ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
94

The EEAS cannot claim that the applicant’s arguments regarding the continuous nature of this alleged damage are based on her ‘subjective perception’ that all the events in her professional and personal life since 2001 are consequential upon the delegation’s initial failure to issue the ‘estemara 6’ certificate. Indeed, the applicant’s arguments are based not on any purely subjective assessment on her part, but on numerous objective, concrete facts recorded in the documents that are before the court, which disclose, in particular, that the applicant firmly intended, from the beginning of 2005 onwards, to return to live and work in the country of her birth, where she owns an apartment and where her family and friends live, and that she missed real employment opportunities in Egypt in 2005, 2006 and 2007 because of the absence from her social security file of an ‘estamara 6’ certificate in her name. It is also clear from the case file that, despite the many requests which the applicant made, from February 2005 onwards, for the irregularity in her situation to be remedied, it was not until more than five years later that the delegation, principally in its own interests (see paragraph 119 below), deigned to take a first real step in the matter and attempt to obtain a ‘movement certificate’ concerning the applicant. It is also clear that, as a consequence of this inextricable situation, the applicant suffered stress and anxiety which caused her physical and psychological problems some of which still persisted at the time when she brought the present action.
20

The interpretation of Article 55(1) of Regulation No 1974/2006 proposed by the Republic of Finland is, the Commission submits, contrary both to its structure, which establishes a general rule and a derogation, and to the ‘normative hierarchy’ between that rule and that derogation. It is apparent from its wording that aid for the purchase of second-hand equipment derogates from the general rule relating to the purchase of new equipment, which, as such, does not require specific substantiation. It is precisely due to the derogating nature of that aid that the Member States may finance the purchase of second-hand equipment only in ‘duly substantiated cases’, that is to say, by making an extra effort of definition and reasoning. The interpretation proposed by the Republic of Finland extends the scope of application of the derogation to such a degree that it becomes a general rule. In that regard, the Republic of Finland cannot rely on a discretionary power, since the criterion of ‘duly substantiated cases’ must be interpreted uniformly in all the Member States and the Member States are required to keep within the limits clearly defined by Regulation No 1974/2006. The application of the derogation provided for in Article 55(1) of Regulation No 1974/2006 therefore presupposes that the Member States correctly defines beforehand the ‘duly substantiated cases’, namely a limited number of clearly identified cases. In that context, the Commission also contests the argument that the criteria of ‘duly substantiated cases’ and ‘conditions under which the purchase of second-hand equipment may be regarded as eligible’ are interconnected and should be applied together. The Commission concludes that the Finnish legislation fails to define, in accordance with Article 55(1) of Regulation No 1974/2006, the ‘duly substantiated cases’ in which aid may, by derogation, be granted for the purchase of second-hand equipment.
10

By letter of 4 March 2013, the President of the Parliament declined the invitation to participate in the consultation procedure provided for in the Council Decision of 23 June 1981, on the ground that it was for the Council alone to adapt the social dialogue provided for in that decision to the new situation created by the transition to the ordinary legislative procedure for revising the Staff Regulations following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. In that letter, he stated that the Consultation Committee established by that decision was intended to ensure that the views of officials are known to the representatives of the Member States before those representatives legislate and that the Council receives information enabling it to take its decisions in full knowledge of the relevant facts. He was of the view that, following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, that decision had become, if not obsolete, at least a purely internal matter. He went on to say that he could not see any way for the Parliament to participate in the Consultation Committee, for two reasons. The first was the lack of any legal basis for such participation. The second was the absence of any need for such participation, the objective of listening to the views of the staff representatives before legislating being achieved by more direct and flexible means at the Parliament. On this point, the President of the Parliament stated that, within the Parliament, discussions were public, information was readily available and both the rapporteur and the shadow rapporteurs on revision of the Staff Regulations were and would continue to be in constant dialogue with the OSPs and the other interested parties at all stages of the drafting and adoption of the report of the Legal Affairs Committee. He further explained that the Vice-President of the Parliament, the Secretary-General of the Parliament, the Head of Cabinet of the President of the Parliament and the Director-General for Personnel of the Parliament had, together, spoken at the Parliament’s general staff meeting about progress on the revision of the Staff Regulations, and that, in that context, the Vice-President of the Parliament had addressed in detail all of the issues which had been raised. He also stated that that meeting had been attended by staff not only from the Parliament but also from other institutions, including the Council.
Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 16 December 2015 —

Rotkäppchen-Mumm Sektkellereien v OHIM — Ruiz Moncayo (RED RIDING HOOD)

