II ‑ 2661Case T-73/04
Le Carbone-Lorraine
v
Commission of the European Communities
(Competition — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Market 
for electrical and mechanical carbon and graphite products — Guidelines on 
the method of setting fines — Gravity and duration of the infringement — 
Mitigating circumstances — Cooperation during the administrative 
procedure — Principle of proportionality — Principle of equal treatment)
Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber), 8 October 2008            II ‑ 2674
Summary of the Judgment
 1.  Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Criteria — Complex infringement
  (Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15(2); Commission Notice No 98/C 9/03, Section 1A)
II ‑ 2662SUMMARY — CASE T‑73/04
 2.  Competition — Community rules — Infringements — Fines — Single infringement
  (Art. 81(1) EC; Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15(2))
 3.  Competition — Community rules — Application by the Commission — Independent of 
assessments by the authorities of non-member States
  (Arts 3(1)(g) EC and 81 EC)
 4.  Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Criteria — Gravity of the infringe -
ment — Account to be taken of the effects of the whole of the infringement
  (Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15(2))
 5.  Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Criteria — Gravity of the infringe -
ment — Price-fixing — Commission’s obligation, when assessing the impact of an infringe -
ment, to take as a reference the competition that would have existed without that 
infringement
  (Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15(2); Commission Notice No 98/C 9/03, Section 1A)
 6.  Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Criteria — Gravity of the infringe -
ment — Gravity of each undertaking’s participation
  (Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15(2); Commission Notice No 98/C 9/03)
 7.  Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Criteria — Overall turnover of the 
undertaking concerned — Turnover corresponding to the goods covered by the infringement
  (Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15(2))
 8.  Competition — Fines — Decision imposing fines — Obligation to state the reasons on which 
the decision is based
  (Art. 253 EC; Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15(2); Commission Notice No 98/C 9/03)
 9.  Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Deterrent character — General 
requirement that must be a reference point for the Commission throughout the calculation 
of the fine
  (Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15; Commission Notice No 98/C 9/03, Section 1A)
 10.  Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Criteria — Gravity of the infringe -
ment — Mitigating circumstances — Implementation of a programme of adherence to 
Community competition rules
  (Art. 81 EC; Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15; Commission Notice No 98/C 9/03)
 11.  Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Criteria — Gravity of the infringe -
ment — Mitigating circumstances — Passive or ‘follow-my-leader’ role of the undertaking
  (Council Regulation No 17, Art.  15; Commission Notice No 98/C 9/03, Section 3, first 
indent)
II ‑ 2663CARBONE‑LORRAINE v COMMISSION
 12.  Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Criteria — Gravity of the infringe -
ment — Mitigating circumstances
  (Council Regulation No 17, Art.  15; Commission Regulation No 2842/98; Commission 
Notice No 98/C 9/03, Section 3)
 13.  Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Criteria — Mitigating circum -
stances — Conduct deviating from that agreed within the cartel
  (Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15; Commission Notice No 98/C 9/03, Section 3, second 
indent)
 14.  Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Criteria — Mitigating circum -
stances — Termination of the infringement before the Commission intervenes
  (Council Regulation No 17, Art.  15; Commission Notice No 98/C 9/03, Section 3, third 
indent)
 15.  Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Criteria — Gravity of the infringe -
ment — Mitigating circumstances — Reduction of the amount of the fine in return for 
cooperation allowing the level of participation of another undertaking to be determined
  (Council Regulation No 17, Art.  15; Commission Notice No 98/C 9/03, Section 3, sixth 
indent)
 16.  Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Criteria — Reduction of the amount 
of the fine in return for cooperation by an undertaking
  (Council Regulation No 17; Commission Notice No 96/C 207/04, Section D(2))
 17.  Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Criteria — Financial situation of the 
undertaking concerned
  (Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15)
 1   For the purposes of applying Article  81 
EC, the reason for defining the relevant 
