ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.

Does the interpretation of Articles 251, 394(3) and 411 of the LEC [Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil] (Law on Civil Procedure) set out in the reasoned decision of 1 October 2019, which equates the amount at issue in the proceedings with the financial interest of the dispute and, consequently, leads to a reduction of the fees that the consumer has paid his or her lawyer, on the basis of a fixed sum (EUR 18 000), established in law only in respect of an amount that cannot be estimated and not an amount that is unspecified, conflict with Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of the Directive, (1) since it cannot restore the consumer to the factual and legal position which he or she would have been in if that term had not existed, even though there is, in the consumer’s favour, a judicial declaration that the term is unfair, and since it does not remove an unreasonable procedural requirement relating to a limitation of costs where such removal would ensure that the consumer has the most suitable and effective means of legitimately exercising his or her rights?
2.

Must Article 4(2) TEU and Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that respect for the national identity and constitutional identity of the Member States of the European Union means that those Member States have a broad discretion as regards the rules for establishing parentage? Specifically: — Must Art. 4(2) TEU be interpreted as allowing Member State to request information on the biological parentage of the child? — Must Article 4(2) TEU in conjunction with Article 7 and Article 24(2) of the Charter be interpreted as meaning that it is essential to strike a balance of interests between, on the one hand, the national identity and constitutional identity of a Member State and, on the other hand, the best interests of the child, having regard to the fact that, at the present time, there is neither a consensus as regards values nor, in legal terms, a consensus about the possibility of registering as parents on a birth certificate persons of the same sex without providing further details of whether one of them, and if so, which of them, is the child’s biological parent? If this question is answered in the affirmative, how could that balance of interests be achieved in concrete terms?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 25 September 2020 — HEITEC AG v HEITECH Promotion GmbH and RW

(Case C-466/20)

(2020/C 443/13)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: HEITEC AG

Respondents: HEITECH Promotion GmbH, RW

Questions referred

1. Can acquiescence within the meaning of Article 9(1) and (2) of Directive 2008/95/EC (1) and Article 54(1) and (2) and Article 111(2) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (2) be excluded not only by means of an administrative or court action, but also through conduct not involving a court or administrative authority?

2. If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: Does the sending of a warning letter, in which the proprietor of the earlier sign, before initiating legal proceedings, requires the proprietor of the later sign to agree to refrain from using the sign, and to enter into an obligation to pay a contractual penalty in the event of an infringement, constitute conduct precluding acquiescence within the meaning of Article 9(1) and (2) of Directive 2008/95/EC and Article 54(1) and (2) and Article 111(2) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009?

3. When seeking judicial redress, is the bringing of the action before the court or the receipt of the action by the defendant decisive for calculating the five-year acquiescence period for the purposes of Article 9(1) and (2) of Directive 2008/95/EC and Article 54(1) and (2) and Article 111(2) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009? Is it significant in this regard that receipt of the action by the defendant is delayed beyond the expiry of the five-year period through the fault of the proprietor of the earlier trade mark?

4. Does the limitation of rights in accordance with Article 9(1) and (2) of Directive 2008/95/EC and Article 54(1) and (2) and Article 111(2) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 encompass consequential claims under trade mark law, for example, claims for compensation, provision of information or destruction, as well as prohibitory injunctions?

(1) Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 2008 L 299, p. 25).

(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Wien (Austria) lodged on 31 August 2020 — Österreichische Apothekerkammer v HA

(Case C-407/20)

(2020/C 443/05)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberlandesgericht Wien

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Österreichische Apothekerkammer

Defendant: HA

Question referred

Is Article 36 TFEU to be interpreted as meaning that a national prohibition on mail-order sales of in vitro diagnostic medical devices for determining HIV status intended by the manufacturer to be able to be used by lay persons in their home environment, that is a measure having equivalent effect within the meaning of Article 34 TFEU, is justified in order to protect the health and life of humans?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Nürnberg (Germany) lodged on 29 September 2020 — RightNow GmbH v Wizz Air

