ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 23 September 2019 — Axpo Trading Ag v Gestore dei Servizi Energetici SpA — GSE

(Case C-705/19)

(2019/C 432/29)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Axpo Trading Ag

Respondent: Gestore dei Servizi Energetici SpA — GSE

Question referred

Do the following provisions:

— Article 18 TFEU, in so far as it prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nationality within the scope of application of the Treaties;

— Articles 28 and 30 TFEU and Article 6 of the EEC-Switzerland Free Trade Agreement, in so far as they provide for the abolition of customs duties on imports and measures having equivalent effect;

— Article 110 TFEU, in so far as it prohibits taxation on imports in excess of those imposed directly or indirectly on similar domestic products;

— Article 34 TFEU and Article 13 of the EEC-Switzerland Free Trade Agreement, in so far as they prohibit the adoption of measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on imports;

— Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, in so far as they prohibit the implementation of a State aid measure not notified to the Commission and incompatible with the internal market; and

— Directive 2009/28/EC, (1) in so far as it seeks to promote intra-Community trade in green electricity, thus promoting, moreover, the production capacity of individual Member States,

preclude national legislation which imposes on importers of green electricity a financial burden that does not apply to domestic producers of the same product?

(1) Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (OJ 2009 L 140, p. 16).
4.

If courts in the Netherlands as referred to in Question 3 above have international, but not internal, territorial jurisdiction to hear all individual claims for compensation brought by investors who have suffered damage as referred to in Question 1, will the internal territorial jurisdiction be determined on the basis of the place of domicile of the misled investor, the place of establishment of the bank in which that investor holds his or her personal bank account or the place of establishment of the bank in which the investment account is held, or on the basis of some other connecting factor?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 24 May 2019 by Hochmann Marketing GmbH against the order of the General Court (Third Chamber) made on 22 March 2019 in Case T-657/18, Hochmann Marketing GmbH v Council of the European Union

(Case C-408/19 P)

(2020/C 10/27)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Hochmann Marketing GmbH (represented by: J. Jennings, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

By order of 31 October 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Seventh Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Riigikohus (Estonia) lodged on 29 October 2019 — XX v Tartu Vangla

(Case C-795/19)

(2020/C 19/32)

Language of the case: Estonian

Referring court

Riigikohus

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: XX

Defendant: Tartu Vangla

Question referred

Should Article 2(2), read in combination with Article 4(1), of Council Directive 2000/78/EC (1) of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, be interpreted as precluding provisions of national law which provide that impaired hearing below the prescribed standard constitutes an absolute impediment to work as a prison officer and that the use of corrective aids to assess compliance with the requirements is not permitted?

(1) OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16.
4.

Does Directive 93/13, interpreted in the light of the principle of effectivity of Community law, preclude national case-law in which a term or set of terms, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, are considered to be ‘plain [and] intelligible’ for the purposes of the directive, on the grounds that: — the preliminary loan offer sets out in detail the exchange transactions carried out during the life of the credit and makes clear that the euro/Swiss franc exchange rate will be that applicable two working days before the date of the event that determines the transaction and which is published on the website of the European Central Bank; — it is stated in the offer that the borrower agrees to the Swiss franc/euro and euro/Swiss franc exchange transactions necessary for the transaction and repayment of the credit, and that the lender will convert the balance of the monthly payments after payment of the charges associated with the credit into Swiss francs; — the offer states that, if the exchange transaction results in a sum lower than the amount payable in Swiss francs, the amortisation of the capital will be less rapid and any unpaid capital in respect of a repayment period will be entered on the debit side of the account in Swiss francs, and that it is made clear that the amortisation of the capital of the loan will change according to upwards or downwards variations in the exchange rate applied to the monthly payments that that change may result in the extension or reduction of the loan amortisation period and, where appropriate, alter the total repayment cost; — the articles ‘internal account in euros’ and ‘internal account in Swiss francs’ describe the transactions carried out in each payment period to the credit and the debit of each account, and the contract explains in transparent terms the actual functioning of the foreign currency conversion mechanism in transparent terms; — and although there is no express reference in the offer to the ‘exchange risk’ which is borne by the borrower since he does not receive income in the account currency, or any explicit reference to the ‘interest rate risk’?
In the event that Question 2a) is answered in the affirmative: Is the EU law referred to in Question 2a) to be interpreted as meaning that an exception to the principle referred to in 2a), according to which the rightholder must be reimbursed the full amount of the lawyers’ fees referred to in 1a), or at least a reasonable and substantial proportion of those fees,

