ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 55/7

Appeal brought on 18 December 2012 by Lancôme parfums et beauté & Cie against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 5 October 2012 in Case T-204/10: Lancôme parfums et beauté & Cie v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

(Case C-593/12 P)

2013/C 55/10

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Lancôme parfums et beauté & Cie (represented by: A. von Mühlendahl, Rechtsanwalt)

Other parties to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs); Focus Magazin Verlag GmbH

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— Annul the Judgment of the General Court of 5 October 2012 in Case T-204/10;

— Order the Office to bear the costs of the proceedings before the Court of Justice and before the General Court, as well as the costs of the proceedings before the Office’s Board of Appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellant submits that the contested judgment should be set aside on the following grounds:

First, the Appellant claims that the General Court violated Article 53(1) CTMR (1) in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) CTMR in deciding that the Office was justified in finding that COLOR FOCUS must be declared invalid because of likelihood of confusion.

Second, the Appellant claims that the General Court committed reversible legal error in dismissing the Appellant’s claim that the assertion of rights based on the mark FOCUS amounts to an ‘abuse of rights’.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark

OJ L 78, p. 1
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 32/14

Appeal brought on 10 December 2012 by Ivan Jurašinović against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 3 October 2012 in Case T-465/09 Jurašinović v Council

(Case C-576/12 P)

2013/C 32/19

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Ivan Jurašinović (represented by: N. Amara-Lebret, avocate)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the decision under appeal, refer the case back to the General Court or, failing this;

— annul the decision of 22 September 2009 by which the applicant was granted only partial access to the following documents: reports of the European Union observers present in Croatia, in the Knin area, of 1 August to 31 August 1995;

— order the Council of the European Union to authorise access, in electronic form, to all the documents requested;

— order the Council of the European Union to pay the applicant the sum of EUR 8 000 not including charges for litigation costs with interest at the ECB rate until the date of registration of the application.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of his appeal, the appellant puts forward three grounds of appeal.

Firstly, the appellant takes the view that the General Court infringed the general principle of the right to a fair trial, since it could not have legitimately ruled on the application without having previously examined the documents to which access was requested.

Secondly, the applicant raises the infringement of Articles 9(1) and 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, (1) because, while Article 4(1)(a) provides that it is possible to refuse access to a document undermining the public interest as regards international relations, such a refusal cannot be founded on the sensitive nature of documents which, since they have not been classified, are not entitled to protection under Article 9(1).

Thirdly, the appellant alleges that the General Court erred in law concerning the existence of an earlier disclosure of the documents. In so far as the communication drawn up between the Council and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia may have as its basis only Regulation No 1049/2001, the existence of an earlier disclosure, to the benefit of a defendant, of European Union citizenship, in the context of criminal proceedings pending before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, required that the application be granted.

(1) OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 63/12

Appeal brought on 27 December 2012 by Greinwald GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 10 October 2012 in Case T-333/11 Nicolas Wessang v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

(Case C-608/12 P)

2013/C 63/20

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Greinwald GmbH (represented by: C. Onken, Rechtsanwältin)

Other parties to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), Nicolas Wessang

Form of order sought

— Set aside the judgment of the General Court of 10 October 2012 in Case T-333/11 in so far as the application was granted;

— amend the judgment of the General Court of 10 October 2012 in Case T-333/11 so as to dismiss the application in its entirety;

— order the applicant at first instance to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellant submits that the judgment under appeal is incompatible with the legal rationale underlying Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of the Community trade mark regulation (CTMR), (1) in that it is based on the assumption of an increase in the likelihood of confusion owing to the conceptual similarity of the words ‘foods’ and ‘snacks’. According to Article 7(1)(b) and (c) CTMR, signs that are devoid of any distinctive character and descriptive signs are excluded from trade mark protection. Similarities between components of signs that are devoid of any distinctive character or are descriptive cannot therefore be responsible for, or increase, any likelihood of confusion.

