ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 325/8

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 25 June 2013 — BestWater International GmbH v Michael Mebes, Stefan Potsch

(Case C-348/13)

2013/C 325/12

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: BestWater International GmbH

Defendants: Michael Mebes, Stefan Potsch

Question referred

Does the embedding, within one’s own website, of another person’s work made available to the public on a third-party website, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, constitute communication to the public within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC, (1) even where that other person’s work is not thereby communicated to a new public and the communication of the work does not use a specific technical means which differs from that of the original communication?

(1) Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (OJ 2001 L 167, p. 10).
Third Plea: the erroneous definition of the norms and customs of the sector which constitutes an infringement of Article 7(1) (b) CTMR The GC correctly stated, at para. 45, that it is necessary to ascertain whether the contested CTM departs significantly from the norms and customs of the relevant sector. Thus the analysis of whether a 3D shape mark is distinctive requires first and foremost an examination of the ‘norms of the sector’ in order to then determine whether a particular 3D mark can be distinguished by the consumer from other undertakings. However, the identification by the GC of the latter falls far short of a well-grounded definition of the ‘norms’ of the sector for beverages. The indications identified by the GC relating to the norms of the sector are first factually wrong (the reference to an inexistent ‘cylindrical section’) and so vague and general that — if applied — no beverage bottle would ever pass the test for distinctiveness (not even the famous Coca-Cola bottle, if it were the object of a cancellation action). By contrast, the Cancellation Division properly defined the norms of the sector. Further, the Board of Appeal in decision R 2465/2011-2 dated 1 February 2012 (Freixenet v. OHIM), held at para. 36 that ‘previously, nor the examiner, nor the Board, presented documents which contained references to the reality of the market existing at the day of application, and did not identify nor indicate concrete examples of identical or similar bottles commonly used in the sector before said date. This omission is a sufficient ground to uphold the appeal .’ Thus, the General Court, by omitting to indicate concrete examples of the norms of the sector, clearly infringed Article 7 (1) (b) of the CTMR.
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declare that, in view of (a) its failure to impose, within the national legal system, an obligation to notify the competent Polish authorities of the locations at which GMO crops are being grown pursuant to Part C of Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, (1) (b) its failure to establish a register for recording the locations at which such GMO crops are being grown, and (c) its failure to provide information to the public on the locations at which such GMO crops are being grown, the Republic of Poland has failed to meet its obligations under Article 31(3)(b) of Directive 2001/18/EC;
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 344/49

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Simboulio tis Epikratias lodged on 16 September 2013 — Agrooikosystimata EPE v Ipourgos Ikonomias kai Ikonomikon, Ipourgos Αgrotikis Anaptixis kai Trofimon, Region of Thessaly

(Case C-498/13)

2013/C 344/85

Language of the case: Greek

Referring court

Simboulio tis Epikratias

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Agrooikosystimata EPE

Defendants: Ipourgos Ikonomias kai Ikonomikon, Ipourgos Αgrotikis Anaptixis kai Trofimon, Region of Thessaly

Question referred

Must those who are to qualify as beneficiaries of the long-term agricultural land set-aside scheme under Regulation (EEC) No 2078/92 (1) and Regulation (EC) No 746/96 (2) be farmers or is it sufficient if they assume the financial risk of the land entered in the scheme and are responsible for its management?

(1) Council Regulation (EEC) No 2078/92 of 30 June 1992 on agricultural production methods compatible with the requirements of the protection of the environment and the maintenance of the countryside (OJ 1992 L 215, p. 85).

(2) Commission Regulation (EC) No 746/96 of 24 April 1996 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2078/92 on agricultural production methods compatible with the requirements of the protection of the environment and the maintenance of the countryside (OJ 1996 L 102, p. 19).
(b)

Must Article 4(1) of the directive be interpreted as precluding a national provision under which the use of temporary agency labour is permitted only in the cases specially listed, such as to cope with peak periods of work or for work which cannot be given to an undertaking’s own employees to do? May the use of agency workers for a lengthy period in the ordinary work of an undertaking alongside the undertaking’s own employees be defined as a prohibited use of agency labour?
3.

