both parties were legally represented. The applicant ’s lawyers 
submitted that the loan contracts had to be seen in the context of a complex series of 
contracts, wh ich had been entered into between companies controlled by the applicant 
and the respondent respectively in relation to the entire Burgas Plaza pr oject. The court 
did not accept that submission. On 31st October, 2017, the Sofia City Court granted 
judgment t o the respondent on foot of the contracts of loan in the sum of €425,926, 
together with costs and interest.  
10. The applicant appealed that judg ment to the Court of Appeal in Bulgaria. A hearing was 
held in that court on 5th November, 2018. On 6th Decembe r, 2018, the Court of Appeal 
delivered a written judgment, wherein it affirmed the judgment of the Sofia City Court.  
11. The applicant sought to  have a further appeal to the Supreme Court of Cassation in 
Bulgaria. However, on 10th October, 2019, that cour t refused to allow any further appeal 
in the matter.  
Other Proceedings  
12. Prior to the judgments obtained by the respondent in the Courts of Bulgaria, the applicant 
had taken a number of steps in relation to his overall dispute concerning the loss of his 
investment in the Burgas Plaza project. On 21st November, 2014, the app licant obtained 
an interim worldwide freezing order against the assets of a company known as MRP Brazil 
Ltd, which was the successor in title to Balkan Holdings Ltd, which had been the vehicle 
through which the respondent had purported to make his investme nt in the Burgas Plaza 
Shopping Centre. That worldwide Mareva injunction had been obtained before the High 
Court of the Isle of Man, which was where Balkan Holdings Ltd and subsequently  MRP 
Brazil Ltd, were registered. On 19th December, 2014, a hearing was  held before the High 
Court of the Isle of Man concerning the continuance of the worldwide freeing order, at 
which both parties were represented. The freezing order prevented MRP Brazil  Ltd 
reducing its assets anywhere in the world below the sum of €22m. I t also made certain 
directions in relation to disclosure of information by MRP Brazil Ltd.  
13. On 22nd February, 2015, the High Court of Justice of the Isle of Man (Deemster Gough) 
gave a written judgment in which the learned judge stated that he was sati sfied that the 
claimant in those proceedings, Gort Holdings Ltd, had a good arguable case that it had 
been the victim of deceit and that the misrepresentations and deceit had continued after 
the initial memorandum of understanding and through the project, including various 
agreements to inject further loan capital to keep the project afloat and the ultimate 
assignment of Balkan’s interest to another company, Omega. On that basis, the cou rt 
extended the continuance of the worldwide freezing order pending the  outcome of 
arbitration proceedings between the parties that were then pending before the 
International Court of Arbitration of the ICC (hereinafter “ the ICC arbitration ”).  
The ICC Arb itration  
14. On 18th December, 2014, a request for arbitration had bee n submitted by Gort Holdings 
Ltd against MRP Brazil Ltd and another company known as Bridgecorp A.D. and a 
company called Burgas Holdings Ltd. Those arbitration proceedings had reference  number 
20711/TO. Sir Bernard Eber QC was appointed as sole arbitrator .  
15. On 24th June, 2015, an answer was filed on behalf of MRP Brazil Ltd to the arbitration 
proceedings. On 28th April, 2016, an order was made by the arbitrator deeming the 
claimant’s  case against the second respondent, Bridgecorp A.D. as having been 
withdrawn. On 11th September, 2016, by consent, an order was made by the arbitrator 
staying the arbitration proceedings upon settlement terms that had been set out in an 
order of the High Court of Justice of the Isle of Man dated 8th October, 2015. That 
settlement appears to have been reached between Gort Holdings Ltd and the receivers, 
who had been appointed over the business of MRP Brazil Ltd. That appears to have been 
the end of that set  of arbitration proceedings before the ICC.  
16. On 20th January, 2020 , the applicant and Gort Holdings Ltd submitted a fresh request to 
the ICC for a further arbitration against the respondent personally and ten other 
corporate entities. On 26th March, 20 20, an answer to the request for arbitration was 
filed on behalf of th e respondent. In a decision made on 18th June, 2020 and confirmed 
on 6th August, 2020, the ICC decided that the arbitration would proceed as against the 
respondent and Bridgecorp A.D., b ut not against the third to eleventh named 
respondents. That arbitrati on proceeding had reference number 25093/TO/AZR.  
17. On 1st September, 2020, the applicant appealed the exclusion of the third to eleventh 
named respondents from the arbitral proceeding s. That appeal is pending before the 
courts in Paris and is due to be heard on 6th January, 2021. The applicant’s lawyer in 
France has indicated that he would expect a judgment to be delivered within 30 days 
thereafter.  
18. Finally, in light of the fact t hat the arbitral proceedings have been permitted to proceed 
against th e respondent personally, the applicant’s lawyers in France, have confirmed that 
they have received instructions to make a further application to the High Court of Justice 
of the Isle of Man seeking an extension of the worldwide freezing order to cover the 
assets of the respondent. In a letter furnished by Mr. Le Bars, the applicant’s French 
lawyer, he indicated that he anticipated that such application may be made on 15th 
December, 2020. The court is not aware whether any such application has been made 
and, if so, the outcome of same.  
Submissions on behalf of the Applicant  
19. The essential submission made on behalf of the applicant was that he had been induced 
by fraudulent misrepresenta tions made by the respondent to invest circa €22m in the 
Burgas Plaza  venture. In particular, he alleged that it had been fraudulently represented 
to him by the respondent that of the sum of €20m that was required by the sellers of the 
property; that if th e applicant were to put up €15m, the respondent would put up €5m of 
his own funds. It is alleged by the applicant, that the respondent never put up the funds 
that he had promised. The applicant maintains that he was induced by the fraudulent 
representation s on the part of the respondent to make the investment; to provide th e 
personal guarantee to Piraeus Bank and to enter into other contracts, including the loan 
contracts, the subject of the Bulgarian judgment. The applicant submits that all of the 
contract s have to be seen as a complex series of contracts that were intercon nected and 
all were tainted by fraud on the part of the respondent. It is submitted that in these 
circumstances, it would be contrary to public policy for the Irish Courts to enforce the 
Bulgarian judgment obtained by the respondent.  
