Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1 Competition - Administrative proceedings - Observance of the rights of the defence - Whether the parties involved have a right to express an opinion regarding the way in which their own arguments have been taken into account - No such right

2 Competition - Dominant position - Collective dominant position - Meaning

(EC Treaty, Art. 86 (now Art. 82 EC))

3 Competition - Dominant position - Collective dominant position - Meaning - Joint abusive conduct or individual abusive conduct

(EC Treaty, Art. 86 (now Art. 82 EC))

4 Competition - Dominant position - Existence - Extremely large market shares - Generally constitutes sufficient evidence

(EC Treaty, Art. 86 (now Art. 82 EC))

5 Competition - Dominant position - Abuse - Meaning - Obligations incumbent upon dominant undertakings

(EC Treaty, Art. 86 (now Art. 82 EC))

6 Competition - Dominant position - Abuse - Abusive pricing policy

(EC Treaty, Art. 86 (now Art. 82 EC))

7 Competition - Dominant position - Abuse - Discriminatory pricing - Anti-competitive effects on competitors in a neighbouring market

(EC Treaty, Art. 86 (now Art. 82 EC))

8 Competition - Dominant position - Abuse - Selective and discriminatory rebates granted by an undertaking to customers exposed to its competitors

(EC Treaty, Art. 86 (now Art. 82 EC))

9 Competition - Dominant position - Abuse - Fidelity rebates intended to prevent customers of an undertaking from obtaining their supplies from competing producers - Target rebates

(EC Treaty, Art. 86 (now Art. 82 EC))

10 Competition - Administrative proceedings - Obligations of the Commission - Must act within a reasonable time - Criteria of assessment

(Council Regulation No 17)

Summary

1 The taking into account of an argument put forward by an undertaking during the administrative procedure leading to the adoption of a decision concerning it with regard to competition, when the undertaking has not been given an opportunity to express an opinion in that respect before the adoption of the final decision, cannot as such constitute an infringement of defence rights, especially where the fact that the argument was taken into account does not alter the nature of the complaints against it. Where the undertaking has had an opportunity to express its view on the position adopted by the Commission in the statement of objections, it can expect that its own explanations may lead the Commission to alter its opinion.

2 A joint dominant position consists in a number of undertakings being able together, in particular because of factors giving rise to a connection between them, to adopt a common policy on the market and to act to a considerable extent independently of their competitors, customers and, ultimately, consumers.

The mere fact that two economic entities are independent is not sufficient to remove the possibility of their holding a joint dominant position. It cannot be accepted that undertakings in a vertical relationship, without however being integrated to the extent of constituting one and the same undertaking, should be able abusively to exploit a joint dominant position.

3 Whilst the existence of a joint dominant position may be deduced from the position which the economic entities concerned together hold on the market in question, the abuse does not necessarily have to be the action of all the undertakings in question. It only has to be capable of being identified as one of the manifestations of such a joint dominant position being held. Therefore, undertakings occupying a joint dominant position may engage in joint or individual abusive conduct. It is enough for that abusive conduct to relate to the exploitation of the joint dominant position which the undertakings hold in the market.

4 The existence of a dominant position may derive from several factors which, taken separately, are not necessarily decisive. Amongst these factors, however, extremely large market shares are in themselves, save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of a dominant position. A market share of over 50% in itself constitutes evidence of the existence of a dominant position on the market in question.

5 `Abuse' is an objective concept referring to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition is already weakened and which, through recourse to methods different from those governing normal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition. It follows that Article 86 of the Treaty (now Article 82 EC) prohibits a dominant undertaking from eliminating a competitor and thereby reinforcing its position by having recourse to means other than those within the scope of competition on the merits. From that point of view, not all competition on price can be regarded as legitimate. The prohibition laid down in Article 86 of the Treaty is also justified by the consideration that harm should not be caused to consumers.

