JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (First Chamber)

26 January 1995

Joined Cases T-90/91 and T-62/92

Henri de Compte

v

European Parliament

‛Officials — Revocation of a decision recognizing the existence of an occupational disease — Subsequent adoption of a decision refusing such recognition — Annulment’

Full text in French II-1

Application for:

annulment of the European Parliament's decision of 18 April 1991 revoking with retroactive effect the decision of 24 January 1991 recognizing that the applicant was suffering from an occupational disease within the meaning of Article 73 of the Staff Regulations, and for an order that the Parliament pay him the relevant benefit (Case T-90/91) and, secondly, annulment of the Parliament's decision of 20 January 1992 refusing to recognize that the applicant was suffering from an occupational disease, and for an order that the Parliament pay him the relevant benefit (Case T-62/92).

Decision:

Applications dismissed. Order for compensation for non-material damage.

Abstract of the Judgment

On 18 January 1988 the appointing authority imposed on the applicant, an official of the European Parliament, the disciplinary measure of downgrading.

On 14 June 1988 the applicant requested that the Parliament initiate the procedure for recognition that he was suffering from an occupational disease and entitled to the benefits provided for by Article 73 of the Staff Regulations. The Medical Committee set up in accordance with Article 23 of the Rules on the Insurance of Officials of the European Communities against the Risk of Accident and of Occupational Disease (the Insurance Rules) expressed the opinion in its report, drawn up on 22 January 1991, that:

‘1. (The applicant) is suffering from severe anxio-depressive decompensation, in the form of melancholia and paranoia, the cause of which is occupational, the condition having been generated by stress which was occasioned by accusations perceived as malicious, and which has led to the downgrading of his career and to mental problems.

2. The subject contracted this illness through having encountered in the performance of his duties exceptional circumstances of such a nature as to induce illness.

3. (...)

4. The causal factors responsible for the illness are the subjective and the objective experiences ensuing from the accusations made against the subject. Those two forms of experience have in equal measure had a decisive effect on a person predisposed towards paranoia. ’

On 24 January 1991 the appointing authority determined that the applicant was suffering from an occupational disease, which had given rise to permanent partial invalidity at the rate of 40%, and decided to pay him the sum of BFR 9147091.

On 18 April 1991 the appointing authority revoked that decision with retroactive effect, stating that it would be ‘replaced by another decision which will be adopted in the light of the judgment to be given in Case T-26/89 De Compte v European Parliament’ upon conclusion of the proceedings brought by the applicant against the decision of 18 January 1988 imposing upon him the disciplinary measure of downgrading. The statement of the reasons for the April 1991 decision essentially reflects die judgment of the Court of Justice of 21 January 1987 in Rienzi, according to which an illness may only be classified as occupational if it arises in the course of or in connection with the lawful performance of his duties by the official concerned. However, the Medical Committee's report attributed the applicant's illness to the accusations made against him, which had caused disciplinary proceedings to be commenced against him, and to the disciplinary measure resulting from those proceedings. Thus, in adopting the decision of 24 January 1991, the appointing authority had based its conclusions on an erroneous interpretation of the concept, ‘of occupational origin’, in so far as it had espoused the findings of the Medical Committee and, as a consequence, had committed an error in its interpretation of the concept of occupational disease for the purposes of Article 73 of the Staff Regulations and Article 3(2) of the Insurance Rules. In view of the fact that its initial position had been based on an erroneous interpretation of the concept of occupational disease, the appointing authority considered itself entitled to revoke with retroactive effect the decision of 24 January 1991 in order to ensure compliance with the law.

On 17 October 1991 the Court of First Instance gave its judgment in Case T-26/89, rejecting as unfounded the action brought by the applicant against the disciplinary measure of downgrading which had been imposed upon him. On 16 December 1991 an appeal was brought against that judgment before the Court of Justice, which dismissed it by judgment of 2 June 1994 in Case C-326/91 P De Compte v Parliament (paragraph 9).

On 20 January 1992, following the judgment given by the Court of First Instance on 17 October 1991 in Case T-26/89, the appointing authority adopted the decision which had been envisaged in the decision of 18 April 1991 revoking the decision of 24 January 1991. The grounds for the decision of 20 January 1992 were essentially that an illness may only be classified as occupational if it arises in the course of the proper performance of his duties by die official concerned. That decision concludes that the applicant ‘has not contracted an occupational disease within the meaning of the Rules on Insurance of Officials of the European Communities against the Risk of Accident and of Occupational Disease’.

The application in Case T-90/91 for annulment of the decision of 18 April 1991

The legality of the revoked decision of 24 January 1991

The concept of occupational disease on which the official concerned relies implies the existence of a causal link between the disease and the performance of the duties assigned to the official or his conditions of work, that is to say, the factors which give rise to the illness must constitute the materialization of a risk inherent in the performance of those duties (paragraph 39).

