ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 90/6

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Germany) lodged on 15 December 2015 — Jan Šalplachta

(Case C-670/15)

(2016/C 090/09)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesarbeitsgericht

Party to the main proceedings

Applicant: Jan Šalplachta

Question referred

Does the right of a natural person to effective access to justice in a cross-border dispute within the meaning of Articles 1 and 2 of Council Directive 2003/8/EC of 27 January 2003 to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes by establishing minimum common rules relating to legal aid for such disputes (1) require that legal aid granted by the Federal Republic of Germany must extend to the costs incurred by the applicant for the translation of the declaration and supporting documents annexed to the legal aid application, where the applicant, at the same time as bringing the action, applies for legal aid to the court hearing the case, which is also the competent receiving authority within the meaning of Article 13(1)(b) of the directive, and he has himself arranged for the translation to be made?

(1) OJ 2003 L 26, p. 41, corrigendum OJ 2003 L 32, p. 1.
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does it suffice that the realisation of the financial promise to existing members depends primarily or mostly on an indirect payment through the contributions of existing members, i.e. existing members do not obtain their compensation primarily or mostly from their own sale or their own consumption of goods or services, but depend for the realisation of the financial promise primarily or mostly on the subscription and contributions of new members (‘indirect link’)?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 191/2

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul Sibiu (Romania) lodged on 2 July 2015 — Andreea Corina Târșia v Statul român, Universitatea ‘Lucian Blaga’ Sibiu, Consiliul Național pentru Combaterea Discriminării

(Case C-328/15)

(2016/C 191/02)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Tribunalul Sibiu

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Andreea Corina Târșia

Defendants: Statul român, Universitatea ‘Lucian Blaga’ Sibiu, Consiliul Național pentru Combaterea Discriminării

By order of 14 April 2016, the Court (Sixth Chamber) declared that it clearly lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the request for a preliminary ruling made by the Tribunalul Sibiu (Romania) by decision of 8 June 2015.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 326/6

Appeal brought on 25 September 2015 by Roland SE against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 16 July 2015 in Case T-631/14 Roland SE v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-515/15 P)

(2016/C 326/10)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Roland SE (represented by: C. Onken, Rechtsanwältin)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

Christian Louboutin

By order of 14 April 2016 the Court (Ninth Chamber) dismissed the appeal.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 270/14

Appeal brought on 17 August 2015 by Best-Lock (Europe) Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 16 June 2015 in Case T-395/14: Best-Lock (Europe) v EUIPO

(Case C-451/15 P)

(2016/C 270/18)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Best-Lock (Europe) Ltd (represented by: J. Becker, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

By order of 14 April 2016 the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 106/28

Appeal brought on 4 February 2016 by European Bicycle Manufacturers Association against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 26 November 2015 in Case T-425/13: Giant (China) Co. Ltd v Council of the European Union

(Case C-61/16 P)

(2016/C 106/30)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: European Bicycle Manufacturers Association (represented by: L. Ruessmann, avocat, J. Beck, solicitor)

Other parties to the proceedings: Giant (China) Co. Ltd, Council of the European Union, European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— declare the Appeal admissible and well-founded;

— set aside the General Court's judgment;

— rule on the substance and dismiss the Application for Annulment or refer the case back to the General Court for a decision on the substance of the Application for Annulment; and

— order the Applicant before the General Court to pay the Appellant's costs for the Appeal and the Intervention before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

— First ground of appeal: The General Court committed an error of law by applying an incorrect legal analysis of the Council's application of Article 18 of the Basic Regulation. Contrary to the General Court's findings, Regulation 502/2013 (1) applied Article 18(1) globally to the Giant group because the Institutions lacked complete and comprehensive information about the related companies, and not only to information related to the export price of the group.

— Second ground of appeal: The General Court committed an error of law in finding that the Council could not consider Giant's failure to provide basic threshold information as non-cooperation within the meaning of Article 18(1) of the Basic Regulation. The information required was basic threshold information necessary to permit the Institutions to obtain a complete and accurate picture of the Giant group and not providing this information constituted therefore a lack of cooperation that cast doubt on the reliability of the information that was provided by Giant.

