ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesverwaltungsgericht Steiermark (Austria) lodged on 26 May 2020 — LM

(Case C-219/20)

(2020/C 304/10)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landesverwaltungsgericht Steiermark

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: LM

Defendant: Bezirkshauptmannschaft Hartberg-Fürstenfeld

Interested party: Österreichische Gesundheitskasse

Kompetenzzentrum LSDB

Question referred

Must Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 41(1) and the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law which provides for a mandatory five-year limitation period in the case of an offence committed as a result of negligence in administrative-offence proceedings?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Suceava (Romania) lodged on 23 April 2020 — BE, DT v Administrația Județeană a Finanțelor Publice Suceava, Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Iași, Accer Ipurl Suceva — lichidator judiciar al BE, EP

(Case C-182/20)

(2020/C 297/29)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Suceava

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: BE, DT

Defendants: Administrația Județeană a Finanțelor Publice Suceava, Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Iași, Accer Ipurl Suceva — lichidator judiciar al BE, EP

Question referred

Do Directive 2006/112/EC (1) and the principles of fiscal neutrality, the right to deduct VAT and fiscal certainty preclude, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, national legislation which requires, once insolvency proceedings in respect of an economic operator have been initiated, automatically and without further checks, adjustment of VAT, by refusing to allow the economic operator to deduct VAT on taxable transactions that occurred prior to the declaration of insolvency and ordering the operator to pay the deductible VAT? Does the principle of proportionality preclude, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, such provisions of national law, given the economic consequences for the economic operator and the definitive nature of such an adjustment?

(1) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1, Special edition in Romanian: Chapter 09 Volume 003 P. 7).
3.

Must the fundamental principle of European Union law of equality between men and women, which is included as a founding value in Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union, and the prohibition of discrimination on ground of sex, which is recognised as a fundamental right in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in conjunction with Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, be interpreted as precluding a national measure such as that under consideration in the main proceedings (which was prompted by Constitutional Court judgment No 40/2014 of 11 March 2014, the ensuing national case-law and the legislative amendments that implemented the judgment) which — in practice, given the general lack of awareness of the need for formalisation and the absence of any transition period for complying with the requirement — initially prevented members of de facto partnerships governed by the Catalan Civil Code from obtaining a survivor’s pension, and has subsequently made it extremely difficult for them to access this benefit, to the disadvantage of a far greater percentage of women than men?
1.

Does it follow from EU law, in particular from Article 4(3) TEU, the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU and Article 260(1) TFEU, that, in the context of ongoing court proceedings between private persons, Article 15(1), (2)(g) and (3) of Directive 2006/123 on services in the internal market (1) has direct effect in such a way that the national provisions contrary to that directive that are contained in Paragraph 7 of the German Verordnung über die Honorare für Architekten- und Ingenieurleistungen (Decree on fees for services provided by architects and engineers (‘the HOAI’)), pursuant to which the minimum rates for planning and supervision services provided by architects and engineers laid down in that official scale of fees are mandatory — save in certain exceptional cases — and any fee agreement in contracts with architects or engineers which falls short of the minimum rates is invalid, are no longer to be applied?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 22 July 2020 — Conseil national des centres commerciaux v Premier ministre, Ministre de l’Économie, des Finances et de la Relance, Ministre de la cohésion des territoires et des relations avec les collectivités territoriales

(Case C-325/20)

(2020/C 339/02)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Conseil national des centres commerciaux

Defendants: Premier ministre, Ministre de l’Économie, des Finances et de la Relance, Ministre de la cohésion des territoires et des relations avec les collectivités territoriales

Question referred

Must Article 14(6) of Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market (1) be interpreted as meaning that it permits the presence, on a collegiate body responsible for issuing an opinion on the granting of a commercial operating permit, of a recognised expert describing the local economic fabric, whose role is limited to merely presenting the situation of the economic fabric in the relevant catchment area and the impact of the project on that economic fabric, without taking part in the vote on the permit application?

