ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
25

In those circumstances, the Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden (Regional Court of Appeal, Arnhem-Leeuwarden, Netherlands) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) (a) Does EU law preclude the taste of a food product — as the author’s own intellectual creation — being granted copyright protection? In particular: (b) Is copyright protection precluded by the fact that the expression “literary and artistic works” in Article 2(1) of the Berne Convention, which is binding on all the Member States of the European Union, includes “every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression”, but that the examples cited in that provision relate only to creations which can be perceived by sight and/or by hearing? (c) Does the (possible) instability of a food product and/or the subjective nature of the taste experience preclude the taste of a food product being eligible for copyright protection? (d) Does the system of exclusive rights and limitations, as governed by Articles 2 to 5 of Directive [2001/29], preclude the copyright protection of the taste of a food product? (2) If the answer to question 1(a) is in the negative: (a) What are the requirements for the copyright protection of the taste of a food product? (b) Is the copyright protection of a taste based solely on the taste as such or (also) on the recipe of the food product? (c) What evidence should a party who, in infringement proceedings, claims to have created a copyright-protected taste of a food product, put forward? Is it sufficient for that party to present the food product involved in the proceedings to the court so that the court, by tasting and smelling, can form its own opinion as to whether the taste of the food product meets the requirements for copyright protection? Or should the applicant (also) provide a description of the creative choices involved in the taste composition and/or the recipe on the basis of which the taste can be considered to be the author’s own intellectual creation? (d) How should the court in infringement proceedings determine whether the taste of the defendant’s food product corresponds to such an extent with the taste of the applicant’s food product that it constitutes an infringement of copyright? Is a determining factor here that the overall impressions of the two tastes are the same?’
15

Article 64 of that law, which transposes Article 138 of the VAT Directive into the Czech legal system, provides: ‘(1) The supply of goods to another Member State by the person liable to pay the tax to a person registered for VAT in another Member State, where those goods have been dispatched or transported from the national territory by the person liable to pay the tax or the purchaser or an authorised third person, is exempt from the tax and is tax deductible, other than where the goods are supplied to a person for whom the purchase of the goods in another Member State is not taxable. … (3) The supply of excise goods to another Member State by the person liable for payment to a taxable person who is not registered for VAT in another Member State or to a legal person which is not registered for VAT in another Member State, where those goods were dispatched or transported from the national territory by the person liable for payment or the acquirer or an authorised third person, is exempt from tax with the right to deduct the tax, if the dispatch or transport of the goods is carried out in accordance with the law on excise duty, and the purchaser shall become liable to pay the excise duty in the Member State in which the dispatch or transport of the goods ends. …’
3

Recitals 28, 117 and 118 of Directive 2014/24 read as follows: ‘(28) This Directive should not apply to certain emergency services where they are performed by non-profit organisations or associations, since the particular nature of those organisations would be difficult to preserve if the service providers had to be chosen in accordance with the procedures set out in this Directive. However, the exclusion should not be extended beyond that strictly necessary. It should therefore be set out explicitly that patient transport ambulance services should not be excluded. In that context it is furthermore necessary to clarify that CPV [Common Procurement Vocabulary] Group 601 “Land Transport Services” does not cover ambulance services, to be found in CPV class 8514. It should therefore be clarified that services, which are covered by CPV code 85143000‑3, consisting exclusively of patient transport ambulance services should be subject to the special regime set out for social and other specific services (the “light regime”). Consequently, mixed contracts for the provision of ambulance services in general would also be subject to the light regime if the value of the patient transport ambulance services were greater than the value of other ambulance services. … (117) Experience has shown that a series of other services, such as rescue services, firefighting services and prison services are normally only of cross-border interest as of such time as they acquire sufficient critical mass through their relatively high value. In so far as they are not excluded from the scope of this Directive, they should be included under the light regime. To the extent that their provision is actually based on contracts, other categories of services, such as government services or the provision of services to the community, they would normally only be likely to present a cross-border interest as from a threshold [EUR] 750000 and should consequently only then be subject to the light regime. (118) In order to ensure the continuity of public services, this Directive should allow that participation in procurement procedures for certain services in the fields of health, social and cultural services could be reserved for organisations which are based on employee ownership or active employee participation in their governance, and for existing organisations such as cooperatives to participate in delivering these services to end users. This provision is limited in scope exclusively to certain health, social and related services, certain education and training services, library, archive, museum and other cultural services, sporting services, and services for private households, and is not intended to cover any of the exclusions otherwise provided for by this Directive. Those services should only be covered by the “light regime”.’
48