(Case C-469/20)

(2021/C 9/11)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Nürnberg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: RightNow GmbH

Defendant: Wizz Air

Question referred

Is Article 3(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (1) to be interpreted as meaning that a term in the general terms and conditions of a commercial air carrier which has not been individually negotiated, under which a contract of carriage concluded with a consumer in the course of electronic commerce is to be governed by the law of the Member State in which the air carrier is resident, which is not identical to the law of the place in which the passenger is habitually resident, is unfair in so far as it leads the consumer into error by failing to draw his attention to the fact that the choice as to the law applicable in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (2) does not apply to any law and is limited to the law of the countries named in the second subparagraph of Article 5(2) of the Rome I Regulation?

The case was removed from the Register of the Court of Justice by order of the Court of 12 November 2020.

(1) OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29.

(2) OJ 2008 L 177, p. 6.
3.

Article 3 of Regulation 2020/1054, which fixes the date on which that regulation enters into force (20 August 2020) without providing for any transitional period, particularly with regard to the fact that there is an obligation immediately to apply (i) the amendments made to Article 8(8) of Regulation No 561/2006 prohibiting rest periods from being taken in the cabin of the vehicle, and (ii) the amendments made to Article 8(8a) of Regulation No 561/2006 relating to the obligation to ensure that drivers return to their place of residence every four weeks, is contrary to: 3.1 The principle of proportionality, in that, in fixing the period up to the date of entry into force at 20 days, the EU institutions (i) failed to have regard for the fact that, for objective reasons and in the absence of a transitional period, the Member States and transporters are unable to adapt to the obligations as amended, and (ii) did not put forward any arguments to justify the urgency in bringing those new requirements into force; 3.2 The obligation to state reasons, laid down in Article 296 TFEU, in that the EU institutions, when examining the proposal, were aware, by reason of the impact analysis and from other sources, that (i) the prohibition on spending sleeping time in the cabin during the periods concerned would be inapplicable in practice for the majority of Member States (because of the inadequate availability of alternative accommodation) and for transport undertakings, (ii) the obligation to ensure that drivers return to their place of residence or to the operational centre of the undertaking would give rise to practical difficulties as the rules for the implementation of that obligation are not clear, with the result that the EU institutions were required to put forward arguments to justify the absence of a transitional period or the non-deferment of the entry into force of the legislation; 3.3 The principle of sincere cooperation, in that the EU institutions not only failed in any way to justify the need to ensure the immediate entry into force of the prohibition on spending the night in the vehicle cabin during the periods in question and of the obligation to ensure that drivers would return to their place of residence but also failed to take into account the data submitted by Member States and interested parties concerning objective obstacles and the need to provide for a transitional period which would make it possible to prepare for the amended rules.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 19 October 2020 — CT v Deutsche Lufthansa AG

(Case C-528/20)

(2021/C 28/30)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: CT

Defendant: Deutsche Lufthansa AG

Question referred

Does a strike by the air carrier’s own employees that is called by a trade union constitute an extraordinary circumstance within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1)?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 30 October 2020 — Criminal proceedings against IR

(Case C-569/20)

(2021/C 28/38)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad

Party to the main proceedings

IR

Questions referred

Are Article 8(2)(b) in conjunction with recitals 36 to 39 of Directive 2016/343 (1) and Article 4а(1)(b) in conjunction with recitals 7 to 10 of Framework Decision 2009/299 to be interpreted as covering a case in which the accused person was informed of the list of charges against him, in its original version, and then, due to the fact that he has fled, objectively cannot be informed of the trial and is defended by a lawyer appointed ex officio with whom he has no contact?

If this is answered in the negative: Is a national provision (Article 423(1) and (5) of the NPK), pursuant to which no provision is made for any legal protection against investigative measures carried out in absentia and against a conviction handed down in absentia where the accused person, after having been informed of the original list of charges, is in hiding and therefore could not be informed of the date and place of the trial or of the consequences of non-appearance, consistent with Article 9 in conjunction with the second sentence of Article 8(4) of Directive 2016/343 and Article 4а(3) in conjunction with Article 4a(1)(d) of Framework Decision 2009/299?

