ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.

Having regard to: a) The giving by the United Kingdom of notice under Article 50 of the TEU; b) The uncertainty as to the arrangements which will be put in place between the European Union and the United Kingdom to govern relations after the departure of the United Kingdom; and c) The consequential uncertainty as to the extent to which KN would, in practice, be able to enjoy rights under the Treaties, the Charter or relevant legislation, should he be surrendered to the United Kingdom and remain incarcerated after the departure of the United Kingdom, Is a requested Member State required by European Union Law to decline to surrender to the United Kingdom a person the subject of a European arrest warrant, whose surrender would otherwise be required under the national law of the Member State, (i) in all cases? (ii) In some cases, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case? (iii) In no cases?
5.

Is the relationship between Article 4(2)(d) and Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1346/2000 to be interpreted as meaning that Article 6(1) applies only if it is not possible under the law of the State of the opening of proceedings to apply a set-off, or can Article 6(1) also apply to other situations, for example where there is only a certain difference between the level of possibility of set-off in the legal orders in question or where there are no differences at all but set-off is nonetheless refused in the State of the opening of proceedings?
2.

If Question 1 is answered in the negative: Is Article 3(1) of Council Directive No 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (‘the Unfair Contract Terms Directive’) ( 2 ) to be interpreted as meaning that a clause in a fiduciary agreement concluded between a professional and a consumer concerning the management of an interest in a limited partnership, which was not individually negotiated and which provides that the law of the State in which the limited partnership has its seat is to apply, is unfair if the sole purpose of the fiduciary agreement is the management of the limited partnership interest and the beneficiary is granted the rights and obligations of a direct partner?
1.

Must the criterion of ‘a service … which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks’ in Article 2(c) of Framework Directive 2002/21/EC ( 1 ) be interpreted as meaning that it also includes, or may also include, web-based email services which are supplied over the open internet and do not themselves provide internet access? (a) Must that criterion be interpreted as meaning, in particular, that the electronic processing service which the provider of such an email service supplies via its email server, by assigning to the email addresses the IP addresses of the physical connections involved and uploading the emails, broken down into data packets, to the open internet, or — conversely — receiving them from there, on the basis of various protocols in the internet protocol suite, is itself to be regarded as a ‘conveyance of signals’, or is it only the transmission of those data packets over the internet by Internet (Access) Providers which constitutes a ‘conveyance of signals’? (b) Must that criterion be interpreted as meaning, in particular, that the transmission of the email, broken down into data packets, over the open internet by Internet (Access) Providers is attributable to the provider of such an email service, with the result that, to this extent, the provider in question also supplies a service consisting in the ‘conveyance of signals’? If so, under what conditions may such transmission be so attributed? (c) In the event that the provider of such an email service either conveys signals itself or the conveyance of signals by Internet (Access) Providers is in any event attributable to it, can that criterion be interpreted as meaning, in particular, that such an email service, irrespective of any additional functions of the service, such as the editing, storage and organisation of emails or the management of contact details, and irrespective of the technical effort expended by the provider in connection with individual functions, also consists ‘wholly or mainly’ in the conveyance of signals, given that, if that service is considered in functional terms from the point of view of users, it is its communication function which stands at the forefront?
If the first question referred is answered in the affirmative:

Under what circumstances can a former employee’s losses suffered in respect of occupational old-age pension benefits as a result of the insolvency of the employee be regarded as manifestly disproportionate and therefore oblige the Member States to ensure a minimum degree of protection against such losses, even though the former employee receives at least half of the benefits arising from his acquired pension rights?
2.

If Question 1 is answered to the effect that the existence of such legal remedies for detainees, without further assessment of the specific conditions of detention in the issuing Member State by the executing judicial authority, does not of itself exclude a genuine risk of inhuman or degrading treatment of the person whose surrender is sought: (a) Are the aforementioned provisions to be interpreted as meaning that the assessment by the executing judicial authority of the conditions of detention in the issuing Member State extends to all prisons or other correctional facilities in which the person whose surrender is sought may be incarcerated? Does this also apply to simply temporary or transitional detention in certain prisons? Or can the assessment be limited to the prison in which, according to information from the authorities of the issuing Member State, the person whose surrender is sought is likely to be incarcerated for most of the time? (b) For this purpose, is it necessary to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the conditions of detention concerned that determines both the personal space available to each prisoner and other conditions of detention? Are the conditions of detention thus determined to be assessed on the basis of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights established in its judgment in Muršić v Croatia (judgment of 30 October 2016, application no 7334/13)?
3.