It follows from the foregoing considerations that Directive 2006/112 and the principles of fiscal neutrality and effectiveness must be interpreted as not precluding a practice of the tax authority whereby, in the absence of any suspicion of tax evasion, that authority refuses an undertaking the right to deduct the VAT which that undertaking, as the recipient of services, unduly paid to the supplier of those services on the basis of an invoice drawn up by that supplier in accordance with the rules on the ordinary VAT regime, whereas the relevant transaction fell under the reverse charge mechanism, and where the tax authority did not, – examine, prior to refusing the right to deduct, whether the issuer of that incorrect invoice could reimburse the recipient of the invoice the amount of VAT unduly paid and could correct that invoice under a self-correction procedure, in accordance with the applicable national rules, in order to recover the tax which it unduly paid to the Treasury, or – itself decide to reimburse the recipient of that invoice the tax which the recipient unduly paid to the issuer of the invoice and that the latter, subsequently, unduly paid to the Treasury. Those principles require, however, in the situation where the reimbursement by the supplier of services to the recipient of those services of the VAT unduly invoiced would be impossible or excessively difficult, in particular in the case of the insolvency of the supplier, that the recipient of the services must be able to address its application for reimbursement to the tax authorities directly.
6

Article 13 of that regulation, entitled ‘Circumvention’, provided: ‘1. Anti-dumping duties imposed pursuant to this Regulation may be extended to imports from third countries, of the like product, whether slightly modified or not, or to imports of the slightly modified like product from the country subject to measures, or parts thereof, when circumvention of the measures in force is taking place. Anti-dumping duties not exceeding the residual anti-dumping duty imposed in accordance with Article 9(5) may be extended to imports from companies benefiting from individual duties in the countries subject to measures when circumvention of the measures in force is taking place. Circumvention shall be defined as a change in the pattern of trade between third countries and the Community or between individual companies in the country subject to measures and the Community, which stems from a practice, process or work for which there is insufficient due cause or economic justification other than the imposition of the duty, and where there is evidence of injury or that the remedial effects of the duty are being undermined in terms of the prices and/or quantities of the like product, and where there is evidence of dumping in relation to the normal values previously established for the like product, if necessary in accordance with the provisions of Article 2. … 3. Investigations shall be initiated pursuant to this Article on the initiative of the Commission or at the request of a Member State or any interested party on the basis of sufficient evidence regarding the factors set out in paragraph 1. Initiations shall be made, after consultation of the Advisory Committee, by Commission Regulation which may also instruct the customs authorities to make imports subject to registration in accordance with Article 14(5) or to request guarantees. Investigations shall be carried out by the Commission, which may be assisted by customs authorities, and shall be concluded within nine months. When the facts as finally ascertained justify the extension of measures, this shall be done by the Council, acting on a proposal submitted by the Commission, after consultation of the Advisory Committee. The proposal shall be adopted by the Council unless it decides by a simple majority to reject the proposal, within a period of one month after its submission by the Commission. The extension shall take effect from the date on which registration was imposed pursuant to Article 14(5) or on which guarantees were requested. The relevant procedural provisions of this Regulation with regard to initiations and the conduct of investigations shall apply pursuant to this Article. …’
80

