ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
3

Recitals 1 to 3, 16, 37 to 39, 42 and 43 in the preamble to Directive 98/44 are worded as follows: ‘(1) Whereas biotechnology and genetic engineering are playing an increasingly important role in a broad range of industries and the protection of biotechnological inventions will certainly be of fundamental importance for the Community’s industrial development; (2) Whereas, in particular in the field of genetic engineering, research and development require a considerable amount of high-risk investment and therefore only adequate legal protection can make them profitable; (3) Whereas effective and harmonised protection throughout the Member States is essential in order to maintain and encourage investment in the field of biotechnology; … (16) Whereas patent law must be applied so as to respect the fundamental principles safeguarding the dignity and integrity of the person; whereas it is important to assert the principle that the human body, at any stage in its formation or development, including germ cells, and the simple discovery of one of its elements or one of its products, including the sequence or partial sequence of a human gene, cannot be patented; whereas these principles are in line with the criteria of patentability proper to patent law, whereby a mere discovery cannot be patented; … (37) Whereas the principle whereby inventions must be excluded from patentability where their commercial exploitation offends against ordre public or morality must also be stressed in this Directive; (38) Whereas the operative part of this Directive should also include an illustrative list of inventions excluded from patentability so as to provide national courts and patent offices with a general guide to interpreting the reference to ordre public and morality; whereas this list obviously cannot presume to be exhaustive; whereas processes, the use of which offend against human dignity, such as processes to produce chimeras from germ cells or totipotent cells of humans and animals, are obviously also excluded from patentability; (39) Whereas ordre public and morality correspond in particular to ethical or moral principles recognised in a Member State, respect for which is particularly important in the field of biotechnology in view of the potential scope of inventions in this field and their inherent relationship to living matter; whereas such ethical or moral principles supplement the standard legal examinations under patent law regardless of the technical field of the invention; … (42) Whereas, moreover, uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes must also be excluded from patentability; whereas in any case such exclusion does not affect inventions for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes which are applied to the human embryo and are useful to it; (43) Whereas pursuant to Article F(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the Union is to respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law; …’
4

Article 46a of Regulation No 1408/71, entitled ‘General provisions relating to reduction, suspension or withdrawal applicable to benefits in respect of invalidity, old age or survivors under the legislations of the Member States’, provides: ‘1. For the purposes of the Chapter, overlapping of benefits of the same kind shall have the following meaning: all overlapping of benefits in respect of invalidity, old age and survivors calculated or provided on the basis of periods of insurance and/or residence completed by one and the same person. 2. For the purposes of this Chapter, overlapping of benefits of different kinds means all overlapping of benefits that cannot be regarded as being of the same kind within the meaning of paragraph 1. 3. The following rules shall be applicable for the application of provisions on reduction, suspension or withdrawal laid down by the legislation of a Member State in the case of overlapping of a benefit in respect of invalidity, old age or survivors with a benefit of the same kind or a benefit of a different kind or with other income: (a) account shall be taken of the benefits acquired under the legislation of another Member State or of other income acquired in another Member State only where the legislation of the first Member State provides for the taking into account of benefits or income acquired abroad; (b) account shall be taken of the amount of benefits to be granted by another Member State before deductions of taxes, social security contributions and other individual levies or deductions; (c) no account shall be taken of the amount of benefits acquired under the legislation of another Member State which are awarded on the basis of voluntary insurance or continued optional insurance; (d) where provisions on reduction, suspension or withdrawal are applicable under the legislation of only one Member State on account of the fact that the person concerned receives benefits of a similar or different kind payable under the legislation of other Member States or other income acquired within the territory of other Member States, the benefit payable under the legislation of the first Member State may be reduced only within the limit of the amount of the benefits payable under the legislation or the income acquired within the territory of other Member States.’
77

