ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
3.

Must the principle of fiscal neutrality, which is of fundamental importance for the establishment and functioning of the common system of value added tax, be interpreted as meaning that it permits a tax assessment practice, such as that in the main proceedings, in accordance with which the value added tax is also invoiced to the service provider despite the reverse-charge procedure applied by the recipient of the supply of services, where account is taken of the fact that the recipient has already invoiced the tax for the supply of services, that there is no risk of any loss of tax revenue and that the system for correction of tax documents provided for under national law is not applicable?
3.

Do Articles 3(1), 4(1), 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13 preclude a provision of national law, such as Article 693 LEC, which allows a claim to be made for accelerated repayment of the total amount of the loan on the grounds of failure to pay three monthly instalments, without taking into account other factors such as the duration or amount of the loan or any other relevant matters and which also makes the possibility of avoiding the effects of such accelerated repayment dependent on the will of the creditor except in cases in which the mortgage is secured on the mortgagor’s permanent residence?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 175/27

Action brought on 21 March 2014 — European Parliament v Council of the European Union

(Case C-136/14)

2014/C 175/34

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: European Parliament (represented by: J. Rodrigues and L. Visaggio, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

— annul Council Directive 2013/64/EU of 17 December 2013 amending Council Directives 91/271/EEC and 1999/74/EC, and Directives 2000/60/EC, 2006/7/EC, 2006/25/EC and 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, following the amendment of the status of Mayotte with regard to the European Union. (1)

— order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The European Parliament seeks annulment of Directive 2013/64/EU which the Council adopted on the legal basis of Article 349 TFEU.

According to the Parliament, the legal basis chosen by the Council is incorrect, on the ground that the measures provided for in the contested directive come under the responsibilities of the European Union pursuant to various common policies. Those measures should therefore have been adopted under sector-specific legal bases concerning the areas of environment, agriculture, social policy and public health, namely Articles 43(2), 114, 153(2), 168 and 192(1) TFEU and not on the basis of Article 349 TFEU.

For the Parliament, measures which are not designed to deal with the economic or social constraints which an outermost region is facing by means of derogation from the full application of EU law in the region concerned cannot legitimately be based on the legal basis of Article 349 TFEU. Accordingly, measures which merely seek to postpone the application of certain provisions of EU law to an outermost region do not fall within the scope of that Article.

(1) OJ 2013 L 353, p. 8.
1.

Must Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses, (1) in particular Article 1(1) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that the concept of a ‘transfer of a business’ encompasses a situation in which an undertaking active on the charter flights market is wound up by decision of its majority shareholder, itself an undertaking active in the aviation sector and, in the context of the winding up, the parent company: (i)- replaces the company being wound up under aircraft leasing contracts and ongoing charter flight contracts with tour operators; (ii)- carries out activities previously pursued by the company being wound up; (iii)- re-employs some workers until that point employed by the company being wound up and engages them to perform identical tasks; (iv)- receives small equipment from the company being wound up?
2)

a) In the event that the above legislation is held to be inconsistent with the principles of Community law as regards the fixed-term employees concerned, is it possible to identify objective reasons for derogating from the principle that those employees should be treated no differently from permanent employees, for considerations relating to social policy purposes, construed in these circumstances as the need to prevent the insertion of ‘stabilised’ employees in parallel with those already placed on the permanent staff in accordance with the general rule requiring a competitive examination for access to posts with the public administrative authorities (the rule imposed by the third paragraph of Article 97 of the Constitution and subject only to derogation by statute, such as the legislation at issue, under which the sole requirement is success in a simple selection procedure) and is it possible — in the light of the Court’s observations in [paragraph] 47 of its order of 7 March 2013 [in Case C-393/11 AEEG v Bertazzi and Others [2013] ECR] — for [the needs underlying] those objective reasons to be regarded as satisfied, in terms of proportionality, merely by giving workers in precarious employment whose position has been ‘stabilised’ personal salary compensation which can be absorbed by future pay rises and is not open to reassessment, with an interruption of the normal advancement in salary level and of access to higher grades? b) On the other hand, if, once suitability for particular duties has been determined, periodic appraisals were undertaken to verify that the duties are being performed correctly, with a view to permitting the employees concerned to progress to higher grades and salary levels with the possibility of moving to a different category on the strength of a competitive examination held later, would that be sufficient to redress the balance between the position of ‘stabilised’ employees and the position of staff members recruited on the basis of a public competitive examination, without it being necessary for length of service to be set at nought and salaries to be set at the starting level in the case of the former group (in the absence, moreover, of any appreciable advantage in favour of the second group under the AEEG rules governing career advancement, as described above), with the result that, in the case under consideration, there would be no objective reasons, of the requisite objectivity and transparency, for derogating from Directive 1999/70/EC that could be applied to the employment conditions in question in the particular context of relevance here?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 212/19