(1) OJ 2006 L 376, p. 36.
3.

Do Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA and the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter indeed preclude the executing judicial authority from executing an EAW when it has established that: — there is a real risk in the issuing Member State of breach of the fundamental right to a fair trial for any suspected person, where that risk is connected with systemic and generalised deficiencies relating to the independence of that Member State’s judiciary, — those systemic and generalised deficiencies are therefore not only liable to have negative consequences, but actually do have such consequences for the courts of that Member State with jurisdiction over the proceedings to which the requested person will be subject, and — there are therefore serious and factual grounds to believe that the requested person runs a real risk of breach of his fundamental right to an independent tribunal and, therefore, of the essence of his fundamental right to a fair trial, even if, aside from those systemic and generalised deficiencies, the requested person has not expressed any specific concerns, and even if the requested person’s personal situation, the nature of the offences for which he is being prosecuted and the context that forms the basis of the EAW, aside from those systemic and generalised deficiencies, do not give rise to fears that the executive and/or legislature will exert concrete pressure on or influence his trial?
1.

Under EU law, especially the principle of effectiveness, and for the purposes of European fundamental rights, must no deduction for actual use of the vehicle be applied to the damage sustained by the purchaser where the manufacturer of a vehicle or engine infringes European registration law and European emissions standards? Does that preclusion of any deduction apply where a manufacturer causes a customer intentional damage contrary to public policy?
Appeal brought on 24 August 2020 by Lípidos Santiga, SA against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 11 June 2020 in Case T-561/19, Lípidos Santiga v Commission

(Case C-402/20 P)

(2020/C 348/17)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Lípidos Santiga, SA (represented by: P. Muñiz Fernández, abogado)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 11 June 2020, Lipidos Santiga v Commission (case T-561/19) notified to the appellant on 12 June 2020, insofar as it dismissed the action as inadmissible;

— declare the action brought by the Appellant admissible and refer the case back to the General Court to rule on the merits of the case; and

— order the European Commission to pay the costs of these proceedings and of the proceedings before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First ground of appeal: The General Court erred in law in finding that the Appellant’s situation is not affected by the European Union’s exclusion of palm oil biofuel from the EU market.

A. In omitting to examine whether there is a market for palm oil biofuel outside the REDII (1) mandatory targets, the General Court failed to state sufficient grounds.

B. The General Court erred in law in concluding that the contested provisions do not trigger the express prohibition contained in Article 26(2) of RED II concerning the use palm oil biofuel.

C. The General Court erred in law in finding that, as a consequence of the low ILUC-risk exception, the Appellant is not directly affected by the contested provisions.

Second ground of appeal: The General Court erred in law in finding that Member States have discretion to implement the prohibition in Article 26(2) of RED II triggered by the contested provisions.

Third ground of appeal: The General Court’s legal characterisation of the effects on the Appellant’s situation arising from the contested provisions, as well as its interpretation and application of the direct concern test, are manifestly erroneous.

(1) Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (OJ 2018, L 328, p. 82).
2.

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: What requirements are to be imposed in terms of a real family relationship within the meaning of Article 16(1)(b) of Directive 2003/86/EC in such a case? (a) Does the legal parent/child relationship suffice or is a real family life necessary? (b) If a real family life is necessary: How close must it be? For example, do occasional or regular visits suffice, must the family cohabit in a single household or must they also be part of a support unit whose members are reliant upon one another? (c) For the purpose of his or her subsequent immigration, must a child still in a third country who has submitted an application for family reunification to join a parent with refugee status and who has since come of age be expected following entry to (re-)establish a family life in the Member State in the manner described in Question 2(b)?
Appeal brought on 11 May 2020 by Gamma-A SIA against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 12 March 2020 in Case T-352/19, Gamma-A v EUIPO — Zivju pārstrādes uzņēmumu serviss

(Case C-199/20 P)

(2020/C 359/02)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Gamma-A SIA (represented by: M. Liguts, advokāts)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 3 September 2020, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) decided that the appeal should not be allowed to proceed and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
2.

