ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Łodzi (Poland) lodged on 3 September 2018 — City of Łowicz v State Treasury — Governor of Łódź Province

(Case C-558/18)

(2019/C 44/11)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Okręgowy w Łodzi

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: City of Łowicz

Defendant: State Treasury — Governor of Łódź Province

Question referred

On a proper construction of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union, does the resulting obligation for Member States to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law preclude provisions which materially increase the risk of undermining the guarantee of independent disciplinary proceedings against judges in Poland through:

(1) political influence on the conduct of disciplinary proceedings;

(2) the emerging risk that the system of disciplinary measures will be used to politically control the content of judicial decisions; and
1.

Must the rule of EU law contained in Article 4(2)(a) of Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA of 25 October 2004 laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking, (1) read in conjunction with Article 2(1)(c) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that that rule does not preclude the expression ‘a significant quantity of drugs’ from being interpreted on a case-by-case basis as part of the individual assessment of a national court, and that that assessment does not require the application of any objective criterion, in particular that it does not require a finding that the offender possesses drugs for the purpose of performing acts covered by Article 4(2)(a) of that framework decision, that is to say production, offering, offering for sale, distribution, brokerage, or delivery on any terms whatsoever?
1.

Are Articles 8 and 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 7(f) of Directive 95/46/EC, (1) on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data, to be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law such as that at issue in the main proceedings, namely Article 5(2) of Law No 677/2001, and Article 6 of Decision No 52/2012 of the ANSPDCP (Autoritatea Națională de Supraveghere a Prelucrării Datelor cu Caracter Personal, the National Authority for the Supervision of the Processing of Personal Data), in accordance with which video surveillance may be used to ensure the safety and protection of individuals, property and valuables and for the pursuit of legitimate interests, without the consent of the person concerned?
1.

If after the ‘reverse merger’ in question, the interest and other financial charges on the loans taken out with third parties or associates (which but for the merger would be deductible by the company now being acquired), in order to purchase the shares of the subsidiary which is now the acquiring company, and transferred as a result of the merger, are interpreted as ceasing to be deductible for tax purposes from the profits of the acquiring company, will Article 23(1)(c) of the Corporation Tax Code, in the version in force in 2013, be compatible with EU law, in particular in the sense that that non-deductibility of the financial charges may constitute an impediment or restriction to the merger operations encompassed by Council Directive 2009/133/EC, (1) infringing the principles and objectives of that directive, as well as Article 4 thereof?
A.

With respect to the part of the judgment under appeal that deals with the first, second and third pleas in law of the action and concerns the correction imposed in the decoupled direct aid sector there are three grounds of appeal. The first ground of appeal is based on the misinterpretation and misapplication of Article 2 of Commission Regulation (ΕC) No 796/2004 (2) of 21 April 2004 on the definition of pasture and on the insufficient and erroneous statement of reasons in the judgment under appeal. The second ground of appeal is based on the misinterpretation of the Guidelines (Document VI/5330/97) with respect to whether the conditions for the imposition of a 25 % financial correction are met, misinterpretation and misapplication of Articles 43, 44 and 137 of Regulation (EC) No 73/2009, (3) insufficient and contradictory statement of reasons, and distortion of the sense of the Conciliation Body’s summary report. Further, by the third ground of appeal the appellant challenges the misinterpretation and misapplication of Article 31(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 (4) and the related Guidelines, the ne bis in idem principle, the principle of proportionality, and an insufficient and contradictory statement of reasons.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 7 May 2018 by Schniga GmbH against the judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 23 February 2018 in Case T-445/16, Schniga GmbH v Gemeinschaftliches Sortenamt (CPVO)

(Case C-308/18 P)

(2019/C 93/26)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Schniga GmbH (represented by: G. Würtenberger, R. Kunze und T. Wittmann, Rechtsanwälte)

Other party to the proceedings: Gemeinschaftliches Sortenamt (CPVO)

By decision of 8 November 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Tenth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as unfounded and ordered the appellant to pay its own costs.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Erding (Germany) lodged on 10 December 2018 — U.B. and T.V. v Eurowings GmbH

(Case C-776/18)

(2019/C 82/13)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Erding

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: U.B., T.V.