20. In support of his  contention that there was fraud on the part of the respondent, the 
applicant relies on the judgment of Deemster Gough when granting the worldwide 
freezing order against MRP Brazil Ltd, w herein he stated very clearly that the applicant 
therein, Gort Holdin gs Ltd, had a strong arguable case that there had been deceit and 
misrepresentation on the part of Balkan Holdings Ltd, which the learned judge found was 
a company controlled by the respo ndent. In this regard, the applicant relied on the 
findings and state ments of the learned judge at paras. 76 – 84 of his judgment delivered 
on 22nd February, 2015.  
21. The applicant accepts that he was legally represented at the hearings before the courts  in 
Bulgaria, but states that those courts did not accept his argumen t that the loan contracts 
the subject matter of those proceedings, had to be seen as being part of a complex series 
of contracts that had been entered into by various companies controlled  by the applicant 
and the respondent; all of which had been induced b y and were tainted with, the 
fraudulent representations made by the respondent. It was submitted that while the 
Bulgarian courts had not acceded to that argument, it had to be recognised that the 
International Court of Arbitration of the ICC had, in its ru ling of January, 2020, acceded to 
the request for arbitration made by the applicant, which named the respondent personally 
as a respondent thereto and also included the contracts the subj ect matter of the 
Bulgarian judgment.  
22. In those arbitration proce edings, a clear allegation of fraud had been made against the 
respondent. Thus, it was submitted that there was a strong possibility that the outcome of 
the ICC arbitration proceedings wo uld be that the loan contracts on which the Bulgarian 
judgments were based, had in fact been induced by the fraudulent representations made 
by the respondent. In such circumstances, it was submitted that the court should have 
regard to the allegations of s erious fraud made therein and should refuse enforcement of 
the Bulgar ian judgment pending the outcome of the ICC arbitration.  
23. Mr. Sheahan SC, on behalf of the applicant, submitted that Article 45 of Regulation (EU) 
No. 1215/2012 of the European Parlia ment and the Council of 12th December, 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the r ecognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters (hereinafter referred to as “ Brussels I Recast ”) provided that the courts of a 
member state could refuse to recogni se or enforce a foreign judgment if it was contrary 
to public policy in the state of enforcement so to do.  
24. It was submitted that the prevention of fraud was part of the public policy endorsed by 
Irish law over many years. This had been recognised both  in statute and at common law. 
Statutes such as the Statute of Frauds  (Ireland) Act, 1695, the Statute of Limitations, 
1957 (as amended), the Courts and Courts Officers Act, 1995; the Civil Liability and 
Courts Act, 2004 and the Land and Conveyancing Law R eform Act, 2009, all had 
provisions which were designed to prevent fr aud. In addition, fraud of any kind 
constituted a serious criminal offence in this jurisdiction. It had been originally legislated 
for in the Larceny Act, 1861 in s. 84 and thereafter in the Debtors (Ireland) Act, 1872 in 
s. 13, which were now encompassed in the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) 
Act, 2001. Fraud was also an actionable wrong at common law in the form of the tort of 
deceit.  
25. It was submitted that it had long be en established that fraud was a ground for the refusal 
of recognition  of a foreign judgment on the basis of public policy. In England, that had 
been established in a case dealing with the predecessor of the current EU enforcement 
regime in the case of Interdesco SA v. Nullifire Ltd  [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 180.  
26. It was submi tted that the Irish Courts would not allow recognition or enforcement of a 
foreign judgment where it was contrary to Irish public policy. Such public policy 
considerations were not closed  and what was permissible in another jurisdiction, may not 
necessaril y be consistent with Irish public policy. Counsel referred to Sporting Index Ltd 
v. O’Shea  [2015] IEHC 407, where the High Court refused to enforce an English judgment 
based on a gambling  debt, as that was contrary to the provisions of s. 36(2) of the 
Gaming and Lottery Act, 1956 and its enforcement would therefore be contrary to public 
policy in Ireland.  
27. Counsel pointed out that in Article 45 of Brussels I Recast, it was provided that  a court 
could refuse recognition “if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy (ordre 
public) in the Member State addressed”. It was submitted that Irish case law had 
confirmed that “ manifestly ” was a threshold issue that highlighted how th e issue involved 
must be fundamental with regard to the rights of the  individual or the public good.  
28. Counsel submitted that principles that had been identified as being contrary to public 
policy were those involving “ some element of illegality ”, being  “injurious to the public 
good” and “ offensive to the ordinary respon sible and fully informed member of the 
public ”; see Broström Tankers AB v. Factorias Vulcano SA  [2004] 2 I.R. 191, where that 
analysis had been set out and it was confirmed that the publi c policy relevant to 
enforcement actions brought before the Irish Cou rts was the public policy of Ireland, and 
not that of the seat of the arbitration, or where the award had been rendered. That case 
involved enforcement of an arbitral award.  
29. It was s ubmitted that the judgment which had been obtained by the respondent in the 
Bulgarian courts, had been obtained by an underlying fraud. It was submitted that it was 
clear that the contracts giving rise to the Bulgarian judgments, were not, as argued by 
the respondent, standalone contracts, but were in fact only entered into  as part of a 
larger series of transactions involving the purchase of the Burgas Plaza Shopping Centre 
in Sofia.  
30. It was submitted that the case put forward by the respondent in his r eplying affidavit that 
the applicant had borrowed money from him in s tandalone contracts, did not make sense. 
It was submitted that at all times the applicant was the person providing monies and 
funding for the project. The respondent had been in the weake r financial position; indeed, 
the respondent had never put any of the  monies he had promised into the venture and 
further, had concealed that fact from the applicant. It was submitted that in these 
circumstances, the enforcement of the Bulgarian judgment, the subject matter of the 
present application, would facilitate such fraud and be manifestly contrary to public policy 
in this jurisdiction.  