market, if at all, is to determine whether 
an agreement is liable to affect trade 
between Member States and has as its 
object or effect the prevention, restric ‑
tion or distortion of competition within 
the common market  Consequently, 
there is an obligation on the Commis ‑
sion to define the relevant market in a decision applying Article  81 EC only 
where it is impossible, without such a 
definition, to determine whether the 
agreement, decision by an association 
of undertakings or concerted practice 
at issue is liable to affect trade between 
Member States and has as its object 
or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the 
common market 
II ‑ 2664SUMMARY — CASE T‑73/04
  The Commission is not required to 
define the relevant product markets in 
order to assess the gravity of an infringe ‑
ment for each of the categories of rele ‑
vant products  First, in accordance with 
the guidelines on the method for setting 
fines imposed pursuant to Article  15(2) 
of Regulation No 17 and Article  65(5) 
of the ECSC Treaty, the assessment of 
the gravity of an infringement must take 
account of the nature of the infringe ‑
ment, its actual impact on the market 
where that can be measured and the size 
of the relevant geographic market  There 
is no obligation on the Commission, in 
the guidelines, to assess the impact of 
a cartel, specifically, for each category 
of relevant products  Furthermore, in 
dealing with a single complex infringe ‑
ment concerning a number of products, 
the Commission is not obliged to carry 
out a separate assessment for each aspect 
of the infringement, nor to break down 
the amount of the fine in respect of those 
aspects, nor is it required to examine 
the gravity of each infringement when it 
imposes a single fine on an undertaking 
which has committed several infringe ‑
ments  Such a finding is not, in addition, 
such as to allow an ‘arbitrary collective 
punishment’ of undertakings involved in 
a cartel 
  Pursuant to Section 1 A, sixth para ‑
graph, of the aforementioned guidelines, 
a limited presence on a market could 
possibly lead to a lower starting amount 
in the context of ‘differential treatment’ 
for the undertakings involved in a cartel  
In addition, the relative gravity of the 
participation of each of the undertakings in question must be examined by the 
Commission in the assessment of miti ‑
gating circumstances 
  (see paras 36, 45, 46, 48‑52)
 2   In the context of the application of 
Article 81 EC, it is open to the Commis ‑
sion to initiate a single proceeding 
for practices concerning a number of 
different products, and such a procedure 
may lead to the adoption of a single deci ‑
sion that an undertaking has committed 
a number of separate infringements, and 
imposes on that undertaking as many 
separate fines each within the limits 
laid down in Article 15(2) of Regulation 
No 17  Where the Commission takes 
the view that the entire product group 
covered by the proceeding was the object 
of a single complex infringement, in the 
light of, inter alia, the functioning of the 
cartel at issue, it may choose to adopt 
one decision imposing a single fine on 
each of the relevant undertakings  That 
choice is neither illogical nor contrary to 
the principle of sound administration 
  (see paras 56, 63‑66)
II ‑ 2665CARBONE‑LORRAINE v COMMISSION
 3   The practice adopted by non‑member 
States’ competition authorities cannot 
be imposed on the Commission which 
is responsible for the implementation 
and guidance of Community competi ‑
tion policy  The exercise of their powers 
by the authorities of non‑Member States 
under their territorial jurisdiction meets 
requirements specific to those States  
The elements forming the basis of 
other States’ legal systems in the field 
of competition not only include specific 
aims and objectives but also result in the 
adoption of specific substantive rules 
and a wide variety of legal consequences, 
whether administrative, criminal or civil, 
when the authorities of those States 
have established that there have been 
infringements of the applicable competi ‑
tion rules  On the other hand, the legal 
situation is completely different where 
an undertaking is caught exclusively  — 
in competition matters  — by the appli ‑
cation of Community law and the law of 
one or more Member States on compe ‑
tition, that is to say, where a cartel is 
confined exclusively to the territorial 
scope of application of the legal system 
of the European Community 
  It follows that, when the Commis ‑
sion imposes sanctions on the unlawful 
conduct of an undertaking, even conduct 
originating in an international cartel, 
it seeks to safeguard the free competi ‑
tion within the common market which 
constitutes a fundamental objective of 
the Community under Article 3(1)(g) EC  
On account of the specific nature of the 
legal interests protected at Community level, the Commission’s assessments 
pursuant to its relevant powers may 
diverge considerably from those of 
