ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
2.

Is the first paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 to be interpreted as meaning that the extension of a residence permit is to be regarded as constituting the authorisation specified in that provision to join a Turkish worker duly registered as belonging to the labour force in the case where the family member concerned has lived continuously, since being authorised to join the Turkish worker within the meaning of that provision, together with that person but the latter, following a period of temporary absence therefrom, is duly registered as belonging afresh to the labour force of the Member State only at the date on which the residence permit is extended?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 7/11

Action brought on 30 October 2015 — European Commission v Republic of Malta

(Case C-557/15)

(2016/C 007/18)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: C. Hermes, K. Mifsud-Bonnici, agents)

Defendant: Republic of Malta

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that by adopting a derogation regime allowing the live-capturing of seven species of wild finches (Chaffinch Fringilla coelebs, Linnet Carduelis cannabina, Goldfinch Carduelis carduelis, Greenfinch Carduelis chloris, Hawfinch Coccothraustes coccothraustes, Serin Serinus serinus and Siskin Carduelis spinus), the Republic of Malta has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 5(a) and 5(e) and 8(1) in connection with Annex IV, point (a), read in conjunction with Article 9(1), of Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds (1);

— order Republic of Malta to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Malta introduced a derogation regime for the authorization of trapping seven species of wild finches in 2014 under which it authorized trapping seasons in 2014 and 2015.

Directive 2009/147 obliges Member States to prohibit the capture and keeping of wild birds not included in Annex II, such as the finches in question, and any capture of wild birds via non-selective means such as traps or nets. Any derogation from these prohibitions is subject to the strict conditions set out in Article 9 of the Directive.

The Commission considers that Malta's derogation regime allowing the trapping of the seven finch species is inconsistent with Articles 5(a), 5(e) and 8(1) in connection with Annex IV, point (a) of the Directive.

The Commission considers that Malta has not established that the conditions for derogation set out in Article 9(1) of the Directive are met. First, Malta fails to demonstrate the absence of another satisfactory solution as required by the chapeau of Article 9(1) of the Directive. Second, Malta's derogation regime fails to provide a statement of reasons with regard to the alleged absence of other satisfactory solutions. Third, Malta has not demonstrated that the authorized activity constitutes ‘judicious use’ within the meaning of Article 9(1)(c) of the Directive. Fourth, Malta fails to demonstrate compliance with the requirement in Article 9(1)(c) of the Directive that the derogation only concerns ‘small numbers’ of birds. Fifth, Malta has not established that the authorization occurs under ‘strictly supervised conditions’ as required by Article 9(1)(c) of the Directive.

(1) OJ L 20, p. 7.
5.

In turn, when the consumer against whom enforcement is sought lodges an objection to mortgage enforcement proceedings on the grounds of the unfairness of a contractual term inserted in the consumer contract which forms the basis of the enforcement proceedings or which determined the amount payable, is it compatible with Articles 6 and 7 of Directive [93/13] for the risk of serious difficulties for the economic public order to be assessed in the light of the economic effects that might be engendered by the potential bringing of an individual action or lodging of an objection to enforcement by a large number of consumers on the grounds that the clause is unfair, or, on the contrary, must that risk to be assessed in the light of the financial effect on the economy of the specific objection to enforcement brought by the consumer against whom enforcement is sought?
1.

Must Article 96(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 (1) establishing the Community Customs Code be interpreted as meaning that not only the person who enters into a transport agreement with the seller for the transport of the goods (the contractual or main carrier), but also the person who carries out the transport, in full or in part, on the basis of another transport agreement concluded with the contractual or main carrier (the transport subcontractor), is to be regarded as a carrier of the goods?
1.

Must Title II of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 (1) be interpreted as meaning that a worker residing in the Netherlands who normally works in the Netherlands and who takes unpaid leave for three months is deemed to continue to be (also) employed in the Netherlands during that period if (i) the employment relationship continues during that period and (ii) for purposes of the application of the Dutch Werkloosheidswet (Law on unemployment) that period is considered to be a period of employment?
1.

