ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
14

It was in those circumstances that the Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas decided to stay proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. Must Article 34 TFEU be interpreted as prohibiting national legal rules under which, when seeking to sell on the market of a Member State of the European Union articles of gold imported from another Member State which are permitted to be put on the market of that Member State (of export), those articles must be stamped with a mark, of an independent assay office authorised by a Member State, which confirms that the article bearing it has been assayed by that office and in which information intelligible to consumers of the Member State of import concerning the article’s standard of fineness is specified, in circumstances where such information concerning the standard of fineness is provided in a separate and additional mark or marking stamped on the same article of gold? 2. For the answer to the first question is it significant that, as in the instance under consideration, the additional marking concerning the standard of fineness of articles of gold that is provided on the articles and is intelligible to consumers of the Member State of import (for example, marking with the three Arabic numerals “585”) has not been effected by an independent assay office authorised by a Member State of the European Union, but the information provided in the marking corresponds in meaning to the information specified in the mark, stamped on the same article, of the independent assay office authorised by the Member State of export (for example, the State of export’s marking with the Arabic numeral “3” specifically denotes, under the legal measures of that State, a standard of fineness of 585)?’
9

Article 2112(1) and (5) of the Civil Code, in the version deriving from Article 32 of Legislative Decree No 276/2003 on the application of the powers in matters relating to employment and the labour market laid down by Law No 30 of 14 February 2003 (decreto legislativo n. 276 – Attuazione delle deleghe in material di occupazione e mercato del lavoro, di cui alla legge 14 febbraio 2003 n. 30) of 10 September 2003 (Ordinary Supplement to the GURI No 235 of 9 October 2003, ‘the Civil Code’), in force at the material time, provides: ‘1. In the event of a transfer of an undertaking, the employment relationship shall continue with the transferee … … 5. For the purposes and the effects of the present Article, the transfer of a business includes any transaction that, as a consequence of a legal transfer or merger, entails a change in the ownership of an organised economic activity, whether profit-making or not, existing before the transfer, that maintains its identity in the transfer, irrespective of the agreement or the measure pursuant to which the transfer is carried out, including the usufruct or lease of the business. The provisions of the present Article shall apply also to the transfer of part of the business, understood as a functionally autonomous part of an organised economic activity, identified as such by the transferor and the transferee at the time of its transfer’.
8

Under Article 6 of Regulation No 1191/69: ‘1. Within one year of the date of the entry into force of this Regulation transport undertakings shall lodge with the competent authorities of the Member States the applications referred to in Article 4. Transport undertakings may lodge applications after the expiry of the aforementioned period if they find that the provisions of Article 4(1) are satisfied. 2. Decisions to maintain a public service obligation or part thereof, or to terminate it at the end of a specified period, shall provide for compensation to be granted in respect of the financial burdens resulting therefrom; the amount of such compensation shall be determined in accordance with the common procedures laid down in Articles 10 to 13. 3. The competent authorities of the Member States shall take decisions within one year of the date on which the application is lodged as regards obligations to operate or to carry, and within six months as regards tariff obligations. The right to compensation shall arise on the date of the decision by the competent authorities but in any event not before 1 January 1971. 4. However, if the competent authorities of the Member States consider it necessary by reason of the number and importance of the applications lodged by each undertaking, they may extend the period prescribed in the first subparagraph of paragraph 3 until 1 January 1972 at the latest. In such case, the right to compensation shall arise on that date. Where they intend to avail themselves of this power, the competent authorities of the Member States shall so inform the undertakings concerned within six months following the lodging of applications. Should any Member State meet with special difficulties, the Council may, at the request of that State and on a proposal from the Commission, authorise the State concerned to extend until 1 January 1973 the time limit indicated in the first subparagraph of this paragraph. 5. If the competent authorities have not reached a decision within the time limit laid down, the obligation in respect of which the application under Article 4(1) for termination was made shall stand terminated. 6. The Council shall, on the basis of a report submitted by the Commission before 31 December 1972, study the situation in each Member State with regard to the implementation of this Regulation.’
9

