ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Appeal brought on 8 December 2021 by the European Parliament against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 29 September 2021 in Case T-384/19, Parliament v Axa Assurances Luxembourg SA and Others

(Case C-766/21 P)

(2022/C 119/28)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: European Parliament (represented by: E. Paladini and B. Schäfer, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Axa Assurances Luxembourg SA, Bâloise Assurances Luxembourg SA, La Luxembourgeoise SA, Nationale-Nederlanden Schadeverzekering Maatschappij NV

Form of order sought

— annul the second and fourth paragraphs of the operative part of the judgment under appeal;

— refer the case back to the General Court;

— reserve costs, with the exception of those which are subject to the third paragraph of the operative part of the judgment under appeal.

In the alternative,

— annul the second and fourth paragraphs of the operative part of the judgment under appeal;

— grant the form of order sought by the European Parliament at first instance in respect of Axa Assurances Luxembourg SA, Bâloise Assurances Luxembourg SA and La Luxembourgeoise SA.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of its appeal, the European Parliament raises three grounds of appeal.

The first ground of appeal alleges an error of law consisting in the infringement of the principles of interpretation of EU law. The Parliament considers that the General Court disregarded, in particular, the rule of interpretation consisting in taking account of the purpose of the contract and the context in which its terms, and more specifically the term ‘flooding’, appear. In the alternative, the Parliament takes the view that the General Court distorted the exclusion clause relating to flooding.

The second ground of appeal alleges an error relating to reasoning of the judgment under appeal, which is, in the Parliament’s view, vitiated by a contradiction in the reasoning of the General Court on the interpretation of the term ‘flooding’.

Thirdly, the Parliament considers that the judgment under appeal contains several distortions of the facts and evidence: the General Court distorted the Parliament’s position on the interpretation of the term ‘flooding’; it assessed the situation of the building site at the time of the damage in a manifestly erroneous manner, and also distorted the findings of the expert report on the causes of the damage.
3.

Is Article 4 of Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA, (2) read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, to be interpreted as meaning that it applies a fortiori where the act is not a criminal offence and as precluding national legislation, such as Article 59(2) of the ZANN, which excludes the owner of property confiscated from the group of persons entitled to lodge an appeal, or, such as Article 232 of the ZM, which expressly states that a notice by which property is confiscated under national law from a third party not party to the administrative offence proceedings is not open to appeal?
2.

When deciding on an application for renewal under Paragraph 38a(1) of the AufenthG, is the Ausländerbehörde (authority responsible for foreign nationals) entitled under the provisions of Article 14 et seq. of Directive 2003/109/EC, where the other requirements for a temporary renewal are met and the foreign national has, in particular, stable and regular resources, to establish — in such a way as to deprive that foreign national of his or her rights — that he or she has in the meantime, that is to say, after moving to the second Member State, lost his or her status in the first Member State in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 9(4) of Directive 2003/109/EC? Is the relevant point in time for that decision the date of the most recent decision of an authority or court?
2.

If the Court of Justice replies to question 1 in the affirmative, is the air carrier obliged, as part of those reasonable measures, a) to return with the aircraft assigned for operation of the flight, which was diverted to a neighbouring airport because of a storm, to collect the passengers for that flight as soon as the crew’s flying time allows, and, therefore, to operate that flight? If so, is the air carrier also obliged to do this even if, for that reason, in order for other flights which have been assigned to the aircraft to operate, it has to provide another aircraft and a replacement crew at the departure airport of those flights, which is the air carrier’s base airport? b) to transfer the passengers by road to the aircraft assigned for operation of the flight, which was diverted to a neighbouring airport 140 km away because of a storm, and to operate the flight from there? c) to send a replacement aircraft or to transfer the passengers by road to the replacement aircraft, which was sent to a neighbouring airport, and, therefore, to operate the flight?
1.

