ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
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Actions for annulment - Natural or legal persons - Measures of direct and individual concern to them - Provision fixing the derived intervention price for white sugar for all areas in Italy in respect of a particular marketing year - Action brought by Italian sugar manufacturers - Inadmissible

(EC Treaty, Art. 173, fourth para. (now, after amendment, Art. 230, fourth para., EC); Council Regulation No 1534/95, Art. 1(f))

Summary

$$The action brought by Italian sugar manufacturers for annulment of Article 1(f) of Regulation 1534/95 - which fixes the derived intervention price for white sugar for all areas in Italy in respect of the 1995/96 marketing year - is inadmissible.

Article 1(f) applies to objectively determined situations and is aimed generally at categories of persons regarded in the abstract. First, in requiring the Italian intervention agency to buy in at that price any white sugar offered to it by those manufacturers, it applies to an indeterminate number of transactions. Secondly, given that the fixing of the derived intervention price is also passed directly on to the purchase prices which the manufacturers are required to pay to Italian beet growers, it is also applicable to an indeterminate number of transactions downstream from the intervention operations.

Furthermore, the system of `regionalisation' of white sugar prices, which provides that for white sugar an intervention price for the non-deficit areas of the Community and a derived intervention price for each of the deficit areas are to be fixed each year on a basis as close as possible to economic realities, applies objectively to all sugar manufacturers and beet growers; it is not aimed at those manufacturers individually.

Even supposing that the Council was aware of the applicants' identity - that is to say, as holders of sugar production quotas - when it adopted the Regulation, that fact is not sufficient to enable them to be regarded as individually concerned. The general application and hence the legislative nature of a measure are not called in question by the fact that it is possible to define more or less precisely the number or even the identity of the persons to whom it applies at any given time, as long as it is established that such application takes effect by virtue of an objective situation of fact or of law defined by the measure in question.

Moreover, the mere fact that the applicants held production quotas is not susceptible of establishing that specific rights which they enjoyed were infringed. The allocation of production quotas was not, prior to the adoption of the contested regulation, accompanied by an established right that a specific intervention price would be fixed. The applicants' legal situation was therefore no different from that of other holders of production quotas, all of whom had to adjust to the intervention prices fixed by the Council in accordance with the supply situation foreseeable for the various production areas.
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1 Procedure - Originating application - Procedural requirements - Summary of the pleas in law relied on - Pleas in law not set out in the application - Catch-all reference to the annexes - Inadmissible

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 44(1)(c))

2 Acts of the institutions - Statement of reasons - Obligation - Scope - Plea alleging absence or inadequacy of the statement of reasons - Plea alleging incorrectness of the statement of reasons - Distinction

(EC Treaty, Art. 190)

Summary

3 Under Article 44(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure, an application must contain, inter alia, a summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based. That statement of claim must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to exercise its power of judicial review. In order to guarantee legal certainty and sound administration of justice it is necessary for the basic legal and factual particulars relied on to be indicated, at least in summary form, coherently and intelligibly in the application itself. Although the body of the application may be supported and supplemented, in regard to specific points, by references to extracts of documents appended thereto, a catch-all reference to the annexes to the application, in order to indicate essential parts of the legal arguments, does not satisfy the requirements of the Rules of Procedure. Since the annexes have a purely evidential and instrumental function, it is not for the Court to seek and identify in the annexes the grounds on which it may consider the action to be based.

4 The statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the Treaty must clearly and unequivocally show the reasoning of the institution which adopted the measure, so as to enable the Community judicature to exercise its power of review and the persons concerned to know the grounds on which the measure was adopted.

The absence or inadequacy of a statement of reasons constitutes a plea going to infringement of essential formal requirements and, as such, is distinct from a plea going to incorrectness of the grounds of the contested decision, which is reviewed in the context of the question whether a decision is well founded.
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Officials - Conditions of employment of other servants - Auxiliary staff - Auxiliary session interpreters of the European Parliament - Community tax levied on their remuneration - Whether legal

(Conditions of Employment of Other Servants, Arts 52(b), and 78; Regulation No 260/68, Art. 2)

Summary

Article 78 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants allows the Parliament, by way of derogation from Title III thereof, to limit to the duration of the work of its sessions the period for which the auxiliary staff required for their organisation are engaged. Thus, the purpose of that provision is to enable the institution concerned to meet its specific needs for large numbers of additional staff to ensure that the meetings of its various decision-making bodies are conducted properly.

