ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 9(1)(b) Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the [European Union] trade mark must be interpreted as meaning that the fact that, in part of the European Union, an EU trade mark and a national mark peacefully coexist, does not allow the conclusion that in another part of the European Union, where peaceful coexistence between that EU trade mark and the sign identical to that national mark is absent, there is no likelihood of confusion between that EU trade mark and that sign.

If the proprietor of the EU trade mark was only protected against infringements committed throughout the entire territory of the European Union, he would not be able to contest the use of identical or similar signs which give rise to a likelihood of confusion in only part of that territory, even though Article 9(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 is intended to protect that proprietor, throughout the European Union, against any use which adversely affects his trade mark’s function of indicating origin.

Consequently, when the use of a sign gives rise, in one part of the European Union, to a likelihood of confusion with an EU trade mark, whilst, in another part of the European Union, that same use does not give rise to such a likelihood of confusion, there is an infringement of the exclusive right conferred by that trade mark. In that case, the European Union trade marks court hearing the case must prevent the marketing of the goods concerned under the sign at issue throughout the entire territory of the European Union, with the exception of the part in respect of which there has been found to be no likelihood of confusion (judgment of 22 September 2016, combit Software, C‑223/15, EU:C:2016:719, paragraphs 25 and 36).

It is clear, moreover, from the case-law of the Court that the examination of the likelihood of confusion in part of the European Union must be based on a global assessment of all the relevant factors in the case concerned and that that assessment must include a visual, phonetic or conceptual comparison of the mark and the sign used by the third party, which may lead, in particular for linguistic reasons, to different conclusions for one part of the European Union and for another (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 September 2016, combit Software, C‑223/15, EU:C:2016:719, paragraphs 31 and 33 and the case-law cited).

(see paras 32, 33, 36, 38, operative part 1)
Case C‑422/16

Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb eV

v

TofuTown.com GmbH

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Trier)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Common organisation of the markets in agricultural products — Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 — Article 78 and Annex VII, Part III — Decision 2010/791/EU — Definitions, designations and sales descriptions — ‘Milk’ and ‘milk products’ — Designations used for the promotion and marketing of purely plant-based products)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber), 14 June 2017

Agriculture—Common organisation of the markets—Milk and milk products—Protection of designations—A priori exclusion of the designation (milk) and the designations reserved for milk products to designate purely plant based products—Breach of principle of proportionality—None (Arts 40 TFEU to 43 TFEU; European Parliament and Council Regulation No 1308/2013, Art. 78(2) and Annex VII, part III)

Agriculture—Common organisation of the markets—Milk and milk products—Protection of designations—A priori exclusion of the designation (milk) and the designations reserved for milk products to designate purely plant based products—Absence of comparable restrictions applicable to vegetarian or vegan substitutes for meat or fish—Breach of the principle of equal treatment with regard to producers of vegetarian or vegan substitutes for milk or milk products—None (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 1308/2013, Art. 78(2) and Annex VII, part III)
Article 7 of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, and the right to an effective remedy set out in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted, in the case of a dispute between a worker and his employer as to whether the worker is entitled to paid annual leave under the first of those articles, as precluding the worker having to take his leave first before establishing whether he has the right to be paid in respect of that leave.

The very purpose of the right to paid annual leave is to enable the worker to rest and to enjoy a period of relaxation and leisure (see, inter alia, judgments of 20 January 2009, Schultz-Hoff and Others, C‑350/06 and C‑520/06, EU:C:2009:18, paragraph 25, and of 30 June 2016, Sobczyszyn, C‑178/15, EU:C:2016:502, paragraph 25).

It is true that Directive 2003/88 contains no provisions on judicial remedies available to the worker, in the case of a dispute with his employer, to enforce his right to paid annual leave under that directive. However, it is not disputed that the Member States must, in such a context, ensure compliance with the right to an effective remedy, as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 September 2016, Star Storage and Others, C‑439/14 and C‑488/14, EU:C:2016:688, paragraph 46).

