ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.

Must the ‘the polluter pays’ environmental principle, provided for in Article 191(2) TFEU, and Article 9(1) of Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000, (1) which lays down the principle of the recovery of costs for water services and also the appropriate economic balancing of water uses, be interpreted as precluding the introduction of a tax on the use of inland waters to produce energy, such as the tax at issue in the proceedings, which does not incentivise the efficient use of water, nor establish mechanisms for the preservation and protection of public water resources, the quantification of that tax being totally unconnected to the capacity to cause damage to the public water resources, as it is focused solely and exclusively on the income-generating capacity of producers?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 182/8

Appeal brought on 12 February 2018 by FTI Touristik GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 30 November 2017 in Case T-475/16, FTI Touristik GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-99/18 P)

(2018/C 182/07)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: FTI Touristik GmbH (represented by: A. Parr, Rechtsanwältin)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Harald Prantner and Daniel Giersch

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the Eighth Chamber of the General Court of 30 November 2017 (T-475/16);

— order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant claims that the judgment of the General Court is based on an infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009. (1) The judgment is inadequately reasoned. Not all of the factual circumstances, the interplay of which is essential to the assessment of the likelihood of confusion, were taken into account. This constitutes an error of law.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1), as amended (replaced by Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1)).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 182/12

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 9 March 2018 — Agrenergy Srl v Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico

(Case C-180/18)

(2018/C 182/14)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Agrenergy Srl

Respondent: Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico

Question referred

Should Article 3(3)(a) of Directive 2009/28/EC (1) be interpreted — including in view of the general principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and the overall system of rules introduced by that directive to incentivise the production of energy from renewable sources — as rendering incompatible with EU law national legislation which allows the Italian Government, in subsequent implementing decrees, to reduce or even remove incentives introduced earlier?

(1) Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (OJ 2009 L 140, p. 16).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 190/15

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal de première instance de Liège (Belgium) lodged on 3 April 2018 — Pauline Stiernon, Marion Goraguer, Muriel Buccarello, Clémentine Vasseur, Manon Pirotton, Anissa Quotb v Etat belge, SPF Santé publique, Communauté française de Belgique

(Case C-237/18)

(2018/C 190/20)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal de première instance de Liège

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Pauline Stiernon, Marion Goraguer, Muriel Buccarello, Clémentine Vasseur, Manon Pirotton, Anissa Quotb

Defendants: Etat belge, SPF Santé publique, Communauté française de Belgique

Question referred

Inasmuch as Royal Order of 02/07/2009 establishing the list of allied health professions does not list psychomotor therapy as an allied health profession, although an undergraduate degree in psychomotor therapy has been established in Belgium, thereby restricting the freedom of movement of persons, the freedom to choose an occupation and the right to engage in work, does [that Royal Order] infringe Articles 20, 21 and 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 15 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights?
2.

Second ground of appeal, alleging infringement of Article 107(1) TFEU and Article 296(2) TFEU in respect of the conclusion that Measures No 2 and 4 conferred an advantage on the appellant. With regard to Measure No 2 (2008 guarantee): misinterpretation of the temporal criterion in the concept of undertaking in difficulty. Misinterpretation of the criterion of remuneration of the guarantee. With regard to Measure No 4 (2010 guarantee): (a) failure to state reasons regarding the granting of the guarantee as a current practice; (b) failure to state reasons regarding the irreparable harm that the appellant claims to have suffered; (c) failure to state reasons and infringement of Article 107(1) TFEU and of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations as regards the conditions of the guarantee and the amount of the commission; (d) failure to state reasons regarding the particular position of the National Bank of Greece SA (ETE) as private shareholder.
Case C-78/18: Action brought on 6 February 2018 — European Commission v Hungary

Action brought on 6 February 2018 — European Commission v Hungary

(Case C-78/18)

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: V. Di Bucci, L. Malferrari and K. Talabér-Ritz, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Hungary

Form of order sought

The Commission claims that the Court of Justice should:

