ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 30/28

Appeal brought on 24 November 2016 by National Iranian Tanker Company against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 14 September 2016 in Case T-207/15: National Iranian Tanker Company v Council of the European Union

(Case C-600/16 P)

(2017/C 030/33)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: National Iranian Tanker Company (represented by: T. de la Mare QC, M. Lester QC, J. Pobjoy, Barristers, R. Chandrasekera, S. Ashley, C. Murphy, Solicitors)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the Judgment of the General Court of 14 September 2016 in National Iranian Tanker Company v Council of the European Union, (Case T-207/15);

— determine the case before the General Court and in particular to: — annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/236 of 12 February 2015 (1) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/230 of 12 February 2015 (2), insofar as each applies to the Appellant; — alternatively, declare that (a) Article 20(1)(c) of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP of 26 July 2010 (3) (as amended) and (b) Article 23(2)(d) of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 (4) (as amended), are inapplicable insofar as they apply to the Appellant by reason of illegality; and

— order that the Respondent pay the costs of the appeal and of the proceedings before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on four pleas in law.

1. First plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/236 of 12 February 2015 and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/230 of 12 February 2015 did not infringe the principles of res judicata, legal certainty, legitimate expectations and finality, or the right to an effective remedy under Article 47 of the EU Charter.

2. Second plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the criteria for designation were satisfied as regards the Appellant.

3. Third plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the interference with the Appellant’s fundamental rights was proportionate.

4. Fourth plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in rejecting the Appellant’s alternative argument that a broad interpretation of the designation criterion would render it disproportionate.

(1) Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/236 of 12 February 2015 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran

OJ L 39, p. 18

(2) Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/230 of 12 February 2015 implementing Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran

OJ L 39, p. 3

(3) 2010/413/CFSP: Council Decision of 26 July 2010 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Common Position 2007/140/CFSP

OJ L 195, p. 39

(4) Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010

OJ L 88, p. 1
A.

In view of the answer given to the first question, must Article 25(1)(a) of Regulation No 810/2009 of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas be interpreted as meaning that, subject to its discretion with regard to the circumstances of the case, a Member State to which an application for a visa with limited territorial validity has been made is required to issue the visa applied for, where a risk of infringement of Article 4 and/or Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union or another international obligation by which it is bound is detected?
1.

Is Article 1(1) of Directive 2003/49/EC, (1) read in conjunction with Article 1(4) thereof, to be interpreted as meaning that a company resident in a Member State that is covered by Article 3 of the Directive and, in circumstances such as those of the present case, receives interest from a subsidiary in another Member State, is the ‘beneficial owner’ of that interest for the purposes of the Directive? 1.1. Is the concept ‘beneficial owner’ in Article 1(1) of Directive 2003/49/EC, read in conjunction with Article 1(4) thereof, to be interpreted in accordance with the corresponding concept in Article 11 of the OECD 1977 Model Tax Convention? 1.2. If Question 1.1. is answered in the affirmative, should the concept then be interpreted solely in the light of the commentary on Article 11 of the 1977 Model Tax Convention (paragraph 8), or can subsequent commentaries be incorporated into the interpretation, including the additions made in 2003 regarding ‘conduit companies’ (paragraph 8.1, now paragraph 10.1), and the additions made in 2014 regarding ‘contractual or legal obligations’ (paragraph 10.2)? 1.3. If the 2003 Commentaries can be incorporated into the interpretation, is it then a condition for deeming a company not to be a ‘beneficial owner’ for the purposes of Directive 2003/49/EC that there actually has been a channelling of funds to those persons who are deemed by the State in which the interest payer is resident to be ‘the beneficial owners’ of the interest in question, and — if so — is it then a further condition that the actual passing take place at a point close in time to the payment of the interest and/or take place as a payment of interest? 1.3.1. Of what significance is it in that connection if equity capital is used for the loan, if the interest in question is entered on the principal (‘rolled up’), if the interest recipient has paid tax on the interest received to the State where the interest payer is resident, if the interest recipient has subsequently made an intra-group transfer to its parent company resident in the same State with a view to adjusting earnings for tax purposes under the prevailing rules in the State in question, if the interest in question is subsequently converted into equity in the borrowing company, and if the interest recipient has had a contractual or legal obligation to pass the interest to another person? 1.4. What significance does it have for the assessment of the issue whether the interest recipient must be deemed to be a ‘beneficial owner’ for the purposes of the Directive if the referring court, following an assessment of the facts of the case, concludes that the recipient — without having been contractually or legally bound to pass the interest received to another person — did not have the ‘full’ right to ‘use and enjoy’ the interest as referred to in the 2014 Commentaries on the 1977 Model Tax Convention?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 63/16