(Case T‑128/15)

‛Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for the Community word mark RED RIDING HOOD — Earlier national and international word marks ROTKÄPPCHEN — Relative ground for refusal — No likelihood of confusion — No similarity between the signs — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

1. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 18-20, 23)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Word marks RED RIDING HOOD and ROTKÄPPCHEN (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 21, 22, 41, 42)

3. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity of the marks concerned — Conceptual similarity between the marks composed of verbal elements in different languages — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 28, 40)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 28 January 2015 (Case R 1012/2014-4) relating to opposition proceedings between Rotkäppchen-Mumm Sektkellereien GmbH and Alberto Ruiz Moncayo.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Appeal Chamber)

13 May 2016

CX

v

European Commission

‛Appeal — Civil service — Officials — Disciplinary proceedings — Disciplinary measure — Downgrading — Rights of the defence — Articles 4 and 6 of the Staff Regulations — Article 9 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations — Principle of proportionality — Manifest error of assessment’

Appeal:

against the judgment of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (First Chamber) of 18 June 2015 in CX v Commission (F‑27/13, EU:F:2015:60), seeking to have that judgment set aside.

Held:

The appeal is dismissed. CX is ordered to pay the costs.

Summary

Appeal — Grounds — Mere repetition of the pleas in law and arguments presented before the Civil Service Tribunal — Inadmissibility (Art. 257, third para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Annex I, Art. 11(1); Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 195(2)) Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — General Court’s review of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 257, third para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Annex I, Art. 11(1))
5.

EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Refusal to register based on one of the absolute grounds for refusal set out in Article 7(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 — Whether sufficient (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)) (see para. 33)
1.

EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 16)
2.

EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Assessment of the likelihood of confusion—Determination of the relevant public—Attention level of the public (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 16)
Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 29 November 2016 —

Pi-Design v EUIPO — Société des produits Nestlé (PRESSO)

(Case T‑545/15)

(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — International registration — Application for territorial extension of the protection — Word mark PRESSO — Earlier national word mark PRESSO — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)

1. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 20, 21, 39)

2. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Word marks PRESSO (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 22-24, 38, 51)

3. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Similarity between the goods or services in question—Criteria for assessment—Complementary nature of the goods or services (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 25, 32)

4. EU trade mark—Appeals procedure—Action before the EU judicature—Legality of the decision of a Board of Appeal adjudicating in opposition proceedings—Challenge in reliance on new elements of law or fact—Not permissible (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 65 and 76(1)) (see paras 44, 45)

5. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Weak distinctive character of the earlier mark—Effect (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 47)

6. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Coexistence of earlier marks on the market—Effect (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 48)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 2 July 2015 (Case R 428/2014-1), relating to opposition proceedings between the Société des produits Nestlé and Pi-Design.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT

(Appeal Chamber)

6 July 2016

LM

v

European Commission

‛Appeal — Civil service — Officials — Pension for surviving spouse — Articles 18 and 27 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations — Article 25 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights — Right of the divorced spouse of a deceased official — Maintenance paid by the deceased official’

Appeal:

against the order of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal [confidential], seeking to have that order set aside.

Held:

The appeal is dismissed. LM is to pay the costs.

Summary

Officials — Pensions — Survivor’s pension — Maintenance fixed by agreement between the former spouses — Capping of the survivor’s pension

(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 25; Staff Regulations, Annex VIII, Arts 18 and 27)

According to Article 27 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations, the divorced spouse of an official or a former official shall be entitled to a survivor’s pension, as defined in Chapter 4 of that annex, provided that, on the death of the former spouse, he/she can justify entitlement on his/her own account to receive maintenance from him/her by virtue of a court order or as a result of an officially registered settlement in force between himself/herself and his/her former spouse. Under that same provision, the survivor’s pension may not exceed the amount of maintenance paid at the time of death of the former spouse, the amount having been adjusted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 82 of the Staff Regulations.

However, Article 18 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations, which provides, in essence, for the payment of a survivor’s pension, the minimum amount of which is equal to 35% of the last basic salary of the deceased former official, applies exclusively to a surviving spouse who has not been divorced.

In that regard, it is by Article 27 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations that the European Union demonstrates its observance of the rule laid down in Article 25 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union concerning the specific case of a divorced spouse of a deceased official by undertaking to meet the former official’s obligation to pay maintenance to the divorced surviving spouse. Nonetheless, Article 25 of the Charter does not contain a rule conferring on individuals a subjective right in respect of a minimum amount of survivor’s pension for persons covered by Article 27 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations.

