ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
9

Paragraph 20 of the Közúti közlekedésről szóló 1988. évi I. törvény (Law No I of 1988 on road traffic, ‘the Road Traffic Law’) states: ‘(1) A fine may be imposed on anyone who infringes the present law, specific legislation, or acts of Community law, relating to … (d) the use of recording equipment and tachograph discs in the field of road transport, and of the cards necessary for digital tachographs, … (2) The following are entitled to conduct the procedure for imposing a fine (according to their supervisory powers as defined in subparagraph 11): the traffic authorities, the police, the customs authorities, the disaster protection authorities, the employment authorities and the public space supervision authorities. (3) The provisions of the specific legislation governing the supervisory activities of the authority responsible for the procedure shall apply to the procedure for imposing a fine referred to in subparagraph 2, unless provided for otherwise in the present paragraph. (4) A person — other than the hirer or driver of a private car hired from the operator of a vehicle fleet within the meaning of the Law on registration duties, if the vehicle registration duty has been paid and the driver of the private car proves this by producing a certificate issued by the customs authorities — who contravenes a provision of subparagraph 1, points (a) to (j) and (l), may be fined 10000 to 800000 [Hungarian] forints [(HUF)], and in the case referred to in point (k) 10000 to 300000 [HUF]. A specific provision shall lay down the maximum amount of the fines to be imposed for infringements of the various provisions, and of the fine that may be imposed in that procedure for several unlawful acts or omissions. No fine shall be imposed where two years have passed since the commission of the infringement (prescription). (5) The person liable for an infringement of one of the above provisions shall be obliged to pay the fine. Where the liability of several persons can be established, they shall be obliged to pay the amount of the fine laid down in the specific provision in proportion to their share of liability for the infringement. If their share of liability cannot be established, the obligation to pay the fine shall rest on them in equal shares. No obligation to pay a fine can be established where there is a compelling reason, not within the control of the person involved in road traffic, which he did not foresee and could not reasonably foresee. …’
22

In those circumstances, the Østre Landsret (Eastern Regional Court) decided to stay proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘Are ingots consisting of a random, rough fusion of various scrapped, gold-bearing metal objects covered by the terms ‘gold material or semi-manufactured products’ within the meaning of Article 198(2) of the VAT Directive? It can be taken as established that the ingots consist of a random, rough fusion of various scrapped, gold-bearing metal objects and they can contain, in addition to gold, also organic materials, such as teeth, rubber, PVC and metals/materials such as copper, tin, nickel, amalgam, the remains of batteries containing mercury and lead, and various toxic substances, etc. There is thus no question of it being a gold-bearing product which is being processed directly into a finished product. On the other hand, the ingot is a processed product (a fusion), which — as a form of intermediate stage — is created with a view to extracting the gold content. The ingots have a high gold content, on average between 500 and 600 thousandths, and thus substantially over 325 thousandths gold. After extraction, the gold content is to be used to manufacture (gold/gold-bearing) products. In answering the question, it can also be taken as established that the ingots cannot directly form part of other products, since first the ingots must be subjected to processing in which the metals are separated and the non-metals and hazardous substances etc., are melted away/excreted.’
26

It must be borne in mind in this regard that, in the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which a dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the question put concerns the interpretation of a provision of EU law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgments of 13 March 2001 in PreussenElektra, C‑379/98, EU:C:2001:160, paragraphs 38 and 39, and of 22 June 2010 in Melki and Abdeli, C‑188/10 and C‑189/10, EU:C:2010:363, paragraph 27).
3

