ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 152/16

Appeal brought on 13 February 2018 by Koton Mağazacilik Tekstil Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 30 November 2017 in Case T-687/16: Koton Mağazacilik Tekstil Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-104/18 P)

(2018/C 152/19)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Koton Mağazacilik Tekstil Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ (represented by: J. Güell Serra, E. Stoyanov Edissonov, lawyers)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Joaquín Nadal Esteban

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— annul the contested decision;

— declare invalid the contested EUTM No. 9917436; and

— order Joaquín Nadal Esteban and EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The General Court stated in the judgment under appeal as regards the assessment of the conditions for the application of Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No. 207/2009 (1) that it was apparent from the judgment of the Court of Justice of 11 June 2009, Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli, C-529/07, EU:C:2009:361, that bad faith presupposed the existence of a likelihood of confusion and that it consequently required the goods and services at stake to be similar or identical.

The appellant claims that it does not follow from the judgment in Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli that bad faith on the part of the applicant for registration presupposes the existence of a likelihood of confusion between the marks/signs of the parties, but that the existence of such a likelihood of confusion is just an example of factors that can be taken into account, and not a sine qua non condition for the application of Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No. 207/2009.

The appellant thus alleges that, by finding that Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No. 207/2009 presupposed or required the existence of a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public and thus similarity or identity in the goods and services at stake, the General Court misinterpreted Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli and misapplied Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No. 207/2009. It consequently erred in law.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009, L 78, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale della Campania (Italy) lodged on 22 January 2018 — Meca Srl v Comune di Napoli

(Case C-41/18)

(2018/C 142/36)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale della Campania

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Meca Srl

Defendant: Comune di Napoli

Question referred

Do the Community principles of protection of legitimate expectations and of legal certainty, laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and the principles deriving therefrom, such as those of equal treatment, non-discrimination, proportionality and effectiveness, referred to in Directive 2014/24/EU, (1) and the provisions of Article 57(4)(c) and (g) of that Directive, preclude the application of national legislation, such as the Italian legislation founded on Article 80(5)(c) of Legislative Decree No 50/2016, according to which challenging before the courts significant deficiencies identified in the performance of a previous procurement procedure, which resulted in the early termination of a previous procurement contract, excludes any assessment by the procuring entity as to the reliability of the tenderer, until a final ruling has been issued in the civil proceedings, when the undertaking concerned has not demonstrated that it has adopted any ‘self-cleaning’ measures in order to remedy the breaches and avoid any repetition of them?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 152/20

Action brought on 28 February 2018 — European Commission v Kingdom of Spain

(Case C-164/18)

(2018/C 152/24)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (representatives: P. Ondrůšek, E. Sanfrutos Cano and G. von Rintelen, Agents)

Defendant: Kingdom of Spain

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court of Justice should:

— Declare that, by failing to adopt, by 18 April 2016, all of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014, (1) or, in any case, by failing to notify those measures to the Commission, the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 51(1) of that directive;

— Impose on the Kingdom of Spain, in accordance with Article 260(3) TFEU a daily penalty payment of EUR 61 964,32, with effect from the date of delivery of the judgment declaring the failure to fulfil the obligation to adopt or, in any case, notify to the Commission, the measures necessary to comply with Directive 2014/23/EU;

— Order the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The period prescribed for adapting national law to Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council ended on 18 April 2016.

(1) Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts ( OJ 2014 L 94, p. 1).
1.

Must point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 1(1) of Directive 98/59/EC of the Council of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies (1) (‘Directive 98/59/EC’) be interpreted as meaning that, for the purposes of determining the number of workers normally employed in an establishment, regard is to be had to the number of workers employed in the usual course of business at the time of the redundancy?
6.

