ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
The principle of the retroactive application of the more lenient criminal law, as enshrined in Article 49(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, is part of primary EU law. Even before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which conferred on the Charter the same legal value as the treaties, it has been held that that principle followed from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and, therefore, had to be regarded as forming part of the general principles of EU law, which national courts must respect when applying national law.

The application of the more lenient criminal law necessarily involves a succession of laws over time and is based on the conclusion that the legislature changed its position either on the criminal classification of the act or the penalty to be applied to an offence.

Article 6 TEU and Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be interpreted as meaning that the accession of a State to the European Union does not preclude another Member State from imposing a criminal penalty on persons who committed, before the accession, the offence of facilitation of illegal immigration for nationals of the first State.

National criminal legislation which makes the facilitation of illegal immigration subject to a term of imprisonment, in accordance with Article 3 of Directive 2002/90, which defines the facilitation of unlawful entry, transit and residence, and Article 1 of Framework Decision 2002/946, on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, which provide that such an offence is to be punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, is not directed at third-country nationals who illegally enter the territory of that Member State and reside there without a residence permit, but at persons who facilitate the unlawful entry and residence of those nationals in the territory of that State. The mere fact that, after their illegal entry, those nationals have become EU citizens because of the accession of their State of origin to the European Union has no bearing on the course of the criminal proceedings brought against those persons who facilitate illegal immigration.

That acquisition of EU citizenship constitutes a factual situation which is not capable of changing the constituent elements of the offence of facilitation of illegal immigration.

No provision of that directive or of other EU legislation indicates that the acquisition of EU citizenship ought to entail the disappearance of the criminal offence committed by accused persons who engaged in labour trafficking. To decide otherwise would encourage such trafficking once a State has initiated the process of accession to the European Union, since traffickers would then be assured of benefiting from immunity. In that case, the aim achieved would be exactly the opposite of the aim pursued by the EU legislature.

(see paras 32-34, 36, 42, operative part)
Case C‑412/15

TMD Gesellschaft für transfusionsmedizinische Dienste mbH

v

Finanzamt Kassel II - Hofgeismar,

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hessisches Finanzgericht)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Taxation — Value added tax — Directive 2006/112/EC — Exemptions for certain activities in the public interest — Article 132(1)(d) — Supplies of human organs, blood and milk — Scope — Plasma of human blood transformed and used for industrial purposes’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 5 October 2016

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Exemptions — Exemptions for certain activities in the public interest — Supplies of human organs, blood and milk — Concept of human blood — Plasma of human blood transformed and used for industrial purposes — Not included

(Council Directive 2006/112, Art. 132(1)(d))

Article 132(1)(d) of Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted to the effect that supplies of human blood which Member States are required to exempt by virtue of that provision do not include supplies of plasma obtained from human blood where that plasma is intended to be used, not for direct therapeutic purposes, but exclusively for the manufacture of medicinal products.

Article 132(1)(d) of Directive 2006/112 concerns only transactions directly linked to healthcare or which have a therapeutic purpose. Therefore, so-called ‘industrial’ plasma, that is to say, plasma the supply of which does not contribute directly to activities in the public interest, since it is intended to be incorporated into an industrial production, in particular with a view to manufacturing medicinal products, cannot come under the exemption referred to in in that provision. Consequently, only plasma actually intended for direct therapeutic use comes under the exemption laid down in Article 132(1)(d) of Directive 2006/112.

(see paras 31, 35, 36, 40, operative part)
Article 4(a) and (c) and Article 5(1) and (2) of Directive 91/250 on the legal protection of computer programs must be interpreted as meaning that, although the initial acquirer of a copy of a computer program accompanied by an unlimited user licence is entitled to resell that copy and his licence to a new acquirer, he may not, however, in the case where the original material medium of the copy that was initially delivered to him has been damaged, destroyed or lost, provide his back-up copy of that program to that new acquirer without the authorisation of the rightholder.

