ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
2)

If that first question is answered in the affirmative, can that restriction on the movement of capital, which arises as a combined result of French legislation, which imposes the disputed contributions on all recipients of certain income from assets, without in itself making any distinction as to the place in which they are insured under a social security scheme, and a European Union act of secondary legislation, be regarded as compatible with the requirements of the said article of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular: — in light of Article 64(1) [TFEU], for the movement of capital falling within the scope of that paragraph, on the grounds that the restriction arises due to the application of the principle that the legislation of a single Member State is to apply, as provided in Article 11 of the Regulation [(EC) No 883/2004] of 29 April 2004, introduced into EU law by Article 13 of Regulation [(EEC) No 1408/71] of 14 June 1971, in other words, on a date prior to 31 December 1993, even though the contributions on income from assets in question were established or made applicable after 31 December 1993; — in light of Article 65(1) [TFEU], on the grounds that the French tax legislation, when applied in a way compliant with Regulation [(EC) No 883/2004] of 29 April 2004, creates a distinction between taxable persons whose situations differ in relation to the criterion for being insured under a social security scheme; — in light of the existence of overriding reasons in the public interest to justify a restriction on the free circulation of capital, derived from the fact that the provisions that might be regarded as restricting the movement of capital from or to a third country correspond to the aim of Regulation [(EC) No 883/2004] of 29 April 2004 of allowing free movement of workers within the European Union?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 112/30

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Korkein oikeus (Finland) lodged on 17 February 2017 — Zurich Insurance PLC, Metso Minerals Oy v Abnormal Load Services (International) Ltd

(Case C-88/17)

(2017/C 112/40)

Language of the case: Finnish

Referring court

Korkein oikeus

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Zurich Insurance PLC, Metso Minerals Oy

Defendant: Abnormal Load Services (International) Ltd

Question referred

How are the place or places where the service is provided to be determined in accordance with the second indent of Article 5(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 (1) where a contract for the carriage of goods between Member States is concerned and the transport consists of several parts in which different means of transport are used?

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1).
D.

If the answer to question C is yes, is Article 14(5) of Directive 2011/95/EU compatible with Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 78(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which provide, inter alia, that secondary EU legislation must comply with the Geneva Convention, as it introduces a ground for refusing refugee status without any consideration of fear of persecution, as required by Article 1A of the Geneva Convention?
C.

In the present case, is it sufficient to sue the compensation body or is it also necessary to sue the insurance company? In the latter case, can the insurance company be sued at its headquarters in Luxembourg or must the action be brought against its representative in Portugal?
1.

Must Article 4(5) of Directive 2002/47 (1) be interpreted as imposing an obligation on Member States to establish legal rules which provide that financial collateral is not included in the assets remaining after the insolvency of the collateral taker (a bank in the process of being wound up)? In other words, are Member States obliged to establish legal rules which require that a collateral taker (a bank) should be de facto able to obtain satisfaction of its claim, which is secured by financial collateral (money in an account of the bank and a right of claim to that money), despite the fact that the enforcement event occurred after the commencement of the proceedings for the winding-up of the collateral taker (the bank)?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 178/11

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 1 March 2017 — Raoul Thybaut, Johnny De Coster and Frédéric Romain v Région wallonne

(Case C-160/17)

(2017/C 178/12)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Raoul Thybaut, Johnny De Coster and Frédéric Romain

Defendant: Région wallonne

Question referred

Is Article 2(a) of Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment (1) to be interpreted as including in the concept of plan or programme an area prescribed by a legislative provision and adopted by a regional authority:

— the sole purpose of which is to determine the boundary of a geographical area in which an urban development plan is capable of being carried out, it being understood that this plan, which must pursue a defined objective — in this case concerning renovation and development of urban functions requiring the creation, modification, extension, removal or overhang of roads and public spaces — justifies the adoption of the area, which in turn entails acceptance of the principle of this plan, but which must still be subject to planning permission which requires the assessment of effects; and

— which has the effect, from a procedural point of view, of allowing planning permission applications for measures or works located in this area to benefit from a special procedure, it being understood that the planning rules that were applicable to the land concerned before adoption of the area remain applicable, but that the use of this procedure may allow derogation from these rules to be obtained more easily; and

— which enjoys a presumption of public interest for expropriations within the framework of an accompanying expropriation plan?

