ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 296(2) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as laying down exhaustively all the cases in which a Member State may exclude a farmer from the common flat-rate scheme for farmers.

Article 296(2) of the VAT Directive refers only to the possibility of excluding from the flat-rate scheme certain categories of farmers and farmers for whom application of the normal VAT arrangements, or of the simplified procedures provided for in Article 281 of the directive, is not likely to give rise to administrative difficulties.

Neither the objectives of the flat-rate scheme nor the context of Article 296(2) of the VAT Directive mean that the legislature is to be regarded as having intended to allow other grounds of exclusion.

It is true that one of the objectives pursued by the flat-rate scheme is to enable farmers who are subject to it to offset the VAT costs which they have borne on account of their activity. However, the risk of excessive offsetting in respect of VAT is taken into consideration by Article 299 of the VAT Directive with regard to flat-rate farmers as a whole. To that end, Article 299 prohibits the Member States from setting flat-rate compensation percentages at levels which would have the effect of obtaining for flat-rate farmers as a whole refunds greater than the input VAT charged.

Furthermore, Articles 297 to 299 of the VAT Directive provide that the flat-rate compensation percentages are set globally by each Member State in the light of macroeconomic statistics for flat-rate farmers alone for the preceding three years. Therefore, Article 299 of the directive cannot justify the adoption of a decision to exclude, on an individual basis, a farmer from the flat-rate scheme in the light of the refunds obtained by applying those percentages.

(see paras 36-39, 44, operative part 1)
The concepts of ‘cancellation’ and ‘refusal’ in Article 90(1) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as including a situation in which, under a financial leasing agreement with definite transfer of ownership, the lessor may no longer claim payment of the leasing instalment from the lessee because the lessor has terminated the agreement owing to breach of contract by the lessee.

Where a financial leasing agreement has been definitively terminated because of non-payment of the lease instalments payable by the lessee, the lessor may rely on Article 90(1) of Directive 2006/112 against a Member State with a view to obtaining a reduction of the taxable amount for value added tax, even if the applicable national law considers that situation to be a case of ‘non-payment’ within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the directive and does not allow the taxable amount to be reduced in the case of non-payment.

(see para. 45, operative part 2)
Article 132(1)(m) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that an activity such as duplicate bridge, which is characterised by a physical element that appears to be negligible, is not covered by the concept of ‘sport’ within the meaning of that provision.

Examination of the context of Article 132(1)(m) of Directive 2006/112 therefore argues in favour of an interpretation that the concept of ‘sport’ appearing in that provision is limited to activities satisfying the ordinary meaning of the term ‘sport’, characterised by a not negligible physical element, but not covering all activities that may, in one way or another, be associated with that concept.

With regard, lastly, to the purpose of Article 132(1)(m) of the directive, it should be recalled that the objective of that provision is to encourage certain activities in the general interest, namely, services closely linked to sport or physical education supplied by non-profit-making organisations to persons taking part in sport or physical education, and, therefore, that provision seeks to promote such participation by large sections of the population.

The fact that an activity promoting physical and mental well-being is practised competitively does not lead to a different conclusion. In fact, the Court has ruled that Article 132(1)(m) of Directive 2006/112 does not require, for it to be applicable, that the sporting activity be practised at a particular level, for example, at a professional level, or that the sporting activity at issue be practised in a particular way, namely in a regular or organised manner or in order to participate in sports competitions (judgments of 21 February 2013, Žamberk, C‑18/12, EU:C:2013:95, paragraph 22, and of 19 December 2013, Bridport and West Dorset Golf Club, C‑495/12, EU:C:2013:861, paragraph 19). In that respect, it must also be noted that the competitive nature of an activity cannot, per se, be sufficient to establish its classification as a ‘sport’, failing any not negligible physical element.

(see paras 22, 23, 25, 29, operative part)
Article 45 TFEU must be interpreted to the effect that it precludes legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which a taxpayer residing in that Member State and working for the public administration of another Member State may not deduct from the income tax basis of assessment in her Member State of residence the pension and health insurance contributions deducted from her wages in the Member State of employment, in contrast to comparable contributions paid to the social security fund of her Member State of residence, where, under the Convention for the avoidance of double taxation between the two Member States, the wages must not be taxed in the worker’s Member State of residence and merely increase the tax rate to be applied to other income.

The refusal to grant a resident taxpayer the advantages arising from the fact that her personal and family circumstances are taken into account in the form of deductions of additional pension and health insurance contributions, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, as special expenses cannot therefore be justified either for reasons connected with the balanced allocation of powers of taxation or the maintenance of fiscal cohesion.

