ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Action brought on 24 May 2019 — European Commission v Republic of Slovenia

(Case C-413/19)

(2019/C 246/16)

Language of the case: Slovenian

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: M. Kocjan and K. Talabér-Ritz)

Defendant: Republic of Slovenia

Form of order sought

The Commission claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by having limited the obligation to demonstrate energy performance to buildings owned or used by public authorities, the Republic of Slovenia has failed to fulfil its obligation under Article 13(2) of the Directive on the energy performance of buildings; (1)

— order the Republic of Slovenia to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Under Article 13(2) of Directive (EU) 2010/31/EU, the Member States must require that where a total useful floor area over 500 m2 of a building for which an energy performance certificate has been issued in accordance with Article 12(1) is frequently visited by the public, the energy performance certificate is displayed in a prominent place clearly visible to the public. Since the Republic of Slovenia has imposed that requirement only for buildings owned or used by public bodies, the Commission has decided to bring an action before the Court.

(1) Directive 2010/31/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the energy performance of buildings (OJ 2010 L 153, p. 13).
2.

The burden of proving ‘presentation at check-in’ If the answer to question 1(a) is in the affirmative, that is to say, if Article 3(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 does apply to compensation applied for by a passenger whose flight has been delayed: Are the conditions established in Article 3(2)(a) preconditions that the consumer must prove to have been satisfied in order for the regulation to apply, or grounds for exonerating the airline by allowing it to produce the passenger list in order to show that the consumer did not present him or herself for check-in “as stipulated and at the time indicated in advance and in writing (including by electronic means) by the air carrier, the tour operator or an authorised travel agent, or, if no time is indicated, not later than 45 minutes before the published departure time” to which Article 3(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 refers, in the light of technological developments that now allow boarding cards to be issued electronically, the absence of any time stamp on paper boarding cards, the correlative absence of any obligation for passengers to present themselves physically at a check-in counter and the fact that the airlines alone hold all the information about passenger check-in until check-in operations are closed? If the answer to question 1(a) is in the affirmative, that is to say, if Article 3(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 does apply to compensation applied for by a passenger whose flight has been delayed: Does the burden of proof of the actual presentation of a passenger bringing legal proceedings ‘as stipulated and at the time indicated in advance and in writing (including by electronic means) by the air carrier, the tour operator or an authorised travel agent, or, if no time is indicated, not later than 45 minutes before the published departure time’ to which Article 3(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004, fall exclusively on the passenger in the light of technological developments that now allow boarding cards to be issued electronically, the absence of any time stamp on paper boarding cards, the correlative absence of any obligation for passengers to present themselves physically at a check-in counter and the fact that the airlines alone hold all the information about passenger check-in until check-in operations are closed?
1.

Is a provision of national law, namely Article 1 of the Ovršni zakon (Law on enforcement) (published in the Narodne novine Nos 112/12, 25/13, 93/14, 55/16 and 73/17), which gives notaries the power to enforce the recovery of debts based on an authentic document by issuing a writ of execution, as an enforcement order, without the express agreement of the debtor who is a legal person established in the Republic of Croatia, compatible with Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 18 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in the light of the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Cases C-484/15 and C-551/15?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (Romania) lodged on 25 April 2019 — SC Romenergo SA and Aris Capital SA v Autoritatea de Supraveghere Financiară

(Case C-339/19)

(2019/C 255/28)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: SC Romenergo SA and Aris Capital SA

Respondent: Autoritatea de Supraveghere Financiară

Question referred

Must Article 63 et seq. TFEU, read in conjunction with Article 2(2) of Directive 2004/25/EC (1) and Article 87 of Directive 2001/34/EC, (2) be interpreted as precluding a national legislative framework (in the present case Article 2(3)(j) of CNVM Regulation No 1/2006) which establishes a legal presumption of concerted practice in respect of holdings in companies whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market and which are treated as alternative investment funds (known as ‘financial investment companies’) with regard to:

1. persons who have carried out or who are carrying out economic transactions together, whether related or unrelated to the capital market, and

2. persons who, in carrying out economic transactions, use financial resources which have the same origin or which originate from different entities which are involved persons?

(1) Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids (OJ 2004 L 142, p. 12).

(2) Directive 2001/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 May 2001 on the admission of securities to official stock exchange listing and on information to be published on those securities (OJ 2001 L 184, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 21 May 2019 — VG Bild-Kunst v Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz

(Case C-392/19)

(2019/C 270/23)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant in the appeal on a point of law: VG Bild-Kunst

Respondent in the appeal on a point of law: Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz

Question referred

Does the embedding of a work — which is available on a freely accessible website with the consent of the rightholder — in the website of a third party by way of framing constitute communication to the public of that work within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC (1) where it occurs through circumvention of protection measures against framing taken or instigated by the rightholder?

