ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
9

Article 4 of that regulation, which lists the exceptions to the right of access, reads as follows: ‘1. The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the protection of: (a) the public interest as regards: — public security, — defence and military matters, — international relations, — the financial, monetary or economic policy of the Community or a Member State; … 3. … Access to a document containing opinions for internal use as part of deliberations and preliminary consultations within the institution concerned shall be refused even after the decision has been taken if disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the institution’s decision-making process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure. 4. As regards third-party documents, the institution shall consult the third party with a view to assessing whether an exception in paragraph 1 or 2 is applicable, unless it is clear that the document shall or shall not be disclosed. 5. A Member State may request the institution not to disclose a document originating from that Member State without its prior agreement. 6. If only parts of the requested document are covered by any of the exceptions, the remaining parts of the document shall be released. 7. The exceptions as laid down in paragraphs 1 to 3 shall only apply for the period during which protection is justified on the basis of the content of the document. The exceptions may apply for a maximum period of 30 years. In the case of documents covered by the exceptions relating to privacy or commercial interests and in the case of sensitive documents, the exceptions may, if necessary, continue to apply after this period.’
13

Article 25f of Legislative Decree No 231/2001, in the version resulting from Legislative Decree No 81 of 9 April 2008 implementing Article 1 of Law No 123 of 3 August 2007 on the protection of health and safety at the workplace (Ordinary Supplement No 108 to GURI No 101 of 30 April 2008), entitled ‘Manslaughter or assault causing severe, or very severe, injury, committed in breach of the provisions on the protection of health and safety at the workplace’, provides as follows: ‘1. Where the offence set out in Article 589 of the Criminal Code is committed, in breach of Article 55(2) of the Legislative Decree implementing the authorisation contained in Law No 123 of 3 August 2007 concerning health and safety at the workplace, it shall be punishable by a fine of 1000 quotas. Where a person is convicted of the offence referred to in the previous sentence, the prohibitory sanctions laid down in Article 9(2) shall be applicable for a period of between three months and one year. 2. Without prejudice to Article 25f(1), the offence set out in Article 589 of the Criminal Code shall be punishable by a fine of no less than 250 quotas and no more than 500 quotas where it is committed in breach of the provisions on the protection of health and safety at the workplace. Where a person is convicted of the offence referred to in the previous sentence, the prohibitory sanctions laid down in Article 9(2) shall be applicable for a period of between three months and one year. 3. Where the offence set out in Article 590(3) of the Criminal Code is committed in breach of the provisions on the protection of health and safety at the workplace, it shall be punishable by a fine of no more than 250 quotas. Where a person is convicted of the offence referred to in the previous sentence, the prohibitory sanctions laid down in Article 9(2) shall be applicable for a period of no more than six months.’
21

Taking the view that resolution of the dispute before it depended on the interpretation of Community law, the Legfelsőbb Bíróság decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court: ‘(1) Is the principle of tax neutrality (Article 9 of [Directive 2006/112]) infringed by a legal interpretation which prevents the addressee of an invoice from exercising his right to deduct where the operator who issued it has, prior to full performance of the contract or issue of the invoice, had his business operator’s licence withdrawn by the municipal authority? (2) Can the fact that the individual operator who issued the invoice has not declared the workers whom he employs (who, as a result, work “in the black economy”), and the fact that, for that reason, the tax authority has found that the said operator “has no declared workers”, prevent the addressee of that invoice from exercising the right to deduct, having regard to the principle of tax neutrality? (3) Can it be held that the addressee of the invoice is guilty of a lack of care when he does not verify either whether a legal relationship exists between the workers employed on a work site and the issuer of the invoice or whether the latter has fulfilled his tax-return obligations or any other obligations relating to those workers? Can it be held that such conduct constitutes an objective factor which demonstrates that the addressee of the invoice knew or ought to have known that he was participating in a transaction involving fraudulent evasion of VAT? (4) Having regard to the principle of tax neutrality, can the national court take the above circumstances into consideration when its overall assessment leads it to the conclusion that the economic transaction did not take place between the persons specified on the invoice?’
11

