ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
In the context of the European Union’s distribution of powers, the choice of the legal basis for a measure must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review, which include the aim and content of that measure. If examination of that measure reveals that it pursues a twofold purpose or that it has a twofold component and if one of those is identifiable as the main or predominant purpose or component, whereas the other is merely incidental, that measure must be based on a single legal basis, namely, that required by the main or predominant purpose or component.

In that regard, Decision 2011/853 on the signing, on behalf of the Union, of the European Convention on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access primarily pursues an objective that has a specific connection to the common commercial policy, which means that, for the purposes of the adoption of that decision, Article 207(4) TFEU, together with Article 218(5) TFEU, must be cited as the legal basis and which also means that the signing of the Convention on behalf of the European Union falls within the exclusive competence of the European Union, pursuant to Article 3(1)(e) TFEU. By contrast, the improvement of the conditions for the functioning of the internal market is an ancillary objective of that decision that provides no justification for its adoption on the basis of Article 114 TFEU.

An EU act falls within the common commercial policy if it relates specifically to international trade in that it is essentially intended to promote, facilitate or govern trade and has direct and immediate effects on trade. It follows that only those acts of the European Union with a specific link to international trade are capable of falling within the field of the common commercial policy. In that regard, while Directive 98/84 on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access is intended to ensure adequate legal protection at EU level for the services concerned in order to promote trade in those services within the internal market, Decision 2011/853, by authorising the signing of the Convention on behalf of the European Union, is intended to introduce similar protection in European non-member countries, in order to promote the supply of such services to those States by EU service providers. That objective, which can be seen from the recitals to that decision, read in conjunction with the Convention, to be the primary objective of that decision, therefore has a specific connection with international trade in those services, by dint of which it can legitimately be linked to the common commercial policy.

(see paras 52, 53, 57, 58, 64, 65, 76)
Case C‑196/12

European Commission

v

Council of the European Union

‛Action for failure to act — Annual adjustment of the remuneration and pensions of officials and other servants of the European Union — Staff Regulations — Adjustment of correction coefficients — Council decision — Refusal to adopt the Commission’s proposal — Failure to act — Inadmissibility’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 19 November 2013

Action for failure to act — Failure to act — Meaning — Failure to act — Measure not providing satisfaction — Council Decision rejecting a proposal for a regulation — Not included

(Art. 265 TFEU)

An action for failure to act is based on the premise that unlawful inaction on the part of an institution makes it possible, particularly for other institutions, to bring an action before the Court seeking a declaration that the failure to act is contrary to the FEU Treaty. Article 265 TFEU covers a failure to take a decision or to define a position, and not the adoption of a measure different from that sought or considered necessary by the applicant.

In that regard, a decision formally adopted by the Council rejecting a Commission proposal for a regulation, which is an act against which an action can be brought under Article 263 TFEU and which was published in series L of the Official Journal of the European Union, the series which contains EU legislation, is a definition of a position for the purposes of Article 265 TFEU.

(see paras 22-26)

Case C‑196/12

European Commission

v

Council of the European Union

‛Action for failure to act — Annual adjustment of the remuneration and pensions of officials and other servants of the European Union — Staff Regulations — Adjustment of correction coefficients — Council decision — Refusal to adopt the Commission’s proposal — Failure to act — Inadmissibility’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 19 November 2013

Action for failure to act — Failure to act — Meaning — Failure to act — Measure not providing satisfaction — Council Decision rejecting a proposal for a regulation — Not included

(Art. 265 TFEU)

An action for failure to act is based on the premise that unlawful inaction on the part of an institution makes it possible, particularly for other institutions, to bring an action before the Court seeking a declaration that the failure to act is contrary to the FEU Treaty. Article 265 TFEU covers a failure to take a decision or to define a position, and not the adoption of a measure different from that sought or considered necessary by the applicant.

In that regard, a decision formally adopted by the Council rejecting a Commission proposal for a regulation, which is an act against which an action can be brought under Article 263 TFEU and which was published in series L of the Official Journal of the European Union, the series which contains EU legislation, is a definition of a position for the purposes of Article 265 TFEU.

