JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition)

19 May 2021 ( *1 )

(Dumping – Imports of certain cast iron articles originating in China – Definitive anti-dumping duty – Action for annulment – Admissibility – Association – Standing to bring proceedings – Interest in bringing proceedings – Injury determination – Calculation of the import volume – Macroeconomic and microeconomic indicators – Sampling – Calculation of the EU industry’s cost of production – Prices charged intra-group – Causal link – Attribution and non-attribution analysis – No assessment of injury by segment – Assessment of the significance of undercutting – Confidential treatment of information – Rights of the defence – PCN-by-PCN methodology – Product comparability – Calculation of the normal value – Analogue country – Adjustment for VAT – Determination of the selling, general and administrative costs and profit)

In Case T‑254/18,

China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products, established in Beijing (China), and the other applicants whose names are listed in Annex I, ( 1 ) represented by R. Antonini, E. Monard and B. Maniatis, lawyers,

applicants,

v

European Commission, represented by T. Maxian Rusche and P. Němečková, acting as Agents,

defendant,

supported by

EJ Picardie, established in Saint-Crépin-Ibouvillers (France), and the other interveners whose names are listed in Annex II, ( 2 ) represented by U. O’Dwyer, B. O’Connor, Solicitors, and M. Hommé, lawyer,

interveners,

ACTION under Article 263 TFEU seeking the annulment of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/140 of 29 January 2018 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain cast iron articles originating in the People’s Republic of China and terminating the investigation on imports of certain cast iron articles originating in India (OJ 2018 L 25, p. 6), in so far as it concerns the applicants.

THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition),

composed of S. Gervasoni, President, L. Madise, P. Nihoul (Rapporteur), R. Frendo and J. Martín y Pérez de Nanclares, Judges,

Registrar: E. Artemiou, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure and further to the hearing on 29 June 2020,

gives the following

Judgment

Background to the dispute

1 On 31 October 2016, a complaint was lodged with the European Commission, in accordance with Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (OJ 2016 L 176, p. 21) (‘the basic regulation’), seeking to have it initiate an anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of certain cast iron articles originating in the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India.

2 That complaint was submitted by seven EU producers, namely Fondatel Lecomte SA, Fonderies Dechaumont SA, Fundiciones de Odena, SA, Heinrich Meier Eisengießerei GmbH & Co. KG, Saint-Gobain Construction Products UK Ltd, Saint-Gobain PAM SA and Ulefos Oy (‘the complainants’). It was supported by two EU producers, namely EJ Picardie and Montini SpA.

3 By notice published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 10 December 2016 (OJ 2016 C 461, p. 22), the Commission initiated an anti-dumping proceeding concerning the imports in question.

4 The product subject to the investigation was ‘certain articles of lamellar graphite cast iron (grey iron) or spheroidal graphite cast iron (also known as ductile cast iron), and parts thereof[, t]hese articles [being] of a kind used to: – cover ground or sub-surfaces systems, and/or openings to ground or sub-surface systems, and also – give access to ground or sub-surface systems and/or provide view to ground or sub-surface systems’ (‘the product concerned’).

5 The investigation into dumping and injury covered the period from 1 October 2015 to 30 September 2016 (‘the investigation period’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2013 to the end of the investigation period (‘the period under consideration’).

6 On 16 August 2017, the Commission adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1480 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain cast iron articles originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ 2017 L 211, p. 14) (‘the provisional regulation’). The Commission provisionally found no dumping in respect of imports originating in the Republic of India.

7 Following the anti-dumping proceeding, the Commission adopted Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/140 of 29 January 2018 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain cast iron articles originating in the People’s Republic of China and terminating the investigation on imports of certain cast iron articles originating in India (OJ 2018 L 25, p. 6) (‘the contested regulation’).

8 China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products (‘the CCCME’) is an association governed by Chinese law whose members include Chinese exporting producers of the product concerned. The CCCME took part in the administrative proceeding which led to the adoption of the contested regulation.

9 The other legal persons whose names are listed in Annex I are nine Chinese exporting producers, two of which were selected by the Commission as part of the sample of Chinese exporting producers used for the purposes of the investigation.

Procedure and forms of order sought

10 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 23 April 2018, the applicants, namely CCCME and the other legal persons whose names are listed in Annex I, brought the present action. The defence, reply and rejoinder were lodged on 22 August 2018, 12 November 2018 and 23 February 2019 respectively.

11 By documents lodged at the Court Registry on 26 July 2018, EJ Picardie and the other legal persons whose names are listed in Annex II sought leave to intervene in the present case in support of the form of order sought by the Commission. By order of 24 October 2018, the President of the First Chamber of the General Court granted such leave to intervene.

12 On 13 December 2018, the interveners lodged a statement in intervention at the Court Registry. The applicants and the Commission submitted their comments on that statement in intervention on 24 January 2019.

13 Following a change in the composition of the Chambers of the Court, the Judge Rapporteur was assigned to the Fourth Chamber, to which the present case was reassigned.

14 On a proposal from the Fourth Chamber, the Court decided, pursuant to Article 28 of its Rules of Procedure, to assign the case to a Chamber sitting in extended composition.

15 On a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, the Court (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) decided to open the oral part of the procedure and, by way of measures of organisation of procedure as provided for in Article 89 of its Rules of Procedure, put written questions to the parties and requested the Commission to produce a document. The parties replied to those questions and to that document production request within the prescribed period.

16 The parties presented oral argument at the hearing held on 29 June 2020.

17 The applicants claim that the Court should: – annul the contested regulation in so far as it applies to them and to the members of the CCCME mentioned in Annex A.2; – order the Commission and the interveners to pay the costs.

18 The applicants also request the Court to order, by way of a measure of organisation of procedure, the Commission to produce the calculations and source data concerning the import volumes, injury and dumping margin of the Chinese and Indian exporting producers.

19 The Commission, supported by the interveners, contends that the Court should: – dismiss the action as being inadmissible; – in the alternative, dismiss the action as being partially admissible; – in the further alternative, dismiss the action as being unfounded; – order the applicants to pay the costs.

Law

Admissibility

20 The Commission, supported by the interveners, sets out a number of pleas of inadmissibility against the action brought before the Court, alleging that: – the application lacks clarity and precision (first plea of inadmissibility, raised as the principal argument); – it is impossible for the CCCME to act in its own name and on behalf of its members (second and third pleas of inadmissibility, raised in the alternative); – the action is inadmissible in so far as it is brought by the other legal persons whose names appear in Annex I (fourth plea of inadmissibility, also raised in the alternative).

21 Those pleas of inadmissibility will be examined in the following paragraphs.

The lack of clarity and precision in the application

22 As its principal argument, the Commission maintains, in its first plea of inadmissibility, that the action is inadmissible in its entirety, on the ground that the application does not meet the minimum requirements of clarity and precision laid down in Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, in so far as the grouping together of entities challenging the contested regulation under the same term, namely ‘applicants’, does not make it possible to identify the claims submitted by each of them in the application.

23 In that regard, it should be recalled that, under Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which applies to the procedure before the General Court pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 53 of that statute, and under Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, the application must, in particular, contain the name of the applicant and a brief statement of the pleas in law relied on.

24 That information must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the action, if necessary without any other information (judgment of 11 September 2014, Gold East Paper and Gold Huasheng Paper v Council, T‑444/11, EU:T:2014:773, paragraph 93).

25 In the present case, the Commission does not maintain that the applicants are not properly identified or that the pleas in law are not sufficiently clear, but submits that, in their action, the applicants have not specified the pleas in law relied on by each of them, whereas those details are necessary to assess the effect of their status on the admissibility of the pleas in law relied on.

26 In that regard, it should be stated that, contrary to the Commission’s assertions, the essential information regarding the relationship between the applicants and the pleas raised are apparent from the application.

27 Indeed, paragraph 1 of the application states that the action is brought, first, by the CCCME on its own behalf in respect of certain claims, second, by the CCCME acting on behalf of its members and, third, by nine Chinese exporting producers acting individually without using the intermediary of the CCCME.

28 From that information it follows that solely the application for annulment brought by the CCCME on its own behalf is limited.

29 The scope of the action brought by the CCCME acting on its own behalf is set out, in paragraph 5 of the application, as seeking to safeguard its procedural rights, on the understanding that, in that context, the CCCME alleges infringement of the principle of sound administration, of the rights of the defence and of certain provisions of the basic regulation, namely Article 6(7), Article 19(1) to (3) and Article 20(2) and (4).

30 Accordingly, contrary to the Commission’s assertion, a relationship can be established, on the basis of the application, between the pleas in law and the applicants relying on them.

31 It follows that the Commission was in a position to put forward its defence taking account of the effect of the differences in the applicants’ status on the admissibility of the pleas and to reach conclusions on those issues and that the Court may, for its part, exercise its power of review in full knowledge of the facts, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 24 above.

32 In those circumstances, the first plea of inadmissibility must be rejected.

Admissibility of the action in so far as it is brought by the CCCME in its own name

33 In its action, the CCCME states that it is acting on its own behalf in order to safeguard the procedural rights conferred on it during the investigation pursuant to the basic regulation.