Appeal brought on 7 May 2014 by LG Display Co. Ltd, LG Display Taiwan Co., Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 27/02/2014 in Case T-128/11: LG Display Co. Ltd, LG Display Taiwan Co., Ltd v European Commission

(Case C-227/14 P)

2014/C 212/22

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: LG Display Co. Ltd, LG Display Taiwan Co., Ltd (represented by: A. Winckler, avocat, F.-C. Laprévote, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

— partially set aside the General Court's judgment in Case T-128/11 insofar as it dismisses its request to partially annul the Commission's decision of 8 December 2010 in Case COMP/39309;

— based on the elements available to it, partially annul the Commission's decision and reduce the amount of the fines set forth therein — to assist in that regard, LG Display submits in Annex A.2. a table with the fine calculation in different scenarios. LG Display respectfully submits in this regard that the Court of Justice possesses sufficient information to exercise its full jurisdiction;

— order the Commission to pay LG Display's legal and other costs and expenses in relation to this matter; and

— take any other measures that the Court of Justice considers appropriate.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By its first plea, LG Display disputes the General Court's conclusion that the Commission was entitled to include LG Display's sales to its parent companies LGE and Philips in the value of sales to calculate LG Display's fine. This plea is divided into two limbs. First, the General Court erred in law, failed to provide adequate reasoning, manifestly distorted the evidence, violated LG Display's rights of defence, and failed to exercise its full jurisdiction, by holding that the Commission may include internal sales in the value of sales for the purpose of calculating the fine based merely on the fact that such sales were made on a market affected by the cartel in which LG Display was active. Second, the General Court erred in law, failed to provide adequate reasoning, manifestly distorted the evidence, and violated LG Display's rights of defence by upholding the Commission's finding that internal sales were indeed affected by the cartel.

By its second plea, LG Display disputes the General Court's conclusion that the Commission correctly refused to grant LG Display partial immunity from fines for the year 2005. This plea is divided into two limbs. First, the General Court committed an error of substantive law and failed to state adequate reasons when granting the full immunity applicant a privileged position in respect of partial immunity. Second, the General Court manifestly distorted the evidence and committed an error of substantive law by refusing to grant LG Display partial immunity from fines for the period as of August 26, 2005, after which date the Commission did not have evidence provided by the immunity applicant proving LG Display's continued participation in the cartel.
2.

On a proper construction of Articles 2, 14 and 24(1) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, must the financial consideration relating to a purchase option be regarded as consideration for the performance of the agreement and as a supply of goods and, as such, subject to VAT, when it represents the greater part of the total amount due under a financial leasing agreement and is paid by the lessee to the lessor in such a way that, as a result of the failure in part to perform obligations, the lessor regains possession of the subject-matter of the lease agreement, sells it to a third party and pays the excess of the sale price to the lessee after deducting, in the final account, the sum relating to the purchase option, or must it be regarded as consideration for the service of the rent of, or for the use of, the property (and, as such, subject to VAT by law or at the option of the taxable persons), or must it rather be regarded as compensation for damage for the termination of the agreement, paid in order to make good the loss caused by the lessee’s failure to perform and having no direct connection with any provision of services for consideration and, as such, not subject to VAT?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 212/16

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 14 April 2014 — Criminal proceedings against G

(Case C-181/14)

2014/C 212/17

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Party to the main proceedings

G

Question referred

Is Article 1(2)(b) of Directive 2001/83/EC (1) of 6 November 2001, as amended by Directive 2004/27/EC (2) of 31 March 2004, to be interpreted as meaning that substances or combinations of substances, within the meaning of that provision, which merely modify — that is, do not restore or correct — human physiological functions are to be regarded as medicinal products only if they are of therapeutic benefit or at any rate bring about a modification of bodily functions along positive lines? Consequently, do substances or combinations of substances which are consumed solely for their — intoxication-inducing — psychoactive effects, and in the process also have an effect which at least poses a risk to health, fall under the definition of ‘medicinal product’ contained in the directive?

