OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

BOBEK

delivered on 8 December 2020 ( 1 )

Case C‑383/19

Powiat Ostrowski

v

Ubezpieczeniowy Fundusz Gwarancyjny

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy w Ostrowie Wielkopolskim (District Court of Ostrów Wielkopolski, Poland))

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Approximation of laws – Directive 2009/103/EC – Motor vehicle civil liability insurance – Article 3(1) – Obligation to take out a civil liability insurance contract relating to the use of motor vehicles – Vehicle not capable of being driven due to its technical state – Division of tasks under Article 267 TFEU – Interpretation and application of EU law)

I. Introduction

1. When does the obligation to take out civil liability insurance begin and end pursuant to Article 3 of Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability? ( 2 )

2. In its judgment in Juliana, the Court stated that ‘a vehicle which is registered and therefore has not been officially withdrawn from use, and which is capable of being driven, corresponds to the concept of “vehicle” within the meaning of Article 1(1) [Directive 72/166] and, consequently, does not cease to be subject to the insurance obligation laid down in Article 3(1) of that directive’. ( 3 )

3. Faced with a factual scenario in which a motor vehicle was not formally withdrawn from use, but which at the same time was apparently not capable of being driven due to its poor technical state, the Sąd Rejonowy w Ostrowie Wielkopolskim (District Court of Ostrów Wielkopolski, Poland), wonders, in essence, whether in Juliana, the Court indeed intended to set two cumulative conditions for the existence of an obligation to insure a motor vehicle under the directive.

II. Legal framework

A. EU law

4. Article 1 of Directive 2009/103 provides: ‘For the purposes of this Directive: 1. “vehicle” means any motor vehicle intended for travel on land and propelled by mechanical power, but not running on rails, and any trailer, whether or not coupled; … 4. “territory in which the vehicle is normally based” means: (a) the territory of the State of which the vehicle bears a registration plate, irrespective of whether the plate is permanent or temporary; or (b) in cases where no registration is required for a type of vehicle but the vehicle bears an insurance plate, or a distinguishing sign analogous to the registration plate, the territory of the State in which the insurance plate or the sign is issued; or (c) in cases where neither a registration plate nor an insurance plate nor a distinguishing sign is required for certain types of vehicle, the territory of the State in which the person who has custody of the vehicle is permanently resident; or (d) in cases where the vehicle does not bear any registration plate or bears a registration plate which does not correspond or no longer corresponds to the vehicle and has been involved in an accident, the territory of the State in which the accident took place … …’

5. Article 3 of that directive, entitled ‘Compulsory insurance of vehicles’, provides, in its first paragraph: ‘Each Member State shall, subject to Article 5, take all appropriate measures to ensure that civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles normally based in its territory is covered by insurance.’

6. Pursuant to Article 5 of that directive, entitled ‘Derogation from the obligation in respect of compulsory insurance of vehicles’: 1. A Member State may derogate from Article 3 in respect of certain natural or legal persons, public or private; a list of such persons shall be drawn up by the State concerned and communicated to the other Member States and to the [European] Commission. … 2. A Member State may derogate from Article 3 in respect of certain types of vehicle or certain vehicles having a special plate; the list of such types or of such vehicles shall be drawn up by the State concerned and communicated to the other Member States and to the Commission. …’

7. Within Chapter 4 of Directive 2009/103, relating to ‘Compensation for damage caused by an unidentified vehicle or a vehicle for which the insurance obligation provided for in Article 3 has not been satisfied’, Article 10, entitled ‘Body responsible for compensation’, sets out in its first paragraph: ‘1. Each Member State shall set up or authorise a body with the task of providing compensation, at least up to the limits of the insurance obligation for damage to property or personal injuries caused by an unidentified vehicle or a vehicle for which the insurance obligation provided for in Article 3 has not been satisfied. The first subparagraph shall be without prejudice to the right of the Member States to regard compensation by the body as subsidiary or non-subsidiary and the right to make provision for the settlement of claims between the body and the person or persons responsible for the accident and other insurers or social security bodies required to compensate the victim in respect of the same accident. However, Member States may not allow the body to make the payment of compensation conditional on the victim establishing in any way that the person liable is unable or refuses to pay. …’

B. Polish law

8. Article 10(2) of the Ustawa z dnia 22 maja 2003 r. o ubezpieczeniach obowiązkowych, Ubezpieczeniowym Funduszu Gwarancyjnym i Polskim Biurze Ubezpieczycieli Komunikacyjnych (Law of 22 May 2003 on Compulsory Insurance, the Insurance Guarantee Fund and the Polish Motor Insurers’ Bureau; ‘the Law on Compulsory Insurance’ (Dz.U. of 2018, item 473)), provides: ‘An action may be brought before an ordinary court seeking to establish the compliance with or absence of the insurance obligation.’

9. In accordance with the wording of Article 23(1) of the Law on Compulsory Insurance, the keeper of a motor vehicle is required to conclude a compulsory civil liability insurance contract for motor vehicle keepers in respect of damage resulting from the use of the motor vehicle in his or her possession.

