ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
10

Article 48 of that directive, entitled ‘Technical and/or professional ability’, states as follows: ‘1. The technical and/or professional abilities of the economic operators shall be assessed and examined in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3. 2. Evidence of the economic operators’ technical abilities may be furnished by one or more of the following means according to the nature, quantity or importance, and use of the works, supplies or services: (a) (i) a list of the works carried out over the past five years, accompanied by certificates of satisfactory execution for the most important works. These certificates shall indicate the value, date and site of the works and shall specify whether they were carried out according to the rules of the trade and properly completed. Where appropriate, the competent authority shall submit these certificates to the contracting authority direct; … (b) an indication of the technicians or technical bodies involved, whether or not belonging directly to the economic operator’s undertaking, especially those responsible for quality control and, in the case of public works contracts, those upon whom the contractor can call in order to carry out the work; … (h) a statement of the tools, plant or technical equipment available to the service provider or contractor for carrying out the contract; ... 3. An economic operator may, where appropriate and for a particular contract, rely on the capacities of other entities, regardless of the legal nature of the links which it has with them. It must in that case prove to the contracting authority that it will have at its disposal the resources necessary for the execution of the contract, for example, by producing an undertaking by those entities to place the necessary resources at the disposal of the economic operator. 4. Under the same conditions a group of economic operators as referred to Article 4 may rely on the abilities of participants in the group or in other entities. ...’
18

In those circumstances, the Corte dei conti, sezione giurisdizionale per la Regione Siciliana, decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) In interpreting and applying the rules and principles of European Union law, may a national court – on the basis of national legislation which makes a renvoi to European Union law in relation to purely internal situations – depart from, or incorrectly apply, the interpretation given to those rules and principles in the case-law of the Court of Justice? (2) Are the interpretation and application of Article 3 of [Law No 241/1990] and Article 3 of [Sicilian Regional Law No 10/1991] – in relation to Article 1 of [Law 241/1990], which require the Italian administrative authorities to apply the principles of European Union law, in accordance with the obligation to state reasons for the acts of public authorities laid down in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU and Article 41(2)(c) of the [Charter] – to the effect that measures of public authorities in private-law form – that is to say, measures which relate to individual rights and which are in any event mandatory in matters relating to pensions – may be exempt from the obligation to state reasons, compatible with European Union law, and does such a case amount to infringement of an essential procedural requirement governing an administrative measure? (3) Is the first sentence of Article 21g(2) of [Law No 241/1990], as interpreted by the administrative case-law – in relation to the obligation to state reasons for an administrative measure laid down by Article 3 of [Law 241/1990] and Article 3 of [Sicilian Regional Law No 10/1991], read in conjunction with the obligation to state reasons for the acts of public authorities laid down by the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU and Article 41(2)(c) of the [Charter] – compatible with Article 1 of [Law No 241/1990], which requires the administrative authorities to apply the principles of European Union law, and, consequently, are the interpretation and application of that interpretation whereby the authorities may supplement a statement of reasons for an administrative measure in court proceedings compatible and permissible?’
25

Taking the view that the outcome of the proceedings before it is dependent upon the interpretation of the concept of waste within the meaning of Regulations Nos 259/93 and 1013/2006, the Rechtbank te Rotterdam decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. Must a consignment of diesel be categorised as waste within the meaning of [Regulations Nos 259/93 and 1013/2006] in the following circumstances: — the consignment consists of Ultra Light Sulphur Diesel, which has been unintentionally mixed with methyl tertiary butyl ether; — after the consignment is delivered to a buyer, it transpires that – because of the mix – it does not satisfy the specifications agreed between the buyer and the vendor and is therefore “off-spec”; — the consignment – following a complaint by the buyer – is taken back by the vendor in accordance with the purchase agreement, and the vendor refunds the purchase price; — the vendor has the intention – whether or not after mixing it with another product – of placing the consignment back on the market? 2. If the answer to question 1 is in the affirmative: (a) is it possible to specify a point in time in the abovementioned factual circumstances from which this is the case; (b) does the status of the consignment change to a non-waste product at any point in time between the delivery to the buyer and a new blending carried out by or on behalf of the vendor and, if so, at what point? 3. Is it relevant to the answer to question 1: — whether the consignment could be used as fuel in the same way as pure ULSD, but because of its lower flashpoint it no longer satisfied the (safety) requirements; — whether, as a result of the new composition, the consignment could not be stored by the buyer pursuant to an environmental permit; — whether the consignment could not be used by the buyer for the purpose for which it had been bought, namely for sale as diesel fuel from the pump; — whether or not the buyer intended to return the consignment to the vendor pursuant to the purchase agreement; — whether the vendor did in fact intend to take back the consignment with a view to processing it through blending it and to place it back on the market; — whether or not the consignment can be restored either to the state originally intended or processed into a product that is marketable for a price approaching that of the market value of the original ULSD consignment; — whether that restoration/processing is a common production process; — whether the market value of the consignment in the state that it is in at the time that it is taken back by the vendor is (virtually) the same as the price of a product that does satisfy the agreed specifications; — whether the consignment taken back can be sold on the market in the state that it is in at the time that is taken back without being processed; — whether trade in products such as the consignment is common and is not regarded in relevant trade circles as trade in waste?’
4

