JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Appeal Chamber)

11 September 2013

L

v

European Parliament

‛Appeal — Civil service — Members of the temporary staff — Contract for an indefinite period — Decision to dismiss — Obligation to state reasons — Loss of trust’

Appeal:

against the judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal of the European Union [confidential] seeking to have that judgment set aside.

Held:

The judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal of the European Union [confidential] is set aside in so far as it did not rule on the plea alleging infringement of the principle of impartiality, rejected the plea alleging factual inaccuracy and a manifest error of assessment and held that the appellant had not claimed that the Parliament should be ordered to pay the costs. The remainder of the appeal is dismissed. The remainder of the action brought by Mr L before the Civil Service Tribunal in Case [confidential] is dismissed. Each party is to bear its own costs relating both to the first instance proceedings and the appeal proceedings.

Summary

Officials — Members of the temporary staff — Staff engaged by a political group in the European Parliament — Dismissal on grounds connected to the relationship of mutual trust — Obligation to state reasons — Scope

The appeal court is required to rule, if necessary of its own motion, on a plea involving a question of public policy concerning the admissibility of an application at first instance, in order to ascertain whether or not that application meets the necessary requirements of clarity and precision. (see para. 22) See: 29 November 2007, C‑176/06 P Stadtwerke Schwäbisch Hall and Others v Commission, not published in the ECR, para. 18 T-156/08 P R v Commission [2009] ECR-SC I-B-1-11 and II-B-1-51, para. 30, and the case-law cited therein

Under Article 35 of the Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal, an application must, in particular, contain a summary of the pleas in law on which it is based. It must accordingly specify the nature of the grounds on which the action is based, so that a mere abstract statement of the grounds does not satisfy the requirements of the Statute of the Court of Justice or the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. Moreover, that summary — albeit concise — must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Civil Service Tribunal to rule on the action, if necessary, without any further information. In order to ensure legal certainty and the sound administration of justice, it is necessary — if an action or, more specifically, a plea in law, is to be admissible — that the basic legal and factual particulars relied on be indicated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself. (see para. 34) See: C-352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission [2000] ECR I-5291, para. 34; C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission [2005] ECR I-5425, para. 426 T-385/00 Seiller v EIB [2003] ECR-SC I-A-161 and II-801, para. 40 and the case-law cited therein; T‑338/07 P Bianchi v ETF [2010] ECR-SC, para. 59

The obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 25 of the Staff Regulations, which is intended to give the addressees of measures the possibility to determine whether the decision is correct, and to serve as a basis for judicial review, applies to decisions to terminate contracts of indefinite duration as members of the temporary staff governed by the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities. As an exception, however, it is accepted that, in certain circumstances, the statement of reasons for a measure may be supplemented either during the administrative phase or after the application is brought. During the administrative phase, it is accepted that the statement of reasons for the measure may be supplemented by the context in which the measure was adopted and which was known to the applicant, by oral information and by the complaint. In particular, as regards dismissal on the ground of loss of mutual trust between a member of the temporary staff and the political group of the European Parliament to which he is assigned, although a temporary staff member assigned to non-attached Members has an interest in making sure that the bond of trust that has been breached is that with his direct line-manager, in the case of a staff member assigned to a traditional political group other than that of the non-attached Members, characterised by a presumably shared political conviction, where the bond of trust is breached, it no longer exists with the group as a whole, and the question of which persons have lost trust is no longer relevant. (see paras 60-61, 64) See: 28 February 2008, C‑17/07 P Neirinck v Commission, not published in the ECR, paras 50 to 52 T-237/00 Reynolds v Parliament [2005] ECR-SC I-A-385 and II-1731, para. 96; T-406/04 Bonnet v Court of Justice [2006] ECR-SC I-A-2-213 and II-A-2-1097, para. 52; T-404/06 ETF v Landgren [2009] ECR II-2841, paras 143 to 171 and 179; T‑283/08 P Longinidis v Cedefop [2011] ECR-SC, para. 68; T‑213/10 P P v Parliament [2011] ECR-SC, para. 35

The existence of a relationship of trust is not based on objective factors and by its very nature cannot be subject to judicial review, since the Courts of the Union cannot substitute their assessment for that of the authority authorised to conclude contracts of employment. In that respect, it should be noted that, in the political field, loss of trust is a broad concept. However, where an institution which decides to terminate the contract of a member of the temporary staff refers, in particular, to specific material facts that have led to the decision to dismiss him because of loss of trust, the Court is required to check the veracity of those material facts. In so far as an institution explains the grounds that have resulted in the loss of trust by referring to specific material facts, the Court must check that the facts on which those grounds are based are substantively accurate. In doing so the Court must not substitute its assessment for that of the competent authority, which considers that the loss of trust has been established, but must confine itself to checking whether the facts referred to by the institution on which its decision was based are substantively accurate. (see paras 68-70) See: T-123/95 B v Parliament [1997] ECR-SC I-A-245 and II-697, para. 73

A plea in law alleging that the Civil Service Tribunal failed to respond to a plea relied on at first instance is, essentially, tantamount to an allegation of infringement of the obligation to state reasons arising from Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, applicable to the Civil Service Tribunal pursuant to Article 7(1) of Annex I to that Statute. (see para. 94) See: C-583/08 P Gogos v Commission [2010] ECR I-4469 and the case-law cited therein