(see paras 37, 41, 47, operative part 1)
Appeal—Grounds—Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence—Inadmissibility—Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence—Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted—Ground of appeal alleging distortion of the clear sense of the evidence—Need to indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted and show the errors of appraisal which led to that distortion

(Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 168(1)(d))

(see paras 24, 25)
Case C‑227/16

Jan Theodorus Arts

v

Veevoederbedrijf Alpuro BV

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Agriculture — Common agricultural policy — Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 — Single payment scheme — Veal farmer who concluded an integration contract — Contractual term under which the single payment is payable to the integration undertaking — Whether permissible)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber), 9 November 2017

Agriculture — Common agricultural policy — Direct support schemes — Common rules — Single payment scheme — Veal farmer who concluded an integration contract — Contractual term authorising the payment of aid to the integration undertaking — Lawfulness

(Council Regulation No 73/2009)

Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003, must be interpreted as not precluding a contractual term under which the amount of aid which a veal farmer is entitled to claim under the single payment scheme is payable to an integration undertaking in the case where the transfer of that aid takes place within the context of reciprocal benefits and obligations negotiated between the parties to the contract.

(see para. 29, operative part)
Article 2(2)(b)(i) of Council Directive 2008/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which an employer may dismiss a worker on the grounds of his intermittent absences from work, even if justified, in a situation where those absences are the consequence of sickness attributable to a disability suffered by that worker, unless that legislation, while pursuing the legitimate aim of combating absenteeism, does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that aim, which is a matter for the referring court to assess.

It should be noted in that respect that a worker with a disability is, in principle, more exposed to the risk of being dismissed under Article 52(d) of the Workers’ Statute than a worker without a disability. Compared with such a worker, a worker with a disability has the additional risk of being absent by reason of an illness connected with his disability. He thus runs a greater risk of accumulating days of absence because of illness, and consequently of reaching the limits laid down in Article 52(d) of the Workers’ Statute. It is thus apparent that the rule in that provision is liable to place disabled workers at a disadvantage and so to bring about a difference of treatment indirectly based on disability within the meaning of Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78 (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 April 2013, HK Danmark, C‑335/11 and C‑337/11, EU:C:2013:222, paragraph 76).

In the present case, it must be considered that combating absenteeism at work may be regarded as a legitimate aim, within the meaning of Article 2(2)(b)(i) of Directive 2000/78, since it concerns a measure of employment policy (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 April 2013, HK Danmark, C‑335/11 and C‑337/11, EU:C:2013:222, paragraph 82).

It must, however, be ascertained whether the measures implemented by the national legislation in order to achieve that aim are appropriate and do not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain that aim.

(see paras 39, 44, 45, 57, operative part)
With regard to the admissibility of an appeal against a decision of the General Court, Article 168(1)(b) of the Court’s Rules of Procedure of 25 September 2012 provides that the appeal is to contain a reference to the decision of the General Court appealed against, without requiring that that decision be attached to the appeal. Therefore, since those Rules of Procedure entered into force on 1 November 2012, there is no longer any requirement for the General Court’s judgment that is being appealed against to be annexed to the appeal, a simple reference to that decision being sufficient.

Under the system governing judicial review proceedings before the EU courts, it is the parties that take the initiative in pursuing the case and delimiting its subject matter, inter alia by identifying in the form of order sought the act, or part of the act, which they intend to submit to judicial review. Since the court reviewing the legality of an act cannot rule ultra petita, it cannot grant an annulment which goes beyond that sought by the applicant

It is true that the EU courts must raise of their own motion pleas involving matters of public policy. Nonetheless, the fact that the court reviewing legality has jurisdiction to raise of its own motion a plea involving matters of public policy does not mean that it has jurisdiction to amend of its own motion the form of order sought by an applicant. Indeed, while the pleas constitute the essential basis of the form of order sought in an application, they are, nonetheless, necessarily separate from the form of order sought, which defines the limits of the dispute on which the EU courts are asked to rule.

As a consequence, while, by raising of their own motion a plea involving matters of public policy which, a priori, has not been put forward by the parties, the EU courts do not go beyond the scope of the dispute that has been brought before them, or in any way infringe the rules of procedure relating to the presentation in the application of the subject matter of the dispute and the pleas in law, the position would be different if, following their substantive examination of the contested measure, those courts, on the basis of a plea raised of their own motion, were to annul a measure to an extent that went beyond the annulment sought in the form of order they were duly requested to make, on the ground that such an annulment was necessary to remedy the unlawfulness established of their own motion in carrying out their substantive analysis.

