ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
10

Article 28 of the regulation, entitled ‘Transitional measures’, provides in paragraphs 5 and 6: ‘5. Health claims as referred to in Article 13(1)(a) may be made from the date of entry into force of this Regulation until the adoption of the list referred to in Article 13(3), under the responsibility of food business operators provided that they comply with this Regulation and with existing national provisions applicable to them, and without prejudice to the adoption of safeguard measures as referred to in Article 24. 6. Health claims other than those referred to in Article 13(1)(a) and 14(1)(a), which have been used in compliance with national provisions before the date of entry into force of this Regulation, shall be subject to the following: (a) health claims which have been the subject of evaluation and authorisation in a Member State shall be authorised as follows: (i) Member States shall communicate to the Commission, by 31 January 2008 at the latest, such claims accompanied by a report evaluating the scientific data in support of the claim; (ii) after consulting the [European Food Safety] Authority, the Commission shall, in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 25(3), adopt a decision concerning the health claims authorised in this way and designed to amend non-essential elements of this Regulation by supplementing it. Health claims not authorised under this procedure may continue to be used for six months following the adoption of the Decision; (b) health claims which have not been the subject of evaluation and authorisation in a Member State: such claims may continue to be used provided an application is made pursuant to this Regulation before 19 January 2008; health claims not authorised under this procedure may continue to be used for six months after a decision is taken pursuant to Article 17(3).’
26

That consideration, which related to a situation in which a business established in a Member State was precluded by a provision of national law from registering for a trade because the person whom it had appointed as manager — who, in that instance, was salaried — did not reside in that Member State, also applies, by analogy, where the condition at issue concerns a manager who is not an employee. The Court found that the rules governing freedom of movement for workers could easily be frustrated if Member States were able to circumvent prohibitions under those rules merely by imposing on employers conditions to be met by any worker whom they wished to employ, which, if imposed directly on the worker, would constitute restrictions of the exercise of the worker’s right to freedom of movement under Article 45 TFEU (see, to that effect, the judgment in Clean Car Autoservice, EU:C:1998:205, paragraph 21). A finding to that effect must also be made where the employer wishes to employ, not a salaried worker, but a worker with self-employed status whose situation is covered by Article 49 TFEU (see also, so far as concerns the possibility for employees of a service provider to rely on freedom to provide services, the judgment in Abatay and Others, C‑317/01 and C‑369/01, EU:C:2003:572, paragraph 106).
16

Under Article 39 of that regulation, entitled ‘Financial corrections’: ‘1. The Member States shall, in the first instance, bear the responsibility for investigating irregularities, acting upon evidence of any major change affecting the nature or conditions for the implementation or supervision of assistance and making the financial corrections required. The Member State shall make the financial corrections required in connection with the individual or systemic irregularity. The corrections made by the Member State shall consist in cancelling all or part of the Community contribution. The Community funds released in this way may be re-used by the Member State for the assistance concerned, in compliance with the arrangements to be defined pursuant to Article 53(2). 2. If, after completing the necessary verifications, the Commission concludes that: (a) a Member State has not complied with its obligations under paragraph 1; or (b) all or part of an operation justifies neither part nor the whole of the contribution from the Funds; or (c) there are serious failings in the management or control systems which could lead to systemic irregularities; the Commission shall suspend the interim payments in question and, stating its reasons, request that the Member State submit its comments and, where appropriate, carry out any corrections, within a specified period of time. If the Member State objects to the observations made by the Commission, the Member State shall be invited to a hearing by the Commission, in which both sides in cooperation based on the partnership make efforts to reach an agreement about the observations and the conclusions to be drawn from them. 3. At the end of the period set by the Commission, the Commission may, if no agreement has been reached and the Member State has not made the corrections and taking account of any comments made by the Member State, decide within three months to: (a) reduce the payment … or (b) make the financial corrections required by cancelling all or part of the contribution of the Funds to the assistance concerned. The Commission shall when deciding the amount of a correction take account, in compliance with the principle of proportionality, of the type of irregularity or change and the extent and financial implications of the shortcomings found in the management or control systems of the Member States. In the absence of a decision to do either (a) or (b) the interim payments shall immediately cease to be suspended. …’
The decisive criterion for determining whether a measure falls within the scope of ‘employment conditions’ within the meaning of clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work, which is annexed to Directive 1999/70 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP is the criterion of employment, that is to say the employment relationship between a worker and his employer. An interpretation of that clause which excludes from the definition of ‘employment conditions’ conditions relating to termination of a contract of employment, such as the notice period, would limit the scope of the protection granted to fixed-term workers against discrimination, in disregard of the objective assigned to that provision.

Clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work, which is annexed to Directive 1999/70 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that, for the termination of fixed-term contracts of more than six months, a fixed notice period of two weeks may be applied regardless of the length of service of the worker concerned, whereas the length of the notice period for contracts of indefinite duration is fixed in accordance with the length of service of the worker concerned and may vary from two weeks to three months, where those two categories of workers are in comparable situations.

A difference in treatment with regard to employment conditions as between fixed-term workers and permanent workers cannot be justified on the basis of a criterion which, in a general and abstract manner, refers precisely to the term of the employment. If the mere temporary nature of an employment relationship were held to be sufficient to justify a difference in treatment, the objectives of Directive 1999/70 and the Framework Agreement would be negated and recourse to such a criterion would perpetuate a situation unfavourable to fixed-term workers. Similarly, the stability of the employment relationship that a fixed-term contract is supposed to promote cannot constitute an objective ground within the meaning of clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement.

(see paras 38-40, operative part)
In that regard, the referring body possesses all the characteristics necessary in order to be regarded as a court or tribunal of a Member State for the purposes of Article 267 TFEU.

In order to determine whether a body making a reference is a ‘court or tribunal’ for the purposes of Article 267 TFEU, which is a question governed by EU law alone, the Court takes account of a number of factors, such as whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent.

Articles 4(1)(c) and 7(1) and (2) of Directive 69/335 concerning indirect taxes on the raising of capital, as amended by Directive 85/303, must be interpreted as precluding the reintroduction by a Member State of capital duty on increases of share capital of a company falling under the first of those provisions, which were subject to such duty on 1 July 1984, but which were later exempted from that duty.

Article 7(1) of Directive 69/335 sets out a clear and unconditional obligation, on the part of Member States, to exempt from capital duty transactions falling within the scope of that directive which, on 1 July 1984, were exempted or taxed at a rate of 0.50% or less.

However, in so far as transactions falling under Article 4(1) of Directive 69/335 were, on 1 July 1984, subject to capital duty, at a rate higher than 0.50%, a Member State could, in accordance with Article 7(2) of that directive, decide to continue to make transactions of that type subject to capital duty at the time of its accession to the Union, on 1 January 1986.

In that regard, the reference to the date of 1 July 1984, made in the first subparagraph of Article 7(1) of Directive 69/335, cannot constitute for Member States which, at that date, made the transactions in question subject to capital duty, at a rate higher than 0.50%, an authorisation to reintroduce such a duty after waiving it. The intention of the EU legislature was in fact to abolish capital duty, the possibility of maintaining it only being an exception motivated by the fear of loss of revenue by Member States. Therefore, even if the loss of budget revenue could justify maintaining capital duty beyond 1 July 1984, within the limits set in Article 7(2) of the directive, it could not justify reintroducing such duty.

(see paras 45, 46, 50, 52, operative part)
Article 1(1) and (3) and the last subparagraph of Article 2a(2) of Directive 92/13 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, as amended by Directive 2007/66, must be interpreted as meaning that the time allowed for bringing an action for the annulment of the decision awarding a contract starts to run again where the contracting authority adopts a new decision, after the award decision has been adopted but before that contract is signed, which may affect the lawfulness of that award decision. That period starts to run from the communication of the earlier decision to the tenderers or, in the absence thereof, from when they became aware of that decision.

