ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
In view of the wording of Article 145 of Regulation No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code, the outward processing procedure may apply where the operations take place outside the customs territory of the European Union. Accordingly, the fact that the operations took place in the high seas is not such as to preclude application of the provisions of that regulation relating to that customs procedure with economic impact.

Article 148(c) of Regulation No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code must be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of a request for authorisation to use the outward processing procedure, in order to assess whether the economic conditions governing the use of that procedure are satisfied, it is necessary to take account not only of the essential interests of Community producers of products analogous to the finished product resulting from the envisaged processing operations, but also of those of Community producers of products analogous to the basic products or to the intermediate non-EU products intended to be incorporated in the Community goods temporarily exported during those operations.

The economic conditions governing the use of the outward processing procedure contained in Article 148(c) of Regulation No 2913/92 serve to enable the customs authorities to assess whether the use of the outward processing procedure is essentially favourable to the EU industry, while ensuring that the benefits which a trader would derive from that procedure do not result, in return, in significant disadvantages for other EU producers. Those economic conditions must therefore be construed in a manner that allows the customs authorities to take full account of such conflicts of interest within the EU industry.

As regards conflicts of interest, in circumstances in which the processing operation envisaged involves the inclusion, in temporarily exported Community goods, of a significant quantity of a non-Community basic product, and in which the customs duties relating to that basic product are significantly higher than those applicable to the compensating product obtained at the conclusion of that operation, it is necessary to state that the use of the outward processing procedure for that operation is also capable of seriously harming the essential interests of traders producing that basic product within the European Union.

To carry out that same processing operation outside the European Union would allow an operator to import into the European Union the portion corresponding to that basic product while avoiding the payment of customs duties applicable to that basic product, which duties are designed specifically to protect those Community producers from such imports. In that situation, the benefit of the outward processing procedure would provide an additional advantage to the trader requesting that procedure, consisting in the partial exemption which it would obtain from the customs duties applicable to the compensating product, thus rendering more advantageous that type of operation, which nonetheless has an adverse effect on the interests of EU producers.

(see paras 41, 43, 44, 49, operative part)
Article 64(1) TFEU must be interpreted as applying to national legislation which imposes a restriction on the movements of capital referred to in that provision, such as the extended recovery period at issue in the main proceedings, even where that restriction can also be applied to situations which have nothing to do with direct investment, establishment, the provision of financial services or the admission of securities to capital markets.

In that regard, it should be noted, first, that it is apparent from the wording of Article 64(1) TFEU that that provision contains a derogation from the prohibition laid down in Article 63(1) TFEU in favour of the ‘application’ of any restrictions which existed on 31 December 1993 under national law adopted in respect of the movement of capital involving direct investment, establishment, the provision of financial services or the admission of securities to capital markets. Thus, the applicability of Article 64(1) TFEU depends, not on the purpose of the national legislation containing such restrictions, but on its effect. That provision applies to the extent to which that national legislation imposes a restriction on movements of capital involving direct investment, establishment, the provision of financial services or the admission of securities to capital markets. Accordingly, the fact that that legislation may also apply to other situations is not such as to preclude Article 64(1) TFEU from being applicable in the circumstances which it covers.

Secondly, that interpretation is confirmed by the Court’s case-law. According to that case-law, a restriction on capital movements, such as a less favourable tax treatment of foreign-sourced dividends, comes within the scope of Article 64(1) TFEU, inasmuch as it relates to holdings acquired with a view to establishing or maintaining lasting and direct economic links between the shareholder and the company concerned and which allow the shareholder to participate effectively in the management of the company or in its control (judgment of 24 November 2016, SECIL, C‑464/14, EU:C:2016:896, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited). Similarly, according to the Court, a restriction is covered by Article 64(1) TFEU as being a restriction on the movement of capital involving direct investment in so far as it relates to investments of any kind undertaken by natural or legal persons and which serve to establish or maintain lasting and direct links between the persons providing the capital and the undertakings to which that capital is made available in order to carry out an economic activity (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 May 2008, Orange European Smallcap Fund, C‑194/06, EU:C:2008:289, paragraph 102). It is clear from those judgments, and, in particular, from their use of the phrases ‘inasmuch as’ and ‘in so far as’, that the scope of Article 64(1) TFEU does not depend on the specific purpose of a national restriction, but on its effect on the movements of capital referred to in that provision.