For the purposes of Article 56 TFEU and in the light of the constitutional relationship between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom: 1.1. Are Gibraltar and the UK to be treated as if they were part of a single Member State for the purposes of EU law and so that Article 56 TFEU does not apply, save to the extent that it can apply to an internal measure? Alternatively, 1.2. Having regard to Article 355(3) TFEU, does Gibraltar have the constitutional status of a separate territory to the UK within the EU such that the provision of services between Gibraltar and the UK is to be treated as intra-EU trade for the purposes of Article 56 TFEU? Alternatively, 1.3. Is Gibraltar to be treated as a third country or territory with the effect that EU law is only engaged in respect of trade between the two in circumstances where EU law has effect between a Member State and a non-Member State? Alternatively, 1.4. Is the constitutional relationship between Gibraltar and the UK to be treated in some other way for the purposes of Article 56 TFEU?
2.

in view of the Explanation (OJ 2007 C 303, p. [19]) that the limitations which may legitimately be imposed on the rights in Article 6 of the Charter may not exceed those permitted by the European Convention on Human Rights in the wording of its Article 5[(1)](f), and in the light of the interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights of the latter provision in, inter alia, the judgment of 22 September 2015 in Nabil and Others v Hungary, 62116/12, according to which the detention of an asylum-seeker is contrary to the aforementioned Article 5(1)(f) if such detention was not imposed with a view to removal?
2.

Is Article 33(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2038/1999 of 13 September 1999 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector to be interpreted — particularly in the light of the judgment of 27 September 2012 in Zuckerfabrik Jülich (C-113/10, C-147/10 and C-234/10) — as meaning that the carry forward to be taken into account (as a debit or credit item) in the overall calculation of the production levies is to be calculated, for all categories of sugar exported, by dividing the total amount of the actual expenditure by the total amount of the quantities actually exported, regardless of whether or not export refunds have actually been paid for those quantities?
2.

Insofar as Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 is applicable: When passengers are transported on one of several connecting flights without any significant stopover at the connecting airports, is the place of departure of the first leg of the journey to be regarded as being the place where the services were provided under the second indent of Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 even if the flight connection has been carried out by different air carriers and the claim which has been brought is directed against the air carrier which operated a different leg of the journey, on which a significant delay occurred?
3.

In the third ground of appeal, the appellant claims that Article 15(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009 (1) was, in several respects, incorrectly interpreted and applied. First, in the context of the examination of the distinctiveness of the trade mark required under Article 15(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009, the General Court did not follow Court of Justice’s case-law on determining the distinctiveness of three-dimensional product trade marks. The General Court did not in that regard compare the trade mark at issue with the oven forms commonly used in the sector, as required by the Court of Justice’s case-law. Second, the General Court assumed that the possible functionality of the form of the trade mark at issue was irrelevant for determining its distinctiveness. The General Court thereby infringed the recognised principle that account must be taken of all the relevant circumstances of the case at issue in determining the distinctiveness of a trade mark. Third, the General Court did not follow the Court of Justice’s case-law on use so as to preserve the rights of a trade mark proprietor in connection with a registered trade mark used as part of a composite trade mark. The General Court considered it sufficient in that regard that a trade mark used as part of a composite trade mark is still recognised as a reference of origin to the former trade mark. The General Court failed to have regard to the obligation laid down clearly in Article 15(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009 and the Court of Justice’s case-law always to assess whether the distinctiveness of the registered trade mark has been influenced. The General Court failed to conduct that assessment.
2.

If so, does it do so in any, or all, of the following situations: i.e., where the surrender of the requested person within the period laid down in paragraph 2 has already been prevented by circumstances beyond the control of any of the Member States, leading to the agreement of a new surrender date, and such circumstances – i) are found to be on-going; or ii) having ceased, are found to be re-occurring; or iii) having ceased, different such circumstances have arisen which have prevented, or are likely to prevent, surrender of the requested person within the required period referable to the said new surrender date?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 90/2

Appeal brought on 21 September 2015 by TVR Italia Srl against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 15 July 2015 in TVR Automotive v OHIM — TVR Italia (Case T-398/13)

(Case C-500/15 P)

(2016/C 090/02)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: TVR Italia Srl (represented by: F. Caricato, avvocato)

Other parties to the proceedings: TVR Automotive Ltd and Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as Agent)

By order of 14 January 2016 the Court (Ninth Chamber) dismissed the appeal.
—

declare that, by failing to adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council, (1) and in any event by not notifying the Commission of such provisions, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 130(1) of that directive;
1.

