ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
2.

Is Article 1 of Regulation (EU) No 547/2011, read in combination with paragraph 1(f) of Annex I thereto, to be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of a parallel import of a plant protection product, the batch number initially allocated by the manufacturer must be indicated on the packaging, or is it compatible with that provision for the parallel importer to remove the original batch number and to affix its own identification number to the packaging, provided it keeps records showing the correlation between the batch numbers used by it and the batch numbers used by the holder of the authorisation of the plant protection product imported in parallel?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel București (Romania) lodged on 21 December 2021 — R.I. v Inspecția Judiciară, N.L.

(Case C-817/21)

(2022/C 165/32)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel București

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: R.I.

Respondents: Inspecția Judiciară, N.L.

Question referred

Must Article 2 and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union, Decision 2006/928 (establishing a mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Romania to address specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption), (1) and the guarantees of independence and impartiality imposed under EU law, be interpreted as precluding national legislation which allows the chief inspector of the Judicial Inspectorate to issue administrative acts of a normative nature (subordinate to the law) and/or an individual nature by which he or she decides autonomously on the organisation of the institutional framework of the Judicial Inspectorate for the selection of judicial inspectors and the assessment of their activity, the conduct of the inspection activities, and the appointment of the deputy chief inspector, where, under organic law, those persons alone may carry out, approve or reject acts of disciplinary investigation in respect of the chief inspector?

(1) Commission Decision 2006/928 of 13 December 2006 establishing a mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Romania to address specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption (OJ 2006 L 354, p. 56).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 10 November 2021 by Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 1 September 2021 in Case T-463/20, Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe v EUIPO

(Case C-678/21 P)

(2022/C 148/14)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe Ltd (represented by: S. Malynicz, BL, M. Maier, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 24 February 2022, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe Ltd shall bear its own costs.
1.

In relation to the pursuit of an action to enforce the restitutory effects of a declaration of nullity of a term under which the borrower is required to pay the costs of formalising the contract, is it compatible with Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13 (1) to make the bringing of the action subject to a 10-year limitation period which starts to run from when the term exhausts its effects upon settlement of the final payment, the point at which the consumer becomes aware of the facts which establish the unfairness, or is it necessary for the consumer to be in possession of additional information concerning the legal assessment of the facts? Given that the action for restitution is subject to a long limitation period of 10 years, at what point must the consumer be in a position to be aware of the unfairness of the term and of the rights granted to him or her under Directive 93/13 — before the limitation period starts to run or before that period expires?
1.

Is Article 8(1) of Directive 2012/13/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings (OJ 2012 L 142, p. 1), read in conjunction with Article 6(2) thereof, to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which is applied in a corrective manner on the basis of settled case-law in the EU Member State concerned and under which it is permissible that information concerning the grounds for detaining a suspect, including information concerning the criminal offence of which he or she is suspected, is not contained in the written detention order, but in other accompanying documents (originating before or after that order) which are not provided to him or her immediately and of which the person can subsequently be informed in the event that he or she challenges the legality of the detention before the courts?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 19 December 2021 by Ioana-Felicia Rosca against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 20 October 2021 in Case T-434/19, Rosca v Commission

(Case C-802/21 P)

(2022/C 398/12)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Ioana-Felicia Rosca (represented by: L.-O. Tufler, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 07/09/2022, the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) held that the appeal is dismissed as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded and that Ms Ioana-Felicia Rosca should bear her own costs.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 16 August 2021 by Bálint Krátky against the order of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 22 June 2021 in Case T-13/21 Krátky v European Parliament and Others

(Case C-503/21 P)

(2022/C 222/09)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Parties

Appellant: Bálint Krátky (represented by: I. Kriston, ügyvéd)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Parliament, Council of the European Union, European Commission

By order of 22 March 2022, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Ninth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the costs.
(i)

First, the General Court so erred by its interpretation concerning the conditions in which the Commission could refuse to register a European citizens’ initiative — in particular when it found that such a refusal may occur only where the possibility for the Commission of submitting a proposal for an EU legal act for the purpose of implementing the Treaties may be totally excluded. However, such an initiative, it is submitted, manifestly falls outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for an EU legal act if, following a legal assessment in abstracto of the measures proposed, there are serious doubts that such measures could be adopted on the basis of the Treaties.
3.

