ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 347/22

Action brought on 21 August 2017 — European Commission v Ireland

(Case C-504/17)

(2017/C 347/29)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: F. Tomat, J. Tomkin, Agents)

Defendant: Ireland

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that by not ensuring the application of the minimum levels of taxation for motor fuels prescribed by Council Directive 2003/96/EC (1) of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity, Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 4 and 7 of that Directive;

— declare that by allowing the use of marked fuel for the purposes of propelling private pleasure craft, even where such fuel has not been subject to any exemption or reduction of excise duty, Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Directive 95/60/EC (2) of 27 November 1995 on fiscal marking of gas oils and kerosene;

— order Ireland to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Commission considers that the system by which Ireland imposes and collects excise duties on fuel used to propel private pleasure craft is incompatible with its obligations under Council Directive 2003/96/EC (the ‘Energy Taxation Directive’) and Directive 95/60/EC (the ‘Fiscal Marking Directive’).

Concerning the payment of excise duties, it is apparent that only a very small minority of owners of pleasure-craft actually submit returns to pay the full rate of tax duty. The Commission further considers that permitting the sale of marked fuel for uses that are subject to a full rate of excise duty is fundamentally incompatible with the Fiscal Marking Directive. The obligation to mark fuel that has been subject to a reduced rate of excise duty is intended specifically to ensure that those fuels are readily distinguishable from fuel in respect of which full duty has been paid. However, the effect of the national measure is that where marked fuel is found in a tank of a private pleasure craft that has been refuelled in Ireland, it is not possible to determine by reference to the marking, whether or not the fuel used was subject to a full or discounted rate of excise duty.

(1) OJ 2003, L 283, p. 51.

(2) OJ 1995, L 291, p. 46.
1.

Is paragraph 16 of Decision C(2011) 863 final of the European Commission of 11 February 2011, adopted pursuant to Article 108(3) TFEU, declaring State aid No 546/2010 of the Republic of Bulgaria for investment in agricultural holdings in the form of corporate tax relief to be compatible with Article 107(3) TFEU to be interpreted as meaning that, in the light of the Commission’s powers, on the one hand, and of the principles of procedural autonomy and legal certainty, on the other, it is permissible to apply a national rule under which the period laid down in that paragraph for reviewing whether the conditions governing the State aid granted have been met is to be construed only as being indicative and not as being an exclusionary period?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 347/18

Reference for a preliminary ruling from Court of Appeal (Ireland) made on 9 August 2017 — Neculai Tarola v Minister for Social Protection

(Case C-483/17)

(2017/C 347/23)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Court of Appeal

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Neculai Tarola

Defendant: Minister for Social Protection

Question referred

Where a citizen of another EU member state after his first twelve months of exercising his right of free movement arrives in the host state and works (otherwise than for a fixed term contract) for a two week period for which he is remunerated and thereafter becomes involuntarily unemployed, does that citizen thereby retain the status of a worker for no less than a further six months for the purposes of Article 7(3)(c) and Article 7(1)(a) of Directive 2004/38/EC (1) such as would entitle him to receive social assistance payments or, as the case may be, social security benefits on the same basis as if he were a resident citizen of the host State?

(1) Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ L 158, p. 77)
2.

Are Articles 12, 13 and 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’) to be interpreted as meaning that even a service provider whose service consists in registering IP addresses, thus enabling them to be anonymously linked to domains, and in renting out those IP addresses, is to be regarded as a service provider within the meaning of those provisions to whom the exemptions from liability provided for there apply?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 374/16

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 10 August 2017 — Criminal proceedings against Alfonso Verlezza and Others

(Case C-487/17)

(2017/C 374/23)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte suprema di cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Alfonso Verlezza, Riccardo Traversa, Irene Cocco, Francesco Rando, Carmelina Scaglione, Francesco Rizzi, Antonio Giuliano, Enrico Giuliano, Refecta Srl, E. Giovi Srl, Vetreco Srl, SE.IN Srl

Questions referred

1. Must the Annex to Decision 2014/955/EU (1) and Regulation (EU) No 1357/2014 (2) be interpreted, with reference to the classification of waste to which mirror codes have been assigned, as meaning that the producer of the waste must, when the composition of the waste is not known, carry out a prior classification of it, and, if so, within what limits?

