ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
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as regards the substance, first, — give a ruling stating that Article 55(a) of the Loi sur l’Assurance-maladie (LAMal) (Law on medical insurance) infringes: — Article 2 (non-discrimination), Article 7 (right to equal treatment) and Article 13 (standstill obligation) of the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons between Switzerland and the European Union (AFMP); — Article 55 of Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications; — find that the horizontal directive of the Canton of Geneva relating to ‘Recruitment procedure within public law institutions and subsidised entities’ infringes the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons between Switzerland and the European Union (AFMP) and that all the other Swiss federal laws on national preference infringe the AFMP; — find that, in return, there are no discriminatory measures by the Member States vis-à-vis doctors who are Swiss nationals; — find that the European Commission, which must ensure the application of the Treaties, wrongfully failed to act, thereby infringing the principle of legitimate expectations and the principle of certainty of the acquired rights of Dr Nathaniel Magnan; — find that there is a causal link between the European Commission’s wrongful failure to act and the harm suffered by Dr Nathaniel Magnan; — find that the European Commission failed to act; — order the European Commission to pay the sum of EUR 1141 198.10 euros (one million one hundred and forty-thousand one hundred and ninety-eight euros and ten cents; exchange rate of 7 January 2019 at 11:39 UTC) corresponding to CHF 1 281 444 (one million two hundred and eighty-one thousand four hundred and forty-four Swiss francs) to Dr Nathaniel Magnan, in respect of damage already suffered since 2013 on the basis of the non-contractual liability of the Commission on the basis of Article 340 TFEU; — order the European Commission, on the basis of Article 340 TFEU, for failure to act, to pay the sum of EUR 500 (five hundred euros) per working day to Dr Nathaniel Magnan as a result of the continuous, permanent and current financial damage, corresponding to daily financial damage until the Swiss Confederation complies with the AFMP, or the withdrawal of one of the parties from the agreement;
Action brought on 9 April 2019 — Infineon Technologies v Commission

(Case T-234/19)

(2019/C 213/52)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Infineon Technologies AG (Neubiberg, Germany) (represented by: L. Assmann and M. Peiffer, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— annul the defendant’s decision, notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1), of 28 May 2018 on aid scheme SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) implemented by Germany for baseload consumers under Paragraph 19 of the Stromnetzentgeltverordnung (Regulation on electricity network charges, ‘the StromNEV’); and

— order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The application is based on one plea in law, arguing that the contested decision is unlawful because the exemption from the network charges under the second sentence of Paragraph 19(2) of the StromNEV is not State aid within the meaning of Article 107 et seq. TFEU.

In this regard, the applicant first argues that the exemption from network charges granted on the basis of Paragraph 19(2) of the StromNEV was not granted through State resources within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU but was financed through German electricity grid operators which are organised under private law and are not attributable to the State. Neither does the effect of the disputed surcharge equate to a levy on electricity consumption in Germany. In addition, the Federal Republic of Germany has no control over the transmission system operators which are entrusted with the management of these resources.

It is further claimed that the exemption from network charges on the basis of Paragraph 19(2) of the StromNEV differs in significant aspects from the underlying circumstances in Cases C-206/06, Essent Netwerk Noord and Others and C-262/12, Vent De Colère!. The disputed case is comparable, however, with the surcharge in Case C-405/16 P, Germany v Commission, and therefore not classifiable as aid.
Official Journal of the European Union

Action brought on 20 April 2019 — gastivo portal v EUIPO — La Fourchette (Representation of a fork on a green background)

(Case T-266/19)

(2019/C 230/69)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: gastivo portal GmbH (Bremen, Germany) (represented by: O. Spieker, A. Schönfleisch, N. Willich and N. Achilles, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: La Fourchette SAS (Paris, France)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark (Representation of a fork on a green background) — Application for registration No 15 474 356

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 20 February 2019 in Case R 1213/2018-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— annul the contested decision;

— order EUIPO and the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal to bear the costs of the proceedings including the costs necessarily incurred by the applicant before the Board of Appeal.

Pleas in law

— Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;
2.

