ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
The classification of a substance of unknown or variable composition, complex reaction products or biological materials (UVCB) in respect of the aquatic environmental hazards which it involves must be established in accordance with the provisions of Regulation No 1272/2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures. Annex I to that regulation establishes that the approach for that classification is tiered and is dependent upon the type of information available for the mixture itself and for its components. Elements of the tiered approach include classification based on tested mixtures, classification based on bridging principles and the use of ‘summation of classified components’ and/or an ‘additivity formula’.

Point 4.1.3.5.5 of Annex I to Regulation No 1272/2008 does not provide for the use of criteria other than those expressly referred to in that provision. However, no provision expressly prohibits other factors liable to be relevant to the classification of a UVCB substance from being taken into consideration.

However, the indicated methodological approach is difficult due, inter alia, to the fact that the term substances covers a wide range of chemicals, many of which pose difficult challenges to a classification system based on rigid criteria. That document therefore highlights a complex interpretational problem, even for experts, presented by classification, in particular of so-called ‘complex or multi-component’ substances for which biodegradation, bioaccumulation, partitioning behaviour and water solubility all present problems of interpretation, where each component of the mixture may behave differently.

The EU legislature integrated the provisions of the Globally Harmonised System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS) in Annex I to Regulation No 1272/2008, without demonstrating any intention to deviate from that approach. In those circumstances, it cannot be held that, by thus integrating the GHS in Regulation No 1272/2008, the EU legislature disregarded its methodological limitations.

The strict and automatic application of the summation method in all circumstances is liable to result in an undervaluing of the aquatic toxicity of a UVCB substance with few known constituents. Such a result cannot be regarded as consistent with the goal of protection of the environment and human health pursued by Regulation No 1272/2008.

Therefore, when it applies the summation method in order to determine whether a UVCB substance comes within the categories of acute or chronic aquatic toxicity, the Commission is not required to limit its assessment solely to the factors expressly referred to in point 4.1.3.5.5 of Annex I to Regulation No 1272/2008, to the exclusion of any other factor. In accordance with its duty to act diligently, the Commission is required to examine carefully and impartially other factors which, although not expressly referred to by those provisions, are nevertheless relevant.

(see paras 36, 39, 43, 45-47)
20

As regards the context of which the first sentence of Article 23(1) of the Regulation is part, the Court observes, first of all, that the second sentence of that paragraph qualifies the rule set out in that first sentence as regards ‘third parties who have acquired rights’ in the trade mark after the date of the legal act in question but who knew of the act at the date on which the rights were acquired. Article 23(2) establishes an exception to that rule in the case of a ‘person who acquires the Community trade mark or a right concerning the Community trade mark’ by way of transfer of the whole of the undertaking or by any other universal succession. Accordingly, an interpretation of Article 23(1) and (2) of the Regulation which is both literal and schematic gives support to the idea that it, as a whole, is intended to govern the enforceability of the legal acts referred to in Articles 17, 19 and 22 of the Regulation in respect of third parties who have, or are likely to have, rights in the Community trade mark.
4

According to Article 139ter of the LIT, which was inserted by Article 1(24) of the Law of 19 December 2008 (Mémorial A 2008, p. 2622): ‘(1) Any taxpayer in receipt of income arising from pensions or annuities within the meaning of Article 96(1)(1) and (2) of the LIT which Luxembourg has the right to tax, and in possession of a tax deduction form, is to be granted a pensioners’ tax credit (PTC). The tax credit shall be taken into account only once for all pensions and annuities awarded to the taxpayer. (2) Pensioners’ tax credit shall be fixed at EUR 300 per year. The monthly amount shall be EUR 25. Pensioners’ tax credit shall be limited to the period in which the taxpayer is entitled to an income arising from pensions or annuities within the meaning of and subject to the conditions set out in [paragraph 1]. It shall be paid by the pension fund or any other body liable for payment of the pension during the tax year to which it relates, as provided for in detailed rules to be set out in the Grand-Ducal regulation referred to in [paragraph] 4. For incomes amounting to less than EUR 300 per year or EUR 25 per month, the pensioners’ tax credit shall not be granted. The pensioners’ tax credit shall be imputable and refundable to the pensioner exclusively in the context of the deduction of tax from wages and salaries as duly carried out by the pension fund or any other body liable for payment of the pension, on the basis of a tax deduction form. (3) The pension fund or body liable for payment of the pension having paid the pensioners’ tax credit and single-parent tax credit is entitled to offset credits granted against positive deductions or, where applicable, claim reimbursement of the tax credits advanced, as provided for in detailed rules to be set out in the Grand-Ducal regulation referred to in [paragraph] 4. (4) A Grand-Ducal regulation may specify the detailed rules for the application of the present Article.’
6