taking account of other factors (such as, for instance, how current the work is, the period of publication and the infringement by a natural person outside the interests of his trade or profession)

is to be considered

even if the infringement of intellectual property rights within the meaning of Article 2 of the Enforcement Directive consists in file sharing, that is to say making a work available to the public by offering it for free download to all users on a freely accessible exchange platform that has no digital rights management?
First ground of appeal: The principle of energy solidarity is not a legal criterion, and does not impose on executive bodies an obligation to act

The principle of energy solidarity in Article 194 TFEU is, as a general guiding principal, a purely political notion and not a legal criterion.

The primary law principle of energy solidarity cannot give rise to specific rights and obligations for the European Union and/or for the Member States. In particular, no obligations flow from that abstract guiding principal for executive bodies, such as verification obligations on the European Commission as part of its decision-making.

On account of its abstract and indeterminable nature, the concept of energy solidarity is not justiciable.
1.

Are Paragraphs 6(1) and 27(1) of the EG-FGV (1) and/or Articles 18(1) and 26(1) of Directive 2007/46/EC (2) to be interpreted as meaning that the manufacturer is in breach of its obligation to issue a valid certificate pursuant to Paragraph 6(1) of the EG-FGV (and/or of its obligation to deliver a certificate of conformity pursuant to Article 18(1) of Directive 2007/46/EC), if it has installed in the vehicle an impermissible defeat device within the meaning of Articles 5(2) and 3.10 of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007, (3) and that the placing of such a vehicle on the market is in breach of the prohibition on placing a vehicle on the market without a valid certificate of conformity pursuant to Paragraph 27(1) of the EG-FGV (and/or of the prohibition of sale without a valid certificate of conformity pursuant to Article 26(1) of Directive 2007/46/EC)? If the answer to (1) is in the affirmative: 1 a. Are Paragraphs 6 and 27 of the EG-FGV and/or Articles 18(1), 26(1) and 46 of Directive 2007/46/EC also aimed at protecting the end customer, including in relation to his freedom of disposal and his assets? Does a car buyer’s acquisition of a used vehicle that has been placed on the market without a valid certificate of conformity come within the area of the risks for the prevention of which these standards were adopted?
2.

In a case concerning the protection of material and non-material personality rights against online infringement, is it necessary, when assessing the grounds of jurisdiction set out in Article 7(2) of Regulation [[…] No 1215/2012 […]], that is to say, when assessing whether a national court is the court for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur, to take account of circumstances such as: — the public to whom the website on which the infringement occurred is principally addressed; — the language of the website and in which the publication in question is written; — the period during which the online information in question remained accessible to the public; — the individual circumstances of the applicant, such as the applicant’s wartime experiences and his current social activism, which are invoked in the present case as justification for the applicant’s special right to oppose, by way of judicial proceedings, the dissemination of allegations made against the community to which the applicant belongs?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 28 November 2019 by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 20 September 2019 in Case T-65/18, Venezuela v Council

(Case C-872/19 P)

(2020/C 45/25)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (represented by: L. Giuliano and F. Di Gianni, avvocati)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal insofar as it dismissed the action as inadmissible;

— declare the action brought by the appellant admissible and refer the case back to the General Court to rule on the merits of the case; and

— order the Council to pay the costs of these proceedings and of the proceedings before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on a sole ground of appeal divided into three limbs.

The General Court wrongly interpreted the criterion of direct concern provided for in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU in light of Almaz-Antey case law:

1. The General Court applied the wrong test to assess whether the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is directly concerned by the contested provisions (1).

2. The General Court erred in law since it overlooked some essential circumstances of the present case when applying the direct concern criterion as established in Almaz-Antey.

