ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Action brought on 17 October 2019 — European Commission v Kingdom of Belgium

(Case C-767/19)

(2020/C 10/33)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by O. Beynet and Y. G. Marinova, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Kingdom of Belgium

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court of Justice should:

— declare that, by failing correctly to transpose: — Article 9(1)(a) of Directives 2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC, — Article 37(4)(a) and (b) of Directive 2009/72/EC and Article 41(4)(a) and (b) of Directive 2009/73/EC, — Article 37(6)(a), (b) and (c) and (9) of 2009/72/EC and Article 41(6)(a), (b) and (c) and (9) of Directive 2009/73/EC, and — Article 37(10) of 2009/72/EC and Article 41(10) of Directive 2007/73/EC, — the Kingdom of Belgium has failed to fulfil its obligations under Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, (1) and under Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC; (2)

— order the Kingdom of Belgium to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The action is brought against the defective transposition in Belgium of Directives 2009/72 and 2009/73, concerning the common rules for the internal market in electricity and natural gas, respectively. Those directives contain, inter alia, provisions relating to the effective separation between the operation of electricity and gas transmission networks from supply and generation activities in order to prevent the risk of discrimination in the operation of the network. They also provide for the establishment of independent national regulatory authorities in order to achieve the objectives set by those directives.

The Commission takes the view that the transposition of the directives has been carried out insufficiently by the Kingdom of Belgium in two respects, namely the establishment of full ownership unbundling and the provisions concerning the powers and independence of the national regulatory authority.

(1) OJ 2009 L 211, p. 55.

(2) OJ 2009 L 211, p. 94.
Action brought on 25 November 2019 — European Commission v Hungary

(Case C-856/19)

(2020/C 19/39)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: C. Perrin and A. Sipos, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Hungary

Form of order sought

The Commission claims that the Court should:

— declare that Hungary has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 10(2) and (3) of Council Directive 2011/64/EU of 21 June 2011 on the structure and rates of excise duty applied to manufactured tobacco, (1) by levying, after the expiration of the transitional period granted until 31 December 2017, an overall excise duty of less than 60 % of the weighted average retail selling price of cigarettes released for consumption and levying an excise duty of less than EUR 115 per 1 000 cigarettes.

— order Hungary to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pursuant to Article 10(2) of Council Directive 2011/64/EU of 21 June 2011 on the structure and rates of excise duty applied to manufactured tobacco, as of 1 January 2014, the overall excise duty on cigarettes is to represent at least 60 % of the weighted average retail selling price of cigarettes released for consumption, unless the excise duty levied amounts to at least EUR 115 per 1 000 cigarettes. Since Hungary levies an excise duty of less than EUR 115 per 1 000 cigarettes, that Member State is required to establish an excise duty at a rate equivalent to or greater than 60 % of the weighted average price.

The third subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2011/64/EU granted Hungary and seven other Member States a transitional period until 31 December 2017 in order to reach that rate of excise duty. Under Article 10(2) and (3) of Directive 2011/64/EU, those Member States were required to reach the abovementioned excise duty thresholds by the end of that period.

The Commission claims that, at the end of the transitional period, Hungary did not reach the excise duty thresholds set out in Article 10(2) and (3) of Directive 2011/64/EU and that, as of 31 December 2017, that Member State continues to levy an excise duty that is below the thresholds established in that directive.

(1) Council Directive 2011/64/EU of 21 June 2011 on the structure and rates of excise duty applied to manufactured tobacco (OJ 2011 L 176, p. 24).
1.

Is Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1760 (1) of 28 September 2016 concerning the classification of certain goods in the Combined Nomenclature (CN) invalid in so far as it classifies the bank note validator and cash boxes specified in the Regulation under CN Code 84729070, rather than CN Code 903149 90?
2.