authorities of non‑member States 
  (see paras 57‑60)
 4   Where the Commission considers that 
a collection of agreements or concerted 
practices constitute a single continuous 
infringement, it is not bound, for the 
purposes of calculating the starting 
amount of the fine, to carry out a genuine 
assessment of the unlawful practices 
on each of the relevant markets, nor to 
take account of the actual behaviour 
which an undertaking claims to have 
adopted  It must only take into account 
the combined effects of the infringement 
taken as a whole 
  (see paras 80, 89, 90, 95, 97, 102)
 5   In order to assess the actual effect of 
an infringement on the market, the 
Commission must take as a reference the 
competition that would normally exist if 
there were no infringement 
II ‑ 2666SUMMARY — CASE T‑73/04
  In the case of a price cartel, the Commis ‑
sion may legitimately infer that the 
infringement had effects from the fact 
that the cartel members took measures 
to apply the agreed prices, for example 
by announcing them to customers, 
instructing their employees to use them 
as a basis for negotiation and monitoring 
their application by their competitors 
and their own sales departments  In 
order to conclude that there has been an 
impact on the market, it is sufficient that 
the agreed prices have served as a basis 
for determining individual transaction 
prices, thereby limiting customers’ room 
for negotiation 
  By contrast, the Commission cannot be 
required, once the implementation of a 
cartel has been established, to system ‑
atically show that the agreements have 
actually allowed the undertakings in 
question to obtain a level of transaction 
price higher than that which would have 
prevailed in the absence of the cartel  In 
that regard, the argument that only the 
fact that the level of transaction prices 
would have been different from that 
which would have applied in the absence 
of collusion can be taken into consid ‑
eration in determining the gravity of 
the infringement cannot be upheld  In 
addition, it would be disproportionate to 
insist on such proof, which would absorb 
considerable resources, given that it 
would require making hypothetical 
calculations based on economic models, 
whose accuracy would be difficult for the 
Court to verify, and whose infallibility is 
in no way proved   To assess the gravity of the infringement, 
it is decisive to know that the under ‑
takings did all that they could to give 
concrete effect to their intentions  Those 
undertakings cannot therefore benefit 
from external factors which counter ‑
acted their own efforts, by turning them 
into factors justifying a reduction in the 
fine 
  The Commission is therefore entitled to 
rely on the implementation of the cartel 
to find that there was an impact on the 
market without it being necessary to 
determine precisely the significance of 
that impact 
  Even supposing that the actual impact 
of the cartel had not been proved to the 
requisite legal standard by the Commis ‑
sion, the classification of an infringe ‑
ment as ‘very serious’ could still be 
appropriate  The three aspects to be 
taken into account in the assessment of 
the gravity of the infringement under 
the guidelines on the method for setting 
fines imposed pursuant to Article  15(2) 
of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of 
the ECSC Treaty — which are the nature 
of the infringement, its actual impact on 
the market where that can be measured 
and the size of the relevant geographic 
market — do not have the same weight 
in the context of an overall assessment  
The nature of the infringement plays 
a primary role, in particular, for classi ‑
fying infringements as ‘very serious’  In 
that regard, it follows from the descrip ‑
tion of very serious infringements in 
those guidelines that agreements or 
II ‑ 2667CARBONE‑LORRAINE v COMMISSION
concerted practices involving, in par ‑
ticular, price‑fixing may be classified as 
‘very serious’ on the basis of their nature 
alone, without it being necessary for 
such conduct to have a particular impact 
or cover a particular geographic area  
That conclusion is corroborated by the 
fact that, while the indicative descrip ‑
tion of serious infringements expressly 
mentions the market impact and the 
effects on extensive areas of the common 
market, that of very serious infringe ‑
ments does not mention any require ‑
ment as to the actual market impact 
or the effects produced in a particular 
geographical area 
  (see paras 83‑87, 91)
 6   In the context of determining the 
amount of the fine for an infringement of 
competition rules under the guidelines 
on the method for setting fines imposed 
pursuant to Article  15(2) of Regulation 
No 17 and Article  65(5) of the ECSC 
Treaty, a distinction must be drawn 
between the assessment of the gravity of 
the infringement, which is used to deter ‑
mine the starting amount of the fine, and 
the assessment of the relative gravity of 
