ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Case T‑425/11

Hellenic Republic

v

European Commission

‛State aid — Greek casinos — System providing for a levy of 80% on admission fees of different amounts — Decision declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market — Concept of State aid — Advantage’

Summary — Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber), 11 September 2014

Actions for annulment — Actions of the Member States — Action against a Commission decision finding an aid incompatible with the internal market — Admissibility not subject to proof of interest in bringing proceedings (Art. 263 TFEU) State aid — Concept — Legal nature — Interpretation on the basis of objective factors — Judicial review — Scope (Art. 107(1) TFEU) State aid — Concept — Scheme imposing an identical tax rate on different admission fees — Amounts of admission fees fixed by the public authorities — No advantage for undertakings applying a lower admission fee (Art. 107(1) TFEU)

See the text of the decision. (see paras 33, 34) See the text of the decision. (see paras 37-43) In the case of national legislation providing for, first, a uniform tax of the price of admission tickets to casinos, and, second, two different statutory prices for admission tickets, since the charge paid to the State for all casinos is calculated in proportion to what they actually received in that respect, the fact that casinos in respect of which a lower admission fee applies pay lesser sums to the State than casinos to which a higher, but directly proportional, admission fee applies is not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an advantage within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU in favour of the casinos falling within the first category. (see paras 55, 57, 68)

Case T‑425/11

Hellenic Republic

v

European Commission

‛State aid — Greek casinos — System providing for a levy of 80% on admission fees of different amounts — Decision declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market — Concept of State aid — Advantage’

Summary — Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber), 11 September 2014

Actions for annulment — Actions of the Member States — Action against a Commission decision finding an aid incompatible with the internal market — Admissibility not subject to proof of interest in bringing proceedings (Art. 263 TFEU) State aid — Concept — Legal nature — Interpretation on the basis of objective factors — Judicial review — Scope (Art. 107(1) TFEU) State aid — Concept — Scheme imposing an identical tax rate on different admission fees — Amounts of admission fees fixed by the public authorities — No advantage for undertakings applying a lower admission fee (Art. 107(1) TFEU)
Keywords

Summary

Keywords Procedure — Costs — Recoverable costs — Avoidable costs provoked by a party and incurred by the Court — Interpretation costs (Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 90(a)) Summary Article 90(a) of the Rules of Procedures provides that where a party has caused the General Court to incur avoidable costs, the General Court may order that party to refund them. In accordance with that provision, an intervener must be ordered to refund interpreting costs occasioned by his request to be allowed to plead in his language at the hearing, which he did not attend. (see paras 49, 50)

Case T‑541/11

(publication by extracts)

Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian

v

Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)

‛Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for the Community word mark GULBENKIAN — Earlier well-known national mark, company name and national logos Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian — Relative grounds for refusal — Evidence of the existence of the earlier rights — Article 8(1)(b), (4) and (5) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Article 90(a) of the Rules of Procedure’

Summary — Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber), 26 June 2014

Procedure — Costs — Recoverable costs — Avoidable costs provoked by a party and incurred by the Court — Interpretation costs

(Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 90(a))

Article 90(a) of the Rules of Procedures provides that where a party has caused the General Court to incur avoidable costs, the General Court may order that party to refund them. In accordance with that provision, an intervener must be ordered to refund interpreting costs occasioned by his request to be allowed to plead in his language at the hearing, which he did not attend.

(see paras 49, 50)
Concerning Council acts imposing restrictive measures on Syria, the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, in particular, that as part of the review of the lawfulness of the grounds which are the basis of the decision to list or to maintain the listing of a given person on the lists of persons subject to sanctions, the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that that decision is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated. It is the task of the competent European Union authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. It is necessary that the information or evidence produced by the authority in question should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned. If that material is insufficient to allow a finding that a reason is well founded, the Courts of the European Union shall disregard that reason as a possible basis for the contested decision to list or maintain a listing.

Where the evidence provided by the Council does not contain any indicia capable of supporting its claims against the applicant, it follows that the Council has not discharged its burden of proof under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

(see paras 80, 81, 85, 86)
1.