Defendant: Eurowings GmbH

Question referred

In the event of a cancellation within the meaning of Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004, (1) is it to be assumed that there has been an offer to re-route allowing passengers to reach their final destination no more than two hours after their scheduled time of arrival also in the case where replacement transportation is provided to an airport other than that named in the booking confirmation, if that other airport is located in the same region?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 26 June 2018 by Adrian Iordăchescu, Florina Iordăchescu, Mihaela Iordăchescu and Cristinel Iordăchescu against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) made on 18 April 2018 in Case T-298/17, Iordăchescu and Others v Parliament and Others

(Case C-426/18 P)

(2019/C 112/14)

Language of the case: Romanian

Parties

Appellants: Adrian Iordăchescu, Florina Iordăchescu, Mihaela Iordăchescu, Cristinel Iordăchescu (represented by: A. Cuculis, avocat)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Parliament, Council of the European Union, European Commission

By order of 31 January 2019, the Court (Ninth Chamber) dismissed the appeal.
Appeal brought on 21 December 2018 by Deza, a.s. against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 24 October 2018 in Case T-400/17 Deza v Commission

(Case C-813/18 P)

(2019/C 93/41)

Language of the case: Czech

Parties

Appellant: Deza, a.s. (represented by: P. Dejl, advokát)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Republic of Finland, Kingdom of Sweden, European Chemicals Agency

Form of order sought

— set aside the judgment of the General Court of 24 October 2018 in Case T-400/17;

— annul in part Commission Regulation (EU) No 2017/776 (1) of 4 May 2017 amending Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008, in so far as it concerns the classification and labelling of the substance anthraquinone;

— order the Commission to pay the appellant’s costs incurred in the present appeal proceedings before the Court of Justice and in the previous proceedings before the General Court.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of its appeal, the appellant puts forward four grounds of appeal.

1. The General Court interpreted and applied the CLP Regulation (2) incorrectly, in particular the following basic principles: (i) the substance evaluated and classified must be placed on the EU market; (ii) a causal link between a substance and carcinogenic effects in test animals must be demonstrated by sufficient evidence; (iii) sufficient evidence must be obtained from reliable and admissible scientific studies; and (iv) classification of a substance must take account of new scientific and technical knowledge and scientific and technical progress.

2. The General Court reviewed the classification of anthraquinone, in other words part of the Commission Regulation, in a manner contrary to the requirements for judicial review of decisions of the EU institutions and bodies, and distorted the facts and evidence.

3. The General Court interpreted and applied the principle of legal certainty incorrectly.

4. As a result of the above defects, the General Court breached the appellant’s rights and the principles laid down in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular the right to a fair hearing, the right to the peaceful enjoyment of property, and the principle of legal certainty.

(1) OJ 2017 L 116, p. 1.

(2) Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (OJ 2008 L 353, p. 1).
2.

Must European law and, in particular, Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention be interpreted as meaning that it follows therefrom that the public (any person) should, in the event of an alleged infringement of the procedural requirements and public-participation rights applicable to that public, as contained in Article 6 of that Convention, have access to justice? Is it important in that regard that the public concerned (interested parties) should have access to justice in that respect and can also raise substantive complaints before the courts?
2.

If that question is answered in the affirmative: Has Article 3(3) of Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC, read in conjunction with points (b) and (c) of Annex A thereto, had direct effect since 1 July 2004 in respect of a supply company incorporated under private law (as a German GmbH), because the abovementioned provisions of that directive are unconditional, so far as their subject matter is concerned, and can therefore be applied without any further implementing act, and confer rights on citizens vis-à-vis an organisation which, despite its private-law legal form, is subject to the authority of the State because the State is the sole shareholder in the undertaking?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 23 November 2018 by Sevenfriday AG against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 27 September 2018 in Case T-449/17: Sevenfriday v EUIPO

(Case C-733/18 P)

(2019/C 155/22)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Sevenfriday AG (represented by: M. Mostardini, F. Mellucci, S. Pallavicini, avvocati)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Seven SpA

By order of 19 March 2019 the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 11 September 2018 by Felismino Pereira against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 13 July 2018 in Case T-606/16 Pereira v Commission

(Case C-571/18 P)

(2019/C 131/20)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Felismino Pereira (represented by: N. de Montigny, lawyer)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 14 February 2019, the Court (Seventh Chamber) dismissed the appeal as manifestly inadmissible.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 7 December 2018 by Michal Harvilik — HYDRA against the order of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 25 September 2018 in Case T-365/18, Michal Harvilik — HYDRA v Czech Republic and the European Court of Human Rights

