ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Appeal brought on 19 June 2020 by Sebastian Veit against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) delivered on 2 April 2020 in Case T-474/18, Sebastian Veit v European Central Bank

(Case C-272/20 P)

(2020/C 371/03)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Sebastian Veit (represented by: K. Kujath, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Central Bank

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) of 2 April 2020 in Case T-474/18;

— annul the decision of the European Central Bank of 3 January 2018 on the classification of the appellant with effect from 1 January 2018, as clarified by the decision of the European Central Bank of 25 May 2018;

— order the European Central Bank to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The judgment under appeal infringes EU law. The General Court misinterpreted the general principle of equal treatment under Articles 20, 51(1) and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

The General Court erred in deciding that the difference in treatment of internal and external candidates for recruitment with regard to their classification in step by the European Central Bank on the basis of various rules was justified and proportionate.

The case-law of the Court of Justice on the interpretation of the provisions of the Staff Regulations on the classification in step of an official in service, which was applied mutatis mutandis to the case by the General Court, does not correspond with the facts that have given rise to the dispute.
1.

Does legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings constitute a restriction on the freedom of establishment enshrined in Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or, in the alternative, on the freedom to provide services guaranteed in Article 56 [of that treaty], and on the freedom to conduct a business recognised in Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?
2.

May EU law, and in particular the provisions of Article 4(3) TEU, in conjunction with those of Article 325(1) and (2) TFEU, [and] Article 1(1)(a) of the Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, be interpreted as precluding a national provision that exempts from punishment a person accused of an offence committed after completion of the project execution phase — in other words, during the sustainability phase, and with regard to the obligations assumed by that person under the financing agreement — and as further precluding the national rule from being interpreted as meaning that the concept of fraud affecting the [European Union’s] financial interests does not also include the unlawful conduct of the beneficiary of the funding during the project sustainability phase, with regard to the obligations assumed under the financing agreement, regardless of the origin of the funds or the amounts disbursed in fulfilment of the obligations assumed by the beneficiary to ensure the sustainability of the project (the beneficiary’s own resources or [EU] funds)?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 7 September 2020 — TR

(Case C-416/20)

(2020/C 390/32)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Person whose surrender is sought: TR

Other party: Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Hamburg

Question referred

In the case of decisions on the extradition for the purposes of criminal prosecution of a person convicted in absentia from a Member State of the European Union to another Member State, are the provisions of Directive 2016/343, (1) in particular Articles 8 and 9 thereof, to be interpreted as meaning that the legality of the extradition (in particular in a so-called case of absconding) depends on the fulfilment by the requesting State of the conditions laid down in the Directive?

(1) Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ 2016 L 65, p. 1).
2.

Must the provision of Article 299 TFEU that an enforcement clause is to be appended without any formality other than verification of the authenticity of the decision be interpreted as meaning that the national court, when ruling on the enforcement clause and applying national civil-procedure rules, is not entitled to examine whether or not the claim to which the enforceable order relates is time-barred?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 29 June 2020 by Bergslagernas Järnvaruaktiebolag against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 29 April 2020 in Case T-73/19, Bergslagernas Järnvaruaktiebolag v EUIPO — Scheppach Fabrikation von Holzbearbeitungsmaschinen (Wood-splitting tool)

(Case C-284/20 P)

(2020/C 414/28)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Bergslagernas Järnvaruaktiebolag (represented by: S. Kirschstein-Freund, B. Breitinger, Rechtsanwälte)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 6 October 2020, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) decided that the appeal is not allowed to proceed and ordered Bergslagernas Järnvaruaktiebolag to bear its own costs.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht München (Germany) lodged on 1 October 2020 — Vodafone Kabel Deutschland GmbH v Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände — Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V.

(Case C-484/20)

(2020/C 433/41)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberlandesgericht München

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Vodafone Kabel Deutschland GmbH

Defendant: Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände — Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V.