If a decision is required as to whether the contract terms listed in the Annex to Directive [93/13] are unfair in the light of the criteria established in Article 3(1) of the Directive, is the requirement in Article 5 of the Directive for terms to be drafted in plain, intelligible language satisfied in the case of a contract term which affects decisions by the consumer about performance of the contract, resolution of disputes with the lender through judicial or non-judicial channels, or the exercise of rights, when (although the wording is clear grammatically) the legal effects of the term can be determined only by interpreting national laws on which the courts had not formulated a consistent position at the time the contract was concluded, and on which no consistent position has emerged in subsequent years?
Case C-199/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 19 March 2018 — Pollo del Campo S.c.a., Avi Coop Società Cooperativa Agricola v Regione Emilia-Romagna and Others

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 19 March 2018 — Pollo del Campo S.c.a., Avi Coop Società Cooperativa Agricola v Regione Emilia-Romagna and Others

(Case C-199/18)

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: Pollo del Campo S.c.a., Avi Coop Società Cooperativa Agricola

Respondents: Regione Emilia-Romagna, Azienda Unità Sanitaria Locale 104 di Modena, A.U.S.L. Romagna

Questions referred

1. By providing that Member States must ensure the collection of fees for the activities referenced in Annex IV, Section A, and Annex V, Section A, must Article 27 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 be interpreted as placing an obligation to pay on all agricultural operators, even those which ‘carry out the activities of slaughtering and cutting of meat instrumental to and connected with the activity of rearing livestock’?

2. Can a [Member] State make certain categories of undertaking exempt from payment of the veterinary fees in the case where it has set up a system for the collection of fees that, overall, guarantees coverage of the costs of the official controls, or may it apply charges that are lower than those provided for by Regulation (EC) No 8[8]2/2004? ( 1 )

( 1 ) Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules (OJ 2004 L 165, p. 1).
Case C-316/18: Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division) (United Kingdom) made on 14 May 2018 — Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Cambridge

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division) (United Kingdom) made on 14 May 2018 — Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Cambridge

(Case C-316/18)

Referring court

Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs

Defendants: The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Cambridge

Questions referred

1. Is any distinction to be made between exempt and non-taxable transactions for the purpose of deciding whether VAT incurred for the purposes of such transactions is deductible?

2. Where management fees are incurred only in relation to a non-taxable investment activity, is it nonetheless possible to make the necessary link between those costs and the economic activities which are subsidised with the investment income which is produced as a result of the investments, so as to permit VAT deduction by reference to the nature and extent of downstream economic activity which carries an entitlement to deduct VAT? To what extent is it relevant to consider the purpose to which the income generated will be put?
2.

If the answer to Question 1 is that such a right to information can exist: (a) Is a body which monitors subsidies for farmers from EU funds and, in that respect, stores data which relate to (plant) species obtained from farmers who apply for those subsidies to be regarded as an official body involved in the monitoring of agricultural production within the meaning of the first indent of Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1768/95? (b) Is an official body justified in withholding the requested information if the provision of that information requires the data which it holds to be processed and catalogued by a third party and if doing so would require financial expense in the region of EUR 6000? In that regard, is it relevant whether the person making the request is prepared to meet the costs incurred?
1.

Should Article 2 of Directive 2007/64/EC ( 1 ) be interpreted such that its scope, as defined in that article, must be deemed to include the execution of a direct-debit payment order issued by a third-party on an account which it does not hold, where the holder of that account has not entered into a payment service contract for a single transaction, or a framework contract for the provision of payment services with that credit institution?
1.

