ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
5

Article 16 of Regulation No 1290/2013 concerns the evaluation review procedure. It reads as follows: ‘1. The Commission or the relevant funding body shall provide a transparent evaluation review procedure for applicants which consider that the evaluation of their proposal has not been carried out in accordance with the procedures set out in this Regulation, the relevant work programme, work plan or the call for proposals. 2. A request for review shall relate to a specific proposal, and shall be submitted by the coordinator of the proposal within 30 days of the date on which the Commission or the relevant funding body informs the coordinator of the evaluation results. 3. The Commission or the relevant funding body shall be responsible for the examination of the request referred to in paragraph 2. The examination shall cover only the procedural aspects of the evaluation, and not the merits of the proposal. 4. An evaluation review committee composed of Commission staff or of staff of the relevant funding body shall provide an opinion on the procedural aspects of the evaluation process. It shall be chaired by an official of the Commission or of the relevant funding body, from a department other than that responsible for the call for proposals. The committee may recommend one of the following: (a) re-evaluation of the proposal primarily by evaluators not involved in the previous evaluation; (b) confirmation of the initial evaluation. 5. On the basis of the recommendation referred to in paragraph 4, a decision shall be taken by the Commission or the relevant funding body and notified to the coordinator of the proposal. The Commission or the relevant funding body shall take such decision without undue delay. 6. The review procedure shall not delay the selection process of proposals which are not the subject of requests for review. 7. The review procedure shall not preclude any other actions the participant may take in accordance with Union law.’
109

Supported by the French Republic, the applicant claims that the commitments accepted by the Commission do not address the competition concerns expressed in its preliminary assessment. In particular, the object of the contested decision was to examine the agreements between Paramount and Sky on the distribution of audiovisual works in the United Kingdom and in Ireland. However, the Commission made commitments binding that related to the whole of the EEA and did so without examining the legal and economic context of the agreements entered into by Paramount, for the one part, and broadcasters other than Sky active in the EEA, for the other part. In proceeding from the premiss that any preliminary analysis relating to the market in the United Kingdom and in Ireland could be implicitly extrapolated to the French market, which was not the subject of an analysis the Commission made a manifest error of assessment entailing an error of law. What is more, the Commission imposed the same consequences on Sky and on the applicant, although those two broadcasters did not enjoy the same procedural rights, which entailed a breach of the applicant’s rights of defence. The Commission’s approach would become even more paradoxical after the departure of the United Kingdom from the EEA, since the commitments made binding would apply solely in markets which have not been the subject of any preliminary analysis by the Commission.
174

As regards the 45% share of that net profit margin that ought to have been received by the applicant, the Commission objects that the applicant has produced no written agreement to that effect with the members of the consortium, that in the table evaluating the damage linked with the loss of the procurement at issue that share is accompanied by the abbreviation ‘TBC’ and that it seems disproportionate, since, when added to the management commission, it would have resulted in the applicant’s receiving 67% of the net profit margin expected when the procurement at issue was carried out, leaving the other four members of the consortium with only the remaining 33% of that margin to share among them. In that regard, it should be observed that the only admissible evidence which the applicant has adduced does not show the key for allocating the net profit margin on which the members of the consortium agreed in the event that the procurement at issue should be awarded to them. Nor does the applicant dispute that the abbreviation ‘TBC’, in the table evaluating the damage linked with the loss of the procurement at issue, showed that the allocation key mentioned remained ‘to be confirmed’ when the contract had been formally signed. Since the applicant was necessarily entitled, on the same basis as the other members of the consortium, to a share of the net profit margin expected when the procurement at issue was carried out, but since it has not succeeded, in the present case, in establishing that its share ought to have been greater than that of the other members of the consortium and, more particularly, since it would have been equivalent to 45% of that margin, the Court considers that, on a fair assessment of the applicant’s rights to compensation, that share will be fixed at 20%, which corresponds to an allocation in equal shares of the expected net profit margin among the five members of the consortium.
80