If Question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative: In the calculation of the period of five years of non-use pursuant to Article 51(1)(a) CTMR and Article 58(1)(a) EUTMR in the case of a counterclaim, filed prior to expiry of the period of five years of non-use, for a declaration that an EU trade mark has lapsed, is account to be taken of the date of filing of the counterclaim or of the date of the last hearing in the appeal on the merits?
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Nürnberg (Germany) lodged on 21 October 2019 — Myflyright GmbH v SunExpressGünes Ekspres Havacilik A

(Case C-770/19)

(2020/C 27/21)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Nürnberg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Myflyright GmbH

Defendant: SunExpressGünes Ekspres Havacilik A

The case was removed from the register of the Court of Justice by order of the President of the Court of 11 November 2019.
1

Can the exercise of the right to strike by airline staff be regarded as an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation 261/20[0]4 (1)where the strike is called by a trade union in pursuit of improvements to employment conditions and is not triggered by a prior decision of the employer but by the employees’ demands, or is it a circumstance inherent in the normal exercise of an air carrier’s activity?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky (Slovakia) lodged on 26 November 2019 — Slovak Telekom a.s. v Protimonopolný úrad Slovenskej republiky

(Case C-857/19)

(2020/C 36/24)

Language of the case: Slovak

Referring court

Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Slovak Telekom a.s.

Defendant: Protimonopolný úrad Slovenskej republiky

Questions referred

A question concerning the interpretation of the first sentence of Article 11(6) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (1) of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty:

1. Does the phrase ‘shall relieve the competition authorities of the Member States of their competence to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty’ (2) mean that the authorities of the Member States lose their powers to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty?

2. Does Article 50 (Right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, proclaimed in Nice on 7 December 2000, also apply to administrative offences consisting of the abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union for which the Commission and the authority of a Member State have imposed sanctions separately and independently in the exercise of their powers under Article 11(6) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002?

(1) OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1.

(2) [in the first sentence of Article 11(6) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003]
1.8.

Do the provisions of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax permit or preclude national legislation which provides that the right to deduct VAT relating to investments that are abandoned is retained in two cases only, those cases being identified by summary reference to two judgments of the Court of Justice: (i) where, because of circumstances beyond the control of the taxable person, the taxable person never uses the goods or services for the purposes of its economic activity, as the Court ruled in its judgment in Case C-37/95, Belgian State v Ghent Coal Terminal NV, and (ii) in other cases in which purchased goods or services in respect of which the right of deduction has been exercised are not used for the purposes of the taxable person’s economic activities for objective reasons beyond the taxable person’s control, as the Court ruled in Case C-110/94, Intercommunale voor zeewaterontzilting (INZO) v Belgian State?
1.

Can the maternity supplement provided for in Article 60 of the Ley General de la Seguridad Social (General Law on Social Security), the consolidated version of which was approved by Real Decreto Legislativo 8/2015 (Royal Legislative Decree 8/2015), be considered a positive measure or action designed to achieve substantive equality between women and men which is permissible under Article 157(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union?
Appeal brought on 29 November 2019 by PlasticsEurope against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 20 September 2019 in Case T-636/17, PlasticsEurope v ECHA

(Case C-876/19 P)

(2020/C 54/40)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: PlasticsEurope (represented by: R. Cana, E. Mullier, F. Mattioli, avocats)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Chemicals Agency, French Republic, ClientEarth

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court in Case T-636/17;

— annul the Decision ED/30/2017 by the Executive Director of ECHA of 6 July 2017;

— Alternatively, refer the case back to the General Court to rule on the appellant’s application for annulment;

— order the respondent to pay the costs of these proceedings, including the costs of the proceedings before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on the following pleas in law:

A. The General Court erred in law by misinterpreting REACH (1) and by holding that the Agency is not required to demonstrate the existence of scientific evidence of probable serious effects pursuant to Article 57(f) of REACH.

