ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
12

The Amtsgerich Hamburg (Local Court, Hamburg), being doubtful as to the applicability of Regulation No 261/2004 to the flight in question, in spite of the interpretation made by the Court in the judgment of 11 July 2019, České aerolinie (C‑502/18, EU:C:2019:604), decided to stay proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘Must Article 5(1)(c) and Article 7(1) of Regulation No 261/2004, read together with Article 3(5) of that regulation, be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of connecting flights, where there are two flights which are the subject of a single reservation, departing from an airport located outside the territory of any Member State (in a third country) for an airport located within the territory of a Member State via an airport in another [Member State], a passenger who suffers a delay of three hours or more in reaching his or her final destination, the cause of that delay arising in the journey’s first segment operated, under a code-share agreement, by an air carrier established in a third country, may bring his or her action for compensation under that regulation against the Community air carrier through which the flight was reserved in its entirety and which operated only the second segment of the journey?’
14

Taking the view that the case before it raised questions concerning the interpretation of EU law, the Pécsi Törvényszék (Pécs High Court) decided to stay proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘Does the practice of a Member State, pursuant to which the latter, relying on the ex tunc effects of the reduction applicable to the taxable amount in the event of definitive non-payment in accordance with Article 90(1) of the [VAT] Directive, calculates the general limitation period of five years during which the reduction may be applied to the taxable amount, laid down by that Member State, from the time of the initial supply of goods and not from the time when the debt concerned has become irrecoverable and, relying on the expiry of that limitation period, deprives the taxable person acting in good faith of its right to a reduction of the taxable amount in the case of debts which have become definitively irrecoverable, in circumstances in which a number of years may have elapsed between the time the goods were supplied and the time when the debt became definitively irrecoverable and in which, at the time when the debt became definitively irrecoverable, the Member State’s legislation, unlike EU law, did not permit the reduction of the taxable amount in the case of debts that had become definitively irrecoverable, comply with the fundamental principles of proportionality, fiscal neutrality and effectiveness, particularly in the light of point 63 of the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Biosafe – Indústria de Reciclagens [(C‑8/17, EU:C:2017:927)], paragraph 27 of the judgment [of 23 November 2017, Di Maura (C‑246/16, EU:C:2017:887)] and paragraph 36 of the judgment [of 22 February 2018, T‑2 (C‑396/16, EU:C:2018:109)], and having regard to the fact that a Member State may not charge an amount of VAT exceeding that paid by the supplier of goods or services in respect of the goods or services supplied?’
–

‘It should be stated, as the Advocate General observes in points 33 and 34 of his Opinion, that, by the judgment of 13 January 2021, MM (C‑414/20 PPU, EU:C:2021:4), the Court did not rule directly on the question whether the Bulgarian procedure for the issuing of a European arrest warrant by a prosecutor during the pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings satisfied the requirements inherent in effective judicial protection, but confined itself to holding that, where the law of the issuing Member State does not contain a separate legal remedy, EU law confers jurisdiction on a court of that Member State to review indirectly the validity of the European arrest warrant. Accordingly, it cannot be inferred from that judgment that the Court ruled that the existence of such a possibility of ex post judicial review was such as to satisfy the requirements inherent in the effective judicial protection of the rights of the requested person.’
28

The Court inferred from that that the fact that it had, in essence, held in the judgments of 4 September 2014, Vnuk (C‑162/13, EU:C:2014:2146), of 28 November 2017, Rodrigues de Andrade (C‑514/16, EU:C:2017:908), and of 20 December 2017, Núñez Torreiro (C‑334/16, EU:C:2017:1007), that only those cases of use of the insured vehicle which fall within the scope of its use as a means of transport and, therefore, within the concept of ‘use of vehicles’, for the purposes of the first paragraph of Article 3 of Directive 2009/103, may give rise to the insurer being responsible, under a contract of insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of that vehicle, for the damage or injuries caused by the latter, does not in any way mean that the determination of whether there is an obligation to take out such insurance should be dependent on whether or not the vehicle at issue is actually being used as a means of transport at a given time (judgment of 4 September 2018, Juliana, C‑80/17, EU:C:2018:661, paragraph 41).
Order of the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) of 5 May 2021 – Production Christian Gallimard v EUIPO

