ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Order of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 1 February 2022 – Macías Chávez and Others v Parliament and Spain

(Case C‑322/21 P)

(Appeal – Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Action for failure to act and for damages – Institutional law – European Parliament’s Committee on Petitions – Petition alleging infringement by the Spanish courts of EU law in the field of fundamental rights – Decision to declare the petition closed – Appeal in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded)

1. Appeals – Grounds – Grounds which are manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded – Dismissal at any point, by reasoned order, without an oral procedure (Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 181) (see para. 24)

2. Judicial proceedings – Application initiating proceedings – Formal requirements – Identification of the subject matter of the dispute – Summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based – Unambiguous wording of the form of order sought by the applicant – Requirement not met – Inadmissibility (Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 21, first para., and 53, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 76(d)) (see paras 38, 39)

3. Appeals – Grounds – Mere repetition of the pleas and arguments put forward before the General Court – Error of law relied on not identified – Manifest inadmissibility (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para., Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 168(1)(d) and 169) (see paras 49, 53, 54)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded.
Appeals – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Burden of proof

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b)

(see para. 17)
Appeal – Grounds of appeal – Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence – Inadmissibility – Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence – Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted – Plea alleging distortion of the clear sense of the facts and evidence – Need to indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted and show the errors of appraisal which led to that distortion

(Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 168(1)(d))

(see paras 4 [4-6, 34, 35, 47], 5)
Order of the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) of 5 April 2022 – Kappes v Sedus Stoll and EUIPO

(Case C‑785/21 P)

(Appeal – EU trade mark – Determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Article 170b of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Request failing to demonstrate that an issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Appeal not allowed to proceed)

1. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Burden of proof (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b) (see para. 14)

2. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Request that an appeal be allowed to proceed – Formal requirements – Scope (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b) (see paras 15-17)

3. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Incompatibility with the case-law of the Court – Request that the appeal be allowed to proceed failing to demonstrate that the issue is significant – Appeal not allowed to proceed (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a (1) and 170b) (see paras 18, 19)

Operative part

1. The appeal is not allowed to proceed.
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 2 May 2022 – Správa železnic

(Joined Cases C‑221/21 and C‑222/21) ( 1 )

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Rail transport – Directive 2012/34/EU – Decisions of the regulatory body – Article 56(10) – Judicial review – National law providing for the jurisdiction of civil courts – Detailed procedural rules governing the appeal – Compatibility with Directive 2012/34 – Manifest inadmissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling)

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Admissibility – Questions referred lacking sufficient information regarding the legislative context – Lack of information necessary to understand the applicable national legislation – Manifest inadmissibility

(Art. 267 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 23; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 53(2) and 94(b))

(see paras 31-34, 36-40, operative part)

Operative part

The requests for a preliminary ruling made by the Obvodní soud pro Prahu 1 (District Court, Prague 1, Czech Republic) by decisions of 22 September 2020 and of 1 October 2020 are manifestly inadmissible.

( 1 ) OJ C 242, 21.6.2021.
In the introductory part of the judgment of 15 September 2022, Minister for Justice and Equality (Third-country national cousin of a Union citizen) (C‑22/21, EU:C:2022:683), the reference to the observations submitted by the Minister for Justice and Equality shall be rectified as follows:

‘the Minister for Justice and Equality, by M. Browne, A. Joyce and J. Quaney, acting as Agents, and by D. Brett, D. Conlan Smyth, Senior Counsel, and T. O’Connor, Barrister-at-Law,’
Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 14 July 2022 –

Finanzamt Österreich (Family allowances for staff of an international organisation)

(Case C‑25/22)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Article 53(2) and Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Requirement to provide reasons justifying the need for an answer to the questions referred – Lack of sufficient information – Manifest inadmissibility)

1. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Admissibility – Questions referred without sufficient information regarding the reasons justifying the need for an answer to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling – No connecting factor between the dispute in the main proceedings and the provisions of EU law referred to in the questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Manifest inadmissibility (Art. 267 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 23; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 53(2) and 94(c)) (see paras 22-30, 36-40 and operative part)

2. EU law – Principles – Equal treatment – Discrimination on grounds of nationality – Prohibition – Scope – Difference in treatment between nationals of Member States and nationals of non-member States – Not included (Art. 18 TFEU) (see para. 35)

Operative part

The request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzgericht (Federal Finance Court, Austria), made by decision of 31 December 2021, is manifestly inadmissible.
Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Burden of proof

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b)

(see para. 11)
2.

