ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 178/4

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Centrale Raad van Beroep (Netherlands) lodged on 8 April 2013 — Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen (Uwv) v M.S. Demirci and Others

(Case C-171/13)

2013/C 178/08

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Centrale Raad van Beroep

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen (Uwv)

Respondents: M.S. Demirci, D. Cetin, A.I. Önder, R. Keskin, M. Tüle, A. Taskin

Questions referred

1. Must Article 6(1) of Decision No 3/80, (1) having regard to Article 59 of the Additional Protocol, (2) be interpreted as precluding a legislative provision of a Member State, such as Article 4a of the TW, (3) which withdraws the supplementary benefit awarded on the basis of national legislation if the persons in receipt of that benefit no longer live in the territory of that State, even if those persons, while retaining Turkish nationality, have acquired the nationality of the host Member State?

2. If, in answering the first question, the Court of Justice concludes that the persons concerned may rely on Article 6(1) of Decision No 3/80, but that such reliance is restricted by the effect of Article 59 of the Additional Protocol: must Article 59 of the Additional Protocol be interpreted as precluding continuation of entitlement to the supplementary benefit for Turkish nationals, such as the persons concerned, as from the point in time at which European Union nationals can no longer claim entitlement to that benefit on the basis of European Union law, even if European Union nationals retained that benefit for a longer period of time on the basis of national law?

(1) Decision No 3/80 of the Association Council of 19 September 1980 on the application of the social security schemes of the Member States of the European Communities to Turkish workers and members of their families (OJ 1983 C 110, 25.4.1983, p. 60).

(2) Additional Protocol, signed in Brussels on 23 November 1970 and concluded, approved and confirmed on behalf of the Community by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2760/72 of 19 December 1972 (OJ 1973 C 113, p. 18).

(3) Toeslagenwet (Netherlands Law on supplementary benefits designed to ensure receipt of the minimum income).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 178/2

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Netherlands) lodged on 21 March 2013 — VDP Dental Laboratory NV, Staatssecretaris van Financiën

(Case C-144/13)

2013/C 178/03

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hoge Raad der Nederlanden

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: VDP Dental Laboratory NV, Staatssecretaris van Financiën

Questions referred

1. Should Article 17(1) and (2) of the Sixth Directive (1) be interpreted to mean that if a national statutory provision, contrary to the Directive, provides for an exemption (in respect of which the right to deduct is excluded), the taxable person is entitled to the right to deduct in reliance on Article 17(1) and (2) of the Sixth Directive?

2. Should Article 143(a) and Article 140(a) and (b) of the 2006 VAT Directive (2) be interpreted to mean that the exemptions from VAT contained in those provisions do not apply to the importation and the intra-Community acquisition of dental prostheses? If the answer to that question is in the negative, is the application of the exemptions then subject to the condition that the dental prostheses must have been supplied from another country by a dentist or dental technician and/or supplied to a dentist or dental technician?

(1) Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1).

(2) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).
1.

Is an adjuvant which has no therapeutic effect on its own, but which enhances the therapeutic effect of an antigen when combined with that antigen in a vaccine, an ‘active ingredient’ within the meaning of Article 1(b) of Regulation 469/2009/EC (1)?
2.

(a) Does the ground for refusal or invalidity in Article 3(1)(e)(iii) of Directive 89/104/EEC, as codified in Directive 2008/95/EC, namely, that (shape) trade marks may not consist exclusively of a shape which gives substantial value to the goods, refer to the motive (or motives) underlying the relevant public’s decision to purchase? (b) Does a ‘shape which gives substantial value to the goods’ within the meaning of the aforementioned provision exist only if that shape must be considered to constitute the main or predominant value in comparison with other values (such as, in the case of high chairs for children, safety, comfort and reliability) or can it also exist if, in addition to that value, other values of the goods exist which are also to be considered substantial? (c) For the purpose of answering Questions 2(a) and 2(b), is the opinion of the majority of the relevant public decisive, or may the court rule that the opinion of a portion of the public is sufficient in order to take the view that the value concerned is ‘substantial’ within the meaning of the aforementioned provision? (d) If the latter option provides the answer to Question 2(c), what requirement should be imposed as to the size of the relevant portion of the public?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 207/19

