ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Case C‑224/15 P

Rose Vision SL

v

European Commission

‛Appeal — Projects funded by the European Union in the field of research — Audits finding irregularities in the implementation of certain projects — Commission decisions suspending payment of the amounts payable under certain projects — Action for compensation — Rejection — Statement of reasons’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 26 May 2016

Appeal — Grounds — Inadequate or contradictory grounds — Admissibility — Scope of the obligation to state reasons — Scope of the Court’s review of judgments of the General Court

(Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

The statement of the reasons on which the judgment under appeal is based must clearly and unequivocally disclose the General Court’s thinking, so that the persons concerned can be apprised of the justification for the decision taken and the Court of Justice can exercise its power of review.

However, the obligation to state reasons does not require the General Court to provide an account which follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case and the reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why the General Court has not upheld their arguments and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review.

The question whether the grounds of a judgment of the General Court are contradictory or inadequate is a question of law which is amenable, as such, to review on appeal.

(see paras 24-26)
Case C‑291/15

EURO 2004. Hungary Kft.

v

Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Nyugat-dunántúli Regionális Vám- és Pénzügyőri Főigazgatósága

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from the Zalaegerszegi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Customs union — Common Customs Tariff — Value for customs purposes — Determination of the Customs value — Transaction value — Price actually paid — Doubts based on the veracity of the declared price — Declared price lower than the price paid in respect of other transactions relating to similar goods’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber), 16 June 2016

Customs union — Common Customs Tariff — Value for customs purposes — Transaction value — Determination — Existence of doubts as to the veracity of the declared price — Reference to the transaction value of similar goods — Lawfulness — Condition

(Council Regulation No 2913/92, as amended by Regulation No 82/97, Arts 30 and 31; Commission Regulation No 2454/93, as amended by Regulation No 3254/94, Art. 181a)

Article 181a of Regulation No 2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation of Regulation No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code, as amended by Regulation No 3254/94, must be interpreted as not precluding a customs authority practice whereby the customs value of imported goods is determined on the basis of the transaction value of similar goods, the method in Article 30 of Regulation No 2913/92, as amended by Regulation No 82/97, where the declared transaction value is considered to be unreasonably low in comparison with the statistical average of the purchase prices verified in the context of the importation of similar goods and despite the fact that the customs authority does not refute or call into question the authenticity of the invoice or the bank transfer certificate produced in order to establish the price actually paid for the imported goods, without the importer having submitted, in response to a request to that effect from the customs authority, additional evidence to demonstrate the accuracy of the declared transaction value of those goods.

The customs authorities can, for the purposes of determining the customs value, disregard the declared price of imported goods and use secondary methods to determine the customs value of imported goods, as laid down in Articles 30 and 31 of Regulation No 2913/92 and, in particular, the sale price of similar goods, if their doubts concerning the transaction value of those goods persist after they have asked for additional information or documents and have provided the person concerned with a reasonable opportunity to respond to the grounds for those doubts. In that regard, in circumstances where it appears that the declared price is more than 50% lower than the statistical mean value, such a difference in price is sufficient to substantiate the customs authority’s doubts and its rejection of the declared customs value of the goods at issue.

(see paras 35, 38, 39, 44, operative part)
An action for recovery of sums not due on the ground of unjust enrichment, which has its origin in the repayment of a fine imposed in competition law proceedings, is not covered by ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of Article 1 of Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.

Although certain actions between a public authority and a person governed by private law may come within the scope of Regulation No 44/2001, the same does not hold true where the public authority is acting in the exercise of its public powers. To determine whether that is the case, it is necessary to identify the legal relationship between the parties to the dispute and to examine the basis and the detailed rules governing the bringing of the action.

As regards the legal relationship between the parties in the main proceedings, it must be observed that, while private actions brought to ensure compliance with competition law fall within the scope of Regulation No 44/2001, it is evident, however, that a penalty imposed by an administrative authority in the exercise of the regulatory powers conferred upon it under national legislation comes within the concept of ‘administrative matters’, excluded from the scope of Regulation No 44/2001 in accordance with Article 1(1) thereof. That applies, in particular, to a penalty imposed by reason of an infringement of provisions of national law prohibiting restrictions on competition. It follows that a dispute in which the competition authority seeks the payment of a debt by an undertaking which arises from a fine which it imposed on that undertaking, is an administrative matter.

