ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Appeal brought on 21 September 2018 by Silec Cable SAS, General Cable Corp. against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 12 July 2018 in Case T-438/14: Silec Cable, General Cable v Commission

(Case C-599/18 P)

(2018/C 436/39)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Silec Cable SAS, General Cable Corp. (represented by: I. Sinan, Barrister, C. Renner, Rechtsanwältin)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

— annul the judgment under appeal;

— set aside Article 1 of the Decision (1) as it pertains to Silec Cable and General Cable;

— in the alternative, amend Article 2 of the Decision and reduce the amount of the fine imposed on Silec Cable and General Cable in light of the arguments put forward in support of the present appeal;

— in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court;

— order the European Commission to pay all of the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

With their first plea, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law in failing to correctly apply the rules relating to evidence and distorted the evidence before it regarding appellant Silec's participation in the alleged infringement.

The General Court incorrectly used the open and public distancing test to reverse the burden of proof for establishing the appellant Silec's alleged infringement. The appellants submit that the General Court also erred in law in exclusively relying on the subjective perception of other participants in the alleged infringement to prove appellant Silec's participation. The appellants further consider that the General Court distorted the evidence before it, and also violated the obligation of professional secrecy (Article 339 TFEU), when finding that the appellant Silec participated in the alleged infringement.

With their second plea, the appellants contend that the General Court violated the principle of equal treatment when refusing to qualify the appellant Silec's involvement in the alleged infringement as that of a ‘fringe player.’

The appellants submit that the General Court unlawfully took account of Safran/Sagem/Sagem Communications' behaviour when assessing the individual involvement of the appellant Silec for the purpose of assessing the amount of the fine. The appellants submit that the General Court itself moreover provides manifestly contradictory reasoning in this regard. The appellants further contend that the General Court compares the wrong factual situations when concluding that the Commission does not discriminate against the appellant Silec when refusing to qualify it as a fringe player.

(1) Commission Decision of 2 April 2014 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39610 — Power Cables) (notified under document C(2014) 2139 final) (OJ 2014, C 319, p. 10).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Szombathelyi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 24 September 2018 — UTEP 2006. SRL v Vas Megyei Kormányhivatal Hatósági Főosztály, Hatósági, Építésügyi és Oktatási Osztály

(Case C-600/18)

(2018/C 436/40)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Szombathelyi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: UTEP 2006. SRL

Defendant: Vas Megyei Kormányhivatal Hatósági Főosztály, Hatósági, Építésügyi és Oktatási Osztály

Question referred

Should [Article] 92 TFEU be interpreted as precluding an interpretation of Article 12/A of the a kis- és középvállalkozásokról, fejlődésük támogatásáról szóló 2004. [évi] XXXIV. törvény (Law No XXXIV of 2004 on small and medium-sized enterprises and aid for their development; ‘KKV Law’) and the practice of the authorities followed in this respect, according to which Article 12/A of the KKV Law cannot be applied to enterprises (legal entities) that are not registered in Hungary, but in another Member State, but that are otherwise in line with the concept of small and medium-sized enterprise laid down by that Law?
(ii)

error of law in its finding that the adoption of an organigram and the decisions relating to it and the description of the posts therein must be subject to the applicant's right to be heard;
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 11 September 2018 — Caseificio Cirigliana Srl and Others v Ministero delle Politiche agricole, alimentari e forestali and Others

(Case C-569/18)

(2018/C 436/34)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants at first instance and appellants in the present proceedings: Caseificio Cirigliana Srl, Mail Srl, Sorì Italia Srl

Defendants at first instance and respondents in the present proceedings: Ministero delle Politiche agricole, alimentari e forestali, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Ministero della Salute

Question referred

Should Articles 3, 26, 32, 40 and 41 of the TFEU and Articles 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of Regulation 1151/2012/EU (1) on the Protected Designation of Origin, which require Member States to guarantee both free competition in respect of goods within the European Union and protection for quality schemes to support less favoured agricultural areas, be interpreted as precluding a restriction being imposed under national law (Article 4 of Decree Law No 91 of 24 June 2014, as converted into law by Law No 116 of 11 August 2014) on the production of PDO Mozzarella di Bufala Campana, which is to be made in factories dedicated exclusively to such production, in which the holding and storage of milk originating from farms not included in the monitoring system for PDO Mozzarella di Bufala Campana is prohibited?

