ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
2.

If it is concluded that a situation of ‘bis in idem’ does not arise, on the grounds that, in accordance with the criteria put forward in this decision, the facts are not completely identical: (A) Whether, in the light of the circumstances of the present case, the restrictions on the effects of judgments delivered in other EU Member States expressly established in Article 14(2) of the Ley Orgánica 7/2014 de 12 de noviembre, sobre intercambio de información de antecedentes penales y consideración de resoluciones judiciales penales en la Unión Europea (Organic Law 7/2014 of 12 November 2014 on exchanging information on criminal records and taking account of judicial decisions in criminal matters), which transposes European legislation, are compatible with Council Framework Decision 2008/675/JHA (1) of 24 July 2008 on taking account of convictions in the Member States of the European Union in the course of new criminal proceedings, and with Article 45 and Article 49(3) of the Charter and the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions within the European Union. (B) Whether the absence of a procedure or mechanism in Spanish law which provides for the recognition of judgments delivered in other European countries, for the application of the totality principle and for the adjustment or capping of sentences to ensure they are proportional, in situations where a sentence imposed by a foreign court is to be served in Spain and the sentence concerns acts which form a continuing offence or linked offences when taken in conjunction with other acts that have been tried and been the subject of a conviction in Spain, is contrary to Article 45 and Article 49(3) of the Charter, in conjunction with Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA (2) of 13 June 2002 and Article 8(1) and (2) of Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA (3) of 27. November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union and, in general, with the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions within the European Union.
1.

Must Articles 169(1) and (2)(a) TFEU and 114(3) TFEU be interpreted as precluding Article 5 of Directive 2015/2302 (1) on package travel and linked travel arrangements, since that article does not include, among the compulsory precontractual information to be provided to travellers, the right, conferred on travellers by Article 12 of the directive, to terminate the contract before the start of the package and obtain a full refund of payments made in the event of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances which significantly affect the performance of the package?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Stuttgart (Germany) lodged on 17 February 2022 — TAP Portugal v flightright GmbH

(Case C-156/22)

(2022/C 222/22)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Stuttgart

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: TAP Portugal

Respondent: flightright GmbH

Question referred

Is Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that an extraordinary circumstance within the meaning of that provision exists where a flight departing from an airport outside the base of the operating air carrier is cancelled because a crew member deployed on that flight (in casu the co-pilot), who has passed the prescribed regular medical examinations without restriction, dies suddenly and in a way that the air carrier is unable to foresee shortly before the flight or falls so seriously ill that he or she cannot perform the flight?

(1) Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Germany) lodged on 1 March 2022 — MO v SM, as trustee of G GmbH

(Case C-134/22)

(2022/C 222/20)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesarbeitsgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant in the appeal on a point of law: MO

Respondent in the appeal on a point of law: SM, as trustee of G GmbH

Question referred

What is the purpose of the second subparagraph of Article 2(3) of Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies, (1) according to which the employer is to forward to the competent public authority a copy of, at least, the elements of the written communication which are provided for in the first subparagraph, point (b), subpoints (i) to (v)?

(1) OJ 1998 L 225, p. 16.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administrativen sad Gabrovo (Bulgaria) lodged on 31 March 2022 — IL v Regionalna direktsia ‘Avtomobilna administratsia’ Pleven

(Case C-227/22)

(2022/C 237/48)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Administrativen sad Gabrovo

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant in cassation: IL

Respondent in cassation: Regionalna direktsia ‘Avtomobilna administratsia’ Pleven

Question referred

Do the provisions of Directive 2006/126 (1) give Member States the possibility to require drivers of vehicles of categories С, CE, C1, C1E, D, DE, D1, D1E to undergo medical examinations to determine their psychological and mental fitness at intervals shorter than the period of validity of the driving licence, and in this connection to require a separate document (in addition to the driving licence) certifying their fitness? Or does the holding of a valid driving licence for the abovementioned categories also certify the psychological and mental fitness of the driver, as that fitness was determined when the driving licence was first issued or renewed?

