ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Consequently, national legislation which regulates taxation of the income of investors who possess holdings in collective investment undertakings, by laying down methods of taxation that differ according to whether the non-resident investment fund concerned complies with the national provisions, constitutes a measure which relates to capital movements within the meaning of that nomenclature.

Although the receipt of dividends from a collective investment undertaking is not expressly mentioned as a ‘capital movement’ in the nomenclature that constitutes Annex I to Directive 88/361 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty, it may be linked to the acquisition by residents of units of foreign undertakings dealt in or not dealt in on a stock exchange and, therefore, is indissociable from a capital movement.

It is apparent from the wording of Article 56 TFEU and Article 63 TFEU, and the position which they occupy in two different chapters of Title IV of the Treaty, that, although closely linked, those provisions were designed to regulate different situations and they each have their own field of application. In order to determine whether national legislation falls within the scope of one or other of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, the purpose of the legislation concerned must be taken into consideration.

National legislation whose purpose relates principally to the provision of financial services falls within the Treaty provisions relating to the freedom to provide services, even though it could result in or involve capital movements.

On the other hand, national measures whose purpose relates at least principally to capital movements fall within the field of application of Article 64(1) TFEU.

Accordingly, the decisive criterion for the application of Article 64(1) TFEU is concerned with the causal link between the capital movements and the provision of financial services and not with the personal scope of the contested national measure or its relationship with the provider, rather than the recipient, of such services.

(see paras 30-32, 34, 39)
In an action for failure to fulfil obligations it is, in principle, for the Commission to set out, in its reasoned opinion, its assessment of the observations made by the Member State in its response to the letter of formal notice.

However, the fact that the Commission responded only briefly or not at all to the arguments of the Member State concerned seeking to establish that the benefits at issue are covered by a certain provision has no effect on the delimitation of the subject-matter of the dispute and does not make it impossible for that Member State to put an end to the alleged infringement, nor does it prejudice the rights of the defence, since by such an analysis, the Commission has excluded the applicability of that provision.

(see paras 41-43)
As regards the common foreign and security policy, since none of the grounds for annulment referred to in Article 263 TFEU has been established before the General Court, that court made an error of law when it ruled that, when adopting an initial act establishing restrictive measures against entities allegedly involved in nuclear proliferation, the Council must assess the relevance and the validity of the information and evidence submitted to it by a Member State or by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

It is evident from the first paragraph of Article 60 of the Statute of the Court of Justice that an appeal is not to have suspensory effect. The second paragraph of that article provides, however, that, by way of derogation from Article 280 TFEU, decisions of the General Court declaring a regulation to be void are to take effect only as from the date of expiry of the period for lodging an appeal or, if an appeal is lodged within that period, as from the date of its dismissal.

Thus, regulations requiring the funds of designated persons and entities to be frozen resemble both measures of general application, in that they impose on a category of addressees determined in a general and abstract manner a prohibition on, inter alia, making funds and economic resources available to persons and entities named in the lists contained in their annexes, and a bundle of individual decisions affecting those persons and entities.

It is the individual nature of those acts which, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU and the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, permits natural and legal persons to have access to the Courts of the European Union.

However, the fact that the persons and entities who are the subject of the restrictive measures imposed by the regulation at issue are expressly named, so that they appear to be directly and individually concerned by it within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, does not mean that that act is not of general application within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 288 TFEU or that it is not to be classified as a regulation.

Regulation No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran, including its Annex IX, has the nature of a regulation, since the second paragraph of Article 51 thereof provides that it is to be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States, which corresponds to the effects of a regulation as provided for in Article 288 TFEU.

(see paras 118-121)
When the amount of the fine for infringement of the competition rules is determined, there cannot, by the application of different methods of calculation, be any discrimination between the undertakings which have participated in an agreement or a concerted practice contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU.

