ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
57

First, that was the case where the Court of Justice dismissed an action directed against the measures of a directive on the total prohibition of advertising of tobacco products as inadmissible on the ground that the annulment would have had the effect of transforming a total prohibition of advertising into a partial prohibition (judgment of 5 October 2000 in Germany v Parliament and Council, C‑376/98, ECR, EU:C:2000:544, paragraph 117). Second, that was the case where this Court dismissed an action directed against the inclusion of a site in the annex of a directive as a site of Community importance to the extent that its inclusion extended the site to the territorial waters of Gibraltar as inadmissible on the ground that the annulment would have necessarily altered the geographical limits of the site of Community importance and, therefore, the substance of the decision to include that site (order of 24 May 2011 in Government of Gibraltar v Commission, T‑176/09, EU:T:2011:239, paragraphs 38 to 41, confirmed by order of 12 July 2012 in Government of Gibraltar v Commission, C‑407/11 P, EU:C:2012:464, paragraphs 30 to 35). Third, that was the case where, having taken into account the aims of the system for authorising the placing of plant protection products on the market, this Court dismissed an action directed against the measures of the directive concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market that included an active substance in its annex as inadmissible on the ground that the annulment would have had the effect of transforming the inclusion of a substance for a certain limited period and for certain crops into one unlimited in time and for all crops, since the contested limitations constituted mandatory and essential conditions for the inclusion of the substance in the annex in question (judgment of 12 April 2013 in Du Pont de Nemours (France) and Others v Commission, T‑31/07, EU:T:2013:167, paragraph 85). Fourth, that was the case where the Court of Justice dismissed an action directed against the measures of a State aid decision as inadmissible on the ground that the annulment would have had the effect of transforming the temporally limited acceptance of State aid for undertakings into a temporally unlimited acceptance (order in Carbunión v Council, cited in paragraph 51 above, EU:C:2014:2446, paragraph 31). The situations which would have been brought about by the annulment of the measures contested in those various cases are similar to that which would be brought about by the annulment of the contested measure.
44

In this regard, the applicant himself explains that, at the time the action was brought, the WPK was still competent to supervise statutory auditors in relation to the examination of the accounts of public-interest entities, and that this situation will continue until the supervisory competence of the WPK is transferred to a body meeting the criteria set out in Article 21 of the contested regulation. From that time onward, all German statutory auditors who have begun or begin activities relating to the examination of the accounts of public-interest entities after the adoption of the contested regulation, but before the transfer of supervisory competence, are or will be in exactly the same situation as the applicant: the supervision of their activity will pass from the WPK, made up of practising members of the accountancy profession, to another body which meets the requirements described in Article 21 of the contested regulation; that is, a body which cannot, in particular, include statutory auditors who are in practice or have been in practice in the three preceding years among the members of its governing body, or among those responsible for decision-making.
In interlocutory proceedings in the context of an action brought against measures re-entering an undertaking on the list of persons and entities forming the subject-matter of restrictive measures against Iran with a view to preventing nuclear proliferation, the action does not prima facie appear to be unfounded where there is a major legal disagreement whose resolution is not immediately obvious and which therefore calls for a detailed examination on the merits. That is the case with the question whether the Council is entitled, in view of the right to an effective remedy, to rely on the case-law according to which, where a measure adopted by an EU institution has been annulled for formal or substantive defects, that institution is entitled to adopt afresh an identical measure, this time observing the formal rules and ensuring that the new measure is not vitiated by the same substantive defect, in order to correct findings of illegality which led to the annulment of a restrictive measure, by adopting a new measure which has the same practical effect as the earlier measure, where the factual situation has not changed in substance, or whether observance of the fundamental right to an effective remedy does not require that there be an element of a time-bar in subsequent legal proceedings which may be brought by the same company, which would require the Council to include in its first file compiled for restrictive measures all the reasons for inclusion and incriminating evidence which it could easily obtain by the date on which the file is compiled, and which would prevent it, if the Court censures those reasons and evidence, from using them to justify a relisting of the company. That would mean such a relisting could be envisaged only where new and relevant facts or evidence have emerged, while the Council would be prohibited from using, during future relistings, evidence that it had admittedly not yet invoked, but which could already have been invoked on the date of the first listing.