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 28 November 2016 — Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri v Giovanna Castellano and Others

(Case C-617/16)

(2017/C 063/23)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte suprema di cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri

Respondents and cross-appellants: Giovanna Castellano, Maria Concetta Pandolfo, Antonio Marletta, Vito Mannino, Olga Gagliardo, Emilio Nardi, Maria Catania, Massimo Gallucci, Giovanna Pischedda, Giambattista Gagliardo

Questions referred

1. Is Directive 82/76, (1) which amended Directives 75/362 (2) and 75/363, (3) to be interpreted as including within its scope full-time and part-time courses for trainee medical specialists which had already begun by 31 December 1982 and continued after that date, that being the date by which the Member States were to have adopted the necessary measures to comply with the directive, in accordance with Article 16 thereof? If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative,

2. Is the annex appended to the ‘coordination’ directive (Directive 75/363) by Article 13 of Directive 82/76, which amended Directives 75/362 and 75/363, to be interpreted as meaning that, with respect to specialist training courses which had already begun by 31 December 1982, the obligation to provide trainee specialists with adequate remuneration is dependent on fulfilment of the obligation to reorganise courses or on compliance with the requirements of the abovementioned directives?

3. With respect to specialist doctors who pursued specialist training courses which began before 1 January 1983 but had not ended by that date, was there any obligation to pay them adequate remuneration for the entire duration of the course or for the period after 31 December 1982 alone and, if so, to what conditions, if any, was that obligation subject?

(1) Council Directive 82/76/EEC of 26 January 1982 amending Directive 75/362/EEC concerning the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications in medicine, including measures to facilitate effective exercise of the right of establishment and freedom to provide services and Directive 75/363/EEC concerning the coordination of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in respect of activities of doctors (OJ 1982 L 43, p. 21).

(2) Council Directive 75/362/EEC of 16 June 1975 concerning the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications in medicine, including measures to facilitate the effective exercise of the right of establishment and freedom to provide services (OJ 1975 L 167, p. 1).

(3) Council Directive 75/363/EEC of 16 June 1975 concerning the coordination of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in respect of activities of doctors (OJ 1975 L 167, p. 14).
(1)

When a property, despite being unoccupied for the period of two or more years, is being marketed, that is it is available on the market to be let or for the provision of ‘office centre’ services, and it is established that the owner intends to let the property subject to VAT and has made the necessary efforts to give effect to that intention, is the characterisation as a ‘failure actually to use the property for the purposes of the business’ and/or ‘failure actually to use the property in taxed transactions’ — for the purposes of Article 26(1) of the VAT Code and Article 10(1)(b) of the Regime for the Waiver of the VAT exemption in Transactions relating to Immovable Property, introduced by Decree-Law No 21 of 29 January 2007, in their earlier versions — and therefore adopting the view that the deduction initially made must be adjusted, since it is above the amount to which the taxable person was entitled, compatible with Articles 167, 168, 184, 185 and 187 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (1) of 28 November 2006?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 78/6

Appeal brought on 29 June 2016 by Franmax UAB against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 26 April 2016 in Case T-21/15: Franmax v EUIPO — Ehrmann (DINO)

(Case C-361/16 P)

(2017/C 078/08)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Franmax UAB (represented by: E. Saukalas, advokatas)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Ehrmann AG Oberschönegg im Allgäu

By order of 8 November 2016 the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 95/4

Appeal brought on 7 September 2016 by Universal Protein Supplements Corp. against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 29 June 2016 in Cases T-727/14 and T-728/14: UNIVERSAL PROTEIN SUPPLEMENTS v EUIPO — H YOUNG HOLDINGS (ANIMAL)

(Case C-485/16 P)

(2017/C 095/09)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Universal Protein Supplements Corp. (represented by: S. Malynicz QC)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), H Young Holdings plc

By order of 31 January 2017 the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 86/15

