ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 14 December 2018 — GAEC Jeanningros v Institut National de l’origine et de la qualité (INAO), Ministre de l’Agriculture et de l’Alimentation, Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances

(Case C-785/18)

(2019/C 72/11)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: GAEC Jeanningros

Respondents: Institut National de l’origine et de la qualité (INAO), Ministre de l’Agriculture et de l’Alimentation, Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances

Interested party: Comité interprofessionel de gestion du Comté

Question referred

Must Article 53 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs, (1) Article 6 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 664/2014 of 18 December 2013 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the establishment of the Union symbols for protected designations of origin, protected geographical indications and traditional specialities guaranteed and with regard to certain rules on sourcing, certain procedural rules and certain additional transitional rules, (2) and Article 10 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 668/2014 of 13 June 2014 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, (3) in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning that, in the specific case where the European Commission has upheld the application by the national authorities of a Member State seeking to have the specification of a name amended and to secure registration of the controlled designation of origin (appellation d’origine contrôlée), although that application is still the subject of an action pending before the national courts of that State, those courts may decide that there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the dispute, or, in view of the effects attached to a possible annulment of the contested measure on the validity of the registration by the European Commission, must those courts rule on the lawfulness of that measure adopted by the national authorities?

(1) OJ 2012 L 343, p. 1.

(2) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 664/2014 of 18 December 2013 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the establishment of the Union symbols for protected designations of origin, protected geographical indications and traditional specialities guaranteed and with regard to certain rules on sourcing, certain procedural rules and certain additional transitional rules (OJ 2014 L 179, p. 17).

(3) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 668/2014 of 13 June 2014 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (OJ 2014 L 179, p. 36).
4.

If the court finds that Articles 1.2.1 to 1.2.9 and 2.8 of the contract are unfair because they were not drafted in sufficiently plain and intelligible language, should all the financial terms, including the term concerning interest, be declared not written? Or should only those terms concerning the variation of the exchange rate and the term concerning currency be declared not written, retaining a fixed-interest rate, in euros? Or should another option be considered?
First ground of appeal

The appellant submits that the principle of legal certainty requires that interested persons know precisely the scope of the obligations under the legislation to which they are subject, which is guaranteed where the legislation concerned has been duly published in the official language of the intended recipient.

In the case of a legal act which has not been duly published, the procedural time-limits relating to notification can begin to run only from the date on which the first notification is properly issued.
3.

If the second question is answered to the effect that expenditure paid by a third party (whether or not by set-off) cannot be regarded as expenditure actually paid by the beneficiary as referred to in Article 55(1) of Regulation 1198/2006: (a) does an executive practice whereby the provider of the subsidy has consistently considered contributions from third parties to be expenditure actually paid by the beneficiary as referred to in Article 55(1) of Regulation 1198/2006 mean that the beneficiary could not have been expected to detect such an incorrect interpretation of Article 55(1) of Regulation 1198/2006 by the provider of the subsidy, with the result that the beneficiary is entitled to the subsidy as granted to him, and (b) should the contributions from third parties then be included in the expenditure actually paid by the beneficiary as referred to in Article 55(1) of Regulation 1198/2006 (in which case the subsidy is set higher) or (c) should recovery of the wrongly granted subsidy then be waived on the basis of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and/or the principle of legal certainty? (d) does it make any difference in that regard if the provider of the subsidy, as in the present case, has granted an advance on the subsidy?
Appeal brought on 26 November 2018 by Gugler France against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 25 September 2018 in Case T-238/17: Gugler v EUIPO

(Case C-736/18 P)

(2019/C 112/17)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Gugler France (represented by: S. Guerlain, avocat)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Alexander Gugler

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— annul the September 25th, 2018 decision of the General Court (8th Chamber) in case T-238/17 for violation of article 8 (4) EUTMR regarding the assessment of the likelihood of confusion which correspond to the concepts of article 8 (1) (b) EUTMR;

— order Mr Alexander Gugler to bear the applicants costs in relation to the present proceeding.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The applicant alleges infringement of article 8 (4) of the EUTMR and consequently article L711-4 of the French Code of Intellectual Property by failing to establish the existence of an economic link originating from the owner of the earlier right (the applicant) and towards the applicant of the contested mark (the defendant) and, also, the possible absence of a likelihood of confusion.
Action brought on 7 December 2018 — European Commission v Hungary

(Case C-771/18)

(2019/C 139/20)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: O. Beynet and K. Talabér-Ritz, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Hungary

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that Hungary has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 14(1) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, (1) and Article 13(1) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005, (2) by failing to take account of the costs actually incurred by network operators;

— declare that Hungary has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 37(17) of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, (3) and Article 41(17) of Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, (4) by failing to establish a suitable mechanism guaranteeing the right to appeal against the decisions of the national regulatory authority, as provided for under the abovementioned provisions of Directives 2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC;

— order Hungary to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Article 14(1) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 and Article 13(1) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 establish the principle that tariffs for the use of networks must be cost-oriented.