The lawful acquirer of the copy of a computer program, who holds an unlimited licence to use that program but who no longer has that original material medium on which that copy was initially delivered to him, because he has destroyed, damaged or lost it, cannot, for that reason alone, be deprived of any possibility of reselling that copy to a third party, since this would render ineffective the exhaustion of the distribution right under Article 4(c) of Directive 91/250.

Thus, the lawful acquirer of an unlimited licence for the use of a used copy of a computer program must be able to download that program from the copyright holder’s website, since that downloading constitutes a reproduction of a computer program that is necessary to enable the new acquirer to use the program in accordance with its intended purpose.

However, the initial acquirer of the copy of the computer program — in respect of which the copyright holder’s distribution right is exhausted in accordance with Article 4(c) of Directive 91/250 — who resells that copy must, in order to avoid infringing that rightholder’s exclusive right of reproduction of his computer program, laid down in Article 4(a) of that directive, make any copy in his possession unusable at the time of its resale.

(see paras 53-55, 57, operative part)
The examination of the third question did not bring to light any evidence able to affect the validity of the limits for water content in frozen chicken meat laid down in Article 15(1) and Annexes VI and VII to Commission Regulation (EC) No 543/2008 of 16 June 2008 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards the marketing standards for poultry meat, as amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1239/2012 of 19 December 2012.

Article 15(1) of Regulation No 543/2008 and Annexes VI and VII thereto clearly define the content and scope of the requirements set out therein. Those provisions unambiguously determine both the products to which they relate, namely frozen and quick-frozen chickens, and the water content limit which must not be exceeded.

Since Annexes VI and VII to Regulation No 543/2008, as amended by Implementing Regulation No 1239/2012, are sufficiently precise for the purpose of carrying out the checks on frozen and quick-frozen chickens intended for export with export refunds, the fact that a Member State has not adopted practical measures, whose adoption is provided for in Article 18(2) of that regulation, does not prevent those checks from being relied on against the undertakings concerned.

(see paras 23, 30, 52, operative part 1, 3)
Case C‑420/15

Criminal proceedings

against

U

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the

tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 45 TFEU — Freedom of movement for workers — Obligation to register a vehicle belonging to a person resident in Belgium and intended to be used in Italy)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 31 May 2017

Freedom of movement for persons — Workers — Restrictions — Workers residing in a Member State and possessing, as owner, a vehicle registered in another Member State — Vehicle intended essentially for use in the territory of that latter Member State — Obligation to register the vehicle in the Member State of residence — Not permissible — No justification

(Art. 45 TFEU)

Article 45 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the case in the main proceedings, in accordance with which a worker residing there is required to register in that Member State a motor vehicle which he owns, but which is already registered in another Member State and is intended essentially for use in that latter State.

(see para. 31, operative part)
Case C‑336/15

Unionen

v

Almega Tjänsteförbunden

and

ISS Facility Services AB

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Arbetsdomstolen)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Social policy — Directive 2001/23/EC — Article 3 — Safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings — Collective agreements applicable to the transferee and the transferor — Additional periods of notice granted to dismissed workers — Account to be taken of the length of service with the transferor)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber), 6 April 2017

Social policy — Approximation of laws — Transfers of undertakings — Safeguarding of employees’ rights — Directive 2001/23 — Rights and obligations within the meaning of Article 3 — Obligation of the transferee to take into account, when dismissing an employee more than one year after the transfer of the undertaking, the length of service which that employee acquired with the transferor, in the calculation of that employee’s overall length of service

(Council Directive 2001/23, Art. 3)

Article 3 of Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances such as those in the case in the main proceedings, the transferee must, when dismissing an employee more than one year after the transfer of the undertaking, include, in the calculation of that employee’s length of service, which is relevant for determining the period of notice to which that employee is entitled, the length of service which that employee acquired with the transferor.

