ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas (Lithuania) lodged on 20 December 2018 — AAS BALTA v UAB GRIFS AG

(Case C-803/18)

(2019/C 82/16)

Language of the case: Lithuanian

Referring court

Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant in cassation: AAS BALTA

Other party to the proceedings in cassation: UAB GRIFS AG

Question referred

Must Articles 15(5) and 16(5) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters be construed as meaning that, in the case of large-risk insurance, an agreement conferring jurisdiction included in the insurance contract concluded between the policyholder and the insurer may be relied on against a person insured under that contract who has not expressly subscribed to that clause and who is habitually resident or established in a Member State other than that of the policyholder and the insurer?

(1) Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1).
3.

If the second question referred is answered in the negative: Is Article 3(4)(b) of Directive 2001/23/EC to be interpreted to mean that the measures necessary to protect the interests of employees in respect of rights conferring on them immediate or prospective entitlement to old-age benefits under supplementary company or intercompany pension schemes have been taken if the national law provides that — the obligation to provide the employee covered by the transfer of a business in insolvency proceedings with old-age benefits under supplementary company or intercompany pension schemes in the future is transferred to the transferee of the business, — the transferee of the business is liable for pension entitlements, the amount of which is determined, inter alia, on the basis of the length of service and the remuneration upon the occurrence of the covered event, to the extent that they are based on periods of service completed after insolvency proceedings are opened, — in that case, the insolvency insurance institution designated under national law does not have to assume responsibility for the part of the pension entitlements accrued before the insolvency proceedings were opened to the extent the amount of those entitlements is calculated on the basis of the remuneration received by the employee as at the date on which the insolvency proceedings were opened, and — neither the transferee nor the insolvency insurance institution is liable for the increases in the pension entitlements that arise due to increases in remuneration after the insolvency proceedings have been opened, but in respect of periods of service completed before that point in time, — the employee may assert, however, this difference in the value of his entitlements in the insolvency proceedings of the transferor?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 13 July 2018 by CeramTec GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 3 May 2018 in Case T-193/17: CeramTec GmbH v EUIPO

(Case C-463/18 P)

(2019/C 93/28)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: CeramTec GmbH (represented by: A. Renck, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 15 January 2019 the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
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That the General Court erred in law both (i) when it held, in paragraphs 30 and 32 of the order under appeal, that it is unlikely that the unlawfulness alleged by the appellant in the action will recur in the future and that the appellant has no interest in pursuing the action, and (ii) when it held, in those same paragraphs, that the relevant issue in this context is whether it is likely that, in the future, a situation will occur in which a draft law is notified to the Commission addressing its concerns regarding existing legislation of the notifying Member State which is the subject of pending infringement proceedings, and in which the Commission refuses access to a detailed opinion delivered on the basis of directive 98/34 (1) which pertains to that draft law, justifying this by a general presumption of non-disclosure following from the need to protect the purpose of those infringement proceedings, while, in law, the relevant issue is not whether such a specific situation is likely to recur, but instead whether the interpretations of regulation 1049/2001 (2) or of directive 98/34 invoked by the Commission and complained about in the appellant’s action are likely to be applied by the Commission in the future.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Judicial da Comarca de Faro (Portugal) lodged on 28 December 2018 — Rolibérica, Lda v Autoridade para as Condições do Trabalho

(Case C-834/18)

(2019/C 112/32)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Tribunal Judicial da Comarca de Faro

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Rolibérica, Lda

Defendant: Autoridade para as Condições do Trabalho

Question referred

Can Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 be interpreted to the effect that it requires the weekly rest period for drivers engaged in the carriage of goods and passengers by road to begin and end between 00:00 on Monday and 24:00 on Sunday or, on the other hand, can it be taken in full and without interruption between each week worked?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport and amending Council Regulations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EC) No 2135/98 and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 (OJ 2006 L 102, p. 1).
2.

Is the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex laid down in Article 4(1) of Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security (1) to be interpreted as precluding a national provision such as Article 60 of Royal Legislative Decree 8/2015 approving the consolidated text of the General Law on Social Security (Real Decreto legislativo 8/2015 por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley General de la Seguridad Social) of 30 October 2015, which absolutely and unconditionally excludes fathers in receipt of a pension, who are able to prove that they have assumed the task of bringing up their children, from entitlement to the credit it establishes for the purposes of calculating retirement, survivor’s and permanent incapacity pensions?
2.