34 According to the Commission, which is supported by the interveners, the action is inadmissible in that respect, since the CCCME is not an association representing the interests of its members, but rather an emanation of the People’s Republic of China. Therefore, in the Commission’s view, the CCCME cannot rely on the procedural rights which the basic regulation grants to representative associations and to interested parties, but ought to be granted, in the light of that regulation, the status of representative of the exporting country, which confers on it, at most, a right to information.

35 In support of that position, which is put forward in the alternative and constitutes the second plea of inadmissibility raised against the admissibility of the action, the Commission and the interveners set out the following matters.

36 First, Article 4 of the CCCME’s articles of association, by stipulating that it is to act under the supervision, management and business guidance of the Ministry of Civil Affairs and of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, establishes that the CCCME is a working group of the Chinese administration, and not a trade association.

37 Second, the general meeting of the members of the CCCME is held only once every five years, as stated in Article 16 of its articles of association, whereas that meeting is represented as being the highest authority of the group and is deemed, on that basis, to have the powers listed in Article 14 of the CCCME’s articles of association.

38 Third, the Chinese chambers of commerce resulted from a reorganisation of governmental institutions and of the Chinese Communist Party. Their role as an extension of the party and of the State did not, however, fundamentally change when that reorganisation took place. Their conduct continues to be determined by the State, so that they do not have the independence required to be regarded as representative associations.

39 Fourth, the CCCME is managed by the national competent association management agency, in accordance with the Chinese legislation applicable to associations, with the result that the CCCME cannot take any initiative or defend any position without the prior authorisation of the People’s Republic of China.

40 Fifth, the existence of close links with the Chinese Ministry of Commerce is demonstrated by the involvement of a deputy director of that ministry at a meeting held by the CCCME on 9 December 2016 in order to examine the investigation planned at that time by the Commission and which led to the contested regulation being adopted. As regards that involvement, the existence of which is demonstrated by the minutes of that meeting provided by the applicants, the Commission states that that involvement bears out the fact that the CCCME’s participation in the investigation was a means for the People’s Republic of China to monitor its progress. The CCCME was present systematically during the inspections carried out by the Commission’s agents at the headquarters of the Chinese exporting producers as a means of carrying out such monitoring. Indeed, the Chinese exporting producers copied the CCCME on all emails exchanged with the Commission, even where they themselves were not members of the CCCME.

41 For their part, the interveners maintain that, at the direction of the People’s Republic of China, the CCCME is implementing a strategy designed to undermine legitimate trade defence measures taken by the European Union and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). That is, in their opinion, demonstrated by the fact that, in the present case, the CCCME is arguing in favour of two fundamental changes, namely, first, that the Court’s review of the legality of the contested regulation be extended and, second, that full access to confidential data contained in the Commission’s investigation file be granted.

42 Sixth, the interveners submit that the CCCME describes itself on its website as an organisation whose purpose is to rectify and regulate national market economic order. In that vein, the interveners state that a working committee for industry self-discipline was established within the CCCME in order to prevent harmful competition between Chinese companies as regards external trade and overseas engineering markets.

43 Seventh, the statements provided by the applicants show that the 19 undertakings on whose behalf the CCCME claims to act were not members of that entity during the investigation, but only became so between December 2017 and January 2018. In such circumstances, the CCCME cannot, in the view of the interveners, claim to be a genuine association representing those members. Moreover, the CCCME’s website does not mention cast iron products as a branch of activities covered by that association.

44 In order to adopt a position, it must be recalled that the task of the EU Courts, when an objection to the admissibility of an action or of part of an action is brought before them, is to determine whether the requirements laid down in the case-law concerning that type of objection have been satisfied.

45 In the present case, it appears that, according to the case-law, in order to establish whether the CCCME is entitled to bring an action in its own name, there must be an examination as to whether it has, first, locus standi and, second, an interest in bringing proceedings, which are required under Article 263 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 September 2015, Mory and Others v Commission, C‑33/14 P, EU:C:2015:609, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).

– Standing to bring proceedings

46 As regards standing to bring proceedings, the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU provides that any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first and second paragraphs of that provision, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person, against acts of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures.

47 Since the contested regulation is not addressed to the CCCME, it is necessary to establish whether, in so far as it seeks to safeguard its procedural rights by bringing an action in its own name, the CCCME may rely on the second situation provided for in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, namely the situation in which the applicant can establish that it is, first, individually and, second, directly concerned by the contested measure.

48 Those two requirements (individual concern and direct concern) are examined in turn in the following paragraphs.

49 According to the case-law, individual concern presupposes that the contested act affects the applicant by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to it or by reason of circumstances in which it is differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes it individually just as in the case of the person addressed by such a decision would be (judgment of 15 July 1963, Plaumann v Commission, 25/62, EU:C:1963:17, p. 107).

50 The fact that a person or entity is involved in some way or other in the procedure leading to the adoption of a contested measure is not sufficient to distinguish that person or entity individually in relation to the measure in question (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 October 1983, Fediol v Commission, 191/82, EU:C:1983:259, paragraph 31; of 17 January 2002, Rica Foods v Commission, T‑47/00, EU:T:2002:7, paragraph 55; and of 9 June 2016, Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association v Council, T‑276/13, EU:T:2016:340, paragraph 81).

51 By contrast, individual concern may be regarded as established where a provision of EU law requires, in order for an EU measure to be adopted, that a procedure be followed under which that person or entity may assert procedural rights, including the right to be heard, the particular legal position in which it finds itself being such as to distinguish it individually as provided for in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 October 1983, Fediol v Commission, 191/82, EU:C:1983:259, paragraph 31; of 17 January 2002, Rica Foods v Commission, T‑47/00, EU:T:2002:7, paragraph 55; and of 9 June 2016, Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association v Council, T‑276/13, EU:T:2016:340, paragraph 81).

52 In that context, it is necessary to examine whether, in the course of the procedure leading to the adoption of the contested regulation, the legislative body which enacted that regulation granted the CCCME procedural rights in respect of which it could seek protection by acting on its own behalf before the Courts of the European Union.

53 In the context of that examination, it should be noted that, following its request, the CCCME received authorisation from the Commission to gain access, pursuant to Article 6(7) of the basic regulation, to the investigation file, that authorisation having been granted on 16 December 2016.

54 Subsequently, the Commission addressed to the CCCME, in accordance with Article 20(1) of the basic regulation, the provisional conclusions which it had reached. According to the file, that communication took place on 17 August 2017. The CCCME submitted written comments on the provisional conclusions on 15 September 2017.

55 At a later stage, on 8 November 2017, the CCCME received, in accordance with Article 20(2) of the basic regulation, the final conclusions, in which the Commission intended to propose that definitive measures be imposed.

56 As regards those final conclusions, the CCCME submitted written comments on 20 November 2017, to which the Commission replied, as stated in recital 9 of the contested regulation.

57 Finally, the CCCME was granted, by the Commission, the right to take part in two hearings arranged in the context of the investigation, as provided for in Article 6(5) of the basic regulation, for persons or entities who, within the time limit laid down in the notice published in the Official Journal of the European Union, request in writing to be heard, demonstrating that they are indeed interested parties, that they are likely to be affected by the outcome of the proceedings and that there are particular reasons for hearing them.

58 It follows from those procedural documents that, throughout the administrative procedure, the CCCME was regarded by the Commission as an interested party to which the procedural rights provided for in the basic regulation ought to be granted.

59 The recognition of that status and of the resulting rights for the CCCME were noted in the contested regulation, in which the Commission stated, in recital 25, that, pursuant to the provisions in the basic regulation, that entity had to be regarded as an interested party representing, in particular, the Chinese castings industry.

60 On that basis, it must be held that, having thus been distinguished individually by the Commission during the administrative procedure, the CCCME satisfies the requirements laid down by the case-law for being regarded as individually concerned by the contested regulation as regards the action brought in its own name for the purpose of safeguarding its procedural rights.

61 That conclusion is disputed by the Commission and the interveners, which – without calling into question the fact that procedural rights and a particular status were granted to the CCCME during the investigation pursuant to the basic regulation – claim that that situation is, in fact, the product of an error. In preparing its defence before the Court, the Commission realised that, since the CCCME was an emanation of the People’s Republic of China, the CCCME could not, in fact, be granted the status and procedural rights provided for in the basic regulation. Even though it occurs at the stage of the judicial proceedings, recognition of such an error ought, according to the Commission, to render the action brought by the CCCME in its own name inadmissible.

62 In response to that argument, first, it must be recalled that, when hearing an objection concerning admissibility, the Courts of the European Union must examine whether the requirements of the Treaty have been satisfied and that that examination has led to the conclusion that that was indeed so in the instant case.

63 Second, it must be stated that the Commission’s line of argument amounts to suggesting that the legal position which it granted to the CCCME, pursuant to the basic regulation, must be disregarded for the purposes of the present action, on the ground that that position was the result of an error attributable to it.