For the purposes of European legislation and Directive 2000/31/EC in particular, can the notion of passive hosting provider be used only in the absence of any activity involving the filtering, selection, indexing, organisation, cataloguing, aggregation, evaluation, use, modification, extraction or promotion of the contents published by users, deemed to be illustrative indicators which do not all have to coexist since they are to be regarded in their own right as indicating business management of the service and/or the adoption of a technique for assessing user behaviour to increase their loyalty, or is it for the referring court to assess the relevance of those circumstances so that, if one or more of them exists, the neutrality of the service which leads to classification as passive hosting provider may be regarded as overriding?
Action brought on 8 February 2022 — European Commission v Republic of Bulgaria

(Case C-85/22)

(2022/C 148/24)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: Gr. Koleva, C. Hermes)

Defendant: Republic of Bulgaria

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

(1) declare that the Republic of Bulgaria has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 4(4) and Article 6(1) of Directive 92/43/EEC (1) on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (‘the Habitats Directive’), by: — failing to designate as soon as possible and within six years at most as special areas of conservation (‘SACs’) 194 out of a total of 229 sites of Community importance (‘SCIs’), adopted by Decisions 2009/93/EC, 2009/91/EC and 2009/92/EC of 12 December 2008 and Decision 2013/23/EU of 16 November 2012; — systematically and persistently failing to fulfil its obligation to set detailed site-specific conservation objectives; — systematically and persistently failing to fulfil its obligation to establish the necessary conservation measures which correspond to the ecological requirements of the natural habitat types in Annex I and the species in Annex II present on the site, and — failing correctly to transpose Article 6(1) into national law.

(2) order Bulgaria to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The present case concerns the incorrect transposition of Article 6(1) and the misapplication of Article 4(4) and Article 6(1) of the Habitats Directive on the part of Bulgaria.

Article 4(4) of the Habitats Directive requires, inter alia, once a given site has been adopted as a site of Community importance in accordance with the procedure laid down in paragraph 2 of that provision, that the Member State concerned designate it as an SAC as soon as possible and within six years at most. In the judgment in Case C-849/19, Commission v Greece (EU:C:2020:1047), the Court stated that the Member States are required also to set specific conservation objectives for each SAC. Article 6(1) of the Habitats Directive provides that in the context of SACs, Member States are to establish the necessary conservation measures involving, if need be, appropriate management plans specifically designed for the sites or integrated into other development plans, and appropriate statutory, administrative or contractual measures which correspond to the ecological requirements of the natural habitat types in Annex I and the species in Annex II present on the sites.

According to the Commission, the Republic of Bulgaria has failed to fulfil its obligations under those provisions to designate SACs within the required time limit; to set detailed site-specific conservation objectives; to establish the necessary conservation measures; and correctly to transpose into national law Article 6(1) of the Habitats Directive.

(1) OJ 1992 L 206, p. 7.
1.

a. Is Article 6(1)(b) and (f) of the General Data Protection Regulation (1) to be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of a partnership comprised of many members of the public, a limited partner with negligible liability has a ‘legitimate interest’ in obtaining information relating to all partners with shares held indirectly through a trustee, together with their contact details and the number of their shares in such a partnership, and a contractual obligation to that effect must be inferred from the partnership agreement? b. Or is a legitimate interest restricted under such circumstances to obtaining from the partnership information on limited partners with shares held indirectly and, rather than bearing negligible liability, hold shares above a minimum threshold that may, at least potentially, allow them to influence the future of the partnership?
3.

Do extraordinary circumstances within the meaning of Article 5(3) of the regulation exist where the impact of an air traffic management decision in relation to a particular aircraft on a particular day gives rise to a long delay, an overnight delay or the cancellation of one or more flights by that aircraft, irrespective of the reason for that decision?
1.

Having regard to recitals 4 and 6 of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (1) establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union and to Article 4(2) TEU, must Article 65(1)(b) TFEU be interpreted as meaning that it permits the laying down of rules such as those in Paragraph 85 of veszélyhelyzet megszűnésével összefüggő átmeneti szabályokról és a járványügyi készültségről szóló 2020. évi LVIII. törvény (Law LVIII of 2020 on transitional provisions relating to the end of the state of emergency and to the pandemic crisis), and in particular those in Paragraph 276(1) and (2)(a) and Paragraph 283(1)(b) of that law?
2.