(Case C-768/18 P)

(2019/C 213/02)

Language of the case: Slovak

Parties

Appellant: Michal Harvilik — HYDRA (represented by: A. Wagner, lawyer)

Other parties to the proceedings: Czech Republic, European Court of Human Rights

By order of 19 March 2019, the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) ruled that the present appeal is inadmissible.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 30/11/2018 by Harry Shindler and Others against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 26 November 2018 in Case T-458/17 Shindler and Others v Council

(Case C-755/18 P)

(2019/C 172/08)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellants: Harry Shindler and Others (represented by J. Fouchet, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

By order of 19 March 2019, the Court of Justice (Fourth Chamber) dismissed the appeal.
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy v Gorzowie Wielkopolskim (Poland) lodged on 3 October 2018 — Prokuratura Rejonowa w Słubicach v BQ

(Case C-623/18)

(2020/C 433/18)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Okręgowy v Gorzowie Wielkopolskim

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Prokuratura Rejonowa w Słubicach

Defendant: BQ

By order of 6 October 2020, the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) ruled that the request for a preliminary ruling is manifestly inadmissible.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 18 December 2018 by Saga Furs Oyj against the order of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 12 October 2018 in Case T-313/18: Saga Furs v EUIPO — Support Design

(Case C-805/18 P)

(2019/C 255/20)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Saga Furs Oyj (represented by: J. Kaulo, luvan saanut oikeudenkäyntiavustaja)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Support Design AB

By order of 12 June 2019 the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal de première instance de Liège (Belgium) lodged on 21 January 2019 — BU v État belge

(Case C-35/19)

(2019/C 103/17)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal de première instance de Liège

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: BU

Defendant: État belge

Question referred

Does Article 38 § 1(4) of the C.I.R./92 infringe Article 45 et seq. (principle of free movement of workers) and Article 56 et seq. (principle of freedom to provide services) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in so far as it exempts disability allowances from tax only if those allowances are paid by the State Treasury, that is to say, by the Belgian State, in accordance with Belgian legislation, thereby giving rise to discrimination between taxpayers resident in Belgium who receive disability allowances paid by the Belgian State under Belgian legislation, which are exempt from tax, and taxpayers resident in Belgium who receive allowances intended to compensate for a disability paid by another Member State of the European Union, which are not exempt from tax?
1.

Is a national measure such as the one in issue in this case, provided for in Article 35 of the Zakon za energetikata (Energy Law) and set out in more detail in Article 11 of Naredba No 2 za regulirane na tsenite na prirodnia gaz (Ordinance No 2 on Natural Gas Price Regulation) of the Darzhavnata Komisia za energiyno i vodno regulirane (State Energy and Water Regulatory Commission; ‘KEVR’) of 19 March 2013, according to which the entire financial burden associated with the public service obligations imposed on the energy companies is to be borne by customers, permissible under Articles 36 and 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and under Article 3 of Directive 2009/73/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, considering that: (a) the economic burden arising from the public service obligations does not affect all energy companies; (b) the costs of the public service obligations are borne mainly by the end customers, who are unable to contest them, even though they obtain natural gas from the end suppliers at freely determined prices; (c) there is no differentiation of the economic burden arising from the performance of the public service obligations which is borne by different types of customers; (d) there is no time limitation for the application of this measure; (e) the calculation of the value of the public service obligations is made on the basis of the costs accounting method according to a forecast model?
3.

Is it possible for a surfing and sailing school to be recognised as an organisation with a similar object, within the meaning of Article 132(1)(i) of Directive 2006/112, on the basis of the regulations regarding school or university law, whereby even external surfing and sailing courses form part of physical education or the university education of physical education teachers where a grade or some other certificate of achievement is awarded, and/or on the basis of a public interest in sporting activities? Is a direct or indirect absorption of the costs of the courses by the school or university necessary for such recognition?
Appeal brought on 25 January 2019 by Banco Santander, S.A. against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 15 November 2018 in Case T-227/10 Banco Santander, S.A. v European Commission

(Case C-52/19 P)

