ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 27 February 2021 by José María Castillejo Oriol against the order of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 11 February 2021 in Case T-696/20, Castillejo Oriol v Spain and Commission

(Case C-145/21 P)

(2021/C 502/17)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: José María Castillejo Oriol (represented by: J. Jover Padró, lawyer)

Other parties to the proceedings: Kingdom of Spain and European Commission

By order of 6 October 2021, the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded and ordered José María Castillejo Oriol to bear his own costs.
I.

Does Directive 2011/92/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ 2012 L 26, p. 1) as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 (OJ 2014 L 124, p. 1) (‘Directive 2011/92/EU’) preclude a national rule by which the assessment of the environmental effects of urban development projects is made conditional both on the attainment of thresholds for land take of at least 15 ha and for gross floor area of more than 150 000 m2 and on the development project in question being a project for entirely multifunctional development with at least residential and commercial buildings, including the access roads and utilities intended for those buildings, and with a catchment area that extends beyond the area covered by the project? In this regard, is it relevant that national law imposes special conditions for: — theme parks or amusement parks, sports stadia or golf courses (above a certain land take or a certain number of parking spaces); — industrial or trading estates (above a certain land take); — shopping centres (above a certain land take or a certain number of parking spaces); — accommodation establishments, such as hotels or holiday villages, and ancillary facilities (above a certain number of beds or a certain land take, limited to the area outside enclosed settlements); and — car parks or garages accessible to the public (above a certain number of parking spaces)?
1.

Can Article 132(1)(g) of the VAT Directive (1) be interpreted as meaning that it allows a commercial company registered as a social service provider in one Member State (in this case, Bulgaria) to rely on that provision in order to obtain a tax exemption for the social services which it provides in the territory of other Member States to private individuals who are nationals of those States? Is the answer to that question affected by the fact that the recipients of the services were referred to the provider by commercial companies registered in the Member States in which the services are provided?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Szegedi Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 4 October 2021 — Napfény-Toll Kft. v Nemzeti Adó — és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

(Case C-615/21)

(2022/C 11/24)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Szegedi Törvényszék

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Napfény-Toll Kft.

Defendant: Nemzeti Adó — és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

Question referred

Are the principles of legal certainty and of effectiveness, which form part of Community law, to be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State which does not allow the courts to exercise any discretion, such as Paragraph 164(5) of the az adózás rendjéről szóló 2003. évi XCII. törvény (Law XCII of 2003 establishing a code of tax procedure; ‘the former Code of Tax Procedure’), and the practice based on that legislation, under which, in matters of value added tax, the limitation period in respect of the right of the tax authorities to make a tax assessment is to be suspended for the whole duration of judicial review, regardless of the number of repeat administrative tax procedures, with no ceiling on the cumulative duration of the suspensions where there are several rounds of judicial review, one after another, including in cases where the court ruling on a decision of a tax authority taken as part of a repeat procedure following on from an earlier court decision finds that the tax authority failed to comply with the guidance contained in that court decision, that is to say, where it is due to the fault of that authority that the new court proceedings took place?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 9 June 2021 by FCA Italy SpA against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 28 April 2021 in Case T-191/20, FCA Italy v EUIPO

(Case C-360/21 P)

(2022/C 37/05)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: FCA Italy SpA (represented by: F. Jacobacci, E. Truffo, avvocati)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 9 June 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that FCA Italy SpA should bear its own costs.
3.

If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, is a national provision that provides that, where no agreement is reached between the State Administration and the entity managing the national repository in relation to integrating the node concerned into the repository, integration may be required, unilaterally and authoritatively, by ministerial order compatible with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/[1]61, in particular Articles 25, 31, 32, 35, 36 and 44 thereof?
2.