However, where a tenderer becomes aware, after the expiry of the period for bringing an action laid down by national legislation, of an irregularity allegedly committed before the award decision was adopted, an action for the annulment of that decision may be brought only within that period, unless such a right of action is explicitly provided for by national law in accordance with EU law.

(see paras 47, 48, operative part)
It is apparent from the very wording of clause 2(1) of the framework agreement on fixed-term work, which is annexed to Directive 1999/70 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, that the scope of the Framework Agreement is conceived in broad terms, covering generally ‘fixed-term workers who have an employment contract or employment relationship as defined in law, collective agreements or practices in each Member State’. In addition, the definition of fixed-term workers for the purposes of the Framework Agreement, set out in clause 3(1), encompasses all workers without drawing a distinction according to whether their employer is in the public or private sector.

Clause 5 of the framework agreement on fixed-term work, which is annexed to Directive 1999/70 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must be interpreted as not precluding national rules which allow universities to renew successive fixed-term employment contracts concluded with associate lecturers, with no limitation as to the maximum duration and the number of renewals of those contracts, where such contracts are justified by an objective reason within the meaning of clause 5(1)(a), which is a matter for the referring court to verify. However, it is also for that court to ascertain that the renewal of those employment contracts was actually intended to cover temporary needs and that the aforementioned national rules were not, in fact, used to meet fixed and permanent needs in terms of employment of teaching staff.

Subject to the verifications which it is for the referring court to carry out, since that court has exclusive jurisdiction to interpret national law, it appears that those rules lay down, in accordance with clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement, the precise and concrete circumstances in which fixed-term employment contracts may be concluded or renewed for the purpose of the employment of associate lecturers and that they respond to a genuine need. In addition, such temporary contracts appear to be capable of achieving the legitimate social policy objective pursued, consisting in enriching university teaching in specific areas by the experience of recognised specialists, because those contracts allow the development both of the competences of the persons concerned in the areas concerned and of the needs of the universities to be taken into account.

(see paras 45, 49, 50, 60, operative part)
Article 3(1) of Regulation No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings must be interpreted as meaning that the courts of the Member State in the territory of which insolvency proceedings regarding a company’s assets have been opened have jurisdiction, on the basis of that provision, to hear and determine an action, brought in the context of insolvency proceedings, by the liquidator of that company against the managing director of that company for reimbursement of payments made after the company became insolvent or after it had been established that the company’s liabilities exceeded its assets.

The fact that the national legislation theoretically allows such an action to be brought even where no insolvency proceedings concerning the assets of the debtor company have been opened does not per se preclude such an action being characterised as an action which derives directly from insolvency proceedings and is closely connected with them, providing that that action was actually brought in the context of insolvency proceedings.

(see paras 20, 26, operative part 1)
Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, and the principles of EU law relating to consumer protection and a balance in the parties’ rights and obligations must be interpreted as meaning that statutory and regulatory provisions of a Member State are excluded from their scope when there is no contractual term altering the effect or ambit of those provisions. In such a case, the national provisions are not contractual but are laws or regulations. Such provisions do not fall within the scope of that directive, which aims to prohibit unfair terms in contracts concluded with consumers.

As regards the principles of EU law relating to consumer protection and a balance in the parties’ contractual rights and obligations, it must be held that Directive 93/13 is intended to ensure that they are observed by removing from consumer contracts unfair terms as a manifestation of the imbalance between the contracting parties.

National statutory and regulatory provisions are excluded from the scope of Directive 93/13 where no unfair contractual term has been relied on. Also, given the existence of a lex specialis, such as Directive 93/13, which provides for certain cases to be excluded, the underlying general principles are also inapplicable.