The term ‘occupational disease’, for the purposes of Article 73 of the Staff Regulations and Article 3 of the Insurance Rules, cannot be applied to a pathological condition which does not have a sufficiently direct relationship with a risk inherent in the duties performed by an official or the conditions in which those duties must be performed, but which arises from wholly unconnected factors and situations, such as conduct inconsistent with the obligations under which officials are placed by the Staff Regulations and the disciplinary measures to which such conduct may possibly lead (paragraph 40).

See: 118/84 Commission v Royale Belge [1985] ECR 1889, para. 17; C-185/90 P Commission v Gill [1991] ECR I-4779; 257/81 K v Council [1983] ECR 1, para. 20; 76/84 Rienzi v Commission [1987] ECR 315, paras 20 and 21; T-122/89 F v Commission [1990] ECR II-517

It follows that the findings contained in the Medical Committee's report of 22 January 1991 were based on an erroneous interpretation of the concept of occupational disease, and that the appointing authority's decision of 24 January 1991, which was based on those findings, is vitiated by an illegality which exposes it to the possibility of annulment and, consequently, of revocation with retroactive effect (paragraph 46).

See: 189/82 Seiler v Council [1984] ECR 229

Whether the period within which the decision of 24 January 1991 was revoked was reasonable

The revocation of an unlawful act which grants a benefit to the individual concerned is only permissible if it takes place within a reasonable period (paragraph 51).

See: 7/56 and 3/57 to 7/57 Algera v Common Assembly [1957] ECR 39; 14/61 Hoogovens v High Authority [1962] ECR 253; 111/63 Lenunerz-Werke v High Authority [1965] ECR 677; 14/81 Alpha Steel v Commission [1982] ECR 749; 15/85 Consorzio Cooperative d'Abruzzo v Commission [1987] ECR 1005; C-248/89 Cargill v Commission [1991] ECR I-2987; C-365/89 Cargill [1991] ECR I-3045

The period within which the Parliament's revocation of the decision of 24 January 1991 took place — approximately two months and 25 days, that is to say, less than three months — cannot be regarded, given the circumstances of the case, as unreasonable in so far as, since March 1991, the applicant had been made aware of the doubts entertained by the appointing authority with regard to the legality ofthat decision (paragraphs 52 and 53).

Due regard for the applicant's legitimate expectations with respect to the legality of the revoked decision

The administration's right to revoke an unlawful act is limited by the need to have sufficient regard for legitimate expectations on the part of the addressee of the act who may have been led to rely on its lawfulness; otherwise, since administrative measures, even though they may be irregular, are presumed to be valid, there is a risk that the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations would be undermined (paragraph 59).

See: Alpha Steel v Commission, Cargill v Commission and Consorzio Cooperative d'Abruzzo v Commission, cited above

As early as the first fortnight of March 1991, that is to say, within a period of one and a half months, the applicant was informed that the implementation of that decision — payment of the benefit granted under Article 73 of the Staff Regulations — was a matter of uncertainty since the decision might be vitiated by illegality. Consequently, on the date of the revocation by the Parliament, which is at issue in this case, the applicant no longer had any justification for entertaining a legitimate expectation that the revoked decision was lawful (paragraph 59).

However, since, by virtue of Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations, the Court has unlimited jurisdiction in the present case, it is appropriate — notwithstanding the absence of any properly formulated claim to that effect — that the Court should of its own motion order the defendant to pay compensation for the damage caused by a service-related fault. That fault consists in the initial determination, following an inadequate examination of his request, that the applicant was suffering from an occupational disease, in the expression, shortly afterwards, on the part of the Parliament's officers, of reservations regarding the lawfulness and the implementation of that decision and, finally, in the revocation of the decision. The applicant may thereby have been put in a state of uncertainty and anxiety with regard to his entitlement to the benefit provided in the case of occupational disease and thus, in view of the highly vulnerable state of his mental health, have been caused additional mental suffering of such a nature as to constitute nonmaterial damage (paragraphs 64 to 68).

See: 23/69 Fiehn v Commission [1970] ECR 547; 24/79 Oberthür v Commission [1980] ECR 1743; T-73/89 Barbi v Commission [1990] ECR II-619; T-63/89 Latham v Commission [1991] ECR II-19, para. 37; T-27/90 Latham v Commission [1991] ECR II-35, para. 49

The application in Case T-62/92 for annulment of the decision of 20 January 1992

The Court holds that, having regard to its findings in Case T-90/91 on the correct interpretation of the concept of occupational disease, to the absence of any breach of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations and to the fact that the period which elapsed between the decision of 24 January 1991 and the decision of 20 January 1992 — the former having been revoked in the meantime — the application cannot be granted (paragraphs 77 to 81).

Lastly, the Court considers that, given the subject-matter of the contested decision, namely the refusal to find that the applicant was suffering from an occupational disease, that decision could in any event have been lawfully adopted by the appointing authority if it had based itself solely on a correct interpretation of the concept of occupational disease, so that any other ground adduced as justification for its adoption could only be superfluous (paragraph 82).

Operative part:

1. The claims in the application in Case T-90/91 are rejected. The Parliament is ordered to pay the applicant the sum of BFR 200000 by way of compensation for nonmaterial damage.