ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
4

The recitals of Directive 68/151 are worded as follows: ‘Whereas the co-ordination provided for in Article 54(3)(g) [of the EEC Treaty] and in the General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment is a matter of urgency, especially in regard to companies limited by shares or otherwise having limited liability, since the activities of such companies often extend beyond the frontiers of national territories; Whereas the co-ordination of national provisions concerning disclosure, the validity of obligations entered into by, and the nullity of, such companies is of special importance, particularly for the purpose of protecting the interests of third parties; Whereas in these matters Community provisions must be adopted in respect of such companies simultaneously, since the only safeguards they offer to third parties are their assets; Whereas the basic documents of the company should be disclosed in order that third parties may be able to ascertain their contents and other information concerning the company, especially particulars of the persons who are authorised to bind the company; Whereas the protection of third parties must be ensured by provisions which restrict to the greatest possible extent the grounds on which obligations entered into in the name of the company are not valid; Whereas it is necessary, in order to ensure certainty in the law as regards relations between the company and third parties, and also between members, to limit the cases in which nullity can arise and the retroactive effect of a declaration of nullity, and to fix a short time limit within which third parties may enter objection to any such declaration’.
4

Article 1 of that directive, headed ‘Scope and availability of review procedures’, provides in paragraphs 1 and 3: ‘1. This Directive applies to contracts referred to in Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [(OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114)], unless such contracts are excluded in accordance with Articles 10 to 18 of that Directive. Contracts within the meaning of this Directive include public contracts, framework agreements, public works concessions and dynamic purchasing systems. Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that, as regards contracts falling within the scope of Directive 2004/18/EC, decisions taken by the contracting authorities may be reviewed effectively and, in particular, as rapidly as possible in accordance with the conditions set out in Articles 2 to 2f of this Directive, on the grounds that such decisions have infringed Community law in the field of public procurement or national rules transposing that law. … 3. Member States shall ensure that the review procedures are available, under detailed rules which the Member States may establish, at least to any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular contract and who has been or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement.’
17

In those circumstances, the Obvodní soud pro Prahu 6 (Prague 6 District Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. Is a collision between an aircraft and a bird an event within the meaning of paragraph 22 of the judgment of 22 December 2008, Wallentin-Hermann (C‑549/07, EU:C:2008:771), or does it constitute extraordinary circumstances within the meaning of recital 14 of [Regulation No 261/2004], or is it impossible to classify it under either of those concepts? 2. If the collision between an aircraft and a bird constitutes extraordinary circumstances within the meaning of recital 14 of [Regulation No 261/2004], may preventative control systems established in particular around airports (such as sonic bird deterrents, cooperation with ornithologists, the elimination of spaces where birds typically gather or fly, using light as a deterrent and so on) be considered to be reasonable measures to be taken by the air carrier to avoid such a collision? What in this case constitutes the event within the meaning of paragraph 22 of [the judgment of 22 December 2008, Wallentin-Hermann (C‑549/07, EU:C:2008:771)]? 3. If a collision between an aircraft and a bird is an event within the meaning of paragraph 22 of [the judgment of 22 December 2008, Wallentin-Hermann (C‑549/07, EU:C:2008:771)], may it also be considered to be an event within the meaning of recital 14 of [Regulation No 261/2004], and may, in such a case, the body of technical and administrative measures which an air carrier must implement following a collision between an aircraft and a bird which nevertheless did not result in damage to the aircraft be considered to constitute exceptional circumstances within the meaning of recital 14 of that regulation? 4. If the body of technical and administrative measures taken following a collision between an aircraft and a bird which nevertheless did not result in damage to the aircraft constitutes exceptional circumstances within the meaning of recital 14 of [Regulation No 261/2004], is it permissible to require, as reasonable measures, the air carrier to take into consideration, when it schedules flights, the risk that it will be necessary to take such technical and administrative measures following a collision between an aircraft and a bird and to make provision for that fact in the flight schedule? 5. How must the obligation on the air carrier to pay compensation, as provided for in Article 7 of [Regulation No 261/2004], be assessed where the delay is caused not only by administrative and technical measures adopted following a collision between the aircraft and a bird which did not result in damage to the aircraft, but also to a significant extent by repairing a technical problem unconnected with that collision?’
11

