ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
21

In those circumstances, the Landesgericht Salzburg (Regional Court, Salzburg) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Is Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 applicable to an employment relationship in which, although an employment contract was entered into in Austria for the performance of work in Germany, the female employee, who remained in Austria and was prepared for several months to work, did not perform any work? In the event that the first question is answered in the affirmative: (2) Is Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 to be interpreted as meaning that it is possible to apply a national provision which enables an employee to bring an action in the place where she was resident during the employment relationship or at the time when the employment relationship ended (thus facilitating the process of bringing an action), as is the case with Paragraph 4(1)(a) of the [ASGG]? (3) Is Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 to be interpreted as meaning that it is possible to apply a national provision which enables an employee to bring an action in the place where the remuneration is to be paid or was to be paid upon termination of his employment relationship (thus facilitating the process of bringing an action), as is the case with Paragraph 4(1)(d) of the ASGG? In the event that Questions 2 and 3 are answered in the negative: (4) Is Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 to be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of an employment relationship in which the female employee has not performed any work, the action must be brought in the Member State in which the employee remained prepared to work? Is Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 to be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of an employment relationship in which the female employee has not performed any work, the action must be brought in the Member State in which the employment contract was initiated and entered into, even if the performance of work in another Member State had been agreed or envisaged in that employment contract? In the event that the first question is answered in the negative: (5) Is Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 applicable to an employment relationship in which, although an employment contract was entered into in Austria for the performance of work in Germany, the female employee, who remained in Austria and was prepared for several months to work, did not perform any work, if it is possible to apply a national provision which enables an employee to bring an action in the place where she was resident during the employment relationship or at the time when the employment relationship ended (thus facilitating the process of bringing an action), as is the case with Paragraph 4(1)(a) of the ASGG, or if it is possible to apply a national provision which enables an employee to bring an action in the place where the remuneration is to be paid or was to be paid upon termination of the employment relationship (thus facilitating the process of bringing an action), as is the case with Paragraph 4(1)(d) of the ASGG?’
13

Article 18(1) and (4) of Law No 300 of 20 May 1970 provides, in the version applicable to the facts at issue in the main proceedings: ‘The court, in the decision declaring the dismissal null and void for being discriminatory … because it can be linked to other cases of nullity provided for by law or because it is determined by a decisive unlawful reason within the meaning of Article 1345 of the Civil Code, shall order the employer … to reinstate the worker to his or her post, regardless of the formal reason relied on and regardless of the number of workers employed by the employer. … Where reinstatement has been ordered, the employment relationship shall be deemed to be terminated if the worker has not returned to work within thirty days of being invited to do so by the employer, except in the case that the worker has requested the compensation referred to in the third paragraph of this Article. The system referred to in this Article shall also apply to dismissal declared ineffective on the grounds that it was effected orally. … The court, where it finds that the justified objective grounds or just cause adduced by the employer do not exist, … shall annul the dismissal and order the employer to proceed with the reinstatement referred to in the first paragraph and to pay compensation commensurate with the worker’s last actual overall salary from the date of dismissal until the date of actual reinstatement, minus any amounts the worker received from other professional activities during the period of exclusion and the amounts that he or she could have received by diligently seeking a new job. … The employer shall also be ordered to pay social security contributions from the day of dismissal until the day of actual reinstatement, together with interest at the legal rate without application of penalties for non-payment or late-payment of contributions, in an amount equal to the difference between the contributions which would have been paid under the employment contract that was terminated by the unfair dismissal and the contributions paid to the worker in connection with the performance of other professional activities. …’
2