The differentiation in the amounts of the fine, which the principle of equal treatment between undertakings requires, need not necessarily be undertaken in the context of setting the multipliers for the ‘gravity of the infringement’ and the ‘additional amount’, in view of the broad discretion enjoyed by the Commission in calculating the fine. The differences and circumstances particular to the undertakings concerned may, if need be, be taken into account at another stage in calculating the fine, such as in the context of adjusting the basic amount in the light of aggravating and mitigating circumstances under points 28 and 29 of the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, or in the context of the value of sales taken into account in calculating the basic amount of the fine, inasmuch as that value reflects, for each participating undertaking, the extent of its participation in the infringement in question, in accordance with point 13 of the 2006 Guidelines. That point pursues the objective of adopting, as the starting point for the calculation of the fine imposed on an undertaking, an amount which reflects the economic significance of the infringement and the relative size of the undertaking’s contribution to it.

(see paras 38, 56, 57)
27

That interpretation is borne out by analysis of the development of the European Union legislation in the field of misleading advertising and comparative advertising. Directive 84/450, in its original version, concerned only misleading advertising. Regulation of comparative advertising was inserted into that latter directive by Directive 97/55/EC of European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 amending Directive 84/450 concerning misleading advertising so as to include comparative advertising (OJ 1997 L 290, p. 18). The objective of Directive 97/55, pursuant to recital 18 in the preamble thereto, was to establish the conditions under which comparative advertising is permitted. On the other hand, that directive did not in any way amend the provisions of Directive 84/450 on misleading advertising. Next, Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) (OJ 2005 L 149, p. 22) limited the scope of Directive 84/450 to the protection of traders. Lastly, Directive 2006/114 codified that latter directive. It follows that the European Union legislature did not intend, in adopting Directives 97/55 and 2006/114, to amend the rules relating to misleading advertising as provided for in Directive 84/450, except by restricting their scope.
120

With regard to the fifth and last ground of appeal, it should be noted that, in paragraph 124 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court referred to settled case-law in accordance with which the statement of reasons required by the second subparagraph of Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the measure at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for it and to enable the competent court to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular, the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (Joined Cases C-341/06 P and C-342/06 P Chronopost and La Poste v UFEX and Others [2008] ECR I-4777, paragraph 88 and the case-law cited).
9

Article 20 of the DPR No 574/1988 provides: ‘1. In civil proceedings each party shall have the right to choose the language in which he drafts his documents. That choice shall be indicated in the drafting in one or other language of the document instituting proceedings or of the defence or equivalent documents. 2. Should the document instituting proceedings and the defence or equivalent documents be drafted in the same language, then the proceedings shall be monolingual. Otherwise, the proceedings shall be bilingual. 3. In bilingual proceedings each party shall use the language he has chosen. Judicial orders shall be issued and written in both languages, unless the party with an interest in that requirement waives it before the hearing in which the order is applied for. The parties’ documents shall be written in Italian or German, and there is no ex officio obligation to translate them at the expense of the court. In bilingual proceedings, parties who do not reside or do not have their seat in the Province of Bolzano can ask the court, within the period of 30 days following the transmission or lodging of documents, to have these wholly or partially translated into the other language at the expense of the court. The court may exclude from translation, in whole or in part, documents lodged by the parties which are regarded as clearly irrelevant.’
18

In those circumstances, the Bundesgerichtshof decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. Does it represent an inconsistent restriction on gaming and betting activities where, on the one hand, in a Member State organised as a federal State, the organisation and facilitation of public games of chance on the internet is, in principle, prohibited by the law in force in the overwhelming majority of the Länder and — without an established right — can be allowed, exceptionally, only for lotteries and sporting bets in order to provide a suitable alternative to the illegal supply of games of chance as well as to combat the development and spread thereof, but — on the other hand, under the law in force in one of that Member State’s Länder, subject to certain specified objective conditions, an authorisation for the marketing of sporting bets on the internet must be issued to any EU citizen or equivalent legal person, thereby undermining the effectiveness of the restriction on the marketing of games of chance on the internet in force in the rest of the Federal Republic in achieving the legitimate public interest objectives which it pursues? 2. Does the answer to the first question depend on whether the different legal position in one Land removes altogether or significantly undermines the effectiveness of the restrictions on the marketing of games of chance on the internet in force in the other Länder in achieving the legitimate public interest objectives which they pursue? If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative: 3. Is the inconsistency avoided by the Land with the divergent legislation adopting the restrictions on games of chance in force in the rest of the Länder, even where, in relation to the administrative licensing contracts already concluded there, the previous more generous rules on internet games of chance in that Land remain in force for a transitional period of several years because those authorisations cannot be revoked, or cannot be revoked without incurring compensation payments which the Land would find difficult to bear? 4. Does the answer to the third question depend on whether, during the transition period of several years, the effectiveness of the restrictions on games of chance in force in the other Länder is affected or significantly undermined?’
7

