ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 3(a) of Regulation No 469/2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products must be interpreted as meaning that, in order for an active ingredient to be regarded as ‘protected by a basic patent in force’ within the meaning of that provision, it is not necessary for the active ingredient to be identified in the claims of the patent by a structural formula. Where the active ingredient is covered by a functional formula in the claims of a patent issued by the European Patents Office, Article 3(a) of that regulation does not, in principle, preclude the grant of a supplementary protection certificate for that active ingredient, on condition that it is possible to reach the conclusion on the basis of those claims, interpreted inter alia in the light of the description of the invention, as required by Article 69 of the Convention on the Grant of European Patents and the Protocol on the interpretation of that provision, that the claims relate, implicitly but necessarily and specifically, to the active ingredient in question, which is a matter to be determined by the referring court.

With regard to the requirements laid down by the Convention on the Grant of European Patents, the Court does not have jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of that convention, since, unlike the Member States, the European Union has not acceded to the convention. The Court cannot, therefore, provide further guidance to the referring court concerning the manner in which it is determine the extent of the claims of a patent issued by the European Patents Office.

(see paras 40, 44, operative part)
Article 2(2)(c) of Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State cannot require a direct descendant who is 21 years old or older, in circumstances where a Union citizen regularly, for a significant period, pays a sum of money to that descendant, necessary in order for him to support himself in the State of origin, in order to be regarded as dependent and thus come within the definition of a family member under that provision, to have tried unsuccessfully to obtain employment or to obtain subsistence support from the authorities of his country of origin and/or otherwise to support himself.

The requirement for such evidence, which is not easy to provide in practice, is likely to make it excessively difficult for that descendant to obtain the right of residence in the host Member State. Accordingly, that requirement is likely to deprive Articles 2(2)(c) and 7 of Directive 2004/38 of their proper effect.

(see paras 22, 24, 26, 28, operative part 1)
Article 2 of Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that, where the defendant is domiciled in a Member State other than that in which the court seised is situated, it precludes the application of a national rule of jurisdiction relating to the unilateral termination of exclusive distribution agreements which provide that the national courts have jurisdiction where the grantor is established in its territory and the distribution agreement produces all or part of its effects there.

If a case presenting an international element falls within the scope ratione materiae of the regulation, and if the defendant is domiciled in a Member State, the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the regulation must, in principle, be applied and prevail over national rules of jurisdiction.

(see paras 22, 23, operative part 1)
Articles 49 TFEU and 54 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State relating to tax on the turnover of store retail trade which obliges taxable legal persons constituting, within a group, ‘linked undertakings’ within the meaning of that legislation, to aggregate their turnover for the purpose of the application of a steeply progressive rate, and then to divide the resulting amount of tax among them in proportion to their actual turnover, if – and it is for the referring court to determine whether this is the case – the taxable persons covered by the highest band of the special tax are linked, in the majority of cases, to companies which have their registered office in another Member State.

Although that legislation does not make a formal distinction according to the registered office of the companies, it may bring about indirect discrimination on the basis of the registered office of the companies for the purposes of those articles. That legislation imposes a criterion of differentiation between, on the one hand, taxable persons subject to the special tax which are linked to other companies within a group, and, on the other hand, taxable persons which are not part of a group of companies. That criterion has the effect of disadvantaging legal persons which are linked to other companies within a group compared with legal persons which are not part of such a group of companies.

In that respect, such a restriction is permissible only if it is justified by overriding reasons in the public interest. It is further necessary, in such a case, that it be appropriate for ensuring the attainment of the objective in question and not go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective. However, it is not possible to validly invoke, in support of such a system, either the protection of the economy of the country or the restoration of budgetary balance by increasing fiscal receipts.

(see paras 31, 33, 41, 42, 44, 45, operative part)
On a proper construction of clause 2.4 of the framework agreement on parental leave which is set out in the annex to Directive 96/34 on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, as amended by Directive 97/75, read in the light both of the objectives thereof and of clause 2.6 thereof, it is contrary to that provision for the fixed-sum protective award payable to a worker on part-time parental leave, where the employer unilaterally and without compelling or sufficient reason terminates that worker’s full-time contract of indefinite duration, to be determined on the basis of the reduced salary earned by that worker at the date of the dismissal.

