ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Articles 306 to 310 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that the mere supply by a travel agent of holiday accommodation rented from other taxable persons or such a supply of a holiday residence combined with the supply of additional ancillary services, regardless of the importance of those ancillary services, each amount to a single service covered by the special scheme for travel agents.

(see para. 35, operative part 1)
Case C‑176/17

Profi Credit Polska S.A. w Bielsku Białej

v

Mariusz Wawrzosek

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy w Siemianowicach Śląskich I Wydział Cywilny)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Consumer protection — Directive 93/13/EEC — Unfair terms in consumer contracts — Directive 2008/48/EC — Order for payment procedure founded on a promissory note that secures the obligations arising from a consumer credit agreement)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 13 September 2018

Consumer protection — Unfair terms in consumer contracts — Directive 93/13 — Obligation on the national court to examine of its own motion whether a term in a contract before it is unfair — Scope — Limits — Inapplicable if the legal and factual elements necessary for its review are unavailable

See the text of the decision. (see paras 42, 44)

So far as concerns the right to an effective remedy, the obligation resulting from Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13 to lay down detailed procedural rules that ensure observance of the rights which individuals derive from Directive 93/13 combating the use of unfair terms implies a requirement that there be a right to an effective remedy, a requirement also enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The right to an effective remedy must apply both as regards the designation of courts having jurisdiction to hear and determine actions based on EU law and as regards the detailed procedural rules relating to such actions (see, to that effect, judgment of 31 May 2018, Sziber, C‑483/16, EU:C:2018:367, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited). As the Advocate General has noted in point 77 of her Opinion, in order to determine whether a procedure, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, infringes a right to an effective remedy, the referring court must, as is apparent from the Court’s case-law, determine whether the detailed rules of the opposition procedure which national law lays down give rise to a significant risk that the consumers concerned will not lodge the objection required (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 June 2012, Banco Español de Crédito, C‑618/10, EU:C:2012:349, paragraph 54; of 14 March 2013, Aziz, C‑415/11, EU:C:2013:164, paragraph 58; and of 18 February 2016, Finanmadrid EFC, C‑49/14, EU:C:2016:98, paragraph 52). Indeed, without effective review of whether the terms of the contract concerned are unfair, observance of the rights conferred by Directive 93/13 cannot be guaranteed (judgment of 7 December 2017, Banco Santander, C‑598/15, EU:C:2017:945, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited). The adequate and effective means that are to guarantee consumers a right to an effective remedy must include the possibility of bringing an action or lodging an objection under reasonable procedural conditions, so that the exercise of their rights is not subject to conditions, in particular time limits or costs, which reduce exercise of the rights guaranteed by Directive 93/13 (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 April 2016, Radlinger and Radlingerová, C‑377/14, EU:C:2016:283, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited). (see paras 59, 61-63)
4.

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted — Plea alleging distortion of the facts — Need to indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted and show the errors of appraisal which led to that distortion (Art. 256(1), second para, TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see para. 62)
Accession of new Member States — Romania — Environment — No time limit laid down in the Act of Accession within which to implement Directive 1999/31 — Consequence — Application ab initio and in toto of the directive

(2005 Act of Accession, Arts 52 and 53; Council Directive 1999/31, Arts 14(b) and (c), 18 and 19)

(see paras 23, 25-27)
Article 2(1)(b)(iii) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that it applies to intra-Community acquisitions of excise goods, in respect of which the excise duty is chargeable in the Member State of destination of the dispatch or transport of those goods, carried out by a taxable person whose other acquisitions are not subject to value added tax pursuant to Article 3(1) of that directive.

Article 2(1)(b)(iii) of Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted as meaning that, in a chain of successive transactions which gave rise only to a single intra-Community transport of excise goods under an excise duty suspension arrangement, the acquisition carried out by the trader liable for payment of the excise duty in the Member State of destination of the dispatch or transport of those goods cannot be classified as an intra-Community acquisition subject to value added tax under that provision, where that transport cannot be ascribed to that acquisition.