If this is answered in the negative: Does Article 9 of Directive 2016/343 in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter have direct effect?

(1) Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ 2016 L 65, p. 1).
1.

Is Article 17(1) of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, concluded in Montreal on 28 May 1999, signed by the European Community on 9 December 1999 and approved on its behalf by Council Decision 2001/539/EC of 5 April 2001, (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘accident’ within the meaning of that provision covers a situation in which a passenger falls on the last third of a mobile boarding stairway when disembarking from an aircraft — for no ascertainable reason — and sustains an injury, which was not caused by an object used when serving passengers within the meaning of the decision of the Court of Justice of 19 December 2019, C-532/18, (2) and there was no defect in the quality of the stairway, which, in particular, also was not slippery?
Is the second sentence of Article 38(3) of Regulation (EU) No 2016/679 (1) (General Data Protection Regulation; GDPR) to be interpreted as precluding a provision in national law, such as Paragraph 38(1) and (2) in conjunction with the second sentence of Paragraph 6(4) of the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (Federal Law on data protection; ‘the BDSG’), which declares ordinary termination of the employment contract of the data protection officer by the data controller, who is his employer, to be impermissible, irrespective of whether his contract is terminated for performing his tasks?

If the first question is answered in the affirmative:
1.

Is Article 6(1) read in conjunction with Article 21(2) and Article 21(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (‘Brussels I Regulation’) (1) to be interpreted as meaning that an employee can sue a legal person — which is not his employer and which is not domiciled in a Member State within the meaning of Article 63(1) of the Brussels I Regulation but which, by virtue of a letter of comfort, is directly liable to the employee for claims arising from an individual contract of employment with a third party — in the courts for the place where or from where the employee habitually carries out his work in the employment relationship with the third party or in the courts for the last place where he did so, if the contract of employment with the third party would not have come into being in the absence of the letter of comfort?
2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative — that is to say that the leasing of land in the case of compulsory leasing is exempt from value added tax — then, where all other instances of the leasing of land are subject to value added tax, is such an exemption not contrary to one of the principles of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, namely the principle of neutrality of value added tax?
4.

Must Article 19 TEU, in conjunction with Article 267 TFEU and the general principle of the right to a fair trial before a court or tribunal previously established by law, be interpreted as meaning that the court of final instance of a Member State is to reject an application for the transfer of a case file concerning a case in which a question has been referred for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice where such an application has been lodged by a person appointed to a judicial post under national legislation and in circumstances that result in a court or tribunal being formed which does not meet the requirements of independence and impartiality and is not a court established by law, without first having to exhaust the procedure referred to in the question referred for a preliminary ruling in Case C-508/19 or in the judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 November 2019, C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, A. K. and Others?
2.

Must the issuing of a debit note to a supplier of wind turbine components with a view to obtaining reimbursement of the costs which the purchaser of those products has incurred during the warranty period in replacing components (new imports of products from the supplier to which VAT was applied and which gave rise to a right to deduct input tax) and repairing them (by purchasing from third parties services on which VAT was charged), in the context of the supply to third parties of services in connection with the installation of a wind farm by that purchaser (a member of the same group [of companies] as the vendor, which is established in a third country), be classified as a mere transaction for passing on costs and, as such, exempt from VAT, or as a supply of services for consideration which must give rise to a charge to tax?
2.