It suffices to note that, in accordance with the case-law, the conditions governing admissibility of an action for annulment cannot be set aside on the basis of the applicant’s interpretation of the right to effective judicial protection. In relation specifically to the subject matter of these proceedings, it has been held that an individual who is not directly and individually concerned by a Commission decision relating to State aid and whose interests consequently could not be affected by the State measure covered by that decision cannot invoke the right to judicial protection in relation to that decision (judgment of 22 November 2007, Sniace v Commission, C‑260/05 P, EU:C:2007:700, paragraphs 64 and 65). However, it follows from the information set out above that it is precisely one of those two conditions which is not satisfied in the present case, since the applicant has not established that it was individually concerned by the contested decision. In view of the fact that the present case and the case giving rise to the judgment of 25 June 1998, British Airways and Others v Commission (T‑371/94 and T‑394/94, EU:T:1998:140) do not relate to identical or even similar measures, the applicant is not justified in claiming that dismissal of the present action as inadmissible would adversely affect its right to effective judicial protection.
Agriculture — Financing by the EAGF — Principles — Member States’ duty of diligence in recovering amounts irregularly paid — Scope — Court proceedings which must be initiated in order to recover those sums — No obligation to systematically exhaust all internal appeal procedures regardless of the particular circumstances of the case

(Art. 4(3) TEU; European Parliament and Council Regulation No 1306/2013, Art. 58(1); Council Regulation No 1290/2005, Art. 9(1))

(see paras 79, 82-84, 90)
Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 7 July 2021 –

HM v Commission

(Case T‑587/16 RENV)

(Civil service – Officials – Recruitment – Competition notice EPSO/AST-SC/03/15 – Refusal to allow participation in the assessment tests – Request for review – Refusal to forward that request to the selection board for the open competition on the grounds that it was out of time – Division of competences between EPSO and the competition selection board – Interest in bringing proceedings)

1. Judicial proceedings – Judgment of the Court of Justice binding the General Court – Conditions – Reference back following an appeal – Points of law finally determined by the Court of Justice in the context of the appeal – Res judicata – Scope (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 61; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 215) (see para. 38)

2. Judicial proceedings – Time limit for producing evidence – Article 85(2) and (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court – Scope – Evidence in rebuttal and the amplification of evidence – Not included – Submission of evidence before the oral part of the procedure is closed – Whether permissible – Conditions (Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Arts 85(1) to (3) and 92(7)) (see paras 55, 60, 61, 64, 66-69)

3. Actions brought by officials – Time limits – Complaint lodged out of time – Burden of proof (Staff Regulations of Officials, Art. 91(3)) (see paras 88-90, 92, 102, 109, 110, 117, 123)

Re:

Application on the basis of Article 270 TFEU for the annulment of the decision of the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) of 17 August 2015 not to take into account the request for review of the decision of the selection board not to allow the applicant to participate in the next stage of Competition EPSO/AST-SC/03/15-3.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Annuls the decision of the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) of 17 August 2015 not to take into account the request for review of the decision of the selection board not to allow the applicant to participate in the next stage of Competition EPSO/AST-SC/03/15-3;
EU trade mark—Surrender, revocation and invalidity—Absolute grounds for invalidity—Registration contrary to Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation No 207/2009—Word mark HP

(Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 7(1)(b) and (c) and 52(1)(a))

(see paras 32, 46)
Judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) of 31 January 2018 — Weber-Stephen Products v EUIPO (iGrill)

(Case T‑35/17)

(EU trade mark — International registration designating the European Union — Word mark iGrill — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

1. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service—Aim—Need to preserve availability (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 14)

2. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service—Meaning (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 15-17, 32)

3. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service—Assessment of the descriptive nature of a sign—Criteria (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 18)

4. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service—Word mark iGrill (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 20-23, 33, 34, 37, 38)

5. EU trade mark—Decisions of the Office—Principle of equal treatment—Principle of sound administration—EUIPO’s previous decision-making practice—Principle of legality—Need for a strict and complete examination in each particular case (Council Regulation No 207/2009) (see para. 36)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 4 November 2016 (Case R 538/2016–2), relating to the international registration designating the European Union of the word mark iGrill.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 23 April 2018 — Genomic Health v EUIPO (ONCOTYPE DX GENOMIC PROSTATE SCORE)

(Case T‑354/17)

(EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark ONCOTYPE DX GENOMIC PROSTATE SCORE — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptiveness — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Equal treatment)

1. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service—Aim—Need to preserve availability—Scope of the examination (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 23)

2. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service—Meaning (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 24)

3. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service—Assessment of the descriptive nature of a sign—Criteria (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 25, 29)

4. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service—Word mark ONCOTYPE DX GENOMIC PROSTATE SCORE (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 27, 32-39)

5. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks devoid of any distinctive character—Trade mark made up of several elements—Possible for the competent authority to examine each of the elements making up the trade mark—Scope of protection of the mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 28, 30, 31)

6. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Refusal of registration based on one of the absolute grounds for refusal set out in Article 7(1) of Regulation No 207/2009—Whether sufficient (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)) (see para. 42)

7. EU trade mark—Decisions of the Office—Legality—Examination by the EU judicature (Council Regulation No 207/2009) (see para. 46)

8. EU trade mark—Decisions of the Office—Principle of equal treatment—Principle of sound administration—EUIPO’s previous decision-making practice—Principle of legality—Need for a strict and complete examination in each particular case (Council Regulation No 207/2009) (see paras 47-49)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 February 2017 (Case R 1682/2016-5), concerning an application for registration of the word sign ONCOTYPE DX GENOMIC PROSTATE SCORE as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) of 26 April 2018 –

Pfalzmarkt für Obst und Gemüse v EUIPO (100% Pfalz)

(Case T‑220/17)

(European Union trade mark — Application for EU figurative mark 100% Pfalz — Absolute ground for refusal — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Obligation to state reasons — Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 94 of Regulation 2017/1001))

1. EU trade mark—Procedural provisions—Statement of reasons for decisions—Scope (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 75, first sentence) (see para. 13)

2. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service—Aim—Need to preserve availability (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 20)

3. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service—Meaning (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 21, 22, 24)

4. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service—Assessment of the descriptive nature of a sign—Geographical names (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 23)

5. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service—Criteria (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 29)

6. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service—Figurative mark 100% Pfalz (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 30, 31, 36)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 7 February 2017 (Case R 1549/2016-1) concerning an application for registration of the figurative sign 100% Pfalz as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) of 18 May 2018 –

Italytrade v EUIPO — Tpresso (teaespresso)

(Case T‑68/17)

(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for the EU word mark teaespresso — Earlier international figurative mark TPresso and earlier international word mark TPRESSO — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

1. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 18, 19, 58)

2. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Similarity of the marks concerned—Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 22, 28, 29)

3. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Word mark teaespresso—Figurative marks TPresso and word mark TPRESSO (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 30-34, 40-47, 56, 65, 69, 70)

4. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Similarity of the marks concerned—Breakdown of a word sign into word elements having concrete significance (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 53)

5. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Weak distinctive character of the earlier mark—Effect (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 67)

6. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Weighing elements of similarity or difference between the signs—Taking into account of the intrinsic characteristics of the signs or the conditions in which the goods or services are marketed (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 68)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 29 November 2016 (Case R 1099/2016-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Tpresso and Italytrade.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
EU trade mark—Appeals procedure—Appeal against a decision of the Opposition Division of EUIPO—Decision of the Board of Appeal going beyond the subject-matter of the opposition—Unlawfulness

(Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 42(5), first sentence, 64(1), first sentence, and 76(1))

(see para. 20)
Judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) of 14 June 2018 –

Lion’s Head Global Partners v EUIPO — Lion Capital (LION’S HEAD global partners)

(Case T‑310/17)

(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — International registration designating the European Union — Figurative mark LION’S HEAD global partners — Earlier EU word mark LION CAPITAL — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

1. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 16)

2. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Similarity of the marks concerned—Assessment of the distinctiveness of an element composing a trade mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 17, 18)

3. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Similarity of the marks concerned—Criteria for assessment—Composite mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 19)

4. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Similarity of the marks concerned—Visual similarity between a figurative mark and a word mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 24)

5. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Figurative mark LION’S HEAD and word mark LION CAPITAL (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 27-29, 31, 32, 40, 42, 45, 46)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 28 February 2017 (Case R 1477/2016 4), relating to opposition proceedings between Lion Capital and Lion’s Head Global Partners.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;