— Declare that Hungary, by introducing discriminatorily, unnecessarily and without justification restrictions on foreign grants to Hungarian civil organisations through the a külföldről támogatott szervezetek átláthatóságáról szóló 2017. évi LXXVI. törvény (Law LXXVI of 2017, on the transparency of organisations that receive financial support from abroad), the provisions of which impose obligations of registration, declaration and transparency on certain categories of civil organisations—those that receive direct or indirect foreign financial support exceeding a specified amount —and also make it possible for penalties to be imposed on organisations that do not fulfil such obligations, has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 63 TFEU and Articles 7, 8 and 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

— Order Hungary to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Law LXXVI of 2017, on the transparency of organisations that receive financial support from abroad, imposes new obligations of registration, declaration, transparency and publicity on certain categories of civil organisations—those that receive direct or indirect foreign financial support exceeding a specified amount—and also makes it possible for penalties to be imposed on organisations that do not fulfil such obligations.

On 14 July 2017, the Commission initiated infringement proceedings against Hungary in relation to Law LXXVI of 2017.

Finding that the response provided by Hungary was unsatisfactory, the Commission moved to the next phase of infringement proceedings and, on 5 October 2017, sent Hungary a reasoned opinion.

Finding that the response to the reasoned opinion was not satisfactory either, the Commission decided to refer the case to Court of Justice for a declaration that Hungary had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 63 TFEU and Articles 7, 8 and 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
1.

When a farmer has purchased some plants belonging to a plant variety from a nursery (establishment owned by a third party) and planted them before the grant of the variety right has come into effect, in order for the subsequent activity of that farmer of collecting the successive harvests to be covered by the ius prohibendi in Article 13(2) of Regulation (EC) No 2100/94, ( 1 ) must the requirements under Article 13(3) be satisfied for Article 13(2) to be interpreted as relating to harvested material? Or must Article 13(2) be interpreted as meaning that the activity of harvesting is an act of production or reproduction of the variety which results in ‘harvested material’, whose prohibition by the holder of the plant variety does not require the conditions in Article 13(3) to be satisfied?
Case C-312/18 P: Appeal brought on 11 May 2018 by Eco-Bat Technologies Ltd, Berzelius Metall GmbH, Société traitements chimiques des métaux against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 21 March 2018 in Case T-361/17: Eco-Bat Technologies Ltd, Berzelius Metall GmbH, Société traitements chimiques des métaux v European Commission

Appeal brought on 11 May 2018 by Eco-Bat Technologies Ltd, Berzelius Metall GmbH, Société traitements chimiques des métaux against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 21 March 2018 in Case T-361/17: Eco-Bat Technologies Ltd, Berzelius Metall GmbH, Société traitements chimiques des métaux v European Commission

(Case C-312/18 P)

Parties

Appellants: Eco-Bat Technologies Ltd, Berzelius Metall GmbH, Société traitements chimiques des métaux (represented by: M. Brealey QC, I. Vandenborre, advocaat, S. Dionnet, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

— set aside the order of the General Court (Eight Chamber) of 21 March 2018 in case T-361/17, Eco-Bat Technologies and Others v Commission;

— declare admissible the appellant’s application registered as case T-361/17;

— refer the case back to the General Court for the annulment or reduction of the penalty imposed by the Commission with the initial decision as amended by the correcting decision;

— order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The General Court has committed an error in law in determining the reference date by looking at the initial, incomplete, decision instead of the full and final decision, correct and complete in every aspect (particularly in those aspects that are the object of the appeal). By doing so, the General Court has breached the appellant’s fundamental rights (in particular, its right of defence). A person has the right to have the limitation period available in full as from the date of the substantive amendment decision. The General Court has also misinterpreted the Commission’s duty to state reasons and the principle of good administration in assuming that the appellant should have resorted to assumptions in order to fully understand how the Commission arrived at the amount of the fine.
3.

Must Article 401 of the VAT Directive ( 1 ) be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State that gives rise to a distinction between foreign-owned taxable persons and national taxable persons? Must the special tax be considered a tax on turnover? In other words, is this tax compatible or not with the VAT Directive?
Case C-219/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 26 March 2018 — Brenta Scrl and Others v Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA), Regione Veneto

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 26 March 2018 — Brenta Scrl and Others v Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA), Regione Veneto

(Case C-219/18)

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: Brenta Scrl, Michele Bianchin, Antonio Bortignon, Doriano Bortignon, Bruno Caron, Francesca Carraro, Antonio Didonè, Loris Donazzan, Rino Guidolin, Silvano Orsato, Valentino Rigo, Roberto Sacchetto, Emiliano Sonda, Azienda agricola Rebesco Antonio e Guerrino s.s.