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Social No 33 de Madrid (Spain) lodged on 29 December 2016 — Lucía Montero Mateos v Agencia Madrileña de Atención Social de la Consejería de Políticas Sociales y Familia de la Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid

(Case C-677/16)

(2017/C 086/19)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de lo Social No 33 de Madrid

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Lucía Montero Mateos

Defendant: Agencia Madrileña de Atención Social de la Consejería de Políticas Sociales y Familia de la Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid

Question referred

Must clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP which forms part of the Community legal order by virtue of Council Directive 1999/70 (1) be interpreted as meaning that termination of a temporary ‘contrato de interinidad’ to cover a vacancy when the term for which the contract was concluded by the employer and the worker expires constitutes objective grounds justifying the Spanish legislature’s not providing in such a case for any compensation whatsoever for the termination of the contract, whereas compensation of 20 days’ pay for every year of service is provided for in the case of a comparable permanent worker dismissed on objective grounds?

(1) OJ 1999 L 175, p. 1.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 112/13

Appeal brought on 7 March 2016 by Juozas Edvardas Petraitis against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 18 December 2015 in Case T-460/15, Petraitis v Commission

(Case C-137/16 P)

(2017/C 112/19)

Language of the case: Lithuanian

Parties

Appellant: Juozas Edvardas Petraitis, represented by T. Veščiūnas, advocatas

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 24 November 2016, the Court of Justice (Tenth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered Mr Juozas Edvardas Petraitis to bear his own costs.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 104/27

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 19 December 2016 — Peter Valach and Others v Waldviertler Sparkasse Bank AG and Others

(Case C-649/16)

(2017/C 104/40)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberster Gerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Peter Valach, Alena Valachová, Europa SC ZV II a.s., Europa SC LV a.s., VAV Parking a.s., Europa SC BB a.s., Byty A s.r.o.

Defendants: Waldviertler Sparkasse Bank AG, Československá obchodná banka a.s., City of Banská Bystrica

Question referred

Is Article 1(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (1) to be interpreted as meaning that an action brought by the holders of shares in an insolvent company — as is the case of the first and second applicants — and by project companies in a business relationship with the insolvent company — as is the case of the third to seventh applicants — which is founded on a claim in tort for damages against members of a creditors’ committee in respect of voting impropriety regarding a restructuring plan in connection with insolvency proceedings concerns insolvency within the meaning of Article 1(2)(b) of Regulation No 1215/2012 and is for that reason excluded from the scope ratione materiae of that regulation?

(1) OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 249/16

Appeal brought on 30 December 2016 by Capella EOOD against the judgment delivered by the General Court (Eighth Chamber) on 12 May 2016 in Case T-750/14, Ivo-Kermartin GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-687/16 P)

(2017/C 249/23)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Capella EOOD (represented by: C. Pfitzer, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 7 June 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Tenth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
3.

The General Court ruled out the similarity among the conflicting marks based on the assumption that the relevant public … will not perceive in [the contested] mark the capital letter ‘G’, represented by the earlier marks, but rather an abstract ornamental motif. Moreover, having regard to the stylisation of the sign and to the fact that its elements are interlocking or joined together, it could be perceived both as reproducing stylised letters, such as the capital letter ‘X’ or the letter ‘e’, and as a combination of figures and letters, such as the figure ‘3’ and the letter ‘e’’ (see, to that effect, paragraph 32 of the judgment under appeal). This assumption is the crucial point of the judgment under appeal, having led the General Court to rule out any similarity among the conflicting marks and, consequently, the applicability of Articles 8(1)(b) and 8(5) CTM Regulation to the case at issue.
1.

In the circumstances of the present case, is the notion ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ in Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (1) to be understood as meaning the place of conclusion of the defendants’ unlawful agreement infringing Article 82(c) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (Article 102(c) TFEU), or the place of commission of acts by which the financial benefit obtained from that agreement was exploited, by means of predatory pricing (cross-subsidisation) when competing with the applicant in the same relevant markets?
10.

