ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 12a(1a) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 of 21 March 1972 fixing the procedure for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community, as amended and updated by Council Regulation (EC) No 118/97 of 2 December 1996, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 647/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 April 2005, must be interpreted as meaning that an E 101 certificate issued by the institution designated by the competent authority of a Member State pursuant to Article 14(2)(a) of Regulation No 1408/71, as amended and updated by Regulation No 118/97, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 647/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 April 2005, is binding on both the social security institutions of the Member State in which the work is carried out and the courts of that Member State, even where it is found by those courts that the conditions under which the worker concerned carries out his activities clearly do not fall within the material scope of that provision of Regulation No 1408/71.

Indeed, given that the Court has determined, through its case-law, the procedure to be followed in order to resolve any dispute between the institutions of the Member States concerned as regards the validity or the accuracy of an E 101 certificate, the institutions of those States applying Regulations Nos 1408/71 and 574/72, including the Swiss Confederation pursuant to the EC-Switzerland Agreement, must follow that procedure, even if it were established that the conditions under which the workers concerned carry out their activities clearly do not fall within the material scope of the provision on the basis of which the E 101 certificate was issued.

(see paras 53, 61, operative part)
Article 15(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 on the European Union trade mark must be interpreted as meaning that the affixing of an individual EU trade mark, by the proprietor or with his consent, on goods as a label of quality is not a use as a trade mark that falls under the concept of ‘genuine use’ within the meaning of that provision. However, the affixing of that mark does constitute such genuine use if it guarantees, additionally and simultaneously, to consumers that those goods come from a single undertaking under the control of which the goods are manufactured and which is responsible for their quality. In that case, the proprietor of the mark is entitled to prevent, pursuant to Article 9(1)(b) of that regulation, the affixing by a third party of a similar sign on identical goods, if that affixing creates a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public.

Article 52(1)(a) and Article 7(1)(g) of Regulation No 207/2009 on the European Union trade mark must be interpreted as meaning that an individual mark cannot be declared invalid, on the basis of a joint application of those provisions, because the proprietor of the mark fails to ensure, by carrying out periodic quality controls at its licensees, that expectations relating to the quality which the public associates with the mark are being met.

The scope of Articles 66 to 74 of Regulation No 207/2009 on the European Union trade mark, relating to collective EU trade marks, is expressly confined, according to the wording of Article 66(1) of the regulation, to marks described as such when applied for.

The demarcation of the applicability of those articles must be strictly adhered to, especially as the rules they introduce, such as those set out in Article 67 of the regulation concerning regulations governing use of the mark, go hand in hand with the requirement, when making the application for registration, to expressly describe the mark applied for as a collective mark. Therefore, it is not possible to apply those rules by analogy to individual EU trade marks.

Accordingly, Regulation No 207/2009 must be interpreted as meaning that its provisions on collective EU trade marks may not be applied mutatis mutandis to individual EU trade marks.

(see paras 59-61, operative part 3)
The right of access to documents of the institutions conferred on the public by Regulation No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents is subject to certain limitations based on grounds of public or private interest. In particular, and in reflection of recital 11 in the preamble thereto, Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001 sets out a series of exceptions allowing the institutions to refuse access to a document where its disclosure would undermine the protection of one of the interests protected by that provision. Nevertheless, as such exceptions depart from the principle of the widest possible public access to documents, they must be interpreted and applied strictly.

Thus, the concept of ‘decision-making process’ referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001 must be construed as relating to decision-making, without covering the entire administrative procedure which led to the decision. That interpretation follows from the very wording of the provision and addresses the requirement of strict interpretation.

Regarding the right of access to environmental information held by the institutions and bodies of the European Union, that interpretation of the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001 is also compelling in the light of the purpose of Regulation No 1367/2006 concerning the application of the Aarhus Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters to the institutions and bodies of the European Union. It is true that Article 6 of Regulation No 1367/2006 merely states that the exception laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001 must be interpreted in a restrictive way, without elaborating on the concept of ‘decision-making process’ within the meaning of that provision. However, Article 4(4)(a) of the Aarhus Convention provides that a request for environmental information may be refused where disclosure of that information would adversely affect the confidentiality of the proceedings of public authorities, where such confidentiality is provided for under national law, and not the entire administrative procedure at the end of which those authorities hold their proceedings.

(see paras 62-64, 76-81)
Case C‑569/15

X

v

Staatssecretaris van Financiën

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Application of social security schemes — Migrant workers — Determination of the applicable legislation — Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 — Article 14(2)(b)(i) — Person normally employed in the territory of two or more Member States — Person employed in one Member State and engaged in paid employment on the territory of another Member State during a period of unpaid leave lasting three months)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 13 September 2017

Social security — Applicable legislation — Article 14(2)(b) of Regulation No 1408/71 — A person normally employed in several Member States — A person residing and employed in the territory of one Member State who, during a three month period of unpaid leave taken in that Member State, is employed in the territory of another Member State — Included — Conditions — Verification by the national court

(Council Regulation No 1408/71, Art. 14(2)(b)(i))

Article 14(2)(b)(i) of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community, as amended and updated by Council Regulation (EC) No 118/97 of 2 December 1996, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 592/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008, must be interpreted as meaning that a person residing and employed in the territory of one Member State who, for a period of three months, takes unpaid leave and is employed in the territory of another Member State, is to be regarded as normally employed in the territory of two Member States within the meaning of that provision, provided that, during that period of leave, he is considered as normally employed under the social security legislation of the first Member State and that the activity carried out on the territory of the second Member State is habitual and significant in nature, which it is for the referring court to determine.