— Third ground of appeal: The General Court committed an error of law in finding that there would be no risk of circumvention if Giant were granted an individual anti-dumping duty but Jinshan would not. The Institutions' concerns regarding circumvention by related companies in the present case are justified and constitute a valid additional ground for the rejection of the request for an individual antidumping duty by Giant.

(1) Council Regulation (EU) No 502/2013 of 29 May 2013 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 990/2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of bicycles originating in the People’s Republic of China following an interim review pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 OJ L 153, p. 17
2.

Does Article 28 of the regulation preclude, in a situation where an asylum seeker is not in detention at the time when the Member State responsible agrees to take charge of him, the application of national rules which, in Sweden, mean that an alien may not be kept in detention pending implementation [of a transfer] for longer than two months, if there are no serious reasons for detaining him for a longer period, and if there are such serious reasons, the alien may be kept in detention for a maximum of three months or, if it is probable that implementation will take longer due to a lack of cooperation from the alien or it takes time to obtain the necessary documents, a maximum of twelve months?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 145/19

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (Romania) lodged on 1 February 2016 — Evo Bus GmbH v Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Ploiești — Administrația Județeană a Finanțelor Publice Argeș

(Case C-55/16)

(2016/C 145/24)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Evo Bus GmbH

Defendant: Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Ploiești — Administrația Județeană a Finanțelor Publice Argeș

Question referred

Are the Eighth Directive (79/1072/EEC) (1) and the principle of fiscal neutrality to be interpreted as precluding/having precluded the legislation of a Member State which regulates/regulated, in the light of the principle that there should be certainty in tax matters, the conditions for eligibility for reimbursement of value added tax, such as, in the present case, the condition requiring proof of payment of the tax by suppliers?

(1) Eighth Council Directive 79/1072/EEC of 6 December 1979 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Arrangements for the refund of value added tax to taxable persons not established in the territory of the country (OJ 1979 L 331, p. 11).
2.

Does Article 198(10) of the 1992 Income Tax Code, in the version which was in force for the 2000 and 2001 tax years, constitute a provision for the prevention of fraud or abuse within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive of 23 July 1990 (Council Directive 90/435/EEC), and, if so, does Article 198(10) of the 1992 Income Tax Code go further than is necessary in order to combat such fraud or abuse in so far as it provides that interest is not to be regarded as a business expense up to an amount corresponding to the dividends qualifying for exemption under Articles 202 to 204 where those dividends are derived from shares which, at the time of their transfer, had not been held for an uninterrupted period of at least one year, in which connection no distinction is made according to whether those interest payments relate to (the financing of) the holding from which the dividends qualifying for exemption were derived or not?
1.

In cases where a credit institution operates as an investment firm to which funds have been transferred for the acquisition of debt securities issued by the same credit institution, but the securities issue does not become effective and the securities are not transferred to the ownership of the person who has paid the funds, while the funds have already been debited from that person’s bank account and transferred to an account opened in the name of the credit institution and are not repayable, and the national legislative intent in such a case is not clear with regard to the application of a specific protection scheme, can Article 1.1 of the Deposit Directive (1) and Article 1(4) of the Investor Directive (2) be applied directly in order to determine the applicable coverage scheme, and is the intended use of the funds the decisive criterion for that purpose? Do those provisions of the directives display the necessary clarity, detail and unconditionality and confer rights on individuals, with the result that they may be relied on by individuals before national courts to found their claims for payment of compensation brought against the State body providing insurance cover?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 145/18

Appeal brought on 25 January 2016 by Dyson Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 11 November 2015 in Case T-544/13: Dyson Ltd v European Commission

(Case C-44/16 P)

(2016/C 145/23)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Dyson Ltd (represented by: E. Batchelor, M. Healy, solicitors, F. Carlin, barrister, A. Patsa, advocate)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— Annul the contested judgment in its entirety;

— Annul the contested Regulation (1) in its entirety; and

— Order the Commission to pay its own costs and Dyson’s costs in connection with these proceedings and the proceedings before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Dyson submits the General Court erred in law:

i. First, the General Court mischaracterised Dyson's plea as manifest error rather than lack of legal competence under Art.10(1) of Directive 2010/30/EU (2);

ii. Second, the General Court misinterpreted the scope of the Commission's delegated power under Art. 10(1) of Directive 2010/30/EU;

iii. Third, the General Court infringed Dyson's rights of defence as to facts on which Dyson had no opportunity to provide its views;

iv. Fourth, the General Court distorted and/or disregarded relevant evidence;

v. Fifth, the General Court infringed Art. 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice by not stating reasons for: (i) characterising the applicable legal test as one of manifest error; (ii) concluding Dyson's data was ‘extremely speculative’; (iii) purporting to rely on an unspecified part of an unidentified ‘impact study’; and (iv) disregarding Dyson's reproducibility evidence; and

vi. Sixth, the General Court misapplied the legal test for equal treatment.

