ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
2.

EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Earlier trade mark constituted by an EU trade mark — Refusal to register on a ground relating to refusal even limited to part of the Union (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 22)
Officials — Competitions — Selection Board — Rejection of application — Obligation to state reasons — Scope — Observance of the secrecy of proceedings — Reasoning limited to the communication of scores under the selection criteria — Lawfulness — Conditions

(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 41(2)(c); Staff Regulations of Officials, Art. 25, 2nd para.)

(see paras 21, 23-25, 27, 28, 31-33)
3.

EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Assessment of the likelihood of confusion — Determination of the relevant public — Attention level of the public (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 19, 24)
EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Overlap of the scope of the grounds set out in Articles 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 2017/1001

(European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(b) and (c))

(see paras 20, 60, 61)
Judicial proceedings — Application initiating proceedings — Formal requirements — Identification of the subject-matter of the dispute — Brief summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based — No requirement for an express reference to the provisions on which the action is based

(Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 76(1)(d))

(see paras 24, 26)
EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Separate examination of the grounds for refusal in relation to each of the goods or services covered by the application for registration — Obligation to state the reasons for refusing to register — Scope

(European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Arts 7(1) and 94(1), first sentence)

(see para. 28)
2.

EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Assessment of the likelihood of confusion — Determination of the relevant public — Attention level of the public (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 29)
EU trade mark — Observations of third parties and opposition — Examination of the opposition — Proof of use of the earlier mark — Genuine use — Meaning — Interpretation taking account of the rationale of Article 47(2) and (3) of Regulation 2017/1001

(European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Recital 24 and Art. 47(2) and (3); Commission Delegated Regulation 2017/1430, Art. 10(3))

(see para. 22)
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 19 December 2019 –

Vins el Cep v EUIPO — Rotkäppchen-Mumm Sektkellereien (MIM NATURA)

(Case T‑589/18)

(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for the EU figurative mark MIM NATURA — Earlier international word and figurative registrations MM and MM and earlier national word mark MUMM — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Figurative mark MIM NATURA — Word and figurative marks MM, MM and MUMM

(European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 8(1)(b))

(see paras 26, 57, 69, 75)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 12 July 2018 (Case R 2270/2017-1), relating to opposition proceedings between Rotkäppchen-Mumm Sektkellereien and Vins el Cep, SL.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
3.

EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity between the goods or services in question — Criteria for assessment (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 24)
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 11 February 2020 –

Stada Arzneimittel v EUIPO (ViruProtect)

(Case T‑487/18)

(EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark ViruProtect — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Duty to state reasons)

1. EU trade mark — Procedural provisions — Statement of reasons for decisions (Art. 296 TFEU; Council Regulation No 207/2009) (see para. 15)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Aim — Need to preserve availability (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 16)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Meaning (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 23)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Meaning — Neologism consisting of elements descriptive of characteristics of the goods or services concerned — Whether included where the nature of the combination is not unusual (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 25)

5. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Word mark ViruProtect (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 39, 43, 47)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 4 June 2018 (Case R 1886/2017-5), relating to an application for registration of the word sign ViruProtect as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Acts of the institutions – Act amending an earlier provision – General principles of law – Rule of equivalence of form – No infringement

(European Parliament and Council Regulation No 1308/2013; Council Regulation No 1234/2007; Commission Regulation No 689/2013)

(see paras 74-77)
Actions brought by officials – Staff of the European Central Bank – Action against a decision rejecting a complaint – Admissibility – Obligation to rule on pleas directed against the decision rejecting the complaint – Pleas devoid of independent content or purely confirmatory decision – Absence

(Staff Regulations of Officials, Arts 90 and 91; Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank, Art. 36.2; Conditions of Employment for Staff of the European Central Bank, Art. 42)

(see paras 40, 41)
Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber, Extended Composition) of 16 December 2020 – Bilbaína de Alquitranes v Commission

(Case T‑645/18)

