ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Directive 2005/36 on the recognition of professional qualifications must be interpreted as not precluding the creation, by a Member State, of a specialised training course, either in the field of medicine or that of dentistry, the title of which does not correspond to those listed, in respect of that Member State, in Annex V to that directive. Such a specialised course may be open both to persons who have completed only a basic medical training course and to those who have completed and validated only studies in the context of a basic dental training course. If a Member State creates a specialised training course which does not correspond, by its title, to a specialisation listed in Annex V to Directive 2005/36 and does not confer entitlement to the award of a title listed in that annex, that specialisation is not a training course within the meaning of Articles 25 and 35 of that directive and, with the result that, that directive does not govern the conditions for access or the content of the training course thus created.

However, in the light of Directive 2005/36, such a specialised training course, which is not covered by Annex V, cannot, in so far as it does not fulfil the requirements laid down in Article 24 or 34 of that directive concerning basic medical or dentistry training, lead to the issuing of evidence of basic medical training or evidence of basic dental training. Directive 2005/36 precludes a person who does not possess evidence of basic medical training from practising the profession of medical practitioner and a person who does not possess evidence of basic dentistry training from practising the profession of dental practitioner.

(see paras 38-41, 44, 45, operative part 1)
Article 35 of Regulation No 1291/2000 laying down common detailed rules for the application of the system of import and export licences and advance fixing certificates for agricultural products, as amended by Regulation No 325/2003, must be interpreted as meaning that the objective of the security referred to by that provision is not only to guarantee that the obligation to import the product concerned will be fulfilled but also to ensure that proof of the use of the licence will be submitted within a certain period.

Article 35(4)(c) of Regulation No 1291/2000 laying down common detailed rules for the application of the system of import and export licences and advance fixing certificates for agricultural products, as amended by Regulation No 325/2003, must be interpreted as meaning that, where proof that a product has been correctly imported has been submitted late, the amount to be forfeited, in respect of the quantities for which proof has not been provided within the time-limit set under Article 35(4)(a) of that regulation, must be calculated on the basis of a level of security which was actually applied at the time when the application for the issue of the licence or licences relating to that importation was made. For the purposes of such an interpretation, it is irrelevant that the security was lodged on the basis of a rate that was higher than that applicable to other imports of the same type of product as the product imported, given that the latter was exempted from the payment of import duties.

(see para. 33, operative part 2)
Article 74(2) of Regulation No 40/94 on the Community trade mark provides that the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) may disregard facts or evidence which are not submitted in due time by the parties concerned. It results from the wording of that provision that, as a general rule and unless otherwise specified, the submission of facts and evidence by the parties remains possible after the expiry of the time-limits to which such submission is subject under the provisions of Regulation No 40/94 and that OHIM is in no way prohibited from taking account of facts and evidence which are submitted or produced late. In stating that the latter ‘may’, in such a case, decide to disregard evidence, Article 74(2) grants OHIM broad discretion to decide, while giving reasons for its decision in that regard, whether or not to take such evidence into account.

Although the first subparagraph of Rule 50(1) of Regulation No 2868/95 implementing Regulation No 40/94 lays down the principle that the provisions relating to proceedings before the department which has made the decision against which the appeal is brought are to be applicable to appeal proceedings mutatis mutandis, the third subparagraph of Rule 50(1) constitutes a special rule derogating from that principle. That special rule is specific to the appeal proceedings brought against the Opposition Division’s decision and specifies the rules, before the Board of Appeal, governing the facts and evidence submitted after the expiry of the time-limits set or specified at first instance. The third subparagraph of Rule 50(1) of Regulation No 2868/95 must therefore be applied, at this particular stage of the appeal proceedings against the Opposition Division’s decision, in place of the provisions relating to the proceedings before that division, which include Rule 20(1) of Regulation No 2868/95.

