ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
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Must the provision according to which the claim in respect of which a request for recovery has been made ‘shall be treated as a claim of the Member State in which the requested authority is situated’, as provided for in [the second paragraph of] Article 6 of Council Directive 2008/55/EC on mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to certain levies, duties, taxes and other measures, (1) which replaces Article 6(2) of Council Directive 76/308/EEC of 15 March 1976 on mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to certain levies, duties, taxes and other measures, (2) be understood as meaning that the claim of the requesting State is to be treated as being a claim of the requested State, with the result that the claim of the requesting State acquires the status of a claim of the requested State?
1.

Is Article 17(1)(a) of Directive 2004/38/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC to be interpreted as meaning that workers who, at the time when they stop working, have reached the age laid down by the law of the State of employment for entitlement to an old age pension must have been working in the State of employment for at least the preceding 12 months and must have resided in the State of employment continuously for at least three years in order to acquire the right of permanent residence before completion of a five-year residence period?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 4 January 2019 — QG v Germanwings GmbH

(Case C-7/19)

(2019/C 122/13)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: QG

Defendant: Germanwings GmbH

Question referred:

Does a regular strike under national law announced by a trade union and involving an operating air carrier’s own staff members constitute an extraordinary circumstance within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004? (1)

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administratīvā rajona tiesa (Latvia) lodged on 5 March 2019 — SIA ‘KOB’ v Madonas novada pašvaldības Administratīvo aktu strīdu komisija

(Case C-206/19)

(2019/C 155/41)

Language of the case: Latvian

Referring court

Administratīvā rajona tiesa

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: SIA ‘KOB’

Defendant: Madonas novada pašvaldības Administratīvo aktu strīdu komisija

Question referred

Does European Union law, in particular Articles 18, 49 and 63 TFEU, preclude national legislation which requires legal persons – in cases where the member or members who together represent more than half of the voting capital in the company, and all persons who are entitled to represent that company, are nationals of other Member States of the European Union – to submit certificates of registration of those members or representatives as Union citizens and a document demonstrating that they have a knowledge of the official language corresponding to at least level B.2, in order to acquire ownership of agricultural land?
2.

In the event that the Court finds that the Commission’s decision is to be interpreted as also declaring the reductions in employees’ contributions to be incompatible, must the undertaking be regarded as having received the full amount of those reductions or only a part thereof? In the latter case, how is that part to be assessed? Is the Member State required to order recovery from the employees concerned of the part of the aid from which they benefited?
2.

Is the Hamburg Public Prosecutor’s Office, which forms part of the executive, rather than the judiciary, under national German law, is part of the structure of the Ministry for Justice and is required to prosecute criminal offenders where it considers appropriate, having appraised all the evidence, both incriminating and exculpatory, sufficiently independent an authority involved in the dispensation of criminal justice to qualify as a ‘judicial authority’ within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 (1) on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States?
Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) (United Kingdom) made on 15 March 2019 — Blackrock Investment Management (UK) Limited v Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs

(Case C-231/19)

(2019/C 172/24)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Blackrock Investment Management (UK) Limited

Defendant: Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs

Question referred

On the proper interpretation of Article 135.1(g) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (1), where a single supply of management services within the meaning of that Article is made by a third-party provider to a fund manager and is used by that fund manager both in the management of special investment funds (‘SIFs’) and in the management of other funds that are not special investment funds (‘non-SIFs’):

(a) Is that single supply to be subject to a single rate of tax? If so, how is that single rate to be determined? or

(b) Is the consideration for that single supply to be apportioned in accordance with the use of the management services (for example, by reference to the amounts of the funds under management in the SIFs and non-SIPs respectively) so as to treat part of the single supply as exempt and part as taxable?

(1) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006, L 347, p. 1).
Action brought on 22 February 2019 — European Commission v Republic of Austria

(Case C-161/19)

(2019/C 148/28)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: C. Hermes and M. Noll-Ehlers, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Republic of Austria

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by authorising the springtime hunting of woodcocks in the Land of Lower Austria, the Republic of Austria has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 7(4) of Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds; (1)

— order the Republic of Austria to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The present action is brought against the authorisation of springtime hunting of woodcocks (Scolopax rusticola) in Lower Austria. Male woodcocks may be hunted during courtship in that Land between 1 March and 15 April, and a maximum number of 1410 (since February 2017: 759) woodcocks may be killed.

