ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
3.

In providing an answer to questions 1 and 2, is it material whether or not it is possible and reasonable for the child and its parents to take up residence in the country of which the child and the mother are nationals, the protection of which they are able to avail themselves of and which is not the same as the refugee’s (father’s) country of origin, or is it sufficient that family unity in Germany can be maintained on the basis of the rules governing the right of residence?
1.

Must Article 20(2)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in conjunction with the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the principles of non-discrimination and the equivalence of procedural measures in national judicial proceedings and Article 1[(1)](a) of Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 (1) on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters be interpreted as meaning that, where the national law of the court seised provides that the latter is to obtain, of its own motion, information regarding the defendant’s address in its own State and it is established that the defendant is in another State of the European Union, the national court seised is obliged to obtain information regarding the defendant’s address from the competent authorities of the State in which he resides?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Korneuburg (Austria) lodged on 20 April 2020 — Airhelp Limited v Austrian Airlines AG

(Case C-164/20)

(2020/C 230/22)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landesgericht Korneuburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Airhelp Limited

Respondent: Austrian Airlines AG

Question referred

Are Articles 5, 6 and 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the illness and associated unfitness to fly, as diagnosed by an airport doctor, of a passenger who has already boarded an aircraft which has not yet taken off — after which the air carrier refuses to carry that passenger, with the result that the passenger must leave the aircraft and his baggage must be unloaded — must be regarded as an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights?

(1) OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1.
Appeal brought on 11 June 2020 by European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 2 April 2020 in Case T-383/17, Hansol Paper v Commission

(Case C-260/20 P)

(2020/C 271/39)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: J.-F. Brakeland, and A. Demeneix, agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Hansol Paper Co. Ltd, European Thermal Paper Association (ETPA)

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal, reject the application at first instance and order Hansol Paper Co. Ltd to pay the costs;

or, alternatively,

— refer back the case to the General Court for reconsideration and reserve the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In the judgment under appeal the General Court annulled, to the extent that it concerns Hansol Paper Co. Ltd, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/763 of 2 May 2017 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain lightweight thermal paper originating in the Republic of Korea (1).

The Commission relies, in support of its appeal, on three grounds of appeal.

The Commission considers the General Court:

— distorted the evidence and misinterpreted the legal framework applicable to the data on which the Commission is entitled to rely in order to construct the export price under Article 2(9) of the basic regulation (2);

— misinterpreted the rules of article 2(1) and (3) of the basic regulation for the determination of the normal value in case of absence of domestic sales; and

— misinterpreted the rules of article 3 of the basic regulation when defining the undercutting margin in case of exports to the Union through related entities.

(1) OJ 2017, L 114, p. 3.

(2) Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (OJ 2016, L 176, p. 21).
Reference for a preliminary ruling from High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) (United Kingdom) made on 15 May 2020 — VA v Prosecutor of the regional prosecutor’s office in Ruse, Bulgaria

(Case C-206/20)

(2020/C 262/18)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: VA

Respondent: Prosecutor of the regional prosecutor’s office in Ruse, Bulgaria

Question referred

Where surrender is sought in order to prosecute a requested person, and where the decision to issue an underlying national arrest warrant (‘NAW’) and the decision to issue a European arrest warrant (‘EAW’) are both taken by a public prosecutor, without any involvement of a Court prior to surrender, does a requested person receive the dual level of protection envisaged by the Court in Bob-Dogi C-241/15, (ECLI:EU:C:2016:385) if:

a) the effect of the NAW is limited to detaining the individual for a maximum of 72 hours for the purpose of bringing him before a Court; and
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 3 April 2020 — FI v Eurowings GmbH

(Case C-157/20)

(2020/C 279/32)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Düsseldorf

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: FI

Defendant: Eurowings GmbH

Question referred

Does a trade union organised strike by an operating air carrier’s own staff (in this case the cabin crew) constitute an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004? (1)

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
2.

Must Article 5(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, in conjunction with the principle that the national court must guarantee procedural rights for the effective protection of rights deriving from EU law, be interpreted as meaning that a national court, which, after having issued an order for payment against a particular debtor, has established that that debtor is unlikely to be habitually resident in the State of the court and, provided that this constitutes an obstacle to the issuing of an order for payment against such a debtor under national law, is obliged to annul, of its own motion, the order for payment issued, despite the absence of an express statutory provision to that effect?
Action brought on 23 June 2020 — European Commission v Council of the European Union

(Case C-275/20)

(2020/C 279/52)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: J.-F. Brakeland, M. Afonso, D. Schaffrin, Agents)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— annul Council Decision (EU) 2020/470 (1) of 25 March 2020 as regards the extension of the period of entitlement for audiovisual co-productions as provided for in Article 5 of the Protocol on Cultural Cooperation to the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part;

— order Council to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The action for annulment brought by the Commission concerns the renewal for 3 years of an entitlement of audiovisual co-productions of producers from the EU Party and Korea to benefit from the respective schemes for the promotion of local/regional cultural content under Article 5 of the Protocol on Cultural Cooperation to the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, and the Republic of Korea.

