ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 63/8

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Ploiești (Romania) lodged on 1 December 2017 — Oana Mădălina Călin v Direcţia Regională a Finanţelor Publice Ploieşti — Administraţia Judeţeană a Finanţelor Publice Dâmboviţa, Statul Român — Ministerul Finanţelor Public, and Administraţia Fondului pentru Mediu

(Case C-676/17)

(2018/C 063/11)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Ploiești

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Oana Mădălina Călin

Respondents: Direcţia Regională a Finanţelor Publice Ploieşti — Administraţia Judeţeană a Finanţelor Publice Dâmboviţa, Statul Român — Ministerul Finanţelor Public, and Administraţia Fondului pentru Mediu

Question referred

Can Article 4(3) TEU, which refers to the principle of sincere cooperation, Articles 17, 20, 21 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 110 TFEU, the principle of legal certainty and the principles of equivalence and effectiveness stemming from the principle of procedural autonomy be interpreted as precluding national legislation, namely Article 21(2) of Law No 554/2004 on administrative proceedings as interpreted by Ruling No 45/2016 of the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (ICCJ) — Completul pentru dezlegarea unor chestiuni de drept (High Court of Cassation and Justice — Panel for the Resolution of Points of Law), under which the period within which a request for revision based on Article 21(2) of Law No 554/2004 may be submitted is one month from the date of notification of the final judgment subject to revision?
1

(a) Must Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, read in conjunction with Article 4(3) TEU, be interpreted as meaning that an applicant may challenge the legality of a decision of an institution of the Union which must be implemented by national authorities, by pleading infringement of essential procedural requirements, infringement of the Treaties or misuse of powers? (b) Must Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, read in conjunction with Article 4(3) TEU, be interpreted as meaning that the institutions of the Union which are involved in the adoption of a decision whose validity is challenged in proceedings before a national court are bound to provide that court, if requested to do so, with all the information at their disposal and which was taken into account, or should have been taken into account, by them in the adoption of that decision? (c) Must Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that the right to an effective remedy requires the court to conduct a robust review of whether the conditions for the application of Article 13 of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (1) have been satisfied? In particular, does that Article 47 mean that that court is competent to fully assess whether the facts have been fully and adequately established so as to justify the legal effect relied upon? In particular, does that Article 47 also mean that that court is competent to fully assess whether facts which were allegedly not taken into account in the adoption of the decision, but which could be detrimental to the legal effect associated with the facts which were established, should have been taken into account?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 94/2

Appeal brought on 25 September 2017 by Lackmann Fleisch- und Feinkostfabrik GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 19 July 2017 in Case T-432/16, Lackmann Fleisch- und Feinkostfabrik v EUIPO

(Case C-570/17 P)

(2018/C 094/03)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Lackmann Fleisch- und Feinkostfabrik GmbH (represented by: A. Lingenfelser, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 16 January 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Tenth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 83/10

Appeal brought on 11 September 2017 by Josel, SL against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 28 June 2017 in Case T-333/15: Josel v EUIPO — Nationale-Nederlanden Nederland

(Case C-536/17 P)

(2018/C 083/14)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Josel, SL (represented by: J. Güell Serra, abogado)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Nationale-Nederlanden Nederland BV

By order of 17 January 2018 the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 112/16

Appeal brought on 18 December 2017 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 10 October 2017 in Case T-435/15: Kolachi Raj Industrial (Private) Ltd v European Commission

(Case C-709/17 P)

(2018/C 112/21)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: J.-F. Brakeland, A. Demeneix, M. França, Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Kolachi Raj Industrial (Private) Ltd, European Bicycle Manufacturers Association

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court of 10 October 2017 in Case T-435/15 Kolachi Raj Industrial (Private) Ltd v Commission, reject the application at first instance, and order the applicant to pay the costs; or, alternatively,

— refer back the case to the General Court for reconsideration; reserve the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appeal brought by the Commission concerns the judgment of the General Court of 10 October 2017 in Case T-435/15. In that judgment, the General Court annulled, to the extent that it concerns Kolachi Raj, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/776 (1) of 18 May 2015 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Council Regulation (EU) No 502/2013 on imports of bicycles originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of bicycles consigned from Cambodia, Pakistan and the Philippines, whether declared as originating in Cambodia, Pakistan and the Philippines or not.

