ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 10 March 2016 — SolarWorld v Commission

(Case C‑312/15 P) ( 1 )

‛Appeals — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Appeal manifestly unfounded — Regulation (EU) No 513/2013 — Dumping — Imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (cells and wafers) originating in or consigned from China — Provisional anti-dumping duty — Definitive anti-dumping duty — No need to adjudicate — Loss of interest in bringing proceedings’

1. Appeal — Grounds — Grounds which are manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded — Dismissal at any point, by reasoned order, without an oral procedure (Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 181) (see paras 15, 16)

2. Actions for annulment — Natural or legal persons — Interest in bringing proceedings — Action brought against a regulation imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty — Subsequent adoption of a regulation imposing a definitive anti‑dumping duty — No longer any interest in bringing proceedings (Art. 263 TFEU) (see paras 25, 26, 29, 30)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. SolarWorld AG is ordered to pay the costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 302, 14.9.2015.
1.

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 28, 29)
2.

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 55, 62-66)
1.

Appeals — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 26, 27)
The judgment of 13 February 2014 in Sokoll-Seebacher (C‑367/12) must be read as meaning that the criterion relating to a strict limit on the number of ‘persons who continue to be served’, laid down by the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, is not to be applied, for the purposes of determining the existence of a need to open a new pharmacy, in a general manner, in every specific situation which will be the subject of an assessment.

National legislation is appropriate for securing attainment of the objective sought only if it genuinely reflects a concern to attain that objective in a consistent and systematic manner.

In spite of the adjustment measure provided for in the national legislation, by applying the criterion relating to the number of ‘people who continue to be served’, there is a danger that equal and adequate access may not be guaranteed for certain people living in certain areas with local characteristics, such as rural and isolated regions situated outside the existing pharmacies’ areas of supply, in particular for people with reduced mobility.

However, by referring to rural or isolated regions and to persons with reduced mobility, the Court did not intend to limit the scope of its assessment of the consistency of the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings to that type of region and that category of persons.

By reason of the strict limit on the number of ‘persons who continue to be served’ it lays down, the national legislation does not enable the competent authority to duly take into account the particularities of each situation examined or to guarantee the attainment in a consistent and systematic manner of the main objective intended by that legislation, which is to ensure a supply of medicinal products to the public which is reliable and of good quality.

In that sense, the Court held that the legislation of a Member State, which lays down, as an essential criterion in order to determine the existence of a need for the opening of a new pharmacy, a strict limit on the number of ‘persons who continue to be served’ is contrary to Article 49 TFEU, in particular, to the requirement of consistency in the pursuit of the intended objective, where the competent authorities cannot depart from that limit to take account of particular local conditions, that is to say, ultimately the special feature of the various specific situations, each of which having to be subject to examination.

It follows that the inconsistency deriving from the application of a criterion which concerns a strict limit on the number of ‘persons who continue to be served’ is systematic. Therefore, the dangers to which such an application gives rise are liable to affect the assessment of any specific situation.

(see paras 27, 31-36, operative part)
1.

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 32, 36)
Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 7 July 2016 —

Panasonic v Commission

(Case C‑608/15 P) ( *1 )

‛Appeal — Rules of Procedure of the Court — Article 181 — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Global market for cathode ray tubes for television sets and computer monitors — Agreements and concerted practices on pricing, market-sharing, customer-allocation and output-limitation — Rights of the defence — Statement of objections — Content’

Competition — Administrative procedure — Statement of objections — Necessary content — Observance of the rights of the defence — Scope (Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 27(1)) (see paras 20-24)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. Panasonic Corp. shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the European Commission.

( *1 ) OJ C 27, 25.1.2016.
Judicial proceedings—Costs—Taxation—Recoverable costs—Elements to be taken into consideration—Fees payable by the parties to their own lawyers—Determination of the fees which may be recovered from the party ordered to pay the costs

(Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 144(b))

(see para. 21)
1.

