ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Appeal brought on 23 February 2019 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Joined Cases T-339/16, T-352/16 and T-391/16 Ville de Paris, Ville de Bruxelles and Ayuntamiento de Madrid v European Commission

(Case C-179/19 P)

(2019/C 155/38)

Languages of the case: Spanish and French

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: J.F. Brakeland, Agent)

Other parties to the proceedings: Ville de Paris, Ville de Bruxelles, Ayuntamiento de Madrid

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018, of which the Commission was notified on the same date, in Joined Cases T-339/16, T-352/16 and T-391/16 Ville de Paris, Ville de Bruxelles and Ayuntamiento de Madrid v European Commission, dismiss the action at first instance and order the applicants to pay the costs; or, in the alternative,

— set aside the judgment and refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration; reserve the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appeal is founded on a single ground of appeal. The Commission submits that, in paragraphs 121 to 151 of its judgment, the General Court erred in law in concluding that Regulation 2016/646 (1) modifies an essential element of Regulation 715/2007. (2) That error is due, first, to the General Court’s incorrect interpretation of the concept of modification, illustrated by its recourse to the concept of ‘de facto’ modification, and, secondly, to an incorrect interpretation of the scope of Regulation 2016/646. In doing so, the judgment endangers the inter-institutional balance of the European Union.

(1) Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/646 of 20 April 2016 amending Regulation (EC) No 692/2008 as regards emissions from light passenger and commercial vehicles (Euro 6) (OJ 2016 L 109, p. 1)

(2) Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2007 on type approval of motor vehicles with respect to emissions from light passenger and commercial vehicles (Euro 5 and Euro 6) and on access to vehicle repair and maintenance information (OJ L 2007 L 171, p. 1)
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour du travail de Liège (Belgium) lodged on 18 March 2019 — B v Centre public d’action sociale de Liège (CPAS)

(Case C-233/19)

(2019/C 164/42)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour du travail de Liège

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: B.

Defendant: Centre public d’action sociale de Liège (CPAS)

Question referred

Must Articles 5 and 13 of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, (1) read in the light of Articles 19(2) and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and Article 14(1)(b) of that directive, read in the light of the judgment in Case C-562/13, delivered on 18 December 2014 by the Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber), be interpreted as endowing with suspensive effect an appeal brought against a decision ordering a third-country national suffering from a serious illness to leave the territory of a Member State, in the case where the appellant claims that the enforcement of that decision is liable to expose him to a serious risk of grave and irreversible deterioration in his state of health:

— without it being necessary to examine the appeal, its mere introduction being sufficient to suspend the enforcement of the decision ordering the third-country national to leave the territory of that Member State; or

— following a marginal review as to whether there is an arguable complaint, lack of grounds for inadmissibility or whether the action brought before the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers (Council for asylum and immigration proceedings, Belgium) is manifestly unfounded; or

— following a full and comprehensive judicial review carried out by the labour courts in order to determine whether the enforcement of that decision is indeed liable to expose the appellant to a serious risk of grave and irreversible deterioration in his state of health?

(1) OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98.
Action brought on 8 March 2019 — European Commission v Republic of Finland

(Case C-217/19)

(2019/C 172/23)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: C. Hermes, E. Ljung Rasmussen, Agents)

Defendant: Republic of Finland

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that by recurrently granting authorizations for spring hunting of male Common Eiders (Somateria mollissima) in the province of Åland since 2011, the Republic of Finland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 7(4) and 9(l)(c) of Directive 2009/147/EC (1) of the European parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds;

— order Republic of Finland to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Since 2011, the regional government of the Åland Islands, an autonomous region in Finland, has recurrently each year authorized ‘derogation spring hunting’ of male Common Eider ducks with a total quota of 2000 to 3800 birds during two to three weeks in May. This time period coincides with the period of reproduction of Common Eiders.

Article 7(4) of Directive 2009/147/EC prohibits hunting during the period of reproduction.

Finland claims that the spring hunting of Common Eiders in the Åland Islands is justified by the derogation provision of Article 9(1)(c) of Directive 2009/147/EC. According to the case-law of the Court, Member States bear the burden of proof for establishing that the conditions of this provision are met.

The Commission considers that Finland, first, has not established that the derogation regime constitutes ‘judicious use’ within the meaning of Article 9(1)(c) of Directive 2009/147/EC. Finland has, in particular, not substantiated with sound scientific evidence that it is ensured that the relevant population of Common Eider ducks is maintained at a satisfactory level.

Secondly, Finland has not demonstrated that the authorized spring hunting only concerns the use of birds ‘in small numbers’ pursuant to Article 9(1)(c) of Directive 2009/147/EC.

