ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1)

(a) What does the term ‘undertaking carrying out an “economic activity”’ mean for the purposes of Article 2(a) of Directive 2002/14/EC? (1) (b) Does it include private-law legal entities such as the EOPPEP which, in the exercise of its powers of certification of vocational training bodies, acts as a public-law legal entity and exercises public powers, inasmuch as (i) for certain of its activities, such as the provision of all manner and form of vocational guidance services to the competent ministerial bodies, centres and vocational education and training bodies, undertakings, and employers’ and workers’ associations (Article 14(2)(ib) of Law 4115/2013, Government Gazette I/24), it follows from Article 14(2)(ie) of that law laying down the requirements for the provision of advisory and vocational guidance services by private individuals and legal entities in Greece that there may be a market in which commercial undertakings are carrying out an activity in competition with the applicant, and (ii) according to Article 23(1)(d) of that law, the applicant’s resources include revenue from the performance of work and the provision of services either allocated to it by the Minister or performed on behalf of third parties, including government departments, national and international organisations, public- or private-law legal entities and private individuals, whereas (iii) for its other activities, Article 20 of Law 4115/2013 provides for the payment of fees? (c) Does the answer to the above question depend on whether, in relation to most of the activities (Article 14(2) of Law 4115/2013) of the private-law legal entity, a few appear to be carried out only in a market environment and, if the answer to that is in the negative, whether it suffices that the legislature provided (Article 14(2)(ib) and Article 23(1)(d) of Law 4115/2013) for that legal entity to act, in part at least, as a market operator or whether it is necessary to prove that it does indeed carry out a particular activity in a market environment?
1.

Must Article 3(5) and (7) of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, (1) which requires that the rights of an energy customer (small undertaking), in the event of a change of energy supplier, be exercised in accordance with the rule ensuring that the eligible customer is in fact able easily to switch to a new supplier, and that that change be made in a non-discriminatory manner as regards cost, effort or time, be interpreted as precluding the possibility of imposing a contractual penalty on an energy customer for terminating a fixed-term energy supply contract where the energy customer wishes to change energy supplier, irrespective of the amount of loss suffered (Articles 483(1) and 484(1) and (2) of the Ustawa z dnia 23 kwietnia 1964 r. kodeks cywilny (Law of 23 April 1964 establishing the Civil Code)) and without any criteria being laid down in the Law on Energy (Article 4j(3a) of the Ustawa z dnia 10 kwietnia 1997 r. prawo energetyczne (Law on Energy of 10 April 1997)) for the charging of such fees or the establishment thereof?
Must the provisions of Article 4(5) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA be interpreted as meaning that a judgment refusing to execute a European arrest warrant issued for the purposes of the execution of a custodial sentence and recognition of the judgment passing sentence pursuant to Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, but without its effective execution by imprisonment of the sentenced person following a pardon and suspension of the sentence, in accordance with the law of the executing State (EU Member State), and without obtaining the consent of the sentencing State in the context of the recognition procedure, amounts to a judgment ‘by a third State in respect of the same acts’?

If Question 4 is answered in the affirmative:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Kammergericht Berlin (Germany) lodged on 15 June 2022 — Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin

(Case C-398/22)

(2022/C 359/41)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Kammergericht Berlin

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin

Other party: RQ

Questions referred

1. Where appeal proceedings have been conducted, is the concept of ‘trial’ in Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, (1) as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, (2) to be interpreted as relating to the trial which preceded the decision at first instance if only the requested person lodged an appeal and either it was dismissed without examination of the merits or the judgment at first instance was varied in his or her favour?

2. Is it compatible with the primacy of EU law for the German legislature to have configured the case of conviction in absentia as an absolute impediment to surrender in Paragraph 83(1)(3) of the Gesetz über die internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen (Law on international mutual legal assistance in criminal matters), even though Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, provides only for an optional ground for refusal in that regard?

(1) Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1).

(2) Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 amending Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing the procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial (OJ 2009 L 81, p. 24).
3.

