ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
26

In those circumstances, the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions, which are formulated in the same terms in Cases C‑333/15 and C‑334/15, to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Must Articles 43 and 44 of Regulation No 1782/2003 be interpreted as precluding national legislation which excludes from treatment as eligible hectares all areas of permanent pasture declared by a farmer in excess of those taken into account at the relevant time for the purpose of determining the normal entitlements due to that farmer, making the inclusion of those areas, and therefore the replacement of arable land with pasture, conditional on the pasture being genuinely given over to the rearing of livestock in the specific financial year in respect of which the farmer seeks to activate the payment entitlements? If that is to be answered in the negative: (2) Must Article 29 of Regulation No 1782/2003, in excluding payments under support schemes for beneficiaries of such schemes “for whom it is established that they artificially created the conditions required for obtaining such payments with a view to obtaining an advantage contrary to the objectives of that support scheme”, be interpreted as not permitting States to adopt general measures which reduce the number of “eligible hectares” (of permanent pasture) by laying down general situations in which the beneficiary will be presumed to have artificially created the conditions required for obtaining payment, without establishing, specifically and in relation to a particular farmer, the activity carried on by that farmer and his conduct?’
7

Article 12 of the directive, headed ‘Retention of the right of residence by family members in the event of death or departure of the Union citizen’, provides: ‘1. Without prejudice to the second subparagraph, the Union citizen’s death or departure from the host Member State shall not affect the right of residence of his/her family members who are nationals of a Member State. Before acquiring the right of permanent residence, the persons concerned must meet the conditions laid down in points (a), (b), (c) or (d) of Article 7(1). 2. Without prejudice to the second subparagraph, the Union citizen’s death shall not entail loss of the right of residence of his/her family members who are not nationals of a Member State and who have been residing in the host Member State as family members for at least one year before the Union citizen’s death. Before acquiring the right of permanent residence, the right of residence of the persons concerned shall remain subject to the requirement that they are able to show that they are workers or self-employed persons or that they have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their period of residence and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State, or that they are members of the family, already constituted in the host Member State, of a person satisfying these requirements. “Sufficient resources” shall be as defined in Article 8(4). Such family members shall retain their right of residence exclusively on a personal basis. 3. The Union citizen’s departure from the host Member State or his/her death shall not entail loss of the right of residence of his/her children or of the parent who has actual custody of the children, irrespective of nationality, if the children reside in the host Member State and are enrolled at an educational establishment, for the purpose of studying there, until the completion of their studies.’
63

Having regard to the fact that Benelux trade marks and designs fall within a regime in the three Member States concerned which is in advance of the jurisdictional structure established by Benelux, based on a decentralised system and a mechanism for referring questions for a preliminary ruling to the Benelux Court of Justice and the multilingual character of that regional union, the codified rule in Article 4.6 of the BCIP, which is founded in particular on the defendant’s domicile and thereby ensures that the disputes relating to Benelux trade marks and designs may be dealt with, as the case may be, by a Belgian, Luxembourg, or Dutch court, instead of being concentrated, pursuant to Article 22(4) of Regulation No 44/2001 and then Article 24(4) of Regulation No 1215/2012, before the Dutch courts where the filing and registration of trade marks is centralised and the register is kept, may, as the Advocate General observed in point 41 of his Opinion and by analogy with the findings of the EU legislature regarding jurisdiction for disputes relating to EU trade marks, must be treated as indispensable for the proper functioning of the Benelux regime of trade marks and designs.
10

Article 9 of Ley 55/2003 del Estatuto Marco del Personal Estatutario de los Servicios de Salud (State Law 55/2003 on the framework regulations for health service staff regulated under administrative law) of 16 December (BOE No 301 of 17 December 2003, p. 44742, ‘the framework regulations’), provides as follows: ‘1. On grounds of need, urgency or for the development of programmes of a temporary, auxiliary or extraordinary nature, the health services may appoint temporary regulated staff. Temporary regulated staff may be appointed on an interim, occasional or replacement basis. 2. Appointment on an interim (or ‘temporary replacement’) basis may be used to temporarily cover a vacant post in the healthcare institutions or services where it is necessary to ensure performance of the duties pertaining to that post. The interim regulated staff member’s service shall be terminated if a permanent staff member is appointed, through the procedure laid down in law or regulation, to the post occupied by that interim regulated staff member, or if that post is abolished. 3. Appointment on an occasional basis shall be made in the following situations: (a) when it concerns the provision of certain services of a temporary, auxiliary or extraordinary nature; (b) when it is necessary in order to ensure the permanent and continuous operation of the healthcare institutions; (c) for the provision of additional services in order to compensate for a reduction of normal working hours. The occasional regulated staff member’s service shall be terminated when the purpose of the appointment has been accomplished, when the period expressly set out in his notice of appointment has expired, or when the duties for which the appointment was made are abolished. If more than two appointments are made for the provision of the same services for a total period of 12 months or more in a period of two years, the reasons for this shall be examined, in order to assess, if necessary, whether it is appropriate to create a permanent post in the healthcare institution concerned. …’
9