In the context of its first ground of appeal, the Commission criticises paragraphs 272 to 275 of the judgment under appeal, which are worded as follows: ‘272 In the present case, it must be stated that, in the cases cited in the [decision at issue] in order to establish the existence of repeated infringement on Eni’s part, namely the cases which gave rise to the Polypropylene and PVC II decisions (see paragraph 257 [of the judgment under appeal]) (see footnote 517 of the [decision at issue]), the Commission has neither claimed nor shown that the companies concerned by those decisions, namely [Anic] and EniChem respectively, had not independently determined their conduct on the market at issue over the course of the infringement periods selected and that they therefore constituted, with their parent company Eni, an economic entity and therefore an undertaking within the meaning of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC. The Commission found an infringement only on the part of those subsidiaries and not on the part of their parent company. As observed by the applicants, without being contradicted by the Commission, Eni was not heard in the context of the administrative procedure which led to the adoption of those decisions. 273 However, the principle of respect for the rights of the defence precludes a competition decision from being held to be lawful in a case where the Commission imposes a fine on an undertaking without first having informed it of the objections relied on against it. The statement of objections must also indicate in which capacity a legal person is called on to answer the allegations (judgments in Papierfabrik August Koehler and Others v Commission, [C‑322/07 P, C‑327/07 P and C‑338/07 P, EU:C:2009:500], paragraphs 37 and 39; and [Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission, EU:C:2009:536], paragraph 57). 274 Therefore, it cannot be accepted that, when making a determination as to the aggravating circumstance of repeated infringement on Eni’s part, the Commission is entitled to decide that Eni should be held liable for a previous infringement in relation to which it was not penalised by a Commission decision and in the establishment of which it was not the addressee of a statement of objections, with the result that it was not given an opportunity to present its arguments with a view to disputing that it formed an economic unit with certain other undertakings — in the present case, Anic and EniChem — at the time of the earlier infringement. 275 It follows that the infringement found in Article 1 of the [decision at issue] cannot be regarded as a repeated infringement on Eni’s part.’
35

In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to question 1(b) is that the answer to question 1(a) is capable of being affected by the fact that privileges, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, conferred by national legislation upon an independent bank acting for the public benefit, at the time of its establishment, in consideration for entering into agricultural credit operations and for specific tasks entrusted to that bank, are still in force, and that even after the functions of that bank were extended to cover all banking activities and that bank has become a public limited company. It is for the referring court to determine whether, in the light of all the relevant legal and factual circumstances, the four cumulative conditions justifying, in accordance with the Court’s case-law, the finding that those privileges constitute compensation for services provided by that bank in order to discharge public service obligations, and that they thus escape being classified as State aid, are satisfied.
75

In that regard, the appellant submits, in particular, first, that, by reversing the burden of proof, application of the 2002 Leniency Notice resulted in an infringement of Article 2 of Regulation No 1/2003. Second, it claims that application of that notice infringes the right to a fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Third, the appellant criticises the General Court for having merely noted, in paragraph 155 of the judgment under appeal, that a penalty is lawful where the person concerned is in a position to ascertain which acts and omissions render him liable, without responding to the complaint, raised at first instance, that the system of determining penalties applicable in competition matters is not compatible with the ECHR, in particular Article 7 thereof, which requires that infringements and punishments be clearly defined. Fourth, the appellant criticises the General Court for having held, in paragraph 169 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant pleaded before the General Court that the Commission had made an error in the assessment of the facts only when setting the multiplier for the ‘additional amount’ at the rate of 15% and not when setting the multiplier for the ‘gravity of the infringement’ at the same rate. Fifth, the appellant pleads the illegality of the criteria set out in the 2006 Guidelines, the taking account of which by the Commission when determining the amount of each of the penalties results, because of the application of the ceiling provided for in Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, in the amount of the fine imposed automatically being 10% of turnover. The General Court completely failed to examine that plea of illegality and confined itself, in paragraph 158 of the judgment under appeal, to observing that the appellant had not been ordered to pay a penalty equal to 10% of turnover. Sixth, the Commission and then the General Court set the multipliers for the ‘gravity of the infringement’ and the ‘additional amount’ starting, as is clear from paragraphs 165 and 166 of the judgment under appeal, from the erroneous premisses that the appellant had participated in a single infringement, on the territories of six Member States, covering all the product groups under investigation, with a market share of approximately 54.3% in each of those States, and engaging in anticompetitive practices which were, as a rule, implemented. Seventh, the appellant submits that, although the General Court held that the Commission’s decision was vitiated by an error of assessment, it drew no conclusions from this in paragraphs 192 to 195 of the judgment under appeal. In proceeding in that way, the General Court infringed the principles of proportionality and equal treatment.
1.

