ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo (Spain) lodged on 7 May 2021 — Confederación Nacional de Autoescuelas (CNAE) and Others v Asociación para la Defensa de los Intereses Comunes de las Autoescuelas (AUDICA) and Others

(Case C-292/21)

(2021/C 329/10)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Supremo

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Administración General del Estado, Confederación Nacional de Autoescuelas (CNAE), UTE CNAE-ITT-FORMASTER-ECT

Defendants: Asociación para la Defensa de los Intereses Comunes de las Autoescuelas (AUDICA), Ministerio Fiscal

Question referred

Is a national provision pursuant to which contracts for the provision of road safety awareness and training courses for the purposes of the recovery of driving licence points must be awarded by means of a public service concession compatible with Directive 2006/123/EC, (1) or, as the case may be, with other provisions or principles of European Union law?

(1) Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 36).
4.

Alternatively, and in the context of the scope of application of EU law, do Article 6[(1)](e) of the General Data Protection Regulation and the principle of proportionality enshrined in recitals 4 and 129 thereof preclude — in the holding of municipal elections and elections to the European Parliament — national rules implementing that regulation, such as those at issue, which preclude and restrict from the outset the possibility of carrying out any video recording during the determination of the election results at polling stations, do not differentiate and regulate individual elements of the recording process or even allow for such differentiation and regulation, and preclude the possibility of achieving the objectives of the regulation — the protection of personal data of individuals — by other means?
3.

Does the principle of the rule of law, in the form of effective judicial protection and the equivalence of remedies, preclude national legislation which: (a) prevents any judicial review of the correct application of the ESA 2010 by ISTAT for the purpose of defining the scope of sector S.13 and thus the accuracy, transparency and reliability of budgetary balances, as a means of verifying Italy’s convergence towards the MTO (infringement of the principle of effective protection)? (b) exposes the applicant — should the defendant’s interpretation of the rule be deemed correct, whether by a law governing its authentic interpretation or otherwise — to the burden of two separate legal challenges and the consequent risks of conflicting rulings as to the existence of a legal status under [EU] law, making impossible the effective protection of its right within the time allowed for fulfilment of the ensuing obligations (in other words, the financial year) and undermining the legal certainty as to the existence of general government status? (c) provides that — should the defendant authority’s interpretation of the rule be deemed correct, whether by a law governing its authentic interpretation or otherwise — the correct definition of the budgetary scope should be determined by a different court to that which has jurisdiction in matters of budgetary law under the Italian Constitution?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 4 June 2021 — Criminal proceedings against HYA and Others

(Case C-349/21)

(2021/C 338/15)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad

Parties to the main proceedings

HYA and Others

Questions referred

Is a practice of national courts in criminal proceedings whereby the court authorises the interception, recording and storage of telephone conversations of suspects by means of a pre-drafted, generic text template in which it is merely asserted, without any individualisation, that the statutory provisions have been complied with compatible with Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, (1) read in conjunction with Article 5(1) and recital 11 thereof?

If not, is it contrary to EU law if the national law is interpreted as meaning that information obtained as a result of such authorisation is used to prove the charges brought?

(1) Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) (OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37, Special edition in Bulgarian: Chapter 13 Volume 036 P. 63).
1.

Must Article 28(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, (1) read in the light of the right to effective judicial protection, be interpreted as meaning: — that a person who has been surrendered to the issuing Member State and in respect of whom a third Member State has subsequently issued an EAW for offences committed prior to that surrender, must be able to exercise his or her right to be heard in relation to the request for consent for subsequent surrender, as referred to in Article 28(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, in the issuing Member State before a judicial authority of that Member State during the proceedings on the execution of the EAW issued by the third Member State; or — that that person must be able to exercise his right to be heard in the Member State which previously surrendered him to the executing judicial authority during the proceedings on the giving of consent for subsequent surrender?
4.

