ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Case C‑85/18 PPU

CV

v

DU

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Judecătoria Oradea)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Urgent preliminary ruling procedure — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility — Child custody — Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 — Articles 8, 10 and 13 — Concept of ‘habitual residence’ of a child — Judgment delivered by a court of another Member State concerning the place of residence of a child — Wrongful removal or retention — Jurisdiction in cases of child abduction)

Summary — Order of the Court (First Chamber), 10 April 2018

Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and in the matters of parental responsibility — Regulation No 2201/2003 — Jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters relating to maintenance obligations — Regulation No 4/2009 — Jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility and maintenance obligations — Wrongful removal or retention of a child — Jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State other than that of the habitual residence of the child prior to its removal — Absence — Limits

(Council Regulations No 2201/2003, Art. 10, and No 4/2009, Art. 3)

Article 10 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, and Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, must be interpreted as meaning that, in a case such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in which a child who was habitually resident in a Member State was wrongfully removed by one of the parents to another Member State, the courts of that other Member State do not have jurisdiction to rule on an application relating to custody or the determination of a maintenance allowance with respect to that child, in the absence of any indication that the other parent consented to his removal or did not bring an application for the return of that child.

(see para. 57, operative part)
Case C‑621/18

Andy Wightman and Others

v

Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Session, Inner House, First Division (Scotland))

(Expedited procedure)

Summary — Order of the President of the Court, 19 October 2018

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Expedited preliminary ruling procedure – Conditions – Circumstances justifying that a case be dealt with within a short time – Request for interpretation concerning the possibility for a Member State to revoke unilaterally the notification of its intention to withdraw from the European Union – Need to obtain a reply from the Court before the parliamentary consideration and voting on the withdrawal agreement within the parliament of the Member State concerned – Case concerning fundamental issues of national constitutional law and EU law – Grant of the request that the reference for a preliminary ruling be determined pursuant to an expedited procedure

(Art. 50 TEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 23a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 105(1))

See the text of the decision.

(see paras 7-11)
On an application for interim measures, where it was necessary to assess whether it was urgent to order interim measures in order to prevent the disclosure of material alleged to be confidential, that assessment overlaps, to an extent, the examination of whether there is a prima facie case that the information is confidential, as claimed by the party seeking those measures.

In that regard, it is only when, first, the applicant for interim measures alleges that the information whose publication he wishes provisionally to prevent constitutes business secrets or is covered by professional secrecy and, second, that allegation satisfies the condition that there is a prima facie case, that the judge hearing an application for interim measures is in principle required, when examining the condition of urgency, to start from the premiss that the information constitutes business secrets or is covered by professional secrecy. Therefore, it is insufficient, for the purposes of being granted interim measures, to have claimed that the information which is to be disclosed is confidential where such a claim does not satisfy the condition relating to a prima facie case.

(see paras 15, 21, 22)
Case C‑315/18 P(R)

Valencia Club de Fútbol SAD

v

European Commission

(Appeal — Order of the court hearing the application for interim measures — State aid — Aid granted by the Spanish authorities to certain football clubs — Guarantee given by a public body in connection with loans to three football clubs in the Autonomous Community of Valencia — Decision declaring the aid to be incompatible with the internal market — Recovery order — Suspension of operation of a measure — Urgency — Statement of reasons — Effective judicial protection)

Summary — Order of the Judge hearing applications for interim measures, 22 November 2018

Appeal — Grounds — Inadequate or contradictory grounds — Scope of the obligation to state reasons — Reliance by the General Court on implied reasoning — Lawfulness — Conditions (Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 36 and 53, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 119) Application for interim measures — Admissibility criteria — Application — Formal requirements — Pleas establishing a prima facie case for the measures applied for — Possibility of supplementing the information and evidence set out in the application — Discretion of the Courts of the Union (Arts 278 and 279 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 160(3)) Appeal — Pleas in law/Grounds — Review by the Court of the General Court’s assessment of the need to provide additional information — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU)
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 13 December 2018 — Hochmann Marketing GmbH v EUIPO