(1) Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment (OJ 2001 L 197, p. 30).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 168/28

Appeal brought on 5 April 2017 by ANKO AE Antiprosopeion, Emporiou kai Viomichanias against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 25 January 2017 in Case T-771/14, ANKO v European Commission

(Case C-173/17 P)

(2017/C 168/37)

Language of the case: Greek

Parties

Appellant: ANKO AE Antiprosopeion, Emporiou kai Viomichanias (represented by: Stavroula Paliou, lawyer)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court of Justice of the European Union should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court of 25 January 2017 in Case Τ-771/14 and refer the case back to the General Court for it to rule on the substance.

— order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellant claims that the judgment in Case Τ-771/14 of the General Court of 25 January 2017 contains findings of law which are contrary to rules of EU law and challenges those findings by this appeal.

The appellant considers that the judgment under appeal should be set aside:

i First , on the ground of a distortion of the sense of the evidence, in relation to the reliability of the system for the recording of work time.

ii Second , on the ground of an error in law, in relation to the rules that apply, with respect to the action, to the matters to be proved and the burden of proof.

iii Third , on the ground of an error in law, in relation to the rules that apply, with respect to the cross-action, to the allocation of the burden of proof.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 202/8

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Szczecinie (Poland) lodged on 28 February 2017 — Paweł Hofsoe v LVM Landwirtschaftlicher Versicherungsverein Münster a.G.

(Case C-106/17)

(2017/C 202/13)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Okręgowy w Szczecinie

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Paweł Hofsoe

Defendant: LVM Landwirtschaftlicher Versicherungsverein Münster a.G. having its place of establishment in Münster

Question referred

Must the reference, in Article 13(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (1), to Article 11(1)(b) thereof be interpreted as meaning that a natural person who is engaged in, inter alia, obtaining damages from insurers, and who relies on the acquisition of a debt on a contractual basis from the party directly injured may bring an action for that debt against the civil-liability insurer of the person responsible for a road accident, which has its registered office in a Member State other than the Member State of the place of domicile of the injured party, before a court of the Member State in which that injured party is domiciled?

(1) OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 195/15

Action brought on 7 April 2017 — European Commission v Kingdom of Spain

(Case C-181/17)

(2017/C 195/20)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: J. Hottiaux and J. Rius, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Kingdom of Spain

Form of order sought

The Commission claims that the Court should:

— declare, in accordance with Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, that, by laying down a minimum number of vehicles for obtaining a public transport authorisation, the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 3 and 5(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009 concerning access to the occupation of road transport operator;

— order the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The action brought by the European Commission against the Kingdom of Spain concerns the application of Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing common rules concerning the conditions to be complied with to pursue the occupation of road transport operator and repealing Council Directive 96/26/EC. (1)

The Commission takes the view that, by imposing the requirement, for the purpose of obtaining a public transport authorisation, that undertakings should have at least three vehicles, the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 3(1) and (2) and Article 5(b) of that regulation.

(1) OJ 2009 L 300, p. 51.
1.

Does EU law (and in particular Directive 2011/92/EU, (1) in the version in force on the date of adoption of the contested measures) preclude, as a rule, a national rule or administrative practice which allows EIA screening or EIAs in respect of plants already in existence at the time when the procedure takes place, or does it, on the other hand, allow exceptional circumstances justifying a derogation from the general rule that an EIA is, by nature, a preventative assessment to be taken in into account?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 213/17

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Commissione tributaria provinciale di Roma (Italy) lodged on 10 March 2017 — Luigi Bisignani v Agenzia delle Entrate -Direzione Provinciale 1 di Roma

(Case C-125/17)

(2017/C 213/21)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Commissione tributaria provinciale di Roma

