ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
—

the significant labour and skill required for setting up that database cannot, as such, justify such protection if they do not express any originality in the selection or arrangement of the data contained in that database. Firstly, it is apparent from reading Article 3(2) in conjunction with recital 15 of Directive 96/9 that the copyright protection provided for by that directive concerns the ‘structure’ of the database, and not its ‘contents’ nor, therefore, the elements constituting its contents. The concepts of ‘selection’ and of ‘arrangement’ within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the directive refer respectively to the selection and the arrangement of data, through which the author of the database gives the database its structure. By contrast, those concepts do not extend to the creation of the data contained in that database. Secondly, as is apparent from recital 16 of Directive 96/9, the notion of the author’s own intellectual creation refers to the criterion of originality. As regards the setting up of a database, that criterion of originality is satisfied when, through the selection or arrangement of the data which it contains, its author expresses his creative ability in an original manner by making free and creative choices and thus stamps his ‘personal touch’. By contrast, that criterion is not satisfied when the setting up of the database is dictated by technical considerations, rules or constraints leaving no room for creative freedom. Accordingly, no other criteria than that of originality is to be applied to determine the eligibility of a database for the copyright protection provided for by the directive. (see paras 30, 32, 37-40, 45, 46, operative part 1)
First, ‘loans’ fall under heading XI of Annex I to Directive 88/361 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty, without it being determined whether those loans are for consideration or free of charge or what their particular purpose is. Next, in order to determine whether the tax treatment by a Member State of certain transactions is covered by the provisions on the free movement of capital, there is no need to distinguish between transactions effected in money and those effected in kind. Finally, it is apparent from the inclusion of inheritances and legacies under the above heading that the fact that a transaction is free of charge does not, in itself, prevent it being deemed a movement of capital within the meaning of Article 56 EC. In addition, the loan of a motor vehicle for use free of charge constitutes a benefit which represents a specific economic value, corresponding to the cost of use of a hire car of the same type and for the same period.

Article 56 EC must be interpreted as meaning that it precludes legislation of a Member State which requires residents who have borrowed a vehicle registered in another Member State from a resident of that State to pay, on first use of that vehicle on the national road network, the full amount of a tax normally due on registration of a vehicle in the first Member State, without taking account of the duration of the use of that vehicle on that road network and without that person being able to invoke a right to exemption or reimbursement where that vehicle is neither intended to be used essentially in the first Member State on a permanent basis nor, in fact, used in that way.

If vehicles which are not registered in a Member State are intended to be used essentially in that State on a permanent basis or if they are, in fact, used in that way, there is not actually a difference between the treatment of a person who resides in that State and uses such a vehicle free of charge and that of a person who uses a vehicle registered in that Member State on the same conditions which was therefore already subject to vehicle tax on its first registration. In those circumstances, the charging of vehicle tax on first use on the road network in the Member State concerned of vehicles which are not registered in that State is justified in the same way as the tax due on the registration of the vehicle in that State. On the other hand, if the vehicles are not intended to be used essentially on a permanent basis or are not, in fact, used in that way, there would be a difference in treatment between the two categories of persons and the charging of the tax concerned would not be justified. In such circumstances, the connection of those vehicles with the Member State would be insufficient to justify the charging of a tax normally due on registration of a vehicle in that State.

(see paras 50-52, 56, operative part)
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. State aid — Meaning — Legal concept — Interpretation on the basis of objective factors

(Art. 107(1) TFEU)

2. State aid — Meaning — Selective nature of the measure — Derogation from the general tax system — Justification derived from the nature and general scheme of the system — Burden of proof

(Art. 107(1) TFEU)

3. Appeals — Grounds — Error of law — Characterisation of a measure as State aid — Comprehensive review not carried out by the General Court on account of the failure to find the appraisals under review to be technical or complex

(Arts 107(1) TFEU and 256 TFEU)

4. Appeal — Appeal held to be well founded — Judgment to be given on the substance by the appeal court — Condition — Whether the state of the proceedings permits final judgment to be given — Meaning

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 61(1))

5. State aid — Meaning — Selective nature of the measure — Derogation from the general tax system — Justification derived from the nature and general scheme of the system — Criteria for assessment — Scheme for the realignment of the value of assets for tax purposes in the banking sector

(Art. 107(1) TFEU)

Summary

1. See the text of the judgment.

(see para. 100)

2. The definition of state aid does not include national measures introducing a differentiation between undertakings and which are, therefore, prima facie selective when that differentiation arises from the nature and overall structure of the system of charges of which they form part. It is for the Member State which has made such a distinction between undertakings in terms of charges to show that it is actually justified by the nature and the general scheme of the system in question.

