ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
2.

Do the provisions of Article 1(3) of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the surrender procedure between the Member States of the European Union and Iceland and Norway, as well as those of Articles 21(1) and 67(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and those of Articles 6 and 45(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, allow a Member State, to which an arrest warrant is addressed, to rule again in the case in which another Member State refused to surrender the same person for the purposes of criminal prosecution in the same case, after the requested person has exercised his or her right of free movement and moved from the State in which surrender had been refused to the State to which the new arrest warrant is addressed?
Appeal brought on 3 February 2021 by Bilbaína de Alquitranes, SA against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 16 December 2020 in Case T-645/18, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA v Commission

(Case C-75/21 P)

(2021/C 128/37)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Bilbaína de Alquitranes, SA (represented by: P. Sellar, advocaat, K. Van Maldegem, avocat, M. Grunchard, avocate)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Kingdom of Spain and European Chemicals Agency

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— refer the case back to the General Court for consideration; and

— reserve the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First plea in law, alleging that the General Court's finding that the appellant’s argument that the Commission committed a manifest error did not necessarily imply also the argument that the Commission had infringed the duty of act diligently, is wrong as a matter of law.

Second plea in law, alleging that the General Court was wrong as a matter of law to use an alleged lack of legal clarity of point 4.1.3.5.5 of Annex I to Regulation No 1272/2008 (1) as a ground for dismissing the legal argument that was actually being made by the appellant.

Third plea in law, alleging that the General Court could not rely on the finding that the legal framework was complex in order to excuse the Commission's failure to take into account the lack of CTPHT's (classified pitch, coal tar, high-temp) solubility. The General Court had actually held the opposite in earlier related proceedings (Case T-689/13 DEP, Bilbaina de Alquitranes SA and Others v European Commission). Without any explanation for holding the opposite, the General Court's reasoning is insufficient and contradictory.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the General Court wrongly applied the ordinary, due diligence test. By finding that the Commission acted as any other ordinary, duly diligent administrative authority would, it used an incorrect and inappropriate point of comparison to assess the due diligence and ordinariness of the Commission.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the General Court's statement of reasons is insufficient and contradictory insofar as that court found, without indicating any evidence and by only relying on the opinion of the Advocate General, that the Commission may have had difficulties in correcting its manifest error of assessment, thereby suggesting that Commission’s approach could be excused.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that the General Court was wrong in law to conclude that the Commission's error could be excused by reference to the precautionary principle because it is settled case law that the principle cannot be invoked during the classification of a substance.

(1) Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (OJ 2008, L 353, p. 1).
Action brought on 26 February 2021 — European Commission v Ireland

(Case C-126/21)

(2021/C 148/15)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: J. Tomkin, and S. Grünheid, Agents)

Defendant: Ireland

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that by failing to adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Council Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA of 23 October 2009 on the application, between Member States of the European Union, of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions on supervision measures as an alternative to provisional detention (1) or, in any event, by failing to notify such provisions to the Commission, Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 27 of that Framework Decision;

— order Ireland to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

According to Article 27 of Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA, Member States were to take the necessary measures to comply with the provisions of the Framework Decision by 1 December 2012 and to notify the Commission of such measures.

The Commission considers that Ireland has infringed its obligations under Article 27 of the Council Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA, by failing to adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with the Framework Decision or, in any event, by failing to notify such provisions to the Commission.

(1) OJ 2009, L 294, p. 20.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Budai Központi Kerületi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 2 March 2021 — Criminal proceedings against KI

(Case C-131/21)

(2021/C 182/58)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Budai Központi Kerületi Bíróság

Party to the main proceedings

KI

Question referred

Is it contrary to Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — interpreted in the light of Article 4 of the Additional Protocol No 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) of 1950, and the relevant case-law of the European Court of Human Rights — to initiate a criminal prosecution which is based, in part, on facts in respect of which the defendant has already, in administrative proceedings leading to sanctions and by a final decision, been given an on-the-spot fine which, as a result of non-payment, was converted by means of a court decision into a custodial sentence?
1.