(see paras 81, 87-90)
Case C‑532/16

Valstybinė mokesčių inspekcija prie Lietuvos Respublikos finansų ministerijos

v

SEB bankas AB

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Common system of value added tax (VAT) — Limitation of the right to deduct input tax — Adjustment of the deduction of input tax paid — Supply of land — Mischaracterisation as ‘taxable activity’ — Indication of VAT on the initial invoice — Amendment of that indication by the supplier)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 11 April 2018

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation—Common system of value added tax—Deduction of input tax—Adjustment of the initial deduction—Initial deduction made unlawfully—Obligation to adjust—Adjustment mechanism provided for by Directive 2006/112 with regard to immovable property acquired as capital goods—Scope—Deduction initially made in the absence of any right to deduct—Precluded (Council Directive 2006/112, Arts 184 and 187 to 189) Harmonisation of fiscal legislation—Common system of value added tax—Deduction of input tax—Adjustment of the initial deduction—Initial deduction made unlawfully—Determination of the date on which the obligation to adjust arises and the period for which that adjustment must be made, incumbent on the Member States—Obligation to comply with EU law and its general principles, in particular legal certainty and legitimate expectations (Council Directive 2006/112, Art. 186)
Case C‑651/16

DW

v

Valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas aģentūra

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākā tiesa)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Social security — Maternity benefit — Calculation of the amount on the basis of the income of the insured person during a reference period of 12 months — Person employed, during that period, by an EU institution — National legislation fixing the amount at issue at 70% of the average contribution basis — Restriction on freedom of movement for workers — Principle of sincere cooperation)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber), 7 March 2018

Freedom of movement for persons — Workers — Equal treatment — National legislation on the payment of maternity benefits — Calculation of the amount — Classification of a period of employment for an EU institution as a period of unemployment by applying the average contribution basis fixed in the Member State in question — Substantial reduction in the amount of maternity benefits as a result of having carried out a professional activity outside of that Member State — Not permissible

(Art. 45 TFEU)

Article 45 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State such as that at issue in the main proceedings that, for the purposes of determining the average contribution basis when calculating the amount of maternity benefit, equates the months of the reference period in which the person concerned worked in an EU institution and was not insured in that Member State with a period of unemployment and applies to them the average contribution basis in that Member State, which has the effect of substantially reducing the amount of the maternity benefit granted to that person in comparison with the amount to which she would have been entitled had she been gainfully employed in that Member State alone.

It is important, in that regard, to note that although the applicable national legislation does not, as such, require payment of State social insurance contributions during the reference period as a condition for a maternity benefit to be granted, the fact remains that the application of the rules for calculating the benefit at issue produce a similar result, since the amount of the benefit granted to a worker who was employed by an EU institution is substantially less than that to which she could have been entitled had she worked in the territory of the Member State concerned and contributed to its social security system.

It follows that national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings constitutes an obstacle to and, therefore, discourages the pursuit of an occupation outside the Member State in question, whether in another Member State or within an EU institution or an international organisation, in so far as, by accepting such a post, a worker who was previously or subsequently insured in the Member State in question receives, under the social security regime of that Member State, a benefit of an amount substantially lower than that to which she would have been entitled had she not exercised her right to free movement.

(see paras 25, 27, 38, operative part)
Case C‑676/16

CORPORATE COMPANIES s.r.o.

v

Ministerstvo financí ČR

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Nejvyšší správní soud)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing — Directive 2005/60/EC — Scope — Article 2(1), point 3(c) and Article 3, point 7(a) — Business activity of an undertaking consisting in the sale of companies already entered in the Register of Companies and formed solely for the purposes of sale — Sale by means of the transfer of the undertaking’s holding in the ready-made company)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 17 January 2018

Approximation of laws — Prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing — Directive 2005/60 — Scope — Undertaking whose business activity consists in selling ready-made companies — Included

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2005/60, Arts 2(1), point 3(c) and 3, point 7(a))

Article 2(1), point 3(c) of Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, read in conjunction with Article 3, point 7(a) of that directive, must be interpreted as meaning that a person, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, whose commercial activity consists in selling companies which it formed itself, without any prior request on the part of its potential clients, for the purposes of sale to those clients, by means of a transfer of its shares in the capital of the company being sold, falls within the scope of those provisions.