Annuls Council Decision 2011/357/CFSP of 20 June 2011, amending Decision 2010/639/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against certain officials of Belarus, Council Regulation (EU) No 588/2011 of 20 June 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures against President Lukashenko and certain officials of Belarus, Council Decision 2011/666/CFSP of 10 October 2011 amending Decision 2010/639/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Belarus, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1000/2011 of 10 October 2011 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in respect of Belarus, Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP of 15 October 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Belarus and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1017/2012 of 6 November 2012 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in respect of Belarus, in so far as those acts concern Sport-pari ZAO;
Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 27 November 2014 —

Hesse and Lutter & Partner v OHIM — Porsche (Carrera)

(Case T‑173/11)

‛Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for Community word mark Carrera — Earlier Community and national word marks CARRERA — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Unfair advantage taken of the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trade mark — Article 8(5) of Regulation No 207/2009 — Partial substitution of a party to the proceedings’

1. Judicial proceedings — Application initiating proceedings — Formal requirements — Brief summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 21; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 44(1)(d)) (see para. 26)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 32, 33)

3. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Word mark Carrera and word marks CARRERA (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b) (see paras 37-48)

4. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark enjoying a reputation — Protection of well-known earlier mark extended to dissimilar goods or services — Conditions (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(5)) (see paras 51-53, 62)

5. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark enjoying a reputation — Protection of well-known earlier mark extended to dissimilar goods or services — Proof to be adduced by proprietor — Genuine future risk of undue profit or damage (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(5)) (see para. 67)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 11 January 2011 (Case R 306/2010-4) concerning opposition proceedings between Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG and Mr Kurt Hesse.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
2.

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 29, 50)
4.

Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures against Belarus — Freezing of funds of certain persons and bodies in view of the situation in Belarus — Obligation to extend that measure to entities owned or controlled by such an entity — Condition — Acts instituting restrictive measures providing for the application of the latter to the said owned or controlled entities — Judgment having annulled the restrictive measures concerning the entity — Scope — Annulment of the restrictive measures concerning the entities owned or controlled by the entity (Council Decisions 2011/357/CFSP, 2011/666/CFSP and 2012/642/CFSP; Council Regulations No 588/2011, No 1000/2011 and 1017/2012) (see paras 88, 89, 144, 145, 149)
Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 22 May 2012 —

Sport Eybl & Sports Experts v OHIM — Seven (SEVEN SUMMITS)





(Case T‑179/11)

Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for Community figurative mark SEVEN SUMMITS — Earlier Community figurative mark Seven — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Figurative marks SEVEN SUMMITS and Seven (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 22, 55-57, 62, 63, 71)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 17 January 2011 (Case R 364/2010-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Seven SpA and Sport Eybl & Sports Experts GmbH.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 16 October 2012 — Monier Roofing Components v OHIM (CLIMA COMFORT)

(Case T-371/11)

Community trade mark — Application for the Community word mark CLIMA COMFORT — Absolute ground for refusal — Lack of distinctiveness — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Right to be heard — Second sentence of Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009 — Ex officio examination of the facts — Article 76(1) of Regulation No 207/2009

1. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Assessment of distinctive character — Criteria (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 13, 18, 19, 36)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Word mark CLIMA COMFORT (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 14, 25-29, 32-43)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 28 April 2011 (Case R 2026/2010-1), concerning an application for registration of the word sign CLIMA COMFORT as a Community trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
40

However, it is to be borne in mind that, according to the case-law referred to in paragraph 19 above, since the representatives of the proprietor of the trade mark act on behalf of and in the name of the proprietor, their actions must be regarded as being the proprietor’s actions. Likewise and by analogy, as the General Court has already held concerning the remission of customs duties, the negligence of the representative is to be taken into account in the same way as that of the interested party (judgment of the General Court of 30 November 2006 in Case T-382/04 Heuschen & Schrouff Oriëntal Foods v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 94). It follows that the applicant, its American agent and firm B., representing it before OHIM, appear to constitute a single entity for the purposes of the proceedings before OHIM and the failure to comply with the requirement to exercise due care incumbent on the representatives must be considered to be the failure of the proprietor for the purposes of those proceedings. Consequently, the question whether the applicant or its American agent displayed a sufficient level of diligence is relevant only from the point of view of their contractual relations with firm B. and the establishment of liability for any damage suffered by the applicant, but cannot affect its legal position vis-à-vis OHIM.
26