(see paras 39, 40, 43-45, operative part)
Keywords

Operative part



Keywords

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling

—

Jurisdiction of the Court

—

Case pending before the national court rendered devoid of purpose

—

No need to adjudicate (Art. 267 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 100) (see paras 34-37, operative part

)

Operative part

Operative part

There is no need to reply to the request for a preliminary ruling made by the juge des libertés et de la détention (liberty and custody judge) of the Tribunal de grande instance de Bayonne (France), by decision of 9 April 2013 (Case C‑189/13).
Case C‑410/13

‘Baltlanta’ UAB

v

Lietuvos valstybė

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Vilniaus apygardos administracinis teismas)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Structural funds — Economic, social and territorial cohesion — Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 — Article 38 — Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 — Article 19 — Fisheries — Court proceedings at national level — Obligation on the part of the Member State to take the measures necessary to ensure the successful implementation of the decision relating to the grant of funds following court proceedings’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 3 September 2014

The concept of ‘irregularity’ referred to in Article 38(1)(e) of Regulation No 1260/1999 laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds must be interpreted as concerning any infringement of EU law as a result of an act or omission which could be detrimental to the general budget of the European Union. In the light of that definition of ‘irregularity’, Article 38(1)(e) of Regulation No 1260/1999 must be interpreted as obliging the Member States to prevent, detect and correct irregularities of EU law resulting from an act or omission which could be detrimental to the general budget of the European Union, to inform the Commission of such irregularities, and to keep it informed of the progress of administrative and legal proceedings concerning those irregularities. (see paras 49, 50)

Article 19 of Regulation No 2792/1999 laying down the detailed rules and arrangements regarding Community structural assistance in the fisheries sector, as amended by Regulation No 2369/2002, does not in any way oblige the Member States concerned to implement an aid scheme with the purpose of financing a project which had been wrongly prevented from receiving financial assistance. (see para. 63)

See the text of the decision. (see paras 64, 65)
Keywords

Operative part



Keywords

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an unregistered trade mark or other sign used in the course of trade — Conditions — Assessment having regard to the criteria laid down by the national law governing the sign relied on (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(4)) (see paras 47, 48)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an unregistered trade mark or other sign used in the course of trade — Conditions — Use of the sign in the course of trade — Local range of the sign — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(4)) (see paras 51-54)

Operative part

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the appeals;

2. Orders Peek & Cloppenburg KG, established in Düsseldorf (Germany), to pay the costs.
With regard to the limitation period laid down in Article 3 of Regulation No 2988/95 on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, that article must be interpreted as applying to procedures brought by the national authorities against recipients of European Union aid following irregularities found by the national body responsible for paying the export refunds under the EAGGF.

In that regard, Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95 is applicable both to irregularities leading to the imposition of an administrative penalty for the purposes of Article 5 thereof and to irregularities which are the subject of an administrative measure for the purposes of Article 4 of that regulation, a measure which is intended to withdraw the wrongly obtained advantage without however constituting a penalty.

(see paras 41, 45, operative part 1)
Article 1(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that an action seeking legal redress for damage resulting from alleged infringements of EU competition law comes within the notion of ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of that provision and, therefore, falls within the scope of that regulation.

Article 22(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that an action seeking legal redress for damage resulting from alleged infringements of EU competition law does not constitute proceedings having as their object the validity of the decisions of organs of companies within the meaning of that provision.

Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that neither the detailed rules for determining the amount of the sums which are the subject of the provisional and protective measures granted by a judgment in respect of which recognition and enforcement are requested, in the case where it is possible to follow the line of reasoning which led to the determination of the amount of those sums, and even where legal remedies were available which were used to challenge such methods of calculation, nor the mere invocation of serious economic consequences constitute grounds establishing the infringement of public policy of the Member State in which recognition is sought which would permit the refusal of recognition and enforcement in that Member State of such a judgment given in another Member State.

Moreover, the extent of the obligation to give reasons may vary according to the nature of the judgment and must be examined, in the light of the proceedings taken as a whole and all the relevant circumstances, taking account of the procedural guarantees surrounding that judgment, in order to ascertain whether those guarantees ensure that the persons concerned have the possibility to bring an appropriate and effective appeal against that decision.

The concept of ‘public policy’ within the meaning of Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 seeks to protect legal interests which are expressed through a rule of law, and not purely economic interests.

(see paras 52, 56, 59, operative part 3)