Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. Procedure — Measures of inquiry — Examination of witnesses — Discretion of the Court of First Instance – Impact of the general principle of Community law of the right to a fair judicial process

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 68(1))

2. Procedure — Application initiating the proceedings – Formal requirements – Summary account of the pleas in law put forward – Pleas in law not set out in the application – Reference to elements in an annex – Inadmissible

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 44(1)(c))

3. Competition – Community rules – Undertaking – Concept

(EC Treaty, Arts 85 and 86 (now Arts 81 EC and 82 EC))

4. Competition – Community rules – Infringement by an undertaking – Attribution to another undertaking in view of the economic and legal links between them – Conditions – Insufficiency of a single control of capital

(EC Treaty, Art. 85(1) (now Art. 81(1) EC))

5. Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Participation of an undertaking in an anti-competitive initiative – Sufficiency, in order to engage the liability of the undertaking, of tacit approval without publicly distancing itself or reporting the matter to the competent authorities

(EC Treaty, Art. 85(1) (now Art. 81(1) EC))

6. Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Adverse effect on competition – Criteria for assessment – Anti-competitive object – Sufficient finding

(EC Treaty, Art. 85(1) (now Art. 81(1) EC))

7. Appeals – Pleas in law – Plea submitted for the first time in the context of the appeal – Inadmissible

(EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 51)

8. Competition – Community rules – Infringements – Fines – Determination – Criteria – Raising of the general level of fines – Whether permissible – Conditions

(EC Treaty, Arts 85(1) and 86 (now Arts 81(1) EC and 82 EC); Council Regulation No 17)

9. Community law – Principles — Protection of legitimate expectations – Limits – Elimination of infringements of the competition rules – Determination of the amount of fines – Method of calculating fines – Discretion of the institutions – Lack of effect of the Leniency Notice

(Commission Notice 96/C 207/04)

10. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Criteria – Gravity of the infringements – Attenuating circumstances – Obligation for the Commission to adhere to its previous practice in taking decisions – None

(Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15(2))

11. Community law – General principles of law – Non-retroactivity of penal provisions – Scope – Fines imposed for infringement of the competition rules – Included – Possible breach owing to the application to an infringement committed before their introduction of the Guidelines on the method of setting fines – Foreseeability of the changes introduced by the Guidelines – No breach

(European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 7; Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15; Commission Notice 98/C 9/03)

12. Acts of the institutions – Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed for infringements of the competition rules – Act of general application – Effects

(Commission Notice 98/C 9/03)

13. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Criteria – Overall turnover of the undertaking concerned – Turnover achieved with the goods forming the subject-matter of the infringement – Respective taking into consideration – Limits

(Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15(2))

14. Appeals – Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice – Challenge, for reasons of fairness, of the assessment made by the Court of First Instance of the amount of the fines imposed on undertakings – Excluded – Review limited to ascertaining the taking into consideration by the Court of First Instance of the essential factors to assess the gravity of the infringement and all the arguments raised against the fine imposed

(TC Treaty, Art. 85 (now Art. 81 EC); EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 51; Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15)

15. Competition – Guidelines on the method of setting fines – Calculation method taking into account various elements of flexibility to the detriment of the turnover of the hitherto privileged undertaking — Conformity with Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17

(Council Regulation No 15, Art. 15(2); Commission Notice 98/C 9/03)

16. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Maximum amount – Calculation – Distinction between the final amount and the intermediate amount of the fine – Consequences

(Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15(2))

17. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Criteria – Financial situation of the undertaking concerned – Whether taken into consideration – Obligation – None

(Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15(2))

18. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Criteria – Reduction in the amount of the fine in exchange for the cooperation of the undertaking involved – Conditions – Discretionary power of the Commission

(Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15(2); Commission Notice 96/C 207/04, Section D, points 1 and 2)

19. Competition – Administrative procedure – Respect for the rights of the defence – Statement of objections – Necessary content – Indication of the criteria for calculating the contemplated fine – Premature indication – Absence of obligation to indicate a possible change of policy concerning the level of the amount of fines

(Council Regulation No 17)

20. Appeals – Pleas in law – Inadequate statement of reasons – Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice – Taking into consideration of the facts found by the Court of First Instance – Included

(EC Treaty, Art. 190 (now Art. 253 EC))

21. Acts of the institutions – Statement of reasons – Obligation – Scope – Decisions – Remedy of a failure to state reasons during the administrative procedure – Not permissible

(EC Treaty, Art. 190 (now Art. 253 EC))

Summary

1. Even where a request for the examination of witnesses, made in the application, states precisely about what facts and for what reasons the witness or witnesses should be examined, it falls to the Court of First Instance to assess the relevance of the application to the subject-matter of the dispute and the need to examine the witnesses named.

