ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
4)

If Articles 45 and 49 TFEU and Directive 2005/36 of 7 September 2005 apply in the present case, must they be interpreted as precluding the selection board charged with the recruitment of legal secretaries at the Cour de cassation from making participation in that competition conditional on the holding of a doctorate or licentiate degree in law awarded by a Belgian university, or on recognition by the French Community, which has competence in the field of education, that the master’s degree awarded to the applicant by the University of Poitiers in France is equivalent to the qualification of doctorate, licentiate degree or master’s degree in law awarded by a Belgian university?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 315/33

Appeal brought on 17 January 2014 by Three-N-Products Private Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 7 November 2013 in Case T-63/13 Three-N-Products Private Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)

(Case C-22/14 P)

2014/C 315/54

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Three-N-Products Private Ltd (represented by: M. Thewes and T. Chevrier, lawyers)

Other party to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)

By order of 2 July 2014, the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) dismissed the appeal.
2)

If the reply to Question 1 is in the affirmative, must Articles 17(2)(a), 18(1)(a) and 22(3) of the Sixth Directive be interpreted as precluding provisions of national law under which, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, tax cannot be deducted by the taxable person since the invoice was issued by a person who was not the actual supplier of the goods and it is not possible to establish the identity of the actual supplier of the goods and to require that supplier to pay the tax, or to identify the person required to pay the tax on the basis of the issuance of the invoice pursuant to Article 21(1)(c) of the Sixth Directive?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 329/10

Action brought on 28 July 2014 — European Parliament v Council of the European Union

(Case C-363/14)

2014/C 329/12

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: European Parliament (represented by: F. Drexler, A. Caiola, M. Pencheva, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

— Annul Council Implementing Decision 2014/269/EU of 6 May 2014 amending Decision 2009/935/JHA as regards the list of third States and organisations with which Europol shall conclude agreements (1)

— order the defendant to pay all the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of its action, the European Parliament raises three pleas in law.

Firstly, the European Parliament contests the use by the Council of an incorrect decision-making procedure for the adoption of Decision 2014/269/EU. The Parliament deduces therefrom that the Council has committed not only a breach of the Treaties but also a breach of essential procedural requirements.

Secondly, the European Parliament complains of the Council’s use either of a legal basis repealed by the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon or of a secondary legal basis, which is unlawful pursuant to the case-law of the Court of Justice.

Lastly, in the view of the Parliament, the list of third States and organisations with which Europol is to conclude agreements is a legislative matter. It should be considered by the EU legislature, since it is an essential element of a regulated area. In consequence, the legal basis and procedure used by the Council are legally incorrect.

(1) OJ 2014 L 138, p. 104.
1.

Must Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on cosmetic products (1) be interpreted as meaning that a product which does not come under Regulation No 1223/2009 must comply with the requirements of that regulation solely by reason of a statement on the outer packaging that the product is a ‘cosmetic eye accessory which is subject to the EU cosmetics directive’?
2.

If the answer to Question 1 is that the case-law of the Court of Justice concerning the Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment and the free movement of services in a purely internal situation applies to the assessment of the question as to whether Chapter III of Directive 2006/123 is applicable: (a) Should the national courts apply the provisions laid down in Chapter III of Directive 2006/123 in a situation such as that in the present case, in which the service provider has not established himself on a cross-border basis and does not offer services on a cross-border basis, but nevertheless relies on those provisions? (b) Is it relevant to the answer to that question that the operator provides services primarily to self-employed prostitutes from Member States other than the Netherlands? (c) In order to answer that question, is it necessary to determine whether undertakings established in other Member States have shown or will show genuine interest in establishing a window prostitution business in Amsterdam?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 372/2

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Nürnberg (Germany) lodged on 14 July 2014 — Criminal proceedings against Andreas Wittmann

(Case C-339/14)

2014/C 372/03

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberlandesgericht Nürnberg

Parties to the main proceedings

Andreas Wittmann

Other party: Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Nürnberg

Question referred

Must Article 11(4) of Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) be interpreted as meaning that a situation where a driving licence has not been withdrawn from the driver of a vehicle only because his driving licence was withdrawn from him previously and he therefore no longer has a driving licence, and where, at the same time, an order is made to the effect that that person is not in any event to be issued with a new driving licence for a given period of time, is equivalent to the withdrawal of a driving licence?

