ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
106

In the third place, the applicant’s argument that, since the rapporteur Member State declared the renewal application admissible in accordance with Article 8 of Implementing Regulation No 844/2012, EFSA can no longer call into question the completeness of the information communicated by the applicant, is unfounded. The fact that the dossier formally contains all the items referred to in Article 7 of that regulation does not in itself constitute a decision on the quality of those items from a scientific point of view, which may necessitate an in-depth study and may result in diverging assessments by the rapporteur Member State and EFSA with regard to whether or not they are sufficient to allow a renewal application. It must be observed in that regard that Article 7 of Implementing Regulation No 844/2012 requires only that the items referred to in its provisions for the purposes of setting up a ‘supplementary’ dossier be communicated. In accordance with Article 8 of that regulation, this is a condition for the admissibility of the application and therefore a formal requirement which, if satisfied, triggers the substantive assessment of the dossier, referred to in Chapter 2 of that regulation. It must be pointed out that the fact that the application is formally declared to be admissible for the purposes of Article 8 of Implementing Regulation No 844/2012 does not preclude the Member State from requiring additional information in accordance with Article 11(5) of that regulation, or EFSA from requiring additional information in accordance with Article 13(3) of that regulation. Moreover, that was the situation in the present case since, by communication of 13 July 2016, the applicant received a letter from EFSA requiring further information concerning oxasulfuron. …
45

The applicant claims that the Appointing Authority imposed on him an obligation that was more binding than that provided for by Article 17a(2) of the Staff Regulations. The fact that the Parliament had set up a committee of inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of EU law in relation to money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion (‘the PANA Committee’) does not mean that he can express views on issues relating to the Panama Papers only where he has criticised the work of that committee, of the Parliament or of the European Union, in a way that has seriously prejudiced the legitimate interests of the Union. The applicant cites in that regard the judgment of 6 March 2001, Connolly v Commission (C‑274/99 P, EU:C:2001:127), from which it is clear that it is not necessary in the present case to know whether he failed to give notice of his proposal to publish the book in question, but rather to determine whether the legitimate interests of the Union could be seriously threatened by the book’s content. Thus, since the book in question does not present such a threat, it cannot be regarded as falling within the condition laid down in Article 17a(2) of the Staff Regulations, or as being related to the work of the Union.
51

It is clear that, as interested parties within the meaning of Article 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589, the applicants have an interest in bringing an action for annulment of the contested decision, the content of which cannot be separated from the commitments of the Italian authorities relating to the BMPS restructuring plan, including the burden-sharing measures (see paragraphs 37 to 41 above). That interest in bringing proceedings stems, inter alia, from the fact that, following such annulment, the Commission would be led to open the formal investigation procedure, in the context of which they could exercise their procedural rights under Article 108(2) TFEU in order to affect that institution’s assessment pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU and therefore the content of its decision. The applicants, in the context of their fifth plea, rely on an infringement of those procedural safeguards, observance of which they can obtain only if it is possible for them to bring a challenge before the EU Courts against the contested decision (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 24 May 2011, Commission v Kronoply and Kronotex, C‑83/09 P, EU:C:2011:341, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited, and of 20 June 2019, a&o hostel and hotel Berlin v Commission, T‑578/17, not published, EU:T:2019:437, paragraph 41). That is all the more so since, in the present case, the Commission, after a long pre-notification phase including many exchanges with the Italian authorities and the notification of the measures at issue, limited itself on 28 June 2017 to a preliminary examination of only six days before adopting the contested decision on 4 July 2017, without the interested parties having had the opportunity to submit their comments.
EU trade mark — Procedural provisions — Decisions of EUIPO — Observance of the rights of the defence — Scope of the principle

(Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 63(2) and Art. 75, second sentence)

(see paras 33, 34, 39)
Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 13 February 2020 –

Repsol v EUIPO (INVENTEMOS EL FUTURO)

(Case T‑8/19)

(EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark INVENTEMOS EL FUTURO — Absolute ground for refusal — No distinctive character — No distinctive character acquired through use — Article 7(1)(b) and (3) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of distinctive character — Marks consisting of advertising slogans — Perception of the trade mark by the relevant public — Attention level of the public (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 19, 31, 32)

2. EU trade mark — Procedural provisions — Statement of reasons for decisions — Article 94 of Regulation 2017/1001 — Scope identical to that of Article 296 TFEU (Art. 296 TFEU; European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 94) (see paras 34, 52)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Separate examination of the grounds for refusal in relation to each of the goods or services covered by the application for registration — Obligation to state the reasons for refusing to register — Scope (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 94) (see paras 35, 36, 48, 49)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of distinctive character — Marks consisting of advertising slogans — Laudatory promotional formula (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 55-59)

5. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of distinctive character — Word mark INVENTEMOS EL FUTURO (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 67, 68)

6. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Trade marks which are devoid of distinctive character, descriptive or commonplace — Exception — Distinctive character acquired through use — Assessment criteria (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(b) and (3)) (see paras 74-78, 84, 85, 107)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 23 October 2018 (Case R 1173/2018-2), relating to an application for registration of the word sign INVENTEMOS EL FUTURO as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 13 May 2020 –

EC Brand Comércio, Importação e Exportação de Vestuário em Geral v EUIPO (pantys)

(Case T‑532/19)

(EU trade mark — Application for the EU figurative mark pantys — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 — No distinctive character acquired through use — Article 7(3) of Regulation 2017/1001)

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Assessment of the descriptive nature of a sign — Criteria (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 13-15, 18, 24, 28)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Figurative mark pantys (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 17, 19-21, 31, 35, 40, 41)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Assessment of registrability by the Office — Production of evidence — Not required (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 23)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Assessment of the registrability of a sign — EU rules only taken into account — Decisions of national authorities not binding EU bodies (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001) (see para. 33)

5. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of distinctive character — Exception — Distinctive character acquired through use — Criteria for assessment (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(3)) (see paras 49-54)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 22 May 2019 (Case R 314/2019-5), relating to an application for registration of the figurative mark pantys as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Community designs — Grounds for invalidity — No individual character — Design not giving the informed user a different overall impression from that produced by the earlier design — Global assessment of all the elements of the earlier design — Nature of the product incorporating a design — Effect

(Council Regulation No 6/2002, Recital 14 and Arts 6(1), 25(1)(b) and 36(6))

(see paras 51, 52)
EU trade mark – Appeal proceedings – Action before the EU Courts – Jurisdiction of the General Court – Alteration of a decision of the Office – Assessment in the light of the powers conferred on the Board of Appeal

(Regulation2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Art. 72(3))

(see paras 13, 14)
Judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) of 28 May 2020 –

Lozano Arana and Others v EUIPO – Coltejer (LIBERTADOR)

(Case T‑564/19)

(EU trade mark –– Revocation proceedings –– EU word mark LIBERTADOR –– Genuine use of the mark –– Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 –– Right to be heard –– Article 94 of Regulation 2017/1001 –– Due notification –– Article 60 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/1430 (now Article 60 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625) –– Failure to produce proof of genuine use of the mark within the time limit prescribed –– Article 19(1) of Delegated Regulation 2017/1430 (now Article 19(1) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625))

1. EU trade mark – Procedural provisions – Decisions of the Office – Observance of the rights of the defence – Scope of the principle (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 94(1), second sentence) (see para. 26)

2. EU trade mark – Procedural provisions – Notification – Notification to the appointed representative – Regularity (Commission Regulation 2017/1430, Art. 60(1) and (3)) (see paras 30, 31, 34, 35)

3. EU trade mark – Procedural provisions – Revocation proceedings – Proof of use of the earlier mark – Time limit set by the Office – Strictness (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 58(1)(a); Commission Regulation 2017/1430, Art. 19(1)) (see paras 38, 40-42)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 20 June 2019 (Case R 2482/2018-4), relating to revocation proceedings between Coltejer and Mr Albert Benmaor and Mr Lozano Arana.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 9 September 2020 –

Daw v EUIPO (SOS Loch- und Rissfüller)

(Case T‑626/19)

(EU trade mark – Application for EU word mark SOS Loch- und Rissfüller – Absolute grounds for refusal – No distinctive character – Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – Descriptive character – Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001)

1. EU trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark – Absolute grounds for refusal – Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service – Aim – Need to preserve availability (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 23)

2. EU trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark – Absolute grounds for refusal – Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service – Definition (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 24, 36, 41)

3. EU trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark – Absolute grounds for refusal – Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service – Assessment of the descriptive nature of a sign – Criteria (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 25, 26, 31, 32)

4. EU trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark – Absolute grounds for refusal – Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service – Word mark SOS Loch- und Rissfüller (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 34, 37, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54, 63)

5. EU trade mark – Decisions of the Office – Principle of equal treatment – Principle of sound administration – EUIPO's previous decision-making practice – Principle of legality – Need for a strict and complete examination in each particular case (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001) (see para. 56)