(see paras 79, 80, operative part)
Case C‑278/16

Criminal proceedings

against

Franck Sleutjes

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Aachen)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Judicial cooperation in criminal matters — Directive 2010/64/EU — Article 3(1) — Right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings — Translation of ‘essential documents’ — Definition of essential documents — Penalty order issued following a simplified unilateral procedure and imposing on the addressee a fine for a minor offence)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 12 October 2017

Judicial cooperation in criminal matters—Right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings—Directive 2010/64—Scope—Objection against a non-final penalty order made under a simplified procedure—Included (European Parliament and Council Directive 2010/64, Art. 1) Judicial cooperation in criminal matters—Right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings—Directive 2010/64—Right to translation of essential documents—Meaning of an essential document—Penalty order for minor offences delivered following a simplified unilateral procedure—Included (European Parliament and Council Directive 2010/64, Art. 3)
Article 2(1) of Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on driving licences and Articles 18, 21, 45, 49 and 56 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State under which that Member State may refuse to recognise a certificate issued in another Member State evidencing its holder’s right to drive, where that certificate does not fulfil the requirements of the model driving licence provided for in that directive, even if the conditions set by that directive for issuing a driving licence have been satisfied by the holder of that certificate.

Article 2(1) of Directive 2006/126 and Articles 21, 45, 49 and 56 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding a Member State from imposing a penalty on a person who, despite having satisfied the conditions for the issuing of a driving licence as provided for in that directive, drives a motor vehicle in that Member State without a driving licence conforming to the model driving licence provided for in that directive and who, pending the issuing of such a driving licence by another Member State, can prove only that he has been granted the right to drive in another Member State by means of a temporary certificate issued by that Member State, provided that that penalty is not disproportionate to the seriousness of the facts at issue. It is thus for the referring court to take into account, in its assessment of the seriousness of the offence committed by the person in question and of the severity of the penalty to be imposed on him, as a potentially mitigating circumstance, the fact that that person had been granted the right to drive in another Member State, evidenced by a certificate issued by that other Member State which will, in principle, be exchanged before its expiry, at that person’s request, for a driving licence conforming to the requirements of the model driving licence provided for in Directive 2006/126. That court must also consider, in the context of its assessment, what actual risk that person posed for road safety in its territory.

(see para. 79, operative part 2)
Case C‑649/16

Peter Valach and Others

v

Waldviertler Sparkasse Bank AG and Others

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 — Scope — Action for liability in tort against the members of a committee of creditors which rejected a restructuring plan in insolvency proceedings)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 20 December 2017

Judicial cooperation in civil matters—Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters—Regulation No 1215/2012—Scope—Matters excluded—Bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings—Definition—Actions which derive directly from insolvency proceedings and are closely connected with them—Applicability of Regulation No 1346/2000 (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 1215/2012, Art. 1(2)(b); Council Regulation No 1346/2000) Judicial cooperation in civil matters—Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters—Regulation No 1215/2012—Scope—Matters excluded—Bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings—Scope—Action for liability in tort brought against the members of a committee of creditors because of their conduct in voting in insolvency proceedings—Excluded—Applicability of Regulation No 1346/2000 (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 1215/2012, Art. 1(2)(b); Council Regulation No 1346/2000)
Case C‑250/16 P

Ludwig-Bölkow-Systemtechnik GmbH

v

European Commission

(Appeal — Arbitration clause — Sixth framework programme for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2002-2006) — Partial repayment of the sums paid to the appellant — Liquidated damages)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber), 16 November 2017

Action for annulment—Grounds—Lack of or inadequate statement of reasons—Separate ground from the one concerning substantive legality (Arts 263 TFEU and 296 TFEU)

Appeal—Grounds—Plea submitted for the first time in the context of the appeal—Inadmissibility—Arguments simply constituting an amplification of a plea relied on in the application—Admissibility (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

Appeal—Grounds—Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence—Inadmissibility—Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence—Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 168(1)(d))

Judicial proceedings—Burden of proof—Evidence not produced by the parties—No obligation on the EU judicature to obtain it—Not included

Appeal—Grounds—Mistaken assessment of the facts—Inadmissibility – Review by the Court of the interpretation of a contract term—Not included (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 169)

Appeal—Grounds—Inadequate statement of reasons—Reliance by the General Court on implied reasoning—Lawfulness—Conditions (Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 36 and 53, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 117)
In circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, the first paragraph of Article 32 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as to the second of two successive supplies of the same goods which gave rise to only one intra-Community transport.

Where the second supply in a chain of two successive supplies involving a single intra-Community transport is an intra-Community supply, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations must be interpreted as meaning that the person ultimately acquiring the goods, who wrongly claimed a right to deduct input value added tax, may not deduct, as input value added tax, the value added tax paid to the supplier solely on the basis of the invoices provided by the intermediary operator which incorrectly classified its supply.

The right to deduct VAT can be exercised only in respect of taxes actually due and cannot be extended to overpaid input VAT (see, by analogy, judgment of 14 June 2017, Compass Contract Services, C‑38/16, EU:C:2017:454, paragraphs 35 and 36). It follows that the exercise of that right does not extend to VAT which is due exclusively because it features on an invoice (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 December 1989, Genius, C‑342/87, EU:C:1989:635, paragraph 19, and of 6 November 2003, Karageorgou and Others, C‑78/02 to C‑80/02, EU:C:2003:604, paragraph 51).

In that regard, it must be noted that the right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations extends to any person in a situation in which an administrative authority has caused that person to entertain expectations which are justified by precise assurances provided to him (judgment of 9 July 2015, Salomie and Oltean, C‑183/14, EU:C:2015:454, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

(see paras 43, 46, 49, operative part 2)
1.

