ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

(Second Chamber)

29 January 2016

Carlo de Nicola

v

European Investment Bank (EIB) and Others

‛Civil service — EIB staff — Refusal to reimburse medical expenses — Action for annulment — Claims for damages — Non-contractual liability of the European Union — Adoption of directives on laser devices — Infringement of the right to a fair hearing — Excessive length of the court procedure — Lack of jurisdiction of the Civil Service Tribunal — Partial referral of the action to the General Court of the European Union’

Application:

under Article 270 TFEU, by which Mr De Nicola essentially seeks, first, annulment of the decision of 4 December 2014 by which the European Investment Bank (EIB or ‘the Bank’) refused to reimburse him for certain medical expenses, and annulment of ‘all connected, consequent and prior acts’ and, secondly, an order requiring the Bank and the European Union to compensate him for the harm he claims to have suffered.

Held:

The claims for damages for material and non-material harm brought by Mr De Nicola against the European Union, represented by the Council of the European Union and the Court of Justice of the European Union, in the action registered under case reference F‑82/15, De Nicola v EIB and Others, are referred to the General Court of the European Union. The costs relating to those claims are reserved.

Summary

Judicial proceedings — Division of competences between the EU courts — Claim for damages based on an act of the legislature, on the grounds of unfairness of the judicial proceedings and excessive length of those proceedings — Lack of jurisdiction of the Civil Service Tribunal — Referral to the General Court

(Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 51, first para. and Annex I, Art. 1; Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal, Art. 80)

The Civil Service Tribunal has jurisdiction ratione materiae to hear and determine an action for damages brought by an official or other member of staff against the institution by whom he is employed, where the dispute originates in the employment relationship between the person concerned and the institution. However, it follows from Article 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 51 of the Statute of the Court of Justice that only the General Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine at first instance actions for damages brought by individuals where those actions do not originate in an employment relationship between the person concerned and an institution.

A division of competences between the Civil Service Tribunal and the General Court, such as arises from Article 256 TFEU and Article 1 of Annex I to the Statute of the Court of Justice, creates an obligation to consider the true object of a claim for damages, including the legal basis on which it is brought, in order to verify whether the dispute thus demarcated relates to the reciprocal rights and obligations binding the official, member of staff or other servant, on the one hand, and the institution or organisation which employs him, on the other.

In this regard, a claim for damages for material harm based on an act of the legislature and the alleged unfairness of the judicial proceedings as well as the allegedly excessive length of those proceedings does not arise out of the employment relationship between the person concerned and the institution, as it is the allegedly wrongful approach of the EU legislature with regard to citizens, and the alleged delay by the Court of Justice in ruling on the substance of the case, which are claimed to have caused harm to the person concerned as a citizen and legal subject of the European Union.

Furthermore, it is apparent from Article 80 of the Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal that where the Tribunal finds that the action before it falls within the jurisdiction of the General Court, it is to refer that action to the General Court, making its decision in that regard by way of reasoned order. Where an application is merely a vehicle for a series of claims, any claim having independent substance may be regarded as constituting an action within the meaning of that article.

(see paras 19, 21, 23, 25)

See:

Judgment of 10 September 2015 in Review Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission, C‑417/14 RX-II, EU:C:2015:588, paras 38 and 41

Order of 7 December 2011 in Strack v Commission, F‑44/05 RENV, EU:F:2011:191, paragraphs 8 and 10 and the case-law cited therein