the participation of each of the undertak ‑
ings concerned, as that latter issue must 
be examined in the context of a possible 
application of aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances 
  (see para  100) 7   The Commission is not required, when 
assessing fines in accordance with the 
gravity and duration of the infringement, 
to base its calculations on the turnover 
of the undertakings concerned and more 
particularly the turnover obtained from 
the relevant products  While it cannot 
be denied that that turnover can consti ‑
tute an appropriate basis for establishing 
the threat to competition in the relevant 
product markets, and the relative im ‑
portance of the participants to a cartel 
vis‑à‑vis the relevant products, it is 
never  theless true that turnover is not, by 
any means, the only criteria according to 
which the Commission must assess the 
gravity of the infringement  To limit the 
assessment of the proportional nature of 
the starting amount to a comparison of 
that starting amount and the turnover 
for the relevant products would be to 
grant that factor excessive importance  
The nature of the infringement, its 
actual impact, the geographic scope of 
the market affected and the necessary 
deterrent effect of the fine are further 
factors, which justify the aforementioned 
figure 
  (see paras 114, 118, 119)
 8   Regarding the setting of the fines for an 
infringement of competition law, the 
Commission satisfies the requirement 
to state reasons when, in its decision, 
it states the factors which enabled it to 
determine the gravity of the infringe ‑
ment and its duration, without being 
II ‑ 2668SUMMARY — CASE T‑73/04
required to provide a more detailed 
account of figures relating to the method 
for setting the fine  Statements of figures 
relating to the calculation of fines, 
however useful such figures may be, are 
not essential to compliance with the duty 
to state reasons 
  Concerning the reasons for the starting 
amounts in absolute terms, fines consti ‑
tute an instrument of the Commis ‑
sion’s competition policy, and it must 
be allowed a margin of discretion when 
fixing their amount, in order that it may 
channel the conduct of undertakings 
towards observance of the competi ‑
tion rules  In addition, the level of fines 
must not be easily foreseen by economic 
operators  Therefore, the Commission 
cannot be required to provide, in that 
regard, aspects of its reasoning other 
than those relating to the gravity of the 
infringement 
  (see paras 129, 130)
 9   As deterrence is an objective of fines for 
infringements of competition rules, the 
need to ensure it is a general requirement 
which must be a reference point for the 
Commission throughout the calculation 
of fines and does not necessarily imply that there be a specific step in that calcu ‑
lation in which an overall assessment is 
made of all relevant circumstances for 
the purposes of attaining that objective 
  For the purposes of taking account 
of the deterrent effect, the Commis ‑
sion did not define, in the guidelines on 
the method for setting fines imposed 
pursuant to Article  15(2) of Regulation 
No 17 and Article  65(5) of the ECSC 
Treaty, a methodology or individual 
criteria, which it may be obligatory to 
detail specifically  The fourth paragraph 
of Section 1 A of the Guidelines, in the 
context of instructions on the assess ‑
ment of the gravity of the infringement, 
mentions only the need to set the fine at 
a level which ensures that it has a suffi ‑
ciently deterrent effect 
  (see paras 131, 132)
 10   Although it is important that an under ‑
taking takes measures to prevent future 
infringements of Community competi ‑
tion law by its personnel — for example 
the implementation of a programme of 
adherence to competition rules  — the 
taking of such measures does not alter 
the reality of the infringement found  In 
II ‑ 2669CARBONE‑LORRAINE v COMMISSION
the context of determining the amount 
of the fine imposed for infringement of 
competition rules, the Commission is 
not, therefore, bound to consider such a 
factor as a mitigating circumstance, nor 
in the context of taking account of the 
deterrent effect of the fine, all the more 
so when the infringement in question 
is a clear infringement of Article 81 EC  
In that regard, it is irrelevant that such 
measures have been implemented by 
the undertaking before the Commission 
intervened  Moreover, it is impossible to 
determine the effectiveness of internal 
measures taken by an undertaking to 
prevent future infringements of compe ‑
tition law 
  (see paras 143, 144, 231)
 11   In accordance with Section 3, first 
indent, of the Guidelines, ‘an exclu ‑
sively passive’ role in an infringement 
will, where it is established, constitute a 
mitigating circumstance in setting fines 
imposed pursuant to Article  15(2) of 
Regulation No 17 and Article  65(5) of 
the ECSC Treaty  A passive role implies 
that the undertaking will adopt a ‘low 