In order to assess whether the activities carried out in the territory of the latter Member State during that period are habitual and significant in nature, regard must be had, in particular, to the duration of periods of activity and to the nature of the employment as defined in the contractual documents, as well as to the actual work performed, where appropriate (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2017, X, C‑570/15, paragraph 21).

(see paras 27, 29, operative part)
Where, following the annulment of a decision adopted on the basis of provisions of the ECSC Treaty and finding a breach of Article 65 CS, the Commission readopts, after the expiry of that Treaty, the annulled decision on the legal basis of Article 7(1) and Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, the procedure leading to that new decision must comply with the rules of procedure laid down by that regulation, even if the procedure began before that regulation came into force.

Given that the procedure for replacing such a measure may, in principle, be resumed at the very point at which the illegality occurred, the Commission is not obligated to adopt a new statement of objections before readopting a decision establishing an infringement of Article 65 CS that was annulled on the ground that the Commission did not have power to adopt it on the basis of the ECSC Treaty, which was no longer in force at the date of adoption of that decision.

According to Article 12 of Regulation No 773/2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles [101 and 102 TFEU], the Commission must, however, give the parties to whom it addressed a statement of objections the opportunity to develop their arguments at an oral hearing, if they so request in their written comments. It follows that the Commission is required, in application of Articles 12 and 14 of Regulation No 773/2004, to give the parties the opportunity to develop their arguments during a hearing to which the competition authorities of the Member States were invited.

Having regard to the importance, in the context of a procedure provided for by Regulations No 1/2003 and 773/2004, of holding, at the request of the parties concerned, an oral hearing to which the competition authorities of the Member States are invited, in accordance with Article 14(3) of the latter regulation, failure to hold such a hearing constitutes infringement of an essential procedural requirement. In so far as the right to such a hearing, provided for by Regulation No 773/2004, was not respected, it is not necessary for the undertaking, the rights of which have been infringed in this way, to demonstrate that such infringement might have influenced the course of the proceedings and the content of the decision at issue to its detriment. Accordingly, the procedure is necessarily vitiated, regardless of any possible detrimental consequences for the undertaking concerned that could result from that infringement.

(see paras 28, 29, 32, 35, 36, 40, 41, 45, 46, 48-50)
12

Article 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Grazhdanski protsesualen kodeks) provides: ‘1. Where the defendant cannot be found at the address stated in the documents, and no person can be found who agrees to receive service, the server shall affix a notice to the door or letter box of the person concerned; if there is no access to these, the notice is to be posted on the entrance door of the building or in a visible place nearby. If he has access to the letter box, the server shall also place a notice in the letter box. 2. The notice shall state that the documents have been deposited at the court registry if service is by a court employee or officer; that they have been deposited at the offices of the municipality if service is by a municipal employee; and that they may be collected there within two weeks from the date of affixing the notice. 3. Where the defendant does not appear in order to collect a copy of the documents, the court shall require the applicant to provide information on the defendant’s registered address, except in the cases referred to in Articles 40(2) and 41(2), in which case the notice is to be added to the documents. If the address stated does not correspond to the permanent or current address of the party, the court shall order service at the permanent or current address in accordance with the procedure laid down in paragraphs 1 and 2. 4. Where the server establishes that the defendant does not reside at the address stated, the court shall instruct the applicant to provide information on the defendant’s registered address notwithstanding the affixing of the notice mentioned in paragraph 1. 5. Service is deemed to have taken place on expiry of the period prescribed for collecting it by the court registry or municipal offices. 6. On establishing that service has taken place correctly, the court shall order the document served to be added to the documents in the case, and shall appoint a special representative at the applicant’s expense.’
18

In those circumstances, the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Must Article 24 of Regulation No 44/2001 be interpreted as meaning that the expression “jurisdiction derived from other provisions of this Regulation” also covers the situation in which the parties to a contract for the assignment of rights to a trade mark registered in a Member State of the European Union have decided, unequivocally and undisputedly, to confer jurisdiction to settle any dispute regarding fulfilment of contractual obligations on the courts of a State which is not a Member State of the European Union and in which the applicant is domiciled (has its seat), while the applicant has seised a court of a Member State of the European Union in whose territory the defendant is domiciled (has its seat)? (2) If the answer is in the affirmative: (a) Must Article 23(5) of Regulation No 44/2001 be interpreted as not referring to a clause conferring jurisdiction on a State that is not a Member State of the European Union, so that the court seised pursuant to Article 2 of the regulation will determine jurisdiction according to the rules of private international law in its own national legislation? (b) Can a dispute relating to the enforcement, through the courts, of the obligation to assign rights to a trade mark registered in a Member State of the European Union, assumed under a contract between the parties to that dispute, be regarded as referring to a right “required to be deposited or registered” within the meaning of Article 22(4) of the regulation, having regard to the fact that, under the law of the State in which the trade mark is registered, the assignment of rights to a trade mark must be entered in the Trade Mark Register and published in the Official Industrial Property Bulletin? (3) If the answer [to the first question] is in the negative, does Article 24 of Regulation No 44/2001 preclude a court seised pursuant to Article 2 of the regulation, in a situation such as that described in the [first] question, from declaring that it does not have jurisdiction to determine the case, even though the defendant has entered an appearance before that court, including in the final instance, without contesting the jurisdiction?’
4