Article 8 of Directive 2002/91, which is entitled ‘Inspection of boilers’, provides: ‘With regard to reducing energy consumption and limiting carbon dioxide emissions, Member States shall either: (a) lay down the necessary measures to establish a regular inspection of boilers fired by non-renewable liquid or solid fuel of an effective rated output of 20 kW to 100 kW. Such inspection may also be applied to boilers using other fuels. Boilers of an effective rated output of more than 100 kW shall be inspected at least every two years. For gas boilers, this period may be extended to four years. For heating installations with boilers of an effective rated output of more than 20 kW which are older than 15 years, Member States shall lay down the necessary measures to establish a one-off inspection of the whole heating installation. On the basis of this inspection, which shall include an assessment of the boiler efficiency and the boiler sizing compared to the heating requirements of the building, the experts shall provide advice to the users on the replacement of the boilers, other modifications to the heating system and on alternative solutions; or (b) take steps to ensure the provision of advice to the users on the replacement of boilers, other modifications to the heating system and on alternative solutions which may include inspections to assess the efficiency and appropriate size of the boiler. The overall impact of this approach should be broadly equivalent to that arising from the provisions set out in (a). Member States that choose this option shall submit a report on the equivalence of their approach to the Commission every two years.’
18

In those circumstances the Gerechtshof ’s‑Hertogenbosch decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. In the appraisal of the question – to be answered in the context of Article 110 TFEU – as to whether the amount of the levy in 2010 in respect of the registration of the passenger car [vehicle in question] is (not) higher than the residual amount of the levy which is incorporated into the value of similar used passenger cars already registered within national territory, should the following be considered to be similar for purposes of determining that residual amount: — a comparable [vehicle] which, in the year in which the [vehicle in question] was first put into service (2006), was registered as an unused passenger car, or — also the (other) [vehicles] which were available on the market for used [vehicles] in 2010, and which, like the [vehicle in question], were first put into service on 30 May 2006 and are otherwise comparable, but which were (imported and) registered as used [vehicles] after 30 May 2006 (after 30 May 2006 and up to 2009), and/or — also the (other) [vehicles] which were available on the market for used [vehicles] in 2010, and which, unlike the [vehicle in question], were first put into service after 30 May 2006, but are otherwise comparable, and which were (imported and) registered as unused or used [vehicles] after 30 May 2006 (after 30 May 2006 and up to 2009)? 2. In the appraisal of the question as to whether Article 110 TFEU precludes the levying of BPM in respect of the registration of the [vehicle in question] in 2010 in so far as that levy is based on the CO2 emission …, should that part of the levy be deemed to be a new tax, to be distinguished from the BPM up to 1 February 2008, which was based solely on the [net] list price, with the result that, to the extent to which the levy is based on the CO2 emission, a comparison with (similar) used [vehicles] which were registered before 1 January 2010 is not relevant? 3. If there is no question of a new tax as contemplated in Question 2: is the levying of BPM in respect of the registration of the [vehicle in question] in 2010, in so far as that levy is based on the CO2 emission …, precluded by the fact that, pursuant to Article 110 TFEU, the levy based on the CO2 emission … was not imposed in respect of [vehicles] comparable to the [vehicle in question] which were first put into service before 1 February 2008 and which, in the period from 1 February 2008 to 31 December 2009, were imported and registered as used [vehicles], whereas that levy based on the CO2 emission was imposed in respect of the registration, in the aforementioned period, of [used vehicles] which were first put into service after 1 February 2008 but were otherwise comparable to the [vehicle in question] …?’
9