Article 93 of that regulation, headed ‘International jurisdiction’, provides: ‘1. Subject to the provisions of this Regulation as well as to any provisions of the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement applicable by virtue of Article 90, proceedings in respect of the actions and claims referred to in Article 92 shall be brought in the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled or, if he is not domiciled in any of the Member States, in which he has an establishment. 2. If the defendant is neither domiciled nor has an establishment in any of the Member States, such proceedings shall be brought in the courts of the Member State in which the plaintiff is domiciled or, if he is not domiciled in any of the Member States, in which he has an establishment. 3. If neither the defendant nor the plaintiff is so domiciled or has such an establishment, such proceedings shall be brought in the courts of the Member State where [OHIM] has its seat. … 5. Proceedings in respect of the actions and claims referred to in Article 92, with the exception of actions for a declaration of non-infringement of a Community trade mark, may also be brought in the courts of the Member State in which the act of infringement has been committed or threatened, or in which an act within the meaning of Article 9(3), second sentence, has been committed.’
Although, in order to ensure that a European Commission decision declaring an aid scheme unlawful and incompatible with the internal market and ordering the recovery of the aid in question, but not identifying the individual recipients of that aid and not determining the precise amounts to be recovered is executed, the national court is bound by that decision, it is not, by contrast, bound by the positions adopted by that institution in the execution of that decision. However, in accordance with the principle of cooperation in good faith laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, the national court must take the statements of position into account as a factor in the assessment of the dispute before it.

To the extent that the elements contained in those statements of position, as well as the Commission opinions which may be sought by the national court, are intended to facilitate the accomplishment of the task of the national authorities in the immediate and effective execution of the recovery decision and, having regard to the principle of cooperation in good faith, the national court must take them into account as a factor in the assessment of the dispute before it and must state reasons having regard to all the documents in the file submitted to it.

(see paras 31, 32, operative part 1)
According to Article 1(j) of Regulation No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems, the term ‘residence’ refers to the place where a person habitually resides.

For the purpose of determining the habitual centre of a person’s interests, the national court must take account of all the relevant criteria, in particular those identified in Article 11(1) of Regulation No 987/2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation No 883/2004, as well as, in accordance with Article 11(2) of that regulation, the intention of the person concerned as to his actual place of residence. That intention must be assessed in the light of the objective facts and circumstances of the case in the main proceedings; a mere declaration of intention to reside in a particular place is not, in itself, sufficient for the purpose of the application of Article 11(2).

The list of factors to be taken into account in determining a person’s place of residence, now codified in Article 11 of Regulation No 987/2009, is not exhaustive and does not establish any order of precedence for the various criteria set out in Article 11(1).

(see paras 43, 46, 54)
EU law must be interpreted as meaning that a provision of a collective labour agreement which sets minimum fees for self-employed service providers who are members of contracting employees’ organisations and perform for an employer, under a works or service contract, the same activity as that employer’s employed workers, falls within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU only if those service providers are ‘false self-employed’, in other words, they are in a situation comparable to that of those workers. It is for the national court to ascertain whether that is so.

Service providers such as musicians substituting for members of an orchestra, are, in principle, ‘undertakings’ within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU, for they offer their services for remuneration on a given market and perform their activities as independent economic operators in relation to their principal. That finding cannot, however, prevent such a provision of a collective labour agreement from being regarded also as the result of dialogue between management and labour if the service providers, in the name and on behalf of whom the trade union negotiated, are in fact ‘false self-employed’, that is to say, service providers in a situation comparable to that of employees. A service provider can lose his status of an independent trader, and hence of an undertaking, if he does not determine independently his own conduct on the market, but is entirely dependent on his principal, because he does not bear any of the financial or commercial risks arising out of the latter’s activity and operates as an auxiliary within the principal’s undertaking.