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 22, 56)
16

By the first part of its second plea, Old Larko takes issue with the General Court for having erred in law in interpreting and applying the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice in that it applied that provision in abstracto, without considering the particular features of the case. In particular, the General Court ignored the combined effect of the decision at issue and the incompatibility decision, and also the particular position of Old Larko as the sole significant creditor of New Larko. In addition, it maintains that Old Larko is in a special position owing to the measures taken by the Greek authorities which, in its submission, makes the recovery of the debts from New Larko more difficult. That series of relationships and situations gives rise, de facto, to an interest in the result of the case. Thus, in the appellant’s submission, the General Court breached that provision by considering that the appellant’s interest was insufficient.
5

Article 211 of the General Law on Social Security (Ley General de la Seguridad Social), approved by Royal Legislative Decree No 1/94 of 20 June 1994 (BOE No 154, 29 June 1994, p. 20658; ‘the LGSS’), as applicable to the facts at issue in the main proceedings, provides: ‘1. The basis for calculating the unemployment benefit shall be the average of the basis on which contributions were paid in that respect in the last 180 days of [work]. … 2. The amount of unemployment benefit shall be determined by applying to the basis for calculation the following percentages: 70% during the first 180 days and 50% from day 181. 3. The maximum amount of the unemployment benefit shall be 175% of the Multi-purpose Public Income Indicator (indicador público de rentas de efectos multiples; “the IPREM”), except when the worker has one or more dependent children, in which case the amount shall be 200% or 225%, respectively, of that rate. The minimum amount of the unemployment benefit shall be 107% or 80% of [the IPREM], depending on whether the employee has or has not, respectively, dependent children. In the case of unemployment as a result of loss of part-time or full-time employment, the maximum and minimum amounts of the benefit referred to above shall be determined by taking into account [the IPREM], calculated on the basis of the average number of hours worked during the last 180 days referred to in paragraph 1 of this article, such average being weighted in relation to the number of days in every part- or full-time employment during that period. [The IPREM] taken into account for the purpose of this paragraph is that which applied at the time when the right arises, increased by one sixth. …’
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling—Jurisdiction of the Court—Limits—Factual and legal situation at issue in the dispute in the main proceedings outside of the scope of EU law—Clear lack of jurisdiction of the Court

(Art. 267 TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 51; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 53(2))

(see paras 30-45, operative part)
Appeal—Grounds—Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence—Inadmissibility—Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence—Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see para. 5)
Article 16(1)(a) of Regulation No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation No 1347/2000, must be interpreted to the effect that the ‘time when the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document is lodged with the court’, within the meaning of that provision, is the time when that document is lodged with the court concerned, even if under national law lodging that document does not of itself immediately initiate proceedings.

Once it has been established which of the two options in Article 16(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation No 2201/2003 applies, in accordance with the choice made by the Member State concerned, the time when a court was seised may be objectively established solely on the basis of the time, as provided for in the case of the first option under Article 16(1)(a), when the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document was lodged with that court, irrespective of any national procedural rule intended to determine when and in what circumstances proceedings are initiated or are considered to be pending, provided that the applicant has not subsequently failed to comply with the condition relating to service of that document on the respondent.

(see paras 26, 28, 29, operative part)
Order of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 26 May 2016 —

Hewlett Packard Development Company v EUIPO

(Case C‑77/16 P)

‛Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure — EU trade mark — Word mark FORTIFY — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Article 7(1)(c)’

EU trade mark — Decisions of the Office — Principle of equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — OHIM’s previous decision-making practice — Principle of legality — Need for a strict and complete examination in each particular case (see para. 4)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.
2.

Application for interim measures — Jurisdiction of the judge hearing the application for interim relief — Limits — Action for annulment pending before the General Court — Application, in the context of an appeal, seeking that the Court grant an interim measure different from that sought at first instance — Manifest lack of jurisdiction (Arts 278 TFEU and 279 TFEU) (see paras 18, 19)
Articles 2, 9, 26, 167, 168 and 173 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that, in so far as the involvement of a holding company, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in the management of its subsidiaries, where it has charged those subsidiaries neither for the cost of the services procured in the interest of the group of companies as a whole or in the interest of certain of its subsidiaries, nor for the corresponding VAT, does not constitute an ‘economic activity’, within the meaning of that directive, such a holding company does not have the right to deduct input VAT paid in respect of those services in so far as those services relate to transactions falling outside the scope of that directive.