Article 22 of Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003 of 19 December 2002 laying down the statute for executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community programmes (OJ 2003 L 11, p. 1), entitled ‘Legality of acts’, is worded as follows: ‘1. Any act of an executive agency which injures a third party may be referred to the [European] Commission by any person directly or individually concerned or by a Member State for a review of its legality. Administrative proceedings shall be referred to the Commission within one month of the day on which the interested party or Member State concerned learnt of the act challenged. After hearing the arguments adduced by the interested party or by the Member State concerned and those of the executive agency, the Commission shall take a decision on the administrative proceedings within two months of the date on which proceedings were instituted. Without prejudice to the Commission’s obligation to reply in writing giving grounds for its decision, the failure by the Commission to reply within that deadline shall be taken as implicit rejection of the proceedings. 2. On its own initiative the Commission may review any act of an executive agency. It shall decide within two months of the day [of] that review, after having heard the arguments adduced by the agency. 3. Where an act is referred to the Commission in accordance with paragraphs 1 or 2, the Commission may suspend implementation of the act at issue or prescribe interim measures. In its final decision the Commission may uphold the executive agency’s act or decide that the agency must modify it either in whole or in part. 4. Executive agencies must take the necessary measures within a reasonable period to comply with the Commission’s decision. 5. An action for annulment of the Commission’s explicit or implicit decision to reject the administrative appeal may be brought before the Court of Justice [of the European Union], in accordance with [Article 263 TFEU].’
6

Appearing in Chapter IV of that directive, entitled ‘Professional ethics, independence, objectivity, confidentiality and professional secrecy’, Article 22 thereof, entitled ‘Independence and objectivity’, provides: ‘1. Member States shall ensure that, when carrying out a statutory audit, a statutory auditor or an audit firm, and any legal person in a position to directly or indirectly influence the outcome of the statutory audit, is independent of the audited entity and is not involved in the decision-taking of the audited entity. Independence shall be required at least during both the period covered by the financial statements to be audited and the period during which the statutory audit is carried out. Member States shall ensure that a statutory auditor or an audit firm takes all reasonable steps to ensure that, when carrying out a statutory audit, his, her or its independence is not affected by any existing or potential conflict of interest or business or other direct or indirect relationship involving the statutory auditor or the audit firm carrying out the statutory audit and, where appropriate, its network managers, auditors, employees, any other natural persons whose services are placed at the disposal or under the control of the statutory auditor or the audit firm, or any person directly or indirectly linked to the statutory auditor or the audit firm by control. The statutory auditor or the audit firm shall not carry out a statutory audit if there is any threat of self-review, self-interest, advocacy, familiarity or intimidation created by financial, personal, business, employment or other relationships between: – the statutory auditor, the audit firm, its network, and any natural person in a position to influence the outcome of the statutory audit, and – the audited entity, as a result of which an objective, reasonable and informed third party, taking into account the safeguards applied, would conclude that the statutory auditor’s or the audit firm’s independence is compromised. … 4. Member States shall ensure that persons or firms referred to in paragraph 2 do not participate in or otherwise influence the outcome of a statutory audit of any particular audited entity if they: … (c) have had an employment, or a business or other relationship with that audited entity within the period referred [to] in paragraph 1 that may cause, or may be generally perceived as causing, a conflict of interest. 5. Persons or firms referred to in paragraph 2 shall not solicit or accept pecuniary or non-pecuniary gifts or favours from the audited entity or any entity related to an audited entity unless an objective, reasonable and informed third party would consider the value thereof as trivial or inconsequential. …’
33

In order to have a general view of all the appropriate office buildings available on the property market and which met its requirements, Wiener Wohnen commissioned, at the beginning of 2012, an independent expert in real estate to conduct an overall analysis of the market and of office sites in Vienna. According to the Republic of Austria, when that analysis was being drawn up, the planning of the Gate 2 building had already been completed in its entirety, all the plans being available, but the project had not yet been implemented. Accordingly, Wiener Wohnen had exercised no influence on the architectural design or the actual planning of the A and B wings of that building. Apart from requirements concerning the office space and parking spaces, the negotiations relating to the lease in question related primarily to the amount of the rent and the operating costs. One of the essential elements of the negotiations was the handing over of those two wings on the scheduled dates, in order for the relocation of some 1000 employees to be organised. The only aspects of the construction in respect of which Wiener Wohnen was able to intervene concerned the subdivision of the premises, the occupation of the offices and the basic amenities of the leased space.
24

