ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 414/14

Appeal brought on 13 July 2015 by Louis Vuitton Malletier against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 21 April 2015 in Case T-360/12: Louis Vuitton Malletier v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), Nanu-Nana Handelsgesellschaft mbH für Geschenkartikel & Co. KG

(Case C-364/15 P)

(2015/C 414/17)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Louis Vuitton Malletier (represented by: P. Roncaglia, G. Lazzeretti, F. Rossi, N. Parrotta, avvocati)

Other parties to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), Nanu-Nana Handelsgesellschaft mbH für Geschenkartikel & Co. KG

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— Annul the judgment of the General Court of the European Union (Second Chamber) of April 21, 2015, in Case T-360/12, served upon the Appellant on April 29, 2015;

— Order OHIM to pay the costs incurred by the Appellant during these proceedings;

— Order Nanu-Nana to pay the costs incurred by the Appellant during these proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

1. By means of the present appeal Louis Vuitton Malletier (hereafter referred to as ‘Louis Vuitton’ or the ‘Appellant’) requests that the Court of Justice annul the decision of the General Court of the European Union (Second Chamber) of April 21, 2015, in Case T-360/12 (the ‘judgment under appeal’), whereby the General Court dismissed Louis Vuitton application against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of May 16, 2012, in Case R 1854/2011-1, which had declared Community trademark registration No. 658751 (figurative) invalid in its entirety, for lack of distinctive character.

2. The present appeal is aimed at showing that the General Court erred in concluding that the provision of Article 7(i)(b) CTM Regulation (1) is applicable to the contested trademark.

3. In upholding the Board of Appeal’s decision that had declared the contested trademark invalid for not being inherently distinctive the General Court infringed the rules concerning the burden of proof in invalidity proceedings.

4. In particular, the Appellant maintains that to comply with the principles on the presumption of validity enjoyed by registered Community trademarks and the apportion of the burden of proof in invalidity actions, the General Court should have reversed the challenged decision, on the basis that Nanu-Nana had not met its burden, as it had not been able to demonstrate what the norm and customs of the relevant sector were at the date of filing of the contested trademark and therefore that the contested trademark did not depart significantly from them.

5. In light of the above the Appellant requests that the Court of Justice annul the judgment under appeal and order both the OHIM and Nanu-Nana to pay the costs incurred by the Appellant during these proceedings.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark OJ L 78, p. 1.
6.

Is the review by the civil courts of the equitable nature of charges imposed by an infrastructure manager compatible with EU law taking into account the fact that EU law assumes that it is the regulatory body that is competent to determine differences of opinion between an infrastructure manager and a person entitled to access as regards charges for the use of railway infrastructure, or the amount or structure of such charges, which the person entitled to access is or would be obliged to pay (third subparagraph of Article 30(5) of Directive 2001/14/EC), and the fact that the potentially large number of disputes before different civil courts means that the regulatory body would not be able to ensure the uniform application of railway regulatory law (Article 30(3) of Directive 2001/14/EC)?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 429/9

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank van Koophandel Brussel (Belgium) lodged on 5 October 2015 — Uber Belgium BVBA v Taxi Radio Bruxellois NV, Other parties: Uber NV and Others

(Case C-526/15)

(2015/C 429/13)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank van Koophandel Brussel

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Uber Belgium BVBA

Defendant: Taxi Radio Bruxellois NV

Other parties to the proceedings: Uber NV and Others, Brusselse Hoofdstedelijk Gewest, Belgische Federatie van Taxis, Nationale Groepering van Ondernemingen met Taxi- and Locatievoertuigen met Chauffeur VZW

Question referred

Should the principle of proportionality, laid down in Article 5 TEU and Article 52(1) of the Charter, (1) read in conjunction with Articles 15, 16 and 17 of the Charter and with Articles 28 TFEU and 56 TFEU, be interpreted as precluding a rule such as that laid down in the Ordonnantie van het Brusselse Hoofstedelijk Gewest van 27 april 1995 betreffende de taxidiensten voor het verhuren van voertuigen met vervoerder (Ordinance of the Brussels-Capital Region of 27 April 1995 relating to taxis and services for the rental of vehicles with carrier), be interpreted as meaning that the term ‘taxi services’ (‘taxidiensten’) also applies to unpaid individual carriers who are involved in ride sharing (shared transport) by accepting ride requests which they are offered by means of a software application of the companies Uber BV et al established in another Member State?