The existence of a discretion in that regard on the part of the Court of First Instance cannot be challenged on the basis of the general principle of Community law inspired by Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides that everyone is entitled to a fair hearing, and, more particularly, the principle laid down in paragraph 3(d) of that article, which provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf on the same conditions as witnesses against him, a principle that constitutes a particular aspect of the right to a fair hearing.

In practice, that latter provision does not confer on the accused an absolute right to obtain the attendance of witnesses before a court and it is in principle for the national court to determine whether it is necessary or appropriate to call a witness.

Article 6(3) of that Convention does not therefore require that every witness be called but is aimed at full equality of arms, ensuring that the procedure in issue, considered in its entirety, gave the accused an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge the suspicions concerning him.

(see paras 68-71)

2. It follows from Article 44(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance that the essential facts and law on which an application is based must be apparent from the text of the application itself, even if only stated briefly, and that a reference in the application to such elements in an annex to the application is therefore not sufficient.

Likewise, it is not for the Court of First Instance to seek and identify in the annexes the pleas and arguments on which it may consider the action to be based, since the annexes have a purely evidential and ancillary purpose.

(see paras 94, 97, 100)

3. In the field of competition law, the concept of an undertaking covers any entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal status and the way in which it is financed. It does not require that the economic unit concerned have legal personality.

(see paras 112-113)

4. The anti-competitive conduct of an undertaking can be attributed to another undertaking where it has not decided independently upon its own conduct on the market but carried out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by that other undertaking, having regard in particular to the economic and legal links between them.

In that regard, the fact that the share capital of two separate commercial companies is held by the same person or the same family is insufficient, in itself, to establish that those companies are a single economic unit with the result that, under Community competition law, the actions of one company can be attributed to the other and that one can be held liable to pay the fine for the other.

(see paras 117-118)

5. It is sufficient for the Commission to show that an undertaking participated in meetings at which anti-competitive agreements were concluded, without manifestly opposing them, to prove to the requisite standard that the undertaking participated in the cartel. Where participation in such meetings has been established, it is for that undertaking to put forward evidence to establish that its participation in those meetings was without any anti-competitive intention by demonstrating that it had indicated to its competitors that it was participating in those meetings in a spirit that was different from theirs.

In that regard, a party which tacitly approves of an unlawful initiative, without publicly distancing itself from its content or reporting it to the administrative authorities, effectively encourages the continuation of the infringement and compromises its discovery. That complicity constitutes a passive mode of participation in the infringement which is therefore capable of rendering the undertaking liable in the context of a single agreement.

Nor is the fact that an undertaking does not act on the outcome of a meeting having an anti-competitive object such as to relieve it of responsibility for the fact of its participation in a cartel, unless it has publicly distanced itself from what was agreed in the meeting.

(see paras 142-144)

6. For the purposes of applying Article 85(1) of the Treaty (now Article 81(1) EC), it is sufficient that the object of an agreement should be to restrict, prevent or distort competition irrespective of the actual effects of that agreement. Consequently, in the case of agreements reached at meetings of competing undertakings, that provision is infringed where those meetings have such an object and are thus intended to organise artificially the operation of the market. In such a case, the liability of a particular undertaking in respect of the infringement is properly established where it participated in those meetings with knowledge of their object, even if it did not proceed to implement any of the measures agreed at those meetings.

The fact of the participation in the cartel of dominant or particularly powerful undertakings in a position to take retaliatory measures against other, much less powerful, participants should the latter publicly distance themselves from what was decided at meetings having an anti-competitive object, the greater or lesser degree of regular participation by the undertaking concerned in the meetings and of completeness of its implementation of the measures agreed are relevant not to the establishment of its liability but rather to the extent of that liability and thus to the severity of the penalty.