However, the Law on electricity and the Law on natural gas currently in force in Hungary do not allow the national regulatory authority, when setting tariffs for the use of networks, to take into account all the costs actually incurred by system operators, such as excise duty on energy networks and commission costs related to banking operations.

The Commission claims that there is no objective reason for preventing the national regulatory authority from taking into account the abovementioned costs when setting tariffs for the use of the networks.

In addition, under Article 37(17) of Directive 2009/72/EC and Article 41(17) of Directive 2009/73/EC, Member States must ensure that suitable mechanisms exist at national level under which a party affected by a decision of a regulatory authority has a right of appeal to a body independent of the parties involved and of any government.

According to the Commission, Hungary has failed to establish a suitable mechanism guaranteeing the right to appeal against the decisions of the national regulatory authority.

(1) OJ 2009 L 211, p. 15.

(2) OJ 2009 L 211, p. 36.

(3) OJ 2009 L 211, p. 55.

(4) OJ 2009 L 211, p. 94.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Timișoara (Romania) lodged on 24 December 2018 — SC Terracult SRL v Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Timișoara — Administrația Județeană a Finanțelor Publice Arad — Serviciul Inspecție Fiscală Persoane Juridice 5 and Agenția Națională de Administrare Fiscală — Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Timișoara — Serviciul de Soluționare a Contestațiilor

(Case C-835/18)

(2019/C 131/27)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Timișoara

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: SC Terracult SRL

Respondents: Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Timișoara — Administrația Județeană a Finanțelor Publice Arad — Serviciul Inspecție Fiscală Persoane Juridice 5 and Agenția Națională de Administrare Fiscală — Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Timișoara — Serviciul de Soluționare a Contestațiilor

Question referred

Do the VAT Directive (1) and the principles of fiscal neutrality, effectiveness and proportionality preclude, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, an administrative practice and/or an interpretation of provisions of national legislation which prevents the correction of certain invoices and, consequently, the entry of the corrected invoices in the VAT return for the period in which the correction was made, in respect of transactions carried out during a period which was the subject of a tax inspection, following which the tax authorities issued a tax assessment which has become final, when, after the issue of the tax assessment, additional data and information have been discovered which would entail the application of a different tax regime?

(1) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).
2.

Does a unilateral instruction from the employer prohibiting the wearing of any visible sign of political, ideological or religious beliefs constitute indirect discrimination on the grounds of religion and/or gender, within the meaning of Article 2(1) and Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78/EC, against a female employee who, due to her Muslim faith, wears a headscarf? In particular: (a) Can discrimination on the grounds of religion and/or gender be justified under Directive 2000/78/EC with the employer’s subjective wish to pursue a policy of political, ideological and religious neutrality even where the employer thereby seeks to meet the subjective wishes of his customers? (b) Do Directive 2000/78/EC and/or the fundamental right of freedom to conduct a business under Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in view of Article 8(1) of Directive 2000/78/EC preclude a national regulation according to which, in order to protect the fundamental right of freedom of religion, a ban on religious clothing may be justified not simply on the basis of an abstract capacity to endanger the neutrality of the employer, but only on the basis of a sufficiently specific risk, in particular of a specifically threatened economic disadvantage for the employer or an affected third party?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 19 November 2018 — KROL — Zakład Robót Wodno-Kanalizacyjnych Sp. z o.o., S.k. v Porr S.A.

(Case C-722/18)

(2019/C 164/03)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: KROL — Zakład Robót Wodno-Kanalizacyjnych Sp. z o.o., S.k.

Respondent: Porr S.A.

Question referred

Does EU law, in particular recitals 13, 20 and 22 of Directive 2000/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2000 on combating late payment in commercial transactions (1) and Article 18 TFEU laying down the principle of non-discrimination, permit the possibility of excluding compensation for late payment in respect of transactions financed in whole or in part by the EU Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund, which follows from Article 4(3)(c) of the Ustawa o terminach zapłaty w transakcjach handlowych (Law on Payment Terms in Commercial Transactions)?

(1) OJ 2000 L 200, p. 35.
1.

Infringement of Article 19(3) of the Statute of the Court of Justice (in conjunction with Article 51(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court) The conclusion reached in the order under appeal that there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the appellant’s application for replacement is based on an error in law in finding that the action in Case T-664/16 was inadmissible and an error in law in finding that the relationship between the appellant and the applicant was relevant. The General Court dismissed the action in Case T-664/16 as inadmissible in breach of Article 19(3) of the Statute of the Court of Justice, since it misapplied the parties’ obligation laid down in that provision to be ‘represented by a lawyer’. The General Court overestimates the requirements of the lawyer’s independence. The wording and meaning of Article 19(3) of the Statute of the Court of Justice do not justify the General Court’s interpretation. The General Court’s interpretation also finds no basis in the case-law of the Court of Justice. It is not foreseeable and breaches the principle of legal certainty.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 27 December 2018 by Linak A/S against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 18 October 2018 in Case T-368/17: Linak v EUIPO — ChangZhou Kaidi Electrical

(Case C-820/18 P)

(2019/C 255/22)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Linak A/S (represented by: V. von Bomhard, Rechtsanwältin, and J. Fuhrmann, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 19 June 2019 the Court of Justice (Tenth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
Ground involving an issue of public policy: Infringement of EU Law — Errors of law — Infringement of substantive requirements — Infringement of the rights of the defence

It is submitted that the Secretary General failed to conduct a personal hearing of the appellant and also failed to forward the file, particularly the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) report.

