ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
ORDER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

(Third Chamber)

30 June 2011

Case F-14/10

Luigi Marcuccio

v

European Commission

(Civil service — Officials — Social security — Accident — Procedure for recognising permanent partial invalidity under Article 73 of the Staff Regulations — Duration of procedure — Action for damages — Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law — Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure)

Application: brought under Article 270 TFEU, applicable to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to Article 106a thereof, in which Mr Marcuccio essentially seeks an order that the Commission compensate him for the material and non-material damage he claims to have suffered as a result of the unreasonable duration of the procedure for recognition, under Article 73 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, of permanent partial invalidity following a non-occupational accident which he sustained on 12 September 2003.

Held: The action is dismissed as manifestly lacking any foundation in law. The applicant is ordered to bear, as well as his own costs, the costs incurred by the Commission. The applicant is ordered to refund the Tribunal the sum of EUR 1 000 under Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure.

Summary

Officials — Social security — Insurance against the risk of accident and of occupational disease — Medical opinion — Duty to act within a reasonable time

(Staff Regulations, Art. 73; Rules on insurance against the risk of accident and of occupational disease, Arts 19 and 21)

The reasonableness of the duration of an administrative procedure must be appraised in the light of the circumstances specific to each case and, in particular, its context, the various procedural stages followed by the institution, the conduct of the parties in the course of the procedure, the complexity of the case and its importance for the various parties involved.

As far as concerns the civil service, the institution is responsible for the speed at which the doctors work whom it appoints to issue findings as provided for in Articles 19 and 21 of the Rules on insurance against the risk of accident and of occupational disease. However, in so far as it is proved that a delay is ascribable to the dilatory or obstructive conduct of the official, the institution must not be held responsible for that delay.

(see paras 49, 50)

See:

17 December 1998, C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission, para. 29; 16 July 2009, C-385/07 P Der Grüne Punkt-Duales System Deutschland v Commission, paras 181 to 188

22 October 1997, T-213/95 and T-18/96 SCK and FNK v Commission, para. 57; 11 April 2006, T-394/03 Angeletti v Commission, para. 154

1 July 2010, F-97/08 Füller-Tomlinson v Parliament, para. 167, on appeal before the General Court of the European Union, Case T-390/10 P
ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECOND CHAMBER

OF THE CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL





15 February 2011

Case F-18/10

Georges Capidis

v

European Commission

(Amicable settlement — Removal from the register)

Application: brought under Articles 236 EC and 152 EA, in which Mr Capidis seeks annulment of the appointing authority’s decision of 30 April 2009 imposing a disciplinary sanction in the form of downgrading by one grade.

Held: Case F-18/10 Capidis v Commission is removed from the register of the Tribunal. The parties are to bear the costs as agreed between them.

Summary

Officials — Actions — Amicable settlement of the dispute before the Civil Service Tribunal — Removal from the register

(Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal, Art. 69)
As is apparent from the first paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, applicable before the Civil Service Tribunal pursuant to Article 7(1) of Annex I to that Statute, the institutions are free to have recourse to the assistance of a lawyer. The latter’s remuneration is therefore covered by the concept of expenses necessarily incurred for the purposes of the proceedings, without the institution being required to show that such assistance is objectively warranted.

Concerning the determination of the amount of recoverable lawyer’s fees, the Union judicature is not empowered to tax the fees payable by the parties to their own lawyers but it may determine the amount of those fees which may be recovered from the party ordered to pay the costs. When ruling on an application for taxation of costs, it is not obliged to take account of any national scales of lawyers’ fees or any agreement in that regard between the party concerned and his agents or advisers.

Similarly, the fixed nature of the remuneration has no effect on the Tribunal’s assessment of the amount recoverable by way of costs, since it bases its decisions on well-established criteria laid down by case-law and precise information which the parties must provide to it. Whilst the absence of such information does not preclude the Civil Service Tribunal fixing the amount of the recoverable costs on the basis of an equitable assessment, it nonetheless places it in a situation where its assessment of the applicant’s claims must necessarily be strict.

Likewise, the amount of the institution’s lawyer’s fees that are recoverable cannot be evaluated without taking into consideration the work carried out, even before the matter was brought before the Civil Service Tribunal, by the legal services of the institution. Since the admissibility of an action is subject to the prior introduction of a complaint and its rejection by the appointing authority, the legal services of the institution are in principle involved in dealing with disputes even before such disputes are brought before the Civil Service Tribunal.

As regards the scale of the work involved in the pre-litigation procedure, it is for the courts of the Union to make a fair assessment of the work necessary for the purpose of the main proceedings when determining how many hours the lawyer worked.