Second plea, alleging infringement of the principle of sound administration, the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials and the obligation to state reasons arising therefrom, on the ground that the defendant did not take a position, in the contested decisions, on the argument made in the complaint relating to two conditions required for the Union to incur non-contractual liability, namely the existence of faults and the causal link.
1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to sound administration. The applicant claims in support of his action, inter alia, that the Council of the European Union did not exercise due care and attention in the adoption of Decision (CFSP) 2019/354 of 4 March 2019, since before the adoption of the contested decision it did not address the applicant’s arguments and the evidence he had adduced, which supports his case, and it relied primarily on the brief summary by the Prosecutor-General’s Office of Ukraine and did not request any supplementary information on the course of the investigations in Ukraine.
Official Journal of the European Union

Action brought on 30 May 2019 — Mubarak v Council

(Case T-327/19)

(2019/C 255/59)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Mohamed Hosni Elsayed Mubarak (Cairo, Egypt) (represented by: B. Kennelly QC, J. Pobjoy, Barrister, G. Martin, C. Enderby Smith and F. Holmey, Solicitors)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/468 of 21 March 2019 (1) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/459 of 21 March 2019 (2), insofar as they apply to the applicant; and

— order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

1. First plea in law, alleging that the defendant had failed to verify that the Egyptian authorities would have respected the applicant’s fundamental European Union rights, including Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in the context of the proceedings and investigations relied upon by the defendant.

2. Second plea in law, alleging that the defendant made errors of assessment in considering that the criterion for listing the applicant in Article 1 of Council Decision 2011/172/CFSP (3) and Article 2 of Council Regulation (EU) No 270/2011 of 21 March 2011 (4) would have been satisfied.

(1) Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/468 of 21 March 2019 amending Decision 2011/172/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt (OJ L 80, 22.3.2019, p. 40).

(2) Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/459 of 21 March 2019 implementing Regulation (EU) No 270/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt (OJ L 80, 22.3.2019, p. 1).

(3) Council Decision 2011/172/CFSP of 21 March 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt (OJ L 76, 22.3.2011, p. 63).

(4) Council Regulation (EU) No 270/2011 of 21 March 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt (OJ L 76, 22.3.2011, p. 4).
1.

First plea in law, alleging an abuse of process and infringement of Articles 47 and 49 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants and of Articles 23 and 24 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union.
8.

Eighth plea in law, alleging further grounds of infringement of the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, equal treatment, non-discrimination and solidarity. The applicant claims that the intervention in question is unlawful inasmuch as it is at odds with the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, solidarity and equal treatment, given that it: (i) retroactively imposes the contributory system on persons to whom the annuity was disbursed long before Resolution No 14/2018 of the [Office of the President of the] Italian Chamber of Deputies, if not well before the contributory system entered into force via the ‘Dini’ Reform (1996); (ii) alters the legal status of the contributions received from the former member of parliament, while remaining silent, however, on the subject of the fees deducted directly by the Italian Chamber [of Deputies] as a withholding tax; (iii) imposes the retroactive application of a contributory system which, however, is in no way contributory in terms of either its form or its aims; (iv) irrationally and incorrectly applies probabilistic conversion ratios and calculation criteria, referring to the already known past and not to the future; and (v) reveals a clear desire to treat life annuities in the same way as pension rights for public sector employees when these are in reality emoluments of a different nature.
2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the exemptions contained in Chapter 9 of the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 are not derogations. — The objective of the CFC rules is to impose a CFC charge in respect only of those arrangements that pose a high risk of abuse/artificial diversion. The UK selected a legislative technique whereby it: (i) began with a broad and inclusive definition of CFCs, and (ii) excluded the overwhelming majority of profits derived from CFCs, in order to identify only the narrow category of profits that present a risk of abuse/artificial diversion. Chapters 5 and 9 of the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 operate together to identify those arrangements that present a high risk of abuse/artificial diversion. — It is further argued that the Commission manifestly erred when it held that the said Chapter 9 Exemptions are a derogation, because it focused on the legislative technique employed, not the underlying objectives of the measure. — In the applicant’s view, the Commission also held — wrongly — that there was no relevant distinction between Qualifying Loan Relationships (QLRs) and non-QLRs. The UK Government is uniquely well placed to determine which kinds of arrangements present a high risk of abuse/artificial diversion. The Commission, it is alleged: a. erred in law when it failed to grant the UK Government a suitable margin of appreciation when assessing that issue; and b. manifestly erred in its assessment of the arrangements in question.
Official Journal of the European Union