The Commission claims that the legislation in question infringes the prohibition of springtime hunting in Article 7(4) of Directive 2009/147.

The Republic of Austria contends that the legislation is covered by the derogation in Article 9(1)(c) of Directive 2009/147. Under that provision, Member States may derogate inter alia from Article 7(4) of the directive, where there is no other satisfactory solution, in order to permit, under strictly supervised conditions and on a selective basis, the capture, keeping or other judicious use of certain birds in small numbers. In accordance with the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, it is for the Member States to establish that the conditions for its application are met.

The Commission claims that the Republic of Austria has neither shown that there is no other satisfactory solution within the meaning of the introductory sentence of Article 9(1) nor established that the authorised maximum number of specimens that may be killed meets the requirement of ‘small numbers’ in Article 9(1)(c) of the directive. Autumn hunting appears to be a satisfactory alternative, as non-negligible numbers of woodcocks are also present in the Lower Austrian hunting areas in autumn. The Republic of Austria has not provided any convincing evidence for its assertion that springtime hunting is more considerate towards the population of woodcocks than autumn hunting. In addition, the calculation of the ‘small numbers’ is incorrect, since the Austrian figures are based on the wrong reference population.

(1) OJ 2010 L 20, p. 7.
Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) (United Kingdom) made on 20 March 2019 — Eli Lilly and Company v Genentech Inc.

(Case C-239/19)

(2019/C 172/26)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

High Court of Justice (Chancery Division)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Eli Lilly and Company

Defendant: Genentech Inc.

Question referred

Does the SPC Regulation (1) preclude the grant of an SPC to the proprietor of a basic patent in respect of a product which is the subject of a marketing authorisation held by a third party without that party's consent?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products (OJ 2009, L 152, p. 1).
1.

In order to guarantee the effectiveness of EU law and not make it impossible to enjoy the right to family reunification which, according to the applicant, is conferred on her by Article 4 of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification (1), must that provision be interpreted as meaning that the sponsor’s child is able to enjoy the right to family reunification where he becomes an adult during the court proceedings brought against the decision which refuses to grant him that right and was taken when he was still a minor?’
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Third, the General Court infringed Art. 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice duty to state reasons when it rejected Niche's interpretation of the settlement agreement without addressing its legal arguments.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 11 February 2019 — Raggio di Sole Società Cooperativa Onlus v Comune di Ostuni, Consorzio per l’Inclusione Sociale dell’Ats Fasano — Ostuni — Cisternino

(Case C-110/19)

(2019/C 182/16)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Raggio di Sole Società Cooperativa Onlus

Defendants: Comune di Ostuni, Consorzio per l’Inclusione Sociale dell’Ats Fasano — Ostuni — Cisternino

Question referred

Does EU law (in particular the principles of legitimate expectations, legal certainty, freedom of movement, freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services) preclude a national legislative provision, such as Article 83(9), Article 95(10) and Article 97(5) of the Italian ‘Codice dei contratti pubblici’ (‘Public Procurement Code’), under which failure to indicate labour costs and costs relating to the safety of workers by a tenderer in a public procurement procedure results in any event in the tenderer being excluded from the procedure without the tenderer being given, at a later stage, the benefit of the ‘soccorso istruttorio’ procedure (whereby a tenderer is given an opportunity to remedy shortcomings in his tender documentation after submission of his tender), even where the existence of such an obligation to indicate those costs is apparent from sufficiently clear legal provisions in the public domain and irrespective of the fact that the contract notice does not expressly refer to the legal obligation to provide specific information?
3.

