ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 32(3) of Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 610/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that it requires Member States to provide for an appeal procedure against decisions refusing visas, the procedural rules for which are a matter for the legal order of each Member State in accordance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. Those proceedings must, at a certain stage of the proceedings, guarantee a judicial appeal.

It is for the referring court, which alone has jurisdiction to interpret its national law, to determine whether and to what extent the review system at issue in the main proceedings satisfies those requirements. In that connection, the national court must take account of the fact that the interpretation of the provisions of the Visa Code, as is clear from recital 29 thereof, must be carried out in accordance with the fundamental rights and principles recognised by the Charter.

Although it is true that in examining a visa application the national authorities have a broad discretion as regards the conditions for applying the grounds of refusal laid down by the Visa Code and the evaluation of the relevant facts, such discretion has no influence on the fact that the authorities directly apply a provision of EU law. It is clear that the Charter is applicable where a Member State adopts a decision refusing to issue a visa under Article 32(1) of the Visa Code. Article 47 of the Charter, which constitutes a reaffirmation of the principle of effective judicial protection, requires, in its first paragraph, that any person whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law are violated should have the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in that article (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 December 2015, Tall, C‑239/14, EU:C:2015:824, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited). Furthermore, the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter provides that everyone is entitled to a hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal. It follows, as the Advocate General observed, in point 119 of his Opinion, that Article 47 of the Charter requires the Member States to guarantee, at a certain stage of the proceedings, the possibility to bring the case concerning a final decision refusing a visa before a court.

(see paras 31, 32, 36-39, 41, 42, operative part)
Any provisions adopted by the institutions, whatever their form, which are intended to have binding legal effects are regarded as ‘challengeable acts’ for the purposes of Article 263 TFEU. As regards recommendations, they are, in accordance with Article 263 TFEU, excluded from the scope of that provision and pursuant to the fifth paragraph of Article 288 TFEU, they have no binding force. However, in exceptional cases, the impossibility of bringing an action for annulment against a recommendation does not apply if the contested act, by reason of its content, does not constitute a genuine recommendation. In that regard, in order to determine whether the contested act produces binding legal effects, it is necessary to examine the substance of that act and to assess those effects on the basis of objective criteria, such as the content of that act, taking into account, as appropriate, the context in which it was adopted and the powers of the institution which adopted the act.

As regards Recommendation 2014/478/EU on principles for the protection of consumers and players of online gambling services and for the prevention of minors from gambling online, it is apparent, after an analysis, conducted to the requisite legal standard, of the wording, the content and the purpose of the contested recommendation, as well as of the context of which it forms part, that that recommendation does not have and is not intended to have binding legal effects, with the result that it cannot be classified as a challengeable act for the purposes of Article 263 TFEU.

(see paras 29-32, 37)
A Member State fails to fulfil its obligations under Directive 2006/126 on driving licences where its national legislation contains a definition of categories C and C1 which does not include the demarcation of categories C/C1 and D/D1 provided for in Article 4 of that directive and expressed by the words ‘other than those in categories D1 or D’, or deletion of the lower limit of more than eight passengers that the EU legislature intended to introduce with the adoption of Directive 2006/126. The existence of those differences in definition results in vehicles of category D1 being able to be driven, under national law, by holders of a C1 licence, which is contrary to the objective of Directive 2006/126, namely that of road safety. Thus, for a certain type of vehicle, the category of driving licence required in that Member State differs from that which must be held by drivers in other Member States. Such a situation is contrary to the primary objectives pursued by Directive 2006/126.

Moreover, a lower limit for the number of passengers that vehicles belonging to category D1 can transport is tantamount to imposing a condition which does not appear in Article 4(4)(h) of Directive 2006/126, in which EU law defines that category. The existence of that additional condition leads to differences in how that directive is applied in the Member State concerned compared to other Member States when determining the category within which a vehicle falls, and, accordingly, the type of driving licence required for that vehicle. In that regard, a Member State is not authorised to adopt national legislation transposing Directive 2006/126 which introduces conditions not provided for by the directive, which would result in the categories of vehicles defined by Directive 2006/126 being amended, to the detriment of road safety.

