ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State (Belgium) lodged on 29 October 2021 — VZW Belgische Vereniging van de Industrie van Plantenbeschermingsmiddelen (PHYTOFAR) v Vlaams Gewest

(Case C-658/21)

(2022/C 73/12)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Raad van State

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: VZW Belgische Vereniging van de Industrie van Plantenbeschermingsmiddelen (PHYTOFAR)

Defendant: Vlaams Gewest

Question referred

Must Article 5(1) of Directive 2015/1535/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015‘laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services’ be interpreted as meaning that a prohibition on the use of pesticides containing glyphosate on land in private use by users who do not have a phytosanitary licence is deemed to concern a technical regulation which must be communicated to the European Commission in accordance with the provisions of that article?

(1) OJ 2015 L 241, p. 1.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 25 March 2021 by RY against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 13 January 2021 in Case T-824/19, RY v Commission

(Case C-193/21 P)

(2022/C 64/07)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: RY (represented by: J.-N. Louis, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 9 December 2021, the Court (Sixth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as manifestly inadmissible.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 22 December 2021 by European Union Copper Task Force against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 13 October 2021 in Case T-153/19, European Union Copper Task Force v Commission

(Case C-828/21 P)

(2022/C 73/35)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: European Union Copper Task Force (represented by: I. Moreno-Tapia Rivas and C. Vila Gisbert, abogadas)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, European Parliament, Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— annul the judgment under appeal;

— issue a judgment on the substance of the action for annulment or, subsidiary, refer the case back to the General Court for judgment;

— order the European Commission to pay the costs of the appeal proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the applicant relies on the following pleas in law.

The General Court erred in law in relation to the scope of its judicial review and has breached the appellant’s right to an effective judicial protection.

The General Court infringed the principle of non-arbitrariness by failing to require a harmonized approach in the scope of application of PBT (persistence, bioaccumulation and toxicity) criteria.

The General Court infringed the precautionary principle and the principle of proportionality.

The General Court breached the rules of procedure by dismissing the appellant’s request to appoint an expert.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Nederlandstalige rechtbank van eerste aanleg Brussel (Belgium) lodged on 19 November 2021 — Recreatieprojecten Zeeland BV, Casino Admiral Zeeland BV, Supergame BV v Belgische Staat

(Case C-695/21)

(2022/C 84/37)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Nederlandstalige rechtbank van eerste aanleg Brussel

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: Recreatieprojecten Zeeland BV, Casino Admiral Zeeland BV, Supergame BV

Respondent: Belgische Staat

Question referred

Must Article 56(1) TFEU be interpreted as precluding the national legislation of a Member State from allowing the operators of a limited and controlled number of licensed games of chance establishments in its territory to benefit from an exception to a generally applicable advertising ban in respect of such establishments, unless it also provides for the possibility of the operators of games of chance establishments located in other Member States also being allowed to benefit from the same exception to the advertising ban in its territory in respect of their establishments?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 11 November 2021 — Versicherungsanstalt öffentlich Bediensteter, Eisenbahnen und Bergbau

(Case C-681/21)

(2022/C 84/32)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Authority bringing the appeal on a point of law: Versicherungsanstalt öffentlich Bediensteter, Eisenbahnen und Bergbau, represented by the Finanzprokuratur (body providing legal advice to the Austrian Government)

Interested party: B

Question referred

Are Article 2(1) and 2(2)(a) and Article 6(1) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (1) and the principles of legal certainty, maintenance of established rights and effectiveness of EU law to be interpreted as precluding national legislation — such as that at issue in the main proceedings — under which a previously advantaged category of civil servants is retroactively no longer entitled to pension benefits accruing on the basis of a pension adjustment, and which, in that way (retroactive removal of the previously advantaged category by now placing it on an equal footing with the previously disadvantaged category), has the effect that the previously disadvantaged category of civil servants is also not/no longer entitled to pension benefits accruing on the basis of the pension adjustment to which the latter category would have been entitled because of discrimination on grounds of age which has already been (on several occasions) judicially established — as a result of the non-application of a national provision which is contrary to EU law for the purpose of establishing equal treatment with the previously advantaged category?