10. Pursuant to Article 31(3) of the Law on Compulsory Insurance: ‘In the event of the passing or transfer of the ownership of a registered motor vehicle, the keeper of which did not conclude a civil liability insurance contract for motor vehicle keepers despite an obligation to do so, the keeper to whom the ownership of the vehicle passed or was transferred shall be required to conclude a civil liability insurance contract for motor vehicle keepers on the date of the passing or transfer of the ownership of the motor vehicle, and by the time that the motor vehicle is put into use at the latest. If the transfer of possession of a registered motor vehicle has taken place without the passing or transfer of the ownership of that vehicle and the former keeper of that vehicle did not conclude a civil liability insurance contract for motor vehicle keepers despite having a obligation to do so, the subsequent keeper of the vehicle shall be required to conclude a civil liability insurance contract for motor vehicle keepers on the date of taking possession of that vehicle, and by the time that the motor vehicle is put into use at the latest.’

11. In accordance with Article 84(1) of the Law on Compulsory Insurance, the Insurance Guarantee Fund is the body empowered to monitor compliance with the obligation to conclude a civil liability insurance contract by holders of motor vehicles. Moreover, under Article 88(7), anyone who fails to take out such a contract is required to pay a fine to the Insurance Guarantee Fund.

12. Article 130a(10) of the Ustawa z dnia 20 czerwca 1997 r. Prawo o ruchu drogowym (Law of 20 June 1997 on Road Traffic (Dz.U. of 2018, item 1990)), in the version applicable to the main proceedings, provides: ‘As regards a vehicle that has been removed from the road, in the circumstances set out in paragraph 1 or 2 [in particular, when the technical state of the vehicle endangers road safety or in the event of a failure to comply with parking rules], the starosta (chief district official) shall apply to the court for a decision on the forfeiture of the vehicle to the powiat (district), if the owner or an authorised person, having been properly notified, has not collected the vehicle within 3 months of the date of its removal. The notification shall contain information concerning the consequences of failure to collect a vehicle.’

III. Facts, national proceedings and the questions referred

13. By decision of 16 January 2018, the Sąd Rejonowy w Ostrowie Wielkopolskim (District Court of Ostrów Wielkopolski) ordered the confiscation, in favour of the local government authority, Powiat Ostrowski (Ostrów District, Poland; ‘the applicant’), of a Renault Clio 1.5 DCI vehicle, registered in Poland and parked in a guarded car park following its removal from public roads. The confiscation order became final on 7 February 2018, thereby making the applicant the owner of the vehicle.

14. On 6 February 2018, the applicant submitted an application for the above decision to be served together with an order of enforceability and for the enforcement clause to be affixed. These requests were granted on 20 April 2018. Consequently, the applicant concluded an insurance contract for the vehicle with effect from 23 April 2018.

15. According to the documents in the file, the vehicle in question was examined by an expert on 2 May 2018. That assessment established that it was impossible to start the vehicle, that it was in a poor technical state, that it constituted scrap metal and had a market value of 400 Polish zlotys (PLN). Given its technical state, the applicant ordered that the vehicle be scrapped. The vehicle was dismantled before it was subsequently deregistered on 22 June 2018.

16. On 25 September 2018, the applicant brought an appeal before the Sąd Rejonowy w Ostrowie Wielkopolskim (District Court of Ostrów Wielkopolski) against the decision of the Ubezpieczeniowy Fundusz Gwarancyjny (Insurance Guarantee Fund, ‘the defendant’) requiring it to pay a fine for failing to conclude a civil liability insurance contract during the period from 7 February 2018 to 22 April 2018.

17. In the light of the judgment in Juliana, the referring court wonders whether it is possible to exclude the obligation to conclude a civil liability insurance contract in respect of the use of motor vehicles in a situation where the vehicle in question is immobilised on private land, has been acquired by the local government authority, is not capable of being driven and is intended to be destroyed in accordance with the wishes of its owner.

18. In those circumstances, the Sąd Rejonowy w Ostrowie Wielkopolskim (District Court of Ostrów Wielkopolski, Poland) decided to stay proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Must Article 3 of Directive 2009/103 be interpreted as meaning that the obligation to take out civil liability motor insurance extends even to situations in which a local government authority – a district – has acquired, on the basis of a court decision, title to a vehicle which is not capable of being driven, is on private property in the form of a guarded car park not on the public highway, and is to be destroyed in accordance with the wishes of its owner? (2) Or must it be interpreted as meaning that, in such circumstances, the local government authority, as the owner of the vehicle, is not obliged to take out insurance, without prejudice to the liability of the fund towards injured third parties?’

19. Written observations have been submitted by the defendant, the German and Polish Governments, as well as the European Commission.

IV. Analysis

A. Admissibility

20. The defendant puts forward two lines of argument. First, it argues that the questions referred for a preliminary ruling are inadmissible on the grounds that they relate, for the most part, to an interpretation of national law. Second, it argues that an answer, in response to the doubts expressed by the referring court, is largely capable of being drawn out from the case-law of the Court.

21. I would in fact agree with the defendant on the first line of argument. However, I am bound to disagree on the second one.