If not, can it be effected, in keeping with the spirit of Regulation (ΕC) No 1393/2007, by service on the lawyer acting for the respondents appearing under protest, who is under an obligation vis-à-vis his clients to accept service, or must service be effected anew under the procedure provided for in Regulation (ΕC) No 1393/2007?
1.

May the Member States exclude an economic operator from participating in a procedure for the award of a public contract on grounds other than those listed in Article 45 of Directive 2004/18/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (in particular, on grounds that are considered to be justified from the point of view of protecting the public interest, the legitimate interests of the contracting authority or fair competition and the maintenance of lawfulness in competition) and, if so, is the provision of such exclusion in relation to an economic operator that has committed an infringement related to his economic or professional activity and established by court judgment which has the authority of res judicata given not more than five years ago compatible with the second recital in the preamble to that directive and with Articles 18 TFEU, 34 TFEU, 49 TFEU and 56 TFEU?
2.

If the reply to the first question is in the affirmative: does the defence under Article 13 of the Insolvency Regulation also apply to limitation periods or other time-bars relating to actions to set aside transactions under the law which governs the dispute concerning the contested legal transaction (lex causae)?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 9/20

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour du travail de Bruxelles (Belgium) lodged on 31 October 2013 — Centre public d’action sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-La-Neuve v Moussa Abdida

(Case C-562/13)

2014/C 9/32

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour du travail de Bruxelles

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Centre public d’action sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-La-Neuve

Respondent: Moussa Abdida

Questions referred

1. On a proper construction of Directives 2004/83/EC, (1) 2005/85/EC (2) and 2003/9/EC, (3) is a Member State which provides that a foreign national has the right to subsidiary protection for the purposes of Article 15(b) of Directive 2004/83/EC if that person ‘suffers from an illness which is of such a kind as to entail a real risk to his life or physical integrity or a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment where there is no adequate treatment for that illness in his country of origin’ under an obligation to — provide for a remedy with suspensive effect in respect of the administrative decision refusing leave to remain and/or subsidiary protection, and ordering the person to leave the territory of that State, — make provision under its social security or reception system for the basic needs of the person applying for subsidiary protection (other than his medical needs) to be met pending a ruling on his appeal against that administrative decision?

2. If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative, does the Charter of Fundamental Rights — and, in particular, Articles 1 to 3 (human dignity, right to life and integrity), Article 4 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), Article 19(2) (right not to be removed to a State where there is a serious risk of inhuman or degrading treatment), Articles 20 and 21 (equality and non-discrimination as compared with other categories of applicants for subsidiary protection) and/or Article 47 (right to an effective remedy) of that Charter — place a Member State in course of transposing Directives 2004/83/EC, 2005/85/EC and 2003/9/EC into national law under an obligation to make provision for a remedy with suspensive effect and for the requisite means of meeting the basic needs referred to in Question 1?

(1) Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted (OJ 2004 L 304, p. 2).

(2) Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status (OJ 2005 L 326, p. 13).

(3) Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers (OJ 2003 L 31, p. 18).
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set aside the Judgment in accordance with the pleas in law put forward by this appeal, and/or to annul Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Decision in so far as it relates to the applicants, and/or to set aside Article 2 of the Decision to the extent a fine has been imposed on the applicants or to reduce the fine that has been imposed on the applicants in Article 2 of the Decision,
2.

The General Court infringed European Union law in interpreting the case-law on the concept of ‘actual beneficiary’ for the purposes of examining the admissibility of actions brought against decisions declaring an aid scheme unlawful and incompatible. In particular, — the General Court wrongly interpreted the case-law on the concept of ‘actual beneficiary’ and distorted the facts in applying it to the transactions carried out by the applicant after 21 December 2007; — the General Court also erred in law as regards the transactions before 21 December 2007 in interpreting the concept of ‘actual beneficiary’ as developed in the case-law.
1.