(see para. 34, operative part)
–

to take into consideration, in accordance with the conditions it has laid down, a criminal conviction of the director of a tendering company, even if the conviction is not yet final, for an offence concerning the professional conduct of that company where the director ceased to perform his duties in the year preceding the publication of the tender notice, and
Appeal—Grounds—Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence—Inadmissibility—Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence—Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)
Appeal—Grounds—Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence—Inadmissibility—Review by the Court of the findings of fact—Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see para. 25)
Joined Cases C‑316/16 and C‑424/16

B

v

Land Baden-Württemberg

and

Secretary of State for the Home Department

v

Franco Vomero

(Requests for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof Baden-Württemberg and from the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom)

(References for a preliminary ruling — Citizenship of the European Union — Right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States — Directive 2004/38/EC — Article 28(3)(a) — Enhanced protection against expulsion — Conditions — Right of permanent residence — Residence in the host Member State for the 10 years preceding the decision to expel the person concerned from that Member State — Period of imprisonment — Consequences as regards the continuity of the 10-year period of residence — Connection with the overall assessment of an integrative link — Time at which that assessment must be carried out and criteria to be taken into account in that assessment)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 17 April 2018

Citizenship of the Union—Right to move and reside freely in the territory of the Member States—Directive 2004/38—Restriction on the right of entry and the right of residence on grounds of public policy or public security—Protection against expulsion—Condition—Residence for the 10 years preceding the expulsion decision—Condition for application—Person concerned having a right of permanent residence (European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38, Arts 16, 28(2) and (3)(a)) Citizenship of the Union—Right to move and reside freely in the territory of the Member States—Directive 2004/38—Restriction on the right of entry and the right of residence on grounds of public policy or public security—Protection against expulsion—Condition—Residence for the 10 years preceding the expulsion decision—Period of continuous residence calculated by counting back from the date of the expulsion decision (European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38, Art. 28(3)(a)) Citizenship of the Union—Right to move and reside freely in the territory of the Member States—Directive 2004/38—Restriction on the right of entry and the right of residence on grounds of public policy or public security—Protection against expulsion—Condition—Interruption of the continuity of residence in the host Member State by a period of imprisonment—Period of 10 years’ continuous residence preceding the period of imprisonment—Overall assessment of the integrative links with the Member State (European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38, Art. 28(3)(a)) Citizenship of the Union—Right to move and reside freely in the territory of the Member States—Directive 2004/38—Restriction on the right of entry and the right of residence on grounds of public policy or public security—Protection against expulsion—Condition—Residence for the 10 years preceding the expulsion decision—Time at which that assessment must be carried out—Date on which the expulsion decision is adopted (European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38, Art. 27(2), second para., and 28(3)(a))
In the case in the main proceedings, the legislation in question lays down a criterion relating to the sales area of the establishment which does not give rise to any direct discrimination. Nor does the evidence submitted to the Court show that that criterion disadvantages in most cases nationals from other Member States or companies whose seat is in another Member State.

A tax such as that at issue in the main proceedings imposed on large retail establishments according, in essence, to their sales area does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU to the extent that it exempts establishments whose sales area is less than 2500 m2. Nor, in so far as that tax exempts establishments which pursue the business of a garden centre or of selling vehicles, construction materials, machinery or industrial supplies or reduces by 60% the tax base of establishments selling furniture, sanitary ware and doors and windows and those that are do-it-yourself stores, does it constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, provided that those establishments do not have as significant an adverse effect on the environment and on town and country planning as the others, which it is for the referring court to ascertain. Such a tax does, however, constitute State aid within the meaning of that provision, to the extent that it exempts collective large retail establishments with a surface area equal to or greater than 2500 m2.

(see paras 67, 68, operative part 2)