64 Such an error, even if it were established, could not erase what was recognised and granted during the administrative procedure, particularly as the author of a contested measure is able to correct the errors which it makes in the course of that measure’s adoption. Accordingly, that author may, when it becomes aware of the error, decide that procedural rights and recognised status are to be withdrawn from the party concerned, without prejudice to that party’s ability then to request the EU Courts to review the validity of the decision thus taken (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 January 2000, BEUC v Commission, T‑256/97, EU:T:2000:21, paragraphs 27 and 84). Where the error is identified after the administrative procedure has closed, as is so in the present case according to the arguments put forward by the Commission, the author of the contested measure retains the possibility of withdrawing that measure and resuming the procedure, correcting the error at the stage at which it was committed (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 March 2016, Frucona Košice v Commission, T‑103/14, EU:T:2016:152, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited), without prejudice to the possibility for the party concerned to contest once again the decision taken in its regard.

65 It follows that the argument put forward by the Commission with the support of the interveners must be rejected.

66 In so far as is necessary, it should be pointed out that the Commission further maintains that, even if the CCCME were able to claim procedural rights derived from the basic regulation, that entity ought to be recognised as a representative association within the meaning of that regulation, and not as an interested party within the meaning of the same regulation. The status of representative association gives access to procedural rights which are more limited than those available to interested parties, with the consequence that the action ought to be declared inadmissible in respect of certain procedural rights relied on by the CCCME which are granted by the basic regulation only to interested parties.

67 By way of response to that argument, suffice it to point out that that representation of the CCCME by the Commission does not correspond to what is set out in the contested regulation, the statement of reasons of which is what is to be taken into account in the present action.

68 In the contested regulation, the Commission acknowledged the CCCME’s status as an interested party, without ambiguity, as was indicated in paragraph 59 above. The Commission accordingly stated as follows in recital 25: ‘… the Commission considered that the open file of the case made available to parties, including to the CCCME, contained all the information relevant for the presentation of their cases and used in the investigation. If the information was deemed confidential, the open file contained meaningful summaries thereof. All the interested parties, including the CCCME, had access to the open file and could consult it. With regard to the CCCME, the Commission observed that although it represents, among others, the Chinese castings industry, it was not authorised by any individual sampled exporting producer to have access to its confidential information. Thus, the confidential disclosure sent to the individual sampled Chinese exporting producers could not be provided to the CCCME.’

69 Moreover, as is apparent from paragraphs 53 to 58 above, the Commission granted to the CCCME, during the procedure, both procedural rights which are expressly provided for in relation to representative associations, such as those set out in Article 20(1) and (2) of the basic regulation, enabling information to be obtained on the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which provisional measures have been imposed or on the basis of which it is intended to recommend the imposition of definitive measures, and other procedural rights granted without distinction to all interested parties under that regulation, such as the right to be heard pursuant to Article 6(5) of the basic regulation.

70 In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be held that the CCCME satisfies the requirements to be regarded as being individually concerned within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, without prejudice to the possibility that the Commission may deny, where appropriate, in the future, the CCCME the status and guarantees at issue and the possibility, for the entity concerned, to challenge that decision before the EU Courts in such a situation.

71 Since individual concern has therefore been established, it is necessary to examine whether the CCCME may be regarded as also being directly concerned, which requires that the following conditions be satisfied cumulatively.

72 First, the contested measure must directly affect the applicant’s legal situation (judgment of 13 October 2011, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, C‑463/10 P and C‑475/10 P, EU:C:2011:656, paragraph 66).

73 Second, the contested measure must leave no discretion to its addressees, who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from EU rules without the application of other intermediate rules (judgment of 13 October 2011, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, C‑463/10 P and C‑475/10 P, EU:C:2011:656, paragraph 66).

74 Those conditions are satisfied in the present case, since the CCCME can ensure that its procedural rights are respected only if it is able to challenge the contested regulation.

75 Since the CCCME is, accordingly, directly affected as well as individually affected, it must be concluded that it has standing to bring proceedings in its own name in order to ensure that its procedural rights are safeguarded (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 February 2019, Council v Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association, C‑465/16 P, EU:C:2019:155, paragraphs 101 to 109).

76 To complete the analysis, it is stated that, in the defence, the Commission maintained that the CCCME was not a legal person within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. At the hearing, however, it withdrew that plea of inadmissibility after examining the documents provided by the applicants concerning the legal personality of the CCCME under Chinese law, a fact of which note was taken in the minutes of the hearing.

– Interest in bringing proceedings

77 As regards interest in bringing proceedings, it is stated in the case-law that an action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person is admissible only in so far as that person has an interest in the annulment of the contested measure (judgment of 10 December 2010, Ryanair v Commission, T‑494/08 to T‑500/08 and T‑509/08, EU:T:2010:511, paragraph 41; orders of 9 November 2011, ClientEarth and Others v Commission, T‑120/10, not published, EU:T:2011:646, paragraph 46, and of 30 April 2015, EEB v Commission, T‑250/14, not published, EU:T:2015:274, paragraph 14).

78 In that regard, it must be observed that the annulment of the contested regulation would require the Commission to reopen the anti-dumping procedure and, if it took the view that the conditions laid down in the basic regulation for that purpose had been met, to allow the CCCME to intervene in the proceeding by obtaining its comments in accordance with the basic regulation.

79 Since it is capable of having such effects, an annulment could have legal consequences for the CCCME acting in its own name.

80 In those circumstances, it must be held that the CCCME has the interest in bringing proceedings which is necessary to bring the present action in its own name.

Admissibility of the action in so far as it is brought by the CCCME on behalf of its members and admissibility of the arguments raised in support of that action

81 In the third plea of inadmissibility, also raised in the alternative, the Commission, by means of four arguments, disputes the CCCME’s ability to bring an action on behalf of its members.

– Lack of representativeness

82 The Commission, supported by the interveners, contends that the right of associations to bring legal proceedings when they act on behalf of their members is permitted, in the case-law, only for associations which are representative. In Member States’ legal tradition, that term refers to the character of a body governed by private law which is capable of representing the collective interests of its members as democratically defined by those members within it. That representativeness, it is argued, is not present in the case of the CCCME, which ought to be regarded as an emanation of the People’s Republic of China and cannot therefore rely on the case-law at issue.

83 In that regard, it must be stated that, according to the case-law, an association is entitled to bring an action for annulment in particular where it represents the interests of undertakings which themselves are entitled to bring proceedings (order of 23 November 1999, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council, T‑173/98, EU:T:1999:296, paragraph 47, and judgment of 15 September 2016, Molinos Río de la Plata and Others v Council, T‑112/14 to T‑116/14 and T‑119/14, not published, EU:T:2016:509, paragraph 33).

84 An association’s ability to act on behalf of its members is based on the significant advantage afforded by that method of proceeding, by obviating the institution of numerous separate actions against the same acts by the members of the association representing their interests (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 July 1995, AITEC and Others v Commission, T‑447/93 to T‑449/93, EU:T:1995:130, paragraph 60; of 15 September 2016, Molinos Río de la Plata and Others v Council, T‑112/14 to T‑116/14 and T‑119/14, not published, EU:T:2016:509, paragraph 35; and of 30 April 2019, UPF v Commission, T‑747/17, EU:T:2019:271, paragraph 25).

85 It follows from the case-law cited in paragraph 84 of the present judgment that, in order for that advantage to materialise, it is necessary and sufficient, first, that the association in question acts on behalf of its members (who are themselves entitled to bring proceedings, something which is to be examined subsequently) and, second, that the powers conferred on it in its articles of association permit actions to be initiated.

86 It is necessary to examine whether those two requirements can be regarded as being satisfied so far as concerns the CCCME.

87 As regards the first requirement, it must be observed that, in order to establish their status as members, the CCCME provided to the Court, in respect of each of the undertakings on whose behalf the action is brought, a document attesting to their membership.

88 As regards the second requirement, it may be noted that the articles of association produced by the CCCME set out the corporate purpose to be pursued by that association in terms which enable legal proceedings intended to defend the interests of its members against trade defence measures to be covered.

89 That finding is based on Article 3 of the articles of association of the CCCME, which defines the CCCME’s corporate purpose as being ‘to provide its members with coordination, consultation and service; maintain a level playing field against trade protectionism; safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of its members; and promote the healthy development of the mechanical and electronic industries’.

90 That finding is also based on Article 6(4), (5) and (9) of the articles of association, which grants the CCCME the ability to ‘organi[s]e enterprises to deal with trade remedies cases and intellectual property litigation cases with respect to overseas exports of mechanical and electronical products from China, provide legal advice and legal support for members, and apply to the government for investigation of unfair competition practices of foreign companies[,] to organise the formulation of industry service regulations, promote industry self-regulation and maintain normal import and export business order as well as the common interest of members … and to carry out other work based on the requirements of the members’.

91 In so far as is necessary, it may be noted that the corporate purpose of the CCCME is described in its articles of association in terms similar to those used in the articles of association of the applicant associations in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 28 February 2019, Council v Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association (C‑465/16 P, EU:C:2019:155, paragraphs 60 to 63), in which the Court of Justice held that the condition relating to standing to bring proceedings for those associations was satisfied.