In that regard, it follows from the wording of Article 2(1)(b)(iii) of the VAT Directive, as set out in paragraph 41 of the present judgment, that the liability to pay VAT, pursuant to that provision, for intra-Community acquisitions of excise goods in the Member State of destination, is subject to three cumulative conditions.

It presupposes, first, that the transaction constitutes an intra-Community acquisition within the meaning of Article 20 of the VAT Directive; secondly, that the transaction concerns excise goods for which the excise duty is due in the Member State of destination; and, thirdly, that the transaction is carried out by a taxable person or a non-taxable legal person whose other acquisitions are not subject to VAT pursuant to Article 3(1) of that directive.

Only an acquisition that satisfies all those conditions may be classified as an intra-Community acquisition.

Therefore, where several acquisitions for consideration give rise to a single intra-Community dispatch or intra-Community transport of goods, that dispatch or transport can only be ascribed to one of those acquisitions, which will alone be subject to VAT in the Member State of destination as an intra-Community acquisition provided that the other conditions laid down in Article 2(1) of the VAT Directive are met (see, by analogy, judgment of 6 April 2006, EMAG Handel Eder, C‑245/04, EU:C:2006:232, paragraph 45).

(see paras 59, 60, 62, 63, 68, operative part 2)
Articles 21, 22 and 24 of Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications must be interpreted as obliging a Member State, whose legislation creates a requirement to pursue full-time training and a prohibition on being enrolled on two courses at the same time, automatically to recognise the evidence of formal qualifications issued by another Member State on the completion of partially concurrent training.

Article 21 and Article 22(a) of Directive 2005/36 must be interpreted as precluding the host Member State from verifying compliance with the condition that the overall duration, level and quality of part-time training are not lower than those of continuous full-time training.

In that regard, it can be observed that a system for the automatic and unconditional recognition of evidence of formal qualifications, such as that provided for in Article 21 of Directive 2005/36, would be seriously jeopardised if it were open to Member States at their discretion to question the merits of a decision taken by the competent authority of another Member State to issue such evidence (see, by analogy, judgment of 19 June 2003, Tennah-Durez, C‑110/01, EU:C:2003:357, paragraph 75).

The automatic and unconditional recognition of evidence of formal qualifications remains the same where the home Member State issues such evidence following basic medical training or dental practitioner training that is provided in accordance with Article 22(a) of Directive 2005/36. In that context also, it is for the competent authorities of the home Member State, and not for those of the host Member State, to ensure that the overall duration, level, and quality of the part-time training are not lower than those of continuous full-time training, and, more generally, that all the requirements laid down by Directive 2005/36 are fully complied with.

Accordingly, where a course satisfies the training requirements established by Directive 2005/36, which it is for the authority of the Member State which issues the evidence of formal qualifications to verify, the authorities of the host Member State may not refuse recognition of that evidence of formal qualifications. The fact that the individual concerned has pursued part-time training, under Article 22(a) of that directive, or more than one course simultaneously or during periods which partially overlap, is irrelevant in that regard, provided that the training requirements laid down by that directive are met.

(see paras 36, 37, 40, 41, operative part 2)
The circumstance that the EU judicature may have committed a breach of the obligation to adjudicate within a reasonable time in cases relating to the lawfulness of a fine imposed by the Commission cannot be the determining cause of the damage suffered by the undertaking which brought the action as a result of paying bank guarantee charges during the period by which that time was exceeded. That would be the case only if it were compulsory to maintain the bank guarantee, so that the undertaking which brought an action against a Commission decision imposing a fine on it, and which chose to provide a bank guarantee in order not to comply immediately with that decision, was not entitled, before the date on which the judgment on that action was delivered, to pay that fine and put an end to the bank guarantee that it had provided.

Like the provision of the bank guarantee, the maintenance of that guarantee is a matter for the discretion of the undertaking concerned in the light of its financial interests. Nothing prevents, as a matter of EU law, that undertaking from terminating, at any time, the bank guarantee that it has provided and paying the fine imposed, where, in view of the evolution of the circumstances in relation to those existing on the date when that guarantee was provided, that undertaking deems that option more advantageous for it. That might be the case, in particular, where the conduct of the proceedings before the EU judicature leads the undertaking in question to take the view that the judgment will be delivered at a date later than that which it had initially envisaged and that, consequently, the cost of the bank guarantee will be higher than the cost that it had initially envisaged when providing that guarantee.

