ORDER OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Second Chamber)

24 July 1997

Case T-573/93 (129)

Manuel Francisco Caballero Montoya

v

Commission of the European Communities

‛Judgments — Interpretation’

Full text in Spanish II-761

Application for:

interpretation of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of 19 June 1996 in Case T-573/93 Caballero Montoya v Commission [1996] ECRSC II-909.

Decision:

Application dismissed.

Abstract of the Order

By judgment of 19 June 1996 in Case T-573/93 Caballero Montoya v Commission [1996] ECRSC II-909, the Court of First Instance annulled the Commission's decision of 12 February 1993 in so far as that decision, while recognizing that the applicant, a Commission official, was entitled — in respect of the period from1 December 1992 to 30 November 1993 — to an allowance for a person treated as a dependent child in the case of his first son, refused to grant him such an allowance in the case of his second son.

The Court annulled the decision on the ground that the Commission's refusal, which was based on the fact that both of the applicant's sons live ‘in the official's household’, was based on an error of law in the interpretation of the provisions of Article 6 of the general implementing provisions concerning persons to be treated as dependent children (see paragraphs 56 to 67 of the judgment), which were adopted by the Commission on 28 September 1989 and entered into force on 1 October 1989.

Accordingly, the Court took the view that the Commission was under a duty to adopt a new, properly reasoned, decision as to whether the applicant was entitled to have only one son treated as a dependent child or whether both sons should be so treated (paragraph 67 of the grounds of the judgment).

By letter of 11 July 1996 the applicant asked the Commission to take the necessary measures ‘so that, by implementation of the Court's findings at [paragraph] 67 of the [judgment], a new decision, more soundly based in law, may be taken in compliance with the operative part [of that judgment] in relation to [the applicant's request of] December 1992 for recognition of his entitlement to the allowance for a person treated as a dependent child in respect of [his] two sons, Manuel Javier and Jaime José’. The applicant also asked the Commission to ‘review that entitlement automatically [...] with regard to subsequent years (1993, 1994 and 1995)’.

By letter of 10 September 1996 the Directorate-General for Personnel and Administration (DG IX) advised the applicant of the decision to grant him, for the period from 1 December 1992 to 30 November 1993, two allowances — for his sons Manuel Javier and Jaime José, respectively. The applicant's other request concerning the years 1993, 1994 and 1995 was rejected on the following ground: ‘Since the judgment cited above has no effect on the award of a second allowance in respect of subsequent periods, the decisions which have been notified to you remain in force’.

Taking the view that the abovementioned Commission decision of 10 September 1996 was not properly reasoned, the applicant called on the Commission by letter of 17 September 1996 to review that decision so as to avoid ‘the reopening of lengthy judicial proceedings’.

By letter of 15 October 1996 DG IX refused the applicant's request on the ground that the judgment of the Court concerned only the lawfulness of the decision refusing an allowance for the second son and could not therefore call in question ‘subsequent decisions concerning the granting ofthat allowance [to the applicant]’.

By document lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 4 December 1996, the applicant made the present application for interpretation under Article 129 of the Rules of Procedure.

Findings of the Court

An application for interpretation of a judgment must, in order to be admissible, concern the operative part of the judgment in question, and the essential grounds thereof, and seek to clarify an obscure point or resolve an ambiguity that may affect the meaning or scope of that judgment, in so far as the Court was required to decide the particular case before it. An application for interpretation of a judgment is therefore inadmissible where it relates to matters not decided by the judgment concerned or seeks to obtain from the Court in question an opinion on the application, implementation or consequences of its judgment (paragraph 27).

See: 5/55 ASSIDER v High Authority [1955] ECR 135; 70/63 A High Authority v Collotti and Court of Justice [1965] ECR 275; 9/81 — Interpretation Court of Auditors v Williams [1983] ECR 2859; 206/81 A Alvarez v Parliament [1983] ECR 2865; 25/86 Suss v Commission [1986] ECR 3929; 146/85 and 431/85 — MerpKtationMaindiaux and Others v ESCand Others [1988] ECR 2003; T-22/91 IKľRaiola-Dentiand Others v Council [1993] ECR II-817; T-165/89 (129) Plug v Commission [5.10.95], not published in the ECR

In the absence of any obscurity or ambiguity affecting the meaning or scope of the judgment in question and in so far as it is sought to obtain from the Court an opinion on the implementation and consequences of that judgment, the application for interpretation does not satisfy the conditions for admissibility laid down in the case-law referred to above (paragraph 34).

Operative part:

The application for interpretation is dismissed as inadmissible.