ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.

Is Article 77(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), ( 1 ) read in conjunction with Article 78(1) thereof, to be understood as meaning that the outcome that the supervisory authority reaches and notifies to the data subject (a) has the character of a decision on a petition? This would mean that judicial review of a decision on a complaint taken by a supervisory authority in accordance with Article 78(1) of the GDPR is, in principle, limited to the question of whether the authority has handled the complaint, investigated the subject matter of the complaint to the extent appropriate and informed the complainant of the outcome of the investigation, or (b) is to be understood as a decision on the merits taken by a public authority? This would mean that judicial review of a decision on a complaint taken by a supervisory authority in accordance with Article 78(1) of the GDPR leads to the decision on the merits being subject to a full substantive review by the court, whereby, in individual cases — for example where discretion is reduced to zero — the supervisory authority may also be obliged by the court to take a specific measure within the meaning of Article 58 of the GDPR.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 15 October 2021 — NN v Regione Lombardia

(Case C-636/21)

(2022/C 2/29)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant and appellant: NN

Defendant and respondent: Regione Lombardia

Question referred

Does Article 220 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1323 (2) of 2 August 2019 preclude national legislation (such as the Ministerial Decree of 15 January 2020 enacted by the Italian Minister for Agriculture, Food and Forestry Policies) which is interpreted and applied so as to limit access to compensation for damage caused by avian influenza only to undertakings that have not ceased operating on the date of submission of the application?

(1) Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 (OJ 2013 L 347, p. 671).

(2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1323 of 2 August 2019 on exceptional market support measures for the eggs and poultrymeat sectors in Italy (OJ 2019 L 206, p. 12).
Appeal brought on 3 June 2021 by Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 24 March 2021 in Case T-282/19, Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi v EUIPO

(Case C-345/21 P)

(2022/C 24/14)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi (represented by: S. Malynicz, BL, S. Baran, Barrister, V. Marsland, Solicitor)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 23 November 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi should bear its own costs.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 9 November 2021 by KN against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 1 September 2021 in Case T-377/20, KN v EESC

(Case C-673/21 P)

(2022/C 11/27)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: KN (represented by: M. Casado García-Hirschfeld and M. Aboudi, avocats)

Other party to the proceedings: European Economic and Social Committee

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court of 1 September 2021, KN v EESC (T-377/20);

— grant the forms of order sought at first instance;

— order the EESC to pay all the costs, including those incurred before the General Court.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In the context of the appeal, the appellant contests in particular paragraphs 102 to 106, 167 to 169, 171 to 177 and 197 of the judgment under appeal.

In support of the appeal, the appellant puts forward a single ground of appeal, alleging a distortion of the facts by the judgment under appeal and manifest errors of assessment resulting in inaccurate legal reasoning.
1.

Is the expression ‘manifestly contrary to public policy’ in the EU and, by extension, to domestic public policy, which constitutes a ground for non-recognition and non-enforcement pursuant to point 1 of Article 34 and Article 45(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, (1) to be understood as meaning that it extends beyond explicit anti-suit injunctions prohibiting the commencement and continuation of proceedings before a court of another Member State to judgments or orders delivered by courts of Member States where: (i) they impede or prevent the claimant in obtaining judicial protection by the court of another Member State or from continuing proceedings already commenced before it; and (ii) is that form of interference in the jurisdiction of a court of another Member State to adjudicate a dispute of which it has already been seised, and which it has admitted, compatible with public policy in the EU? In particular, is it contrary to public policy in the EU within the meaning of point 1 of Article 34 and Article 45(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, to recognise and/or declare enforceable a judgment or order of a court of a Member State awarding provisional damages to claimants seeking recognition and a declaration of enforceability in respect of the costs and expenses incurred by them in bringing an action or continuing proceedings before the court of another Member State, where the reasons given are that: (a) it follows from an examination of that action that the case is covered by a settlement duly established and ratified by the court of the Member State delivering the judgment (or order); and (b) the court of the other Member State seised in a fresh action by the party against which the judgment or order was delivered lacks jurisdiction by virtue of a clause conferring exclusive jurisdiction?
Appeal brought on 25 November 2021 by Graham R. Watson (T-245/20) against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 15 September 2021 in Joined Cases T-240/20 to T-245/20, Arnaoutakis and Others v Parliament

(Case C-716/21 P)

(2022/C 37/31)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Graham R. Watson (represented by: J. M. Martínez Gimeno, abogado, D. Sarmiento Ramírez-Escudero, abogado, E. Arnaldos Orts, abogado, and F. Doumont, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal in its entirety;

— rule on the dispute and annul the Parliament’s decision in so far as it rejects the appellant’s application to be granted a voluntary additional pension on the ground that he has not reached the required age of 65;