Article 7 of that directive, entitled ‘Misleading omissions’, states: ‘1. A commercial practice shall be regarded as misleading if, in its factual context, taking account of all its features and circumstances and the limitations of the communication medium, it omits material information that the average consumer needs, according to the context, to take an informed transactional decision and thereby causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise. 2. It shall also be regarded as a misleading omission when, taking account of the matters described in paragraph 1, a trader hides or provides in an unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely manner such material information as referred to in that paragraph or fails to identify the commercial intent of the commercial practice if not already apparent from the context, and where, in either case, this causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise. … 4. In the case of an invitation to purchase, the following information shall be regarded as material, if not already apparent from the context: (a) the main characteristics of the product, to an extent appropriate to the medium and the product; … (c) the price inclusive of taxes, or where the nature of the product means that the price cannot reasonably be calculated in advance, the manner in which the price is calculated, as well as, where appropriate, all additional freight, delivery or postal charges or, where these charges cannot reasonably be calculated in advance, the fact that such additional charges may be payable; …’
34

In those circumstances, the Administrativen sad Veliko Tarnovo (Administrative Court, Veliko Tarnovo) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Must Article 273, Article 2(1)(a), Article 9(1) and Article 14(1) of the VAT directive, taken together, having regard to the principles of fiscal neutrality and proportionality, be interpreted as meaning that a Member State is to be entitled to treat the de facto absence of goods which were transferred to a taxable person by way of taxable supplies as subsequent taxable supplies of those goods for consideration by that taxable person, without the recipient of those goods being identified, where the aim is to prevent VAT evasion? (2) Must the provisions referred to in Question 1, having regard to the principles of fiscal neutrality and proportionality, be interpreted as meaning that a Member State is to be entitled to treat the failure by a taxable person to record tax-relevant documents relating to taxable supplies received in the manner described above, where this serves the same aim? (3) Must Articles 273, 73 and 80 of the VAT directive, taken together, having regard to the principles of equal treatment and proportionality, be interpreted as meaning that Member States are to be entitled, on the basis of national provisions which do not serve to transpose the VAT directive, to determine the taxable amount for supplies of goods by a taxable person in a way which diverges from the general rule provided for in Article 73 of the VAT directive and the exceptions expressly provided for in Article 80 of that directive, where the aim is, first, to prevent VAT evasion and, secondly, to determine a taxable amount for the transactions concerned that is as reliable as possible?’
5

Article 7 of Framework Decision 2008/909, headed ‘Double criminality’, is worded as follows: ‘The following offences, if they are punishable in the issuing State by a custodial sentence or a measure involving deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of at least three years, and as they are defined by the law of the issuing State, shall, under the terms of this Framework Decision and without verification of the double criminality of the act, give rise to recognition of the judgment and enforcement of the sentence imposed: — participation in a criminal organisation, — terrorism, — trafficking in human beings, — sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, — illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, — illicit trafficking in arms, ammunition and explosives, — corruption, — Fraud, … — laundering of the proceeds of crime, — counterfeiting currency, … — computer-related crime, — environmental crime, … — facilitation of unauthorised entry and residence, — murder, grievous bodily injury, — illicit trade in human organs and tissue, — kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage taking, — racism and xenophobia, — organised or armed robbery, — illicit trafficking in cultural goods, … — swindling, — racketeering and extortion, — counterfeiting and product piracy, — forgery of administrative documents and trafficking therein, — forgery of means of payment, — trafficking in hormonal substances and other growth promoters, — illicit trafficking in nuclear or radioactive materials, — trafficking in stolen vehicles, — rape, — arson, — crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, — unlawful seizure of aircraft/ships, — sabotage. … 3. For offences other than those covered by paragraph 1, the executing State may make the recognition of the judgment and enforcement of the sentence subject to the condition that it relates to acts which also constitute an offence under the law of the executing State, whatever its constituent elements or however it is described. 4. Each Member State may, on the adoption of this Framework Decision or later, by a declaration notified to the General Secretariat of the Council, declare that it will not apply paragraph 1. Such declarations or withdrawals of declarations shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.’
14