Article 63(1), first and third subparagraphs, and Article 63(2) of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18 (OJ 2014 L 94, pp. 65 to 242), which are referred to by the referring court, state: ‘1. With regard to criteria relating to economic and financial standing as set out pursuant to Article 58(3), and to criteria relating to technical and professional ability as set out pursuant to Article 58(4), an economic operator may, where appropriate and for a particular contract, rely on the capacities of other entities, regardless of the legal nature of the links which it has with them. … Where an economic operator wants to rely on the capacities of other entities, it shall prove to the contracting authority that it will have at its disposal the resources necessary, for example, by producing a commitment by those entities to that effect. … Where an economic operator relies on the capacities of other entities with regard to criteria relating to economic and financial standing, the contracting authority may require that the economic operator and those entities be jointly liable for the execution of the contract. … 2. In the case of works contracts, service contracts and siting or installation operations in the context of a supply contract, contracting authorities may require that certain critical tasks be performed directly by the tenderer itself or, where the tender is submitted by a group of economic operators as referred to in Article 19(2), by a participant in that group.’
7

Under Article 30 of that order: ‘1. The following shall be exempt from court stamping fees: actions and applications, whatever the cause of action, including applications for review, brought in accordance with the law by the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, the Office of the President of Romania, the Romanian Government, the Constitutional Court, the Romanian Court of Auditors, the Legislative Council, the Ombudsman, the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Ministry of Finance, as well as those brought by other public institutions, in any procedural capacity, where they are concerned with public revenues. 2. For the purposes of this Emergency Order, “public revenues” shall include revenues accruing to the State budget, the State social security budget, local budgets, the budgets of special funds, including that of the health insurance fund, the budget of the Public Treasury, revenues from the reimbursement of external loans and also interest and commission associated with the Public Treasury, revenues accruing to the budgets of public institutions totally or partially funded by the State budget, local budgets, the State social security budget and the budgets of special funds, where appropriate, revenues accruing to the budget of funds from external loans arranged or guaranteed by the State, where reimbursement, interest and other costs are paid from public funds and revenues accruing to the budget of non-repayable external funds.’
27

In those circumstances the College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven (Administrative Court of Appeal for Trade and Industry) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Must Article 4(1) of the Framework Directive, read in conjunction with Articles 8 and 13 of the Access Directive, be interpreted as meaning that, in principle, in a dispute concerning the lawfulness of a cost-oriented scale of charges imposed by the [NRA] in the wholesale call termination market, a national court is permitted to make a ruling which does not accord with [Recommendation 2009/396] in which [the “pure Bulric” method] is recommended as the appropriate price regulation measure for call termination markets, if, in that national court’s view, this is required on the basis of the facts in the case brought before it and/or on the basis of considerations of national or supranational law? (2) If the answer to Question 1 is affirmative: to what extent is the national court permitted, in assessing a cost-oriented price regulation measure: (a) in the light of Article 8(3) of the Framework Directive, to evaluate the NRA’s argument that the development of the internal market is promoted by reference to the degree to which the functioning of the internal market is in fact influenced? (b) to assess, in the light of the policy objectives and regulatory principles laid down in Article 8 of the Framework Directive and Article 13 of the Access Directive, whether the price regulation measure: (i) is proportionate; (ii) is appropriate; (iii) has been applied proportionately and is justified? (c) to require the NRA to demonstrate adequately that: (i) the policy objective, referred to in Article 8(2) of the Framework Directive, that the NRAs should promote competition in the provision of electronic communications networks and electronic communications services is genuinely being attained and that users are genuinely deriving maximum benefit in terms of choice, price and quality; (ii) the policy objective, referred to in Article 8(3) of the Framework Directive, that NRAs should contribute to the development of the internal market is genuinely being attained; (iii) the policy objective, referred to in Article 8(4) of the Framework Directive, that the interests of the citizens [of the European Union] should be promoted is genuinely being attained? (d) in the light of Article 16(3) of the Framework Directive, and of Article 8(2) and (4) of the Access Directive, when assessing whether the price regulation measure is appropriate, to take into account the fact that the measure has been imposed on the market on which the regulated undertakings possess significant market power but, in the form chosen ([the “pure Bulric” method]), has the effect of promoting one of the objectives of the Framework Directive, namely the interests of end-users, on another market which has not been earmarked for regulation?’
14

