ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
68

It is true, as the Commission pointed out at the hearing, that, on different aspects, the essential health and safety requirements set out in Directive 2006/42 are more extensive than those set out in Directive 98/37, but it was then, as the case may be, for the Commission to encourage the rapid adoption, with respect to certain types of machinery or other equipment covered by the new directive, of a new harmonised standard allowing a response to those new requirements and to indicate where necessary, in particular cases, that a harmonised standard published under Directive 98/37 did not allow the provision of a presumption of conformity with those new requirements. Article 10 of Directive 2006/42 provides moreover for a ‘procedure for disputing a harmonised standard’, which can be initiated by a Member State or by the Commission and which can, in particular, lead to the references of the harmonised standard concerned included in the Official Journal being retained with restrictions or withdrawn. However, in those cases, the Commission should have indicated in the column entitled ‘Date of cessation of presumption of conformity of superseded standard’ publication tables of titles and references of harmonised standards under Directive 2006/42 a date different from the date of withdrawal if the harmonised standard at issue was indeed superseded, or indicated in the Official Journal by another appropriate means the repeal of the publication of references of the harmonised standard at issue where that standard has not yet been superseded. As was noted in paragraph 64 above, the lack of a specific indication in the publication tables of titles and references of harmonised standards under Directive 2006/42 or in another form indicates, a contrario, in accordance with Note 1 of the column entitled ‘Date of cessation of presumption of conformity of superseded standard’, that that date corresponds to the date of withdrawal defined by the standardisation body. It can moreover be noted that the developments of the ‘machinery’ directives, the first version of which was Council Directive 89/392/EEC of 14 June 1989 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to machinery (OJ 1989 L 183, p. 9), including when they resulted in the repeal of previous versions or to substantial supplements, did not lead to the general repeal of publications of harmonised standards made under previous versions (see, for example, OJ 2000 C 252, p. 5).
29

Moreover, according to settled case-law, it is for the Commission to prove an infringement of the rules on the common organisation of the agricultural markets. The Commission is therefore obliged to give reasons for its decision finding an absence of, or deficiencies in, inspection procedures operated by the Member State in question. However, the Commission is required not to show exhaustively that the checks carried out by the national authorities are inadequate, or that there are irregularities in the figures submitted by them, but to adduce evidence of serious and reasonable doubt on its part regarding those checks or figures. The Member State concerned, for its part, cannot rebut the Commission’s findings by mere assertions which are not substantiated by evidence of a reliable and operational supervisory system. If it is not able to show that the Commission’s findings are inaccurate, they are likely to raise serious doubts as to the existence of an appropriate and effective body of supervisory measures and inspection procedures. The reason for this mitigation of the burden of proof on the Commission is that it is the Member State which is best placed to collect and verify the data required for the clearance of the accounts of the EAGF and consequently, it is for that State to adduce the most detailed and comprehensive evidence that its checks have been carried out and its figures are accurate and, if appropriate, that the Commission’s assertions are incorrect (see judgment of 4 September 2015, United Kingdom v Commission, T‑245/13, EU:T:2015:595, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).
148

For the sake of completeness, even if that reference was considered to be sufficient in the present case, with the result that the Court is entitled to research in Annex A.5 to the application whether a document demonstrates that the loans in question exist, it would be necessary, at the very least, to acknowledge the two documents reproduced in pages 43 and 44 on the one hand, and pages 45 and 46 on the other, of the file of annexes to the application. Those documents are two loan agreements concluded between Codefa, as the borrower, and the applicant, as the lender, for EUR 70000 and EUR 150000 respectively, thus a total amount of EUR 220000, which appears to correspond to the amount claimed by the applicant. However, it should be noted that, as the applicant himself acknowledged at the hearing, those two agreements, which are drafted in English, are not initialled or signed. In those circumstances, even if the arguments based on those two documents were considered admissible, the probative value of those documents is severely limited in so far as they do not make it possible to establish with certainty the existence of the debt on which the applicant bases his claim for compensation at issue. That conclusion cannot be altered in the light of the fact that, as the applicant stated at the hearing, it is clear from the details on Codefa’s liabilities balance sheet (summary statements at 30 June 2011), reproduced on pages 80 and 81 of the file of annexes to the application, that under the section ‘Bank loans and overdrafts’, line 455002 ‘MAHMOUDIAN Féreidoun’ reports a debt amount of EUR 220000 net on 30 June 2011. Since Codefa was liquidated more than six months after those summary statements were drawn up, it is not possible to know for certain that the loans granted by the applicant to Codefa had not been reimbursed, in part or in full, in the meantime. Therefore, even if the Court is able to take into account that document in Annex A.5 to the application, to which the applicant did not expressly refer in the application, in any event, such a reference would not be capable of demonstrating the fact of the alleged damage.
Judgment of the General Court (Appeal Chamber) of 14 February 2017 — Kerstens v Commission

(Case T‑270/16 P)