Appeal brought on 29 April 2013 by Albergo Saturnia Internazionale Spa against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 20 February 2013 in Joined Cases T-278/00 to T-280/00, T-282/00 to T-286/00 and T-288/00 to T-295/00 Albergo Quattro Fontane and Others v Commission

(Case C-234/13 P)

2013/C 207/32

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: Albergo Saturnia Internazionale Spa (represented by: A. Bianchini and F. Busetto, avvocati)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Comitato ‘Venezia vuole vivere’

Form of order sought

— Set aside the order of the General Court under appeal

— Uphold the forms of order sought at first instance and, accordingly, — annul, in so far as is reasonable and in so far as it concerns the appellant, European Commission Decision No 2000/394/EC of 25 November 1999 on aid to firms in Venice and Chioggia by way of relief from social security contributions under Laws Nos 30/1997 and 206/1995; — in the alternative, annul that decision in so far as it imposes an obligation to recover the relief granted and in so far as it requires interest to be added to the amount of relief to be recovered for the periods taken into consideration in the judgment;

— order the Commission to pay the costs incurred both at first instance and on appeal.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant raises nine grounds of appeal:

First ground: the General Court erred in not taking into consideration the fact that the measures in question did not confer any advantage upon their beneficiaries given their compensatory nature.

Second ground: the Court erred in not excluding, or at least assessing, the likelihood that the measures in question would affect competition and intra-Community trade.

Third ground: the Court erred in holding that the derogations in Article 87(2)(b) EC (now Article 107(2)(b) TFEU) and Article 87(3)(b) EC (now Article 107(3)(b) TFEU) were inapplicable.

Fourth ground: the Court erred in holding that the derogation in Article 87(3)(c) EC (now Article 107(3)(c) TFEU) was inapplicable.

Fifth ground: the Court erred in holding that the derogations in Article 87(3)(d) and (e) EC (now Article 107(3)(d) and (e) TFEU) were inapplicable.

Sixth ground: the Court erred in holding that the derogation in Article 86(2) EC (now Article 106(2) TFEU) was inapplicable.

Seventh ground: the Court erred in not recognising the existence of the aid, thus infringing Article 88(3) EC (now Article 108(3) TFEU) and Article 15 of Regulation No 659/1999. (1)

Eighth ground: the Court erred in finding that Article 14(1) of Regulation No 659/1999 did not apply to the recovery order.

Ninth ground: the Court erred in finding that Article 14(1) of Regulation No 659/1999 did not apply to the addition of interest.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ 1999 L 83, p. 1).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 207/21

Appeal brought on 29 April 2013 by Biasutti Hotels srl, formerly Hotels Biasutti Snc, against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 20 February 2013 in Joined Cases T-278/00 to T-280/00, T-282/00 to T-286/00 and T-288/00 to T-295/00 Albergo Quattro Fontane and Others v Commission

(Case C-236/13 P)

2013/C 207/34

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: Biasutti Hotels srl, formerly Hotels Biasutti Snc (represented by: A. Bianchini and F. Busetto, avvocati)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Comitato ‘Venezia vuole vivere’

Form of order sought

— Set aside the order of the General Court under appeal

— Uphold the forms of order sought at first instance and, accordingly, — annul, in so far as is reasonable and in so far as it concerns the appellant, European Commission Decision No 2000/394/EC of 25 November 1999 on aid to firms in Venice and Chioggia by way of relief from social security contributions under Laws Nos 30/1997 and 206/1995; — in the alternative, annul that decision in so far as it imposes an obligation to recover the relief granted and in so far as it requires interest to be added to the amount of relief to be recovered for the periods taken into consideration in the judgment;

— order the Commission to pay the costs incurred both at first instance and on appeal.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant raises nine grounds of appeal:

First ground: the General Court erred in not taking into consideration the fact that the measures in question did not confer any advantage upon their beneficiaries given their compensatory nature.

Second ground: the Court erred in not excluding, or at least assessing, the likelihood that the measures in question would affect competition and intra-Community trade.