According to recitals 5, 6, 10, 12, 17 and 20 of Regulation No 805/2004: ‘(5) The concept of “uncontested claims” should cover all situations in which a creditor, given the verified absence of any dispute by the debtor as to the nature or extent of a pecuniary claim, has obtained either a court decision against that debtor or an enforceable document that requires the debtor's express consent, be it a court settlement or an authentic instrument. (6) The absence of objections from the debtor as stipulated in Article 3(1)(b) can take the shape of default of appearance at a court hearing or of failure to comply with an invitation by the court to give written notice of an intention to defend the case. … (10) Where a court in a Member State has given judgment on an uncontested claim in the absence of participation of the debtor in the proceedings, the abolition of any checks in the Member State of enforcement is inextricably linked to and dependent upon the existence of a sufficient guarantee of observance of the rights of the defence. … (12) Minimum standards should be established for the proceedings leading to the judgment in order to ensure that the debtor is informed about the court action against him, the requirements for his active participation in the proceedings to contest the claim and the consequences of his non-participation in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence. … (17) The courts competent for scrutinising full compliance with the minimum procedural standards should, if satisfied, issue a standardised European Enforcement Order certificate that makes that scrutiny and its result transparent. … (20) Application for certification as a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims should be optional for the creditor, who may instead choose the system of recognition and enforcement under [Council] Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 [of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1)] or other Community instruments.’
21

In accordance with Article 14 of Directive 1999/31: ‘Member States shall take measures in order that landfills which have been granted a permit, or which are already in operation at the time of transposition of this Directive, may not continue to operate unless the steps outlined below are accomplished as soon as possible and within eight years after the date laid down in Article 18(1) at the latest: (a) with a period of one year after the date laid down in Article 18(1), the operator of a landfill shall prepare and present to the competent authorities, for their approval, a conditioning plan for the site including the particulars listed in Article 8 and any corrective measures which the operator considers will be needed in order to comply with the requirements of this Directive with the exception of the requirements in Annex I, point 1; (b) following the presentation of the conditioning plan, the competent authorities shall take a definite decision on whether operations may continue on the basis of the said conditioning plan and this Directive. Member States shall take the necessary measures to close down as soon as possible, in accordance with Article 7(g) and 13, sites which have not been granted, in accordance with Article 8, a permit to continue to operate; (c) on the basis of the approved site-conditioning plan, the competent authority shall authorise the necessary work and shall lay down a transitional period for the completion of the plan. Any existing landfill shall comply with the requirements of this Directive with the exception of the requirements in Annex I, point 1 within eight years after the date laid down in Article 18(1); (d) (i) within one year after the date laid down in Article 18(1), Articles 4, 5, and 11 and Annex II shall apply to landfills for hazardous waste; (ii) within three years after the date laid down in Article 18(1), Article 6 shall apply to landfills for hazardous waste.’
19

Article 243 of the LGT, entitled ‘Extraordinary appeal for the unification of precedent’, provides: ‘1. An extraordinary appeal for the unification of precedent may be filed by the Director-General for Taxation of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance against the tax decisions issued by [the TEAC], when that Director-General disagrees with the content of such decisions. … 2. The Special Chamber for the Unification of Precedent shall be competent to resolve such an appeal. The Special Chamber shall be composed of the President of [the TEAC], who shall preside, three members of that Tribunal, the Director-General for Taxation of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, the Director-General of the State Tax Administration Agency, the Director-General or the Director of the Department of the State Tax Administration Agency to which the body that issued the act which is referred to in the decision that is the object of the appeal is functionally attached, and the President of the Council for the Defence of Taxpayers. … 3. The decision on appeal shall be adopted by a majority of the members of the Special Chamber. In the event of a tie, the President shall always have the casting vote. 4. The decision on appeal shall be issued within six months and shall respect the particular legal situation relating to the appealed decision, establishing the applicable precedent. 5. The precedent established by such appeal decisions shall be binding on the [TEAs], on the tax bodies of the autonomous communities and of the cities with autonomous status and on the remainder of the State Tax Administration and of the autonomous communities and cities with autonomous status.’
2.

