ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
30

As is apparent from the order for reference, both the amount of the usage charge at issue in the main proceedings and that of the supplementary charge are provided for under that decree, since the applicant in the main proceedings has no discretion as to whether it is appropriate to apply them. Furthermore, although the supplementary charge entails a significant increase in the sum initially due, it does not follow from the information available to the Court that it constitutes a penalty for a road traffic offence of any kind. As the applicant states in its written observations, the obligation to pay the usage charge and the supplementary charge is distinct from the power of the competent authority to impose a fine the amount of which may vary from HUF 10000 to HUF 300000 (approximately EUR 25 to EUR 830), on the basis of Paragraph 21(2) of the Law on road traffic, in the case where the owner of the vehicle fails to comply with his or her obligation to pay the tolls.
4

Article 12 of that directive provides: ‘1. Member States may regard as a taxable person anyone who carries out, on an occasional basis, a transaction relating to the activities referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 9(1) and in particular one of the following transactions: (a) the supply, before first occupation, of a building or parts of a building and of the land on which the building stands; (b) the supply of building land. 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1(a), “building” shall mean any structure fixed to or in the ground. Member States may lay down the detailed rules for applying the criterion referred to in paragraph 1(a) to conversions of buildings and may determine what is meant by “the land on which a building stands”. Member States may apply criteria other than that of first occupation, such as the period elapsing between the date of completion of the building and the date of first supply, or the period elapsing between the date of first occupation and the date of subsequent supply, provided that those periods do not exceed five years and two years respectively. 3. For the purposes of paragraph 1(b), “building land” shall mean any unimproved or improved land defined as such by the Member States.’
Order of the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) of 28 September 2022 – the airscreen company v EUIPO

(Case C‑320/22 P)

(Appeal – EU trade mark – Determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Article 170b of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Request failing to demonstrate that an issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Appeal not allowed to proceed)

1. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Burden of proof (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b) (see para. 11)

2. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Request that an appeal be allowed to proceed – Formal requirements – Scope (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b) (see paras 12-14)

3. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Request that an appeal be allowed to proceed failing to demonstrate that the issue is significant – Appeal not allowed to proceed (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b) (see paras 15-18)

Operative part

1. The appeal is not allowed to proceed.
Order of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 30 June 2022 –

HG v Commission

(Case C‑150/22 P)

(Appeal – Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Civil service – Decision of the General Court of the European Union from which no appeal lies – Manifest lack of jurisdiction)

Appeal – Jurisdiction of the Court – Decisions against which an appeal may be brought – Decision given by the General Court in its appellate capacity – Not included

(Art. 256 TFEU; European Parliament and Council Regulation 2016/1192, Art. 4)

(see paras 5-9)

Operative part

1. HG’s appeal is dismissed due to a manifest lack of jurisdiction of the Court.
OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE-GENERAL TRABUCCHI

DELIVERED ON 16 DECEMBER 1975 ( 1 )

Mr President,

Members of the Court,

By a decision dated 13 July 1962 the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia granted Mrs Chantal Adlerblum the right to a pension as compensation for physical injuries caused by persecution on racial grounds. This decision was based on the Federal Law of 29 June 1956.

Taking this pension into account the Commission de Recours Gracieux de la Caisse Nationale d'Assurance Vieillesse des Travailleurs Salariés refused to grant the increase in pension allowable for a dependant spouse claimed by Mr Jacob Adlerblum who was the beneficiary of an old-age pension in France. The decision was founded on the French Decree of 29 December 1945 which lays down in Article 71 (6) the maximum figure for personal resources in excess of which the said increase cannot be granted.

In the appeal against this decision which Mr Adlerblum lodged with the Commission de Première Instance du Contentieux de la Sécurité Sociale et de la Mutualité Sociale Agricole of Paris, he asserted that the pension received by his wife should not have been taken into account. This pension should in fact be treated as a social asssistance benefit and as such it should not be included in the assessment of resources referred to in Article 3 of the French Decree of 1 April 1964.