22. Indeed, through interpretation of indeterminate legal concepts drawn from the provisions of Directive 2009/103 and its predecessors, the Court has been increasingly invited to effectively settle individual liability claims. In a number of such cases, it is not immediately obvious, at least not to me, how deeply factual distinctions, which would appear to pertain to the interpretation of indeterminate legal concepts contained in the directive, in particular the concept of ‘vehicle’ or the ‘use of vehicles’, ( 4 ) are necessary for safeguarding the interpretative unity and consistency of EU law.

23. The present case is nonetheless different. Hidden in a layer of factual detail is an issue that is indeed of a broader, structural relevance: when does the obligation to take out civil liability insurance under Article 3 of Directive 2009/103 end? The present case concerns, in essence, the interpretation of the Court’s judgment on the same issue delivered by the Grand Chamber two years ago. Within that context, the questions posed by the referring court are not only admissible, but they are actually highly relevant.

B. Merits

24. By its first and second questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court seeks to establish whether Article 3 of Directive 2009/103 must be interpreted as meaning that the conclusion of a civil liability insurance contract relating to the use of vehicles remains compulsory, even if the vehicle in question is in a technical state where it is no longer capable of being driven.

25. Thus, although the factual circumstances in the main proceedings are of course different, the Court is faced with the same legal issue that was at the heart of the Juliana case: when does the obligation to insure motor vehicles under Article 3 of Directive 2009/103 end?

26. Certainly, formally speaking, the Court provided an interpretation of Article 3(1) of Directive 72/166/EEC ( 5 ) in Juliana. However, the key provisions in the earlier motor vehicles directives (Directives 72/166 and 84/5/EEC ( 6 )) referred to in the Court’s judgment in Juliana, relating to the definition of ‘vehicle’, the insurance obligation, exemptions from that obligation and compensation for damage caused by a vehicle for which this obligation was not fulfilled, are now set out in Articles 1, 3, 5 and 10, respectively of Directive 2009/103. Thus, the content of those provisions remains, in essence, the same. ( 7 )

1. Juliana

27. The main proceedings in Juliana concerned the following (unfortunate) chain of events: the respondent was the owner of a motor vehicle registered in Portugal. She had stopped driving it for health reasons. She had parked it in the yard of her house, but had not taken any steps to withdraw it formally from use. The car was thus registered and operational. One day, her son took the car keys without her knowledge, drove off and caused a road accident on a public road. He and two passengers travelling with him in the car were killed.

28. The national compensation fund, the Fundo de Garantia Automóvel (Motor Vehicle Guarantee Fund, Portugal), the appellant in the main proceedings, paid out compensation in relation to the accident to the families of the two deceased passengers. The Fund then brought a recovery action against the respondent, as the owner of the vehicle, claiming that she was under the duty to have the car insured pursuant to Article 3(1) of Directive 72/166 (now essentially Article 3 of Directive 2009/103). In those circumstances, the referring court enquired whether that provision should be interpreted as meaning that the obligation to take out civil liability motor insurance extends even to the situation in which the vehicle is, by the owner’s choice, immobilised in a private courtyard, away from public roads.

29. In its reply to that first question, the Court recalled that the concept of ‘vehicle’, which already appeared in Article 1(1) of Directive 72/166, is formulated in ‘very general terms’ and encompasses any motor vehicle intended for travel on land and propelled by mechanical power. The Court further noted that the concept of ‘vehicle’ must be objective and independent of the intention of the owner, ( 8 ) thus confirming that the subjective intention of the owner to no longer drive the vehicle is not relevant for determining whether or not it is a vehicle within the meaning of the directive.

30. Thus, the scope of the obligation to insure must, for reasons of legal certainty, be determined in advance before any possible involvement of a vehicle in an accident. ( 9 ) The Court also excluded any backwards reasoning in this regard, stating that the use of the vehicle at any given moment, be it as a means of transport or otherwise, cannot in fact determine the obligation to take out civil liability insurance. ( 10 )

31. Those arguments led the Court to conclude, in paragraph 42 of Juliana, that: ‘In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that a vehicle which is registered and therefore has not been officially withdrawn from use, and which is capable of being driven, corresponds to the concept of “vehicle” within the meaning of Article 1(1) of [Directive 72/166] and, consequently, does not cease to be subject to the insurance obligation laid down in Article 3(1) of that directive, on the sole ground that its owner no longer intends to drive it and immobilises it on private land.’ ( 11 )

32. The same wording is then repeated in paragraphs 52 and in the operative part of the judgment, stating in general terms that ‘the conclusion of a contract of insurance against civil liability relating to the use of a motor vehicle is obligatory when the vehicle concerned is still registered in a Member State and is capable of being driven’. ( 12 )

33. In the present case, the referring court is doubtful as to whether the ability to use a vehicle as a means of transport constitutes a necessary element of the definition of the concept of ‘vehicle’ within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the directive. In other words, is the technical status of a car (scrap metal and due to be scrapped), while that same car is still legally registered as a car (no formal steps have so far been taken for its withdrawal from use and the vehicle bears registration plates), decisive to the determination of whether there is a vehicle that must mandatorily be insured?

