ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas (Lithuania) lodged on 30 April 2021 — P.I. v Migracijos departamentas prie Lietuvos Respublikos vidaus reikalų ministerijos

(Case C-280/21)

(2021/C 278/46)

Language of the case: Lithuanian

Referring court

Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: P.I.

Respondent: Migracijos departamentas prie Lietuvos Respublikos vidaus reikalų ministerijos

Question referred

Is opposition to an illegally operating and corruptly influential group which oppresses an applicant for asylum through the machinery of the State and against which it is impossible to mount a legitimate defence due to extensive corruption in the State to be regarded as equivalent to attributed political opinion within the meaning of Article 10 of Directive 2011/95/EU? (1)

(1) Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9).
Appeal brought on 28 January 2021 by Topcart GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 18 November 2020 in Case T-377/19, Topcart GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-48/21 P)

(2021/C 297/15)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Topcart GmbH (represented by: M. Hoffmann, Rechtsanwalt)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Carl International

By order of 12 May 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) did not allow the appeal to proceed and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
2.

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: Is a collectively agreed rule that provides for a higher level of compensation for irregular night work than for regular night work compatible with Article 20 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union if that rule is intended to compensate not only for the adverse effects on health caused by night work but also for the burden arising from the greater difficulty in planning for irregular night work?
2.

Having regard to the other provisions of EU law, is the principle of equivalence to be interpreted as conferring subjective rights on individuals against the Member State and as precluding the application of Austrian national rules under which the court must, before disposing of an application for review, which must be directed at the annulment of a separately contestable decision of a contracting authority, determine the type of contract award procedure and the (estimated) contract value as well as the total number of contested, separately contestable decisions from specific award procedures and also, if necessary, the lots from a specific award procedure, in order then to issue, if necessary, an order for regularisation via the presiding judge of the competent chamber of the court for the purpose of recovering fees and then, in the event of non-payment of fees, to prescribe — before or no later than at the same time as rejecting an application for review due to failure to pay fees subsequently demanded — the procedural fees via the chamber of the court competent to deal with the application for review, failing which a loss of entitlement would ensue, when in civil cases in Austria, such as, for example, in the case of actions seeking compensation or injunctions for infringements of competition law, non-payment of fees does not otherwise preclude the disposal of an action, irrespective of the issue of the fees payable for judicial protection, whatever the amount, and, by way of further comparison, in Austria, non-payment of appeal fees for bringing appeals against administrative decisions or for appeals or appeals on points of law against decisions of administrative courts to the Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court) or the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Supreme Administrative Court) does not lead to the dismissal of an appeal owing to non-payment of fees?
1.

Is Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, (1) read in the light of Articles 7, 8, 11 and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and of the principles established by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its judgment of 2 March 2021 in Case C-746/18, to be interpreted as precluding national rules such as those laid down in Article 132(3) of Legislative Decree No 196/2003, which confer powers on the Public Prosecutor, which is a body whose independence and autonomy is fully guaranteed under the rules laid down in Title IV of the Italian Constitution, to require, by reasoned order, the delivery over of traffic data and location data for the purposes of criminal proceedings?
2.

Is it compatible with Directive 2001/29/EC or with the general principles of EU law for national legislation to confer on the aforementioned legal person powers to request information, including accounting information, from those applying for a certificate of exemption from the obligation to pay compensation for private copying?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 25 March 2021 by Turk Hava Yollari AO against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 27 January 2021 in Case T-382/19, Turk Hava Yollari v EUIPO — Sky (skylife)

(Case C-185/21 P)

(2021/C 320/14)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Turk Hava Yollari AO (represented by: R. Almaraz Palmero, abogada)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Sky Ltd

By order of 29 June 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Turk Hava Yollari AO should bear its own costs.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Italy) lodged on 18 January 2021 — Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) v Ryanair DAC

(Case C-380/21)

(2021/C 349/29)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte Suprema di Cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS)

Respondent: Ryanair DAC

Question referred

Can the concept of a person ‘employed principally in the territory of the Member State in which he resides’ contained in Article 14(2)(a)(ii) [of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71, (1) as amended] be interpreted in the same way as that which (concerning judicial cooperation in civil matters, jurisdiction and individual contracts of employment (Regulation (EC) No 44/2001) (2)) Article 19(2)(a) [of the latter Regulation] defines as the ‘place where the employee habitually carries out his work’, including in the aviation and airline crew sector (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91), (3) as expressed in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union referred to in the grounds?