(see paras 29, 30, 32, 37, 38, 53)
As regards the date at which the parties acceptance of the proceedings must be given, namely the date on which the court is seised, Article 16 of Regulation No 2201/2003 states that that date corresponds, in principle, to when the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document is lodged with the court (judgments of 1 October 2014, E, C‑436/13, EU:C:2014:2246, paragraph 38, and of 12 November 2014, L, C‑656/13, EU:C:2014:2364, paragraph 55).

Facts arising after the date on which the court is seised may nevertheless demonstrate that the acceptance required under Article 12(3)(b) of Regulation No 2201/2003 was lacking at that date. Thus, in the judgment of 12 November 2014, L (C‑656/13, EU:C:2014:2364, paragraphs 56 and 57), the Court held that the existence of an express or at least unequivocal agreement within the meaning of that provision manifestly cannot be established where the court in question is seised on the initiative of only one of the parties to the proceedings and, later, another party to those proceedings, on taking the first step required of him in the first proceedings, pleads the lack of jurisdiction of the court seised.

Similarly, in a situation where a prosecutor is regarded, under the applicable national law, as having the capacity of a party to a procedure in matters of parental responsibility, the opposition, made by that party as regards the choice of jurisdiction made by the parents of the child in question after the date on which the court was seised, precludes the acceptance of prorogation of jurisdiction by all the parties to the proceedings at that date from being established. However, in the absence of such opposition, the agreement of that party may be regarded as implicit and the condition of the unequivocal acceptance of prorogation of jurisdiction by all the parties to the proceedings at the date on which that court was seised, may be held to be satisfied.

(see paras 30-32)
The fact that a regulatory act of the European Union entails implementing measures, within the meaning of the final limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, such that certain legal effects of that regulation only materialise through those measures, does not exclude that that regulation produces, in the legal situation of a natural or legal person, other legal effects, which do not depend on the adoption of implementing measures.

The legal effects of Regulation 2015/408 on implementing Article 80(7) of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and establishing a list of candidates for substitution as regards the duration of the validity of the renewal of approval of metalaxyl will only materialise, in respect of an importer of metalaxyl, through the intermediary of implementing measures. It follows from the provisions of Regulation No 1107/2009, in particular Article 24(2) thereof, that the classification of metalaxyl as a candidate for substitution by Regulation 2015/408 is without prejudice to the application of the procedure for the renewal of approval of that substance. That procedure requires, in the same way as the procedure for the renewal of approval of an active substance which is not included on the list annexed to Regulation 2015/408, the adoption of a regulation by the Commission, pursuant to Article 20(1) of Regulation No 1107/2009.

In those circumstances, a Commission regulation on the renewal of approval of candidates for substitution, such as metalaxyl, is an implementing measure of Regulation 2015/408, within the meaning of the final limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. The effects of Regulation 2015/408 on the performance, by the Member States, of a comparative assessment of the health or environmental risks of plant protection products containing metalaxyl compared with a substitute product or a non-chemical method of pest control or prevention will not be made with respect to an importer of metalaxyl except through the intermediary of measures taken by the competent authorities of the Member States and such acts constitute, therefore, implementing measures within the meaning of the final limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

(see paras 52, 57, 58, 61, 66)
Case C‑643/16

American Express Company

v

The Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Treasury

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the High Court of Justice (England & Wales), Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court))

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive (EU) 2015/2366 — Payment services in the internal market — Article 35(1) — Obligation to provide authorised or registered payment service providers with access to payment systems — Point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 35(2) — Inapplicability of that obligation to payment systems composed exclusively of payment service providers belonging to a group — Applicability of that obligation to three party payment card schemes that have entered into co-branding or agency arrangements — Validity)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 7 February 2018