The Commission relies, in support of its action, on one single ground.

The Commission considers that by basing its decision on Article 3(1) of Council Decision (EU) 2015/2169 (2) of 1 October 2015 on the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, and not on Article 218(6) TFEU as proposed by the Commission, the Council relied on a secondary legal basis, not provided for in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Therefore, the Council violated the principle of conferral of powers in Article 13(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the principle of institutional balance as developed in the case-law of the Court of Justice.

(1) Council Decision (EU) 2020/470 of 25 March 2020 as regards the extension of the period of entitlement for audiovisual co-productions as provided for in Article 5 of the Protocol on Cultural Cooperation to the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, OJ 2020, L 101, p. 1.

(2) Council Decision (EU) 2015/2169 of 1 October 2015 on the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, OJ 2015, L 307, p. 2.
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative:

Is the air carrier which actually operated the delayed flight on the first segment of the journey the ‘operating air carrier’ within the meaning of Article 5(1)(c) and Article 7(1) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 or is the air carrier which operated the punctual flight on the second segment of the journey, via which both flights were booked, the ‘operating air carrier’ within the meaning of Article 5(1)(c) and Article 7(1) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004?
Appeal brought on 23 July 2020 by easyJet Airline Co. Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 May 2020 in Case T-8/18, easyJet Airline v Commission

(Case C-343/20 P)

(2020/C 297/50)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: easyJet Airline Co. Ltd (represented by: J. Rivas Andrés, avocat, A. Manzaneque Valverde, abogada)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal and/or annul Commission Decision (EU) 2017/1861 (1) of 29 July 2016 on State Aid SA33983 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) (ex 2011/N) — Italy — Compensation to Sardinian airports from public service obligations (SGEI), to the extent that it concerns the appellant;

— in the alternative, set aside the judgment under appeal and refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration; and

— order the Commission to pay the costs of the present proceedings and those in first instance.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellant submits that the judgment under appeal should be set aside on the following four grounds:

First, the judgment under appeal erred in law by mixing the assessment of two conditions for the existence of State aid (state resources and advantage).

Second, the judgment under appeal erred in law by considering that the MEO test could not be applied in the present case. The General Court erred in concluding that the airport operators did not contribute significant amounts of their own funds and did not act as private market economy operators. Furthermore, the reasoning in the judgment under appeal as to the non-application of the MEO test, infringed Article 345 TFUE, the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination as well as easyJet's rights of defence.

Third, the judgment under appeal erred in law by concluding that the airport operators acted as mere intermediaries of the Region of Sardinia.

Fourth, the judgment under appeal erred in law regarding the identification of: (i) the final beneficiaries of the regional scheme; (ii) the indirect advantage; and (iii) the secondary effects of the scheme.

(1) OJ 2017, L 268, p. 1.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 28 April 2020 by Fabryki Mebli ‘Forte’ S.A. against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 27 February 2020 in Case T-159/19, Bog-Fran v EUIPO — Fabryki Mebli ‘Forte’

(Case C-183/20 P)

(2020/C 287/42)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Fabryki Mebli ‘Forte’ S.A. (represented by: H. Basiński, adwokat)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Bog-Fran sp. z o.o. sp.k

By order of 16 July 2020, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) decided that the appeal should not be allowed to proceed and ordered Fabryki Mebli ‘Forte’ S.A. to bear its own costs.
2.

If the first question is answered in the affirmative, is Article 36(1) of Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002 concerning life assurance, in conjunction with points 11 and 12 of Annex III(A) thereto, to be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of a legal relationship such as that set out in the first question, the obligation to provide information on the characteristics of the capital assets that are associated with the unit-linked fund also means that the consumer, the assured person, must be informed in a comprehensive and comprehensible manner of all the risks, and their kind and scale, associated with investment in a unit-linked asset (such as structured bonds or derivatives), or is it, for the purposes of the provision cited, sufficient to provide him with just basic information on the principal kinds of risk associated with investing monies by means of a unit-linked fund?
2.

If the correct answer to the first question is (a): does it follow from the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning non-business purposes within the meaning of Article 6(2) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes (judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 12 February 2009 in VNLTO – C-515/07, EU:C:2009:88) that, in the case of a taxable person who a) on the one hand, pursues an economic activity and, in so doing, provides services for consideration within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes, and b) on the other hand, pursues at the same time an activity which is incumbent upon him in the exercise of public authority (an activity he carries on in an official capacity) and in respect of which he is not considered to be a taxable person, in accordance with Article 4(5) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes, a service falling within the sphere of his economic activity which he provides free of charge for a purpose falling within the sphere of the activity he carries on in an official capacity is not subject to tax, in accordance with Article 6(2)(b) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes?
1.