If the first question were to be answered in the affirmative, would the conditions laid down in Article 8(2)(a) and/or (b) of Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ 2016 L 65, pp 1–11), with respect to the holding of a trial in the absence of a foreign accused person, be fulfilled in the case where the foreign national was duly informed of the criminal case and of the consequences of non-appearance and is represented by a mandated lawyer appointed either by the accused person or by the State, but the appearance in person of the accused person is precluded by a ban, adopted in the administrative proceedings, on entering and residing in the country in which the criminal proceedings are being conducted?
1.

Does the concept of ‘placing on the market’ within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 8(3) of Directive 2014/40/EU (1) cover the offering of tobacco products via vending machines in such a way that, although the cigarette packets contained in them display the warnings prescribed by law, the cigarette packets are initially stocked in the machine in such a way that they are not visible to the consumer, and the warnings on them become visible only when the customer operates the machine, which has previously been enabled by the cashier, and the cigarette packet is thus dispensed onto the checkout belt prior to the payment process?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Kúria (Hungary) lodged on 30 July 2020 — CHEP Equipment Pooling NV v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

(Case C-396/20)

(2020/C 423/36)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Kúria

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: CHEP Equipment Pooling NV

Defendant: Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

Question referred

Must Article 20(1) of Council Directive 2008/9/EC (1) of 12 February 2008 laying down detailed rules for the refund of value added tax, provided for in Directive 2006/112/EC, to taxable persons not established in the Member State of refund but established in another Member State (Directive 2008/9/EC) be interpreted as meaning that, even where there are clear numerical discrepancies (not involving a proportional deduction) between the refund application and the invoice that are to the disadvantage of the taxable person, the Member State of refund may deem that there is no need to request additional information and that it has received all the relevant information on which to make a decision in respect of the refund?

(1) OJ 2008 L 44, p. 23.
2.

Is point 12 of Annex I to Directive (EU) 2016/681 compatible with Articles 7 and 8 and the first paragraph of Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in view of the fact that the requested information is not set out in detail and, at the same time, that that point of the annex does not lay down any limitation on the nature and scope of the information, which might mean that the requirement relating to the clarity and precision of rules affecting the right to protection of private life and the right to protection of personal data is not met?
4.

In the event that questions 1 to 3 are answered in the negative, is Article 2(j) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 to be interpreted as meaning that a situation in which passengers join the queue at the check-in desk in good time (here, approximately two hours) before departure, but, because of organisational shortcomings on the part of the airline (such as not opening enough check-in desks, short staffing and not providing information to passengers over the public announcement system) and/or on account of disruptions affecting the airport (in this instance, a baggage carousel malfunction), do not reach the front of the queue at the check-in desk until a point in time (in this instance, five minutes before the scheduled time of departure) by which boarding has already closed and for that reason passengers are no longer being accepted onto the flight, constitutes a case of ‘denied boarding’ within the meaning of Article 2(j) of the Regulation?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 12 August 2020 — DP v Deutsche Lufthansa AG

(Case C-384/20)

(2020/C 423/31)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: DP

Defendant: Deutsche Lufthansa AG

Question referred

Does a strike by the air carrier’s own employees that is called by a trade union constitute an extraordinary circumstance within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004? (1)

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 28 September 2020 — BC v Deutsche Lufthansa AG

(Case C-467/20)

(2020/C 433/38)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Hamburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: BC