(1) Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community (OJ 1971 L 149, p. 2).

(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1).

(3) Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 of 16 December 1991 on the harmonization of technical requirements and administrative procedures in the field of civil aviation (OJ 1991 L 373, p. 4).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 4 June 2021 — Criminal proceedings against DD

(Case C-347/21)

(2021/C 338/13)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad

Party to the main proceedings

DD

Questions referred

Is the right of the accused person to be present in person under Article 8(1) of Directive 2016/343, (1) read in conjunction with Article 10(1) and recital 44 thereof, safeguarded where a witness has been examined in the absence of the accused person at a separate hearing but the accused person had the opportunity to put questions to that witness at the subsequent hearing but stated that he or she had no questions, or is it necessary, in order to safeguard the right to be present in person, for that examination to be repeated in its entirety, including the questions put by the other parties who were present at the first examination?

Is the right to be defended by a lawyer under Article 3(1) of Directive 2013/48, (2) read in conjunction with Article 12(1) thereof, safeguarded where two witnesses have been examined in the absence of the lawyer at two separate hearings but the lawyer was given the opportunity to put questions to the two witnesses at the subsequent hearing, or is it necessary, in order to safeguard the right of defence by a lawyer, for those two examinations to be repeated in their entirety, including the questions of the other parties from the first hearing, and, in addition, for the lawyer who was absent from the two previous hearings to be given the opportunity to ask his questions?

(1) Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ 2016 L 65, p. 1).

(2) Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty (OJ 2013 L 294, p. 1).
2.

Does the concept of ‘access’ to that information, which the manufacturer is required to grant under Article 61(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/858, include giving the publishers of technical information pursuant to Article 3(45) of Regulation (EU) 2018/858 the authority to use this information for tasks associated with their business in the aftermarket supply chain, or does a right of exploitation of this kind require a separate agreement in the form of an exploitation and republishing licence, which then does not fall within the scope of Article 63 of Regulation (EU) 2018/858 as regards the fees claimed by the manufacturer in this respect? If the first question referred is answered in the negative, and Chapter III of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 applies to end-of-life vehicles, additionally: Does the concept of ‘access’ to that information, which the manufacturer is required to grant under Article 6(1) of Regulation (EU) No 715/2007, include giving the publishers of technical information pursuant to Article 3(15) of Regulation (EU) No 715/2007 the authority to use this information for tasks associated with their business in the aftermarket supply chain, or does a right of exploitation of this kind require a separate agreement in the form of an exploitation and republishing licence, which then does not fall within the scope of Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 715/2007 as regards the fees claimed by the manufacturer in this respect?
4.

In the light of Article 27(1)(e) of Directive 92/83/EEC, do the principles of proportionality and effectiveness, in the context of the objectives and general scheme of that directive, preclude the exemption provided for therein from being denied to the taxable person of a Member State of destination who has received ethyl alcohol-type goods and who relied on the fact that those goods were deemed to be exempt on the basis of an official interpretation of those provisions of that directive by the tax authorities of the Member State of origin, given consistently and over a long period of time and transposed into national law and applied in practice, but which subsequently turns out to be incorrect, in the event that, given the circumstances, it is possible to exclude any possibility of fraud or evasion of excise duty?
In the light of Article 17 TFEU, does a situation in which a religious society that is recognised and established in one Member State of the European Union applies in another Member State for subsidisation of a private school which is recognised as denominational by that religious society and which is operated in that other Member State by an association registered under the law of that other Member State fall within the scope of EU law, in particular Article 56 TFEU?

