13.

For the purpose of answering the preliminary question two points may be inferred from the foregoing discussion. The first concerns the scope of Article 7(1 )(a) of the directive and the second the application of the principle of proportionality, which the Court has held to restrict the scope of derogations from the principle of equal treatment (see point 11 above). As regards the first point, it seems to me that the fact that provision is made for an indeterminate transitional period for the withdrawal of the derogation from the principle of equal treatment permitted by Article 7(1 )(a) shows that the narrow interpretation of the provision proposed by the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Commission is incorrect. If, as the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Commission maintain, the possibility of derogation laid down therein allowed the Member States solely to treat men and women unequally with respect to the moment at which the pension is paid, and if it did not extend to other financial and regulatory consequences flowing from a different pensionable age, it would, on that view, have been necessary to eliminate discrimination regarding the latter consequences by the end of the period for implementation of Directive 79/7 (which was in any event a long one), and the (even longer) transitional period in Article 7(2) would not have applied in respect thereof. If that interpretation is correct, then I fail to see why, for the examination (and review) of the national measures based on Article 7(1 )(a), construed so narrowly, it was necessary to provide for an implementation period which was longer than normal. As regards the second point, I consider that in a context such as the present the principle of proportionality plays a smaller role than is usual. The principle of proportionality requires the Court to weigh the interest pursued by the rule in question (in this case the derogating provision in Article 7(l)(a) and the national rules based thereon) against the interest which that rule infringes (in this case the principle of equal treatment). The infringement of the latter interest may go no further than is appropriate and necessary for the purposes of the former interest. In a case such as the present where the relevant rules — in particular Article 7(2) and Article 8(2) of the directive — themselves lay down a procedure involving the balancing of interests, it is not as a rule, in my view, for the Court to undertake such a balancing of interests itself. In my view, in such circumstances it may do so only very exceptionally, for example where it appears that the procedure provided for by the rules was not taken seriously by the State concerned (a claim which is not made by the Commission in this case ( 11 )) or because it appears that the discrimination may be eliminated without excessive legislative or financial difficulties, i. e. in this case where the national court could grant men equality of treatment with women with respect to the instances of discrimination which it mentions ( 12 ) without unduly jeopardizing the coherence or financial equilibrium of the national social security system concerned (being the reasons for the period of grace granted to the Member State — see point 12 above). ( 13 ) It is a matter for the national court to consider this last question.