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 26, 27, 42, 59)
Case C‑84/15

Sonos Europe BV

v

Staatssecretaris van Financiën

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 — Customs union and Common Customs Tariff — Tariff classification — Combined Nomenclature — Headings 8517, 8518, 8519, 8527 and 8543 — Stand-alone device designed to retrieve, receive and stream digital audio files in the form of amplified sound’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber), 17 March 2016

Customs union — Common Customs Tariff — Tariff headings — Stand-alone device designed to retrieve, receive and stream digital audio files in the form of amplified sound — Classification under heading 8519 of the Combined Nomenclature — Assessment by the referring court

(Council Regulation No 2658/87, as amended by Regulations No 1031/2008 and No 948/2009, Annex I, heading 8519)

The Combined Nomenclature listed in Annex I to Regulation No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, in the version resulting, successively, from Regulation No 1031/2008 and Regulation No 948/2009, must be interpreted as meaning that a stand-alone device designed to retrieve, receive and stream digital audio files in the form of amplified sound, must, subject to the referring court’s assessment of all of the facts which it has available to it, be classified under tariff heading 8519 of that nomenclature.

In that regard, the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System Explanatory Notes relating to heading 8519 state that ‘generally’ sound is recorded onto or reproduced from an internal storage device or media, which does not exclude other sources. Accordingly, the mere fact that the source of the sound does not come from an internal storage device does not exclude classification of that product under that heading. Consequently, the sound reproduction function of a stand-alone device designed to retrieve, receive and stream digital audio files in the form of amplified sound cannot be called into question on the basis of the fact that the source of the sound which it reproduces is the internet or another device with which it shares a local network or a device to which it is connected by a cable. In addition, the intended use of a product may constitute an objective criterion for classification if it is inherent in the product, and that inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the product’s objective characteristics and properties.

(see paras 42, 43, 48, operative part)
Article 16(b) of Regulation No 110/2008 on the definition, description, presentation, labelling and the protection of geographical indications of spirit drinks and repealing Regulation No 1576/89 must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to assess whether there is an ‘evocation’ within the meaning of that provision, the national court is required to refer to the perception of the average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, that concept being understood as covering European consumers and not only consumers of the Member State in which the product giving rise to the evocation of the protected geographical indication is manufactured.

For the purpose of finding the existence of an ‘evocation’, it is for the national court to verify, in addition to the inclusion of part of a protected name in the term used to designate the product at issue, that when the consumer is confronted with the name of the product, the image triggered in his mind is that of the product whose designation is protected. Therefore, the national court must essentially rely on the presumed reaction of consumers in the light of the term used to designate the product at issue, it being essential that those consumers establish a link between that term and the protected name.

In that context, the protection provided by Article 16 of Regulation No 110/2008 to geographical indications must be interpreted in the light of the objective pursued by the registration of those indications, namely, to allow the identification of spirit drinks as originating from a specific territory in situations where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of those drinks may be essentially attributed to that geographical origin.

Moreover, the system of registration of geographical indications of spirit drinks seeks to contribute to the attainment of a high level of consumer protection. On that basis, in order to assess the ability of a word used to designate a product to evoke a protected name, it is necessary to take account of the presumed expectation of the average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, a criterion which is based on the principle of proportionality.

Finally, in the light of the need to guarantee effective and uniform protection of the geographic indications in the territory of the European Union, it must be considered that the concept of ‘consumer’ covers European consumers.

(see paras 22-28, operative part 1)
Joined Cases C‑145/15 and C‑146/15

K. Ruijssenaars and Others

v

Staatssecretaris van Infrastructuur en Milieu

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State (Pays-Bas)

‛Air transport — Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 — Article 7 — Compensation payable to passengers in the event that their flight is cancelled or delayed by more than three hours — Article 16 — National bodies responsible for the enforcement of the regulation — Powers — Adoption of enforcement measures against the air carrier for payment of the compensation due to the passenger’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber), 17 March 2016

Transport — Air transport — Regulation No 261/2004 — Compensation and assistance to passengers — Flight significantly delayed — National bodies responsible for enforcement of the regulation — Requirement to take enforcement action against an air carrier for payment of the compensation due to a passenger — No such requirement)

(European Parliament and Council Regulation No 261/2004, Recital 21 and Arts 7(1) and (16))

Article 16 of Regulation No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation No 295/91, must be interpreted as meaning that, where an individual complaint has been made by a passenger to the body designated by each Member State pursuant to Article 16(1) of the regulation following the refusal by an air carrier to pay to the passenger the compensation provided for in Article 7(1) of the regulation, that body is not required to take enforcement action against the carrier with a view to compelling it to pay the compensation.