In order to clarify this last point the Commission de Première Instance, on the basis of Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, has requested the Court to decide whether the benefit granted to Mrs Adlerblum by the decision of 13 July 1962 by the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia on the basis of Article 195 of the Federal Law of 29 June 1956 constitutes a social assistance benefit.

In the light of the pleadings and in particular of the observations submitted by the parties I must point out that the definition of the nature of the benefit granted to Mrs Adlerblum in Germany for the purposes of the implementation of Article 3 of the French Decree of 1 April 1964, and thus of the review of the decision of the French social security institution, pertains exclusively to the interpretation of national law.

Furthermore there is ample evidence to emphasize the fact that Community social security legislation itself excludes from its scope benefits provided for victims of war or its consequences: see Article 4 (4) of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71.

I therefore suggest that the Court should reply to the French court to the effect that the poblems set out do not relate either to the interpretation of Community law or to the validity of a Community act and consequently that they do not come within the jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by Article 177 of the EEC Treaty.

( 1 ) Translated from the Italian.
OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL WARNER

DELIVERED ON 5 JUNE 1980

My Lords,

I hope that I shall be acquitted of any discourtesy to Counsel if in these cases I express my opinion at once and briefly. I do so because it seems to me that with one minor qualification the questions that are referred to the Court are answered by the judgments delivered by the Court on 27 February of this year in Case 68/79 the fust case and on 27 March of this year in Case 61/79 the Denkavit Italiana case and in Cases 66, 127 & 128/79 the Salumi, Vasanelli and Ultrocchi cases. I see no reason to invite Your Lordships to depart from what the Court there said. I agree in that respect with the Opinion delivered by Mr. Advocate General Capotorti on 6 May in Case 130/79 the Express Dairy Foods Ltd. case. Those judgments were, of course, delivered after the orders for reference in the present cases had been made. The one qualification to which I referred is that those judgments make no mention of Article 171 of the Treaty whereas the first question referred to the Court in Case 826/79 does mention it. It is, however, in my opinion, manifest that a judgment of the Court of the kind to which Article 171 applies, like a judgment under Article 177 cannot create new law. It can only be declaratory of what the law has been. That must be so since such a judgment entails a finding that the Member State concerned “has failed to fulfil an obligation” under the Treaty.

In my opinion, therefore, Your Lordhips should in these cases follow the authorities that I have mentioned. It is not in my opinion for this Court to try to resolve the doubts and difficulties arising from the relevant Italian law which have been discussed during the argument before us.
OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL REISCHL

DELIVERED ON 28 JANUARY 1981 ( 1 )

Mr President,

Members of the Court,

A further case requiring to be dealt with today concerns Council Directive 76/769/EEC, issued on 27 July 1976, on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to restrictions on the marketing and use of certain dangerous substances and preparations (Official Journal L 262 of 27 September 1976, p. 201 et seq. ).

According to Article 3 thereof — for further details I refer to the Report for the Hearing — the Member States had to bring into force the provisions necessary to comply with the directive within 18 months of its notification. That period expired on 2 February 1978.

Proceedings under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty were begun by a letter from the Commission dated 28 January 1979. The defendant, the Italian Republic, has pointed out that Community activity in the sphere of harmonization directives has increased considerably in recent years, so that it is often necessary to resort to legislative procedures in order to fulfil obligations under Community law. The Italian Government is therefore endeavouring to secure authorization from the Italian Parliament in order to be able to comply with these numerous obligations by means of decrees. The Senate gave its assent to a draft Law to that effect on 16 July 1980, which is at present still under scrutiny by the Chamber of Deputies. After its enactment, a firm date for which admittedly cannot be given, it will immediately be possible to implement numerous Community directives, including the one concerned in these proceedings.

Here again it has to be stated that under existing case-law, as cited in detail by the Commission, it is clear that such a defence to proceedings under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty is futile.

Since provisions to implement the aforesaid directive have to this day not been adopted in Italy it is necessary, in this case too, to declare that the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under the EEC Treaty by not bringing into force within the prescribed period provisions to implement Directive 76/769/EEC. Furthermore, the Italian Republic must be ordered to pay the costs in this case also, as sought by the Commission.