Accordingly, the one-year time-limit set by Article 52(b) of those Conditions on the length of employment of auxiliary staff has, by definition, no relevance to such additional staff because the repetitive nature and limited duration of their successive contracts are in fact features of the concept of engagement within the meaning of Article 78 of those Conditions.

The Parliament does not, therefore, exceed the limits of the derogation granted to it in Article 78 of those Conditions, by adopting, pursuant to that provision, the internal rules applicable to session interpreters since the only staff who come under those rules are freelance interpreters engaged to provide their services to the Parliament on a part-time basis during its plenary sessions, committee meetings and meetings of other parliamentary bodies.

Accordingly, the engagement of an interpreter as a member of staff within the meaning of Article 78 of the Conditions of Employment necessarily gives him the status of a member of the auxiliary staff within the meaning of Title III of those Conditions. Since, under Article 2 of Regulation No 260/68, auxiliary staff are subject to Community tax, the Parliament is not contravening that provision in levying Community tax on the remuneration of such a member of staff in accordance with its internal rules.
16

At the request of Judge Murray, the question was put to the Administrative Committee on 14 June 1995 together with an explanatory memorandum, dated 6 June 1995, from the Head of the Personnel Division, Mr Pommies, entitled ‘Situation des chauffeurs de membres — cas de M. John Mellett’ [Situation of the drivers of Members of the Court — Case of Mr John Mellett]. That memorandum, which was prepared at the request of the Registrar, states, in particular, at point 5, that ‘M. Murray a demandé que M. Mellett soit titularisé en application de la décision du 30 juin 1976’ [Mr Murray requested that Mr Mellett be established as a permanent official pursuant to the Decision of 30 June 1976]. Annexed to that memorandum was, inter alia, a copy of a proposal for a new system of recruitment and appointment of drivers of Members of the Court, dated 1 February 1993. That proposal, which was prepared by the Head of the Personnel Division, provided as follows: ‘le nouveau régime devrait s'appliquer à tous les chauffeurs de membres recrutés à compter de la date de sa mise en vigueur. ... A titre transitoire le chauffeur de membre de la Cour engagé comme agent temporaire le 16 mai 1992, sous l'empire de la décision de 1976, pourrait continuer à bénéficier de ces dispositions et donc faire l'objet d'une procédure de titularisation après trois années de service, sur proposition du membre concerné. En revanche, le nouveau régime serait appliqué aux trois agents temporaires engagés en janvier 1993. Les intéressés ont d'ailleurs été informés par écrit lors de la notification de leur engagement que la possibilité d'abroger la décision de 1976 était en cours de discussion et qu'ils ne pourraient pas s'attendre à une titularisation dans l'emploi qu'ils étaient appelés à occuper’. [The new scheme should apply to all Members' drivers recruited with effect from the date on which it enters into force. ... As a transitional measure, the driver of the Member of the Court who was recruited as a member of thè temporary staff on 16 May 1992, under the 1976 Decision, could remain subject to the provisions of that decision and thus the procedure for his establishment could be commenced after three years of service, on a proposal from the Member concerned. However, the new scheme would be applied to the three members of the temporary staff recruited in January 1993. Indeed, the persons concerned were informed in writing at the time they were notified of their recruitment that the possible repeal of the 1976 Decision was under discussion and that they could not expect to become established in the posts they were called upon to fill.] By agreement with the President of the Court of Justice, that proposal, which had been approved by the Registrar, was submitted to the Administrative Committee on 15 February 1993 and should subsequently have been submitted to the administrative meeting. However, that proposal, which the administrative committee had deferred to a subsequent meeting, was not re-entered on the agenda of any administrative meeting.
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1 Transport - Inland waterway transport - Structural improvements - Contribution to scrapping fund - Exemption for specialised vessels - To be narrowly construed - Vessel intended for the carriage of goods other than those for which it is specially designed - Not covered

(Council Regulation No 1101/89, Art. 8(3)(c))

2 Acts of the institutions - Statement of reasons - Obligation - Scope - Decision refusing, in the context of the structural improvement of inland waterway transport, to exempt the owner of a new vessel from the obligation to contribute to the scrapping fund

(EC Treaty. Art. 190; Council Regulation No 1101/89, Art. 8(3)(c))

Summary

1 Article 8(3)(c) of Regulation No 1101/89 on structural improvements in inland waterway transport, which exempts the owner of a new vessel - where this is a `specialised' vessel - from the obligation to pay a contribution to the scrapping fund, even where he scraps no vessel, must be narrowly construed having regard to the aim of the Regulation, in so far as it is a derogation from the rules generally applicable.