(see paras 18-20, 22, 30)

orders in Marcuccio v Commission, T‑278/07 P-DEP, EU:T:2013:269, para. 20; and Marcuccio v Commission, T‑366/10 P-DEP, EU:T:2014:63, para. 33 and the case-law cited therein

order in Chatzidoukakis v Commission, F‑84/10 DEP, EU:F:2014:41, paras 21, 22 and 24 and the case-law cited therein
ORDER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

(Third Chamber)

12 September 2011





Case F-98/10





Francesca Cervelli

v

European Commission

(Civil service – Officials – Expatriation allowance – Request for reconsideration – Substantial new facts – Action manifestly inadmissible)

Application: brought under Article 270 TFEU, applicable to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to Article 106a thereof, whereby Ms Cervelli seeks annulment of the Commission’s decision rejecting her request for a reconsideration of the decision refusing to grant her the expatriation allowance.

Held: The action is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible. The applicant is ordered to pay all the costs.

Summary

Officials – Actions – Action brought against a refusal to reconsider a definitive decision – Admissibility – Condition

(Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91)

A decision which has not been challenged by the person to whom it is addressed within the prescribed period becomes definitive as against that person. However, the existence of substantial new facts may justify the submission of a request for reconsideration of an earlier decision which has become definitive.

An action brought against a decision refusing to reconsider a decision which has become definitive will be declared admissible if it appears that the request for reconsideration was actually based on substantial new facts. On the other hand, if it appears that the request was not based on such facts, the action against the decision refusing to reconsider the earlier decision must be dismissed as inadmissible.

The legal effects of a judgment annulling a measure relate, other than to the parties, only to persons directly concerned by the annulled measure itself and such a judgment can constitute a new fact only with respect to those persons.

Furthermore, a decision which is not issued by the institution employing the person concerned, but by another institution, cannot be regarded as a substantial new fact either. In that regard, although, according to the principle of a single civil service, as laid down in Article 9(3) of the Treaty of Amsterdam, all the officials of all the institutions of the Union are governed by the same provisions, such a principle does not mean that the institutions are required to make identical use of the discretion afforded to them by the Staff Regulations given that, on the contrary, in the management of their staff, the institutions enjoy a ‘principle of autonomy’.

(see paras 19, 20, 23-25)

See:

26 September 1985, 231/84 Valentini v Commission, para. 14; 8 March 1988, 125/87 Brown v Court of Justice, para. 13

16 September 1997, T-220/95 Gimenez v Committee of the Regions, para. 72; 24 March 1998, T-232/97 Becret-Danieau and Others v Parliament, para. 43; 7 February 2001, T-186/98 Inpesca v Commission, paras 40, 47 and 48; 16 September 2009, T-271/08 P Boudova and Others v Commission, para. 48
Even though the Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants do not lay down rules on the use of languages by the institutions of the Union in decisions addressed to their staff, the administration is under an obligation, when it addresses an individual decision to an official or other member of staff, to draw it up, in accordance with its duty to have regard for his welfare, in a language of which he has a thorough knowledge.

In the case of a decision to reject a complaint, notification of that decision in a language which is neither the mother tongue of the official or other staff member concerned, nor the language in which the complaint was drawn up, may be regarded as lawful provided that the person in question was able to have effective knowledge of it. If, on the other hand, the addressee of that decision considers that he is unable to understand it, it is for him to ask the competent authority of the institution to provide him with a translation either in the language of the complaint or in his mother tongue. Where such a request is made with all due despatch, the time-limit starts to run only from the date on which that translation is notified to the official or other staff member concerned.

However, where an official or other staff member voluntarily chooses to submit his complaint in a given language which is not his mother tongue, that choice implies that the person concerned accepts its use by the institution in its reply.

In any event, it is accepted that an administration may choose its internal languages of communication if that choice is based on objective considerations. The use by the administration, for drawing up its decision on a complaint, of the language chosen by the complainant is based on objective considerations resulting from the choice of language made by the complainant himself. Consequently, the use by the institution concerned of the same language as that in which the complaint was made is not arbitrary in nature.

