ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
6

Article 4 of the Habitats Directive provides: ‘1. On the basis of the criteria set out in Annex III (Stage 1) and relevant scientific information, each Member State shall propose a list of sites indicating which natural habitat types in Annex I and which species in Annex II that are native to its territory the sites host. ... ... 2. On the basis of the criteria set out in Annex III (Stage 2) and in the framework both of each of the nine biogeographical regions referred to in Article 1(c)(iii) and of the whole of the territory referred to in Article 2(1), the Commission shall establish, in agreement with each Member State, a draft list of sites of Community importance drawn from the Member States’ lists identifying those which host one or more priority natural habitat types or priority species. ... The list of sites selected as sites of Community importance, identifying those which host one or more priority natural habitat types or priority species, shall be adopted by the Commission in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 21. 3. The list referred to in paragraph 2 shall be established within six years of the notification of this Directive. 4. Once a site of Community importance has been adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in paragraph 2, the Member State concerned shall designate that site as a special area of conservation as soon as possible and within six years at most, establishing priorities in the light of the importance of the sites for the maintenance or restoration, at a favourable conservation status, of a natural habitat type in Annex I or a species in Annex II and for the coherence of Natura 2000, and in the light of the threats of degradation or destruction to which those sites are exposed. 5. As soon as a site is placed on the list referred to in the third subparagraph of paragraph 2 it shall be subject to Article 6(2), (3) and (4).’
16

That refusal was challenged before the High Court of Justice (Chancery Division — Patents Court) by Neurim, which argued, in essence, that the relevant MA for the application of Article 3(d) of the SPC Regulation is that which concerns the product for which the application for the SPC is made. Since its action was dismissed, Neurim appealed to the Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division). Although that court considered that Neurim’s arguments were well founded, none the less it decided to stay the proceedings in order to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. In interpreting Article 3 of [the SPC Regulation], when [an MA] (A) has been granted for a medicinal product comprising an active ingredient, is Article 3(d) to be construed as precluding the grant of an SPC based on a later [MA] (B) which is for a different medicinal product comprising the same active ingredient where the limits of the protection conferred by the basic patent do not extend to placing the product the subject of the earlier MA on the market within the meaning of Article 4? 2. If the grant of the SPC is not precluded, does it follow that in interpreting Article 13(1) of the SPC Regulation, “the first [MA] in the Community” needs to be an authorisation to place a medicinal product on the market within the limits of the protection conferred by the basic patent within the meaning of Article 4? 3. Are the answers to the above questions different if the earlier [MA] has been granted for a veterinary medicinal product for a particular indication and the later [MA] has been granted for a medicinal product for human use for a different indication? 4. Are the answers to the above questions different if the later [MA] required a full application for marketing approval in accordance with Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/83/EC (formerly a full application under Article 4 of Directive 65/65/EEC)? 5. Are the answers to the above questions different if the product covered by the authorisation (A) to place the corresponding medicinal product on the market is within the scope of protection of a different patent which belongs to a different registered proprietor from the SPC applicant?’
41

In those circumstances the Varhoven administrativen sad decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. Are the first paragraph of Article 179, Article 180 and Article 273 of [the VAT] Directive and the principle of effectiveness in the field of indirect taxation, which is discussed in the judgment of 8 May 2008 in Joined Cases C-95/07 and C-96/07 Ecotrade [2008] ECR I-3457, to be interpreted as permitting a limitation period such as that in the present case under Article 72(1) of [the ZDDS] (2008 version), which period was extended — under Section 18 of the transitional and concluding provisions of the Law amending and supplementing [the ZDDS] — until the end of April 2009 solely for recipients of supplies who became taxable before 1 January 2009, taking into account the circumstances of the case, that is to say: — inasmuch as registration is a precondition for exercising the right to deduct input VAT, a person who has made an intra-Community acquisition of goods and who is not registered in accordance with [the ZDDS] must register voluntarily, even though that person does not meet the conditions for compulsory registration; — the new legislative provision in Article 73a of [the ZDDS] (in force since 1 January 2009) whereby the right to deduct value added tax is to be granted irrespective of whether the time-limit under Article 72(1) of [the ZDDS] was complied with, if the tax is chargeable to the recipient of the supply, provided the supply was not concealed and is documented in the accounts; — the subsequent amendment of Article 72(1) of [the ZDDS] (in force since 1 January 2010), whereby the right to deduct input VAT may be exercised during the tax period in which that right arose or in one of the subsequent twelve tax periods? 2. Is the principle of tax neutrality as a fundamental principle, which is of importance for the establishment and functioning of the common system of VAT, to be interpreted as meaning that a tax assessment practice such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which acknowledges the late accounting for of value added tax, levies interest as a penalty and imposes an additional penalty of denial of the right to deduct input VAT, is permissible in the actual circumstances of the applicant’s case, taking into account the fact that the transaction was not concealed, it was documented in the accounts, the tax authorities had the necessary information, no abuse occurred and the budget was not adversely affected?’
7