(1) OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16.
Appeal brought on 6 December 2021 by Pilatus Bank plc against the order of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 24 September 2021 in Case T-139/19, Pilatus Bank v ECB

(Case C-750/21 P)

(2022/C 95/20)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Pilatus Bank plc (represented by: O. Behrends, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Central Bank (ECB)

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the order under appeal;

— declare void pursuant to Article 264 TFEU the ECB’s decision of 21 December 2018 declaring to the appellant that it was no longer competent to ensure its direct prudential supervision and to take measures concerning it;

— to the extent that the Court of Justice is not in a position to take a decision on the merits to refer the case back to the General Court for it to determine the action for annulment; and

— order the ECB to pay the appellant's costs and the costs of this appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on two grounds of appeal.

First ground of appeal alleging that the General Court misinterpreted the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (1) by falsely assuming that the ECB has no further competence with respect to the appellant as a result of the appellant’s loss of license.

Second ground of appeal alleging that the General Court fails to address appropriately the pleas in law of the appellant which do not concern the alleged lack of competence of the ECB.

(1) Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ 2013 L 287, p. 63).
1.

Are Article 4(2), (3) and (4) and Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 1210/2003, (1) as amended, to be interpreted as meaning that: — the frozen funds and economic resources remain, pending the decision to transfer them to the successor arrangements to the Development Fund for Iraq, the property of the natural and legal persons, bodies and entities associated with the regime of former President Saddam Hussein covered by the freezing of funds and economic resources? — or those frozen funds are the property of the successor arrangements to the Development Fund for Iraq upon the entry into force of the regulation identifying, in Annexes III and IV, the natural and legal persons, bodies and entities associated with the regime of former President Saddam Hussein covered by the freezing of funds and economic resources?
Appeal brought on 16 December 2021 by the Council of the European Union against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 29 September 2021 in Joined Cases T-344/19 and T-356/19, Front Polisario v Council

(Case C-798/21 P)

(2022/C 119/31)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Council of the European Union (represented by: F. Naert, V. Piessevaux, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Front populaire pour la libération de la Saguia el-Hamra et du Rio de oro (Front Polisario), Kingdom of Spain, French Republic, European Commission, Chambre des pêches maritimes de la Méditerranée, Chambre des pêches maritimes de l’Atlantique Nord, Chambre des pêches maritimes de l’Atlantique Centre, Chambre des pêches maritimes de l’Atlantique Sud

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal in so far as it annuls Decision 2019/441 (1);

— give final judgment in the matters that are the subject of the appeal and dismiss the action brought by Front Polisario in Case T-344/19;

— order Front Polisario to pay the costs of the appeal and of Case T-344/19;

— in the alternative: maintain the effects of Decision 2019/441 for a period of 12 months from the date on which judgment is delivered.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The first ground of appeal alleges infringement of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and concerns the judgment under appeal in so far as it concluded that Front Polisario has the capacity to bring proceedings before the Courts of the European Union.

The second ground of appeal alleges infringement of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and breach of the principle that documents must be construed in accordance with their actual terms, and concerns the judgment under appeal in so far as it concluded that the contested decision is of direct and individual concern to Front Polisario.

The third ground of appeal alleges an error of law as regards the possibility of relying on rules of international law and concerns the judgment under appeal in so far as it concluded that Front Polisario can rely on the principle of self-determination and the principle of the relative effect of treaties.

The fourth ground of appeal alleges misinterpretation and misapplication of the general principle of the relative effect of treaties and of the right of self-determination, breach of the principle that documents must be construed in accordance with their actual terms, distortion of the Council’s arguments and infringement of Article 36, read in conjunction with the first paragraph of Article 53, of the Statute of the Court of Justice. It concerns the judgment under appeal in so far as it concluded that the people of Western Sahara did not give their consent to the agreements with which Decision 2019/441 is concerned.