Question referred

Is Article 62(4) of Directive 2015/2366 (1) to be interpreted in such a way that it prevents a national regulation or practice, in the form of a transitional provision, that only allows the prohibition of charges for the use of payment instruments and payment services in accordance with the corresponding national implementing provision in relation to ongoing contractual obligations with consumers, if the underlying contractual obligation arose after 13 January 2018, but not if the underlying contractual obligation arose prior to 13 January 2018, where settlement of (other) payment transactions does not start until after 13 January 2018?

(1) Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC (OJ 2015 L 337, p. 35).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 12 August 2020 — VR v Deutsche Lufthansa AG

(Case C-381/20)

(2020/C 423/28)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: VR

Defendant: Deutsche Lufthansa AG

Question referred

Does a strike by the air carrier’s own employees that is called by a trade union constitute an extraordinary circumstance within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004? (1)

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal Administrativo (Portugal) lodged on 22 September 2020 — Real Vida Seguros, S. A. v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

(Case C-449/20)

(2020/C 433/30)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Supremo Tribunal Administrativo

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Real Vida Seguros, S. A.

Defendant: Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

Question referred

Does the fact that, for the purposes of calculating the amount of the imposto sobre [o rendimento] [d]as pessoas coletivas (Corporation Tax; IRC) due from the appellant in respect of financial years 1999 and 2000, Articles 31 and 2 of the Estatuto dos Benefícios Fiscais (Statute governing Tax Benefits) permit a 50 % deduction in dividends obtained on national (Portuguese) stock exchanges but exclude dividends obtained on the stock exchanges of other countries of the European Union from benefiting from the deduction, constitute a breach of the free movement of capital under Article 63 et seq. TFEU?
1.

First ground of appeal, alleging an infringement of Article 266 TFEU and the appellant’s right to full compliance with the judgment to be implemented in that the General Court erred in law by holding that the decision to restart the administrative investigation was a preparatory act not adversely affecting the interests of KF. It was a decision to not properly implement a judgment pursuant to Article 266 TFEU, also taking into account the specific circumstances of KF’s case, and thereby it affected her interests immediately and directly. The General Court erred in law by failing to take into account the specific circumstances of KF’s case, including irreversible illegalities in the initial administrative investigation. The General erred in law by failing to recognize that: — the SatCen is objectively not capable of reversing the illegalities by restarting the administrative investigation, given also how unduly witnesses in the initial administrative investigation were influenced and the serious attacks on KF’s good repute and professional reputation as found to have occurred in the judgment to be implemented; — the guarantees of a fair procedure cannot be provided and — there is a breach of the reasonable time principle.
1.

Are rules of national law that oblige a court, when taking expert evidence as required in a procedure for the award of a licence, to obtain an expert’s report from an occupational self-governing organisation whose decision-making bodies are in fact dominated mostly by members of an occupational group whose interests tend to conflict with those of the occupational group to which the applicant for the licence belongs, or — in the event that such rules are contrary to EU law — from an official expert employed by a public authority, compatible with the appearance of impartiality of that court required by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?
3.

In light, inter alia, of the findings of the Court in its judgment in Case C-590/14 P (paragraphs 49 and 50) (2), where, in a case, such as this one, in which the Commission has adopted a decision on State aid finding that an existing aid scheme and planned changes are compatible with the internal market and the State has announced, inter alia, that it will only apply the existing aid scheme up to a particular cut-off date, the existing aid scheme based on the applicable provisions of law is applied beyond the cut-off date announced by the State, does it qualify as new aid within the meaning of Article 1(c) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 (3)?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 5 June 2020 by ViaSat, Inc. against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 26 March 2020 in Case T-734/17, ViaSat v Commission

(Case C-235/20 P)

(2021/C 9/05)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: ViaSat, Inc. (represented by: P. de Bandt, avocat, M. R. Gherghinaru, avocate, J. Ruiz Calzado, abogado, L. Marco Perpiñà, abogada)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Inmarsat Ventures Ltd

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— declare the present appeal admissible and well-founded and, consequently,

— set aside the judgment under appeal and give a final judgment in this case ordering the Commission to provide the access to the documents requested,

— annul the decision of the Secretary-General of the Commission of 11 January 2018;

— order the Commission to pay the appellant’s costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First plea in law: error in law regarding the application of a general presumption of confidentiality to the requested documents and violation of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 (1) relating to the protection of commercial interests and of the duty to state reasons.

