ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
16

In the version adopted in 2007, the HS Explanatory Notes relating to heading 8521 were drafted as follows: ‘(A) RECORDING AND COMBINED RECORDING AND REPRODUCING APPARATUS These are apparatus which, when connected to a television camera or a television receiver, record on media electric impulses (analogue signals) or analogue signals converted into digital code (or a combination of these) which correspond to the images and sound captured by a television camera or received by a television receiver. Generally the images and sound are recorded on the same media. The method of recording can be by magnetic or optical means and the recording media is usually tapes or discs. The heading also includes apparatus which record, generally on a magnetic disc, digital code representing video images and sound, by transferring the digital code from an automatic data processing machine (e.g., digital video recorders). In magnetic recording on tape the images and sound are recorded on different tracks on the tape whereas in magnetic recording on disc the images and sound are recorded as magnetic patterns or spots in spiral tracks on the surface of the disc. In optical recording, digital data representing the images and sound are encoded by a laser onto a disc. Video recording apparatus which receive signals from a television receiver also incorporate a tuner which enables selection of the desired signal (or channel) from the frequency band of signals transmitted by the television transmitting station. When used for reproduction, the apparatus convert the recording into video signals. These signals are passed on either to a transmitting station or to a television receiver. (B) REPRODUCING APPARATUS These apparatus are designed only to reproduce images and sound directly on a television receiver. The media to be used in these instruments are prerecorded mechanically, magnetically or optically on special recording equipment. The following are examples of such apparatus: (1) Apparatus using discs in which the image and sound data are stored on the disc by various methods and picked up by a laser optical reading system, capacitive sensor, pressure sensor or magnetic head. Subject to Note 3 to Section XVI, apparatus which are capable of reproducing both video and audio recordings are to be classified in this heading. (2) Apparatus that decodes and converts into a video signal image data recorded on a light sensitive film (the sound being recorded by a magnetic process on the same film).’
17

The Joint Commentary on the Protocol by the Governments of the Benelux countries of 20 June 2002 on the amendment of the Uniform Benelux Law on designs and models states: ‘Article 21(3) and the related Article 24 have always been the subject of considerable criticism. According to those articles, if persons who own both a design right and a copyright for a product wish that copyright to be maintained after the cancellation or revocation of the design right, they must file a maintenance declaration for that product, which is entered in the Benelux register. The article was included in [the Uniform Law] at the time because publication of the rights for which protection has been claimed is one of the most important principles of [the Uniform Law]. The Hoge Raad [of the Netherlands] has, however, since confirmed that that provision is not compatible with Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, which provides that the enjoyment and the exercise of copyright may not be subject to any formality, with respect to works the authors of which are protected under the Convention (HR 26 May 2000, RvdW 2000, 141). Article 9 of the TRIPS Agreement also requires the Contracting States to comply with that article of the Berne Convention. The deletion of Article 21(3) and Article 24 is justified on the foregoing grounds.’
24

In those circumstances, the Vrhovno sodišče (Supreme Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Must the term “counterclaim” within the meaning of Article 6(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 be interpreted as extending also to a claim brought as a counterclaim in accordance with national law after, in proceedings on an appeal on a point of law, a judgment delivered in proceedings on the defendant’s original claim that had become final and enforceable was set aside and the case referred back to the court of first instance for rehearing, where the applicant, in his counterclaim alleging unjust enrichment, seeks reimbursement of the amount which he was obliged to pay on the basis of the judgment delivered in the proceedings on the defendant’s original claim and set aside? (2) Must the expression “matters relating to a contract concluded by a person, the consumer” in Article 15(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 be interpreted as extending to a situation in which the consumer brings an action, in which he pursues a claim alleging unjust enrichment, by way of counterclaim for the purposes of national law, linked to the original claim, which however relates to a case concerning a consumer contract within the meaning of that provision of Regulation No 44/2001, and in which the consumer-applicant seeks reimbursement of the amount he was obliged to pay by a judgment (subsequently) set aside, delivered in proceedings on the defendant’s original claim, and thus reimbursement of an amount arising from a case concerning a consumer contract? (3) If, in the case described above, jurisdiction cannot be based either on the jurisdictional rules for counterclaims or on the jurisdictional rules for consumer contracts: (a) Must the term “matters relating to a contract” in Article 5(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 be interpreted as extending to an action in which the applicant pursues a claim alleging unjust enrichment, but that is brought as a counterclaim under national law, linked to the defendant’s original claim which relates to the contractual relationship between the parties, where the purpose of the claim alleging unjust enrichment is to obtain reimbursement of the amount the applicant was obliged to pay by a judgment (subsequently) set aside, delivered in proceedings on the defendant’s original claim, and thus reimbursement of an amount arising from a contractual case? If the foregoing question can be answered in the affirmative: (b) In the case described above, must jurisdiction based on the place of performance within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 be examined on the basis of the rules governing the performance of obligations deriving from a claim alleging unjust enrichment?’
8