Paragraphs 52 and 52f(1) and (2) of Law 360/1968 on the taxation of business income (Laki elinkeinotulon verottamisesta (360/1968), ‘Law on the taxation of business income’) are worded as follows: ‘Paragraph 52 The provisions of Paragraphs 52a to 52f shall apply to the merging, division, transfer of assets and exchange of shares of domestic limited companies. Paragraphs 52a to 52f also apply mergers, divisions and transfers of business of other companies referred to in Paragraph 3 of the Law on income tax. The provisions on limited companies, shares, share capital and shareholders, shall apply for that purpose to other companies, their share capital corresponding to their capital and to their shareholders or members. The provisions relating to mergers shall also apply to mergers of domestic groups of companies. The provisions relating to limited companies, shares and shareholders shall apply for that purpose to the share capital of groups and to their shareholders and the groups themselves. Paragraphs 52a to 52f shall apply subject to the limits set out below, when the merger, division, transfer of assets or exchange of shares concerns companies referred to in Article 3(a) of Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies of different Member States and to the transfer of the registered office of a SE or SCE from one Member State to another, which are liable to corporation tax. A company is considered to be established in a Member State if it has a registered office there in accordance with the law of that State, and is not regarded as being established outside the European Union pursuant to an agreement concluded between a Member State and a third country with the aim of avoiding double taxation. … Paragraph 52f “Exchange of shares” means an arrangement whereby a limited company obtains a portion of the shares of another limited company such that the shares which it owns give more than half the number of votes produced by all the shares of the other company, or, if the limited company already has more than half the number of votes of this company’s shares, obtains more of this company’s shares and, as consideration, gives new shares which it has issued, or its own shares that it holds, to the other company’s shareholders. Consideration may also take the form of cash, but may not be more than ten percent of the nominal value of the shares given as consideration, or (if there is no nominal value) of the share capital paid for the corresponding portion of shares. In taxation, an exchange of shares is not regarded as a disposal. That part of the acquisition cost of the assigned shares not written off in the taxation is regarded as the acquisition cost of the shares received in the exchange. Insofar as cash is received as consideration, the exchange is regarded as a disposal of shares.’
28

In those circumstances the Administrativen sad Sofia-grad (Sofia Administrative Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. In the light of the facts of the main proceedings, does the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU in conjunction with Articles 20 TFEU and 21 TFEU require that a national provision of a Member State such as that at issue in the main proceedings — under which a final administrative act may be annulled in order to put an end to an infringement of a fundamental right which has been established by a decision of the European Court of Human Rights, which right is also recognised in EU law and concerns the freedom of movement enjoyed by nationals of the Member States — must also be applied with reference to the interpretation adopted by decision of the Court … of provisions of EU law which are relevant to the restrictions on the exercise of the aforementioned right, where the administrative act must be annulled in order to put an end to the infringement? 2. Does it follow from Article 31(1) and (3) of Directive 2004/38 that, where a Member State has provided in its national law for a procedure for examining an administrative act which limits the right under Article 4(1) of the Directive, the competent administrative authority is required, at the request of the addressee of the administrative act, to examine that measure and to assess its legality with reference also to the case-law of the Court … on the interpretation of relevant provisions of EU law governing the conditions and limitations applicable to the exercise of that right, so as to ensure that the limitation imposed on the right is not disproportionate at the time when the review decision is adopted, where the administrative act imposing the limitation is already final at that time? 3. Do the provisions of the second sentence of Article 52(1) of the [Charter] and Article 27(1) of Directive 2004/38 permit the application of a national provision which provides for the imposition of a limitation on the freedom of movement, within the European Union, of a national of a Member State, solely on account of the existence of an unsecured liability in excess of a certain amount laid down by law that is owed to a private person (a commercial company), in the context of pending enforcement proceedings for the recovery of the claim, and without regard to the possibility, provided for in EU law, of the claim being recovered by an authority of another Member State?’
45