profile’, that is to say not actively partici ‑
pate in the creation of any anti‑competi ‑
tive agreements   Among the factors likely to demonstrate 
an undertaking’s passive role in a cartel, 
a significantly more sporadic participa ‑
tion in the meetings than that of the 
other ordinary members of the cartel 
can be taken into account as well as its 
late entry on the market which is the 
subject of the infringement, independ ‑
ently of the duration of the undertak ‑
ing’s participation, or even the existence 
of statements dealing specifically with 
that point coming from other undertak ‑
ings which participated in the infringe ‑
ment  It is therefore not sufficient that 
the applicant adopted a ‘low profile’ 
during certain periods of the cartel 
or in relation to certain cartel agree ‑
ments  Furthermore, an approach which 
consists of separating the assessment 
of an undertaking’s attitude depending 
on the subject‑matter of the agree ‑
ments or concerted practices seems, at 
the least, theoretical when those agree ‑
ments or concerted practices are part of 
a general strategy, which determines the 
conduct of the members of the cartel on 
the market and limits their commercial 
freedom in order to pursue an identical 
anti‑competitive objective and a single 
economic aim, namely to distort the 
normal conditions of competition in the 
relevant market 
  In addition, the fact that an undertaking 
puts an end to its participation in the 
cartel only a few months before the other 
members of the cartel does not justify a 
reduction in the amount of the fine on 
the basis of the mitigating circumstance 
relating to an ‘exclusively passive role in 
the infringement’ 
  (see paras 163, 164, 179, 180, 184)
II ‑ 2670SUMMARY — CASE T‑73/04
 12   Where the Commission applies, in a 
decision, the method laid down in the 
guidelines on the method for setting 
fines imposed pursuant to Article  15(2) 
of Regulation No 17 and Article  65(5) 
of the ECSC Treaty and concludes that 
there are neither aggravating nor attenu ‑
ating circumstances applicable for the 
undertaking in question, that under ‑
taking is entitled to claim, before the 
Community courts, the benefit of miti ‑
gating circumstances and the reduction 
of the amount of the associated fine, 
even if it did not so claim in its response 
to the statement of objections 
  Article  4 of Regulation No 2842/98 on 
the hearing of parties in certain proceed ‑
ings under Articles [81 EC] and [82 EC], 
which provides that parties wishing to 
make known their views on the objec ‑
tions raised against them are to do so 
in writing and may in their written 
comments set out all matters relevant to 
their defence, does not require undertak ‑
ings, which are the addressees of a state ‑
ment of objections, to formalise specif ‑
ically a request for acknowledgement of 
mitigating circumstances 
  Moreover, the statement of objections 
is a preparatory act as opposed to the 
decision which constitutes the final 
stage in the proceeding and in which 
the Commission gives its view on the 
responsibilities of the undertakings and, 
if appropriate, on the penalties to be 
imposed on them   To determine the amount of the fine, 
the Commission must take account of 
all the circumstances of the case and in 
particular the gravity and duration of the 
infringement, which are the two criteria 
explicitly referred to in Article  15(2) of 
Regulation No 17  Where an infringe ‑
ment has been committed by several 
undertakings, the relative gravity of the 
participation of each of them must be 
examined by the Commission in order to 
determine whether there are, in regard 
to those undertakings, aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances  Sections 2 
and 3 of the aforementioned guidelines, 
which the Commission must adhere to, 
provide for a variation in the amount of 
the fine on the basis of certain aggra ‑
vating or mitigating circumstances, 
which are unique to each of the under ‑
takings concerned 
  (see paras 188‑194)
 13   To determine whether an undertaking 
should benefit from mitigating circum ‑
stances on the basis of the non‑imple ‑
mentation in practice of the offending 
agreements under Section 3, second 
indent, of the Guidelines on the method 
for setting fines imposed pursuant to 
Article  15(2) of Regulation No 17 and 
Article  65(5) of the ECSC Treaty, it is 
necessary to determine whether during 
the period in which the undertaking was 
party to those agreements, it actually 
avoided implementing them by adopting 
competitive conduct on the market or, 
at the very least, whether it clearly and 
substantially breached the obligations 
II ‑ 2671CARBONE‑LORRAINE v COMMISSION
relating to the implementation of the 
cartel to the point of disrupting its very 
operation 
  (see para  196)
 14   An undertaking which has taken part 
in an infringement of Community 
competition law cannot benefit from 
mitigating circumstances, pursuant to 
Section 3, third indent, of the Guide ‑
