ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Case C‑92/15

Sven Mathys

v

De Grave Antverpia NV

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from the hof van beroep te Antwerpen)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive 96/75/EC — Systems of chartering and pricing in inland waterway transport — Scope — Article 1(b) — ‘Carrier’ — Article 2 — Freedom to conclude contracts and negotiate prices’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber), 12 October 2016

Transport — Inland waterway transport — Directive 96/75 — Systems of chartering and pricing in inland waterway transport — Carrier — Definition — National legislation enabling a person not corresponding to the definition of carrier to conclude a contract of carriage as a carrier — Lawfulness

(Council Directive 96/75, Arts 1(b) and 2)

In the context of inland waterway transport activities, Article 1(b) of Directive 96/75 on the systems of chartering and pricing in national and international inland waterway transport in the Community, in so far as it defines a carrier as an owner or an operator of one or more inland waterway vessels, and Article 2 of that directive, in so far as it states that, in that field, contracts are to be freely concluded between the parties concerned, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation that would enable a person who does not correspond to that definition to conclude a contract of carriage as a carrier.

Indeed, Directive 96/75 in no way governs the intervention of chartering brokers or persons who, without themselves possessing the means to carry on inland waterway transport activities, would nonetheless personally undertake to provide such transport by making provision for the use of the services of a boatmaster. Accordingly, the description, in national law, of a party to such contracts as a chartering broker or a charterer has no connection with the interpretation of that directive.

(see paras 34, 36, operative part)
Case C‑527/15

Stichting Brein

v

Jack Frederik Wullems

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from the Rechtbank Midden-Nederland)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Intellectual and industrial property — Directive 2001/29/EC — Harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights — Article 3(1) — Communication to the public — Definition — Sale of a multimedia player — Add-ons — Publication of works without the consent of the right holder — Access to streaming websites — Article 5(1) and (5) — Right of reproduction — Exceptions and limitations — Lawful use)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 26 April 2017

Approximation of laws—Copyright and related rights—Directive 2001/29—Harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society—Communication to the public—Definition—Sale of a multimedia player on which there are pre-installed add-ons, available on the internet, containing hyperlinks to websites on which copyright-protected works have been made available to the public without the consent of the right holders—Included (European Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, Art. 3(1)) Approximation of laws—Copyright and related rights—Directive 2001/29—Harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society—Right of reproduction—Acts of temporary reproduction—Definition—Acts of temporary reproduction, on a multimedia player on which there are pre-installed add-ons available on the internet, of a copyright-protected work obtained by streaming from a website belonging to a third party offering that work without the consent of the copyright holder—Not included (European Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, Art. 5(1) and (5))
1.

Declares that, by failing to adopt, with regard to the landfills of Torremolinos (Malaga), Torrent de S’Estret (Andratx, Mallorca), Hoya de la Yegua de Arriba (Yaiza, Lanzarote), Barranco de Butihondo (Pájara, Fuerteventura), La Laguna-Tiscamanita (Tuineje, Fuerteventura), Lomo Blanco (Antigua, Fuerteventura), Montaña de Amagro (Galdar, Gran Canaria), Franja Costera de Botija (Galdar, Gran Canaria), Cueva Lapa (Galdar, Gran Canaria), La Colmena (Santiago del Teide, Tenerife), Montaña Los Giles (La Laguna, Tenerife), Las Rosas (Güimar, Tenerife), Barranco de Tejina (Guía de Isora, Tenerife), Llano de Ifara (Granadilla de Abona, Tenerife), Barranco del Carmen (Santa Cruz de La Palma, La Palma), Barranco Jurado (Tijarafe, La Palma), Montaña Negra (Puntagorda, La Palma), Lomo Alto (Fuencaliente, La Palma), Arure/Llano Grande (Valle Gran Rey, La Gomera), El Palmar — Taguluche (Hermigua, La Gomera), Paraje de Juan Barba (Alajeró, La Gomera), El Altito (Valle Gran Rey, La Gomera), Punta Sardina (Agulo, La Gomera), Los Llanillos (La Frontera, El Hierro), Faro de Orchilla (La Frontera, El Hierro), Montaña del Tesoro (Valverde, El Hierro), Arbancón (Castilla-La Mancha), Galve de Sorbe (Castilla-La Mancha), Hiendelaencina (Castilla-La Mancha), Tamajón (Castilla-La Mancha), El Casar (Castilla-La Mancha), Cardeñosa (Ávila), Miranda de Ebro (Burgos), Poza de la Sal (Burgos), Acebedo (León), Bustillo del Páramo (León), Cármenes (León), Gradefes (León), de Noceda del Bierzo (León), San Millán de los Caballeros (León), Santa María del Páramo (León), Villaornate y Castro (León), Cevico de La Torre (Palencia), Palencia (Palencia), Ahigal de los Aceiteros (Salaman), d’Alaraz (Salamanca), de Calvarrasa de Abajo (Salamanca), de Hinojosa de Duero (Salamanca), Machacón (Salamanca), Palaciosrubios (Salamanca), Peñaranda de Bracamonte (Salamanca), de Salmoral (Salamanca), Tordillos (Salamanca), Basardilla (Segovia), Cabezuela (Segovia), Almaraz del Duero (Zamora), Cañizal (Zamora), Casaseca de las Chanas (Zamora), La Serratilla (Abanilla), Las Rellanas (Santomera) and El Labradorcico (Águilas), the necessary measures to ensure that waste management is carried out without endangering human health, without harming the environment and, in particular without risk to water, air, soil, animals or plants, and that the waste disposed of are treated by the municipalities themselves or by a dealer, an establishment or undertaking which carries out waste treatment operations or arranged by a private or public waste collector in accordance with Articles 4 and 13 of Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives, the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 13 and 15(1) of that directive.
Under Article 174 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, a response is to seek to have the appeal allowed or dismissed, in whole or in part. Furthermore, in accordance with Articles 172 and 176 of those rules, the parties authorised to lodge a response may submit, by a document separate from the response, a cross-appeal which, according to Article 178(1) and the second sentence of Article 178(3) of those rules, must seek to have set aside, in whole or in part, the judgment under appeal on the basis of pleas in law and arguments separate from those relied on in the response. It is apparent from those provisions, read together, that the response may not seek to have the judgment under appeal set aside on the basis of distinct and independent grounds from those raised in the appeal, since such grounds may be raised only as part of a cross-appeal.