(see paras 21, 22, 25, operative part 1)
Case C‑275/15

ITV Broadcasting Limited and Others

v

TVCatchup Limited and Others

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the

Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division))

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive 2001/29/EC — Harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society — Article 9 — Access to cable of broadcasting services — Concept of ‘cable’ — Retransmission of broadcasts of commercial television broadcasters by a third party via the internet — ‘Live streaming’)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 1 March 2017

Approximation of laws — Copyright and related rights — Directive 2001/29 — Harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society — Continued application of other legal provisions — Concept of ‘access to cable of broadcasting services’ — National legislation providing that copyright is not infringed in the case of the immediate retransmission by cable, including via the internet, in the area of initial broadcast, of works broadcast on television channels subject to public service obligations — Not included

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, Recital 60 and Arts 5 and 9)

Article 9 of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, and specifically the concept of ‘access to cable of broadcasting services’, must be interpreted as not covering, and not permitting, national legislation which provides that copyright is not infringed in the case of the immediate retransmission by cable, including, where relevant, via the internet, in the area of initial broadcast, of works broadcast on television channels subject to public service obligations.

As regards Article 9 of Directive 2001/29, as the Advocate General noted at points 37 and 38 of his Opinion, it is apparent from that provision, read in the light of recital 60 of that directive, that Article 9 is intended to maintain the provisions applicable in areas other than that harmonised by the directive. Indeed, an interpretation of Article 9 of Directive 2001/29 to the effect that it permits a retransmission, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, without the consent of the authors, in cases other than those provided for in Article 5 of that directive, would run counter not only to the objective of Article 9, but also to the exhaustive nature of Article 5, and, consequently, would be detrimental to the achievement of the principal objective of that directive which is to establish a high level of protection of authors.

It is irrelevant whether the protected works were initially broadcast on television channels subject to public service obligations. Indeed, there is no basis in Directive 2001/29 that would justify affording less protection to those channels’ content.

(see paras 26-29, operative part)
Case C‑91/15

Kawasaki Motors Europe NV

v

Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Douane

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from the Gerechtshof Amsterdam)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Assessment of validity — Regulation (EC) No 1051/2009 — Common Customs Tariff — Tariff classification — Combined Nomenclature — Heading 8701 — Tractors — Subheadings 8701 90 11 to 8701 90 39 — Agricultural tractors (excluding pedestrian-controlled tractors) and forestry tractors, wheeled, new — Light four-wheeled all terrain vehicles designed to be used as tractors’

Summary– Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber), 22 September 2016

Customs union — Common Customs Tariff — Tariff headings — New all terrain four-wheeled vehicles able to push twice their own weight or more — Regulation No 1051/2009 — Included in subheading 8701 90 90 of the Combined Nomenclature — Invalidity of paragraph 2 of the annex to that regulation

Where a national court has doubts as to the validity of a classification regulation which it must apply by analogy to goods which are sufficiently similar to those covered by that regulation, it is justified for that court to submit a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court to assess the validity of that regulation. (see para. 39)

Paragraph 2 of the annex to Regulation No 1051/2009 concerning the classification of certain goods in the Combined Nomenclature is invalid in so far as it classifies the vehicle described in that paragraph under subheading 8107 90 90 of that Combined Nomenclature, as amended by Commission No 948/2009, and not under one of subheadings 8701 90 11 to 8701 90 39 of that Combined Nomenclature, which correspond to the engine power of that vehicle. New all terrain four-wheeled vehicles with one seat only, fitted with Ackerman steering controlled by a handlebar, equipped with a towing hitch and the technical characteristics of which enable them to push twice their own weight or more, must be classified in subheading 8701 90 of the combined nomenclature, classification of those vehicles in eight-digit subheadings being determined by their engine power. In that regard, only eight-digit subheadings 8701 90 11 to 8701 90 39 of the combined nomenclature are relevant, relating to agricultural tractors and forestry tractors, new. (see paras 41, 46, 48, 62, 63, operative part)
Case C‑592/15

Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs

v

British Film Institute

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the

Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Civil Division))

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Value added tax — Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC — Article 13A(1)(n) — Exemptions for certain cultural services — No direct effect — Determination of the exempt cultural services — Discretion of the Member States)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 15 February 2017

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Exemptions provided for in the Sixth Directive — Exemptions for certain activities in the public interest — Article 13A(1)(n) — Exemption for certain cultural services — No direct effect

(Council Directive 77/388, Art. 13A(1)(n))

Article 13A(1)(n) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes

Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment, exempting ‘certain cultural services’, must be interpreted as not being of direct effect, so that in the absence of transposition that provision may not be relied on directly by a body governed by public law or other cultural body recognised by the Member State concerned supplying cultural services.

The literal interpretation of Article 13A(1)(n) of the Sixth Directive is confirmed by the history of the directive and the objectives pursued by the EU legislature.

It must therefore be considered that, by referring to ‘certain cultural services’, Article 13A(1)(n) of the Sixth Directive does not require the exemption of all cultural services, so that the Member States may exempt ‘certain’ of them while subjecting others to VAT.

(see paras 19, 23, 28, operative part)
4.

Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures against Iran — Legal basis — Restrictive measures adopted on the basis of Article 215 TFEU or Article 291 TFEU — Distinction between adoption procedures — Adoption in the context of Article 291 TFEU not subject to a joint proposal of the High Representative and the Commission — No breach of the principle of equal treatment (Arts 215 TFEU, 263, fourth para., TFEU and 291(2), TFEU) (see paras 50, 51)
Regulation No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings is based on a so-called attenuated universality model, according to which, first, the law applicable to the main insolvency proceedings and its effects is that of the Member State within the territory of which those proceedings were opened, albeit that, secondly, that regulation lays down a number of exceptions to that rule. Article 5(1) of that regulation lays down one of those exceptions. That provision, by derogating from the rule of the law of the Member State of the opening of the proceedings, allows the law of the Member State on whose territory the asset concerned is situated to be applied to the right in rem of a creditor or a third party over certain assets belonging to the debtor.

Article 5 of Regulation No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings must be interpreted to the effect that security created by virtue of a provision of national law by which the real property of a person owing real property taxes is, by operation of law, to be subject to a public charge and that property owner must accept enforcement of the decision recording that tax debt against that property, constitutes a right in rem for the purposes of that article.

In that regard, whilst Article 5(2) and (3) of Regulation No 1346/2000 does not define the notion of a right in rem, it does, however, explain, through a number of examples of rights described in that regulation as in rem, the scope and therefore the limits of the protection afforded by that provision to the privileges, guarantees or other rights under the national law of the Member States of the creditors of an insolvent debtor. A right satisfies the criteria laid down in Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1346/2000, in order not to render ineffective the limitation on the scope of Article 5 of that regulation to rights ‘in rem’, where, first, it is a charge which directly and immediately encumbers taxed real property and, secondly, the owner of the real property must accept enforcement against that property. Furthermore, during insolvency proceedings the tax authorities have the status of a preferential creditor on the basis of the charge over the property.

Moreover, neither the wording of the provisions of Regulation No 1346/2000 nor its objectives make it possible to interpret Article 5 of that regulation to the effect that it does not cover rights in rem granted outside the context of a commercial transaction.

In any event, an interpretation of Article 5 of Regulation No 1346/2000 to the effect that the exception which it makes provision for covers solely rights in rem created in the context of commercial or credit transactions would lead to unfavourable treatment of the owners of rights in rem granted in the context of transactions other than commercial transactions.