B. The General Court erred in law in the assessment of the evidence available to it and in the assessment of the facts as supported by that evidence. In particular, the Court erred in concluding that the ECHA had established ‘probable’ serious effects; failed to assess whether the ECHA had in fact evaluated the information on the equivalent level of concern, and instead erroneously relied on the ECHA’s assertion that that criterion had been met; erred in dismissing the appellant’s plea related to the relevance of European Food and Safety Authority (EFSA)‘s conclusions for the case at hand; erred in concluding that EFSA’s conclusions support and are consistent with the ECHA’s decision; distorted the evidence submitted by the parties.

C. The General Court has breached the principle of equal treatment by treating the appellant less favourably than the ECHA.

D. The General Court erred in law in misinterpreting Article 2(8)(b) of the REACH Regulation and breached its duty to state reasons by failing to address the additional arguments on intermediates made by the appellant.

(1) Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC (OJ 2006, L 396, p. 1, corrigendum OJ 2007 L 136, p. 3).
2.

If it does: a) Where such a right is breached by the bringing of proceedings against that person in a third State, is there an obligation upon the Member State to provide a remedy, including by the grant of an anti-suit injunction? b) Does any such obligation extend to a case where a cause of action available in the courts of a third State is not available under the law applicable in the courts of the Member State?
1.

Do Article 110 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 273 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added (1) not preclude a provision such as Article 103(5a) of the Ustawa z dnia 11 marca 2004 r. o podatku od towarów i usług (Law of 11 March 2004 on the tax on goods and services), (2) which stipulates that, in the case of an intra-Community acquisition of motor fuels, the taxable person is obliged, without being called upon to do so by the head of the customs office, to calculate and pay the amounts of tax to the account of the customs office competent for dealing with the payment of excise duty: (a) within 5 days of the date on which the goods in question enter the place of receipt of excise goods specified in the relevant permit — if the goods are the subject of intra-Community acquisition within the meaning of the Ustawa z dnia 6 grudnia 2008 r. o podatku akcyzowym (Law of 6 December 2008 on excise duty) by a registered consignee under the excise duty suspension procedure pursuant to the provisions on excise duty; (b) within 5 days of the date on which such goods enter a tax warehouse from the territory of a Member State other than Poland; (c) upon the movement of these goods within the territory of Poland — if the goods are moved outside of the excise duty suspension procedure pursuant to the provisions on excise duty?
3.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/381 of 3 March 2017 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine und Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/374 of 3 March 2017 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine are annulled to the extent to which they concern Mr Mykola Yanovych Azarov.
2.

If the answer to the first question is in the negative: Is Article 22a(1) to be interpreted as meaning that a key audit partner takes up a position of the kind referred to in this provision upon commencing employment in the position concerned?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Darmstadt (Germany) lodged on 11 December 2019 — EP v Kreis Groß-Gerau

(Case C-905/19)

(2020/C 77/39)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgericht Darmstadt

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: EP

Defendant: Kreis Groß-Gerau

Questions referred

Can it be inferred from the prohibition of discrimination in Article 64 of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement with Tunisia (1) that a curtailment of the period of validity of a residence permit because the conditions for the grant of that residence permit are no longer satisfied is prohibited if

— the Tunisian national was in employment at the time when the retroactive curtailment of the period of validity of the residence permit was notified,

— the decision to curtail the period of validity is not based on grounds relating to the protection of a legitimate national interest, such as public policy, public security or public health, and

— the Tunisian national did not possess authorisation to take up employment (work permit) that was independent of the residence permit, but was entitled by law to take up employment during the period of validity of the residence permit?

Does the legal status of a foreign national arising from the prohibition of discrimination in Article 64 of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement with Tunisia require, in addition to the residence permit, the grant of an administrative authorisation to take up employment?

What is the relevant point in time for the assessment of legal status under the law on residence and work permits? Is the relevant point in time the date of adoption of the administrative decision withdrawing the right of residence or the date of the judicial decision?

