ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
18

In those circumstances, the Landesgericht Korneuburg (Regional Court, Korneuburg) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Is Article 8(3) of [Regulation No 261/2004] to be interpreted as meaning that it is applicable to two airports which are both located in the immediate vicinity of a city centre, but only one of them is located in the territory of the city and the other is located in a neighbouring federal Land? (2) Are Article 5(1)(c), Article 7(1) and Article 8(3) of [Regulation No 261/2004] to be interpreted as meaning that, in the event that a flight lands at an alternative airport of destination in the same town, city or region, there is a right to compensation owing to cancellation of the flight? (3) Are Article 6(1), Article 7(1) and Article 8(3) of [Regulation No 261/2004] to be interpreted as meaning that, in the event that a flight lands at an alternative airport in the same town, city or region, there is a right to compensation owing to a long delay? (4) Are Articles 5, 7 and Article 8(3) of [Regulation No 261/2004] to be interpreted as meaning that, in order to determine whether a passenger has suffered a loss of time equal to or in excess of three hours within the meaning of the judgment [of 19 November 2009, Sturgeon and Others (C‑402/07 and C‑432/07, EU:C:2009:716)], the delay must be calculated on the basis of the point in time at which the flight lands at the alternative airport of destination or the point in time at which the passenger is transferred to the airport of destination for which the booking was made or to another close-by destination agreed with the passenger? (5) Is Article 5(3) of [Regulation No 261/2004] to be interpreted as meaning that an air carrier which operates flights as part of a flight rotation system may rely on an incident – specifically on a reduction of the arrival rate brought about by stormy weather conditions – which occurred in relation to the flight three flights back in the rotation sequence of the flight concerned? (6) Is Article 8(3) of [Regulation No 261/2004] to be interpreted as meaning that, in the event that a flight lands at an alternative airport of destination, the air carrier must take the initiative to offer transport to a different location, or the passenger must request the transport? (7) Are Article 7(1), Article 8(3) and Article 9(1)(c) of [Regulation No 261/2004] to be interpreted as meaning that the passenger has a right to compensation owing to a breach of the obligations to provide assistance and care provided for in Articles 8 and 9?’
68

As a preliminary point, it should be recalled, as stated in paragraphs 28 and 63 of the present judgment, that, despite the answer given to the first question in paragraph 57 of this judgment, the referring court cannot, on account of Article 8:69a of the Awb, annul, at the request of an individual such as X, the requirement in the environmental licence at issue in the main proceedings on the sole ground that it is contrary to Article 5(1) of Directive 2008/68, since, according to its own findings, that provision is not intended to protect X’s interest in obtaining material protection for the residential area situated in the vicinity of the service station concerned, and that provision must consequently be regarded, at this stage, as being, in principle, legally unchallengeable by an individual such as X. That being so, the referring court states that, under the principle of Netherlands administrative law according to which a licence, even if it has become, in principle, unchallengeable by an individual such as X, may not impose any requirement in respect of which the competent authority cannot ensure compliance by the addressee by means of a subsequent decision enforcing that requirement, X may, ultimately, obtain the annulment of the requirement at issue in the context of her action brought against the licence imposing that requirement, which is also pending before the referring court, on condition of satisfying the clearness test, that is to say, as recalled in paragraph 29 of this judgment, the rule of Netherlands law according to which it must be clear, on the basis of a summary examination leaving no room for doubt, that the requirement in question could not be imposed owing to the infringement of higher-ranking rules of law.
6