(see paras 29, 30, 32)
Articles 49 and 56 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding national rules, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which provide, for the concession for management of the computerised Lotto and other fixed-odds numerical games, a sole concessionaire model, unlike other games, prediction games and betting, to which a multiple concessionaire model applies, provided that the national court establishes that the national rules actually pursue, in a consistent and systematic manner, the objectives relied on by the Member State concerned.

Such a divergence in legal regimes is not, in itself, capable of affecting the suitability of such a sole concessionaire model for achieving the objective of preventing citizens from being incited to squander money on gambling and of combating addiction to the latter, for which it was established (see, by analogy, judgment of 28 February 2018, Sporting Odds, C‑3/17, EU:C:2018:130, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

However, a system of dual organisation of the market for games of chance may be contrary to Article 56 TFEU if it is found that the competent authorities pursue policies seeking to encourage participation in games of chance other than those covered by the sole concessionaire model rather than to reduce opportunities for gambling and to limit activities in that area in a consistent and systematic manner so that the aim of preventing incitement to squander money on gambling and of combating addiction to the latter, which was at the root of the establishment of the sole concessionaire model, can no longer be effectively pursued by means of the sole concessionaire model (see, by analogy, judgment of 28 February 2018, Sporting Odds, C‑3/17, EU:C:2018:130, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited). Such a dual system, on the other hand, is compatible with Article 56 TFEU, since the referring court establishes that the rules restricting the freedom to provide services actually pursue, in a consistent and systematic manner, the objectives relied on by the Member State concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 February 2018, Sporting Odds, C‑3/17, EU:C:2018:130, paragraph 33).

(see paras 50-53, operative part 1)
11

As regards, in particular, the declarations that candidates or tenderers must submit, Article 38(2) of Legislative Decree No 163/2006 provided: ‘For the purposes of paragraph (1)(m), quater, the tenderer shall attach one of the following declarations: (a) a declaration that it is not in a situation of control for the purposes of Article 2359 of the Civil Code in relation to any person, and that it is submitting the tender independently; (b) a declaration that it is not aware of the participation in the procedure of persons that are, in relation to the tenderer, in any of the situations of control referred to in Article 2359 of the Civil Code, and that it is submitting the tender independently; or (c) a declaration that it is not aware of the participation in the procedure of persons that are, in relation to the tenderer, in any of the situations of control referred to in Article 2359 of the Civil Code, and that it is submitting the tender independently. In the situations described in points (a), (b) and (c), the contracting authority shall exclude those tenderers in respect of which it establishes that the tenders are attributable to a single decision-making centre, on the basis of unambiguous evidence. Verification shall take place and any tenders be excluded after the opening of the envelopes containing the financial bid.’
38

In that regard, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court that the possibility of exercising the right of deduction without any temporal limit would be contrary to the principle of legal certainty, which requires the tax position of the taxable person, in the light of his rights and obligations vis-à-vis the tax authority, not to be open to challenge indefinitely. Therefore, a limitation period the expiry of which has the effect of penalising a taxable person who has not been sufficiently diligent and has failed to claim deduction of input tax, by making him forfeit his right of deduction, cannot be regarded as incompatible with the regime established by the VAT Directive, in so far as, first, that limitation period applies in the same way to analogous rights in tax matters founded on domestic law and to those founded on EU law (principle of equivalence) and, second, that it does not in practice render impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of the right of deduction (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 July 2012, EMS-Bulgaria Transport, C‑284/11, EU:C:2012:458, paragraphs 48 and 49 and the case-law cited).
25