31. It was submitted that it was only on account of the fraudulent representations made by 
the respondent, that the  applicant was induced personally to enter into a memorandum of 
under standing to establish a legal entity in Malta for the purpose of acquiring Burgas 
Plaza A.D.; the respondent had further induced the applicant to provide a personal 
guarantee to Piraeus B ank related to the acquisition of Burgas Plaza; he had induced the 
applicant to invest additional capital to fund the purchase of the shopping centre and to 
consent (in his capacity as a member of the board of directors) to the company entering 
into an adv ertising contract with a company owned and controlled by the responde nt. It 
was that advertising contract which had ultimately given rise to the Bulgarian judgment. 
It was submitted that it was clearly stated by the applicant in his affidavits that he woul d 
not have entered into any of those contracts, but for the fraudulen t representations made 
by the respondent to induce him to enter into a series of contracts and actions to acquire 
the shares of Burgas Plaza, such that the subsequent contracts, including  the advertising 
contract and the related loan contracts, would not h ave been entered into by the 
applicant, but for the misrepresentation on the part of the respondent.  
32. Counsel accepted that in a judgment between the same parties based on another 
Bulgarian judgment, being the judgment of Meenan J. in Gwyn -Jones v. McD onald  [2002] 
IEHC 240, the court had refused the applicant’s application for an order refusing the 
enforcement of a Bulgarian judgment in the sum of €119,522.24 obtained by the 
respondent  against the applicant. However, it was pointed out that that judgmen t had 
been a default judgment and as such, the main ground on which the refusal of recognition 
and enforcement was sought, concerned whether or not the applicant had been validly 
served w ith the proceedings in Ireland. Counsel accepted that Meenan J. had f ound that 
the applicant had been validly served with the Bulgarian proceedings which had led to the 
judgment.  
33. Counsel further accepted that the judge had also dealt with the issue of  refusal of 
recognition of the judgment on grounds of public policy a nd had refused to make any 
such order on the basis that the judgment before him concerned a claim between the 
applicant and the respondent personally, whereas the proceedings before the H igh Court 
of Justice of the Isle of Man were between Gort Holdings Lt d and MRP Brazil Ltd. However, 
counsel submitted that this Court was entitled to take notice of the fact that that 
judgment had been delivered on 19th May, 2020 and that on 18th June, 202 0, the ICC 
had decided that the request for arbitration could proceed  against the respondent 
personally, which direction had been confirmed on 6th August, 2020. Those arbitral 
proceedings clearly raised the issue of fraud in connection with the full series  of contracts 
entered into between the parties and various corporate entities controlled by them, 
including the loan agreements, the subject matter of the Bulgarian judgment. Thus, it was 
submitted that the circumstances of this case were not on all fours with the issues that 
were presented for the determination of Meenan J . in the previous case.  
34. In relation to the arbitration proceedings before the ICC, it was submitted that the 
principle of comity of courts, required that the Irish Courts should have  regard to the fact 
that there was a valid dispute pending before the  ICC in relation to the contracts the 
subject matter of the Bulgarian judgment. In addition, there was evidence before the 
court from the Opinion furnished by Mr. Le Bars, the applicant’s  French lawyer, that there 
was provision in Bulgarian law for a judgm ent to be reopened, in the event that there 
were new grounds on which to allege that there had been fraud leading to the obtaining 
of that judgment. It was submitted that in the event tha t the ICC arbitration found that 
the loan contracts were either induc ed by fraud, or tainted by fraudulent representations 
made by the respondent, the necessary application would immediately be made to the 
courts in Bulgaria to reopen the matter.  
35. In these circumstances, it was submitted that even if this Court was not prepared to 
refuse the recognition or enforcement of the Bulgarian judgment on grounds of public 
policy; it was submitted that it would be reasonable and in accordance with the dictates o f 
justice, for the court to place a stay on the enforcement of the Bu lgarian judgment 
against the applicant in this jurisdiction, pending the outcome of the ICC arbitration.  
36. Finally, it was submitted that the court should have regard to the financial standing of the 
respective parties. The applicant was a man of very considerable assets within this 
jurisdiction. In that regard, a valuer’s report had been exhibited in relat ion to his property 
in County Cork, which was valued at €26m. In addition, he had  deposed to the fact that 
he had substantial other assets within the jurisdiction. Accordingly, there was no 
question, but that the respondent would be in a position to enforc e the Bulgarian 
judgment against his assets in this jurisdiction, in the event that the ICC arbitration 
should be determined against the applicant.  
37. It was submitted that conversely the respondent was a citizen of New Zealand, who had 
resided in Bulgar ia for some time, but did not appear to reside there anymore. He had 
given an address in England in the affidavits sworn by him in the within proceedings, but 
it appeared that he was currently resident in Brazil, where he was pursuing other 
interests throu gh his company, MRP Brazil Ltd, where he was involved in the construction 
of a building known as Trump Towers in Rio de Janeiro. The court was also urged to have 
regard to the fact that MRP Brazil Ltd had been ordered to pay 60% of the costs in 
connection with the Mareva injunction proceedings, but had not been able to do so and 
had been put into receivership. Those costs had never been paid to the applicant.  
38. It was submitted that in these circumstances, there was a very real risk that if the court 
permitted the respondent to enforce the Bulgarian judgment against the applicant in this 
jurisdiction, the assets would be dissipated and the outcome of the arbitration 
proceedings, insofar as they concerned these loans, would be rendered nugatory. In these 
circumstances, it was submitted that the balance of justice lay in favour of granting either 
an injunction preventing the enforcement of the Bulgarian judgment pending the outcome 
of the ICC arbitration, or placing a stay on the enforcement of that judgment  pending the 
outcome of those proceedings.  