In line with what is set out under [1] and [2] above, and having regard to what is expressly put forward by the appellant, does a provision of national law which allows support schemes to continue to be granted to non-high-efficiency cogeneration until 31 December 2015 comply with the EU-law principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination, since that could be the interpretation of domestic Italian law as a result of Article 25(11)(c)(1) of Legislative Decree No 28 of 3 March 2011, which repeals the abovementioned provisions of Article 11 of Legislative Decree No 79/1999 with effect from 1 January 2016, or rather now by 19 July 2014 (as a result of Article 10(15) of Legislative Decree No 102 of 4 July 2014)?
Appeal brought on 26 March 2019 by Bena Properties Co. SA against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 16 January 2019 in Case T-412/16 Bena Properties v Council

(Case C-260/19 P)

(2019/C 187/53)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Bena Properties Co. SA (represented by: E. Ruchat, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant submits that the Court should:

— Declare the appeal admissible and well founded;

— Accordingly, set aside the judgment of 16 January 2019, Bena Properties v Council, T-412/16;

And, giving judgment itself,

— Annul Decision (CFSP) 2016/850 of 27 May 2016 and its subsequent implementing acts, in so far as they concern the appellant;

— Order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The first ground of appeal alleges an error of law in that the General Court disregarded the applicant’s right, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, to be heard prior to the adoption of new restrictive measures.

The second ground of appeal alleges an error of law and distortion of the facts in that the General Court disregarded the items submitted by the applicant in support of its action for annulment to demonstrate that it did not support the Syrian regime.

The third ground of appeal alleges an error of law in so far as the General Court did not hold that Articles 27 and 28 of Decision 2013/255/CFSP, according to which membership of the Al-Assad or Makhlouf families constitutes an autonomous criterion justifying the imposition of sanctions, were illegal and in so far as it, on the same occasion, reversed the burden of proof.
2.

If so, must Article 2(2) of Directive 89/391/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work be interpreted as meaning that Article 2(1) and (2) of [Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time] is not to be applied to police officers who are members of the professional staff of the Rapid Intervention Police?
1.

Given that the Portuguese State did not inform the European Commission of the technical regulations contained in Decree-Law No 442/89 of 2 December 1989, should those provisions ‒ more specifically Article 3 (using the wording shown) and Article 9 mentioned below ‒ be unenforceable, and can individuals rely on that lack of enforceability?
2.

Irrespective of the answer to the first question, is the taxable person under Article 9(1) of Directive 2006/112/EC, who is not established in the Member State of refund but in the territory of another Member State, considered a taxable person under Article 2(1) of Directive 2008/9/EC, (2) even where that person is registered for VAT purposes or would be required to be registered for VAT purposes in the Member State of refund?
1.

Does Article 56 et seq. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union apply to national legislation (a binding measure of general application in the form of a municipal decree) prohibiting a certain service in part of one municipality, simply because some of the customers of a service provider affected by that legislation may come or do come from another Member State of the European Union? If so, is a mere assertion of the possible presence of customers from another Member State sufficient to trigger the applicability of Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, or is the service provider obliged to prove the actual provision of services to customers who come from other Member States?
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal da Relação de Guimarães (Portugal) lodged on 26 March 2019 — MH, NI v OJ, Novo Banco SA

(Case C-253/19)

(2019/C 206/33)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Tribunal da Relação de Guimarães

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants at first instance and appellants on appeal: MH, NI

Defendants at first instance and respondents on appeal: OJ, Novo Banco SA

Question referred

Under Regulation (EU) 2015/848 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council, do the courts of a Member State have jurisdiction to open main insolvency proceedings in respect of a citizen whose sole immovable asset is located in that State, while he, along with his family unit, is habitually resident in another Member State where he is in paid employment?

(1) Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (OJ 2015 L 141, p. 192).
Appeal brought on 18 February 2019 by Vans, Inc. against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 6 December 2018 in Case T-848/16, Deichmann SE v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-125/19 P)

(2019/C 220/22)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Vans, Inc. (represented by: M. Hirsch and M. Metzner, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Deichmann SE

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union (Ninth Chamber) of 6 December 2018 in Case T-848/16 and dismiss the action;

— order Deichmann SE to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The General Court incorrectly proceeded on the basis that Deichmann had sufficiently substantiated the earlier marks; in particular, the General Court interpreted the concept of ‘equivalent document’ under Rule 19(2)(a)(ii) of Regulation No 2868/95 (1) (now Article 7(2)(a)(ii) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625) (2) too broadly.