As to the substance of the case, the whole argument of the applicant consists in claiming that, at least from 1 January 1959, she in fact carried out duties of a nature and of an importance superior to those which correspond to the category and the grade which were given to her in the service. We are here on contractual ground, where the Court has wide powers of discretion. It is true that the contract remains the legal basis of the relationship between the parties. In this respect it is certainly the contract of 28 June to 1 July 1958, (of the so-called Brussels type), corresponding by analogy to a post in Grade C of these ECSC scale and by which the applicant entered the service of the Euratom Commission, which is the basis of this relationship. Later, the position of the person concerned was improved and, in particular, she was classified as from 1 January 1960, still by analogy with the ECSC scale, in Grade 9, Step 3, of Category B. In my opinion, in order to justify the existence of a breach of contract of such a nature as to require compensation, it is necessary to establish that the actual duties given to the applicant relate to a higher category. It does not. seem that such is the case: according to the detailed explanations given by the defendant, Mrs Minot was quite quickly given drafting duties, and not only administrative duties, which justified her classification in Category B; on the other hand, these were not ‘planning’ duties relevant to Category A. To tell the truth, a doubt arises from the fact that, in the ‘provisional’ establishment report of 17 April 1962, there appears the remark, written and signed by the Director-General, that ‘these are Category A duties’, an argument used by the applicant and of which the Commission refrained from making any explanation. It appears difficult to me, nevertheless, to set this simple remark, which is not explained, against the details furnished in the statements of the Commission in respect of the real nature of the dutties of the applicant. It is probable that the person concerned, in carrying out the tasks which were entrusted to her, showed evidence of ability superior to that strictly required of servants in Category B, which could have allowed certain prospects of subsequent promotion to a post in Category A. But it is not actually established that the applicant in fact carried out duties related by their nature to Category A, whilst, as you know, she possessed none of the qualifications normally required for promotion to a post in that grade. As to classification in grades within these Categories, I consider that, during the contractual period before the Staff Regulations, and in the absence of any precise ‘job description’, such a classification could only have been made by the administration.
2.

In my opinion of 21 May 1977 I further indicated that if it is decided that an interim order is necessary, or more precisely, if serious and irreparable damage is found, it is necessary to strike a balance between the interests involved. On that occasion I reached the conclusion that the extent and gravity of the damage threatening the Netherlands and French fishing industry was still not sufficiently clear. The intervention of the Netherlands Government and the figures produced by the Commission in the meantime have provided valuable information on this point. I now consider that a reasonable probability has been established that there is a threat of very serious and indeed irreparable damage to the Nehterlands fishing fleet (42 trawlers are directly affected) and to the Netherlands fish-processing industry if the total prohibition on fishing in the waters affected by the Irish measure continues, especially in the months from July to September which are of prime importance for them. Secondly, it seems to me to be worth noting in this connexion that the extensive prohibition on fishing imposed on third countries, as the Commission has described it, has helped to relieve very greatly the pressure on fish stocks around Ireland. In view of this I now no longer have any hesitation in striking the balance between the interests involved to the effect that I now consider that it is necessary to suspend the Irish measures by way of an interim order.
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL SIR GORDON SLYNN

DELIVERED ON 8 OCTOBER 1981

My Lords,

Case 29/81 is an application by the Commission for a declaration that the Republic of Italy has failed to fulfil its obligations under the EEC Treaty in that it has not adopted the measures which are necessary for the implementation of Council Directive 74/562 of 12 November 1974 (OJ L 308 of 19. 11. 1974, p. 23), within the period fixed for doing so by Article 6.