In those circumstances, the Bundesverwaltungsgericht decided to stay the proceedings and to refer to the Court for a preliminary ruling the following questions, which are worded in almost identical terms in both Cases C-71/11 and C-99/11: ‘1. Is Article 9(1)(a) of [the] Directive … to be interpreted as meaning that not every interference with religious freedom which infringes Article 9 of the ECHR constitutes an act of persecution within the meaning of [the former provision], and that a severe violation of religious freedom as a basic human right arises only if the core area of that religious freedom is adversely affected? 2. If Question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative: (a) Is the core area of religious freedom limited to the profession and practice of faith in the areas of the home and neighbourhood, or can there be an act of persecution, within the meaning of Article 9(1)(a) of [the] Directive …, also in cases where, in the country of origin, the observance of faith in public gives rise to a risk to life, physical integrity or freedom and the applicant accordingly abstains from such practice? (b) If the core area of religious freedom can also comprise the public observance of certain religious practices: — Does it suffice in that case, in order for there to be a severe violation of religious freedom, that the applicant feels that such observance of his faith is indispensable in order for him to preserve his religious identity, — or is it further necessary that the religious community to which the applicant belongs should regard that religious observance as constituting a central part of its doctrine, — or can further restrictions arise as a result of other circumstances, such as the general conditions in the country of origin? 3. If Question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative: Is there a well-founded fear of persecution, within the meaning of Article 2(c) of [the] Directive …, if it is established that the applicant will carry out certain religious practices – other than those falling within the core area – after returning to the country of origin, even though they will give rise to a risk to his life, physical integrity or freedom, or can the applicant reasonably be expected to abstain from such practices?’
5

In Chapter 3 of Title XII of the VAT Directive, headed ‘Special scheme for travel agents’, Articles 306 to 310 of the directive state: ‘Article 306 (1) Member States shall apply a special VAT scheme, in accordance with this Chapter, to transactions carried out by travel agents who deal with customers in their own name and use supplies of goods or services provided by other taxable persons, in the provision of travel facilities. ... (2) For the purposes of this Chapter, tour operators shall be regarded as travel agents. Article 307 Transactions made, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 306, by the travel agent in respect of a journey shall be regarded as a single service supplied by the travel agent to the traveller. The single service shall be taxable in the Member State in which the travel agent has established his business or has a fixed establishment from which the travel agent has carried out the supply of services. Article 308 The taxable amount and the price exclusive of VAT, within the meaning of point (8) of Article 226, in respect of the single service provided by the travel agent shall be the travel agent’s margin, that is to say, the difference between the total amount, exclusive of VAT, to be paid by the traveller and the actual cost to the travel agent of supplies of goods or services provided by other taxable persons, where those transactions are for the direct benefit of the traveller. ... Article 310 VAT charged to the travel agent by other taxable persons in respect of transactions which are referred to in Article 307 and which are for the direct benefit of the traveller shall not be deductible or refundable in any Member State.’
42

By decision No U9200215/58, the Hungarian Patent Office rejected that application for invalidation, referring to Paragraph 42(3) of the Law on Patents. It applied that provision in such a way that, of the abovementioned documents, it took no account of patent specifications K4 to K8, K10, K19, K21 and K22 in the new invalidation procedure. According to the Hungarian Patent Office, those documents ‘[had] constituted the basis of the decision in the previous invalidation procedure.’ It added that ‘each of those documents [had] been subject to examination, regardless of which of them contained information relevant to the model concerned’ and that, ‘since the decision in the previous procedure [was] based on all of the documents examined, they [had to] be disregarded in the present procedure’. The Hungarian Patent Office also stated that ‘each of the features covered by the main claims concerning the protection by utility model [was] identifiable from the photographs and [that], therefore, the protection of that model [could] claim priority’. It added that ‘a decision [had] also [been] made concerning priority in the previous procedure, and that decision was also based on the conclusion that the protection by utility model should be accorded the priority which had been conferred on it on the basis of the transformation of the protection of the industrial design’. In that respect, the Hungarian Patent Office declared that patent specifications K20 and K23 were not part of the state of the art.
22

