ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 27 June 2017 —

Aldi Einkauf v EUIPO — Fratelli Polli (ANTICO CASALE)

(Case T‑327/16)

(EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU word mark ANTICO CASALE — Absolute grounds for refusal — Article 52(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Article 7(1)(b), (c) and (g) and Article 52(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009)

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Aim — Need to preserve availability (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 7(1)(c), and 52(1)(a)) (see para. 17)

2. EU trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Absolute grounds for invalidity — Registration contrary to Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 — Assessment of the descriptive character of the trade mark — Criteria (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 7(1)(c), and 52(1)(a)) (see para. 19)

3. EU trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Absolute grounds for invalidity — Registration contrary to Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 — Word mark ANTICO CASALE (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 7(1)(c), and 52(1)(a)) (see paras 27-30)

4. EU trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Absolute grounds for invalidity — Registration contrary to Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/20091 — Assessment of the descriptive character of the trade mark — Criteria (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 7(1)(b), and 52(1)(a)) (see paras 34, 35)

5. EU trade mark — Procedural provisions — Examination of the facts of the Office’s own motion — Invalidity proceedings concerning absolute grounds for refusal — Examination restricted to the submissions of the parties (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 7, 52, 55 and 76(1)) (see paras 38-40)

6. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Trade marks likely to deceive the public — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 7(1)(g), and 52(1)(a)) (see para. 51)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 13 April 2016 (Case R 1337/2015-2) relating to invalidity proceedings between Aldi Einkauf and Fratelli Polli.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 13 July 2017 — Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis v ERCEA

(Case T‑348/16 OP)

(Arbitration clause — Application to have a judgment set aside — Stay of execution of a judgment by default — Interlocutory judgment)

Judicial proceedings — Action before the General Court — Opposition to a judgement given by default — No suspensory effect on the implementation of the judgement — Competence of the general Court to suspend implementation until the decision on the opposition

(Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Arts 123(4), and 166; Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 41 and 53)

(see paras 3-5)

Re:

APPLICATION to have the judgment of 6 April 2017, Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis v ERCEA (T‑348/16, not published, EU:T:2017:268) set aside.

Operative part

Execution of the judgment of 6 April 2017, Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis v ERCEA (T‑348/16), is stayed pending the outcome of the application made by the European Research Council Executive Agency (ERCEA) to have that judgment set aside.
Appeal — Grounds — Mistaken assessment of the facts — Inadmissibility — Review by the General Court of the assessment of the facts — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Art. 257 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58 and Annex I, Art. 11)

(see paras 12, 13)
Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 18 September 2017 — Codorníu v EUIPO — Bodegas Altun (ANA DE ALTUN)

(Case T‑86/16)

(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU figurative mark ANA DE ALTUN — Earlier national figurative mark ANNA — Relative grounds for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) and (5) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Obligation to state reasons)

1. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 17, 18, 67, 68)

2. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Assessment of the likelihood of confusion—Determination of the relevant public—Attention level of the public (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 20)

3. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Similarity between the goods or services in question—Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 22)

4. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Similarity of the marks concerned—Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 24, 25, 35, 52)

5. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Figurative marks ANA DE ALTUN and ANNA (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 69-73)

6. EU trade mark—Procedural provisions—Statement of reasons for decisions—Article 75, first sentence, of Regulation No 207/2009—Scope identical to that of Article 296 TFEU (Art. 296 TFEU; Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 75, first sentence) (see paras 82, 87)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 9 December 2015 (Case R 199/2015-2) relating to opposition proceedings between Codorníu and Bodegas Altun.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 9 December 2015 (Case R 199/2015-2);
Judicial proceedings—Application initiating proceedings—Formal requirements—Brief summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based—Inadmissibility

(Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 76(d))

(see paras 29, 30)
Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 26 September 2017 — Hanschmann v Europol

(Case T‑562/16)

(Civil Service — Europol — Non-renewal of a contract — Refusal to award a contract for an indefinite period — Compensation — Annulment by the Civil Service Tribunal — Enforcement of the judgments in Cases F‑27/09 and F‑104/12)

1. Actions brought by officials—Action against a decision rejecting a complaint—Admissibility—Obligation to rule on pleas directed against the decision rejecting the complaint—Pleas devoid of independent content or purely confirmatory decision—None (Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91) (see paras 21-23)

2. Judicial proceedings—Admissibility of actions—Assessment having regard to rules in force at the time the application lodged—Formal requirements—Clear and precise statement of the pleas relied on—Appeal before the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (Rules of Procedure of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal, Art. 50(1)(e)) (see paras 25-28)

3. Actions for annulment—Judgment annulling a measure—Effects—Obligation to implement—Scope—Both the operative part and the grounds of the judgment to be taken into account—Retroactive effect of annulment—Obligation to ensure that the annulled measure is not replaced by a measure affected by the same irregularity (Article 266 TFEU) (see paras 33-35)