Second plea in law: Error in law regarding the existence of an overriding public interest in disclosure and violation of the last clause of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of commercial interests.

(1) Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001, L 145, p. 43).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 10 July 2020 by Kerry Luxembourg Sàrl against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 29 April 2020 in Case T-109/19, Kerry Luxembourg v EUIPO

(Case C-305/20 P)

(2021/C 9/07)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Kerry Luxembourg Sàrl (represented by: A. von Mühlendahl, H. Hartwig, Rechtsanwälte)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 29 October 2020, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal is not allowed to proceed and that Kerry Luxembourg Sàrl shall bear its own costs.
—

in the alternative, should it find that it cannot grant the principal claim for partial annulment of the contested regulation, annul, in its entirety, Regulation (EU) 2020/1054 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2020 amending Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 as regards minimum requirements on maximum daily and weekly driving times, minimum breaks and daily and weekly rest periods and Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 as regards positioning by means of tachographs; and
The first plea in law, alleging the infringement of the principle of proportionality, provided for in Article 5(4) TEU

Romania submits that the solution of referring to the criterion of the typology of transport operations, with a view to identifying the situations in which the rules for the posting of drivers in the road transport sector may be applied was not the subject of an impact assessment carried out by the Commission and is not substantiated on the basis of any report/study or scientific data.

The co-legislators had, in the present case, the obligation to conduct an impact assessment, since they amended the Commission’s proposal substantially without having sufficient information enabling them to assess the proportionality of the new measure.

In addition, the criterion of the typology of transport operations creates uncertainty in identifying the host Member State and the legislation applicable. Consequently, referring to that criterion adversely affects legal certainty, being contrary, inter alia, even to the stated objectives of Directive (EU) 2020/1057.

Furthermore, applying the rules for posting drivers in the road transport sector by reference to the criterion of transport operations may affect the flexibility and rapidity specific to that sector.
1.

Is the introduction of a provision, such as that contained in Article 1(649) of Law 190/14, which reduces commission and fees only in respect of a specific and limited category of operator, namely operators of games played on gaming machines, and not all operators in the gaming sector, compatible with the exercise of the freedom of establishment guaranteed by Article 49 TFEU and with the exercise of the freedom to provide services guaranteed by Article 56 TFEU?
1.

Must Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13 (1) on unfair terms in consumer contracts, as interpreted in the case-law of the Court of Justice, in particular in Case C-118/17, Dunai, be interpreted as meaning that the legislature’s intervention in the relationships between a consumer who is a borrower [Or. 2] and a bank cannot deprive consumers of their right to challenge in court the terms of the original contract, or of an annex to the contract concluded pursuant to statute, in order to exercise their right to reimbursement of all the advantages which the bank unduly obtained to the detriment of consumers as a result of applying unfair contract terms, where, following an intervention by the legislature, the consumers entered into an amendment of the original contractual relationship voluntarily on the basis of a statutory obligation imposed on banks to offer consumers this possibility, and not directly as a result of statutory intervention as was the case in Dunai?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 19 October 2020 — IO and Others v Deutsche Lufthansa AG

(Case C-526/20)

(2021/C 28/28)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: IO, SP, DR

Defendant: Deutsche Lufthansa AG

Question referred

Does a strike by the air carrier’s own employees that is called by a trade union constitute an extraordinary circumstance within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1)?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 21 August 2020 by Dermavita Co. Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 25 June 2020 in Case T-104/19, Dermavita v EUIPO — Allergan Holdings France (JUVÉDERM)

(Case C-400/20 P)

(2021/C 35/32)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Dermavita Co. Ltd (represented by: D. Todorov, адвокат)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Allergan Holdings France

By order of 3 December 2020, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) decided that the appeal should not be allowed to proceed and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
1.