As regards the establishment of the European Union’s non-contractual liability, a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law that is intended to confer rights on individuals is established where the breach is one that implies that the institution concerned manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits set on its discretion, the factors to be taken into consideration in that connection being, inter alia, the degree of clarity and precision of the rule breached and the measure of discretion left by that rule to the EU authorities. A breach of EU law will, in any event, clearly be sufficiently serious if it has persisted despite a judgment finding the breach in question to be established, or despite a preliminary ruling or settled case-law of the Court on the matter from which it is clear that the conduct in question constituted a breach.

A breach, over a period of almost three years, of the obligation on the Council to provide, in the event of a challenge, information or evidence substantiating the reasons for the adoption of restrictive measures against a natural or legal person constitutes a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals. It is clear that such an obligation, which is derived from the case-law relating to asset-freezing measures adopted in the specific context of the fight against international terrorism, applies equally with regard to the adoption of asset-freezing restrictive measures aimed at applying pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran given, in particular, the individual nature of those restrictive measures and the considerable impact they are likely to have on the rights and freedoms of the persons and entities subject to them.

(see paras 30, 31, 39, 40)
In order to assess a measure under Article 106(2) TFEU, the Commission is not required to examine whether the conditions laid down by the case-law in Altmark, in particular the second and fourth of those conditions, are met. Verification of the conditions laid down in the Altmark case-law occurs upstream, that is to say in the examination of the issue of whether the measures at issue must be characterised as State aid. That issue must be resolved before the one which consists in examining, where necessary, if incompatible aid is nevertheless necessary to the performance of the tasks assigned to the recipient of the measure at issue, under Article 106(2) TFEU.

By contrast, the conditions laid down in the Altmark case-law are no longer to be applied where the Commission, having found that a measure must be characterised as aid, in particular in so far as the recipient undertaking is unable to pass the test of comparison with a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped so as to be able to meet the necessary public-service requirements, examines whether that aid can be justified under Article 106(2) TFEU.

(see paras 33-35)
Case C‑605/15

Minister Finansów

v

Aviva Towarzystwo Ubezpieczeń na Życie S.A. w Warszawie

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Taxation — Value added tax — Directive 2006/112/EC — Article 132(1)(f) — Exemptions for certain activities in the public interest — Exemption for the supply of services by independent groups of persons for their members — Applicability to insurance)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 21 September 2017

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Exemptions — Exemptions for certain activities in the public interest — Supplies of services by independent groups of persons who are carrying on an activity which is exempt for the purpose of rendering services to their members — Scope — Economic activity in the area of insurance — Included

(Council Directive 2006/112, Art. 132(1)(f))

Article 132(1)(f) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted to the effect that the exemption provided for in that provision relates only to independent groups of persons whose members carry on an activity in the public interest referred to in Article 132 of that directive and that, therefore, the services supplied by independent groups of persons whose members carry on an economic activity in the area of insurance, which does not constitute such an activity in the public interest, are not entitled to that exemption.