It follows from this that a likelihood of confusion presupposes the possible impairment of a trade mark’s function as an indication of origin. However, such a function can be ascribed only to signs and components of signs that have distinctive character. If a component of a sign does not have the function of indicating origin, that function cannot be impaired as a result of the use of a similar component of a sign in a subsequent trade mark.

The principle that components of signs that are devoid of distinctive character cannot give rise to any likelihood of confusion is, after all, reflected in the case-law of the Court, according to which the public will not generally consider a descriptive element forming part of a complex mark to be the distinctive or dominant element of the overall impression of a composite mark.

(1) OJ 2009 L 78, p.1.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 101/7

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Hannover (Germany) lodged on 21 December 2012 — Pia Braun v Region Hannover

(Case C-603/12)

2013/C 101/13

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgericht Hannover

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Pia Braun

Defendant: Region Hannover

Question referred

Does the right to freedom of movement and freedom of residence conferred on a Union citizen by Articles 20 and 21 TFEU preclude — in a case such as the present one, in which a student who still lives with her parents in a Member State neighbouring Germany and whose parents commute to Germany for work has applied for an education grant for studies in a third Member State — a regulatory system in national law under which German nationals with a permanent residence outside the Federal Republic of Germany may be awarded an education grant to attend an education establishment situated in a Member State of the European Union only if special circumstances of the individual case justify the grant and, pursuant to which, the approval of the grant is left, as to the remainder, to the discretion of the competent national authorities?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 225/53

Appeal brought on 29 November 2012 by Emil Micsunescu against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 25 September 2012 in Case T-314/12: Micsunescu v Commission

(Case C-569/12 P)

2013/C 225/97

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Emil Micsunescu (represented by: R. Neagu, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 27 June 2013 the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 108/14

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil régional d’expression française de l’ordre des médecins vétérinaires (Belgium) lodged on 28 June 2012 — Disciplinary proceedings against Jean Devillers

(Case C-318/12)

2013/C 108/28

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil régional d'expression française de l'ordre des médecins vétérinaires (Belgium)

Party to the main proceedings

Jean Devillers

The request for a preliminary ruling made by the Conseil régional d’expression française de l’ordre des médecins vétérinaires (Belgium), by decision of 12 May 2012 (Case C-318/12), is manifestly inadmissible.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 63/13

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de Cassation (France) lodged on 2 January 2013 — Cartier Parfums Lunettes SAS and Axa Corporate Solutions Assurances SA v Ziegler France SA, Montgomery Transport SARL, Inko Trade SRO, Jaroslave Mateja, Groupama Transport

(Case C-1/13)

2013/C 63/22

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour de Cassation

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Cartier Parfums Lunettes SAS and Axa Corporate Solutions Assurances SA

Defendants: Ziegler France SA, Montgomery Transport SARL, Inko Trade SRO, Jaroslave Mateja, Groupama Transport

Question referred

Must Article 27(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (1) be interpreted as meaning that the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, if neither party has claimed that it lacks jurisdiction or if the court has accepted its jurisdiction by a decision which is irrevocable for any reason whatsoever, including the exhaustion of legal remedies?

(1) OJ 2001, L 12, p. 1.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 86/10

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 14 January 2013 — Alpina River Cruises GmbH and Nicko Tours GmbH v Ministero delle infrastrutture e dei trasporti — Capitaneria di Porto di Chioggia

(Case C-17/13)

2013/C 86/17

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Alpina River Cruises GmbH, Nicko Tours GmbH

Defendant: Ministero delle infrastrutture e dei trasporti — Capitaneria di Porto di Chioggia

Question referred

Must Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 of 7 December 1992 (1) be interpreted as applying to cruises carried out between ports within a Member State without different passengers embarking and disembarking in those ports, in that those cruises start and end with the same passengers embarking and disembarking in the same port within that Member State?