Under Paragraph 77 of Law CXXVII of 2007 on VAT (Általános forgalmi adóról szóló 2007. évi CXXVII. törvény, ‘the Law on VAT’): ‘(1) In the case of the supply of goods or services or intra-Community acquisitions of goods, the taxable amount is reduced subsequently by the amount of the consideration which is repaid or to be repaid to the person entitled if, following completion of the transaction: (a) where the transaction is invalid: (aa) the situation obtaining before the completion of the transaction is restored, or (ab) the transaction is declared to have had effects in the period preceding the decision declaring that it is invalid; (ac) the transaction is declared valid by way of elimination of a disproportionate advantage; (b) where there are failures in the completion of the transaction: (ba) the transaction is cancelled by the person entitled; (bb) the person entitled is given a price reduction. (2) The taxable amount is also reduced subsequently where (a) the amount advanced is repaid because the transaction is not completed; (b) in the case of the supply or hire of goods referred to in Paragraph 10(a), the tax debtor exercises his right to cancel as a result of the failure to pay the consideration in full and the parties restore the situation existing before completion of the transaction, or, if that is not possible, recognise that the transaction had effects until the time of the failure; (c) in the case of goods on which a deposit is paid, the amount paid by way of deposit is returned. (3) The taxable amount may be reduced subsequently in the case of a price reduction, in accordance with Paragraph 71(1)(a) and (b), following completion of the transaction.’
11

Article 33 of the consolidated text of the Law on the Workers’ Statute (texto refundido de la Ley del Estatuto de los Trabajadores), adopted by Royal Legislative Decree 1/1995 (Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1995) of 24 March 1995 (BOE No 75 of 29 March 1995, p. 9654), in the version in force at the time of the facts at issue in the main proceedings (‘the Workers’ Statute’), is worded as follows: ‘1. The Wages Guarantee Fund, an autonomous body accountable to the Ministry of Employment and Social Security, which has legal personality and the capacity to act in order to achieve its objectives, shall pay to workers any remuneration which is unpaid on account of the insolvency or administration of the employer. For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, remuneration shall include the amount which the conciliation agreement or the judicial decision recognises as such by virtue of the definition in Article 26(1), as well as outstanding remuneration falling due during proceedings challenging a dismissal in cases where this is payable in accordance with the law, although the Wages Guarantee Fund shall not pay, in one capacity or another, jointly or separately, an amount greater than the product of three times the minimum daily interprofessional wage, including the proportional share of any bonus, and the number of days of unpaid remuneration, up to a maximum of 150 days. 2. In the cases referred to in the previous paragraph, the Wages Guarantee Fund shall pay the compensation fixed by a judgment, an order, a judicial conciliation settlement or an administrative decision in favour of workers by reason of the dismissal or the termination of contracts in accordance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the present Law or by reason of the termination of contracts in accordance with Article 64 of Law 22/2003 of 9 July 2003 on insolvency, and also the compensation for the termination of temporary or fixed‑term contracts in cases provided by the law. In all cases, a maximum of one year’s remuneration shall be paid, taking into account that the daily wage, taken as the basis for that computation, may not exceed three times the minimum interprofessional wage, including the proportional share of any bonus. … 6. For the purposes of this article, the employer shall be deemed to be insolvent where an action for recovery initiated in the form laid down by the Law on Employment Procedure does not secure the satisfaction of claims made against that employer. …’
5