92 Accordingly, it must be held that, in the present case, the two conditions laid down in the case-law for an association to bring an action on behalf of its members are satisfied.

93 That position is, however, disputed in two respects by the Commission and the interveners.

94 In the first place, the interveners state that the certificates produced by the CCCME to establish the membership of the undertakings claiming to belong to its organisation were drawn up shortly before the action was brought, without that membership having been demonstrated during the administrative phase which led to the adoption of the contested regulation.

95 In their view, representation covering the entire procedure, including the administrative stage, ought to be established, in order to be able to rely on the case-law enabling associations to act on behalf of their members, without which the representation would be artificial, being exclusively linked to the bringing of the action.

96 In that regard, suffice it to recall that, according to the case-law, the recognition of a right of action for associations on behalf of their members is based on a procedural reason linked to the sound administration of justice, namely the advantage which stems from bringing together, in one action, a series of actions which would otherwise be brought by the undertakings concerned (see paragraph 84 of the present judgment), and that it is not required that the representation covers the entire procedure, including the administrative stage, in order for the association to be able to bring an action on behalf of its members.

97 In the present case, such an advantage is indeed present, since the action brought by the CCCME on behalf of its members makes it possible to obviate the institution of an action by each of the members on whose behalf it acts. In addition, it is common ground that, on the date on which the action was brought, the undertakings on whose behalf the CCCME brings legal proceedings were indeed members of that association.

98 In the second place, the Commission, supported by the interveners, submits that, beyond the two requirements which have just been examined, a third requirement, linked to the representativeness of the association at issue, for the purposes of the legal tradition common to the Member States, was introduced by the judgment of 28 February 2019, Council v Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association (C‑465/16 P, EU:C:2019:155).

99 In that regard, it must be stated that, in the judgment of 28 February 2019, Council v Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association (C‑465/16 P, EU:C:2019:155, paragraphs 120 to 125), the Court of Justice held that the absence of a right to vote or any other means for undertakings to defend their interests within an association did not preclude an association from bringing an action on behalf of its members.

100 On that basis, the Court of Justice set aside the judgment of 9 June 2016, Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association v Council (T‑276/13, EU:T:2016:340), by which, at first instance, the General Court, introducing a requirement adding to the conditions examined above, had held that the right of action of associations had to be subject, where they claimed to act on behalf of their members, to the existence of a right to vote or another means enabling their members to express their views within the organisation.

101 It is therefore necessary to reject the interpretation of the judgment of 28 February 2019, Council v Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association (C‑465/16 P, EU:C:2019:155), put forward by the Commission and the interveners, according to which the right of associations to bring legal proceedings on behalf of their members contains an additional condition which is linked to the representativeness of that association for the purposes of the legal tradition common to the Member States.

102 Moreover, it may be noted that the EU legislature has demonstrated a certain realism by making provision, in anti-dumping legislation, for the situation in which dumped imports originate in a country which does not have a market economy. Thus, Article 2 of the basic regulation lays down different rules for determining normal value according to whether or not the exporting producers concerned are established in a country with a market economy.

103 If a condition of representativeness were necessary with regard to an entity purporting to be an association, account ought to be taken, in order to assess whether that condition is satisfied, first, of the specific features of the third country from which that entity originates and, second, of the fact that, in the case of a non-market economy State, the public authorities intervene to a greater degree in the functioning and activities of undertakings or associations operating within its territory.

104 On the basis of those considerations, the first argument put forward by the Commission and the interveners against the admissibility of the action brought by the CCCME on behalf of its members must be rejected.

– Nature of the contested regulation

105 The Commission maintains, also in order to dispute the CCCME’s ability to act on behalf of its members, that the nature of the contested regulation precludes the application, in proceedings concerning trade defence measures, of the case-law on the admissibility of actions brought by associations.

106 According to the Commission, the contested regulation involves a bundle of decisions each concerning an individual exporting producer. Since the effects of a possible annulment of that regulation can benefit only the exporting producer which brought an action, it is of fundamental importance, for reasons of legal certainty, to identify the undertakings seeking that annulment via the association which acts on their behalf. Such identification is not possible, on the basis of information in the Official Journal of the European Union regarding court proceedings brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union, where an action is brought by an association on behalf of its members.

107 In that regard, it must be noted that the case-law does not make it possible to exclude the right for an association to bring proceedings on behalf of its members against trade defence measures (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 February 2019, Council v Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association, C‑465/16 P, EU:C:2019:155, paragraph 126; of 21 March 2012, Fiskeri og Havbruksnæringens Landsforening and Others v Council, T‑115/06, not published, EU:T:2012:136, paragraph 29; and of 15 September 2016, Molinos Río de la Plata and Others v Council, T‑112/14 to T‑116/14 and T‑119/14, not published, EU:T:2016:509, paragraph 63).

108 The procedural advantages which the case-law acknowledges in respect of actions of that kind are also a feature of the present case, since the regulations imposing anti-dumping duties can affect a large number of exporting producers identified in those measures or concerned by the investigation which preceded their adoption.

109 It is true that, in accordance with the case-law, a regulation imposing different anti-dumping duties is of direct concern to each operator which is the subject of that regulation only in respect of the regulation’s provisions which impose a specific anti-dumping duty on that operator and determine the amount thereof, and not in respect of those provisions which impose anti-dumping duties on other undertakings (judgment of 10 March 1992, Ricoh v Council, C‑174/87, EU:C:1992:108, paragraph 7).

110 Accordingly, an action for annulment of a regulation imposing anti-dumping duties, if successful, results in the annulment of that regulation in so far as it imposes an anti-dumping duty on the applicant and that annulment does not affect the validity of the other aspects of that regulation, in particular the anti-dumping duty applicable to other operators (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 February 2001, Nachi Europe, C‑239/99, EU:C:2001:101, paragraph 27).

111 However, suffice it to observe that the exporting producers on whose behalf the CCCME acts are 19 Chinese exporting producers identified in Annex A.2 to the application as being Hebei Cheng’An Babel Casting Co. Ltd, Shanxi Jiaocheng Xinglong Casting Co. Ltd, Tianjin Jinghai Chaoyue Industrial and Commercial Co. Ltd, Qingdao Jiatailong Industrial Co. Ltd, Qingdao Jinfengtaike Machinery Co. Ltd, Shahe City Fangyuan Casting Co. Ltd, Shandong Heshengda Machinery Technology Co. Ltd, Baoding Shuanghu Casting Co. Ltd, Tang County Kaihua Metal Products Co. Ltd, Weifang Nuolong Machinery Co. Ltd, Laiwu Xinlong Weiye Foundry Co. Ltd, Handan Zhangshui Pump Manufacturing Co. Ltd, Zibo Joy’s Metal Co. Ltd, Dingxiang Sitong Forging and Casting Industrial, Jiaocheng County Honglong Machinery Manufacturing Co. Ltd, Laiwu City Haitian Machinery Plant, Lianyungang Ganyu Xingda Casting Foundry, Rockhan Technology Co. Ltd and Botou GuangTai Precision Casting Factory.

112 It follows that, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 110 of the present judgment, only those members could benefit from an annulment if the Court were to find that the CCCME was successful in the action which it had brought on their behalf.

113 For that reason, the second argument put forward by the Commission to challenge the admissibility of the action brought by the CCCME on behalf of its members must be rejected.

– Members not included in the sample

114 The Commission points out that the members of the CCCME were not included in the sample of Chinese exporting producers which it selected during the investigation and submits that the case-law permits solely operators which were so selected to bring proceedings.

115 In that regard, it must be recalled that, as stated in paragraph 46 of the present judgment, under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU a person has standing to bring proceedings against an act addressed to that person, against an act which is of direct and individual concern to him or her or against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to him or her and which does not entail implementing measures.

116 The first and third situations envisaged by that provision do not concern the members of the CCCME, since, first, the contested regulation is not addressed to those members (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 September 2016Molinos Río de la Plata and Others v Council, T‑112/14 to T‑116/14 and T‑119/14, not published, EU:T:2016:509, paragraphs 39), and, second, the contested regulation involves implementing measures, the system established by Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ 2013 L 269, p. 1) and in the context of which the contested regulation was adopted, provides in fact that the duties fixed by that regulation are collected on the basis of the measures adopted by the national authorities (see, to that effect, order of 21 January 2014, Bricmate v Council, T‑596/11, not published, EU:T:2014:53, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).

117 Since the present case does not involve the first and third situations provided for in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, it is necessary to establish whether the conditions laid down for the application of the second situation are fulfilled as regards the members of the CCCME, which entails examining whether they are directly and individually concerned.

118 In the present case, the condition relating to direct concern is fulfilled since (i) the contested regulation directly affects the legal situation of the members of the CCCME and (ii) the customs authorities of the Member States are required to levy the duties imposed by the contested regulation without having any margin of discretion (see, to that effect, judgments of 29 March 1979, ISO v Council, 118/77, EU:C:1979:92, paragraph 26, and of 15 September 2016, Molinos Río de la Plata and Others v Council, T‑112/14 to T‑116/14 and T‑119/14, not published, EU:T:2016:509, paragraph 62).

