ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Order of the Vice-President of the Court of 21 May 2021 – Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi v EUIPO

(Case C‑201/21 P)

(Appeal – EU trade mark – Article 170a(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – No request that the appeal be allowed to proceed – Appeal inadmissible)

Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – No request that the appeal be allowed to proceed – Inadmissibility

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court, Art. 170a(1))

(see paras 4-6)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed as inadmissible.
Order of the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) of 12 May 2021 – BSH Hausgeräte v EUIPO

(Case C‑67/21 P)

(Appeal – EU trade mark – Determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Article 170b of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Request failing to demonstrate that an issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Refusal to allow the appeal to proceed)

1. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Issue that has not been examined by the Court – Request that the appeal be allowed to proceed failing to demonstrate that the issue is significant – Appeal not allowed to proceed (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b) (see paras 14-16)

2. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Request that the appeal be allowed to proceed failing to demonstrate that the issue is significant – Appeal not allowed to proceed (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b) (see paras 18, 19)

Operative part

1. The appeal is not allowed to proceed.
Order of the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) of 1 September 2021 –

Likvidacijska masa iza Mesoprodukt and Čuljak v Commission

(Case C‑171/21 P)

(Appeal – Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Action for annulment and for damages – Complaint lodged with the European Commission seeking a declaration that EU law has been infringed by the Republic of Croatia – Alleged non-compliance of national law with Directive 68/151/EEC – Failure to initiate infringement proceedings – Application for legal aid – Appeal manifestly unfounded)

1. Action for annulment – Actionable measures – Refusal by the Commission to initiate infringement proceedings – Precluded (see paras 13, 14)

2. Non-contractual liability – Conditions – Sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals – Discretion of the institution when adopting the measure (see paras 13, 14)

3. Judicial proceedings – Application for legal aid – Conditions for granting – Appeal manifestly unfounded – Dismissal of application (Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 187(1)) (see paras 16, 17)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed as being manifestly unfounded.

2. The application of Likvidacijska masa iza Mesoprodukt d.o.o. and of Mr Gojko Čuljak for legal aid is rejected.
Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Burden of proof

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 170b)

(see paragraph 11)
Appeals – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Burden of proof

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b)

(see para. 15)
Appeals – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Burden of proof

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b)

(see para. 12)
Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 7 April 2022 – Elliniko Dimosio (Cleaning staff in schools)

(Case C‑133/21) ( 1 )

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Social policy – Directive 1999/70/EC – Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP – Clause 4 – Principle of non-discrimination – Successive fixed-term contracts in the public sector – National legislation establishing a difference in treatment as regards remuneration between workers employed under fixed-term contracts for the supply of services and those employed under contracts of indefinite duration – No justification – Concept of ‘objective reasons’)

1. Social policy – Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP – Directive 1999/70 – Concept of ‘fixed-term worker’ – Workers employed under fixed-term contracts for the supply of services to clean schools – Included (Council Directive 1999/70, Annex, Clauses 2(1) and (2), 3(1) and 4(1)) (see paras 39-44)

2. Social policy – Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP – Directive 1999/70 – Conditions of employment – Concept – Conditions relating to remuneration – Included (Council Directive 1999/70, Annex, Clause 4(1)) (see para. 45)

3. Social policy – Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP – Directive 1999/70 – Prohibition on discrimination against fixed-term workers – National legislation establishing a difference in treatment as regards remuneration between workers employed under fixed-term contracts for the supply of services and those employed under contracts of indefinite duration – No objective grounds – Not permissible (Council Directive 1999/70, Annex, Clause 4(1)) (see paras 60-63, operative part)

Operative part

Clause 4(1) of the framework agreement on fixed-term work, concluded on 18 March 1999, which is annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which a fixed-term worker, whose contracts is classified as a contract for the supply of services, is not entitled to receive remuneration equivalent to that paid to a permanent worker on the ground that that worker carried out his or her work under a fixed-term contract in the knowledge that that contract sought to meet permanent and long-lasting needs of his or her employer.

( 1 ) OJ C 206, 31.5.2021.
Appeal – Grounds – Lack of specific criticism of a point of the General Court’s reasoning – Failure to indicate the paragraphs of the judgment under appeal that are contested – Manifest inadmissibility

(Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 169(2))

(see paras 26-29, 32, 44, 45)
64

Thus, pursuant to that case-law, the purpose of the procedure for interim relief is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future final decision, in order to prevent a lacuna in the legal protection afforded by the Court. It is for the purpose of attaining that objective that urgency must be assessed in the light of the need for an interlocutory order to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the party seeking the interim relief. It is for that party to prove that it cannot await the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering such damage. While it is true that, in order to establish the existence of serious and irreparable damage, it is not necessary for the occurrence and imminence of the damage to be demonstrated with absolute certainty, it being sufficient to show that damage is foreseeable with a sufficient degree of probability, the party seeking interim measures is nevertheless required to prove the facts forming the basis of its claim that serious and irreparable damage is likely (order of the Vice-President of the Court of 16 July 2021, Symrise v ECHA, C‑282/21 P(R), not published, EU:C:2021:631, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
26