Submissions on behalf of the Respondent  
39. On behalf of the respondent, Mr. Costello BL submitted that, in essence, the issue before 
the court was a simple one: The respondent had entered into loan agreements wi th the 
applicant in March and April, 2011. Those were standalone agreements and were not 
connected to any other contracts that had been entered into either between the parties 
personally, or between corporate entities controlled or connected to them. The 
respondent had obtained a judgment from the Sofia City Court on foot of the loan 
agreements. The applicant had been legally represented in the proceedings before that 
court. The applicant had exercised his right to appeal that judgment to the Court of 
Appea l. He had also exercised a further right to petition the Supreme Court of Cassation 
in Bulgaria to allow him to make a further appeal in the matter; which had been refused. 
The applicant did not like the fact that the Bulgarian courts had not acceded to hi s 
submission that the loan agreements were connected to other contracts entered into by 
other corporate entities. It was submitted that this application was merely an effort to get 
over the fact that the Bulgarian courts had made a ruling against the appli cant and, 
accordingly, he sought to prevent recognition or enforcement of the Bulgarian judgments 
on the same grounds that he had raised before the Bulgarian courts.  
40. It was submitted that insofar as the applicant alleged that there had been fraudulent  
misrepresentation on the part of the respondent, it was important to note that that 
allegation was strongly contested by the respondent. Furthermore, the allegation of fraud 
concerned contracts that had been entered into by other corporate entities. Those  
contracts were totally separate to the simple loan agreements the subject matter of the 
Bulgarian judgment.  
41. It was submitted that the applicant had tried to run the same argument before Meenan J. 
in the earlier proceedings in Gwyn -Jones v. McDonald  in respect of the default judgment 
that had been obtained by the respondent against the applicant in the Bulgarian courts; 
which argument had been unsuccessful before the High Court on that occasion.  
42. In relation to the court’s jurisdiction to refuse to  recognise or enforce a validly obtained 
foreign judgment on grounds of public policy, it was submitted that the exception 
provided for in Article 45(1) of the Brussels I Recast, was only available in specific and 
limited circumstances. It had been establi shed in a number of decisions of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union that the exception provided for in Article 45(1) (and Article 
34 of the previous regulation) could only be relied upon in exceptional cases and the court 
of the state in which enfo rcement was sought could not review the accuracy of the 
findings of law or fact made by the court of the state of origin; recourse to the public 
policy clause could only be envisaged where recognition or enforcement of the judgment 
given in another member state would be at variance to an unacceptable degree with the 
legal order of the state in which enforcement was sought, inasmuch as it would infringe a 
fundamental principle; the infringement would have to constitute a manifest breach of a 
rule of law rega rded as essential in the legal order of the state in which enforcement was 
sought; see Apostolides v. Orams (C -420/07) [2009] ECR I -03571 and Krombach v. 
Bamberski (C-7/98) [2000] ECR I -1935.  
43. It was submitted that the circumstances of this case fell f ar short of the circumstances 
which would be necessary in order to justify the refusal of recognition of a judgment 
obtained in another member state on grounds of public policy on the criteria set out by 
the CJEU decisions mentioned above.  
44. It was subm itted that while a worldwide freezing order had been granted in the High 
Court of Justice of the Isle of Man against MRP Brazil Ltd, the learned judge had made it 
clear that it was not for him to make any findings of fact in relation to the existence of 
fraud on the part of the respondent to those proceedings, that being a matter for 
determination in the arbitration proceedings. In particular, he had stated as follows at 
para. 42: - 
 “[…] Of course, as I have already commented, it is not for me to test the de tail of 
the evidence of the warring factions in this matter because that will be done at the 
arbitration hearing. All I have to do is assess whether the claimant, Gort, has a 
good arguable case.”  
45. Counsel accepted that the learned judge had found that t he claimant in that case had a 
good arguable case and on that basis had granted the worldwide freezing order, but it 
was submitted that that fell far short of an actual finding of fraud on the part of MRP 
Brazil Ltd, or on the part of the respondent.  
46. In relation to the arbitration proceedings pending before the ICC, counsel submitted that 
while the International Court of Arbitration had accepted the request for arbitration as 
submitted by the applicant in January, 2020, which named the respondent as a 
respondent in his personal capacity, that did not mean that the issue of the jurisdiction of 
the ICC to deal with the matter had been finally determined.  
47. In this regard, counsel referred to the Opinion of Mr. Wade, the respondent’s legal 
counsel in En gland, who had given the opinion that there were strong grounds for 
believing that the arbitral tribunal, when ultimately appointed, would be likely to refuse 
jurisdiction to enter upon the arbitration due to the following facts: firstly, there was no 
arbitration clause in either of the loan agreements which were the subject matter of the 
Bulgarian judgment; secondly, there were exclusive jurisdiction clauses giving jurisdiction 
to the courts of Bulgaria in each of those agreements; thirdly, the applicant h ad 
participated through his legal representatives in the hearings before the Bulgarian courts; 
and, fourthly, the respondent had never consented to any arbitration proceeding before 
the ICC. It was submitted that any arbitrator, including the ICC, can only  have jurisdiction 
where there is a valid arbitration agreement between the parties that it should have 
jurisdiction to enter upon the dispute. It was submitted that in these circumstances, the 
court was entitled to have regard to the opinion expressed by Mr. Wade that the tribunal, 
when ultimately appointed, was highly unlikely to accept jurisdiction in the matter.  
48. In relation to the assertion by the applicant’s lawyers that they had received instructions 
to make an application to the High Court of Jus tice of the Isle of Man seeking an 
extension of the worldwide freezing order to cover the personal assets of the respondent, 
the same averment had been made in the affidavit sworn by the applicant on 16th 
December, 2019 and, as yet, no such application had  been made. Even if such an order 
was obtained, it was submitted that that was merely a freezing order and would only 
apply once the respondent succeeded in securing payment as a result of the enforcement 
of the Bulgarian judgment against the applicant in this jurisdiction. However, as no such 
order had yet been made, it was submitted that the balance of justice did not lie in favour 
of this Court refusing enforcement on the basis of a speculative assumption that the 
freezing order might be extended against  the assets of the respondent.  