(1) Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (OJ 2001 L 311, p. 67).

(2) Directive 2004/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 amending Directive 2001/83/EC (OJ 2004 L 136, p. 34).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 235/5

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul Sibiu (Romania) lodged on 22 April 2014 — Silvia Georgiana Câmpean v Administrația Finanțelor Publice a Municipiului Mediaș, Administrația Fondului pentru Mediu București

(Case C-200/14)

2014/C 235/06

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Tribunalul Sibiu

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Silvia Georgiana Câmpean

Defendants: Administrația Finanțelor Publice a Municipiului Mediaș, Administrația Fondului pentru Mediu București

Question referred

On a proper construction of Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, Articles 17, 20, 21(1) and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the principle laid down in the case-law of the Court of Justice that taxes prohibited by EU law must be refunded, Recommendation Rec (2003)16 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and Resolution 1787 (2011) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, is it possible that a provision such as Article XV of Emergency Government Order No 8/2014 is thereby precluded?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 235/8

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Simvoulio tis Epikratias (Council of State) lodged on 7 May 2014 — Konstantinos Maistrellis v Minister for Justice, Transparency and Human Rights

(Case C-222/14)

2014/C 235/11

Language of the case: Greek

Referring court

Simvoulio tis Epikratias (Council of State)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Konstantinos Maistrellis

Defendant: Minister for Justice, Transparency and Human Rights

Question referred

Must the provisions of Directive 96/34/EC (1) and Directive 2006/54/EC (2), in so far as they are applicable, be interpreted as precluding national regulations, such as the contested provision of the third sentence of Article 53(3) of Law 3528/2007, providing that if the civil servant’s wife does not work or exercise any profession the male spouse is not entitled to parental leave, unless it is considered that due to a serious illness or injury the wife is unable to meet the needs related to the upbringing of the child?

(1) Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC (OJ 1996 L 145, p. 4).

(2) Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast) (OJ 2006 L 204, p. 23).
1)

Must the case-law of the Court of Justice concerning a service concession be understood as meaning that it does not extend to a complex arrangement which includes the payment of reimbursements within the authority’s organisational responsibility in the form of a direct reimbursement scheme and at the same time a system of booking journeys which is not within the authority’s responsibility?
4)

In the light of the circumstances of the main case, may Article 179 of [Directive 2006/112] be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which a taxable person to whom the special exemption scheme is applied and who has belatedly applied for registration for VAT purposes is under an obligation to pay the tax that should have been levied, but has no right to subtract the amount of tax deductible for each tax period, it being the case that that right of deduction will be exercised subsequently on the basis of the tax return submitted after registration of the taxable person for VAT purposes, which may have repercussions for calculation of the incidental charges?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 292/18

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Firenze (Italy) lodged on 12 June 2014 — Criminal proceedings against Skerdjan Celaj

(Case C-290/14)

2014/C 292/22

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale di Firenze

Party to the main proceedings

Skerdjan Celaj

Question referred

Do the provisions of Directive 2008/115 (1) preclude a Member State’s legislation which provides for the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment of up to four years on an illegally staying third-country national [Or.10] who, having been returned to his country of origin neither as a criminal law sanction nor as a consequence of a criminal law sanction, has re-entered the territory of the State in breach of a lawful re-entry ban but has not been the subject of the coercive measures provided for by Article 8 of Directive 2008/115 with a view to his swift and effective removal?