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling—Jurisdiction of the Court—Limits—Questions referred in a fictitious national dispute—Inadmissibility—No act or omission of a national authority capable of giving rise to an action for judicial review—Not capable, in itself, of rendering the dispute fictitious (Art. 267 TFEU) Approximation of laws—Payment services in the internal market—Directive 2015/2366—Obligation to provide payment service providers with access to payment systems—Applicability to three party payment card schemes that make use of an agent for the purposes of supplying payment services—Inapplicability to schemes that have entered into a co-branding agreement with a co-branding partner who does not provide payment services with respect to the co-branded products (European Parliament and Council Directive 2015/2366, Art. 35(1) and (2), first para., (b)) Acts of the institutions—Statement of reasons—Obligation—Scope and limits—Directive subjecting three party payment card schemes that have entered into agency contracts to the payment systems access obligation (Art. 296(2) TFEU; European Parliament and Council Directive 2015/2366, Recital 49, 50 and 52 and Art. 35(1)) Approximation of laws—Payment services in the internal market—Directive 2015/2366—Obligation to provide payment service providers with access to payment systems—Applicability to three party payment card schemes that make use of an agent for the purposes of supplying payment services—Breach of principle of proportionality—None (European Parliament and Council Directive 2015/2366, art. 35)
Case C‑561/16

Saras Energía SA

v

Administración del Estado

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo)

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive 2012/27/EU — Article 7(1), (4) and (9) — Article 20(4) and (6) — Promotion of energy efficiency — Energy efficiency obligation scheme — Other policy measures — Energy Efficiency National Fund — Establishment of such a fund as the principal measure implementing energy efficiency obligations — Contribution obligation — Designation of the obligated parties — Energy distributors and/or retail energy sales companies)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 7 August 2018

Energy—Promotion of energy efficiency—Directive 2012/27—Energy efficiency obligation schemes—Other public policy measures—National legislation establishing, as the principal measure implementing energy efficiency obligations, a system of annual contributions to an Energy Efficiency National Fund—Lawfulness—Conditions (European Parliament and Council Directive 2012/27, Arts 7 and 20) Energy—Promotion of energy efficiency—Directive 2012/27—Energy efficiency obligation schemes—Other public policy measures—Designation of the obligated parties—National legislation placing energy efficiency obligations on only certain specified undertakings in the energy sector—Lawfulness—Conditions—Objective and non-discriminatory criteria—To be determined by the national court (European Parliament and Council Directive, Art. 7)
Article 15 of Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market is to be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which veterinary practitioners have an exclusive right to retail and use organic products, special purpose anti-parasitic products and veterinary medicinal products.

In the present case, it should be noted that national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings reserves access to activities entailing the retail supply and use of certain veterinary products to veterinary practitioners and imposes a requirement of the kind referred to in Article 15(2)(d) of Directive 2006/123. As a consequence, such a requirement must satisfy the three conditions laid down in Article 15(3) of that directive, that is, they must be non-discriminatory, necessary and proportionate to the attainment of an overriding requirement relating to the public interest. With regard to the second element of the third condition, namely that the requirement concerned should not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objective in question, it should be noted that the protection of public health ranks foremost among the assets or interests protected by the EU Treaty and that it is for the Member States to determine the degree of protection which it wishes to afford to public health and the way in which that degree of protection is to be achieved. As this may vary from one Member State to another, Member States must be allowed a measure of discretion (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2008, Commission v Germany, C‑141/07, EU:C:2008:492, paragraph 51).

Moreover, there is nothing in the file submitted to the Court to suggest that, by adopting the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, the Member State concerned exceeded the discretion it enjoys in this field. As regards the third element of the third condition laid down in Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/123, namely that no less restrictive measures should be available that would enable the same objective to be attained, the Commission maintains that the objective of protecting public health could be attained just as effectively by a measure which allows the products in question to be sold by other duly qualified professionals, such as pharmacists or other persons having undergone advanced professional training in the pharmaceutical field. However, while such other professionals may in fact have in-depth knowledge as regards the properties of the various components of veterinary medicinal products, there is nothing to suggest that they have received special training appropriate to animal health. Therefore, it is not evident that the measure proposed by the Commission is liable to give the same result as that provided for by national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings.