Defendant: Deutsche Lufthansa AG

Question referred

Are Article 5(1)(c) and Article 7(1) of Regulation No 261/2004 (1), read together with Article 3(5) of that regulation, to be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of connecting flights, where there are two flights that are the subject of a single reservation, departing from an airport located outside the territory of a Member State (third country) and travelling to an airport located in a Member State, a passenger who suffers a delay in reaching his or her destination of 3 hours or more, the cause of that delay arising in the first flight, operated, under a code-share agreement, by a carrier established in a non-Member State, may bring his or her action for compensation under that regulation against the Community air carrier with which the booking of the entire journey was made and that only performed the second leg of that journey?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Nürnberg (Germany) lodged on 21 September 2020 — PN and LM v Ryanair Designated Activity Company

(Case C-445/20)

(2020/C 433/29)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Nürnberg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: PN, LM

Defendant: Ryanair Designated Activity Company

Questions referred

1. Does a trade union-organised strike by an operating air carrier’s own staff constitute ‘extraordinary circumstances’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004 (1)?

2. Is it of any significance that the strike was held in connection with staff demands not previously agreed by contract between the staff and the operating air carrier?

3. Is it of any significance that the strike in question was triggered by the operating air carrier’s conduct during negotiations with the trade union?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
6-3:

(a) Is the concept of an ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ measure within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 13(1) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 to be interpreted as meaning that damage suffered by the purchaser of the vehicle in accordance with the legislation cannot be offset or reduced by the actual possibility of using a vehicle which does not comply with Regulation (EC) No 715/2007? (b) Does the concept of effet utile inherent in EU law require that the concept of an ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ measure within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 13(1) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 be differentiated according to whether the infringement within the meaning of Article 13(2) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 was committed intentionally or merely negligently, and only in the latter case justifies offsetting the actual possibility of using the purchased vehicle? (c) Is the concept of an ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ measure within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 13(1) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 to be interpreted as meaning that, even if a benefit is offset, the manufacturer of the vehicle must pay financial compensation for the use of the capital derived, namely the consideration, and thus pay interest on it? (d) Is the concept of an ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ measure within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 13(1) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 to be interpreted as meaning that the manufacturer of a vehicle which does not comply with Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 must be precluded, at least from the time at which the first serious request for return is made by the purchaser, from offsetting the actual possibility of using the vehicle against the consideration paid?
2.

Is the court of the Member State whose jurisdiction is intended to follow from a declaration of lack of jurisdiction by the court previously seised in the other Member State competent to examine whether the conditions governing a decision by the court previously seised, as provided for in Articles 6(a) and 7(a) of Regulation No 650/2012, were met? To what extent is the decision of the court previously seised binding? In particular: (a) Is the court of the Member State whose jurisdiction is intended to follow from a declaration of lack of jurisdiction by the court previously seised in the other Member State competent to examine whether the deceased validly chose the law of the Member State in accordance with Article 22 of Regulation No 650/2012? (b) Is the court of the Member State whose jurisdiction is intended to follow from a declaration of lack of jurisdiction by the court first seised in the other Member State competent to examine whether a request for a declaration of lack of jurisdiction, as provided for in Article 6(a) of Regulation No 650/2012, has been brought by one of the parties to the proceedings before the court previously seised? (c) Is the court of the Member State whose jurisdiction is intended to follow from a declaration of lack of jurisdiction by the court first seised in the other Member State competent to examine whether the court previously seised rightly assumed that the courts of the Member State of the chosen law are better placed to rule on the succession?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla Łodzi-Śródmieścia w Łodzi (Poland) lodged on 22 July 2020 — Prokuratura Rejonowa Łódź-Bałuty v D.P.

(Case C-338/20)

(2021/C 19/19)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy dla Łodzi-Śródmieścia w Łodzi

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Prokuratura Rejonowa Łódź-Bałuty

Defendant: D.P.

Questions referred

Does the service on a sentenced person of a decision imposing a financial penalty, without providing a translation into a language which the addressee understands, entitle the authority of the enforcing State to refuse to enforce the decision on the basis of the provisions implementing Article 20(3) of Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA (1) on the grounds of a breach of the right to fair trial?

(1) Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties (OJ 2005 L 76, p. 16–30).