34. The referring court notes that if it were to follow the Court’s statement in Juliana, it would be bound to declare that in the circumstances of the present case, there was no obligation to take out a civil liability insurance contract, because the car was objectively unfit for use as a vehicle due to its poor technical state. The referring court then also expresses doubts as to whether national rules, in particular Article 23(1) of the Law on Compulsory Insurance, which ties the obligation to conclude a civil liability insurance contract for motor vehicle keepers to any motor vehicle in their possession, regardless of whether the vehicle is capable of being driven, would be compatible with EU law.

35. In short, the concerns of the referring court revolve around the use of ‘and’ (conjunction) between the legal status (valid registration) and the technical status (ability to be driven) of a vehicle in Juliana. Are both of these conditions cumulative, in the sense that both must be met at the same time, in order for there to be a ‘vehicle’ which then falls under the obligation to be insured pursuant to Article 3 of Directive 2009/103?

36. All the interveners who presented written observations (except for the German Government) agree that there is a duty to insure in a case such as the present one, essentially because the vehicle in question has not been formally withdrawn from use. The German Government suggests that, while Article 3 of Directive 2009/103 does not impose any such obligation, it does not preclude a Member State from adopting more stringent measures, such as those adopted by Poland in the present case. Thus, in any event, in the view of the German Government, Article 3 of the directive does not oppose the national legislation at issue in the present case.

37. For the reasons set out in detail in my Opinion in Juliana, ( 13 ) I agree essentially with the defendant, the Polish Government and the Commission: the obligation to insure against civil liability in respect of the use of a motor vehicle is compulsory when, and as long as, the vehicle is either officially registered (legal status) or is objectively capable of being driven and is being used as such (factual status). In view of the logic, aim and purpose of Directive 2009/103, there is a disjunctive ‘or’ between the two statuses: for the consequence to enter (there being a duty to take out insurance), it suffices that only one of the two conditions be true.

38. In order to explain why I believe this to be the case, I shall first recall the principles guiding the interpretation of the duty to take out insurance against civil liability under Article 3 of the directive (2), before turning to the individual situations that may arise (3). In view of that proposed answer, the specific features of the present case can be dealt with relatively swiftly (4).

2. The Guiding Principles

39. First, as was correctly pointed out by the German Government, it ought to be stressed that neither Article 3, nor any other provision of Directive 2009/103 in fact, is intended to establish liability in individual cases. The directive provides for a general obligation to insure. It is not intended to decide, indirectly through the concept of ‘vehicle’ or the ‘use of vehicles’, on liability for an accident in an individual case.

40. Second, the scope of the obligation to insure and the indeterminate legal concepts relating to that obligation must be embedded in the twofold objective that Directive 2009/103 aims at ensuring: a high level of protection for victims of accidents caused by motor vehicles and (thereby) the promotion of free movement within the European Union.

41. The Court has recalled the objective of providing a high level of protection for victims of motor vehicle accidents whenever it has interpreted the directives. ( 14 ) Indeed, that primary objective, requiring seamless protection of victims of motor vehicle accidents, is not only an aim in its own right, but is equally essential for ensuring the free movement of (persons and goods): it is only when robust protection of potential victims of motor vehicle accidents is ensured through compulsory insurance that Member States may be asked, pursuant to Article 4 of Directive 2009/103, to refrain from carrying out systematic checks on insurance against civil liability vis-à-vis vehicles entering their territory from another Member States.

42. That objective requires a broad interpretation of the scope of the obligation to take out civil liability insurance under Article 3 of the directive. That is further buttressed by the following two intra-systemic arguments.

43. Third, there is an important connection, or rather direct correlation, between the scope of the obligation to insure vehicles under Article 3 of Directive 2009/103 and the extent of the obligation to pay compensation by national compensation bodies under Article 10(1) of that directive. The potential scope of intervention of the compensation body under the directive is coextensive with the obligation to insure. Unless a Member State extends of its own volition the scope of the intervention of the national compensation fund, that fund is, under the directive, required to pay compensation only for damage caused by an unidentified vehicle or a vehicle for which the insurance obligation under Article 3 has not been satisfied.

44. This connection is crucial for the entire structure and purpose of the directive: in the absence of an obligation to insure under its Article 3, only the (uninsured) personal liability of the perpetrator could be triggered. The compensation fund would also not be obliged to act because the insurance obligation under Article 3 was in fact satisfied (no obligation to insure). Thus, to the extent that there is no insurance obligation at all, the risks would be borne entirely by the victim of the accident. Such a situation would certainly not amount to a high level of protection for the victims of motor vehicle accidents. ( 15 )

45. Fourth, even if indeed leading to a rather broad interpretation of ‘vehicle’ or its use, the concerns regarding a dangerous overreach of the duty to insure are misplaced.