Regarding the alternative claims seeking the partial annulment of the Total and Elf Aquitaine judgment, paragraph 11 above (EU:T:211:250), the Court of Justice found as follows: ‘78 The [applicants’] arguments must be dismissed as manifestly unfounded because they are not such as to affect the General Court’s finding … that the fact that Arkema left the [applicants’] group after the period of the infringement in question, but before the adoption of the [Methacrylates] decision cannot affect the application of the multiplier in relation to the other companies of the group, which include the applicants. The General Court reached that conclusion by reason of the fact that the disposal of Arkema, whose turnover was approximately EUR 5.7 thousand million in 2005, could not have led to a significant decrease in the turnover of the [applicants’] group, which was taken into account by the Commission when setting the multiplier of 3, that is to say, approximately EUR 143 thousand million for the same year, such as to render the multiplier unjustified in relation to the applicants. … 81 … it must be observed that the applicants’ submissions concerning a violation of the “indivisible nature of the fine” and the need to extend in their favour the General Court’s approach in [the Arkema judgment] arise from an erroneous concept, on the applicants’ part, of both the substantive law and the procedural law. 82 First, the objective of the multiplier as a deterrent being precisely to ensure that, having regard to the size and the financial capacity of the undertaking in question, the fine should not become negligible, it goes without saying that, after the disposal of Arkema, that objective remained valid both for the applicants and for Arkema. As the size of the latter was considerably less than that of the applicants and, at the date of the [Methacrylates] decision, Arkema no longer formed part of the [applicants’] group, Arkema’s size could not be taken into account for determining the multiplier representing the deterrent effect for the purpose of calculating the fine imposed on Arkema. That objective difference confronting Arkema and the applicants justified applying a different multiplier to the latter in any case. 83 Secondly, in the present case there is nothing to justify extending to the applicants the force of res judicata which is to be attributed to the [Arkema] judgment. The multiplier applying to them and to Arkema is different. The mere fact that those companies had to pay a fine for which they are [jointly and severally] liable cannot justify extending the force of res judicata. On that point, it is sufficient to note that, as the Commission explained in the letter of 8 July 2011, the reduction in Arkema’s fine left the applicants’ fine unchanged …’
130

Regarding Ortero’s article, it is necessary to note that the observations therein have been widely criticised by other authors in commentaries subsequently published in the journal Analytical Chemistry. These authors have especially criticised the scientific quality of Otero’s assessments, and those of other authors of the article in question. In particular, they considered the following: ‘The experiments and observations described in this document do not justify calling into question the merits or the reliability of the LC-MS/MS method as an assessment method with the aim of protecting consumers … We conclude that, since the authors have referred to the wrong method, the entire publication is rendered irrelevant with regard to “concerns” and “proposed assessment methods”. Unfortunately, that also means that the publication is based on a mistaken premiss … This document reveals a misunderstanding of the factors crucial for successful general use of the LC-MS/MS method, and some problems with specific competences in work on the three toxins. We show the existence of problems in the carrying-out of and briefing on the experiments, including an eventual cross contamination due to the injector and the lack of quality assurance/quality control. As a result, the specific conclusions drawn are not considered to be valid.’
The judicial review of the lawfulness of a measure whereby restrictive measures are imposed on an entity extends to the assessment of the facts and circumstances relied on as justifying it, and to the evidence and information on which that assessment is based.

The legality of the contested decision may be assessed only on the basis of the elements of fact and law on which it was adopted and not on the basis of information which was brought to the institution’s knowledge after the adoption of that decision, even if the latter takes the view that that information could legitimately be the basis for the adoption of that decision. In short, the Court cannot substitute the grounds on which that decision is based.

(see paras 18, 29)
It follows from Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation anti-dumping No 1225/2009 that the Union institutions must demonstrate that the dumped imports are causing significant injury to the EU industry, owing to their volume and price. That entails what is known as the ‘attribution analysis’. It also follows from Article 3(7) of the basic regulation that the institutions must examine all other known factors which are injuring the EU industry at the same time as the dumped imports and, moreover, ensure that the injury caused by those other factors is not attributed to the dumped imports. That entails what is known as the ‘non-attribution analysis’.

The objective of Article 3(6) and (7) of Regulation No 1225/2009 is therefore to ensure that the Union institutions separate and distinguish the injurious effects of the dumped imports from those caused by other factors. If the institutions do not separate and distinguish the impact of the various injury factors, they cannot legitimately conclude that the dumped imports have caused injury to the EU industry. Next, when determining the injury, the Council and the Commission must, in particular, examine whether the injury which they propose to find might have its cause in the conduct of EU producers themselves.

(see paras 62-64)
Keywords

Subject of the case

Operative part



Keywords

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Overlap between the scope of the grounds for refusal set out in subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Article 7(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b) and (c)) (see paras 18, 19)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Word mark ECO PRO (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 23-32, 34)

3. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Word mark composed of several elements — Account taken of the overall perception of the combination by the relevant public (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 24)

Subject of the case

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 18 January 2012 (Case R 1418/2011-4), concerning the international registration designating the European Community of the word sign ECO PRO.

Operative part

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Bayerische Motoren Werke AG to pay the costs.