Article 15 of Regulation No 2201/2003, headed ‘Transfer to a court better placed to hear the case’, provides: ‘1. By way of exception, the courts of a Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter may, if they consider that a court of another Member State, with which the child has a particular connection, would be better placed to hear the case, or a specific part thereof, and where this is in the best interests of the child: (a) stay the case or the part thereof in question and invite the parties to introduce a request before the court of that other member state in accordance with paragraph 4; or (b) request a court of another Member State to assume jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 5. 2. Paragraph 1 shall apply: (a) upon application from a party; or (b) of the court’s own motion; or (c) upon application from a court of another Member State with which the child has a particular connection, in accordance with paragraph 3. A transfer made of the courts own motion or by application of a court of another Member State must be accepted by at least one of the parties. 3. The child shall be considered to have a particular connection to a Member State as mentioned in paragraph 1, if that Member State: (a) has become the habitual residence of the child after the court referred to in paragraph 1 was seised; or (b) is the former habitual residence of the child; or (c) is the place of the child’s nationality; or (d) is the habitual residence of a holder of parental responsibility; or (e) is the place where property of the child is located and the case concerns measures for the protection of the child relating to the administration, conservation or disposal of this property. 4. The court of the Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter shall set a time limit by which the courts of that other Member State shall be seised in accordance with paragraph 1. If the courts are not seised by that time, the court which has been seised shall continue to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 8 to 14. 5. The courts of that other Member State may, where due to the specific circumstances of the case this is in the best interests of the child, accept jurisdiction within six weeks of their seisure in accordance with paragraph 1(a) or 1(b). In this case, the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction. Otherwise, the court first seised shall continue to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 8 to 14. 6. The courts shall cooperate for the purposes of this Article, either directly or through the central authorities designated pursuant to Article 53.’
11

Section 72 of the 1990 Act, which was intended to transpose Article 6 of Directive 2000/78, lays down savings and exceptions to the general prohibition of discrimination in occupational benefit schemes, in the following terms: ‘(1) It shall not constitute a breach of the principle of equal pension treatment on the age ground for a scheme to — (a) fix age or qualifying service, or a combination of both, as a condition or criterion for admission to the scheme, (b) fix different ages or qualifying service, or a combination of both, as conditions or criteria for admission to the scheme for employees or groups or categories of employees, (c) fix age or qualifying service, or a combination of both, as a condition or criterion for entitlement to benefits under the scheme, (d) fix different ages or qualifying service, or a combination of both, as conditions or criteria for entitlement to benefits under the scheme for employees or groups or categories of employees, (e) (i) fix age or qualifying service, or a combination of both, as a condition or criterion in relation to the accrual of rights under a defined benefit scheme or in relation to the level of contributions to a defined contribution scheme, or (ii) fix different ages or qualifying service, or a combination of both, as conditions or criteria in relation to the accrual of rights under a defined benefit scheme or in relation to the level of contributions to a defined contribution scheme for employees or groups or categories of employees, where, in the context of the relevant employment, to do so is appropriate and necessary by reference to a legitimate objective of the employer, including legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives, (f) use criteria as to age in actuarial calculations: Provided that this does not result in a breach of the principle of equal pension treatment on the gender ground. (2) It shall not constitute a breach of the principle of equal pension treatment on the marital or family status ground for a scheme to provide more favourable occupational benefits where those more favourable benefits are in respect of any person in respect of whom, under the rules of the scheme, a benefit is payable on the death of the member, provided that this does not result in a breach of the said principle on the gender ground. (3) It shall not constitute a breach of the principle of equal pension treatment on the marital status or sexual orientation ground to provide more favourable occupational benefits to a deceased member’s widow or widower provided that it does not result in a breach of the said principle on the gender ground. (4) In this section any reference to the fixing of age or ages for entitlement to benefits includes a reference to the fixing of retirement age or ages for entitlement to benefits.’
3