46. On the one hand, there is Article 5 of Directive 2009/103. Under that provision, the Member States have the option of limiting the scope of the compulsory insurance by excluding either vehicles belonging to certain natural or legal persons, public or private; or certain types of vehicle; or certain vehicles bearing special plates. In this case, Article 5 of Directive 2009/103 also provides that in the case of a derogation, the Member State must designate the competent authority or body, or even the competent guarantee fund, which will be responsible for providing compensation to victims of accidents caused by vehicles benefiting from exemptions. In this way, it is again guaranteed that no vehicles will be driven without being covered by insurance or a compensation scheme. ( 16 )

47. On the other hand, while categorically insisting on compliance with the insurance obligation in general, the directive does not preclude reasonable flexibility in respect of the public registration schemes (temporal or seasonal deregistration or suspension of registration for vehicles being driven only in certain periods), or also in respect of the insurance industry (differentiated insurance premiums for vehicles that are rarely driven). The bottom line remains the same: differentiated risks might result in a different type of insurance, but certainly would not result in the total exclusion of the insurance obligation. ( 17 )

48. Fifth and finally, all these considerations support a broad interpretation of the concept of ‘use of vehicles’ and correspondingly a broad scope of the duty to insure such a vehicle under Article 3 of Directive 2009/103. Indeed, the concept of ‘vehicle’ is unconnected with the actual use of the vehicle in question at any given time. ( 18 ) The obligation to take out insurance under Article 3 of Directive 2009/103 is objective and independent of the intention of the owner (at that specific moment). ( 19 ) The exact way in which a vehicle was being used at a given moment when an accident occurred is an issue for (ex post) the settling of individual liability in each of those individual cases, but not for the (ex ante) definition whether or not there was an obligation to take out insurance in the first place. These are different issues. ( 20 )

49. Therefore, whether a vehicle is, at a given point in time, in fact capable of being used or driven is irrelevant for determining whether it corresponds objectively to the concept of ‘vehicle’. In circumstances where a vehicle is in need of significant repair and is thus not capable of being driven, that vehicle does not lose its objective status as a vehicle, within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Directive 2009/103.

3. The scope of Juliana: ‘And’ or ‘Or’?

50. It was for these reasons that in Juliana, I proposed that the Court adopt a rather broad scope of the obligation to insure under the directive(s), which would be, at the same time, subject to a reasonable degree of continuity, foreseeability, stability, and thus legal certainty.

51. In specific terms, I suggested that first, as long as a vehicle is and remains registered in a Member State, and no official measures have been taken to suspend or to terminate its registration, there is an obligation to insure. Thus, formal legal status is indeed decisive. ( 21 )

52. Second, the objective technical status of a vehicle would only come into question with regard to vehicles that are suitable for and actually used for travel on land, but are not registered. In that regard, I noted that Directive 72/166, and likewise Directive 2009/103, do not make the concept of vehicle, or its use, subject to national registration. ( 22 ) Indeed, the overall logic of those instruments is simpler: what is objectively a vehicle, and what is being driven and used as such, may cause damage, and ought to be insured. The key consideration remains a high level of protection for victims of motor vehicle accidents.

53. Thus, it is quite clear that there might be an obligation to insure under Directive 2009/103 even for vehicles that, while not being registered, are objectively vehicles that are being used as such and may cause damage. However, in view of the factual scenario at hand in Juliana, in which the vehicle in question was both registered (legal status) and capable of being driven, and in fact was being driven (mechanical status), I discontinued further discussions on the potential dissonance between legal status and technical status of a vehicle, since there was no need for that in the context of that case. ( 23 )

54. However, in view of the guiding principles that govern the logic and systems of the earlier directives and now Directive 2009/103, the scope of the obligation to insure would always coincide at least with the official registration of the vehicle in a Member State, that is to say the formal certification that an object is indeed a vehicle which is authorised for use on public roads. In addition, I deliberately did not exclude situations in which a vehicle, which, for whatever reason, is not registered, could still be a vehicle within the meaning of Directive 2009/103.

55. In accordance with such an understanding of the scope of the obligation to insure, the logical relationship between the legal status and the mechanical status would be an ‘or’ (a disjunction). There will be a duty to insure under the directive if (i) the car is registered; or (ii) it is capable of being used as a vehicle and is in fact being used as such; or (iii) the car is registered and is being used as a vehicle. ( 24 )

56. However, it is true that in its judgment, the Court repeatedly singled out only a variation of the third scenario, with a conjunctive ‘and’ between the two statuses, which appear to be setting a cumulative condition, subsequently reproduced as a general rule in the operative part of the judgment.

57. In view of the fact that the Court expressly agreed with several of my key arguments, ( 25 ) forming the basis of the reasoning, it would indeed be surprising if, as regards the solution adopted, it would have had the intention of formulating the obligation to insure (in general) in such a strikingly narrow way. Viewed in that context, the statements made in paragraphs 42, 52, and in the operative part of the judgment in Juliana could perhaps be regarded, not as the Court setting a general test for the existence of an obligation to insure, but rather as providing a circumscribed and narrow answer on the specific facts set out by the referring court.

58. As regards those factual circumstances, it is recalled in paragraphs 25, 27 and 34 of the Juliana judgment that the referring court’s doubts arose from the fact that the vehicle was immobilised on private property and used without its owner’s knowledge or permission.