Article 4 of that directive provided: ‘1. The following transactions shall be subject to capital duty: (a) the formation of a capital company; (b) the conversion into a capital company of a company, firm, association or legal person which is not a capital company; (c) an increase in the capital of a capital company by contribution of assets of any kind; (d) an increase in the assets of a capital company by contribution of assets of any kind, in consideration, not of shares in the capital or assets of the company, but of rights of the same kind as those of members, such as voting rights, a share in the profits or a share in the surplus upon liquidation; (e) the transfer from a third country to a Member State of the effective centre of management of a company, firm, association or legal person, whose registered office is in a third country and which is considered in that Member State, for the purposes of charging capital duty, as a capital company; (f) the transfer from a third country to a Member State of the registered office of a company, firm, association or legal person, whose effective centre of management is in a third country and which is considered in that Member State, for the purposes of charging capital duty, as a capital company; (g) the transfer from a Member State to another Member State of the effective centre of management of a company, firm, association or legal person which is considered in the latter Member State, for the purposes of charging capital duty, as a capital company, but is not so considered in the other Member State; (h) the transfer from a Member State to another Member State of the registered office of a company, firm, association or legal person, whose effective centre of management is in a third country and which is considered in the latter Member State, for the purposes of charging capital duty, as a capital company, but is not so considered in the other Member State. 2. The following transactions may, to the extent that they were taxed at the rate of 1% as at 1 July 1984, continue to be subject to capital duty: (a) an increase in the capital of a capital company by capitalisation of profits or of permanent or temporary reserves; (b) an increase in the assets of a capital company through the provision of services by a member which do not entail an increase in the company’s capital, but which do result in variation in the rights in the company or which may increase the value of the company’s shares; (c) a loan taken up by a capital company, if the creditor is entitled to a share in the profits of the company; (d) a loan taken up by a capital company with a member or a member’s spouse or child, or a loan taken up with a third party, if it is guaranteed by a member, on condition that such loans have the same function as an increase in the company’s capital; …’
The Combined Nomenclature set out in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, in the version resulting from Commission Regulation (EU) No 1006/2011 of 27 September 2011, must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to determine whether a mixture of vegetable oils such as that at issue in the main proceedings must be classified as an edible mixture of vegetable oils under CN subheading 1517 90 91 or as an inedible mixture of vegetable oils under CN subheading 1518 00 31, all the factors relevant to the case must be taken into account, in so far as they relate to the objective characteristics and properties inherent in that product. Among the relevant factors which may justify the classification of such a mixture as ‘inedible’, account should be taken of the information provided by the producer of that mixture in the context of the customs declaration, according to which, because of the characteristics of the process for its production, the presence of noxious substances in that mixture cannot be excluded. In that regard, the fact that an analysis of samples taken from such a mixture of vegetable oils has not shown that it contains any noxious substance does not suffice, by itself, to call into question the classification of the mixture in question as ‘inedible’. Such a consequence presupposes the existence of other relevant evidence capable of calling into question the accuracy of the information relating to the process for the production of the mixture in question, provided by its producer and included in that declaration, in accordance with Articles 62, 68 and 71 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 648/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 April 2005.
16

In those circumstances, the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Administrative Court, Austria) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘Are Articles 2(1), 2(2)(a) and 6(1) of Directive 2000/78 to be interpreted as meaning that they are not compatible with a national provision — such as that in issue in the main proceedings — under which periods of apprenticeship and periods of employment as a contract agent with the Federal Government for which contributions to the compulsory pension insurance scheme were to be paid for the purposes of obtaining a civil servants’ pension are: — to be credited as pensionable periods prior to entry into service if they are completed after the 18th birthday, whereby the Federal Government in this case receives an agreed transferred contribution in accordance with the provisions of social security law for crediting these periods from the social security agency; or, alternatively — not to be credited as pensionable periods prior to entry into service, if they are completed before the 18th birthday, whereby there is no agreed transfer to the Federal Government for such periods if they are not credited, and the insured party is reimbursed for any contributions made to the pension insurance scheme, especially considering that, in the event that these periods are subsequently required to be credited under EU law, there would be a possible claim for the refund of the sums reimbursed by the social security organisation from the civil servant as well as the subsequent creation of an obligation on the part of the social security organisation to pay an agreed contribution to the Federal Government?’