Keywords

Summary



Keywords

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1 . TRANSPORT - PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION - CONCEPT OF COMPARABILITY

( ECSC TREATY, ARTICLE 70 )

2 . TRANSPORT - SPECIAL INTERNAL RATES AND CONDITIONS - CONDITIONS OF LEGALITY - TEMPORARY AND CONDITIONAL AGREEMENT

( ECSC TREATY, ARTICLE 70 )

3 . TRANSPORT - SPECIAL INTERNAL RATES AND CONDITIONS - DAMAGE - ABSENCE THEREOF - AUTHORIZATION NOT JUSTIFIED

( ECSC TREATY, ARTICLES 2, 3, 70 )

4 . TRANSPORT - PARTIAL INTEGRATION - REGIONAL POLICY

( ECSC TREATY, ARTICLE 70 ) ( EEC TREATY, ARTICLE 80 )

5 . TRANSPORT - SPECIAL INTERNAL RATES AND CONDITIONS - POWER OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY

( ECSC TREATY, FOURTH PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 70; CONVENTION ON THE TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS, SEVENTH PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 10 )

6 . FUNDAMENTAL PROVISIONS - PROHIBITION LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 4 ( C ) OF THE TREATY - PROTECTIVE MEASURES LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 67

7 . FUNDAMENTAL PROVISIONS - ATTAINMENT OF GENERAL OBJECTIVES - OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPETITION

( ECSC TREATY, ARTICLES 2 AND 3 )

8 . FUNDAMENTAL PROVISIONS - GENERAL OBJECTIVES - RATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTION - CONCEPT

( SEE JOINED CASES 7 AND 9/54, RECUEIL, VOL . II, P . 92 )

( ECSC TREATY, ARTICLE 2 )

9 . FUNDAMENTAL PROVISIONS - COMMON INTEREST - DEFINITION

( ECSC TREATY, ARTICLE 2 )

( SEE CASE 8/57, RECUEIL, VOL . IV, P . 249 )

10 . FUNDAMENTAL AND PERSISTENT DISTURBANCES - THOSE ENTITLED TO INVOKE THEM

( ECSC TREATY, ARTICLES 2 AND 37 )

Summary

1 . CF . PARAGRAPH 2, SUMMARY, JUDGMENT IN JOINED CASES 3 TO 18, 25 AND 26/58 .

THE CASE OF DISCRIMINATION COVERED BY THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 70 REFERS EXCLUSIVELY TO CONDITIONS OF TRANSPORT AND THEREFORE TO THE COMPARABILITY OF DIFFERENT ROUTES AND LOCATIONS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF TRANSPORT .

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2 . IT IS NECESSARY TO APPRAISE THE LAWFULNESS OF SPECIAL INTERNAL RATES AND CONDITIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE TREATY, ACCORDING TO WHICH THE COMMUNITY MUST PROGRESSIVELY BRING ABOUT CONDITIONS WHICH WILL OF THEMSELVES ENSURE THE MOST RATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTION AT THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL OF PRODUCTIVITY . THAT DISTRIBUTION IS BASED IN PARTICULAR ON THE COMPOSITION OF PRODUCTION COSTS RESULTING FROM OUTPUT, THAT IS, FROM THE PHYSICAL AND TECHNICAL CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE VARIOUS PRODUCERS OPERATE AND THEIR INDIVIDUAL EFFORTS . THUS THE AGREEMENT REFERRED TO IN THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 70 CAN ONLY BE GIVEN IF THE PROTECTIVE RATES AUTHORIZED ENABLE THE UNDERTAKINGS IN WHOSE FAVOUR THEY ARE MADE TO OVERCOME EXCEPTIONAL TEMPORARY DIFFICULTIES RESULTING FROM UNFORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE LIKELY TO RESULT IN A SITUATION IN WHICH THE COMPOSITION OF PRODUCTION COSTS NO LONGER CORRESPONDS TO THEIR NATURAL CONDITIONS .

3 . CF . PARAGRAPH 5, SUMMARY, JUDGMENT IN JOINED CASES 3 TO 18, 25 AND 26/58 .

THE ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE PROFITABILITY OF AN UNDERTAKING OF THE LACK OF SPECIAL RATES AND CONDITIONS DOES NOT RENDER THOSE RATES AND CONDITIONS CONSONANT WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE TREATY AND THEREFORE DOES NOT, IN CASES WHERE THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 70 APPLIES, PUT THE HIGH AUTHORITY UNDER AN OBLIGATION BASED ON ARTICLES 2 AND 3 .

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4 . SINCE THE INTEGRATION AIMED AT BY THE ECSC TREATY IS ONLY PARTIAL, THE HIGH AUTHORITY IS NOT ENTITLED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT, WITH REGARD TO TRANSPORT, THE REQUIREMENTS OF A REGIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 80 ( 2 ) OF THE EEC TREATY .

5 . THE SEVENTH PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION ON THE TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS DOES NOT INTRODUCE ANY DEROGATION FROM THE RULES LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 4 ( B ) AND IN THE FIRST AND FOURTH PARAGRAPHS OF ARTICLE 70 BUT MERELY PLACES THE HIGH AUTHORITY UNDER A DUTY, DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, TO ALLOW SUCH TIME FOR THE MODIFICATION OF PROTECTIVE RATES AND CONDITIONS IN FORCE AT THAT DATE AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO AVOID ANY SERIOUS ECONOMIC DISTURBANCE .

6 . IT IS WRONG TO MAINTAIN THAT THE PROHIBITION LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 4 ( C ) MUST BE APPLIED IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 67 . THE PROTECTIVE MEASURES LAID DOWN IN THAT ARTICLE, FAR FROM CONTRAVENING ARTICLE 4 ( C ), ARE INTENDED ONLY TO COMPENSATE FOR THE ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGES WHICH RESULT IN THE COMMON MARKET FROM AN ACTION BY A MEMBER STATE WHICH THE HIGH AUTHORITY DOES NOT HAVE THE POWER TO BRING TO AN END DIRECTLY .

7 . THE OBJECTIVES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 3 ( B ), ( C ), ( D ) AND ( G ) MUST BE ATTAINED WITHOUT CONTRAVENING THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF COMPETITION LAID DOWN IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 2 BY COMPLYING WITH THE NATURAL AND UNDISTORTED CONDITIONS OF PRODUCTION TO WHICH PRODUCERS ARE SUBJECT .

8 . THE MOST RATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTION AT THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL OF PRODUCTIVITY IS BASED IN PARTICULAR ON THE COMPOSITION OF PRODUCTION COSTS RESULTING FROM OUTPUT, THAT IS, FROM THE PHYSICAL AND TECHNICAL CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE VARIOUS PRODUCERS OPERATE AND FROM THEIR INDIVIDUAL EFFORTS .

9 . THE COMMON INTEREST IS NOT LIMITED TO THE SUM OF THE INDIVIDUAL INTEREST OF THE UNDERTAKINGS IN THE COMMUNITY . IT GOES BEYOND THE RANGE OF THOSE INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS AND IS DEFINED IN RELATION TO THE GENERAL AIMS OF THAT COMMUNITY WHICH ARE LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 2 .

10 . THE EXISTENCE OF FUNDAMENTAL AND PERSISTENT DISTURBANCES MAY, BECAUSE OF THEIR GENERAL EFFECT ON THE NATIONAL ECONOMY, ONLY BE INVOKED BY THE STATE CONCERNED AND UNDER THE PROCEDURE LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 37 .