(see paras 101, 120, 121)

3. Although the General Court is required to carry out a comprehensive review of the characterisation of the tax scheme at issue as State aid by the Commission, and therefore to examine whether or not the differentiation between undertakings which a tax scheme results in is due to the nature or general scheme of the tax system of which it forms part, its power of review is limited with regard to whether a measure comes within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU, in a case where the appraisals by the Commission are technical or complex in nature. But it is still necessary for the General Court, if it is not to err in law by failing to carry out its comprehensive review, to reach a finding that the appraisals are technical or complex.

(see paras 102-104)

4. See the text of the judgment.

(see paras 106, 107)

5. See the text of the judgment.

(see paras 136, 137)
In order to determine whether the obligation on the service recipient to withhold tax at source, in that it entails an additional administrative burden and related liability risks, constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services prohibited by Article 56 TFEU, it is irrelevant whether the non-resident service provider may deduct the tax withheld by the Member State of the provision of services from the tax for which he is liable in the Member State in which he is established.

Article 56 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the obligation imposed, under the legislation of a Member State, on the service recipient to withhold at source wages tax on the remuneration paid to service providers established in another Member State, whereas such an obligation does not exist in relation to remuneration paid to service providers who are established in the Member State at issue, constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services, within the meaning of that provision, in that it entails an additional administrative burden and related liability risks. In fact, the obligation to withhold tax is liable to render cross-border services less attractive for resident recipients of services than services provided by resident service providers and to deter those recipients from having recourse to non-resident service providers.

In so far as the restriction to the freedom to provide services arising from national legislation results from the obligation to withhold tax at source, in that it entails an additional administrative burden and related liability risks, that restriction can be justified by the need to ensure the effective collection of tax and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that purpose, even in the light of the opportunities for mutual assistance in the recovery of taxes presented by Directive 76/308 on mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to certain levies, duties, taxes and other measures, as amended by Directive 2001/44.

In fact, in the case of service providers who provide occasional services in a Member State other than that in which they are established, and where they remain only a short period of time, a withholding tax at source constitutes an appropriate means of ensuring the effective collection of the tax due.

Furthermore, even if Directive 2001/44 carries out a degree of approximation of national provisions in the area of taxation inasmuch as it obliges all Member States to treat claims originating in other Member States as being national claims, its aim was not to replace the taxation at source as a method of collecting tax. Moreover, the collection of the tax directly from the non-resident service provider would not necessarily constitute a less severe means than deduction at source.

The subsequent renunciation of the withholding tax by the Member State cannot prejudice either its appropriateness to achieve the aim pursued or its proportionality, both of which must be assessed solely in the light of the objective pursued.

(see paras 42, 47, 52, 53, operative part 2)
While Regulation No 617/2010 concerning the notification to the Commission of investment projects in energy infrastructure within the European Union has the aim of collection of information, that aim is introduced by the regulation so that the European Union may achieve certain objectives which have been assigned to it in the energy sector. In addition, the content of Regulation No 617/2010 reveals that it relates essentially to the implementation of a system for the collection of information relating to investment projects in energy infrastructure designed to allow the European Union to achieve the objectives laid down in the energy sector, in particular as regards the functioning of the internal energy market, the security of the European Union’s energy supply and the development of new and renewable energies.

Given its aim and content, the regulation cannot be based on Article 337 TFEU. That provision forms the legal basis for the acts concerning the general activity of collecting information carried out by the Commission, without requiring that such collection be necessary for the purpose of achieving the objectives of a given European Union policy.