Third ground: the Court erred in holding that the derogations in Article 87(2)(b) EC (now Article 107(2)(b) TFEU) and Article 87(3)(b) EC (now Article 107(3)(b) TFEU) were inapplicable.

Fourth ground: the Court erred in holding that the derogation in Article 87(3)(c) EC (now Article 107(3)(c) TFEU) was inapplicable.

Fifth ground: the Court erred in holding that the derogations in Article 87(3)(d) and (e) EC (now Article 107(3)(d) and (e) TFEU) were inapplicable.

Sixth ground: the Court erred in holding that the derogation in Article 86(2) EC (now Article 106(2) TFEU) was inapplicable.

Seventh ground: the Court erred in not recognising the existence of the aid, thus infringing Article 88(3) EC (now Article 108(3) TFEU) and Article 15 of Regulation No 659/1999. (1)

Eighth ground: the Court erred in finding that Article 14(1) of Regulation No 659/1999 did not apply to the recovery order.

Ninth ground: the Court erred in finding that Article 14(1) of Regulation No 659/1999 did not apply to the addition of interest.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ 1999 L 83, p. 1).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 207/28

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hof van beroep te Antwerpen (Belgium) lodged on 15 May 2013 — Provincie Antwerpen v Mobistar NV

(Case C-264/13)

2013/C 207/46

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hof van beroep te Antwerpen

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Provincie Antwerpen

Respondent: Mobistar NV

Question referred

Must Article 6 and/or Article 13 of Directive 2002/20/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive) be interpreted as precluding a public authority of a Member State from being allowed to tax, for budgetary or other reasons, the economic activity of telecommunications operators which arises in the territory or a part thereof through the presence on public or private property of GSM masts, pylons or antennae which are used for that activity?

(1) OJ 2002 L 108, p. 21.
1.

Is a contract to be concluded for the lease of something in the future — even in the form, suggested most recently, of an undertaking to lease — equivalent to a public works contract, albeit with certain characteristics of a lease contract, with the result that such a contract cannot be included among the contracts which are excluded, under Article 16 of Directive 2004/18/EC, (1) from the scope of the rules on public procedures?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 207/32

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Commissione Tributaria Regionale per la Toscana (Italy) lodged on 21 May 2013 — Equoland Soc. coop. arl v Agenzia delle Dogane

(Case C-272/13)

2013/C 207/53

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Commissione Tributaria Regionale per la Toscana

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Equoland Soc. coop. arl

Defendant: Agenzia delle Dogane — Ufficio delle Dogane di Livorno

Questions referred

1. In order to benefit, under Article 16 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC (1) of 17 May 1977 and Articles 154 and 157 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC, (2) from the exemption from the payment of the VAT on importation resulting from the placement of the imported goods under warehousing arrangements other than customs warehousing, that is to say under VAT warehousing arrangements, is it sufficient that such placement occur only on paper and not physically?

2. Do the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC and Council Directive 2006/112/EC preclude a practice whereby a Member State collects VAT on importation despite the fact that that VAT — by error or irregularity — has been settled already under the reverse charge mechanism through self-invoicing and simultaneous entry in the sales and purchases register?

3. Is the principle of VAT neutrality breached when the Member State seeks to collect VAT which has already been settled under the reverse charge mechanism through self-invoicing and simultaneous entry in the sales and purchases register?

(1) Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1).

(2) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 226/5

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de la Comunidad Valenciana (Spain) lodged on 30 May 2013 — Ayuntamiento de Benferri v Conselleria de Infraestructuras y Transporte, Iberdrola Distribución Eléctrica SAU

(Case C-300/13)

(2013/C 226/09)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Superior de Justicia de la Comunidad Valenciana, Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo, Sección 1

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Ayuntamiento de Benferri

Defendants: Conselleria de Infraestructuras y Transporte, Iberdrola Distribución Eléctrica SAU

Questions referred

1. Is the concept of ‘construction of overhead electrical power lines with a voltage of 220 kV or more and a length of more than 15 km’ in point 20 of Annex I to Directive 85/337, (1) as amended by Directive 97/11, (2) to be interpreted as meaning that the only electricity installations it covers are overhead power lines which reach both those thresholds?