Paragraph 37(1) and (3) of the Enforcement Code, in the version applicable to the facts in the main proceedings (‘the Enforcement Code’), provides: ‘1. The parties to the proceedings shall be the creditor and the debtor; other persons shall be party only to those parts of the proceedings in respect of which they are granted the status of a party to the proceedings by this law. Where the court rules on the costs of enforcement, the authorised bailiff shall also be a party to the proceedings. … 3. Enforcement may be carried out against a person other than the person indicated in the decision as the debtor, or for the benefit of a person other than the person indicated in the decision as the creditor, only if it is shown that the obligations or the rights arising from the enforcement order have been transferred to that person pursuant to Article 41. If circumstances arise on the basis of which there is a transfer or subrogation of the rights and obligations arising from the enforcement order, the parties to the proceedings must notify the enforcing authority in writing and without undue delay. That notification must be accompanied by a document proving the transfer or subrogation of the rights and obligations. The enforcing authority must notify the court of an application for authorisation to modify the parties to the proceedings within a period of 14 days from the day on which it becomes aware of those circumstances. The court shall rule, by means of an order, in a period of 60 days from the notification of the application. The decision shall be notified to the enforcing authority, to the creditor and the debtor which are referred to in the enforcement order, and to the party to whom the right or obligation has been transferred.’
6

Clause 2 of the Framework Agreement, entitled ‘Parental leave’, is worded as follows: ‘1. This agreement grants, subject to clause 2.2, men and women workers an individual right to parental leave on the grounds of the birth or adoption of a child to enable them to take care of that child, for at least three months, until a given age up to 8 years to be defined by Member States and/or management and labour. … 3. The conditions of access and detailed rules for applying parental leave shall be defined by law and/or collective agreement in the Member States, as long as the minimum requirements of this agreement are respected. Member States and/or management and labour may, in particular: (a) decide whether parental leave is granted on a full-time or part-time basis, in a piecemeal way or in the form of a time-credit system; (b) make entitlement to parental leave subject to a period of work qualification and/or a length of service qualification which shall not exceed one year; … 4. In order to ensure that workers can exercise their right to parental leave, Member States and/or management and labour shall take the necessary measures to protect workers against dismissal on the grounds of an application for, or the taking of, parental leave in accordance with national law, collective agreements or practices. 5. At the end of parental leave, workers shall have the right to return to the same job or, if that is not possible, to an equivalent or similar job consistent with their employment contract or employment relationship. 6. Rights acquired or in the process of being acquired by the worker on the date on which parental leave starts shall be maintained as they stand until the end of parental leave. At the end of parental leave, these rights, including any changes arising from national law, collective agreements or practice, shall apply. …’
32

In those circumstances the Raad van State decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, the first three of which are formulated in the same terms in the cases of Mr O. and Mr B., with only the fourth question specific to the case of Mr B.: ‘(1) Should Directive 2004/38 …, as regards the conditions governing the right of residence of members of the family of a Union citizen who have third‑country nationality, be applied by analogy, as in the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in [Singh and in Eind], where a Union citizen returns to the Member State of which he is a national after having resided in another Member State in the context of Article 21(1) [TFEU], and as the recipient of services within the meaning of Article 56 [TFEU]? (2) [If the first question is answered in the affirmative], is there a requirement that the residence of the Union citizen in another Member State must have been of a certain minimum duration if, after the return of the Union citizen to the Member State of which he is a national, the member of his family who is a third-country national wishes to gain a right of residence in that Member State? (3) [If the second question is answered in the affirmative], can that requirement then also be met if there was no question of continuous residence, but rather of a certain frequency of residence, such as during weekly residence at weekends or during regular visits? (4) As a result of the time which elapsed between the return of the Union citizen to the Member State of which he is a national and the arrival of the family member from a third country in that Member State, in circumstances such as those of the … case [concerning Mr B.], has there been a lapse of possible entitlement of the family member with third-country nationality to a right of residence derived from Union law?’
3

The Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988, in the version applicable to the main proceedings (‘ICTA’), provides in section 402: ‘(1) Subject to and in accordance with this Chapter and section 492(8), relief for trading losses and other amounts eligible for relief from corporation tax may, in the cases set out in subsections (2) and (3) below, be surrendered by a company (“the surrendering company”) and, on the making of a claim by another company (“the claimant company”) may be allowed to the claimant company by way of a relief from corporation tax called “group relief”. (2) Group relief shall be available in a case where the surrendering company and the claimant company are both members of the same group. A claim made by virtue of this subsection is referred to as a “group claim”. (3) Group relief shall also be available in the case of a surrendering company and a claimant company either where one of them is a member of a consortium and the other is— (a) a trading company which is owned by the consortium and which is not a 75 per cent subsidiary of any company; or (b) a trading company— (i) which is a 90 per cent subsidiary of a holding company which is owned by the consortium; and (ii) which is not a 75 per cent subsidiary of a company other than the holding company; or (c) a holding company which is owned by the consortium and which is not a 75 per cent subsidiary of any company; or, in accordance with section 406, where one of them is a member of a group of companies and the other is owned by a consortium and another company is a member of both the group and the consortium. A claim made by virtue of this subsection is referred to as “a consortium claim”. (3A) Group relief is not available unless the following condition is satisfied in the case of both the surrendering company and the claimant company. (3B) The condition is that the company is resident in the United Kingdom or is a non-resident company carrying on a trade in the United Kingdom through a permanent establishment. (4) A consortium claim shall not be made if a profit on a sale of the share capital of the other company or its holding company which the member owns would be treated as a trading receipt of that member. (5) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, two or more claimant companies may make claims relating to the same surrendering company, and to the same accounting period of that surrendering company. (6) A payment for group relief— (a) shall not be taken into account in computing profits or losses of either company for corporation tax purposes, and (b) shall not for any of the purposes of the Corporation Tax Acts be regarded as a distribution ...; and in this subsection “a payment for group relief” means a payment made by the claimant company to the surrendering company in pursuance of an agreement between them as respects an amount surrendered by way of group relief, being a payment not exceeding that amount.’
7

Article 16 of the LHO provides: ‘§ 1. The prohibitions referred to in Article 6 and Article 8 shall not apply to: (a) sales at the home of a consumer other than the purchaser, on condition that the sale takes place in the inhabited part of a dwelling used exclusively for private purposes; (b) home sales at the invitation of the consumer, in respect of which the customer has expressly requested in advance a visit by the vendor, for the purposes of negotiating the purchase of goods or services; (c) sales and the provision of services in retail outlets of public transport companies and in railway stations run directly or indirectly by NMBS-Holding (Belgian National Railways Company-Holding) or its subsidiaries, as well as in all the immovable property in which those stations are located; (d) sales and the provision of services in airports and port areas open to international travel; (e) the provision of services to be effected in the event of overriding necessity; (f) sales, in petrol stations or units of establishments located in motorway areas, of an assortment of general foodstuffs and household items, with the exception of distilled alcohol beverages and yeast-based beverages with an alcohol volume exceeding 6%, on condition that the net commercial surface area does not exceed 250 m2. Where a consumer accepts an offer of a visit at the initiative of the vendor, this shall not constitute an invitation within the meaning of (b). § 2. In addition, those prohibitions shall not apply to the units of an establishment whose main activity is the sale of one of the following groups of goods: (a) newspapers, magazines, tobacco products and smoking accessories, telephone cards and National Lottery products; (b) audiovisual media and video games, as well as the rental thereof; (c) fuel and oil for automobile vehicles; (d) ice cream in individual portions; (e) foodstuffs prepared in the unit of an establishment which are not consumed there. A main activity arises where the sale of the group of goods which constitutes the main activity accounts for at least 50% of annual turnover. ...’
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Limits — Request for interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — National legislation not constituting a measure implementing EU law and not having any other connection with EU law — Lack of jurisdiction of the Court

(Art. 267 TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts 17 and 51; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 94(a) and (c))
Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in respect of Belarus must be interpreted as meaning that, when taking a decision on whether to grant a derogation requested under that provision with a view to bringing an action challenging the lawfulness of restrictive measures imposed by the European Union, the competent national authority does not enjoy an absolute discretion, but must exercise its powers in a manner which upholds the rights provided for in the second sentence of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and observes the indispensable nature of legal representation in bringing such an action before the General Court of the European Union.

A freeze of funds cannot have the effect of depriving the persons whose funds have been frozen from effective access to justice. However, in the exercise of its discretion the competent national authority may verify that the funds release of which is requested are intended exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services. It may also set the conditions it deems appropriate in order to guarantee, inter alia, that the objective of the sanction imposed is not frustrated and the derogation granted is not distorted.

(see paras 26, 34, operative part 1)