The Republic of Italy has explained that it was necessary, in this case, to initiate consultations with interested parties and that process has inevitably delayed the matter being brought before the Italian legislature. Once again, it seems to me that the jurisprudence of the Court has made it clear consistently that a Member State is not entitled to rely on practices or circumstances existing in its own internal legal or administrative system to justify failing to comply with the obligations imposed on it by a directive.

In this case, too, a request has been made that the Court should delay the making of a declaration and should extend the time for the implementation of this directive. Whilst understanding the reasons which have been put forward by counsel for the Republic of Italy, it does not seem to me, for the reasons given in my opinion in Case 28/81, that it is open to the Court to extend the date, or that it would be right to defer making a decision in the case.

Accordingly, in my opinion, the declaration sought by the Commission should be granted in this case also and the Republic of Italy should be ordered to pay the costs of the action as asked by the Commission.
OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL

VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT

DELIVERED ON 19 JANUARY 1984 ( 1 )

Mr President,

Members of the Court,

I consider the observations submitted by the Commission in this case sufficiently comprehensive and appropriate for there to be no necessity for me to make any addition or amendment thereto. The other observations, both written and oral, which were submitted to the Court were also, of course, extremely useful; however, I do not consider them such as to refute the very persuasive arguments put forward by the Commission. If I well understand him, Counsel for the first two accused in the main proceedings has based the observations we have just heard primarily on the English language version of the relevant regulation, as well as on certain ambiguities present in that version which confuse its import. However, that is the kind of situation in which this Court has been able, if not always, at least very often, to resolve the ambiguities by comparing the various language versions. Reference to the preamble, or the ‘rationale’ of the provisions in questions, to use Mr Pardoe's words, may be necessaiy or useful only as regards any remaining uncertainty and that, I think, is the approach which has been followed by the Commission in its submissions. I therefore endorse those arguments without reserve and suggest that the Court reply to the questions in the manner proposed by the Commission. The wording of the questions appears to me, however, to call for a somewhat different wording of the Court's replies to that suggested by the Commission.

Such wording, which follows more closely that of the questions themselves whilst adding, by implication, some further definition as suggested by Mr Pardoe, might I think be as follows:

Reply to Questions 1 and 2

The term “carcases” within the meaning of Article 14a (c) of Regulation (EEC) No 543/69 of the Council of 25 March 1969, as amended by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2827/77 of 12 December 1977, applies solely to carcases not intended for human consumption, consisting of the whole, or almost the whole, body of dead or slaughtered animals.

Reply to Questions 3 and 4

“Animal waste not intended for human consumption”, the phrase which defines another exception in the abovementioned article, refers to all the byproducts of slaughtering which are intended for use other than as food for humans, including byproducts which have some commercial value in those other uses.

Reply to Question 5

The exception provided for in Article 14a (2) (c) of the abovementioned regulation does not apply to a vehicle transporting at the same time products other than carcases and animal waste not intended for human consumption.

( 1 ) Translated from the French.
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL SIR GORDON SLYNN

DELIVERED ON 8 MAY 1984

My Lords,

This is an application by the Commission under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty against the Republic of Italy for a declaration that Italy has failed to comply with its obligations under the Treaty.

Council Directive 79/32, which was addressed to all Member States, defined the different kinds of manufactured tobacco, which are in use for the purposes of taxes, other than turnover taxes, which affect the consumption of such manufactured tobacco. Article 9 of the directive required Member States to bring into force the laws, regulations or administrative provisions necessary to comply with the directive not later than 1 January 1980, and to inform the Commission thereof. It also required that Member States should supply the texts of the main provisions of national law which were adopted in the field of the directive.

The Commission, by letter of 1 October 1981, since it had not received any communication from the Italian Government, called upon that government to submit its observations. On 20 November 1981 the Commission was informed that a draft law had in fact been presented to Parliament. Since the law was not adopted by 13 July 1982 the Commission issued a reasoned opinion under Article 169. That reasoned opinion produced only an acknowledgment on 28 July 1982 so that this application was made to the Court.