Must Article 273 of the VAT Directive (1) be interpreted as meaning that a penalty regime under which taxpayers classified as high-risk taxpayers who commit a minor infringement of the Elektronikus Közúti Áruforgalom Ellenőrző Rendszer (EKAER) (Road freight electronic monitoring system) may not be fined less than 30 % of 40 % of the value of the transported goods and which does not allow for the fine to be waived exceeds the limits of the power conferred on Member States by that article?
2.

a) Is EU law, particularly with regard to — Articles 3, 13 and 14 of the Enforcement Directive, — Article 8 of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, (2) and — Article 7 of Directive 2009/24/EC the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs (Codified version) (3) to be interpreted as meaning that a holder of intellectual property rights within the meaning of Article 2 of the Enforcement Directive is in principle entitled to reimbursement of the full amount of the lawyers’ fees referred to in 1a), or at least a reasonable and substantial proportion of those fees, even if — the alleged infringement has been committed by a natural person outside his trade or profession, and — a national provision provides, for such a case, that such lawyers’ fees are generally recoverable only after the value in dispute has been reduced? b) In the event that Question 2a) is answered in the affirmative: Is the EU law referred to in Question 2a) to be interpreted as meaning that an exception to the principle referred to in 2a), according to which the rightholder must be reimbursed the full amount of the lawyers’ fees referred to in 1a), or at least a reasonable and substantial proportion of those fees, taking account of other factors (such as, for instance, how current the work is, the period of publication and the infringement by a natural person outside the interests of his trade or profession), is to be considered even if the infringement of intellectual property rights within the meaning of Article 2 of the Enforcement Directive consists in file sharing, that is to say making a work available to the public by offering it for free download to all users on a freely accessible exchange platform that has no digital rights management?
2.

How must Article 198(4) of Law 9/2017 [which lays down] a payment period of 60 days in all circumstances and for all contracts, providing for an initial period of 30 days for approval and another, additional period of 30 days for payment, be interpreted, in so far as [recital] 23 of the directive is worded as follows: ‘Long payment periods and late payment by public authorities for goods and services lead to unjustified costs for undertakings. It is therefore appropriate to introduce specific rules as regards commercial transactions for the supply of goods or services by undertakings to public authorities, which should provide in particular for payment periods normally not exceeding 30 calendar days, unless otherwise expressly agreed … and provided it is objectively justified in the light of the particular nature or features of the contract, and in any event not exceeding 60 calendar days.’[?]
3.

If Question 1 is to be answered in the negative and Question 2 in the affirmative: a. Is it necessary that the court that has jurisdiction to rule on the succession be addressed in the official language of the location of that court in order for the declaration concerning the waiver of succession to be valid and, in particular, in order to comply with the time limits applicable for making such declarations before that court? b. Is it necessary that the court that has jurisdiction to rule on the succession receive the original documents drawn up in relation to the waiver by the court that has jurisdiction for the place of habitual residence of the party waiving succession and a translation thereof in order for the declaration concerning the waiver of succession to be valid and, in particular, in order to comply with the time limits applicable for making such declarations before the court that has jurisdiction to rule on the succession?
Reference for a preliminary ruling from Westminster Magistrates’ Court (United Kingdom) made on 1 December 2020 — Svishtov Regional Prosecutor’s Office v PI

(Case C-648/20)

(2021/C 62/19)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Westminster Magistrates’ Court

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Svishtov Regional Prosecutor’s Office

Defendant: PI

Question referred

Where surrender is sought in order to prosecute a requested person, and where the decision to issue an underlying national arrest warrant (‘NAW’) and the decision to issue a European arrest warrant (‘EAW’) are both taken by a public prosecutor, without any involvement of a Court prior to surrender, does a requested person receive the dual level of protection envisaged by the Court in Bob-Dogi C-241/15 (1) if:

a. the effect of the NAW is limited to detaining the individual for a maximum of 72 hours for the purpose of bringing him before a Court; and

b. on surrender, it is solely a matter for the Court whether to order release, or to continue detention, in light of all the circumstances of the case?

(1) Judgment of the Court of 1/6/2016 (ECLI:EU:C:2016:385)