Thus, where a new vessel is intended for the transport of goods other than certain dangerous substances, and on that account contributes to the increase in carrying capacity of the fleets used for the transport of other goods, a sector which already suffers from overcapacity, its bringing into service runs counter to the objectives of Regulation No 1101/89 and cannot therefore qualify for the exemption in question. In that connection, it is irrelevant that the vessel operates in a separate branch of the inland waterways transport market since, in order to determine whether the bringing into service of a new vessel aggravates existing overcapacity in the sector, it is necessary to take into account the inland waterway transport market as a whole.

2 The purpose of the obligation to state reasons for a decision affecting a person is to enable the Community judicature to exercise its power of review as to the legality of the decision and to enable the person concerned to ascertain the matters justifying the measure adopted, so that he can defend his rights and verify whether the decision is well founded. Thus the Commission is not under a duty to take a position on every argument relied upon by the parties concerned in support of their case, and need only set out the essential facts and legal considerations underpinning the decision.

Specifically, in the case of a decision pursuant to Article 8(3)(c) of Regulation No 1101/89 refusing to exempt the owner of a new vessel who scraps no vessel from the obligation to contribute to the scrapping fund, which is a decision which must be preceded by consultation of the Member States and the organisations representing inland waterways transport, the Commission is not required to give the owner details of the point of view expressed by the Member States or the organisations concerned. Their point of view carries only the weight of an opinion and where the Commission takes a different approach that cannot cast doubt on the validity of its decision.
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Commission - Right of public access to Commission documents - Decision 94/90 - Transparency - Exceptions to the principle of access to documents - Protection of the public interest - Court proceedings - A preparatory document relating to the investigation stage of an infringement procedure with respect to a Member State

(EC Treaty, Art. 169 (now Art. 226 EC); Commission Decision 94/90)

Summary

$$Decision 94/90 on public access to Commission documents, which embodies the relevant code of conduct, is a measure which grants citizens a right of access to documents held by the Commission. It is intended to give effect to the principle of the widest possible access for citizens to information with a view to strengthening the democratic character of the institutions and the trust of the public in the administration. Decision 94/90 applies generally to requests for access to documents and any person may ask for access to any unpublished Commission document without being required to give a reason for the request.

Although the right of access is subject to exceptions, which fall into two categories, these must be narrowly construed so as not to frustrate application of the general principle of giving the public the widest possible access to documents held by the Commission. The first category is framed in mandatory terms, to the effect that `the institutions will refuse access to any document where disclosure could undermine [inter alia] the protection of the public interest (public security, international relations, monetary stability, court proceedings, inspections and investigations)'.

The confidentiality which the Member States are entitled to expect of the Commission warrants, under the heading of protection of the public interest, a refusal of access to documents relating to investigations which may lead to an infringement procedure. The disclosure of documents relating to the investigation stage of the procedure laid down in Article 169 of the Treaty (now Article 226 EC), during the negotiations between the Commission and the Member State concerned, could undermine the proper conduct of the infringement procedure inasmuch as its purpose - to enable the Member State to comply of its own accord with the requirements of the Treaty or, if appropriate, to justify its position - could be jeopardised. Accordingly, a preparatory document relating to that stage of the procedure satisfies the conditions subject to which the Commission may rely on the public interest exception.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Third Chamber)

24 February 2000

Case T-82/98

Frans Jacobs

v

Commission of the European Communities

‛Officials — Promotion — Absence of periodic report — Irregularity of the promotions procedure’

Full text in French II-169

Application for:

annulment of the of the Commission's decision not to promote the applicant to Grade B 4 during the 1997 promotions procedure.

Held:

The decision of the Commission not to promote the applicant to Grade B 4 during the 1997 promotions procedure is annulled. The Commission shall bear the costs.

Summary

Officials — Promotion — Examination of comparative merits — Official eligible for promotion before the end of his first reporting period — Obligation to draw up an interim report — Practical impossibility — Information which may be taken into consideration in lieu of a report

(Staff Regulations, Art. 45(1))

The periodic report constitutes an indispensable criterion of assessment each time the official's career is taken into consideration with a view to a decision concerning his promotion.

It follows that, where an official is eligible for promotion before the expiry of the first reference period concerning him, the institution is required either to draw up an interim report or, where drawing up such a report would be impossible in practice, to provide other information concerning the official's merits to make up for the absence of the report.