(1) Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds (OJ 2010, L 20, p-7)
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie (Poland) lodged on 2 January 2019 — VL v Szpital Kliniczny im. dra J. Babińskiego Samodzielny Publiczny Zakład Opieki Zdrowotnej w Krakowie

(Case C-16/19)

(2019/C 164/11)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: VL

Respondent: Szpital Kliniczny im. dra J. Babińskiego Samodzielny Publiczny Zakład Opieki Zdrowotnej w Krakowie

Question referred

Should Article 2 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (1) be interpreted as meaning that the differing treatment of individual members of a group distinguished by a protected characteristic (disability) amounts to a breach of the principle of equal treatment if the employer treats individual members of that group differently on the basis of an apparently neutral criterion, and that criterion cannot be objectively justified by a legitimate aim, and the measures taken in order to achieve that aim are not appropriate and necessary?

(1) OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16.
1.

Does Article 69 of Directive 2001/83/EC (1) make exhaustive provision with respect to the permissible content of package leaflets for the medicinal products referred to in Article 14(1) or may other information within the meaning of Article 62 of Directive 2001/83/EC be included?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo (Spain) lodged on 20 February 2019 — Atresm dia Corporación de Medios de Comunicación, S.A. v Asociación de Gestión de Derechos Intelectuales (AGEDI) and Artistas e Intérpretes o Ejecutantes, Sociedad de Gestión de España (AIE)

(Case C-147/19)

(2019/C 182/21)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Supremo

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Atresmedia Corporación de Medios de Comunicación, S.A.

Respondents: Asociación de Gestión de Derechos Intelectuales (AGEDI) and Artistas e Intérpretes o Ejecutantes, Sociedad de Gestión de España (AIE)

Questions referred

1. Does the concept of the ‘reproduction of a phonogram published for commercial purposes’ referred to in Article 8(2) of Directives 92/100 (1) and 2006/115 (2) include the reproduction of a phonogram published for commercial purposes in an audiovisual recording containing the fixation of an audiovisual work?

2. In the event that the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, is a television broadcasting organisation which, for any type of communication to the public, uses an audiovisual recording containing the fixation of a cinematographic or audiovisual work in which a phonogram published for commercial purposes has been reproduced, under an obligation to pay the single equitable remuneration provided for in Article 8(2) of the aforementioned directives?

(1) Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property (OJ 1992 L 346, p. 61).

(2) Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 28).
—

firstly, made improper use of the resources of the Court of Auditors in order to finance activities with no connection or incompatible with his duties as a Member;
2.

Can Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 31 of Directive 2013/3[2]/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (known as the ‘Procedures Directive’) be interpreted, again in the light of Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as meaning that legislation of a Member State which lays down a single mandatory time limit of 60 days in total for judicial proceedings in asylum matters, irrespective of any individual circumstances and without regard to the particular features of the case or any potential difficulties in relation to evidence, is compatible with those provisions?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landessozialgericht Nordrhein-Westfalen (Germany) lodged on 25 February 2019 — JD v Jobcenter Krefeld — Widerspruchsstelle

(Case C-181/19)

(2019/C 182/24)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landessozialgericht Nordrhein-Westfalen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: JD

Defendant: Jobcenter Krefeld — Widerspruchsstelle

Questions referred

1. Is the exclusion of Union citizens having a right of residence under Article 10 of Regulation No 492/2011 (1) from receipt of social assistance within the meaning of Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 (2) compatible with the requirement of equal treatment arising from Article 18 TFEU read in conjunction with Articles 10 and 7 of Regulation No 492/2011? (a) Does social assistance within the meaning of Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 constitute a social advantage within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation No 492/2011? (b) Does the limitation set out in Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 apply to the requirement of equal treatment arising from Article 18 TFEU read in conjunction with Articles 10 and 7 of Regulation No 492/2011?

2. Is the exclusion of Union citizens from receipt of special non-contributory cash benefits within the meaning of Articles 3(3) and 70(2) of Regulation No 883/2004 (3) compatible with the requirement of equal treatment arising from Article 18 TFEU read in conjunction with Article 4 of Regulation No 883/2004 if those citizens have a right of residence arising from Article 10 of Regulation No 492/2011 and are integrated into a social security system or family benefits system within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 883/2004?

(1) Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union Text with EEA relevance (OJ 2011 L 141, p. 1).

(2) Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004 L 158, p. 77).

(3) Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems (OJ 2004 L 166, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal administratif de Paris (France) lodged on 3 April 2019 — XS v Recteur de l’académie de Paris

(Case C-281/19)

(2019/C 187/58)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal administratif de Paris

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: XS

Defendant: Recteur de l’académie de Paris

Question referred

Does French law, which does not take into account for the purposes of regrading within the school-teaching professional body the previous service of an official with the European Commission, or more broadly, with an EU institution, whereas it does provide for previous professional activities carried out within the authorities of an EU Member State to be taken into account, infringe the obligations and scope of Article 45 of the Treaty on the Function of the European Union?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Gerechtshof te Amsterdam (Netherlands) lodged on 14 March 2019 — Dexia Nederland BV v XXX

(Case C-229/19)

(2019/C 187/49)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Gerechtshof te Amsterdam

