ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 352/9

Appeal brought on 23 September 2013 by Philips Lighting Poland S.A., Philips Lighting BV against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 11 July 2013 in Case T-469/07: Philips Lighting Poland S.A., Philips Lighting BV v Council of the European Union

(Case C-511/13 P)

2013/C 352/16

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Philips Lighting Poland S.A., Philips Lighting BV (represented by: M.L. Catrain González, abogada, E.A. Wright, H. Zhu, Barristers)

Other parties to the proceedings: Council of the European Union, Hangzhou Duralamp Electronics Co., Ltd, GE Hungary Ipari és Kereskedelmi Zrt. (GE Hungary Zrt), European Commission, Osram GmbH

Form of order sought

The Appellants claim that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment and annul the Contested Regulation in so far as it applies to the Appellants;

— order the Council to pay the Appellants’ costs both before the General Court and in connection with the present proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By the present appeal, the Appellants request that the Judgment be set aside and the Contested Regulation be annulled on the grounds that:

1. The General Court wrongly interpreted Article 9(1) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 (1) (the ‘basic regulation’) (‘Article 9(1)’) when concluding that the Council is entitled to apply Article 9(1) a fortiori to situations that fall outside the scope of application of that provision (i.e., where there is no withdrawal of a complaint, but rather support for the complaint merely falls). The General Court’s expansive interpretation of Article 9(1) is not supported by either the wording or the scheme of the provisions of the basic regulation. It is also contradicted by the Institutions’ practice in the last 25 years during which reliance on Article 9(1), following the withdrawal of a complaint, has always triggered the termination of the related investigation.

2. The General Court committed an error of law by misinterpreting, and therefore misapplying, Articles 4(1) and 5(4) of the basic regulation (‘Articles 4(1) and Article 5(4)’) when defining the ‘Community industry’. This led to the incorrect conclusion that a ‘major proportion’ of total Community production must be determined through application of only one of the two thresholds required by Article 5(4), the 25 % threshold only. The erroneous definition of the ‘Community industry’ vitiated the Institutions’ injury analysis which, instead of being determined on the basis of the effect of the dumped imports on the ‘Community industry’ as set out in Article 3(1) of the basic regulation (‘Article 3(1)’), and defined in Article 5(4) was assessed on the basis of the situation of the ‘supporting company’ or ‘the largest producer’. Neither of these terms is used in the basic regulation for the purpose of determining ‘injury’.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community, OJ L 56, p. 1
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 377/7

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas (Lithuania) lodged on 14 October 2013 — Gazprom OAO, other party to the proceedings: Republic of Lithuania

(Case C-536/13)

2013/C 377/14

Language of the case: Lithuanian

Referring court

Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant in cassation: Gazprom OAO

Other party to the proceedings: Republic of Lithuania, represented by the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Lithuania

Questions referred

1. Where an arbitral tribunal issues an anti-suit injunction and thereby prohibits a party from bringing certain claims before a court of a Member State, which under the rules on jurisdiction in the Brussels I Regulation (1) has jurisdiction to hear the civil case as to the substance, does the court of a Member State have the right to refuse to recognise such an award of the arbitral tribunal because it restricts the court’s right to determine itself whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case under the rules on jurisdiction in the Brussels I Regulation?

2. Should the first question be answered in the affirmative, does the same also apply where the anti-suit injunction issued by the arbitral tribunal orders a party to the proceedings to limit his claims in a case which is being heard in another Member State and the court of that Member State has jurisdiction to hear that case under the rules on jurisdiction in the Brussels I Regulation?

3. Can a national court, seeking to safeguard the primacy of European Union law and the full effectiveness of the Brussels I Regulation, refuse to recognise an award of an arbitral tribunal if such an award restricts the right of the national court to decide on its own jurisdiction and powers in a case which falls within the jurisdiction of the Brussels I Regulation?