(1) Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on driving licences; OJ 2006 L 403, p. 18.
1.

Must Article 49 in conjunction with Article 52 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union be interpreted as precluding the application of national provisions which require a carrier whose seat is in another Member State and is established in the Czech Republic by means of an organisational unit to obtain, in addition to the licences and concessions authorising a carrier with its seat in the Czech Republic to operate domestic scheduled services (urban public transport), in order to pursue the same activity, also a special authorisation, the issue of which is at the discretion of the administrative authorities?
3)

Must Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 be interpreted to the effect that, if the addressee of a notice refuses a document drafted in a certain language, following a declaration from the court hearing the action that that person has a sufficient level of understanding of that language, the refusal of the document is not justified, and the court hearing the action may apply the consequences provided for in the legislation of the State of transmission to this type of unjustified refusal of a document and, if the procedural rules of the State of transmission so provide, treat the document as having been served on the addressee?
2.

Is Article 49 TFEU (Article 43 EC) to be understood as precluding a provision such as Article 23(1)(a) of the DBA Deutschland/Österreich 2000 (2000 Double taxation convention between Germany and Austria) — according to which income from Austria is to be exempt from the basis of assessment for German taxation if that income can be taxed in Austria — if losses accrued in an Austrian permanent establishment of a German company limited by shares can no longer be taken into account in Austria because the permanent establishment is sold to an Austrian company limited by shares belonging to the same group as the German company?
1.

Are Articles 19, 22 and 29 of the Montreal Convention to be understood and interpreted as meaning that an air carrier is liable to third parties, inter alia to the passengers’ employer, a legal person with which a transaction for the international carriage of passengers was entered into, for damage occasioned by a flight’s delay, on account of which the applicant (the employer) incurred additional expenditure connected with the delay (for example, the payment of travel expenses)?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 409/28

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Social No 1 de Córdoba (Spain) lodged on 27 August 2014 — María Auxiliadora Arjona Camacho v Securitas Seguridad España, S.A.

(Case C-407/14)

2014/C 409/40

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de lo Social No 1 de Córdoba

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: María Auxiliadora Arjona Camacho

Defendant: Securitas Seguridad España, S.A.

Question referred

May Article 18 of Directive 2006/54/EC, (1) which refers to the dissuasive (in addition to real, effective and proportionate) nature of the compensation to be awarded to a victim of discrimination on grounds of sex, be interpreted as meaning that it enables the national court to award the victim reasonable punitive damages that are truly additional, that is to say, an additional amount which, although going beyond the full reparation of the actual loss and damage suffered by the victim, serves as an example to others (in addition to the person responsible for the damage), provided that the amount in question is not disproportionate, that also being the case even when the concept of punitive damages does not form part of the legal tradition of that national court?

(1) Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast)

OJ 2006 L 204, p. 23.
1)

Does it run counter to REACH (1) that a person who, in the course of a business, imports a chemical product into Sweden — in respect of which there is an obligation to notify under REACH — must notify it in accordance with the Swedish legislation to the Kemikalieinspektionen for registration in the Swedish product register?
3.

Is a place of residence condition imposed on beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status compatible with Article 33 and/or Article 29 of Directive 2011/95/EU, where it is based on grounds of migration or integration policy, for instance to prevent points of social tension as a result of the accumulated settlement of foreign nationals in certain municipalities or districts? Are abstract migration or integration policy grounds sufficient in this regard or must such grounds be specifically ascertained?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 462/11

Appeal brought on 7 April 2014 by Big Line Sas di Graziani Lorenzo against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 13 February 2014 in Case T-380/12, Demon International v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market, Big Line Sas di Graziani Lorenzo

(Case C-170/14 P)

(2014/C 462/19)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: Big Line Sas di Graziani Lorenzo (represented by: B. Osti, avvocato)

Other parties to the proceedings: Demon International, LC, Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

By order of 6 November 2014, the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as being in part manifestly unfounded and in part manifestly inadmissible.
1.