Therefore, whilst the finding that a dominant position exists does not in itself imply any reproach against the undertaking concerned, that undertaking has a special responsibility, irrespective of the causes of that position, not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market. Similarly, whilst the fact that an undertaking is in a dominant position cannot deprive it of its entitlement to protect its own commercial interests when they are attacked, and whilst such an undertaking must be allowed the right to take such reasonable steps as it deems appropriate to protect those interests, such behaviour cannot be allowed if its purpose is to strengthen that dominant position and thereby abuse it.

6 Where an undertaking enjoys a dominant position, it is necessary, in order to determine whether a particular pricing policy is abusive, to consider all the circumstances, particularly the criteria and rules governing the grant of discounts, and to investigate whether, in providing an advantage not based on any economic service justifying it, the discount tends to remove or restrict the buyer's freedom to choose his sources of supply, to bar competitors from access to the market, to apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties or to strengthen the dominant position by distorting competition. The distortion of competition arises from the fact that the financial advantage granted by the undertaking in a dominant position is not based on any economic consideration justifying it, but tends to prevent the customers of that dominant undertaking from obtaining their supplies from competitors. One of the circumstances may therefore consist in the fact that the practice in question takes place in the context of a plan by the dominant undertaking aimed at eliminating a competitor.

7 For an undertaking with a dominant position on a given market to reserve for itself, without objective need, an auxiliary or derivative activity on a neighbouring but distinct market on which it does not occupy a dominant position, at the risk of eliminating all competition on that market, falls within Article 86 of the Treaty (now Article 82 EC).

Specifically, a situation in which an undertaking enjoying a dominant position on the industrial sugar market grants discriminatory price rebates to its customers, depending on whether or not those customers are in competition with it as sugar packers on the retail sugar market, falls within Article 86 in so far as, first, there is an undeniable connection between the industrial and retail sugar markets and, secondly, the undertaking in question also holds a dominant position on the retail sugar market. The possible absence of competition between the applicant's customers enjoying rebates and competing sugar packers does not preclude the application of Article 86(c) of the Treaty, since the discriminatory practice complained of restricts competition from rival sugar packers on the retail sugar market.

8 The influence of the pricing policy of operators active on a national market on that of operators active on a neighbouring national market is of the very essence of a common market. Anything which restricts that influence must therefore be regarded as an obstacle to the achievement of that common market and prejudicial to the outcome of effective and undistorted competition, especially with regard to the interests of consumers. Accordingly, where such obstacles are brought about by an undertaking holding a dominant position, it is in principle appropriate to conclude that this is a case of abuse incompatible with Article 86 of the Treaty (now Article 82 EC).

The grant, by an undertaking holding more than 88% of the relevant market, of special rebates to certain customers exposed to competition because of their location along a border, constitutes an abuse contrary to Article 86. The undertaking cannot rely on the insufficiency of the financial resources at its disposal at the time to justify the selective and discriminatory granting of those border rebates and thereby escape the application of Article 86, without making a dead letter of the prohibition contained therein.

9 Fidelity rebates granted by an undertaking in a dominant position are an abuse within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty (now Article 82 EC) where their aim is, by granting financial advantages, to prevent customers from obtaining their supplies from competing producers. In such cases, all the circumstances must be appraised, in particular the criteria and detailed rules for granting rebates. It must also be determined whether there is a tendency, through an advantage not justified by any economic service, to remove or restrict the buyer's choice as to his sources of supply, to block competitors' access to the market, to apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, or to reinforce the dominant position by distorting competition.

The granting of target rebates by an undertaking in a dominant position, one of the immediate effects of which is a build-up of stocks and a concomitant reduction in purchases, amounts to restricting the normal development of competition and is incompatible with the objective of undistorted competition in the common market. It is not based on any economic service justifying that advantage, but seeks to remove or restrict the purchaser's freedom of choice concerning his sources of supply and to block the access of other suppliers to the market.

10 It is a general principle of Community law that the Commission must act within a reasonable time when adopting decisions following administrative proceedings relating to competition policy. However, the question whether the duration of an administrative proceeding is reasonable must be determined in relation to the particular circumstances of each case and, in particular, its context, the various procedural stages followed by the Commission, the conduct of the parties in the course of the procedure and the complexity of the case.