Article 13 of the directive, entitled ‘Retention of the right of residence by family members in the event of divorce, annulment of marriage or termination of registered partnership’, is worded as follows: ‘1. Without prejudice to the second subparagraph, divorce, annulment of the Union citizen’s marriage or termination of his/her registered partnership, as referred to in point 2(b) of Article 2 shall not affect the right of residence of his/her family members who are nationals of a Member State. Before acquiring the right of permanent residence, the persons concerned must meet the conditions laid down in points (a), (b), (c) or (d) of Article 7(1). 2. Without prejudice to the second subparagraph, divorce, annulment of marriage or termination of the registered partnership referred to in point 2(b) of Article 2 shall not entail loss of the right of residence of a Union citizen’s family members who are not nationals of a Member State where: (a) prior to initiation of the divorce or annulment proceedings or termination of the registered partnership referred to in point 2(b) of Article 2, the marriage or registered partnership has lasted at least three years, including one year in the host Member State; … … (c) this is warranted by particularly difficult circumstances, such as having been a victim of domestic violence while the marriage or registered partnership was subsisting; … … Before acquiring the right of permanent residence, the right of residence of the persons concerned shall remain subject to the requirement that they are able to show that they are workers or self-employed persons or that they have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their period of residence and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State, or that they are members of the family, already constituted in the host Member State, of a person satisfying these requirements. “Sufficient resources” shall be as defined in Article 8(4). Such family members shall retain their right of residence exclusively on a personal basis.’
6

Article 211 of the UCC, entitled ‘Authorisation’, provides in paragraphs 1 and 2: ‘1. An authorisation from the customs authorities shall be required for the following: (a) the use of the inward or outward processing procedure, the temporary admission procedure or the end-use procedure; … The conditions under which the use of one or more of the procedures referred to in the first subparagraph … is permitted shall be set out in the authorisation. 2. The customs authorities shall grant an authorisation with retroactive effect, where all of the following conditions are fulfilled: (a) there is a proven economic need; (b) the application is not related to attempted deception; (c) the applicant has proven on the basis of accounts or records that: (i) all the requirements of the procedure are met; (ii) where appropriate, the goods can be identified for the period involved; (iii) such accounts or records allow the procedure to be controlled; (d) all the formalities necessary to regularise the situation of the goods can be carried out, including, where necessary, the invalidation of the customs declarations concerned; (e) no authorisation with retroactive effect has been granted to the applicant within three years of the date on which the application was accepted; (f) an examination of the economic conditions is not required, except where an application concerns renewal of an authorisation for the same kind of operation and goods; (g) the application does not concern the operation of storage facilities for the customs warehousing of goods; (h) where an application concerns renewal of an authorisation for the same kind of operation and goods, the application is submitted within three years of expiry of the original authorisation. …’
48

In addition, according to Hamas, the General Court rightly recalled, first, that the signature required by those provisions is intended in particular to enable third parties to satisfy themselves that acts notified to them have indeed been adopted by the institution concerned and, secondly, that it is the mere failure to authenticate an act which constitutes the infringement of an essential procedural requirement. From the point of view of third parties, the conduct of the procedure within the Council is irrelevant, the only aspect that is important being the authentication of the act that concerns them, with respect both to its reasons and to the operative part. However, in the present case, the statements of reasons relating to the acts at issue which were communicated to Hamas do not contain a signature or even a date that would enable them to be identified as acts emanating from the Council and to determine exactly when they were adopted. Furthermore, the Council has not claimed that it was impossible for it to authenticate the statements of reasons in question. Its arguments in relation to the conduct of that procedure are therefore ineffective and unfounded, and the fact that the statements of reasons communicated to Hamas are consistent with those adopted by the Council is also ineffective.
3