Does Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13/EEC preclude national case-law to the effect that, in order to assess whether the term constituting an essential element of the mortgage or loan agreement is clear and intelligible, account must be taken of issues such as consumers’ general knowledge of that term, the mandatory information that financial institutions must provide to potential borrowers under regulations on standardised information sheets, advertising by banks, the particular attention paid to it by the average consumer as being part of the cost to be paid entirely at the time of taking out the loan, and constituting a substantial part of the economic consequences to them of securing the loan, and whether the wording, placement and structure of the term make it possible to conclude that it constitutes an essential element of the contract?
Appeal brought on 1 October 2021 by the European Parliament against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 14 July 2021 in Case T-670/19, Carbajo Ferrero v Parliament

(Case C-613/21 P)

(2022/C 37/15)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: European Parliament (represented by: I. Terwinghe, C. González Argüelles, R. Schiano, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: Fernando Carbajo Ferrero

Form of order sought

The appellant claims, principally, that the Court of Justice should:

— set aside the judgment of 14 July 2021 of the General Court in Case T-670/19;

— refer the case back to the General Court;

— reserve the costs.

The appellant claims, in the alternative, that the Court of Justice should:

— set aside the judgment of 14 July 2021 of the General Court in Case T-670/19;

— dismiss the action brought at first instance;

— order Mr Carbajo Ferrero to pay all costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The first ground of appeal is based on, first, errors of law relating to the interpretation of the decision laying down the stages of the selection procedure of senior officials of 16 May 2020, as amended by the decision of the Bureau of 18 February 2008, and the interpretation of the principles of equal treatment and transparency and, second, a distortion of the facts. The Parliament submits that the General Court erred in finding that the procedure for the appointment of the Director for Media of the Directorate-General for Communication was carried out in an improper manner, in that the Advisory Committee for the appointment of senior officials failed to use the same criteria for the comparative analysis of merits throughout the procedure.

By the second ground based on an error of law and distortion of the facts and evidence, the Parliament claims that the General Court misconstrued the function of the report on the interviews, compiled by the Advisory Committee, and erred in finding that the Appointing Authority did not correctly take account of the professional experience of the appellant.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 1 October 2021 by Cora against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 20 July 2021 in Case T-500/19, Coravin v EUIPO — Cora (CORAVIN)

(Case C-619/21 P)

(2022/C 64/18)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Cora (represented by: M. Georges-Picot, avocate)

Other parties to the proceedings: Coravin, Inc. and European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

By order of 13 December 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) ruled that the appeal should not be allowed to proceed.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Social n.o 1 de Madrid (Spain) lodged on 20 September 2021 — NC v BA, DA, DV and CG

(Case C-583/21)

(2022/C 51/23)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de lo Social n.o 1 de Madrid

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: NC

Defendants: BA, DA, DV and CG

Question referred

Does Article 1(1)(a) of Council Directive (EC) 2001/23 of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses, (1) and consequently the contents of the directive, apply to a situation in which the notary in post in a notary’s office — who is both a public official and also the private-sector employer of the office’s employees, with the employment relationship being governed by general employment legislation and by a sectoral Collective Agreement — succeeds the outgoing post-holder, takes on the previous notary’s Protocol, continues to provide services at the same place of work using the same material facilities, and takes on the staff who had worked for the previous notary who had held that post?

(1) OJ 2001 L 82, p. 16.
1.

Does Article 20 TFEU, in conjunction with Article 7 [of the Charter], preclude legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which citizenship of that Member State is, in principle, lost by operation of law on reaching the age of 22 in the case of persons born outside that Member State who have never lived in that Member State and who have also not resided there in circumstances that indicate a close attachment to that Member State, with the result that persons who do not also have citizenship of another Member State are deprived of their status as Union citizens and of the rights attaching to that status, taking into account that it follows from the legislation at issue in the main proceedings that: (a) a close attachment to the Member State is presumed to exist, in particular, after a total of one year’s residence in that Member State, (b) if an application to retain citizenship is submitted before the person reaches the age of 22, authorisation to retain citizenship of the Member State under less stringent conditions may be obtained and for that purpose the competent authorities must examine the consequences of loss of citizenship, and (c) lost citizenship can be recovered after the person concerned reaches the age of 22 only by means of naturalisation, to which a number of requirements are attached, including that of uninterrupted residence in the Member State for a longer duration, although the period of residence may be somewhat shortened for former nationals of that Member State?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy-Śródmieścia w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 24 August 2021 — A.S. v Bank M. SA

(Case C-520/21)

(2022/C 64/13)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy-Śródmieścia w Warszawie

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: A.S.