59. Since the object of the first question referred for a preliminary ruling was to determine the limits of the compulsory insurance obligation where the vehicle concerned is, solely by the choice of its owner, who no longer intends to drive it, parked on private land, the Court clarified that this obligation is not linked to the use of the vehicle or to whether or not the vehicle concerned has caused damage. ( 26 )

60. It is in that specific factual context that the Court considered, in paragraph 42 of its judgment in Juliana, that a vehicle which is registered and therefore has not been officially withdrawn from use, and which is capable of being driven, does not cease to be subject to the insurance obligation.

61. Thus, viewed in that context, the two propositions, relating in turn to the legal status and the mechanical status of the vehicle, were perhaps not intended to be setting two cumulative conditions, but rather to be simply mirroring the factual situation in the main proceedings.

62. Whether that understanding is correct is ultimately for the Court to clarify. I would, however, add several additional arguments as to why, if any logical connection were to be made between the legal status and the mechanical status of a vehicle for the purpose of the duration of the obligation to insure under Article 3 of Directive 2009/103, it should rather be an ‘or’ and not an ‘and’.

63. As the referring court correctly notes, the factual circumstances of the main proceedings are different to those which gave rise to the judgment in Juliana. Only one of the conditions mentioned by the Court is fulfilled: the first legal or administrative condition concerning the registration of the vehicle.

64. Thus, in general, the two elements mentioned in the Juliana judgment, the legal status and the mechanical status of a vehicle, could give rise to four different scenarios: (i) a vehicle which is registered and is capable of being driven; (ii) a vehicle which is registered but is not capable of being driven; (iii) a vehicle which is not registered but is capable of being driven; and (iv) a vehicle which is neither registered nor capable of being driven.

65. In line with the Court’s judgment in Juliana, it is evident that the obligation to insure a vehicle is present under the first scenario, regardless of the intention of the owner or whether the vehicle in question is immobilised on private land, or any other factual variations. The subjective intention of the owner of a perfectly roadworthy vehicle, until and unless it materialises in formal steps, is irrelevant.

66. Similarly, under the fourth scenario, where neither of the two conditions are fulfilled, because the vehicle is neither registered nor capable of being driven, it is equally evident that the insurance obligation is not present. Where there is no vehicle, there is nothing to insure.

67. However, as the referring court points out, it is not clear whether the obligation to insure a vehicle is present where the owner of the vehicle finds himself or herself in the second or third scenario in which only one of the two conditions is fulfilled.

68. In my view, the answer must be in the affirmative in both scenarios.

69. As to the third scenario, there can certainly be vehicles (a means of transport fulfilling all the conditions objectively constituting a vehicle) that are not registered. The crucial issue becomes the question of why they are not insured. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the cases of cars that are driven while not insured in breach of national rules are less of a structural issue in terms of the protection of victims. If they are driven in breach of national rules on car insurance then they are being driven illegally. Nevertheless, the safety net of the compensation fund will still apply because any damage caused will have been so caused by ‘a vehicle for which the insurance obligation provided for in Article 3 has not been satisfied’ pursuant to Article 10(1) of Directive 2009/103.

70. The real structural problem, from the point of view of the directive, are cars that could potentially be lawfully driven under national law without having to be insured. In this way, a narrow definition of the scope of the insurance obligation under Article 3 would have direct repercussions on Article 10(1) of Directive 2009/103, allowing cars that are neither insured nor in respect of which the compensation fund is obliged to step in and provide a safety net to be lawfully driven.

71. For this reason, the mere objective existence of a vehicle coupled with its actual use must be able to trigger the obligation to insure under Article 3 of Directive 2009/103, at the latest when such a vehicle starts being used as such within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Directive 2009/103. Thus, if I build a ‘Batmobile’ at home with all the technical characteristics of a vehicle and then, instead of just admiring it in my living room, I drive it, the obligation to insure it begins objectively from its first use as a vehicle, even if I did not formally register it.

72. However, it is indeed reasonable to suggest that the triggering point in such a specific scenario is at the latest, the first use of the device as a vehicle, not necessarily its mere construction (and the fact that it could be potentially driven). Thus, if the Batmobile I built (or perhaps, for a more realistic example, a veteran car that I restored), will remain forever confined to my living room (or rather to my garage), without ever being driven (that is to say, used as vehicle), then it cannot endanger anyone as a vehicle. However, from the moment at which it starts to be driven and thus used as a vehicle, it must be insured pursuant to Article 3 of Directive 2009/103. ( 27 )

73. Finally, there is the second scenario, which is particularly relevant in the present case: the vehicle remains registered but is not capable of being driven because of its poor technical state. In my view, even in such as case, the insurance obligation remains in place so long as that registration is maintained. In other words, it is only when the vehicle is officially deregistered (or suspended, or whatever other official and formal process exists at the national level for that purpose), that the insurance obligation will also cease to exist.

74. This must be the case for at least three additional reasons.

75. First, the requirement to take the appropriate formal and official steps for withdrawing or at least suspending the vehicle from use is essential for legal certainty. There may be a number of situations in which a vehicle might be temporarily, or even for a longer period not roadworthy or simply not used. ( 28 ) Would each of those periods mean that the insurance obligation would lapse for the duration? Would a vehicle’s actual status change between being a vehicle and not being a vehicle simply because its owner did not bother to have it repaired? Could the individuals then even claim, for the periods of time that their car was in fact not roadworthy, a rebate or remission of part of their insurance premiums?