( 1 ) Translated from the German.
FURTHER OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL

VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT

DELIVERED ON 15 JULY 1982 ( 1 )

Mr President,

Members of the Court,

In the present case, in which I delivered an opinion on 25 March 1982, the Court decided to reopen the oral procedure. It wished to obtained further information about the nature, background and consequences of the decision of the French Institution of 23 November 1976 to grant a survivor's pension to Mrs Saelens and immediately to reduce it to nil in reliance on Article 12 of Regulation No 1408/71 and Article 7 of Regulation No 374/72. That decision gave rise to a number of misunderstandings underlying the reference made bv the Belgian court which I dealt with under point 2.2 of my earlier opinion. Those misunderstandings relate to the supposition that a rule against the overlapping of benefits was also applied by the Belgian Institution to the French survivor's pension which was reduced to nil. That is incorrect, as may be seen once more from the well-documented replies of the Belgian Institution. From those replies it may be seen that under the new decision of 11 January 1977 Mrs Saelens receives, in addition to the retirement pension itself, a higher survivor's pension than was granted under the earlier decision of 9 August 1971.

As regards the French decision itself, I expressed the view in my earlier opinion, partly as a result of the Commission's observations, that what is involved is the application of a national rule against the overlapping of benefits. The reply by the French Government confirms that view. The question whether that decision is correct under French law is not a matter which the Court of Justice may decide in the context of these proceedings. What is important is that no fanors can be discerned from the replies of the French Government which might give cause to doubt the correctness of the decision of the Belgian Institution. Accordingly, I see no reason for modifying the view which I expressed in my first opinion.

On the basis of the further information as to the facts now received and the provisions of Community law applied in the present case, that view might be expressed in the Court's reply to the cuestión raised as follows:

Provided that account is taken of the provision contained in Article 7 (1) (b) of Regulation No 574/72, Article 12 of Regulation No 1408/71 does not preclude the application of a national rule against the overlapping of benefits in respect of retirement and survivor's pensions, irrespective of what another Member State may have decided under its own national law with regard to the application of a similar rule against overlapping.

( 1 ) Trmtlitrd Ironi the Dutch
3.

Let us now examine the question which has been referred to the Court by the Tribunal de Police of the First Canton of Verviers. In the grounds of its judgment, the court cites provisions of Belgian law on the one hand, and the wording of the EEC Treaty on the other, and questions the compatibility of the former with the latter. In this connection it cites “Article 8 of the Law of 1 August 1960, inasmuch as it permits a national authority to fix rates unilaterally” and the “Royal Decrees of 24 September 1971, 8 September 1978 and 18 July 1979, inasmuch as they make rates fixed bilaterally between two Member States compulsory”. The Tribunal compares those provisions with Article 3 (e) of the Treaty which “introduces a common transport policy” and Article 75, which “empowers the Council to lay down common rules applicable to international transpon to or from the territory of a Member State”. For that reason the Tribunal considers that “a preliminary question arises as to the compatibility of the Belgian legislation with the EEC Treaty”, and that “in accordance with Article 177 of the Treaty, it is advisable to submit [the question] to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling”. The request is repeated in the operative pan of the judgment, which asks the Court “to give a preliminary ruling on the question of the compatibility of the Belgian legislation with the EEC Treaty”. The terms of the request led the Belgian Government to raise two objections of inadmissibility. The first is based on the fact that the Coun may not rule on the validity of national laws in proceedings for obtaining a preliminary ruling. The second is the objection of oscuri libelli, based on the fact that the wording of the request is too general. The Court's case-law provides answers to these two objections. It is true that the Court may not rule “proceedings brought under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty ... on the compatibility of rules of national law with provisions of Community law.” However, the Court does have jurisdiction “to provide the national court with all material concerning the interpretation of Community law which will enable that court to judge whether those rules are compatible with the rule of Community law in question”. ( 4 ) As far as the second objection is concerned, I need only refer to Case 10/71, Ministère Public Luxembourgeois v Muller and Others ( 5 ) in which the judgment of the Tribunal d'Arrondissement [District Court] of Luxembourg did not cite the provisions of Community law which it required to be interpreted. Nevertheless, following the opinion of Advocate General Dutheillet de Lamothe, ( 6 ) the Court stated that “despite the imprecise nature of the questions, the grounds of judgment of the national court clearly show the subject-matter of [the] reference”. ( 7 ) In the light of the grounds stated by the Tribunal de Police of Verviers, I suggest that the Court interpret the question as seeking to ascertain whether Council Regulation No 2831/77 permits a Member State to fix compulsory rates for the carriage of goods by road between another Member State and itself. We must therefore examine the relevant legal provisions.
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL SIR GORDON SLYNN