In those circumstances, the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça (Supreme Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Does [the VAT Directive], and in particular Articles 63, 167, 168, 178 to 180, 182 and 219 thereof, and the principle of neutrality, preclude legislation the effect of which is that, when the seller of the goods, liable to VAT, was subject to a tax inspection which found that the VAT rate that he applied in a given situation was less than the due rate, paid to the State the additional tax and seeks to obtain the respective payment from the purchaser, also liable to VAT, the period in which the latter may deduct that additional tax starts to run from the date of issue of the initial invoices and not from the date of issue or receipt of the rectifying documents? (2) If not, do the abovementioned articles of that directive and the principle of neutrality preclude legislation the effect of which is that, once documents rectifying the initial invoices are received, issued following the tax inspection and payment to the State of the additional tax, for the purpose of obtaining payment of that additional tax, at a time when the period for exercising the right of deduction has already elapsed, it is legitimate for the purchaser to refuse to pay, on the grounds that refusal of the passing on of tax is justified when it is impossible to deduct that additional tax?’
6

Pursuant to Article 12(1) and (2) of the VAT Directive: ‘1. Member States may regard as a taxable person anyone who carries out, on an occasional basis, a transaction relating to the activities referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 9(1) and in particular one of the following transactions: (a) the supply, before first occupation, of a building or parts of a building and of the land on which the building stands; (b) the supply of building land. 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1(a), “building” shall mean any structure fixed to or in the ground. Member States may lay down the detailed rules for applying the criterion referred to in paragraph 1(a) to conversions of buildings and may determine what is meant by “the land on which a building stands”. Member States may apply criteria other than that of first occupation, such as the period elapsing between the date of completion of the building and the date of first supply, or the period elapsing between the date of first occupation and the date of subsequent supply, provided that those periods do not exceed five years and two years respectively.’
3

Recitals 2 to 7, 11, 12, 22 and 24 of Directive 2003/96 state: ‘(2) The absence of Community provisions imposing a minimum rate of taxation on electricity and energy products other than mineral oils may adversely affect the proper functioning of the internal market. (3) The proper functioning of the internal market and the achievement of the objectives of other Community policies require minimum levels of taxation to be laid down at Community level for most energy products, including electricity, natural gas and coal. (4) Appreciable differences in the national levels of energy taxation applied by Member States could prove detrimental to the proper functioning of the internal market. (5) The establishment of appropriate Community minimum levels of taxation may enable existing differences in the national levels of taxation to be reduced. (6) In accordance with Article 6 of the [EC] Treaty, environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of other Community policies. (7) As a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Community has ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The taxation of energy products and, where appropriate, electricity is one of the instruments available for achieving the Kyoto Protocol objectives. … (11) Fiscal arrangements made in connection with the implementation of this Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity are a matter for each Member State to decide. In this regard, Member States might decide not to increase the overall tax burden if they consider that the implementation of such a principle of tax neutrality could contribute to the restructuring and the modernisation of their tax systems by encouraging behaviour conducive to greater protection of the environment and increased labour use. (12) Energy prices are key elements of Community energy, transport and environment policies. … (22) Energy products should essentially be subject to a Community framework when used as heating fuel or motor fuel. To that extent, it is in the nature and the logic of the tax system to exclude from the scope of the framework dual uses and non-fuel uses of energy products as well as mineralogical processes. Electricity used in similar ways should be treated on an equal footing. … (24) Member States should be permitted to apply certain other exemptions or reduced levels of taxation, where that will not be detrimental to the proper functioning of the internal market and will not result in distortions of competition.’
10

Article 16 of that regulation provides: ‘1. When making a textile product available on the market, the textile fibre composition descriptions referred to in Articles 5, 7, 8 and 9 shall be indicated in catalogues and trade literature, on packaging, labels and markings in a manner that is easily legible, visible, clear and in print which is uniform as regards its size, style and font. This information shall be clearly visible to the consumer before the purchase, including in cases where the purchase is made by electronic means. 2. Trade marks or the name of the undertaking may be given immediately before or after textile fibre composition descriptions referred to in Articles 5, 7, 8 and 9. … Other information shall be always displayed separately. 3. The labelling or marking shall be provided in the official language or languages of the Member State on the territory of which the textile products are made available to the consumer, unless the Member State concerned provides otherwise. …’