(see paras 53, 54, 64, 67-70, 73, operative part 1)
Clause 4(1) of the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded on 18 March 1999, which is annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation under which the compensation paid to workers employed under fixed-term contracts entered into in order to cover working hours no longer covered as a result of a worker taking partial retirement, such as the relief contract at issue in the main proceedings, on expiry of the term for which those contracts were concluded, is less than the compensation awarded to permanent workers on termination of their employment contract on objective grounds.

Indeed, it follows from the definition of ‘fixed-term contract’ in Clause 3(1) of the Framework Agreement that a contract of that kind ceases to have any future effect on expiry of the term stipulated in the contract, that term being identified as the completion of a specific task, the occurrence of a specific event or, as in the present case, a specific date being reached. Thus, the parties to a fixed-term employment contract are aware, from the moment of its conclusion, of the date or event which determines its end. That term limits the duration of the employment relationship without the parties having to make their intentions known in that regard after entering into the contract.

By contrast, the termination of a permanent employment contract on one of the grounds set out in Article 52 of the Workers’ Statute, on the initiative of the employer, is the result of circumstances arising which were not foreseen at the date that contract was entered into and which disrupt the normal continuation of the employment relationship. As is clear from the Spanish Government’s explanations set out in paragraph 55 of the present judgment and as the Advocate General noted, in essence, in point 60 of her Opinion, it is precisely in order to compensate for the unforeseen nature of the termination of the employment relationship for such a reason and, accordingly, the frustration of any legitimate expectations the worker may have had at that date as regards the stability of that relationship, that Article 53(1)(b) of the Workers’ Statute requires compensation equivalent to twenty days’ remuneration per year of service to be paid to the dismissed worker.

In the latter case, Spanish law does not treat fixed-term workers and comparable permanent workers differently, since Article 53(1)(b) of the Workers’ Statute provides for statutory compensation equivalent to twenty days’ remuneration per year of service with the employer to be paid to a worker, irrespective of whether their employment contract is for a fixed term or for an indefinite duration.

In those circumstances, it must be held that the fact that the respective compensation amounts provided for in Articles 49(1)(c) and 53(1)(b) of the Workers’ Statute, which are paid in fundamentally different contexts, have different purposes constitutes an objective reason justifying the different treatment at issue.

(see paras 57-61, operative part)
–

the obligation of professional secrecy provided for in paragraph 1 of that article, read in conjunction with Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be guaranteed and implemented in such a way as to reconcile it with the rights of the defence. Accordingly, it is for the competent national court, when a competent authority invokes that obligation in order to refuse to disclose documents in its possession that are not in the file concerning the person who is the subject of a measure adversely affecting him, to ascertain whether that information is objectively connected to the complaints upheld against him and, if this should be the case, to weigh up the interest of the person in question in having access to the information necessary for him to be in a position to exercise fully his rights of defence and the interests in connection with maintaining the confidentiality of the information covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, before taking a decision whether to communicate each of the requested pieces of information.
Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 on the European Union trade mark pursues an aim which is in the public interest, namely that descriptive signs or indications relating to the categories of goods or services in respect of which registration is sought may be freely used by all, including as collective marks or as part of complex or graphic marks. That provision therefore prevents such signs and indications from being reserved to one undertaking alone because they have been registered as trade marks.

As regards, more particularly, signs or indications which may serve to designate the geographical origin of the categories of goods in respect of which registration of the mark is sought, especially geographical names, it is in the public interest that they remain available, not least because they may be an indication of the quality and other characteristics of the categories of goods concerned, and may also, in various ways, influence consumer tastes by, for instance, associating the goods with a place that may give rise to a favourable response.

A sign may not be refused registration on the basis of Article 7(1)(c) of that regulation unless the geographical name in respect of which registration as a trade mark is sought designates a place which is associated in the mind of the relevant class of persons, at the time the application for registration is made, with the category of goods concerned, or it is reasonable to assume that such an association may be established in the future.

However, it should be noted that, in principle, Article 7(1)(c) of that regulation does not preclude the registration of geographical names which are unknown to the relevant class of persons — or at least unknown as the designation of a geographical location — or of names in respect of which, because of the type of place they designate, such persons are unlikely to believe that the category of goods concerned originates there.

(see paras 36-39)