Recitals 2, 6, 18, 19 and 22 of Directive 2014/41 are worded as follows: ‘(2) Pursuant to Article 82(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union is to be based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions, which is, since the Tampere European Council of 15 and 16 October 1999, commonly referred to as a cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the Union. … (6) In the Stockholm Programme adopted by the European Council of 10-11 December 2009, the European Council considered that the setting up of a comprehensive system for obtaining evidence in cases with a cross-border dimension, based on the principle of mutual recognition, should be further pursued. The European Council indicated that the existing instruments in this area constituted a fragmentary regime and that a new approach was needed, based on the principle of mutual recognition, but also taking into account the flexibility of the traditional system of mutual legal assistance. The European Council therefore called for a comprehensive system to replace all the existing instruments in this area, including Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA, covering as far as possible all types of evidence, containing time limits for enforcement and limiting as far as possible the grounds for refusal. … (18) As in other mutual recognition instruments, this Directive does not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect the fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Charter. In order to make this clear, a specific provision is inserted in the text. (19) The creation of an area of freedom, security and justice within the Union is based on mutual confidence and a presumption of compliance by other Member States with Union law and, in particular, with fundamental rights. However, that presumption is rebuttable. Consequently, if there are substantial grounds for believing that the execution of an investigative measure indicated in the [European investigation order (EIO)] would result in a breach of a fundamental right of the person concerned and that the executing State would disregard its obligations concerning the protection of fundamental rights recognised in the Charter, the execution of the EIO should be refused. … (22) Legal remedies available against an EIO should be at least equal to those available in a domestic case against the investigative measure concerned. In accordance with their national law Member States should ensure the applicability of such legal remedies, including by informing in due time any interested party about the possibilities and modalities for seeking those legal remedies. In cases where objections against the EIO are submitted by an interested party in the executing State in respect of the substantive reasons for issuing the EIO, it is advisable that information about such challenge be transmitted to the issuing authority and that the interested party be informed accordingly.’
38

In those circumstances, the Tribunale di Napoli (District Court, Naples, Italy) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Does the different treatment accorded only to Catholic religious education teachers, such as the applicants [in the main proceedings], constitute discrimination on grounds of religion, within the meaning of Article 21 of the Charter … and Directive [2000/78], or does the fact that the certificate attesting to their suitability issued to these workers can be revoked constitute an adequate reason why only Catholic religious education teachers, such as the applicants [in the main proceedings], are treated differently from other teachers and are not covered by any measure precluding such treatment, as required under Clause 5 of the framework agreement …? (2) If direct discrimination is taken to have occurred, within the meaning of Article 2(2)(a) of Directive [2000/78], on grounds of religion (Article 1), and the [Charter], the Court is requested to consider what instruments are available to the referring court to eliminate the effects of such discrimination, bearing in mind that all teachers other than Catholic religious education teachers are now covered by the special recruitment plan laid down in Law No 107/2015, being granted tenure and consequently given employment contracts of indefinite duration. Should this court therefore impose an employment relationship of indefinite duration with the defendant public authorities [in the main proceedings]? (3) Must Clause 5 of the framework agreement … be interpreted as precluding a national legal provision, such as the provision at issue, under which the rules of ordinary law governing employment relationships and intended to penalise the misuse of successive fixed-term employment contracts by the automatic [transformation] of a fixed-term contract into a contract of indefinite duration where the employment relationship continues for more than a certain period of time, do not apply to the schools sector – specifically to Catholic religious education teachers – and therefore permit successive fixed-term employment contracts for an indefinite period of time? In particular, can the requirement to obtain the approval of the diocesan ordinary constitute an “objective reason” within the meaning of Clause 5(1)(a) of the framework agreement, or, instead, should such treatment be regarded as discrimination prohibited under Article 21 of the [Charter]? (4) If the answer to question 3 is in the affirmative, do Article 21 of the [Charter], Clause 4 of the framework agreement … and/or Article 1 of Directive [2000/78] permit the disapplication of provisions that preclude the automatic [transformation] of a fixed-term employment contract into an employment contract of indefinite duration where the employment relationship continues for more than a certain period of time?’
Appeals – Interest in bringing proceedings – Condition – Appeal capable of procuring an advantage for the party bringing it – Admissibility of a request for substitution of grounds amounting to a defence to one of the applicant’s pleas

(Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 56(2))

(see para. 36)
Customs union – Incurrence and recovery of a customs debt – Guarantee for the customs debt – Communication of the amounts of the duties to the debtor within a period of three years from the date on which the customs debt was incurred – Concept of a ‘debtor’ – Deposit constituting the guarantee for the customs debt – Not included – Limitation period – Applicability – None

(Council Regulation No 2913/92, as amended by Regulation No 1186/2009, Arts 195 and 221(1) and (3))

