ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Appeal brought on 21 February 2019 by Ehab Makhlouf against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-409/16 Makhlouf v Council

(Case C-157/19 P)

(2019/C 172/18)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Ehab Makhlouf (represented by: E. Ruchat, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant submits that the Court should:

— Declare the appellant’s action admissible and well founded;

— Accordingly, set aside the judgment of 12 December 2018 given by the General Court of the European Union in Case T-409/16, Ehab Makhlouf v Council of the European Union;

And, giving judgment itself,

— Annul Decision (CFSP) 2016/850 of 27 May 2016 (1) and its subsequent implementing acts, in so far as they concern the appellant;

— Order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of his appeal, the appellant relies on three grounds:

The first ground of appeal, alleging an error of law in that the General Court disregarded the applicant’s right to be heard prior to the adoption of new restrictive measures, as enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights;

The second ground of appeal, alleging an error of law and distortion of the facts in so far as the General Court disregarded the items submitted by the applicant in support of his action for annulment to demonstrate that he did not support the Syrian regime;

The third ground of appeal, alleging an error of law in so far as the General Court did not hold that Articles 27 and 28 of Decision 2013/255/CFSP, (2) according to which membership of the Al-Assad or Makhlouf families constitutes an autonomous criterion justifying the imposition of sanctions, were illegal and in so far as it, on the same occasion, reversed the burden of proof.

(1) Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/850 of 27 May 2016 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria (OJ L 141, p. 125).

(2) Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP of 31 May 2013 concerning restrictive measures against Syria (OJ L 147, p. 14).
Appeal brought on 31 March 2019 by Ethniko Kentro Erevnas kai Technologikis Anaptyxis (EKETA) against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 22 January 2019 in Case T-166/17, EKETA v European Commission

(Case C-273/19 P)

(2019/C 182/32)

Language of the case: Greek

Parties

Appellant: Ethniko Kentro Erevnas kai Technologikis Anaptyxis (EKETA) (represented by: V. Christianos and K. Karagounis, lawyers)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court of Justice of the European Union should:

1. Set aside the judgment of the General Court of 22 January 2019 in Case Τ-166/17 (1), to the extent of points 2 and 3 of the operative part and the paragraphs of that judgment relating thereto;

2. Refer the case back to the General Court for a further ruling;

3. Order the Commission to pay the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant does not challenge point 1 of the operative part of the judgment under appeal, and the related paragraphs 142-143, 145, 171, 173, 187-189 and 191-193 of the judgment under appeal are also not challenged.

The appellant claims that points 2 and 3 of the operative part of the judgment under appeal and the paragraphs relating to them should be set aside on the following grounds:

— First ground of appeal: The General Court failed to give judgment in accordance with the law and did not assess all the evidence produced by ΕΚΕΤΑ. The General Court also distorted the facts, as they emerged from that evidence, erred in law as to the allocation of the burden of proof and was in breach of the obligation to state reasons for its decision (paragraph 5 et seq.).

— Second ground of appeal: The General Court erred in law, in that it misinterpreted the issue of whether there was a risk of conflict of interest (paragraph 78 et seq.).

— Third ground of appeal: The General Court erred in law, in that it misinterpreted in this case the obligation of the Commission to carry out its audit in accordance with the International Standards on Auditing (paragraph 94 et seq.).

— Fourth ground of appeal: The General Court erred in law in its interpretation of the principle of proportionality, which it disregarded (paragraph 103 et seq.).

(1) ECLI:EU:T:2019:26.
1.

Is it compatible with Article 4 of Directive 2012/13/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings (‘Directive 2012/13/EU’), Article 8(2) of Directive 2012/13/EU, the right to liberty and security under Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the right of defence under Article 48(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the right to a fair trial under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union for the national authorities not to provide the detainee, throughout the period of detention, with the information referred to in Article 4(2) of Directive 2012/13/EU (in particular the right to access to the materials of the case), fully or completely, and not to permit the detainee to challenge that failure to provide information in accordance with Article 8(2) of Directive 2012/13/EU? If the reply to that question should be in the negative, does that infringement of the law of the European Union affect, at any stage in the criminal proceedings, the legality of the deprivation of personal liberty when the detainee has been placed in pre-trial detention, in addition to the continuation of such pre-trial detention?
—

Pursuant to Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, annul the decision and refer the case back to the General Court, requiring that costs be duly assessed, in accordance with Article 138 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.
5.