4. Acts of the institutions—Directives—Directive 1999/70 concerning the ETUC, UNICE and CEEP Framework Agreement on fixed-term work—Direct imposition of obligations on EU institutions in relations with their staff—Not included—Invocability—Scope (Art. 288, third para. TFEU; Council Directive 1999/70) (see paras 46-48)

5. Officials—Members of the temporary staff—Recruitment—Renewal of a fixed-term contract—Administration’s discretion—Europol staff—Adoption of an internal directive establishing the principle of renewal under certain conditions—Voluntary curb on the administration’s discretion in the matter (Europol Staff Regulations, Art. 6) (see paras 58, 59, 61, 67, 70, 72)

6. Actions brought by officials—Judgment annulling a measure—Effects—Obligation to implement—Period of waiting extended by unlawfulness of a decision of an institution—Compensation for non-material harm through appropriate reparation (Article 266 TFEU) (see paras 76, 77)

7. Officials—Principles—Protection of legitimate expectations—Conditions—Specific assurances given by the authorities (see paras 79, 80)

Re:

ACTION brought under Article 270 TFEU, seeking annulment of the decision of Europol of 29 July 2014 not to renew for an indefinite period the contract awarded to the applicant and to allocate a sum of EUR 10000 to him on account of the length of the procedure and the prolongation of his state of uncertainty and annulment of the decision rejecting his complaint.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 4 October 2017 — Intesa Sanpaolo v EUIPO — Intesia Group Holding (INTESA)

(Case T‑143/16)

(EU trade mark — Revocation proceedings — EU word mark INTESA — Article 51(1)(a) and (2) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 58(1)(a) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 — No genuine use of the trade mark)

1. EU trade mark—Surrender, revocation and invalidity—Causes of revocation—Absence of genuine use of a trade mark—Proof of use of the earlier mark—Partial use—Effect (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 51(1)(a) and (2)) (see paras 17, 18)

2. EU trade mark—Surrender, revocation and invalidity—Causes of revocation—Absence of genuine use of a trade mark—Proof of use of the earlier mark—Genuine use—Meaning—Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 51(1)(a)) (see paras 19-23, 45)

3. EU trade mark—Surrender, revocation and invalidity—Causes of revocation—Absence of genuine use of a trade mark—Word mark INTESA (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 51(1)(a) and (2)) (see paras 35, 47, 54, 61, 69)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 21 January 2016 (Case R 632/2015-1), relating to revocation proceedings between Intesa Sanpaolo and Intesia Group Holding.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) of 22 November 2017 – Toontrack Music v EUIPO (EZMIX)

(Case T-771/16)

(European Union trade mark — Application for EU word mark EZMIX — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Equal treatment and principle of sound administration)

1. EU trade mark–Appeals procedure–Action before the EU judicature–Jurisdiction of the General Court–Re-evaluation of the facts in the light of evidence produced for the first time before it–Not included (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 65) (see para. 19)

2. EU trade mark–Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark–Absolute grounds for refusal–Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service–Aim–Need to preserve availability (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 26)

3. EU trade mark–Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark–Absolute grounds for refusal–Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service–Meaning–Mark composed of a word or neologism resulting from a combination of elements (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 27-29, 38, 39, 46)

4. EU trade mark–Decisions of the Office–Principle of equal treatment–Principle of sound administration–EUIPO’s previous decision-making practice–Principle of legality–Need for a strict and complete examination in each particular case (Council Regulation No 207/2009) (see paras 48-52)

5. EU trade mark–Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark–Absolute grounds for refusal–Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service–Word mark EZMIX (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 63, 64, 73-78)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 27 July 2016 (Case R 2436/2015-5) concerning an application for registration of word mark EZMIX as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 28 November 2017 — Steel Invest & Finance (Luxembourg) v Commission

(Case T‑254/16)

(State aid — Iron and steel industry — Aid granted by Belgium in favour of several undertakings in the iron and steel industry — Decision declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market and ordering its recovery — Obligation to state reasons — Concept of State aid — Advantage — Private investor test)

1. Acts of the institutions—Statement of reasons—Obligation—Scope—Commission decision on State aid (Art. 296 TFEU) (see paras 31-48)

2. State aid—Meaning—Assessment according to the criterion of the private investor—Complex evaluation of economic matters—Discretion of the Commission—Judicial review—Limits (Art. 107(1) TFEU) (see paras 58-66)

Re:

APPLICATION pursuant to Article 263 TFEU and seeking partial annulment of Commission Decision (EU) 2016/2041 of 20 January 2016 on State aid SA.33926 2013/C (ex 2013/NN, 2011/CP) granted by Belgium to Duferco (OJ 2016 L 314, p. 22).