76. Second, there is the element of proof and evidence. Who would have to certify that the car is in fact in such a mechanical state that it could not be driven? How would that be done? Would it be through self-certification or would a letter from my mechanic be required? Or would an affidavit from my neighbour, swearing that the car was stationary in my backyard with no wheels on it, be enough? Leaving aside all the practical problems and complexities of such proof and evidence, the key fact remains that they would be completely unnecessary. Why would such considerations be necessary in the first place if the only thing that needs to be done is for the owner of the vehicle to bring the legal status of the vehicle in line with its alleged mechanical status and accordingly de-register the vehicle, or take any other appropriate administrative steps under national law to that effect, either temporarily, or permanently?

77. Third and finally, within such a context, an obligation thus conceived also provides the right incentives. By means of the ongoing obligation to pay insurance as long as no official steps have been taken, it indirectly encourages car owners to take due care of their property. It is of course entirely an owner’s choice whether to have a defective vehicle repaired, sold in the state it is in, sold off as scrap metal because it is beyond repair, or simply kept parked on a street or in one’s yard. However, should any of these choices lead to the termination of the ‘official life’ of a vehicle, the duty ought to be placed upon the shoulders of the owner to carry out the official deregistration procedures by, for example, handing over the registration plates or obtaining any appropriate form of public certification, even temporarily, which confirms that the vehicle has been withdrawn from use.

78. In doing so, the owner of the vehicle would naturally cross over from the second scenario into the fourth scenario outlined above where the obligation to insure the vehicle in question ceases to exist. Otherwise, the insurance obligation must be maintained.

4. Application to the present case

79. The second scenario outlined above provides a clear answer to the referring court’s questions. In my view, there is no doubt that the obligation to insure can continue as long as no measures are taken by the applicant to formally certify the poor technical state of the vehicle in question, so as to render it unfit for use, by officially deregistering it or by undertaking any other appropriate steps for withdrawing the vehicle from use under national law.

80. Beyond that general statement concerning the scope of the obligation to insure under Article 3 of Directive 2009/103, specifically the end of that obligation, I do not think that this Court can be of any further assistance to the referring court.

81. First, all the specific factual circumstances singled out by the referring court in its order for reference and in its first question (the vehicle acquired by the district following a court decision; located on private property in the form of a guarded car park and not on a public road; to be destroyed in accordance with the wishes of its owner) are helpful in setting out and illustrating the situation in the main proceedings. However, they are not relevant for the interpretation of the EU law at issue.

82. Directive 2009/103 and in particular its Article 3 requires only that the Member States set up a comprehensive and robust compulsory insurance framework for vehicles, in order to provide for a seamless safety net for potential victims of motor vehicle accidents. Provided that main objective is met, and from a structural point of view, it is not possible for vehicles to be driven lawfully in a Member State where they are under no obligation to be insured, and in which case they would fall short of both Article 3 and Article 10(1) of Directive 2009/103, there is a natural scope for differentiated solutions across the Member States. That implies some permissible diversity in terms of individual outcomes of factually different or even of factually similar, cases.

83. Second, within that permissible degree of diversity of approaches and solutions, unusual situations are always possible. That appears to be partly true with the present case, in which the Renault Clio 1.5 DCI at issue could effectively not be insured by the applicant under national law until it had obtained formal proof of ownership, and that that formal proof was in fact delayed apparently as a result of somebody else’s inaction. In that context and taking into account the fact that the car was in a guarded car park and was not capable of being driven anyway, it may indeed appear somewhat odd to be asking for payment of the outstanding insurance in this particular case.

84. In any event, odd or not, it is not the job of this Court to settle individual insurance claims at national level. Under Article 267 TFEU, the Court of Justice may be called upon to provide the interpretation of any act of EU law. However, the application of EU law to actual cases, a fortiori the application of national laws adopted within the realm of the discretion of the Member States in implementing the Union framework, appertains to the tasks entrusted to national courts.

85. Within that division of tasks, it falls indeed to this Court to clarify the overall framework of Article 3 of Directive 2009/103 and to determine the exact material and temporal scope of the obligation to take out civil liability insurance under that provision, examined and interpreted in the general context of that directive. However, having carried out that interpretative task, if necessary also coupled with some indications as to how to assess the (in)compatibility of national rules transposing that obligation, the application of those rules to individual cases and the settling of such cases is a task for the national court.

86. Thus, having provided an interpretation of Article 3 of Directive 2009/103, in the light of which it would appear that there is nothing inappropriate in the national legislation applicable in the present case, it is, put very bluntly, in my view of no concern to this Court who exactly will eventually end up paying the insurance for the Renault Clio 1.5 DCI for the period between 7 February 2018 to 22 April 2018 when, following a court decision, the Powiat Ostrowski acquired the title to that vehicle, which was not capable of being driven and was stored on private property in the form of a guarded car park, and not on a public road, and was to be destroyed in accordance with the wishes of its owner.