The Commission relies, in support of its appeal, on one single ground of appeal.

The Commission considers that the General Court misinterpreted Article 1 3(2)(b) of the basic anti-dumping regulation. First, in the contested judgment, the General Court incorrectly imported rules of origin in the application of Article 13 of the Basic Regulation and in the interpretation of the term ‘from’ used in its Article 13(2)(b). Second, the General Court incorrectly restricted the type of evidence that the Commission may use to demonstrate that parts come ‘from’ the country subject to anti-dumping measures. The Commission considers that the interpretation adopted by the General Court is not in line with the text, the context and the purpose of Article 13 of the Basic Regulation, nor with the case-law of the Court of Justice on anti-circumvention measures.

(1) OJ 2015, L 122, p. 4.
1.

Should Article 4(3) and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union, read in conjunction with the third paragraph of Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 2008/50/EC (1) of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe, be interpreted as meaning that, when it is alleged that a Member State has not sited the sampling points in a zone in accordance with the criteria set out in point B.1.(a) of Annex III to Directive 2008/50, it is for the national courts, on application by individuals who are directly affected by the exceedance of the limit values referred to in Article 13(1) of that directive, to examine whether the sampling points were sited in accordance with those criteria and, if they were not, to take all necessary measures against the national authority, such as an order, with a view to ensuring that the sampling points are sited in accordance with those criteria?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 123/7

Appeal brought on 19 August 2017 by CBA Spielapparate- und Restaurantbetriebs GmbH against the order of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 19 June 2017 in Case T-906/16, CBA Spielapparate- und Restaurantbetriebs GmbH v European Commission

(Case C-508/17 P)

(2018/C 123/09)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: CBA Spielapparate- und Restaurantbetriebs GmbH (represented by: A. Schuster, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 8 February 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Tenth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
1.

Is an individual trade mark used in such a way as to infringe rights for the purposes of point (b) of the second sentence of Article 9(1) of the EC Trade Mark Regulation (1)/EU Trade Mark Regulation (2) or point (a) of the second sentence of Article 5(1) of the Trade Mark Directive (3) in the case where — the individual trade mark is affixed to a product in respect of which the individual trade mark is not protected; — the affixing of the individual trade mark by a third party is perceived by the public as a ‘test seal’, which is to say that, although the product has been manufactured and placed on the market by a third party not acting under the control of the trade mark proprietor, the trade mark proprietor has tested some of the characteristics of that product and, on that basis, given it a particular rating shown on the test seal; and — the individual trade mark is registered for, inter alia, ‘consumer information and consultancy with regard to the selection of goods and services, in particular using test and investigation results and by means of quality judgments’?
Case C-714/17 P: Appeal brought on 20 December 2017 by Kevin Karp against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 23 October 2017 in Case T-833/16: Karp v Parliament

Appeal brought on 20 December 2017 by Kevin Karp against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 23 October 2017 in Case T-833/16: Karp v Parliament

(Case C-714/17 P)

Parties

Appellant: Kevin Karp (represented by: N. Lambers, avocat, R. Ben Ammar, avocate)

Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament

By order of 19 June 2018 the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 152/2

Appeal brought on 22 September 2017 by Mediaexpert sp. z o.o. against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 20 July 2017 in Case T-780/16: Mediaexpert v EUIPO

(Case C-560/17 P)

(2018/C 152/02)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Mediaexpert sp. z o.o. (represented by: J. Aftyka, radca prawny)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 13 March 2018 the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
Case C-731/17 P: Appeal brought on 23 December 2017 by Nap Innova Hoteles, S.L., against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 4 December 2017 in Case T-522/17 Nap Innova Hoteles v SRB

Appeal brought on 23 December 2017 by Nap Innova Hoteles, S.L., against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 4 December 2017 in Case T-522/17 Nap Innova Hoteles v SRB

(Case C-731/17 P)

Parties

Appellant: Nap Innova Hoteles, S.L. (represented by: L. Hernández Cabeza, abogado)

Other party to the proceedings: Single Resolution Board

By order of 5 July 2018, the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered Nap Innova Hoteles, S.L., to pay its own costs.
Case C-358/17: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hannover (Germany) lodged on 9 June 2017 — Walter Langguth and Elke Langguth v TUIfly GmbH