119 As regards individual concern, it must be recalled that, according to the case-law, regulations imposing anti-dumping duties are, by their nature and scope, of a legislative nature in that they apply generally to the economic operators concerned (judgments of 16 April 2015, TMK Europe, C‑143/14, EU:C:2015:236, paragraph 19, and of 28 February 2019, Council v Marquis Energy, C‑466/16 P, EU:C:2019:156, paragraph 47). That legislative nature does not, however, preclude those regulations from being of individual concern to those producers and exporters of the product concerned who are alleged to have carried out dumping on the basis of data relating to their commercial activities. That is the case, in general, of producers and exporters which are able to establish that they were identified in the acts of the Commission or the Council or that they were concerned by the preliminary investigations (judgment of 28 February 2019, Council v Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association, C‑465/16 P, EU:C:2019:155, paragraph 79; see also judgment of 16 January 2014, BP Products North America v Council, T‑385/11, EU:T:2014:7, paragraph 74 and the case-law cited).

120 In that regard, it must be observed that the members of the CCCME are producers and exporters of the product concerned which, first, provided the Commission with information in response to the questionnaire contained in Annex I to the notice of initiation of the investigation and, second, are identified in the contested regulation, more particularly in the annex to which Article 1(2) of the operative part of that regulation refers. In their capacity as other cooperating companies identified in that annex, the members of the CCCME are subject to an anti-dumping duty of a specific amount, which is different from the amount applicable to all the other unidentified companies to which the contested regulation applies. Therefore, and as the Commission itself submits, as stated in paragraph 106 of the present judgment, the contested regulation comprises a bundle of decisions each concerning a particular exporting producer.

121 In those circumstances, it must be held, in the light of the criteria resulting from the case-law as identified in paragraph 119 of the present judgment, that, in addition to being directly concerned by the contested regulation, the members of the CCCME are individually concerned by that regulation.

122 Finally, the members of the CCCME have an interest in bringing proceedings since, by virtue of being subject to the anti-dumping duties imposed by the contested regulation, they have an interest in the annulment of that regulation.

123 Accordingly, it must be held that the members of the CCCME and, consequently, that association itself, fulfil the conditions for their action to be admissible and the third argument put forward by the Commission against that conclusion must be rejected.

– Limits on the arguments which may relied upon

124 The Commission maintains that the CCCME cannot rely, on behalf of its members, on an infringement of the provisions which, in the basic regulation, relate to matters other than those concerning the determination, by the Commission, of the injury caused to the EU industry.

125 The Commission states that the mandate conferred on the CCCME by the Chinese exporting producers during the anti-dumping investigation extended solely to defending those undertakings against its claims regarding injury. It follows that the members of the CCCME granted that entity the right to represent them during the investigation and, therefore, in the present action, solely in order to defend them against the Commission’s assertions concerning injury.

126 In that regard, it should be recalled that, as stated in paragraphs 88 to 90 of the present judgment, the tasks conferred on the CCCME by the articles of association governing its creation and organisation include defending the interests of its members.

127 By its general nature, such a task covers initiating legal proceedings designed to defend the interests of its members against trade defence measures and to put forward, in that context, any plea capable of calling into question the lawfulness of those measures, even if the mandate received from the members was limited, during the investigation, to injury.

128 It must, furthermore, be recalled that, according to the case-law, an association whose tasks under its statutes include defending the interests of its members, as is the case in respect of the CCCME, need not have a mandate or specific authority established by the members whose interests it defends in order to be recognised as having standing to bring proceedings before the EU Courts (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 January 2013, Aiscat v Commission, T‑182/10, EU:T:2013:9, paragraph 53), since, by its very nature, initiating an action is inherent in the defence of such interests.

129 It is thus necessary to reject the fourth argument put forward by the Commission, according to which it is impossible for the CCCME to plead, on behalf of its members, an infringement of provisions which do not concern the injury caused to the EU industry.

Admissibility of the action in so far as it is brought by the other legal persons whose names appear in Annex I

130 In the alternative, the Commission also disputes the admissibility of the action in so far as it is brought by the other legal persons whose names appear in Annex I.

131 In the first place, the Commission maintains that, for the reason already set out in paragraph 114 of the present judgment, seven of the other legal persons whose names appear in Annex I, who are non-sampled Chinese exporting producers, do not have the standing required to bring proceedings.

132 In that regard, it must be held that, like the members of the CCCME, those undertakings, which are exporting producers of the product concerned, first, provided the Commission with information in response to the questionnaire contained in Annex I to the notice of initiation of the investigation and, second, are identified in the contested regulation as other cooperating companies listed in the annex to that regulation. On that basis, their names appear in that annex and they are subject to an anti-dumping duty of a specific amount, with the result that it must be concluded that the contested regulation contains a bundle of decisions each concerning a particular exporting producer. Accordingly, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraphs 118 to 122 of the present judgment, the conclusion must be drawn that those seven legal persons have an interest and standing to bring proceedings.

133 In the second place, the Commission maintains that the mandates provided by the other legal persons whose names appear in Annex I contain irregularities which preclude the action from being admissible, on the ground that they do not identify clearly the position of the persons who signed them and do not establish that those persons had the power to sign such documents.

134 More particularly, as regards seven of the other legal persons whose names appear in Annex I, the position of the person who signed the authority to act is a ‘general manager’, ‘managing director’, ‘financial controller’ or ‘director’, without any further explanation or justification as to whether that person was able to sign such a mandate under Chinese law.

135 As regards the other two legal persons whose names are listed in Annex I, it is submitted that they provided a mandate which did not state the signatory’s position, without, furthermore, attaching any documents establishing that the signatory had the power to sign such a document.

136 In that regard, it must be stated that the version of the Rules of Procedure which stems from the regulation of 23 April 2015 (OJ 2015 L 105, p. 1), does not require proof that the authority granted to the lawyer was conferred on him by someone authorised for the purpose, as was the case for the Rules of Procedure of 2 May 1991, which were previously in force (see, to that effect, order of 7 March 2016, Sopra Steria Group v Parliament, T‑182/15, not published, EU:T:2016:165, paragraphs 26 to 29; judgments of 28 September 2016, European Food v EUIPO – Société des produits Nestlé (FITNESS), T‑476/15, EU:T:2016:568, paragraph 19, and of 17 February 2017, Batmore Capital v EUIPO – Univers Poche (POCKETBOOK), T‑596/15, not published, EU:T:2017:103, paragraphs 19 and 20).

137 It follows that the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission must be rejected.

138 Consequently, it must be held that the other legal persons whose names are listed in Annex I are entitled to bring an action for annulment against the contested regulation.

Conclusion on admissibility

139 In the light of all of the foregoing considerations, it must be held that the action is admissible, first, in so far as it is brought by the CCCME in its own name in order to safeguard its procedural rights, second, in so far as it is brought by the CCCME on behalf of the 19 members which it identified and, third, in so far as it is brought by the other legal persons whose names appear in Annex I.

Substance

140 The applicants put forward six pleas in law in support of their action.

141 The first plea in law alleges infringement of Article 3(2), (3), and (5) to (7) of the basic regulation and failure to have regard to the principle of sound administration in so far as the Commission did not base its injury and causation findings on positive evidence or on an objective examination.

142 The second plea in law alleges that the Commission infringed Article 3(6) and (7) of the basic regulation in its causation analysis.

143 The third plea in law alleges that the Commission infringed the rights of the defence and Article 6(7), Article 19(1) to (3) and Article 20(2) and (4) of the basic regulation by refusing to give the applicants access to information relevant to the dumping and injury determinations.

144 The fourth plea in law alleges infringement of Article 2(10), Article 3(2)(a), Article 3(3) and Article 9(4) of the basic regulation and failure to have regard to the principle of sound administration in the determination of the dumping margin, price undercutting and injury elimination level.

145 The fifth plea in law alleges that the Commission infringed Article 2(10)(b) and Article 2(7)(a) of the basic regulation by making the adjustment for value added tax (VAT) in the context of the comparison between the export price and the normal value.

146 The sixth plea in law alleges infringement of Article 2(7)(a) of the basic regulation in the determination of the selling, general and administrative costs (‘SG&A costs’) and profit used for the constructed normal value.

Scope of judicial review

147 As a preliminary point, the applicants submit that there must be a full judicial review of the contested regulation, which should not be limited to the ‘manifest error of assessment’ test which in general forms the basis of judicial review of complex economic evaluations.

148 At the hearing, the applicants stated that, in making that preliminary observation, they did not intend to depart from the existing case-law, but merely wished to emphasise that, in their view, the EU Courts had to verify the material accuracy, reliability and consistency of the evidence relied on by the Commission even in areas in which the Commission has a broad discretion.