(Non-contractual liability – Environment – Classification, labelling and packaging of certain substances and mixtures – Classification of pitch, coal tar, high-temp as an Aquatic Acute 1 (H400) toxic substance and as an Aquatic Chronic 1 (H410) toxic substance – Sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals)

1. Non-contractual liability – Conditions – Unlawfulness – Damage – Causal link – One of the conditions not satisfied – Claim for compensation dismissed in its entirety (Art. 340, second para. TFEU) (see paras 54, 55)

2. Non-contractual liability – Conditions – Unlawfulness – Sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals – Rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals – Meaning – Classification method for aquatic environmental hazards – Precluded (Art. 340, second para. TFEU; European Parliament and Council Regulation No 1272/2008, as amended by Regulations No 286/2011 and No 944/2013, Annex I, point 4.1.3.5.5) (see paras 58, 66-69)

3. Non-contractual liability – Conditions – Unlawfulness – Sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law which leads to the imposition or strengthening of obligations on individuals so as to affect their legal situation (Art. 340, second para. TFEU) (see paras 70, 71)

4. Non-contractual liability – Conditions – Unlawfulness – Sufficiently serious breach of EU law – Requirement that the institutions manifestly and seriously disregard the limits of their discretion – Breach by the Commission of a rule affording it some discretion when classifying chemical substances and mixtures – Highly complex scientific situation – No sufficiently serious breach (Art. 340, second para. TFEU; European Parliament and Council Regulation No 1272/2008, as amended by Regulations No 286/2011 and No 944/2013, Annex I, point 4.1.3.5.5) (see paras 80-116)

Re:

Action under Article 268 TFEU seeking compensation for the damage which the applicant claims to have suffered as a result of the adoption of Commission Regulation (EU) No 944/2013 of 2 October 2013 amending, for the purposes of its adaptation to technical and scientific progress, Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures (OJ 2013 L 261, p. 5), in so far as that regulation classified pitch, coal tar, high-temp as an Aquatic Acute 1 (H400) and Aquatic Chronic 1 (H410) substance.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Bilbaína de Alquitranes, SA to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber, Extended Composition) of 9 September 2020 – Arkéa Direct Bank and Others v ECB

(Case T‑149/18)

(Economic and monetary policy – Prudential supervision of credit institutions – Contribution to the deposit guarantee system or to the single resolution fund by means of irrevocable payment commitments – Tasks entrusted to the ECB – Specific supervision powers of the ECB – Article 4(1)(f) and Article 16(1)(c) and (2)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 – Measure requiring the deduction of the cumulative amount of irrevocable payment commitments outstanding from Tier 1 capital – Absence of individual examination)

1. Economic and monetary policy – Economic policy – Supervision of the EU financial sector – Single supervisory mechanism – Prudential supervision of groups of credit institutions on a consolidated basis – Capital requirements – Scope of the control and evaluation carried out by the European Central Bank (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 575/2013, Arts 26(1), first subpara., (a) to (f) and 36; Council Regulation No 1024/2013, Art. 4(1)(f)) (see paras 45-50)

2. Economic and monetary policy – Economic policy – Supervision of the EU financial sector – Single supervisory mechanism – Prudential supervision of groups of credit institutions on a consolidated basis – Capital requirements – Scope of the control and evaluation carried out by the European Central Bank – Obligation to carry out an individual prudential examination (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 575/2013, Art. 92(3); Council Regulation No 1024/2013, Arts 4(1)(f) and 16(1)(c) and (2)(d)) (see paras 51, 65-72)

3. Economic and monetary policy – Economic policy – Supervision of the EU financial sector – Single supervisory mechanism – Prudential supervision of groups of credit institutions on a consolidated basis – Capital requirements – Scope of the control and evaluation carried out by the European Central Bank – Funds that may be subject to a measure requiring the implementation of a policy or special treatment – Concept – Irrevocable payment commitments (IPCs) – Included (Council Regulation No 1024/2013, Arts 4(1)(f) and 16(1)(c) and (2)(d)) (see paras 59, 60)