V. Conclusion

87. I propose that the Court answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy w Ostrowie Wielkopolskim (District Court of Ostrów Wielkopolski, Poland) as follows: – Article 3 of Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability, is to be interpreted as meaning that the conclusion of an insurance contract against civil liability in respect of the use of a motor vehicle is compulsory in circumstances where it is officially registered or is used as a vehicle.

( 1 ) Original language: English.

( 2 ) OJ 2009 L 263, p. 11.

( 3 ) Judgment of 4 September 2018 (C‑80/17, EU:C:2018:661, paragraph 42, repeated in similar terms in paragraph 52, and in the operative part of the judgment). My emphasis.

( 4 ) See notably the recent judgments of 15 November 2018, BTA Baltic Insurance Company (C‑648/17, EU:C:2018:917), and of 20 June 2019, Línea Directa Aseguradora (C‑100/18, EU:C:2019:517). See also order of 11 December 2019, Bueno Ruiz and Zurich Insurance (C‑431/18, not published, EU:C:2019:1082).

( 5 ) Council Directive of 24 April 1972 on the approximation of the laws of Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and to the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability (OJ, English Special Edition Series I, 1972 (II), p. 360), as amended by Directive 2005/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 (OJ 2005 L 149, p. 14), codified by Directive 2009/103.

( 6 ) Second Council Directive of 30 December 1983 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles (OJ 1984 L 8 p. 17), as amended by Directive 2005/14.

( 7 ) See also the correlation table in Annex II to Directive 2009/103.

( 8 ) Judgment of 4 September 2018, Juliana (C‑80/17, EU:C:2018:661, paragraph 39).

( 9 ) Ibid., paragraph 40.

( 10 ) Ibid., paragraph 41.

( 11 ) My emphasis.

( 12 ) My emphasis.

( 13 ) C‑80/17, EU:C:2018:290, points 93 to 110.

( 14 ) See, in particular, judgment of 4 September 2018, Juliana (C‑80/17, EU:C:2018:661, paragraph 47), as well as, most recently, order of 11 December 2019, Bueno Ruiz and Zurich Insurance (C‑431/18, EU:C:2019:1082, paragraphs 33 and 34, not published).

( 15 ) In detail, see my Opinion in Juliana (C‑80/17, EU:C:2018:290, points 31 to 36).

( 16 ) My Opinion in Juliana (C‑80/17, EU:C:2018:290, point 107).

( 17 ) My Opinion in Juliana (C‑80/17, EU:C:2018:290, points 88 to 89 and 100).

( 18 ) Judgment of 4 September 2018, Juliana (C‑80/17, EU:C:2018:661, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited). See, in the same sense, judgments of 4 September 2014, Vnuk (C‑162/13, EU:C:2014:2146, paragraph 33), and of 28 November 2017, Rodrigues de Andrade (C‑514/16, EU:C:2017:908, paragraph 11).

( 19 ) Judgment of 4 September 2018, Juliana (C‑80/17, EU:C:2018:661, paragraph 39).

( 20 ) To illustrate the point: if the Hulk grabs a car parked on a (European) city street in order to fight off an alien invasion, and, being the Hulk, causes damage not only to the aliens, but also to other property on that street by using the car as a weapon, it is fair to assume that that vehicle, which was just parked there for a few hours by its owner while he or she was at work in the building nearby, was a vehicle subject to the (ongoing) obligation to be insured. The fact that in the hands of the Hulk and at that precise moment, that specific ‘use of vehicle’ would hardly amount to ‘any use of a vehicle consistent with the normal function of that vehicle’, that is to say as a ‘means of travel’, is certainly of relevance for assigning liability for the damage caused in the individual case, logically excluding the motor vehicle insurance from being asked to pay for the damage, but not for the continuing existence of the obligation to take out civil liability insurance under Article 3 of Directive 2009/103.

( 21 ) My Opinion in Juliana (C‑80/17, EU:C:2018:290, point 95).

( 22 ) My Opinion in Juliana (C‑80/17, EU:C:2018:290, point 99).

( 23 ) My Opinion in Juliana (C‑80/17, EU:C:2018:290, points 103 to 110).

( 24 ) With of course these categories and the discussion that follows in this Opinion being primarily relevant for national systems that place the obligation to insure a vehicle on the owner of a car, which, as I understand it, is the case in Poland. The assessment would be somewhat different (as to its articulation, but not as to the principle) for systems that impose the obligation to take out insurance under Article 3 of Directive 2009/103 on the users/drivers – see further my Opinion in Juliana (C‑80/17, EU:C:2018:290, points 25 to 27).

( 25 ) Judgment of 4 September 2018, Juliana (C‑80/17, EU:C:2018:661, paragraphs 39 and 46).

( 26 ) See judgment of 4 September 2018, Juliana (C‑80/17, EU:C:2018:661, paragraphs 40 and 41).

( 27 ) While it naturally remains possible to provide for differentiated insurance obligations for such specific types of vehicles in national law (see above, point 47 of this Opinion).

( 28 ) For further illustrations, see the situations envisaged in points 77 and 78 of my Opinion in Juliana (C‑80/17, EU:C:2018:290).