ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 30 January 2018 — Jean Patou Worldwide v EUIPO — Emboga (HISPANITAS JOY IS A CHOICE)

(Case T‑808/16)

(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU figurative mark HISPANITAS JOY IS A CHOICE — Earlier EU word mark JOY — Genuine use of the earlier mark — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Similarity of the signs — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

1. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 21, 22)

2. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Similarity of the marks concerned—Criteria for assessment—Composite mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 29, 30, 40)

3. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Figurative mark HISPANITAS JOY IS A CHOICE and word mark JOY (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 31, 35, 42-44, 54, 56)

4. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Criteria for assessment—Distinctiveness or reputation of the earlier mark—Effect (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 50, 51)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 23 June 2016 (Case R 235/2016-1), relating to opposition proceedings between Jean Patou Worldwide and Emboga.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Common foreign and security policy—Restrictive measures taken having regard to the situation in Ukraine—Freezing of funds of persons involved in the misappropriation of public funds belonging to the Ukrainian State—Infringement of the right to property and of the freedom to conduct a business—Breach of principle of proportionality—None

(Art. 21(2)(b) TEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts 16 and 17(1); Council Decisions 2014/119/CFSP, recital 2 and (CFSP) 2016/318; Council Regulation (EU) 2016/311)

(see paras 49-58, 67-71, 75-78)
Two marks are similar when, from the point of view of the relevant public, they are at least partially identical as regards one or more relevant aspects.

In contrast to the concept of similarity, the concept of identity implies, in principle, that the two elements compared should be the same in all respects. However, since, first, the perception of identity must be assessed with regard to an average, reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect consumer and, secondly, the perception of identity is not the result of a direct comparison of all the characteristics of the elements compared, insignificant differences which may go unnoticed by an average consumer do not mean that the signs under comparison are not identical. Consequently, a sign is identical to a trade mark where it reproduces, without any modification or addition, all the elements constituting the trade mark or where, viewed as a whole, it contains differences so insignificant that they may go unnoticed by an average consumer.

(see paras 56, 57)
Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 11 July 2018 –

Enoitalia v EUIPO — La Rural Viñedos y Bodegas (ANTONIO RUBINI)

(Case T‑707/16)

(EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU word mark ANTONIO RUBINI — Earlier EU figurative mark RUTINI — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Similarity of the signs — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

1. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 16, 17, 69, 76)

2. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Assessment of the likelihood of confusion—Attention level of the public (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 22)

3. EU trade mark—Surrender, revocation and invalidity—Relative grounds for invalidity—Existence of an identical or similar earlier mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Word mark ANTONIO RUBINI and figurative mark RUTINI (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 8(1)(b) and 53(1)(a)) (see paras 23, 26, 41-44, 51, 58, 64-68, 78-80)

4. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Similarity of the marks concerned—Criteria for assessment—Composite mark—Assessment of the distinctiveness of an element composing a trade mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 27, 28, 38-40, 46)

5. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Similarity of the marks concerned—Whether conceptual differences may neutralise visual or aural similarities—Conditions (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 63)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 28 June 2016 (Case R 1085/2015-5), relating to invalidity proceedings between La Rural Viñedos y Bodegas and Enoitalia.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judicial proceedings—Application initiating proceedings—Formal requirements—Brief summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based—Abstract statement—Inadmissibility

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 21, first para. and 53, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 177(1)(d))

(see paras 45, 46)
Compliance with the reasonable time requirement in the conduct of administrative procedures constitutes a general principle of EU law which is enforced by the European Union Courts and is, moreover, laid down as a component of the right to good administration by Article 41(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

However, infringement of the reasonable time principle does not, as a general rule, justify the annulment of a decision taken at the culmination of an administrative procedure. It is only where the passing of an excessive period is likely to have an effect on the actual substance of the decision adopted at the end of the administrative procedure that non-compliance with the reasonable time principle affects the validity of the administrative procedure.

Thus, the Civil Service Tribunal erred in law in finding that the decision to make the appointment of a temporary staff member subject to the deferment of medical cover with retroactive effect from the date of his entering the service had, in effect, been converted into a decision to exclude the person concerned, with immediate effect, from receiving invalidity benefits in respect of invalidity that had already occurred. The sole fact that the decision to make the appointment subject to the deferment of medical cover was made after the contract had ended and after the Invalidity Committee had made its findings does not in itself establish that there was undue delay that affected the substance of that decision.

(see paras 45, 46, 56, 59)
Article 52(3) of Regulation No 6/2002 on Community designs provides that an application for a declaration of invalidity brought before the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) shall not be admissible if an application relating to the same subject matter and cause of action, and involving the same parties, has been adjudicated on by a Community design court and has acquired the authority of a final decision. Those provisions, which relate only to the decisions of Community design courts, do not apply to a decision of EUIPO.