2. Is the concept of ‘… transmission of electrical energy by overhead cables’ in section 3(b) of Annex II to Directive 85/337, as amended by Directive 97/11, to be interpreted as meaning that the only electrical energy transmission installations it covers are overhead power lines? If not:

3. Is the concept of ‘… transmission of electrical energy by overhead cables’ in section 3(b) of Annex II to Directive 85/337 to be interpreted as meaning that it covers transformer substations?

4. Is the concept of ‘… transmission of electrical energy by overhead cables’ in section 3(b) of Annex II to Directive 85/337 to be interpreted as meaning that it covers transformer substations, although the construction or extension thereof is carried out by means of a project which does not include the construction of an overhead power line?

(1) Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ 1985 L 175, p. 40).

(2) Council Directive 97/11/EC of 3 March 1997 amending Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ 1997 L 73, p. 5).
3.

Ground of appeal alleging inadequate grounds for the judgment under appeal. In the view of the Republic of Poland, the General Court failed to explain which of the substantive and formal requirements arising under Article 20 of Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 had in fact not been met. The General Court also failed to establish to what extent the possibility of establishing the intentional nature of the action by way of judicial proceedings may have led to an incompatibility of the payment system introduced by the Polish authorities with the objectives of the common agricultural policy. Furthermore, in the view of the Republic of Poland, the General Court failed to explain how the calculations carried out by the Polish authorities as to the actual risks faced by the fund were inconsistent.
3.

Must Article 3(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 of 18 May 2006 be interpreted as meaning that the authority which is responsible for granting the aforementioned exemption is entitled or obliged, when carrying out the assessment as to whether to grant the exemption sought, to have regard for, inter alia, the fact that the applicants submitting the request are seeking to give effect to their fundamental rights (in this case, the right to a judicial remedy), although it must also ensure that if, in the specific case, the exemption is granted, the objective of the sanction provided for will not be negated and that the exemption will not be misused (for example, if the amount of money earmarked for securing a legal remedy would be manifestly disproportionate in relation to the scale of the legal services provided)?
—

declare that, by failing to adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to ensure compliance with Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, (1) and in any event by not notifying the Commission of such provisions, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 27(1) of that directive;
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 252/17

Appeal brought on 27 May 2013 by Cindu Chemicals BV, Deza, a.s., Koppers Denmark A/S, Koppers UK Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 7 March 2013 in Case T-95/10: CINDU Chemicals BV and others v European Chemicals Agency (ECHA)

(Case C-289/13 P)

2013/C 252/25

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Cindu Chemicals BV, Deza, a.s., Koppers Denmark A/S, Koppers UK Ltd (represented by: K. Van Maldegem, avocat)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court in Case T-95/10; and

— annul Decision ED/68/2009 of the European Chemicals Agency (‘ECHA’) (the ‘Contested Decision’) identifying Anthracene Oil (Low) as a substance to be included on the Candidate List in accordance with Article 59 of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (‘REACH’) (1), or

— alternatively, refer the case back to the General Court to rule on the appellants’ application for annulment; and order the respondent to pay all the costs of these proceedings (including the costs before the General Court).

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellants submit that, in dismissing their application for partial annulment in respect of the contested decision, the General Court breached Community law. In particular, the appellants contend that the General Court committed a number of errors in its interpretation of the legal framework as applicable to the appellants’ situation. That resulted in the General Court making a number of errors in law; in particular:

— in finding that the case related to complex scientific and technical facts and that the identification of anthracene oil (low) as having PBT and vPvB properties on the basis of its constituents present in a concentration of at least 0.1% was not vitiated by a manifest error;

— the constituents do not have to be individually identified as having PBT or vPvB properties in a separate ECHA decision based on a thorough assessment for that purpose;

— Article 59(3) and Annex XV of REACH were not breached because information on alternative substances was not included in the Annex XV dossier; and

— that there was no breach of the principle of equal treatment

For these reasons the appellants claim that the judgment of the General Court in Case T-95/10 should be set aside and the contested decision should be annulled.

(1) Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC, OJ L 396, p. 1