149 In that regard, it should be recalled that, in accordance with the case-law, in view of the broad discretion enjoyed by the EU institutions in the field of trade defence measures, the EU Courts must confine themselves to reviewing, in proceedings concerning trade defence measures, which are characterised by the complexity of the economic and political situations which must be examined, whether the rules of law have been complied with, whether the relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the facts on which the contested choice is based have been accurately stated, whether there are any manifest errors of assessment of those facts and whether there has been a misuse of powers (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 September 2019, Trace Sport, C‑251/18, EU:C:2019:766, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

150 In that context, it is for the Court, as the applicants request, first, to establish whether the evidence relied upon is factually accurate, reliable and consistent, and second, to ascertain whether that evidence contains all the relevant information which had to be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it (judgment of 7 April 2016, ArcelorMittal Tubular Products Ostrava and Others v Hubei Xinyegang Steel, C‑186/14 P and C‑193/14 P, EU:C:2016:209, paragraph 36).

The first plea in law: injury determination and causation

151 The first plea is divided into six parts.

– The first part of the first plea in law: the calculation of import volumes

152 In the first part, the applicants maintain that the Commission used unreliable data supplied by the complainants to calculate the volume of dumped imports.

153 That line of argument is disputed by the Commission.

154 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that in accordance with Article 1(1) of the basic regulation, an anti-dumping duty may be imposed on any dumped product whose release for free circulation in the European Union causes injury.

155 Article 3(2)(a) of the basic regulation provides that a determination of injury is to be based on positive evidence and is to involve an objective examination, in particular, of the volume of the dumped imports.

156 Data from the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat) are to be used to calculate the volume of dumped imports (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 March 2012, GLS, C‑338/10, EU:C:2012:158, paragraph 30). Those data are classified according to codes derived from the combined nomenclature (CN). In the present case, the product covered by the contested regulation falls under two codes: CN code ex73251000 (non-malleable cast iron) and CN code ex73259910 (malleable cast iron), the term ‘ex’ before the code indicating, in both cases, that the product under investigation comes under only part of the code under consideration.

157 In order to establish the volume of dumped imports, the transactions which were registered under those codes during the period under consideration, namely, between 1 January 2013 and 30 September 2016, must be added together.

158 In the present case, adjustments had to be made to resolve three difficulties arising in the calculation of the volume of dumped imports.

159 The first difficulty concerned non-malleable cast iron products (CN ex73251000). Prior to 2014, those products formed part of a larger group (CN ex732510), which was broken down into sub-codes, three of which included the product concerned, the third of those sub-codes with CN code ex73251099, however, was not restricted to that product. From 2014 onwards, that breakdown no longer existed. In order to establish the volume of dumped imports, the Commission had only data corresponding to CN code ex73251000 which covered the product concerned, together with other products. To resolve the difficulty, it was necessary, within those more general figures, to isolate the figures which corresponded to the actual imports of the product concerned during the period under consideration. In order to achieve that, the Commission relied on a suggestion made by the complainants involving two methodological decisions. First of all, to determine the proportion of imports of the product concerned covered by the general category, the complainants suggested that the Commission rely on the ratio of those imports in the three sub-codes which, prior to 2014, provided data concerning that product. Next, as regards the third of those sub-codes, which did not cover solely the product concerned, but rather was broader, the suggestion was made to estimate the proportion attributable to the product concerned at 30%.

160 On the basis of that reasoning, it was observed that, before 2014, as regards Chinese imports, 60% of the volume recorded as imports from China under CN code ex732510 was derived from the three sub-codes corresponding to the product concerned. As regards Indian imports, that ratio was 73%, whereas it was 50% for the other third countries. Those percentages were then applied to imports recorded during the period between 1 January 2014 and the end of the investigation period under CN code ex73251000.

161 The second difficulty related to malleable cast iron (CN ex73259910). The code which corresponded to that product remained unchanged throughout the period under consideration. However, that code also covered products other than the product concerned. In order to resolve that difficulty, the Commission used a method suggested by the complainants, as it had done for non-malleable cast iron.

162 First of all, as the complainants had done, the Commission observed that the importers of the product concerned in malleable cast iron originating in the People’s Republic of China had started to use CN code ex73259910 in 2005, when previous anti-dumping measures had been imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 1212/2005 of 25 July 2005 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain castings originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ 2005 L 199, p. 1). In order to calculate the imports concerned by that code, it selected, on the basis of that observation, the previous year, namely 2004, as the reference year. It had data for that reference year which set out, for the People’s Republic of China, imports corresponding to CN code ex73259910 but not relating to the product concerned. It therefore calculated the quantity of the product concerned by the imports from the People’s Republic of China under that code by subtracting the transactions which had been carried out in 2004 from the volume of imports in the period under consideration. Following that reasoning, the Commission accordingly took the view that, for the People’s Republic of China, a proportion of 100% of the transactions relating to the product concerned came under CN code ex73259910, from which 14645 tonnes was to be subtracted.

163 A similar calculation was then made for imports from the Republic of India. The complainants observed that, for the product concerned, imports under CN code ex73259910 from that country had commenced in 2010. According to the complainants, that could be explained by the withdrawal of the minimum price undertaking from which the CCCME and certain Chinese companies benefited under the previous anti-dumping measures imposed by Regulation No 1212/2005. Following that withdrawal, many operators sought to obtain supplies from Indian producers. That led to the growth of imports from that country for the product concerned. Having made that finding, the Commission, thereby following the suggestion made by the complainants, calculated the quantity of the product concerned under CN code ex73259910 for imports from the Republic of India by subtracting the 2009 import volumes from the import volumes during the period under consideration. Once that reasoning had been applied, it accordingly took the view that a proportion of 100% of the transactions relating to the product concerned came under CN code ex73259910, from which 6074 tonnes had to be subtracted.

164 Finally, the investigations carried out by the complainants showed that it was unlikely that imports from other third countries coming under that code contained the product concerned. The Commission, thereby following the complainants, accordingly took the view that, for the other third countries, 0% of the transactions relating to the product concerned came under CN code ex73259910.

165 The third difficulty concerned channel gratings. Those products form part of the Eurostat data corresponding to codes used for the product concerned. However, as stated in recital 41 of the contested regulation, they were excluded from the investigation. To establish the volume of dumped imports, it was therefore necessary to deduct the figures which could be attributed to channel gratings from the available figures.

166 To resolve that difficulty, the Commission, acting on its own initiative, relied on an estimate of imports of channel gratings. In order to make that estimate, it set out the average sales of channel gratings made by the sampled Chinese exporting producers during the investigation period. Those sales represented 10% of the total imports used for that period. That percentage was applied to the figures obtained for imports recorded during the period under consideration.

167 The context of the first part of the first plea having thus been explained, it must be noted that, in that part of the plea, the applicants raise three complaints concerning the calculation made by the Commission to establish the volume of dumped imports.

168 By their first complaint, the applicants complain that the Commission accepted the data submitted by the complainants without verifying them, which is contrary to the impartiality which should govern its attitude in that type of procedure.

169 In that regard, it must be stated that, in the present case, in order to calculate the volume of dumped imports, the Commission did not merely use the data provided by the complainants, but rather used a method which had been suggested by the complainants, while ensuring, on the basis of that method which it had in the meantime endorsed, that it would itself perform the calculation leading to the figures which it finally used.

170 In at least two documents, the Commission explained the reasons which led it to use the method suggested by the complainants. Accordingly, in recital 122 of the provisional regulation, it stated that ‘in the complaint the complainants [had] explained their method to arrive at the import data limited to the product concerned using Eurostat data’ and that, ‘in the absence of a more reliable method and data’, it had ‘based the determination of the import volume of the product concerned from the [People’s Republic of China] on this method using Eurostat data excluding channel gratings[, since the CCCME had] not provided any alternative data’. Furthermore, in recitals 110 and 111 of the contested regulation, the Commission stated, in particular, that ‘it [had] noted that the method used by the complainants to arrive at the import data related to the product concerned during the period under consideration was based on Eurostat data’, which is then briefly described, and stated that, ‘as [it] [had] found no other alternative source of information that would more accurately reflect the import data for the product concerned, it considered the method based on Eurostat data as the most appropriate one’.

171 The Commission therefore analysed the method in question before adopting it, explaining how, in its view, it considered it appropriate. Thus, in recital 113 of the contested regulation, the Commission rejected the request of the ad hoc association of independent importers, Free Castings Imports (FCI), and of the CCCME to exclude CN code 73259910 or to take into account a percentage of that code in calculating the import volumes of the product concerned, stating that ‘an analysis of the imports under this CN code since the imposition of provisional measures until the beginning of October 2017 [had] shown significant imports of 6796 tonnes under the TARIC code 7325991051 from [the People’s Republic of China] which exclusively refer[red] to the product concerned’ and that ‘therefore, it [was] clear that the product concerned [was] imported also under CN code 73259910’. On that occasion, the Commission stated that it ‘did not have any evidence that imports of other products under this CN code [had] followed the same trend as the product concerned since 2005’ and that, ‘consequently, using a percentage over the period under consideration would be unreliable’.