May the terms ‘impede’ or ‘render less attractive’ which are used in the judgment in Case C-98/14 be interpreted — having regard to and in application of Additional Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — as meaning that an unjustified and unreasonable increase in the tax on gaming in a Member State deprives the organisers of games of chance in amusement arcades of their profits in a disproportionate and discriminatory fashion which distorts competition in favour of casinos and infringes the aforementioned Additional Protocol to the ECHR and Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?
1.

Should the provisions of Directive 2008/48/EC of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, as amended, (1) in particular Articles 3(g), 10(1) and 22(1) thereof, be interpreted as precluding ‘non-interest credit costs’, determined as a lump sum in accordance with the statutory calculation formula set out in Article 36a of the ustawa z dnia 12 maja 2011 r. o kredycie konsumenckim (Dziennik Ustaw z 2018 r., poz. 993, tekst jednolity) (Law of 12 May 2011 on Consumer Credit) (Journal of Laws of 2018, item 993, consolidated text) (the Law on Consumer Credit), from being distinguished from the ‘total cost of the credit to the consumer’, as defined in that directive, in a manner that enables the actual non-interest credit costs borne by the loan provider to be concealed from the consumer?
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Općinski građanski sud u Zagrebu — Stalna služba u Sesvetama (Croatia) lodged on 30 July 2018 and 15 January 2019 — QB, RA v Jadransko osiguranje d.d

(Case C-651/18)

(2019/C 295/02)

Language of the case: Croatian

Referring court

Općinski građanski sud u Zagrebu — Stalna služba u Sesvetama

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: QB, RA

Defendant: Jadransko osiguranje d.d

By order of 11 July 2019, the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) declared that the request for a preliminary ruling made by the Općinski građanski sud u Zagrebu (Municipal Civil Court, Zagreb), by decisions of 30 July 2018 and 15 January 2019, is manifestly inadmissible.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 18 December 2018 by FCA US LLC against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 18 October 2018 in Case T-109/17: FCA US v EUIPO — Busbridge

(Case C-795/18 P)

(2019/C 255/19)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: FCA US LLC (represented by: C. Morcom QC)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 20 June 2019 the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
2.

Is Article 62(1), in conjunction with Article 62(2), of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 to be interpreted as meaning that, when a worker becomes unemployed, the competent institution of the Member State of residence must base the calculation of the benefits on the ‘salary’ that the person concerned ‘received’ in respect of his/her last activity as an employed person in the territory of that institution even in the case where, under the national legislation administered by the competent institution, that salary may not be included as a basis for calculating the benefits in the reference period because it was not processed timeously and a notional assessment of the benefit is provided for as an alternative?
1.

By its first ground of appeal, the Commission claims that the General Court erred in law in its interpretation of Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). The first part of that ground alleges an error of law in the interpretation of the content of Article 31(2) of the Charter. The content of the right to an annual period of paid leave, which is enshrined under Article 31(2), is specified in Article 7 of Directive 2003/88. (1) Thus, the General Court erred in law by taking into account other provisions of Directive 2033/88, such as Articles 14 and 23, and considering them to be applicable to the legislature. By the second part of that ground, the Commission alleges an error of law in the interpretation of Article 31(2) of the Charter in so far as the General Court considered that the reduction provided for under Article 6 of Annex X to the Staff Regulations was not compatible with a purported principle of improving the living and working conditions of those concerned. Such a principle has no legal basis. The third part of that ground alleges, in the alternative, an error of law in the interpretation of the other statutory provisions relating to the context of Article 6 of Annex X to the Staff Regulations. The General Court erred in excluding other statutory provisions from its assessment solely on the ground that they existed before the amendment to Article 6 of Annex X to the Staff Regulations. The legislature has broad discretion in the choice of measures to be amended or maintained.
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infringement of Articles 10, 13 and 14 of the Treaty on European Union. Infringement of Articles 114, 168(4)(c), 289 and 294 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: by naming Amsterdam as the seat of the EMA, the contested regulation merely reflects the choice made at the Council meeting of 20 November 2017 without any involvement on the part of the European Parliament. It follows, with regard to the adoption of the regulation, that, by not having been able to influence in any way the content of the decision, the Parliament was essentially divested of its prerogatives, which ought rather to have been fully respected, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties governing the legislative procedure chosen;
1.