In those circumstances, the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘Must the first and third sentences of [the first subparagraph of] Article 4(1) of the Framework Directive be interpreted as meaning that — in the event that a network provider contests a decision of the NRA setting call termination rates in the network of that undertaking [(the first decision)] and that undertaking then contests a subsequent decision (implementing decision) of the NRA amending a contract between the addressee of the [first decision] and another undertaking so that the rates paid by that other undertaking for call termination in the network of the addressee of the [first decision] correspond to the rates set in the [first decision] — the national court, having found that the [first decision] has been annulled, cannot annul the implementing decision in view of the [second subparagraph] of Article 4(1) of the Framework Directive and the interests which the undertaking benefiting from the implementing decision derives from the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations or of legal certainty, or must the first and third sentences of [the first subparagraph of] Article 4(1) of the Framework Directive, in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, be interpreted as meaning that the national court may annul the implementing decision of the NRA and consequently remove the obligations laid down therein for the period preceding the judgment if it finds that that is necessary in order to provide effective protection for the rights of the undertaking appealing against the NRA’s decision that enforces the obligations laid down in the [first decision] which was subsequently annulled?’
26

In those circumstances, the Rechtbank Den Haag (District Court, The Hague) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Are Articles 1(1), 2(1)(b) and 6(1) of Directive 2006/115 to be construed as meaning that “lending” as referred to in those provisions also means making copyright-protected novels, collections of short stories, biographies, travelogues, children’s books and youth literature available for use, not for direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage, via a publicly accessible establishment — by placing a digital copy (reproduction A) on the server of the establishment and enabling a user to reproduce that copy by downloading it on to his/her own computer (reproduction B), — in such a way that the copy made by the user when downloading (reproduction B) is no longer usable after a limited period, and — in such a way that other users cannot download the copy (reproduction A) on to their computers during that period? (2) If Question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative: does Article 6 of Directive 2006/115 and/or any other provision of EU law preclude Member States from imposing on the application of the restriction on the lending right included in Article 6 of Directive 2006/115 a condition that the copy of the work made available by the establishment (reproduction A) must have been brought into circulation by an initial sale or other transfer of ownership of that copy within the European Union by the rightholder or with his consent within the meaning of Article 4(2) of Directive 2001/29? (3) If Question 2 is to be answered in the negative: does Article 6 of Directive 2006/115 lay down other requirements for the source of the copy (reproduction A) provided by the establishment, for instance the requirement that the copy was obtained from a lawful source? (4) If Question 2 is to be answered in the affirmative: is Article 4(2) of Directive 2001/29 to be construed as meaning that the initial sale or other transfer of ownership of material as referred to in that provision also means making available remotely by downloading, for use for an unlimited period, a digital copy of copyright-protected novels, collections of short stories, biographies, travelogues, children’s books and youth literature?’
36