Dyson respectfully requests that the Court annul the contested judgment and grant the order sought before the General Court, annulling Commission Regulation (EU) No 665/2013 (‘Contested Regulation’) as it has sufficient information before it to rule on the substance of the issues raised at first instance.

(1) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 665/2013 of 3 May 2013 supplementing Directive 2010/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to energy labelling of vacuum cleaners OJ L 192, p. 1

(2) Directive 2010/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the indication by labelling and standard product information of the consumption of energy and other resources by energy-related products OJ L 153, p. 1
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Authorise YUL to serve interim and final garnishee orders on the European Investment Bank in respect of those debts and, de minimis, of all sums owed or which will be owed by the European Investment Bank to the Russian Federation in its capacity as issuer of bonds subscribed by the Russian Federation, including on the interest generated by those bonds and their reimbursement, in accordance with the arrangements laid down in the applicable issue contract(s) or prospectus(es) and up to an amount, in principal and interest, subject to revaluation during the proceedings, of EUR 1 690 886 892,20 (amount of the debt held by YUL against the Russian Federation);
3.

Do the swap agreements concluded between [Sociedade Metropolitana de Desenvolvimento, S.A.] (‘SMD’) and Banco Santander Totta have sufficient international elements to give rise to the application of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 and Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 in order to determine which courts have international jurisdiction to settle disputes relating to them where: (a) Those entities are nationals of a Member State, Portugal, that concluded two swap agreements in Portugal consisting of an ISDA Master Agreement and two confirmations, negotiated by the Autonomous Region of Madeira on behalf of SMD; (b) In that negotiation, the Autonomous Region of Madeira, assisted by Banco BPI, S.A., and by a law firm, invited more than one international bank to submit proposals, one of those invited banks being JP Morgan; (c) Banco Santander Totta is wholly owned by Banco Santander, with domicile in Spain; (d) Banco Santander Totta acted in its capacity as an international bank with subsidiaries in various Member States and under the single brand Santander; (e) Banco Santander Totta was considered in the ISDA Master Agreement as a Multibranch Party, able to make and receive payments in any transaction through its subsidiaries in London or Luxemburg; (f) Under the terms of the ISDA Master Agreement concluded, the parties may, in certain cases, transfer their rights and obligations to other representative offices or subsidiaries; (g) The parties to the swap agreements specified that English law was applicable and concluded jurisdiction agreements that confer exclusive jurisdiction on the English courts; (h) The agreements were drafted in English and the terminology and concepts used are Anglo-Saxon; (i) The swap agreements were concluded with the objective of covering the risk of variation in the interest rates of two financing agreements, both drafted in English and concluded with foreign entities (one based in the Netherlands and the other in Italy), and in one of the financing agreements it is provided that borrowers’ payments must be made to the HSBC Bank Plc account in London, on dates defined by reference to the London time zone and subject to English law and the English courts; (j) Banco Santander Totta acted as an intermediary of the international market, having concluded hedging agreements in the context of the international market?
2.

(a) If the answer to the first question is no, must Article 5 of Decision No 1/95 of the [EC]-Turkey Association Council be interpreted as meaning that a tax such as that governed by the Hungarian Law on motor vehicle tax, which, in accordance with that Law, is levied on a goods vehicle with a Turkish registration number operated by a Turkish haulier and used for the carriage of goods, by reason of the fact that it crosses the Hungarian border in order to arrive at another Member State — starting from Turkey and passing through Hungary as the transit Member State — constitutes a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction and is not, therefore, compatible with Article 5 of that decision? (b) Must Article 7 of Decision No 1/95 of the [EC]-Turkey Association Council be interpreted as meaning that it is permissible, on road safety grounds and the grounds for applying laws, for a tax such as that governed by the Hungarian Law on motor vehicle tax, which, in accordance with that Law, is levied on a goods vehicle with a Turkish registration number operated by a Turkish haulier and used for the carriage of goods, to be applied, by reason of the fact that it crosses the Hungarian border in order to arrive at another Member State, starting from Turkey and passing through Hungary as the transit Member State?
1.