(1) Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (OJ 2012 L 343, p. 1).
—

declare, in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, — that, by not adopting waste management plans in accordance with the requirements of Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives, (1) or by not having revised those plans in accordance with Directive 2008/98/EC concerning the Autonomous Communities of Aragon, the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands, Madrid and the Autonomous City of Ceuta, the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 28(1) and Article 30(1) of Directive 2008/98/EC; and — that, by not officially informing the Commission of the adoption or revision of the waste management plans concerning the Autonomous Communities of Aragon, the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands, Madrid and the Autonomous City of Ceuta, the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 33(1) of Directive 2008/98/EC;
4.

Can the fact that [EU funds] are to be allocated for the 2017-[2019] apiculture programmes on the basis of the number of beehives notified in 2013 by the Member States in the context of the 2014-2016 apiculture programmes be interpreted as meaning that, after the period that ended on 31 December 2016, which provides the basis for the distribution of aid for 2017, the number of beehives needed in order to be allocated aid may also be determined by a different method?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Аdministrativen sad Haskovo (Bulgaria) lodged on 18 October 2018 — SZ v Мitnitsa Burgas

(Case C-652/18)

(2019/C 4/21)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Аdministrativen sad Haskovo

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: SZ

Respondent: Мitnitsa Burgas

Question referred

Are Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on controls of cash entering or leaving the Community and Article 49(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law such as Article 20(1) of the Valuten Zakon (Law on Currency) which, in the case of a failure to comply with the obligation to declare under Article 3 of the Regulation, in addition to the imposition of a fine pursuant to Article 18(1) of the Law on Currency of BGN 1 000 to BGN 3 000, cumulatively provides for the full confiscation of the undeclared cash regardless of its provenance and intended use?

(1) OJ 2005 L 309, p. 9.
Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division) made on 7 November 2018 — SY v Associated Newspapers Ltd

(Case C-687/18)

(2019/C 25/34)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: SY

Defendant: Associated Newspapers Ltd

Question referred

Are provisions of national law such as subsections 32(4) and (5) of the Data Protection Act 1998 (‘the DPA’) — which provide that, where a data controller claims that any personal data to which proceedings against that data controller relate are being processed: (i) only for the purposes of journalism, artistic purposes, or literary purposes; and (ii) with a view to the publication of journalistic, literary or artistic material which has not previously been published by the data controller, such proceedings shall be stayed insofar as they concern unpublished personal data until (a) a determination by the Information Commissioner that conditions (i) or (ii) are not fulfilled, (b) the data controller's claim is withdrawn or (c) the personal data are published — compatible with Articles 9, 22 and 23 of Directive 95/46/EC (1) and Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights?

(1) Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ 1995, L 281, p. 31).
3.

If questions 1 and 2 are answered in the affirmative, is Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, read in conjunction with Article 267 TFEU and in the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning the liability of the Italian State for manifest infringement of Community law by courts adjudicating at last instance in the judgments in Köbler (EU:C:2003:513), Traghetti del Mediterraneo (EU:C:2006:391) and Commission v Italy (EU:C:2011:775), inconsistent with Article 2(3) and (3a) of Law No 117 of 13 April 1988 on the civil liability of judges, which provides for judicial liability for intentional fault or serious misconduct ‘in the event of manifest infringement of the law or of European Union law’ and which presents national courts with the choice — which, however it is made, gives rise to civil liability and liability to disciplinary action in relation to the State in cases in which the public authority itself is a substantive party, and in particular where the adjudicator of the case is a giudice di pace working for a fixed term and without effective legal, economic and social security protection –, as in the present case, of either infringing national legislation, by disapplying it and applying EU law, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, or of infringing EU law and applying national legislation which precludes protection and is incompatible with Articles 1(3) and 7 of Directive 2003/88, Clauses 2 and 4 of the framework agreement on fixed-term work implemented by Directive 1999/70/EC, and Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale ordinario di Brescia (Italy) lodged on 31 October 2018 — JH v KG