Action brought on 21 June 2019 — Topcart v EUIPO — Carl International (TC CARL)

(Case T-377/19)

(2019/C 270/41)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Applicant: Topcart GmbH (Wiesbaden, Germany) (represented by: M. Gail, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Carl International (Limonest, France)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant for the trade mark at issue: Applicant

Trade mark at issue: Application for EU word mark TC CARL — Application No 14 957 542

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 2 April 2019 in Case R 1826/2018-2

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— annul the contested decision;

— order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Plea in law
Official Journal of the European Union

Action brought on 7 July 2019 — CupoNation v EUIPO (Cyber Monday)

(Case T-494/19)

(2019/C 288/78)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: CupoNation GmbH (Munich, Germany) (represented by: L. Ullmann, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: Application for EU figurative mark Cyber Monday in coral red and black — Application No 17 020 851

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 11 April 2019 in Case R 1798/2018-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— annul the contested decision;

— order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

— Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;
Action brought on 17 May 2019 — Graanhandel P. van Schelven v Commission

(Case T-306/19)

(2019/C 280/58)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Graanhandel P. van Schelven BV (Nieuwe Tonge, Netherlands) (represented by: C. Almeida, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— annul Article 1(3) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/446; (1)

— order the defendant to produce all relevant documents leading to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2019/446.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on five pleas in law.

1. First plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s revocation of ‘Control Union Certifications’ (CUC) as an EU organic certifier appears arbitrary as it is based on false facts.

2. Second plea in law, alleging that the applicant’s subjective right to be protected from the arbitrary revoking of Commission appointments of organic certifiers to run EU organic controls in third countries was violated. Its interest as a competitor in the organic market was not protected.

3. Third plea in law, alleging that, with the revocation of CUC’s appointment as an EU organic certifier, the supply of organic products in decade-long trade relations are blocked and the applicant’s rights as importer have been directly affected. Such direct concern is established by the contested regulation as the applicant was the recipient, as importer, of certificates of inspection issued by CUC which enabled it to access the EU organic food and feed market. CUC is the organic certifier for the farms in the Black Sea region from which the applicant’s main supplier sources the organic products.

4. Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission violated the applicant’s right to be subject only to proportionate interference with its business as well as the basic fundamental guarantee of its property and its freedom to engage in commerce.

5. Fifth plea in law, referring to the applicant’s second head of claim, which seeks access to Commission documents, alleging that the applicant enjoys the general access rights granted under EU law and based on the guarantee of due process and the right to be heard as protected by relevant human rights instruments.

(1) Commission Implementing Regulation 2019/446 of 19 March 2019 amending and correcting Regulation (EC) No 1235/2008 laying down detailed rules for implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 as regards the arrangements for imports of organic products from third countries (OJ 2019 L 77, p. 67).
2.

Second plea in law, alleging failure to fulfil the obligation to state reasons laid down in the second paragraph of Article 296 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — Romania submits that the obligation to state reasons laid down in the second paragraph of Article 296 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union cannot be limited to informing the organisers regarding the elements laid down in Article 4(3) of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011, namely the reasons for refusing to register the proposed initiative and of all possible remedies available to them. — In that context, Romania submits that the statement of reasons for Decision (EU) 2019/721 is manifestly inadequate. A manifestly inadequate statement of reasons may prevent the persons concerned from ascertaining the reasons for the registration of the proposed initiative and responding accordingly and may also prevent the General Court of the European Union from exercising its power of review as to the legality of the decision.
3.