Actions for failure to fulfil obligations — Subject-matter of the dispute — Provisions of the Treaty — National tax legislation providing for the immediate attribution of gains made by non-resident close companies to participators in those companies — Potential adverse effects on both the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital — Delimitation of the action in accordance with the Commission’s application (Arts 49 TFEU and 63 TFEU; EEA Agreement, Arts 31 and 40) (see paras 16, 17)
The principles of legal certainty and of the protection of legitimate expectations do not preclude a national tax authority from deciding, following a tax audit, to subject transactions to value added tax and to impose the payment of surcharges, provided that that decision is based on clear and precise rules and that that authority’s practice has not been such as to give rise, in the mind of a prudent and well-informed trader, to a reasonable expectation that that tax would not be levied on such transactions, this being a matter for the referring court to determine. The surcharges applied in such circumstances must comply with the principle of proportionality.

Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax precludes national rules under which the right to deduct input value added tax, due or paid on goods and services used in the context of taxed transactions, is refused to the taxable person, who must nevertheless pay the tax that he ought to have recovered, for the sole reason that he was not identified for value added tax purposes when he carried out those transactions, so long as he has not been duly identified for value added tax purposes and the tax return for the tax due has not been filed.

The right to deduct is a fundamental principle of the common system of value added tax, which in principle may not be limited, and is exercisable immediately in respect of all the taxes charged on transactions relating to inputs. Moreover, the principle of value added tax neutrality requires that deduction of input value added tax be allowed if the substantive requirements are satisfied, even if the taxable person has failed to comply with some of the formal requirements. Consequently, where the tax authority has the information necessary to establish that the substantive requirements have been satisfied, it cannot, in relation to the right of the taxable person to deduct that tax, impose additional conditions which may have the effect of rendering that right ineffective for practical purposes. In that regard, identification for value added tax purposes, provided for in Article 214 of Directive 2006/112, and the obligation of the taxable person to state when his activity as a taxable person commences, changes or ceases, provided for in Article 213 of that directive, are only formal requirements for the purposes of control, and they cannot undermine, inter alia, the right to deduct value added tax in the case where the substantive conditions which give rise to that right are satisfied. With regard to penalising the failure on the part of the taxable person to comply with the obligations relating to accounts and tax returns by a denial of the right to deduct, it clearly goes further than is necessary to attain the objective of ensuring the correct application of those obligations, since EU law does not prevent Member States from imposing, where necessary, a fine or a financial penalty proportionate to the seriousness of the offence.

(see paras 56, 58-60, 63, 65, operative part 2)
The EU legislature has discretion when it decides to confer on the Commission a delegated power pursuant to Article 290(1) TFEU or an implementing power pursuant to Article 291(2) TFEU. However, that discretion must be exercised in compliance with the conditions laid down in Articles 290 TFEU and 291 TFEU.

With respect to the conferral of a delegated power, Article 290(1) TFEU states that a legislative act may delegate to the Commission the power to adopt non-legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative act.

However, in the exercise of the implementing power conferred on it, the institution concerned must provide further detail in relation to the content of a legislative act, in order to ensure that it is implemented under uniform conditions in all the Member States. In exercising an implementing power, the Commission may neither amend nor supplement the legislative act, even as to its non-essential elements.

Neither the existence nor the extent of the discretion conferred on it by the legislative act is relevant for determining whether the act to be adopted by the Commission comes under Article 290 TFEU or Article 291 TFEU. It follows from the wording of Article 290(1) TFEU that the lawfulness of the EU legislature’s choice to confer a delegated power on the Commission depends solely on whether the acts the Commission is to adopt on the basis of the conferral are of general application and whether they supplement or amend non-essential elements of the legislative act.