Under the third subparagraph of Rule 50(1) of Regulation No 2868/95, where the appeal is directed against a decision of an Opposition Division, the Board of Appeal must limit its examination of the appeal to facts and evidence presented within the time-limits set or specified by the Opposition Division, unless the Board considers that additional or supplementary facts and evidence must be taken into account pursuant to Article 74(2) of Regulation No 40/94. Regulation No 2868/95 therefore expressly provides that the Board of Appeal enjoys, when examining an appeal directed against a decision of the Opposition Division, the discretion deriving from the third subparagraph of Rule 50(1) of Regulation No 2868/95 and from Article 74(2) of Regulation No 40/94 to decide whether or not to take into account additional or supplementary facts and evidence which were not presented within the time-limits set or specified by the Opposition Division.

(see paras 22-24, 29, 30, 32, 33)
Articles 56 EC and 58 EC must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State relating to the calculation of inheritance tax which provides that, in the event of inheritance of immovable property in that State, in a case where the deceased and the heir had a permanent residence in a third country, such as the Swiss Confederation, at the time of the death, the tax-free allowance is less than the allowance which would have been applied if at least one of them had been resident in that Member State at that time.

Firstly, that national legislation constitutes a restriction on the free movement of capital within the meaning of Article 56(1) EC.

Secondly, where, for the purposes of taxing immovable property acquired by inheritance and located in the Member State concerned, national legislation places on the same footing (i) non-resident heirs who have acquired the property from a non-resident deceased and (ii) non-resident or resident heirs who have acquired it from a resident deceased and resident heirs who have acquired it from a non-resident deceased it cannot, without infringing the requirements of EU law, treat those heirs differently in connection with that tax as regards the application of a tax-free allowance in respect of the immovable property. By treating inheritances of those two classes of persons in the same way except in relation to the amount of the allowance which an heir may receive, the national legislature accepted that there was no objective difference between them as regards the detailed rules and conditions of charging inheritance tax which could justify a difference in treatment.

However, just as the status of a taxable person does not in any way depend on the place of residence — the legislation at issue subjecting any acquisition of an immovable property located in that Member State to inheritance tax whether the deceased and heir be resident or non-resident — the aim of partial exemption of the estate affects all those subject to inheritance tax in the Member State in the same way, whether they be resident or non-resident, since that exemption aims to reduce the total amount of the inheritance.

In that regard, as the amount of the tax-free allowance does not depend on the amount of the taxable value but is granted to the heir in his capacity as a taxable person, the fact that the non-resident heir of a non-resident deceased has limited tax liability does not, for the purposes of that allowance, make the situation of that heir objectively different from that of the non-resident heir of a resident deceased or from that of the resident heir of a resident or non-resident deceased.

(see paras 26, 51, 53, 55, 68, operative part)
Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 87/344 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to legal expenses insurance must be interpreted as precluding a legal expenses insurer which stipulates in its insurance contracts that legal assistance will in principle be provided by its employees from also providing that the costs of legal assistance provided by a lawyer or legal representative chosen freely by the insured person will be covered only if the insurer takes the view that the handling of the case must be subcontracted to an external lawyer.

The interpretation of Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 87/344 will not differ depending on whether or not legal assistance is compulsory under national law in the inquiry or proceedings concerned.

In fact, the right of the insured person to choose his legal representative freely is of general application and is obligatory in nature. It follows from both the eleventh recital in the preamble to Directive 87/344 and Article 4(1) of that directive that the interest of persons covered by legal expenses insurance means that the insured person must have the freedom to choose his own lawyer or other person appropriately qualified under national law for the purpose of any judicial or administrative proceedings. Accordingly, it follows from a reading of those provisions that the insured person’s right to choose his lawyer cannot be restricted to situations in which the insurer decides that recourse should be had to an external lawyer.

(see paras 22, 23, 25, 29, 32, operative parts 1, 2)
The initiation by the Commission of the formal examination procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU cannot release national courts from their duty to safeguard the rights of individuals faced with a possible breach of Article 108(3) TFEU. However, the scope of that obligation may vary, depending on whether or not the Commission has initiated the formal examination procedure with regard to the measure at issue in the proceedings before the national court.

In a situation where the Commission has not yet initiated the formal examination procedure, the national courts, seised of a request that they should draw the appropriate conclusions from a possible infringement of the last sentence of Article 108(3) TFEU, may have cause to interpret and apply the concept of aid with a view to determining whether those measures should have been notified to the Commission.