— order the Parliament to pay the costs of the appeal proceedings and the costs of the proceedings before the General Court in Case T-245/20.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The grounds of appeal allege: (i) the Bureau’s lack of competence to take the decision of the Bureau of 2018, inter alia in so far as it lays down substantive conditions for rights conferring prospective entitlement before the entry into force of the Staff Regulations; (ii) infringement of the first sentence of Article 27(2) of the Staff Regulations by reason of non-observance of rights conferring prospective entitlement prior to the entry into force of the Staff Regulations; (iii) infringement of the principle of equality and non-discrimination and of the principle of proportionality; and (iv) infringement of the principle of legal certainty (lack of transitional measures) and the principle of legitimate expectations.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht München I (Germany) lodged on 17 November 2021 — RSD Reise Service Deutschland GmbH v QL

(Case C-690/21)

(2022/C 51/29)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht München I

Parties to the main proceedings

Defendant and appellant: RSD Reise Service Deutschland GmbH

Applicant and respondent: QL

Question referred

Is Article 12(4) of Directive (EU) 2015/2302 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the traveller may be forced to accept a voucher and/or postponement in lieu of the repayment requested in the event of cancellation by the organiser due to a global pandemic?

(1) Directive (EU) 2015/2302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on package travel and linked travel arrangements, amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 90/314/EEC (OJ 2015 L 326, p. 1).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 18 June 2021 by Hasbro Inc. against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 21 April 2021 in Case T-663/19, Hasbro v EUIPO

(Case C-373/21 P)

(2022/C 37/06)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Hasbro Inc. (represented by: J. Moss, Barrister)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 1 December 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Hasbro Inc. should bear its own costs.
1.

Do Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts preclude an interpretation of national law to the effect that the legal consequences of invalidity derived from an unfair term in a consumer contract, where the unfair term relates to the principal subject of the transaction and, as a result, the (loan) contract cannot continue to exist without the term considered to be unfair, are that, after it has declared that the contract as a whole is invalid — in other words, that the contract as a whole cannot (1) continue in existence and cannot create binding legal effects for the consumer — the national court (a) declares that the contract is valid and in so doing converts into Hungarian forints the account currency of the loan granted, which constitutes the main subject matter of the contract, and replaces that sum denominated in the account currency with the amount in forints that the consumer has effectively received from the lender, and at the same time calculates (replaces) the ordinary interest on the principal amount so determined in a different manner from the method that was used to calculate that interest in the contract declared invalid, such that the ‘initial’ interest rate at the time when the contract was concluded is equal to the value of the Budapest interbank lending rate in forints (BUBOR), used as a reference rate, which was in force at the time when the contract was concluded, plus the interest rate differential set in the original contract (denominated in foreign currency), (b) declares that the contract is valid and in so doing sets a ceiling on the conversion rate between the foreign currency and the Hungarian forint, in other words, reduces the exchange rate risk actually assumed by the consumer as a result of the unfair term in the contract to a level which the court considers reasonable and which the consumer may have taken into consideration when the contract was concluded, leaving the interest rate set in the contract unchanged until the date of the mandatory conversion into forints stipulated by a subsequent law?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Social n.o 1 de Madrid (Spain) lodged on 20 September 2021 — JD v BA, DA, DV and CG

(Case C-584/21)

(2022/C 51/24)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de lo Social n.o 1 de Madrid

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: JD

Defendants: BA, DA, DV and CG

Question referred

Does Article 1(1)(a) of Council Directive (EC) 2001/23 of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses, (1) and consequently the contents of the directive, apply to a situation in which the notary in post in a notary’s office — who is both a public official and also the private-sector employer of the office’s employees, with the employment relationship being governed by general employment legislation and by a sectoral Collective Agreement — succeeds the outgoing post-holder, takes on the previous notary’s Protocol, continues to provide services at the same place of work using the same material facilities, and takes on the staff who had worked for the previous notary who had held that post?

(1) OJ 2001 L 82, p. 16.
5.

Is non-material damage within the meaning of Article 82 of the General Data Protection Regulation incurred even where the third party who received the document containing the personal data did not read the data before returning the document containing the information, or does the discomfort of the person whose personal data were unlawfully disclosed suffice for the purpose of establishing non-material damage within the meaning of Article 82 of the General Data Protection Regulation, given that every unauthorised disclosure of personal data entails the risk, which cannot be eliminated, that the data might nevertheless have been passed on to any number of people or even misused?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Županijski sud u Puli-Pola (Croatia) lodged on 30 November 2021 — Criminal proceedings against GR, HS, IT, INTER CONSULTING d.o.o., in liquidation

(Case C-726/21)

(2022/C 64/35)

Language of the case: Croatian

Referring court

Županijski sud u Puli-Pola

Parties to the main proceedings

GR, HS, IT, INTER CONSULTING d.o.o., in liquidation

Question referred

In assessing whether there has been an infringement of the ne bis in idem principle, is it possible to compare only the facts cited in the enacting terms of the indictment of the Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Puli-Pola (Pula Public Prosecutor’s Office, Croatia) of 28 September 2015 with the key facts cited in the enacting terms of the indictment of the Staatsanwaltschaft Klagenfurt (Klagenfurt Public Prosecutor’s Office, Austria) of 9 January 2015, and in the operative part of the judgment of the Landesgericht Klagenfurt (Klagenfurt Regional Court) of 3 November 2016, upheld by judgment of the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court of the Republic of Austria) of 4 March 2019, or is it possible to compare the facts cited in the enacting terms of the indictment of the Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Puli-Pola (Pula Public Prosecutor’s Office) with the facts cited in the grounds of the judgment of the Landesgericht Klagenfurt (Klagenfurt Regional Court) of 3 November 2016, upheld by judgment of the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court of the Republic of Austria), and which were the subject of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Staatsanwaltschaft Klagenfurt (Klagenfurt Public Prosecutor’s Office) against several persons, in particular against GR and HS, and which were subsequently omitted from the indictment by the Staatsanwaltschaft Klagenfurt (Klagenfurt Public Prosecutor’s Office) of 9 January 2015 (and were not cited in those enacting terms)?
1.