[Is the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C 465/2005 Commission v Italy (EU:C:2007:781), in which that court] found that the Italian State was in breach of the principles enshrined in Articles 43 and 49 of the EC Treaty (freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services), stating that: (a) it is obligatory to swear an oath of allegiance to the Italian Republic in order to work as a private security guard; (b) private security guard activities may be pursued by service providers established in another Member State only after authorisation of limited territorial validity has been granted by the Prefetto (provincial governor) without taking account of the obligations to which such providers are already subject in their Member State of origin; (c) that authorisation is to be of limited territorial validity and is to be granted subject to consideration of the number and size of private security undertakings already operating in the area in question; (d) private security undertakings must have a place of business in each province in which they operate; (e) the staff of private security undertakings must be individually authorised to undertake private security work without taking account of the controls and verifications already carried out in the Member State of origin; (g) [sic] private security undertakings must have a minimum and/or maximum number of employees in order to obtain authorisation; (h) such undertakings must lodge a guarantee with the local Cassa depositi e prestiti; (i) the prices for private security services are to be fixed, with the approval of the Prefetto, within the limits of a predetermined margin for variation; [to be interpreted as] precluding, of itself, the provincial public security authority (the Questore) from imposing requirements regarding the provisions of services such as those at issue in this case, [which] make it compulsory to deploy a minimum number of security guards (two) for operations entailing the provisions of particular services?
—

declare that, by not adopting every law, regulation and administrative provision necessary for compliance with Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, (1) or, in any event, by not notifying those provisions to the Commission, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 130(1) of that directive;
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 145/13

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy we Wrocławiu (Poland) lodged on 1 July 2015 — Z.Ś., Z.M., M.P. v X w G.

(Case C-325/15)

(2016/C 145/16)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy we Wrocławiu

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Z.Ś., Z.M., M.P.

Defendant: X w G.

The Court of Justice (Tenth Chamber) made an order on 18 February 2016 in which it answered the first question submitted for a preliminary ruling by the referring court. The second question was found to be manifestly inadmissible.
1.

Does the aim of efficient management of migration flows constitute an overriding reason in the public interest capable of denying exemption for a Turkish national born in federal territory from the requirement for a residence permit which he could claim by virtue of the standstill clause of Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 of the EEC/Turkey Association Council of 19 September 1980 on the Development of the Association?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 270/15

Appeal brought on 10 September 2015 by KS Sports IPCo GmbH, successor in law to BH Stores BV against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 2 July 2015 in Case T-657/13: KS Sports v EUIPO

(Case C-480/15 P)

(2016/C 270/21)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: KS Sports IPCo GmbH, successor in law to BH Stores BV (represented by: T. Dolde, Rechtsanwalt, M. Hawkins, Solicitor, P. Homann, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

By order of 14 April 2016 the Court (Sixth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 200/5

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Bacău (Romania) lodged on 27 July 2015 — Ovidiu Rîpanu v Compania Națională ‘Loteria Română’ S.A.

(Case C-407/15)

(2016/C 200/07)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Bacău (România)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Ovidiu Rîpanu

Defendant: Compania Națională ‘Loteria Română’ S.A.

By order of 18 February 2016, the Court (Tenth Chamber) declared that it clearly lacked jurisdiction to reply to the question submitted.
Misapplication of the principle of good faith in the performance of the contract at issue.

The General Court erred in its assessment of Article 1134 of the Belgian Civil Code, with respect to the application of the principle of good faith in the performance of the contract.
For the purposes of Article 107 TFEU, is the holding by a Romanian publicly-funded company of shares in a joint (Romanian-Turkish) company equivalent to State aid subject to the obligation to notify set out in Article 108(3) TFEU?