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Steel Invest & Finance (Luxembourg) SA to bear its own costs;
Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 28 November 2017 — adp Gauselmann v EUIPO (Juwel)

(Case T‑31/16)

(European Union trade mark — Application for EU word mark Juwel — Absolute ground for refusal — Lack of distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

1. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks devoid of any distinctive character—Assessment of distinctive character—Criteria (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 17, 18, 38)

2. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks devoid of any distinctive character—Word mark Juwel (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 20-22, 28, 43)

3. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks devoid of any distinctive character—Marks constituted of advertising slogans—Flattering promotional formula (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 40)

4. EU trade mark—Decisions of the Office—Principle of equal treatment—Principle of sound administration—EUIPO’s previous decision-making practice—Principle of legality—Need for a strict and complete examination in each particular case (Council Regulation No 207/2009) (see paras 47-49)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 16 November 2015 (Case R 2571/2014-1) concerning an application for registration of word mark Juwel as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 5 December 2017 — El Corte Inglés v EUIPO — Elho Business & Sport (FRee STyLe)

(Case T‑212/16)

(EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU figurative mark FRee STyLe — Absolute ground for refusal — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Article 76 of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 95 of Regulation 2017/1001) — Equal treatment)

1. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service—Aim—Need to preserve availability (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 14)

2. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service—Meaning—Mark composed of a word or neologism resulting from a combination of elements (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 17, 18)

3. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service—Assessment of the descriptive nature of a sign—Criteria (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 19)

4. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service—Figurative mark FRee STyLe (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c) and (2)) (see paras 21, 22, 25-50)

5. EU trade mark—Appeals procedure—Appeal against a decision of the Opposition Division of EUIPO—Examination by the Board of Appeal—Scope—Facts and evidence not produced in support of the opposition within the period prescribed for that purpose—Account taken—Discretion of the Board of Appeal (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 76(2) (see paras 54-56)

6. EU trade mark—Decisions of the Office—Principle of equal treatment—Principle of sound administration—EUIPO’s previous decision-making practice—Principle of legality—Need for a strict and complete examination in each particular case (see paras 63, 64)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 12 February 2016 (Case R 378/2015-1), relating to invalidity proceedings between Elho Business & Sport and El Corte Inglés.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Case T‑482/16 RENV

(publication by extracts)

Oscar Orlando Arango Jaramillo and Others

v

European Investment Bank

(Civil service — EIB staff — Period allowed for commencing proceedings — Reasonable time — Pensions — 2008 reform — Contractual nature of the employment relationship — Proportionality — Obligation to state reasons — Legal certainty — Liability — Non-material harm)

Summary — Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber), 13 December 2017

Actions brought by officials — Staff of the European Investment Bank — Time-limits — Requirement that action be brought within a reasonable time — Application by analogy of Article 91(3) of the Staff Regulations — Not permissible — Assessment by reference to the circumstances of the case

(Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91; Staff Regulations of the European Investment Bank, Art. 41)

Nowhere in EU legislation is there any indication as to the time limit for bringing proceedings which is applicable to disputes between the European Investment Bank and its staff. However, the reconciliation of the right to effective judicial protection, which is a general principle of EU law and requires that an individual should have a sufficient period of time to assess the lawfulness of the measure adversely affecting him and, if necessary, to prepare his case, and the need for legal certainty, which requires that, after a certain time, measures taken by European Union bodies should become definitive, requires that those disputes be brought before the European Union Courts within a reasonable period.

The ‘reasonableness’ of a period is to be appraised in the light of all the circumstances specific to each case and, in particular, the importance of the case for the person concerned, its complexity and the conduct of the parties. It follows that a time limit which has been laid down in advance cannot be presumed, in general, to constitute a reasonable period.

In this regard, while the three-month time limit laid down by Article 91(3) of the Staff Regulations is only applicable to disputes between the institutions of the European Union and their officials or servants, and not to purely internal disputes between the Bank and its members of staff, including disputes in which members of staff seek annulment of acts of the Bank adversely affecting them, it does provide a relevant point of reference, in so far as disputes of the first kind are similar in nature to those of the second, and disputes of both kinds are subject to judicial review under Article 270 TFEU.

However, having regard to the concept of a reasonable period, the period of three months laid down in Article 91(3) of the Staff Regulations cannot be applied by analogy as a limitation period to members of staff of the Bank when they bring an action for annulment of a measure adopted by that bank which adversely affects them.

(see paras 61, 62, 64-66)
Judicial proceedings—Application initiating proceedings—Formal requirements—Brief summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based—Pleas in law not set out in the application—General reference to other documents—Inadmissibility

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 21, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 177(1)(d))

(see para. 9)
Acts of the institutions—Statement of reasons—Obligation—Scope—Restrictive measures against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Ukraine—Freezing of funds of persons involved in the misappropriation of public funds—Decision falling within a context known to the person concerned, enabling him to understand the scope of the measure taken against him—Whether summary statement of reasons sufficient—Limits—Statement of reasons not capable of consisting of a general and stereotyped formulation

(Art. 296, second para., TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 41(2)(c); Council Decisions 2014/119/CFSP and (CFSP) 2016/318; Council Regulation 2016/311)

(see paras 41-44)