lines on the method for setting fines 
imposed pursuant to Article  15(2) of 
Regulation No 17 and Article  65(5) of 
the ECSC Treaty, when it has terminated 
its anti‑competitive practices following 
the intervention of non‑member States’ 
competition authorities 
  (see para  230)
 15   In determining the amount of the fine 
for infringement of Community compe ‑
tition law, a reduction in the fine on 
grounds of cooperation during the 
administrative procedure is justified 
only if the conduct of the undertaking 
in question enabled the Commission to 
establish the existence of an infringe ‑ment more easily and, where relevant, to 
bring it to an end 
  The provision of information enabling 
the Commission to evaluate more 
precisely the degree of cooperation 
offered by one of the undertakings 
involved in a cartel during the admin ‑
istrative procedure for the purposes of 
determining the amount of its fine, and 
which therefore made the Commission’s 
task during the investigation easier, 
can constitute an ‘effective cooperation 
outside of the scope of the [Leniency] 
Notice’, within the meaning of Section 
3, sixth indent, of the Guidelines on 
the method for setting fines imposed 
pursuant to Article  15(2) of Regulation 
No 17 and Article  65(5) of the ECSC 
Treaty 
  However, that information must relate 
to the anti‑competitive practices which 
are the subject‑matter of the investi ‑
gation, since information concerning 
a territory different than that which is 
the subject‑matter of the investigation 
cannot be accepted 
  (see paras 238, 239, 253)
II ‑ 2672SUMMARY — CASE T‑73/04
 16   The Commission has a wide discre ‑
tion as regards the setting of fines for 
infringement of Community competi ‑
tion law and it may, in that regard, take 
account of numerous factors, including 
the cooperation provided by the under ‑
takings concerned during the investiga ‑
tion conducted by its departments  The 
Commission enjoys also a wide discre ‑
tion in assessing the quality and useful ‑
ness of the cooperation provided by an 
undertaking, in particular by reference 
to the contributions made by other 
undertakings  Regard being had for that 
wide discretion  — which is expressed, 
inter alia, by the indication of a range 
for the size of the reduction of 10% to 
50%  — the maximum reduction of 50% 
does not automatically arise where the 
conditions laid down in Section D, para ‑
graph 2, first and second indents, of the 
Leniency Notice are met 
  The Commission can base its assessment 
of the level of reduction on the fact, first, 
that the evidence provided by the under ‑
taking in question added only limited 
value to the evidence already in the 
Commission’s possession, and second, 
that undertaking’s cooperation started 
after it had received a request for infor ‑
mation pursuant to Article 11 of Regula ‑
tion No 17   On the one hand, the reduction of the 
fines, where there is cooperation from 
undertakings which participated in the 
infringements of Community competi ‑
tion law, is justified if the conduct made 
it easier for the Commission to establish 
an infringement and, as the case may 
be, to put an end to it  The Commission 
cannot, therefore, disregard the useful ‑
ness of the information provided, as it is 
necessarily part of the evidence already 
in its possession  In that regard, since 
the fundamental difference at the root 
of Sections B, C and D of the Leniency 
Notice is the usefulness of the informa ‑
tion provided, the Commission may use 
the usefulness criterion to determine the 
level of the reduction for each category 
of reduction of fine laid down in those 
sections 
  On the other hand, in the context of an 
overall assessment, the Commission can 
take account of the fact that an under ‑
taking sent it the documents only after 
the request for information, without, 
however, being able to consider that fact 
as the determining factor to minimise 
the cooperation provided by that under ‑
taking under Section D, paragraph  2, 
first indent, of the Notice on the non‑
imposition or reduction of fines in cartel 
cases 
  (see paras 271‑274, 276, 277, 279, 283)
II ‑ 2673CARBONE‑LORRAINE v COMMISSION
 17   While the Commission is not required, 
when determining the amount of the 
fine for infringement of Community 
competition law, to take account of 
the financial losses of the undertaking 
in question, since recognition of such 
an obligation would have the effect of 
conferring an unfair competitive advan ‑
tage on the undertakings least well 
adapted to the conditions of the market, 
the Commission can nevertheless decide 
to reduce the amount of the fine on 
account of serious financial difficulties 
combined with recent fines imposed on 
that undertaking for infringements of 
Community competition law committed at the same time, thereby considering 
that it is not necessary to impose on that 
undertaking the total amount of the fine 
to ensure effective deterrence 
  (see paras 308, 314, 315)