Is the provision contained in point 1.4 of Chapter V of Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 of 22 December 2004 on the protection of animals during transport and related operations and amending Directives 64/432/EEC and 93/119/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1255/97 (1), to the effect that, after 14 hours of travel, animals are to be given a rest period of at least one hour sufficient for them in particular to be given liquid and if necessary fed, after which they may be transported for a further 14 hours, to be interpreted as meaning that the periods of transport may also be interrupted by a rest period of more than one hour or by several rest periods at least one of which lasts for one hour?
4.

Finally, if the answer to the third question is in the affirmative: when a spatial planning measure has been adopted that relates to a wider single geographical area, and requires, in principle, under Article 3(2)(b) of Directive 2001/42/EC in conjunction with Article 6(3) of Directive 92/43/EEC, the carrying out of a strategic environmental assessment, which did not take place, and if it is found that the carrying out of a prior environmental assessment was required only for certain sections of this area — on account of the rules finally imposed in relation to the land uses and activities permitted in those sections, which do not constitute mere management plans — whereas for the largest part this assessment was not required because the rules adopted, in so far as they relate to these sections, in practice constitute a management plan, for which, in accordance with Article 3(2)(b) of Directive 2001/42/EC in conjunction with Article 6(3) of Directive 92/43/EEC, there is no obligation to carry out such an assessment, is it possible, for the purposes of Directive 2001/42/EC, to find that this body of rules is partially invalid and, therefore, to annul it only in respect of the sections of the area which, because of the rules finally imposed, require the carrying out of a prior environmental assessment, with the further consequence, after the partial annulment of the measure in question, that a strategic environmental assessment takes place only in relation to this part and not the overall area?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 26/21

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Audiencia Provincial de Castellón (Spain) lodged on 27 November 2014 — Juan Carlos Sánchez Morcillo, María del Carmen Abril García v Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A.

(Case C-539/14)

(2015/C 026/25)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Audiencia Provincial de Castellón

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Juan Carlos Sánchez Morcillo, María del Carmen Abril García

Defendant: Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A.

Question referred

Must Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC (1), in conjunction with Articles 47, 34(3) and 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2), be interpreted as precluding a procedural provision of the kind laid down in Article 695(4) of the Spanish Law on Civil Procedure, applicable to appeals against a decision determining the outcome of an objection to enforcement proceedings in relation to mortgaged or pledged goods, which allows an appeal to be brought only against an order staying the proceedings, disapplying an unfair term or dismissing an opposition based on an unfair term, the immediate consequence of which is that more legal remedies on appeal are available to the seller or supplier seeking enforcement than to the consumer against whom enforcement is sought?

(1) Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts

OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29.

(2) OJ 2000, C 364, p. 1.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 431/9

Appeal brought on 20 August 2014 by Basic AG Lebensmittelhandel against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 26 June 2014 in Case T-372/11: Basic AG Lebensmittelhandel v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

(Case C-400/14 P)

(2014/C 431/15)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Basic AG Lebensmittelhandel (represented by: D. Altenburg, T. Haug, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), Repsol YPF, SA

Form of order sought

The appellant requests that:

— The decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (General Court) of June 26, 2014 (Case T-372/11) shall be annulled and the case shall be referred to the General Court for reapplication;

— The defendant shall bear all costs of this proceeding.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The applicant contests the General Court's interpretation of the definition of ‘distribution services’ which is — as a matter of law — a preliminary issue in the assessment of similarity of services. The applicant consequently claims that the General Court has taken an incorrect perception as the legal basis for its subsequent assessment concerning the likelihood of confusion between the trademarks at issue.

The applicant would point out that the ECJ's main function is to supply a uniform interpretation of the concept and scope of the respective services (C-418/02, paragraph 33 — Praktiker; joined cases C-414/99 to C-416/99 Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss, paragraphs 42 and 43) and of the judgment ‘IP-Translator’ (C-307/10, June 19, 2012) whereby ‘goods and services have to be definable in an objective manner in order to fulfil the trademark's function as an indication of origin’ and asks the ECJ for a ‘sufficient precise and clear’ definition of ‘distribution services’.

In the opinion of the applicant, the service ‘distribution’ has a very narrow scope and comprises only the activities ‘transport; packaging and storage of goods’ but not ‘retail and wholesale’ services. The applicant further points out that the Court of Justice clarified in the ‘Praktiker’ judgment that the objective of ‘retail’ (class 35) is — in contrast to the services in class 39 — the sale of goods to consumers, whereas these activities consist, ‘inter alia, in selecting an assortment of goods offered for sale and in offering a variety of services aimed at inducing the consumer to conclude the transaction with the trader in question rather than with a competitor’.