3. The General Court neglected to consider the factual effects of the contested provisions on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

(1) Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2074 of 13 November 2017 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela (OJ 2017, L 295, p. 60).
2.

If the answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative and the Member State of the Schengen area has requested the surrender of that person in order to conduct the proceedings in respect of which extradition is requested, must that person be surrendered to that State, in accordance with the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the surrender procedure between the Member States of the European Union and Iceland and Norway?
6.

Is the concept of ‘bodies recognised … as being devoted to social wellbeing’ contained in Article 132(1)(g) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax to be interpreted, in view of the recognition of the social character of the body, as laying down certain requirements vis-à-vis the way in which the service provider operates or as regards the not-for-profit or profit-making objective of the activity of the service provider, or more generally as restricting by other criteria or conditions the scope of the exemption provided for in Article 132(1)(g), or is the performance of services ‘linked to welfare and social security work’ alone sufficient to give the body at issue a social character?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Vicenza (Italy) lodged on 15 November 2019 — AV v Minister for Justice and the Italian Republic

(Case C-834/19)

(2020/C 54/32)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale di Vicenza

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: AV

Defendant: Minister for Justice and the Italian Republic

Questions referred

Does the national practice whereby honorary district court judges who work as described [in the order for reference] (as in AV’s case) are excluded from the concept of ‘part-time worker’, as referred to in Clause 2 of the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1997/81/EC, (1) and from the concept of ‘fixed-term worker’, as referred to in Clause 2 of the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC, (2) constitute an obstacle to the effectiveness of Directives 1997/81/EC and 1999/70/EC?

(1) Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC — Annex: Framework agreement on part-time work (OJ 1998 L 14, p. 9).

(2) Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (OJ 1999 L 175, p. 43).
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 26 November 2019 — NH v Deutsche Lufthansa AG

(Case C-864/19)

(2020/C 68/35)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: NH

Defendant: Deutsche Lufthansa AG

The case was removed from the Register of the Court of Justice by order of the President of the Court of 9 January 2020.
2.

Are the requirements referred to in Question 1 breached in a situation where the parties can lodge an extraordinary appeal against a judgment handed down in court proceedings such as those described in Question 1, and this extraordinary appeal is lodged with a court such as the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland), the decisions of which cannot be the subject of appeal under national law, and national law imposes on the president of the organisational unit of that court (chamber) competent to hear the appeal the obligation to allocate cases in accordance with an alphabetical list of judges of that chamber, expressly prohibiting the omission of any judge, and the judges among whom the cases are allocated include a person appointed upon the motion of a collegiate body such as the Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (National Council of the Judiciary), the members of which are judges: (a) elected by a chamber of parliament which votes for a list of candidates drawn up in advance by a parliamentary committee from among the candidates nominated by parliamentary factions or a body of that chamber of parliament on the basis of proposals from groups of judges or citizens, and as a result there are three occasions on which the candidates receive support from politicians during the election procedure; (b) who represent a majority of the members of that collegiate body sufficient to take decisions on submitting motions for appointments to judicial positions as well as other binding decisions required under national law?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 1 August 2019 by L’Oréal against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 19 June 2019 in Case T-180/16 RENV, L’Oréal v EUIPO — Guinot

(Case C-587/19 P)

(2020/C 77/22)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: L’Oréal (represented by T. de Haan and P. Péters, avocats)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office and Guinot

By order of 7 October 2019, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) ruled that the appeal should not be allowed to proceed.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Gericht Erster Instanz Eupen (Belgium) lodged on 16 April 2019 — YU v Wallonische Region

(Case C-315/19)

(2020/C 77/16)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Gericht Erster Instanz Eupen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: YU

Defendant: Wallonische Region

By order of 26 September 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Sixth Chamber) gives the following ruling:

Article 45 TFEU is to be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State pursuant to which an employee residing in that Member State can rely on an exception to the obligation to register in the employee’s Member State of residence a vehicle, which has been made available to the employee by an employer established in a different Member State where the vehicle is registered, only if the documents proving that the condition for the exception is met are at all times carried by the employee in the vehicle.
1.