(1) Euro-Mediterranean Agreement of 17 July 1995 establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other part (OJ 1998 L 97, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Amsterdam (Netherlands) lodged on 6 November 2019 — Stichting Cartel Compensation, Equilib Netherlands BV v Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV and Others

(Case C-819/19)

(2020/C 95/12)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank Amsterdam

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Stichting Cartel Compensation, Equilib Netherlands BV

Defendants: Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV, Martinair Holland NV, Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Lufthansa Cargo AG, British Airways plc, Société Air France SA, Singapore Airlines Ltd, Singapore Airlines Cargo Pte Ltd, Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV, Martinair Holland NV, Société Air France SA, Singapore Airlines Cargo Pte Ltd, Singapore Airlines Ltd, Lufthansa Cargo AG, Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Swiss International Air Lines AG, British Airways plc, Air Canada, Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd, SAS AB, Scandinavian Airlines System Denmark-Norway-Sweden, SAS Cargo Group A/S, Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV, Martinair Holland NV, Société Air France SA, Lufthansa Cargo AG, Deutsche Lufthansa AG, British Airways plc

Question referred

In a dispute between injured parties (in the present case shippers, recipients of air cargo services) and air carriers, do the national courts have the power — either because of the direct effect of Article 101 TFEU, or at least of Article 53 EEA, or on the basis of (the direct effect of) Article 6 of Regulation 1/2003 (1) — to fully apply Article 101 TFEU, or at least Article 53 EEA, with regard to agreements/concerted practices of air carriers in respect of freight services on flights operated before 1 May 2004 on routes between airports within the EU and airports outside the EEA, or, before 19 May 2005, on routes between Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and airports outside the EEA, or, on flights operated before 1 June 2002, between airports within the EU and Switzerland, also for the period that the transitional regime of Articles 104 and 105 TFEU applied, or does the transitional regime preclude that?

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 13 December 2019 — Agrimotion S.A. v ADAMA Deutschland GmbH

(Case C-912/19)

(2020/C 95/16)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf

Parties to the main proceedings

Defendant and appellant: Agrimotion S.A.

Applicant and respondent: ADAMA Deutschland GmbH

Question referred

Can an undertaking which places a plant protection product authorised in the Member State of origin on the market of the Member State of introduction rely on the parallel trade permit granted by the competent authority of the Member State of introduction to a third undertaking, if the canisters containing the plant protection product and in which that product is placed on the market of the Member State of introduction indicate both the holder of the permit and the importing undertaking? If there are any additional requirements, what are they? (1)

(1) Pursuant to Article 52 of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ 2009 L 309, p. 1).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 29 August 2019 by BS against the order of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 17 June 2019 in Case T-593/18, BS v Parliament

(Case C-642/19 P)

(2020/C 103/10)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: BS (represented by: M. Maes and J.-N. Louis, lawyers)

Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament

By order of 15 January 2020, the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) dismissed the appeal.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 12 August 2019 — Flightright GmbH v IBERIA LAE SA Operadora Unipersonal

(Case C-606/19)

(2020/C 103/09)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Hamburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Flightright GmbH

Defendant: IBERIA LAE SA Operadora Unipersonal

By order of 13 February 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Sixth Chamber) ruled that the second indent of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (1) must be interpreted as meaning that the ‘place of performance’, within the meaning of that provision, in respect of a flight consisting of a confirmed single booking for the entire journey and divided into several legs, can be the place of departure of the first leg of the journey where transport on those legs of the journey is performed by two separate air carriers and the claim for compensation brought on the basis of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, (2) arises from the cancellation of the final leg of the journey and is brought against the air carrier in charge of that last leg.

(1) OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1.

(2) OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1.
1.

Must Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union, Article 325(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 58 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, (1) [and] Article 4 of Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (2), drawn up on the basis of Article 83(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, be interpreted as precluding the adoption of a decision by a body outside the judicial system, the Curtea Constituțională a României (Constitutional Court of Romania), which adjudicates on a procedural objection alleging that the composition of the panel seized of the case is unlawful, in the light of the principle that the judges of the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice, Romania) must be specialised (not provided for in the Romanian Constitution), and which obliges a judicial body to refer cases which are at the (full-merits) appeal stage for re-examination within the first procedural cycle before the same court?