(1) Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on driving licences (OJ 2006 L 403, p. 18).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 18 April 2022 by QI, QJ, QL, QM, QN, QP, QQ, QT, QU, QW, QX against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 9 February 2022 in Case T-868/16, QI and Others v Commission and ECB

(Case C-262/22 P)

(2022/C 244/25)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: QI, QJ, QL, QM, QN, QP, QQ, QT, QU, QW, QX (represented by: S. Pappas, A. Pappas, avocats)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, European Central Bank, Council of the European Union, European Council, QK, QO, QR, QS, QV

Form of order sought

The Appellants claim that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— refer the case back to the General Court;

— order the defendants to pay their own costs and the costs of the Appellants in the present proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

With the present appeal, the Appellants respectfully request the Court of Justice to review and set aside the appealed judgment, on the basis of two grounds:

First, that the General Court performed an inadequate examination of the third plea of illegality of the application, alleging a sufficiently serious breach of the right to property guaranteed by Article 17(1) of the Charter. In turn, this improper examination resulted in the misapplication and infringement of the Appellants’ right to property.

Second, that the General Court infringed the principle of proportionality.
1.

Must the administrative authority’s practice, set out in administrative position 1/2020 of the INSS’ Subdirectorate-General for Planning and Legal Services of 31 January 2020, of systematically refusing to grant the supplement at issue to men and requiring them to pursue their claims through the courts, as has happened to the applicant in the present case, be regarded, in accordance with Council Directive 79/7/EEC (1) of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, as an administrative breach of that directive, which is different from the legislative breach found to have been committed in the judgment of the Court of Justice of 12 December 2019 in WA (C-450/18), (2) so that, considered in itself, that administrative breach constitutes discrimination on grounds of sex, in view of the fact that, according to Article 4 of that directive, the principle of equal treatment means that there is to be no discrimination whatsoever on ground of sex, either directly, or indirectly, and that, according to Article 5 of that directive, Member States are to take the measures necessary to ensure that any legislative or administrative provisions contrary to the principle of equal treatment are abolished?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rayonen sad Nesebar (Bulgaria) lodged on 28 March 2022 — Criminal proceedings against QS

(Case C-219/22)

(2022/C 266/13)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Rayonen sad Nesebar

Party to the main proceedings

QS

Question referred

Must Article 3(3) of Council Framework Decision 2008/675/JHA (1) of 24 July 2008 on taking account of convictions in the Member States of the European Union in the course of new criminal proceedings be interpreted as precluding national legislation such as Article 68(1) of the NK, in conjunction with Article 8(2) thereof, which provides that the national court seised of an application for execution of the sentence imposed by a previous conviction handed down by a court of another Member State may, for that purpose, alter the arrangements for executing that sentence by ordering its actual execution?

(1) OJ 2008 L 220, p. 32.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesverwaltungsgericht Vorarlberg (Austria) lodged on 28 January 2022 — NK

(Case C-55/22)

(2022/C 257/26)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landesverwaltungsgericht Vorarlberg

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: NK

Respondent authority: Bezirkshauptmannschaft Feldkirch

Question referred

Is the principle of [ne] bis in idem, as guaranteed by Article 50 of the Charter, to be interpreted as meaning that the competent administrative penal authority of a Member State is prevented from imposing a fine on a person for infringement of a provision of the legislation on games of chance if administrative penal proceedings brought previously against the same person for an infringement of a different provision of the legislation on games of chance (or, more generally, a rule from the same field of law), which were based on the same facts, were finally terminated after an oral hearing with the taking of evidence had been held?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal da Relação de Lisboa (Portugal) lodged on 20 April 2022 — Fonds de Garantie des Victimes des Actes de Terrorisme et d’Autres Infractions (FGTI) v Victoria Seguros S.A.

(Case C-264/22)

(2022/C 284/20)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Tribunal da Relação de Lisboa

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Fonds de Garantie des Victimes des Actes de Terrorisme et d’Autres Infractions (FGTI)

Respondent: Victoria Seguros S.A.