However, information can compensate for the absence of a periodic report only where it meets certain conditions, and it is for the defendant institution to show that those conditions were satisfied. The information must be sufficiently objective to allow judicial review, second, it must contain an assessment of the official's merits by the persons responsible for drawing up his periodic report, third, it must have been communicated to the official in such a way as to ensure his rights of defence and, fourth, it must be available to the promotions committee when the latter examines the comparative merits of all the candidates.

(see paras 34, 38 and 41)

See: C-68/91 P Moritz v Commission [1992] ECR I-6849, para. 16; T-58/92 Moat v Commission [1993] ECR II-1443, para. 59
The statement of the reasons on which a decision imposing a disciplinary measure on an official is based must state precisely the facts which the official is found to have committed and the considerations which have led the appointing authority to impose the particular penalty. Furthermore, if the penalty imposed is more severe than that suggested by the Disciplinary Board, the decision must state in detail the reasons why the appointing authority has not followed the opinion of the Disciplinary Board.

The appointing authority has the power, distinct from that exercised by the Disciplinary Board, to assess the liability of the official and subsequently to choose the disciplinary measure which it considers appropriate for the disciplinary offences found against him. Since Articles 86 to 89 of the Staff Regulations do not lay down any fixed relationships between the disciplinary measures set out therein and the various types of offence committed by officials and do not state to what extent the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances is to influence the choice of penalty, the decision as to the penalty to be imposed must be based on an overall assessment by the appointing authority of all the specific facts and particular circumstances of each individual case. A decision imposing the penalty of removal from post necessarily involves delicate considerations on the part of the institution, given the particularly serious consequences of such a penalty. The institution has a wide discretion in that regard and the Court cannot substitute its assessment for that of the appointing authority; judicial review is limited to ascertaining that the facts were properly established, that there has been no manifest error in the assessment of the facts and that there has been no misuse of powers.

(see paras 48 to 50)

See: T-500/93 Y v Court of Justice [1996] ECR-SC I-A-335 and II-977, paras 34 and 56
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Actions for annulment – Actionable measures – Definition – Measures producing binding legal effects – Failure to adopt a proposal for regulation imposing an anti‑dumping duty – Effect of the regulatory nature of the anti‑dumping procedure – None (Art. 230 EC; Council Regulation No 384/96, Art. 6(9)) (see paras 31-33)

2. Acts of the institutions – Statement of reasons – Obligation – Scope – Failure to adopt a proposal for regulation imposing a definitive anti‑dumping duty (Art. 253 EC; Council Regulation No 384/96) (see para. 36)
Considered in the light of those principles, the second paragraph of Article 17 of the Staff Regulations gives expression to the permanent need to strike a fair balance between ensuring that a fundamental right may be exercised and protecting a legitimate objective of general interest. Hence, that objective may justify restricting the exercise of such a right only if the actual circumstances require it and only in so far as necessary. According to that provision, an official is obliged to request permission to publish an article but the obligation is limited to articles dealing with the work of the Communities and permission may be refused only ‘where the proposed publication is liable to prejudice the interests of the Communities’.

Freedom of expression, enshrined in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is one of the fundamental rights which, as the Court of Justice has consistently held and as is reaffirmed by the preamble to the Single European Act and by Article F(2) of the Treaty on European Union (now, after amendment, Article 6(2) EU), are protected in the Community legal order and apply inter alia to Community officials. However, fundamental rights do not constitute an unfettered prerogative but may be subject to restrictions, provided that the latter in fact correspond to objectives of general interest and do not constitute, in relation to the objective pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference in a democratic society, which infringes upon the very substance of the rights safeguarded.

In a democratic society founded on respect for fundamental rights, the fact that an official publicly expresses points of view different from those of the institution for which he works cannot, in itself, be regarded as liable to prejudice the interests of the Communities for the purposes of the second paragraph of Article 17 of the Staff Regulations. Clearly, the purpose of freedom of expression is precisely to enable expression to be given to opinions which differ from those held at an official level. To accept that freedom of expression could be restricted merely because the opinion at issue differs from the position adopted by the institutions would be to negate the purpose of that fundamental right. Likewise, the second paragraph of Article 17 of the Staff Regulations would be rendered nugatory, since, as is apparent from its wording, it clearly lays down the principle on which permission for publication is granted, specifically providing that such permission is to be refused only where the proposed publication is liable to prejudice the interests of the Communities.

Consequently, the mere fact that there is a difference of opinion between an official and his institution does not justify refusing a request under the second paragraph of Article 17 of the Staff Regulations for permission to publish, in so far as there is no evidence that making that difference public would be liable to prejudice the interests of the Communities.

(see paras 57 to 60)