In those circumstances, the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid (High Court of Justice, Madrid) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Can the creation of a temporary contract such as a temporary replacement contract to cover a vacant post, where the duration of the contract is left to the discretion of the employer, who decides whether or not to fill the vacant post, when to do so and how long the process lasts, be considered compatible with the practical effect of Clauses 1 and 5 of Directive 1999/70? (2) Should the requirement established by Clause 5 of … Directive [1999/70] to introduce one or more of the measures it stipulates in order to prevent abuse of temporary contracts be considered to have been transposed into Spanish law in the case of temporary replacement contracts to cover vacant posts, given that, according to the case-law, the law does not impose a time limit on such employment relationships, it does not specify the objective reasons that justify the renewal of such relationships, and it does not stipulate how many times those relationships may be renewed? (3) Is the objective and practical effect of the Framework Agreement undermined by the fact that, according to the case-law, Spanish law does not contain any effective measure to prevent and penalise abuse in respect of workers on temporary replacement contracts to cover vacant posts, in that: there is no limit on the maximum total duration of such contracts, which never become permanent contracts or non-permanent contracts of an indefinite duration, no matter how many years elapse; workers do not receive any compensation on the termination of their employment; the public authority is not required to justify the renewal of a temporary replacement contract where, for years, the vacant post is not included in the list of public [sector] vacancies or the selection process is delayed? (4) Should an employment relationship be regarded as having satisfied the purpose of … Directive [1999/70] where it is not time limited, its duration, according to the case-law arising from the judgment of 5 June 2018, Montero Mateos (C‑677/16, EU:C:2018:393), is unusually long and is entirely at the discretion of the employer, with no limit or justification, the worker is unable to predict when the contract will come to an end, and the contract may continue until the worker retires; or should such a relationship be deemed an abuse? (5) Under the judgment of 25 October 2018, Sciotto (C‑331/17, EU:C:2018:859), can the financial crisis of 2008 be considered to be a justification, in the abstract, for the absence of any measure to prevent the abuse of successive fixed-term employment relationships within the meaning of Clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement, which could prevent or discourage the employment relationship between the complainant and the Community of Madrid from continuing from 2003 until 2008, at which point the relationship is renewed and subsequently continues until 2016, meaning that the replacement contract continued for 13 years?’
5

According to the general considerations in the HS Explanatory Notes to Chapter 29 of the HS, entitled ‘Organic chemicals’: ‘A separate chemically defined compound is a substance which consists of one molecular species (e.g., covalent or ionic) whose composition is defined by a constant ratio of elements and can be represented by a definitive structural diagram. In a crystal lattice, the molecular species corresponds to the repeating unit cell. Separate chemically defined compounds containing other substances deliberately added during or after their manufacture (including purification) are excluded from this chapter. … [These compounds] may contain impurities (Note 1(a)). … The term “impurities” applies exclusively to substances whose presence in the single chemical compound results solely and directly from the manufacturing process (including purification). These substances may result from any of the factors involved in the process and are principally the following: (a) Unconverted starting materials. (b) Impurities present in the starting materials. (c) Reagents used in the manufacturing process (including purification). (d) By-products. It should be noted, however, that [those] substances are not in all cases regarded as “impurities” permitted under Note 1(a). When such substances are deliberately left in the product with a view to rendering it particularly suitable for specific use rather than for general use, they are not regarded as permissible impurities. …’
42

As Regulation No 12 seeks to preserve the safety of persons and public order, it must be held that that regulation pursues legitimate objectives, as is apparent from paragraphs 36 and 37 of this judgment. In those circumstances, it is still necessary to ascertain whether the requirement laid down in Article 4 of that regulation and in Annex 1 thereto – namely that a prison officer’s auditory acuity must meet minimum standards of sound perception, without the use of corrective aids being permitted during the assessment of whether those standards are met, and where failure to meet those standards constitutes an absolute medical impediment to the exercise of his or her duties, resulting in their termination and therefore liable to lead to his or her dismissal – is proportionate. Accordingly, it is necessary to examine whether that requirement is appropriate for attaining those objectives and ensure that it does not go beyond what is necessary to attain them (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 November 2014, Vital Pérez, C‑416/13, EU:C:2014:2371, paragraph 45).
23