Article 6 of Directive 96/67 is worded as follows: ‘1. Member States shall take the necessary measures in accordance with the arrangements laid down in Article 1 to ensure free access by suppliers of groundhandling services to the market for the provision of groundhandling services to third parties. … 2. Member States may limit the number of suppliers authorised to provide the following categories of groundhandling services: — baggage handling, — ramp handling, – …, — freight and mail handling as regards the physical handling of freight and mail, whether incoming, outgoing or being transferred, between the air terminal and the aircraft. They may not, however, limit this number to fewer than two for each category of groundhandling service. 3. Moreover, as from 1 January 2001 at least one of the authorised suppliers may not be directly or indirectly controlled by: — the managing body of the airport, — any airport user who has carried more than 25% of the passengers or freight recorded at the airport during the year preceding that in which those suppliers were selected, — a body controlling or controlled directly or indirectly by that managing body or any such user. However, at 1 July 2000, a Member State may request that the obligation in this paragraph be deferred until 31 December 2002. The Commission, assisted by the Committee referred to in Article 10, shall examine such request and may, having regard to the evolution of the sector and, in particular, the situation at airports comparable in terms of traffic volume and pattern, decide to grant the said request. 4. Where, pursuant to paragraph 2, they restrict the number of authorised suppliers, Member States may not prevent an airport user, whatever part of the airport is allocated to him, from having, in respect of each category of groundhandling service subject to restriction, an effective choice between at least two suppliers of groundhandling services, under the conditions laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3.’
53

The national legislation and practice at issue in the main proceedings provide for a metrological verification both for hot-water meters connected to remote (telemetric) data-transmission devices and for the latter. It should, however, be noted, first, that, in accordance with Article 9 of Directive 2004/22, the evaluation of the compliance of a water meter with the relevant essential requirements laid down by that directive must be carried out before it is placed on the market and put into use. It is only where such an assessment is favourable that the manufacturer of that meter may affix the supplementary metrological marking. Thus, a hot-water meter which satisfies all the requirements of that directive has already been subject to a metrological verification. Second, as has been noted in paragraph 33 of the present judgment, point 8.1 of Annex I to the directive provides that the metrological characteristics of hot-water meters satisfying all the requirements laid down by Directive 2004/22 must not be influenced in any inadmissible way by the connection to it of any remote (telemetric) device that communicates with the measuring instrument. Third, in the event of a discrepancy between the results shown by the measuring instrument and that device, point 10.5 of Annex I states that it is the reading displayed by the measuring instrument which serves as the basis for the price to be paid by the user.
12

Under Article 5 of Regulation No 3317/94: ‘1. The flag Member State shall send the Commission all applications for the issue to vessels flying its flag of third-country fishing licences to carry on fishing activities under the fishing possibilities granted to the Community pursuant to a fisheries agreement with a third country. It shall ensure that the applications comply with the terms of the agreement and with Community rules. 2. The Commission shall examine the applications from each Member State in the light of the fishing possibilities allocated to it pursuant to Community provisions and any conditions laid down in the fisheries agreement applicable to Community vessels. The Commission shall, no later than 10 working days from the date on which the Member State’s application was received, or within the time-limits laid down by the fisheries agreement, send to the third country concerned the applications for the issue of a third-country fishing licence to Community vessels wishing to carry on their fishing activities in its waters. Should the examination of an application by the Commission reveal that it does not meet the conditions laid down in this paragraph, the Commission shall immediately inform the Member State concerned that it cannot transmit all or part of the said application to the third country concerned, giving its reasons. 3. The Commission shall immediately inform the flag Member State of the fact that the third country concerned has granted a fishing licence to carry on fishing activities or of the third country’s decision not to grant such a licence. In the latter case, the Commission shall carry out the relevant checks in consultation with the flag Member State and the third country concerned.’