Does the principle of judicial independence, enshrined in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as interpreted by the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (judgment of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16, EU:C:2018:117), preclude the establishment of the section for the investigation of offences committed within the Judiciary, within the prosecutors office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice, in the light of the rules governing the appointment/removal of prosecutors as members of that section, the rules governing the exercise of functions within that section and the way in which jurisdiction is established, in connection with the limited number of positions in that section?
ensure for those same agglomerations that the waste water which enters the collecting systems is subject to secondary or equivalent treatment before discharge, as required by Articles 4, 10 and 15 of and by Annexes I.B and I.D to the Directive,

failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 3, 4, 10, 15 and Annex I to Directive 91/271/EEC (1) concerning urban waste-water treatment.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Finanzgericht des Saarlandes (Germany) lodged on 9 April 2019 — QM v Finanzamt Saarbrücken

(Case C-288/19)

(2019/C 206/43)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Finanzgericht des Saarlandes

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: QM

Defendant: Finanzamt Saarbrücken

Question referred

Is Article 56(2) of the VAT Directive (1) to be interpreted as meaning that ‘hiring of a means of transport to a non-taxable person’ should also be understood as referring to the provision of a vehicle (company car) forming part of the assets of the business of a taxable person to his staff, if the employee does not provide consideration for it that does not consist in (part of) the work performed by him, and thus does not make any payment, does not use any of his cash remuneration for it, and also does not choose between various benefits offered by the taxable person under an agreement between the parties according to which the entitlement to use the company car is contingent on the forgoing of other benefits?

(1) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1) as amended by Council Directive 2008/8/EC of 12 February 2008 (OJ 2008 L 44, p. 11).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 7 January 2019 by BI against the order of the President of the General Court delivered on 26 November 2018 in Case T-626/18 AJ BI v European Commission

(Case C-99/19 P)

(2019/C 220/20)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: BI

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

The Court of Justice of the European Union (Seventh Chamber) dismissed the appeal by order of 21 May 2019 and ordered the unsuccessful party to pay the costs.
Appeal brought on 29 April 2019 by Souruh SA against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 28 February 2019 in Case T-440/16 Souruh v Council

(Case C-350/19 P)

(2019/C 213/22)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Souruh SA (represented by: E. Ruchat, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant submits that the Court should:

— Declare the appeal admissible and well founded;

— Accordingly, set aside the judgment of 28 February 2019 (T-440/16);

And, giving judgment itself,

— Annul Decision (CFSP) 2016/850 of 27 May 2016 (1) and its subsequent implementing acts, in so far as they concern the appellant;

— Order the Council to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The first ground of appeal alleges an error of law in that the General Court disregarded the applicant’s right, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, to be heard prior to the adoption of new restrictive measures.

The second ground of appeal alleges an error of law and distortion of the facts in that the General Court disregarded the items submitted by the applicant in support of its action for annulment to demonstrate that it did not support the Syrian regime.

The third ground of appeal alleges an error of law in so far as the General Court did not hold that Articles 27 and 28 of Decision 2013/255/CFSP, according to which membership of the Al-Assad or Makhlouf families constitutes an autonomous criterion justifying the imposition of sanctions, were illegal and in so far as it, on the same occasion, reversed the burden of proof.

(1) Council Decision (CFSP) of 27 May 2016 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria (OJ 2016 L 141, p. 125).
1.

Where a national provision, such as Article 2(2)(a) of Order TAS 2865/2003, requires that a person must have left a social security scheme in order to be eligible for voluntary insurance or optional continued insurance, must the person concerned have left a Spanish social security scheme or, on the other hand, in accordance with the principle of equal treatment of facts laid down in Article 5(b) of Regulation No 883/2004, (1) must the Spanish competent institution take account of the fact that the person concerned has left a similar social security scheme of another Member State, as though that had occurred in Spain?
3.