Accordingly, Regulation No 617/2010 must be based on Article 194 TFEU which, as is apparent from its wording, in particular that of Article 194(2), constitutes the legal basis for European Union acts which are ‘necessary’ to achieve the objectives assigned to the European Union policy on energy. The aim and content of the regulation relate closely to the objectives of the European Union policy on energy and that collection of information can be justified only by an objective consistent with achieving some of the specific tasks entrusted to the European Union by Article 194(1) TFEU, concerning energy policy.

Finally, although Regulation No 617/2010 also covers the notification to the Commission of investment projects in certain nuclear infrastructures, the fact remains that the regulation, as regards its aim and content, concerns the implementation, not of European Union policy in the specific sector of nuclear energy as defined by the EAEC Treaty, but of the European Union policy on energy in general. It follows that the contested regulation does not fall under Article 187 EA either.

(see paras 52, 61, 64, 66, 69, 73, 82, 85)
A Member State which provides that the railway infrastructure manager, which itself supplies railway transport services, may participate in the preparation of the service timetable and, therefore, in the allocation of trains paths or infrastructure capacity, fails to fulfil its obligations under Article 6(3) of, and Annex II to, Directive 91/440 on the development of the Community’s railways and Article 14(2) of Directive 2001/14 on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure.

Thus, a railway undertaking cannot be entrusted with the defining or assessing of availability for the purpose of adopting decisions on the allocation of train paths or with all the preparatory work for the adoption of decisions concerning the essential functions, such as the preparation of the service timetable.

It is clear from Article 14(2) of Directive 2001/14 that, if the infrastructure manager is not independent of the railway undertakings, the task of allocating infrastructure capacity must be entrusted to an allocating body independent in its legal form, organisation and decision-making from any railway undertakings.

However, since traffic management cannot be regarded as an essential function that must be entrusted to an independent entity, it is clear from Article 6(3) of Directive 91/440 that traffic management may be assigned to an infrastructure manager which is also a railway undertaking.

(see paras 30, 35, 37, 38, 43)
Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 3 February 2011 – Commission v Belgium

(Case C-391/10)

Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations – Directive 2007/36/EC – Exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies – Failure to transpose completely within the prescribed period

Actions for failure to fulfil obligations – Examination of the merits by the Court – Situation to be taken into consideration – Situation on expiry of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (Art. 258 TFEU; European Parliament and Council Directive 2007/36) (see paras 8-12)

Re

Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations – Failure to take or to communicate within the prescribed period the measures necessary to comply with Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies (OJ 2007 L 184, p. 17).

Operative part

The Court:

1. Declares that, by failing to adopt, within the prescribed period, all the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, the Kingdom of Belgium has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive;
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 7 April 2011 – Commission v Luxembourg

(Case C-305/10)

Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations – Rail transport – Directive 2005/47/EC – Working conditions of mobile workers engaged in interoperable cross-border services in the railway sector – Agreement between sectoral social partners at European level – Failure to transpose within the prescribed period

1. Actions for failure to fulfil obligations – Examination of the merits by the Court – Situation to be taken into consideration – Situation on expiry of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (Art. 258 TFEU; Council Directive 2005/47) (see paras 8, 11-13)

2. Actions for failure to fulfil obligations – Right of the Commission to bring judicial proceedings – To be exercised at its discretion (Art. 258 TFEU) (see para. 9)

Re:

Action for failure to fulfil obligations – Failure to adopt and/or notify, within the prescribed period, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions provided for by Council Directive 2005/47/EC of 18 July 2005 on the Agreement between the Community of European Railways (CER) and the European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF) on certain aspects of the working conditions of mobile workers engaged in interoperable cross-border services in the railway sector (OJ 2005 L 195, p. 15).