Point 1.1 of the Guidelines annexed to the Recommendation of 23 July 2003, entitled ‘The concept of coexistence’, states: ‘The cultivation of [GMOs)] in the EU is likely to have implications for the organisation of agricultural production. On the one hand, the possibility of the adventitious (unintended) presence of genetically modified (GM) crops in non-GM crops, and vice versa, raises the question as to how producer choice for the different production types can be ensured. In principle, farmers should be able to cultivate the types of agricultural crops they choose, be it GM crops, conventional or organic crops. None of these forms of agriculture should be excluded in the EU. On the other hand, the issue is also linked to consumer choice. To provide European consumers with a real choice between GM food and non-GM food, there should not only be a traceability and labelling system that functions properly, but also an agricultural sector that can provide the different types of goods. The ability of the food industry to deliver a high degree of consumer choice goes hand in hand with the ability of the agricultural sector to maintain different production systems. Coexistence refers to the ability of farmers to make a practical choice between conventional, organic and GM crop production, in compliance with the legal obligations for labelling and/or purity standards. The adventitious presence of GMOs above the tolerance threshold set out in Community legislation triggers the need for a crop that was intended to be a non-GMO crop, to be labelled as containing GMOs. This could cause a loss of income, due to a lower market price of the crop or difficulties in selling it. Moreover, additional costs might incur to farmers if they have to adopt monitoring systems and measures to minimise the admixture of GM and non-GM crops. Coexistence is, therefore, concerned with the potential economic impact of the admixture of GM and non-GM crops, the identification of workable management measures to minimise admixture and the cost of these measures. …’
Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 25 October 2012 —

Commission v France



(Case C-164/11)

Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Directive 2003/96/EC — Taxation of energy products and electricity — Failure to transpose within the prescribed period

1. Actions for failure to fulfil obligations — Examination of the merits by the Court — Situation to be taken into consideration — Situation on expiry of the time-limit set in the reasoned opinion (Art. 258 TFEU) (see paras 41, 45)

2. Tax provisions — Harmonisation of laws — Taxation of energy products and electricity — Directive 2003/96 — Implementation by Member States — Obligation to achieve a result — Failure to satisfy that obligation — Failure to fulfil obligations (Art. 258 TFEU; Council Directive 2003/96, Art. 18(10), second subpara.) (see para 47, operative part)

Re:

Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Failure to adopt, within the prescribed period, the provisions necessary to adapt its electricity taxation system to the provisions laid down by Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (OJ 2003 L 283, p. 51) — Application of a single rate on expiry of the transitional period.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Declares that, by failing to adopt the provisions necessary to adapt its electricity taxation system to the provisions laid down by Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity, despite the expiry of the transitional period provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 18(10) of that directive, the French Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive;
78

It is apparent from the examination of the first ground of appeal that the General Court did not err in law in holding that the Commission had legitimately considered the capital contributions to constitute State aid for the purpose of Article 87(1) EC. It was therefore also without vitiating its judgment by an error in law that the General Court, in dismissing the plea raised before it alleging an infringement of the division of competences stemming from the EC Treaty, stated, at paragraphs 203 to 205 of the judgment under appeal, as follows: ‘203 In the present case, with regard ... to the complaint that the Commission infringed the powers of the Member States, it must be pointed out that, as is clear from consideration of the first plea in law, the Commission did not err when it considered that the capital contributions constituted State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC. Consequently, it had power under Article 87(2) and (3) to assess the capital contributions ... It thus cannot have infringed the powers of the Member States in that regard. 204 With regard to the allegation that regional and economic policies, of which the development of the southern runway is part, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member States, it must be stated that, even if that were true, the consequence of that fact would not be to deprive the Commission of its power to supervise State aid pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 EC where financing granted under such policies constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC. 205 Finally, with regard to the fact that the Commission is unable to provide better supervision than that exercised at national level as is required by the second paragraph of Article 5 EC, it must be said that that argument is irrelevant since it is established that the Commission had the power under the EC Treaty to supervise the measure at issue in the present case since the measure in question was State aid.’
28