Article 97 of that regulation, entitled ‘International jurisdiction’, reads as follows: ‘1. Subject to the provisions of this Regulation as well as to any provisions of Regulation … No 44/2001 applicable by virtue of Article 94, proceedings in respect of the actions and claims referred to in Article 96 shall be brought in the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled or, if he is not domiciled in any of the Member States, in which he has an establishment. 2. If the defendant is neither domiciled nor has an establishment in any of the Member States, such proceedings shall be brought in the courts of the Member State in which the plaintiff is domiciled or, if he is not domiciled in any of the Member States, in which he has an establishment. 3. If neither the defendant nor the plaintiff is so domiciled or has such an establishment, such proceedings shall be brought in the courts of the Member State where [EUIPO] has its seat. … 5. Proceedings in respect of the actions and claims referred to in Article 96, with the exception of actions for a declaration of non-infringement of [an EU] trade mark, may also be brought in the courts of the Member State in which the act of infringement has been committed or threatened, or in which an act within the meaning of Article 9(3), second sentence, has been committed.’
53

In stating in its question that once certain pre-determined facts are established, the existence of such a causal link will ‘always be considered to be established’, the referring court seems to refer to an irrefutable presumption. However, such a presumption would have the consequence that, even where the pre-identified facts are not, hypothetically, capable of establishing with certainty the existence of such a causal link, the producer would, in such a case, be deprived of all opportunity to adduce facts or put forward arguments, such as scientific arguments, in order to rebut that presumption, and the court would thus not have any opportunity to assess the facts in the light of that evidence or those arguments. In being so automatic, such a situation would not only undermine the principle set out in Article 4 of Directive 85/374 by which the victim has the burden of proof of the defect and the causal link, but would also risk compromising the very effectiveness of the system of liability introduced by that directive. The presence of one of the three conditions for engaging the liability of the producer under that directive would then be imposed on the court, without its even having the possibility of examining whether the other facts submitted to it for assessment in the case before it might not lead to the opposite conclusion.
18

Consequently, the Juzgado de lo Mercantil No 3 de Barcelona (Commercial Court No 3, Barcelona) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Inasmuch as Article 2(2)(d) of [Directive 2006/123] excludes transport activities from the scope of that directive, must the activity carried out for profit by [Uber Systems Spain], consisting of acting as an intermediary between the owner of a vehicle and a person who needs to make a journey within a city, by managing the IT resources — in the words of [Uber Systems Spain], “smartphone and technological platform” interface and software application — which enable them to connect with one another, be considered to be merely a transport service or must it be considered to be an electronic intermediary service or an information society service, as defined by Article 1(2) of [Directive 98/34]? (2) Within the identification of the legal nature of that activity, can it be considered to be … in part an information society service, and, if so, ought the electronic intermediary service to benefit from the principle of freedom to provide services as guaranteed in [EU] legislation — Article 56 TFEU and Directives [2006/123] and … [2000/31]? (3) If the service provided by [Uber Systems Spain] were not to be considered to be a transport service and were therefore considered to fall within the cases covered by Directive 2006/123, is Article 15 of Law [No 3/1991] on unfair competition [of 10 January 1991] — concerning the infringement of rules governing competitive activity — contrary to Directive 2006/123, specifically Article 9 on freedom of establishment and authorisation schemes, when the reference to national laws or to legal provisions is made without taking into account the fact that the scheme for obtaining licences, authorisations and permits may not be in any way restrictive or disproportionate, that is, it may not unreasonably impede the principle of freedom of establishment? (4) If it is confirmed that Directive [2000/31] is applicable to the service provided by [Uber Systems Spain], are restrictions in one Member State regarding the freedom to provide the electronic intermediary service from another Member State, in the form of making the service subject to an authorisation or a licence, or in the form of an injunction prohibiting provision of the electronic intermediary service based on the application of the national legislation on unfair competition, valid measures that constitute derogations from Article 3(2) of Directive [2000/31] in accordance with Article 3(4) thereof?’
Chapter IV of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, in particular Article 41(1) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that a maintenance creditor who has obtained an order in one Member State and wishes to enforce it in another Member State may make an application directly to the competent authority of the latter Member State, such as a specialised court, and cannot be required to submit the application to that court through the Central Authority of the Member State of enforcement.