The complaints which any passenger may make to the national body pursuant to Article 16(2) of Regulation No 261/2004 are to be regarded as a form of alert signal intended to contribute to the proper application of the regulation in general, without that body being required to act on such complaints in order to guarantee each individual passenger’s right to obtain compensation. Moreover, the term ’sanction’ as used in Article 16(3) of Regulation No 261/2004 — that provision being read in conjunction recital 21 of the regulation — must be interpreted as referring to the measures adopted in response to the infringements which the national body identifies in the course of its general monitoring activities provided for in Article 16(1), not to administrative enforcement action to be taken in each individual case.

(see paras 31, 32, 38, operative part)
Article 8 of Directive 2008/94 on the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer applies to outstanding pension contribution, in so far as they are not compensated under Article 3 of that directive. In that regard, the protection afforded by Article 8 is complementary to that guaranteed by Article 3 of that directive, and they can both apply together to the same situation.

Although pension contributions are not expressly referred to in Article 8 of Directive 2008/94, they are closely connected with the rights conferring immediate or prospective entitlement to old-age benefits, which that provision seeks to protect. Those contributions are designed to finance the immediate entitlement of employees at the time of their retirement. The failure on the part of the employer to pay contributions could constitute a cause of underfunding of a supplementary occupational pension scheme, a situation which falls under Article 8 of that directive.

The fact remains that Article 3 and Article 8 of Directive 2008/94 have different purposes and concern two different types of protection.

Article 3 of that directive requires that the payment of outstanding claims, including not only salary claims, but also, subject to Article 6 of that directive, certain contributions in the form of salary claims, be ensured by the guarantee institutions. Moreover, Article 4(2) and (3) of Directive 2008/94 grants the Member States the power to restrict the scope of Article 3 thereof. Such a restriction may concern both the length of the period for which outstanding claims are to be met by the guarantee institution and the level at which the payments made by that institution are capped. In addition, the protection established in Article 3 of Directive 2008/94 concerns, in principle, short-term claims.

Article 8 of Directive 2008/94, for its part, has a more restricted material scope in so far as it seeks to protect the interest of employees in securing payment of their pension claims. Moreover, that article, unlike Articles 3 and 4 of that directive, does not provide expressly for Member States to have the power to limit the level of protection. Moreover, contrary to Article 3 of that directive, Article 8 thereof seeks to guarantee the protection of the long-term interests of employees, given that, as regards immediate or prospective entitlements, such interests extend, in principle, over the entire retirement period.

(see paras 24-28)
Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted, for the purpose of conferring the jurisdiction given by that provision to hear an action to establish liability for infringement of the prohibition on resale outside a selective distribution network resulting from offers, on websites operated in various Member States, of products covered by that network, as meaning that the place where the damage occurred is to be regarded as the territory of the Member State which protects the prohibition on resale by means of the action at issue, a territory on which the appellant alleges to have suffered a reduction in its sales.

First of all, the likelihood of damage occurring in a particular Member State is subject to the condition that the right whose infringement is alleged is protected in that Member State. Thus, where the protection granted by the Member State of the place of the court seised is applicable only in that Member State, that court has jurisdiction only to determine the damage caused within the Member State in which it is situated. Then, in the event of infringement, by means of a website, of the conditions of a selective distribution network, the damage which the distributor may claim is the reduction in the volume of its sales resulting from the sales made in breach of the conditions of the network and the ensuing loss of profits. In that regard, the fact that the websites on which the offer of the products covered by the selective distribution right appears operate in Member States other than that of the court seised is irrelevant, as long as the events which occurred in those Member States resulted in or may result in the alleged damage in the jurisdiction of the court seised, which it is for the national court to ascertain.

(see paras 30, 31, 33-35, operative part)