(see paras 145, 150)

7. To allow a party to put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea in law which it has not raised before the Court of First Instance would mean allowing that party to bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a wider case than that heard by the Court of First Instance. In an appeal the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is thus confined to examining the assessment by the Court of First Instance of the pleas argued before it.

(see para. 165)

8. The fact that the Commission, in the past, imposed fines of a certain level for certain types of infringement does not mean that it is estopped from raising that level within the limits indicated in Regulation No 17 if that is necessary to ensure the implementation of Community competition policy; on the contrary, the proper application of the Community competition rules requires that the Commission may at any time adjust the level of fines to the needs of that policy.

The supervisory task conferred on the Commission by Articles 85(1) and 86 of the EC Treaty (now Articles 81(1) EC and 82 EC) not only includes the duty to investigate and punish individual infringements but also encompasses the duty to pursue a general policy designed to apply, in competition matters, the principles laid down by the Treaty and to guide the conduct of undertaki ngs in the light of those principles.

(see paras 169-170, 227)

9. Traders cannot have a legitimate expectation that an existing situation which is capable of being altered by the Commission in the exercise of its discretionary power will be maintained. That principle clearly applies in the field of competition policy, which is characterised by a wide discretion on the part of the Commission, in particular as regards the determination of the amount of fines.

Undertakings involved in an administrative procedure in which fines may be imposed cannot therefore acquire a legitimate expectation in the fact that the Commission will not exceed the level of fines previously imposed. It follows that a legitimate expectation cannot be based on a method of calculating fines either.

Furthermore, the legitimate expectation that traders are able to derive from the Leniency Notice is limited to an assurance that their fines will be reduced by a certain percentage, but does not extend to the method of calculating fines or, a fortiori , to a specific level of the fine capable of being calculated at the time when the trader decides to implement his intention to cooperate with the Commission.

(see paras 171-173, 187-188, 228)

10. As regards the determination of the amount of the fine to be imposed for infringement of the competition rules, the mere fact that the Commission, in its previous practice when taking decisions, granted a certain rate of reduction for specific conduct does not mean that it is required to grant the same proportionate reduction when assessing similar conduct in a subsequent administrative procedure.

(see para. 192)

11. The principle of non-retroactivity of criminal laws, enshrined in Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights as a fundamental right, constitutes a general principle of Community law which must be observed when fines are imposed for infringement of the competition rules and requires that the penalties imposed correspond with those fixed at the time when the infringement was committed.

The concept of ‘law’ (‘ droit ’) for the purposes of Article 7(1) corresponds to ‘law’ (‘ loi ’) used in other provisions of that Convention and encompasses both law of legislative origin and that deriving from case-law. Although that provision, which enshrines in particular the principle that offences and punishments are to be strictly defined by law ( nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege ), cannot be interpreted as prohibiting the gradual clarification of the rules of criminal liability, it may preclude the retroactive application of a new interpretation of a rule establishing an offence. That is particularly true of a judicial interpretation which produces a result which was not reasonably foreseeable at the time when the offence was committed, especially in the light of the interpretation put on the provision in the case-law at the material time.

Like that case-law on new developments in case-law, a change in an enforcement policy, in this instance the Commission’s general competition policy in the matter of fines, especially where it comes about as a result of the adoption of rules of conduct such as the Guidelines adopted by the Commission on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty, may have an impact from the aspect of the principle of non-retroactivity. Having particular regard to their legal effects and to their general application, such rules of conduct come, in principle, within the concept of ‘law’ for the purposes of Article 7(1) of the Convention.

In order to ensure that the principle of non-retroactivity was observed, it is necessary to ascertain whether the change in question was reasonably foreseeable at the time when the infringements concerned were committed. In that regard, the scope of the notion of foreseeability depends to a considerable degree on the content of the text in issue, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed. A law may still satisfy the requirement of foreseeability even if the person concerned has to take appropriate legal advice to assess, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. This is particularly true in relation to persons carrying on a professional activity, who are used to having to proceed with a high degree of caution when pursuing their occupation. They can on this account be expected to take special care in assessing the risks that such an activity entails.

