IV —

I now come to the questions referred by the President of the Trieste Tribunal which concern the direct and immediate applicability, in the legal order of Member States, of the disputed provisions in Regulations Nos 19/62 and 120/67. The very wording of Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome makes it abundantly clear that Community regulations as such are binding in their entirety and directly applicable in all Member States; in addition, the regulations, by reason of their character and function in the system of sources of Community law, are capable of conferring rights on private parties which national courts have a duty to acknowledge and protect. Lastly, mere publication of them in the Official Journal of the Communities brings them into force on the date specified in them or, in the absence thereof, as determined by the Treaty. Of course, not all the relevant subject matter is covered exhaustively by the detailed provisions in regulations issued by the Council or the Commission. Consequently Member States are requested in certain cases, quite naturally, to undertake themselves some of the implementing measures, e.g. to decide which internal bodies shall be competent in matters relating to the organization of the agricultural markets. This was exactly what was done by Article 23 of Regulation No 19 when it allowed for action to be taken on a national level to ensure effective implementation of the provisions of the Regulation. On the other hand Member States are certainly not empowered to adopt any measure, even a legislative one, which does not merely complement a Community regulation, but alters, or even conflicts with it. Finally, the regulations have direct effect — thus mere reiteration of their provisions in the country's internal legislation is a pointless exercise. The technique of ‘reproducing’ Community law in a country's internal legislation, or even the procedure of ‘reception’ of Community law into the domestic laws of a country is not only superfluous but also, according to previous decisions, detrimental, for resort to such procedures can create ambiquity both as to the legal character of the provisions to be applied, and as to the date of their entry into force. That was very clearly stated by the Court in its judgment of 7 February 1973 (Case 39/72, Commission v Italian Republic), in particular when it drew attention to the fact that any method of implementation which could impede the direct effectiveness of Community regulations and thus prejudice the simultaneous and uniform application of them throughout the Community was contrary to the Treaty. Similarly, by using the technique of reproduction of Community regulations, no national legislator can possibly relieve his country's courts of their obligation to apply Community law, unless they seek an interpretation — should they think it necessary — from this Court. That is also a consequence of the principle, repeatedly confirmed, that the enforceability of Community law cannot change from one country to another in tune with their national laws, even those passed subsequently, without jeopardizing the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty. Indeed, by transferring some of their powers to the Community institutions, Member States accepted a restriction of their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act, incompatible with the essential concept of the Community, cannot prevail, (judgment of 15 July 1964, Case 6/64, Costa v Enel, Rec. 1964). The reply to be given to the President of the Trieste Tribunal, then, based on the above principles, is that Article 20 (1) of Regulation No 19 and Article 18 (2) of Regulation No 120/67, being regulations within the meaning of Article 189 of the Treaty which are directly applicable in their entirety, in the sense that their entry into force is not conditional on subsequent adoption of Community implementing provisions, nor even, in this instance, of national legislative provisions, bound every Member State not to impose any longer any customs duties or charges having equivalent effect and, correspondingly, created a right for the individual to withhold payment of any such charges.