As regards the detailed rules applicable to the action brought, the fact that the competition authority brought an action before the civil courts does not alter that situation. Whatever the nature of the proceedings afforded by national law, the fact that in recovering those costs the applicant acts pursuant to a debt which arises from an act of public authority is sufficient for its action to be treated as being outside the ambit of Regulation No 44/2001.

(see paras 32-34, 38-40, 43, operative part)
A fuel storage site of a coal-fired power plant which is situated approximately 800 metres from that power plant, which is separated from it by a public road, and where the fuel is transported from that site to the power plant by means of a conveyor belt which crosses that public road, is part of an ‘installation’ within the meaning of Article 3(e) of Directive 2003/87 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Directive 96/61, as amended by Decision No 1359/2013.

As that storage site does not constitute a stationary unity within the meaning of Article 3(e) of Directive 2003/87, it is part of an installation within the meaning of that article only if the coal storage activity fulfils the criteria laid down by that provision for activities other than those mentioned in Annex I to that directive. Such will be the case if that activity is directly associated with the combustion activity of the power plant, if it has a technical connection with the activities carried out on the site of that power plant and if it could have an effect on emissions and pollution. That direct association is, moreover, evidenced by the existence of a technical connection between the two activities. Such a connection exists in any event, for the coal storage site in question, by reason of the very fact of the practical organisation of that site and the presence of a conveyor belt located between the coal park and the power plant. Furthermore, since the coal storage activity emits, by a natural self-heating process, greenhouse gases, that activity could have an effect on emissions and pollution within the meaning of Article 3(e) of Directive 2003/87.

(see paras 29-31, 33, 34, operative part 1)
Article 555(1)(a) of Regulation No 2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation of Regulation No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code, as amended by Regulation No 2286/2003, must be interpreted as meaning that remunerated flights for helicopter flight instruction, with a trainee pilot and a flight instructor on board, are not to be regarded as constituting commercial use of a means of transport for the purposes of that provision.

Regulation No 2286/2003 not only removed from the concept of commercial use the non-remunerated transport of persons, but also made the purpose of the use the determining factor. Therefore, that concept no longer covers all economic activities involving a means of transport and which includes transport of persons in the broad sense, but concerns only those whose purpose is the transport, inter alia, of persons. In circumstances where the means of transport is used for training purposes, the transport of persons, if it took place, is only the corollary of the training activity which, as the main purpose of the contract, is the provision of services in return for which the trainee pilots have paid.

(see paras 34, 35, 43, operative part)
Article 53(2) of Directive 2004/18 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, read in the light of the principle of equal treatment and of the consequent obligation of transparency, must be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of a public service contract to be awarded pursuant to the criterion of the most economically advantageous tender in the opinion of the contracting authority, that authority is not required to bring to the attention of potential tenderers, in the contract notice or the tender specifications relating to the contract at issue, the method of evaluation used by the contracting authority in order to specifically evaluate and rank the tenders. However, that method may not have the effect of altering the award criteria and their relative weighting.

It is true that, the relative weighting of each of the award criteria must, subject to the third subparagraph of Article 53(2) of Directive 2004/18, be clearly defined from the beginning of the award procedure, thus enabling tenderers to establish objectively the actual importance given to an award criterion relative to another during their subsequent evaluation by the contracting authority. Similarly, the relative weighting of each of the award criteria cannot be changed throughout the procedure. However, neither Article 53(2) of Directive 2004/18 nor any other provision thereof lays down an obligation on the contracting authority to bring to the attention of potential tenderers, by publication in the contract notice or in the tender specifications, the method of evaluation applied by the contracting authority in order to effectively evaluate and assess the tenders in the light of the award criteria of the contract and of their relative weighting established in advance in the documentation relating to the contract in question. Nor is such a general obligation apparent from the case-law of the Court.