Must the concept of ‘purpose limitation’ as defined in Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (1) (the ‘Regulation’), be interpreted as meaning that the fact that the controller stores in parallel in another database personal data which were otherwise collected and stored for a limited legitimate purpose is consistent with that concept or, conversely, is the limited legitimate purpose of collecting those data no longer valid so far as the parallel database is concerned?
3.

Is it justified, pursuant to Article 2(83) of Regulation No 651/2014, to apply a requirement that the revenues obtained from the principal activity should be re-invested in the principal activities of the entity in question, and must other aspects be assessed in order to determine properly the primary goal of the activities of the institution submitting the project proposal? Would the use made of the revenues obtained (whether they are reinvested in the principal activities or, for example, in the case of a private founder, paid out as dividends to the shareholders) alter that assessment, even in a situation in which most of the revenues come from fees for educational services?
1.

Do Articles 2 (with particular regard to the principle of the rule of law) and 19 TEU, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Articles 120(1) and 126(1) TFEU, Articles 3(1), 6(1)(b) and 12 of Directive 2011/85/EU, (1) Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013, (2) the EU law principles of proportionality, sincere cooperation and effectiveness stemming from Articles 4 and 5 TEU preclude national emergency legislation, such as that laid down in Article 53(8) of Decree-Law No 104 of 14 August 2020, converted, with amendments, into Law No 126 of 13 October 2020, from being interpreted and applied as meaning that that national emergency legislation prevents, even on a temporary basis (from 15 August 2020 to 30 June 2021, and therefore well beyond the period of duration of the state of emergency), the effective and timely judicial review of compliance with fiscal rules which is conferred on, in accordance with the internal constitutional and legislative legal framework, an independent court specialised in accountancy, such as the Corte dei conti (Court of Auditors), by suspending, in particular, judicial review functions over local authorities which are in a situation of severe structural imbalance capable of causing their failure and have started a long term consolidation path and need — for that very reason, and because of the difficulties stemming from the health emergency — more than other entities, to be subject to an independent, effective and timely, monitoring, which prevents the financial crisis from worsening and the deviation from the consolidation path from becoming irreversible and leading to the failure of that authority?
2.

In the event that the data subject — in whose opinion the processing of personal data relating to him has infringed Regulation 2016/679 — simultaneously exercises his right to lodge a complaint under Article 77(1) of that regulation and his right to bring a legal action under Article 79(1) of the same regulation, may an interpretation in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights be regarded as meaning: (a) that the supervisory authority and the court have an obligation to examine the existence of an infringement independently and may therefore even arrive at different outcomes; or (b) that the supervisory authority’s decision takes priority when it comes to the assessment as to whether an infringement has been committed, regard being had to the powers provided for in Article 51(1) of Regulation 2016/679 and those conferred by Article 58(2)(b) and (d) of that regulation?
1.

Is a corporate fare which is more favourable than the standard fare (in casu, EUR 152.00 instead of EUR 169.00), and which is based on a framework agreement between an air carrier and another undertaking and which can be booked only for employees of the undertaking concerned for the purposes of business trips, a reduced fare not available directly or indirectly to the public within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 3(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004? (1)
2.

Where the trade mark proprietor has affixed its trade mark to the cylinder, both on the label and engraved on the neck of the cylinder, when putting a cylinder containing carbon dioxide on the market, do the Bristol-Myers Squibb criteria referred to above, and in particular the so-called condition of necessity, also apply when a third party refills the cylinder with carbon dioxide for the purposes of resale, removes the original label and replaces it with a label bearing that third party’s own trade mark, while at the same time the trade mark of the person that put the cylinder on the market continues to be visible in the engraving on the neck of the cylinder?
Appeal brought on 2 February 2021 by Laure Camerin against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 24 November 2020 in Case T-367/19, Camerin v Commission

