ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Case C‑226/16

Eni SpA and Others

v

Premier ministre and Ministre de l’Environnement, de l’Énergie and de la Mer

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France))

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Energy — Gas industry — Security of gas supply — Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 — Obligation of natural gas undertakings to take measures to safeguard the supply of gas to protected customers — Point 1 of the second paragraph of Article 2 — Definition of ‘protected customers’ — Article 8(2) — Additional obligation — Article 8(5) — Possibility for natural gas undertakings of fulfilling their obligation at regional level or at Union level — National legislation imposing on gas suppliers an additional gas storage obligation, the scope of which includes customers who are not protected customers within the meaning of Regulation No 994/2010 — Obligation to be fulfilled, as regards 80% of the gas stored, on the territory of the Member State concerned)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 20 December 2017

Energy—Security of natural gas supply—Regulation No 994/2010—Obligation of natural gas suppliers to take measures to safeguard the supply of gas to protected customers—Scope—National legislation imposing on gas suppliers an additional gas storage obligation to safeguard the supply of gas to other types of customers—Lawfulness—Condition (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 994/2010, Arts 2, second para., point 1, and 8(2)) Energy—Security of natural gas supply—Regulation No 994/2010—Obligation of natural gas suppliers to hold gas stocks in order to guarantee security of supply in the event of crisis—Scope—National legislation requiring suppliers to fulfil that obligation exclusively through infrastructure situated within the territory of the Member State—Unlawful (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 994/2010, Art. 8(5))
Article 118m(2)(a)(ii) of Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation), as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 491/2009 of 25 May 2009, and Article 103(2)(a)(ii) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 October 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 are to be interpreted as meaning that the scope of those provisions covers a situation where a protected designation of origin, such as ‘Champagne’, is used as part of the name under which a foodstuff is sold, such as ‘Champagner Sorbet’, and where that foodstuff does not correspond to the product specifications for that protected designation of origin but contains an ingredient which does correspond to those specifications.

Article 118m(2)(a)(ii) of Regulation No 1234/2007, as amended by Regulation No 491/2009, and Article 103(2)(a)(ii) of Regulation No 1308/2013 are to be interpreted as meaning that the use of a protected designation of origin as part of the name under which is sold a foodstuff that does not correspond to the product specifications for that protected designation of origin but contains an ingredient that does correspond to those specifications, such as ‘Champagner Sorbet’, constitutes exploitation of the reputation of a protected designation of origin, within the meaning of those provisions, if that foodstuff does not have, as one of its essential characteristics, a taste attributable primarily to the presence of that ingredient in the composition of the foodstuff.

In that regard, it must be concluded that the use of a PDO as part of the name under which is sold a foodstuff that does not correspond to the product specifications for that PDO but contains an ingredient which does correspond to those specifications is intended to take unfair advantage of the reputation of the PDO if that ingredient does not confer on that foodstuff one of its essential characteristics. As to whether the ingredient in question confers on the foodstuff concerned one of its essential characteristics, the quantity of that ingredient in the overall composition of the foodstuff is a significant but not, in itself, a sufficient factor. Where the name of the foodstuff indicates, as in the main proceedings, that it contains an ingredient protected by a PDO, which is intended to convey the taste of the foodstuff, the taste imparted by that ingredient must constitute the essential characteristic of that foodstuff.

(see paras 50-53, operative part 2)
Regarding the amount and the form of the lump sum payment to be imposed on a Member State for failure to comply with a judgment of the Court establishing a failure to comply with Directive 91/271 concerning urban waste-water treatment, it should be borne in mind, concerning the seriousness of the infringement, that that directive is intended to protect the environment. A lack or shortage of urban waste water treatment plants is likely to harm the environment and must be regarded as particularly serious. It is also necessary to cite as an aggravating circumstance the fact that the judgment has not yet been fully complied with, which is equivalent to a delay of almost 20 years, in so far as the obligation to ensure that the secondary treatment of the urban waste water in the Member State concerned should have been fulfilled on 31 December 1998 at the latest. Accordingly, the Court cannot but confirm the particularly lengthy character of an infringement which, in the light of the objective mentioned above, is also a matter of indisputable gravity.