(see paras 25, 27, 28, 37, operative part)
As regards a reference for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of the principle of the non-contractual liability of a State for damage caused to individuals by breaches of EU law for which the State can be held responsible, that principle is inherent in the EU legal order. Individuals harmed have a right to compensation on the basis of that liability where three conditions are met, namely that the rule of EU law infringed is intended to confer rights on them, that the breach of that rule is sufficiently serious, and that there is a direct causal link between the breach and the damage sustained by the individuals. The non-contractual liability of a Member State for damage caused by a decision of a national court adjudicating at last instance which infringes a rule of EU law is governed by the same conditions. Consequently, the principle of the non-contractual liability of the State is within the interpretative jurisdiction of the Court.

EU law must be interpreted as meaning that the system of non-contractual liability of a Member State for damage caused by a breach of that law does not apply in the case of damage allegedly caused to an individual as a result of an alleged breach of a fundamental freedom laid down in Article 49, 56 or 63 TFEU by national legislation that is applicable without distinction to the State’s own nationals and those of other Member States, where, in a situation which is confined in all respects within a single Member State, there is no link between the subject or circumstances of the dispute in the main proceedings and those articles.

The Court, on a question being referred by a national court in connection with a situation confined in all respects within a single Member State, cannot, where the referring court does not indicate something other than that the national legislation in question applies without distinction to nationals of the Member State concerned and those of other Member States, consider that the request for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the provisions of the FEU Treaty on the fundamental freedoms is necessary to enable that court to give judgment in the case pending before it. The specific factors that allow a link to be established between the subject or circumstances of a dispute, confined in all respects within a single Member State, and Article 49, 56 or 63 TFEU must be apparent from the order for reference. Consequently, in a situation which is confined in all respects within a single Member State, it is for the referring court to indicate to the Court, in accordance with the requirements of Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, in what way the dispute pending before it, despite its purely domestic character, has a connecting factor with the provisions of EU law on the fundamental freedoms that makes the preliminary ruling on interpretation necessary for it to give judgment in that dispute.

(see paras 54, 55, 58, operative part)
Appeal—Grounds—Plea submitted for the first time in the context of the appeal—Inadmissibility

(Art. 256(1), second para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see paras 46)
Article 7, first paragraph, first indent, of Decision No 1/80 of the EEC-Turkey Association must be interpreted as meaning that that provision confers a right of residence in the host Member State on a family member of a Turkish worker who has been authorised to enter that Member State for the purposes of family reunification, and who, from his entry into the territory of that Member State, has lived with that Turkish worker, even if the period of at least three years during which the latter is duly registered as belonging to the labour force does not immediately follow the arrival of the family member concerned in the host Member State, but is subsequent to it.

The scheme of gradual acquisition of rights which is provided for in Article 7, first paragraph, of Decision No 1/80 pursues a dual objective. First, before the initial period of three years expires, that provision seeks to enable family members to be with a migrant worker, with a view to thus furthering, by means of family reunification, the employment and residence of the Turkish worker who is already legally integrated in the host Member State. Secondly, that provision seeks to deepen the lasting integration of the Turkish migrant worker’s family in the host Member State by granting to the family member concerned, after three years of legal residence, the possibility for him to gain access to the labour force. The fundamental objective thus pursued is that of consolidating the position of that family member, who is, at that stage, already legally integrated in the host Member State, by giving him the means to support himself in that State and therefore to establish a position which is independent of that of the migrant worker.

In the light of the general objective pursued by Decision No 1/80, which is to improve, in the social field, the treatment accorded to Turkish workers and members of their families with a view to achieving gradually freedom of movement, the system put in place by, in particular, the first paragraph of Article 7 of that decision is thus intended to create conditions which will promote family reunification in the host Member State.

An interpretation of Article 7, first paragraph, first indent, of Decision No 1/80 according to which, solely because the three-year period in which the reference Turkish worker worked in an employed capacity for an uninterrupted period was not immediately after the date of family reunification, a Turkish national cannot rely on the rights conferred by that provision, is excessively restrictive with regard to the objective it pursues.

In those circumstances, it must be held that, for the purposes of acquiring a right to residence under Article 7, first paragraph, of Decision No 1/80, by a family member of the reference Turkish worker, the condition that the latter is duly registered in the labour force of that Member State must not necessarily be satisfied on the actual date of arrival of the family member concerned in the host Member State or during the three or five years immediately after that date.