(1) Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 of 7 December 1992 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage) (OJ 1992 L 364, p. 7).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 147/3

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Datenschutzkommission (Austria) lodged on 28 January 2013 — H v E

(Case C-46/13)

2013/C 147/05

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Datenschutzkommission

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: H

Defendant: E

Questions referred

1. Is Article 7(c) of Directive 2006/24/EC (1) to be interpreted as meaning that natural persons affected by the retention of data within the meaning of the Directive do not fall into the category of ‘specially authorised personnel’ within the meaning of that provision and may not be granted a right to receive information on data relating to their own person from the provider of a publicly available communications service or a public communications network?

2. Is Article 13(1)(c) and (d) of Directive 95/46/EC (2) to be interpreted as meaning that the right of natural persons affected by the retention of data within the meaning of Directive 2006/24/EC to receive information on data relating to their own person pursuant to Article 12(a) of Directive 95/46/EC from the provider of a publicly available communications service or a public communications network can be excluded or restricted?

3. If Question 1 is answered at least partly in the affirmative: Is Article 7(c) of Directive 2006/24/EC compatible with the fundamental right laid down in the second sentence of Article 8(2) [of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union] and thus valid?

(1) Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC (OJ 2006 L 105, p. 54).

(2) Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ 1995 L 281, p. 31).
1.

Is the national court called upon to rule on the amount of State aid which the Commission has ordered to be recovered bound, as regards both the existence of the State aid and its amount, by the Commission’s Decision of 24 January 2007 adopted upon the conclusion of procedure No C 52/2005 concerning State aid, as supplemented by the determinations which the Commission made in its notes of 11 June 2008 COMP/H4/EK/cd D(2008) 127 and 23 October 2009 COMP/H4/CN/si D(2009)230 and as confirmed by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 15 June 2010 in Case T-177/07?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 141/11

Action brought on 4 February 2013 — European Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

(Case C-60/13)

2013/C 141/19

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: A. Caeiros, L. Flynn, Agents)

Defendant: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by refusing to make available the sum of £ 20 061 462,11 in relation to duties on imports of fresh garlic covered by erroneous binding tariff information, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has failed to fulfill its obligations under Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, Article 8 of Decision 2000/597/EC (1) and Articles 2, 6, 9, 10 and 11 of Regulation (EC) No 1150/2000 (2).;

— order United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By its application, the Commission claims that the United Kingdom authorities caused a loss of traditional own resources by issuing Binding Tariff Information documents without due care which allowed imports of fresh Chinese garlic outside quota. The Commission considers that, where there has been an administrative error and consequently own resources were unduly not established, the EU must be credited with the equivalent of the amount of own resources lost. Accordingly, the United Kingdom authorities should have made available to the Commission the total amount of customs duties involved, which is estimated at £ 20 061 462,11, as well as the interest due on late payments under Article 11 of Regulation No 1150/2000.

(1) 2000/597/EC, Euratom: Council Decision of 29 September 2000 on the system of the European Communities' own resources

OJ L 253, p. 42

(2) Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1150/2000 of 22 May 2000 implementing Decision 94/728/EC, Euratom on the system of the Communities' own resources

OJ L 130, p. 1
—

declare that, by inserting terms in the open invitation to tender for the provision of services to support the production operation of OPS-IKA (the integrated information system of the Idrima Kinonikon Asfalision (Social Security Institution; ‘the IKA’)) and of the IKA’s website and to expand the databases, for a period of 30 months (invitation to tender No L30/POY/9/5-6-2009 — published in the Official Journal of the European Union under No 2009/S110-159234), under which, first, the tenderers had to have experience in the performance of similar contracts for a Greek insurance body and, second, experience of the subcontractors could not establish experience of the tenderers, the Hellenic Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 2, and Articles 44(2) and 48 in conjunction with Article 2, of Directive 2004/18/EC; (1)
2.

Should the financial allowance, provided for by Article 13(5) of the Directive, be granted from the date of the application for asylum and the reception request, or from the expiry of the period provided for in Article 5(1) of the Directive, or from another date. Should the financial allowance be of such a nature that it allows the asylum seeker, in the absence of material reception facilities provided by the Member State or by an institution designated by the Member State, to provide for his own accommodation at all times, if necessary in the form of hotel accommodation, until such time as he is offered permanent accommodation or as he is able to acquire more permanent accommodation himself?
2.