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Dexia Nederland BV

Defendant: XXX

Question referred

Should Directive 93/13 (1) be interpreted as meaning that a contractual term, from the point of view of the criteria laid down in that directive, should already be regarded as unfair if that contractual term, assessed in the light of all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract, contains the mere possibility of causing a significant imbalance depending on the circumstances that materialise during the course of the contract, in particular because that contractual term fixes in advance a potential advantage that arises for the seller at the time of the premature termination of the contract, at a certain percentage of the remaining lease sum, thereby derogating from the applicable rules of national law under which such an advantage is not fixed in advance but must be determined on the basis of the circumstances attending the termination of the contract, in particular, the level of the interest rate that should be applied for the remaining duration of the contract to an amount received prematurely?

(1) Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 11 March 2019 — Parsec Fondazione Parco delle Scienze e della Cultura v Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti, Autorità nazionale anticorruzione (ANAC)

(Case C-219/19)

(2019/C 206/29)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Parsec Fondazione Parco delle Scienze e della Cultura

Defendants: Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti, Autorità nazionale anticorruzione (ANAC)

Question referred

Does recital 14 in conjunction with Articles 19(1) and 80(2) of Directive 2014/24/EU (1) preclude a legal provision such as Article 46 of Legislative Decree No 50 of 18 April 2016, by which Italy transposed Directives 2014/23/EU, (2) 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU (3) into national law, which permits only economic operators created in the legal forms indicated in that provision to take part in tendering procedures for the award of ‘architectural and engineering services’, which has the effect of excluding from participation in such procedures economic operators that perform such services using a different legal form?

(1) Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65).

(2) Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 1).

(3) Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 243).
2.

The burden of proving ‘presentation at check-in’ If the answer to question 1(a) is in the affirmative, that is to say, if Article 3(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of 11 February 2004 does apply to compensation applied for by a passenger whose flight has been delayed: (a) Are the conditions established in Article 3(2)(a) preconditions that the consumer must prove have been satisfied in order for the regulation to apply, or grounds for exonerating the airline by allowing it to produce the passenger list in order to show that the consumer did not present him or herself for check-in “as stipulated and at the time indicated in advance and in writing (including by electronic means) by the air carrier, the tour operator or an authorised travel agent, or, if no time is indicated, not later than 45 minutes before the published departure time” to which Article 3(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of 11 February 2004 refers, in the light of technological developments that now allow boarding cards to be issued electronically, the absence of any time stamp on paper boarding cards, the correlative absence of any obligation for passengers to present themselves physically at a check-in counter and the fact that the airlines alone hold all the information about passenger check-in until check-in operations are closed? (b) Do the principle of effectiveness, the objectives of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of 11 February 2004 and the high level of protection of passengers and consumers in general guaranteed by Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of 11 February 2004 or other provisions of Community law preclude placing exclusively on passengers alone the burden of proving that they presented themselves for check-in ‘as stipulated and at the time indicated in advance and in writing (including by electronic means) by the air carrier, the tour operator or an authorised travel agent, or, if no time is indicated, not later than 45 minutes before the published departure time’ to which Article 3(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of 11 February 2004 refers, in the light of technological developments that now allow boarding cards to be issued electronically, the absence of any time stamp on paper boarding cards, the correlative absence of any obligation for passengers to present themselves physically at a check-in counter and the fact that the airlines alone hold all the information about passenger check-in until check-in operations are closed?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 15 April 2019 — Milis Energy SpA v Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico and Gestore dei Servizi Energetici SpA — GSE

(Case C-306/19)

(2019/C 213/17)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Milis Energy SpA

Defendants: Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico and Gestore dei Servizi Energetici SpA — GSE

Question referred

Does EU law preclude the application of a provision of national law, such as that set out in Article 26(2) and (3) of Decree-Law No 91/2014, as converted into law by Law No 116/2014, which significantly reduces or delays the payment of incentives already granted by law and defined on the basis of ad hoc agreements concluded by undertakings generating electrical energy by means of photovoltaic conversion with Gestore dei Servizi Energetici SpA, a public company responsible for that process? In particular, is such a provision of national law compatible with the general principles of EU law relating to legitimate expectations, legal certainty, sincere cooperation and effectiveness, with Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, with Directive 2009/28/EC (1) and the rules governing support schemes laid down therein, and with Article 216(2) TFEU, in particular in relation to the Energy Charter Treaty?

(1) Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (OJ 2009 L 140, p. 16).
If Question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative:

By the reference to ‘refusal to perform military service in a conflict’, does Article 9(2)(e) of Directive 2011/95/EU also protect persons who, after the deferment of military service has expired, do not make themselves available to the military administration of the State of origin and evade compulsory conscription by fleeing?
If Question 3(a) is to be answered in the negative:

Is an ex post calculation of costs after the end of the calculation period to be based entirely on the actual costs and the actual toll revenue, that is to say, not on the assumptions made in this regard in the original predictive calculation?