(Case C-681/18)

(2019/C 35/12)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale ordinario di Brescia

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: JH

Defendant: KG

Question referred

Must Article 5(5) of Directive 2008/104/EC (1) of 19 November 2008 be interpreted as precluding the application of Legislative Decree No 276/2003, as amended by Decree Law 34/2014, which: (a) does not place limits on successive assignments of the same worker to the same user undertaking; (b) does not require that, in order for the use of fixed-term supply work to be lawful, there must be technical, production, organisational or replacement reasons for having recourse to such supply work; (c) does not provide that, in order for the use of such a form of employment contract to be lawful, the production requirement of the user undertaking must be temporary in nature?

(1) Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on temporary agency work (OJ 2008 L 327, p. 9).
1.

Is Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002, in conjunction with Articles 7, 8, 11 and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, to be interpreted as meaning that in criminal proceedings the access of State authorities to data making it possible to establish the start and end point, the date, the time and the duration, the type of communications service, the terminal used and the location of use of a mobile terminal in relation to a telephone or mobile telephone communication of a suspect constitutes so serious an interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in those articles of the Charter that that access in the area of prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences must be restricted to the fighting of serious crime, regardless of the period to which the retained data to which the State authorities have access relate?
Appeal brought on 12 December 2018 by Mellifera eV, Vereinigung für wesensgemäße Bienenhaltung against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 27 September 2018 in Case T-12/17, Mellifera eV v European Commission

(Case C-784/18 P)

(2019/C 54/20)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Mellifera eV, Vereinigung für wesensgemäße Bienenhaltung (represented by: A. Willand, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

1. set aside the judgment of the General Court of 27 September 2018, Mellifera eV v European Commission, T-12/17, in so far as the General Court rejected the application of the applicant at first instance in point 1 of the form of order sought, as set out in indent 1 of paragraph 18 of the judgment under appeal, in which it requested that the General Court annul the decision Ares (2016) 6306335 of the defendant at first instance of 8 November 2016, and ordered that the applicant at first instance pay the costs;

2. annul the decision of the defendant at first instance referred to in point 1 above;

3. order the defendant at first instance to pay the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant relies, essentially, on two grounds of appeal.

First ground of appeal: Infringement of Article 10(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006, (1) in conjunction with Article 2(1)(g) of that regulation and with the Aarhus Convention.

Contrary to the view taken by the General Court, the extension of the authorisation for the active substance glyphosate is an administrative act that is amenable to review in the procedure under Article 10(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006. In particular, in accordance with its wording and objective, the constituent element of individual scope referred to in Article 2(1)(g) of Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 relates to the objective field of application, rather than to the number or identifiable nature of those persons who are subject to that legislation.

Second ground of appeal: Infringement of the principle that secondary EU legislation is to be interpreted in the light of conventions in the field of public international law.

The General Court infringed the principle that secondary EU legislation should, so far as possible, be interpreted in accordance with conventions in the field of public international law, by failing to interpret Article 10, in conjunction with Article 2(1)(g), of Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 in accordance with the Aarhus Convention, despite the latter being directly consistent with the wording and objective of the relevant EU legislation in Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006.

(1) Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies, OJ 2006 L 264, p. 13.
Appeal brought on 17 December 2018 by Jean-François Jalkh against the judgment delivered on 17 October 2018 in Case T-27/17 Jean-François Jalkh v Parliament

(Case C-793/18 P)

(2019/C 65/37)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Jean-François Jalkh (represented by: F. Wagner, avocat)

Other party: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The appellant submits that the Court should:

— Set aside the judgment given on 17 October 2018 by the Seventh Chamber of the General Court of the European Union (T-27/17); Accordingly:

— Annul the decision of the European Parliament of 22 November 2016 adopting Report No A8-0319/2016 on the request for waiver of the immunity and privileges of Jean-François Jalkh, Member of the European Parliament;

— Make an appropriate order on the amount to be awarded to the appellant in respect of the costs of the proceedings;

— Order the European Parliament to pay the entirety of the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The grounds of appeal allege a breach of EU law, error of law and error of characterisation of the legal nature of the facts, as well as manifest error of assessment.