Does ‘clear objective evidence’ within the meaning of Article 220(6) of the Convention on the Law of the Sea and Article 7(2) of Directive 2005/35/EC include not only evidence that a vessel has committed the infringements to which the aforementioned provisions refer but also evidence of the consequences of the spill? What form of evidence is to be required to show that there is a threat of major damage to the coastline or related interests or to any resources of the territorial sea or of the exclusive economic zone, such as the bird and fish stocks and the marine environment in the area? Does the requirement of clear objective evidence mean, for example, that the assessment of the adverse effects of the oil spillage on the marine environment must always be based on specific surveys and studies relating to the impact of the oil spill that has occurred?
1.

Must Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13 (1) be interpreted to the effect that a national court, in appraising the unfairness of an accelerated repayment clause in a mortgage loan contract concluded with a consumer that provides for acceleration upon failure to pay an instalment, in addition to other cases of non-payment of further instalments, may assess the unfairness only of the contractual term or case of non-payment of an instalment and treat the accelerated repayment clause covering non-payment of instalments also laid down on a general basis in the clause as still valid, regardless of whether any specific finding of validity or unfairness has to be deferred to the time when the power is exercised?
6.

Must Article 56 TFEU and the prohibition of discrimination be interpreted as precluding a situation in which the Member State — through the possible initiation of a tender procedure in order to award concessions for physical casinos and through the possibility, for those with the status of trustworthy operators of games of chance, of submitting an offer [to contract] in order to obtain a concession in respect of a physical casino — provides the theoretical possibility that any service provider that fulfils the legal requirements, including a service provider established in another Member State, may obtain a concession to operate a physical casino and, once in possession of that concession, a licence to operate an online casino, but, in reality, the Member State in question does not initiate any public and transparent tender procedure to award concessions, and the service provider does not, in practice, have the possibility of submitting an offer [to contract], and, nevertheless, the authorities of the Member State declare that the service provider acted illegally by providing the service without a licence and impose an administrative penalty on it?
1.

Are Articles 56 and 57 TFEU, Directive 96/71/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 12 of Chapter 2, Free movement of persons, of Annex V to the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Croatia and the adjustments to the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, to be interpreted as meaning that Austria is entitled to restrict the posting of workers employed in an undertaking established in Croatia by requiring a work permit, where this posting takes place by means of transfer to a company established in Italy [Or. 2] so that the Italian company can provide a service in Austria, and the work carried out by the Croatian workers for the Italian company on the construction of a wire rod mill in Austria is restricted to providing this service in Austria and there is no employment relationship between them and the Italian company?
2.

The appellant first alleges infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of the European Trade Mark Regulation (1) on the ground that the General Court erred in applying the principles governing three-dimensional marks to the IR mark at issue. The appellant also claims that the General Court, in its assessment of the IR mark according to the principles governing three-dimensional marks, did not provide a definition of the ‘standards and usual practices of the sector’ in respect of the goods at issue, and finally that the General Court applied stricter criteria to the assessment of the overall impression of the IR mark than those provided for in Article 7(1)(b) of the Trade Mark Regulation.
1.

Is the subparagraph of Article 3(3) of Annex I to Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 (1) which is worded ‘Enterprises which have one or other of such relationships through a natural person or group of natural persons acting jointly are also considered linked enterprises if they engage in their activity or in part of their activity in the same relevant market or in adjacent markets’ to be interpreted as meaning that enterprises carrying out their activities on the same market as members of a global group of companies held by the same group of proprietors are considered to be ‘linked enterprises’ vis-à-vis one another automatically and regardless of other circumstances, without it being necessary to examine in detail whether they are in fact in one of the relationships referred to in Article 3(3)(a), (b), (c) and (d) or whether they are acting jointly on the same market;
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 161/8

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy Poznań-Grunwald i Jeżyce w Poznaniu (Poland) lodged on 7 February 2017 — Grzegorz Chudaś and Irena Chudaś v DA Deutsche Allgemeine Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft AG

(Case C-66/17)

(2017/C 161/10)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy Poznań-Grunwald i Jeżyce w Poznaniu

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Grzegorz Chudaś and Irena Chudaś

Defendant: DA Deutsche Allgemeine Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft AG

Question referred

Should Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims (1) … (‘Regulation No 805/2004’), read in conjunction with Article 7 of that regulation, be interpreted as meaning that a European Enforcement Order certificate may be issued in respect of a decision concerning reimbursement of the costs of proceedings contained in a judgment in which a court has established the existence of a right?

(1) OJ 2004 L 143, p. 15.