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht München I (Germany) lodged on 29 June 2021 — KT, NS v FTI Touristik GmbH

(Case C-396/21)

(2021/C 382/21)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht München I

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: KT, NS

Defendant: FTI Touristik GmbH

Question referred

Do restrictions imposed due to an infectious disease that is prevalent at the travel destination constitute a lack of conformity within the meaning of Article 14(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/2302 (1) even if, because of the worldwide spread of the infectious disease, such restrictions were imposed both in the traveller’s place of residence and in other countries?

(1) Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on package travel and linked travel arrangements, amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 90/314/EEC (OJ 2015 L 326, p. 1).
—

treats high-speed maritime passenger transport between the ports of Messina and Reggio Calabria as equivalent to rail transport by sea between the Italian mainland and Sicily, as provided for in Article 2(e) of decreto del Ministero dei trasporti e della navigazione n. 138 T del 31 ottobre 2000 (Decree No 138 T of the Italian Ministry of Transport and Navigation of 31 October 2000), or at least allows them to be treated as equivalent by law;
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla m. st. Warszawy w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 7 June 2021 — J.K. v TP S.A.

(Case C-356/21)

(2021/C 391/08)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy dla m. st. Warszawy w Warszawie

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: J.K.

Defendant: TP S.A.

Question referred

Must Article 3(1)(a) and (c) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (1) be construed as permitting the exclusion from the scope of Council Directive 2000/78/EC, and consequently also as permitting the exclusion from the application of the sanctions laid down in national law pursuant to Article 17 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC, of the freedom of choice of parties to a contract so long as that choice is not based on sex, race, ethnic origin or nationality, in a situation where the alleged discrimination consists in a refusal to enter into a civil-law contract under which work is to be carried out by a self-employed natural person when that refusal is based on the sexual orientation of the prospective counterparty?

(1) OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16.
1.

Must the concept of ‘consumer’, as used in Article 17 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, be interpreted in the light of its content as defined in the context of Council Directive 87/102/EEC (2) of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit, or is its content independent?
1.

Can the provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement, which provide for the continuance of the EAW (1) regime in respect of the United Kingdom, during the transition period provided for in that agreement, be considered binding on Ireland having regard to its significant AFSJ (2) content; and
2.

Is Article 57(4) of Directive 2014/24/EU to be interpreted as exhaustively regulating the optional grounds for exclusion in the sense that the principle of equal treatment (Article 18(1) of that directive) cannot preclude the award of a contract where tenders are submitted that are neither independent nor autonomous?
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 5 March 2021 — Deutsche Lufthansa AG v VR

(Case C-141/21)

(2021/C 422/03)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Deutsche Lufthansa AG

Defendant: VR

The case was removed from the Register of the Court of Justice by order of the President of the Court of 18 June 2021.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d’appel de Paris (France) lodged on 21 July 2021 — Towercast v Autorité de la concurrence, Ministère de l’Économie

(Case C-449/21)

(2021/C 452/09)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour d’appel de Paris

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Towercast

Defendants: Autorité de la concurrence, Ministère de l’Économie

Question referred

Is Article 21(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (1) to be interpreted as precluding a national competition authority from regarding a concentration which has no Community dimension within the meaning of Article 1 of that regulation, is below the thresholds for mandatory ex ante assessment laid down in national law, and has not been referred to the European Commission under Article 22 of Regulation No 139/2004, as constituting an abuse of a dominant position prohibited by Article 102 TFEU, in the light of the structure of competition on a market which is national in scope?

(1) OJ 2004 L 24, p. 1.
3.