Does it constitute public funding selective in nature, and could it have an effect on trade between Member States of the European Union?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 111/17

Appeal brought on 19 February 2016 by the Council of the European Union against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 10 December 2015 in Case T-512/12 Polisario Front v Council

(Case C-104/16 P)

(2016/C 111/20)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Council of the European Union (represented by: A. de Elera-San Miguel Hurtado and A. Westerhof Löfflerová, Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Popular Front for the liberation of Saguia-el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front), European Commission

Form of order sought

— set aside the judgment of the General Court in Case T-512/12;

— give final judgment in the matters which are the subject of the present appeal by dismissing the action for annulment brought by the Polisario Front (the ‘applicant’); and

— order the applicant to pay the costs incurred by the Council at first instance and in the present appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of its appeal, the Council raises several pleas alleging errors of law.

First, the Council takes the view that the General Court has erred in law by holding that the applicant had the capacity to bring proceedings before the Courts of the European Union.

Second, it submits that the General Court erred in law by holding that the applicant was direct and individually concerned by the decision annulled.

Third, it criticises the General Court for having erred in law by basing the annulment on a plea which had not been raised by the applicant and with regard to which the Council was unable to express its views.

Fourth, the Council complains that the General Court erred in law by holding that the Council was required to examine the possible impact of the production activities concerning the products covered by the agreement concluded by the decision annulled on the human rights of the population of Western Sahara before adopting the decision annulled.

Fifth, the General Court erred in law by holding that the Council was required to examine whether there was evidence, under the agreement concluded by that decision, of the exploitation of the natural resources of the territory of Western Sahara under Moroccan control which may be carried out to the detriment of its inhabitants and may infringe their fundamental rights, before adopting the decision annulled.

Finally, the Council claims that the General Court erred in law by partially annulling the contested decision which had the effect of altering its substance.
3.

If those interpretations should be held to be incompatible with Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13, is it always and at all events contrary to the ‘requirement of good faith’ to include in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer clauses that define the main object of the contract and are worded in insufficiently clearly and comprehensibly, or must that breach of the principle of good faith be examined in the light of other circumstances? In the latter case, what circumstances must the national court take into consideration in order to be able to find that there has been no breach of the principle of good faith when it identifies the existence of a clause defining the main object of the contract that is worded unclearly and incomprehensibly? In particular, may such circumstances include the existence of national legislation with the status of a law or regulation which provides, in abstracto, for the validity of that type of ‘floor clause’?
3.

In the cases concerned in the main proceedings, when assessing whether ‘the principal is to blame’ within the meaning of the second indent of Article 11(1) of Directive 86/653, (a) may only legal reasons leading directly to termination of the contract be considered (for example, the contract ceases as a result of the non-performance of an obligation under it by the third party), or (b) may it also be considered whether those legal reasons were not the result of the conduct of the principal in the legal relationship with that third party which induced the third party to lose confidence in the principal and consequently to breach an obligation under the contract with the principal?
1.

Does the ‘proof’ that Article 13 of Regulation No 1346/2000 (1) requires of the person who benefited from an act detrimental to all the creditors, in order to prevent that act from being challenged in accordance with the rules of the lex fori concursus, include a requirement to raise a procedural objection in the strict sense of that term within the periods laid down by the procedural rules of the lex fori, when seeking to rely on the derogation provided in the regulation and to prove that the two conditions laid down by that provision have been met? or Does Article 13 of Regulation No 1346/2000 apply when the party concerned has requested its application during the proceedings, even when the time limits laid down by the procedural rules of the lex fori for lodging procedural objections have expired, or even where that provision is applied by the court of its own motion, provided that the party concerned has provided proof that the detrimental act is subject to the lex causae of another Member State whose law does not permit the act to be challenged by any means in the specific circumstances of the case?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 145/20

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Netherlands) lodged on 3 February 2016 — The Shirtmakers BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën

(Case C-59/16)

(2016/C 145/25)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hoge Raad der Nederlanden

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: The Shirtmakers BV

Other party: Staatssecretaris van Financiën

Question referred

Should Article 32(1)(e)(i) of the Community Customs Code be interpreted as meaning that the term ‘cost of transport’ should be understood to mean the amounts charged by the actual carriers of the imported goods, even where those carriers have not charged those amounts directly to the buyer of the imported goods but to another operator who has concluded the contracts of carriage with actual carriers on behalf of the buyer of the imported goods, and who has charged the buyer higher amounts in connection with his efforts in arranging the transport?