40.

The Curtea de Apel Alba Iulia (Court of Appeal, Alba Iulia) decided to stay proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) May [the Memorandum of Understanding] be regarded as an act, decision or communication having legal force within the meaning defined by the Court (judgments of 3 February 1976, Manghera and Others (59/75, EU:C:1976:14), and of 20 March 1997, France v Commission (C‑57/95, EU:C:1997:164)) and may it be interpreted by the Court? (2) If the answer is in the affirmative, is [the Memorandum of Understanding] to be interpreted as allowing the European Commission to require, for the purposes of reducing the effects of the economic crisis by reducing staff costs, the adoption of a national law which withdraws a person’s right to receive a contributory pension accrued over more than 30 years, which was legally established and received before that law came into force, on the ground that the person in question receives a salary for activity, carried out on the basis of an employment contract, other than the activity in respect of which he receives the pension? (3) Is [the Memorandum of Understanding] to be interpreted as allowing the European Commission to require, for the purposes of reducing the effects of the economic crisis, the adoption of a national law which completely and indefinitely withdraws a person’s right to receive a contributory pension accrued over more than 30 years, which was legally established and received before that law came into force, on the ground that the person in question receives a salary for activity, carried out on the basis of an employment contract, other than the activity in respect of which he receives the pension? (4) On a proper construction of the Memorandum [of Understanding] as a whole, and specifically of section (d) of point 5 thereof, which concerns reforming and improving the efficiency of the public administration, was it lawful for the European Commission to require, for the purposes of reducing the effects of the economic crisis, the adoption of a national law which barred retired officials of the public institutions from receiving a salary in addition to the pension? (5) Can Articles 17, 20, 21 and 47 of the Charter, Article 6 TEU, 110 TFEU, the principle of legal certainty derived from EU law and the case‑law of the Court be interpreted as precluding a rule such as that set out in Article 21(2) of Law No 554/2004, which provides that, in the event of failure to observe the principle of the primacy of EU law, it is possible to revise decisions of national courts only in the context of administrative law proceedings and which does not allow decisions of national courts made in other areas (civil, criminal, commercial, and so on) to be revised in the event that such decisions are inconsistent with that principle? (6) Does Article 6 TEU, in the version consolidated in 2010, preclude legislation of a Member State under which the payment of a professional judge’s pension, established on the basis of contributions made by that judge over more than 30 years of judicial service, is to be conditional upon the termination of his employment contract to teach law at university level? (7) Do Article 6 TEU, in the version consolidated in 2010, Article 17(1) of the Charter and the case‑law of the Court preclude legislation which divests a pension holder of his right to receive a pension, even though that pension has been established on the basis of contributions made over more than 30 years, where judges have made and continue to make separate pension contributions in respect of their university teaching activities? (8) Do Article 6 TEU, in the version consolidated in 2010, and Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78, concerning equal treatment of persons regardless of race and ethnic origin, and the case‑law of the Court preclude the Constitutional Court of a Member State from delivering a judgment by which, in exercise of its jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of a law, it establishes that only persons appointed for a fixed term have the right to combine a pension with a salary, thereby denying that right to professional judges, who are barred from receiving their pension, established on the basis of personal contributions made over more than 30 years, because they have retained a position teaching law at university level? (9) Do Article 6 TEU, in the version consolidated in 2010, and the case‑law of the Court preclude legislation which indefinitely makes the payment of a judge’s pension, established on the basis of contributions made over more than 30 years, conditional upon termination of university employment? (10) Do Article 6 TEU, in the version consolidated in 2010, and the case‑law of the Court preclude legislation which destroys the proper balance to be maintained between the protection of personal property, on the one hand, and general interest requirements, on the other, and which requires only one specific category of persons to lose their judicial pension by reason of the fact that they engage in university employment?’