(see paras 28-32)
Regulation No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation No 295/91, as is clear from recitals 1 and 2 in the preamble thereto, aims to ensure a high level of protection for passengers. Although Article 3(1)(b) of that regulation, read in the light of that objective, does not require it to be proved that the passenger concerned has actually obtained the benefits or compensation and assistance in a third country, the mere possibility of entitlement cannot of itself justify the conclusion that the regulation is not applicable to that passenger. It cannot be accepted that a passenger may be deprived of the protection granted by Regulation No 261/2004 solely on the ground that he may benefit from some compensation in the third country, without any evidence that that compensation corresponds to the purpose of the compensation guaranteed by that regulation or that the conditions to which the beneficiary is subject and the various means of implementing it are equivalent to those provided for by that regulation.

Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation No 295/91, must be interpreted as meaning that a technical problem which occurred unexpectedly, which is not attributable to poor maintenance and which was also not detected during routine maintenance checks, does not fall within the definition of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ within the meaning of that provision. In that connection, although a breakdown caused by the premature malfunction of certain components of an aircraft, do indeed constitute an unexpected event, the fact remains that such a breakdown remains intrinsically linked to the very complex operating system of the aircraft, which is operated by the air carrier in conditions, particularly meteorological conditions, which are often difficult or even extreme, it being understood moreover that no component of an aircraft lasts forever. Therefore, in the course of the activities of an air carrier, that unexpected event is inherent in the normal exercise of an air carrier’s activity, as air carriers are confronted as a matter of course with unexpected technical problems.

Furthermore, the prevention of such a breakdown or the repairs occasioned by it, including the replacement of a prematurely defective component, is not beyond the actual control of that carrier, since the latter is required to ensure the maintenance and proper functioning of the aircraft it operates for the purposes of its business.

(see paras 41-44, 49, operative part)
1.

Declares that, by applying a scheme of State intervention, consisting of the obligation, for energy undertakings, to apply prices for supplies of natural gas which have been approved by the president of the Urzad Regulacji Energetyki (Energy Regulation Authority), an obligation which is unlimited in time and for which national law does not impose on the administrative authorities any obligation to check at regular intervals the necessity and nature of the application of that intervention in the gas sector, having regard to the level of development of that sector, and which is characterised by its application to an unlimited group of users or customers, without any distinction being drawn according to customers and without any differentiation of the situation of individuals within the context of individual groups of customers, the Republic of Poland has failed to comply with its obligations under the provisions of Article 3(1) in conjunction with Article 3(2) of Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC;
Case C‑174/14

Saudaçor — Sociedade Gestora de Recursos e Equipamentos da Saúde dos Açores SA

v

Fazenda Pública

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from the Supremo Tribunal Administrativo)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Value added tax — Directive 2006/112/EC — Article 13(1) — Treatment as a non-taxable person — Concept of ‘body governed by public law’ — Limited company which is responsible for the provision of services in respect of the planning and management of the health service of the Autonomous Region of the Azores — Determination of the detailed arrangements for those services, including their remuneration, in programme agreements concluded between that company and that region’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 29 October 2015

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Taxable persons — Bodies governed by public law — Treatment as non-taxable persons in respect of activities in which they engage as public authorities — Concept — Provision by a company of services in respect of the planning and management of a regional health service — Included — Conditions — Existence of an economic activity — Classification of the company as a body governed by public law — Independent interpretation

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Taxable persons — Bodies governed by public law — Treatment as non-taxable persons in respect of activities in which they engage as public authorities — Exceptions — Supply of services effected for consideration — Concept

See the text of the decision. (see paras 31-33)

Article 9(1) of Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that an activity whereby a company provides a region with services in respect of the planning and management of the regional health service under the programme agreements concluded between that company and that region constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of that provision. In that regard, the direct link between the supply of services and the consideration received does not appear to be called into question by the fact that the service provider’s activity is intended to fulfil a constitutional obligation exclusively and directly incumbent upon the State under the national constitution, namely the obligation to implement a national health service which is universal and potentially free, to be financed, in essence, by public resources. Under Article 9(1) of Directive 2006/112, a taxable person means any person who, independently, carries out any economic activity, whatever the purpose or results of that activity. (see paras 39, 40, 42, operative part 1)

See the text of the decision. (see para. 52)