(see para. 40, operative part)
Any measures adopted by the institutions of the European Union, whatever their form, which are intended to have binding legal effects, are regarded as actionable measures, within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU.

That is not the case of a letter sent to a Member State by a director of the Commission in which the latter, on the one hand, expressed the view of his Directorate that that Member State was considered liable for the loss of own resources incurred in another Member State and, on the other hand, explained its opinion as to the legal consequences of those losses and the obligations which, according to him, would result for the receiving Member State, while inviting that Member State to make available the amounts at issue. Firstly, neither the statement of a simple legal opinion, nor a simple request to make available the amounts in question can be capable of producing legal effects. Furthermore, it cannot be inferred from the mere fact that the letter at issue lays down a time limit for making that amount available, whilst indicating that a delay may give rise to default interest, in view of the overall content of that letter, that the Commission intended, rather than expressing its opinion, to adopt a measure which has binding legal effects or, therefore, conferring on that letter the nature of an actionable measure.

Secondly, as regards the context, the dispatch of a letter such as the letter at issue was a common practice of the Commission intended to initiate informal discussions on a Member State’s compliance with EU law, which could be followed by the initiation of the pre-litigation phase of an infringement procedure. In view of the Commission’s discretion to initiate infringement proceedings, a reasoned opinion is not capable of producing binding legal effects. The same applies a fortiori to letters, which can be regarded as simple informal contacts prior to the opening of the pre-litigation phase of an action for failure to fulfil obligations. Finally, as regards the powers of the Commission, that institution has no power to adopt binding acts requiring a Member State to make available the amounts at issue.

(see paras 47, 60-66)
Case C‑574/15

Criminal proceedings

against

Mauro Scialdone

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Varese)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Value added tax (VAT) — Protection of the European Union’s financial interests — Article 4(3) TEU — Article 325(1) TFEU — Directive 2006/112/EC — PFI Convention — Penalties — Principles of equivalence and effectiveness — Failure to pay, within the time limit prescribed by law, the VAT resulting from an annual tax return — National legislation imposing a custodial sentence only where the amount of unpaid VAT exceeds a certain criminalisation threshold — National legislation imposing a lower criminalisation threshold for a failure to pay withholding income tax)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 2 May 2018

Own resources of the European Union—Protection of the European Union’s financial interests—Fight against fraud and other illegal activities—Obligation of the Member States to establish effective and deterrent penalties—Concept of fraud and any other illegal activities—Failure to pay, within the time limit prescribed by law, the value added tax resulting from the annual tax return—Illegal activity liable to affect the financial interests of the European Union (Art. 325(1) TFEU; Council Directive 2006/112, Arts 206 and 250(1); Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests, Art. 1(1)(b)) Own resources of the European Union—Protection of the European Union’s financial interests—Fight against fraud and other illegal activities—Obligation of the Member States to establish effective and deterrent penalties—Scope—Tax offences in the field of value added tax—Failure to pay, within the time limit prescribed by law, the value added tax resulting from the annual tax return—National legislation imposing a custodial sentence—Higher criminalisation threshold than for a failure to pay withholding income tax—Lawfulness (Art. 4(3) TEU; Art. 325(1) TFEU; Council Directive 2006/112)
Although ‘multilateral system’ is not defined as such by that directive, it is stated in recital 6 thereof that the definitions of ‘regulated market’ and of ‘multilateral trading facility (MTF)’, which are the two forms of multilateral system governed by the directive, should exclude bilateral systems in which an investment firm enters into every trade on own account and not as a riskless counterparty interposed between the buyer and seller. Under Article 4(1)(6) of Directive 2004/39 dealing on own account means trading against proprietary capital resulting in transactions in financial instruments. From that clear distinction between a multilateral system and a bilateral system, it may be inferred that a market operator or an investment firm operating a multilateral system acts without incurring risk and without trading against proprietary capital in the conclusion of transactions within that system.