(Appeal — Civil Service — Officials — Dismissal of the action at first instance — Acts contrary to the dignity of the civil service — Dissemination of insulting remarks with regard to another official — Disciplinary proceedings — Enquiry in the form of an examination of the facts — Disciplinary penalty of a reprimand — Procedural irregularity — Consequences of the irregularity)

1. Officials — Disciplinary measures — Procedure — Observance of the rights of the defence — No decision opening a prior administrative inquiry — Breach of essential procedural requirement — Person concerned not heard during the prior inquiry — Infringement of the rights of the defence (Staff Regulations, Annex IX) (see paras 61, 62, 66-68, 73, 76, 77)

2. Officials — Disciplinary measures — Decision to open disciplinary proceedings — Administration’s discretion — Scope (Staff Regulations, Annex IX) (see para. 81)

Re:

APPEAL brought against the judgment of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (Second Chamber) of 18 March 2016, Kerstens v Commission (F‑23/15, EU:F:2016:65), and seeking to have that judgment set aside.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Sets aside the judgment of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (Second Chamber) of 18 March 2016, Kerstens v Commission (F‑23/15, EU:F:2016:65) in so far as it rejects the claim for annulment of the European Commission’s decision of 15 April 2014 imposing a reprimand on Mr Petrus Kerstens;

2. Annuls the Commission’s decision of 15 April 2014 imposing a reprimand on Mr Kerstens;
Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 22 March 2017 — Hoffmann v EUIPO (Genius)

(Case T‑425/16)

(European Union trade mark — Application for EU word mark Genius — Absolute ground for refusal — No distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)

1. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks devoid of any distinctive character—Concept—Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 24, 25)

2. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks devoid of any distinctive character—Marks constituted of advertising slogans—Distinctive character—Application of specific criteria for assessment—Not permissible (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 26, 27)

3. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks devoid of any distinctive character—Marks constituted of advertising slogans—Slogan carrying an objective message (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 28)

4. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks devoid of any distinctive character—Marks constituted of advertising slogans—Flattering promotional formula (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 29, 39, 40)

5. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks devoid of any distinctive character—Word mark Genius (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 41, 43, 44, 50)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 31 May 2016 (Case R 1631/2015-5), concerning an application for registration of the word sign Genius as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
4.

EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Similarity of the marks concerned—Criteria for assessment—Composite mark—Weak distinctive character of the dominant element (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 34)
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 16 May 2017 —

Mühlbauer Technology v EUIPO (Magicrown)

(Case T‑218/16)

(EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark Magicrown — Absolute grounds for refusal — Lack of distinctive character — Descriptiveness — Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Concept (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 16, 17)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Assessment of the descriptive nature of a sign — Criteria (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 18)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Concept — Neologism consisting of elements descriptive of characteristics of the goods or services concerned — Whether included where the nature of the combination is not unusual (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 19)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Word mark Magicrown (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 22, 23, 34, 35)

5. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Refusal of registration based on one of the absolute grounds for refusal set out in Article 7(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 — Whether sufficient (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)) (see para. 36)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 7 March 2016 (Case R 1213/2015-4) concerning an application for registration of the word sign Magicrown as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
European Union — Judicial review of the legality of the acts of the institutions — Restrictive measures against Syria — Ambit of the review

(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47; Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/850)

(see paras 74-76, 88)
Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 8 June 2017 —

Bundesverband Deutsche Tafel v EUIPO — Tiertafel Deutschland (Tafel)

(Case T‑326/16)

(EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU word mark Tafel — Enforcement by EUIPO of a judgment setting aside a decision of one of its Boards of Appeal — Absolute ground for refusal — Article 52(1)(a) and Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Descriptive character — Article 65(6) of Regulation No 207/2009 — Decision taken following the annulment by the General Court of an earlier decision)

1. Actions for annulment — Judgment annulling a measure — Effects — Obligation to implement — Scope — Both the operative part and the grounds of the judgment to be taken into account — Retroactive effect of annulment (Art. 266 TFEU) (see paras 18, 19)

2. EU trade mark — Appeals procedure — Action before the EU judicature — Implementation of a judgment annulling a decision adopted by a Board of Appeal — New examination of the appeal (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 65(6)) (see paras 20-22)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Aim — Need to preserve availability (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 32)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Criteria (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 33-37)

5. EU trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Absolute grounds for invalidity — Registration contrary to Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 — Word mark Tafel (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 39-44)

6. EU trade mark — Appeals procedure — Action before the EU judicature — Jurisdiction of the General Court — Review of the lawfulness of decisions of the Boards of Appeal — Re-examination of the facts in the light of evidence not previously submitted before EUIPO bodies — Precluded (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 65) (see para. 46)

7. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Exception — Acquisition through use — Examination by the Office — Limitation to the facts and evidence raised by the trade mark applicant (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(3)) (see para. 49)

8. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Assessment of the registrability of a sign — EU rules only taken into account — Earlier registration of the mark in certain Member States or third countries — Decisions not binding EU bodies (Council Regulation No 207/2009) (see para. 51)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 4 April 2016 (Case R 248/2016-4), relating to invalidity proceedings between Tiertafel Deutschland and Bundesverband Deutsche Tafel.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 13 July 2017 —

LG Electronics v EUIPO (QD)

(Case T‑650/16)

(EU trade mark — Application for the EU word mark QD — Absolute grounds for refusal — Descriptive character — No distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Aim — Need to preserve availability (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 13)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Concept (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 14, 15, 25, 26)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Criteria (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 16)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Word mark QD (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 18, 22, 23, 30, 34)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 24 May 2016 (Case R 2046/2015-1), relating to an application for registration of the word sign QD as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
2.

