4.

Turning now to the second group of questions I must first of all point out that, according to the wording of the order, the national court has framed them in case an affirmative answer is given to Question 1 (b). However the Commission and all the other parties talcing part in this case have rightly observed that the German -court has certainly committed an error since there is no point in putting the second group of questions unless a negative reply is given to Question 1 (b) and not the reverse. It is in fact clear that to ask the question — as Question 2 (a) in fact does — “may a description and presentation ... which is not objectionable under Article 43 (1) none the less come within the scope of Article 43 (2)” entails taking the view that the scope of Article 43 (1) is more limited than that of Article 43 (2) (that is, it would prohibit only confusion with specific brand names or production localities) and that view corresponds to a negative reply to Question 1 (b). For that reason the phrase introducing the second group of questions should be amended by substituting the word “negative” for the word “affirmative”. Now that those points have been disposed of it is clear that the affirmative answer which I have suggested should be given to Question 1 (b) renders it unnecessary to consider Question 2 (a). On the other hand I think that different reasoning applies in regard to Question 2 (b). This question too is in fact in the alternative (as that has been explained above) and accordingly there is no formal need to express an opinion on it. Nevertheless I consider that the general outlines of the problem should be considered. The problem is the relationship between the Community rules set out in Article 8 (c), Article 18 (c) and Article 43 of Regulation No 355/79 and any national rules which deal with “confusion” caused to consumers from the point of view of unfair competition. In fact these problems are independent of the first group of questions and are undoubtedly relevant for the national court which is required to decide in the present case whether, and if so to what degree, German legislation on unfair competition is applicable in addition to the said regulation. In my view the description and presentation of wines and grape musts is governed exhaustively and completely by Regulation No 355/79 and the relative implementing provisions (contained in Commission Regulation No 1608/76). That those rules are self-contained is clearly apparent from Article 54 (1) of Council Regulation No 337/79 on the common organization of the market in wine, the first subparagraph of which requires the Council to adopt “as necessary” the rules relating to the designation and presentation of the products covered by the above-mentioned organization of the market, and the second subparagraph of which provides that “until entry into force of the rules referred to in the first subparagraph, the rules on this matter shall be those adopted by the Member States”. From those provisions it follows that once the Community rules have entered into force (which occurred, at any rate for wines and grape musts, with the promulgation of Regulation No 355/79), those rules preclude further application of national provisions in the same field unless permitted in regard to specific points by particular Community provisions. In fact there are many provisions of that nature in the regulation in question: I would cite as examples the second subparagraph of Article 1 (3); Article 2 (2) (h) and Article 2 (3) (d) (g) and (i); Article 3 (2) and the second subparagraph of Article 3 (3), Article 3 (4) and the second subparagraph of Article 3 (5); Article 4 (2); Article 5 (2); Article 6 (2); Article 11 (3) etc. It must be stated that in this field the provision which has the greatest bearing on the present case is Article 13 (2), according to which “in the case of quality wines psr obtained on their territory, Member States may make compulsory, dispense with or restrict the use of certain particulars referred to in Article 12 (2) ...”. I should point out that Article 12 (2) lists the information which may be, but need not be, included on the labelling of quality wines psr, which information may embrace a brand name (Article 12 (2) (c)). Is it possible to interpret that provision as meaning that national legislation may restrict the use of a brand name by prohibiting names which are capable of misleading the consumer as to the geographical origin or other characteristics of the product? I think that the reply must be in the negative since that aspect of the description and presentation of products is expressly and exhaustively governed by Articles 18 and 43 of the Regulation No 355/79, to which the power to derogate conferred by the said Article 13 (2) may not be extended. Nevertheless recognition of the complete and, in principle, exclusive character of the Community rules on the description and presentation of wine products does not entail rejection of the possibility of the continuing applicability of national provisions which, whilst impinging upon these rules, pursue objectives which are different from and compatible with (or even complementary to) the particular objectives of the rules in question. In my view that is the case with national provisions intended to prevent and suppress unfair competition. In fact I have already had occasion to note that the objectives of Regulation No 355/79 consist essentially in protecting consumers of wines and grape musts — by furnishing them with sufficient and truthful information on the products which they wish to buy — and in facilitating execution by the authorities of their duties of organization and supervision. On the other hand domestic rules regarding unfair competition are concerned principally with the protection of traders and only indirectly with consumers. I should add that at the points at which the above-mentioned regulation is concerned with the matter of the “confusion” caused by the use of distinctive signs for a product (as in the said Article 43), and thus deals with a problem displaying aspects relating to unfair competition (or perhaps aspects relating to a brand name), it is not only the case that different groups of provisions overlap but that the Community provisions prove to consist only of “substantive” rules whilst the domestic law on unfair competition (like that on brand names) also includes appropriate procedural arrangements and prescribes sanctions in the event of unlawful conduct. It would thus be inconceivable were Regulation No 355/79 to be interpreted, by reason of the fact that it is “complete” in the matter of description and presentation of wines, as being exclusive also as respects domestic rules on unfair competition and brand names. What is necessary, and indeed sufficient, is that no provisions on unfair competition or on brand names should be applied whose content constitutes an amendment (whether more or less stringent it matters not) of the provisions of that regulation. These considerations are in line with the reasoning which I pursued in Case 50/76 Amsterdam Bulb [1977] ECR 137. I acknowledged then that the Member States may not adopt provisions intended to change the scope of Community regulations or to supplement them and in that connexion I cited the judgments of the Court of 18 February 1970 in Case 40/69 Hauptzollamt Hamburg v Bollmann [1970] ECR 69 and of 18 June 1970 in Case 74/69, Hauptzollamt Bremen v Krohn [1970] ECR 451. However I also stated that “this view was adopted in relation to cases where the government provision in question had the effect of interpreting the Community regulation and in consequence modified its scope: the underlying reason for the Court's decision was an intention to exclude anything which might modify or compromise the scope or rather the substance of a Community measure. It cannot, however, be said that a penal sanction changes the substance of the provisions of the regulation ... the fact that, for the purposes of [ensuring that Community regulations are observed], a State supplements Community legislation by penal sanctions does not conflict with the principles of the law of the European Communities”. The Court followed that point of view and held inter alia that “in the absence of any provision in the Community rules providing for specific sanctions to be imposed on individuals for a failure to observe those rules, the Member States are competent to adopt such sanctions as appear to them to be appropriate” (judgment of 2 February 1977 in the said case of Amsterdam Bulb [1977] ECR 137 at p. 151). Turning to the present case I consider that in the situation described above, where Community provisions and national provisions overlap, the principle to which to adhere is that of the priority of the Community rules, from which it follows that national law is applicable only in so far as it supplements, or is compatible with, Community law. In the field of unfair competition it can accordingly be stated, in my view, that it is permissible to apply those internal rules which do not jeopardize due observance of Articles 8, 18 and 43 (or others) of the said Regulation No 355/79 and which, as respects procedures and sanctions, contribute to ensuring observance of those provisions.