(see paras 19-22)

23 March 2000, T-197/98 Rudolph v Commission, paras 44 and 46 and the case-law cited therein; 7 February 2001, T-118/99 Bonaiti Brighina v Commission, paras 15 and 17

3 March 2009, F-63/07 Patsarika v Cedefop, para. 31 and the case-law cited therein; 29 June 2011, F-7/07 Angioi v Commission, paras 91 and 106
ORDER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

(Second Chamber)

Case F-20/11

7 July 2011

Gianpaolo Bracalente

v

European Commission

(Persons claiming the status of official or other member of staff of the European Union – Actions – Manifest inadmissibility – Failure to comply with the pre-litigation procedure)

Application: brought under Article 270 TFEU, applicable to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to Article 106a thereof, in which Mr Bracalente, an employee of the Istituto Vigilanza Notturna Gallarate S.r.l., essentially asks the Tribunal to recognise his status as a member of the contract staff of the Commission, and more particularly of the Joint Research Centre (JRC), and, consequently, to order the Commission to pay the remuneration and other financial benefits which he claims are due to him in that capacity, as well as payment of damages for the harm he claims to have suffered.

Held: The action is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible. The applicant is to bear his own costs.

Summary

Officials – Actions – Conditions for admissibility – Compliance with the prior administrative procedure

(Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91)

In the system of remedies laid down by Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations, first of all, an action before the Civil Service Tribunal must be directed against an act adversely affecting the applicant consisting either in a decision taken by the appointing authority or the authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment, or in the failure of either of those authorities to take a measure required by the Staff Regulations, and secondly, such an action is admissible only if the person concerned has first lodged a complaint against the act adversely affecting him with that authority, in accordance with Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, and if that complaint has been rejected by express or implied decision. Furthermore, where an official or other staff member, or even a person outside the institution, seeks to secure from the administration the adoption of a decision in relation to him, the prior administrative procedure must begin with a request from the person concerned, in accordance with Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations, asking the appointing authority or the authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment to adopt the decision he seeks; the rejection of that request may then form the subject of a complaint.

(see para. 12)
ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

(First Chamber)

15 April 2013

Case F‑1/12

Henrik Andersen

v

Court of Auditors of the European Union

(Civil service — Officials — Retirement on grounds of invalidity — Article 78 of the Staff Regulations — Action in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded)

Application: under Article 270 TFEU, applicable to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to Article 106a thereof, in which Mr Andersen seeks, essentially, the annulment of the decision of 21 January 2011 of the Secretary General of the Court of Auditors of the European Union rejecting his application for compensation for losses suffered as a result of his retirement, and payment by the Court of Auditors of damages for that harm.

Held: The action is dismissed as in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded. Mr Andersen is to bear his own costs and is ordered to pay the costs incurred by the Court of Auditors of the European Union.

Summary

Actions brought by officials — Action for annulment not brought within the time-limit — Action for damages aiming to achieve the same result — Inadmissibility

(Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91)

An action for damages is not admissible where the official seeks to obtain the same result as he would have obtained had he been successful in an action for annulment which he failed to commence in due time.

An official seeks to circumvent the inadmissibility of the claim alleging that a decision rejecting an application for annulment is unlawful where the facts and arguments relied on to establish the liability of the institution are the same as those which were the subject-matter of the rejection decision against which the applicant has not brought legal proceedings.

(see paras 27, 29, 35)

See:

14 February 1989, 346/87 Bossi v Commission, para. 32

28 October 2010, F‑84/08 Cerafogli v ECB, para. 50
ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

(Third Chamber)

29 January 2013

Case F‑79/12

Karel Brus

v

European Commission

(Civil service — Officials — Application initiating proceedings — Formal requirements — Statement of the grounds on which the application is based — Action manifestly inadmissible)

Application: brought under Article 270 TFEU, applicable to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to Article 106a thereof, whereby Mr Brus seeks annulment of the decisions of the European Commission of 29 September 2011 respectively dismissing him and reducing the amount of his retirement pension, following the disciplinary proceedings initiated for failure to fulfil his obligations under the Staff Regulations.

Held: The action is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible. The applicant is to bear his own costs and is ordered to pay the costs incurred by the Commission.

Summary

Judicial proceedings — Application initiating proceedings — Formal requirements — Clear and precise statement of the pleas in law on which the application is based

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 21; Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal, Art. 35(1)(e))

Pursuant to Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 35(1)(e) of the Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal, an application must contain the pleas in law and the arguments of fact and law relied on. Those pleas and arguments must be presented in a sufficiently clear and precise fashion to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Tribunal to rule on the application, if necessary without any further information. In order to ensure legal certainty and the sound administration of justice, it is necessary, in order for an action to be admissible, that the essential matters of law and fact relied on are stated, at least in summary form, but coherently and intelligibly, in the application itself.