Question referred

Is the law applicable to the limitation rules for the right to claim compensation that of the place of the accident (Portuguese law), in accordance with Articles 4(l) and 15(h) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 (Rome II) or, if the injured party’s place is taken by subrogation, is the ‘law of the third person’ subrogee (French law) applicable in accordance with Article 19 of that Regulation?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) (OJ 2007 L 199, p. 40).
1.

Is point 6.4(a) of Annex I to Directive 2010/75/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) to be interpreted as meaning that ‘carcass production’ covers the slaughter process, which begins when the animal is removed from lairage, stunned and killed and ends when the large standard cuts are produced, so that the weight of the slaughter animal is to be calculated before the neck and head as well as the organs and entrails are removed, or does ‘carcass production’ mean the production of pig carcasses after the organs and entrails as well as the neck and head have been removed, and after exsanguination and chilling, so that the weight of the slaughter animal should only be calculated at this point in time?
Action brought on 9 June 2022 — European Commission v Kingdom of Spain

(Case C-384/22)

(2022/C 303/35)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: R. Tricot and E. Sanfrutos Cano, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Kingdom of Spain

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by not adopting, by 6 February 2018, all of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply fully with Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom of 5 December 2013 laying down basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation, and repealing Directives 89/618/Euratom, 90/641/Euratom, 96/29/Euratom, 97/43/Euratom and 2003/122/Euratom, (1) or, in any event, by not communicating those provisions to the Commission, the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 106 of that directive.

— order the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In accordance with Article 106 of Directive 2013/59/Euratom, Member States were required to bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with that directive by 6 February 2018, and to communicate those provisions to the Commission.

Given that the Kingdom of Spain has not yet incorporated all the provisions of Directive 2013/59/Euratom into Spanish legislation or, in any event, has not communicated those provisions to the Commission, as required by Article 106 thereof, the Commission decided, on 9 February 2022, to bring the present action before the Court of Justice for a declaration, under the second paragraph of Article 258 TFEU, that the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 106 of Directive 2013/59/Euratom.

(1) OJ 2014 L 13, p. 1.
Declare that the Kingdom of Sweden has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 2 of Directive (EU) 2017/853 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, codified under Directive (EU) 2021/555 (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, by failing to adopt all the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with

Points 6, 7, 8 and 9 in category A, point 8 in category B and point 5 in category C, under the definition in point A of Part II of Annex I to Directive 91/477, as amended by Article 1(19) of Directive 2017/853,

Article 5(3) of Directive 91/477, as amended by Article 1(6) of Directive 2017/853,

Article 10(1), second paragraph, of Directive 91/477, as amended by Article 1(9) of Directive 2017/853, and

Article 10(2) of Directive 91/477, as amended by Article 1(9) of Directive 2017/853, or, in any case, by failing to notify the Commission of such provisions,
Appeal brought on 8 June 2022 by Air France-KLM against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 30 March 2022 in Case T-337/17, Air France-KLM v European Commission

(Case C-370/22 P)

(2022/C 303/28)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Air France-KLM (represented by: A. Wachsmann, M. Blayney, avocats)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— Principally, — Set aside the judgment under appeal in its entirety; — Consequently, annul European Commission Decision C(2017) 1742 final of 17 March 2017 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39258 — Airfreight), in so far as it concerns Air France-KLM SA, as well as the grounds on which its operative part is based, in so far as that decision imposes a fine on Air France-KLM SA; and

— In the alternative, reduce to an appropriate amount, on the basis of Article 261 TFEU, the fine of EUR 307 360 000 imposed jointly and severally on Air France-KLM and, on the one hand, on Air France SA and, on the other, on KLM, by Articles 3(b) and 3(d) of European Commission Decision C(2017) 1742 final of 17 March 2017 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39258 — Airfreight);

— In any event, order the European Commission to pay all the costs, including those incurred by Air France-KLM SA before the General Court.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appeal is based, principally, on a ground for setting aside the judgment under appeal, in the alternative, on a ground for setting aside that judgment and, in the further alternative, on two grounds for variation of that judgment.