In those circumstances the Juzgado de lo Social No 33 de Barcelona (Social Court No 33, Barcelona) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Must the general prohibition of discrimination affirmed in Article 21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as including, within the ambit of its prohibition and protection, the decision of an employer to dismiss a worker, previously well regarded professionally, merely because of his finding himself in a situation of temporary incapacity for work — of uncertain duration — as a result of an accident at work, when he was receiving health assistance and financial benefits from Social Security? (2) Must Article 30 of the Charter be interpreted as meaning that the protection that must be afforded a worker who has been the subject of a manifestly arbitrary and groundless dismissal must be the protection provided for in national legislation for every dismissal which infringes a fundamental right? (3) Would a decision of an employer to dismiss a worker previously well regarded professionally merely because he was subject to temporary incapacity — of uncertain duration — as a result of an accident at work, when he is receiving health assistance and financial benefits from Social Security, come within the ambit and/or protection of Articles 3, 15, 31, 34(1) and 35(1) of the Charter (or any one or more of them)? (4) If the three foregoing questions (or any of them) are answered in the affirmative and the decision to dismiss the worker, previously professionally well regarded, merely because he was subject to temporary incapacity — of uncertain duration — as a result of an accident at work, when he is receiving health assistance and financial benefits from Social Security, is to be interpreted as coming within the ambit and/or protection of one or more articles of the [Charter], may those articles be applied by the national court in order to settle a dispute between private individuals, either on the view that — depending on whether a “right” or “principle” is at issue — that they enjoy horizontal effect or by virtue of application of the “principle that national law is to be interpreted in conformity with an EU directive”? (5) If the four foregoing questions should be answered in the negative, would the decision of an employer to dismiss a worker, previously well regarded professionally, merely because he was subject to temporary incapacity — of uncertain duration — by reason of an accident at work, be caught by the term “direct discrimination on grounds of disability” as one of the grounds of discrimination envisaged in Articles 1, 2 and 3 of Directive 2000/78?’
38

In the present case, therefore, it is necessary to take into account, as a whole, the various stages of the operation at issue in the main proceedings. It is apparent from the order for reference that the Region of Hannover and the City of Hannover decided together to create, by regulatory act, a new entity governed by public law in order to confer on it certain competences, some of them common to those authorities and some of them belonging to each of them individually. At the same time, they conferred on that new entity certain powers in order to enable it to perform the tasks for which it was now competent. In effect they gave it the means they had hitherto had when so competent and undertook to cover any budgetary shortfalls of that entity, which was also given the power to charge and collect fees and the right to engage in certain activities not strictly within the remit of the competences transferred to it but being of the same type as certain activities performed as part of the tasks entrusted to it. Lastly, the new entity is characterised by autonomy in the performance of its tasks but must abide by the decisions of a general meeting of representatives of its two founding authorities, which is a body of the association and is responsible, inter alia, for appointing its managing director.
20

It is thus, in the first place, necessary to consider whether a collective agreement, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, introduces a difference in treatment on grounds of age, for the purposes of Article 2(1) of Directive 2000/78. In this regard, it should be borne in mind that, under that provision, the principle of equal treatment means that there must be no direct or indirect discrimination whatsoever on any of the grounds referred to in Article 1 of that directive. Article 2(2)(a) of that directive states that, for the purposes of Article 2(1), direct discrimination is taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than another person in a comparable situation, on any of the grounds referred to in Article 1 of that directive. It is clear moreover from Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78 that, for its purposes, indirect discrimination on grounds of age occurs where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons having a particular age at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.
19

In those circumstances, the Finanzgericht Baden-Württemberg (Finance Court, Baden-Württemberg) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following three questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. Is the first indent of Article 202(3) of the Customs Code to be interpreted as meaning that a legal person becomes a customs debtor under the first indent of Article 202(3) of the Customs Code as the person who introduced goods if one of its employees, who is not its statutory representative, brought about the unlawful introduction while acting within the scope of his responsibility? 2. If Question 1 is answered in the negative: Is the second indent of Article 202(3) of the Customs Code to be interpreted as meaning that: (a) a legal person participates in an unlawful introduction (even) if one of its employees, who is not its statutory representative, was involved in that introduction while acting within the scope of his responsibility, and (b) in the case of legal persons who participate in an unlawful introduction, the subjective element that they ‘were aware or should reasonably have been aware’ is to be determined by reference to the natural person in the legal person’s undertaking to whom the matter is entrusted, even if he is not the statutory representative of the legal person? 3. If Question 1 or 2 is answered in the affirmative: Is Article 212a of the Customs Code to be interpreted as meaning that whether the conduct of a participant involves fraudulent dealing or obvious negligence is to be determined, in the case of a legal person, solely by reference to the conduct of the legal person or its organs, or is the conduct of a natural person employed by it and entrusted with the task within the scope of his responsibility to be attributed to it?’