Does EU law, in particular the principle of cooperation in good faith and the principle of res judicata, allow the national court of a Member State (other than Romania) not to comply with its international obligations under the ICSID Convention in a situation where the European Commission has adopted a decision after the date of that award, under which enforcement of the award is regarded as contrary to the EU State aid regime, even when the European Commission participated in the arbitration proceedings (including the action for annulment of the award) and put forward its case in relation to the EU State aid regime?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal du travail francophone de Bruxelles (Belgium) lodged on 21 May 2019 — PN, QO, RP, SQ, TR v Centre public d’action sociale d’Anderlecht (CPAS)

(Case C-394/19)

(2019/C 246/14)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal du travail francophone de Bruxelles

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: PN, QO, RP, SQ, TR

Defendant: Centre public d’action sociale d’Anderlecht (CPAS)

Question referred

Is the principle of full effectiveness of the rules of European Law and the protection of those rules, as defined in the Francovich and Brasserie du pêcheur judgments, in conjunction with Directive 2004/38/EC, (1) to be interpreted as imposing an obligation on a Member State, in circumstances where the right of residence of a foreign national has been withdrawn without prior consideration of proportionality, as a result of an error in transposition into domestic law, to cover, within the framework of its welfare system, the basic needs of the applicant other than medical needs, until the applicant’s position as regards the right of residence has been determined in conformity with EU law?

(1) Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004 L 158, p. 77).
Appeal brought on 23 May 2019 by the French Republic against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 12 March 2019 in Case T-26/18 France v Commission

(Case C-404/19P)

(2019/C 238/16)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: French Republic (represented by: D. Colas, A.-L. Desjonquères, C. Mosser, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant submits that the Court should:

— Set aside in part the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 12 March 2019, in Case T-26/18, France v Commission;

— Give final judgment in the matter by annulling Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/2014 of 8 November 2017 excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure incurred by the Member States under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (1), in so far as it imposes on France a flat-rate correction of 100 % on account of deficiencies in the control system for area aid in Haute-Corse;

— Order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The French Government asks the Court to set aside in part the judgment under appeal in so far as it dismisses its action with regard to the part of the contested decision which concerns the ‘Control system gravely deficient Corse’ for the years 2013 and 2014, in that it applies a flat-rate correction of 100 % on account of deficiencies in the control system for area aid in Haute-Corse.

In support of its appeal, the French Government relies on a single ground of appeal alleging error of law. It is submitted that the General Court relied on an erroneous interpretation of the conditions provided for in point 3.2.5 of the 2015 guidelines for setting a correction rate higher than 25 %. It is claimed that the General Court confused the evidence to be adduced in the situation where the grant of aid is devoid of any legal basis or misinterprets rules of EU law, and the case where the deficiencies in the control system are sufficiently grave as to allow it to be assumed that the aid has been granted in breach of EU law. The General Court therefore wrongly held that the exclusion of all expenditure from EU funding was justified and that the flat-rate correction of 100 % was well founded.

(1) OJ 2017 L 292, p. 61.
1.

Must Article 2 of Directive 2003/88 (1) be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances such as those in the present case, stand-by duty, during which a worker performing his work at a radio and television transmission station must during the period he is not at work (when his physical presence at the workplace is not necessary) be contactable when called and, where necessary, be at his workplace within one hour, is to be considered working time?
1.

Are the provisions of Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that passengers who are transported to their final destination via the booked flight over an hour before the planned time of departure obtain compensation, by application by analogy of Article 7 of that regulation?
2.

The appellant, first of all, claims infringement of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, in so far as the General Court disregarded the fact that Associazione GranoSalus has standing to bring an action by virtue of the fact that its members have individual standing, since the contested Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2324 ‘is of direct and individual concern to them’ as a ‘regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures’. In that regard, the association claims that the General Court erred in applying the provision in question, in so far as it considered that the condition of individual concern was not met because ‘some of the applicant’s members are allegedly affected by the contested act in their general capacity as consumers and citizens of the EU’ (paragraph 57 of the order). That classification of the members of the applicant GranoSalus is however incorrect in the light of the statute of the association which makes its members, and through them, the association, holders and promoters of an interest relating to the protection of consumers and of agricultural producers via the implementation, in particular, of actions ‘seeking to combat, especially at EU level, any increase in the thresholds of mycotoxins and other contaminants in order to protect the health of consumers and, in particular, children’. Since the condition of individual concern is satisfied and that condition is cumulative with respect to that of direct concern, the Court was wrong to rule from that point of view without taking account of it.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Riigikohus (Estonia) lodged on 29 May 2019 — Maksu- ja Tolliamet v Heavyinstall OÜ