Having regard to the fact that the proper application of the Community competition rules requires that the Commission may at any time, within the limits indicated in Regulation No 17, adjust the level of fines to the needs of Community competition policy and, accordingly, that it may raise the level of the amount of fines by reference to that applied in the past, not only by raising the level of the amount of fines in imposing fines in individual decisions, but also by raising it by the application, in particular cases, of rules of conduct of general application, such as the Guidelines, it follows that those Guidelines and, in particular, the new method of calculating fines contained therein, on the assumption that it has the effect of increasing the level of the fines imposed, were reasonably foreseeable for undertakings at the time when the infringements were committed, before those Guidelines were adopted.

(see paras 202, 216-219, 222-224, 227-231)

12. In adopting rules of conduct designed to produce external effects, as is the case of the Guidelines, which are aimed at traders, and in announcing by publishing them that they will henceforth apply to the cases to which they relate, the institution in question imposes a limit on the exercise of its discretion and cannot depart from those rules under pain of being found, where appropriate, to be in breach of the general principles of law, such as equal treatment or the protection of legitimate expectations. It cannot therefore be precluded that, on certain conditions and depending on their content, such rules of conduct, which are of general application, may produce legal effects.

In that regard, even though the Guidelines adopted by the Commission on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty do not constitute the legal basis of the decision imposing a fine on a trader, as that decision is based on Articles 3 and 15(2) of Regulation No 17, they determine, generally and abstractly, the method which the Commission has bound itself to use in assessing the fines imposed by the decision and, consequently, ensure legal certainty on the part of the undertakings.

(see paras 210-213)

13. The gravity of the infringements must be assessed in the light of numerous factors, such as the particular circumstances of the case, its context and the dissuasive effect of fines, although no binding or exhaustive list of the criteria to be applied has been drawn up.

The factors capable of affecting the assessment of the gravity of the infringements include the conduct of each of the undertakings, the role played by each of them in the establishment of the concerted practices, the profit which they were able to derive from those practices, their size, the value of the goods concerned and the threat that infringements of that type pose to the objectives of the Community.

It follows that, on the one hand, it is permissible, for the purpose of fixing the amount of the fine, to have regard both to the total turnover of the undertaking, which gives an indication, albeit approximate and imperfect, of the size of the undertaking and of its economic power, and to the proportion of that turnover accounted for by the goods in respect of which the infringement was committed, which gives an indication of the scale of the infringement. On the other hand, it follows that it is important not to confer on one or the other of those figures an importance disproportionate in relation to the other factors and, consequently, that the fixing of an appropriate fine cannot be the result of a simple calculation based on the total turnover. That is particularly the case where the goods concerned account for only a small part of that figure.

(see paras 241-243, 257, 292, 312)

14. In the context of an appeal the purpose of review by the Court of Justice is, first, to examine to what extent the Court of First Instance took into consideration, in a legally correct manner, all the essential factors to assess the gravity of particular conduct in the light of Article 85 of the Treaty (now Article 81 EC) and Article 15 of Regulation No 17 and, second, to consider whether the Court of First Instance responded to a sufficient legal standard to all the arguments raised by the appellant with a view to having the fine cancelled or reduced.

On the other hand, it is not for the Court of Justice, when ruling on questions of law in the context of an appeal, to substitute, on grounds of fairness, its own assessment for that of the Court of First Instance exercising its unlimited jurisdiction to rule on the amount of fines imposed on undertakings for infringements of Community law.

(see paras 244-245, 303)

15. In setting out in the Guidelines the method which it proposed to apply when calculating fines imposed under Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17, the Commission remained within the legal framework laid down by that provision and did not exceed the discretion conferred on it by the legislature.

Although that method marks a departure from the Commission’s previous practice, which placed more emphasis on the turnover of the undertakings on which fines were imposed, it does not contravene the provisions of that article, as interpreted in the case-law, which do not in any way require that fines be calculated on amounts based on the turnover of the undertakings concerned. On the contrary, by envisaging that numerous factors will be taken into account in assessing the gravity of the infringement fine, including in particular the profits secured by the infringement or the need to ensure the deterrent effect of the fines, while not precluding the taking into account of turnover, and therefore by introducing flexibility, it allows the Commission to exercise its discretion in full conformity with those provisions.