49. In summary, counsel submitted that the issue before the court was a simple one: the 
respondent had obtained a valid judgment from the courts in Bulgaria; there was no basis 
on which to deny him the enforcement of that ju dgment in this jurisdiction, as an 
allegation of fraud in an arbitration instituted before the ICC in France, was not sufficient 
to establish that the enforcement of the judgment in this jurisdiction would be contrary to 
public policy. Insofar as it was su bmitted by the applicant that the court should refuse 
enforcement of the judgment pending the outcome of the ICC arbitration, there was no 
provision for anything of that nature provided for in Brussels I Recast. Accordingly, it was 
submitted that the court  should refuse all of the reliefs sought by the applicant on this 
application.  
Conclusions  
50. The whole purpose of the original 1968 Convention on the jurisdiction and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (the Brussels Convention) an d its successors, 
the Brussels I Regulation of 2001 and the Brussels I Recast Regulation of 2012, was to 
put in place a system whereby there would be harmonised rules regulating what national 
courts would have jurisdiction to deal with disputes in civil an d commercial matters. The 
purpose of establishing clear rules on jurisdiction, was to enable the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments given in one member state by the courts in other member 
states covered by the regulation.  
51. Once the courts of one m ember state had taken jurisdiction pursuant to the regulation 
and had given judgment in the matter, there were very limited grounds on which 
recognition or enforcement of the judgment could be resisted, when it was sought to have 
the judgment enforced in a nother member state. The regulation itself and the case law of 
the CJEU make it clear that the grounds for resisting recognition and enforcement of a 
judgment are extremely limited.  
52. The provisions of the regulation in relation to the recognition and e nforcement of 
judgments are very clear. The following provisions are the relevant ones in this 
application: - 
 Article 36  
1. A judgment given in a Member State shall be recognised in the other Member 
States without any special procedure being required.  
 Article 39  
 A judgment given in a Member State which is enforceable in that Member State 
shall be enforceable in the other Member States without any declaration of 
enforceability being required.  
 Article 45  
1. On the application of any interested party, the re cognition of a judgment shall be 
refused:  
(a) if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy (ordre public) in the 
Member State addressed;  
 Article 46  
 On the application of the person against whom enforcement is sought, the 
enforcement of a j udgment shall be refused where one of the grounds referred to in 
Article 45 is found to exist.  
 Article 52  
 Under no circumstances may a judgment given in a Member Sta te be reviewed as 
to its substance in the Member State addressed.  
53. In Apostolides v. O rams,  the CJEU made it clear that Article 34 of Regulation 44/2001 
(Article 45 in the 2012 Regulation) had to be interpreted strictly inasmuch as it 
constituted an obs tacle to the attainment of one of the fundamental objectives of the 
regulation. The court  further held that with regard to the public policy exception, it could 
only be relied upon in exceptional cases. Recourse to the public policy clause in the 
regulatio n could only be envisaged where recognition or enforcement of the judgment 
given in anoth er member state would be at variance to an unacceptable degree with the 
legal order of the state in which enforcement was sought, inasmuch as it would infringe a 
funda mental principle. The CJEU held that in order for the prohibition of any review of the 
foreign judgment as to its substance to be observed, the infringement would have to 
constitute a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal orde r of the 
state in which enforcement was sought, or of a right recognised as being fundame ntal 
within that legal order; see paras. 54 – 59 of the judgment.  
54. In the Apostolides  case, the CJEU, held that the fact that a judgment had been given by 
the court s of a member state concerning land situated in an area of that state over which 
its gove rnment did not exercise effective control, and could not as a practical matter be 
enforced where the land was situated, did not render that judgment unenforceable befo re 
the Courts in England and Wales. The court held that the fact that the claimants might  
encounter difficulties in having judgments enforced in the area of the country where the 
land was situate, could not deprive them of their enforceability and, therefo re, did not 
prevent the courts of the member state in which enforcement was sought from d eclaring 
such judgments enforceable.  
55. In the Krombach v. Bamberski  case, Mr. Bamberski had brought proceedings before the 
French courts against Mr. Krombach, allegi ng that he had been responsible for the death 
of Mr. Bamberski’s daughter in Germany. Not withstanding that Mr. Krombach was 
resident in Germany, the French court assumed jurisdiction due to the fact that the victim 
of the wrongful act was a French citizen.  Criminal and civil proceedings were commenced 
against Mr. Krombach before the French cou rts. When he did not enter an appearance to 
those proceedings, the French court ruled him to be in contempt of court, which had the 
consequence that he was not permitt ed to enter a defence, or be defended in either the 
criminal or civil proceedings. By a j udgment of 9th March, 1995, the Cour d’Assises 
imposed a custodial sentence of fifteen years on Mr. Krombach after finding him guilty of 
violence resulting in involunt ary manslaughter. By a judgment of 13th March, 1995, the 
same court ruling on the civil c laim, ordered him to pay compensation to Mr. Bamberski 
of FRF350,000.  
56. When Mr. Bamberski sought to enforce the civil judgment against Mr. Krombach before 
the court s in Germany, the German court referred a question for the decision of the CJEU, 
which he ld that the European Court of Human Rights had on several occasions ruled that 
in cases relating to criminal proceedings that, although not absolute, the right of ever y 
person charged with an offence to be effectively defended by a lawyer, if need be one 
appointed by the court, was one of the fundamental elements in a fair trial and an 
accused person did not forfeit entitlement to such a right simply because he was not 
present at the hearing.  The court noted that while the Brussels Convention was intended 
to secure the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and 
enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals, it was not permissible to achieve  that 
aim by undermining the right to a fair hearing.  Accordingly, the court answered th e 
question by stating that the court of the state in which enforcement was sought could, 
with respect to a defendant domiciled in that state and prosecuted for an inte ntional 
offence, take account, in relation to the public policy clause in Article 27 of t he Brussels 
Convention, of the fact that the court of the state of origin refused to allow that person to 
have his defence presented unless he appeared in person.   