Articles 3981, 3983, 3989, 47942, 47943 and 47945 of the Law establishing the Code of Civil Procedure, in the version applicable to the case in the main proceedings (‘the Code of Civil Procedure’) provide: ‘Article 3981 1. An appeal in cassation may be brought before the Sąd Najwyższy [(Supreme Court, Poland)] against a final judgment or order dismissing the action or ruling that there is no need to adjudicate closing the proceedings, in a case originating from a court of second instance, by a party, the Prokurator Generalny [Polish General Public Prosecutor], the Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich [Commissioner for Civic Rights] or the Rzecznik Praw Dziecka [Commissioner for Children’s Rights], unless otherwise provided under a specific rule. … Article 3983 1. The appeal in cassation may be brought by a party on the basis of the following grounds: (1) infringement of the substantive law through misinterpretation or misapplication; (2) infringement of procedural rules, where the infringement may have a significant impact on the outcome of the case. … Article 3989 1. The Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court] shall grant leave to appeal in cassation on grounds of admissibility where: (1) the case involves a fundamental question of law; (2) it is necessary to interpret legal provisions raising serious doubts or giving rise to divergences in the case-law; (3) the proceedings are invalid; or (4) the appeal in cassation is clearly well-founded. 2. The Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court] shall decide in camera on the admissibility of the appeal in cassation. Written reasons for its decision need not be given. … Article 47942 1. If the application is granted, the court shall, in the operative part of its judgment, reproduce the content of the terms contained in the standard conditions of business which have been declared unlawful and shall prohibit the use of those terms. … Article 47943 The final judgment shall produce its effects in relation to third parties once the term contained in the standard conditions of business which has been declared unlawful has been entered in the register referred to in Article 47945(2). … Article 47945 1. The court shall forward to the [President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection] a copy of the final judgment granting the application. 2. The [President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection] shall maintain, on the basis of the judgments referred to in (1), the register of terms contained in general conditions of business which have been declared unlawful. 3. The register referred to in paragraph (2) shall be public.’
26

Article 13(1) of the directive provides, in turn, that, where the consumer exercises his right of withdrawal, all payments made by the consumer, including the costs of delivery, are to be reimbursed to him by the trader. The Court has previously held, with regard to the right of withdrawal as provided for in Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts (OJ 1997 L 144, p. 19), which preceded Directive 2011/83, that, in principle, in the case of withdrawal by a consumer within the withdrawal period, the seller may not claim compensation from the consumer for the value of the use of the consumer goods acquired under a distance contract (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2009, Messner, C‑489/07, EU:C:2009:502, paragraph 29). In addition, a trader is not permitted to charge the costs of delivering the goods to the consumer where the latter exercises his right of withdrawal (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 April 2010, Heinrich Heine, C‑511/08, EU:C:2010:189, paragraph 59).
3

Recitals 2, 3, 8 and 9 of Directive 2011/64 state: ‘(2) The Union’s fiscal legislation on tobacco products needs to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market and, at the same time, a high level of health protection, as required by Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, bearing in mind that tobacco products can cause serious harm to health and that the Union is Party to the World Health Organisation’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). Account should be taken of the situation prevailing for each of the various types of manufactured tobacco. (3) One of the objectives of the Treaty on European Union is to maintain an economic union, whose characteristics are similar to those of a domestic market, within which there is healthy competition. As regards manufactured tobacco, achievement of this aim presupposes that the application in the Member States of taxes affecting the consumption of products in this sector does not distort conditions of competition and does not impede their free movement within the Union. … (8) In the interests of uniform and fair taxation, a definition of cigarettes, cigars and cigarillos and of other smoking tobacco should be laid down so that, respectively, rolls of tobacco which according to their length can be considered as two cigarettes or more are treated as two cigarettes or more for excise purposes, a type of cigar which is similar in many respects to a cigarette is treated as a cigarette for excise purposes, smoking tobacco which is similar in many respects to fine-cut tobacco intended for the rolling of cigarettes is treated as fine-cut tobacco for excise purposes, and tobacco refuse is clearly defined. … (9) As far as excise duties are concerned, harmonisation of structures must, in particular, result in competition in the different categories of manufactured tobacco belonging to the same group not being distorted by the effects of the charging of the tax and, consequently, in the opening of the national markets of the Member States.’
72