(see para. 48, operative part)
Order of the Court (First Chamber) of 11 May 2017 — Exmitiani

(Case C‑286/16) ( 1 )

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Activity of passenger road transport services — Tax — Facts prior to the accession of Romania to the European Union — Manifest lack of jurisdiction of the Court)

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling—Jurisdiction of the Court—Limits—Interpretation of a Community directive in proceedings predating the accession of a Member State to the European Union—Not included

(Art. 267 TFEU)

(see paras 12-17)

Operative part

The Court of Justice of the European Union manifestly lacks jurisdiction to answer the questions referred by the Curtea de Apel Cluj (Court of Appeal, Cluj, Romania).

( 1 ) OJ C 296, 16.8.2016.
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling—Jurisdiction of the Court—Limits—Request for an interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union—Subject matter of the national dispute not having any connection with EU law—Clear lack of jurisdiction of the Court

(Art. 267 TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 51(1))

(see paras 16-18, 33, 34)
Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 24 October 2017 —

Belu Dienstleistung and Nikless

(Case C‑474/16) ( 1 )

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Identical questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Coordination of social security systems — Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 — Applicable legislation — A1 certificate — Probative value)

1. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling—Questions identical to those already ruled on in the case-law—Application of Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice (Art. 267 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 99) (see paras 14-16)

2. Social security—Migrant workers—Legislation applicable—Workers posted to a Member State other than that in which the employer is established—A1 certificate issued by the competent institution of the Member State of establishment—Probative value for the social security institutions of other Member States and for the courts of those Member States—Conditions under which the worker carries out his activities not falling within the material scope of Regulation No 883/2004—Irrelevant (European Parliament and Council Regulations No 883/2004, Art. 12(1) and (2), and No 987/2009, Art. 19) (see paras 17-20, operative part)

Operative part

Article 19 of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems must be interpreted as meaning that an A1 certificate, issued by the institution designated by the competent authority of a Member State under Article 12(1) and (2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, is binding on both the social security institutions of the Member State in which the work is carried out and the courts of that Member State, even where it is found by those courts that the conditions under which the worker concerned carries out his activities clearly do not come within the material scope of that provision of Regulation No 883/2004.

( 1 ) OJ C 441, 28.11.2016.
Judicial proceedings—Objection of inadmissibility—Subject-matter—No obligation on the party raising the plea to set out in its pleadings its arguments on the substance of the case

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 151; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 130)

(see paras 28-33)
Judicial proceedings – Costs – Taxation – Recoverable costs – Elements to be taken into consideration – Discretion of the Court – Costs incurred in the context of an appeal

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 144(b) and 184(1))

(see paras 21-27)
Judicial proceedings—Intervention—Pleas different from those of the main party supported—Admissibility—Condition—Connection with the subject matter of the case

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 40)

(see paras 39, 40)
20

It was in those circumstances that the Kúria (Supreme Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. May a holding company which plays an active role in the management of certain affairs of its subsidiaries, or of the group of companies as a whole, but which does not pass on to its subsidiaries the cost of the services carried out in relation to its active holding activity or the corresponding VAT be regarded as a taxable person for the purpose of VAT in respect of those services? 2. If the first question is answered in the affirmative, may the active holding company exercise the right to deduct the VAT corresponding to the services used by it which are directly related to the taxed economic activity of some of its subsidiaries, and if so in what way? 3. If the first question is answered in the affirmative, may the active holding company exercise the right to deduct the VAT corresponding to the services used which are in the interest of the group of companies as a whole, and if so in what way? 4. Do the answers to be given to the above questions differ if the active holding company bills its subsidiaries in respect of the abovementioned services as intermediary services, and if so to what extent?’
17