Operative part

The Court:

1. Declares that, by failing to adopt, within the prescribed period, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Council Directive 2005/47/EC of 18 July 2005 on the Agreement between the Community of European Railways (CER) and the European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF) on certain aspects of the working conditions of mobile workers engaged in interoperable cross-border services in the railway sector, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive;
Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 27 October 2011 – Commission v Poland

(Case C-311/10)

Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations – Directive 2007/46/EC – Approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles – Failure to transpose within the period prescribed – Incomplete transposition

1. Member States – Obligations – Implementation of directives – Failure to fulfil obligations – Defence based on difficulties of interpretation – Not permissible (Art. 258 TFEU) (see para. 16)

2. Union law – Interpretation – Texts in several languages – Differences between the various language versions – General scheme and aims of the legislation in question taken into consideration (see para. 18)

3. Acts of the institutions – Directives – Implementation by Member States – Necessity of clear and precise transposition – Possible subsequent amendment to the annexes governing the technical aspects of and the implementing rules for the directive – No effect on the obligation to transpose the directive (Art. 288, third para., TFEU) (see paras 24-25, 77)

4. Actions for failure to fulfil obligations – Proof of failure – Burden of proof on the Commission – Presumptions – Not permissible – Failure to fulfil the obligation to inform placed on the Member States by the directive – Consequences (Art. 4(3) TFEU; Arts 17 TFEU and 258 TFEU) (see paras 30, 32-33, 52)

5. Acts of the institutions – Directives – Implementation by Member States – Transposition of a directive without legislative action – Conditions – Existence of a general legal context ensuring the full application of the directive (Art. 288, third para., TFEU) (see paras 40, 47)

6. Acts of the institutions – Directives – Implementation by Member States – Necessity of full transposition into national law (Art. 288, third para., TFEU) (see paras 48, 50)

Re:

Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations – Failure to adopt, within the period prescribed, the provisions necessary to give effect to Directive 2007/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007 establishing a framework for the approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles (Framework Directive) (OJ 2007 L 263, p. 1)

Operative part

The Court:

1. Declares that, by failing to communicate to the European Commission the laws, regulations and administrative provisions implementing Directive 2007/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007 establishing a framework for the approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 48 of that directive;

2. Declares that, by failing to adopt, within the prescribed period, all the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to implement Directive 2007/46, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 48 of that directive;
5

Articles 296 to 298 of the VAT Directive state: ‘Article 296 1. Where the application to farmers of the normal VAT arrangements, or the special scheme [for small enterprises] provided for in Chapter 1, is likely to give rise to difficulties, Member States may apply to farmers, in accordance with this Chapter, a flat-rate scheme designed to offset the VAT charged on purchases of goods and services made by the flat-rate farmers. 2. Each Member State may exclude from the flat-rate scheme certain categories of farmers, as well as farmers for whom application of the normal VAT arrangements, or of the simplified procedures provided for in Article 281, is not likely to give rise to administrative difficulties. 3. Every flat-rate farmer may opt, subject to the rules and conditions to be laid down by each Member State, for application of the normal VAT arrangements or, as the case may be, the simplified procedures provided for in Article 281. Article 297 Member States shall, where necessary, fix the flat-rate compensation percentages. They may fix varying percentages for forestry, for the different sub-divisions of agriculture and for fisheries. Member States shall notify the Commission of the flat-rate compensation percentages fixed in accordance with the first paragraph before applying them. Article 298 The flat-rate compensation percentages shall be calculated on the basis of macro-economic statistics for flat-rate farmers alone for the preceding three years. The percentages may be rounded up or down to the nearest half-point. Member States may also reduce such percentages to a nil rate.’
12

Article 19 of the Regulation, entitled ‘Rights conferred by the Community design’, is worded as follows: ‘1. A registered Community design shall confer on its holder the exclusive right to use it and to prevent any third party not having his consent from using it. The aforementioned use shall cover, in particular, the making, offering, putting on the market, importing, exporting or using of a product in which the design is incorporated or to which it is applied, or stocking such a product for those purposes. 2. An unregistered Community design shall, however, confer on its holder the right to prevent the acts referred to in paragraph 1 only if the contested use results from copying the protected design. The contested use shall not be deemed to result from copying the protected design if it results from an independent work of creation by a designer who may be reasonably thought not to be familiar with the design made available to the public by the holder. …’