When verifying the compliance of the qualified electronic signature with the requirements of Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC, does the fact that the names of the holder of the electronic signature are, instead of being indicated in Cyrillic script as used by the person to identify himself or herself, rather indicated in Latin script constitute an infringement of that regulation, leading to the conclusion that there is no qualified electronic signature?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 16 July 2021 by Ryanair DAC against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 19 May 2021 in Case T-628/20, Ryanair v Commission (Spain; Covid-19)

(Case C-441/21 P)

(2021/C 382/24)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Ryanair DAC (represented by: V. Blanc, E. Vahida and F.-C. Laprévote, avocats, S. Rating, abogado, and I. G. Metaxas-Maranghidis, dikigoros)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Kingdom of Spain, French Republic

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— declare in accordance with Articles 263 TFEU and 264 TFEU that Commission Decision C(2020) 5414 final of 31 July 2020 on State Aid SA.57659 (2020/N) — Spain — COVID-19 — Recapitalisation fund is void; and

— order the Commission to bear its own costs and pay those incurrent by Ryanair, and order the interveners at first instance and in this appeal (if any) to bear their own costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the appellant relies on six pleas in law.

First plea in law: the General Court erred in law in rejecting the appellant’s claim that the non-discrimination principle has been unjustifiably violated.

Second plea in law: the General Court erred in law and manifestly distorted the facts regarding the appellant’s claim on the infringement of the freedom of establishment and the free provision of services.

Third plea in law: the General Court erred in law and manifestly distorted the facts in rejecting the appellant’s plea concerning the misapplication of the balancing test.

Fourth plea in law: the General Court erred in law and committed a manifest error of assessment in the classification of the aid as an aid scheme.

Fifth plea in law: the General Court erred in law and manifestly distorted the facts regarding the Commission’s failure to open a formal investigation procedure.

Sixth plea in law: the General Court erred in law and manifestly distorted the facts regarding the Commission’s failure to state reasons.
1.

Must Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (1) be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘matters relating to a contract’, within the meaning of that provision, covers an action for compensation brought on the basis of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, (2) by a collection agency, a third party to the contract of carriage by air, which relies on its status as assignee of the claim, even though that agency does not demonstrate that it is the successor to all the initial contracting party’s rights and obligations?
3.

Does the obligation to provide a special corrective appliance, provided for by Article 9 of Council Directive 90/270/EEC, refer exclusively to the acquisition of the appliance by the employer, or may it be interpreted more broadly, namely to include an obligation upon the employer to reimburse the costs incurred by the worker in purchasing the appliance him or herself?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 30 July 2021 — Comune di Venezia v Telecom Italia SpA, Infrastrutture Wireless Italiane SpA — Inwit SpA

(Case C-467/21)

(2021/C 422/10)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Comune di Venezia

Respondents: Telecom Italia SpA, Infrastrutture Wireless Italiane SpA — Inwit SpA

Question referred

Does EU law preclude a provision of national legislation (such as Article 8(6) of legge 22 febbraio 2001, n. 36 (Law No 36 of 22 February 2001)), which is understood and applied as allowing individual local authorities to define siting criteria for mobile telephone apparatus, which may be expressed in the form of prohibitions, such as a prohibition on placing antennae in specific areas or within a certain distance of a certain type of building?
2.

Having regard to the potential impact on the livelihood of a Master as a consequence of an automatic mandatory forfeiture of all catch and gear, can a provision of national law such as section 28(5)(b) (2) which does not allow for a national court to examine any impact on the right to earn a livelihood of a person convicted on indictment of an offence contrary to that section and the Regulation (save in the context of considering what fine might be appropriate) be considered compatible with the terms of the Regulation, the Charter and EU law, having regard to the fundamental right of the Master to exercise his or her profession?
4.