In a situation where the Commission has already initiated the formal examination procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU with regard to a measure which has not been notified and is being implemented, the effectiveness of Article 108(3) TFEU and the obligation of sincere cooperation between the national courts, on the one hand, and the Commission and the Courts of the European Union, on the other, require a national court hearing an application for the cessation of the implementation of that measure and the recovery of payments already made to adopt all the necessary measures with a view to drawing the appropriate conclusions from an infringement of the obligation to suspend the implementation of that measure. To that end, the national court may decide to suspend the implementation of the measure in question and order the recovery of payments already made. It may also decide to order provisional measures in order to safeguard both the interests of the parties concerned and the effectiveness of the Commission’s decision to initiate the formal examination procedure.

Where the national court entertains doubts as to whether the measure at issue constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU or as to the validity or interpretation of the decision to initiate the formal examination procedure, it may seek clarification from the Commission and, in accordance with the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU, it may or must refer a question to the Court for a preliminary ruling.

(see paras 32-34, 38, 41-44, operative part)
Case C‑362/12

Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income Group Litigation

v

Commissioners of Inland Revenue andCommissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue andCustoms

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom)

‛Judicial protection — Principle of effectiveness — Principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations — Restitution of sums paid but not due — Remedies — National legislation — Curtailment of the limitation period for the applicable remedies without notice and retroactively’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 12 December 2013

EU law — Direct effect — National taxes that are incompatible with EU law — Recovery — Procedures — Application of national law — Limitation period — Curtailment with retroactive effect — Not permissible in the absence of an adequate transitional period — Infringement of the principles of effectiveness, legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations

(Art. 19(1) TEU)

In a situation in which, under national law, taxpayers have a choice between two possible causes of action as regards the recovery of tax levied in breach of EU law, one of which benefits from a longer limitation period, the principles of effectiveness, legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations preclude national legislation curtailing that limitation period without notice and retroactively.

Whilst national legislation reducing the period within which repayment of sums collected in breach of EU law may be sought is not incompatible with the principle of effectiveness, it is subject to the condition not only that the new limitation period is reasonable but also that the new legislation includes transitional arrangements allowing an adequate period after the enactment of the legislation for lodging the claims for repayment which persons were entitled to submit under the previous legislation. Such transitional arrangements are necessary where the immediate application to those claims of a limitation period shorter than that which was previously in force would have the effect of retroactively depriving some individuals of their right to repayment, or of allowing them too short a period for asserting that right. Furthermore, in order to serve their purpose of ensuring legal certainty, limitation periods must be fixed in advance. Similarly, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations precludes a national legislative amendment which retroactively deprives a taxpayer of the right enjoyed prior to that amendment to obtain repayment of taxes collected in breach of EU law.

It makes no difference to that conclusion that, at the time when the taxpayer issued its claim, the availability of the cause of action affording the longer limitation period had been recognised only recently by a lower court and was not definitively confirmed by the highest judicial authority until later

(see paras 33, 37, 44, 45, 49, 52, operative part 1, 2)
For the purpose of applying Article 110 TFEU, the similar domestic products which are comparable to a used vehicle, which was first put into service before 1 February 2008 and was imported and registered in a Member State in 2010, are the vehicles already present on the market of that Member State whose characteristics are closest to those of the vehicle in question.

Article 110 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding a passenger-car and motorcycle tax as in force in 2010, if and in so far as the amount of that tax levied on used imported vehicles upon their registration in the Member State exceeds the lowest residual amount thereof incorporated into the value of similar used vehicles already registered in that same Member State.

If the amount of registration tax levied on used imported vehicles exceeds the residual registration tax incorporated into the value of similar used vehicles already registered on the national market, this is liable to favour the sale of domestic used vehicles, thereby discouraging the import of similar used vehicles.

In that regard, the Member States’ powers to make new tax arrangements or to change the basis of assessment of existing taxes are not unlimited. The prohibition laid down in Article 110 TFEU applies whenever a fiscal charge is liable to discourage imports of goods originating in other Member States in favour of domestic goods.