Breaches of procedure and infringements of Regulation No 1049/2001, (1) Articles 6 and 13 ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter, and breaches of the principles of effective legal protection, the right to a fair hearing and procedural fairness in conjunction with a failure to state reasons and distortion of facts, attributable to: failure to deal with the case under an expedited procedure; unlawful restrictions on the applicant’s ability to comment and refusal to admit a document concerning correction of the minutes; insufficient judicial review of the documents and dismissal of the applicant’s corresponding application for all documents to be examined in camera; distortion of the facts, insufficient judicial review and breach of the principles of the allocation of the burden of proof and of procedural fairness with regard to the question whether the documentation is complete and to the numbers of confirmatory applications actually made pursuant to Regulation No 1049/2001; excessive duration of proceedings and unlawful treatment of the corresponding application for compensation;
—

declare that, by failing to adopt all the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to transpose Article 2(1), (2), (5), (7), (8), (9), (11), (13), (14), (17), (18), (19), (21), (22), (24), (28) — (35); Article 3(5)(a) and (9)(c); Article 9(1), (2), (3), (7), (9), (10) and (12); Articles 10 and 11; Article 12(d) and (h); Articles 13 and 14; the second and third sentences of Article 16(1), (2) and (3); Articles 17 to 23; Article 25(1); the third and fourth sentences of Article 26(2)(c), the second and fourth sentences of Article 26(2)(d) and (3); Article 29; Article 35(4) and (5); Article 36(a) — (e), (g) and (j); Article 37(1)(b) to (u), (3), (4)(b) and (d), (5) and (9); Article 38(1); Article 39(1), (4) and (8); Article 40(1),(2), (3), (6) and (7); and points 6 and 8 in Annex I(1)(a), (d), (f) and (j) Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC into national law, both with respect to mainland Finland and the province of Åland, or, in any event, by failing to inform the Commission thereof, the Republic of Finland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 49(1) of that directive;
1.

Must a ‘public contract’ within the meaning of Article 1(2)(a) of Directive 2004/18/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts be interpreted as also meaning a contract in the case of which, although the contracting authority does not exercise over the contractor a control similar to that which it exercises over its own departments, both the contracting authority and the contractor are controlled by the same body, which is itself a public contracting authority within the meaning of Directive 2004/18 and the contracting authority and the contractor carry out the essential part of their activities with that common body (horizontal in-house transaction)? If the first question is answered in the affirmative:
6.

On a proper construction of the general Community law principles of legal certainty, protection of legitimate expectations, equality of arms in proceedings, effective judicial protection, and the right to an independent and impartial tribunal and, more generally, to a fair hearing, guaranteed by Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union (as amended by Article 1(8) of the Treaty of Lisbon and to which Article 46 of the Treaty on European Union refers), read in conjunction with Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950, and with Articles 46, 47 and 52(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, proclaimed at Nice on 7 December 2000, as implemented by the Treaty of Lisbon, do those principles preclude the adoption by the Italian State, after a significant period of time, of a provision (such as Article 32(7) of Law No 83/10 as interpreted by Article 1(13) of Law No 92/12) which alters the consequences of ongoing proceedings directly to the detriment of the employee and to the advantage of the employer, the result being that the efficacy in remedial terms is inversely proportional to the length of the process, so far as almost to be cancelled out?
1.

Must Article 4(2) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC (1) of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (‘the Directive’) be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of a debt in respect of a loan which is denominated in a foreign currency but, in reality, is advanced in the national currency, and which is repayable by the consumer solely in national currency, the contractual clause concerning the rate of exchange of the currency, which was not individually negotiated, may form part of the ‘definition of the main subject matter of the contract’? If that is not the case, on the basis of the second indent of Article 4(2) of the Directive, must it be considered that the difference between the buying rate of exchange and the selling rate of exchange constitutes remuneration whose equivalence with the service provided cannot be analysed from the viewpoint of unfairness? In this regard, does the question whether there has in fact been a foreign exchange operation between the financial entity and the consumer have any impact?