As regards the other aspects of the dispute, the Tribunal Administrativo e Fiscal do Porto decided, by decision of 19 October 2011, to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. Must [European Union] law and, in particular, the provisions of Articles 5 to 8, 22, 32, 34, 35 and 56 of … Regulation … No 1083/2006 … and Articles 174, 175 and 176 [TFEU], be interpreted as meaning that it does not allow exceptions to the principle of territorial eligibility of expenditure, that is, that expenditure relating to operations co-financed by the Structural Funds and by the Cohesion Fund is eligible under the Operational Programmes only if it is effected in the NUTS 2 regions covered by each of those Operational Programmes? 2. Specifically, must the abovementioned instruments be interpreted as meaning that they do not allow national authorities to establish rules that, by constituting exceptions to the principle of territoriality of expenditure, allow investments to be considered eligible under Operational Programmes specifically aimed at the Convergence objective if the location of those investments, or of the beneficiary body, is not situated in the NUTS 2 regions covered by such Operational Programmes? 3. Or, on the contrary, must [European Union] law and, in particular, the provisions in Articles 5 to 8, 22, 32, 34, 35 and 56 of … Regulation … No 1083/2006 … and Articles 174, 175 and 176 [TFEU], be interpreted as meaning that they do not preclude the existence of exceptions to the principle of territorial eligibility of expenditure, allowing national authorities to establish rules that allow the expenditure relating to operations co-financed by the Structural Funds and by the Cohesion Fund to be considered as eligible under the Operational Programmes, even though it is not effected in the NUTS 2 regions covered by each of those Operational Programmes, particularly when those exceptions relate to expenditure/operations with a relevant spill-over effect, that is, justified according to the nature of the operations and the multiplying effect that they give rise to in regions other than those in which the investment is made? 4. More specifically, do those instruments preclude national authorities from establishing rules that allow investments to be considered eligible in the context of Operational Programmes aimed at the Convergence Objective where those investments, or the beneficiary body, are not located in the NUTS 2 regions covered by that Convergence objective, particularly where they relate to expenditure/operations with a relevant spill-over effect, that is, justified according to the nature of the operations and the multiplying effect that they give rise to in regions other than those in which the investment is made?’
16

In those circumstances, the Tribunale di Genova decided to stay proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. Is Article 4a of [Directive 1999/32], which was adopted in the light of the entry into force of [Annex VI], to be interpreted, in accordance with the international principle of good faith and the principle of cooperation in good faith as between the Community and its Member States, as meaning that the limit, fixed by that provision, of 1.5% m/m of sulphur in marine fuels does not apply to ships flying the flag of a non-European Union State which is party to the Marpol Convention 73/78, where such ships are in the port of a Member State which is itself a party to [Annex VI]? 2. If Article 4a of [Directive 1999/32], is not to be interpreted as having the meaning proposed in Question 1, is that provision – in so far as it limits to 1.5% m/m the sulphur content of fuel for use by passenger ships operating regular services to or from a Community port, including ships flying the flag of a non-European Union State which is party to [Annex VI], pursuant to which, outside [the emission control areas for SOx] the 4.5% m/m sulphur content limit applies – invalid on the basis that it is contrary to the general principle of international law pacta sunt servanda and to the principle of cooperation in good faith as between the Community and its Member States, in that it requires Member States which have agreed to and ratified Annex VI to act in breach of the obligations entered into towards the other States which are party to [Annex VI]? 3. Is the term “regular services” in Article 2(3g) of [Directive 1999/32], to be interpreted as meaning that cruise ships also count as ships operating “regular services”?’
The date which must be used by the Court for the purpose of determining whether there is a breach of obligations is the date of expiry of that period. The retroactive nature of the judgment repealing those provisions cannot render the action devoid of purpose if that judgment results from an event which took place after that date and which, for that reason, cannot be taken into account.

An action for failure to fulfil obligations cannot be considered to be devoid of purpose if, after the expiry of the period laid down by the Commission during which the Member State in question must take the measures necessary to comply with the reasoned opinion, the provisions of national law which, according to the Commission, gave rise to that failure to fulfil obligations, were repealed with retroactive effect.

A Member State fails to fulfil its obligations under Articles 2 and 6(1) of Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation by adopting a national scheme requiring compulsory retirement of judges, prosecutors and notaries when they reach the age of 62, which unjustifiably gives rise to a difference in treatment on grounds of age.

Such legislation gives rise to a difference in treatment between individuals engaged in those professions and who have reached the age of 62 and younger individuals who are engaged in the same professions since the former, due to their age, are required automatically to cease their functions.

Moreover, that discrimination is not justified in so far as such legislation does not constitute an appropriate or necessary means for achieving the legitimate objectives pursued.