(1) Council Decision (EU) 2019/441 of 4 March 2019 on the conclusion of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco, the Implementation Protocol thereto and the Exchange of Letters accompanying the Agreement (OJ 2019 L 77, p. 4).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 20 August 2021 by FT and Others against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 9 June 2021 in Case T-699/19 FT and Others v Commission

(Case C-518/21 P)

(2022/C 119/24)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellants: FT, FU, FV, FY, FZ, GA, GB, GC, GD, GG, GE, GF, GH, GI, GJ, GK, GL, GM, GN, GO, GP, GQ, GR, GS, GT, GU (represented by: J.-N. Louis, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 27 January 2022, the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) dismissed the appeal as manifestly inadmissible and ordered the appellants to bear their own costs.
1.

Is the Spanish legislation which provides for a tax on coal used for electricity generation compatible with Article 14(1)(a) of Directive 2003/96/EC, (1) when, despite stating that its aim is to protect the environment, that aim is not reflected in the structure of the tax and the tax levied is used to finance the costs of the electricity system?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy w Siemianowicach Śląskich (Poland) lodged on 26 November 2021 — Provident Polska S.A. v VF

(Case C-717/21)

(2022/C 128/05)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy w Siemianowicach Śląskich

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Provident Polska S.A.

Defendant: VF

Question referred

Does Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which gives expression to a fundamental right protecting the place of residence, preclude an interpretation of Article 3(1) and Article 4(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29, as amended), (1) and in particular an interpretation of the concept of a significant imbalance, under which a consumer credit contract may be performed by payment of instalments collected by the seller or supplier exclusively at the consumer’s place of residence?

(1) OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29, Special edition in Polish: Chapter 15 Volume 002 P. 288 — 293.
1.

Must Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (1) be interpreted as meaning that the broadcasting, inside a commercial aircraft occupied by passengers, of a musical work or a fragment of a musical work on take-off, on landing or at any time during a flight, via the aircraft’s public address system, constitutes a communication to the public within the meaning of that provision, particularly (but not exclusively) in the light of the criterion relating to the profit-making objective of the communication? If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Napoli (Italy) lodged on 15 December 2021 — VB v Comune di Portici

(Case C-777/21)

(2022/C 148/16)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale di Napoli

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: VB

Respondent: Comune di Portici

Question referred

Is the Italian State’s legislation (in this case, Article 93(1-bis) and (7-bis) of Legislative Decree No 285/1992) contrary to Articles 49 and 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in that it prohibits a self-employed worker resident in Italy for more than 60 days from travelling in that State in a vehicle registered in another Member State regularly used by that individual to travel and move about in the two Member States — the State of residence and the State where the vehicle is registered — in order to practise his profession (and for reasons relating to his private life)?
2.

Is it compatible with Article 38 [of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union], the principle of the effectiveness of EU law, and Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 13/93 to fix the commencement of the limitation period for an unfair term as the date on which a court with authority to create case-law, such as the Supreme Court, states that a particular term is unfair, irrespective of whether or not the consumer in question is aware of the content of the judgment?
3.

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: Before the recognition of a judgment of a court of another Member State and the enforcement of the sentence imposed by that judgment is refused by reference to Article 3(4) of Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008, in conjunction with the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, on the ground that there are reasons to believe that the conditions prevailing in that Member State are incompatible with the fundamental right to a fair trial because, in that Member State, the judicial system itself is no longer in conformity with the principle of the rule of law, is it necessary to review, in a second step, whether the prevailing conditions which are incompatible with the fundamental right to a fair trial had a detrimental effect specifically on the sentenced person(s) in the proceedings in question?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 3 December 2021 by Coordination nationale médicale santé — environnement (CNMSE), European Forum for Vaccine Vigilance (EFVV), Children’s Health Defense Europe (CHD Europe), Ligue nationale pour la liberté des vaccinations and Terra Sos-tenible against the order of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 27 September 2021 in Case T-633/20, CNMSE and Others v Parliament and Council

(Case C-749/21 P)

(2022/C 482/03)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellants: Coordination nationale médicale santé — environnement (CNMSE), European Forum for Vaccine Vigilance (EFVV), Children’s Health Defense Europe (CHD Europe), Ligue nationale pour la liberté des vaccinations and Terra Sos-tenible (represented by: J.-C. Teissedre, avocat)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Parliament, Council of the European Union

By order of 15 September 2022, the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded, and ordered the appellants to bear their own costs.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 9 July 2021 by Valvis Holding SA against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 12 May 2021 in Case T-638/19, Sun Stars & Sons v EUIPO — Valvis Holding

(Case C-420/21 P)

(2022/C 237/28)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Valvis Holding SA (represented by: M. Stănescu, D. Bogdan, G. Bozocea, avocats)

Other parties to the proceedings: Sun Stars & Sons Pte Ltd, European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 29 April 2022, the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) held that the appeal was dismissed as manifestly inadmissible and that Valvis Holding SA shall bear its own costs.
1.

