ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
15

The Board of Appeal observed that the earlier sign on which the application for a declaration of invalidity was based was the company name of the intervener, Gugler France. First of all, the Board of Appeal found that the conditions laid down in Article 8(4) of Regulation No 207/2009 were satisfied. First, it took the view that the earlier sign had been used in the course of trade with more than merely local significance. In that regard, it found that the evidence adduced by the intervener, in particular copies of its annual report for 2002 and 2003 and invoices, were sufficient to prove that it carried out, under its company name, activities connected with those for which it had been incorporated, prior to the date of application for the contested mark and with more than merely local significance. Second, the Board of Appeal stated that the intervener had acquired rights to the sign on the day on which it was registered in the register of trade and companies, which is the relevant date under Article L. 210-6 of the code de commerce (French Code of Commerce), namely on 7 February 2002, that is to say, prior to the date on which the application for the contested mark was filed. Third, the Board of Appeal noted that, under Article L. 711-4 of the code de la propriété intellectuelle (French Intellectual Property Code), on which the application for a declaration of invalidity was based, the intervener’s company name entitled it to prohibit use of a more recent trade mark if there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public.
115

That conclusion is not called into question by the various arguments put forward by the applicants. Thus, the finding that the mandatory exchange and the devaluation of the disputed bonds are measures deriving from decisions of the Greek State as a public authority is not sufficient to establish a breach of the right to property as provided for in Article 17(1) of the Charter. The fact that bonds are generally considered to be safe, particularly under the Regulation on solvency (see paragraph 88 above), does not affect the assessment that the purchase of State bonds is, by definition, a transaction entailing a certain financial risk (see paragraph 108 above). Similarly, the financial losses claimed by the applicants, even if proven, are not sufficient to establish a breach of Article 17(1) of the Charter, since the bonds have a residual value and, without CACs and the restructuring of the Greek public debt achieved as a result of them, the likelihood of the Hellenic Republic’s going bankrupt would have increased significantly, leading not only to the collapse of the Greek economy and a risk for the euro area, but also an even greater reduction in the value of the disputed bonds held by the applicants. Finally, in so far as the applicants claim that the ECtHR’s judgment of 21 July 2016, Mamatas and Others v. Greece (CE:ECHR:2016:0721JUD 006306614), is not relevant because it is concerned only with expropriation from Greek private creditors, not foreign private creditors who are not established in Greece, it should be noted that the applicants do not put forward any convincing arguments to show that the ECtHR would have taken a different view if it had had to rule expressly on the situation of such foreign creditors, who, moreover, were bound by the same contractual terms under the Greek law of obligations as Greek creditors.
30

On 29 July 2016, the Commission adopted Decision (EU) 2017/1861 on State aid SA 33983 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) (ex 2011/N) — Italy — Compensation to Sardinian airports for public service obligations (SGEI) (OJ 2017 L 268, p. 1; ‘the contested decision’), the operative part of which reads as follows: ‘Article 1 1. The scheme that Italy established by … Law [No 10/2010] does not involve State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) [TFEU] in favour of SOGEAAL …, SOGAER … and GEASAR … 2. The scheme that Italy established by Law No 10/2010 constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty in favour of Ryanair/AMS, easyJet, Air Berlin, Meridiana, Alitalia, Air Italy, Volotea, Wizzair, Norwegian, JET2.COM, Niki, Tourparade, [the applicant], Air Baltic and Vueling, in so far as it relates to the operations of those airlines at Cagliari-Elmas airport and Olbia airport. 3. The State aid referred to in paragraph 2 has been put into effect by Italy in breach of Article 108(3) [TFEU]. 4. The State aid referred to in paragraph 2 is incompatible with the internal market. Article 2 1. Italy shall recover the State aid referred to in Article 1(2) from the beneficiaries. … 3. The sums to be recovered shall bear interest from the date on which they were put at the disposal of the beneficiaries until their actual recovery. … 5. Italy shall cancel all outstanding payments of the aid referred to in Article 1(2) with effect from the date of adoption of this Decision. Article 3 1. Recovery of the aid referred to in Article 1(2) shall be immediate and effective. 2. Italy shall ensure that this Decision is implemented within 4 months following the date of notification of this Decision. Article 4 1. Within 2 months following notification of this Decision, Italy shall submit the following information: – the list of beneficiaries that have received aid under the scheme referred to in Article 1(2) and the total amount of aid received by each of them under the scheme, – the total amount (principal and recovery interests) to be recovered from each beneficiary, – a detailed description of the measures already taken and planned to comply with this Decision, – documents demonstrating that the beneficiaries have been ordered to repay the aid. 2. Italy shall keep the Commission informed of the progress of the national measures taken to implement this Decision until recovery of the aid referred to in Article 2 has been completed. It shall immediately submit, on simple request of the Commission, information on the measures already taken and planned to comply with this Decision. It shall also provide detailed information concerning the amounts of aid and recovery interest already recovered from the beneficiaries. Article 5 This Decision is addressed to the Italian Republic.’
Judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) of 22 November 2018 –