Does it make any difference to the answer to the previous question if, at the material time, there were no biofuel certificates available for purchase on the market, meaning that a small operator could not buy any (or could do so only with great difficulty), and if the Direção-Geral de Energia e Geologia (Directorate General for Energy and Geology; ‘the DGEG’) had not organised the corresponding auctions, leaving the small operator with no option but to pay compensation (materially equivalent to a fine)?
1.

Must Article 203 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (1) be interpreted as meaning that in a situation where an employee of a VAT taxable person has issued a fraudulent invoice showing VAT, on which he or she has included the employer’s details as the taxable person, without that employer’s knowledge and consent, the person who enters the VAT on the invoice and who is thus liable to pay the VAT is to be considered: — the VAT taxable person whose details were unlawfully used in the invoice; or — the employee who unlawfully entered VAT on that invoice using the details of the VAT taxable person?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 28 June 2022 — Criminal proceedings against VB

(Case C-430/22)

(2022/C 408/37)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad

Party to the main proceedings

VB

Questions referred

Must the second sentence of Article 8(4) of Directive 2016/343 (1) be interpreted as obliging a national court which convicts an accused person in absentia, without the conditions of Article 8(2) being met, to make express reference to the accused person’s right to have the proceedings reopened, to which he or she is entitled under Article 9 of that directive, in order that he or she can be informed of that right at a later stage, in particular when he or she is detained for the purpose of executing the sentence? The question arises in the light of the fact that national law provides neither for the person convicted in absentia to be informed of his or her right to have the proceedings reopened when he or she is detained for the purpose of executing the sentence, nor for the involvement of a court in the issuing of a European arrest warrant for the purpose of executing the sentence.

Must the second sentence of Article 8(4) of Directive 2016/343, and in particular the phrase ‘also informed of the possibility to challenge the decision and of the right to a new trial or to another legal remedy, in accordance with Article 9’, be interpreted as meaning that such information concerns a formally recognised right to have the proceedings reopened, or does it concern the right to request such reopening, whereby the substance of the request must then be examined?

(1) Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ 2016 L 65, p. 1).
1.

Must Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (1) be interpreted as being directly applicable in relations between a private transport operator, with a single public service delegation, and its employees, in the light, in particular, of the liberalisation of the rail passenger transport sector?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 18 January 2022 by Enol Velasco Granda and Others against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 24 November 2021 in Case T-658/21, Velasco Granda and Others v Commission

(Case C-39/22 P)

(2022/C 408/32)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellants: Enol Velasco Granda, María José Díaz Rodríguez, Silvia García Miguélez, Beatriz González Carvajal, Antonia Trinidad González Castro, Isabel Merediz Gutiérrez, María Miranda García, Ana Moreira Varillas, Lucía Villa Gutiérrez (represented by: B. González González, abogada)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 6 September 2022, the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as manifestly unfounded and ordered the appellants to bear their own costs.
3.

Is Article 370, read in conjunction with point 2 of Annex X, Part A, of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, to be interpreted as meaning that a Member State’s option to impose VAT on a statutory media licence fee as specified in question 1 may be maintained if, after the entry into force, on 1 January 1978, of Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes (Sixth Directive), the Member State has altered the licensing system so that a smaller proportion of the licence fee resources will, at the discretion of the Minister for Culture, be used to finance (i) radio and television bodies which receive public subsidies but are not themselves public, and (ii) media and film organisations which contribute to but do not themselves carry out radio and television activities?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 25 May 2022 by Laboratorios Ern, SA against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 16 March 2022 in Case T-315/21, Laboratorios Ern v EUIPO — Nordesta (APIAL)

(Case C-342/22 P)

(2022/C 424/25)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Laboratorios Ern, SA (represented by: I. Miralles Llorca, abogada)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Nordesta GmbH

By order of 28 September 2022, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Laboratorios Ern, SA should bear its own costs.
5.