57. At para. 37 of its judgment, the CJEU stated the general principles in relation to the public 
policy exception, which were repeated in the subsequent Apostolides case, as summarised 
above.  Thus, it is clear that in order for the public policy exception to be invoked, 
recognition of the foreign judgment would have to be contrary to a fundame ntal rule of 
law in the state addressed.   
58. The court notes that the wording of Article 27(1) of the Brussels Convention did not 
include the word “ manifestly ” befor e the words “ contrary to public policy ”.  That word was 
only inserted in the 2001 Regulat ion.  The court agrees with the opinion of the authors of 
Delaney and MacGrath on Civil Procedure , 4th Ed. where it is stated as follows at para. 
26-185:- 
 “The word ‘m anifestly’ was not included in Article 27(1) of the Brussels Convention.  
The introducti on of the word ‘manifestly’ into Article 34(1) of the Brussels I 
Regulation narrowed the availability of this ground of non -recognition.”  
59. The opinion of the learned  authors is supported by the opinion furnished by Advocate 
General Szpunar in case C -681/13 Diageo Brands BV v. Simiramida -04 EOOD , which was 
referred to by Mac Eochaidh J. in his judgment in the Sporting Index case at para. 12: - 
 “The adverb ‘manifestly’, added in the course of transformation of the {Brussels} 
Convention into the regulation {44/2001}, gives concrete expression, in the 
regulation, to the expectation of a manifest conflict between the recognition {or 
enforcement} of judgments and public polic y. As is clear from the explanatory 
memorandum in relation to Article 41 of the proposa l for a Council regulation, that 
change was intended to underscore the ‘exceptional nature of the public policy 
ground’ with a view to ‘improv[ing] the free movement of judgments’.”  
60. It is noteworthy that the test applied by the CJEU in the Krombach  case, was on the less 
exacting wording of the Brussels Convention, rather than on the wording of the exception 
as contained in the Brussels I Regulation, or in Brussels I R ecast, which is applicable in 
this case.  The case law cited on behalf of the responden t, is strongly supportive of his 
submission that the public policy exception provided for in Article 45 is not applicable in 
this case.   
61. The cases which were referr ed to by counsel on behalf of the applicant, are not greatly 
supportive of the submissi ons made on behalf of the applicant on this application. In the 
Interdesco SA v. Nullifire Ltd  case, the Court of Queen’s Bench Division in the UK refused 
to deny recogn ition of a French judgment, which the defendant submitted had been 
obtained by the plai ntiff by means of a fraud which it had perpetrated on the French 
court. It was alleged that the plaintiff had fraudulently concealed the fact that it had 
sought certain approvals in relation to its product in the UK and that such approval had 
been rejected  because the product had been found to be substandard. The defendant had 
instituted a further extraordinary appeal, known as a “ recours en révision ” before the 
courts in  Paris. Phillips J. held that where it was alleged that the foreign judgment had 
been o btained by means of a fraud perpetrated on the judgment rendering court, the 
appropriate remedy was for the judgment debtor to seek to set aside the judgment in the 
country where it had been obtained. He stated as follows at para. 37: - 
 “In my judgment, wh ere registration of a Convention judgment is challenged on the 
ground that the foreign court has been fraudulently deceived, the English court 
should first consider wheth er a remedy lies in such a case in the foreign jurisdiction 
in question. If so it will  normally be appropriate to leave the defendant to pursue 
his remedy in that jurisdiction. Such a course commends itself for two reasons. 
First it accords with the spirit  of the Convention that all issues should, so far as 
possible, be dealt with by the St ate enjoying the original jurisdiction. Secondly, the 
courts of that State are likely to be better able to assess whether the original 
judgment was procured by fraud.”  
62. The judge held that the proper course to adopt, was to leave the defendant to seek i ts 
remedy in the appeal before the French courts. He held that the French court was best 
placed to decide whether there had been fraud and, if so, its implications on the  French 
judgment. He refused to deny recognition of the judgment that had been obtaine d by the 
plaintiff before the courts in France.  
63. The decision in Sporting Index Ltd  provides some support for the applicant’s argument. In 
that case the defendant had  run up a large gambling debt with the plaintiff company in 
England. The plaintiff had  obtained a judgment before the County Court in London against 
the defendant for €118,058.99, together with costs of approximately Stg£17,500. Mac 
Eochaidh J. refused to enforce the judgment on the grounds that it would be contrary to 
public policy in Irel and to do so, due to the fact that s.36 of the Gaming and Lotteries Act, 
1956 provided that every contract by way of gaming or wagering was void. It further 
provided that  no action should lie for recovery of any money which was alleged to be won 
or to have  been paid upon a wager, or which had been deposited to abide by the event on 
which a wager was made. In these circumstances the judge held that it would clearly be 
contrary to Irish public policy as expressed in Irish statutory law, to enforce the judgmen t 
based on such a gaming or wagering contract. However, he held that the portion of the 
judgment which related to the costs of the English legal proceedings, was enforcea ble 
against the defendant in this country.  
64. In the course of his judgment, Mac Eoch aidh J. referred to the decision of Dunne J. in 
Emo Oil Ltd v. Mulligan  [2011] IEHC 552, where she had stated as follows at para. 21: - 
 “I think it can be seen from the au thorities referred to above, that in general terms 
a decision based on public policy to refuse recognition to a judgment of another 
Member State will only arise in exceptional circumstances. The exceptions which 
have given rise to a refusal to recognise ap pear to be exceptions in which a 
fundamental right of an individual or entity has bee n engaged, such as the right to 
a fair trial.”  
65. Mac Eochaidh J. expanded on that statement of the law as follows at paras. 22 and 23 of 
his judgment: - 
“22. In assessing  the extent to which public policy in the member state must be 
offended so as to disa llow enforcement, the case law has consistently stated that 
the infringement must constitute a manifest breach of the rule of law regarded as 
essential in the legal order of the state in which enforcement is being sought. I do 
not read the dicta of Dunne J . in Emo Oil (supra) as meaning that the public policy 
exemption may only be invoked if the foreign trial breached fundamental rights. 