(see paragraphs 21, 23, 26, 30, 32 and operative part)
Case C‑652/15

Furkan Tekdemir

v

Kreis Bergstraße

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from the Verwaltungsgericht Darmstadt)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Association Agreement between the European Union and Turkey — Decision No 1/80 — Article 13 — ‘Standstill’ clause — Right of residence of members of the family of a Turkish worker duly registered as belonging to the labour force of a Member State — Existence of an overriding reason in the public interest justifying new restrictions — Efficient management of migration flows — Requirement for nationals of third countries under 16 years old to hold a residence permit — Proportionality)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 29 March 2017

International agreements — EEC-Turkey Association Agreement — Freedom of movement for persons — Workers — ‘Standstill’ rule in Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 of the Association Council — Scope — National legislation laying down new restrictions — Requirement for nationals of third countries under 16 years old to hold a residence permit — Justification for overriding reasons in the public interest — Efficient management of migration flows — Breach of principle of proportionality — Conditions

(Decision No 1/80 of the EEC-Turkey Association Council, Art. 13)

Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 of the Association Council of 19 September 1980 on the development of the Association set up by the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, signed in Ankara on 12 September 1963 by the Republic of Turkey, on the one hand, and by the Member States of the EEC and the Community, on the other, and concluded, approved and confirmed on behalf of the Community by Council Decision 64/732/EEC of 23 December 1963 must be interpreted as meaning that the objective of efficient management of migration flows may constitute an overriding reason in the public interest capable of justifying a national measure, introduced after the entry into force of that decision in the Member State in question, requiring nationals of third countries under the age of 16 years old to hold a residence permit in order to enter and reside in that Member State.

Such a measure is not, however, proportionate to the objective pursued where the procedure for its implementation as regards child nationals of third countries born in the Member State in question and one of whose parents is a Turkish worker lawfully residing in that Member State, such as the applicant in the main proceedings, goes beyond what is necessary for attaining that objective.

(see operative part)
Case C‑699/15

Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs

v

Brockenhurst College

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from theCourt of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division))

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Taxation — Value added tax (VAT) — Directive 2006/112/EC — Exemptions — Supply of restaurant and entertainment services by an educational establishment to a limited public in return for consideration)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 4 May 2017

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Exemptions — Exemptions for certain activities in the public interest — Exemptions for children’s or young people’s education, school or university education, vocational training or retraining — Supplies of services and of goods closely related thereto — Scope — Supply of restaurant and entertainment services by an educational establishment to a limited public — Included — Conditions — Verification a matter for the national court

(Council Directive 2006/112, Art. 132(1)(i))

Article 132(1)(i) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that activities carried out in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, consisting in students of a higher education establishment supplying, for consideration and as part of their education, restaurant and entertainment services to third parties, may be regarded as supplies ‘closely related’ to the principal supply of education and accordingly be exempt from value added tax (VAT), provided that those services are essential to the students’ education and that their basic purpose is not to obtain additional income for that establishment by carrying out transactions which are in direct competition with those of commercial enterprises liable for VAT, which it is for the national court to determine.

(see para. 43, operative part)
Joined Cases C‑217/15 and C‑350/15

Criminal proceedings

against

Massimo Orsi

and

Luciano Baldetti

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from the Tribunale di Santa Maria Capua Vetere)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Taxation — Value added tax — Directive 2006/112/EC — Articles 2 and 273 — National legislation providing for an administrative penalty and a criminal penalty for the same offences, relating to the non-payment of value added tax — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Article 50 — Ne bis in idem principle — Identity of the accused or penalised person — Absence)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 5 April 2017

Fundamental rights — Ne bis in idem principle — Institution of criminal proceedings against a natural person following the imposition of a tax penalty in respect of the same facts on a company with legal personality — Infringement — Absence

(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 50)

Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which permits criminal proceedings to be brought for non-payment of value added tax, after the imposition of a definitive tax penalty with respect to the same act or omission, where that penalty was imposed on a company with legal personality, while those criminal proceedings were brought against a natural person.

(see para. 27, operative part)
Appeal—Grounds—Mistaken assessment of the facts—Inadmissibility—Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence—Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see paras 30-32, 98, 99)
Appeal—Grounds—Inadequate or contradictory grounds—Scope of the obligation to state reasons—Scope of the Court’s review of judgments of the General Court

(Art. 256(1), second para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 36 and 53, first para.)

(see para. 27)