(see para. 19)

See:

15 September 2011, F‑102/09 Bennett and Others v OHIM, para. 115; 1 February 2012, F‑123/10 Bancale and Buccheri v Commission, para. 38; 8 March 2012, F‑12/10 Kerstens v Commission, para. 68
ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

(Third Chamber)

9 December 2013

Luigi Marcuccio

v

European Commission

‛Civil service — Officials — Social security — Article 72 of the Staff Regulations — Decision of the Commission refusing 100% reimbursement of medical expenses incurred by the applicant — Duration of procedure — Action for damages — Action in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly lacking any foundation in law’

Application:

under Article 270 TFEU, applicable to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to Article 106a thereof, in which Mr Marcuccio seeks, in essence, compensation for the damage which he claims to have sustained as a result of the excessive duration of the administrative procedure concerning the claim he made to European Commission on 25 November 2002 for 100% reimbursement of his medical expenses under Article 72 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’).

Held:

The action is dismissed as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly lacking any foundation in law. Mr Marcuccio is to bear his own costs and is ordered to pay the costs incurred by the European Commission.

Summary

Non-contractual liability — Infringement of duty to state reasons — Non-contractual liability of the European Union — None

(Art. 340, second para, TFEU)

Infringement of the duty to state reasons does not cause the European Union to incur non-contractual liability.

(see para. 33)

See:

20 November 2012, T‑491/11 P Marcuccio v Commission, para. 21 and the case‑law cited
Staff case summary



Staff case summary

Summary

1. Officials — Decision adversely affecting an official — Obligation to state reasons — Decision adopted in circumstances known to the addressee

(Staff Regulations, Art. 25, second para.)

2. Judicial proceedings — Court costs — Costs incurred by the Civil Service Tribunal as a result of an action which is an abuse of process by an official — Order for the official to refund those costs

(Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal, Art. 94(a))

1. The purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which a decision adversely affecting an official is based is to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to determine whether the decision is well founded or whether it is defective in such a way that its legality may be challenged, and to enable the Union judicature to exercise its review of the legality of the contested decision. The reasons given for a decision are sufficient if the measure forming the subject-matter of the action was adopted in circumstances which are known to the official concerned and enable him to understand its scope.

(see paras 30-31)

See:

7 October 2009, F‑3/08 Marcuccio v Commission , para. 27 and the case‑law cited therein; 1 December 2010, F‑89/09 Gagalis v Council , para. 67 and the case‑law cited therein

2. Under Article 94(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal, if the Tribunal has incurred avoidable costs, in particular where the action is manifestly an abuse of process, it may order the party who caused such costs to be incurred to refund them in whole or in part, but the amount of that refund may not exceed EUR 2 000. An action manifestly wrongfully takes up the Tribunal’s resources where the applicant fails to mention any information relating to the reason for an institution’s decisions which the institution had, however, supplied to him, and of which he was aware before bringing the action.

(see paras 55-56)
In the procedure for the transfer of pension rights laid down in Article 11(2) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations, it is the decision adopted by the appointing authority or the authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment, as the case may be, once the capital representing the pension rights acquired by the person concerned before entering the service of the EU has actually been transferred, which constitutes an act adversely affecting him, against which he may bring an action under Article 270 TFEU and Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations. On the other hand, a proposal concerning the crediting of pension rights, if accepted by the person concerned, does not constitute an act adversely affecting him which may be the subject of an action under Article 270 TFEU and Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations.

Additional pensionable years may be credited only where the official concerned gives his consent to the procedure for transferring to the EU pension scheme the capital representing pension rights he has acquired previously with the external pension fund concerned, that consent being informed by the proposal for the additional pensionable years to be credited made by the appointing authority on the basis of the provisional amount of capital declared by the national pension fund concerned.

In that regard, at the stage when the proposal for the pension rights to be credited is made, the institution concerned merely undertakes to apply correctly to the situation of the official concerned Article 11(2) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations and the general implementing provisions. That obligation on the institution arises directly from the provisions of the Staff Regulations in question, even if the institution does not expressly give such an undertaking.

Thus, such an undertaking expressed in a proposal for pensionable years to be credited does not give rise to a fresh obligation on the institution in question nor, consequently, to a change in the legal position of the person concerned, in particular because, even where the person gives his consent to the transfer to the EU pension scheme of pension rights which he acquired under a different scheme, the institution making the proposal is not under a corresponding obligation, once the amount of capital declared by the national fund has actually been transferred, automatically to award the person concerned the number of pensionable years stated in the original proposal, in the light of which the official confirmed his intention to transfer the capital to the EU pension scheme.

(see paras 27-31)

See:

Judgments of 13 October 2015 in Commission v Verile and Gjergji, T‑104/14 P, EU:T:2015:776, paras 50, 52, 53 and 74; Commission v Cocchi and Falcione, T‑103/13 P, EU:T:2015:777, para. 66, and Teughels v Commission, T‑131/14 P, EU:T:2015:778, paras 37, 46, 48, 49, 58 and 70