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hannover (Germany) lodged on 9 June 2017 — Walter Langguth and Elke Langguth v TUIfly GmbH

(Case C-358/17)

Referring court

Amtsgericht Hannover

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Walter Langguth, Elke Langguth

Defendant: TUIfly GmbH

By decision of the Court of Justice of 28 May 2018 the case was removed from the Court’s register.
—

declare that, by failing to adopt, by 10 April 2016 at the latest, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to ensure compliance with Directive 2014/26/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market (OJ L 84, 20.3.2014, p. 72), or in any event, by failing to notify the Commission of such provisions, the Republic of Bulgaria has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 43(1) of that directive;
1.

In accordance with Article 15(1) of Directive 2014/89/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning, Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with the directive by 18 September 2016. They shall immediately inform the Commission thereof. In view of the Republic of Bulgaria’s failure to inform it of the national measures transposing the directive, the Commission has decided to bring an action before the Court.
1.

Where the imported goods are medicines, when the customs value of the imported goods is determined in accordance with Article 30(2)(b) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 (1) of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code and Article 151(4) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 (2) of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code, must it be considered that similar goods are those medicines whose active ingredient and the quantity thereof are the same (or similar) or, rather, in order to identify similar goods, must account be taken of market position as well, that is to say, the popularity and demand, of the imported medicine in question and of its producer?
2.

In the event that Question 1 is answered in the negative, is the transaction described above a supply of services that may be regarded as the letting of immovable property within the meaning of Article 135(1)(l) of [Directive 2006/112/EC], or a supply of complex services that may not be regarded as the letting of immovable property and that is taxable by operation of the law?
2.

Must the general principle of EU law of preserving judicial independence through fair and stable remuneration commensurate with the duties performed by the members of the judiciary be interpreted as precluding a national rule such as that in Article 31(One) of Law 39/2010 of 22 December 2010 on the National Budget, which does not have regard to the nature of their duties, their length of service or the importance of their tasks, and which requires a greater sacrifice in order to preserve public expenditure solely from those members of the judiciary who earn the least? (principle of judicial independence)
2.

Is the correct application of Directive No 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 April 2004, in particular Articles 8, 23 and 51 of that directive, and of the principles and rules of the Treaties with regard to non-discrimination, proportionality, freedom to provide services and the right of establishment precluded by provisions of national law, such as those in Article 55(2) of Legislative Decree No 58 of 24 February 1998 (Consolidated Law on provisions on financial intermediation pursuant to Articles 8 and 21 of Law No 52 of 6 February 1996), as amended, and also Article 111, paragraph 2 of the Resolution No 16190 of the Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa — Consob of 29 October 2007 (Regulation laying down the rules implementing Legislative Decree No 58 of 24 February 1998 on intermediaries), that: a) allows the ‘discretionary’ prohibition of the exercise of the activity of a ‘tied agent’ (adviser authorised to offer offsite services — formerly financial planner) in relation to actions not entailing the loss of good repute, as defined by national law, and at the same time do not concern compliance with the provisions implementing the Directive; b) allows the ‘discretionary’ prohibition for up to one year of the exercise of the activity of ‘tied agent’ (consultant authorised to provide offsite services — formerly financial [Or. 13] planner) in proceedings seeking to prevent the ‘strepitus’ deriving from the charge in criminal proceedings whose duration is as a rule much longer than a year’?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 152/17

Reference for a preliminary ruling from Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division) made on 14 February 2018 — Sandoz Ltd, Hexal AG v G.D. Seale LLC, Janssen Sciences Ireland

(Case C-114/18)

(2018/C 152/20)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Sandoz Ltd, Hexal AG

Defendants: G.D. Seale LLC, Janssen Sciences Ireland

Question referred

Where the sole active ingredient the subject of a supplementary protection certificate issued under [the SPC Regulation] (1) is a member of a class of compounds which fall within a Markush definition in a claim of the patent, all of which class members embody the core inventive technical advance of the patent, is it sufficient for the purposes of Article 3(a) of the SPC Regulation that the compound would, upon examination of its structure, immediately be recognised as one which falls within the class (and therefore would be protected by the patent as a matter of national patent law) or must the specific substituents necessary to form the active ingredient be amongst those which the skilled person could derive, based on their common general knowledge, from a reading of the patent claims?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products (OJ 2009, L 152, p. 1).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 152/15