Re:

Application based on Article 263 TFEU for partial annulment, first, of ECB Decision ECB/SSM/2017-9695000CG7B84NLR5984/207 of 19 December 2017, and, second, of ECB Decision ECB-SSM-2019-FRCMU-4 of 14 February 2019.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Annuls paragraph 8 of Decision ECB/SSM/2017-9695000CG7B84NLR5984/207 of the European Central Bank (ECB) of 19 December 2017 and paragraph 5 of Decision ECB-SSM-2019-FRCMU-4 of the ECB of 14 February 2019;
Judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) of 24 March 2021 –

Andreas Stihl v EUIPO – Giro Travel Company (Combination of the colours grey and orange)

(Case T‑193/18)

(EU trade mark – Invalidity proceedings – EU mark consisting of a combination of the colours grey and orange – Absolute ground for refusal – Article 4 and Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation No 40/94 (now Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) – Sufficiently clear and precise graphic representation – Requirement for a systematic arrangement associating the colours in a predetermined and uniform way)

1. EU trade mark – Surrender, revocation and invalidity – Absolute grounds for invalidity – Signs of which a trade mark may consist – Graphic representation of a mark submitted as a figurative mark – Conditions for registration – Sufficiently clear and precise graphic representation (Council Regulation No 40/94, Arts 4 and 7(1)(a) and 51(1)(a)) (see paras 28-30)

2. EU trade mark – Surrender, revocation and invalidity – Absolute grounds for invalidity – Signs of which a trade mark may consist – Colours or combinations of colours – Conditions (Council Regulation No 40/94, Arts 4 and 7(1)(a) and 51(1)(a); Commission Regulation No 2868/95, Art. 1, Rule 3(3)) (see paras 31-33)

3. EU trade mark – Surrender, revocation and invalidity – Absolute grounds for invalidity – Signs of which a trade mark may consist – Colours or combinations of colours – Mark consisting of a combination of the colours orange and grey (Council Regulation No 40/94, Arts 4 and 7(1)(a) and 51(1)(a)) (see paras 38-42)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 23 January 2018 (Case R 200/2017-2) relating to invalidity proceedings between Giro Travel Company and Andreas Stihl.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 23 January 2018 (Case R 200/2017-2);

2. Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Andreas Stihl AG & Co. KG;
Judicial proceedings – Representation of the parties – Authority to act ad litem – Not required for agents of the EU institutions

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 19; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 51)

(see paras 64-66)
State aid – Administrative procedure – Obligations of the Commission – Possible for aid beneficiary to rely on rights as extensive as defence rights as such – Absence – Right of the aid beneficiary to be involved in the procedure to the extent appropriate – Scope – Right of access to the Commission’s administrative file – None

(Art. 108(2) TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 41)

(see paras 40-55)
90

Furthermore, in that regard, it must also be noted, as was made clear in the judgment of 19 December 2018, Azarov v Council (C‑530/17 P, EU:C:2018:1031), that the case-law of the Court of Justice – according to which, in particular, in the event of the adoption of a decision to freeze funds such as that adopted in respect of the applicant, it is not for the Council or General Court to verify whether or not the investigations to which the person concerned by those measures was subject in Ukraine were well founded, but only to verify whether that was the case in relation to the decision to freeze funds in the light of the document or documents on which that decision was based (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 March 2015, Ezz and Others v Council, C‑220/14 P, EU:C:2015:147, paragraph 77; of 19 October 2017, Yanukovych v Council, C‑599/16 P, not published, EU:C:2017:785, paragraph 69; and of 19 October 2017, Yanukovych v Council, C‑598/16 P, not published, EU:C:2017:786, paragraph 72) – cannot be interpreted as meaning that the Council is not required to verify that the decision of the third State on which it intends to base the adoption of restrictive measures was taken in accordance with the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 December 2018, Azarov v Council, C‑530/17 P, EU:C:2018:1031, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
3

