Case C-470/00 P

European Parliament

v

Carlo Ripa di Meana and Others

(Appeal – Members of the European Parliament – Provisional retirement pension scheme – Time-limit for submission of applications to join that scheme – Knowledge acquired – Cross-appeal – Liability for costs – Inadmissibility)

Summary of the Judgment

1. Appeals – Grounds – Incorrect appraisal of the facts – Inadmissible – Dismissal – Legal classification of the facts – Admissible

(Art. 225 EC; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58)

2. Actions for annulment – Actionable measures – Acts adopted by the Parliament intended to produce legal effects outside its internal sphere – Letter from the College of Quaestors rejecting an application to join the Members’ provisional pension scheme retroactively – Decision not confirmatory of an earlier decision laying down, in general terms, a time-limit for applications to join that scheme – Admissible

(Art. 230 EC)

3. Parliament – Rules Governing the Payment of Expenses and Advances of Members of the European Parliament – Notice of amendments thereto to Members – Requirement to notify them individually with acknowledgement of receipt – None – Institutions’ traditional methods of internal communication sufficient

4. Community law – Principles – Legal certainty – Administrative measure imposing obligations on specific individuals – Communication to the parties concerned – Requirement that they be notified individually with acknowledgement of receipt – None

5. Appeals – Subject-matter – Appeal relating solely to the amount of the costs or the party ordered to pay them – Inadmissible

(EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 51, second para.; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, second para.)

6. Procedure – Costs – Appeals – Court of Justice not bound by the forms of order sought by the parties at first instance

(Rules of Procedure of the Court, Arts 69(2) and 122, first para.)

1. It is clear from Article 225 EC and Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice that an appeal is to be limited to points of law. The Court of First Instance therefore has exclusive jurisdiction to find the facts, save where a substantive inaccuracy in its findings is attributable to the documents submitted to it, and to appraise those facts. That appraisal thus does not, save where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice in an appeal. However, where the Court of First Instance has found or appraised the facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction, pursuant to Article 225 EC, to carry out a review of the legal classification of those facts and the legal inferences drawn from them by the Court of First Instance. Such a classification is a question of law which, as such, may be subject to review by the Court of Justice in an appeal.

(see paras 40-41)

2. A letter from the College of Quaestors of the European Parliament rejecting an application to join the Members’ provisional pension scheme retroactively, on the ground that the time‑limit laid down by the Decision of the Bureau of the European Parliament of 13 September 1995 amending that scheme had not been complied with, does not constitute a decision confirming the Bureau’s decision which merely lays down, in general terms, the obligation for Members concerned to submit both an application to join the provisional pension scheme and an application for payment of that pension within a specified time-limit. Where such a letter affects the specific financial situation of the Member concerned, it does in fact constitute a measure having legal effects going beyond the internal organisation of the work of the Parliament and can therefore, in that respect, be made the subject-matter of an action for annulment.

(see paras 56-58)

3. Although Article 27(1) of the Rules Governing the Payment of Expenses and Allowances of Members of the European Parliament provides that on commencement of their term of office Members are to receive a copy of those rules from the Secretary-General of the Parliament and are to acknowledge receipt thereof in writing, it certainly does not extend such a duty of notification to any amendments which might be made to those rules subsequently, in particular amendments relating to the annexes thereto. The rule that amendments made to those rules must be notified individually with acknowledgement of receipt cannot moreover, be inferred from a requirement of equivalence of form, which would mean that the form used to bring a measure to the notice of its addressees would also have to be used for all subsequent amendments to that measure. The method of communication adopted by Article 27(1) of the said rules is attributable, as is moreover apparent from the very wording of that provision, to the Parliament’s intention to make sure that, at the time of taking office, new parliamentarians do actually become acquainted with the financial rules currently in force which are applicable to Members of the Parliament. However, once the latter have taken office, that institution’s traditional methods of internal communication may be considered sufficient to ensure that those members are actually informed of amendments which it makes to those rules.

(see paras 66-67)

4. While it is important, in all circumstances, that measures which impose obligations on specific individuals are brought to their notice in an appropriate manner, it cannot be inferred, from that rule – which is dictated by fundamental considerations of legal certainty – that the communication of such measures should, in all circumstances, be effected by means of an individual notification with acknowledgement of receipt.

(see para. 68)

5. Since the second paragraph of Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, and the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice lay down no distinction based on the nature of the appeal or how it is brought, an appeal relating solely to the liability for, and/or the amount of, costs, must, in application of those provisions, be dismissed as inadmissible.

(see paras 81-82)

6. The fact that the successful party on an appeal claimed at first instance that the Court should make an ‘appropriate’ order as to costs cannot be binding upon the Court of Justice, at the appeal stage, in its decision as to the sharing of those costs, including those of the proceedings brought before the Court of First Instance.

(see para. 87)