Do activities of a committee of inquiry set up by a Parliament of a Member State in the exercise of its right to scrutinise the executive fall within the scope of EU law within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 16(2) TFEU, irrespective of the subject matter of the inquiry, with the result that Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, (General Data Protection Regulation; ‘the GDPR’) is applicable to the processing of personal data by a parliamentary committee of inquiry of a Member State?
Appeal brought on 12 January 2022 by KS and KD against the order of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 10 November 2021 in Case T-771/20, KS and KD v Council and Others

(Case C-29/22 P)

(2022/C 109/26)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: KS and KD (represented by: J. Stojsavljevic-Savic, Solicitor, F. Randolph QC and P. Koutrakos, Barrister)

Other parties to the proceedings: Council of the European Union, European Commission, European External Action Service (EEAS)

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

— allow the appeal, set aside the order under appeal and grant the relief sought before the General Court;

— alternatively, allow the appeal and remit the case to the General Court for final determination; and

— order the respondents to pay the costs of this appeal, proceedings before the General Court and proceedings before the Human Rights Review Panel of EULEX.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appeal is based on the ground that the General Court erred in law by concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the action that the appellants had brought seeking reparation for the damage they have suffered as a result of the violation of their fundamental human rights by the respondents. The ground of appeal is divided in four parts.

First, the General Court erred in law by interpreting broadly the CFSP (European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy) exclusion laid down in the last sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU and the first paragraph of Article 275 TFEU.

Second, the General Court erred in law by misapplying the judgment of 6 October 2020, Bank Refah Kargaran v Council (C-134/19 P, EU:C:2020:793).

Third, the General Court erred in law by misapplying the judgment of 25 March 2021, Carvalho and Others v Parliament and Council (C-565/19 P, not published, EU:C:2021:252).

Fourth, the General Court erred in law by failing to address material parts of the claim and not providing sufficient reasons for its decision.
1.

Is Article 77(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (1) (‘GDPR’), read in conjunction with Article 78(1) thereof, to be understood as meaning that the outcome that the supervisory authority reaches and notifies to the data subject (a) has the character of a decision on a petition? This would mean that judicial review of a decision on a complaint taken by a supervisory authority in accordance with Article 78(1) of the GDPR is, in principle, limited to the question of whether the authority has handled the complaint, investigated the subject matter of the complaint to the extent appropriate and informed the complainant of the outcome of the investigation, or (b) is to be understood as a decision on the merits taken by a public authority? This would mean that a decision on a complaint taken by a supervisory authority would be subject to a full substantive review by the court in accordance with Article 78(1) of the GDPR, whereby, in individual cases — for example where discretion is reduced to zero — the supervisory authority may also be obliged by the court to take a specific measure within the meaning of Article 58 of the GDPR.
3.

If it follows from the interpretation of the provisions of Article 30(2) of the Agreement, read in conjunction with Article 30(1)(a) and (c) thereof, that those provisions are not applicable to the facts of the main proceedings because a Union citizen ceased to reside in the United Kingdom after the end of the transitional period, must the provisions of Article 30(4) of the Agreement, read in conjunction with Article 30(3) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that persons residing or working in the host State or in the State of employment are no longer covered by the provision of Article 30(1) if their legal relationships as employed persons (workers) have been terminated and, as a result, they have lost their right of residence and have left the State of employment or the host State after the end of the transitional period, or must those provisions be interpreted as meaning that the restriction laid down by Article 30(4) relates to the right of residence and the right of employment exercised after the end of the transitional period, without it being relevant when the rights were terminated, provided that they still existed after the end of the transitional period?