Is a national court required to interpret in a manner consistent with Council Directive 2009/133/EC (1) the national tax legislation applicable to internal situations which governs the non-taxation of income arising on the cancellation of the shareholding of a receiving company in the capital of a transferring company, in circumstances such as those of this case, where: — the national legislature has regulated internal transactions and similar cross-border transactions with separate, non-identical rules; — the national rule applicable to internal transactions nevertheless operates using concepts contained in the directive — merger, transfer of assets and liabilities, cancellation of shareholdings; — the explanatory memorandum to the national tax law can be interpreted as meaning that the legislature intended to establish the same tax treatment for national transactions as for cross-border transactions, covered by the transposition of the directive, in order to comply with the principle of the tax neutrality of mergers in a non-discriminatory manner and in such a way as to avoid distortions of competition?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 15 December 2021 by Wolfgang Kappes against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) delivered on 13 October 2021 in Case T-436/20, Sedus Stoll AG v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-785/21 P)

(2022/C 213/23)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Wolfgang Kappes (represented by: B. Schneiders, J. Schneiders, T. Pfeifer, N. Gottschalk, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: Sedus Stoll AG, European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 5 April 2022, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) did not allow the appeal to proceed and ordered the appellant to bear his own costs.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Alba Iulia (Romania) lodged on 11 October 2021 — S.H. v Administrația Județeană a Finanțelor Publice Sibiu, Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Brașov

(Case C-627/21)

(2022/C 191/08)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Alba Iulia

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: S.H.

Respondents: Administrația Județeană a Finanțelor Publice Sibiu, Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Brașov

Question referred

Can the principle of neutrality of VAT, [recital 30] and Articles 16, 184, 186, 187, 188 and 192 of Directive 112/2006/EC (1) be interpreted as being compatible with national legislation relating to adjustment of the deductible tax in respect of capital goods (in particular Article 305(4)(a) of Legea nr. 227/2015 privind Codul fiscal (Law No 227/2015 establishing the Tax Code) and point 79(14)(b) of the Normele metodologice de aplicare a Legii nr. 227/2015 privind Codul fiscal (Rules for applying Law No 227/2015 establishing the Tax Code), approved by Hotărârea Guvernului nr. 1/2016 (Government Decision No 1/2016), laid down pursuant to Article 305(4)(a) of the Tax Code, in conjunction with Article 316(11)(e) of Law No 227/2015 establishing the Tax Code), and with the practice of the tax administration affecting the initial deductibility of VAT paid in respect of the purchases of capital goods by requiring the taxable person to adjust downwards the deductible VAT on the ground that the tax authority annulled, of its own motion, the taxable person’s registration for VAT purposes for a certain period because of a failure to carry on economic activities in relation to the time during which the capital goods were not the subject of supplies of services or goods during the period between the annulment of the tax authority’s own motion and re-registration for the purposes of VAT?

(1) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1, Special edition in Romanian: Chapter 09 Volume 003 P. 7).
Is Directive 2003/88/EC (1) applicable where characteristics peculiar to certain specific public service activities, such as the armed forces or the police, or to certain specific activities in the civil protection services, inevitably conflict with it, in view of the fact that:

Article 1(3) of Directive 2003/88/EC provides that that directive is to apply to all sectors of activity, both public and private, within the meaning of Article 2 of Directive 89/391/EEC; (2)

Article 2(2) of Directive 89/391/EEC provides that that directive is not applicable where characteristics peculiar to certain specific public service activities, such as the armed forces or the police, or to certain specific activities in the civil protection services inevitably conflict with it?
Appeal brought on 9 November 2021 by Eos Products Sàrl against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 8 September 2021 in Case T-489/20, Eos Products Sàrl v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-672/21 P)

(2022/C 222/12)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Eos Products Sàrl (represented by: S. Stolzenburg-Wiemer, Rechtsanwältin)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 4 February 2022, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) decided that the appeal should not be allowed to proceed and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 10 January 2022 — Syndicat Les Entreprises du Médicament (LEEM) v Ministre des Solidarités et de la Santé

(Case C-20/22)

(2022/C 119/38)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Syndicat Les Entreprises du Médicament (LEEM)

Defendant: Ministre des Solidarités et de la Santé

Question referred

Must Article 4 of Council Directive 89/105/EEC of 21 December 1988 relating to the transparency of measures regulating the pricing of medicinal products for human use and their inclusion in the scope of national health insurance systems (1) be interpreted as meaning that the concept of a ‘price freeze […] on all medicinal products or on certain categories of medicinal products’ applies to a measure whose purpose is to control the prices of medicinal products but which concerns only certain medicinal products, on an individual basis, and is not intended to apply to all medicinal products or even to certain categories of them, when the safeguards which that article attaches to the existence of such a price-freezing measure as defined by that article appear, for such a measure, meaningless and pointless?

(1) OJ 1989 L 40, p. 8.
2.