Thus, nothing in Chapter IV, which is headed ‘Recognition, enforceability and enforcement of decisions’ and contains Article 41(1), provides that a special procedure, in addition to the procedures applicable to purely domestic claims, must be followed, or, in particular, that recourse must be had to the Central Authorities of the Member States.

Provision is made for the issuing of proceedings via the Central Authorities in Chapter VII of Regulation No 4/2009, concerning cooperation between Central Authorities.

It follows from Articles 51 and 56 of Regulation No 4/2009, read in the light of recitals 31 and 32 thereof, that a person has a right but is not under any obligation to make an application to the Central Authorities for assistance pursuant to the provisions in Chapter VII of the regulation. It is, therefore, optional and that right will be exercised only if the maintenance creditor wishes to avail herself of it, in order, for example, to overcome certain specific difficulties, such as the location of the maintenance debtor.

It is therefore apparent that Regulation No 4/2009 provides two alternative methods of submitting an application to the courts with jurisdiction, one direct, pursuant to the provisions in Chapter IV of the regulation, and the other through the Central Authorities, if the maintenance creditor seeks the assistance of the Central Authority of the Member State in which she resides, pursuant to the provisions in Chapter VII of the regulation.

That analysis is supported by the wording of Article 45 of Regulation No 4/2009, which forms part of Chapter V thereof. That article, which concerns legal aid, makes an express distinction between two alternative means by which a maintenance creditor may submit an application for enforcement, namely through the Central Authorities ‘or’ directly to the competent authorities.

Accordingly, the obligation imposed on a maintenance creditor by national regulations such as those at issue in the main proceedings to submit an application through the Central Authority of the requested Member State — even though that person wishes to submit an application directly to the competent authorities on the basis of Chapter IV of Regulation No 4/2009 — which, according to the referring court, takes more time, is contrary to Article 41(1) of that regulation, considered in the light of the purpose of the regulation and the system of which that provision forms part.

(see paras 37, 39-44, operative part 1)
1.

Declares that, by tolerating the operation of the waste disposal site in Temploni (Greece), which does not satisfy the conditions and requirements laid down in the environmental legislation of the European Union, the Hellenic Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 13 of Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives, and Article 8(a), Article 11(1) and Annex I to Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste;
Article 7(f) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as not imposing the obligation to disclose personal data to a third party in order to enable him to bring an action for damages before a civil court for harm caused by the person concerned by the protection of that data. However, Article 7(f) of that directive does not preclude such disclosure on the basis of national law.

However, as the Advocate General pointed out in points 82 to 84 of his Opinion and subject to the determination to be carried out in that respect by the national court, it does not appear to be justified, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, to refuse to disclose to an injured party the personal data necessary for bringing an action for damages against the person who caused the harm, or, where appropriate, the persons exercising parental authority, on the ground that the person who caused the damage was a minor.

(see paras 33, 34, operative part)
Case C‑357/16

‘Gelvora’ UAB

v

Valstybinė vartotojų teisių apsaugos tarnyba

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from the Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Unfair commercial practices — Directive 2005/29/EC — Scope — Debt collection agency — Consumer credit — Assignment of debt — Nature of the legal relationship between the agency and the debtor — Article 2(c) — Concept of ‘product’ — Recovery measures taken in parallel to the intervention of a bailiff)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber), 20 July 2017

Consumer protection — Unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices — Directive 2005/29 — Scope — Debt of a defaulting debtor under a consumer credit agreement transferred to a debt collection company — Legal relationship between that company and the defaulting debtor — Included — Concept of ‘product’ — Debt recovery measures taken by that company in parallel with the intervention of a bailiff — Included

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2005/29, Art. 2(c))

Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) must be interpreted as meaning that the legal relationship between a debt collection agency and the debtor, who has defaulted under a consumer credit agreement and whose debt has been assigned to that agency, falls within the material scope of the directive. The practices in which that agency engages in order to recover that debt fall within the concept of ‘product’ within the meaning of Article 2(c) of that directive. In that regard, the fact that the existence of the debt was confirmed by a court decision, and that that decision was passed to a bailiff for enforcement, is without consequence.

