2.

In assessing the matter at issue, to which I shall now turn after this brief preliminary survey, the Court is solely concerned to ascertain when the applicant's service was terminated. It will be clear from the answer to this question whether the relevant basis for calculation of his pecuniary rights is his basic salary as at 30 September 1968 or as at 1 October 1968. The Court will recall from the hearing that the principal basis of the applicant's case is that, according to a generally accepted principle, in calculating a period of time, the dies ad quern is included in that period. In view of the fact that the date 1 October 1968 was given in the relevant Commission decision regarding the applicant's termination of service as the date on which this was to take effect, the applicant claims that pursuant to the above-mentioned principle it must be accepted that the decision took effect only on the expiry of1 October 1968. It can however readily be shown, in agreement with the Commission, that this line of argument is mistaken. The principle relied upon by the applicant, so far from being of general application, is relevant only for the calculation of periods, that is to say the calculation of a specific number of days which are to elapse after a given date, and before the expiration of which a certain measure must be adopted. The situation with which we are concerned does not correspond to these conditions, since here it is a matter of fixing the day upon which a certain decision was to take effect. This fact should not be forgotten in considering the statement contained in the letter from the President of the Commission dated 22 May 1968, according to which the applicant was to fulfil certain functions until the termination of his service. This does not in fact constitute the fixing of a period within the meaning set out above but merely an indication of how the applicant was to spend his time up to the moment when the decision terminating his service was to take effect. I am therefore convinced that there can be no doubt on the question of the intention lying behind the fixing of the time at which the decision of 20 June 1968 was to take effect. The only construction which can be put upon the words ‘avrà effetto dal 1o ottobre 1968’ in the letter of 21 June 1968 from the Directorate General for Personnel and Administration is that the measure was to take effect at the beginning of the stated day or, put in another way, at the end of the previous day. This corresponds moreover to general practice. It would have been very unusual to terminate the service of an official at the end of the first day of a calendar month. Nor can the applicant's argument be justified by reference to the Commission's intention to accord certain advantages to departing officials. The applicant has in mind here the provisions of Article 8 (3) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations, to the following effect: ‘An official whose service is terminated in the course of a calendar year … shall, if he is in active employment in the service of an institution of the three European Communities for less than nine months of that year, be entitled only to part of the payment provided for in paragraph (1)’ (that is to say a lump sum payment in respect of travel expenses from the place where he is employed to his place of origin). In this connexion the applicant claims that the Commission in fact paid him the full lump sum payment for travel expenses in respect of 1968. However, it will easily be seen that from the Commission's point of view such an action was possible since, on the assumption that the applicant's service was terminated on 30 September 1968, the nine months within the meaning of Article 8 of Annex VII were completed at the end of 30 September 1968. This provision could therefore be applied unreservedly without having recourse to the applicant's argument, according to which the master and servant relationship was terminated only at the end of 1 October 1968. Furthermore the applicant's statement that, if account is taken of his seniority as originally fixed, his advancement to the next step fell due on 1 August 1968 is beside the point. Although this may be true, what is important is that following appeals by other officials and by reason of formal defects in the original appointment procedure the applicant's seniority was amended by a subsequent Commission decision dated 26 February 1965. This decision, according to which 1 October of every second year was to be the date upon which he was to advance to the next highest step, was never challenged by the applicant. In the present context it alone is relevant. It would be a mistake to take account of some such considerations of justice as those put forward by the applicant and to refer to an earlier estimate of seniority for the purpose of arranging for the applicant a more favourable calculation of his claim. Finally, the Court can reject the applicant's statement that on 1 October 1968 he was still fulfilling the functions connected with his post. It may well be that he was present in his office on that day and that he signed official documents, although the Commission has challenged the accuracy of this statement. The important question is not whether in fact the applicant fulfilled obligations flowing from his previous functions, but rather whether in so doing he was acting under official instructions. This the applicant was not able to claim. This concords with the fact that no salary was paid for the day of 1 October 1968.