2. Must the examination as to hazardous substances be carried out on the basis of uniform, predetermined methods?

3. Must the examination as to hazardous substances be based on a precise and representative verification that takes into account the composition of the waste, if this is already known or has been identified during the classification phase, or may the examination as to hazardous substances instead be carried out according to criteria of probability by taking into consideration which hazardous substances might reasonably be present in the waste?

4. Where there is doubt, or where it is impossible to establish with certainty whether or not hazardous substances are present in the waste, must that waste nevertheless be classified and treated as hazardous waste in application of the precautionary principle?

(1) 2014/955/EU: Commission Decision of 18 December 2014 amending Decision 2000/532/EC on the list of waste pursuant to Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2014 L 370, p. 44).

(2) Commission Regulation (EU) No 1357/2014 of 18 December 2014 replacing Annex III to Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on waste and repealing certain Directives (OJ 2014 L 365, p. 89).
1.

Does EU law preclude a Member State (in this case, Germany) from rejecting an application for international protection as inadmissible on the ground that refugee status has been granted in another Member State (in this case, Italy), in implementation of the power under Article 33(2)(a) of Directive 2013/32/EU (1) or under the rule in Article 25(2)(a) of Directive 2005/85/EC (2) that preceded it, if the form which the international protection takes, and more specifically, the living conditions of persons qualifying as refugees, in the other Member State which has already granted the applicant international protection (in this case, Italy), does not satisfy the requirements of Article 20 et seq. of Directive 2011/95/EU but does not, in and of itself, infringe Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union or Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 382/26

Appeal brought on 12 April 2017 by Salvo Asenov Todorov against the order of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 14 March 2017 in Case T-839/16 Todorov v Court of Justice of the European Union

(Case C-188/17 P)

(2017/C 382/31)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Parties

Appellant: Slavo Asenov Todorov (represented by: K. Mladenova, advokat)

Other party to the proceedings: Court of Justice of the European Union

The Court of Justice (Tenth Chamber) declared this appeal manifestly admissible by order of 7 September 2017.
3a.

If the answer to Question 1 is that Regulation No 1303/2013 is applicable, must the leasing of an asset (a sailing boat) acquired by means of project funding granted as part of a Leader measure by the not-for-profit association which received the funding to another not-for-profit association which uses the sailing boat for the same operation for which the funding was granted to the beneficiary be regarded as a change in ownership of an item of infrastructure which gives to a firm an undue advantage within the meaning of Article 71(1)(b) of Regulation No 1303/2013, having regard to the fact that the ownership of the sailing boat has remained unchanged but the beneficiary is now the indirect, rather than the direct, possessor of that sailing boat and obtains rental income rather than income derived from the provision of the service described in the application? Must the payment body of a Member State determine what the advantage specifically is in order for the requirement relating to undue advantage to be satisfied? If the answer is in the affirmative, can the undue advantage lie in the fact that the actual user of the asset would not have obtained the project funding if it had itself submitted an application with the same content?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 402/7

Appeal brought on 4 July 2017 by Krassimira Georgieva Mladenova against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 24 April 2017 in Case T-814/16: Krassimira Georgieva Mladenova v European Parliament

(Case C-405/17 P)

(2017/C 402/09)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Krassimira Georgieva Mladenova

Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament

By order of 10 October 2017 the Court of Justice (Tenth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 424/21

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Berlin (Germany) lodged on 12 September 2017 — Claudia Wegener v Royal Air Maroc SA

(Case C-537/17)

(2017/C 424/31)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Berlin

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Claudia Wegener

Defendant: Royal Air Maroc SA

Question referred

Is there a flight, for the purposes of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, in the case where an air carrier’s air transport operation includes scheduled interruptions (stopovers) outside the territory of the European [Union] with a change of aircraft?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 424/19

Appeal brought on 30 August 2017 by L’Oréal against the order of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 26 June 2017 in Case T-182/16 L’Oréal v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

(Case C-524/17 P)

(2017/C 424/27)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: L’Oréal (represented by: T. de Haan, P. Péters, lawyers)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Guinot

Form of order sought

— set aside the order of the General Court of the European Union of 26 June 2017 in Case T-182/16, EU:T:2017:448;

— refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union; and

— reserve the costs; in the alternative, order EUIPO to bear the appellant’s costs in relation both to the appeal and to the proceedings at first instance.