(see para. 33, operative part)
Case C‑528/15

Policie ČR, Krajské ředitelství policie Ústeckého kraje, odbor cizinecké policie

v

Salah Al Chodor and Others

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Nejvyšší správní soud)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection — Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 (Dublin III) — Article 28(2) — Detention for the purpose of transfer — Article 2(n) — Significant risk of absconding — Objective criteria — Absence of a legal definition)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 15 March 2017

Border controls, asylum and immigration — Asylum policy — Criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection — Regulation No 604/2013 — Detention for the purpose of transfer — Condition — Significant risk of absconding — Obligation on Member States to establish objective criteria defining such a risk in a binding provision of general application

(European Parliament and Council Regulation No 604/2013, Arts 2(n) and 28(2))

Article 2(n) and Article 28(2) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, read in conjunction, must be interpreted as requiring Member States to establish, in a binding provision of general application, objective criteria underlying the reasons for believing that an applicant for international protection who is subject to a transfer procedure may abscond. The absence of such a provision leads to the inapplicability of Article 28(2) of that regulation.

Taking account of the purpose of the provisions concerned, and in the light of the high level of protection which follows from their context, only a provision of general application could meet the requirements of clarity, predictability, accessibility and, in particular, protection against arbitrariness.

(see paras 43, 47, operative part)
Observance of the rights of the defence in a proceeding before the Commission, the aim of which is to impose a fine on an undertaking for infringement of competition rules, requires that the undertaking concerned must have been afforded the opportunity to make known its views on the truth and relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged as well as on the documents used by the Commission to support its claim that there has been an infringement. Those rights are referred to in Article 41(2)(a) and (b) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

Accordingly, Article 27(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 provides that, prior to taking a decision establishing an infringement of the rules of competition and imposing a fine, the Commission is required to give those who are the subject of the proceedings the opportunity to have their point of view heard as regards the grounds that the Commission has advanced and is to base its decisions solely on the objections in respect of which the relevant parties have been able to set out their observations.

It follows that the statement of objections is designed to ensure the exercise of the rights of the defence, individually, by each natural or legal person concerned by the administrative proceedings in relation to the competition rules.

By contrast, if the Commission has no intention of establishing that an infringement was committed by a company, the rights of defence do not require a statement of objections to be sent to that company. The sending of a statement of objections to a given company seeks to ensure that the rights of defence of that company are respected, rather than those of a third party, even though that latter party may well be affected by the same administrative proceedings.

(see paras 43-46)
By way of derogation from Article 355(3) TFEU, under the 1972 Act of Accession, EU acts do not apply to Gibraltar in certain areas of EU law. Those exceptions were introduced on account of the special legal position of that territory, in particular its status as a free port (see, in that regard, judgment of 21 July 2005, Commission v United Kingdom, C‑349/03 , EU:C:2005:488 , paragraph 41 ). However, freedom to provide services, enshrined in Article 56 TFEU, is not one of those exceptions.

In that regard, it should be noted that Gibraltar is a European territory for whose external relations a Member State, namely the United Kingdom, is responsible, and that EU law is applicable to that territory pursuant to Article 355(3) TFEU (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 September 2003, Commission v United Kingdom, C‑30/01 , EU:C:2003:489 , paragraph 47 , and 12 September 2006, Spain v United Kingdom, C‑145/04 , EU:C:2006:543 , paragraph 19 ).

Article 355(3) TFEU, in conjunction with Article 56 TFEU, is to be interpreted as meaning that the provision of services by operators established in Gibraltar to persons established in the United Kingdom constitutes, as a matter of EU law, a situation confined in all respects within a single Member State.

It is true that the Court has previously held, as observed by all the interested parties, that Gibraltar does not form part of the United Kingdom (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 September 2003, Commission v United Kingdom, C‑30/01, EU:C:2003:489, paragraph 47, and 12 September 2006, Spain v United Kingdom, C‑145/04; EU:C:2006:543, paragraph 15). That fact is not, however, decisive in determining whether two territories must, for the purposes of the applicability of the provisions on the four freedoms, be treated as a single Member State.