(1) Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (OJ 2001 L 167, p. 10).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD) lodged on 17 May 2019 — MK v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

(Case C-388/19)

(2019/C 270/22)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: MK

Defendant: Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

Question referred

Should Articles 12, 56, 57 and 58 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community [now Articles 18, 63, 64 and 65 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union], taken together, be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that in dispute in the present case (Article 43(2) of the Income Tax Code, approved by Decree-Law 442-A/88 of 30 November 1988, as amended by Law 109-B/2001 of 27 December 2001), with the amendments introduced by Law 67-A/2007 of 31 December 2007, which inserted paragraphs 7 and 8 (now paragraphs 9 and 10) into Article 72 of the Income Tax Code, the purpose of which is to enable the capital gains realised from the sale of immovable property situated in a Member State (Portugal) by a resident of another Member State of the European Union (France) not to be subject, by election, to a tax burden greater than that which would be applicable for the same type of transaction to capital gains realised by a resident of the State in which that immovable property is situated?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 17 January 2019 by Seven SpA against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 21 November 2018 in Case T-339/17: Shenzhen Jiayz Photo Industrial v EUIPO — Seven

(Case C-31/19 P)

(2019/C 280/20)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Seven SpA (represented by: L. Trevisan, avvocato)

Other parties to the proceedings: Shenzhen Jiayz Photo Industrial Ltd, European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 2 July 2019 the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
1)

Must Article 3 of Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability, (1) be interpreted as meaning that the obligation to take out civil liability motor insurance extends even to situations in which a local government authority — a district — has acquired, on the basis of a court decision, title to a vehicle which is not capable of being driven, is on private property in the form of a guarded car park not on the public highway, and is to be destroyed in accordance with the wishes of its owner?
3.

Again, if the answer to the first question is in the negative, does clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement impose the obligation, on the national court hearing a case between a public employer and a worker employed under successive fixed-term employment contracts concluded within the framework of various training, integration and retraining programmes, to examine the appropriateness of concluding successive fixed-term employment contracts in the light of the ‘objective reasons’ set out in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union? In such a case, can the ‘legitimate reasons’ put forward by the public employer be considered to be ‘objective reasons’ justifying the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts in breach of the conditions laid down by Article 10a, cited above, in order, on the one hand, to prevent and tackle abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts where the needs covered by those contracts are not of a temporary nature but are rather fixed and permanent needs in terms of social cohesion within an insecure population and, on the other, to take account of the specific objectives of those vocational reinsertion contracts concluded within the framework of that social employment policy established by the Belgian State and the Walloon Region and which is heavily dependent on public subsidies?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 31 January 2019 by WL against the judgment delivered by the General Court (Ninth Chamber) on 29 November 2018 in Case T-493/17, WL v ERCEA

(Case C-78/19 P)

(2019/C 288/14)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: WL (represented by: F. Elia, avvocato)

Other party to the proceedings: European Research Council Executive Agency (ERCEA)

By order of 11 July 2019, the Court (Sixth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as being, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded, and ordered WL to bear its own costs.
1.

Must Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union, Article 325(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 1(1)(a) and (b) and Article 2(1) of the Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, and the principle of legal certainty be interpreted as precluding the adoption of a decision by a body outside the judicial system, the Curtea Constituțională a României (Constitutional Court of Romania), which adjudicates on the lawfulness of the composition of Chambers hearing the case, in that way creating the conditions for allowing extraordinary actions brought against final judgments delivered in a given period?
1.

Is Article 17 of Directive 77/388/EEC (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the fact that expenditure also benefits a third party — as is the case where, in connection with the sale of apartments, a project promoter pays advertising costs, administrative costs and estate agents’ commission, which also benefit the landowners — does not preclude the value added tax (VAT) charged on those costs from being fully deductible, provided that it is established that there is a direct and immediate link between the expenditure and the economic activity of the taxable person and that the advantage to the third party is of secondary importance compared to the requirements of the taxable person’s business?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 8 May 2019 by José-Ramón Herrero Torres against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 8 March 2019 in Case T 326/18 Herrero Torres v EUIPO — DZ Licores (CARAJILLO LICOR 43 CUARENTA Y TRES)

(Case C-369/19 P)

(2019/C 312/04)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: José-Ramón Herrero Torres (represented by J. Donoso Romero, abogado)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office and DZ Licores S.L.U.

By order of 15 July 2019, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) ruled that the appeal should not be allowed to proceed and ordered José-Ramón Herrero Torres to bear his own costs.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 25 February 2019 by CheapFlights International Ltd against the order of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 11 December 2018 in Case T-565/17: CheapFlights International v EUIPO — Momondo Group

(Case C-170/19 P)

(2019/C 295/04)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: CheapFlights International Ltd (represented by: A. von Mühlendahl and H. Hartwig, Rechtsanwälte)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 10 July 2019 the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) held that the appeal was manifestly unfounded.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Italy) lodged on 28 May 2019 — Blumar SpA v Agenzia delle Entrate

(Case C-415/19)

(2019/C 328/03)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte Suprema di Cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Blumar SpA

Respondent: Agenzia delle Entrate

Question referred

Are Article 1(1223) of Law No 296 of 27 December 2006 (now Article 16a(11) of Law No 11 of 4 February 2005) and the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 23 May 2007 compatible with EU law, with reference to Article 108(3) TFEU as interpreted in Deggendorf, Commission Decision C(2008) 380, and the Community-law principle of proportionality?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Finanzgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 16 July 2019 — Jebsen & Jessen (GmbH & Co.) KG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg

(Case C-543/19)

(2019/C 328/31)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Finanzgericht Hamburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Jebsen & Jessen (GmbH & Co.) KG

Defendant: Hauptzollamt Hamburg

Questions referred

1. Under the conditions of the dispute in the main proceedings, is the exemption from the anti-dumping duty introduced by Article 1 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/82 (1) pursuant to Article 2(1) of that regulation precluded if an undertaking invoice pursuant to Article 2(1)(b) of that regulation does not specify Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/87 (2) referred to in point 9 of the annex to that regulation, but specifies rather Decision 2008/899/EC? (3)

2. If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: May an undertaking invoice that meets the requirements of the annex to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/82 be submitted in the context of a procedure for establishing whether anti-dumping duties are reimbursable in order to obtain exemption from the anti-dumping duty imposed in Article 1 of that regulation pursuant to Article 2(1) thereof?

(1) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/82 of 21 January 2015 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of citric acid originating in the People's Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 and of partial interim reviews pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (OJ 2015 L 15, p. 8).

(2) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/87 of 21 January 2015 accepting the undertakings offered in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of citric acid originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ 2015 L 15, p. 75).

(3) Commission Decision of 2 December 2008 accepting the undertakings offered in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of citric acid originating in the People's Republic of China (OJ 2008 L 323, p. 62).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha (Spain) lodged on 12 June 2019 — WT v Subdelegación del Gobierno en Guadalajara

(Case C-448/19)

(2019/C 328/13)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: WT

Defendant: Subdelegación del Gobierno en Guadalajara

Question referred

Is an interpretation such as that set out in judgments of the Spanish Supreme Court No 191/2019 of 19 February 2019, appeal in cassation 5607/2017 (ECLI:ES:TS:2019:580), and No 257/2019 of 27 February 2019, appeal in cassation 5809/2017 (ECLI:ES:TS:2019:663), according to which, through an interpretation of Directive 2001/40/EC, (1) it is possible to come to the conclusion that any third-country national holding a long-term residence permit who has committed an offence punishable by a sentence of at least one year in duration can and should be ‘automatically’ removed, that is to say, without needing to give any consideration to his personal, family, social or employment circumstances, compatible with Article 12 of Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, (2) and with — inter alia — the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 7 December 2017 (Case C-636/16) and of 8 December 2011 (Case C-371/08)?

(1) Council Directive 2001/40/EC of 28 May 2001 on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third country nationals (OJ 2001 L 149, p. 34).

(2) OJ 2004 L 16, p. 44.
1.

In the legal relationship arising from a subsidy agreement, are the authorities and intermediate bodies of the Member States which are competent to conduct irregularity proceedings at first or second tier empowered to examine directly in the course of the proceedings before them, in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 (‘the Regulation’), (1) and in particular as part of the control mechanism provided for in Articles 60, 70 and 98 thereof, any infringement that has or may have an impact prejudicial to the financial interests of the budget of the European Union, and are they obliged, if necessary, to apply a financial correction?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 9 July 2019 — Passenger Rights spółka akcyjna, with its seat in Warsaw v Ryanair DAC, with its seat in Dublin (Ireland)

(Case C-519/19)

(2019/C 337/08)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Passenger Rights SA

Defendant: Ryanair DAC, with its seat in Dublin (Ireland)

Questions referred

Should Articles 2(b), 3(1) and (2) and 6(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC (1) of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts and Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters — as regards examination of the validity of an agreement conferring jurisdiction — be interpreted as meaning that the final purchaser of a claim acquired by way of assignment from a consumer, which final purchaser is not a consumer himself, may rely on the absence of individual negotiation of contractual terms and on unfair contractual terms arising from a jurisdiction clause?

(1) Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).

(2) OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 8 July 2019 by Jakov Ardalic and others against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 30 April 2019 in Joined Cases T-523/16 and T-542/16, Ardalic and Others v Council

(Case C-518/19 P)

(2019/C 357/21)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellants: Jakov Ardalic, Liliana Bicanova, Monica Brunetto, Claudia Istoc, Sylvie Jamet, Despina Kanellou, Christian Stouraitis, Abdelhamid Azbair, Abdel Bouzanih, Bob Kitenge Ya Musenga, El Miloud Sadiki, Cam Tran Thi (represented by: S. Orlandi, T. Martin, lawyers)

Other parties to the proceedings: Council of the European Union, European Parliament

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— annul the decision no longer to allow the appellants, as of 2014, travelling time or reimbursement of annual travel expenses;

— order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellants claim that the judgment under appeal is vitiated by a number of errors of law.

Firstly, the General Court erred in law in paragraphs 65 and 73 of the judgment in limiting the extent of the judicial review it is required to carry out to ‘manifest’ cases.

Secondly, the General Court erred in law in paragraphs 68 to 71 of the judgment in finding that the appellants were not in a comparable situation to staff members who retained the benefit of travelling time and reimbursement of their annual travel expenses.

Thirdly, the General Court erred in law in finding, in paragraphs 67 and 78 to 84 of the judgment, that the regulations at issue do not infringe the principle of proportionality.