Pleas in law and main arguments

According to the appellant, the General Court distorted the facts and arguments which it had made before it and infringed Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009. (1)

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ L 78, p. 1).
The General Court erred in law in interpreting the EU principle governing European Union financial aid, according to which the Union can subsidise only expenses which have actually been incurred.

The applicant considers that the EU General Court applied a particularly strict interpretation of this principle which is inconsistent with previous case law of the Court and with the European legislator’s will.
1.

Can the rule in Petroma (Case C-271/12) (1) be qualified so as to allow a VAT refund sought by an undertaking not established in the EU, even though the national tax authority has already issued a decision refusing the refund on the grounds that the undertaking had failed to respond to a request for information concerning its tax reference number, in view of the fact that the authority was in possession of that information at the relevant time since it had been provided by the undertaking in response to other requests?
2.

Do the EU rules on the award of public works contracts, public service contracts and public supply contracts, and in particular Articles 1 and 2 of Directive 2004/18/EC and Articles 49, 56 and 105 et seq. of the EU Treaty, preclude national rules which treat private ‘classified’ hospitals as the equivalent of public hospitals, by bringing them within the system of national public healthcare planning, governed by special agreements that are distinct from ordinary accreditation relationships with other private parties that participate in the system of provision of healthcare services, in the absence of the requirements for recognition as a body governed by public law and the requirements for direct awards in accordance with the ‘in-house provision’ model, and thereby take them outside the scope of national and EU rules on public contracts, including in cases where such classified hospitals are entrusted with the manufacture and supply, free of charge, to public healthcare establishments of specific products which are necessary for the provision of healthcare services and where, at the same time, they receive specific-purpose public funding for the purpose of providing such supplies?
3.

Does Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union protect accrued leave, in so far as the duration of the leave exceeds the minimum annual leave of four weeks provided for in Article 7(1) of the Working Time Directive, and does that provision of the Charter of Fundamental Rights preclude a national provision in a collective agreement, or its interpretation, under which an employee who was incapacitated for work at the beginning of his annual leave or part thereof is not entitled, irrespective of any application by him, to carry over annual leave falling within the period in question and to which he is entitled under the collective agreement, if the employee’s entitlement to four weeks of annual leave is not reduced by reason of the fact that the leave under the collective agreement is not carried over?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 32/11

Appeal brought on 27 July 2017 by Laure Camerin against the order of the General Court (Second Chamber) made on 1 June 2017 in Case T-647/16 Camerin v Parliament

(Case C-453/17 P)

(2018/C 032/16)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Laure Camerin (represented by: M. Casado García-Hirschfeld, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament

By order of 30 November 2017, the Court (Second Chamber) dismissed the appeal.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 22/21

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Varhoven kasatsionen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 23 October 2017 — PM v AH

(Case C-604/17)

(2018/C 022/32)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Varhoven kasatsionen sad

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: PM

Respondent: AH

Question referred

Does Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 (1) permit the examination of cases concerning parental responsibility, where the conditions laid down in Articles 8 and 12 of that regulation have not been fulfilled, by a court of a Member State which has jurisdiction to examine the divorce case under Article 3 of the regulation, where the national legislation of that Member State requires the court to rule ex officio on the exercise of parental rights, measures concerning access, maintenance and use of the marital home, at the same time as the divorce application?