Under Council Directive 93/13/EEC (1) of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, and in particular Articles 6(1) and 7(1) thereof, and in order to ensure the protection of consumers and users in accordance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness[,] must a national court, when it finds there to be an unfair contractual clause concerning default interest, declare that as a consequence any type of default interest is invalid, even that which may result from the subsidiary application of a national provision such as Article 1108 of the Civil Code, the Second Transitional Provision of Law No 1/2013, in conjunction with Article 114 of the Law on mortgages, or Article 4 of Royal Decree-Law No 6/2012, and regard itself as not being bound by any recalculation which the professional may have carried out in accordance with the Second Transitional Provision of Law No 1/13?
1.

Set aside the judgment under appeal in relation to: — the attribution of joint and several liability for the infringement to Repsol Petróleo, S.A. and Repsol YPF, S.A. (currently Repsol, S.A.) — the incorrect taking into consideration of the period from 1998 to 2002 for the purposes of calculating the amount of the fine. — the incorrect taking into account by the General Court of the basic amount of the fine set by the Commission as a result of that Court’s failure to exercise its unlimited jurisdiction and breach of the principle of proportionality.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 45/17

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof (Germany) lodged on 30 October 2013 — Finanzamt Dortmund-Unna v Josef Grünewald

(Case C-559/13)

2014/C 45/31

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesfinanzhof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Finanzamt Dortmund-Unna

Defendant: Josef Grünewald

Question referred

Does Article 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) preclude legislation of a Member State under which private support payments by non-resident taxable persons which are connected with a transfer of revenue-producing domestic assets in the course of a so-called anticipated succession are not tax deductible, whereas such payments are deductible in the case of full liability to taxation, but the deduction results in a corresponding tax liability for a (fully taxable) recipient of the payments?
2.

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: 2.1 Under Article 3(a) and (b) of Regulation (EC) No 469/2009, may a protection certificate be granted for the substance protected by the basic patent (in this case, Protein D) where that substance has a therapeutic effect of its own (in this case, as a vaccine against Haemophilus influenzae bacteria) but the authorisation of the medicinal product does not relate to that effect? 2.2 Under Article 3(a) and (b) of Regulation (EC) No 469/2009, may a protection certificate be granted for the substance protected by the basic patent (in this case, Protein D) where the authorisation describes that substance as a ‘carrier’ for the actual active ingredients (in this case, Pneumococcal polysaccharides), the carrier, as an adjuvant, enhances the effect of those substances, but that effect is not expressly mentioned in the authorisation of the medicinal product?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administratīvā apgabaltiesa (Latvia) lodged on 13 December 2013 — VAS ‘Ceļu satiksmes drošības direkcija’, Latvijas Republikas Satiksmes ministrija

(Case C-664/13)

(2014/C 71/15)

Language of the case: Latvian

Referring court

Administratīvā apgabaltiesa

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: VAS ‘Ceļu satiksmes drošības direkcija’, Latvijas Republikas Satiksmes ministrija

Respondent: K. Nīmanis

Question referred

Must Article 12 of Directive 2006/126/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on driving licences, in conjunction with the first sentence of the second recital in the preamble thereto, be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which provides that the only means of proving that a person is normally resident in that State (Latvia) is the declared residence of that person? ‘Declared residence’ must be understood as meaning the obligation of the person, in accordance with the national legislation, to be registered in a state register, in order to notify his accessibility at the declared residence for the purposes of his legal relations with the State and the local authorities.

(1) OJ 2006 L 403, p. 18.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 52/29

Appeal brought on 4 December 2013 by Melkveebedrijf Overenk BV and Others against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 11 September 2013 in Case T-540/11 Melkveebedrijf Overenk and Others v Commission

(Case C-643/13 P)

2014/C 52/53

Language of the case: Dutch

Parties

Appellants: Melkveebedrijf Overenk BV, Maatschap Veehouderij Kwakernaak, Mulders Agro vof, Melkveebedrijf Engelen vof, Melkveebedrijf De Peel BV, M.H.H.M. Moonen (represented by: P.E. Mazel and A. van Beelen, advocaten)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellants request the Court to set aside the order against which the present appeal has been brought and to refer the case back to the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In conclusion, the order should be set aside on the ground of procedural irregularities, which prejudiced the appellants’ interests, and on the ground of the General Court’s breach of European Union law.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 78/2