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1).
2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative: (a) In the light of the principle of proportionality, which is a general principle of European Union law, is a provision of national law permissible, such as that established in Article 18 of the VAT Law, under which, inter alia, tax on the supply of immovable property effected through enforcement in respect of goods owned by the debtor or in his possession in breach of existing law is calculated, collected and paid by a court enforcement officer carrying out an enforcement action who, as paying agent, bears liability in the event of failure to fulfil that obligation? (b) In the light of Articles 206, 250 and 252 of the directive and of the principle of neutrality arising therefrom, is a provision of national law permissible, such as that established in Article 18 of the VAT Law, under which a paying agent as referred to in that provision is required to calculate, collect and pay, within the tax period of the taxable person, an amount of value added tax on a supply, effected through enforcement, of goods owned by that taxable person or in his possession in breach of the law in force, in an amount comprising the product of the proceeds from the sale of the goods, minus value added tax and the applicable rate of that tax, with no reduction of that amount by the amount of input tax from the beginning of the tax period to the date of the collection of that tax from the taxable person?
3.

Are adverse actions by third parties acting on their own responsibility and to whom certain tasks that constitute part of the operation of an air carrier have been entrusted, to be deemed to be extraordinary circumstances within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004?
If the term ‘payable’ refers to the commencement date of the pension awarded with retroactive effect:

Can this be reconciled with the fact that the person entitled to receive the pension who comes under Article 27 of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 cannot, under Netherlands legislation, take out medical care insurance with the same retroactive effect?
1.

In the case of holdings in third-country funds, does the free movement of capital provided for in Article 73b TEC (since 1 May 1999, Article 56 EC) (1) not preclude national legislation (in this instance Paragraph 18(3) of the AuslInvestmG (Law on Foreign Investments)) which provides that, in certain circumstances, national investors in foreign investment funds are deemed to have received, in addition to distributions, notional earnings in the amount of 90 % of the difference between the first and the last redemption price of the year, but of at least 10 % of the final redemption price (or of the stock exchange or market value), because that legislation, which has remained essentially unchanged since 31 December 1993, is concerned with the provision of financial services within the meaning of the rule on the protection of established rights contained in Article 73c(1) TEC (since 1 May 1999, Article 57(1) EC) (2)? If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative:
1.

Under Council Directive 93/13/EEC (1) of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, and in particular Article 6(1) thereof, and in order to ensure the protection of consumers and users in accordance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, must a national court, when it finds there to be an unfair default-interest clause in mortgage loans, declare the clause void and not binding or, on the contrary, must it moderate the interest clause, referring the matter back to the party seeking enforcement or lender for recalculation of the interest?
1.

Must a rule of national law requiring the central bank of the Member State in question to suspend payment of the 13th and 14th month pay to retired employees of that bank be interpreted as contrary to Article 130 TFEU, in so far as it involves interference by the Government (that is to say, the central administration) in the bank’s decision-making powers with regard to its staff policy, in breach of the principal of the autonomy and independence of central banks?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 24/3

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Vergabekammer Arnsberg (Germany) lodged on 22 October 2013 — Bundesdruckerei GmbH v Stadt Dortmund

(Case C-549/13)

2014/C 24/04

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Vergabekammer Arnsberg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Bundesdruckerei GmbH

Defendant: Stadt Dortmund

Question referred

Do Article 56 TFEU and Article 3(1) of Directive 96/71/EC (1) preclude national legislation and/or a procurement condition of a public contracting authority according to which a tenderer who wants to obtain a or the advertised public contract must (1) undertake to pay the staff appointed to carry out the contract a standard or minimum wage fixed in the legislation, and (2) impose the same obligation on an appointed or prospective subcontractor and submit a corresponding undertaking of the subcontractor to the contracting authority, where (a) the legislation provides for such an obligation only for the procurement of public contracts but not also for the award of private contracts, and (b) the subcontractor is resident in another EU Member State and the employees of the subcontractor carry out the services covered by the contract exclusively in the subcontractor’s home country?