(Case C‑118/18 P-INT)

(Application for interpretation — Inadmissibility)

Judicial proceedings — Interpretation of a judgment — Conditions for the admissibility thereof

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 43; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 158(1))

(see paras 8, 15, 16)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed as being, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded.
Appeals — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58(1)(1))

(see para 5)
Appeal — Grounds — Mistaken assessment of the facts — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of Justice of the assessment of the facts put before the General Court — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Art. 256(1), second para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see para. 5)
Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 15 July 2019 — Galeria Parque Nascente

(Case C‑438/18) ( 1 )

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Common system of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, partial divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies of different Member States — Directive 90/434/EEC — Articles 4 and 11 — Directive 2009/133/EC — Articles 4 and 15 — So-called ‘reverse’ merger — Tax system leading to a situation whereby, in the event of a so-called ‘reverse’ merger, costs which are incurred by the parent company relating to a loan taken out by that parent company for the purchase of shares of the subsidiary acquiring the parent company and which are deductible for that parent company, are considered non-deductible for that subsidiary)

1. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Interpretation sought on account of the applicability to a situation confined within one Member State of a provision of EU law rendered applicable by national law — Jurisdiction to provide such an interpretation (Art. 267 TFEU; Council Directive 90/434; Council Directive 2009/133) (see paras 38-41)

2. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Questions the answer to which may be clearly deduced from the Court's existing case-law — Application of Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure (Art. 267 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 99) (see paras 45, 46)

3. Approximation of laws — Common system of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies of different Member States — Directive 90/434 — So-called ‘reverse’ merger — Tax system setting out the deductible costs in relation to that transaction — Costs incurred by the acquiring company considered non-deductible, unlike those incurred by the acquired company — Lawfulness (Council Directive 90/434, as amended by Directive 2006/98) (see paras 48-51, operative part)

Operative part

Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, partial divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies of different Member States and to the transfer of the registered office, of an SE or SCE, between Member States, as amended by Council Directive 2006/98/EC of 20 November 2006 must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which leads to a situation whereby costs which were considered tax deductible for the acquired company before the merger of the companies concerned, and which would have been tax deductible if that merger had not taken place, are not considered tax deductible for the acquiring company.

( 1 ) OJ C 319, 10.9.2018.
Appeal — Grounds — Mistaken assessment of the facts — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statue of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see para. 19)
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 20 November 2019 —

Indaco Service

(Case C‑552/18) ( 1 )

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Public procurement — Directive 2014/24/EU — Article 57(4)(c) and (g) — Award of public service contracts — Optional grounds for exclusion — Grave professional misconduct — Calling into question the economic operator’s integrity — Prior contract — Performance — Breaches — Termination — Judicial remedy — Contracting authority’s assessment of the contractual breach — Preclusion until the end of the judicial proceedings)

Approximation of laws — Procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts — Directive 2014/24 — Award of contracts — Grounds for exclusion from participation in a tender procedure — Grave professional misconduct calling into question the integrity of an economic operator — Termination of an earlier contract on account of such misconduct — Challenge of that termination before a civil court — National legislation preventing the contracting authority from excluding the operator concerned, on the basis of an assessment of that operator’s reliability — Not permissible

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2014/24, Art. 57(4)(c) and (g))

(see para. 28 and operative part)

Operative part

Article 57(4)(c) and (g) of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC must be interpreted as precluding rules of national law pursuant to which an action before the courts against a decision to terminate a public contract, taken by a contracting authority on account of ‘grave professional misconduct’ arising during performance of the contract, prevents the contracting authority which issues a new call for tenders from excluding an operator, at the stage of selecting tenderers, on the basis of an assessment of that operator’s reliability.