Recitals 39, 42, 43 and 49 of the Services Directive are worded as follows: ‘(39) The concept of “authorisation scheme” should cover, inter alia, the administrative procedures for granting authorisations, licences, approvals or concessions, and also the obligation, in order to be eligible to exercise the activity, to be registered as a member of a profession or entered in a register, roll or database, to be officially appointed to a body or to obtain a card attesting to membership of a particular profession. Authorisation may be granted not only by a formal decision but also by an implicit decision arising, for example, from the silence of the competent authority or from the fact that the interested party must await acknowledgement of receipt of a declaration in order to commence the activity in question or for the latter to become lawful. … (42) The rules relating to administrative procedures should not aim at harmonising administrative procedures but at removing overly burdensome authorisation schemes, procedures and formalities that hinder the freedom of establishment and the creation of new service undertakings therefrom. (43) One of the fundamental difficulties faced, in particular by SMEs, in accessing service activities and exercising them is the complexity, length and legal uncertainty of administrative procedures. For this reason, following the example of certain modernising and good administrative practice initiatives undertaken at Community and national level, it is necessary to establish principles of administrative simplification, inter alia through the limitation of the obligation of prior authorisation to cases in which it is essential and the introduction of the principle of tacit authorisation by the competent authorities after a certain period of time elapsed. Such modernising action, while maintaining the requirements on transparency and the updating of information relating to operators, is intended to eliminate the delays, costs and dissuasive effects which arise, for example, from unnecessary or excessively complex and burdensome procedures, the duplication of procedures, the ‘red tape’ involved in submitting documents, the arbitrary use of powers by the competent authorities, indeterminate or excessively long periods before a response is given, the limited duration of validity of authorisations granted and disproportionate fees and penalties. Such practices have particularly significant dissuasive effects on providers wishing to develop their activities in other Member States and require coordinated modernisation within an enlarged internal market of twenty-five Member States. … (49) The fee which may be charged by points of single contact should be proportionate to the cost of the procedures and formalities with which they deal. This should not prevent Member States from entrusting the points of single contact with the collection of other administrative fees, such as the fee of supervisory bodies.’
32

In those circumstances, the Cour administrative (Higher Administrative Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question, which is worded in identical terms in Cases C‑401/15 to C‑403/15, apart from an addition in Case C‑403/15 which is noted in brackets, to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘In order properly to meet the requirements of non-discrimination under Article 7(2) of [Regulation No 492/2011], together with Article 45(2) TFEU [Case C‑403/15: “against the background of Article 33(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union together with, if appropriate, Article 7 of the Charter”], when taking into account the actual degree of attachment of a non-resident student, who has applied for financial aid for higher education studies, with the society and with the labour market of Luxembourg, being the Member State in which a frontier worker has been employed or has carried out his activity in the conditions referred to in Article 2 bis of the [amended Law of 22 June 2000], in direct consequence of the judgment of the Court of Justice of 20 June 2013 [Giersch and Others, C‑20/12, EU:C:2013:411], — should the requirement that the student be the “child” of that frontier worker be taken to mean that he must be the frontier worker’s “direct descendant in the first degree whose relationship with his parent is legally established”, with the emphasis being placed on the child-parent relationship established between the student and the frontier worker, which is supposed to underlie the abovementioned attachment, or — should the emphasis be placed on the fact that the frontier worker “continues to provide for the student’s maintenance” without necessarily being connected to the student through a legal child-parent relationship, in particular where a sufficient link of communal life can be identified, of such a kind as to establish a connection between the frontier worker and the student’s parent with whom the child-parent relationship is legally established? From the latter perspective, where the contribution, by definition non-compulsory, of the frontier worker is not exclusive but made in parallel with that of the parent or parents connected with the student through a legal child-parent relationship, and therefore in principle under a legal duty to maintain the student, must that contribution satisfy certain criteria as regards its substance?’
7