Moreover, where there is a judgment annulling the initial listing of the undertaking concerned which has acquired the force of res judicata, it might be considered, where the activity of the said undertaking has remained unchanged in substance and the difference in the periods of activity referred to is the result of its relisting, carried out by the Council on a factual basis that has also not changed in substance, that application of the concept of res judicata is excluded only on account of the Council’s action in extending artificially the restrictive measures imposed on the undertaking concerned, by presenting evidence which could have been invoked at the time of the applicant’s initial listing. Such an approach, even if it is not considered incompatible with the concept of res judicata, could, in any event, contribute to an infringement of the applicant’s right to an effective remedy.

(see paras 39, 43, 45, 47, 50)
Order of the President of the General Court of 20 May 2015 — Hamcho and Hamcho International v Council

(Case T‑153/15 R)

‛Application for interim measures — Restrictive measures taken against Syria — Freezing of funds and restriction on entry into and transit through the territory of the European Union — Application for suspension of operation of a measure — Failure to comply with procedural requirements — Inadmissibility’

1. Application for interim measures — Suspension of operation of a measure — Interim measures — Conditions for granting — Prima facie case — Urgency — Serious and irreparable damage — Cumulative nature (Arts 278 TFEU and 279 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 104(2)) (see paras 7-9)

2. Application for interim measures — Formal requirements — Submission of applications — Brief summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based — Insufficient explanation of the grounds consisting a prima facie case — General reference to other documents — Inadmissibility (Arts 278 TFEU and 279 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 44(1)(c), and 104(3)) (see paras 10, 11)

3. Application for interim measures — Suspension of operation of a measure — Interim measures — Conditions for granting — Urgency — Serious and irreparable damage — Burden of proof — Restrictive measures taken against Syria — Freezing of funds and restrictions on entry into and transit through EU territory — Need to provide a trustworthy overall image of the situation of the person concerned by the restrictive measures (Arts 278 TFEU and 279 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 104(2)) (see paras 14-16)

Re:

APPLICATION for suspension of operation of the measures imposed on the applicants under Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/108 of 26 January 2015 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (OJ 2015 L 20, p. 2), and of Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2015/117 of 26 January 2015 implementing Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria (OJ 2015 L 20, p. 85).

The Court:

1. The application for interim measures is dismissed.
Keywords

Subject of the case

Operative part



Keywords

Application for interim measures — Suspension of operation of a measure — Interim measures — Conditions for granting — Prima facie case — Urgency — Serious and irreparable damage — Cumulative nature — Discretion of the court hearing the application for interim relief (Arts 256(1) TFEU, 278 TFEU and 279 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 156(3)) (see paras 6, 8)

2. Judicial proceedings — Absolute bar to proceeding — Non-compliance with the Rules of Procedure — To be considered of the Court’s own motion (Arts 256(1) TFEU, 278 TFEU and 279 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 156) (see para. 7)

3. Application for interim measures — Formal requirements — Submission of applications — Brief summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based — Pleas in law not set out in the application and pleadings — General reference to other documents — Inadmissibility (Arts 278 TFEU and 279 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Arts 76(d), and 156(4)) (see paras 9-11)

4. Application for interim measures — Suspension of operation of a measure — Interim measures — Conditions for granting — Urgency — Serious and irreparable damage — Burden of proof — Financial loss — Situation liable to endanger the existence of the applicant company — Loss capable of being subsequently remedied by means of an action for compensation — Not irreparable (Arts 268 TFEU, 278 TFEU, 279 TFEU and 340 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 156(3)) (see paras 13, 14, 16-18)

Subject of the case

Re:

APPLICATION for suspension of operation of the decisions of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank of 28 June and 6 July 2015 concerning the level of emergency liquidity assistance provided to Greek banks.