(Case C-63/21 P)

(2021/C 228/20)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Laure Camerin (represented by: M. Casado García-Hirschfeld, avocate)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

— Annul the order of the General Court delivered on 24 November 2020 in Case T-367/19;

— Order the Commission to pay all the costs, including those incurred before the General Court.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appeal seeks the annulment of the order under appeal in so far as the General Court declared that there was no longer any need to adjudicate and declared the inadmissibility of the application which sought partial annulment of the decision of the PMO of 17 April 2019 and compensation for the non-material damage that the applicant claims to have suffered as a result of the irregularities allegedly committed by the PMO, which make it impossible for the applicant to live in dignity.

In her appeal, the appellant disputes, in particular paragraphs 50 to 52 and 54 of the order under appeal and paragraphs 57 to 62, 67 and 73 to 74 of that order.

In support of the appeal, the appellant puts forward a single ground of appeal, alleging distortion of the facts and manifest errors of assessment resulting in an incorrect statement of reasons in law.
5.

Are Article 2 TEU, read in conjunction with Article 19(1) thereof, and the first and second paragraphs of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to be interpreted as permitting the adoption of national legislation which amends the conditions under which set-offs can be validly declared in a relationship with a banking institution by expressly giving retroactive effect to the new conditions and declaring set-offs lawfully invoked in an earlier period to be invalid, while, in the Member State concerned, insolvency proceedings concerning the banking institution have been opened and court proceedings for a declaration of invalidity of set-offs invoked against the bank which were subject to different legal conditions at the time they were invoked are pending?
Appeal brought on 15 February 2021 by easyCosmetic Swiss GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Single Judge) delivered on 9 December 2020 in Case T-858/19, easyCosmetic Swiss GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

(Case C-93/21 P)

(2021/C 252/12)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: easyCosmetic Swiss GmbH (represented by: D. Terheggen, Rechtsanwalt, and S. E. Sullivan, Rechtsanwältin)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, U.W.I. Unternehmensberatungs- und Wirtschaftsinformations GmbH

By order of 20 May 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) did not allow the appeal to proceed and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
2.

Should a declaration of termination in principle be permitted without any limitation in time, the following questions are also asked: (a) is it sufficient, for the prospective analysis to be made from the perspective of a traveller with regard to the planned travel period as part of an ex ante assessment, that the abovementioned circumstances and the adverse effect resulting therefrom can already be predicted with a reasonable degree of probability and, in the case of a risk situation that has already occurred, that a significant improvement cannot be expected with a high degree of probability; and (b) does a termination which may have been declared prematurely not come at the expense of the traveller if circumstances already existing at the time of the declaration of termination reveal only immediately prior to the planned start of the trip that the trip cannot ultimately be carried out by the organiser or it would have been unreasonable for the traveller to participate in it?
2.

Do the provisions of Article 11(2) and the first to third subparagraphs of Article 11(4) of Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on driving licences constitute a basis for the Member State in which the holder of a driving licence issued by that State is habitually resident to refuse to recognise and enforce an administrative sanction, in the form of a temporary withdrawal of the right to drive a vehicle, imposed in another Member State for the offence of breaching road traffic regulations and negligently causing moderate bodily harm to another person, an offence committed at a time when the offender held a driving licence issued by the State of residence, for which the driving licence originally issued by the State of conviction had been exchanged?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 6 April 2021 — Italy Emergenza Cooperativa Sociale v Azienda Sanitaria Locale Barletta-Andria-Trani

(Case C-213/21)

(2021/C 289/33)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant and appellant: Italy Emergenza Cooperativa Sociale

Defendant and respondent: Azienda Sanitaria Locale Barletta-Andria-Trani

Question referred

Does Article 10(h) of Directive 2014/24/EU (1) — together with recital 28 of that directive — preclude national legislation which provides that contracts for the provision of emergency ambulance transport services may be directly awarded, on a preferential basis, solely to voluntary organisations — provided that they have been registered for at least six months in the national third sector register, belong to a network of associations and are accredited under the relevant sectoral regional legislation (if any) and on the condition that such an award ensures that the service can be provided within a framework of effective contributions to social goals, which pursues objectives of solidarity, in an economically efficient and appropriate manner and in accordance with the principles of transparency and non-discrimination — to the exclusion of other non-profit organisations, and more specifically social cooperatives, such as non-profit-making social enterprises?