(see paras 68-70, 75, 76, operative part)
Case C‑283/15

X

v

Staatssecretaris van Financiën

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden)

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Tax legislation — Income tax — National of a Member State receiving income in that Member State and in a non-Member State, and residing in another Member State — Tax advantage to take account of his personal and family circumstances)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 9 February 2017

Freedom of movement for persons — Freedom of establishment — Equal treatment — Direct taxation — Income tax — National of a Member State receiving the greater part of his income in the territory of that Member State and residing in the territory of another Member State but receiving no income there — Legislation of the former Member State which permits the deduction of ‘negative income’ relating to a dwelling, but refusing the benefit of that deduction to that national — Not permissible — Concept of Member State of activity — Part of income received in the territory a non-Member State — Irrelevant

(Art. 49 TFEU)

Article 49 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding a Member State, the tax legislation of which permits the deduction of ‘negative income’ relating to a dwelling, from refusing the benefit of that deduction to a self-employed non-resident where that person receives, within that Member State, 60% of his total income and does not receive, within the Member State where his dwelling is located, income that enables him to qualify for an equivalent right to deduct.

Where the non-resident receives, within a Member State where he performs some of his activities, 60% of his total global income, it cannot be inferred that, for that reason alone, the Member State where he is resident will not be in a position to take account of his aggregate income and his personal and family circumstances. It would be otherwise only if it were established that the person concerned received, within the Member State where he was resident, either no income or income of so modest an amount that that State would not be able to grant him the advantages that would accrue from account being taken of his aggregate income and his personal and family circumstances.

The injunction imposed by the answer to the first question concerns any Member State of activity within which a self-employed person receives income enabling him to claim there an equivalent right of deduction, in proportion to the share of that income received within each Member State of activity. In that regard, a ‘Member State of activity’ is any Member State that has the power to tax such income from the activities of a non-resident as is received within its territory, irrespective of where the activities are actually performed.

The fact that the non-resident taxpayer concerned receives part of his taxable income not within a Member State, but within a non-Member State, is of no relevance to the answer to the second question.

(see paras 39, 43, 49, 52, operative part 1-3)
6.

Appeal — Grounds — Mistaken assessment of the facts — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted — Ground of appeal alleging distortion of the clear sense of the evidence — Necessity of indicating precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted and showing the errors of appraisal which led to that distortion (Art. 256(1), second para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 168(1)(d)) (see paras 62, 63, 68, 70)
Article 4(1), first subparagraph, first and third sentences, and second subparagraph, of Directive 2002/21 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, as amended by Directive 2009/140 (Framework Directive), in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, is to be interpreted as meaning that a national court hearing an appeal against a decision of the national regulatory authority must be able to annul that decision with retroactive effect if it finds that to be necessary in order to provide effective protection for the rights of the undertaking which has brought the appeal.

Article 4(1) of the Framework Directive, which lays down the requirement to ensure that an effective appeal mechanism exists, is an expression of the principle, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter, of effective judicial protection of an individual’s rights under EU law. In that regard, the second subparagraph of Article 4(1) of the Framework Directive in no way precludes or restricts the ability of a national court to annul, with retroactive effect, a decision of the national regulatory authority. Indeed, all that follows from that provision is that the appeal brought against a decision of that authority does not have suspensory effect, unless interim measures are granted in accordance with national law. The national regulatory authority’s decision will, as a rule, thus apply throughout the proceedings: that does not mean that it is not possible, at the end of the proceedings, to annul that decision with retroactive effect if the national court finds that to be necessary in order to provide effective protection for the rights of the undertaking which has brought the appeal.

Moreover, the fact that a national court has the possibility of annulling a decision of the national regulation authority with retroactive effect is not incompatible with observance of the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations. It is clear from the second subparagraph of Article 4(1) of the Framework Directive that, under that provision, the decision of the authority against which the appeal has been brought is to continue to apply only pending the outcome of the appeal. In those circumstances, economic operators who are parties to an appeal such as that provided for in Article 4(1) of the directive cannot have a legitimate expectation that, in the event of the decision of the national regulation authority in question being annulled, that annulment will not produce effects ex tunc.

(see paras 24-28, 30, 31, operative part)