The Commission received a complaint on 3 January 2017 concerning a requirement laid down in the Magyar Állatorvosi Kamaráról valamint az állatorvosi szolgáltatói tevékenység végzéséről szóló 2012. évi CXXVII. törvény (Law CXXVII of 2012, on the College of Veterinary Surgeons of Hungary and the provision of veterinary services), in accordance with which, only a person who fulfils, inter alia, the requirement of being a national of a State which is part of the Agreement on the European Economic Area may be a member of the College of Veterinary Surgeons. The complainant is a third-country national who, since 2007, has held a long-term residence permit in Hungary and who in 2014 graduated from the Állatorvostudományi Egyetem (University of Veterinary Medicine) of Budapest. The complainant’s request to be admitted to the College of Veterinary Surgeons was rejected on the basis of non-compliance with the abovementioned legal requirement. In Hungary it is necessary to be a member of the College of Veterinary Surgeons in order to exercise the profession of veterinarian whether on an employed or self-employed basis.
Must Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 be interpreted as meaning that that regulation also applies to passenger transport by a flight which is not operated from an airport located in the territory of a Member State but forms part of single booking which also includes a flight from an airport located in the territory of a Member State, even if that former flight is not a directly connecting flight?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 12 December 2019 — Novaol Srl v Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze and Others

(Case C-917/19)

(2020/C 95/19)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Novaol Srl

Defendants: Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, Ministero dell’Ambiente e della Tutela del Territorio e del Mare, Ministero delle Politiche Agricole, Alimentari e Forestali e del Turismo, Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico

Question referred

In the view of the Court of Justice of the European Union — in the light of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999, (1) as amended, Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 of 21 April 2004, (2) and any further relevant provisions of [EU] law — does the definition of State aid, as such subject to an obligation of prior notification to the European Commission, cover a secondary regulatory instrument such as the regulation adopted by means of Ministerial Decree No 37/2015 — which is being challenged in these proceedings — which, in direct enforcement of judgments of the Council of State requiring the annulment in part of the previous regulations already notified to the Commission, has retroactively affected the procedures for application of the reduced excise duty on biodiesel by retroactively amending the criteria for distribution of the benefit thereof among the applicant companies without extending the duration of the programme of tax concessions?

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ 1999 L 83, p. 1).

(2) Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 of 21 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ 2004 L 140, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzgericht (Austria) lodged on 20 December 2019 — Titanium Ltd

(Case C-931/19)

(2020/C 87/14)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesfinanzgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Titanium Ltd

Respondent authority: Finanzamt Wien 1/23

Question referred (1)

Is the term ‘fixed establishment’ to be interpreted as meaning that the existence of human and technical resources is always necessary and therefore that the service provider’s own staff must be present at the establishment, or can — in the specific case of the letting, subject to tax, of a property situated in national territory, which constitutes only a passive tolerance of an act or situation — that property, even without human resources, be regarded as a ‘fixed establishment’?

(1) On the interpretation of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1), as amended by Directive 2008/8/EC (OJ 2008 L 44, p. 11), and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 of 15 March 2011 laying down implementing measures for Directive 2006/112 (OJ 2011 L 77, p. 1).
If the first question is answered in the affirmative:

Does it follow from the rules for calculating the corrected eligibility ratio for heat imported from installations not subject to compulsory emissions trading, which are provided for in the template drawn up by the European Commission and are prescribed for the Member States, that that ratio is applicable to the total amount of heat produced in the installation subject to compulsory emissions trading even if the imported heat can be clearly attributed to one of several identifiable and separately recorded heat flows and/or heat consumptions inside the installation?
2.

In the event that the answer to the first question is that it is also available to qualified investors, is it possible to assess the extent to which they were aware of the economic situation of the issuer of the offer of shares to the public otherwise than through the prospectus, on the basis of their legal and commercial relations with that issuer (for example, being shareholders of the issuer or members of its management bodies, etc.)?
2.

Are the costs of extending the credit included in the concept of ‘total cost of the credit to the consumer’ in Article 3(g) of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102 EEC, in circumstances such as those of the present case, if the clauses on extending the credit form part of the terms and conditions of the credit agreement agreed by the borrower and the lender?