Must Article 5 of Directive [2003/88], read in conjunction with Article 31(2) of the Charter, be interpreted as meaning that, where the law of the Member State and the applicable collective agreement provide for the grant of a continuous weekly rest period of at least 42 hours, it is compulsory, following work which has been performed on the working day prior to the weekly rest period, also to grant the twelve-hour daily rest period guaranteed along with it under the relevant legislation of that Member State and the applicable collective agreement, provided that there are no objective, technical or work organisation conditions which preclude this?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 17 September 2021 by Irish Wind Farmers' Association Clg, Carrons Windfarm Ltd, Foyle Windfarm Ltd, Greenoge Windfarm Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 7 July 2021 in Case T-680/19, Irish Wind Farmers' Association and Others v Commission

(Case C-578/21 P)

(2021/C 462/35)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Irish Wind Farmers' Association Clg, Carrons Windfarm Ltd, Foyle Windfarm Ltd, Greenoge Windfarm Ltd (represented by: M. Segura Catalán, abogada, and M. Clayton, avocate)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— order the Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings at first instance and the proceedings of appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appeal is based on two grounds.

By their first ground, the appellants consider that the General Court misinterpreted Article 108 TFEU and Article 4 of Regulation 2015/1589 (1) by holding that the assessment of the concerned aid measure did not require the Commission to open the formal investigation procedure given the absence of serious difficulties as regards its classification as state aid and its compatibility with the internal market.

The first ground is divided into six branches.

First branch: the General Court erred in law as regards the scope of the Commission’s duty to examine facts and points of law in case of unlawful aid.

Second branch: The General Court erred in law in setting a differentiated treatment of the information submitted by Member States and by complainants.

Third branch: The General Court erred in law in the assessment of the duration of the preliminary examination.

Fourth branch: The General Court erred in law in setting the burden of proof to be met by the complainants.

Fifth branch: The General Court erred in law in disregarding the relevance of the system in the United Kingdom for the case at hand.

Sixth branch: The General Court drew an erroneous conclusion from the technical nature of the method for assessing the NAV of fossil fuel electricity generation facilities.

By their second ground, the appellants consider that the General Court distorted the clear sense of evidence put forward by the applicants.

(1) Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 2015 L 248, p. 9).
Do mileage-based motor vehicle leasing agreements with a term of 48 months that are concluded with a consumer constitute ‘car rental services’, and are they therefore covered by the exception from a right of withdrawal under the law on distance selling set out in Article 16(l) of Directive 2011/83/EU? (1)

If Question 1 is answered in the negative:
1.

Is Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, (1) read in conjunction with subparagraphs (e) and (f) of paragraph 1 of the annex to that directive, to be interpreted as meaning that terms are contrary to the requirement of good faith and are to the disadvantage of the consumer if they substantially increase the consumer’s costs under a credit agreement in the event that the consumer does not transfer his or her salary to [an account with] the lending bank each month, taking into account that, under the terms of the agreement, that consumer is obliged to create a pledge on his or her claim to salary, irrespective of how and in which country he or she receives that salary?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 9 September 2021 — UniCredit Bank Austria AG v Verein für Konsumenteninformation

(Case C-555/21)

(2021/C 513/28)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberster Gerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant in the appeal on a point of law: UniCredit Bank Austria AG

Respondent in the appeal on a point of law: Verein für Konsumenteninformation

Question referred

Is Article 25(1) of Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (1) to be interpreted as precluding national legislation that provides for the sum of interest to be paid by the borrower and the costs that are dependent on the duration of the agreement to be proportionally reduced in the event that the borrower exercises the right to repay the amount of credit, either fully or partially, prior to the expiry of the agreed term, with no corresponding rule for costs that are not dependent on the duration of the agreement?

(1) OJ 2014 L 60, p. 34.
5.

If Questions 1 and 2 are answered in the affirmative, when applying the rules on electricity from renewable energy sources to electricity which has been produced only partly from biodegradable waste, can the legal rationale underlying the second subparagraph of Article 5(3) of Directive 2009/28/EC be applied in such a way that those rules apply only to the part of electricity produced from renewable energy sources, and that part is calculated on the basis of the energy content of the individual energy sources?