(Case C‑143/21 P)

(Appeal – EU trade mark – Determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Article 170 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Request failing to demonstrate a significant issue with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Appeal not allowed to proceed)

1. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Burden of proof (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 170b) (see para. 11)

2. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Request that an appeal be allowed to proceed – Formal requirements – Scope (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b) (see paras 12-14)

3. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Request that the appeal be allowed to proceed failing to demonstrate that the issue is significant – Appeal not allowed to proceed (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b) (see paras 15-18)

Operative part

1. The appeal is not allowed to proceed.
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 3 September 2021 – Löning v Commission

(Case C‑176/21 P)

(Appeal – Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Appeal manifestly unfounded – Tobacco and related products – Rules on packaging and labelling – Cigarette butts – Alleged failure to adopt stricter rules – Damage allegedly caused to the health of the applicant)

Non-contractual liability – Conditions – Unlawfulness – Damage – Causal link – Burden of proof

(Art. 340, para. 2, TFEU)

(see para. 19)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed as being manifestly unfounded.
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 1 September 2021 – KI

(Case C‑131/21) ( 1 )

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Ne bis in idem principle – Duplication of penalties – Nature of a penalty imposed by the police – Implementation of national law – No connection to EU law – Clear lack of jurisdiction of the Court)

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Jurisdiction of the Court – Limits – Request for an interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Subject matter of the national dispute not having any connection with EU law – Clear lack of jurisdiction of the Court

(Art. 6(1) TEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts 50 and 51(1) and (2); Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 53(2))

(see paras 21-25, operative part)

Operative part

The Court of Justice of the European Union clearly has no jurisdiction to rule on the question referred by the Budai Központi Kerületi Bíróság (Central District Court, Buda, Hungary), by decision of 10 February 2021.

( 1 ) OJ C 182, 10.5.2021.
Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Burden of proof

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 170b)

(see para. 12)
Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 13 December 2021 – Sescam

(Case C‑226/21)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Directive 1999/70/EC – Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP – Clause 4 – Principle of non-discrimination – Definition of ‘employment conditions’ – Exemption from providing on-call medical services on the grounds of age granted solely to permanent workers)

1. Social policy – Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP – Directive 1999/70 – Scope – Fixed-term employment contract in the public sector – Worker employed as a doctor who is a member of the temporary regulated staff of the public health service – Included (Council Directive 1999/70, clauses 2(1) and 3(1)) (see paragraphs 31-34)

2. Social policy – Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP – Directive 1999/70 – Employment conditions – Definition – Exemption from providing on-call medical services on the grounds of age – Included (Council Directive 1999/70, Annex, clause 4(1)) (see paras 37-39, 41-43)

3. Social policy – Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP – Directive 1999/70 – Clause 4(1) of the framework agreement – Direct effect (Council Directive 1999/70, Annex, clause 4(1)) (see paragraph 54)

4. Social policy – Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP – Directive 1999/70 – Objective reasons justifying different treatment – National legislation granting the right to permanent workers to be exempt from providing on-call medical services on the grounds of age – Exclusion of fixed-term workers from that right – Not permissible (Council Directive 1999/70, Annex, clause 4(1)) (see paras 49-53, 55, operative part)

Operative part

Clause 4(1) of the framework agreement on fixed-term work, concluded on 18 March 1999, which is set out in the annex to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation pursuant to which the right to an exemption from providing on-call services is granted to permanent workers but not to fixed-term workers.
Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Burden of proof

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b)

(see paragraph 10)
Appeals – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Burden of proof

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b)

(see para. 11)
Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 29 April 2022 –

Valvis Holding v Sun Stars & Sons and EUIPO

(Case C‑420/21 P)

(Appeal – Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – EU trade mark – Appeal brought by a party which was not unsuccessful in its submissions at first instance – Appeal manifestly inadmissible)

Appeal – Grounds – Form of order seeking a substitution of grounds – Inadmissibility

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 169(1))

(see paras 22-24)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible.
Order of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 17 May 2022 – OH v European Court of Human Rights