(see paras 252, 254, 258, 260-261, 267)

16. The upper limit of the amount of the fine referred to in Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 must be understood to mean that the amount of the fine ultimately imposed on an undertaking cannot exceed that limit. That provision therefore does not prohibit the Commission from referring, for the purposes of its calculation, to an intermediate amount in excess of that limit. Nor does it preclude intermediate calculations which take the gravity and the duration of the infringement from being carried out on an amount higher than that limit. Where it turns out, following the calculation, that the final amount of the fine must be reduced by the amount by which it exceeds the upper limit, the fact that certain factors such as the gravity and duration of the infringement are not actually reflected in the amount of the fine imposed is merely a consequence of the application of that upper limit to the final amount.

That upper limit seeks to prevent fines being imposed which it is foreseeable that the undertakings, owing to their size, as determined, albeit approximately and imperfectly, by their total turnover, will not be able to pay. That limit is therefore one which is uniformly applicable to all undertakings and arrived at according to the size of each of them and seeks to ensure that the fines are not excessive or disproportionate. That upper limit thus has a distinct and autonomous objective by comparison with the criteria of gravity and duration of the infringement. The only possible consequence of the upper limit is that the amount of the fine calculated on the basis of those criteria will be reduced to the maximum permitted level. Its application implies that the undertaking concerned will not pay the fine which in principle would be payable if it were assessed on the basis of those criteria.

(see paras 277-283, 323)

17. The Commission is not required, when determining the amount of the fine, to take into account the poor financial situation of an undertaking, since recognition of such an obligation would be tantamount to giving an unjustified competitive advantage to undertakings least well adapted to the market conditions.

(see para. 327)

18. The Commission has a discretion to find that information provided by an undertaking and capable, in principle, of coming within situations permitting a reduction in the fine under Section D, point 2, of the Leniency Notice does not necessarily have to induce it to grant the undertaking a reduction under that notice.

Furthermore, a reduction under the Leniency Notice can be justified only where the information provided and, more generally, the conduct of the undertaking concerned might be considered to demonstrate genuine cooperation on its part. It is clear from the very concept of cooperation, as described in the Leniency Notice, and in particular in the introduction and Section D, point 1, that it is only where the conduct of the undertaking concerned reveals such a spirit of cooperation that a reduction may be granted on the basis of that notice.

Accordingly, an undertaking which has provided incomplete and in part inaccurate information could not claim that its conduct had been of that type.

(see paras 393-397)

19. Provided that the Commission indicates expressly in the statement of objections that it will consider whether it is appropriate to impose fines on the undertakings concerned and that it sets out the principal elements of fact and of law that may give rise to a fine, such as the gravity and the duration of the alleged infringement and the fact that it has been committed ‘intentionally or negligently’, it fulfils its obligation to respect the undertakings’ right to be heard. In doing so, it provides them with the necessary elements to defend themselves not only against a finding of infringement but also against the fact of being fined.

However, to give indications of the level of the contemplated fines, when the undertakings have not been in a position to put forward their observations on the objections held against them, would be tantamount to anticipate inappropriately the Commission’s decision.

Nor, likewise, is the Commission required to indicate in the statement of objections the possibility that it might change its policy as regards the level of the amount of the fines, a possibility which depends on general competition policy considerations with no direct bearing on the particular circumstances of the cases in question.

(see paras 428, 434-435)

20. The question of the extent of the obligation to state reasons is a question of law reviewable by the Court on appeal, since a review of the legality of a decision carried out in that context must necessarily take into consideration the facts on which the Court of First Instance based itself in reaching its conclusion as to the adequacy or inadequacy of the statement of reasons.

(see para. 453)

21. The purpose of the obligation to state reasons is to enable the Court to review the legality of the decision and to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the decision is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested.

The statement of reasons must therefore, in principle, be notified to the person concerned at the same time as the decision adversely affecting him and a failure to state the reasons cannot be remedied by the fact that the person concerned learns the reasons for the decision during the proceedings before the Court.

(see paras 462-463)