Addiko Bank v EUIPO (STRAIGHTFORWARD BANKING)

(Case T‑9/18)

(EU trade mark — Application for the EU work mark STRAIGHTFORWARD BANKING — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Aim — Need to preserve availability (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 14)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Meaning (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 15-17)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Criteria (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 18)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Word mark STRAIGHTFORWARD BANKING (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 20-22, 24-28)

5. EU trade mark — Decisions of the Office — Principle of equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — EUIPO’s previous decision-making practice — Principle of legality — Need for a strict and complete examination in each particular case (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 2017/1001) (see para. 31)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 25 October 2017 (Case R 1090/2017-2), relating to an application for registration of the word sign STRAIGHTFORWARD BANKING as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 28 February 2019 –

Pozza v Parliament

(Case T‑216/18)

(Civil service — Officials — Remuneration — Expatriation allowance — Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations — Place where main occupation is carried on — Inter-institutional transfer — Decision no longer to grant expatriation allowance — Competence — Legitimate expectations)

1. Officials — Remuneration — Expatriation allowance — Purpose — Conditions for granting — Based on objective factors — No habitual residence or main occupation in the Member State of employment prior to entering the service (Staff Regulations of Officials, Annex VII, Art. 4(1)(a)) (see paras 24, 25, 29, 30, 48)

2. Officials — Remuneration — Expatriation allowance — Conditions for granting — Account taken of the main occupation in the Member State of employment prior to entering the service — Whether permissible — Conditions (Staff Regulations of Officials, Annex VII, Art. 4(1)(a)) (see paras 34, 35, 38-40, 42-44)

3. Officials — Remuneration — Expatriation allowance — Conditions for granting — Prior checking of pecuniary rights — Competence of the institution employing the official (Staff Regulations of Officials, Annex VII, Art. 4(1)(a)) (see paras 61, 62, 65, 67)

4. Officials — Principles — Protection of legitimate expectations — Conditions — Specific assurances given by the authorities (see para. 80)

Re:

Application based on Article 270 TFEU seeking annulment of the decision of 8 June 2017 by which the Parliament no longer grants the applicant the expatriation allowance from the date on which he took up his duties.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Single Judge) of 24 January 2019 –

Multifit v EUIPO (TAKE CARE)

(Case T‑181/18)

(EU trade mark — Application for the EU figurative mark TAKE CARE — Absolute ground for refusal — No distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Meaning — Criteria for assessment (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 14, 15)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Composite mark — Taking into account the overall perception of the mark by the relevant public (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 16, 17)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Figurative mark TAKE CARE (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 20, 23-28, 31)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Marks constituted of advertising slogans — Distinctive character — Application of specific criteria for assessment — Not permissible (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 21)

5. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Marks constituted of advertising slogans — Slogan carrying an objective message (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 22)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 4 January 2018 (Case R 845/2017-5), relating to the application for registration of the figurative sign TAKE CARE as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
The word mark upgrade your personality –– the registration of which was sought for the goods in Classes 9 and 28 of the Nice Agreement, including recorded computer programs and game consoles –– is devoid of distinctive character, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 on the European Union trade mark. The semantic content of the trade mark applied for indicates to the consumer a characteristic of the goods covered relating to their market value which, whilst not specific, comes from promotional or advertising information which the relevant public will perceive as such, rather than as an indication of the commercial origin of the goods in question.

In the first place, the slogan ‘upgrade your personality’ contains an invitation to the consumer to improve or develop his personality with the help of the goods covered by the trade mark applied for, which may be associated with the promise that those goods will make such an improvement or development possible or easier to achieve. The fact that there could be subtle differences in the way that slogan is understood does not imply that its meaning is vague, imprecise or ambiguous.

In the second place, the term ‘upgrade’ is currently used in contexts which go far beyond the field of information technology, and, moreover, account must be taken of the fact that the goods covered by the trade mark applied for fall precisely within the field of information technology, so the use of that term appears natural and would not surprise the relevant public.

Lastly, there is no need to consider whether it is possible to make a technical improvement (upgrade) to the human personality, since this is an advertising slogan, and the extent to which it is based in reality is not a relevant criterion for assessment. The consumer is accustomed to advertisements which, implicitly or explicitly, make unrealistic promises.

(see paras 28-32)
2.

EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Assessment of the likelihood of confusion — Determination of the relevant public — Attention level of the public (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 24)
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 28 June 2019 –

Gibson Brands v EUIPO — Wilfer (Shape of a guitar body)

(Case T‑340/18)

(EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU three-dimensional mark — Shape of a guitar body — Absolute ground for refusal — Distinctive character — Article 52(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 59(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Distinctive character acquired through use — Article 52(2) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 59(2) of Regulation 2017/1001))

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Meaning — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 27, 28)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Assessment of distinctive character — Criteria (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 29)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Three-dimensional trade marks consisting of the shape of the product itself — Distinctive character — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 30-32)

4. EU trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Absolute grounds for invalidity — Registration contrary to Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 — Three-dimensional mark — Shape of a guitar body (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 7(1)(b) and 52(1)(a)) (see paras 39-41, 49, 50, 52)

5. EU trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Absolute grounds for invalidity — Registration contrary to Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 — Exception — Distinctive character acquired through use — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 7(3) and 52(2)) (see paras 62, 63, 75)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 March 2018 (Case R 415/2017-2), relating to invalidity proceedings between Mr Wilfer and Gibson Brands.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 5 June 2019 — Biolatte v EUIPO (Biolatte)

(Case T‑229/18)

(EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark Biolatte — Absolute ground for refusal — Lack of distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

1. EU trade mark — Appeals procedure — Action before the EU judicature — Jurisdiction of the General Court — Direction issued to the Office — Not included (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 72(6)) (see para. 15)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of distinctive character — Word mark Biolatte (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 23-25, 33, 42-46, 48, 67, 74-76, 86, 100)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of distinctive character — Concept — Criteria for assessment (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 30)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of distinctive character — Assessment of distinctive character — Criteria (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 31, 52)

5. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of distinctive character — Exception — Distinctive character acquired through use — Criteria for assessment (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(3)) (see para. 93)

Re

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 6 February 2018 (Case R 351/2017-1), relating to an application for registration of the word sign Biolatte as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 6 February 2019 –

Marry Me Group v EUIPO (marry me)

(Case T‑333/18)

(EU trade mark — Application for EU figurative mark marry me — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Aim — Need to preserve availability (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 14)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Concept (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 15, 16, 30)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Assessment of the descriptive nature of a sign — Criteria (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 17, 20, 31)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Figurative sign marry me (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 24-26, 28, 33)

5. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Assessment of the registrability of a sign — EU rules only taken into account — Decisions of national authorities not binding EU bodies (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001) (see para. 32)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 5 March 2018 (Case R 807/2017-5) concerning an application for registration of the figurative sign marry me as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
EU trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Examination of the application — Proof of use of the earlier mark — Genuine use — Concept — Criteria for assessment

(Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 15(1) and 57(2); Commission Regulation No 2868/95, Art. 1, Rule 22(3))

(see paras 28-31)
Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 8 May 2019 –

Lucchini v Commission

(Case T‑185/18)

(Competition — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Market for concrete reinforcing bars in bars or coils — Decision finding an infringement of Article 65 CS after the expiry of the ECSC Treaty on the basis of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 — Partial annulment of the Commission decision — Rejection of a request for reimbursement of a fine paid pursuant to a decision annulled in part — Rejection of a request to be allowed to participate in the administrative procedure that was reopened following the partial annulment of the decision — Rights of the defence — Non-existent act — Non-contractual liability — Limitation)

1. Action for annulment — Admissibility — Dismissal of an action on the substance without ruling on admissibility — Discretion of the Courts of the Union (Art. 263 TFEU) (see para. 24)

2. Action for annulment — Judgment annulling a measure — Effects — Annulment of a Commission decision finding a breach of the competition rules — Effects in relation to addressees not having brought an action — Lack (Arts 101, 263 and 288 TFEU) (see paras 33, 34)

3. Action for annulment — Judgment annulling a measure — Scope — Absolute authority of res judicata — Scope — Both operative part and grounds to be taken into account — Annulling judgments not having effects erga omnes (Arts 264 and 266 TFEU) (see paras 35, 36)

4. Action for annulment — Time-limits — Decision not contested within the prescribed period — Legal certainty — Obligation for the institution concerned to re-examine similar decisions — None (Art. 263 TFEU) (see paras 38-40)

5. Acts of the institutions — Presumption of validity — Non-existent act — Concept (Art. 288 TFEU) (see paras 44, 45, 48)

6. Actions for damages — Limitation period — Point from which time starts to run — Liability for an individual measure — Date of appearance of the prejudicial effects of the act (Art. 340, 2nd para. TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 46) (see paras 55-58)

Re:

First, application under Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of the Commission’s letter of 17 January 2018 rejecting the applicant’s request to be reimbursed for the fine, in the amount of EUR 14350000, that was imposed on it by Commission Decision C(2009) 7492 final of 30 September 2009 concerning an infringement of Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty, in accordance with Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/37.956 — Reinforcing bars, re-adoption) and of the Commission’s letter of 9 March 2018 rejecting the applicant’s request to be allowed to participate in the resumed procedure relating to that case and, secondly, application under Article 268 TFEU seeking compensation for the damage allegedly suffered by the applicant as a result of the infringement of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union committed by the Commission in the procedure leading to the adoption of that decision.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;