(1) Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65).
1.

Is [the first sentence of] Article 6(3) of Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (Habitats Directive) (1) to be interpreted as being applicable to a situation such as that in the present case in which an authorisation is sought to continue operation of an existing fish farm, where the activity of the fish farm and the discharge of nitrogen and other nutrients remains unchanged in relation to the activity and discharge authorised in 2006, but where no assessment was made of the overall activity and the cumulative effects of all the fish farms in the area in connection with the previous authorisation of the fish farm, in so far as the relevant authorities assessed only the overall additional discharge of nitrogen etc. from the fish farm concerned?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour constitutionnelle (Belgium) lodged on 12 April 2021 — Défense Active des Amateurs d’Armes ASBL, NG, WL v Conseil des ministres

(Case C-234/21)

(2021/C 297/21)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour constitutionnelle

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Défense Active des Amateurs d’Armes ASBL, NG, WL

Defendant: Conseil des ministres

Question referred

Does Article 7(4a) of Directive 91/477/EEC, (1) read in conjunction with points 6 to 9 of category A of Part II of Annex 1 to that directive, infringe Articles 17(1), 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations in that it does not allow Member States to provide for transitional arrangements for firearms covered by category A.9 which were lawfully acquired and registered before 13 June 2017, whereas it allows them to provide for transitional arrangements for firearms covered by categories A.6 to A.8 which were lawfully acquired and registered before 13 June 2017?

(1) Council Directive 91/477/EEC of 18 June 1991 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons ( OJ 1991 L 256, p. 51).
1.

Must Article 27 of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 (1) be interpreted: — as meaning that a failure to provide the information leaflet required under Article 4(2) and (3) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 to a person who meets the conditions described in Article 23(1) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 in itself renders the transfer decision irremediably invalid (and potentially also establishes the responsibility of the Member State to which the person has submitted the new application to take a decision on the application for international protection); — or as meaning that it is for the appellant to prove in court that the procedure would have had a different outcome if the leaflet had been provided to him or her?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State (Netherlands) lodged on 25 May 2021 — Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid v F.

(Case C-324/21)

(2021/C 320/29)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Raad van State

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid

Respondent: F.

Question referred

Must Article 29 of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (OJ 2013 L 180[, p. 31]) be interpreted as meaning that a current transfer time limit, as referred to in Article 29(1) and (2), restarts at the point at which the foreign national, having obstructed the transfer by a Member State by absconding, lodges a fresh application for international protection in another (in this case, a third) Member State?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Judicial da Comarca dos Açores (Portugal) lodged on 14 May 2021 — KU and Others v SATA International — Azores Airlines SA

(Case C-308/21)

(2021/C 329/14)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Tribunal Judicial da Comarca dos Açores

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: KU, OP, GC

Defendant: SATA International — Azores Airlines SA

Question referred

Does a delay of more than three hours to, or the cancellation of, a flight as a result of a breakdown of the supply of fuel at the airport of origin, in the case where that airport is responsible for the management of the fuel system, constitute an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ within the meaning and for the purposes of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
1.

Must the second paragraph of Article 63(1) of Directive 2014/24/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, taken on its own and in conjunction with the scope of the principles of European law, namely equality, non-discrimination and transparency in public procurement, be interpreted as meaning that, if the contracting authority ascertains that an entity on whose capacity an economic operator relies does not fulfil the selection criteria, it is obliged to request that entity’s replacement or that it has the option to request such replacement if the economic operator wishes to be selected?