However, in so far as the situation in that Member State has improved compared to that prevailing when the infringement proceedings which gave rise to the judgment finding a failure to fulfil obligations were brought and the extent of the damage to human health and the environment depends on the number of sites affected by the infringement, that damage is therefore less extensive than the damage to human health and the environment caused by the initial failure. In addition, it must be considered to be a mitigating factor that the area concerned of that Member State is home to an important archaeological heritage and that, because of archaeological excavations and the discovery of archaeological remains, the secondary network had been completed, with the exception of a part thereof.

(see paras 93, 94, 96-98)
The first paragraph of Article 3 of Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which makes it possible to exclude from compulsory insurance cover injuries and damage that result from the driving of motor vehicles on roads or terrain that are not ‘suitable for use by motor vehicles’, with the exception of roads or terrain which, although not suitable for that purpose, are nonetheless ‘ordinarily so used’.

There is, moreover, no provision in Directive 2009/103 that limits the scope of the insurance obligation, and of the protection which that obligation is intended to give to the victims of accidents caused by motor vehicles, to the use of such vehicles on certain terrain or on certain roads (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 November 2017, Rodrigues de Andrade, C‑514/16, EU:C:2017:908, paragraph 36). In this case, it is undisputed that the vehicle at issue was being used, at the time when it overturned and thereby injured Mr Núñez Torreiro, as a means of transport. Such use therefore falls within the scope of the concept of ‘use of vehicles’, within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 3 of Directive 2009/103. The fact that, as is stated in the order for reference, the vehicle at issue was being used, at the time when it overturned, in a military exercise area access to which was prohibited for all non-military vehicles and in a part of that area which was not suitable for the use of wheeled vehicles, cannot have any effect on that conclusion and cannot, therefore, limit the insurance obligation that stems from that provision.

(see paras 31-34, 36, operative part)
In the cases in the main proceedings, the legislation in question lays down a criterion relating to the sales area of the establishment which does not give rise to any direct discrimination. Nor does the evidence submitted to the Court show that that criterion disadvantages in most cases nationals from other Member States or companies whose seat is in another Member State.

A tax such as that at issue in the main proceedings imposed on large distribution establishments according, in essence, to their sales area, does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU to the extent that it exempts establishments whose sales area does not exceed 500 m2 and those whose sales area exceeds that threshold but whose basis of assessment does not exceed 2000 m2. Nor, in so far as that tax exempts establishments which pursue the business of selling machinery, vehicles, tools and industrial supplies, construction materials, plumbing materials and doors and windows, for sale only to professionals, fittings for individual, conventional and specialist establishments, and motor vehicles, as well as garden centres and service stations, does it constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, provided that those establishments do not have as significant an adverse effect on the environment and on town and country planning as the others, which it is for the referring court to ascertain.

(see para. 51, operative part 2)
Article 54(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC must be interpreted as meaning that all information relating to the supervised entity and communicated by it to the competent authority, and all statements of that authority in its supervision file, including its correspondence with other bodies, do not constitute, unconditionally, confidential information that is covered, consequently, by the obligation to maintain professional secrecy laid down in that provision. Information held by the authorities established by the Member States to perform the functions laid down by that directive that is information (i) which is not public and (ii) the disclosure of which is likely to affect adversely the interests of the natural or legal person who provided that information or of third parties, or the proper functioning of the system for monitoring the activities of investment firms that the EU legislature established in adopting Directive 2004/39, is to be so classified.

It must also be stated that Article 54 of Directive 2004/39 establishes the general rule that disclosure of confidential information held by the competent authorities is prohibited and lists exhaustively the specific cases where, exceptionally, that general prohibition does not preclude their communication or use (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 November 2014, Altmann and Others, C‑140/13, EU:C:2014:2362, paragraphs 34 and 35). It is, accordingly, not the aim of Article 54 to create a right of access that can be exercised by the public to information held by the competent authorities or to regulate in detail how any such right of access that may be recognised in some cases by national law is to be exercised. It must, last, be emphasised that, since the sole aim of Article 54(1) of Directive 2004/39 is to impose on the competent authorities the obligation to refuse, as a general rule, to disclose confidential information, within the meaning of that provision, the Member States remain free to decide to extend the protection against disclosure to the entire contents of the supervision files of the competent authorities or, conversely, to permit access to information that is in the possession of the competent authorities which is not confidential information within the meaning of that provision.