In those circumstances, the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Supreme Administrative Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Do Article 110 [TFEU] and Article 273 of [the VAT Directive] preclude a provision such as Article 103(5a) of [the Law on VAT], which stipulates that, in the case of an intra-Community acquisition of motor fuels, the taxable person is obliged, without being called upon to do so by the head of the customs office, to calculate and pay the amounts of tax to the account of the customs office competent for dealing with the payment of excise duty: (a) within five days of the date on which the goods in question enter the place of receipt of excise goods specified in the relevant permit – if the goods are the subject of an intra-Community acquisition within the meaning of [the Law of 6 December 2008 on excise duty] by a registered consignee under the excise duty suspension procedure pursuant to the provisions on excise duty; (b) within five days of the date on which such goods enter a tax warehouse from the territory of a Member State other than Poland; (c) upon the movement of these goods within the territory of Poland – if the goods are moved outside of the excise duty suspension procedure pursuant to the provisions on excise duty? (2) Does Article 69 of [the VAT Directive] preclude a provision such as Article 103(5a) of the Law on VAT, which stipulates that, in the case of the intra-Community acquisition of motor fuels, the taxable person is obliged, without being called upon to do so by the head of a customs office, to calculate and pay the amounts of tax to the account of the customs office competent for dealing with the payment of excise duty: (a) within five days of the date on which the goods in question enter the place of receipt of excise goods specified in the relevant permit – if the goods are the subject of an intra-Community acquisition within the meaning of [the Law of 6 December 2008 on excise duty] by a registered consignee under the excise duty suspension procedure pursuant to the provisions on excise duty; (b) within five days of the date on which such goods enter a tax warehouse from the territory of a Member State other than Poland; (c) upon the movement of these goods within the territory of Poland – if the goods are moved outside of the excise duty suspension procedure pursuant to the provisions on excise duty; where the above amounts are interpreted as not constituting interim VAT payments within the meaning of Article 206 of [the VAT Directive]? (3) Does an interim VAT payment within the meaning of Article 206 of [the VAT Directive] which is not paid on time lose its legal status at the end of the tax period for which it is to be paid?’
7

Under Article 10a of that directive, headed ‘Transitional Community-wide rules for harmonised free allocation’: ‘1. By 31 December 2010, the Commission shall adopt Community-wide and fully harmonised implementing measures for the allocation of the allowances … … The measures referred to in the first subparagraph shall, to the extent feasible, determine Community-wide ex ante benchmarks so as to ensure that allocation takes place in a manner that provides incentives for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and energy efficient techniques, by taking account of the most efficient techniques, substitutes, alternative production processes, high efficiency cogeneration, efficient energy recovery of waste gases, use of biomass and capture and storage of CO2, where such facilities are available, and shall not provide incentives to increase emissions. … … 3. Subject to paragraphs 4 and 8, and notwithstanding Article 10c, no free allocation shall be given to electricity generators, to installations for the capture of CO2, to pipelines for transport of CO2 or to CO2 storage sites. 4. Free allocation shall be given to district heating as well as to high efficiency cogeneration, as defined by Directive 2004/8/EC [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 on the promotion of cogeneration based on a useful heat demand in the internal energy market and amending Directive 92/42/EEC (OJ 2004 L 52, p. 50)], for economically justifiable demand, in respect of the production of heating or cooling. … … 11. Subject to Article 10b, the amount of allowances allocated free of charge under paragraphs 4 to 7 of this Article in 2013 shall be 80% of the quantity determined in accordance with the measures referred to in paragraph 1. Thereafter the free allocation shall decrease each year by equal amounts resulting in 30% free allocation in 2020, with a view to reaching no free allocation in 2027. 12. Subject to Article 10b, in 2013 and in each subsequent year up to 2020, installations in sectors or subsectors which are exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage shall be allocated, pursuant to paragraph 1, allowances free of charge at 100% of the quantity determined in accordance with the measures referred to in paragraph 1. …’