(see paras 32, 34, 45, operative part)
Clause 4(1) of the Framework agreement on fixed-term work, annexed to Directive 1999/70 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must be interpreted as meaning that it may be relied on directly against a body wholly owned and supervised by the State.

The decisive criterion for determining whether a measure falls within the scope of ‘employment conditions’, within the meaning of that clause of the framework agreement, is the criterion of employment, that is to say the employment relationship between a worker and his employer. It is not disputed that the compensation in question is paid to a worker on account of the employment relationship between that worker and his employer. As that compensation is paid on account of employment, it falls within the scope of ‘employment conditions’.

Clause 4(1) of the Framework agreement on fixed-term work, annexed to Directive 1999/70 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘employment conditions’ covers the compensation that the employer must pay to an employee on account of the unlawful insertion of a fixed-term clause into his employment contract.

While the Framework agreement on fixed-term work, annexed to Directive 1999/70 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, does not preclude Member States from granting fixed-term workers more favourable treatment than that provided for by the framework agreement, clause 4(1) of the framework agreement must be interpreted as not requiring the compensation paid in respect of the unlawful insertion of a fixed-term clause into an employment relationship to be treated in the same way as that paid in respect of the unlawful termination of a permanent employment relationship.

The situation in which one of those types of compensation is paid is significantly different from that in which the other is paid. The first type of compensation relates to workers whose employment contract was concluded unlawfully, whereas the second relates to employees who have been dismissed.

Even if the formulation of clause 4(1) of the framework agreement does not lead to the conclusion that the compensation for the unlawful insertion of a fixed-term clause into an employment contract and that applicable to the termination of an employment contract of indefinite duration relate to workers who can be regarded as being in a comparable situation, it is apparent, however, from a reading of clause 4(1) in conjunction with clause 8(1) of the framework agreement that they enable Member States that so wish to introduce more favourable provisions for fixed-term workers and, therefore, to treat, in certain situations, the economic consequences of the unlawful insertion of a fixed-term clause into an employment contract in the same way as those of the unlawful termination of an employment contract of indefinite duration.

(see paras 44, 47, 48, operative part 3)
Case C‑84/12

Rahmanian Koushkaki

v

Bundesrepublik Deutschland

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Berlin)

‛Area of freedom, security and justice — Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 — Articles 21(1), 32(1) and 35(6) — Procedures and conditions for issuing uniform visas — Obligation to issue a visa — Assessment of the risk of illegal immigration — Intention of the applicant to leave the territory of the Member States before the expiry of the visa applied for — Reasonable doubt — Discretion of the competent authorities’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 19 December 2013

Border controls, asylum and immigration — Visa policy — Community Code on Visas — Regulation No 810/2009 — Conditions for issuing uniform visas — National provision not providing for an obligation on the national authorities to issue a uniform visa where those conditions are satisfied — Lawfulness — Condition — Interpretation of such a national provision in accordance with that regulation

Border controls, asylum and immigration — Visa policy — Community Code on Visas — Regulation No 810/2009 — Procedures and conditions for issuing uniform visas — Obligation to issue a visa — Conditions — No reasonable doubt that the applicant intends to leave the territory of the Member States before the expiry of the visa applied for — Assessment of actual situation

Articles 23(4), 32(1) and 35(6) of Regulation No 810/2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas must be interpreted as meaning that the competent authorities of a Member State cannot refuse, following the examination of an application for a uniform visa, to issue such a visa to an applicant unless one of the grounds for refusal of a visa listed in those provisions can be applied to that applicant. Those authorities have a wide discretion in the examination of that application so far as concerns the conditions for the application of those provisions and the assessment of the relevant facts, with a view to ascertaining whether one of those grounds for refusal can be applied to the applicant. (see paras 55, 63, operative part 1)

Article 32(1) of Regulation No 810/2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas, read in conjunction with Article 21(1) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that the obligation on the competent authorities of a Member State to issue a uniform visa is subject to the condition that there is no reasonable doubt that the applicant intends to leave the territory of the Member States before the expiry of the visa applied for, in the light of the general situation in the applicant’s country of residence and his individual characteristics, determined in the light of information provided by the applicant. (see para. 73, operative part 2)