Defendant: Bank M. SA

Question referred

Must Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, (1) and the principles of effectiveness, legal certainty and proportionality be interpreted as precluding a judicial interpretation of national legislation pursuant to which, where a loan agreement entered into by and between a bank and a consumer is found to have been null and void from the outset because it contains unfair terms, the parties, in addition to the reimbursement of the sums paid in the performance of that agreement (the bank — loan principal, and the consumer — monthly payments, fees, commissions and insurance premiums) and statutory interest for late payment from the date of the demand for payment, may pursue any other claims (including remuneration, compensation, reimbursement of expenses or indexation of the amounts paid) on the grounds that:

1. the person making the monetary consideration was temporarily deprived of the use of his or her money, so that he or she has lost the opportunity to invest it and thus to make a profit;

2. the person making the monetary consideration incurred the costs of servicing the loan agreement and of transferring the money to the other party;

3. the recipient of the monetary consideration had the benefit of being able to temporarily use someone else’s money, including being able to invest it and thus to make a profit;

4. the recipient of the monetary consideration was temporarily able to use someone else’s money free of charge, which would have been impossible under market conditions;

5. the purchasing power of the money has decreased with time, which translates to a loss in real terms for the person making the monetary consideration;

6. the temporary provision of money may be treated as rendering a service for which the person making the monetary consideration has not received remuneration?

(1) OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29.
Appeal brought on 16 December 2021 by the Federal Republic of Germany against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 6 October 2021 in Case T-745/18, Covestro Deutschland AG v European Commission

(Case C-791/21 P)

(2022/C 73/27)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Federal Republic of Germany (represented by: J. Möller and R. Kanitz, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Covestro Deutschland AG, European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal of the General Court of the European Union of 6 October 2021 in Case T-745/18, in so far as it dismissed the action as unfounded;

— annul the Commission’s Decision of 28 May 2018 on State aid SA.34045 (2013/c) (ex 2012/NN) implemented by Germany for baseload consumers under Paragraph 19 StromNEV C(2018) 3166 final, for the years 2012 and 2013 in accordance with Article 61(1) of the Statute of the Court of Justice;

— order the Commission to pay the costs before the General Court and the Court of Justice.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant relies on a single ground of appeal, in which it alleges an infringement of Article 107(1) TFEU. According to the appellant, the General Court erred in law in assuming that the scheme in Paragraph 19(2) of the German Stromnetzentgeltverordnung (StromNEV) (Regulation on electricity network charges) constitutes State aid as provided for in Article 107(1) TFEU.

First, the General Court erred in law in finding, in the context of the assessment of the State nature of the network charges, that the existence of a mandatory charge on consumers or end users and the State control over the funds or over the administrators of those funds constituted two factors that were ‘part of an alternative’.

Secondly, the General Court erred in law in finding, in the context of the assessment whether there is a ‘mandatory charge on consumers or end users’, that the relationship between an electricity supplier and electricity end users was irrelevant. In addition, the General Court erred in law by taking into account the obligation to levy and not the legal obligation to pay network charges.

Thirdly, the General Court erred in law in holding, in the context of the assessment whether State control or State power to dispose of funds exists, that the exclusive use of the network charges collected did not rule out that the State could dispose of those funds.
2.