(see paras 35-38, operative part 1)
42

In the light of all the foregoing, the answer to the second question is that Articles 45 and 49 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation in which the person concerned does not hold the formal qualification attesting to his or her professional qualification as a pharmacist, within the meaning of point 5.6.2 of Annex V to Directive 2005/36, but has acquired professional competences relating to that profession both in the home Member State and in the host Member State, the competent authorities of the host Member State are obliged, when they are requested to examine an application for recognition of professional qualifications, to assess those competences and to compare them with the competences required in the host Member State in order to practice as a pharmacist. If those competences correspond to those required by the national provisions of the host Member State, the host Member State must recognise them. If that comparative examination reveals that those competences correspond only partially, the host Member State is entitled to require the person concerned to show that he or she has acquired the knowledge and qualifications which are lacking. It is for the competent national authorities to assess, as necessary, whether the knowledge acquired in the host Member State, by way of, inter alia, practical experience, is sufficient to demonstrate acquisition of the knowledge which is lacking. If that comparative examination reveals substantial differences between the training undertaken by the applicant and the training required in the host Member State, the competent authorities may set compensatory measures to remedy those differences.
5

Article 3 of that regulation, entitled ‘Safeguarding of open internet access’, states, in paragraphs 1 to 3 thereof: ‘1. End-users shall have the right to access and distribute information and content, use and provide applications and services, and use terminal equipment of their choice, irrespective of the end-user’s or provider’s location or the location, origin or destination of the information, content, application or service, via their internet access service. … 2. Agreements between providers of internet access services and end-users on commercial and technical conditions and the characteristics of internet access services such as price, data volumes or speed, and any commercial practices conducted by providers of internet access services, shall not limit the exercise of the rights of end-users laid down in paragraph 1. 3. Providers of internet access services shall treat all traffic equally, when providing internet access services, without discrimination, restriction or interference, and irrespective of the sender and receiver, the content accessed or distributed, the applications or services used or provided, or the terminal equipment used. The first subparagraph shall not prevent providers of internet access services from implementing reasonable traffic management measures. In order to be deemed to be reasonable, such measures shall be transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate, and shall not be based on commercial considerations but on objectively different technical quality of service requirements of specific categories of traffic. Such measures shall not monitor the specific content and shall not be maintained for longer than necessary. Providers of internet access services shall not engage in traffic management measures going beyond those set out in the second subparagraph, and in particular shall not block, slow down, alter, restrict, interfere with, degrade or discriminate between specific content, applications or services, or specific categories thereof, except as necessary, and only for as long as necessary, in order to: (a) comply with Union legislative acts, or national legislation that complies with Union law, to which the provider of internet access services is subject, or with measures that comply with Union law giving effect to such Union legislative acts or national legislation, including with orders by courts or public authorities vested with relevant powers; (b) preserve the integrity and security of the network, of services provided via that network, and of the terminal equipment of end-users; (c) prevent impending network congestion and mitigate the effects of exceptional or temporary network congestion, provided that equivalent categories of traffic are treated equally.’
8

Article 33 of the regulation, headed ‘Expression on a per portion basis or per consumption unit’, provides in paragraphs 1 and 2: ‘1. In the following cases, the energy value and the amounts of nutrients referred to in Article 30(1) to (5) may be expressed per portion and/or per consumption unit, easily recognisable by the consumer, provided that the portion or the unit used is quantified on the label and that the number of portions or units contained in the package is stated: (a) in addition to the form of expression per 100 g or per 100 ml referred to in Article 32(2); (b) in addition to the form of expression per 100 g or per 100 ml referred to in Article 32(3) regarding the amounts of vitamins and minerals; (c) in addition to or instead of the form of expression per 100 g or per 100 ml referred to in Article 32(4). 2. By way of derogation from Article 32(2), in the cases referred to in point (b) of Article 30(3) the amount of nutrients and/or the percentage of the reference intakes set out in Part B of Annex XIII may be expressed on the basis of per portion or per consumption unit alone. When the amounts of nutrients are expressed on the basis of per portion or per consumption unit alone in accordance with the first subparagraph, the energy value shall be expressed per 100 g or per 100 ml and on the basis of per portion or per consumption unit.’