Declares that, by excluding projects to locate or search for shale gas deposits by means of drilling to a depth of 5000 metres — with the exception of drilling to a depth of more than 1000 metres in areas intended for water extraction, areas containing protected inland waters and nature protection areas in the form of national parks, nature reserves, landscape parks and ‘Natura 2000’ protection areas and the contiguous protection zones — from the procedure for determining whether an environmental impact assessment is necessary, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under the combined provisions of Articles 2(1) and 4(2) and (3) of, and Annexes II and III to, Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment;
The complaint procedure set out in Article 72 of the Decision of the Bureau of the European Parliament concerning implementing measures for the Statute for Members of the European Parliament is optional. In that regard, the object of an administrative remedy, whether optional or not, is to enable and encourage the amicable settlement of differences arising between the person concerned and the administration in order to avoid litigation. It follows, in particular, that whether an administrative remedy is optional or obligatory has no effect on the fact that a preliminary administrative procedure constitutes a pre-litigation remedy. Accordingly, it cannot be found, in particular with regard to the right to an effective legal remedy enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, that instituting a complaint procedure within the meaning of Article 72 of that decision prejudices the right to bring legal proceedings against the decision at issue.

In that regard, the lack of a prescribed period within which the Parliament’s administration must reply to complaints brought under Article 72 of the Decision of the Bureau of the European Parliament in the context of an optional administrative procedure would not restrict access to the courts, in so far as the person concerned may, at any moment, withdraw from that preliminary administrative procedure and institute legal proceedings. Accordingly the EU judicature cannot find that the action was brought out of time without taking account of the complaint procedure initiated in accordance with Article 72 of that decision.

(see paras 24-26, 28, 35)
Trinseo and the Commission submit, however, that emissions arising from the production of polymers should include ‘indirect’ emissions from the production of heat by the third-party installation supplying that heat for the purposes of polymerisation. That interpretation cannot be accepted, however. As is already apparent from paragraphs 47 and 48 of this judgment, the ‘emissions’ to which Directive 2003/87 applies are, according to the very wording of Article 3(b) of that directive, solely those which give rise to the release of greenhouse gases from sources in an installation. It follows that CO2 emissions arising from the activity of producing heat justify solely the inclusion in that scheme of installations that are the source of those emissions, such as, in the present case, the third-party installation supplying heat to the installation at issue in the main proceedings.

(see paras 53-55, 58)
Case C‑566/16

Dávid Vámos

v

Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Nyíregyházi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Common system of value added tax — Directive 2006/112/EC — Articles 282 to 292 — Special scheme for small enterprises — Exemption scheme — Obligation to opt for the application of the special scheme in the reference calendar year)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 17 May 2018

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Special scheme for small enterprises — Exemption scheme — Right for the taxable person to opt for the application of the scheme — National legislation making the benefit of that scheme conditional upon the taxable person exercising that right at the same time as he submits his declaration of commencement of activity — Whether permissible — Taxable person fulfilling the material conditions for the application of the exemption — Irrelevant

(Council Directive 2006/112, Title XII, Chapter 1, Section 2)

EU law must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which excludes a special value added tax taxation scheme providing for an exemption for small enterprises — that scheme having been adopted in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Chapter I of Title XII of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax — from being applied to a taxable person who fulfils all the material conditions but did not exercise the right to opt for the application of that scheme at the same time as he declared the commencement of his economic activities to the tax authority.

(see para. 55 and operative part)
Case C‑320/16

Criminal proceedings

against

Uber France SAS

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the tribunal de grande instance de Lille)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Services in the field of transport — Directive 2006/123/EC — Services in the internal market — Directive 98/34/EC — Information society services — Rule on information society services — Definition — Intermediation service making it possible, by means of a smartphone application and for remuneration, to put non-professional drivers using their own vehicle in contact with persons who wish to make urban journeys — Criminal penalties)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 10 April 2018

Approximation of laws — Information procedure in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services — Directive 98/34 — Freedom to provide services — Services in the internal market — Directive 2006/123 — Scope — Intermediation service such as UberPop making it possible, by means of a smartphone application and for remuneration, to put non-professional drivers using their own vehicle in contact with persons who wish to make urban journeys — Not included — Services in the field of transport — Definition — Intermediation service such as UberPop — Included

(European Parliament and Council Directives 98/34, Art. 1 and 2006/123, Art. 2(2)(d))

Article 1 of Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services, as amended by Directive 98/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 1998, and Article 2(2)(d) of Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market must be interpreted as meaning that a provision of national law that lays down criminal penalties for the organisation of a system for putting customers in contact with persons carrying passengers by road for remuneration using vehicles with fewer than 10 seats, without being authorised to do so, concerns a ‘service in the field of transport’ in so far as it applies to an intermediation service that is provided by means of a smartphone application and forms an integral part of an overall service the principal element of which is the transport service. Such a service is excluded from the scope of application of those directives.

(see para. 27, operative part)
Appeal—Grounds—Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence—Inadmissibility—Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence—Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see paras 45, 46, 78-80, 90-96, 101, 102)