172 Furthermore, it must be stated that the calculation method suggested by the complainants was not accepted without the Commission verifying it. Indeed, the Commission visited the premises of the complainants’ representatives on 30 May 2017. Following that verification, it came to the conclusion, first, that the proposed allocation between the various CN codes was the most reliable estimate for determining the volume of dumped imports and, second, that that estimate was an objective approximation of such data in the absence of more detailed data from another source.

173 In those circumstances, the applicants’ first complaint that the Commission ‘automatic[ally]’ accepted the method suggested by the complainants must be rejected.

174 The applicants put forward a second complaint, that the data used by the Commission are based on unwarranted and unreasonable assumptions, which are not based on any positive evidence, as the Commission itself admitted.

175 In that regard, it must be observed that, contrary to the applicants’ statements, the Commission did not admit that the method for calculating the import volumes which it had used was incorrect, unreasonable or unreliable or that the import prices resulting from that method were incorrect, unreasonable or unreliable.

176 It is true that the Commission stated, in recital 126 of the provisional regulation, to which the applicants refer, that ‘as this data [was] based on import statistics and the detailed product type mix [was] not known, the evolution of prices [was] not completely reliable’.

177 However, that admission means only that the method used did not, as the Commission states, yield as detailed a result as it would have wished, and it does not imply that, in the Commission’s view, the data obtained by that method were completely unreliable and could not be used at all in drawing up the contested regulation.

178 It is, therefore, for the applicants, if they seek to dispute the reliability of data used by the Commission concerning the volume of dumped imports, to substantiate their assertions with evidence capable of casting specific doubt on the credibility of the method or data used by that institution (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2019, Jinan Meide Casting v Commission, T‑650/17, EU:T:2019:644, paragraph 357 (not published)).

179 In that context, if an applicant wishes its claim to be successful, it cannot merely provide alternative figures, such as figures obtained on the basis of data from the customs authorities from which the contested imports derived, but rather must provide evidence capable of calling into question the data provided by the Commission (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2019, Jinan Meide Casting v Commission, T‑650/17, EU:T:2019:644, paragraph 357 (not published)).

180 Furthermore, it must be recalled that the Commission enjoys a broad discretion in analysing data, including data provided by Eurostat (judgment of 23 September 2015, Schroeder v Council and Commission, T‑205/14, EU:T:2015:673, paragraph 41).

181 In the present case, the applicants dispute five assumptions relied on by the Commission for the purpose of calculating the import volumes on the basis of Eurostat data.

182 In that regard, it should be noted that, on each of those points of contention, the applicants obtained explanations during the investigation as to the method used to arrive at the estimates forming the basis of the adjustments made by the Commission to the Eurostat import data.

183 Thus, in the first place, the applicants dispute that the import volumes of the product concerned out of the total import volume declared under the former CN sub-code ex73251099 (non-malleable cast iron) was stable at 30% from 2009 to 2013, and then remained unchanged from 2013.

184 In that respect, it was explained that approximately 30% of total imports declared under the former CN code ex73251099 related to the product concerned. According to the Commission, that estimate could be regarded as conservative when the 2005 anti-dumping measures were in force. During that time, a 10-digit integrated tariff code of the European Union (TARIC) was defined for that product, which had enabled the Commission and the customs authorities to know the precise figures.

185 That is how it was explained that the 30% figure used by the Commission corresponded to what had been observed after the adoption of Regulation No 1212/2005, when anti-dumping duties on imports of cast iron originating in the People’s Republic of China were applied for the first time. Subsequently, that percentage was used by the Commission in the present proceedings in the absence of a more reliable estimate.

186 In the second place, the applicants dispute the application of the 30% percentage, which results from an estimate of the data specific to imports from the People’s Republic of China to all the countries from which the imports came which were taken into account in the proceeding which gave rise to the adoption of the contested regulation.

187 In that respect, it was explained that the 30% estimate had been applied to the other third countries because there were no specific data for those countries, the only information which could have been obtained being that collected as a result of the imposition, by Regulation No 1212/2005, of anti-dumping measures relating to imports solely from the People’s Republic of China.

188 In the third place, the applicants dispute the assumption that the import volumes of the product concerned out of the total volume of imports registered under the former CN code ex732510 remained unchanged from 2013.

189 In that respect, the Commission explained that, in order to calculate the volume of imports covering the product concerned registered from 2014 under CN General Code ex732510, it had used as a basis the ratio represented by those imports in the three sub-codes which, prior to 2014, provided more specific data concerning that product, by considering separately the data concerning the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of India and the other third countries (see paragraph 159 of the present judgment).

190 In the fourth place, the applicants dispute the assumption that the absolute volume of imports from the People’s Republic of China, made under CN code ex73259910 (malleable cast iron) and not relating to the product concerned, had remained unchanged from 2004.

191 In that respect, the Commission explained the methodology used to calculate the import volumes from the People’s Republic of China under CN code ex73259910, consisting of identifying one year during which imports of the product under investigation had started under that code in the third country concerned and comparing the number of imports registered under that code the year preceding that year with the difference corresponding to the imports registered for the period under consideration, in order to establish the volume of imports of the product concerned registered under CN code ex73259910 during the period under consideration (see paragraphs 162 to 164 of the present judgment).

192 Finally, in the fifth place, the applicants dispute the assumption that the percentage of Chinese imports of channel gratings out of total Chinese imports remained unchanged from 2013 and would be identical to the percentage of imports of channel gratings by the sampled Chinese exporting producers, out of their total imports. In that context, the applicants also dispute the assumption that third countries do not export channel gratings, since, unless they are mistaken, third countries appear not to have been excluded. If an exclusion was made, the assumption, which according to the applicants would also have been unwarranted, was that the percentage of imports of channel gratings from third countries out of their total imports was stable from 2013 and was identical to the percentage of imports of channel gratings of the sampled Chinese exporting producers during the investigation period.

193 On that last point of contention, the Commission explained that, since it had no information on the import volumes of channel gratings which were to be excluded in respect of the product concerned, it relied on the percentage of channel gratings imported by certain sampled producers during the investigation. In its reply to the Court’s questions, the Commission stated that it had relied, in that context, on the data from the sample of Chinese exporting producers and on the data from the sample of Indian exporting producers relating to the investigation period. That estimate was then applied to all imports, namely those from the People’s Republic of China, from the Republic of India and from the other third countries.

194 It is apparent from the foregoing considerations that, in their points of contention, the applicants have not put forward any evidence which can cast doubt on the reliability of those estimates, since, in essence, they do not dispute the reliability of the estimates on which the Commission relied, but rather their application to a period subsequent to that to which the data giving rise to those estimates correspond (first, third, fourth and fifth assumptions, referred to in paragraphs 183, 188, 190 and 192 respectively of the present judgment) or their application to countries other than the country from which the data which gave rise to the estimate originated (second and fifth assumptions, referred to in paragraphs 186 and 192 respectively of the present judgment).

195 The Commission stated that it did not have more accurate or more recent data which were similarly or more reliable.

196 In such a context which is characterised, first, by the lack of more precise and more recent information which is similarly or more reliable and, second, by the reasonableness and plausibility of the estimates presented by the Commission, which are apparent from the explanations provided by the Commission to justify their application, in the light of the broad discretion afforded to the Commission, it is necessary to reject the applicants’ second complaint, to the effect that the data used by the Commission are based on unwarranted and unreasonable assumptions which are not based on any positive evidence.

197 By their third complaint, the applicants take the view, in essence, that the lack of more reliable alternative data is due to a lack of diligence and to inactivity on the part of the Commission, which ought, in their view, to result in the contested regulation being annulled.

198 In that regard, it must be stated that, according to the case-law, the Commission has an obligation to consider on its own initiative all the information available, since in an anti-dumping investigation it does not act as an arbitrator whose remit is limited to making an award solely on the basis of the information and the evidence provided by the parties to the investigation. In that regard, it must be noted that Article 6(3) and (4) of the basic regulation authorises the Commission to request Member States to supply information to it and to carry out all necessary checks and inspections (judgment of 22 March 2012, GLS, C‑338/10, EU:C:2012:158, paragraph 32).

199 However, in order to determine the extent of the requirements imposed on the Commission, it is necessary to consider the limits affecting the time available to it, having regard in particular to the procedural time limits, which may not be sufficient to carry out the checks, inspections and investigations which might be envisaged (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2019, Jinan Meide Casting v Commission, T‑650/17, EU:T:2019:644, paragraph 408 (not published)).

200 Furthermore, account must be taken of whether or not the data envisaged are likely to culminate, with a sufficiently high probability, in more reliable results than those obtained within the applicable time limits (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2019, Jinan Meide Casting v Commission, T‑650/17, EU:T:2019:644, paragraph 410 (not published)).

201 In the present case, it appears that the Commission did not fail to have regard to the case-law referred to in paragraphs 198 to 200 of the present judgment, which requires it to consult all the sources available to it.

202 As regards the information which, according to the applicants, could have been obtained from the national customs authorities, it should be noted that, as the Commission has stated, even if the basic regulation enables it to do so, it would be disproportionate to require that institution to collect import lists, transaction by transaction, from the customs authorities of all the Member States, and to analyse them in order to establish whether they may be taken into account and then to compile the data relating to the product concerned for four years for the whole of the European Union.