(2019/C 112/37)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: Banco Santander, S.A. (represented by: J. Buendía Sierra, E. Abad Valdenebro, R. Calvo Salinero and A. Lamadrid de Pablo, abogados)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant submits that the Court should:

— Set aside the judgment of the General Court of 15 November 2018;

— Uphold the application for annulment and definitively annul the contested decision; and

— Order the European Commission to pay the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

On 15 November 2018, the General Court gave judgment in Case T-227/10, Banco Santander, S.A. v European Commission, (1) against which this appeal is brought. The judgment dismissed the appellant’s action against the European Commission’s decision of 28 October 2009, (2) on ‘financial goodwill’ regulated by Article 12.5 of the Spanish Ley de Impuesto sobre Sociedades (Law on Corporation Tax).

In support of its appeal, the appellant relies on a single ground of appeal, alleging that, in the judgment under appeal, the General Court erred in law in its interpretation of Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in relation to the concept of ‘selectivity’.

In particular, it is submitted that the General Court erred:

— In determining the reference system at the first stage of the selectivity analysis;

— In determining the objective forming the basis for comparing the separate legal and factual situations at the second stage of the selectivity analysis;

— Consequently, the General Court also erred in the attribution of the burden of proof and the application of the principle of proportionality;

— In the alternative, in its examination relating to the supposed lack of proof of a causal link between the companies’ inability to merge abroad and the acquisition of holdings abroad; and

— In the alternative, in ruling out the severability of the measure according to the control percentage;

— In addition to maintaining a legally incorrect line of reasoning, the General Court substituted its own reasoning for that of the Commission’s decision in relation to a number of the abovementioned points, thus giving rise to further errors of law.

(1) Judgment of 15 November 2018, Banco Santander, S.A. v Commission (T-227/10, not published, EU:T:2018:785).

(2) Commission Decision 2011/5/EC of 28 October 2009 on the tax amortisation of financial goodwill for foreign shareholding acquisitions C 45/07 (ex NN 51/07, ex CP 9/07) implemented by Spain (OJ 2011 L 7, p. 48).
2.

Is it compatible with the deductibility rules laid down in the Sixth VAT Directive, specifically Articles 4(1) and (2) and 17(1), (2) and (5), to deduct tax borne by the appellant, Sonaecom SGPS, in respect of the payment to BCP of a commission for organising and putting together a bond loan, allegedly taken out with a view to integrating the financial structure of its affiliated companies, and which, since those investments failed to materialise, was ultimately transferred to Sonae, SGPS, the parent company of the group?
1.

Is a break period in which an employee must be available to his employer within two minutes, in case there is an emergency call out, to be considered ‘working time’ within the meaning of Article 2 of Directive 2003/88/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time?
7.

If both of the preceding questions are answered in the affirmative, must the court assess, for the appropriate apportionment of the royalty or licence fee pursuant to Article 158(3) of Regulation No 2454/93, whether both conditions of Article 157(2) have been met, namely that the royalty or licence fee relates, even if only partly, to the imported goods and that it constitutes a condition of sale of those goods, and, if so, does the rule under Article 160, pursuant to which the conditions of Article 157(2) are met if the seller or a person related to him requires the buyer to make that payment, have to be taken into account in that assessment?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 29 January 2019 — Wikingerhof GmbH & Co. KG v Booking.com BV

(Case C-59/19)

(2019/C 155/29)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant in the appeal on a point of law: Wikingerhof GmbH & Co. KG

Respondent in the appeal on a point of law: Booking.com BV

Question referred

Is Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (1) to be interpreted as meaning that jurisdiction for matters relating to tort or delict exists in respect of an action seeking an injunction against specific practices if it is possible that the conduct complained of is covered by contractual provisions, but the applicant asserts that those provisions are based on an abuse of a dominant position on the part of the defendant?

(1) OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 20 February 2019 — B.M.O. v État belge

(Case C-137/19)

(2019/C 164/25)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: B.M.O.

Defendant: État belge

Question referred

Must Article 4(1)(c) of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, (1) read where appropriate with Article 16(1) of that directive, be interpreted as requiring that third country nationals, in order to be classified as ‘minor children’ within the meaning of that provision, must be ‘minors’ not only at the time of submitting the application for leave to reside but also at the time when the administration eventually determines that application?

(1) OJ 2003 L 251, p. 12.