(1) OJ 2000 C 364, p. 1.
3)

If a collision between an aircraft and a bird is an event within the meaning of paragraph 22 of Wallentin-Hermann, may it also be considered to be an event within the meaning of recital 14 in the preamble to the Regulation and may, in such a case, the body of technical and administrative measures which an air carrier must implement following a collision between an aircraft and a bird which nevertheless did not result in damage to the aircraft be considered to constitute exceptional circumstances within the meaning of recital 14 in the preamble to the Regulation?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 16/24

Appeal brought on 13 November 2015 by Bionorica SE against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 16 September 2015 in Case T-619/14 Bionorica SE v European Commission

(Case C-596/15 P)

(2016/C 016/30)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Bionorica SE (represented by: M. Weidner, T. Guttau, N. Hußmann, Rechtsanwälte)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— conduct an oral hearing;

— set aside the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 16 September 2015 in Case T-619/14;

— order the European Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the form of order which it seeks, the appellant relies on two grounds of appeal:

— Procedural errors: the General Court partially took incorrect facts as a basis and thus reached a wrong decision, which puts a burden on the appellant. The General Court wrongly assumed that the appellant is a food producer which, moreover, was concerned only by deferred health claims within the meaning of Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006. (1) Furthermore, the General Court partially provided an inadequate statement of grounds for its decision. The General Court did not address in detail the content of the Commission’s letter allegedly putting an end to the failure to act and thus reached a wrong decision.

— Infringement of EU law: the General Court wrongly refused to recognise the conditions of Article 265 TFEU, since the Commission’s failure to act was not brought to an end. In addition, the General Court incorrectly assessed Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006, in particular Articles 17 and 28 thereof. Deferred and authorised health claims cannot be treated as equivalent. The legal consequences resulting from the transitional provisions are not sufficiently predictable.

(1) Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on nutrition and health claims made on foods, OJ 2006 L 404, p. 9.
B.

Must a taxable person who is authorised under national law to practise a paramedical activity, namely physiotherapy, but who in the context of his professional health activity uses either indistinctly or complementarily both therapies characteristic of physiotherapy and therapies characteristic of osteopathy be regarded, for the purposes of Article 132(1)(c) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC and, consequently, for the purposes of Article 9 of the CIVA [(Code on VAT)], as a professional who, overall, carries out a paramedical activity which is, accordingly, exempt from VAT?
1.

May a Member State transpose Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA (1) in its national law in such a way that: — its executing judicial authority is, without more, obliged to refuse surrender, for purposes of executing a sentence, of a national or resident of the executing Member State, — by operation of law, that refusal gives rise to the willingness to take over the execution of the custodial sentence imposed on the national or resident, — but the decision to take over execution of the sentence is taken only after refusal of surrender for purposes of executing the sentence, and a positive decision is dependent on (1) a basis for the decision in a treaty or convention which is in force between the issuing Member State and the executing Member State, (2) the conditions set by that treaty or convention, and (3) the cooperation of the issuing Member State by, for example, making a request to that effect, with the result that there is a risk that, following refusal of surrender for purposes of executing the sentence, the executing Member State cannot take over execution of that sentence, while that risk does not affect the obligation to refuse surrender for purposes of executing the sentence?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 27/16

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Amsterdam (Netherlands) lodged on 11 November 2015 — Openbaar Ministerie v Gerrit van Vemde

(Case C-582/15)

(2016/C 027/20)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank Amsterdam

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Openbaar Ministerie

Defendant: Gerrit van Vemde

Question referred

Must the first sentence of Article 28(2) of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA (1) be understood as meaning that the declaration referred to therein may relate only to judgments issued before 5 December 2011, irrespective of when those judgments became final, or must that provision be understood as meaning that the declaration may relate only to judgments which became final before 5 December 2011?