(see paras 38, 39, 44, 46, operative part 1)
Case C‑667/16

M.N.J.P.W. Nooren

and

J.M.F.D.C. Nooren

v

Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Common agricultural policy — EAFRD financing — Regulation (EC) No 1122/2009 — Support for rural development — Non-compliance with cross-compliance rules — Reductions and exclusions — Aggregation of reductions)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 6 June 2018

Agriculture — Common agricultural policy — EAFRD financing — Support for rural development — Application of reductions in the case of negligence — Application of reductions and exclusions in cases of intentional non-compliance — Finding of multiple instances of non-compliance within the same area — Aggregation of reductions — Limits

(Council Regulation No 73/2009, Arts 23 and 24; Commission Regulation No 1122/2009, Arts 70 to 72)

Articles 70 to 72 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1122/2009 of 30 November 2009 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 as regards cross-compliance, modulation and the integrated administration and control system, under the direct support schemes for farmers provided for by that Regulation, as well as for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards cross-compliance under the support scheme provided for the wine sector, read in conjunction with Articles 23 and 24 of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003, must be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, in which there have been found to be multiple instances of non-compliance within the same area, the reduction of the total amount of direct payments that have been, or are to be, granted that is applicable to instances of negligent non-compliance, on the one hand, and the reduction that is applicable to instances of intentional non-compliance, on the other hand, must be aggregated, with the total amount of reductions for one calendar year having to be fixed in compliance with the principle of proportionality and without exceeding the total amount referred to in Article 23(1) of Regulation No 73/2009.

(see para. 32, operative part)
Case C‑633/16

Ernst & Young P/S

v

Konkurrencerådet

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sø- og Handelsretten)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Control of concentrations of undertakings — Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 — Article 7(1) — Implementation of a concentration prior to notification to the European Commission and declaration of compatibility with the common market — Prohibition — Scope — Concept of ‘concentration’ — Termination of a cooperation agreement with a third party by one of the merging undertakings)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 31 May 2018

Concentrations between undertakings — Examination by the Commission — Obligation to suspend the concentration — Concept of ‘concentration’ — Implementation of a transaction contributing to the change in control of the target undertaking — Termination of a cooperation agreement with a third party by one of the merging undertakings — Precluded — To be determined by the national court

(Council Regulation No 139/2004, Art. 7(1))

Article 7(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (‘the EC Merger Regulation’) must be interpreted as meaning that a concentration is implemented only by a transaction which, in whole or in part, in fact or in law, contributes to the change in control of the target undertaking. The termination of a cooperation agreement, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, which it is for the referring court to determine, may not be regarded as bringing about the implementation of a concentration, irrespective of whether that termination has produced market effects.

(see para. 62, operative part)
As regards the condition relating to the existence of a selective advantage, interventions which, in any form whatsoever, are liable to favour undertakings directly or indirectly, or which must be regarded as economic advantages which the recipient undertaking would not have obtained under normal market conditions, are considered to be State aid. In particular, measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges included in the budget of the undertaking and which therefore, without being subsidies in the strict meaning of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect are considered to constitute aid. Article 107(1) TFEU does not distinguish between measures of State intervention by reference to their causes and their aims, but defines them in relation to their effects, and thus independently of the techniques used. If the tax measures at issue are such as to constitute State aid in favour of economic interest groupings (EIGs), where the General Court does not acknowledge that those EIGs are the beneficiaries of those measures on the ground that those entities are fiscally transparent, it will hold that they cannot be the beneficiaries of State aid solely because of their legal form and the relevant rules on the taxation of profits. The classification of a measure as ‘State aid’ cannot depend on the legal status of the undertakings concerned or the techniques used.