Third plea in law, alleging a manifest error of assessment and a lack of evidence. According to settled case-law, the effectiveness of the judicial review, guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter, requires, inter alia, that, as part of the review of the lawfulness of the grounds which form the basis of the decision to list or to maintain the listing of a given person on the lists of persons subject to the sanctions, the Courts of the European Union must ensure that that decision is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. In the applicant’s view, the Council’s allegations concerning both the ‘close ties with the regime’ and a supposed role as an intermediary in oil transactions between the regime and ISIL, must be definitively rejected on the ground that they are entirely unfounded and lack any factual basis to substantiate them.
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if the contested decision is not annulled in its entirety, (a) annul it insofar as it applies to the matched interest exemption within Chapter 9 of Part 9A of the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 and (b) order that in determining the amount of aid to be recovered, losses, reliefs or exemptions which were available to the applicant at the time when it claimed the group financing exemption (GFE), or which would have been available to the applicant at that time had it not claimed the GFE, should in either case be taken into account even if access to those losses, reliefs or exemptions is now time barred under UK law;
Action brought on 5 July 2019 — GlaxoSmithKline Finance and Setfirst v Commission

(Case T-492/19)

(2019/C 312/28)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: GlaxoSmithKline Finance plc (Brentford, United Kingdom) and Setfirst Ltd (Brentford) (represented by: K. Bacon QC, and A. Lyle-Smythe, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

— annul Commission Decision C(2019) 2526 final of 2 April 2019 on the State Aid SA.44896 implemented by the United Kingdom concerning the Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) Group Financing Exemption in its entirety;

— in the alternative, annul the contested decision insofar as it does or may relate to CFCs actually established and carrying on genuine economic activities in another Member State;

— in the alternative, annul the contested decision insofar as it fails to provide sufficient information for the recipient to calculate the precise amount of aid to be recovered without overmuch difficulty;

— in the alternative, grant such partial annulment as the General Court deems appropriate; and

— in any event, order the Commission to pay the applicants’ costs and expenses in connection with these proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on four pleas in law.

1. First plea in law, alleging that the Commission has erred in law and provided insufficient reasoning in finding that the group financing exemption (GFE) constitutes an advantage as, for CFCs which are genuinely established in another Member State, the effect of the Cadbury Schweppes case (1) is that their parent companies should not have been liable to any CFC charge (even a reduced charge levied as a result of the partial GFE).

2. Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission has erred in law, made a manifest error of assessment and has failed to state adequate reasons in finding that the GFE was not justified on the grounds of ensuring compliance with the freedom of establishment.

3. Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission has erred in law and made a manifest error of assessment in concluding that the GFE was not a justified derogation based on the need to avoid complex and disproportionately burdensome allocation of profit to significant people functions based on the OECD’s approach to allocating profits to permanent establishments.

4. Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission has erred in law in failing to provide adequate information as to the parameters of recovery.

(1) Judgment of 12 September 2006 in Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Case C-196/04, EU:C:2006:544).
1.

First plea in law, alleging an error of law in the application of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43). In that regard, the applicant claims that the decision of the European GNSS Agency (GSA) of 20 May 2019 refusing it full access to the document ‘summary of 26 June 2017 by Mr [X]’ is illegal in that that refusal is based on the public security exception provided for in Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001, whereas the document in question: — cannot be connected with issues of public security since it concerns a case connected with agency personnel and; — cannot be classified [RESTREINT/RESTRICTED EU].
Action brought on 17 August 2019 – Scandlines Danmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission

(Case T-566/19)

(2019/C 348/17)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: Scandlines Danmark ApS (Copenhagen, Denmark), Scandlines Deutschland GmbH (Hamburg, Germany) (represented by: L. Sandberg-Mørch, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

— annul the decision of the European Commission of 22 July 2019 which partially rejected the applicants’ request for an extension – until 5 September 2019 or until the end of August 2019 – of the deadline for submitting comments in the context of the formal investigation procedure in case SA. 39078 (2019/C) (ex 2014/N) – Financing of the Fehmarn Belt Fixed Link project;

— order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on two pleas in law.

1. First plea in law, alleging that the Commission violated its obligation to motivate its decision not to grant an extension of the deadline in question until 5 September 2019 or 31 August 2019, as the contested decision contains no reasoning supporting this rejection, or, in any case, entails insufficient reasoning.

2. Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission infringed Article 6(1) of the Procedural Regulation, (1) and thereby also the applicants’ right as interested parties to effectively participate in the formal investigation procedure regarding State aid case SA.39078, since the application was duly justified, well-founded and proportionate.

(1) Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 2015 L 248, p. 9).