In the light of Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 93/13/EEC, where a court finds that the contractual term in question is unlawful and that the contract is not capable of continuing in existence after that term has been removed, in the absence of an agreement by the parties to fill the gap with clauses in accordance with their wishes and in the absence of supplementary provisions (directly applicable to the contract in the absence of an agreement by the parties), must that court declare the contract invalid on the basis of the wishes of the consumer who sought that declaration, or must the court examine, of its own motion, going beyond the form of order sought by the parties, the financial situation of the consumer in order to determine whether declaring the contract invalid would expose the consumer to particularly unfavourable consequences?
2.

If a conviction by final judgment for a particularly serious crime is not, on its own, sufficient to establish the existence of a danger to the community, must Article 14(4)(b) of Directive 2011/95/EU be interpreted as requiring the Member State to establish that, since his or her conviction, the applicant continues to constitute a danger to the community? Must the Member State establish that the danger is genuine and present or is the existence of a potential threat sufficient? Must Article 14(4)(b) of Directive 2011/95/EU, taken alone or in conjunction with the principle of proportionality, be interpreted as allowing revocation of refugee status only if that revocation is proportionate and the danger represented by the beneficiary of that status sufficiently serious to justify that revocation?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal Administrativo (Portugal) lodged on 19 January 2022 — Global, Companhia de Seguros, S.A. v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

(Case C-42/22)

(2022/C 171/21)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Supremo Tribunal Administrativo

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Global, Companhia de Seguros, S.A.

Respondent: Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

Questions referred

A. Must Article 13(B)(a) of the Sixth VAT Directive, (1) and, therefore, the current Article 135(1)(a) of the VAT Directive, (2) be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘insurance and reinsurance transactions’ includes, for the purposes of exemption from VAT, related or supplementary activities such as the purchase and sale of parts from written-off vehicles?

B. Must Article 13(B)(c) of the Sixth VAT Directive, and, therefore, the later Article 136(a) of the VAT Directive, be interpreted as meaning that parts from written-off vehicles are regarded as being purchased and sold solely for an exempt entity, where those goods have not given rise to the right to deduction of VAT?

C. Is it contrary to the principle of VAT neutrality for the sale of parts from written-off vehicles by insurance companies not to be exempt from VAT where there was no right to deduction of VAT?

(1) Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1, Portuguese special edition: Chapter 09 Volume 001 P. 54).

(2) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).
2.

Can Article 2(2)(a) and (b) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation be interpreted as permitting a public administration to put in place an entirely neutral administrative environment and thus to prohibit all members of staff from wearing symbols of conviction, whether or not they are in direct contact with the public, even if that neutral prohibition appears mostly to affect women, and may thus constitute disguised discrimination on grounds of gender?
1.

Does the failure of a controller to discharge or fully to discharge its obligation of accountability under Article 5 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), (1) for example due to the lack of a record — or a complete record — of processing activities in accordance with Article 30 of the GDPR or the lack of an arrangement for a joint procedure in accordance with Article 26 of the GDPR, result in the data processing in question being unlawful within the meaning of Article 17(1)(d) of the GDPR and Article 18(1)(b) of the GDPR, so that the data subject has a right to erasure or restriction?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank van eerste aanleg Oost-Vlaanderen, Afdeling Gent (Belgium) lodged on 17 January 2022 — VN v Belgische Staat

(Case C-34/22)

(2022/C 213/28)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank van eerste aanleg Oost-Vlaanderen, Afdeling Gent

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: VN

Defendant: Belgische Staat

Question referred

Does Article 21(1)(5) of the ITC 1992, as amended by Article 170 of the Law of 25 April 2014 on various provisions, infringe the provisions of Articles 56 and 63 TFEU and Articles 36 and 40 of the EEA Agreement, in that the provision in question, although it applies without distinction to domestic and foreign service providers, not only requires compliance with conditions analogous to those set out in Article 2 RD/ITC 1992, which are de facto specific to the Belgian market, but also requires, first of all, that such analogous requirements be laid down by the public authorities in the EEA State concerned, thus going beyond local prudential supervision and falling instead within the scope of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Directive No 94/19/EC, [thereby] seriously imped[ing] foreign service providers from offering their services in Belgium? (1)

(1) Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes (OJ 1994 L 135, p. 5).
1.