(see paras 22-26)
Article 12(a) of Directive 95/46 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as not precluding the levying of fees in respect of the communication of personal data by a public authority, so long as they are not excessive.

It is for any Member State which requires payment of a fee from individuals exercising the right to access the data referred to in Article 12(a) of Directive 95/46 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data to fix that fee at a level which constitutes a fair balance between, on the one hand, the interest of the data subject in protecting his privacy, in particular through his right to have the data communicated to him in an intelligible form, so that he is able, if necessary, to exercise his rights to rectification, erasure and blocking of the data (in the event that the processing of the data does not comply with the directive) and his rights to object and to bring legal proceedings and, on the other, the burden which the obligation to communicate such data represents for the controller.

Moreover, for the purposes of applying Article 12(a) of Directive 95/46, where a national public authority levies a fee on an individual exercising the right to access personal data relating to him, the level of that fee should not exceed the cost of communicating such data. That upper limit does not prevent the Member States from fixing such fees at a lower level in order to ensure that all individuals retain an effective right to access such data.

Accordingly, Article 12(a) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to ensure that fees levied when the right to access personal data is exercised are not excessive for the purposes of that provision, the level of those fees must not exceed the cost of communicating such data. It is for the national court to carry out any verifications necessary, having regard to the circumstances of the case.

(see paras 28, 30, 31, operative part 2)
Article 16(2) of Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States must be interpreted as meaning that the periods of imprisonment in the host Member State of a third-country national, who is a family member of a Union citizen who has acquired the right of permanent residence in that Member State during those periods, cannot be taken into consideration in the context of the acquisition by that national of the right of permanent residence for the purposes of that provision.

The acquisition, in accordance with Article 16(2) of Directive 2004/38, of the right of permanent residence of family members of a Union citizen who are not nationals of a Member State is dependent, in any event, not only on the fact that the Union citizen himself satisfies the conditions laid down in Article 16(1) of that directive, but also on the fact that those family members have resided legally and continuously ‘with’ that citizen for the period in question, the word ‘with’ reinforcing the condition that those family members must accompany or join that same citizen.

The EU legislature made the acquisition of the right of permanent residence pursuant to Article 16(1) of Directive 2004/38 subject to the integration of the citizen of the Union in the host Member State.

Such integration, which is a precondition of the acquisition of the right of permanent residence is based not only on territorial and temporal factors but also on qualitative elements, relating to the level of integration in the host Member State.

The imposition of a prison sentence by the national court is such as to show the non-compliance by the person concerned with the values expressed by the society of the host Member State in its criminal law, with the result that the taking into consideration of periods of imprisonment for the purposes of the acquisition by family members of a Union citizen who are not nationals of a Member State of the right of permanent residence for the purposes of Article 16(2) of Directive 2004/38 would clearly be contrary to the aim pursued by that directive in establishing that right of residence.

(see paras 23-27, operative part 1)
The concept of a regulatory act which does not entail implementing measures, within the meaning of the final limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, is to be interpreted in the light of that provision’s objective, which, as is clear from its origin, consists in preventing an individual from being obliged to infringe the law in order to have access to a court. Where a regulatory act directly affects the legal situation of a natural or legal person without requiring implementing measures, that person could be denied effective judicial protection if he did not have a direct legal remedy before the European Union judicature for the purpose of challenging the legality of the regulatory act.

In this regard, first, where a regulatory act entails implementing measures, judicial review of compliance with the European Union legal order is ensured irrespective of whether those measures are adopted by the European Union or the Member States. Natural or legal persons who are unable, because of the conditions governing admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, to challenge a regulatory act of the European Union directly before the European Union judicature are protected against the application to them of such an act by the ability to challenge the implementing measures which the act entails. Where responsibility for the implementation of such acts lies with the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union, natural or legal persons are entitled to bring a direct action before the European Union judicature against the implementing acts under the conditions stated in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, and to plead in support of that action, pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, the illegality of the basic act at issue. Where that implementation is a matter for the Member States, those persons may plead the invalidity of the basic act at issue before the national courts and tribunals and cause the latter to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice, pursuant to Article 267 TFEU.