Appeal — Appeal held to be well founded — Annulment of a decision of the Civil Service Tribunal — Transfer to the General Court of jurisdiction to hear disputes between the EU and its agents — Dispute not in a condition to be adjudicated upon — Reference to a chamber other than that of the appeal (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 2016/1192, Art. 4) (see paras 67, 68)
Judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) of 4 July 2017 —

Murphy v EUIPO — Nike Innovate (Electronic wristband)

(Case T‑90/16)

(Community design — Invalidity proceedings — Registered Community design representing an electronic wristband — Prior Community design — Ground for invalidity — Individual character — Different overall impression — Article 6 and Article 25(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 — Obligation to state reasons — Article 62 of Regulation No 6/2002)

1. Community designs — Procedural provisions — Statement of reasons for decisions — Article 62, first sentence, of Regulation No 6/2002 — Scope identical to that of Article 296 TFEU — Recourse by the Board of Appeal to implicit reasoning — Lawfulness — Conditions (Art. 296 TFEU; Council Regulation No 6/2002, Art. 62) (see paras 19-22)

2. Community designs — Ground for invalidity — No individual character — Design not giving the informed user a different overall impression from that produced by the earlier design — Criteria for assessment — Creative licence (Council Regulation No 6/2002, Arts 6(2), and 25(1)(b)) (see paras 36, 37)

3. Community designs — Ground for invalidity — No individual character — Design not giving the informed user a different overall impression from that produced by the earlier design — Representation of an electronic wristband (Council Regulation No 6/2002, Arts 6(1), and 25(1)(b)) (see paras 41, 65, 70)

4. Community designs — Ground for invalidity — No individual character — Design not giving the informed user a different overall impression from that produced by the earlier design — Global assessment of all the elements of the prior design (Council Regulation No 6/2002, Arts 6(1), and 25(1)(b)) (see paras 43, 55, 69)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Third Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 19 November 2015 (Case R 736/2014–3), relating to invalidity proceedings between Mr Murphy and Nike Innovate.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 15 September 2017 —

sheepworld v EUIPO (Beste Mama)

(Case T‑422/16)

(EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark Beste Mama — Absolute ground for refusal — Lack of distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)

1. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks devoid of any distinctive character—Concept—Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 19, 20)

2. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks devoid of any distinctive character—Marks constituted of advertising slogans—Distinctive character—Application of specific criteria for assessment—Not permissible (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 21-23)

3. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks devoid of any distinctive character—Marks constituted of advertising slogans—Flattering promotional formula (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 24, 26)

4. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks devoid of any distinctive character—Marks constituted of advertising slogans—Slogan with a fantasy character (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 25)

5. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks devoid of any distinctive character—Word mark Beste Mama (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 28-32)

6. EU trade mark—Decisions of the Office—Principle of equal treatment—Principle of sound administration—EUIPO’s previous decision-making practice—Principle of legality—Need for a strict and complete examination in each particular case (see para. 46)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 13 May 2016 (Case R 95/2016-4) concerning an application for registration of the word sign Beste Mama as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
EU trade mark—Surrender, revocation and invalidity—Examination of the application—Proof of use of the earlier mark—Genuine use—Meaning—Criteria for assessment—Territorial extent of the use

(Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 15(1), 51 and 57(2) and (3)

(see paras 43-46)
Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 26 October 2017 – Erdinger Weißbräu Werner Brombach v EUIPO (Shape of a large glass)

(Case T-857/16)

(European Union trade mark — International registration designating the European Union — Three-dimensional mark — Shape of a large glass — Absolute ground for refusal — Lack of distinctive nature — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 2017/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

1. EU trade mark–Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark–Absolute grounds for refusal–Marks devoid of any distinctive character–Three-dimensional mark constituted by the shape of the product–Distinctive character–Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 18-21)

2. EU trade mark–Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark–Absolute grounds for refusal–Marks devoid of any distinctive character–Three-dimensional trade marks consisting of the shape of the product itself–Distinctive character–Criteria for assessment–Shape at issue being a (variant) of the typical shapes of the type of goods concerned–Fact not sufficient to establish distinctiveness of the mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 22-24)

3. EU trade mark–Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark–Absolute grounds for refusal–Lack of distinctiveness–Trade mark made up of several elements–Possible for the competent authority to examine each of the elements making up the trade mark–Need to take account of the overall perception of the combination by the relevant public (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para 25)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 20 September 2016 (Case R 659/2016-2) concerning the international registration designating the European Union of the three-dimensional mark constituted by the shape of a large glass.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;