The learned judge notes that cases w here the exemption had been invoked 
involved such circumstances.  
23. I reject the arg ument that the public policy exception does not apply in the instant 
case. The intention of the legislature in relation to the relevant provisions of the 
1956 Act is perf ectly clear. The enforcement of any betting contracts is prohibited 
and I am satisfied  that the statute constitutes a rule of law regarded as essential in 
the legal order of this State. There is a manifest conflict between the foreign court 
order arising f rom a gambling debt and Irish public policy as expressed in the 1956 
statute. Because this rule was enacted by the Oireachtas I am bound to find that 
the rule is essential in the legal order of the State. The rule reflects public policy on 
the control of g ambling. It is an essential measure in as much as the Oireachtas 
has considered it nec essary for the purposes of controlling gambling.”  
66. The applicant also referred to the decision of Kelly J. (as he then was) in Broström 
Tankers AB v. Factorias Vulcano  SA [2004] 2 I.R. 191, which involved the enforcement in 
this jurisdiction of a foreig n arbitration award. It was argued on behalf of the defendant 
that that award should not be enforced in this jurisdiction, due to the fact that the 
defendant company had been placed in protection under the law of Spain, whereby it only 
had to repay 10% of its debts to its creditors. It was argued that if the arbitral award 
were enforced in full, the plaintiff would thereby be able to circumvent the relevant 
provisions of S panish law. It was submitted that that would be contrary to public policy in 
Ireland.  
67. In rejecting that argument, Kelly J. referred to the following statement on the applicability 
of the public policy exception to the recognition of arbitral awards as stated in Cheshire 
and North’s Private International Law , 13th edition: - 
 “Some elemen t of illegality, or that the enforcement of the award would be clearly 
injurious to the public good, or possibly that enforcement would be wholly offensive 
to the ordinary  responsible and fully informed member of the public.”  
68. The court is not satisfied  that these cases offer any great assistance to the applicant in 
the present case. Indeed, it could even be argued that these decisions are supportive of 
the respondent’s position, insofar as they make it clear that there must  be a manifest 
conflict betwee n enforcement of the foreign judgment and the dictates of public policy in 
this State.  
69. The court has had regard to the decision of Meenan J. in the earlier case of Gwyn -Jones v. 
McDonald , where the learned judge held that the existence of the worldwide  freezing 
order made by the Court of Justice of the Isle of Man was not of relevance to the 
proceedings the subject matter of the application before the court, due to the fact that 
the Isle of Man proceedings concerned corpora te entities, whereas the appli cation before 
the court on that occasion, as on this occasion, concerned a judgment between Mr. Gwyn -
Jones and Mr. McDonald personally; the court respectfully agrees with the conclusions of 
Meenan J. in that case.   
70. In con sidering the present applicati on, the court has to have regard to the provisions of 
the regulation as outlined above and to the case law of the CJEU on the public policy 
exception provided for in Article 45.   
71. While a great deal of documentation has be en put before the court coveri ng a multiplicity 
of proceedings in different jurisdictions, the court is of the view that the relevant facts as 
they stand at present, can be summarised as follows: - 
(a) The applicant maintains that he has lost his investment  in the Burgas Plaza project 
due to deceit on the part of the respondent acting as a controller of a number of 
companies, including Balkan Holdings Limited, which subsequently became MRP 
Brazil Limited.  
(b) The applicant maintains that the loan contracts o n foot of which the Bulgarian 
judgments were given, are part of a complex series of contracts between 
individuals and companies all connected with the Burgas Plaza venture.  
(c) The applicant has instituted fresh arbitration proceedings against the responde nt 
personally and against a nu mber of other companies before the ICC.  The ICC has 
refused to allow the applicant proceed against the third to eleventh named 
respondents therein.  The applicant has appealed that ruling to the courts in Paris.   
(d) The app licant has obtained a worldwid e freezing order against MRP Brazil Limited.  
The applicant has stated that he intends to seek an extension of that freezing order 
against the assets of the respondent.  
(e) The respondent’s position is that he denies that ther e has been any fraudulent 
misrepresentation or deceit on his part.  He states that he only ever represented 
that he would invest €5m in the venture.  He did not say that that would be from 
his own funds.  He states that he made that payment with the benefi t of a loan 
from the vendors o f the land.   
(f) The respondent submits that the loan contracts are entirely separate as they were 
contracts entered into between the respondent and the applicant in their personal 
capacities.   
(g) The respondent has obtaine d a final and conclusive judgm ent from the courts in 
Bulgaria, which was obtained after the applicant had been legally represented in 
those proceedings and had exercised his full rights of appeal in respect of the 
judgment of the Sophia City Court. The res pondent submits that in these 
circumstances there is no reason why the Irish courts should refuse recognition or 
enforcement of the Bulgarian judgment.  
(h) The respondent maintains that he has strong grounds on which to contest the 
jurisdiction of the arbi tral tribunal of the ICC to ru le on the applicant’s claim against 
him on the basis that (i) there is no arbitration clause in either of the loan 
agreements; (ii) there were exclusive jurisdiction clauses giving jurisdiction to the 
courts of Bulgaria in eac h agreement; (iii) the courts of Bulgaria have determined 
the matter conclusively and (iv) the respondent has never agreed to the matter 
going to arbitration before the ICC.   
72. The court is of the view that it must refuse the applicant’s application for  it to refuse 
recognition or e nforcement of the Bulgarian judgment.  The Bulgarian courts clearly had 
jurisdiction to deal with the dispute.  In any event, this Court cannot review the issue of 
the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian courts on grounds of public policy having regard to the 
case law of the CJEU; in particular, para. 32 of the Krombach  judgment where it was 
stated as follows: - 
 “It follows that the public policy of the State in which enforcement is sought cannot 
be raised as a bar to recognition or e nforcement of a judgment give n in another 
contracting state solely on the ground that the court of origin failed to comply with 
the rules of the Convention which relate to jurisdiction.”  