(1) Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services (OJ 1997 L 18, p. 1).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 45/23

Action brought on 3 December 2013 — European Commission v Republic of Poland

(Case C-639/13)

2014/C 45/39

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: L. Lozano Palacios and M. Owsiany-Hornung, Agents)

Defendant: Republic of Poland

Form of order sought

— declare that, by applying a reduced rate of VAT to goods intended to provide fire protection, mentioned in Annex 3 to the Law of 11 March 2004 on tax on goods and services, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 96 to 98 of Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax, (1) in conjunction with Annex III to that directive;

— order the Republic of Poland to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of its action, the Commission submits that the Republic of Poland applies a reduced rate of VAT to goods which are not mentioned in Annex III to the directive. Those goods, however, require to be taxed at the standard rate as they cannot come within the scope of the exception provided for in Article 98(2) of the directive. In addition, the argument set out by Poland is related exclusively to economic policy and cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of providing legal justification for breaching the provisions of the directive. In the Commission’s view, there can therefore be no doubt that the provisions of Polish law have not been adapted to the requirements of the directive.

(1) OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.
2.

When an assessment is made as to whether the bilateral convention is more favourable, does Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 require the view to be taken that it is necessary to remain within the legal interpretation of the bilateral convention or is it also necessary to include the specific detailed arrangements for application (regarding the quantum of the pension which can be granted by each State, the payment of which is determined by reference to the application/exclusion of application of the convention by the regulation)?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 52/27

Appeal brought on 26 November 2013 by European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 16 September 2013 in Joined Cases T-379/10 and T-381/10: Keramag Keramische Werke AG and Others, Sanitec Europe Oy v European Commission

(Case C-613/13 P)

2014/C 52/49

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: F. Castillo de la Torre, F. Ronkes Agerbeek, agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Keramag Keramische Werke AG and Others, Sanitec Europe Oy

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside point 1 of the operative part of the judgment under appeal insofar as it annuls article 1 of the contested Decision as regards the events in AFICS and the liability of Allia SAS, Produits Céramique de Touraine SA and Sanitec for them;

— set aside in full point 2 of the operative part of the judgment under appeal;

— if the Court of Justice gives final judgment, to dismiss the action for annulment also insofar as it concerns the events in AFICS and to reinstate the fines imposed on Allia SAS, Produits Céramique de Touraine SA and Sanitec; and, in any event,

— to order the applicants at first instance (now other parts in the proceedings) bear the costs of this appeal, and, to the extent that the Court of Justice gives final judgment on the action for annulment, of such case as well.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First ground: failure to comply with duty to state reasons and the rules of evidence; the General Court failed to examine several relevant pieces of evidence and applied too high evidentiary requirements for those pieces of evidence that the General Court did examine.

Second ground: contradictory reasoning; the assessment of the evidence is in direct contradiction with that in three other judgments delivered the same day relating to the same decision and the same facts.
3.

Third ground of appeal. Breach of the principle of legality in the adoption of the Leniency Notices, in the light of the infringement of Articles 101 to 105 TFEU taken together, and of Article 23 of Council Regulation No 1/2003 (1) The entire procedure originates in and is based on the Commission Notices which established what is known as the leniency programme. The appellant submits that, in the absence of an act of the European legislature, the Commission does not have any power to grant total or partial immunity for undertakings or, on the basis of the notice relating thereto, to initiate competition-law proceedings which result in the imposition of heavy penalties. The General Court did not provide an adequate response to the appellant’s objections inasmuch as it failed to give due consideration to the various points of law raised.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen (Sweden) lodged on 27 December 2013 — X AB v Skatteverket

(Case C-686/13)

(2014/C 71/19)

Language of the case: Swedish

Referring court

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: X AB

Defendant: Skatteverket

Question referred

Do Article 49 TFEU and Article 63 TFEU preclude national legislation according to which the Member State of domicile does not grant a deduction for a currency loss which is an integral part of a capital gain or capital loss on holdings for business purposes in a company which is domiciled in another Member State, where the Member State of domicile applies a system under which capital gains and capital losses on such assets are wholly exempt from taxation?
1.