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (OJ 2003 L 338, p. 1).
(2)

If the answer to the first question referred is in the affirmative, must Article 3(1) of Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems, as amended by Directive 2009/44/EC, which provides that ‘transfer orders and netting shall be legally enforceable and binding on third parties even in the event of insolvency proceedings against a participant, provided that transfer orders were entered into the system before the moment of opening of such insolvency proceedings as defined in Article 6(1). This shall apply even in the event of insolvency proceedings against a participant (in the system concerned or in an interoperable system) or against the system operator of an interoperable system which is not a participant’, be interpreted as meaning that an order such as that in the present case could be regarded as ‘entered into the system’ and had to be executed?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42/8

Appeal brought on 28 November 2017 by Trasta Komercbanka AS, Ivan Fursin, Igors Buimisters, C & R Invest SIA, Figon Co. Ltd, GCK Holding Netherlands BV, Rikam Holding SA against the order of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 12 September 2017 in Case T-247/16: Trasta Komercbanka AS and Others v European Central Bank

(Case C-669/17 P)

(2018/C 042/11)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Trasta Komercbanka AS, Ivan Fursin, Igors Buimisters, C & R Invest SIA, Figon Co. Ltd, GCK Holding Netherlands BV, Rikam Holding SA (represented by: O.H. Behrends, L. Feddern, M. Kirchner, Rechtsanwälte)

Other party to the proceedings: European Central Bank

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

— set aside no. 1 of the order, i.e. the decision by the General Court that there is no need to adjudicate on the action for annulment of Trasta Komercbanka AS (TKB);

— declare that the action for annulment of TKB is not devoid of purpose;

— declare that the action for annulment is admissible;

— refer the case back to the General Court for it to determine the action for annulment, and

— order the European Central Bank (ECB) to pay the appellants’ costs and the costs of the appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By the first ground of appeal, the appellants claim that the General Court erred in assuming that TKB’s remedy is entrusted to the liquidator. The appellants claim that this assumption is irreconcilable with Art. 263 TFEU and the guarantee of an effective remedy as well as a number of related principles.

By the second ground of appeal, the appellants claim that the General Court erred in assuming that the shareholders’ action is a substitute for the shareholders’ ability to defend TKB’s license through an action by TKB itself.

By the third ground of appeal, the appellants claim a number of further substantive errors including a failure to apply the nemo auditur-principle because of the ECB’s interference with TKB’s remedy.

By the fourth ground of appeal, the appellants claim that the General Court failed to take into account the requirements (including form requirements) for a valid revocation of the power of attorney originally issued by TKB.

By the fifth ground of appeal, the appellants claim that the General Court erroneously applied Art. 51(1) rather than Art. 131 of the Rules of Procedure as well as a number of further procedural errors.
3.

How is the requirement laid down in Article 16(1) of the Habitats Directive concerning the conservation status of species’ populations to be assessed when regionally restricted derogation permits are granted? — Is the conservation status of a species to be assessed by reference both to a particular area and to the territory of the Member State as a whole or by reference to an even wider range of the species in question? — Is it possible to satisfy the requirements for granting a derogation permit laid down in Article 16(1) of the Habitats Directive even though the conservation status of a species cannot be regarded as favourable within the meaning of the directive on the basis of a proper assessment? — If the previous question is answered in the affirmative, in which circumstances could that be possible?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 52/20

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 24 November 2017 — Hussein Mohamad Hussein

(Case C-657/17)

(2018/C 052/29)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant on a point of law: Hussein Mohamad Hussein

Respondent authority: Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl

Questions referred

1. Does a failure to respect the time limit specified in Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1560/2003 (1) (‘the Implementing Regulation’) for submitting a request for re-examination in the case where the requested Member State has refused a take charge request in a timely manner pursuant to Article 21(1) of Regulation No 604/2013 (‘the Dublin III Regulation’) (2) result in responsibility being transferred to the requesting Member State in the case where the requesting Member State initially submitted a take charge request in a timely manner within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 21(1) of the Dublin III Regulation and the requested Member State was determined, on the basis of (subsequent) investigations, to be the responsible Member State in accordance with the criteria set out in Chapter III of the Dublin III Regulation?

2. Can the requested Member State — and which is the Member State responsible in accordance with the criteria set out in Chapter III of the Dublin III Regulation — effectively accede to the take charge request under Article 21(1) of the Dublin III Regulation even though the time limit for replying specified in Article 22(7) of that regulation has already passed and the requested Member State had previously refused the take charge request in a timely manner?

(1) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1560/2003 of 2 September 2003 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national (OJ 2003 L 222, p. 3).

(2) Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 31).