203 In their written submissions, the applicants put forward two arguments to challenge the Commission’s conduct in relation to the search for reliable information.

204 In the first place, the applicants maintain that the Commission could have collected certain more detailed data from the national customs authorities so as to verify the reliability of the assumptions made and subsequently to extrapolate the result of that analysis to all the data.

205 In that regard, it should be noted that such information is not immediately available but that it ought also to be obtained on an ad hoc basis from the national authorities concerned. In order to be able to compile a data sample, the Commission ought then to await the reply of those authorities providing the requested information. Proceeding in that manner would, however, involve a significant investment in terms of workload and would require a significant amount of time, since those two issues must be factored in to the strict procedural deadlines imposed on the Commission, as stated in paragraph 199 of the present judgment.

206 Moreover, such a sample of transactions could also raise questions as to the representativeness of the transactions selected, as well as raising doubts as to its relevance, since it does not allow for a precise calculation of the import volumes for the product concerned.

207 In the second place, the applicants allege that the Commission could have turned to the importers, sending them questionnaires, the replies to which would have enabled it to verify whether the data used were reliable, and to make corrections.

208 The applicants submit that the EU institutions have made use of that source of information in other anti-dumping investigations, such as the investigation which led to the adoption of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 430/2013 of 13 May 2013 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of threaded tube or pipe cast fittings, of malleable cast iron, originating in the People’s Republic of China and Thailand and terminating the proceeding with regard to Indonesia (OJ 2013 L 129, p. 1).

209 In that regard, it must be observed that, as the Commission stated, it was not possible in the present case to obtain more reliable data from importers. First of all, the 28 importers which came forward during the investigation provided, in their replies to the questionnaire contained in Annex II to the notice of initiation of the investigation, an overall figure showing the volume of imports covering the product concerned and relating solely to imports from the People’s Republic of China and from the Republic of India, which were the two countries covered by the investigation. In the present case, those data were not subsequently broken down according to the CN codes of the product under investigation. Finally, those replies could be verified solely as regards the three sampled importers which replied to the questionnaire. It has not been established that those importers were sufficiently representative of all importers of the product under investigation. The Commission stated that the market was fragmented and characterised by a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises and that, in such a context, it could not be ruled out that many other unrelated importers operating in the market, with no direct interest in cooperating in the investigation, had not come forward.

210 Accordingly, it must be held that, in the present case, the Commission did not commit a manifest error of assessment in limiting its assessment, as regards the calculation of the import volumes covering the product concerned, to data from Eurostat’s database, as adjusted on the basis of justified assumptions and which reflected a reasonable estimate of the actual figures for those imports.

211 The first part of the plea must therefore be rejected.

– The second part of the first plea in law: the macroeconomic indicators used by the Commission to determine the injury suffered by the EU industry

212 In the second part, the applicants dispute the reliability of the macroeconomic indicators used by the Commission to establish the injury suffered by the EU industry.

213 As a preliminary point, it must be stated that, as was clarified in the parties’ replies to the Court’s questions, the Commission assessed the macroeconomic indicators for the EU industry as a whole.

214 In that context, the Commission relied on different types of data. For the sampled EU producers (‘the sampled producers’), the Commission took account of data submitted by those producers, which it verified. For the other EU producers which lodged the complaint which gave rise to the investigation or which supported that complaint (‘the other complainants’), the Commission relied on the data which it obtained from the replies to the questionnaires returned by those companies. Finally, for the remaining EU producers (‘the remaining producers’), the Commission used estimates provided by the complainants in respect of those producers.

215 In the present case, the applicants put forward six complaints, which are disputed by the Commission.

216 By their first complaint, the applicants criticise the Commission on the ground that it failed to update the data available to it concerning the other complainants.

217 In that regard, it should be noted that, according to recital 136 of the contested regulation, the data concerning the other complainants are taken from their replies to the questionnaire sent to them by the Commission, on the understanding that those data were compiled by the complainants and that they were ‘subsequently brought up to date to cover the investigation period’. The Commission produced a letter, which it sent to the CCCME on 14 June 2017 and in which it stated that the complainants had compiled the data on the basis of the replies to the questionnaire, verified by the Commission, as well as on information gathered by email from the producers who had lodged or supported the complaint. The interveners, for their part, stated that those data had been updated to exclude data concerning channel gratings and to include the latest available quarterly data.

218 Since the applicants have adduced no evidence capable of casting doubt on those assertions, the first complaint must be rejected.

219 In their second complaint, the applicants challenge the contested regulation on the ground that, in order to adopt it, the Commission relied on estimates, not actual data, for the remaining producers.

220 In that regard, it must be stated that the basic regulation does not confer on the Commission investigating powers enabling it to compel undertakings to participate in an investigation or to produce information. Accordingly, the Commission is dependent on the willingness of the parties to cooperate in providing it with the necessary information within the prescribed periods (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 May 2015, Yuanping Changyuan Chemicals v Council, T‑310/12, not published, EU:T:2015:295, paragraph 152 and the case-law cited).

221 In that situation, it is necessary to ascertain whether, in the present case, the Commission sought diligently to collect actual data, before relying on estimates constructed on the basis of the information which it could obtain.

222 In the notice of initiation of the investigation, the Commission invited EU producers manufacturing the product concerned to participate in the anti-dumping proceeding and invited any interested party to make known, within 21 days of the date of publication of the notice of initiation, its views on the selection of the sample of EU producers.

223 The Commission subsequently expressly informed the complainants and other known EU producers of the initiation of the investigation and invited them to participate in it.

224 By email of 16 May 2017, after noting that the data provided by the complainants concerned only their own situation, the Commission requested the complainants’ representatives to provide it with macroeconomic data for the industry as a whole.

225 In those circumstances, the Commission cannot be criticised for having relied on the estimates provided by the complainants for the remaining producers, since the objective was, in accordance with Article 4(1) of the basic regulation, to obtain a view of the EU industry as a whole.

226 In addition, as the interveners point out, the use of estimates may prove necessary in anti-dumping proceedings where certain producers choose not to cooperate or where, as has been shown to be so in the present case, certain EU producers have ceased to produce or to exist at the time when the macroeconomic data were collected.

227 Furthermore, it must be recalled that the estimates are not assumptions and that the complainants followed a calculation method verified by the Commission, which requested, after that verification, that amendments be made. In that regard, the interveners have observed that, contrary to the complainants’ suggestion that the actual production of the operators in question be estimated, the Commission decided to use instead the production capacity of those producers, which increased the overall EU production and decreased the rise in market share gained by the Chinese exporting producers. The interveners infer from this, without being challenged on that point, that the Commission’s choice lowered one injury indicator to the advantage of the Chinese exporting producers.

228 The second complaint must therefore be rejected.

229 In their third complaint, the applicants maintain that the data used by the Commission were substantially revised without explanation.

230 In that regard, it should be noted that, from the file and the parties’ replies to the Court’s questions, it is apparent that the Commission revised the macroeconomic data as follows.

231 On 7 April 2017 the Commission requested by letter to the complainants’ representatives that it be provided, by 12 May 2017 at the latest, with certain macroeconomic data for the period under consideration. On 12 May 2017 the complainants’ representatives provided, by email, a table containing the macroeconomic data.

232 On 15 May 2017 the Commission requested, by email, a non-confidential version of that document. On 16 May 2017 the Commission sent another email, requesting that it be provided with a version containing the macroeconomic data for the EU industry as a whole, excluding channel gratings. On 24 May 2017 the Commission again sent an email to the complainants’ representatives requesting them to send the requested data by 29 May 2017 at the latest and to accept a verification of those data at their premises on 30 May 2017.

233 On 29 May 2017 the complainants’ representatives provided, by email, a new version of the table containing the macroeconomic data (‘the second version of the macroeconomic indicators’). The Commission verified those data on 30 May 2017. During the verification visit, the complainants submitted more complete information on the data concerning the sampled producers, warranting an update of the figures. Furthermore, the Commission stated that the data in the second version of the macroeconomic indicators showed consolidated data for the remaining producers, but that the complainants had not been in a position to verify the consistency of those data with the supporting documents within the time limit set for the verification visit. The verification team thus asked the complainants to break down the data by known producer and accordingly to present an updated table.

234 On 1 June 2017 the complainants’ representatives provided, by email, a new non-confidential version of the macroeconomic data (‘the third version of the macroeconomic indicators’), which included the Commission’s requests. According to the applicants, that version differs significantly from the previous version. The CCCME asked the Commission, by email, to explain the reasons for that difference. By email, the Commission replied that the data had been updated following the inspection carried out on 30 May 2017. On 2 June 2017 the Commission requested, by email, that it be permitted to verify the updated tables at the premises of the complainants’ representatives on the same day. The complainants’ representatives accepted by way of email.

235 Following that verification, the complainants provided the Commission, on the same day, with the fourth version of the macroeconomic indicators on a USB stick. On 12 June 2017 the complainants’ representatives sent the fourth version of the macroecon