73. Nor can this Court review in any way the correctness of the decis ion of the Bulgarian 
court no t to accede to the submission made on behalf of the applicant that the loan 
agreements had to be seen in the context of a complex series of contracts entered into 
between companies controlled by the parties.  Article 52 of the Regulation makes it clear 
that under no circumstances may a judgment given in a member state be reviewed as to 
its substance in the member state addressed.   
74. The net issue for this Court to determine is whether it should refuse recognition or 
enforceme nt of the Bulgarian judgment due to the submission that to do so would be 
contrary to public policy in Ireland, because it would perpetuate, or permit the respondent 
to perpetrate a fraud on the applicant.  The court does not regard that argument as being 
well founded.  All the applic ant has is an allegation made by him that the contract 
between Gort Holdings Limited and Balkan Limited and other contracts, including the 
personal loan contracts the subject of the Bulgarian judgment, were induced by 
fraudulen t representations on the part of the respondent.  There is no finding by any 
court or arbitral tribunal that a fraud has been perpetrated on either Gort Holdings 
Limited, or the applicant, by the respondent or by any company controlled by him.   
75. The mo st that there is, is a judgment of Deemster Gough in the Mareva injunction 
proceedings in the Isle of Man that Gort Holdings Limited had a good arguable case that 
there had been deceit and misrepresentation of it by Balkan, which was controlled by the 
respondent.  On that basis the court in the Isle of Man granted a worldwide freezing order 
against MRP Brazil Limited.  However, Deemster Gough was at pains to point out that he 
was not making a finding of fact that misrepresentation or deceit existed, merely that the 
applicant in those proceedings had raised an arguable case in that regard.  Thus, all there 
is in relation to the allegation of fraud, is the allegation made by the applicant in the 
context of the arbitration proceedings before the ICC, which is p artially supported by the 
dicta of Deemster Gough in the Mereva injunction proceedings.  
76. Where a party has obtained a judgment from the courts of a member state, the courts of 
Ireland have to enforce that judgment unless it is clear that to do so would be contrary to 
public policy in Ireland.  In that regard enforcement would have to be contrary to the rule 
of law in the state where enforcement of the judgment is sought; in this case in Ireland.  
The threshold in that regard is a high one:  see the Apost olides  and Krombach  cases.  
77. In the present case all that the applicant can point to is that he has instituted arbitration 
proceedings in which he has claimed that the contracts the subject matter of the 
judgment of the Bulgarian courts, are tainted by f raudulent representations made by the 
respondent in relation to other contracts between other parties, which he submits can be 
seen as forming a single series of contracts.  However, at present there is only an 
allegation of fraud made by the applicant aga inst the respondent.  There is no finding to 
that effect by any court or arbitral tribunal.  
78. The existence of such an allegation is not sufficient to enable this Court to conclude that it 
would be contrary to public policy to refuse recognition or enfor cement of the judgment 
which the respondent has obtained against the applicant in the courts of Bulgaria.  
Accordingly, the court refuses the primary relief sought by the applicant herein.  
79. In relation to the secondary relief, being an injunction or sta y preventing the enforcement 
of the Bulgarian judgment pending the outcome of the arbitration proceedings before the 
ICC, the court is of the view that that does not constitute a valid ground on which it could 
refuse enforcement of the judgment obtained by  the respondent in Bulgaria.  Such relief 
is not provided for under Article 45 of the regulation.   
80. Article 51 of the regulation provides that the courts of the country in which enforcement 
of the judgment is sought, may only stay the enforcement proce edings if it is satisfied 
that an ordinary appeal has been lodged against the judgment in the member state of 
origin, or that the time for such an appeal has not expired. As is clear from the Interdesco  
case, the power to stay the enforcement proceedings o nly relates to an “ ordinary appeal ” 
and does not apply to the situation where what might be termed an “e xtraordinary 
appeal ” has been lodged: see para. 43 of the judgment.  
81. In the present case, no such appeal has been lodged before the courts in Bulgari a. The 
applicant, through his lawyers, has only gone so far as to state that in the event that the 
ICC arbitration is determined in his favour, they will immediately move such an appeal 
before the courts in Bulgaria, seeking to set aside the judgment grant ed by the Sofia City 
Court. In such circumstances, where no such appeal has even been lodged, this court 
could not grant an injunction, or a stay, on the enforcement proceedings, if and when 
they are instituted by the respondent, on this basis. Even if suc h an appeal had been 
lodged before the courts in Bulgaria, the court would still not have jurisdiction to grant 
such a stay having regard to the provisions of Article 51.  
82. In summary, it would defeat the purpose of Brussels I Recast, if parties could re sist 
enforcement of a foreign judgment by pointing to the fact that they had sought to 
commence, or had commenced, arbitration proceedings against the judgment creditor in 
another state.  The whole purpose of the regulation is to enable parties who have 
obtained judgment in one -member state to enforce the judgment in another member 
state quickly and easily.  That aim would be defeated if the judgment debtor could avoid 
enforcement in one member state, by initiating arbitration proceedings on the same 
matter  in another member state.  Particularly, as the second ICC arbitration was 
commenced over two years after judgment had been obtained against the applicant.  
83. For these reasons, the court refuses to grant an injunction or a stay preventing the 
recognition  or enforcement of the judgment obtained by the respondent before the courts 
of Bulgaria pending the outcome of the second ICC arbitration.  
84. Finally, even if the worldwide Mareva injunction is extended by the High Court of Justice 
of the Isle of Man to  cover the respondent personally, that would not prevent the 
respondent acquiring assets by the enforcement of judgments that he has obtained; it 
merely takes effect to prevent him dissipating his assets below the sum of €22m.  
Accordingly, any extension o f that injunction to cover the respondent’s assets would not 
affect the enforcement of the Bulgarian judgment by the respondent.  
85. For the reasons set out herein, the court refuses all of the reliefs sought by the applicant 
in his originating notice of motion.