(see paras 30, 31)
8

The HS Explanatory Note concerning heading 8519 of the HS provides: ‘This heading covers apparatus for recording sound, apparatus for reproducing sound and apparatus that is capable of both recording and reproducing sound. Generally, sound is recorded onto or reproduced from an internal storage device or media (e.g., magnetic tape, optical media, semiconductor media or other media of heading 85.23). Sound recording apparatus modify a recording medium so that sound reproducing apparatus can subsequently reproduce the original sound-wave (speech, music, etc.). This includes recording based on the receipt of a sound-wave or by other methods, e.g., by recording data sound files, downloaded from an internet page or a compact disc by an automatic data processing machine, onto the internal memory (e.g., flash memory) of a digital audio device (e.g., MP3 player). Devices which record sound as digital code generally are not capable of reproducing sound unless they incorporate a means for converting the recording from digital code to an analogue signal. … (IV) Other apparatus using magnetic, optical or semiconductor media The apparatus of this group may be portable. They may also be equipped with, or designed to be attached to acoustic devices (loudspeakers, earphones, headphones) and an amplifier. … (C) Apparatus using semiconductor media This group includes apparatus which use semiconductor (e.g., solid-state non-volatile) media. Sound is recorded as digital code converted from amplified currents of variable intensity (analogue signal) on the recording medium. Sound is reproduced by reading such medium. The semiconductor media may be permanently installed in the apparatus or may be in the form of removable solid-state non-volatile storage media. Examples include flash memory audio players (e.g., certain MP3 players) which are portable battery operated apparatus consisting essentially of a housing incorporating a flash memory (internal or removable), a microprocessor, an electronic system including an audio-frequency amplifier, an LCD screen and control buttons. The microprocessor is programmed to use MP3 or similar file formats. The apparatus can be connected to an automatic data processing machine for downloading MP3 or similar files.’
15

The Explanatory Note concerning heading 2309 of the HS states: ‘This heading covers sweetened forage and prepared animal feeding stuffs consisting of a mixture of several nutrients designed: … (2) to achieve a suitable daily diet by supplementing the basic farm-produced feed with organic or inorganic substances (supplementary feed); or (3) for use in making complete or supplementary feeds. … B.– Preparations for supplementing (balancing) farm-produced feed (feed supplements) Farm produced feed is usually rather low in proteins, minerals or vitamins. The preparations devised to compensate for these deficiencies, so as to ensure a well-balanced animal diet, consist of proteins, minerals or vitamins plus additional-energy feeds (carbohydrates) which serve as a carrier for the other ingredients. Although, qualitatively, these preparations have much the same composition as those described in paragraph (A), they are distinguished by a relatively high content of one particular nutrient. … C.– Preparations for use in making the complete feeds or supplementary feeds described in (A) and (B) above These preparations, known in trade as “premixes”, are, generally speaking, compound compositions consisting of a number of substances (sometimes called additives) the nature and proportions of which vary according to the animal production required. … This heading excludes: (a) Pellets made from a single material, or from a mixture of several materials which is classified as such in one specific heading, even with an added binder (molasses, starchy substances, etc.) in a proportion not exceeding 3% by weight (headings 07.14, 12.14, 23.01, etc.). … (d) Vegetable waste, residues and by-products of heading 23.08. …’
51

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions referred is that: — Article 9(1) of Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted as meaning that the operation of agricultural engineering works, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, by a non-profit company which engages in such commercial activities only on an ancillary basis, constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of that provision, notwithstanding the fact that those works have in large part been financed by State aid and that their operation gives rise only to revenue from modest fees, provided that that fee can be regarded as having a ‘continuing basis’ on account of the period of time during which it is to be charged. — Article 24 of Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted as meaning that the operation of agricultural engineering works, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, constitutes a supply of services for consideration, on the ground that the services rendered are directly linked to the fee received or to be received, provided that that modest fee constitutes remuneration for the service supplied and notwithstanding the fact that performance of those services is a legal obligation. It will be for the referring court to determine whether the amount of the fee received or to be received, qua consideration, means that there exists a direct link between the services supplied or to be supplied and that consideration, and consequently allows those services to be classified as being effected for consideration. In particular, the referring court will have to ascertain that the fee which the applicants in the main proceedings are planning to charge does not only partly remunerate the services supplied or to be supplied and that its amount has not been determined as a result of other possible factors that could, depending on the circumstances, call into question the direct link between the services supplied and the consideration.
7

Article 30 of Regulation No 65/2011 provides: ‘1. Payments shall be calculated on the basis of what is found to be eligible during the administrative checks. The Member State shall examine the payment claim received from the beneficiary, and establish the amounts that are eligible for support. It shall establish: (a) the amount that is payable to the beneficiary based solely on the payment claim; (b) the amount that is payable to the beneficiary after an examination of the eligibility of the payment claim. If the amount established pursuant to point (a) exceeds the amount established pursuant to point (b) by more than 3%, a reduction shall be applied to the amount established pursuant to point (b). The amount of the reduction shall be the difference between those two amounts. However, no reduction shall be applied if the beneficiary can demonstrate that he/she is not at fault for the inclusion of the ineligible amount. 2. Where a beneficiary is found to have intentionally made a false declaration, the operation in question shall be excluded from support from the EAFRD and any amounts already paid for that operation shall be recovered. Moreover, the beneficiary shall be excluded from receiving support under the same measure for the calendar year of finding and for the following calendar year. …’