By decision of 5 October 2017, the Commission rejected the applicant’s request (‘the contested decision’). In that decision, the PMO stated, inter alia, that the aim of the system established in Article 12 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations was to privilege the constitution of a pension, as a regular future revenue, and to avoid situations where persons would find themselves without sufficient revenue at the age of retirement and would have to appeal to the social assistance of the Member States. The PMO also stated that, from that perspective, the payments made into a national pension scheme or a private insurance scheme, pursuant to Article 12(2) of that annex, ‘in order to establish or maintain pension rights’, had to correspond with the amount of pension contributions which should be expected to be paid under a national pension scheme or which had actually been paid to the PSEUI during the same period, and therefore the future revenue guaranteed by those payments had to be consistent with the payments ensured through the transfer of the pension rights acquired under the PSEUI. In that regard, the PMO noted that the amount of the payments made into the private insurance scheme (EUR 14200) was clearly not consistent with the amount of the contributions paid to the PSEUI (EUR 65 334.95), and therefore it could in no way provide the applicant with an income equivalent to that which he would have been able to acquire on the basis of the actuarial equivalent of his pension rights acquired under the PSEUI. Lastly, the PMO stated that the applicant did however satisfy the conditions for a transfer to another scheme, under Article 12(1)(b) of that annex, which implied that the pension rights which he had acquired with the European Union during his period of employment with Europol are transferred to a national pension scheme or a private insurance scheme or a pension fund of his choice, in accordance with the conditions laid down by that provision.
20

In the third place, the Fifth Board of Appeal examined the issue of the nature and extent of use (paragraphs 43 to 52 of the earlier decision). After pointing out that the majority of the evidence submitted by Sony Computer Entertainment relating to the relevant period consisted of promotional and advertising materials, it considered the extent to which use of a mark in advertising could constitute genuine use. In that connection, it stated, inter alia, that advertising in advance of the actual sale of goods or services was generally considered to constitute genuine use if its purpose was to establish a market for the good or services. It found that, in the case in point, ‘the expectations created all over the world for the launch of the new PlayStation [had given] real marketing power when announcing the name of the new video game console’ (paragraph 49 of the earlier decision). The Board of Appeal then concluded that ‘the fact that the evidence of use filed by [Sony Computer Entertainment Europe showed] advertising and preparatory acts for putting the new console on the market [complied] with the requirements of genuine use’ (paragraph 50 of the earlier decision). Lastly, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 52 of the earlier decision, that it was clear from the evidence produced by Sony Computer Entertainment Europe that the launch of the PlayStation Vita console had been well prepared and carefully planned, and that the PlayStation Vita had been announced as a new handheld gaming console for which specific games had been developed.
48

In the first part of the plea, the applicant submits that the audit in the context of which the requested document was prepared had been completed by the time she requested access to that document. In that regard, she claims that even the title of the document, namely ‘Final audit report – IAS Audit on HR Management in the Education, Audiovisual and Cultural Executive Agency (Ares(2018)361356)’, attests to the completion of the audit in question, as does the recital in the contested decision stating that ‘on the basis of the final audit report, the [EACEA] accepted to implement the proposed recommendations’. In addition, the document entitled ‘HR Annual Plan’, drawn up by the EACEA itself, supports these claims since it refers to remedial actions, indicating that the final phase of the audit exercise had been reached. In addition, the HR Annual Plan shows that seven of the actions proposed in the requested document had been fully implemented, while it is reasonable to assume that the final two actions proposed in the requested document were fully implemented, given that they were, respectively, 70% and 80% complete at the time that the HR Annual Plan was drawn up. The applicant submits, in her reply, that ten major actions were thus completely implemented on the basis of the recommendations of the audit report. In support of those arguments, she prepared a summary note analysing the implementation rates achieved by the EACEA. However, she maintains, in that regard, that, since the exception under Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 can be relied on to refuse access to a document only where disclosure would undermine the purpose of the audit, it does not apply in the present case because the audit in question was complete. It would, in any event, be unacceptable to make access to the requested document dependent on a random, future and distant event.