Must Article 168 and related provisions of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, (1) the principle of tax neutrality arising from that directive, and the associated case-law of the Court of Justice be interpreted as not allowing a trader to deduct input VAT where, under the reverse charging of VAT, known in EU law as the reverse charge procedure, the documentary evidence (invoice) issued by that trader for the goods he or she has purchased states a fictitious supplier, although it is not disputed that the trader in question did actually make the purchase and used the purchased materials in the course of his or her trade or business?
Is it relevant whether the specific strike was triggered by certain conduct of the operating air carrier during the negotiations with the trade union?

By order of the President of the Court of Justice of 7 August 2020, the case was removed from the register of the Court.
2.

If the aforementioned consent to ship waste is to be regarded as a supplier selection criterion (suitability to pursue the professional activity), are the principles of transparency and fair competition laid down in the first and second subparagraphs of Article 18(1) of Directive 2014/24, point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 58(1) and the second subparagraph of Article 58(2) of that directive, the free movement of persons, goods and services enshrined in Article 26(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Articles 7 to 9 of Regulation No 1013/2006 (together or separately but without limitation thereto) to be interpreted and applied in such a way that conditions for the public procurement of waste management services, especially concerning closing dates for the submission of tenders, must create for domestic or foreign suppliers seeking to transport waste across the borders of the Member States of the European Union conditions enabling unrestricted participation in such procurement procedures, and they must inter alia be allowed to produce the aforementioned consent if it has been granted on a later date than the closing date for the submission of tenders?
Appeal brought on 8 April 2020 by WV against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) made on 29 January 2020 in Case T-388/18, WV v EEAS

(Case C-172/20 P)

(2020/C 320/07)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: WV (represented by: É. Boigelot, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European External Action Service (EEAS)

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— Set aside the order of 29 January 2020 of the General Court of the European Union in Case T-388/18, in so far as it dismissed the present appellant’s initial action for annulment as inadmissible and ordered the appellant to pay the costs;

— Order the original defendant to pay all of the costs, including the costs incurred before the General Court of the European Union, in accordance with Article 184 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Union;

— Refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union in order for it to rule on the action.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant submits that, in issuing the order under appeal, the General Court failed to have regard to the principle of unfettered evaluation of evidence and the concept of a body of consistent evidence and, therefore, failed to have regard to the rules relating to the burden of proof, in particular as regards the arguments and evidence submitted concerning the calculation of the time available to the appellant for the purposes of contesting the decision of the EEAS.

The single ground of appeal raised by the appellant also alleges discrimination, distortion of the facts by the order under appeal and manifest errors of assessment made by the General Court resulting in imprecise legal reasoning.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 7 August 2020 — Peek & Cloppenburg KG, represented by Peek & Cloppenburg Düsseldorf Komplementär B.V. v Peek & Cloppenburg KG, represented by Van Graaf Management GmbH

(Case C-371/20)

(2020/C 348/13)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant on a point of law: Peek & Cloppenburg KG, represented by the personally liable partner Peek & Cloppenburg Düsseldorf Komplementär B.V.

Respondent in the appeal on a point of law: Peek & Cloppenburg KG, represented by the personally liable partner Van Graaf Management GmbH

Questions referred

1. Is there a ‘payment’ for product promotion within the meaning of the first sentence of point 11 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29/EC ( 1 ) only in the case where monetary consideration is provided for the use of editorial content in the media to promote a product, or does the term ‘payment’ cover every kind of consideration, irrespective of whether this consists of money, goods, services or assets of any other kind?

2. Does the first sentence of point 11 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29/EC presuppose that the trader provides the media operator with a non-cash benefit as consideration for the use of editorial content and, if so, must such consideration also be assumed to be present in the case where the media operator reports on an advertisement organised in conjunction with a trader, where that trader has made image rights available to the media operator for the purposes of that report, both undertakings have contributed towards the costs and effort associated with that advertisement and the advertisement serves to promote sales of the products of both undertakings?

(1) Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive) (OJ 2005 L 149, p. 22).
2.

If the answer to Question 1 is that it is not permissible to refuse family reunification: What requirements are to be imposed in terms of a real family relationship within the meaning of Article 16(1)(b) of Directive 2003/86/EC in cases of subsequent immigration of parents to join a refugee who comes of age before a decision is adopted on the application for entry and residence for the purposes of family reunification? In particular: (a) Does a first-degree relationship in the direct ascending line suffice (Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86/EC) or is a real family life also necessary? (b) If a real family life is also necessary: How close must it be? For example, do occasional or regular visits suffice, must the family cohabit in a single household or must they also be part of a support unit whose members are reliant upon one another? (c) For the subsequent immigration of parents who are still in a third country and who have submitted an application for family reunification to join a child with recognised refugee status who has since come of age, must there be the expectation that, following their entry, family life will be (re-)established in the Member State in the manner required in Question 2(b)?