Is the term ‘information’ which, pursuant to the third sentence of Article 15(3) of the GDPR, ‘where the data subject makes the request by electronic means, and unless otherwise requested by the data subject, […] shall be provided in a commonly used electronic form’, to be interpreted as referring solely to the ‘personal data undergoing processing’ mentioned in the first sentence of Article 15(3) of the GDPR? a. If Question 4 is answered in the negative: Is the term ‘information’ which, pursuant to the third sentence of Article 15(3) of the GDPR, ‘where the data subject makes the request by electronic means, and unless otherwise requested by the data subject, […] shall be provided in a commonly used electronic form’ to be interpreted as also referring to the information pursuant to Article 15(1)(a) to (h) of the GDPR? b. If Question 4a also is answered in the negative: Is the term ‘information’ which, pursuant to the third sentence of Article 15(3) of the GDPR, ‘where the data subject makes the request by electronic means, and unless otherwise requested by the data subject, […] shall be provided in a commonly used electronic form’ to be interpreted as referring, beyond the ‘personal data undergoing processing’ and the information pursuant to Article 15(1)(a) to (h) of the GDPR, to associated metadata, for example?
2.

If Questions 1(a) and 1(b) are answered in the affirmative, is Article 15(3) and (1) of Directive (EU) 2016/680 consistent with the right to an effective judicial remedy under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2) even though it would thus be impossible for the court (a) to join to the proceedings, in accordance with national procedural rules, in a multi-stage administrative procedure, the other authority which is involved and is actually responsible and which must give its consent to the provision of access to data; and (b) substantively to verify whether the conditions for the refusal of access are met and have been correctly applied by the authority refusing access?
10.

May Article 101(1) TFEU be interpreted as meaning that the mere fact that an association agreement, concluded between an undertaking engaged in the marketing of electricity and an undertaking engaged in the retail sale of food and non-food products for household consumption for the purposes of the cross-promotion of their respective activities (in which, inter alia, the first undertaking grants to its customers discounts on their electricity consumption which the second undertaking deducts from the price of the purchases made by such customers in its retail outlets), contains a clause whereby both parties undertake not to compete with each other or to conclude similar agreements with each other’s competitors, means that the purpose of that clause is to restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU, even if: — the temporal scope of the clause in question (one-year term of the agreement plus one year) coincides with the period, laid down in the same agreement, during which the parties are not authorised to use business secrets or know-how acquired in the course of implementing their association in projects with third parties; — the geographical scope of the clause is confined to the geographical scope of the agreement; — the subjective scope of the clause is confined to the parties to the agreement, to undertakings in whose capital they hold a majority interest and to other undertakings in the same group which also own or operate retail sales outlets falling within the scope of that agreement; — the subjective scope of the clause excludes the vast majority of the companies belonging to the same economic group as the parties, which, in consequence, are not bound by the clause and may compete with the other party to the agreement during and after the term of that agreement; — the undertakings subject to the non-competition clause are present on completely separate product markets, and it has not been shown that, at the time when the agreement was concluded, they had pursued any projects or plans, made any investments or taken any other steps with a view to entering the other party’s market?
2.

If the first question is answered in the negative, must Articles 33 and 36 of Council Regulation No 44/2001 be interpreted as meaning that an action such as a claim of unfair dismissal in the United Kingdom has the same cause of action and the same subject matter as an action such as a claim of dismissal without actual and serious cause in French law, so that the employee’s claims for damages for dismissal without actual and serious cause, compensation in lieu of notice, and compensation for dismissal before the French courts are inadmissible after the employee has obtained a decision in the United Kingdom declaring that there has been an unfair dismissal and making a compensatory award in that respect? Is it necessary in that regard to distinguish between, on the one hand, the damages for dismissal without actual and serious cause that might have the same cause of action and the same subject matter as the compensatory award and, on the other, the compensation for dismissal and compensation in lieu of notice which, in French law, are payable where the dismissal is based on an actual and serious cause, but are not payable in the event of dismissal based on serious misconduct?
2.