In the light of the system of value added tax deriving from Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, ( 1 ) in particular Article 1, Article (2)(1)(a) and (c) and Article 73 in conjunction with subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 78, and the principle of VAT neutrality, which is a general principle of EU law, is it permissible — taking into account the content of Article 29a(1) and Article 29a(6)(1) of the Ustawa z dnia 11 marca 2004 r. o podatku od towarów i usług (tekst jednolity Dz.U. z 2017 r., poz. 1221 ze zm.) (Law of 11 March 2004 on tax on goods and services (consolidated version Dz. U., 2017, No 1221, as amended), ‘the UPTU’) in conjunction with the wording of Article 49(1) and Art. 35 along with Art. 63(4) of the Ustawa z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 o komornikach sądowych i egzekucji (tekst jedn. Dz.U. z 2017 r., poz. 1277 ze zm.) (Law of 29 August 1997 on court enforcement officers and enforcement (consolidated version Dz. U., 2017, No 1277, as amended), ‘the UKSE’) — to adopt the position that the enforcement fees charged by court enforcement officers already include the tax on goods and services (i.e. VAT)? If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative:
1.1

What criteria are to determine whether material constitutes such preparatory design material as is referred to in Article 1(1) of Directive 2009/24/EC ( 1 ) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs? Can documents which set out the requirements as to the functions which are to be performed by a computer program and the result which the computer program must achieve, for example detailed descriptions of investment principles or risk models for asset management including mathematical formulae to be applied in the computer program, constitute such preparatory design material?
Must Articles 1(3) and 5(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA ( 1 ) and Articles 1(a) and (b), 3(3) and (4) and 25 of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA ( 2 ) be interpreted as meaning that the issuing Member State, in its capacity as issuing State,

in a case in which the executing Member State has made the surrender of one of its own nationals for the purpose of prosecution subject to the guarantee set out in Article 5(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, providing that the person concerned, after being heard, is to be returned to the executing Member State in order to serve there the custodial sentence or detention order passed against him in the issuing Member State,

is in fact required — after the conviction involving a custodial sentence or detention order has become legally enforceable — to return the person concerned only once ‘any other proceedings in respect of the offence for which extradition was sought’ — such as confiscation proceedings — ‘are concluded’?
2.

If question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative, is the distribution right with regard to the original or copies of a work as referred to in Article 4(2) of the Copyright Directive exhausted in the Union, when the first sale or other transfer of that material, which includes making available remotely by downloading, for use for an unlimited period, e-books (being digital copies of books protected by copyright) at a price by means of which the copyright holder receives remuneration equivalent to the economic value of the work belonging to him, takes place in the Union through the rightholder or with his consent?
1.

Must Directive 2009/72/EC ( 1 ) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (‘Third Electricity Directive’) be interpreted as meaning that national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which establishes a special measure consisting of a compulsory levy on regulated entities, including the holders of an authorisation to supply electricity granted by the competent regulatory authority of the Member State concerned (‘the regulated entity’ and ‘the Office’ respectively), set in accordance with the financial performance which they achieved not only at national level but also from activity abroad, is contrary to the objective thereof, and in particular Article 3 thereof, where that levy (i) affects the freedom of regulated entities to set a fully competitive price for the supply of electricity on foreign electricity markets, and thus also the competitive process on those markets; (ii) reduces the competitiveness of the regulated entities in comparison with foreign electricity suppliers operating on the Slovak electricity market where both supply electricity to a particular foreign market since the foreign operator is not subject to such a compulsory levy in respect of the supply of electricity abroad; (iii) discourages new competitors from entering the electricity supply market in the Slovak Republic and abroad since such a compulsory levy would apply equally to revenue from their non-regulated activities even if, subsequently during a particular period, they were to hold an authorisation to supply electricity but the revenue they received from that supply was zero; and (iv) may induce Slovak regulated entities to ask the [Slovak] Office — or foreign electricity suppliers to ask the regulatory authority of the respective State of origin which issued them — to revoke the authorisation to supply electricity since for an entity who does not wish the proceeds from its other activities to be subject to the levy in question, revocation of that authorisation is the only way of ridding itself of the status of regulated entity laid down by the legislation at issue?
3.