Must Articles 2(1)(c), 9, 24, 72 and 73 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 be construed as meaning that the levying by an electronic communications operator on its former customers (to whom it granted promotional benefits in the form of free-of-charge installation, service activation, portability or equipment, or the application of special rates, in exchange for a commitment by customers to observe a tie-in period, which those customers have not fulfilled for reasons attributable to themselves) of an amount which, as required by law, must not exceed the costs incurred by the supplier undertaking for the installation of the service and must be proportionate to the benefit granted to the customer, that benefit being identified and quantified as such in the contract concluded, and therefore may not automatically reflect the total value of the instalments outstanding on the date of termination, constitutes a supply of services liable to VAT?
1.

In order to ensure the effectiveness of EU law and not to render it impossible to benefit from the right to family reunification which, in the second applicant’s submission, is conferred on her by Article 4 of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, (1) must that provision be interpreted as meaning that the sponsor’s child may enjoy the right to family reunification when he attains his majority during the judicial proceedings against the decision which refuses him that right and which was taken when he was still a minor?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo A Coruña (Spain) lodged on 24 January 2019 — Compañía de Tranvías de La Coruña, S.A. v Ayuntamiento de A Coruña

(Case C-45/19)

(2019/C 155/28)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo A Coruña

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Compañía de Tranvías de La Coruña, S.A.

Defendant: Ayuntamiento de A Coruña

Question referred

Having regard to Article 8(3)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, (1) does the maximum term of 30 years for contracts referred to therein begin to run: (a) when the contract is awarded or entered into; (b) on the entry into force of the aforesaid provision; (c) on the day following the expiry of the transitional period established in Article 8(2) of that regulation (3 December 2019), or (d) on any other date deemed correct by the Court of Justice of the European Union?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 1191/69 and 1107/70 (OJ 2007 L 315, p. 1).
1.

Should Article 2(1) of Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on combating late payment in commercial transactions, (1) as transposed into the Polish legal order by Article 4(1) of the Ustawa z dnia 8 marca 2013 r. o terminach zapłaty w transakcjach handlowych (Law of 8 March 2013 on Payment Terms in Commercial Transactions) (consolidated text: Journal of Laws [Dz. U.] of 2019, item 118), be interpreted as meaning that contracts the characteristic performance of which consists in providing a temporary right to use goods in exchange for rent (for instance, lease or rental agreements) must also be regarded as transactions which lead to the delivery of goods or the provision of services for remuneration (commercial transactions)?
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Salzburg (Austria) lodged on 15 February 2019 — ZS v PVA Landesstelle Salzburg

(Case C-118/19)

(2019/C 172/15)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landesgericht Salzburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: ZS

Defendant: PVA Landesstelle Salzburg

The case was removed from the register of the Court of Justice by order of the President of the Court of 22 March 2019.
3.

Lastly, does a provision of national legislation, such as Article 33(3a) which, if interpreted in the sense of allowing consortia of municipalities that are central purchasing bodies to operate in a territory corresponding to that of the participating municipalities as a whole, and so, at most, to the provincial territory, limits the scope of operation of those central purchasing bodies, infringe EU law, in particular the principles of free movement of services and of opening up to competition as far as possible in the field of public service contracts?
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First, in violation of Articles 107(1) and 108(2) TFEU, the General Court erred by concluding that the Commission did not err in law and did not experience serious difficulties in holding that the State guarantees and State loans granted to A/S Femern Landanlæg for the Danish rail Hinterland Connections was not liable to distort competition as the relevant market is not open to competition. The appellant argued that this erroneous conclusion of the General Court is based on four errors in law, corresponding to four sub pleas: a) The General Court erred in law by holding that the State guarantees and State loans granted to A/S Femern Landanlæg are not liable to affect competition although the Fixed Link (operated by Femern A/S) and the Danish rail Hinterland Connections (operated by Femern Landanlæg) together constitute one integrated project and the State guarantees and State loans granted to Femern A/S have already been found to be liable to distort competition. b) The General Court erred in law by holding that the market for the management of railway infrastructure in Denmark is not ‘de lege’ open for competition. c) The General Court erred in law by holding that the market for the management of railway infrastructure in Denmark is not ‘de facto’ open for competition. d) The markets for the construction and maintenance of the railway infrastructure, which are open to competition, are separate from the market for the management and operation, in the strict sense, of the railway infrastructure;
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 6 February 2019 — Agenzia delle Dogane v Silcompa SpA