(1) Council Framework Decision of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union (OJ 2008 L 327, p. 27).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 38/37

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation (France) lodged on 23 November 2015 — Concurrence Sàrl v Samsung Electronics France SAS, Amazon Services Europe Sàrl

(Case C-618/15)

(2016/C 038/51)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour de cassation

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Concurrence Sàrl

Defendants: Samsung Electronics France SAS, Amazon Services Europe Sàrl

Question referred

Is Article 5(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (1) to be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of an alleged breach of a prohibition on resale outside a selective distribution network and via a marketplace by means of online offers for sale on a number of websites operated in various Member States, an authorised distributor which considers that it has been adversely affected has the right to bring an action seeking an injunction prohibiting the resulting unlawful interference in the courts of the territory in which the online content is or was accessible, or must some other clear connecting factor be present?

(1) OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 27/21

Appeal brought on 13 November 2015 by the Slovak Republic against the order of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 14 September 2015 in Case T-779/14 Slovak Republic v European Commission

(Case C-594/15 P)

(2016/C 027/25)

Language of the case: Slovak

Parties

Appellant: Slovak Republic (represented by: B. Ricziová, Agent)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The Slovak Republic claims that the Court should:

(i) set aside in its entirety the order of the General Court of 14 September 2015 in Case T-779/14 Slovak Republic v European Commission, in which the General Court dismissed as inadmissible the Slovak Republic’s application, brought under Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, for annulment of the European Commission’s decision, contained in its letter of 24 September 2014, formally demanding the Slovak Republic to make funds available corresponding to a loss of traditional own resources;

(ii) itself rule on the admissibility of the Slovak Republic’s application and refer the case back to the General Court for that latter court to rule on the substance of the application;

(iii) order the European Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings.

In the event that the Court should conclude that it does not have sufficient information to make a final decision on the Commission’s objection of inadmissibility, the Slovak Republic claims, in the alternative, that the Court should:

(i) set aside in its entirety the order of the General Court of 14 September 2015 in Case T-779/14 Slovak Republic v European Commission, in which the General Court dismissed as inadmissible the Slovak Republic’s application, brought under Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, for annulment of the European Commission’s decision, contained in its letter of 24 September 2014, formally demanding the Slovak Republic to make funds available corresponding to a loss of traditional own resources;

(ii) refer the case back to the General Court for that latter court to rule on both the admissibility of the Slovak Republic’s application and the substance of that application;

(iii) order the European Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Slovak Republic puts forward two grounds in support of its appeal:

1. In the first ground of appeal, the Slovak Republic alleges that the General Court erred in law so far as concerns (i) the nature of the funds demanded and the applicability of the legal rules concerning own resources and the related case-law, (ii) the criterion of the institution’s competence in the assessment of whether the contested act was open to challenge, and (iii) the right of access to a court and the urgency of the situation.
1.

First ground — Procedural irregularities before the General Court harming the interests of the Romanian State Romania takes the view that the order under appeal was made in breach of Article 130(7) and (8) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. The General Court, it submits, failed to determine, and did not provide proper reasons, whether it was necessary to examine the objection of inadmissibility together with the examination of the substance. Although the General Court decided that joint examination of the objection of inadmissibility and the substance was not justified, it found that the legal context under which the obligation for Romania to pay arose came under the rules set out in Decision 2007/436 (1) and Regulation No 1150/2000, (2) and ruled that the Romanian State had an obligation arising under those provisions to determine and pay the amount of EUR 14 883,79 as traditional own resources. By analysing the nature and basis of the payment obligation, the General Court ruled on the substance of the case and, in doing so, acted at variance with its decision to rule exclusively on the objection of inadmissibility.
1.

Given that the Court, in its answer to Question 4 in the judgment of 12 December 2006 in Case C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [2006] ECR 1-11753, determined that Articles 43 and 56 of the EC Treaty — now Articles 49 and 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — precluded legislation of a Member State which allows resident companies distributing dividends to their shareholders which have their origin in foreign-sourced dividends received by them to elect to be taxed under a regime which permits them to recover advance corporation tax paid, but, first, obliges those companies to pay that advance corporation tax and subsequently to claim repayment and, secondly, does not provide a tax credit for their shareholders, whereas those shareholders would have received such a tax credit in the case of a distribution made by a resident company which had its origin in nationally-sourced dividends: are any rights under EU law conferred on those shareholders themselves, whether under Article 63 TFEU or otherwise, in cases where they are the recipients of the dividends elected to be paid under that regime; in particular where a shareholder is resident in the same Member State as the company distributing the dividends?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 48/9