As regards, in the first place, the conditions under which Article 56 TFEU is to apply to Gibraltar, it is true that Article 355(3) TFEU does not state that Article 56 is to apply to Gibraltar ‘under the same conditions as they apply to the United Kingdom’. That said, it should be recalled that Article 355(3) TFEU extends the applicability of the provisions of EU law to the territory of Gibraltar, subject to the exclusions expressly provided for in the 1972 Act of Accession, which do not, however, cover freedom to provide services. Furthermore, the fact, relied on by the Government of Gibraltar, that Article 56 TFEU is applicable to Gibraltar, by virtue of Article 355(3) TFEU, and to the United Kingdom, by virtue of Article 52(1) TEU, is irrelevant in that regard.

In the second place, there is no other factor that could justify the conclusion that relations between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom may be regarded, for the purposes of Article 56 TFEU, as akin to those existing between two Member States. To treat trade between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom in the same way as trade between Member States would be tantamount to denying the connection, recognised in Article 355(3) TFEU, between that territory and that Member State.

(see paras 35, 36, 38-42, operative part)
A Member State which does not ensure secondary or equivalent treatment of urban waste water from agglomerations whose population equivalent (p.e.) is between 2000 and 10000 fails to fulfil its obligations under Article 4(1) of Directive 91/271 concerning urban waste water treatment as amended by Regulation No 1137/2008.

The second and third indents of Article 4(1) of Directive 91/271 impose upon the Member States a precise obligation as to the result to be achieved, worded in a clear and unequivocal manner, and according to which urban waste water entering collecting systems must be subject to secondary treatment or an equivalent treatment, either before any discharge where it comes from agglomerations of between 10000 and 15000 p.e. or before discharge to freshwater and estuaries where it comes from agglomerations of between 2000 and 10000 p.e.

(see paras 22, 35, operative part 1)
The provisions of Directive 2001/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2001 on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure, as amended by Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004, in particular Article 4(5) and Article 30(1), (3), (5) and (6) of that directive, as amended, must be interpreted as meaning that they preclude the application of national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides for a review of the equity of charges for the use of railway infrastructure, on a case-by-case basis, by the ordinary courts and the possibility, if necessary, of amending the amount of those charges, independently of the monitoring carried out by the regulatory body provided for in Article 30 of Directive 2001/14, as amended by Directive 2004/49.

Thus, recital 12 of Directive 2001/14 states that charging and capacity-allocation schemes should encourage railway infrastructure managers to optimise use of their infrastructure within the framework established by the Member States (judgment of 28 February 2013, Commission v Spain, C‑483/10, EU:C:2013:114, paragraph 44). Although it is true that those managers may in principle calculate the amount of the charge, using a charging system applying to all the railway undertakings, they could not achieve such optimal use by means of the charging system if they run the risk, at any time, of a civil court determining, in equity, under Paragraph 315 of the BGB, the charge applicable to a single railway undertaking which is party to the proceedings, the determination of that charge by that court thus restricting the infrastructure manager’s discretion to an extent incompatible with the objectives pursued by Directive 2001/14 (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 October 2013, Commission v Italy, C‑369/11, EU:C:2013:636, paragraph 43).

(see paras 80, 81, 103, operative part)
Case C‑649/15 P

TV2/Danmark A/S

v

European Commission

(Appeal — State aid — Article 107(1) TFEU — Public broadcasting service — Measures implemented by the Danish authorities in favour of the Danish broadcaster TV2/Danmark — Concept of ‘aid granted by a Member State or through State resources’ — Judgment in Altmark)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 9 November 2017

Appeal—Grounds—Mere repetition of the pleas and arguments put forward before the General Court—Error of law relied on not identified—Inadmissibility (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 168(1)(d))

Appeal—Grounds—Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence—Inadmissibility—Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence—Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1), second para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

Appeal—Grounds—Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence—Inadmissibility—Review by the Court of the General Court’s findings with regard to national law—Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1), second para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

State aid—Commission decision—Judicial review—Interpretation of the decision in the light of the reasons stated in the decision, regardless of the arguments developed by the Commission in the course of proceedings (Arts 108 TFEU and 263 TFEU)