(a) Must Articles 79(b) and 80(g) of that directive, in conjunction with point 2.2 of the Guidelines on Good Distribution Practice of medicinal products of 5 November 2013, be interpreted as meaning that the staffing requirements are fulfilled even where, as in the main proceedings, the responsible person is (physically) absent from the premises for a period of four hours but can be contacted by telephone during that time? (b) Must Directive 2001/83, in particular Articles 79 and 80(g) thereof, in conjunction with the first paragraph of point 2.3 of the Guidelines on Good Distribution Practice of medicinal products of 5 November 2013, be interpreted as meaning that the staffing requirements provided for in those provisions and guidelines are met where, as in the main proceedings, in the event that the responsible person is absent as described in Question 2(a), the staff present on the premises are not able, in particular in the event of an inspection by the competent authority of the Member State, to provide information themselves on the written procedures relating to their respective areas of responsibility? (c) Must Directive 2001/83, and in particular Articles 79 and 80(g) thereof, in conjunction with point 2.3 of the Guidelines on Good Distribution Practice of medicinal products of 5 November 2013, be interpreted as meaning that, in assessing whether an adequate number of competent personnel is involved in all stages of the wholesale distribution activities, account must also be taken of activities outsourced to third parties (or activities carried out by third parties on behalf of the establishment), as occurred in the case in the main proceedings, and does that directive preclude or even require the obtaining of an expert report for the purposes of that assessment?
2.

In the event that the Court of Justice answers the first question in the negative, is the evaluation of the applicant’s individual situation and personal circumstances in the context of the assessment of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, which the Court has already clarified must be taken into account, more comprehensive than the assessment of the individualisation requirement referred to in the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in N.A. v. United Kingdom? (2) Can those factors, in the case of the same application for subsidiary protection, be taken into account when assessing both Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive and Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive?
3.

If the second question is answered in the affirmative, must Article 5(1)(b) and the second subparagraph of Article 5(1) of Directive 2014/23/EU (2) be interpreted as meaning that the operating risk in exploiting those services must not be transferred to the contractor if the contract awarded: (a) is based on gross cost, with the contracting entity receiving the revenue; (b) only envisages as operating revenue for the operator a fee paid by the [contracting] entity, commensurate with the volume of services provided (and therefore excluding demand risk); (c) leaves the contracting entity with demand-side operating risk (reduction in fees due to a decline in service volumes below a predefined threshold), regulatory risk (resulting from legislative or regulatory changes and delay in the granting of authorisation and/or certification by the competent bodies), financial risk (non-payment or late payment of fees and failure to adjust fees), and risk of force majeure (resulting from an unforeseeable change in the service performance conditions); (d) transfers to the contractor supply side operating risk (changes in the costs of factors such as energy, raw materials and supplies that are beyond the operator’s control), industrial relations risk (resulting from changes in staff costs under a collective agreement), management risk (resulting from an increase in operating costs due to incorrect estimates), and socio-environmental risk (resulting from operating incidents involving assets needed to provide the service)?
Appeal brought on 17 February 2022 by Helene Hamers against the judgment delivered by the General Court (First Chamber) on 21 December 2021 in Case T-159/20 Hamers v Cedefop

(Case C-111/22 P)

(2022/C 222/18)

Language of the case: Greek

Parties

Appellant: Helene Hamers (represented by: Vasileios Spiridon Christianos, Alexandros Politis and Michail Rodopoulos, dikigoroi)

Other party to the proceedings: European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop)

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside in part the judgment of the General Court of 12 December 2021 in Case T-159/20, Hamers v Cedefop, EU:T:2021:913,

— if need be, refer the case back to the General Court for judgment,

— order Cedefop to pay all the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The subject matter of the judgment under appeal was the harm suffered by the appellant due to acts and omissions of Cedefop before, during and subsequent to national criminal proceedings before the Greek judicial authorities, which concerned the regularity and lawfulness of the award of public contracts by Cedefop to third parties from 2001 to 2005.