When a worker has unlawfully been dismissed during part-time parental leave, a fixed-term protective award, provided for by the national legislation, must, in order to satisfy the requirements of the Framework Agreement, be determined on the basis of the full-time salary of that worker. If not, that fixed-sum protective award, while being a protective measure within the meaning of clause 2.4 of the Framework Agreement, which aims to protect workers against dismissal on the grounds of an application for, or the taking of, parental leave, would lose a great part of its effectiveness. Such a method of determining the amount of that fixed-sum award, based on the reduced salary earned during the part-time parental leave, would be likely not to have a deterrent effect sufficient to prevent the dismissal of workers on part-time parental leave.

(see paras 35, 38, 47, 48, operative part)
Articles 119(4) and 168(4) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice must be interpreted as meaning that it is possible to remedy a failure to grant an authority to act on the date on which the appeal was lodged by means of an ex post submission of any document confirming the existence of that authority. Consequently, even if the lawyers acting for the appellant did not, at the date on which the present appeal was lodged, have authority to act on behalf of that appellant, the fact remains that, following the appointment of an ad hoc agent, that agent was validly empowered to confirm his intention that that appellant join in the appeal brought by another appellant.

In accordance with the general principle of good administration, which is included among the guarantees conferred by the EU legal order in administrative proceedings and which is now enshrined in Article 41(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, it is for the EU institutions to conduct recovery procedures with due diligence and to ensure that each procedural step is taken within a reasonable time following the previous step.

Consequently, since the Commission took no action for more than 12 years, such a failure being unjustified by either the complexity of the case or other specific circumstances such as would justify that delay, and that inaction has resulted in the amount of default interest claimed exceeding the disputed debt, the default interest accrued during the period of the Commission’s inactivity of more than 12 years is directly attributable to the Commission’s conduct. Thus, there is a direct causal link between the conduct of the Commission and the damage relied upon by the appellants in their counterclaim, on the basis of Article 340 TFEU and Article 41(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as regards the order that they pay default interest.

(see points 96-100, 102-104, 107, 109)
Since none of the provisions of Regulation No 715/2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation No 1775/2005 expressly establishes an obligation to provide a virtual reverse flow gas transmission capacity, it is not possible, in order to show that such an obligation is implied by those provisions, in the face of clear and precise wording of that regulation, to interpret the provisions with the intention of correcting it and thereby extending the obligations of the Member States relating to it.

No such obligation can be deduced from the wording and scheme of Articles 14(1) and 16(1) and (2)(b) of Regulation No 715/2009, as supported by the travaux préparatoires for Regulation No 1775/2005 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks and Regulation No 715/2009.

(see paras 34, 35, 51)
Keywords

Subject of the case

Operative part



Keywords

Actions for annulment — Natural or legal persons — Measures of direct and individual concern to them — Commission decision declaring State aid to be compatible with the common market without initiating the formal investigation procedure — Action brought by the parties concerned within the meaning of Article 88(2) EC — Identification of the subject-matter of the action — Action designed to safeguard the procedural rights of the persons concerned — Pleas capable of being invoked (Arts 88(2) EC and 230, fourth para. EC; Council Regulation No 659/1999, Arts 1(h), 4(3) and 6(1)) (see para. 60)

2. Appeals — Grounds — Assessment of the economic advantage granted by an aid measure — Plea requiring an appraisal of the facts falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the General Court and not subject, save where they have been distorted, to review by the Court of Justice (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58) (see para. 78)

3. Appeals — Grounds — Plea directed against a superfluous ground — Invalid plea in law — Rejection (see para. 86)

4. Appeals — Grounds — Inadequate statement of reasons — Reliance by the General Court on implied reasoning — Lawfulness — Conditions (Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 36 and 53, first para.) (see para. 110)

Subject of the case

Re:

Appeal brought against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) of 28 March 2012 in Case T-123/09 Ryanair v Commission , by which the General Court dismissed an action seeking, first, the annulment in part of Commission Decision C(2008) 6743 of 12 November 2008 on the loan of EUR 300 million granted by Italy to Alitalia (Aid No C 26/08) (ex NN 31/08) (OJ 2009 L 52, p. 3), in so far as that decision did not order the recovery of the aid from Alitalia’s successors, and, second, the annulment of Commission Decision C(2008) 6745 final of 12 November 2008 declaring that the procedure for selling off the assets of the Alitalia airline company, in the context of the extraordinary administrative procedure set to lead to the liquidation of that airline, does not constitute State aid, provided that the Italian authorities respect their commitments to ensure that the transactions will be carried out at the market price (Aid N 510/2008) (OJ 2009 C 46, p. 6).