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Luigi Bisignani

Defendant: Agenzia delle Entrate -Direzione Provinciale 1 di Roma

Question referred

In so far as they permit the retention in national law of restrictions, in force at 31 December 1993, of movements of capital from or to third countries, in order to prevent potential losses of revenue for the Member States and permit the gathering of evidence of the irregularity or illegality of transactions that appear to be incompatible with, or in breach of, tax legislation and, on the basis of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality under Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union, distinguishing between taxpayers who do not find themselves in the same situation as regards their place of residence or as regards the place where their capital is invested, do Article 64 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in conjunction with the preceding Article 63 and subsequent Article 65 thereof, as well as Council Directive 2011/16/EU, (1) preclude national provisions that, in accordance with Article 9(1)(c) and (d) of Law No 97 of 6 August 2013 (European Law 2013), at least as interpreted by both parties, definitively abolished (rather than reframed) the tax offence established and penalised under Articles 4 and 5 of Decree-Law No 167 of 28 June 1990, converted, with amendments into Law No 227 of 4 August 1990, without, moreover, distinguishing the various cases of capital movement between Member States of the Union from those between the latter and States or territories with preferential tax regimes?

(1) Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC (OJ 2011 L 64, p. 1).
2.

If the first question is to be answered in the affirmative: Is Article 57(1) EC to be interpreted as meaning that a national-law restriction in respect of the movement of capital to or from third countries involving direct investments is to be regarded as applicable on the relevant date of 31 December 1993, if later national law substantially corresponding to the restriction in force at the relevant date enters into force, the restriction existing at the relevant date being nevertheless substantially amended for a short time by legislation which formally entered into force but was in practice never applied due to the fact that it was replaced by the legislation at present in force before it could be applied to a specific case for the first time?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 231/2

Appeal brought on 31 January 2017 by Universidad Internacional de la Rioja, S.A. against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 1 December 2016 in Case T-561/15, Universidad Internacional de la Rioja v EUIPO — Universidad de la Rioja (Universidad Internacional de la Rioja UNIR)

(Case C-50/17 P)

(2017/C 231/03)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: Universidad Internacional de la Rioja (represented by: C. Lema Devesa and A. Porras Fernandez-Toledano, abogados)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 1 June 2017, the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered the Universidad Internacional de La Rioja, S.A. to bear its own costs.
2.

If the first question is answered in the affirmative: Does claiming seniority under Article 34(2) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (2) have the effect that the right under the national trade mark lapses and can no longer be used in such a way as to maintain rights attached to it, or is the national trade mark preserved by virtue of EU law, even though it no longer exists in the register of the Member State concerned, with the result that it can and must continue to be used in such a way as to maintain the rights attached to it?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 239/24

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 13 April 2017 — Bundeskammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte v ING-DiBa Direktbank Austria Niederlassung der ING-DiBa AG

(Case C-191/17)

(2017/C 239/29)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberster Gerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Bundeskammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte

Defendant: ING-DiBa Direktbank Austria Niederlassung der ING-DiBa AG

Question referred

Must Article 4(14) of Directive 2007/64/EC (1) on payment services in the internal market (the Payment Services Directive) be interpreted as meaning that an online savings account with which a customer (without notice and without any particular involvement of the bank) may by way of telebanking make deposits into and withdrawals from a reference account (a current account in Austria) held in his name is also to be included within the term ‘payment account’ (Article 4(14) of that directive) and thus falls within the scope of that directive?

(1) Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC (OJ 2007 L 319, p. 1).
1.

Is there a breach of the principles of fiscal neutrality and effectiveness of the common system of value added tax under the provisions of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (1) of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax if, in a case such as that in the main proceedings, VAT is levied twice on the same supply, once under the general rules, by the supplier showing the tax in the sales invoice, and a second time, by the customer being charged by means of a tax adjustment notice according to the reverse charge mechanism, and if in practice the right to deduct input VAT is refused and national law makes no provision for the VAT shown in the supplier’s invoice to be rectified following the conclusion of the tax audit procedure?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 249/16

Appeal brought on 18 January 2017 by For Tune sp. z o.o. against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 8 November 2016 in Case T-579/15: For Tune sp. z o.o. v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-23/17 P)

(2017/C 249/24)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: For Tune sp. z o.o. (represented by: K. Popławska, adwokat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 15 June 2017 the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
1.