(see paras 13-15)

See:

Judgment of 15 January 2014 in Association de médiation sociale, C‑176/12, EU:C:2014:2, para. 42
1.

EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 15, 16, 35)
Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 6 July 2016 —

Mozzetti v EUIPO — di Lelio (Alfredo alla Scrofa)

(Case T‑96/15)

‛EU trade mark — Proceedings for a declaration of invalidity — Figurative EU trade mark Alfredo alla Scrofa — Earlier national word mark L’ORIGINALE ALFREDO — Request for proof of genuine use — Article 57(2) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Relative ground for refusal — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009’

1. EU trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Examination of the application — Proof of use of the earlier mark — Request presented expressly and on time by the applicant — Possibility of submitting the application for the first time before the Board of Appeal — Exclusion (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 57(2)) (see paras 18, 19, 24)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 31, 32)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity of the marks concerned — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 33, 43)

4. EU trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Relative grounds for invalidity — Existence of an identical or similar earlier mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Figurative mark Alfredo alla Scrofa — Word mark L’ORIGINALE ALFREDO (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 8(1)(b), and 53(1)(a)) (see paras 34, 35, 55, 57, 58)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 2 December 2014 (Case R 655/2014-1), relating to proceedings for a declaration of invalidity between Ms di Lelio and Mr Mozzetti.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
4.

EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Weak distinctive character of the earlier mark — Relevance (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 55)
Judgment of the General Court (Appeal Chamber) of 5 October 2016 —

CJ v ECDC

Case T‑370/15 P

‛Appeal — Civil service — Member of the contract staff — Fixed-term contract — Termination — Breakdown in the relationship of trust — Right to be heard’

1. Officials — Temporary and contract staff — Early termination of a fixed-term contract by notice — Administration’s discretion — No obligation to hold a disciplinary procedure (Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities, Arts 47(b), 49(1)) (see para. 68)

2. Officials — Principles — Rights of defence — Obligation to hear the person concerned before adopting a measure adversely affecting him — Scope (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 41(2)(a); Staff Regulations, Annex IX, Art. 1(1)) (see paras 87, 88)

3. Actions brought by officials — Subject-matter — Directions to the administration — Inadmissibility (Art. 266 TFEU; Staff Regulations, Art. 91) (see para. 109)

4. Officials — Members of the contract staff — Early termination of a fixed-term contract by notice — Justification based on break of the link of confidence — Judicial review — Limits (Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities, Art. 47(b)(ii)) (see para. 165)

Re:

APPEAL brought against the judgment of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (Second Chamber) of 29 April 2015, CJ v ECDC (F‑159/12 and F‑161/12, EU:F:2015:38), seeking to have that judgment set aside in part.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the appeal against the judgment of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (Second Chamber) of 29 April 2015 in CJ v ECDC (F‑159/12 and F‑161/12, EU:F:2015:38) in so far as that appeal concerns Case F 159/12;

2. Orders CJ to bear his own costs and those incurred by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) in the present proceedings, in so far as those costs relate to Case F‑159/12;

3. Sets aside points 3 and 5 of the operative part of the judgment of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (Second Chamber) of 29 April 2015 in CJ v ECDC (F‑159/12 and F‑161/12, EU:F:2015:38);

4. Refers the present case, in so far as it concerns Case F‑161/12, to a chamber other than that which has ruled on the present appeal;
Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 28 September 2016 — Kozmetika Afrodita v EUIPO — Núñez Martín and Machado Montesinos (KOZMeTIKA AFRODITA)

(Case T‑574/15)

‛EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU figurative mark KOZMeTIKA AFRODITA — Earlier national word mark EXOTIC AFRODITA MYSTIC MUSK OIL and earlier national figurative mark AFRODITA MYSTIC MUSK OIL — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 19-21, 55)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Figurative mark KOZMeTIKA AFRODITA — Word mark EXOTIC AFRODITA MYSTIC MUSK OIL and figurative mark AFRODITA MYSTIC MUSK OIL (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 22, 23, 57-61)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity of the marks concerned — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 24)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity of the marks concerned — Criteria for assessment — Composite mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 27-30, 39)

5. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Weak distinctive character of the earlier mark — Effect (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 60)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 28 July 2015 (Case R 2577/2014-4) relating to opposition proceedings between, on the one hand, Mr Núñez Martín and Ms Machado Montesinos and, on the other, Kozmetika Afrodita.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;