If the national courts find that there is abuse arising from the use of successive appointments of temporary regulated staff to cover vacancies in the Madrid Health Service and that they are being used to cover permanent structural needs in the provision of services by permanent regulated employees, given that domestic law contains no effective measure to penalise such misuse and eliminate the consequences of the breach of EU legislation, must Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC be interpreted as requiring the national courts to adopt effective deterrent measures to ensure the effectiveness of the Framework Agreement, and therefore to penalise that misuse and eliminate the consequences of the breach of that EU legislation, disapplying the rule of domestic law that prevents it from being effective? If the answer should be affirmative, as held by the Court of Justice of the European Union in paragraph 41 of its judgment of 14 September 2016 in Cases C 184/15 and C 197/15: (2) As a measure to prevent and penalise the misuse of successive temporary contracts and to eliminate the consequence of the breach of EU law, would it be consistent with the objectives pursued by Directive 1999/70/EC to convert the temporary interim/occasional/replacement regulated relationship into a stable regulated relationship, the employee being classified as a permanent official or an official with an appointment of indefinite duration, with the same security of employment as comparable permanent regulated employees?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 161/44

Action brought on 3 April 2018 — European Central Bank v Republic of Latvia

(Case C-238/18)

(2018/C 161/49)

Language of the case: Latvian

Parties

Applicant: European Central Bank (represented by: C. Zilioli, C. Kroppenstedt and K. Kaiser, acting as Agents, and D. Sarmiento Ramírez-Escudero, lawyer)

Defendant: Republic of Latvia

Form of order sought

The European Central Bank claims that the Court should:

— request the Republic of Latvia, in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 24 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 62 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, to provide all relevant information pertaining to the ongoing investigation by the Korupcijas novēršanas an apkarošanas birojs (Office for the prevention and fight against corruption) of the Governor of the Bank of Latvia;

— declare, pursuant to Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, that the Republic of Latvia has infringed the second paragraph of that provision: — by removing from office the Governor of the Bank of Latvia before the handing down of a conviction from an independent court that examined the merits of the case and — without, if so confirmed by the evidence presented by the Republic of Latvia, exceptional circumstances justifying that removal;

— order the Republic of Latvia to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The ECB claims that the Republic of Latvia has infringed the second paragraph of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank in removing from office the Governor of the Bank of Latvia by way of a provisional security measure, without the handing down of a conviction from an independent court that examined the merits of the case.
1.

(a) Does Article 5(6) of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers, (1) in so far as it is intended to ensure that the consumer will be in a position to assess whether the proposed credit agreement is suited to his needs and to his financial situation, preclude the wording of the first paragraph of Article 15 of the Loi sur le crédit à la consommation (Law on consumer credit) (repealed and now replaced by Article VII.75 of the Code de droit économique (Code on Economic Law)), in so far as it provides that the creditor and the credit intermediary must find, within the framework of the credit agreements which they usually offer or in which they are usually involved, the type and the amount of credit most suitable, taking into account the consumer’s financial situation at the time the credit agreement is concluded and the purpose of the credit inasmuch as that provision establishes a general obligation on the creditor or the credit intermediary to find the most suitable credit for the consumer which is not included in the wording of the abovementioned directive? (b) Does Article 5(6) of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers, in so far as it is intended to ensure that the consumer will be in a position to assess whether the proposed credit agreement is suited to his needs and to his financial situation, preclude the wording of the second paragraph of Article 15 of the Loi sur le crédit à la consommation (repealed and now replaced by Art. Vll.77(2) subparagraph 1 of the Code de droit économique), in so far as the creditor may conclude a credit agreement only if, having regard to the information which is or should have been available to him, particularly on the basis of the consultation required under Article 9 of the Loi du 10 août 2001 relative à la Centrale des crédits aux particuliers (Law of 10 August 2001 on the Central Office for Credits to Individuals) and on the basis of the information referred to in Article 10, he must reasonably take the view that the consumer will be able to fulfil the obligations arising from the agreement inasmuch as it follows that the creditor must himself decide on the expediency of the possible conclusion of a credit agreement on behalf of the consumer?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 182/9

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Arbeidsrechtbank Antwerpen (Belgium) lodged on 19 February 2018 — Maria Vester v Rijksdienst voor Ziekte- en Invaliditeitsverzekering (Riziv)

(Case C-134/18)

(2018/C 182/09)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Arbeidsrechtbank Antwerpen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Maria Vester

Defendant: Rijksdienst voor Ziekte- en Invaliditeitsverzekering (Riziv)

Questions referred

‘Are Articles 45 TFEU and 48 TFEU infringed in the case where the last competent Member State refuses, upon commencement of incapacity for work, after expiry of a waiting period of 52 [Or. 9] weeks of incapacity for work, during which illness benefits were awarded, entitlement to invalidity benefit on the basis of Article 57 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, and the other, previously competent Member State applies, for the examination of the entitlement to a pro-rata invalidity benefit, a 104-week waiting period in accordance with the national law of that Member State?