In accordance with Paragraph 3a of the Umsatzsteuergesetz (Law on turnover tax, ‘the UStG’), entitled ‘Place of other supplies’, in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings: ‘1. Subject to Paragraphs 3b and 3f, the other supplies are effected in the place from which the trader carries on his business. If the supply is effected from a fixed establishment, the location of the establishment shall constitute the place of supply. … 3. Where the customer to whom one of the other supplies mentioned in subparagraph 4 is made is a trader, by way of derogation from subparagraph 1, the other supply shall be deemed to be made to the place where the customer carries on his business. If, however, the other supply is made at the fixed establishment of a trader, the location of the fixed establishment shall be decisive. Where the customer to whom one of the other supplies mentioned in subparagraph 4 is made is not a trader and is resident or established in the territory of a third country, the other supply shall be deemed to be made at his place of residence or establishment. 4. For the purposes of subparagraph 3, “other services” shall mean: (1) the assignment, transfer and administration of patents, copyrights, trade mark rights and similar rights; …’
6

Article 51 of Regulation No 207/2009, headed ‘Grounds for revocation’, provides: ‘1. The rights of the proprietor of the [EU] trade mark shall be declared to be revoked on application to the [European Union Intellectual Property] Office [(EUIPO)] or on the basis of a counterclaim in infringement proceedings: (a) if, within a continuous period of five years, the trade mark has not been put to genuine use in the [European Union] in connection with the goods or services in respect of which it is registered, and there are no proper reasons for non-use; however, no person may claim that the proprietor’s rights in a Community trade mark should be revoked where, during the interval between expiry of the five-year period and filing of the application or counterclaim, genuine use of the trade mark has been started or resumed; the commencement or resumption of use within a period of three months preceding the filing of the application or counterclaim which began at the earliest on expiry of the continuous period of five years of non-use shall, however, be disregarded where preparations for the commencement or resumption occur only after the proprietor becomes aware that the application or counterclaim may be filed; … 2. Where the grounds for revocation of rights exist in respect of only some of the goods or services for which the [EU] trade mark is registered, the rights of the proprietor shall be declared to be revoked in respect of those goods or services only.’
21

In those circumstances the tribunal administratif de Melun (Administrative Court, Melun, France) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Is it possible to infer from the terms of [the judgment of 29 March 2012, Pfeifer & Langen (C‑564/10, EU:C:2012:190)], that Article 3 of [Regulation No 2988/95] is applicable to measures seeking payment of interest due pursuant to [Article 11(3) of Regulation No 3665/87] and Article 5a of [Regulation No 3002/92]? (2) Is the claim for interest to be regarded as naturally arising from a “continuous or repeated” irregularity which ceases on the date on which the principal is repaid, thus deferring until that date the point at which the limitation period in respect of the claim for interest starts to run? (3) If [the second question] is answered in the negative, must the point at which the limitation period starts to run be the day on which the irregularity giving rise to the principal claim was committed, or may it only be the day on which the aid is paid or the security released, corresponding to the starting point for the calculation of such interest? (4) For the purpose of the application of the rules on limitation laid down by Regulation No 2988/95, must any act which interrupts the limitation period in so far as concerns the principal claim be regarded as also interrupting the time running in respect of interest, even if no mention is made of interest in the acts directed at the principal claim that interrupt the limitation period? (5) Does limitation become effective as a result of the fact that the maximum period provided for in the fourth subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95 has expired if, within that period, the paying agency seeks recovery of the aid unduly paid without demanding at the same time the payment of interest? (6) Is it possible for the general five-year limitation period provided for under national law in Article 2224 of the Civil Code by Law No 2008-561 … to have replaced, as regards limitation periods that had not yet expired on the date when that Law entered into force, the four-year limitation period laid down by Regulation No 2988/95, in the light of the derogation provided for in Article 3(3) of that regulation?’