Accordingly, a request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must, in any event, set out clearly and in detail the grounds on which the appeal is based, identify with equal clarity and detail the issue of law raised by each ground of appeal, specify whether that issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law and set out the specific reasons why that issue is significant according to that criterion. As regards, in particular, the grounds of appeal, the request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must specify the provision of EU law or the case-law that has been infringed by the judgment or order under appeal, explain succinctly the nature of the error of law allegedly committed by the General Court, and indicate to what extent that error had an effect on the outcome of the judgment or order under appeal. Where the error of law relied on results from an infringement of the case-law, the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed must explain, in a succinct but clear and precise manner, first, where the alleged contradiction lies, by identifying the paragraphs of the judgment or order under appeal which the appellant is calling into question as well as those of the ruling of the Court of Justice or the General Court alleged to have been infringed, and second, the concrete reasons why such a contradiction raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (order of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, not published, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
34

In order to answer those questions, in the first place, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, the right of taxable persons to deduct the VAT due or already paid on goods purchased and services received as inputs from the VAT which they are liable to pay is a fundamental principle of the common system of VAT established by EU legislation. The right of deduction provided for in Article 167 et seq. of the VAT Directive is an integral part of the VAT scheme and may not, in principle, be limited. In particular, that right may be exercised immediately in respect of all the taxes charged on transactions relating to inputs. The deduction system is meant to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of the VAT payable or paid in the course of all his or her economic activities. The common system of VAT consequently ensures the neutrality of taxation of all economic activities, whatever the purpose or results of those activities, provided that they are themselves subject in principle to VAT (judgment of 18 November 2021, Promexor Trade, C‑358/20, EU:C:2021:936, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
Order of the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) of 15 June 2022 –Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi v EUIPO

(Case C‑121/22 P)

(Appeal – EU trade mark – Determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Article 170b of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Request failing to demonstrate that an issue is significant with respect to the unity, coherence or development of EU law – Refusal to allow the appeal to proceed)

1. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Burden of proof (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a (1) and 170b) (see para. 12)

2. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Request that an appeal be allowed to proceed – Formal requirements – Scope (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b) (see paras 13-15)

3. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Request that the appeal be allowed to proceed failing to demonstrate that the issue is significant – Appeal not allowed to proceed (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b) (see paras 16-18, 20-22)

4. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence – Precluded (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b) (see para. 19)

Operative part

1. The appeal is not allowed to proceed.
1.

A periodic report dated 15 January 1968 was made on Mr Elz, who is at present a principal assistant in the Directorate-General for Financial Control in Brussels. Although at the time he had been first in the service of the High Authority and then of the Commission for almost 14 years and although it was contrary to Article 37 of the former Staff Regulations of the ECSC and Article 43 of the new Staff Regulations of the ECSC and the Staff Regulations of the EEC, this was the first time a report had been made on him. This is no doubt the reason why he attached special importance to it and, as he did not feel satisfied with certain assessments which it contained, he submitted a complaint under Article 90 on 27 March 1968, following which a new amended report was made on 22 May 1968. However, in spite of this Mr Elz requested in an application lodged on 25 July 1968 that the first report of 15 January be annulled. The objection raised by the Commission was sustained and the application was dismissed as inadmissible in a judgment of 25 February 1969. In fact, on the date when the application was lodged the contested measure had already been replaced by the report of 22 May 1968. No doubt Mr Elz, relying on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Staff Regulations, refused to acknowledge that the second report had any legal effect, because he had declined to sign it when it was given to him. As, however, he had become acquainted with the report at the end of May, the judgment held that this document could be used against the applicant and be accepted as sufficient evidence that the report of January 1968 had been withdrawn. The application lodged against this report was of course inadmissible because it had no purpose from the start. Unfortunately, Mr Elz was no more satisfied with the report of 22 May 1968 than he had been with the previous report, so he submitted a complaint through official channels against this report on 14 March 1969 immediately after the judgment to which I have just referred was delivered. The President of the Commission informed him on 8 July that it could only simply confirm it, and the letter referred to the findings contained in the judgment of the Court of 25 February 1969. In these circumstances Mr Elz asked you on 8 October to annul the periodic report of 22 May this time (the date of which he wrongly gives as 31 May, which is the date when he became acquainted with it in its final form). In his reply he stated that his application was to be deemed to be directed against the decision of the President of the Commission of 8 July 1969.
OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL REISCHL

DELIVERED ON 28 JANUARY 1981 ( 1 )

Mr President,

Members of the Court,

The proceedings on which I now give my opinion concern the implementation of Council Directive 77/62/EEC coordinating procedures for the award of public supply contracts, issued on 21 December 1976 (Official Journal L 13 of 15 January 1977, p. 1).

For the detailed content of that directive I refer to the Commission's application and to the Report for the Hearing. Article 30 of the directive provided that the Member States were to adopt the measures necessary to comply with it within 18 months of its notification; that period expired on 23 June 1978. The Italian Republic did not discharge that obligation and so in March 1979 the Commission brought proceedings under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty, in regard to which I again refer to the Report for the Hearing.