6. EU trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark – Refusal of registration based on one of the absolute grounds for refusal set out in Article 7(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 – Whether sufficient (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)) (see para. 62)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of

18 July 2019 (Case R 278/2019-4), relating to an application for registration of the word sign SOS Loch- und Rissfüller as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 23 September 2020 –

Brillux v EUIPO – Synthesa Chemie (Freude an Farbe)

(Case T‑401/19)

(EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – International registration designating the European Union – Figurative mark Freude an Farbe in yellow, orange, red, pink, violet, blue, turquoise, dark green, light green and charcoal – Earlier figurative EU trade mark Glemadur Freude an Farbe – Relative grounds for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

1. EU trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services – Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark – Figurative mark Freude an Farbe in yellow, orange, red, pink, violet, blue, turquoise, dark green, light green and charcoal and Glemadur Freude an Farbe (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 27-31, 46, 51, 52, 60-67, 71)

2. EU trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services – Similarity of the marks concerned – Criteria for assessment – Composite mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 34-36)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 29 March 2019 (Case R 1498/2018-5), relating to opposition proceedings between Synthesa Chemie and Brillux.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Officials – Promotion – Complaint by a candidate not promoted – Decision to reject – Obligation to state reasons – Scope – Inadequate statement of reasons – Regularisation during the proceedings – Conditions

(Art. 296 TFEU; Staff Regulations of Officials, Arts 25, second para., 45 and 90(2))

(see paras 29-32, 34-36, 60)
Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 18 November 2020 –

Topcart v EUIPO – Carl International (TC CARL)

(Case T‑377/19)

(EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for EU word mark TC CARL – Earlier national figurative mark CARL TOUCH – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

1. EU trade mark – Appeals procedure – Action before the EU judicature – Jurisdiction of the General Court – Review of the lawfulness of decisions of the Boards of Appeal – Re-examination of the facts in the light of evidence not previously submitted before EUIPO bodies – Precluded (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 72) (see para. 23)

2. Acts of the institutions – Temporal application – Application of the substantive law in force at the time of the application for the registration of a trade mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 27)

3. EU trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services – Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark – Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 28-31, 77, 83, 86)

4. EU trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services – Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark – Word mark TC CARL and figurative mark CARL TOUCH (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 43, 50, 53, 74, 80, 89, 95)

5. EU trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services – Similarity of the marks concerned – Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 44-47, 59-62, 64)

6. EU trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services – Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark – Weak distinctive character of the earlier mark – Effect (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 78)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 2 April 2019 (Case R 1826/2018-2), relating to opposition proceedings between Carl International and Topcart.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
1.

EU trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark – Absolute grounds for refusal – Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service – Assessment of the descriptive character of a sign – Criteria – Composite mark – Taking into account the overall perception of the mark by the relevant public (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 31-37, 39, 40)
Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 16 December 2020 –

BT v Commission

(Case T‑315/19)

(Civil service – Officials – Surviving spouse – Survivor’s pension – Articles 18 and 20 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations – Conditions for eligibility – Duration of the marriage – Plea of illegality – Equal treatment – Principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age – Proportionality)

1. Officials – Equal treatment – Concept – Comparability of the situations at issue – Criteria for assessment (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts 20, 21(1) and 52(1)) (see paras 42-46)

2. Officials – Pensions – Pension for surviving spouse – Conditions for granting – Discretion of the EU legislature – Judicial review – Scope (Staff Regulations of Officials, Annex VIII, Arts 18 and 20) (see para. 48)

3. Officials – Pensions – Pension for surviving spouse – Conditions for granting – Minimum duration of marriage – Difference in the treatment of surviving spouses depending on whether they married before or after termination of the deceased official’s service – Condition putting those who married after the official’s retirement at a disadvantage – Difference in treatment based indirectly on the age of the former official – Not permissible – Justification – Fight against fraud and protection of the European Union’s financial interests – None (Staff Regulations of Officials, Annex VIII, Arts 18 and 20) (see paras 50-63, 66-70, 76-86, 90-92)

Re:

Application under Article 270 TFEU seeking annulment of the Commission’s decision of 20 July 2018 rejecting the applicant’s request for a survivor’s pension.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Annuls the decision of the European Commission of 20 July 2018 rejecting BT’s request for a survivor’s pension;

2. Orders the Commission to pay, in addition to its own costs, the costs incurred by BT;

3. Orders the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union each to bear their own costs;