Request for a preliminary ruling from the College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven (Netherlands) lodged on 12 February 2018 — T. Boer & Zonen BV v Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken

(Case C-98/18)

(2018/C 152/18)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: T. Boer & Zonen BV

Defendant: Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken

Question referred

Should the provisions of Annex III, Section I, Chapter VII, points 1 and 3, to Regulation No 853/2004 (1) be interpreted as meaning that the cooling of meat must take place in the slaughterhouse itself — such that the loading of the meat into a refrigerated truck may commence once that meat has attained a maximum temperature of 7 degrees Celsius — or may the cooling of the meat also take place in the refrigerated truck, provided that the truck does not leave the premises of the slaughterhouse?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific hygiene rules for food of animal origin (OJ 2004 L 139, p. 55).
‘—

Must the provisions of Articles 103 and 311 of Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 (1) and paragraph 7 of part A in Annex IX thereto, be interpreted as meaning that they require only that the photographs are taken by their photographer, printed by him or under his supervision, signed and numbered up to a maximum of 30 copies, all sizes and mounts included, in order to be able to benefit from the reduced rate of VAT?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 166/19

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per la Lombardia (Italy) lodged on 1 February 2018 — Vitali SpA v Autostrade per l’Italia SpA

(Case C-63/18)

(2018/C 166/24)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per la Lombardia

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Vitali SpA

Defendant: Autostrade per l’Italia SpA

Question referred

Do the principles of freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services referred to in Articles 49 and 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 71 of Directive 2014/24 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014, (1) which does not contemplate quantitative limitations on subcontracting, and the EU-law principle of proportionality preclude the application of national legislation in matters relating to public procurement, such as the Italian rule set out in the third sentence of Article 105(2) of Legislative Decree No 50 of 18 April 2016, pursuant to which subcontracting cannot exceed 30 % of the total amount of the contract for works, services or supplies?

(1) Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 182/15

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d’appel de Mons (Belgium) lodged on 19 March 2018 — Mydibel S.A. v État belge

(Case C-201/18)

(2018/C 182/18)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour d’appel de Mons

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Mydibel S.A.

Respondent: État belge

Question referred

Must Articles 14, 15, 168, 184, 185, 187 and 188 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, (1) be interpreted and applied as meaning that there is, or is not, a revision/adjustment of VAT on an investment good comprising immovable property which had initially been deducted correctly, in the case where that immovable property acquired as a capital good was the subject of a ‘sale and lease back’ transaction, given that:

— the ‘sale and lease back’ is created by the combined and simultaneous granting of a right of emphyteusis (being a temporary right in rem) by the taxable person to two financial institutions and by a leasing by those two institutions to the taxable person;

— that ‘sale and lease back’ is a purely financial transaction designed to increase the liquidity of the taxable person;

— the ‘sale and lease back’ transaction was not subject to VAT;

— the investment property remained in the possession of the taxable person and was used for the taxable activity of the taxable person in a continuous and sustainable manner, both before and after the transaction?

Does an interpretation and application of the abovementioned provisions leading to a revision/adjustment of the VAT initially deducted comply with the principle of neutrality of VAT and/or with the principle of equal treatment??

(1) OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.
A.

In so far as the judgment under appeal examines the first and second grounds of appeal, concerning the correction of 25 % of area aid (paragraphs 48-140 of the judgment under appeal). The first ground of appeal concerns the misinterpretation and application of Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 796/2004 of the Commission of 21 April 2004, regarding the definition of pasture, and the misapplication of Article 296 TFEU, as well as the insufficient and inadequate reasoning of the judgment under appeal. The second ground of appeal concerns the misinterpretation and misapplication of the Guidelines (document VI/5530/1997) with respect to whether the conditions for the imposition of a 25 % financial correction are met, misinterpretation and misapplication of Article 296 TFEU and of Articles 43, 44 and 137 of Regulation No 73/2009, insufficient and contradictory reasoning of the judgment under appeal, breach of the principle of equality of arms and alteration of the summary report.