(Case C‑692/21 P)

(Appeal – Application for legal aid – Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Decision of the General Court of the European Union from which no appeal lies – Manifest lack of jurisdiction)

Appeals – Jurisdiction of the Court – Decisions against which an appeal may be brought – Decision of the General Court rejecting an application for legal aid – Not included

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 56; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 148)

(see paras 1-7)

Operative part

1. The appeal brought by OH is dismissed due to a manifest lack of jurisdiction of the Court.
29

In addition, unlike the proceedings for interim measures referred to in paragraph 27 of the present order, the expedited procedure does not allow the Court to rule immediately and, if necessary, provisionally on the questions referred to it, but first requires it to respect the right to submit written observations which Article 105(3) of the Rules of Procedure confers on the parties to the main proceedings and on the other interested persons referred to in Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which include the Member States, who may, in accordance with Article 38(4) of the Rules of Procedure, submit written observations in their own official language. In addition to the time limits relating to compliance with that requirement are, inter alia, those that the translation of the request for a preliminary ruling into the different official languages of the European Union entails, and of the written observations submitted by the Member States in the language of the proceedings, and then of the ruling of the Court for publication.
Appeal – Grounds – Lack of specific criticism of a point of the General Court’s reasoning and of legal arguments in support of the appeal – Inadmissibility

(Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 168(1)(d) and 169(2))

(see paras 12, 14, 17)
75

As regards the substantive examination of the first ground of appeal, it should be recalled, as the Vice-President of the General Court noted in paragraphs 39 and 40 of the order under appeal, that the purpose of the procedure for interim relief is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future final decision, in order to prevent a lacuna in the legal protection afforded by the Court of Justice. It is for the purpose of attaining that objective that urgency must be assessed in the light of the need for an interlocutory order to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the party seeking the interim relief. It is for that party to prove that it cannot await the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering such damage. While it is true that, in order to establish the existence of serious and irreparable damage, it is not necessary for the occurrence and imminence of the damage to be demonstrated with absolute certainty, it being sufficient to show that damage is foreseeable with a sufficient degree of probability, the party seeking interim measures is nevertheless required to prove the facts forming the basis of its claim that serious and irreparable damage is likely (order of the Vice-President of the Court of 16 July 2021, Symrise v ECHA, C‑282/21 P(R), not published, EU:C:2021:631, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Burden of proof

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b)

(see para. 10)
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 30 June 2022 –

QC v Commission

(Case C‑14/22 P)

(Appeal – Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Civil service – Officials – Pension – Article 11(2) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union – Transfer of pension rights to the EU scheme – Calculation of the pension rights to be transferred – Competence of the national social security authority – Refusal to transfer those rights – Decision of the European Commission fixing the number of years of pensionable service – Power of assessment of the Commission in calculating these rights – None – Action for annulment and for damages – Appeal manifestly unfounded )

Officials – Pensions – Pension rights acquired before entry into the service of the European Union – Transfer to the EU scheme – Procedures – Division of powers between the EU institutions and the national authorities – Power of assessment of the institutions in calculating the pension rights to be transferred – None

(Staff Regulations of Officials, Annex VIII, Art. 11(2))

(see para. 4 [8-11])

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed as manifestly unfounded.
45

In particular, as is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice and as the President of the General Court noted, in essence, in paragraph 24 of the order under appeal, the purpose of the procedure for interim relief is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future decision on the substance, in order to ensure that there is no lacuna in the legal protection provided by the EU judicature. It is for the purpose of attaining that objective that urgency must be assessed in the light of the need for an interlocutory order to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the party seeking the interim relief. It is for that party to prove that it cannot await the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering such harm. Although, in order to establish the existence of serious and irreparable harm, it is not necessary for the occurrence and imminence of the harm to be demonstrated with absolute certainty, it being sufficient to show that damage is foreseeable with a sufficient degree of probability, the party seeking interim measures is nevertheless required to prove the facts which form the basis of its claim that there is a genuine risk of such harm occurring (order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 16 September 2022, OT v Council, C‑526/22 P(R), not published, EU:C:2022:701, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
ORDER OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COURT