In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the first and second questions is that Article 20 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that for the purposes of assessing whether a child who is a Union citizen would be compelled to leave the territory of the European Union as a whole and thereby deprived of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred on him by that article if the child’s third-country national parent were refused a right of residence in the Member State concerned, the fact that the other parent, who is a Union citizen, is actually able and willing to assume sole responsibility for the primary day-to-day care of the child is a relevant factor, but it is not in itself a sufficient ground for a conclusion that there is not, between the third-country national parent and the child, such a relationship of dependency that the child would indeed be so compelled were there to be such a refusal of a right of residence. Such an assessment must take into account, in the best interests of the child concerned, all the specific circumstances, including the age of the child, the child’s physical and emotional development, the extent of his emotional ties both to the Union citizen parent and to the third-country national parent, and the risks which separation from the latter might entail for the child’s equilibrium.
14

In those circumstances, the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labour Court, Germany) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) (a) Does Article 3 of Directive [2001/23] preclude a provision of national law which provides that, in the event of a transfer of an undertaking or business, all conditions of employment agreed between the transferor and the employee, individually and in the exercise of their freedom of contract, in the contract of employment transfer to the transferee unaltered, as if he had himself agreed them in an individual contract with the employee, where national law provides for both consensual and unilateral adjustments by the transferee? (b) If Question 1[(a)] is answered in the affirmative, either generally or for a defined group of individually agreed conditions of employment in the employment contract between the transferor and employee: does the application of Article 3 of Directive 2001/23 have the effect that certain terms of the contract of employment between the transferor and the employee which have been agreed in the exercise of freedom of contract are to be excluded from being transferred unaltered to the transferee, and are to be adjusted simply by reason of the transfer of the undertaking or business? (c) If, according to the Court of Justice’s answers to [Question 1(a) and (b)], an individual provision which has been agreed in an individual contract, under which certain provisions in a collective agreement are, dynamically and in the exercise of freedom of contract, incorporated into the employment contract, is not transferred unaltered to the transferee: (i) does this apply also where neither the transferor nor the transferee is party to a collective agreement or is affiliated to such a party, that is, where, even prior to the transfer of the undertaking or business, the provisions in the collective agreement would not have been applicable to the employment relationship with the transferor in the absence of the term referring to them in the agreement made, in the exercise of freedom of contract, in the contract of employment? (ii) if [Question 1(c)(i)] is to be answered in the affirmative: does this apply also if the transferor and the transferee are undertakings within the same group? (2) Does Article 16 of [the Charter] preclude a national provision enacted to implement Directive [77/187] or Directive [2001/23] which provides that, in the event of a transfer of an undertaking or a business, the transferee is bound by the conditions of employment agreed individually and in the exercise of their freedom of contract by the transferor with the employee as if he had agreed them himself, even if these conditions incorporate certain provisions of a collective agreement, which would not otherwise apply to the employment contract, into the employment contract dynamically, in so far as national law provides for both consensual and unilateral adjustments by the transferee?’
22

Article 204 of the Customs Code provides as follows: ‘1. ‘A customs debt on importation shall be incurred through: (a) non-fulfilment of one of the obligations arising, in respect of goods liable to import duties, from their temporary storage or from the use of the customs procedure under which they are placed … in cases other than those referred to in Article 203 unless it is established that those failures have no significant effect on the correct operation of the temporary storage or customs procedure in question.’ 2. The customs debt shall be incurred either at the moment when the obligation whose non-fulfilment gives rise to the customs debt ceases to be met or at the moment when the goods are placed under the customs procedure concerned where it is established subsequently that a condition governing the placing of the goods under the said procedure or the granting of a reduced or zero rate of import duty by virtue of the end-use of the goods was not in fact fulfilled. 3. The debtor shall be the person who is required, according to the circumstances, either to fulfil the obligations arising, in respect of goods liable to import duties, from their temporary storage or from the use of the customs procedure under which they have been placed, or to comply with the conditions governing the placing of the goods under that procedure.’