4.

As regards the substance, the applicants contend that the contested decisions: (a) do not state the grounds on which they were based or, at least, do not adequately state them; (b) were adopted on the basis of criteria which are not very clear and are therefore contrary to Article 13, according to which repayment or remission can only be granted in precise and predetermined cases; (c) contain no detailed information on the procedure followed, particularly as regards the opinion expressed by the committee of experts, thus making it impossible to exercise judicial review of that aspect of the decision; (d) do not take account of the fact that the negligent conduct of the national authorities helped to induce the applicants into error; (e) were adopted without allowing the parties concerned to intervene before they were adopted and to present their own defence; (f) were taken on the basis of a procedure which did not respect the time-limits laid down in Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation No 1575/80; and (g) do not take account of the exceptional situation beyond the control of the applicants which justifies the application for remission. Let us begin with the objection raised at (a). It is stated that the two decisions do not state the grounds on which they were taken, or at least, the reasons advanced for refusing to grant the remission are obscure or plainly incomprehensible. In particular, they do not take account of the circumstances pleaded by the applicants as evidence of their good faith when they made the declarations which proved to be untrue, namely, the fraud of which they were victim when their clients supplied them with false certificates and the fact that they had no means of discovering that the certificates were in fact false since the documents in question had been issued by nonmember countries. The provision to which this objection refers is to be found in Article 190 of the EEC Treaty (“... decisions of the Council and of the Commission shall state the reasons on which they are based ...”). This Court has interpreted that provision as meaning that the executive must indicate, in a clear and consistent way, the principal circumstances of fact and considerations of law on which its decision is based. Nothing prevents it, however, from doing so summarily and it is not obliged to take a position on all the arguments advanced by the parties (see the judgment of 4. 7. 1963 in Case 24/62, Federal Republic of Germany v Commission [1963] ECR 63, and, more recently, that of 29. 10. 1980 in Joined Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78, Van Landewyck and Others v Commission [1980] ECR 3125). Let us examine the grounds for the contested decision in the light of those principles. Those grounds are contained in three recitals in the preamble. The first of these sets out the facts. It states that as a result of investigations carried out after the customs certificates had been presented to the relevant offices, those certificates were found to be false and therefore that the goods to which they related could no longer have the benefit of a preferential rate of duty. It also notes that the applicants allege that they made their declarations without knowing or suspecting that the documents indicating the origin of the goods were false (in absolute good faith, therefore), and in fact, they were led into that situation by the fact that the national authorities did not inform them of their suspicions as to the authenticity of the certificates. The second recital states that a group consisting of experts from all the member countries met in the context of the Committee on Duty-free Arrangements and examined the two cases at the sittings of 26 November and 8 December 1982. The third recital contains the actual grounds for the decisions. It begins by stating that when a customs agent operates in his own name, as was the case here, he is directly liable for the payment of import duties. It makes clear that the fact that the customs agent was unaware that the certificates of origin were false at the time he submitted them does not constitute a “special circumstance” within the meaning of Article 13. It also makes clear that the good faith of the agent is not sufficient to justify the grant of a remission and that it is precisely such a “circumstance” which is necessary. It points out finally that to accept an application for remission in a case such as the present one would have the effect of rendering ineffective the system of carrying out subsequent checks. It appears to me that those grounds indicate both the essential aspects of the case and the arguments relied on as a basis for the decision. They thus fully correspond to the requirements laid down in this court's case-law. The applicants criticize the grounds stated from two points of view: (a) the special circumstances pleaded by them (namely the fact that they did not know, nor could they have known, that the documents were false) were not mentioned; and (b) the argument that granting the remission would undermine investigations carried out after the event is contradictory. It can be objected to the first of those arguments that it would be unfounded even if it was true. I have in fact just cited two judgments according to which the Commission is not required to take a position on all of the defences put forward by the party concerned. It is thus undeniable that in the present case, the Commission has in no way failed to take into account the facts advanced by the applicants. It has done something which is very different and, in my opinion, perfectly reasonable. It has stated that even if the good faith of the applicants was proved that fact is not sufficient to bring the case within the scope of the concept of “special circumstances”, that is, the second of the two conditions to which Axticle 13 makes remission subject. I find the second argument unconvincing both because the Commission's argument is valid (how can it be denied that granting a remission to anyone who makes use of false certificates because they were presented in good faith would make investigations after the event largely meaningless?), and above all, because that argument was put forward ad colorandum. It does not occupy a decisive place in the scheme of the decision.