If that is the case, is it compatible with the right of free movement that the person concerned, during this waiting time gap, is dependent on social assistance, or do Articles 45 TFEU and 48 TFEU oblige the previously competent Member State to examine the entitlement to invalidity benefits after expiry of the waiting period under the legislation of the last competent Member State, even if the national law of the previously competent Member State does not permit this?’

(1) OJ 2004, L 166, p. 1.
4.

Do the ‘polluter pays’ principle in Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the principles of equality and non-discrimination in Articles 20 and 21 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and Articles 3 and 5 of Directive 2005/89/EC, (2) insofar as they seek to ensure ‘the proper functioning of the internal market for electricity’ and call on Member States to ensure ‘that any measures adopted in accordance with this Directive are non-discriminatory and do not place an unreasonable burden on the market actors’, preclude a provision in national legislation that requires all electricity companies (other than generators of hydroelectricity, which is classified as renewable energy) to fund the tariff deficit, but which imposes a particularly heavy tax burden on nuclear generators, which are required to contribute more than other actors in the energy market, some of which are more polluting, but that do not have to pay these charges, the reasons given being grounds of environmental protection in view of the risks and uncertainties inherent in nuclear activities, without specifying the costs involved or stipulating that the revenue raised is to be used for environmental protection purposes (and given that waste management and storage are already covered by other levies, and nuclear generation companies assume civil liability), and that distorts the free competition required by the liberalised internal market by favouring other electricity generators that do not have to pay environmental taxes even when their sources of production are more highly polluting?
1.

Under Spanish law, in order to calculate a retirement pension, a percentage based on the number of years for which contributions have been paid throughout the person’s entire working life must be applied to the reference basis, which is calculated on the basis of earnings in the most recent years. Must a rule of national law, such as that in Article 247(a) and Article 248(3) of the Ley General de la Seguridad Social (General Law on Social Security), which reduces the number of qualifying years for the purpose of applying the percentage in the case of periods of part-time working, be considered contrary to Article 4(1) of Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security? (1) Does Article 4(1) of Directive 79/7/EEC require that the number of years of contributions that are taken into account in order to determine the percentage to be applied in calculating the retirement pension be determined in the same way for full-time workers and part-time workers?
1.

Notwithstanding the conclusions of the Court of Justice in Aranyosi and Caldararu, where a national court determines there is cogent evidence that conditions in the issuing Member State are incompatible with the fundamental right to a fair trial because the system of justice itself in the issuing Member State is no longer operating under the rule of law, is it necessary for the executing judicial authority to make any further assessment, specific and precise, as to the exposure of the individual concerned to the risk of unfair trial where his trial will take place within a system no longer operating within the rule of law?
2.

If the first question is answered in the affirmative: in the event of termination of a leasing agreement on account of partial non-payment of the leasing instalments owed, on which of the situations referred to in Article 90(1) of the directive can the lessor rely as against a Member State in order to have the taxable amount for VAT purposes reduced to the extent of the instalments that were owed but not paid in respect of the period from the cessation of payments to the time of termination of the agreement, in the case where the termination is not retroactive and this is confirmed by a clause in the agreement itself?
Case C-228/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Kúria (Hungary) lodged on 3 April 2018 — Gazdasági Versenyhivatal v Budapest Bank Nyrt. and Others

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Kúria (Hungary) lodged on 3 April 2018 — Gazdasági Versenyhivatal v Budapest Bank Nyrt. and Others

(Case C-228/18)

Referring court

Kúria

Parties to the main proceedings

Defendant and appellant: Gazdasági Versenyhivatal

Applicants and respondents: Budapest Bank Nyrt., ING Bank NV Magyarországi Fióktelepe, OTP Bank Nyrt., Kereskedelmi és Hitelbank Zrt., Magyar Külkereskedelmi Bank Zrt., ERSTE Bank Hungary Nyrt., Visa Europe Ltd, MasterCard Europe SA

Questions referred

1. Can Article 81(1) EC [Article 101(1) TFEU] be interpreted as meaning that the same conduct can infringe this provision both because the object of the conduct is anti-competitive and also because its effect is anti-competitive, with the two cases being treated as separate grounds in law?