Operative part

Operative part :

The Court:

1. Dismisses the appeal;

2. Orders Ryanair Ltd to bear, in addition to its own costs, the costs incurred by the European Commission and Alitalia - Compagnia Aerea Italiana SpA;

3. Orders the Italian Republic to bear its own costs.
Directive 92/85 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding must be interpreted as meaning that Member States are not required to provide maternity leave pursuant to Article 8 of that directive to a female worker who as a commissioning mother has had a baby through a surrogacy arrangement, even in circumstances where she may breastfeed the baby following the birth or where she does breastfeed the baby.

It follows from the objective of Directive 92/85, from the wording of Article 8 thereof, which expressly refers to confinement, and from the case-law of the Court of Justice that the purpose of the maternity leave provided for in Article 8 is to protect the health of the mother of the child in the especially vulnerable situation arising from her pregnancy. Whilst it is true that the Court has held that maternity leave is also intended to ensure that the special relationship between a woman and her child is protected, that objective concerns only the period after pregnancy and childbirth. It follows from this that the grant of maternity leave pursuant to Article 8 of Directive 92/85 presupposes that the worker entitled to such leave has been pregnant and has given birth to a child. In those circumstances, a female worker who as a commissioning mother has had a baby through a surrogacy arrangement does not fall within the scope of that provision, even in circumstances where she may breastfeed the baby following the birth or where she does breastfeed the baby. Consequently, Member States are not required to grant such a worker a right to maternity leave pursuant to that article.

However, the purpose of Directive 92/85 is to establish certain minimum requirements in respect of the protection of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or who are breastfeeding. Consequently that directive does not in any way preclude Member States from applying or introducing laws, regulations or administrative provisions more favourable to the protection of the safety and health of commissioning mothers who have had babies through a surrogacy arrangement by allowing them to take maternity leave as a result of the birth of the child.

(see paras 35-37, 40-43, operative part 1)
Article 22(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that an action State, seeking a declaration of invalidity of the exercise of a right of pre-emption attaching to that property, and which produces effects with respect to all the parties falls within the category of proceedings which have as their object ‘rights in rem in inmovable property within the meaning of that provision.

A right of pre-emption which attaches to immovable property and which is registered with the Land Register produces its effects not only with respect to the debtor, but guarantees the right of the holder of that right to transfer the property also vis-à-vis third parties, so that, if a contract of sale is concluded between a third party and the owner of the property burdened, the proper exercise of that right of pre-emption has the consequence that the sale is without effect with respect to the holder of that right, and the sale is deemed to be concluded between the holder of that right and the owner of the property on the same conditions as those agreed between the latter and the third party. It follows that, where the third party purchaser challenges the validity of the exercise of the right of pre-emption that action will seek essentially to determine whether the exercise of the right of pre-emption has enabled, for the benefit of its holder, the right to the transfer of the ownership of the immovable property subject to the dispute to be respected. In such a case, the dispute concerns proceedings which have as their object a right in rem in immovable property and fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the forum rei sitae.

(see paras 45-47, operative part 1)
Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 6 March 2014 — Pi-Design and Others v Yoshida Metal Industry

(Joined Cases C‑337/12 P to C‑340/12 P)

‛Appeals — Community trade mark — Registration of signs consisting of a surface with black dots — Declaration of invalidity — Regulation (EC) No 40/94 — Article 7(1)(e)(ii) — Distortion of the evidence’

1. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Signs which consist exclusively of the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result — Identification of the essential characteristics of a sign (Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 7(1)(e)(ii)) (see paras 45-48, 67)

2. Community trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Absolute grounds for invalidity — Registration contrary to Article 7 — Relevant date for the examination of an absolute ground for invalidity — Date of application for registration (Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 51(1)(a)) (see paras 59, 60)

Re:

Appeals brought against the judgments of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 8 May 2012 in Case T‑331/10 Yoshida Metal Industry v OHIM — Pi-Design and Others (Representation of a triangular surface with black dots) and Case T‑416/10 Yoshida Metal Industry v OHIM — Pi-Design and Others (Representation of a surface with black dots), by which that court annulled Decision R 1237/2008-1 of the First Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM) of 20 May 2010 which annulled the decision of the Cancellation Division rejecting the application for a declaration of invalidity brought by Pi-Design, Bodum France and Bodum Logistics A/S in respect of a figurative mark representing a surface with black dots, for goods in Classes 8 and 21 — Interpretation of Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 on the Community trade mark — Sign which consists exclusively of the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result.

Operative part:

The Court:

1. Sets aside the judgments of the General Court of the European Union of 8 May 2012 in Case T‑331/10 Yoshida Metal Industry v OHIM — Pi-Design and Others (Representation of a triangular surface with black dots) and Case T‑416/10 Yoshida Metal Industry v OHIM — Pi-Design and Others (Representation of a surface with black dots);

2. Refers the cases back to the General Court of the European Union;
Article 22(1) of Regulation No 1008/2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community must be interpreted as precluding a national law that requires air carriers to carry, in all circumstances, not only the passenger, but also baggage checked in by him, provided that the baggage complies with certain requirements as regards, in particular, its weight, for the price of the plane ticket and without it being possible to charge any price supplement to carry such baggage.

A national law that requires the price to be paid for the carriage of checked-in baggage to be included, in all circumstances, in the base price of the plane ticket, prohibits any means of setting a price differently for a ticket to travel that includes the right to check in baggage and for a ticket that does not offer that possibility. Consequently, that law contravenes not only the right of air carriers freely to set fares payable for the carriage of passengers on air services and the conditions under which those fares apply, in accordance with Articles 2(18) and 22(1) of Regulation No 1008/2008, but is also likely to call into question, in particular, the objective pursued by that regulation, which is to enable the effective comparison of such fares, in that air carriers affected by such a national law are not permitted to apply separate charges for the service of carrying checked-in baggage, while airlines subject to the legislation of another Member State are permitted to do so.

(see paras 45, 49, operative part)
The compatibility with EU law of national rules under which a company resident in a Member State cannot set off corporation tax paid in another Member State or in a third State by capital companies distributing dividends, because of the exemption of those dividends from tax in the first Member State when they stem from shareholdings representing at least 10% of the capital of the company making the distribution and, in the case in point, the actual shareholding of the capital company receiving the dividends exceeds 90% and the recipient company has been incorporated in accordance with the law of a third State, must be assessed in the light of Articles 63 TFEU and 65 TFEU.

Where the national legislation relating to the treatment of dividends is not intended to apply exclusively to situations in which the parent company exercises decisive influence over the company distributing the dividends, account must be taken of the size of the shareholding of the company receiving the dividend in the company distributing it, in so far as both Article 49 TFEU and Article 63 TFEU may be relied upon and it can be determined in the light of the shareholding’s size that the situation envisaged falls within the scope of one or the other of the freedoms respectively laid down by those two provisions of EU law.

This reasoning is also applicable, by analogy, where solely the free movement of capital may be relied upon given the limits of the personal scope of freedom of establishment. That is so in a situation where the company receiving the dividends is a company formed in accordance with the law of a third State.

In a situation where freedom of establishment cannot be relied upon because of the connection of the company receiving the dividends to the legal system of a third State, national rules which relate to the tax treatment of dividends originating in another Member State or in a third State and do not apply exclusively to situations in which the parent company exercises decisive influence over the company distributing the dividends must be assessed in the light of Article 63 TFEU.

Consequently, a company incorporated in accordance with the law of a third State that is resident in a Member State may, irrespective of the extent of its shareholding in the company distributing dividends resident in another Member State or in a third country, rely upon that provision in order to call the legality of such rules into question. Since the Treaty does not extend freedom of establishment to third countries, it is important to ensure that the interpretation of Article 63(1) TFEU as regards relations with third countries does not enable economic operators who do not fall within the limits of the territorial scope of freedom of establishment to profit from that freedom.

(see paras 40, 42, 43, 51-53, 55, operative part 1)