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In those circumstances, the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State, Italy) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) May conduct that constitutes an abuse of a dominant position be completely lawful in and of itself and be classified as “an abuse” solely because of the (potentially) restrictive effect created in the reference market, or must that conduct also be characterised by a specific “unlawful” component, represented by the use of “competitive methods (or means) that are different” from those that are “normal”? In the latter case, what criteria should be used to establish the boundary between “normal” and “distorted” competition? (2) Is the purpose of the concept of abuse to maximise the well-being of consumers, with the court being responsible for determining whether that well-being has been (or could be) reduced, or does the concept of an infringement of competition law have the function of preserving in itself the competitive structure of the market, in order to avoid the creation of economic power groupings that are, in any case, considered harmful for the community? (3) In the case of an abuse of a dominant position represented by an attempt to prevent the continuation or development of the existing level of competition, is the dominant undertaking in any case permitted to prove that the conduct did not cause any actual harm, despite its abstract ability to generate a restrictive effect? If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, for the purposes of assessing whether an atypical exclusionary abuse has occurred, must Article 102 TFEU be interpreted as meaning that the competition authority has an obligation to examine specifically the economic analyses produced by the party concerning the actual ability of the conduct examined to exclude its competitors from the market? (4) Must an abuse of a dominant position be assessed solely in terms of its effects on the market (including merely potential effects), without regard to the subjective motive of the operator, or does a demonstration of restrictive intent constitute a parameter that may be used (even exclusively) to assess the abusive nature of the dominant undertaking’s conduct? Does such a demonstration of the subjective component serve only to shift the burden of proof to the dominant undertaking (which would have the burden, at this stage, of providing evidence that the exclusionary effect is absent)? (5) In the case of a dominant position held by a number of companies belonging to the same corporate group, is membership of that group sufficient reason to assume that even those companies that have not implemented the abusive conduct have contributed to the infringement, so that the competition authority would merely need to demonstrate a conscious, albeit non-collusive, parallel approach by the companies operating within the collectively dominant group? Or (as is the case for the prohibition on cartels) is there in any case a need to provide evidence, even indirectly, of a specific situation of coordination and instrumentality among the various companies within the dominant group, in particular in order to demonstrate the involvement of the parent company?’