In the first place, it follows from the provisions of Article 80 of Regulation No 6/2002 that a Community design court is a national court of a Member State. Article 52(3) of Regulation No 6/2002 therefore does not apply when the matter has already been adjudicated on by EUIPO, but only when it has been adjudicated on by the national court of a Member State.

In the second place, Article 86(5) of Regulation No 6/2002, according to which no counterclaim for a declaration of invalidity of a registered Community design may be made if an application relating to the same subject matter and cause of action, and involving the same parties, has already been determined by EUIPO in a decision which has become final, does not govern proceedings before EUIPO and, in particular, its Boards of Appeal, but proceedings before Community design courts.

In the third place, Article 52(3) of Regulation No 6/2002 cannot be applied by analogy to cases where EUIPO has already adjudicated on an application for a declaration of invalidity. That is because it has not been established that there is an omission in Article 52(3) of Regulation No 6/2002 that is incompatible with a general principle of law which could be remedied by an application by analogy.

(see paras 17-20, 27, 29, 30)
Only measures which produce binding legal effects capable of affecting an applicant’s interests by bringing about a significant change in his legal position are acts or decisions against which an action for annulment may be brought under Article 263 TFEU. More specifically, in the case of acts adopted by a procedure involving several stages, in particular where they are the culmination of an internal procedure, an act is in principle open to review only if it is a measure definitively laying down the position of the institution on the conclusion of that procedure, and not a provisional measure intended to pave the way for the final decision.

Letters of the European Commission in which that institution has made definitive claims against the beneficiary of EU financial aid, on the basis of the decision to grant financial aid, must be classified as acts open to review if they specify the amounts which the Commission considers must be recovered from the aid beneficiary and which that beneficiary repays, subject to the bringing of an action, thus conforming to the will of the Commission. In that regard, where repayment has been made, the Commission will not adopt any decision following the issuing of the debit note. Accordingly, preventing the beneficiary from being able to contest the sums repaid would risk undermining its right to an effective remedy. It would therefore be contrary to the right to sound administration to encourage the beneficiary not to pay the amounts payable as set out in the debit note so that any decision adopted after the debit note is issued may be challenged on the basis of Article 263 TFEU.

(see paras 30, 31, 34, 35)
An action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person is admissible only in so far as the applicant has an interest in the annulment of the contested measure. In order for such an interest to be present, the annulment of that measure must be capable, if successful, of procuring an advantage for the party who has brought that action.

An action against a Commission decision amending an earlier decision, ordering the applicant and its former subsidiaries jointly and severally to pay fines for anticompetitive behaviour, is admissible since the contested decision was adopted following the General Court’s annulment judgment of a decision whose operative part is exactly the same as that of the contested decision and which amended the provisions of the original decision in terms identical to those of the contested decision, by allocating the amount of fines differently from how they were allocated by those provisions in their original version. First, although not parties to the action brought by the applicant against the decision annulled by the General Court, the former subsidiaries have had, as has the applicant, their respective legal situations affected by that annulment. Second, the legal situation of those subsidiaries with regard to the annulled provisions is connected to that of the applicant, in so far as those provisions are intended to determine the amount of the fines to be imposed on them in respect of the infringements for which they are jointly and severally liable, and the break-down of joint and several liability as between those companies from an external perspective with regard to those fines.

Moreover, in so far as, in its annulment judgment, the General Court ruled only on the infringement of the applicant’s rights of defence, and not the substantive legality of the contested decision, although Article 1 of that decision and Article 1 of the contested decision contain identical provisions, the action may lead to an allocation of the amount of the fines provided for by those provisions that is more favourable to the applicant.

(see paras 53, 68, 69, 71-75)
Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 13 December 2018 –

Pipiliagkas v Commission

(Case T‑689/16)

(Civil service — Officials — Assignment — Decision with retroactive effect — Article 22a of the Staff Regulations — Authority lacking competence — Liability — Compensation in respect of material and non-material harm)

1. Actions brought by officials — Plea alleging lack of competence on the part of the body which adopted the act adversely affecting the official — Finding made by the Court of its own motion (see para. 39)

2. Acts of the institutions — Temporal application — Requirement for a legal basis in force at the date of adoption — Distinction between procedural rules governing competence and substantive rules (Staff Regulations of Officials, Art. 22a) (see paras 41, 42)

3. European Union — Institutions and bodies of the European Union — Exercise of powers — Delegation — Conditions (see para. 56)

4. Officials — Appointing Authority — Exercise of powers — Derogation in respect of the pre-established allocation of competence or subdelegation — Lawfulness — Conditions (Staff Regulations of Officials, Art. 2(1)) (see para. 63)