Operative part

Operative part

1. The application for interim measures is dismissed.

2. Costs are reserved.
When assessing the suitability of a probationary official, a prohibition on taking into account the observations of an external consultant may not be based on an application by analogy of the institution’s guide to staff reports, which relates only to reports on established officials.

Application of a provision by analogy, with regard to an economic operator, is possible where the legal rules applicable, on the one hand, are very similar to those which it is sought to have applied by analogy and, on the other hand, contain an omission which is incompatible with a general principle of EU law and which can be remedied by application by analogy of those other rules.

In that regard, there can be no question of an omission given that, first of all, Article 34 of the Staff Regulations concerning the procedure for assessing probationary officials is sufficiently detailed and, second, whereas Article 43 of the Staff Regulations on staff reports on established officials provides for the adoption of general implementing provisions for that procedure, in accordance with Article 110 of the Staff Regulations, that is not the case with Article 34. An application by analogy of the staff reports guide to the appraisal of probationary officials would therefore be contrary to the intention of the author of that document.

(see paras 25, 26)

Judgment of 12 December 1985 in Krohn, 165/84, EU:C:1985:507, para. 14
Order of the President of the General Court of 29 February 2016 —

Chemtura Netherlands v EFSA

(Case T‑725/15 R)

‛Application for interim measures — Procedure for placing plant protection products on the market — Publication of documents relating to the inclusion of an active substance — Rejection of the request for confidential treatment of certain information — Application for interim measures — Lack of urgency’

1. Application for interim measures — Suspension of operation of a measure — Interim measures — Conditions for granting — Prima facie case — Urgency — Serious and irreparable damage — Cumulative nature — Balancing of all the interests involved — Order of examination and method of verification — Discretion of the court hearing the application for interim relief (Arts 256(1) TFEU, 278 TFEU and 279 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 156(3)) (see paras 20-22)

2. Application for interim measures — Suspension of operation of a measure — Interim measures — Conditions for granting — Urgency — Serious and irreparable damage — Burden of proof — Purely hypothetical damage based on the happening of future and uncertain events — Insufficient to demonstrate urgency — Publication by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) of an assessment of a substance before the Commission’s final decision as to its marketing — No urgency (Arts 278 TFEU and 279 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 156(3); European Parliament and Council Regulation No 1107/2009, Art. 21) (see paras 44, 46-49)

3. Application for interim measures — Suspension of operation of a measure — Interim measures — Conditions for granting — Urgency — Non-material damage not capable of better compensation at the interlocutory stage than in the main proceedings — No urgency (Arts 278 TFEU and 279 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 156(3)) (see paras 51, 52, 54-56)

4. Application for interim measures — Suspension of operation of a measure — Interim measures — Conditions for granting — Serious and irreparable damage — Financial loss not capable of being entirely compensated for at a later stage — Burden of proof — Loss not capable of being stated in figures, but none the less capable of being subsequently compensated for by means of a compensation action — Loss capable of being subsequently compensated for by means of a compensation action — Not irreparable (Arts 268 TFEU, 278 TFEU, 279 TFEU and 340 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 156(2) and (3)) (see paras 58, 60, 61, 63-65)

Re:

APPLICATION for the suspension of operation of the EFSA Decision of 10 December 2015 concerning the publication of certain parts of the EFSA Conclusion on the Peer Review on the review of the approval of the active substance diflubenzuron regarding the metabolite 4-chloroaniline (PCA) in respect of which the applicant requested partial confidential treatment.

Operative part

1. The application for interim relief is dismissed.

2. The order of 15 December 2015 delivered in Case T‑725/15 R is cancelled.
Order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 7 June 2016 —

Beele Engineering v EUIPO (WE CARE)

(Case T‑220/15)

‛EU trade mark — Application for the EU figurative mark WE CARE — Absolute ground for refusal — No distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Definition — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 15, 16)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Marks constituted of advertising slogans — Distinctive character — Application of specific criteria for assessment — Not permissible (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 17-19)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Marks constituted of advertising slogans — Slogan with a fantasy character (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 20)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Marks constituted of advertising slogans — Flattering promotional formula (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 21, 22)

5. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Figurative mark WE CARE (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 30, 33-37, 40, 42-44, 46-48)

6. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Trade mark made up of several elements — Possible for the competent authority to examine each of the elements making up the trade mark — Scope of protection of the mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 32)

7. EU trade mark — Decisions of the Office — Principle of equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — EUIPO’s previous decision-making practice — Principle of legality — Need for a strict and complete examination in each particular case (Council Regulation No 207/2009) (see para. 54)

8. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Assessment of the registrability of a sign — EU rules only taken into account — Decisions by national authorities not binding on EU bodies (Council Regulation No 207/2009) (see para. 58)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 15 January 2015 (Case R 1424/2014-5), relating to an application for registration of the figurative sign WE CARE as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

1. The action is dismissed.
Order of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 13 May 2016 —

CEVA v Commission

(Case T‑601/15)

‛Arbitration clause — Technological research and development project in the area entitled ‘Algae grown from sustainable aquaculture as raw material for biodegradable bioplastics’ — SEABIOPLAS contract — Demand for payment of the financial contribution due — Offsetting — Period allowed for commencing proceedings — Delay — No interest in bringing proceedings — Inadmissibility’

1. Judicial proceedings — Legal basis of an action — Choice for the applicant and not the EU judicature (see para. 22)

2. Actions for annulment — Actionable measures — Concept — Extra-judicial decision to offset debts and amounts due adopted by the Commission on the basis of Regulation No 966/2012 — Included (Art. 263 TFEU; European Parliament and Council Regulation No 966/2012, Art. 80) (see paras 24-26, 30, 31, 33)

3. Acts of the institutions — Presumption of validity — Non-existent act — Concept (Art. 288 TFEU) (see paras 37, 38)

4. Actions for annulment — Natural or legal persons — Interest in bringing proceedings — Need for an actual and current interest — Assessment at the time when the action was lodged — Action capable of securing a benefit for the applicant — None — Inadmissibility (Art. 263, fourth para., TFEU) (see paras 47-50)

Re:

ACTION under Article 272 TFEU seeking an order that the Commission pay the first instalment of the grant due to the applicant under the SEABIOPLAS contract (reference FP7-SME-2013-606032-SEABIOPLAS) concerning a technological research and development project in the area entitled ‘Algae grown from sustainable aquaculture as raw material for biodegradable bioplastics’.

Operative part

1. The action is dismissed as inadmissible.
An association of beekeepers and environmental protection organisations are not directly affected, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, and therefore do not have standing to bring an action for annulment of Implementing Regulation No 2015/1295, approving the active substance sulfoxaflor, in accordance with Regulation No 1107/2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market, and amending the Annex to Implementing Regulation No 540/2011.

Implementing Regulation No 2015/1295, the purpose of which is to approve, subject to certain conditions, the active substance sulfoxaflor as an ingredient of plant protection products under Regulation No 1107/2009 and the inclusion of that substance in the Annex to Regulation No 540/2011 as regards the list of approved active substances, has a direct effect on the legal situation of the Member States, which have the possibility of authorising the placing on the market of plant protection products containing sulfoxaflor, if a request to that effect is made, and on the legal situation of applicants for marketing authorisations for such products, but not on the legal situation of that association and those organisation.

As regards the legal effects of that regulation on the rights of members of the said beekeepers’ association to property and to conduct a business, even if the use of plant protection products containing sulfoxaflor were actually likely to endanger the business activities of those members, those economic consequences concern not their legal situation, but only their factual situation. Second, that alleged danger also presupposes the authorisation by a Member State of a plant protection product containing sulfoxaflor. The grant of such an authorisation is not an automatic consequence of the approval of sulfoxaflor but is subject to the exercise, by the Member States, of a considerable discretion and room for manoeuvre.

Similarly, as regards the campaign objectives of environmental protection organisations, in so far as the contested act has an impact on such objectives, it would, in any event, only be a factual and not a legal impact.

(see paras 24-26, 31-33, 40-42, operative part 1)