If Questions 1 and 2 are answered in the negative, does a right to complain against old charges arise in any event from the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in so far as, where the regulatory body has not decided on the complaint, reimbursement of unlawful old charges under the rules of national civil law is precluded in accordance with the case-law of the Court in Case C-489/15 (2) (judgment of 9 November 2017)?
2.

In the light of principle of necessity under Article 273 of Directive [2006/112] and the principle of proportionality under Article 52(1) of the Charter, is legislation of a Member State under which a company’s tax identification number or VAT identification number may be cancelled for failure to comply with the requirement to lodge a tax guarantee imposed on that company compatible with the freedom to conduct a business enshrined in Article 16 of the Charter and the right to an effective remedy under Article 47 of the Charter, even in the case where the minimum notice period for properly convening a meeting of that company’s decision-making body, in accordance with the general provisions of the legislation of that Member State, does not allow that body to dismiss the executive officer affected by the impediment giving rise to the requirement to lodge that guarantee, and thus to remove that impediment within a timeframe such as to cause the obligation to lodge the guarantee to be extinguished, thereby obviating the need to cancel the tax identification number, before the tax authority’s decision imposing the requirement to lodge that guarantee becomes final?
Appeal brought on 17 August 2022 by ITV plc against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 8 June 2022 in Joined Cases T-363/19 and T-456/19, United Kingdom and ITV v Commission

(Case C-556/22 P)

(2022/C 441/12)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: ITV plc (represented by: J. Lesar, Solicitor, and K. Beal QC)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, LSEGH (Luxembourg) Ltd, London Stock Exchange Group Holdings (Italy) Ltd

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— allow the appeal;

— annul points 2 and 4 of the operative part of the judgment under appeal;

— annul the Commission Decision (EU) 2019/1352 of 2 April 2019 of the State aid SA.44896 implemented by the United Kingdom concerning CFC Group Financing Exemption (1); and

— order the Commission to pay the costs of the application before this Court and the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on four pleas in law:

First, the General Court erred in law and/or made a manifest error of assessment or appraisal in concluding that the Commission had not erred in its selection of the reference system for the analysis of whether or not the State aid provisions found in Articles 107 and 108 TFEU had been breached.

Second, the General Court erred in law and/or made a manifest error of assessment or appraisal in concluding that the relevant exemptions operated as a derogation from a general system of taxation comprising the CFC (controlled foreign companies) rules and thereby conferred a selective advantage on only some of the corporate taxpayers who were otherwise in a comparable position.

Third, the General Court erred in law and/or made a manifest error of assessment or appraisal in concluding that the exemptions, if they did confer a selective advantage (quod non), could not be justified on the basis of administrative practicability.

Fourth, the General Court erred in law in its failure properly to consider and apply the ruling of the judgment of 12 September 2006, Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas, C-196/04, EU:C:2006:544, whether when considering the issue of reference framework, selective advantage or considering the question of whether or not the exemptions (or any of them) might be justified in order to protect the freedom of establishment under Article 49 TFEU. Further or alternatively, the General Court failed to give adequate reasons for its conclusions on this issue.

(1) OJ 2019 L 216, p. 1.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 28 February 2022 by FJ and Others against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 15 December 2021 in Case T-225/20, FJ and Others v EEAS

(Case C-170/22 P)

(2022/C 441/05)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellants: FJ and Others (represented by: J.-N. Louis, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European External Action Service

By order of 5 October 2022, the Court (Seventh Chamber) dismissed the appeal as manifestly inadmissible and ordered the appellants to bear their own costs.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 26 August 2022 by Ana Carla Mendes de Almeida against the order of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 13 June 2022 in Case T-334/21 Mendes de Almeida v Council

(Case C-572/22 P)

(2022/C 463/22)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Parties

Appellant: Ana Carla Mendes de Almeida (represented by: R. Leandro Vasconcelos, P. Almeida Sande and M. Tavares, advogados)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

By order of 16 September 2022, the President of the Court ordered that the case be removed from the register.
Action brought on 21 October 2022 — European Commission v Slovak Republic

(Case C-668/22)

(2022/C 463/28)