Respondents: Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA), Regione Veneto

Questions referred

1. In a situation such as that described in the case in the main proceedings, must EU law be interpreted to the effect that the consequence of the conflict of a legislative provision of a Member State with the third subparagraph of Article 2(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 ( 1 ) is that producers are not obliged to pay the additional levy if the conditions laid down by that regulation are met?

2. In a situation such as that described in the case in the main proceedings, must EU law and, in particular, the general principle of the protection of legitimate expectations be interpreted as meaning that the expectations of persons who have performed an obligation laid down by a Member State and who have benefited from the effects associated with performance of that obligation may not be protected if that obligation has proved to be in conflict with EU law?

3. In a situation such as that described in the case in the main proceedings, do Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1392/2001 ( 2 ) of 9 July 2001 and the EU concept of ‘priority category’ preclude a provision of a Member State, such as Article 2(3) of Decree-Law No 157/2004, adopted by the Italian Republic, which lays down varying methods for refunding an additional levy that has been over-charged, drawing a distinction, in terms of timetables and methods of repayment, between producers who have relied upon due compliance with a national provision that has proved to be in conflict with EU law and producers who have not complied with such a provision?

( 1 ) Council Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 of 28 December 1992 establishing an additional levy in the milk and milk products sector (OJ 1992 L 405, p. 1).

( 2 ) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1392/2001 of 9 July 2001 laying down detailed rules for applying Council Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 establishing an additional levy on milk and milk products (OJ 2001 L 187, p. 19).
Case C-243/18 P: Appeal brought on 3 April 2018 by the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 25 January 2018 in Case T-561/16, Galocha v Fusion for Energy Joint Undertaking

Appeal brought on 3 April 2018 by the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 25 January 2018 in Case T-561/16, Galocha v Fusion for Energy Joint Undertaking

(Case C-243/18 P)

Parties

Appellant: European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy (represented by: G. Poszler and R. Hanak, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: Yosu Galocha

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court of 25 January 2018 in Case T-561/16 by which it annulled the reserve lists for selection procedure F4E/CA/ST/FGIV/2015/001 and the decisions of Fusion for Energy to appoint the successful candidates;

— if the Court of Justice upholds the appeal, order the applicant at first instance to bear the costs incurred at first instance and the costs of the present appeal.

Sole ground of appeal

Infringement of the principle of proportionality and, consequently, imposition of an excessive disadvantage on third parties who are beneficiaries of a decision which has been held to be unlawful.
Case C-261/18: Action brought on 13 April 2018 — European Commission v Ireland

Action brought on 13 April 2018 — European Commission v Ireland

(Case C-261/18)

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: M. Noll-Ehlers, J. Tomkin, Agents)

Defendant: Ireland

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— to declare that, by failing to take the necessary measures to comply with the second ground of the judgment of this Court in Case C-215/06 ( 1 ), Commission v Ireland, Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 260 TFEU;

— to order Ireland to pay to the Commission a lump sum of EUR 1343,2multiplied by the number of days between the ruling in Case C-215/06 and either compliance by Ireland with that ruling or the judgment in the present proceedings, whichever is the sooner, with a minimum lump sum of EUR 1685000;

— to order Ireland to pay to the Commission a penalty payment of EUR 12,264 per day from the date of the judgment in the present proceedings to the date of compliance by Ireland with the ruling in Case C-215/06; and

— order Ireland to pay the costs of this action.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Ireland is required, under Article 260 (1) TFEU, to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court in C-215/06. As Ireland has not taken the necessary measures to comply with the second ground of that judgment, the Commission decided to refer the matter to the Court of Justice.

In its application, the Commission proposes that the Court of Justice impose a lump sum payment of EUR 1343,2 per day and a penalty payment of EUR 12,264 per day on Ireland. The amount of the lump sum and of the penalty payment has been calculated taking into account the seriousness and duration of the infringement and the deterrent effect based on that Member State’s ability to pay.

( 1 ) judgment of 3 July 2008, Commission v Ireland, C-215/16, EU:C:2008:380.
1.