(Case C-420/19)

(2019/C 263/38)

Language of the case: Estonian

Referring court

Riigikohus

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Maksu- ja Tolliamet

Defendant: Heavyinstall OÜ

Question referred

Is Article 16 of Council Directive 2010/24/EU of 16 March 2010 concerning mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to taxes, duties and other measures (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the court of the Member State which has received the request for precautionary measures, when ruling on that request on the basis of national law (which is possible for the requested court under the first sentence of Article 16), is bound to the view taken by the court of the State of establishment of the applicant in relation to the necessity and possibility of the precautionary measure when a document containing that view has been submitted to the court (last sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 16[(1)], according to which this document shall not be subject to any recognition, supplementing or replacement in the requested Member State)?

(1) OJ 2010 L 84, p. 1.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy w Opatowie (Poland) lodged on 20 March 2019 — QL S.A. in B. v C.G.

(Case C-252/19)

(2019/C 280/24)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy w Opatowie

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: QL S.A. in B.

Defendant: C.G.

Question referred

Must the provisions of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, (1) and in particular Article 3(g) and Article 22(1) of that directive, be interpreted as precluding the introduction into national law of the concept of ‘maximum non-interest credit costs’ and the mathematical formula for calculating those costs set out in Article 5(6)(a) in conjunction with Article 36a of the Ustawa o kredycie konsumenckim z dnia 12 maja 2011 r. (Law of 12 May 2011 on Consumer Credit, consolidated text: Journal of Laws [Dz. U.] of 2018, item 993), which allow the costs of the business activity of a seller or supplier to be included in the costs related to a credit agreement that are to be borne by the consumer (the total costs of the credit)?

(1) OJ 2008 L 133, p. 66.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy w Opatowie (Poland) lodged on 8 March 2019 — BW Sp. z o.o., having its seat in B. v D.R.

(Case C-222/19)

(2019/C 280/23)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy w Opatowie

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: BW Sp. z o.o., having its seat in B.

Defendant: D.R.

Question referred

Must the provisions of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, (1) in particular Article 3(1) of that directive, and the principles of EU law concerning consumer protection and the balance between contracting parties be interpreted as precluding the introduction into national law of the concept of ‘maximum non-interest credit costs’ and the mathematical formula for calculating those costs set out in Article 5(6a), in conjunction with Article 36a, of the Ustawa o kredycie konsumenckim (Law on Consumer Credit) of 12 May 2011 (consolidated text: Dziennik Ustaw of 2018, item 993), which allow the costs of the business activity of a seller or supplier to be included in the costs related to a credit agreement that are to be borne by the consumer (the total cost of the credit)?

(1) OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29.
3.

Although there is no general obligation on Member States to provide for the conversion of fixed-term employment contracts into contracts of unlimited duration, does Clause 5 of the framework agreement on fixed-term work annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, headed ‘Measures to prevent abuse’, preclude …, also in the light of the principle of equivalence, national legislation such as that laid down in Article 24(1) and (3) of Law No 240 of 30 December 2010, which provides for the conclusion and extension for a total period of five years (three years and a possible extension of two years) of fixed-term contracts between researchers and universities, making the conclusion of the contract subject to the availability of ‘the resources for planning for the purposes of carrying out research, teaching, non-curricular activities and student service activities’ and also making extension of the contract subject to a ‘positive appraisal of the teaching and research activities carried out’, without laying down objective and transparent criteria for determining whether the conclusion and renewal of those contracts actually meet a genuine need and whether they are capable of achieving the objective pursued and are necessary for that purpose, and therefore entails a specific risk of abusive use of such contracts, thus rendering them incompatible with the purpose and practical effect of the framework agreement?