Second, the question whether a regulatory act entails implementing measures should be assessed by reference to the position of the person pleading the right to bring proceedings under the final limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. It is therefore irrelevant whether the act in question entails implementing measures with regard to other persons.

Third, in order to determine whether the measure being challenged entails implementing measures, reference should be made exclusively to the subject-matter of the action and, where an applicant seeks only the partial annulment of an act, it is solely any implementing measures which that part of the act may entail that must, as the case may be, be taken into consideration.

(see paras 27-31, 56-58)
Article 49 TFEU cannot be applied to activities which have no factor linking them with any of the situations governed by EU law and which are confined in all relevant respects within a single Member State. Where a dispute is of a local nature and all the facts are confined within a single Member State, it cannot be presumed that the legislation at issue will have any cross-border impact. It is true that the Court’s answer to questions concerning fundamental freedoms of the European Union may, even in a purely internal situation, nevertheless be of use to the referring court, especially if its national law were to require it to allow a national to enjoy the same rights as those which a national of another Member State would derive from EU law in the same situation.

However, a situation in which the applicants, who hold authorisations to operate a car and driver hire service which have been issued by one municipality, appear to be attempting to gain access, under conditions other than those being applied to them, to the territory of another municipality, not in order to pursue that activity on a stable and continuous basis from there, but with a view to pursuing that activity on a more ad hoc basis from other territories, falls by nature to be measured, not against the freedom of establishment, but — prima facie — against the freedom to provide services. However, pursuant to Article 58 TFEU, the freedom to provide services in the transport sector is not governed by Article 56 TFEU, but rather by Title VI in Part Three of the TFEU, which concerns the common transport policy. Moreover, car and driver hire services do not, in essence, fall within the scope of the provisions adopted, on the basis of Article 91(1) TFEU, in order to liberalise transport services. It follows that the interpretation of Article 49 TFEU has no bearing on the facts and purpose of the dispute.

(see paras 36-44, operative part)
Article 57 of Fourth Directive 78/660, based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty, on the annual accounts of certain types of companies must be interpreted as precluding the national legislation of a Member State which exempts a subsidiary undertaking governed by the law of that State from the provisions of that directive concerning the content, auditing and publication of annual accounts only if the parent company is also governed by the law of that State.

By using the words ‘the laws of a Member State’, Article 57(a) of Directive 78/660 unequivocally indicates that, for the purpose of the application of the exemption provided for in Article 57, the parent undertaking may be governed by the law of any Member State of the European Union and does not have to be governed by the law of the Member State of the subsidiary undertaking seeking to rely on that exemption. That interpretation of those words is borne out by the fact that, unlike that reference to the parent undertaking, the introductory part of that article states that Member States may exempt subsidiary undertakings ‘governed by their national law’.

Moreover, where a Member State opts for that exemption, it cannot introduce, in the conditions for the application of the exemption, a difference of treatment between parent undertakings established in that State and parent undertakings established in another Member State.

(see paras 25-27, 30, operative part)
The Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of the Philippines, of the other part, falls within development cooperation policy in that it contributes to furthering, in particular, pursuit of the objectives referred to in Articles 21(2)(d) TEU and 208(1) TFEU. The provisions of that framework agreement relating to readmission of nationals of the contracting parties, to transport and to the environment do not contain obligations so extensive that they may be considered to constitute objectives distinct from those of development cooperation that are neither secondary nor indirect in relation to the latter objectives.

European Union policy in the field of development cooperation is not limited to measures directly aimed at the eradication of poverty under Article 208 TFEU, but also pursues the objectives referred to in Article 21(2) TEU, such as the objective, set out in Article 21(2)(d), of fostering the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty. As the eradication of poverty has many aspects, achievement of those objectives requires — according to paragraph 12 of the statement on European Union development policy: ‘The European Consensus’ — the implementation of many development activities. Migration (including the fight against illegal migration), transport and the environment are integrated into the development policy defined in the European Consensus.