Must Article 75, in conjunction with Article 22, of Regulation No 650/2012 be interpreted as meaning that, in the case where a bilateral agreement between a Member State and a third country does not govern the choice of law applicable to a case involving succession but indicates the law applicable to that case involving succession, a national of that third country residing in a Member State bound by that bilateral agreement may make a choice of law? and in particular: — must a bilateral agreement with a third country expressly exclude the choice of a specific law and not merely govern the lex successionis using objective connecting factors in order for its provisions to take precedence over Article 22 of Regulation No 650/2012? — is the freedom to choose the law governing succession and to make the applicable law uniform by making a choice of law — at least to the extent determined by the EU legislature in Article 22 of Regulation No 650/2012 — one of the principles underlying judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters in the European Union, which may not be infringed even where bilateral agreements with third countries apply which take precedence over Regulation No 650/2012?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo No 1 de Pontevedra (Spain) lodged on 2 September 2020 — UN v Subdelegación del Gobierno en Pontevedra

(Case C-409/20)

(2021/C 53/20)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo No 1 de Pontevedra

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: UN

Defendant: Subdelegación del Gobierno en Pontevedra

Questions referred

Must Directive 2008/115/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (Articles 4(3), 6(1), 6(5) and 7(1)) be interpreted as meaning that it precludes national legislation (Articles 53(1)(a) and 55(1)(b), Article 57 and Article 28(3)(c) of Ley Orgánica 4/2000, de 11 de enero, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración social (Basic Law 4/2000 of 11 January 2000 on the rights and freedoms of foreign nationals in Spain and their social integration)) that penalises illegally staying foreign nationals in the absence of aggravating circumstances, initially, with a fine together with a request to return voluntarily to the country of origin followed, thereafter, by the penalty of removal if the foreign national neither regularises his situation nor returns voluntarily to his country?

(1) OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Germany) lodged on 11 December 2020 — Industriegewerkschaft Metall (IG Metall) and ver.di — Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft

(Case C-677/20)

(2021/C 72/24)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesarbeitsgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants, appellants and appellants on a point of law: Industriegewerkschaft Metall (IG Metall), ver.di — Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft

Parties involved: SAP SE, SE-Betriebsrat der SAP SE, Konzernbetriebsrat der SAP SE, Deutscher Bankangestellten-Verband e. V., Christliche Gewerkschaft Metall (CGM), Verband angestellter Akademiker und leitender Angestellter der chemischen Industrie e. V.

Question referred

Is Paragraph 21(6) of the Gesetz über die Beteiligung der Arbeitnehmer in einer Europäischen Gesellschaft (German Law on involvement of employees in a European company), which determines that, in the case where an SE [Societas Europaea; European Company] with its registered office in Germany is established by means of transformation, a separate selection procedure for persons nominated by trade unions for a certain number of supervisory board members representing the employees must be guaranteed, compatible with Article 4(4) of Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard to the involvement of employees (1)?

(1) OJ 2001 L 294, p. 22.
1.

Does a national statutory provision treat part-time workers in a less favourable manner than comparable full-time workers within the meaning of Clause 4.1 of the Framework Agreement on part-time work annexed to Directive 97/81/EC (1) if it permits additional remuneration for part-time and full-time workers to be uniformly contingent on the same number of working hours having been exceeded, and therefore allows account to be taken of the overall remuneration, and not of the component of the remuneration that comprises the additional remuneration?
2.

If the first question is answered in the affirmative, is the law of the Member State in which the proceedings are pending intended to govern all the effects of the winding-up proceedings on the pending lawsuit? In particular, should it be applied in so far as it: — provides that the opening of such proceedings results in the suspension of the pending lawsuit; — subjects the resumption of the proceedings to the claim for insurance compensation being lodged against the estate of the insurance undertaking by the creditor and to the bodies responsible for the winding-up proceedings being summoned; — and precludes an order to pay the insurance compensation, since such an order can no longer be the subject of a judgment except relating to the determination and fixing the amount of the compensation?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 23 November 2020 — Deutsche Lufthansa AG v CS

(Case C-630/20)

(2021/C 72/20)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Deutsche Lufthansa AG

Respondent: CS

Question referred

Does a strike by the air carrier’s own employees that is called by a trade union constitute an extraordinary circumstance within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1)?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).