Principally, by the first ground of appeal, Air France-KLM submits that the judgment under appeal incorrectly confirms the imputation of Air France’s practices and of part of the practices of Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV (‘KLM’). On that basis, Air France-KLM claims that the judgment should be set aside.

In the alternative, by the second ground of appeal, Air France-KLM submits that the General Court failed correctly to assess the Commission’s jurisdiction to apply Article 101 TFEU to inbound services, that is to say, from a third country to the EEA. Air France-KLM maintains that the analysis of the qualified effects is vitiated by errors of law and that the General Court infringed its obligation to state reasons. On that basis, Air France-KLM claims that the judgment should be set aside.

In the further alternative, by the third ground of appeal, Air France-KLM submits that the General Court infringed its obligation to state reasons and the principle of equal treatment, as regards the taking into account of regulatory regimes.

By its fourth and final ground of appeal, Air France-KLM contends that the General Court made errors of law by reversing the burden of proof when it found that Air France participated uninterruptedly in the infringement between 7 December 1999 and 14 February 2006.
1.

Must Article 3(g) of Regulation (EC) No 785/2004 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on insurance requirements for air carriers and aircraft operators be interpreted as meaning that a person — who is not on board a helicopter of a [Union] air carrier, but who is suspended from a hoist cable as an integral piece of equipment (or component) of the helicopter while the helicopter is in flight and who was lifted along with the ascent of the helicopter (as a result of being suspended from the hoist cable); — who was transported as part of a free transport operation provided by the State (a State helicopter used in police services) as a carrier under a ‘carriage contract’ between the air carrier (State) and the employer of the person performing a special task (namely, on the basis of an uznesenie vlády Slovenskej republiky č. 411/2006 Z.z., of 10. mája 2006 k návrhu zásad vykonávania letov lietadiel v policajných službách (Decree No 411/2006 of the Government of the Slovak Republic of 10 May 2006 on the proposed arrangements for the implementation of air flights in police services) and the nariade Ministerstva vnútra Slovenskej republiky č. 50/2012 zo dňa 14 March 2012 o vyžadovaní a schvaľovaní letov (Decree No 50/2012 of the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic of 14 March 2012 on the need for flights and their approval), which provided that the aircraft of the air carrier would perform flights in order to ensure the performance of the tasks of the employer of the person concerned]; — the purpose of the carriage was to perform a special task such as that at issue in the main proceedings {performance of a service task consisting in the specialised training of officers of the Hasičský a záchranný zbor (fire-fighting and rescue unit) using aerial equipment (helicopter) in the form of a crane hoisting exercise for rescuer and [rescued]}, and — who was participating in a task as a trainee member of a firefighting module attached to the helicopter by means of a hoist cable as an integral piece of equipment (or component) of the helicopter on the instructions of the helicopter’s pilot and operator, and was to be hoisted aboard the helicopter during the flight, (a) is a passenger or (b) a member of the flight crew or cabin crew?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal Administrativo (Portugal) lodged on 3 May 2022 — NOS-SGPS SA v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

(Case C-290/22)

(2022/C 318/34)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Supremo Tribunal Administrativo

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: NOS-SGPS SA

Defendant: Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

Question referred

Does a holding company domiciled in Portugal and governed by the provisions of Decree-Law No 495/88 of 30 December 1988, the sole object of which is to manage shareholdings in companies other than those operating in the insurance sector, fall within the concept of financial institution within the meaning of point (22) of Article 3(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU (1) and point (26) of Article 4(1) of Regulation EU No 575/2013? (2)

(1) Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 338).

(2) Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 1).
4.

Is attribution of the winemaking to the eponymous wine-growing holding precluded if the wine-growing holding which rents out the winepress installation and carries out the winepressing has an interest of its own in the manner in which the winepressing is carried out, because a yield- and quality-dependent supplement per hectolitre of Kabinett/Spätlese/Auslese wine on top of the area-based exploitation fee is agreed in the vineyard exploitation agreement which has also been concluded with that holding?