Is EU law, in particular Articles 1, 2 and 6 of Directive 2000/78/EC, (1) in conjunction with Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, to be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which a remuneration system which discriminates on grounds of age is replaced by a remuneration system, under which the classification of a civil servant continues to be determined on the basis of the remuneration seniority determined with effect from a particular transition month (February 2015) in a discriminatory manner under the old remuneration system and, in that context, is subject to a correction in respect of the initially determined previous periods of service through the determination of a comparison reference date, but under which, with regard to the periods completed after the civil servant’s 18th birthday, only the other periods, of which half must be taken into account, are subject to review, and under which the four-year extension of the period in which previous periods of service must be taken into account is juxtaposed with the fact that the other periods, of which half must be taken into account, must be accredited as periods preceding the date of appointment in the determination of the comparison reference date only in so far as they exceed the total amount of four years, of which half must be taken into account (flat-rate deduction of four years, of which half must be taken into account)?
Action brought on 21 December 2021 — European Commission v Republic of Poland

(Case C-814/21)

(2022/C 84/41)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: J. Tomkin and A. Szmytkowska, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Republic of Poland

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by denying citizens of the European Union who do not have Polish nationality but who reside in the Republic of Poland the right to become members of a political party, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 22 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;

— order the Republic of Poland to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Under Article 22 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he or she is not a national is to have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections and in elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he or she resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State.

The Commission takes the view that denying citizens of the Union who do not have Polish nationality but who reside in the Republic of Poland the right to become members of a political party prevents them from exercising their political rights as conferred on them by Article 22 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union under the same conditions as Polish nationals.
1.

Must the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, be interpreted as precluding national legislation such as Article 47b(5) and (6) of the Ustawa z dnia 27 lipca 2001 r. — Prawo o ustroju sądów powszechnych (Law of 27 July 2001 on the system of ordinary courts), in conjunction with Articles 30(1) and 24(1) thereof, under which a body of a national court, such as the college of a court, has the power to release a judge of that court from the obligation to hear some or all of the cases assigned to him or her, in the case where: (a) the composition of the college includes, by law, the presidents of courts appointed to those posts by an executive body, such as the Minister for Justice, who is also the Public Prosecutor General; (b) the judge is released, without his or her consent, from the obligation to hear the cases assigned to him or her; (c) national law does not lay down any criteria to guide the college of a court when releasing a judge from the obligation to hear the cases assigned to him or her, nor does it lay down any obligation to state reasons and to conduct a judicial review of that release; (d) some of the members of the college of the court were appointed to the post of judge in circumstances similar to those referred to in the judgment of the Court of Justice of 15 July 2021 in Commission v Poland (disciplinary regime applicable to judges) (C-791/19, EU:C:2021:596)?
3.

Given that — unlike Annex V, referred to in Article 4 of the WFD — Article 7(3) of the WFD does not set its own parameters for assessing the ban on deterioration: a. Under what conditions is it to be assumed that a body of water has deteriorated and, consequently, the level of purification treatment required in the production of drinking water has increased? b. Could the limit values of Annex I to Council Directive 98/83/EC (4) be regarded as the relevant point of reference for an increase in the level of purification treatment and thus for the ban on deterioration under Article 7(3) of the WFD, as might be inferred from the last part of Article 7(2) of the WFD? c. If Question (b) is answered in the affirmative: Can there be a breach of the ban on deterioration under Article 7(3) of the WFD where the only significant value is not a limit value under Parts A or B of Annex I [to the Drinking Water Directive] but an ‘indicator parameter’ in accordance with Part C of Annex I?
4.

Having regard to the difficulties encountered with the automated luggage check-in, does simply following the instructions of the employees and the machines, thereby overlooking the diminishing amount of time remaining until the check-in process ends and the departure gate closes, constitute contributory negligence on the part of the applicant and his fellow passengers? Can any blame be attributed to the applicant and his fellow passengers for not having considered, in good time, in view of the difficulties that they encountered when checking in their luggage, the possibility of having their luggage forwarded? Would it have been reasonable to expect the group of passengers to separate, leaving one person, for example the applicant, with the luggage, in order to enable the remaining persons to reach the departure gate, in particular in view of the fact that the mobility of the applicant’s daughter and mother-in-law was restricted, due to the need to use crutches following a knee operation in the case of his daughter and due to age and arthrosis in the case of his mother-in-law?