First ground of appeal , alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons and the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment as regards the assessment of the lesser gravity of Roca’s infringement because of the smaller range of goods concerned by the infringement, and distortion of the findings of fact in the decision.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 78/2

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Polimeles Protodikio Athinon (Greece) lodged on 6 August 2013 — Warner-Lambert Company LLC and Pfizer Ellas AE v Minerva Farmakeftiki AE

(Case C-462/13)

2014/C 78/03

Language of the case: Greek

Referring court

Polimeles Protodikio Athinon

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Warner-Lambert Company LLC and Pfizer Ellas AE

Defendant: Minerva Farmakeftiki AE

The Court (Third Chamber) ruled by reasoned order of 30 January 2014.
Appeal brought on 17 December 2013 by European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 8 October 2013 in Case T-545/11: Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and Pesticide Action Network Europe (PAN Europe) v European Commission

(Case C-673/13 P)

(2014/C 71/17)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: B. Smulders, P. Oliver, P. Ondrůšek, Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Stichting Greenpeace Nederland, Pesticide Action Network Europe (PAN Europe)

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— quash the judgment of the General Court;

— pursuant to Article 61 of the Statute of the Court, either give a final ruling on the first and third pleas itself or refer the case back to the General Court for a ruling on those please; and

— order the respondents to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Appeal consists of one plea, namely that the General Court misconstrued the concept of information which ‘relates to emissions into the environment’ in the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No. 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (1) (‘the Aarhus Regulation’), dismissing the Commission's view that this concept must be interpreted in a consistent and harmonious way in the light of the other provisions in issue. There are three branches to this plea:

(i) the General Court erred in disregarding the need to ensure the ‘internal’ consistency of Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (2) read with Article 6(1) of the Aarhus Regulation, as understood in the light of Article 4(4) of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (‘the Aarhus Convention’);

(ii) the General Court failed to take due account of the confidentiality provisions in sector-specific legislation on plant protection products, namely Council Directive 91/414/EEC concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market (3) and Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (4); and

(iii) the General Court erred in disregarding the need to construe Article 6(1) of the Aarhus Regulation in so far as possible in conformity with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (‘TRIPS’).

(1) OJ L 264, 25.9.2006, p. 13.

(2) OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43.

(3) OJ L 230, 19.08.1991, p. 1.

(4) OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 1.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 159/11

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d’appel de Poitiers (France) lodged on 25 October 2013 — criminal proceedings against Jean-Paul Grimal

(Case C-550/13)

2014/C 159/14

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour d’appel de Poitiers

Party to the main proceedings

Jean-Paul Grimal

By Order of 19 March 2014, the Court (Tenth Chamber) declared the request for a preliminary ruling to be manifestly inadmissible.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 85/14

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main (Germany) lodged on 20 December 2013 — Condor Flugdienst GmbH v Andreas Plakolm

(Case C-680/13)

2014/C 85/26

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Frankfurt am Main

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Condor Flugdienst GmbH

Defendant: Andreas Plakolm

Question referred

Is the expression cancellation, which is defined in Article 2(l) of Regulation No 261/2004, (1) to be interpreted as meaning that in a situation such as that in the present case it also applies where, although the flight departed under the original flight number, it was not a non-stop flight as originally planned but involved a stopover scheduled before departure, and another aircraft and airline company were used in a sub-charter arrangement?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 85/17

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 20 January 2014 — Union des syndicats de l'immobilier (UNIS) v Ministre du travail, de l’emploi, de la formation professionnelle et du dialogue social, Syndicat national des résidences de tourisme (SNRT) and Others

(Case C-25/14)

2014/C 85/30

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Union des syndicats de l'immobilier (UNIS)

Defendants: Ministre du travail, de l’emploi, de la formation professionnelle et du dialogue social, Syndicat national des résidences de tourisme (SNRT) and Others

Question referred

Is compliance with the obligation of transparency flowing from Article 56 TFEU a mandatory prior condition for the extension, by a Member State, to all undertakings within a sector, of a collective agreement under which a single operator, chosen by the social partners, is entrusted with the management of a compulsory supplementary social security scheme for employees?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 102/14

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de Primera Instancia (Spain) lodged on 10 January 2014 — Unnim Banc, S.A. v Diego Fernández Gabarro and Others

(Case C-8/14)

2014/C 102/18

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de Primera Instancia

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Unnim Banc, S.A.

Defendants: Diego Fernández Gabarro, Pedro Penalva López and Clara López Durán

Question referred

Is the limitation period of one month provided for by Law 1/2013 on the protection of mortgagors, restructuring of debt and social rent contrary to the terms of Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 93/13/EEC (1)?

(1) Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts

OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29.