Aside from the fact that initiating such measures in parallel to official enforcement proceedings through a bailiff is liable to mislead the debtor as to the nature of the procedure which he faces, the effectiveness of the protection provided to the consumer by the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive requires that the trader, which decided to act unilaterally in order to recover the debts, be subject to the provisions of that directive in respect of the measures which it adopts unilaterally, in parallel to enforcement proceedings.

(see paras 30, 31, operative part)
Case C‑392/16

Dumitru Marcu

v

Agenţia Naţională de Administrare Fiscală (ANAF)

and

Direcţia Generală Regională a Finanţelor Publice Bucureşti

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Bucureşti)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Value added tax (VAT) — Directive 2006/112/EC — Article 199(1)(c) — No VAT registration — Reverse charge — Hypothetical nature of the question referred — Inadmissibility of the question referred)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber), 6 July 2017

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Limits — 62734 / Request for interpretation of provisions of EU law manifestly inapplicable in the dispute in the main proceedings — Inapplicability of Article 199(1)(c) of Directive 2006/112 — Inadmissibility

(Art. 267 TFEU; Council Directive 2006/112, Arts 135(1)(j) and (k), 137(1)(b) and (c) and 199(1)(c))

The request for a preliminary ruling made by the Curtea de Apel Bucureşti (Court of Appeal, Bucharest, Romania) is inadmissible.

It is only when the Member State concerned has opted to allow its taxable persons the option provided for in Article 137 of Directive 2006/112 and one of those taxable persons has exercised that option in respect of transactions covered by Article 135(1)(j) and (k) thereof that the reverse charge mechanism may be applied to those transactions on the basis of Article 199(1)(c) of that directive.

In consequence, although the transactions at issue in the main proceedings, or some of them, concern immovable property within the meaning of Article 135(1)(j) and (k) of Directive 2006/112, since Romania has not applied, in its legislation, the facility provided for in Article 137(1)(b) and (c) of that directive to allow its taxable persons the right of option for taxation of those transactions or, in the absence of an express request by Mr Marcu, in accordance with Article 137 of that directive, to have VAT applied to those transactions, the conditions for application of Article 199(1)(c) of that directive are not met and, in consequence, the reverse charge mechanism, as provided for in that directive, cannot apply.

Even if, secondly, the transactions at issue in the main proceedings relate to immovable property within the meaning of Article 12(1)(a) and (b) of Directive 2006/112, the reverse charge mechanism still cannot apply to those transactions, since they are not among the operations exhaustively referred to in Article 199(1)(a) to (g) of Directive 2006/112.

(see paras 47, 51, 52, 54, operative part)
Regarding the concept of ‘redundancy’ for the purposes of Article 1(1)(a) of Directive 98/59, the Court has held that that directive must be interpreted as meaning that the fact that an employer — unilaterally and to the detriment of the employee — makes significant changes to essential elements of his employment contract for reasons not related to the individual employee concerned falls within that concept (judgment of 11 November 2015, Pujante Rivera, C‑422/14, EU:C:2015:743, paragraph 55).

It follows that the fact that an employer — unilaterally and to the detriment of the employee — makes a change that is not significant to an essential element of the employment contract for reasons not related to the individual employee concerned, or a significant change to a non-essential element of that contract for reasons not related to the individual employee concerned, cannot be classified as a ‘redundancy’ within the meaning of that directive.

The notice of amendment at issue in the main proceedings merely provides that henceforth only the periods of work completed with the employer will be taken into account when determining the due date for the length of service award, with the result that the notice of amendment concerns only when the right to the length of service award is acquired. In those circumstances and without the Court needing to examine whether the length of service award at issue in the main proceedings constitutes an essential element of the employment contracts of the employees concerned, it is sufficient to note that the notice of amendment at issue in the main proceedings cannot be considered to result in a significant change to those contracts and that that notice does not fall within the concept of ‘redundancy’ within the meaning of Article 1(1)(a) of Directive 98/59.

By contrast, the termination of an employment contract following the employee’s refusal to accept a change such as that proposed in the notice of amendment must be considered to be a termination of an employment contract occurring on the employer’s initiative for one or more reasons not related to the individual workers concerned, within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 1(1) of that directive, with the result that it must be taken into account when calculating the total number of redundancies.

(see paras 25-28)