The appellant’s rights of defence have been infringed by the General Court, particularly in the light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 6 of the ECHR.
2.

If the CSG exemption is in principle available to an entity established in a different Member State from one or more members of the CSG and also to a CSG established outside the EU, how should the criterion that the exemption should not be likely to cause distortion of competition be applied? In particular, a) Does it apply to potential distortion which affects other recipients of similar services which are not members of the CSG or does it only apply to potential distortion which affects potential alternative providers of services to the CSG's members? b) If it applies only to other recipients, can there be a real possibility of distortion if other recipients who are not members of the CSG are able either to apply to join the CSG in question, or to set up their own CSG to obtain similar services, or to obtain equivalent VAT savings by other methods (such as by setting up a branch in the Member State or third stat in question). c) If it applies only to other providers, is the real possibility of distortion to be assessed by determining whether the CSG is assured of keeping its member’s custom, irrespective of the availability of the VAT exemption — and therefore to be assessed by reference to the access of alternative providers to the national market in which the members of the CSG are established? If so, does it matter whether the CSG is assured of keeping its members’ custom because they are part of the same corporate group. d) Should potential distortion be assessed at a national level in relation to alternative providers in the third state where the CSG is established? e) Does the tax authority in the EU which administers the VAT Directive bear an evidential burden to establish the likelihood of distortion? f) Is it necessary for the tax authority in the EU to commission specific expert evaluation of the market of the third state where the CSG is established? g) Can the presence of a real possibility of distortion be established by the identification of a commercial market in the third state?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 11 January 2019 — WM v City of Frankfurt am Main

(Case C-18/19)

(2019/C 112/33)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: WM

Authority involved: City of Frankfurt am Main

Question referred

Does Article 16(1) of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (1) preclude national provisions under which custody awaiting deportation may be enforced in an ordinary custodial institution if the foreign national poses a significant threat to the life and limb of others or to significant internal security interests, in which case the detainee awaiting deportation is accommodated separately from prisoners serving criminal sentences?

(1) OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98.
1.

Are Article 4(1)(c)(ii), Article 7(1) and Article 8(1) of Decision No 626/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2008 on the selection and authorisation of systems providing mobile satellite services (MSS) (1) to be interpreted as meaning that, where it is established that the operator selected in accordance with Title II of that decision has not provided mobile satellite services through a mobile satellite system by the deadline set in Article 4(1)(c)(ii) of the decision, the competent authorities of the Member States referred to in Article 8(1) of the decision must refuse to grant authorisations allowing that operator to deploy complementary ground components on the ground that that operator has failed to honour the commitment given in its application?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Wien (Austria) lodged on 15 January 2019 — kunsthaus muerz gmbh v Zürich-Versicherungs AG

(Case C-20/19)

(2019/C 155/25)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberlandesgericht Wien

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: kunsthaus muerz gmbh

Defendant: Zürich-Versicherungs AG

Question referred

Is Directive 2002/83/EC (1) — in particular Article 35 and Article 36 — to be interpreted as precluding a national provision under which, irrespective of a (correct) notice before conclusion of the contract regarding the right of cancellation, the cancellation period comes to an end within 30 days after the contract has been concluded, (even) if the policy holder is not a consumer?

(1) Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002 concerning life assurance (OJ 2002 L 345, p. 1).
2.

Is Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 invalid in respect of an EU importer due to the infringement of Article 2(10) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 in so far as, in the context of calculating the magnitude of the dumping margin for the products concerned, the institutions of the Union refused to take into account, when comparing the normal value of the products of an Indian producer with the export prices of similar Chinese products, adjustments relating to import duties on raw materials and indirect taxes in the analogue country India and to differences in production (costs) and/or in so far as the institutions of the Union, during the investigation, did not provide cooperating Chinese exporting producers (in a timely manner) with all the data of the Indian producer with regard to the determination of the normal value?
2.

Where both parties concerned are public bodies, do recital 28 of Directive 2014/24/EU and Articles 10 and 12(4) thereof preclude the applicability of the provisions of Veneto Regional Law 26/2012, on the basis of the public-public partnership referred to in Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Articles 5(6) of Legislative Decree 50/2016 and 15 of Law 241/1990, in the limited sense of placing the contracting authority under an obligation to give the reasons for the decision to award the contract for the provision of ordinary patient transport services by way of tender procedure rather than by direct award of the contract?