(see paras 36, 46)
5

The first four recitals and the ninth recital of that directive are worded as follows: ‘Whereas mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies of different Member States may be necessary in order to create within the Community conditions analogous to those of an internal market and in order thus to ensure the establishment and effective functioning of the common market; whereas such operations ought not to be hampered by restrictions, disadvantages or distortions arising in particular from the tax provisions of the Member States; whereas to that end it is necessary to introduce with respect to such operations tax rules which are neutral from the point of view of competition, in order to allow enterprises to adapt to the requirements of the common market, to increase their productivity and to improve their competitive strength at the international level; Whereas tax provisions disadvantage such operations, in comparison with those concerning companies of the same Member State; whereas it is necessary to remove such disadvantages; Whereas it is not possible to attain this objective by an extension at the Union level of the systems presently in force in the Member States, since differences between these systems tend to produce distortions; whereas only a common tax system is able to provide a satisfactory solution in this respect; Whereas the common tax system ought to avoid the imposition of tax in connection with mergers, divisions, transfers of assets or exchanges of shares, while at the same time safeguarding the financial interests of the State of the transferring or acquired company; … Whereas it is necessary to allow Member States the possibility of refusing to apply this Directive where the merger, division, transfer of assets or exchange of shares operation has as its objective tax evasion or avoidance …’.
11

The ustawa o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych (Law on copyright and related rights) of 4 February 1994 (Dz. U. of 2006, No 90, heading 631), in the version applicable at the material time (‘the Law of 4 February 1994 on copyright and related rights’), provides in Article 20: ‘1. Producers and importers of: (1) audio recorders, video recorders and other similar devices, (2) photocopiers, scanners and other similar reprographic devices enabling a published work to be copied in full or in part, (3) blank media for recording or reproducing, for personal use, works or the subject matter of related rights, using devices referred to in subparagraphs 1 and 2, shall be required to pay to collective management organisations determined pursuant to paragraph 5, and acting on behalf of authors, performers, phonogram producers, videogram producers and publishers, fees in an amount not exceeding 3% of the amount due by virtue of the sale of those devices and media. 2. The amount obtained by virtue of the fees from the sale of audio recorders and other similar devices and the related blank media shall be paid in the following percentages to the following persons: (1) 50% — authors; (2) 25% — performers; (3) 25% — phonogram producers. … 4. The amount obtained by virtue of the fees from the sale of reprographic devices and the related blank media shall be paid in the following percentages to the following persons: (1) 50% — authors; (2) 50% — publishers. 5. The minister responsible for cultural and national heritage conservation matters, after consulting organisations collectively managing copyright and related rights, associations of authors and of performers and organisations of phonogram producers, of videogram producers and of publishers, as well as organisations of producers or importers of the devices and blank media that are referred to in paragraph 1, shall, by means of an order, determine: the categories of the devices and media and the amount of the fees referred to in paragraph 1, guided by the capacity of the devices and media to reproduce works and also by their use to perform functions other than the reproduction of works; the method of levying and dividing the fees; and the organisations collectively managing copyright or related rights authorised to levy them.’
32

In the light of all of the foregoing, the answer to the question referred is that Article 14 and Article 15(1) of Directive 2008/98 must, as EU law currently stands, be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which, for the purposes of financing an urban waste management and disposal service, provides for a price calculated on the basis of an estimate of the volume of waste generated by users of that service, and not on the basis of the quantity of waste which they have actually produced and presented for collection, as well as for the payment by users, in their capacity as waste holders, of an additional levy intended to finance capital investments necessary for the processing of waste, including the recycling thereof. It is, however, incumbent on the referring court to verify, on the basis of the matters of fact and law placed before it, whether this results in the imposition on certain ‘holders’ of costs which are manifestly disproportionate to the volumes or nature of the waste that they are liable to produce. Accordingly, the national court may take into account, inter alia, criteria relating to the type of property that the users occupy, its surface area and use, the productive capacity of the ‘holders’, the volume of the containers provided to the users, and the frequency of collection, in so far as those parameters are liable to have a direct impact on the amount of the costs of waste management.