5. Officials — Non-contractual liability of the institutions — Conditions — Unlawfulness — Damage — Causal link — Cumulative conditions (Art. 270 TFEU) (see para. 68)

6. Officials — Non-contractual liability of the institutions — Conditions — Unlawfulness — Damage — Causal link — Burden of proving damage (Art. 270 TFEU) (see para. 72)

7. Judicial proceedings — Measures of organisation of procedure — Request for production of documents — Duties of the person making the request (Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 89(3)(d)) (see para. 83)

8. Judicial proceedings — Measures of inquiry — Hearing of witnesses — Discretion of the General Court (Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Arts 91 and 94) (see paras 87, 88)

Re:

Action on the basis of Article 270 TFEU seeking, first, annulment of the decision of 22 December 2015 of the Head of Unit ‘Career and performance management’ of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Human Resources and Security, concerning the reassignment of the applicant with retroactive effect, and, secondly, compensation for the material and non-material harm which he claims to have suffered.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Annuls the decision of 22 December 2015 of the Head of Unit ‘Career and performance management’ of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Human Resources and Security, concerning the reassignment of Mr Nikolaos Pipiliagkas with effect from 1 January 2013;

2. Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

3. Orders the Commission to bear its own costs and half of the costs of Mr Pipiliagkas;
EU trade mark — Appeals procedure — Appeal to a Board of Appeal — Challenge to the contested decision by the defendant in its observations

(Commission Regulation No 216/96, Art. 8(3); Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 59, 60(2) and 64(1))

(see paras 144-147, 156)
Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 12 March 2019 –

Perry Ellis International Group v EUIPO (PRO PLAYER)

(Case T‑220/16)

(EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark PRO PLAYER — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Meaning (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 18, 19, 21, 28)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Word mark composed of several elements — Taking into account the overall perception of the mark by the relevant public (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 20)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Word mark PRO PLAYER (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 32-35, 43)

4. EU trade mark — Decisions of the Office — Principle of equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — EUIPO’s previous decision-making practice — Principle of legality — Need for a strict and complete examination in each particular case (see para. 40)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 24 February 2016 (Case R 1091/2015-2), relating to an application for registration of the word sign PRO PLAYER as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 19 June 2019 –

L’Oréal v EUIPO — Guinot (MASTER SMOKY)

(Case T‑179/16 RENV)

(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU word mark MASTER SMOKY — Earlier national figurative mark MASTERS COLORS PARIS — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 37, 38, 43, 77, 81, 82, 84, 87, 89)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity of the marks concerned — Criteria for assessment — Composite mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 42, 60)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity of the marks concerned — Assessment only on the basis of the dominant element of a complex mark — Conditions (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 44, 45, 49, 58)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Weak distinctive character of the earlier mark — Effect (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 55)

5. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Word mark MASTER SMOKY and figurative mark MASTERS COLORS PARIS (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 63, 66, 67, 76, 91)

6. EU trade mark — Decisions of the Office — Principle of equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — EUIPO's previous decision-making practice — Principle of legality — Need for a strict and complete examination in each particular case (Council Regulation No 207/2009) (see para. 90)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 23 February 2016 (Case R 2905/2014-5) relating to opposition proceedings between Guinot and L’Oréal.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judicial proceedings — Objection of inadmissibility — Power of the General Court to dismiss an action on the merits without ruling on the objection of inadmissibility — Extent of its discretion

(Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Arts 126 and 130)

(see para. 38)
Judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) of 28 April 2021 –

repowermap.org v EUIPO – Repower (REPOWER)

(Case T‑872/16)

(EU trade mark – Invalidity proceedings – International registration designating the European Union – Word mark REPOWER – Absolute ground for invalidity – Descriptive character – No distinctive character – Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) – Obligation to state reasons – Right to be heard – Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 94 of Regulation 2017/1001) – Freedom of expression)

1. EU trade mark – Surrender, revocation and invalidity – Absolute grounds for invalidity – Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service – Concept (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 7(1)(c) and 52(1)(a)) (see paras 36, 38-40, 44, 45)

2. EU trade mark – Surrender, revocation and invalidity – Absolute grounds for invalidity – Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service – Aim – Need to preserve availability (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 7(1)(c) and 52(1)(a)) (see para. 37)

3. EU trade mark – Surrender, revocation and invalidity – Absolute grounds for invalidity – Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service – Word mark REPOWER (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 46, 50, 58, 65, 70, 77, 83, 88, 93, 94, 107)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 26 September 2016 (Case R 2311/2014-5) relating to invalidity proceedings between repowermap.org and Repower.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Alters the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 26 September 2016 (Case R 2311/2014-5) in such a way as to cancel the contested mark with respect to the following services: – Class 37: ‘Services of heating engineers’; – Class 42: ‘Scientific services and research and development relating thereto; industrial research and analyses’;

2. Dismisses the action as to the remainder;