During these proceedings it was disclosed that a draft Law to implement the directive was actually in the process of going through Parliament at the end of 1978; however, after amendments required by the Senate had necessitated further scrutiny by the Chamber of Deputies, it could not be passed owing to the premature dissolution of Parliament early in 1979. A new draft was submitted to the Senate in December 1979. As we were told at the hearing, that draft was passed by the Senate on 4 December 1980 and remitted to the Chamber of Deputies for final enactment. This has been delayed, apparently on account of the fact that on 1 January 1981 a new directive on the same subject (Directive 80/767/EEC) entered into force. As Counsel for the Italian Government explained, the bill will have to be amended accordingly; it must then be remitted once again to the Senate before it can finally be enacted, for which it is not possible to indicate a date.

An assessment of those defence arguments is to be found in the extensive case-law of the Court of Justice cited by the Commission in its application. In particular it is clear that the issue of a new directive and the. necessity of implementing it cannot afford any justification for the failure to implement the directive concerned in these proceedings within the prescribed period.

In view of those facts we therefore have no choice but to grant the application lodged by the Commission. It must accordingly be declared that the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty by not adopting within the prescribed period provisions to implement Directive 77/62/EEC. Furthermore, the costs of the proceedings should be borne by the defendant as claimed in the application.

( 1 ) Translated from the German.
1.

This action, which was brought on 13 June 1980, is based on a series of claims concerning establishment, payment of salary, pension rights, insurance contributions and compensation for termination of her employment contract as a member of the establishment staff made against the Commission by Miss Maria Mascetti, an employee of the Ispra Joint Research Centre. The facts of the case have already been summarized in detail by Mr Advocate General Capotorti in the opinion which he delivered on 18 June 1981. Accordingly, I shall merely refer to the subsequent course of events, commencing with the Court's interlocutory judgment of 14 July 1981. The Court held on that occasion that the application was admissible “with regard to the claim relating to seniority in the step” (paragraph 10 of the decision in Case 145/80 Mascetti v Commission [1981] ECR 1975). However, the Court held that the other claims were inadmissible as they had been submitted out of time. In the light of that judgment, the Commission proposed on 14 October 1981 to insert a term in Miss Mascetti's contract of employment concluded on 24 April 1979 backdating her seniority in Step 8 of Grade C 1 to 1 December of the previous year. At the same time, in an application on a procedural issue under Article 91 of the Rules of Procedure, the Commission requested the Court to terminate the written procedure, to refrain if necessary from initiating the oral procedure, to declare that the application had become devoid of purpose since the applicant no longer had an interest in pursuing the proceedings, to declare that is was unnecessary for the Court to give a decision on the points at issue and to make an order as to costs on an equitable basis, due regard being had to the fact that in the previous dispute between the parties almost all of the claims submitted by Miss Mascetti had been declared inadmissible. Since the applicant persisted in her view that the proceedings should be continued, the Court, by order of 6 May 1982, deferred its decision on the application for a declaration that it was unnecessary to give a decision on the points at issue pending consideration of the substance of the case. For its part, the Commission requested the Court primarily to declare that the application had become devoid of purpose on the ground that the applicant no longer had any interest capable of being furthered by legal proceedings and to declare that it was unnecessary to give a decision on the points at issue or, in the alternative, to dismiss the application as unfounded and, in any event, to order the applicant to pay the whole of the costs.
3.

I shall now examine the criticisms relating to matters of substance. The applicant puts forward various arguments against the transfer of the post: infringement of the Staff Regulations, contravention of the general principles prevailing in the civil service (legitimate expectation and good administration) and misuse of powers. The first submission. According to the applicant, the administration is not entitled to transfer a post when the recruitment procedure has commenced; in any case, the decision to cancel the vacancy notice did not include a statement of the reasons on which it was based. Both criticisms are without foundation. There is no provision in the Staff Regulations which compels the administration to complete the recruitment procedure: it may therefore be interrupted, for example if required by the interests of the service (cf. the judgment in Fux cited earlier). The cancellation of the notice is, moreover, a measure of a general nature which falls within the discretionary powers of the administration and is not capable of having an adverse effect: the defendant institution was not therefore under any obligation to state the reasons for it (judgment of 31 March 1965 in Joined Cases 12 and 29/64 Ley v Commission [1965] ECR 107). Nor does it seem to me that the principle of legitimate expectation has been contravened. Morina considers that his response to a vacancy notice placed him in a position of “near certainty” or gave him a “vested subjective right” to promotion. But his view is without foundation. There are innumerable decided cases which show that under the Community civil service system there is no right properly so-called to promotion from one post to another. Nor has the principle of good administration been contravened, inasmuch as the institution was under no duty to disregard the requirements of the service on the ground that Morina had a future contingent interest in securing the post; and there is no evidence to support the complaint of misuse of powers. The applicant has not shown that the contested decision was not actually based on the interests of the'service and was a subterfuge to favour another official. Moreover, the explanations given by the defendant institution during the oral proceedings have, I believe, dispelled any doubt or concern which might be harboured in that regard. At the most, the Parliament might be reproached for not having given those explanations earlier.