Contrary to what the General Court found, an extract from the TMView database is not an ‘equivalent document’ within the meaning of Rule 19(2)(a)(ii) of Regulation No 2868/95; this is apparent, first, from the clear wording of the provision, which refers, in respect of authorised equivalent documents, to the nature, not the origin, of the document, and, second, from the rationale behind the provision.

Nor can an extract from TMView be established as substantiating evidence on the basis of the properties of the database.

The opposition would therefore — as the Board of Appeal correctly established — have to be rejected simply because the earlier rights were not substantiated.

(1) Commission Regulation of 13 December 1995 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 on the Community trade mark (OJ L 303, 15.12.1995, p. 1).

(2) Commission Regulation of 5 March 2018 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union trade mark, and repealing Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/1430 (OJ L 104, 24.4.2018, p. 1).
2.

However, Czech law (§ 7a zákon č. 406/2000 Sb., o hospodaření energií, ve znění pozdějších předpisů (Paragraph 7a of Law No 406/2000 on the management of energy, as amended)) provides for the obligation to display an energy performance certificate, or energy performance passport, for those buildings only where they are occupied by public authorities. Czech law thus does not provide for the obligation to display an energy performance passport in situations where those buildings are occupied by bodies other than public authorities, and are frequently visited by the public. The legislation required is still merely at the preparatory stage.
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hannover (Germany) lodged on 4 April 2019 — EUflight.de GmbH v TUIfly GmbH

(Case C-283/19)

(2019/C 238/10)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Hannover

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: EUflight.de GmbH

Defendant: TUIfly GmbH

By decision of the President of the Court of Justice of 23 May 2019 the case was removed from the Court’s register.
If the answer to Question 1(c) is in the affirmative:

Does the information to be provided under Article 8(2)(a) of Directive 2004/48/EC also cover the IP address that a user, who has previously uploaded infringing files, last used to access his or her Google/YouTube user account, together with the precise point in time at which access took place, irrespective of whether any infringement was committed when that account was last accessed?
Appeal brought on 15 April 2019 by Boudewijn Schokker against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 8 February 2019 in Case T-817/17 Schokker v EASA

(Case C-310/19 P)

(2019/C 255/25)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Boudewijn Schokker (represented by: T. Martin and S. Orlandi, avocats)

Other party to the proceedings: European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the order of 8 February 2019 in Case T-817/17, Schokker v EASA;

— refer the case back to the General Court; and

— reserve the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant claims, first, that the General Court erred in law by dismissing the action on a ground that it had raised if its own motion and erroneously categorised as ‘manifest’. When it did so, the General Court infringed Article 126 of its Rules of Procedure and the appellant’s rights of defence.

The appellant submits, second, that the General Court erred in law by concluding that a verification of the grounds for the withdrawal of the offer of employment at issue was irrelevant, as an offer of employment can, in any case, be withdrawn at any moment without being subject to any conditions.
1.

Is point (6)(a) of Article 52 in conjunction with Article 54(1) of Directive 2015/2366/EU (1) (Payment Services Directive), pursuant to which the payment service user will be deemed to have accepted proposed changes in the conditions unless the payment service user notifies the payment service provider before the date of their proposed date of entry into force that they are not accepted, to be interpreted as meaning that tacit consent can also be agreed with the consumer for any conceivable contractual conditions without any restriction?
2.

If Question 1 is answered in the negative: (a) Is Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78/EC to be interpreted as meaning that the rights derived from Article 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and from Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms may be taken into account in the examination of whether established indirect unequal treatment on grounds of religion is justifiable on the basis of an internal rule of a private undertaking which prohibits the wearing of prominent, large-scale signs of religious, political or other philosophical beliefs? (b) Is Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78/EC to be interpreted as meaning that national rules of constitutional status which protect freedom of religion may be taken into account as more favourable provisions within the meaning of Article 8(1) of Directive 2000/78/EC in the examination of whether established indirect unequal treatment on grounds of religion is justifiable on the basis of an internal rule of a private undertaking which prohibits the wearing of prominent, large-scale signs of religious, political or other philosophical beliefs?