Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. Applications for interim measures — Suspension of operation of a measure — Judgment of the Court of First Instance against which an appeal has been brought — Right to effective judicial protection — Request for suspension of operation of the act in question challenged at first instance — Whether admissible — (Arts 242 EC and 243 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 83(1))

2. Applications for interim measures — Suspension of operation of a measure — Judgment of the Court of First Instance against which an appeal has been brought — Prima facie case — Judgment declaring the action to be inadmissible — Grounds of appeal relied on against the judgment — Insufficient to justify prima facie suspension of operation of the contested act — (Art. 242 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 83(2))

3. Applications for interim measures — Suspension of operation of a measure — Conditions for granting — Balancing of all the interests involved — (Art. 242 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 83(2))

Summary

1. An application for interim relief, brought in the context of an appeal from the Court of First Instance, cannot be held inadmissible on the ground that it is seeking to obtain suspension of operation of the act in question, which was challenged at first instance. Were Article 83(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court to be interpreted to the effect that the Court has no competence to order suspension of operation of the act that was challenged at first instance when it is hearing an appeal, that would mean that in a large number of appeals, and in particular when the application to the Court to set aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance is founded on a challenge to the latter's ruling of inadmissibility, the appellant would be deprived of any possibility of obtaining interim protection. Such an interpretation would be incompatible with the right to effective judicial protection, which is a general principle of law which underlies the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. That principle is also laid down in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The right of individuals to complete and effective judicial protection under Community law implies in particular that interim protection be available to them if it is necessary for the full effectiveness of the definitive future decision.

see paras 79-81, 85

2. In the context of an appeal against a judgment of the Court of First Instance which held inadmissible the action for annulment, however solid the pleas and arguments put forward by the appellant against that judgment, they cannot suffice to justify prima facie suspension of operation of the act in question, the annulment of which was sought at first instance. In order to establish that the condition relating to a prima facie case is satisfied, the appellant would have to succeed in showing that the pleas and arguments relied on against the legality of that act in the action for annulment are such as to justify prima facie grant of the suspension of operation sought.

see paras 89-90

3. Serious and irreparable harm, one of the criteria for establishing urgency, constitutes the first element in the comparison carried out in assessing the balance of interests. More particularly, that comparison must lead the judge hearing the application to examine whether the possible annulment of the act in question by the Court giving judgment in the main action would make it possible to reverse the situation that would have been brought about by its immediate implementation and conversely whether suspension of the operation of that act would be such as to prevent its being fully effective in the event of the appeal being dismissed on the merits. Furthermore, the strength or weakness of the pleas relied on to show a prima facie case may be taken into consideration by the judge in his assessment of urgency and, if appropriate, of the balance of interests.

see paras 106, 110