Is national legislation, established in Portugal in Decree-law No 69/2005 of 17 March and in Decree-law No 150/90 of 10 May, which, as well as prohibiting the placing on the market of products that could endanger the health and safety of consumers because they can be confused with foods, also prohibits the placing on the market of products that, since they can be confused with other products (toys, in particular) due to their appearance, can, through normal or reasonably foreseeable use, endanger the health and safety of consumers, especially children, compatible with Community law — in particular with Council Directive 2001/95/EC ( 1 ) [of the European Parliament and of the Council] of 3 December 2001 on general product safety, with Articles 28 and 30 of the Treaty (as referred to in that directive) and with Council Directive 87/357/EEC ( 2 ) of 25 June 198[7]?
Case C-204/18 P: Appeal brought on 18 March 2018 by Asociación de la pesca y acuicultura del entorno de Donana y del Bajo Guadalquivir (Pebagua) against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 16 January 2018 in Case T-715/16 Pebagua v Commission

Appeal brought on 18 March 2018 by Asociación de la pesca y acuicultura del entorno de Donana y del Bajo Guadalquivir (Pebagua) against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 16 January 2018 in Case T-715/16 Pebagua v Commission

(Case C-204/18 P)

Parties

Appellant: Asociación de la pesca y acuicultura del entorno de Donana y del Bajo Guadalquivir (Pebagua) (represented by: A. J. Uceda Sosa, abogado)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant submits that the Court of Justice should:

— Set aside in its entirety the order of the General Court under appeal;

— Give final judgment in the matter, upholding in its entirety the form of order sought at first instance by the appellant and, therefore, set aside and cancel the effect of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1141 ( 1 ) or, alternatively, set aside and cancel the effect of the inclusion of the species Procambarus clarkii on the Union list approved by that regulation;

— Order the Commission to pay the costs of both actions.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The order under appeal does not go into the substance of the case raised in the appeal, but finds it inadmissible on the ground that the applicant lacks standing, resulting in an infringement of the second test for standing laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, given that the contested regulation directly affects the undertakings represented by the applicant, without the need for implementing measures.

( 1 ) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1141 of 13 July 2016 adopting a list of invasive alien species of Union concern pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1143/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2016 L 189, p. 4).
1.

Is a decree by which a body of a Member State establishes the conservation objectives for the Natura 2000 network, in accordance with Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora ( 1 ), a plan or programme within the meaning of Directive 2001/42/EC on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment ( 2 ), and, more specifically, within the meaning of Article 3(2)(a) or Article 3(4) of that directive?
Case C-166/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Commissione Tributaria Regionale per la Campania (Italy) lodged on 1 March 2018 — Idroenergia Scrl v Agenzia delle dogane e dei Monopoli — Ufficio delle Dogane di Caserta

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Commissione Tributaria Regionale per la Campania (Italy) lodged on 1 March 2018 — Idroenergia Scrl v Agenzia delle dogane e dei Monopoli — Ufficio delle Dogane di Caserta

(Case C-166/18)

Referring court

Commissione Tributaria Regionale per la Campania

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Idroenergia Scrl

Defendant: Agenzia delle dogane e dei Monopoli — Ufficio delle Dogane di Caserta

By order of 21 June 2018, the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) declared the request for a preliminary ruling submitted by the Commissione Tributaria Regionale per la Campania (Italy) to be manifestly inadmissible.
1.

In the case where a determining authority has rejected an application for international protection as being manifestly unfounded within the meaning of Article 46(6)(a) of Directive 2013/32/EU ( 1 ) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast) and the appeal brought against that rejection before a court under national law does not have automatic suspensive effect, must Article 46(8) of that directive then be interpreted as meaning that the mere lodging of an application for interim relief results in the applicant’s stay on the territory of the Member State no longer being illegal within the meaning of Article 3 of Directive 2008/115/EC ( 2 ) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals and that he therefore comes within the scope of Directive 2013/33/EU ( 3 ) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast)?
3.

Is Article 19(1) of Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 ( 2 ) on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast) to be interpreted as meaning that a woman who, in the area of application of legislation such as that set out in Question 1, claims to have suffered indirect discrimination based on sex on the ground that significantly more women than men are employed on a part-time basis, must assert this fact, in particular that women are statistically much more significantly affected, by submitting specific statistics or specific facts and must substantiate this by means of appropriate evidence?