1. The preliminary observations in the judgment

Contrary to the General Court’s assertion set out in paragraph 21 of the judgment under appeal, the absence of any waiver of parliamentary immunity does not deprive a party of the possibility of seeking, in France, compensation for the harm suffered solely at civil level, on the ground of fault (Article 1240 of the Civil Code) against a Member of Parliament.

2. The first plea in law analysed by the General Court

The General Court’s analysis is based on confusion between two provisions. Point H is part of the reasoning in reference to Article 8 of Protocol No 7, on expressing opinions, whereas the General Court sets out its reasons on that subject in paragraphs 44 to 46, in reference to Article 9 of Protocol No 7 on immunity, which refers to the relevant national provisions.

3. The second and third pleas in law examined by the General Court

It is on account of a manifest error of assessment that the General Court fails to give normative value to the European Parliament Directorate General for Research Working Paper on ‘Parliamentary Immunity in the Member States of the European Community and in the European Parliament, Legal Affairs Series, and fails to take into account the principles recalled therein, which leads to an erroneous assessment of Article 9 of Protocol No 7 in the light of the facts of the case.

4. The fourth plea in law examined by the General Court

— Existing legal practice Contrary to the General Court’s declaration, an established legal practice of the European Parliament ‘consisting in refusing requests for waiver of parliamentary immunity based on facts relating to the political activities of Members of Parliament’ did exist, which ought to have led the General Court to make a different finding on the waiver of parliamentary immunity.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the tribunal de commerce de Paris (France) lodged on 24 December 2018 — Trendsetteuse SARL v DCA SARL

(Case C-828/18)

(2019/C 82/19)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal de commerce de Paris

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Trendsetteuse SARL

Defendant: DCA SARL

Question referred

Should Article 1(2) of Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 (1) on the status of commercial agents be interpreted as meaning that a self-employed intermediary who is acting as an agent on behalf of and in the name of his principal, but does not have the power to change the prices and contractual conditions of his principal’s sales contracts, does not have the authority to negotiate those contracts for the purposes of that article, and consequently cannot be classified as a commercial agent and benefit from the status provided for in the Directive?

(1) Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents (OJ 1986 L 382, p. 17).
Appeal brought on 3 December 2018 by Päivi Leino-Sandberg against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 20 September 2018 in Case T-421/17: Leino-Sandberg v Parliament

(Case C-761/18 P)

(2019/C 82/10)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Päivi Leino-Sandberg (represented by: O. W. Brouwer, advocaat, S. Schubert, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the order of the General Court of 20 September 2018 in Case T-421/17;

— make use of its power under the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice to give final judgment in the matter, and

— order the European Parliament to pay the costs of the proceedings, including the costs of any intervening parties.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First ground of appeal: errors of law in the contested order when it holds that there is no longer a purpose to the action, and therefore no need to adjudicate. The appellant submits that the contested order incorrectly does not apply the legal test set out in Case C-57/16 P, ClientEarth v. Commission (EU:C:2018:660) under which it should have concluded that because the European Parliament has not withdrawn the contested decision, the purpose of the action remained.

Second ground of appeal: errors of law and procedure in the contested order when it holds that there is no longer an interest in bringing proceedings. The appellant submits that the contested order misapplies the legal test set out in established case-law, including Case C-57/16 P, under which it should have concluded that the unlawfulness is liable to recur in the future, irrespective of the particular circumstances of the case, and that therefore the interest in bringing proceedings remained.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Amsterdam (Netherlands) lodged on 3 December 2018 — A, B v C

(Case C-750/18)

(2019/C 93/38)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank Amsterdam

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: A, B

Defendant: C

Question referred

How should Directive 93/13, (1) and, more specifically, the principle of cumulative effect contained in it, be interpreted when assessing whether the sum which a consumer who fails to fulfil his obligations is required to pay in compensation (hereinafter: the penalty clause) is disproportionately high within the meaning of point 1(e) of the annex to that directive, in a case in which penalty clauses are associated with a variety of shortcomings of different types which, by their very nature, do not have to occur jointly, and indeed do not do so in the present case?

(1) Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).