In those circumstances, the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) (United Kingdom) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) For the purposes of Article 49 TFEU (freedom of establishment) and in the light of the constitutional relationship between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom: (a) are Gibraltar and the United Kingdom to be treated as if they were part of a single Member State ... for the purposes of EU law and if so, does that have the consequence that Article 49 TFEU has no application as between the United Kingdom and Gibraltar save to the extent that it can apply to an internal measure, or alternatively, ... for the purposes of Article 49 TFEU, taken individually, so that that article does not apply save to the extent that it can apply to an internal measure? Alternatively, (b) having regard to Article 355(3) TFEU, does Gibraltar have the constitutional status of a separate territory to the United Kingdom within the European Union such that either ... the exercise of the right of establishment as between Gibraltar and the UK is to be treated as intra-EU trade for the purposes of Article 49 TFEU, or ... Article 49 TFEU applies to prohibit restrictions on the exercise of the right of establishment by nationals in the UK in Gibraltar (as a separate entity)? Alternatively, (c) is Gibraltar to be treated as a third country or territory with the effect that EU law is only engaged in respect of trade between the two in circumstances where EU law has effect between a Member State and a non-Member State? Alternatively, (d) is the constitutional relationship between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom to be treated in some other way for the purposes of Article 49 TFEU? (2) How, if at all, [do the answers] to the above questions differ when considered in the context of Article 63 TFEU (and consequently as regards the freedom of movement of capital) rather than Article 49 TFEU?’
ORDER OF THE COURT (Fourth Chamber)

3 September 2021 ( )

(Rectification of judgment)

In Case C‑586/16 P‑REC,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 17 November 2016,

Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd, formerly Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd, established in Vadodara (India),

Ranbaxy (UK) Ltd, established in Hayes (United Kingdom),

represented by R. Vidal, Solicitor, and B. Kennelly QC and by L. Penny, Solicitor,

applicants,

the other parties to the proceedings being:

European Commission, represented by F. Castilla Contreras, T. Vecchi, B. Mongin and C. Vollrath, acting as Agents, and by D. Bailey, Barrister,

defendant at first instance,

supported by:

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, represented initially by D. Guðmundsdóttir, Z. Lavery and D. Robertson, acting as Agents, and by J. Holmes QC, and subsequently by D. Guðmundsdóttir, acting as Agent, and by J. Holmes QC,

intervener in the appeal,

THE COURT (Fourth Chamber),

composed of M. Vilaras, President of the Chamber, D. Šváby (Rapporteur), S. Rodin, K. Jürimäe and P.G. Xuereb, Judges,

Advocate General: J. Kokott,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

after hearing the Advocate General,

makes the following

Order

1 On 25 March 2021, the Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered the judgment in Sun Pharmaceutical Industries and Ranbaxy (UK) v Commission (C‑586/16 P, not published, EU:C:2021:241).

2 The introductory part of that judgment contains errors which it is appropriate for the Court to rectify at the request of the European Commission, pursuant to Article 154(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, which applies to the procedure on appeal pursuant to Article 190(1) of those rules.

On those grounds, the Court (Fourth Chamber) hereby orders:

1. In the introductory part of the judgment of 25 March 2021, Sun Pharmaceutical Industries and Ranbaxy (UK) v Commission (C‑586/16 P, not published, EU:C:2021:241) the reference to the European Commission’s representatives shall be rectified as follows:

‘European Commission, represented by F. Castilla Contreras, T. Vecchi, B. Mongin and C. Vollrath, acting as Agents, and by D. Bailey, Barrister,’

2. The original of this order shall be annexed to the original of the rectified judgment. A note of this order shall be made in the margin of the original of the rectified judgment.

Luxembourg, 3 September 2021.

A. Calot Escobar M. Vilaras
Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 6 July 2017 –Vatseva v European Court of Human Rights

(Case C‑231/17 P)

(Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — General Court of the European Union’s lack of jurisdiction over an action to annul a decision of the European Court of Human Rights)

Appeal—Grounds—Error of law relied on not identified—Inadmissibility

(Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 168(1)(d) and 169)

(see para. 12)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.
1.

Actions brought by officials—Acts adversely affecting an official—Concept—Letter of the Secretary of a political group of the Parliament informing an official of his decision not to extend the secondment to the group—Preparatory act—Not included (Staff Regulations of Officials, Arts 38, 90(2) and 91(1)) (see paras 5, 8)