DELIVERED ON 14 SEPTEMBER 1983

My Lords,

This is an application by the Commission under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty for a declaration that the Republic of Italy has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty in that it has not adopted the measures necessary to implement Council Directive 77/796 of 12 December 1977 (Official Journal, L 334, 24.12.1977, p. 37). The directive was aimed at the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications for goods haulage operators and road passenger transport operators, including measures intended to encourage these operators effectively to exercise their right to freedom of establishment.

By Article 7 of the directive, Member States were to bring into force the measures necessary to comply with the directive before 1 January 1979 and to inform the Commission immediately. In October 1980, the Commission drew the Italian Government's attention to the fact that this directive had not been implemented and, in the absence of a reply, on 15 January 1982 the Commission sent a reasoned opinion to the Italian Government concluding that the government was in breach of its obligations under the Treaty. As no effective reply was received to that, proceedings were brought before the Court.

In its defence, in December 1982, the Italian Government said that in order to implement the directive it was necessary for a bill to be presented to Parliament. A bill had already passed through a committee but had to be approved by the Senate. That draft bill, however, was concerned only with the transport of goods. A further bill relating to the transport of persons was still in the process of being drafted. It now appears that, following the dissolution of Parliament and the subsequent parliamentary elections, a new bill must be presented and the Court has been told, by way of explanation, albeit not by way of answer to the Commission's claim, that steps will be taken shortly for the bill to be re-presented.

The Court has said, on many occasions, that a Member State is not entitled to rely on circumstances or practices existing in its own internal parliamentary or legal system to justify failing to comply with the terms of a directive.

In consequence, in my opinion, the declaration sought by the Commission should be granted and the Republic of Italy should be ordered to pay the costs of this application.
OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL LENZ

DELIVERED ON 10 JULY 1984 ( 1 )

Mr President,

Members of the Court,

By an application received at the Court on 19 December 1983 the Commission of the European Communities brought an action under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty for a declaration that the Italian Republic had failed to fulfil its obligations under the EEC Treaty by not adopting within the specified period the requisite provisions to comply with Council Directive No 79/1071/EEC of 6 December 1979 (Official Journal 1979, L 331, p. 10), which extends to valueadded tax the system of mutual assistance between Member States, established by Directive No 76/308/EEC, for the recovery of claims resulting from operations forming part of the system of financing of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund and for the recovery of agricultural levies and customs duties.

Under Article 3 of the directive in question the Member States had to adopt the requisite measures no later than 1 January 1981 in order to comply with the directive.

The Italian Republic admits that it did not fulfil that obligation within the period stipulated. It justifies its omission basically on the grounds of the difficulties in the legislative process. It says that a new bill is in preparation for the purpose of implementing the directive.

Those circumstances cannot however exonerate the Italian Republic from the infringement of the Treaty with which it is reproached. The Court has consistently held that a Member State cannot rely on provisions, practices or circumstances of its internal legal order to justify a failure to comply with its obligations under Community directives.

Accordingly, I request the Court to declare that the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty by not adopting within the period prescribed the measures needed to comply with Council Directive No 70/1071/EEC of 6 December 1979. Under Article 69 (2) of the Rules of Procedure the unsuccessful party must be ordered to pay the costs.

( 1 ) Translated from the German.