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions put by the referring court is that Article 16(1)(e) of the Habitats Directive must be interpreted as precluding the adoption of decisions granting derogations from the prohibition on the deliberate killing of wolves laid down in Article 12(1)(a), read in conjunction with Annex IV(a) to that directive, by way of hunting for population management purposes, the objective of which is to combat poaching, where: – the objective pursued by such derogations is not stated in a clear and precise manner and where, in the light of rigorous scientific data, the national authority is unable to establish that the derogations are appropriate with a view to achieving that objective, – it is not duly established that their objective cannot be attained by means of a satisfactory alternative, the mere existence of an illegal activity or difficulties associated with its monitoring not constituting sufficient evidence in that regard, – it is not guaranteed that the derogations will not be detrimental to the maintenance of the populations of the species concerned at a favourable conservation status in their natural range, – the derogations have not been subject to an assessment of the conservation status of the populations of the species concerned and of the impact that the envisaged derogation may have on it, at the level of the territory of that Member State or, where applicable, at the level of the biogeographical region in question where the borders of that Member State straddle several biogeographical regions or where the natural range of the species so requires and, to the extent possible, at cross-border level, and – not all conditions are satisfied in relation to the taking, on a selective basis and to a limited extent, under strictly supervised conditions, in limited and specified numbers, of specimens of the species listed in Annex IV to that directive, compliance with which must be established in particular by reference to the population level, its conservation status and its biological characteristics. It is for the national court to ascertain whether that is the case in the main proceedings.
10

Article 9 of Directive 2004/48, entitled ‘Provisional and precautionary measures’, provides: ‘1. Member States shall ensure that the judicial authorities may, at the request of the applicant: (a) issue against the alleged infringer an interlocutory injunction intended to prevent any imminent infringement of an intellectual property right, or to forbid, on a provisional basis and subject, where appropriate, to a recurring penalty payment where provided for by national law, the continuation of the alleged infringements of that right, or to make such continuation subject to the lodging of guarantees intended to ensure the compensation of the rightholder; … (b) order the seizure or delivery up of the goods suspected of infringing an intellectual property right so as to prevent their entry into or movement within the channels of commerce. 2. In the case of an infringement committed on a commercial scale, the Member States shall ensure that, if the injured party demonstrates circumstances likely to endanger the recovery of damages, the judicial authorities may order the precautionary seizure of the movable and immovable property of the alleged infringer, including the blocking of his bank accounts and other assets. … … 7. Where the provisional measures are revoked or where they lapse due to any act or omission by the applicant, or where it is subsequently found that there has been no infringement or threat of infringement of an intellectual property right, the judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the applicant, upon request of the defendant, to provide the defendant appropriate compensation for any injury caused by those measures.’
Case C‑310/18 PPU

Criminal proceedings

against

Emil Milev

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Urgent preliminary ruling procedure — Judicial cooperation in criminal matters — Directive (EU) 2016/343 — Presumption of innocence — Public references to guilt — Remedies — Procedure for reviewing the lawfulness of pre-trial detention)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 19 September 2018

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling—Urgent preliminary ruling procedure—Conditions—Person deprived of liberty—Outcome of the dispute liable to have an influence on that deprivation of liberty (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 23a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 107) Judicial cooperation in criminal matters—Strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings—Directive 2016/343—Scope—Conditions for the adoption of decisions on pre-trial detention—Precluded (European Parliament and Council Directive 2016/343, Arts 3 and 4(1))
Appeal — Appeal upheld — Judgment to be given on the substance by the appeal court — Condition — Whether the state of the proceedings permits final judgment to be given

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 61, first para.)

(see paras 49, 50)
Article 50 TEU must be interpreted as meaning that mere notification by a Member State of its intention to withdraw from the European Union in accordance with that article does not have the consequence that, in the event that that Member State issues a European arrest warrant with respect to an individual, the executing Member State must refuse to execute that European arrest warrant or postpone its execution pending clarification of the law that will be applicable in the issuing Member State after its withdrawal from the European Union. In the absence of substantial grounds to believe that the person who is the subject of that European arrest warrant is at risk of being deprived of rights recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, following the withdrawal from the European Union of the issuing Member State, the executing Member State cannot refuse to execute that European arrest warrant while the issuing Member State remains a member of the European Union. In that context, it must be observed that such a notification does not have the effect of suspending the application of EU law in the Member State that has given notice of its intention to withdraw from the European Union and, consequently, EU law, which encompasses the provisions of the Framework Decision and the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition inherent in that decision, continues in full force and effect in that State until the time of its actual withdrawal from the European Union. Consequently, as the Advocate General stated in point 70 of his Opinion, in a case such as that in the main proceedings, in order to decide whether a European arrest warrant should be executed, it is essential that, when that decision is to be taken, the executing judicial authority is able to presume that, with respect to the person who is to be surrendered, the issuing Member State will apply the substantive content of the rights derived from the Framework Decision that are applicable in the period subsequent to the surrender, after the withdrawal of that Member State from the European Union. Such a presumption can be made if the national law of the issuing Member State incorporates the substantive content of those rights, particularly because of the continuing participation of that Member State in international conventions, such as the European Convention on Extradition of 13 December 1957 and the ECHR, even after the withdrawal of that Member State from the European Union. Only if there is concrete evidence to the contrary can the judicial authorities of a Member State refuse to execute the European arrest warrant.