Moreover, the term ‘employee’ for the purpose of EU law must itself be defined according to objective criteria that characterise the employment relationship, taking into consideration the rights and responsibilities of the persons concerned. With that in mind, the classification of a ‘self-employed person’ under national law does not prevent that person being classified as an employee within the meaning of EU law if his independence is merely notional, thereby disguising an employment relationship. It follows that the status of ‘worker’ within the meaning of EU law is not affected by the fact that a person has been hired as a self-employed person under national law, as long as that persons acts under the direction of his employer as regards, in particular, his freedom to choose the time, place and content of his work, does not share in the employer’s commercial risks, and, for the duration of that relationship, forms an integral part of that employer’s undertaking, so forming an economic unit with that undertaking.

(see paras 27, 31, 33-36)
The Integrated Tariff of the European Communities established by Article 2 of Regulation No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff must be interpreted as meaning that Code 7019 59 00 10 thereof covers products comprising fabrics of glass fibres with openings of a cell size of 4 mm both in length and in width and weighing more than 35 g/m2 and intended for the field of construction.

The fact that the product covered by the customs declaration at issue in the main proceedings, while corresponding to the characteristics laid down in code 7019 59 00 10 of the Integrated Tariff of the European Communities established by Article 2 of Regulation No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff and set out in the regulations subjecting it to anti-dumping duties, does not correspond to the designation given to it in that code and those regulations as published in the language of the Member State of origin of the declarant and on which alone the latter based its declaration is not liable to entail the annulment of its tariff classification under that code made by the customs authorities on the basis of all the other language versions of that code and those regulations.

The wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or, in that regard, be made to override the other language versions, since EU provisions must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all EU languages.

(see paras 48, 53, operative part 2)
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. Border controls, asylum and immigration — Immigration policy — Status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents — Directive 2003/109 — Acquisition of long-term resident status — Condition — Family members of a long-term resident — Obligation to reside legally and continuously in the Member State concerned for five years prior to the submission of an application to acquire that status

(Council Directive 2003/109, Arts 4(1) and 7(1))

2. Border controls, asylum and immigration — Immigration policy — Status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents — Directive 2003/109 — Provisions of national legislation allowing family members to be issued with ‘long-term residents’ EU residence permits’ on terms more favourable than those laid down by that directive — Not permissible

(Council Directive 2003/109, Arts 2(e) and 13)

Summary

1. Articles 4(1) and 7(1) of Directive 2003/109 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, as amended by Directive 2011/51, must be interpreted as meaning that family members, as defined in Article 2(e) of that directive, of a person who has already acquired long-term resident status may not be exempted from the condition laid down in Article 4(1) of that directive, under which, in order to obtain that status, a third-country national must have resided legally and continuously in the Member State concerned for five years immediately prior to the submission of the relevant application.

The condition laid down in Article 4(1) of Directive 2003/109 requiring legal and continuous residence within the territory of the Member State concerned for five years prior to the submission of the relevant application is an essential condition for acquiring the long-term resident status provided for in that directive, with the result that a third-country national may apply to acquire that status, pursuant to Article 7(1) of that directive, only if he personally meets that condition.

(see paras 34, 37, operative part 1)

2. Article 13 of Directive 2003/109 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, as amended by Directive 2011/51, must be interpreted as not allowing a Member State to issue family members, as defined in Article 2(e) of that directive, with long-term residents’ EU residence permits on terms more favourable than those laid down by that directive.

As can be seen in particular from Article 2(b) of Directive 2003/109, read in conjunction with Article 14(1) thereof, a long-term resident’s EU residence permit, in principle, grants its holder the right to reside in the territory of Member States — other than the one which granted him long-term residence status — for a period exceeding three months. Therefore, residence permits which, pursuant to Article 13 of Directive 2003/109, would be issued by a Member State to family members, as defined in Article 2(e) of that directive, on terms more favourable than those laid down by EU law, cannot in any circumstances be long-term residents’ EU residence permits within the meaning of that directive.