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Wuppertal (Germany) lodged on 16 October 2015 — Mircea Florian Freitag

(Case C-541/15)

(2016/C 048/15)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Wuppertal

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Mircea Florian Freitag

Other parties: Angela Freitag, Vica Pavel, Stadt Wuppertal, Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Wuppertal

Question referred

Are Articles 18 TFEU and 21 TFEU to be interpreted as meaning that the authorities of a Member State are obliged to recognise the change of name of a national of that State if that person is at the same time a national of another Member State and has, in that other Member State, by means of a change of name not associated with a change in family-law status, (re-) acquired his original family name received at the time of birth, even though the acquisition of that name did not take place during the habitual residence of that national in that other Member State and was carried out at his own request?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 48/13

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Netherlands) lodged on 16 November 2015 — Staatssecretaris van Financiën; Other party: Lemnis Lighting BV

(Case C-600/15)

(2016/C 048/20)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hoge Raad der Nederlanden

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant in cassation: Staatssecretaris van Financiën

Other party: Lemnis Lighting BV

Question referred

Are headings 8539, 8541, 8543, 8548 and 9405 of the CN to be interpreted as meaning that products such as LED bulbs, which consist of light-emitting diodes and other electrical components, as well as a glass covering and an Edison screw base, and which serve to provide illumination after being fitted into a lighting fitting, must be classified under one of those headings? If so, under which of those headings are those products to be classified? If not, under which other heading must classification then be made?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 68/22

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (Romania) lodged on 30 November 2015 — Costin Popescu v Guvernul României, Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, Direcția Regim Permise de Conducere și Înmatriculare a Vehiculelor, Direcția Rutieră, Serviciul Public Comunitar Regim Permise de Conducere si Inmatriculare a Vehiculelor

(Case C-632/15)

(2016/C 068/29)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Costin Popescu

Defendants: Guvernul României, Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, Direcția Regim Permise de Conducere și Înmatriculare a Vehiculelor, Direcția Rutieră, Serviciul Public Comunitar Regim Permise de Conducere si Inmatriculare a Vehiculelor

Question referred

In the case of riders of mopeds in possession of an official document which gave them the right to ride on the public highway before 19 January 2013, do the provisions of Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) permit the Romanian State to impose a requirement, for the purpose of being able to continue to ride a moped after that date, to obtain a driving licence by undergoing tests/examinations similar to those required for other motor vehicles?

(1) Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on driving licences (Recast) (OJ 2006 L 403, p. 18).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 59/9

Appeal brought on 8 December 2015 by Viasat Broadcasting UK Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 24 September 2015 in Case T-125/12: Viasat Broadcasting UK Ltd v European Commission

(Case C-660/15 P)

(2016/C 059/09)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Viasat Broadcasting UK Ltd (represented by: M. Honoré and S. Kalsmose-Hjelmborg, advokater)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Kingdom of Denmark, TV2/Danmark A/S

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment in Case T-125/12, Viasat Broadcasting UK Ltd v Commission, and

— annul Commission Decision 2011/839/EU (1) of 20 April 2011 on measures adopted by the Danish state in favour of TV2/Danmark (EUT 2011 L 340, s. 1), and

— order the defendant at first instance to pay the costs of Viasat both incurred in the first instance and before your Court alternatively,

— set aside the judgment under appeal, and

— refer the case back to the General Court, and

— reserve the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the form of order sought, Viasat contends that the General Court erred in law when stating that in its assessment under Article 106(2) TFEU the Commission was not required to take account of the fact that aid to TV2 had been granted without observing fundamental principles of transparency and cost efficiency.

More in particular, Viasat contends that the General Court erred in law (1) by relying on the M6 judgment and the related case law to dismiss Viasat’s claims, (2) by holding that Viasat’s arguments lead to a ‘logical impasse’ (3) by rejecting the significance of the 2005 and 2011 SGEI Communications and the 2009 Broadcasting Communication (4) by holding that the 2001 Broadcasting Communication prevented the Commission from applying the methodology which, in Viasat’s view, flows from Article 106(2) TFEU.

(1) Commission Decision of 20 April 2011 on the measures implemented by Denmark (C 2/03) for TV2/Danmark

OJ L 340, p. 1.