If question 2 is to be answered in the negative, what are the requirements under Article 6(2) of Directive 2003/86/EC … that apply to the reasons for rejecting an application for entry and residence of a family member on the grounds of public policy? Must Article 6(2) of Directive 2003/86/EC … therefore be interpreted as precluding a national practice according to which an application for entry and residence of a family member can be rejected on grounds of public policy on the basis of convictions during an earlier stay in the Member State concerned, so that, based on the criteria laid down in the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) of 2 August 2001, Boultif v Switzerland, CE:ECHR:2001:0802JUD005427300, and of 18 October 2006, Üner v The Netherlands, CE:ECHR:2006:1018JUD004641099, a balance is struck between the interest of the family member concerned and the sponsor concerned to exercise the right to family reunification in the Netherlands, on the one hand, and the interests of the Netherlands State to protect public order, on the other hand?
Case C-341/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State (Netherlands) lodged on 24 May 2018 — Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid v J. and Others

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State (Netherlands) lodged on 24 May 2018 — Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid v J. and Others

(Case C-341/18)

Referring court

Raad van State

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid

Defendant: J. and Others

Other parties: C. and H. and Others

Question referred

Must Article 11(1) of Regulation 2016/399 ( 1 ) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) be interpreted as meaning that a third-country national who previously entered the Schengen area, for example through an international airport, exits within the meaning of the Schengen Borders Code as soon as he, as a seafarer, signs on with a seagoing vessel that is already berthed in a seaport which is an external border, irrespective of whether, and if so when, he will leave that seaport with that ship? Or, in order for there to be an exit, must it first be established that the seafarer will leave the seaport with the seagoing vessel concerned, and if so, does a deadline apply within which the departure must take place and at what time must the exit stamp then be applied? Or should a different time, whether or not under other conditions, be equated with ‘exit’?

( 1 ) Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ 2016 L 77, p. 1).
Appeal brought on 2 March 2018 by CJ against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 13 December 2017 in Case T-692/16: CJ v European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)

(Case C-170/18 P)

(2018/C 301/17)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: CJ (represented by: V. Kolias, Δικηγόρος)

Other party to the proceedings: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2017 in Case T-692/16 CJ v ECDC (ECLI:EU:T:2017:894) in whole;

— consequently, in the event that the appeal is declared well founded, annul the new termination decision of 2 December 2015 and award the appellant the emoluments and monetary compensation claimed before the General Court plus statutory interest;

— order the ECDC to pay all costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First plea in law, alleging that the General Court misinterpreted his argument, distorted the evidence and erred in legally classifying the facts in holding that circumstances had not substantively changed between the date of issue of the annulled termination decision and that of the new termination decision so as to prevent ECDC from reissuing the annulled termination decision.

Second plea in law, alleging that the General Court misinterpreted his argument, failed to state sufficient reasons, erred in legally classifying the facts and misinterpreted Article 266 TFEU in holding that the new termination decision was not disproportional under Article 5(4) TEU.

Third plea in law, alleging that the General Court gave the scope of res judicata an overly extensive meaning.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the General Court:

— misinterpreted the judgment of the Civil Tribunal in Joined Cases F-159/12 and F-161/12 CJ v ECDC and understood the resulting res judicata in an overly extensive manner,

— misinterpreted Article 22a(3) of the Staff Regulations on the protection of whistleblowers by failing to give useful effect thereto.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the General Court misinterpreted the rule on the noncontractual liability of the EU, subsidiarily erroneously legally classified the facts, when it held that the contested decision was not reasoned in a manner causing non-material damage to the appellant.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Městský soud v Praze (Czech Republic) lodged on 30 July 2018 — CS and Others v České aerolinie a.s.

(Case C-502/18)

(2018/C 341/11)

Language of the case: Czech

Referring court

Městský soud v Praze

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: CS, DR, EQ, FP, GO, HN, IM, JL, KK, LJ, MI

Defendant: České aerolinie a.s.

Question referred

Is there an obligation on a Community carrier to pay compensation to passengers under Article 3(5), second sentence, of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1) where the Community carrier as the contractual carrier operated the first leg of a flight with a stopover at an airport in a non-Member State, from which, under a code sharing agreement, a carrier which is not a Community carrier operated the second leg of the flight and there was a delay of more than three hours in the arrival at the final destination airport which arose exclusively in the second leg of the flight?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).