(see paras 42-44, operative part 2)
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Limits — Question manifestly without relevance

(Art. 267 TFEU)

2. Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Indirect taxes on the raising of capital — Conversion of a capital company into a different type of capital company not involving any increase in capital — Notarial fees demanded for the drawing up of a notarial act recording that conversion — National legislation providing for the payment to the Treasury of a share of the fees charged by the notary employed as a civil servant — Unlawful

(Council Directive 69/335, Arts 4(1)(c) and (3)(a), 10(c) and 12(1)(e))

Summary

1. See the text of the decision.

(see paras 22-24)

2. Article 10(c) of Directive 69/335 concerning indirect taxes on the raising of capital must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that the Treasury is to receive a share of the fees charged by a notary employed as a civil servant when he draws up a notarial act recording a transaction concerning the conversion of a capital company into a different type of capital company, and which does not lead to an increase in the capital of the company making the acquisition or changing its legal form.

By contrast, that article does not prohibit a notary employed as a civil servant from receiving, when he draws up such attested acts, fees ultimately owed to him in so far as those fees are paid by way of fees or dues within the meaning of Article 12(1)(e) of Directive 69/335.

First, notarial fees must be classed as ‘tax’ for the purposes of Directive 69/335 where they are charged for a transaction covered by that directive by notaries who are employed as civil servants and are, at least in part, paid to the public authority employing the notaries as civil servants and used to finance the public obligations of that authority.

Secondly, since the conversion of capital companies into a different type of capital company must, under that legislation, be made by notarial act, that obligation must be regarded as a formality which is necessary for carrying on the business of the capital company thus converted. The drawing up of such notarial acts is thus a prior formality to which a capital company is subject by reason of its legal form, within the meaning of Article 10(c).

It is clear from Article 4(3)(a) of Directive 69/335 that the Member States may not charge capital duty on ‘the conversion of a capital company into a different type of capital company’. That provision necessarily concerns conversions of companies without any increase in capital. Conversion with an increase in capital is covered by Article 4(1)(c) of the directive. However, the objective pursued by Article 4(3)(a) of Directive 69/335 would be compromised if, on the conversion of a capital company into a different type of capital company, other taxes with the same effect as capital duty could be charged.

(see paras 27, 30, 33, 35-37, operative part)
Article 1(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that an action for the payment of a debt based on the provision of carriage services taken by the insolvency administrator of an insolvent undertaking in the course of insolvency proceedings opened in one Member State and taken against a service recipient established in another Member State comes under the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of that provision.

The decisive criterion adopted by the Court to identify the area within which an action falls is not the procedural context of which that action is part, but the legal basis thereof. According to that approach, it must be determined whether the right or the obligation on which the action is based finds its source in the common rules of civil and commercial law or in the derogating rules specific to insolvency proceedings.

An action for the payment of a debt arising out of the provision of services in implementation of a contract for carriage could be brought by the creditor itself before its divestment by the opening of insolvency proceedings relating to it and, in that situation, the action would be governed by the rules concerning jurisdiction applicable in civil and commercial matters. The fact that, after the opening of insolvency proceedings against a service provider, the action for payment is taken by the insolvency administrator appointed in the course of those proceedings and that the latter acts in the interest of the creditors does not substantially alter the nature of the debt relied on, which continues to be subject, in terms of the substance of the matter, to rules of law which remain unchanged. Such an action does not therefore have a direct link with the insolvency proceedings opened in relation to the applicant. Accordingly, and with it being necessary to examine whether the action is closely connected with the insolvency proceedings, such an action must be regarded as not being covered by Article 3(1) of Regulation No 1346/2000 and, following the same reasoning, as not concerning bankruptcy or winding-up for the purposes of Article 1(2)(b) of Regulation No 44/2001.

(see paras 27-32, operative part 1)