Are Articles 45 and 101 TFEU to be interpreted as precluding the application of the rules on the inclusion on the match sheet and the fielding of locally trained players, as formalised by Articles P335.11 and P.1422 of the URBSFA’s federal regulation and reproduced in Articles B4.1[12] of Title 4 and B6.109 of Title 6 of the new URBSFA regulation?
1.

Must Article 13(1)(b)(i) of Regulation No 883/2004/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, Articles 3(1)(a) and 11(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009 (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing common rules concerning the conditions to be complied with to pursue the occupation of road transport operator and repealing Council Directive 96/26/EC, and Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1072/2009 (3) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 on common rules for access to the international road haulage market be interpreted as meaning that it follows from the fact that an undertaking which obtains a road transport authorisation in a Member State of the European Union in accordance with Regulations (EC) No 1071/2009 and No 1072/2009 and which therefore must have an effective and stable establishment in that Member State that this constitutes irrefutable proof that its registered office is situated in that Member State within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the aforementioned Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 for the purposes of determining the applicable social security system, and are the authorities of the Member State of employment bound by that finding?
1.

Must the provisions of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, (1) in particular Articles 2(1), 9(1) and 13(1) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that a municipality (a public authority) acts as a taxable person for VAT purposes in carrying out a project whose objective is to increase the proportion of renewable energy sources by means of entering into a civil-law contract with property owners, under which the municipality undertakes to install renewable energy source systems on their property and — after a certain period of time has elapsed — to transfer the ownership of those systems to the property owners?
2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, are the provisions of EU law cited above (together or separately, but without limitation to those provisions) to be interpreted as precluding national rules and the practice for applying them under which: (a) the contracting authority, when terminating a public procurement contract on the ground of a substantial breach thereof, does not take any formal (separate) decision concerning the entry of economic operators on the list of unreliable suppliers; (b) an economic operator is not informed in advance about forthcoming entry on the list of unreliable suppliers and is therefore unable to submit relevant explanations and subsequently to contest entry effectively; (c) the contracting authority does not carry out any individual examination of the circumstances of improper performance of a contract, and therefore, if the public procurement contract has been lawfully terminated on the ground of a substantial breach thereof, the economic operator de jure responsible for that breach is automatically entered on the list of unreliable suppliers?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 27 December 2021 — Beverage City & Lifestyle GmbH and Others v Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc.

(Case C-832/21)

(2022/C 119/34)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf

Parties to the main proceedings

Defendants and appellants: Beverage City & Lifestyle GmbH, MJ, Beverage City Polska Sp.z.o.o., FE

Applicant and respondent: Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc.

Question referred

The Higher Regional Court, Düsseldorf, refers the following question to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of Article 122 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 (1) in conjunction with Article 8(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012. (2)

Are claims ‘so closely connected’ that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to prevent irreconcilable judgments, within the meaning of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, where, in infringement proceedings for infringement of an EU trade mark, the connection consists in the fact that the defendant domiciled in a Member State (here, Poland) supplied the goods which infringe an EU trade mark to a defendant domiciled in another Member State (here, Germany) whose legal representative, against whom infringement proceedings have also been brought, is the anchor defendant, if the parties are connected to each other only through the mere supply relationship beyond which there is no legal or factual connection?

(1) Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).

(2) Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1).
Action brought on 21 December 2021 — European Commission v Czech Republic

(Case C-808/21)

(2022/C 109/25)

Language of the case: Czech

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: P. Ondrůšek and J. Tomkin, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Czech Republic

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— Declare that, by denying citizens of the Union who are not nationals of the Czech Republic but who are resident in the Czech Republic the right to become members of a political party or political movement, the Czech Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 22 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;

— Order the Czech Republic to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Under Article 22 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he or she is not a national is to have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections and in elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he or she resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State.

In the Commission’s opinion, having regard to the fact that citizens of the Union who are not nationals of the Czech Republic but who are resident in the Czech Republic do not have the right to become members of political parties or political movements, those citizens of the Union cannot exercise the political rights conferred on them under Article 22 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union under the same conditions as nationals of the Czech Republic.