Language of the case: Slovak

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: B. Sasinowska, G. Wilms and R. Lindenthal, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Slovak Republic

Form of order sought

— declare that, by failing to take the measures necessary to achieve certain results resulting from Commission Regulation (EC) No 29/2009 (1) of 16 January 2009 laying down requirements on data link services for the single European sky, the Slovak Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 4(3) TEU in conjunction with Article 3(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 29/2009;

— order the Slovak Republic to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pursuant to Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 29/2009, ATS providers are to ensure that ATS units providing air traffic services within the airspace referred to in Article 1(3) of that regulation are capable of providing and operating data link services as defined in Annex II to that regulation. The data services defined in Annex II are: data link initiation capability (DLIC), ATC communication management (ACM) service, ATC clearance and information (ACL) service and ATC microphone control (AMC) service. Contrary to Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 29/2009, the ATS provider entrusted by the Slovak Republic has not ensured that ATS units are capable of providing and operating the data link services defined in Annex II to that regulation. The Slovak Republic, within the meaning of Article 4(3) of the EU Treaty, had not, at the time of the expiry of the time limit in its reasoned opinion, taken the necessary measures to ensure that the ATS provider entrusted by it complies with the requirements of Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 29/2009.

(1) OJ 2009 L 13, p. 3.
2.

Is an interpretation of Article 3(2) of Directive 2001/24 which entails the recognition in a host Member State of the effects of a decision by the competent administrative authority of the home Member State which excluded certain obligations and responsibilities from the transfer to a ‘bridge bank’ of the ordinary business and a number of the assets and liabilities of the bank to which the reorganisation measures apply compatible with the fundamental right to effective judicial protection under Article 47 of the Charter and the general principle of legal certainty, where the subsequent conduct of the ‘bridge bank’, acting under the control of a public authority applying EU law, itself created among customers in the host Member State a legitimate expectation that the ‘bridge bank’ had assumed the liabilities corresponding to the responsibilities and obligations which the bank forming the subject of the reorganisation measure held in relation to those customers?
2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, must Article 76 of Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC, read in conjunction with Article 36 of that directive, be interpreted as precluding the contracting authority from requesting, after the first contract award decision has been set aside and the case has been referred back to the contracting entity for a re-examination and re-evaluation of the tenders, additional documents from the contractor demonstrating compliance with the conditions for participation in the public procurement procedure that were not included in the original tender, such as a list of works carried out supplemented by a reference that was not included in the original list of works, that is to say, a reference that was not part of the original tender?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 31 August 2022 by Munich, SL against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 22 June 2022 in Case T-502/20, Munich v EUIPO — Tone Watch (MUNICH10A.T.M.)

(Case C-577/22 P)

(2023/C 24/28)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: Munich, SL (represented by: J. Güell Serra, M. del Mar Guix Vilanova, abogados)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Tone Watch, SL

By order of 29 November 2022, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) decided that the appeal should not be allowed to proceed and ordered Munich SL to bear its own costs.
1.

Is the accumulation of measures taken, supported or tolerated in a State by a de facto government actor and consisting, in particular, of the fact that women — are denied participation in political office and political decision-making processes, — are provided with no legal means to be able to obtain protection from gender-based and domestic violence, — are generally at risk of forced marriages; even though they have been prohibited by the de facto government actor, women are not afforded effective protection against forced marriages and such marriages are sometimes performed with the participation of de facto government actors in the knowledge that it is a forced marriage, — are not allowed to engage in gainful employment or are allowed to do so only to a limited extent, mainly at home, — have difficulties in accessing health facilities, — are fully or largely denied access to education (for example by allowing girls only a primary school education), — are not allowed to be or move about in public without being accompanied by a man (who must be of a certain family relationship) or, at most, are permitted to do so only a certain distance from home, — must completely cover their bodies and veil their faces in public, — may not take part in any sports, as referred to in Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2011/95/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast), to be regarded as sufficiently severe as to affect a woman in a similar manner as described in Article 9(1)(a) of that directive?