The general classification of ‘distribution’ in Nice Class 39 cannot be ignored in the view of the applicant since the ECJ expressly underlined its argumentation in its Praktiker decision in consideration of the Explanatory Note of Nice Class 35 (C-418/02, paragraph 36).

Therefore the decision of the General Court must be annulled and referred back for reapplication.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 26/19

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Berlin (Germany) lodged on 21 November 2014 — Ukamaka Mary Jecinta Oruche and Nzubechukwu Emmanuel Oruche v Bundesrepublik Deutschland

(Case C-527/14)

(2015/C 026/22)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgericht Berlin

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Ukamaka Mary Jecinta Oruche and Nzubechukwu Emmanuel Oruche

Defendant: Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Other parties: Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Potsdam, Emeka Emmanuel Mary Oruche

Question referred

Should the first subparagraph of Article 7(2) of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification (1) be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law which makes the first entry of a member of the family of a sponsor conditional on the requirement that, prior to entry, the family member can demonstrate the ability to communicate, in a basic way, in the German language?

(1) OJ 2003 L 251, p. 12.
1)

Should Article 19(1) of Regulation No 561/2006/EC (1) be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of an infringement, the measure necessary in order to implement a penalty stipulated and applied by the Member State may only be applied to the person who has committed the infringement? To put it in different terms: in the light of Article 18 of Regulation No 561/2006/EC, is it a breach of the obligation upon Member States pursuant to the first sentence of Article 19(1) of Regulation No 561/2006/EC if national legislation provides that a measure which is necessary in order to implement a penalty stipulated and applied by the Member State may be applied to a (natural or legal) person who has not been found by means of an administrative procedure to have committed an infringement?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 34/14

Action brought on 25 November 2014 — European Commission v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg

(Case C-536/14)

(2015/C 034/16)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: J. Hottiaux and L. Nicolae, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Grand Duchy of Luxembourg

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that: — by failing to carry out and notify the analyses of markets 7 and 14 in Recommendation 2003/311/EC (1) and markets 1 and 6 in Recommendation 2007/879/EC (2) within three years from the adoption of previous measures concerning the markets in question, and by failing to notify a reasoned proposed extension to the time-limit to the Commission, — and by failing to request BEREC’s assistance in completing the analyses of the markets in question, the Grand Duchy has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 16(6) and (7) of Directive 2002/21/EC (3) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive), as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC (4) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009;

— order the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In the first place, the Commission complains that the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has not carried out nor has it notified the analyses of markets 7 and 14 in Recommendation 2003/311/EC and markets 1 and 6 in Recommendation 2007/879/EC within three years from the adoption of previous measures concerning the markets in question.

In the second place, the Commission complains that the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has not requested, within the time-limits set, BEREC’s assistance in completing the analyses of the specific markets and adopting the regulatory measures that are required.

(1) Commission Recommendation 2003/311/EC of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communication networks and services (OJ 2003 L 114, p. 45).

(2) Commission Recommendation 2007/879/EC of 17 December 2007 on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (OJ 2007 L 344, p. 65).

(3) OJ 2002 L 108, p. 33.

(4) OJ 2009 L 337, p. 37.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 56/6

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākā tiesa (Latvia) lodged on 27 November 2014 — SIA ‘VM Remonts’ (formerly SIA ‘DIV un Ko’), SIA ‘Ausma grupa’, SIA ‘Pārtikas kompānija’ v Konkurences padome

(Case C-542/14)

(2015/C 056/08)

Language of the case: Latvian

Referring court

Augstākā tiesa

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: SIA ‘VM Remonts’ (formerly SIA ‘DIV un Ko’), SIA ‘Ausma grupa’, SIA ‘Pārtikas kompānija’

Defendant: Konkurences padome

Question referred

Must Article 101(1) TFEU be interpreted as meaning that, in order for it to be established that an undertaking has participated in an agreement restricting competition, it must be shown that an officer of the undertaking has personally engaged in conduct or been aware of, or consented to, conduct by persons providing an external service to the undertaking and at the same time acting on behalf of other parties to a possible prohibited practice?