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Polimeles Protodikio Athinon (Greece) lodged on 2 July 2013 — Warner-Lambert Company LLC and Pfizer Ellas AE v SiegerPharma Anonimi Farmakeftiki Etairia

(Case C-372/13)

2014/C 78/02

Language of the case: Greek

Referring court

Polimeles Protodikio Athinon

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Warner-Lambert Company LLC and Pfizer Ellas AE

Defendant: SiegerPharma Anonimi Farmakeftiki Etairia

The Court (Third Chamber) ruled by reasoned order of 30 January 2014.
(a)

Does the third party’s enjoyment of the exemption depend on the manufacturer of generic medicinal products who is supplied by him actually using the provided active substance for exempted studies or trials under Article 10(6) of Directive 2001/83/EC? Does the exclusion from patent protection apply in such a case even where the third party has no knowledge of the intentions of his customer to use the active substance for purposes covered by the exemption and has also not satisfied himself in this regard? Or, in order for the third party to enjoy the exemption, does it matter only that at the time of his act of provision he can legitimately assume on the basis of all the circumstances (for example, the focus of the undertaking supplied, the small quantity of the active substance provided, the imminent expiry of the patent protection for the active substance in question, experiences as to the customer’s reliability) that the generic pharmaceutical undertaking supplied will use the active substance provided exclusively for exempted trials or studies in the context of a marketing authorisation?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 85/13

Appeal brought on 16 December 2013 by Mundipharma GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 16 October 2013 in Case T-328/12 Mundipharma GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

(Case C-669/13 P)

2014/C 85/24

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Mundipharma GmbH (represented by: F. Nielsen, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— Set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union (Third Chamber) of 16 October 2013 (Case T-328/12);

— Order the defendant and respondent to pay the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue OXYGESIC and Maxigesic and thus that the requirements of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 (1) had not been satisfied. The judgment under appeal is based on a distortion of the facts and contains contradictions which infringe the general rules of logic. It constitutes an infringement of Community law, namely of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009. If the General Court had carried out a correct and non-contradictory assessment of the facts of the case, it would have reached the conclusion that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue and would therefore have upheld the action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market of 23 May 2012.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 85/17

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 20 January 2014 — Beaudout Père et Fils SARL v Ministre du travail, de l’emploi, de la formation professionnelle et du dialogue social, Confédération nationale de la boulangerie et boulangerie-pâtisserie française, Fédération Générale Agroalimentaire — CFDT and Others

(Case C-26/14)

2014/C 85/31

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Beaudout Père et Fils SARL

Defendants: Ministre du travail, de l’emploi, de la formation professionnelle et du dialogue social, Confédération nationale de la boulangerie et boulangerie-pâtisserie française, Fédération Générale Agroalimentaire — CFDT and Others

Question referred

Is compliance with the obligation of transparency flowing from Article 56 TFEU a mandatory prior condition for the extension, by a Member State, to all undertakings within a sector, of a collective agreement under which a single operator, chosen by the social partners, is entrusted with the management of a compulsory supplementary social security scheme for employees?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 102/18

Appeal brought on 23 January 2014 by Enercon GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 12 November 2013 in Case T-245/12: Gamesa Eólica, SL v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)(OHIM)

(Case C-35/14 P)

2014/C 102/24

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Enercon GmbH (represented by: J. Eberhardt, Rechtsanwalt, R. Böhm, Rechtsanwalt)

Other parties to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), Gamesa Eólica, SL

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— annul the judgment in case T-245/12 handed down by the General Court on 12 November 2013;

— order OHIM to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellant submits that the contested judgment should be annulled on the following grounds:

1. As a consequence of the fact that the appellant did not lodge a reply in the proceedings before the General Court, that Court did not involve the appellant in the proceedings and did not serve a copy of the judgment on the appellant. It is submitted that the General Court therefore acted in breach of its Rules of Procedure and violated the appellant’s property rights by denial of due legal process.