The aim of standardisation, in the context of professions in the public sector, pursued by that legislation can constitute a legitimate employment policy objective. However, provisions such as those at issue, which abruptly and significantly lowered the age-limit for compulsory retirement, without introducing transitional measures of such a kind as to protect the legitimate expectations of the persons concerned, are not necessary to achieve that aim.

Likewise, the aim pursued by such legislation to establish a more balanced age structure facilitating access for young lawyers to the professions of judge, prosecutor and notary, can constitute a legitimate aim of employment and labour market policy. However, provisions such as those at issue, which give rise to apparently positive short-term effects but which are liable to call into question the possibility of achieving a truly balanced ‘age structure’ in the medium and long terms, are not appropriate to achieve that aim.

(see paras 50, 61, 62, 64, 68, 75, 77, 79, operative part)
The principle of the neutrality of value added tax must be interpreted as precluding a tax authority from refusing, on the basis of a provision of national law intended to transpose Article 203 of Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax, the supplier of an exempt supply the refund of value added tax invoiced in error to a customer on the ground that the supplier had not corrected the erroneous invoice, in circumstances where that authority had definitively refused the customer the right to deduct that value added tax and such definitive refusal results in the system for correction provided for under national law no longer being applicable.

Where the issuer of the invoice has, in sufficient time, wholly eliminated the risk of any loss of tax revenue, the principle of the neutrality of value added tax requires that the tax which has been improperly invoiced can be corrected without such adjustment being made conditional by the Member States upon the good faith of the issuer of the relevant invoice. The adjustment cannot be dependent upon the discretion of the tax authority.

(see paras 27, 39, operative part 1)
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Jurisdiction of the Court – Limits – Jurisdiction of the national court – Establishing and assessing the facts of the dispute

(Art. 267 TFEU)

2. Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Taxable persons — Concept — Natural person who is already a taxable person in respect of activities as a self-employed bailiff — Any other economic activity carried out occasionally — Included — Condition

(Council Directive 2006/112, Art. 9(1))

Summary

1. See the text of the decision.

(see para. 25)

2. Article 9(1) of Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax is to be interpreted as meaning that a natural person who is already a taxable person for value added tax purposes in respect of his activities as a self-employed bailiff must be regarded as a ‘taxable person’ in respect of any other economic activity carried out occasionally, provided that that activity constitutes an activity within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 9(1) of Directive 2006/112.

(see para. 31, operative part)
Case C-169/12

TNT Express Worldwide (Poland) sp. z o.o.

v

Minister Finansów

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny)

‛Value added tax — Directive 2006/112/EC — Article 66(a) to (c) — Transport and shipping services — Chargeability — Date on which payment is received and no later than 30 days from the date on which the services are supplied — Invoice issued earlier’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber), 16 May 2013

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Chargeable event and chargeability of tax — Transport and shipping services — Date on which payment is received and no later than 30 days from the date on which the services are supplied — Unlawful, even where the invoice has been issued earlier

(Council Directive 2006/112, Art. 66)

Article 66 of Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax, as amended by Directive 2008/117, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that, in respect of transport and shipping services, value added tax is to become chargeable on the date on which payment is received in full or in part, but no later than 30 days from the date on which those services are supplied, even where the invoice has been issued earlier and specifies a later deadline for payment.

(see para. 36, operative part)

Case C-169/12

TNT Express Worldwide (Poland) sp. z o.o.

v

Minister Finansów

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny)

‛Value added tax — Directive 2006/112/EC — Article 66(a) to (c) — Transport and shipping services — Chargeability — Date on which payment is received and no later than 30 days from the date on which the services are supplied — Invoice issued earlier’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber), 16 May 2013

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Chargeable event and chargeability of tax — Transport and shipping services — Date on which payment is received and no later than 30 days from the date on which the services are supplied — Unlawful, even where the invoice has been issued earlier

(Council Directive 2006/112, Art. 66)

Article 66 of Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax, as amended by Directive 2008/117, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that, in respect of transport and shipping services, value added tax is to become chargeable on the date on which payment is received in full or in part, but no later than 30 days from the date on which those services are supplied, even where the invoice has been issued earlier and specifies a later deadline for payment.

(see para. 36, operative part)