The appellant raises two grounds of appeal and claims that the judgment under appeal:

— first, in paragraphs 55 to 61 and 83, contains an error of law in the interpretation of Article 41(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), because, contrary to the General Court’s finding in those paragraphs, the appellant was not examined impartially by Cedefop and, moreover, the decision of the Cedefop Appeals Committee did not remedy the flaw in the decision of 3 July 2019. At the same time, on those grounds, the General Court gave inadequate reasons in the paragraphs referred to above.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Alba Iulia (Romania) lodged on 14 March 2022 — Vantage Logistics S.R.L. v Administraţia Judeţeană a Finanţelor Publice Alba, Auto Help Alba S.R.L., Banca Transilvania S.A., BRD — Groupe Société Générale S.A., S.C. Croma S.R.L., S.C. Polaris M.Holding, S.C. Elit România Piese Auto Originale S.R.L., S.C. Nedo Auto Service S.R.L., CH Insolvency I.P.U.R.L. as court-appointed liquidator of S.C. Nedo Auto Service S.R.L.

(Case C-200/22)

(2022/C 222/29)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Alba Iulia

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Vantage Logistics S.R.L

The other parties to the proceedings: Administrația Județeană a Finanțelor Publice Alba, Auto Help Alba S.R.L, Banca Transilvania S.A., BRD — Groupe Société Générale S.A., S.C. Croma S.R.L., S.C. Polaris M.Holding, S.C. Elit România Piese Auto Originale S.R.L., S.C. Nedo Auto Service S.R.L., CH Insolvency I.P.U.R.L. as court-appointed liquidator of S.C. Nedo Auto Service S.R.L.

Question referred

Can EU law, the principle of respect for, and protection of, the right to private property derived from Article 17 of the Charter [of Fundamental Rights of the European Union], the principle of the primacy of EU law over national law and, in particular, the first sentence of Article 9(6) of Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on preventive restructuring frameworks, on discharge of debt and disqualifications, and on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures concerning restructuring, insolvency and discharge of debt, and amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 (Directive on restructuring and insolvency), (1) be interpreted as precluding national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings (Article 139(1) [point] (C) of Law No 85/2014], which, in the context of insolvency proceedings, [allows] the reorganisation/restructuring plan to be deemed to have been accepted if, where there are two or four categories of claims, at least half the number of categories votes in favour of it, provided that one of the disadvantaged categories accepts the plan and at least 30 % of the total, by value, of the general body of creditors accepts that same plan?

(1) OJ 2019 L 172, p. 18.
1.

Is Article 12(2) of Directive (EU) 2015/2302 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on package travel and linked travel arrangements to be interpreted (a) as meaning that the assessment of the justification of the termination must be based solely on such unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances as have already occurred at the time of termination, (b) or as meaning that it is also necessary to take into account extraordinary circumstances that actually occur after the termination but before the planned start of the journey (being the latest possible date of termination)? If (a) is answered in the affirmative: (aa) : Is Article 12(2) of the directive to be interpreted as meaning that, in the course of legal proceedings on the justification of termination, travellers may also rely on such unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances as had already occurred at the time of termination but of which they only became aware later?
1.

Should Article 7 of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (1) and Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings (namely Article 5(8) of decreto-legge 6 luglio 2012, n. 95, Disposizioni urgenti per la revisione della spesa pubblica con invarianza dei servizi ai cittadini nonché misure di rafforzamento patrimoniale delle imprese del settore bancario (Decree-Law No 95 of 6 July 2012 on urgent provisions for the revision of public expenditure with no change in services to citizens and measures to strengthen the capital base of companies in the banking sector), converted, with amendments, by Article 1(1) of legge 7 agosto 2012, n. 135 (Law No 135 of 7 August 2012)), which, for reasons of public expenditure containment and organisational requirements of the public sector as employer, does not permit the monetisation of leave in the event that an employee in the public service resigns? Further,
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 1 February 2022 by Industria de Diseño Textil SA (Inditex) against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 1 December 2021 in Case T-467/20, Inditex v EUIPO — Ffauf Italia (ZARA)

(Case C-65/22 P)

(2022/C 244/14)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Industria de Diseño Textil SA (Inditex) (represented by: C. Duch Fonoll and S. Sáenz de Ormijana Rico, abogadas)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Ffauf Italia SpA

By order of 6 May 2022, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Industria de Diseño Textil SA (Inditex) should bear its own costs.