In the written pleadings the government has explained that the draft law was presented to Parliament in 1980 with the object of restructuring the tax system relating to tobacco products. That law was not enacted during the life of the Parliament, as then composed, and a new Bill has been prepared for presentation to Parliament. The Court has been told that although the draft is ready it is not possible to say when it is likely to be enacted.

In these circumstances there is plainly no defence to this application. In my opinion the Commission is entitled to the declaration which it seeks, that the Republic of Italy has failed to bring into force the laws necessary to comply with the directive, and the Italian Government should pay the Commission's costs of these proceedings.
1.

By this action under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty, the Commission seeks a declaration that Article 121 (10) of the Belgian Law of 9 August 1963 establishing and organizing a compulsory sickness and invalidity insurance scheme, ( 1 ) as amended by the Law of 8 August 1980 concerning the budget proposals for 1979/80, ( 2 ) is incompatible with Community law. That provision, which came into force on 1 October 1980, provided for a deduction from statutory old-age, retirement, servicerelated and survivors' pensions applicable to all persons in receipt of such pensions; that deduction was paid to the Institut National d'Assurance Maladie-Invalidité [National Sickness and Invalidity Insurance Institution]. ( 3 ) In fact, Article 33 of Regulation No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community provides that: ‘The institution responsible for payment of a pension, and belonging to a Member State whose legislation provides for deductions from pensions in respect of contributions for sickness and maternity shall be authorized to make such deductions from the pension payable by such institution, calculated in accordance with the legislation concerned to the extent that the cost of the benefits under Articles 27, 28, 28 a, 29, 31 and 32 are to be borne by an institution of the said Member State’. ( 4 ) In other words, such a deduction from a pension may only be made in respect of insured persons who receive from the social security institution in question benefits in consideration of which the deductions are made. However, if the benefits are not provided by the institution of the Member State where the deduction is made, no contribution may be deducted. That is precisely the situation of insured persons who reside in a Member State other than Belgium and who, by virtue of Articles 27 to 32 of Regulation No 1408/71, are in receipt of benefits provided by the competent social security institution of the Member State where they are residing. When applied to such persons, Article 121 (10) of the Belgian Law infringes the principle laid down in Article 33 of Regulation No 1408/71.
1.

In this reference for a preliminary ruling, the Tribunal de Travail [Labour Tribunal], Brussels, raises a question which is wholly identical to that which arises in connection with the action for annulment brought by Heinrich Maag, on which I have recently delivered an Opinion (Case 43/84). The question which has been referred to this Court is as follows : ‘Do Articles 1 and 3 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities apply, for the duration of their employment, to interpreters engaged by the Commission of the European Communities, where such employment, covering one or more days, is governed by the Commission's Réglementation concernant les Interprètes de Conférence Indépendants (Freelance) [Arrangements Regarding Freelance Conference Interpreters] of 8 October 1974, and where the amounts paid to such interpreters are described as “remuneration, allowances and expenses payable to freelance conference interpreters” ? ’ As the Belgian court has rightly pointed out, the Court of Justice alone has jurisdiction, pursuant to Article 179 of the EEC Treaty, to determine — as the Court has stated in connection with Article 152 of the EAEC Treaty which is entirely identical to Article 179 — ‘the basis of the service relationship between the Community and its officials or servants other than local staff’, or between the Community and any applicant laying claim to that status (Case 65/74, Porrini v EAEC and Comont, [1975] ECR 319, paragraphs 13 and 15 of the decision). To be precise, Mr Cantisani, who has been engaged by the Commission as a freelance conference interpreter on a number of occasions since November 1975, has sought the benefit of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Conditions of Employment’] in proceedings before the Belgian court, in order to rebut the presumption that under Belgian law any person pursuing a professional or trade activity capable of yielding income within the meaning of Article 20 (1), (2) (b) or (c) or Article 30 or the Code des Impôts sur les Revenues [Belgian Income Tax Code] must be regarded as a self-employed worker unless he furnishes evidence to the contrary.