Is the term ‘communication to the public’ in Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 to be interpreted as meaning that such communication is carried out by a commercial provider of a complete (on-premises) IPTV solution, in the context of which it provides, in addition to software and hardware for receiving TV programmes via the internet, technical support and makes adjustments to the service on an ongoing basis, but that service is operated entirely on the customer’s infrastructure, if the service provides the user with access not only to broadcasting content whose online use has been authorised by the respective rightholders, but also to protected content for which rights clearance has not been obtained, and the provider (a) can influence which TV programmes can be received by the end user via the service, (b) is aware that its service also enables the reception of protected broadcasting content without the consent of the rightholders, but (c) does not advertise that possibility of unauthorised use of its service, thereby creating a major incentive to purchase the product, but rather advises its customers at the time of conclusion of the contract that they must take care of the granting of rights on their own responsibility, and (d) does not provide, through its activity, special access to broadcasting content which, in the absence of its intervention, could not be received or could be received only with difficulty?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Germany) lodged on 21 July 2021 — X-FAB Dresden GmbH & Co. KG v FC

(Case C-453/21)

(2021/C 490/16)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesarbeitsgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Defendant, appellant in first appeal and appellant on a point of law: X-FAB Dresden GmbH & Co. KG

Applicant, respondent in first appeal and respondent in the appeal on a point of law: FC

Questions referred

1. Is the second sentence of Article 38(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (1) (General Data Protection Regulation; ‘the GDPR’) to be interpreted as precluding a provision in national law, such as, in the present case, Paragraph 38(1) and (2) in conjunction with the first sentence of Paragraph 6(4) of the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (Federal Law on data protection; ‘the BDSG’), which makes dismissal of the data protection officer by the controller, who is his employer, subject to the conditions set out therein, irrespective of whether such dismissal relates to the performance of his tasks? If the first question is answered in the affirmative:

2. Does the second sentence of Article 38(3) of the GDPR also preclude such a provision in national law if the designation of the data protection officer is mandatory not in accordance with Article 37(1) of the GDPR, but only in accordance with the law of the Member State? If the first question is answered in the affirmative:

3. Does the second sentence of Article 38(3) of the GDPR have sufficient legal basis, in particular in so far as it covers data protection officers that have an employment relationship with the controller? If the first question is answered in the negative:

4. Is there a conflict of interests within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 38(6) of the GDPR if the data protection officer also holds the office of chairman of the works council established at the controlling body? Must specific tasks have been assigned within the works council in order for such a conflict of interests to be assumed to exist?

(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ 2016 L 119, p. 1).
1.

Must the expression ‘the commission lost by the commercial agent,’ within the meaning of Article 17(2)(a), second indent, of Council Directive 86/653/EEC (1) of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents, be interpreted to the effect that such commissions include commissions for the conclusion of contracts which a commercial agent would have entered into had the commercial agency [contract] endured, with the customers that he or she brought the principal or with which he or she significantly increased the volume of business?
3.

Is national legislation and its interpretation in line with Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/104 and/or with Article 102 TFEU and with the principle of effectiveness if it links ‘knowledge of the fact that harm was caused’ — relevant to the commencement of the subjective limitation period — to the awareness of the injured party ‘of individual partial [occurrences of] harm’, which occur over time in the course of continuous or continuing anticompetitive conduct (as case-law is based on the assumption that the claim in question for compensation in respect of harm is, in its entirety, divisible) and in relation to which separate subjective limitation periods start to run regardless of the knowledge of the injured party of the full extent of the harm caused by the entire infringement of Article 102 TFEU, that is, national legislation and its interpretation that allow the limitation period for a claim for compensation in respect of harm caused by anti-competitive conduct to begin to run before the point at which ceased that conduct consisting of more favourable placement and display of one’s own price comparison engine in breach of Article 102 TFEU?
3.

Are Article 3(1) and Article 4 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 to be interpreted as precluding a clause which provides that accelerated repayment of a loan may be triggered in the event of a delay in payment of over 30 days, when national law, which requires a formal written demand to be sent before the accelerated repayment of the loan, permits the parties to dispense with that step, in which case reasonable notice is required?
2.

Do Articles 23(1) and 46(1) to (3) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (1) preclude a national administrative practice according to which, as a general rule, the authority provides the asylum seeker’s legal representative and the court with only an extract taken from an electronic document management system and containing an incomplete, unstructured and non-chronological collection of electronic PDF files, whereby the latter do not have a structure or set out the sequence of events in chronological order, let alone reflect the complete content of the electronic file.