Must Article 101 TFEU, in conjunction with Article 4(3) TEU, be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that provided for in Article 83bis(10) of Legislative Decree 112/2008, in so far as the price of road haulage services on behalf of third parties may not be lower than minimum operating costs determined by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport and is not left to be freely determined by the contracting parties?
1.

Do the provisions in Article 47(1)(d) of Regulation No 1408/71 (1) mean that the insurance periods completed in another Member State, in the calculation of the Swedish guaranteed pension, can be given a pensionable value which corresponds to the average value of the Swedish periods where the competent authority undertakes a pro-rata calculation under Article 46(2) of that regulation?
2.

Having regard to Articles 49 and 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, are nationals of the Member State concerned affected to the same extent as nationals of the other Member States by legislation of a Member State such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which makes the continuance of rights of usufruct and use constituted over arable land subject to evidence of a close family link with the person who constituted those rights, so that, if the holder of the right of usufruct or use is unable to establish the close family link, his right is extinguished ex lege with no compensation?
2.

Must Article 11(2) of the Return Directive, having regard to the application of transitional law, be interpreted as meaning that decisions taken before that directive entered into force, the legal effect of which is that the addressee must remain outside the Netherlands for ten consecutive years, while the entry ban was determined having regard for all the relevant circumstances of the individual case and was open to challenge on legal grounds, no longer have any legal effect if the duration of that obligation, at the time by which that directive had to be implemented or at the time at which it was established that the person to whom that decision was addressed was present in the Netherlands, exceeded the period provided for in that provision?
1.

On a proper construction of Article 101 TFEU, can the parties to a licensing agreement be regarded as competitors if the licensee company operates on the relevant market concerned solely by virtue of that agreement? Do possible restrictions of competition between the licenser and the licensee in such a situation, although not explicitly provided for in the licensing agreement, fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU or fall within the scope of the exception set out in Article 101(3) TFEU and, if so, within what limits?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 251/9

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 20 April 2016 — Casertana Costruzioni Srl v Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti — Provveditorato Interregionale per le opere pubbliche della Campania e del Molise, Azienda Regionale Campana per la Difesa del Suolo — A.R.CA.DI.S.

(Case C-223/16)

(2016/C 251/12)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Casertana Costruzioni Srl

Defendants: Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti — Provveditorato Interregionale per le opere pubbliche della Campania e del Molise, Azienda Regionale Campana per la Difesa del Suolo — A.R.CA.DI.S.

Question referred

Do Article 47(2) and Article 48(3) of Directive 2004/18/EC, (1) as replaced by Article 63 of Directive 2014/24/EU, (2) preclude national rules which exclude, or may be construed as excluding, any possibility for an economic operator, that is to say a tenderer, of appointing another undertaking to replace the undertaking originally relied upon as ‘auxiliary undertaking’ where the latter no longer has the capacity to participate or that capacity is diminished, thus resulting in the economic operator being excluded from the tendering procedure for reasons that are neither objectively nor subjectively imputable to it?

(1) Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114).

(2) Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65).
2.

Does the answer to Question 1 depend on whether the undertaking advertising in the print medium is advertising sales of its own products and refers directly to its own website for the information required by Article 7(4) of Directive 2005/29/EC, or whether the advertising relates to products which are sold by other undertakings on an internet platform operated by the advertiser, and consumers are able to access the information set out in Article 7(4) of the Directive only through one or more steps (clicks) via links to the internet sites of those other undertakings which are made available only on the website specified in the advertisement?
1.

If the EFP provisions in the Directive (1) concern only the free movement of goods, can they nonetheless apply to Gibraltar on the basis that they do not involve a trade or commercial transaction and are therefore outside the scope of the derogations granted to Gibraltar under the 1972 Act of Accession?