(1) Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 303/16

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Poland) lodged on 5 June 2014 — Gmina Wrocław v Minister Finansów

(Case C-276/14)

2014/C 303/20

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Gmina Wrocław

Respondent: Minister Finansów

Question referred

In the light of Article 4(2), in conjunction with Article 5(3), of the Treaty on European Union, may an organisational entity of a municipality (a local government body in Poland) be regarded as a taxable person for purposes of VAT when it engages in activities other than as a public authority within the meaning of Article 13 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, (1) notwithstanding the fact that it does not satisfy the criterion of autonomy (independence) set out in Article 9(1) of that directive?

(1) OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.
Question 1: Is it inconsistent with the provisions of Directive 77/388/EEC (1) to levy import turnover tax for goods which have been reexported as non-Community goods for which, however, a customs debt is incurred due to a breach of obligation under Article 204 of the Customs Code (2) — in this case: delay in the fulfilment of the obligation to record the removal of the goods from a customs warehouse in the appropriate stock records, at the latest at the time of their removal?

In the event that Question 1 is answered in the negative:
3.

Must the financial institution perform the suitability check required by Article 19(4) and (5) of the directive, taking into account that the forward currency contract — which is an investment service relating to financial derivative instruments — was offered as part of another financial product (namely a loan agreement) and that the derivative instrument in itself constitutes a complex financial instrument? Must it be held that Article 19(9) of the directive is not applicable because, as the risks assumed by the client with regard to the loan and to the financial instrument are fundamentally different, the suitability assessment is essential inasmuch as the transaction contains a derivative instrument?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 303/3

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Częstochowie (Poland) lodged on 20 January 2014 — Ryszard Pańczyk v Dyrektor Zakładu Emerytalno-Rentowego Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji w Warszawie

(Case C-28/14)

2014/C 303/04

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Okręgowy w Częstochowie

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Ryszard Pańczyk

Defendant: Dyrektor Zakładu Emerytalno-Rentowego Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji w Warszawie

By order of 12 June 2014, the Court of Justice held that it manifestly lacks jurisdiction to reply to the questions submitted by the Sąd Okręgowy w Częstochowie.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 315/42

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Rüsselsheim (Germany) lodged on 14 July 2014 — Elvira Mandl, Helmut Mandl v Condor Flugdienst GmbH

(Case C-337/14)

2014/C 315/68

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Rüsselsheim

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Elvira Mandl, Helmut Mandl

Defendant: Condor Flugdienst GmbH

Question referred

Is there an obligation on an airline company which wishes to rely on the possibility of exemption in Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004 (1) to set out and prove that it took all reasonable measures to avoid the foreseeable consequences of an extraordinary circumstance in the form of cancellation or considerable delay or that no such reasonable measures were available to it?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 — Commission Statement (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
Second ground: breach of Article 39(2)(c) and 39(3) of Regulation No 1260/1999, (1) and of Article 4 of Regulation No 438/2001 (2); infringement of the principles relating to the burden of proof; material inaccuracy of the findings of facts in comparison with those resulting from the case-file before the General Court; distortion of the evidence adduced before the General Court. The appellant claims that the General Court distorted the uncontested facts and the evidence from the case-file, in particular the fact that the Italian authorities had analysed, on an individual basis, the evaluations made by the Commission’s inspectors concerning the deficiencies identified in nine first-level checks. According to the appellant, the General Court should have recognised that the contested decision was erroneous in the part pertaining to those nine checks, and should therefore have upheld the Italian Government’s submissions that the Commission had breached Article 39(2) and (3) of Regulation No 1260/1999, given that it had adopted a decision to make a flat-rate correction of 10 % without there being any proof of irregularities from the sample of first-level checks, and (even if the other irregularities are assumed to have occurred) in a manner which was certainly excessive in the light of the principle of proportionality, as laid down in Article 39 of Regulation No 1260/1999. The General Court disregarded the documents in the case-file relating to the findings of facts pertaining to the progress of the checks inasmuch as it failed to take into account the actual quantitative (the threshold agreed with the Commission) and qualitative development of the first- and second-level checks which occurred during 2009. Finally, the General Court distorted the uncontested facts and evidence from the case-file, and breached the articles cited above, by taking the view that the contested decision was justified because the Italian authorities had not demonstrated the progress made by the paying authority.