(Case C-95/19)

(2019/C 182/13)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte suprema di cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Agenzia delle Dogane

Respondent and cross-appellant: Silcompa SpA

Question referred

Is Article 12(3) of Council Directive 76/308/EEC on mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to certain levies, duties, taxes and other measures (1), as amended by Council Directive 2001/44/EC (2), read in conjunction with Article 20 of Council Directive 92/12/EEC on the general arrangements for products subject to excise duty and on the holding, movement and monitoring of such products (3), to be interpreted as meaning that, in proceedings brought against enforcement measures for the collection of excise duty, the court may examine (and if so within what limits) the question of the place (of actual release for consumption) where the irregularity or offence was actually committed where, as in the present case, the same claim, based on the same export transactions, is made, independently, against the taxable person by both the applicant State and the requested State and, in the requested State, proceedings are pending, contemporaneously, both in respect of the national claim and the action for the collection of duties for the other State, and would the court’s finding in that regard invalidate the request for assistance and consequently all the enforcement measures?

(1) Council Directive 76/308/EEC of 15 March 1976 on mutual assistance for the recovery of claims resulting from operations forming part of the system of financing the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, and of the agricultural levies and customs duties (OJ 1976 L 73, p. 18).

(2) Council Directive 2001/44/EC of 15 June 2001 amending Directive 76/308/EEC on mutual assistance for the recovery of claims resulting from operations forming part of the system of financing the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, and of agricultural levies and customs duties and in respect of value added tax and certain excise duties (OJ 2001 L 175, p. 17).

(3) Council Directive 92/12/EEC of 25 February 1992 on the general arrangements for products subject to excise duty and on the holding, movement and monitoring of such products (OJ 1992 L 76, p. 1).
Appeal brought on 25 January 2019 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 15 November 2018 in Case T-793/14: Tempus Energy and Tempus Energy Technology v Commission

(Case C-57/19 P)

(2019/C 148/16)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: É. Gippini Fournier, P. Němečková, Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Tempus Energy Ltd, Tempus Energy Technology Ltd, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber, Extended Composition) of 15 November 2018, notified to the Commission the next day, in Case T-793/14, Tempus Energy Ltd and Tempus Energy Technology Ltd v European Commission; and

— dismiss the application to annul Commission Decision C(2014)5083 final (1) of 23 July 2014 not to raise objections to the aid scheme for the capacity market in the United Kingdom;

alternatively,

— set aside the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber, Extended Composition) of 15 November 2018, notified to the Commission the next day, in Case T-793/14, Tempus Energy Ltd and Tempus Energy Technology Ltd v European Commission;

— refer the case back to the General Court for consideration of the second plea at first instance;

and in any event, order the applicants at first instance to pay the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appeal is based on a single ground: the General Court misinterpreted Article 108, paragraph 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 4, paragraphs 2 and 3 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 (2) of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, by finding that the notified aid measure gave rise to serious doubts as regards its compatibility with the internal market.

Given that the General Court based itself on a series of indicia on serious difficulties, the single ground is divided in the following two prongs on the two series of indicia examined in the contested judgment:

— First prong: The General Court erred in taking into account, as a main indicator of doubts, the length and circumstances of the pre-notification contacts and the complexity and novelty of the measure.

— Second prong: The General Court erred in faulting the Commission for lack of appropriate investigation on certain aspects of the UK capacity market.

(1) Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — Cases where the Commission raises no objections (OJ 2014, C 348, p. 5).

(2) OJ 2015, L 248, p. 9