(see paras 45, 61, 62, operative part)
2.

Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Determination of the basic amount — Determination of the value of sales — Sales carried out in direct or indirect relation to the infringement — Account taken of sales made at the worldwide level in order to reflect the relative importance of each undertaking in the infringement — Respect for the principle of equal treatment — Taking into account the differences and circumstances particular to the undertakings concerned at another stage in calculating the fine — Whether permissible (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts 20 and 21; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2) and (3); Commission Notice 2006/C 210/02, points 13 and 18) (see paras 51-63)
1.

Declares that, by having failed to designate as special areas of conservation 61 sites of Community importance, which were selected by the European Commission in Commission Decision 2004/813/EC of 7 December 2004 adopting, pursuant to Council Directive 92/43/EEC, the list of sites of Community importance for the Atlantic biogeographical region, and in Commission Decision 2006/613/EC of 19 July 2006 adopting, pursuant to Council Directive 92/43/EEC, the list of sites of Community importance for the Mediterranean biogeographical region, as soon as possible and within a period of six years at most from the date on which those decisions were adopted, and, by having failed to adopt the necessary conservation measures which satisfy the ecological requirements of the types of natural habitat referred to in Annex I to Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, and of the species referred to in Annex II to that directive present on those sites of Community importance, the Portuguese Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 4(4) and Article 6(1) of that directive;
Appeal – Grounds – Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence – Inadmissibility – Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence – Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Art. 256(1), second para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see paras 37, 38)
EU law — Principles — Fundamental rights — Compliance ensured by the EU judicature — Right of all persons to a fair hearing — Guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Taking into consideration the European Convention on Human Rights — Requirement of impartiality — Same judge sitting in two chambers that had to hear the same case successively — No infringement

(Art. 6(3) TEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47, first and second paras; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Arts 26(2), 27(1) and 216(1))

(see paras 45-47, 50, 51, 54, 55, 57-60)
23

In those circumstances the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme Administrative Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) In the interpretation of the first subparagraph of Article 157(1) of Directive [2009/138], read in conjunction with Article 13(13) and (14) thereof, is the Member State entitled to levy tax on insurance premiums to be considered the State in which the company (a legal person) which has taken out the insurance policy is established, or the State in which the company which is the subject of the company acquisition is established, where an insurance company with its registered office in the United Kingdom, which is not established in Finland, offers insurance covering risks relating to a company acquisition – to a company which is not established in Finland, which, in the company acquisition, acts as the buyer, and the target company of that acquisition is established in Finland, – to a company established in Finland which, in the company acquisition, acts as the buyer, where the target company of that acquisition is not established in Finland, – to a company which is not established in Finland which, in the company acquisition, acts as the seller where the target company of that acquisition is established in Finland, – a company established in Finland, which, in the company acquisition, acts as the seller where the target company of that acquisition is not established in Finland? (2) Does the fact that the insurance covers only the tax liabilities of the company which arose before the company acquisition have any impact in the present case? (3) Does the question whether the company acquisition concerns shares or a part of the business of the target company have an impact in the present case? (4) If the company acquisition concerns the shares of the target company, does the question of whether representations made by the seller to the buyer concern only the fact that the seller is the owner of the shares sold and that they are not subject to third-party claims have any effect in the present case?’