Must Articles 2(1)(c), 64(1), 66(a) and 73 of Directive 2006/112/EC (1) be interpreted as meaning that a telecommunications operator (television, internet, mobile network and fixed network) is liable for value added tax as a result of charging its customers –– in a case of termination, for reasons attributable to the customer, of a contract containing an obligation to be bound by the contract for a defined term (tie-in period) before the end of that period –– a pre-determined amount, corresponding to the basic monthly amount payable by the customer under the contract, multiplied by the number of monthly payments that are still to be made before the end of the tie-in period, the operator having, at the time when that amount is invoiced and independently of its actual payment, already ceased to provide the services, where: (a) the contractual purpose of the amount invoiced is to deter the customer from disregarding the tie-in period which he has undertaken to observe and to make good the damage sustained by the operator as a result of the failure to complete the tie-in period –– in particular, on account of loss of the profit the operator would have obtained if the contract had continued until the end of the period, as well as on account of the agreement to charge lower tariffs, the supply of equipment or other offers, free of charge or at discounted prices, and the costs of advertising and of acquiring customers; (b) contracts negotiated with a tie-in period entail higher remuneration for the commercial intermediaries who obtained them than contracts obtained by them without a tie-in period and that remuneration is calculated, in each case (that is, as regards contracts with or without a tie-in), on the basis of the amount set for monthly payments in the contracts obtained; (c) the amount invoiced may be classified, under national law, as a penalty clause?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 277/20

Appeal brought on 24 January 2017 by Rudolf Keil against the judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 15 December 2016 in Case T-330/15 Rudolf Keil v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-37/17 P)

(2017/C 277/28)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Rudolf Keil (represented by: J. Sachs, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 31 May 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Tenth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to bear his own costs.
1.

Is Clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June (1) applicable to the horizontal career increment claimed by the applicant, on the basis that it is an employment condition, or, rather, does the increment constitute an element of remuneration with the characteristics described in the present order that depends on the subjective qualities of the recipient which have been gained by working for a number of years under a system based on increasing levels of difficulty and responsibility and on continuity, specialisation and professionalism?
1.

Is Article 4(3) read in conjunction with Article 3 of the 2007 Hague Protocol on the law applicable to maintenance obligations to be interpreted as meaning that a maintenance debtor’s application, on the basis of a change in his income, for a reduction in the amount of maintenance awarded by a decision that has become final is governed by the law of the State of the creditor’s habitual residence even if the amount of maintenance previously payable was determined by the court, on application by the creditor pursuant to Article 4(3) of the 2007 Hague Protocol on the law applicable to maintenance obligations, according to the law of the State where the debtor has his habitual residence, which has not changed? If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative:
2.

In the event that the first question is answered in the negative: Is the spontaneous absence, due to unauthorised work stoppage under employment law or collective agreements (‘wildcat strike’), of a significant part of an operating air carrier’s staff for flight operation an extraordinary circumstance under Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004? In the event that the second question is answered in the affirmative: how high must the rate of absence be to constitute such an extraordinary circumstance?
2.

Is a motor vehicle composed of essential parts which were manufactured before the application of Directive 2007/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007 establishing a framework for the approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles (OJ 2007 L 263, p. 1) and, on the other hand, of essential parts which were only added after the application of that Directive, a motor vehicle which already existed before the application of that Directive, or has such a motor vehicle only come into existence after the application of that Directive?
3.

If the first question is answered in the affirmative, must the provisions of Annex III, Section II, Chapter IV, point 8, to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific hygiene rules for food of animal origin (OJ 2004 L 139) then be interpreted as meaning that the cleaning must take place immediately after evisceration, or may the removal of any visible forms of contamination, on the basis of that provision, also take place during chilling, cutting or packaging?