( 1 ) OJ C 436, 3.12.2018.
Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 3 September 2020 – (Tsipouro)

(Case C‑91/18 INT)

(Application for interpretation – Manifest inadmissibility)

Judicial proceedings – Interpretation of a judgment – Conditions for the admissibility of the application

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 43; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 158(1))

(see paras 8, 9)

Operative part:

1. The application for interpretation is dismissed as being manifestly inadmissible.
1.

Paragraph 28 of the Order of the Vice-President of the Court of 12 June 2018, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission (C‑65/18 P(R), EU:C:2018:426), in the version in the language of the case, shall be rectified as follows: ‘Even on that ground alone, the President of the General Court was fully entitled to find that the condition relating to a prima facie case was not satisfied. Consequently, the other grounds of the order under appeal, contained in paragraphs 37 to 41 and 44 to 46 thereof, which seek to exclude that the information was confidential in any way, are included only for the sake of completeness.’
4

Article 2c of that directive, relating to ‘time limits for applying for review’, provides: ‘Where a Member State provides that any application for review of a contracting authority’s decision taken in the context of, or in relation to, a contract award procedure falling within the scope of Directive [2014/24] or [Directive 2014/23] must be made before the expiry of a specified period, this period shall be at least 10 calendar days with effect from the day following the date on which the contracting authority’s decision is sent to the tenderer or candidate if fax or electronic means are used or, if other means of communication are used, this period shall be either at least 15 calendar days with effect from the day following the date on which the contracting authority’s decision is sent to the tenderer or candidate or at least 10 calendar days with effect from the day following the date of the receipt of the contracting authority’s decision. The communication of the contracting authority’s decision to each tenderer or candidate shall be accompanied by a summary of the relevant reasons. In the case of an application for review concerning decisions referred to in Article 2(1)(b) of this Directive that are not subject to a specific notification, the time period shall be at least 10 calendar days from the date of the publication of the decision concerned.’
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 11 February 2021 – WALLAPOP v EUIPO

(Case C‑763/18 P-INT)

(Interpretation of an order – Manifest inadmissibility)

Judicial proceedings – Interpretation of a judgment – Conditions for the admissibility of the application

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 43; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 158(1))

(see paras 6-11)

Operative part

1. The application for interpretation is dismissed as being manifestly inadmissible.
Order of the Vice-President of the Court 12 July 2019 — Pan v EUIPO

(Case C‑412/19 P)

(Appeal — EU trade mark — Article 170a(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — No request that an appeal be allowed to proceed — Appeal inadmissible)

Appeal — Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed — No request that an appeal be allowed to proceed — Inadmissibility

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 170a(1))

(see paras 4-8)

Operative part

The appeal is dismissed as inadmissible.
Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 4 July 2019 — Daico International v EUIPO

(Case C‑36/19 P)

(Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — EU trade mark — Revocation proceedings — Word mark RoB — Declaration of revocation — Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 — Rule 62(3) — Due notification — Appeal manifestly unfounded)

EU trade mark — Procedural provisions — Notification — Notification by registered letter — Calculation of time limits — Date of receipt

(Commission Regulation No 2868/95, Art. 1, Rule 62(3))

(see para. 5)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed as manifestly unfounded.
Order of the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) of 16 September 2019 — Kiku v CPVO

(Case C‑444/19 P)

(Appeal — Community plant variety rights — Determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed — Article 170b of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Appeal not demonstrating the significance of an issue of law with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law — Appeal not allowed to proceed)

Appeal — Preliminary admission scheme — Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law — Request for the appeal to be allowed to proceed not demonstrating that the issue is significant — Not allowed to proceed

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 170b)

(see paras 8-16)

Operative part

1. The appeal is not allowed to proceed.
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Admissibility — Reference giving no details of the relevant facts or legislation and not setting out the reasons for making that reference to the Court of Justice — Manifest inadmissibility

(Art. 267 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 23; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 53(2) and 94)

(see paras 4-10, 12, 13, operative part)
Order of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 19 November 2019 —

Syyttäjä and Tulli

(Case C‑486/19) ( 1 )

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — State aid — Tax levied on confectionery, ice cream and soft drinks — Exemption of similar products liable to constitute State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU — Power to impose criminal penalties for failure to fulfil obligations as regards that tax)

1. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Questions the answer to which may be clearly deduced from the Court's existing case-law — Application of Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice (Art. 267 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 99) (see paras 19, 20)

2. State aid — Provisions of the Treaty — Scope — Taxes coupled with exemptions regarded as aid — Included — National criminal sanctions imposed for failure to fulfil obligations as regards a tax coupled with exemptions — Those liable to pay the tax may not rely on the nature of the exemptions as aid — Exceptions –Tax and exemption forming an integral part of an aid measure — Tax and aid measure constituting two elements of one and the same fiscal measure which are inseparable —None (Art. 107(1) TFEU) (see paras 21-28, operative part)

Operative part

EU law must be interpreted as not precluding a natural person, acting on behalf of a company subject to a consumption tax levied on certain products, such as the tax at issue in the main proceedings, who failed to fulfil its obligations as regards that tax, from facing criminal sanctions under the applicable national law, even though the exemption enjoyed by other undertakings as regards similar products should be considered State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU.

( 1 ) OJ C 12, 13.1.1997.
Order of the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) of 13 February 2020 — ruwido austria v EUIPO

(Case C‑823/19 P)

(Appeal — EU trade mark — Determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed — Article 170 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Request failing to demonstrate a significant issue with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law — Appeal not allowed to proceed)

Appeal — Preliminary admission scheme — Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law —Request for the appeal to be allowed to proceed not demonstrating that the issue is significant — Appeal not allowed to proceed

(Statue of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a and 170)

(see paras 12-20)

Operative part

1. The appeal is not allowed to proceed.
Appeal — Grounds — Grounds which are manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded — Dismissal at any point, by reasoned order, without an oral procedure

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 181)

(see paras 6, 26-30)
Judicial proceedings — Intervention — Admissibility criteria — Interest in the result of the case — Meaning — Need for a direct and existing interest — Case regarding the legality of a Commission decision on State aid — Recipient undertaking exposed to a risk of recovery ordered by a national court — Existence of a direct and existing interest in the result of the case

(Art. 108(2) and (3) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 40, second para.)

(see paras 28-30, 41-43)
Appeal — Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed — Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law — Burden of proof

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a, third para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b(4))

(see para. 8)
Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 28 October 2020 – Repsol Comercial de Productos Petrolíferos

(Case C‑716/19) ( 1 )

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Article 53(2) and Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Competition – Final decision of a national competition authority finding a practice restricting competition – Scope of the probative value of the facts examined and found – Lack of sufficient details concerning the factual and regulatory context of the main proceedings and the reasons justifying the need to reply to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Manifest inadmissibility)

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Admissibility – Need to provide the Court with sufficient information on the factual and legislative context – Extent of the obligation in the sphere of competition – Insufficient information regarding that context – Manifest inadmissibility

(Art. 267 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 23, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 53(1)(c))

(see paras 13-29, 31, operative part)

Operative part

The request for a preliminary ruling made by Juzgado de lo Mercantil no 2 de Madrid (tribunal de commerce no 2 de Madrid, Espagne), by decision of 29 July 2019, is manifestly inadmissible.

( 1 ) OJ C 423, 16.12.2019.
1.

Paragraph 64 of the judgment of 2 September 2021, Irish Ferries (C‑570/19, EU:C:2021:664), shall be rectified as follows: ‘It follows that the concept of “re-routing to the final destination”, within the meaning of Article 18 of Regulation No 1177/2010, implies that the passenger must be transported to the place that has been contractually provided for, without the itinerary followed and the means of transport necessarily being identical to those originally agreed. Accordingly, the carrier has, in principle, some discretion in offering re-routing to the final destination to a passenger whose service is cancelled. Therefore, it is open to the carrier to offer re-routing, first, by providing an alternative passenger service departing from a port of embarkation and/or to a port of disembarkation using an itinerary other than that originally provided for in the transport contract or, secondly, by providing such a connecting passenger service, or, thirdly, by providing a maritime passenger service coupled with other modes of transport, such as rail or road transport.’