4.

Since the main claims are unacceptable, it is appropriate now to consider the complaints made in the alternative which, as will be recalled, relate to the decisions not to assign Angelini to other posts corresponding to his grade. I should mention at the outset that according to this Court (cf. judgment in Oslizlok, already cited), measures reassigning officials also involve a considerable degree of discretionary power. However, such measures cannot follow automatically from the retirement decision itself; they must be based on specific considerations and enable the official concerned to defend his interests (paragraphs 27 to 30 of the decision). The criticism which gives rise to fewer problems is the accusation that the Commission, in breach of a specific duty, did not on its own initiative examine the possibility of assigning the applicant to the new post of Deputy Director General of Directorate General IX for which he expressly declared himself to have the necessary skills. Article 50 refers to assignment “to another post in his category or service corresponding to his grade”; in other words the provisions thereof relate only to the possibility of a transfer. The post in question, which is classified in the list of posts as Grade A 1ad personam, clearly does not fall within that category. The applicant could only have obtained that post by promotion and in his case it is clearly inappropriate to base a claim to that post on Article 50. As regards the post of Director of Personnel in Directorate General IX (the subject of Vacancy Notice No COM/839/81), it is established that on 20 July 1981 the Consultative Committee examined the various applications and considered that the applicant did not have “the required experience in general personnel management required by the vacancy notice”. Consequently, eight days later, the Commission chose one of the other three candidates proposed by the Committee and, since he was an official in Grade A 3, promoted him to the vacant post with effect from 1 August 1981. Angelini asserts that that choice is vitiated by an insufficient statement of the grounds on which it is based. In my opinion, it may be argued on the basis of the case-law of the Court that when an official is assigned to a post it is unnecessary to give a specific statement of reasons with respect to the other candidates (judgments of 31 March 1965 in Case 16/64 Rauch v Commission [1965] ECR 135; 13 July 1972 in Case 90/71 Bernardi v Parliament [1972] ECR 603; and 30 October 1974 in Case 188/73 Grassi v Council [1974] ECR 1099). They, in fact, are not the victims of a measure adversely affecting them but are merely persons who are notified of a rejection which is implicit in the measure by which the appointment is made. Nor can I agree with the applicant's argument to the effect that the Commission unlawfully failed to consider whether he was suitable for the post in question and that, in any case, his suitability ought to be acknowledged. In the opinion of the Consultative Committee it is expressly stated that Angelina's application was the subject of “special consideration”; nor is there anything to show that the Committee applied inconsistent criteria or that, in assessing the applicant's skills, it made any manifest error — the only defect which, in the case of an assessment which entails a value judgment, can be established by the Court. Admittedly, the vacancy notice, under the heading “Description and nature of the duties” speaks of “personnel management” and does not use the phrase which appears in the opinion of the Committee, namely “general personnel management”. In other words the Committee applied a stricter criterion. But I consider that the adoption of that criterion is justified by the duties inherent in the office and in particular by the other, stringent requirements specified in the vacancy notice (“thorough knowledge of personnel policy and management; proven experience appropriate to the post”). As regards the assessment of his skills the applicant refers to the duties carried out by him from 1963 to 1967 as head of division and the courses which, as chief adviser, he gave to senior officials of the Member States on personnel management at the Commission; but failure to take account of those circumstances, to the extent desired by Angelini certainly does not constitute a manifest error. The fact is that he was concerned only with specific aspects of personnel management whereas, as the Commission has explained, the holder of the post in question must be able “to manage the human resources of the Commission in a coherent fashion”. The applicant also complains of the failure to apply to him a principle which may be inferred from Article 50, namely that for the filling of a similar post a retired official is entitled to priority over candidates of lower rank who could be appointed to such a post only be means of promotion. It is doubtful whether Article 50 provides for such entitlement. However, the theory is interesting and I shall deal with it in detail in my opinion in Case 148/82. It would however be inappropriate to do so here because even if that theory were to be considered well founded no grounds for annulment could be derived from it. At the very least, that theory presupposes that the retired official is suitable for the new post, whereas in this case he does not appear to be suitable, or, if he is, he is less suitable than the candidate who was promoted.