Must Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, (1) be interpreted as meaning that the courts of a Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter, if they consider that a court of another Member State, with which the child has a particular connection, would be better placed to hear the case, or a specific part thereof, may request such a court to assume jurisdiction even in the case where that other Member State has become the place of habitual residence of the child following wrongful removal?
1.

What requirements as to content does information provided need to satisfy in order to be regarded as sufficiently ‘meaningful’ within the meaning of Article 15(1)(h) of the General Data Protection Regulation; ‘the GDPR’)? (1) In the case of profiling, must the information essential for making the result of the automated decision transparent in each individual case also be disclosed by the controller — where necessary in compliance with an existing trade secret — as part of the disclosure of the ‘logic involved’ which includes, in particular, (1) the disclosure of the data subject’s processed data, (2) the disclosure of the parts of the algorithm on which the profiling is based that are necessary to provide transparency, and (3) the information relevant to establishing the connection between the processed information and the rating arrived at? In cases involving profiling, must the party entitled to access for the purpose of Article 15(1)(h) of the GDPR be provided, as a minimum, with the following information on the specific processing concerning him or her, even if a trade secret is involved, in order to enable him or her to protect his or her rights under Article 22(3) of the GDPR: (a) communication of all potentially pseudo-anonymised information, in particular on the manner in which the data subject’s data is being processed, which allows the data subject to check compliance with the GDPR, (b) making available the input data used for profiling, (c) the parameters and input variables used in the determination of the rating, (d) the influence of these parameters and input variables on the calculated rating, (e) information on the origin of the parameters or input variables, (f) an explanation as to why the party entitled to access for the purpose of Article 15(1)(h) of the GDPR has been assigned a specific rating and clarification of the implications of such rating, (g) listing the profile categories and providing an explanation as to what rating implication is associated with each of the profile categories?
Appeal brought on 11 February 2022 by HC against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 1 December 2021 in Case T-804/19, HC v Commission

(Case C-102/22 P)

(2022/C 222/17)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: HC (represented by: D. Rovetta, V. Villante, avvocati)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The Appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside and annul the judgment of the General Court of 1 December 2021 in Case T-804/19, HC vs. European Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2021:849, notified to HC on 1 December 2021;

— declare the plea of illegality under article 277 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union of the Notice of Competition at issue concerning its language regime admissible and founded;

— annul the ‘second contested decision’ at first instance namely the letter/decision of 21 March 2019 in which EPSO rejected the request for review, informing the applicant that the selection board had confirmed its decision not to invite him to the assessment centre;

— award the Appellant 50.000 euro in form of compensation for the damage suffered.

— As a subordinate to the above, set aside the General Court judgment under appeal and send the case back to the General Court;

— order the European Commission to bear the Appellant’s costs both concerning the first instance and present appellate proceeding.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In the current appeal, the Appellant relies on the two main grounds of appeals:

First ground of appeal: Erroneous qualification of facts and distortion of evidence by the General Court with regard to its assessment and judgment concerning the second part of the first plea in law raised by the Appellant at first instance — Breach of the notice of competition. The Appellant faults the General Court of having wrongly qualified the facts, distorted evidence and breached the Notice of Competition applicable to him with regard to the evaluation of the Appellant’s professional experience and academic qualifications.

Second ground of appeal: Breach and wrong interpretation of Article 277 of the TFEU. Breach of Articles 1 to 4 of Regulation No 1 of 15 April 1958 (1) determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community in its version currently in force. Breach of Article 1d and Article 28 of the Staff Regulations and Article 1(1)(f) of Annex III thereto. The Appellants faults the General Court for having interpreted too strictly the requirement related to a ‘close connection’ between the Notice of Competition at issue and the challenged decision before the General Court for the purpose of raising a plea of illegality under article 277 TFEU against such Notice of Competition. The Appellant is of the view that such ‘close connection’ is present and therefore his plea of illegality against the restriction to the use as the second language for the competition at issue of French and English is admissible and well founded.

(1) OJ 1958, 17, p. 385.
3.

After assessment of the specific features of the situation and the resulting legal consequences, can the term ‘public policy’ used in Regulation No 1215/2012 be interpreted as covering the ground for deciding not to recognise a judgment of another Member State where the application of a specialised convention, such as the CMR Convention, creates a legal situation in which both the agreement conferring jurisdiction and the agreement on the applicable law are not observed in the same case?