6 December 2022 ( *1 )

(Rectification order)

In Case C‑478/22 P(R)-REC,

APPEAL under the second paragraph of Article 57 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 17 July 2022,

Telefónica de España SA, established in Madrid (Spain), represented by J. Blanco Carol and F.E. González Díaz, abogados, and P. Stuart, Barrister,

applicant,

the other party to the proceedings being:

European Commission, represented by L. André and M. Ilkova, acting as Agents,

defendant at first instance,

THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COURT,

after hearing the Advocate General, M. Szpunar,

makes the following

Order

1 On 22 November 2022, the Vice-President of the Court of Justice adopted the order in Telefónica de España v Commission (C‑478/22 P(R), EU:C:2022:914).

2 That order contains, in its version in the language of the case, an error which it is appropriate to rectify of its own motion pursuant to Article 154(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, which is applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to Article 190(1) of those rules.

On those grounds, the Vice-President of the Court of Justice hereby orders:

1. Paragraph 1 of the operative part of the order of the Vice-President of 22 November 2022, Telefónica de España v Commission (C‑478/22 P(R), EU:C:2022:914), shall be rectified as follows: ‘The order of the President of the General Court of the European Union of 14 July 2022, Telefónica de España v Commission (T‑170/22 R, not published, EU:T:2022:460), is set aside.’

2. The original of this order shall be annexed to the original of the rectified order. A note of this order shall be made in the margin of the original of the rectified order.

Luxembourg, 6 December 2022. A. Calot Escobar Registrar L. Bay Larsen Vice-President

( *1 ) Language of the case: English.
OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE-GENERAL WARNER

DELIVERED ON 22 JANUARY 1975 ( 1 )

My Lords,

In this Case I am able to deliver my opinion at once and in the language of the Case. It will be very brief as it seems to me sufficient to say that, as both the Commission and the Italian Republic have pointed out, the question raised by the order for reference of the Tribunal administratif de Lyon has already been settled by the Court's judgment in Case 9/74, Casagrande v Landeshauptstadt München ([1974] ECR 773) and I see no reason to suggest that your Lordships should depart from anything in that judgment. On the contrary I still hold the view which I expressed to you at that time.

Adapting the operative part of that judgment to the wording of the question put by the Tribunal de Lyon, I am of the opinion that you should rule that, in providing that the children of a national of a Member State who is or has been employed in the territory of another Member State shall be admitted to that State's educational courses ‘under the same conditions as the nationals’ of that State, Article 12 of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council refers not only to the conditions for admission to courses but also to the whole of the rights flowing from such admission.

( 1 ) Translated from the French.
OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL WARNER

DELIVERED ON 28 FEBRUARY 1978

My Lords,

In this case, I am so wholly in agreement with the reasoning or the Council that I am content to adopt it as my own. I refer in particular to the analysis contained in the Council's written observations — at pp. 9 to 20 — of the authorities in this Court on the effect of the second paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty.

Council Regulation (EEC) No 1692/77 — the Regulation of which the Applicants seek to impugn the validity — would have affected anyone who wished to import into Italy from Japan at any time between 29 July 1977 (the date of its entry into force) and 31 December 1977 (the date of its expiry) motor-cycles having a cylinder capacity of 380 cc or more. The fact, if it be a fact, that no-one other than the Applicants was likely to wish to do so, is not enough to justify a finding that that act, ‘although in the form of a regulation’ was in truth ‘a decision … of direct and individual concern’ to the Applicants. Nor is the fact, if it be a fact, that no-one other than the Applicants had, at the time when the Regulation entered into force, put in, under the Italian exchange control legislatori, for permission to do so.

Accordingly I am of the opinion that this action should be dismissed as inadmissible and that the Applicants should be ordered to pay the costs.
61979C0080

Opinion of Mr Advocate General Mischo delivered on 15 June 1989. - Detalmo Pirzio-Biroli v Commission of the European Communities. - Officials - Employee of the European Association for Cooperation (EAC) - Recognition of their status as officials of the Commission with effect from the date on which they were engaged by the EAC. - Joined cases 80/79 and 205/81.



European Court reports 1989 Page 02441

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