This broad notion of development cooperation has in particular been given concrete expression by the adoption of Regulation No 1905/2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation, which, in order to support pursuit of the same objectives, provides for implementation of European Union assistance by means of geographic and thematic programmes involving numerous aspects.

(see paras 37, 42, 43, 47, 49, 59)
Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 19 December 2013 — Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v Commission

(Case C‑586/12 P)

‛Appeal — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Netherlands market in road pavement bitumen — Fixing of the gross price of road pavement bitumen — Fixing of a rebate for road builders — Evidence — Principle of equal treatment — Unlimited jurisdiction — Proportionality of the fine — Review by the Court’

1. Appeals — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see para. 26)

2. Appeals — Jurisdiction of the Court — Whether it may review, on grounds of fairness, the assessment by the General Court in regard to the amount of the fines imposed on undertakings which have infringed the competition rules of the Treaty — Not included (Art. 261 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 31) (see paras 32, 33)

Re:

Appeal brought against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 27 September 2012 in Case T‑357/06 Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v Commission, by which the General Court dismissed an action, principally, for annulment of Commission Decision C(2006) 4090 final of 13 September 2006 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 [EC] (Case COMP/F/38.456 — Bitumen (Netherlands)), in so far as it concerns the applicant, and, in the alternative, for reduction of the fine imposed on the applicant by that decision.

Operative part:

The Court:

1. Dismisses the appeal;
Keywords

Subject of the case

Operative part



Keywords

Judicial proceedings — Application devoid of purpose — No need to adjudicate — Order delivered without a judge being designated to act as Advocate General — Lawfulness (General Court Rules of Procedure, Arts 113 and 114(4)) (see para. 36)

2. Judicial proceedings — Application devoid of purpose — No need to adjudicate — Possibility of giving judgment without an oral procedure — Obligation to request the parties to submit observations (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47; General Court Rules of Procedure, Arts 113 and 114(3)) (see paras 40-42)

3. Actions for annulment — Interest in bringing proceedings — Interest to be assessed at the time at which an action is brought — Action brought against an act imposing restrictive measures on the applicant — Repeal of the contested act during the proceedings — Declaration that there is no need to adjudicate — Not permissible — Continued interest on the part of the applicant in obtaining recognition that the contested act was unlawful (Arts 263 TFEU and 266 TFEU; Council Regulation No 881/2002, as amended by Commission Regulation No 954/2009; Commission Regulation No 1081/2011) (see paras 59, 63, 68-70, 76, 77, 79)

Subject of the case

Re:

Appeal against the order of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 31 January 2012 in Case T-527/09 Chafiq Ayadi v European Commission , by which the General Court held that there was no longer any need to adjudicate on an action seeking the annulment in part of Commission Regulation (EC) No 954/2009 of 13 October 2009 amending for the 114th time Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban (OJ 2009 L 269, p. 20) — Removal of the interested party from the list of persons and entities concerned.

Operative part

Operative part:

The Court:

1. Sets aside the order of the General Court of the European Union of 31 January 2012 in Case T-527/09 Ayadi v Commission in so far as the order decides that there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action for annulment brought before the General Court by Mr Chafiq Ayadi.

2. Refers the case back to the General Court of the European Union for it to rule again on Mr Chafiq Ayadi’s action for annulment.

3. Reserves the costs.
Article 17(2)(f) of Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that, in order for the dispatch or transport of goods not to be classified as a transfer to another Member State, those goods, after the work on them has been carried out in the Member State in which dispatch or transport of the goods ends, must necessarily be returned to the taxable person in the Member State from which they were initially dispatched or transported.

It is only where the transfer of goods to another Member State is carried out not for the purpose of final consumption of the goods in that Member State, but for the purpose of the processing of those goods followed by their return to the Member State of origin, that such a transfer is not to be classified as an intra-Community supply.

Accordingly, the return of the goods to the taxable person in the Member State from which the goods were initially dispatched or transported must be considered a necessary condition for the application of Article 17(2)(f) of Directive 2006/112.

(see paras 30-32, operative part)