In those circumstances, the Arbeitsgericht München decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. Is a national rule which provides that different treatment on the ground of age may be lawful if, in the framework of an occupational social security scheme, the management and the works council have excluded from social plan benefits workers who are financially secure because they are entitled to a pension, after drawing unemployment benefit where applicable, contrary to the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of age, laid down by Articles 1 and 16 of [Directive 2000/78] or is that unequal treatment justified under [the second subparagraph of] Article 6[(1)(a)] of [the directive]? 2. Is a national rule which provides that different treatment on the ground of age may be lawful if, in the framework of an occupational social security scheme, the management and the works council have excluded from social plan benefits workers who are financially secure because they are entitled to a pension, after drawing unemployment benefit where applicable, contrary to the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of disability laid down by Articles 1 and 16 of [Directive 2000/78]? 3. Is a rule of an occupational social security scheme under which, in the case of workers older than 54 years of age who are made redundant on operational grounds, an alternative calculation will be made of the compensation on the basis of the earliest possible date on which their pension will begin – by comparison with the more normal method of calculation, which takes account in particular of the length of service – and the smaller amount of compensation, though still at least one half of the normal sum in compensation, will be paid, contrary to the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of age laid down by Articles 1 and 16 of [Directive 2000/78], or is that unequal treatment justified under [the second subparagraph of] Article 6[(1)(a)] of [Directive 2000/78]? 4. Is a rule of an occupational social security scheme under which, in the case of workers older than 54 years of age who are made redundant on operational grounds, an alternative calculation will be made of the compensation on the basis of the earliest possible date on which their pension will begin – by comparison with the more normal method of calculation, which takes account in particular of the length of service – and the smaller amount of compensation, though still at least one half of the normal sum in compensation, will be paid, the alternative method of calculation taking into account a retirement pension on the ground of disability, contrary to the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of disability laid down by Articles 1 and 16 of [Directive 2000/78]?’
14

In accordance with Paragraph 82 of the EisbG: ‘1. The Schienen-Control Kommission shall consist of a chairperson and two other members. A substitute member shall be appointed for each member. The substitute members shall take the place of members who are prevented from acting. The chairperson and the substitute chairperson, who must belong to the judiciary, shall be appointed by the Bundesminister für Justiz (Federal Minister for Justice). The other members and substitute members, who must be specialists in the relevant transport sectors, shall be appointed by the Federal Government, acting on a proposal of the Bundesminister für Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie (Federal Minister for Transport, Innovation and Technology). 2. The following may not belong to the Schienen-Control Kommission: 1. Members of the Federal Government or of a provincial government, or State Secretaries; 2. Persons who have a close legal or de facto connection with persons who perform duties for the Schienen-Control Kommission; 3. Persons who are not eligible for election to the Nationalrat (National Council). 3. Members of the Schienen-Control Kommission and their substitute members shall be appointed for a term of five years. On expiry of that term, they shall continue to perform their duties until a new appointment is made. Appointments may be renewed. If a member or substitute member leaves office before that person’s term expires, a new member or substitute member shall be appointed in accordance with subparagraph 1 for the remainder of the term of office. 4. Membership or substitute membership shall cease: 1. on death; 2. on expiry of the term of office; 3. on resignation; 4. where all other members find that the member or substitute member is unable to perform his duties properly because of severe physical or mental illness; 5. where all other members find that the member or substitute member has not complied with invitations to attend three successive sittings without sufficient excuse; 6. in the case of the chairperson or substitute chairperson, on ceasing to belong to the judiciary. 5. Members and substitute members are obliged to observe confidentiality in accordance with Article 20(3) of the Austrian Federal Constitution (Bundes‑Verfassungsgesetz).’