2. Can Article 81(1) EC [Article 101(1) TFEU] be interpreted as meaning that the agreement at issue in the proceedings, which was entered into by Hungarian banks and which establishes, in respect of the two bank card companies, MasterCard and Visa, a unitary amount for the interchange fee payable to the issuing banks for the use of the cards of those two companies, constitutes a restriction of competition by object?

3. Can Article 81(1) EC [Article 101(1) TFEU] be interpreted as meaning that the credit card companies can also be considered to be parties to an interbank agreement where they were not directly involved in defining the content of the agreement but facilitated its adoption and accepted and implemented it; or are these companies to be considered to have acted in concert with the banks that entered into the agreement?
1.

Is it permissible to render the right to a tax exemption from value added tax on the exportation of goods (Article 146 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC ( 1 ) of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax) (‘the Directive’) conditional on the fact that the goods must first be placed under a particular customs procedure (§ 66 Zákona č. 235/2004 Sb., o dani z přidané hodnoty) (Paragraph 66 of Law No 235/2004 on Value Added Tax)?
2.

If the answer to the first question referred is in the negative and the grant of the abovementioned discount is permitted, does it follow from Directive 2012/27/EU that, in order to determine whether the discount is permitted, additional special conditions must be taken into account, such as whether the discount corresponds to the cost savings achieved with the chosen type of billing, whether or not the discount is given with each bill, or whether the discount can be given to the group of final customers who make cost savings with their choice of billing method?
Case C-286/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 9 March 2018 — Agrenergy Srl v Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 9 March 2018 — Agrenergy Srl v Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico

(Case C-286/18)

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Agrenergy Srl

Respondent: Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico

Question referred

Should Article 3(3)(a) of Directive 2009/28/EC ( 1 ) be interpreted — including in view of the general principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and the overall system of rules introduced by that directive to incentivise the production of energy from renewable sources — as rendering incompatible with EU law national legislation which allows the Italian Government, in subsequent implementing decrees, to reduce or even remove incentives introduced earlier?

( 1 ) Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (OJ 2009 L 140, p. 16).
Case C-253/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 12 April 2018 — Stadt Euskirchen v Rhenus Veniro GmbH & Co. KG

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 12 April 2018 — Stadt Euskirchen v Rhenus Veniro GmbH & Co. KG

(Case C-253/18)

Referring court

Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Stadt Euskirchen

Respondent: Rhenus Veniro GmbH & Co. KG

Other parties: SVE Stadtverkehr Euskirchen GmbH, RVK Regionalverkehr Köln GmbH

Question referred

Does Article 5(2)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, ( 1 ) which lays down the requirement to perform the major part of the public passenger transport service itself, prevent the internal operator from having that major part of the services performed by a company in which it has a 2,5 % holding and the remaining shares are held directly or indirectly by other competent authorities?

( 1 ) Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 1191/69 and 1107/70 (OJ 2007 L 315, p. 1).
2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, must Article 148(c) of Directive 2006/112/EC, in conjunction with Article 148(a) of that regulation, be interpreted as meaning that an essential condition for applying the exemption from value added tax to an offshore jackup drilling rig, which has navigated into international waters, is that it must in fact be in a state of movement while it is being used (for commercial/industrial activities), floating or moving at sea from place to place, for a longer period than the period during which it is stationary or immobile, as a result of carrying out drilling activities at sea — that is to say, that navigation must in fact predominate via-à-vis drilling activities?
Case C-146/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesverwaltungsgericht Steiermark (Austria) lodged on 23 February 2018 — Humbert Jörg Köfler

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesverwaltungsgericht Steiermark (Austria) lodged on 23 February 2018 — Humbert Jörg Köfler

(Case C-146/18)

Referring court

Landesverwaltungsgericht Steiermark

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Humbert Jörg Köfler

Respondent authority: Bezirkshauptmannschaft Murtal

Interested party: Finanzpolizei

Question referred

Must Articles 47 and 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights be interpreted as precluding a national provision which provides for a mandatory contribution to the procedural costs of appeal proceedings of 20 % of the fine imposed?