ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Appeal brought on 16 December 2021 by the Federal Republic of Germany against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 6 October 2021 in Case T-238/19, Wepa Hygieneprodukte GmbH and Others v Federal Republic of Germany

(Case C-796/21 P)

(2022/C 73/32)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Federal Republic of Germany (represented by: J. Möller and R. Kanitz, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: WEPA Hygieneprodukte GmbH, WEPA Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG, the latter formerly Wepa Leuna GmbH and Wepa Papierfabrik Sachsen GmbH, and European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal of the General Court of the European Union of 6 October 2021 in Case T-238/19, in so far as it dismissed the action as unfounded;

— annul the Commission’s Decision of 28 May 2018 on State aid SA.34045 (2013/c) (ex 2012/NN) implemented by Germany for baseload consumers under Paragraph 19 StromNEV C(2018) 3166 final, for the years 2012 and 2013 in accordance with Article 61(1) of the Statute of the Court of Justice;

— order the Commission to pay the costs before the General Court and the Court of Justice.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant relies on a single ground of appeal, in which it alleges an infringement of Article 107(1) TFEU. According to the appellant, the General Court erred in law in assuming that the scheme in Paragraph 19(2) of the German Stromnetzentgeltverordnung (StromNEV) (Regulation on electricity network charges) constitutes a State aid as provided for in Article 107(1) TFEU.

First, the General Court erred in law in finding, in the context of the assessment of the State nature of the network charges, that the existence of a mandatory charge on consumers or end users and the State control over the funds or over the administrators of those funds constituted two factors that were ‘part of an alternative’.

Secondly, the General Court erred in law in finding, in the context of the assessment whether there is a ‘mandatory charge on consumers or end users’ that the relationship between an electricity supplier and electricity end users was irrelevant. In addition, the General Court erred in law by taking into account the obligation to levy and not the legal obligation to pay network charges.

Thirdly, the General Court erred in law in holding, in the context of the assessment whether State control or State power to dispose of funds exists, that the exclusive use of the network charges collected did not rule out that the State could dispose of those funds.
Appeal brought on 8 December 2021: Marián Kočner against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 29 September 2021 in Case T-528/20 Kočner v Europol

(Case C-755/21 P)

(2022/C 73/23)

Language of the case: Slovak

Parties

Appellant: Marián Kočner (represented by: M. Mandzák, M. Para, advokáti)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, Kingdom of Spain

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal in full;

— refer the case back to the General Court;

— declare that the General Court is to decide on the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellant relies on two harmful events. The appeal is in total made up of six grounds. The General Court is alleged to have erred in the legal assessment of the case and to have incorrectly applied the substantive law, especially as regards the joint and several liability for damage of the defendant and the Member State, to have incorrectly interpreted the national law, to have incorrectly established that there was a lack of a causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the harmful event, to have stated insufficient reasons for the judgment under appeal and to have distorted the evidence.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 15 November 2021 — YV v Stadtverkehr Lindau (B) GmbH

(Case C-685/21)

(2022/C 84/36)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberster Gerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: YV

Defendant: Stadtverkehr Lindau (B) GmbH

Question referred

Does ‘insurer’ within the meaning of Article 11(1) and Article 13(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (1) include an undertaking which, although not an insurance undertaking, is liable under the applicable law as ‘quasi insurer’ for the motor vehicles kept by it, as if it were an insurer under the provisions of insurance law, due to a derogation from the obligation in respect of compulsory insurance within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Directive 2009/103/EC? (2)

(1) Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1).

(2) Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability (codified version) (OJ 2009 L 263, p. 11).
2.

Must Article 2(1) and (2) of Council Directive 2000/78/[E]C of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, together with Article 3(1)(c), in fine, of that directive, be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that laid down in Article 1(2) of Legea-cadru nr. 330 din 5 noiembrie 2009 privind salarizarea unitară a personalului plătit din fonduri publice (Framework Law No 330 of 5 November 2009 on the uniform remuneration of staff paid from the public purse), as interpreted by Decizia nr. 7/2019 (Decision No 7/2019) (published in Monitorul Oficial al României — Official Journal of Romania — No 343 of 6 May 2019), given by the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice, Romania), ruling on an appeal on a point of law, in circumstances in which the claimants did not have the legal possibility of requesting an increase in their employment allowance on entering the judiciary at a date after the entry into force of [Framework Law No 330/2009], a legislative act which expressly provided that remuneration rights are to be and remain exclusively as provided in [that] law, thus creating remuneration discrimination as compared with their colleagues, including on the basis of the criterion of age, which means in fact that only older judges, who were appointed before January 2010 (who benefited from court rulings in the period from 2006 to 2009, the operative parts of which were subject to interpretation in 2019 pursuant to Decision [No 7/2019 of the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice)]), received retroactive payment of remuneration rights (similar to those sought in the action which forms the subject matter of the present proceedings) during December 2019 and January 2020, in respect of the period from 2010 to 2015, even though during that period the claimants also acted as judges and performed the same work, under the same conditions and in the same institutions?
4.

Must the compensation be determined for each individual infringement, or are several infringements — or at least several infringements of the same nature — penalised by means of an overall amount of compensation, which is not determined by adding up individual amounts but is based on an evaluative overall assessment?
1.

In order to classify an individual product as a ‘part’ of a seat for motor vehicles for the purposes of Chapter 94 of the Combined Nomenclature in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, (1) in the versions applicable to the main proceedings, is it necessary for the seat to be incapable of carrying out its essential and principal function (in the sense of its being a functional unit) without that product, or is it sufficient for the individual part, which is intended solely to be attached to car seats, to be identifiable as part of a seat?
3.

If EU law does not preclude, in the determination by the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application, the attribution of an independent significance, pursuant to a provision of national law, to the interests of an unborn child, can Article 16(1) of Regulation No 343/2003 apply to the relationship between the unborn child and the father of that unborn child who is legally resident in the Member State to which the application is made?
2.

Does the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union preclude the adoption of an interpretation of a national provision under which a judge’s belated declaration of his or her intention to continue to hold a judicial office after reaching retirement age is ineffective, irrespective of the reason for the failure to observe the time limit and the significance of that failure for the proceedings concerning consent to his or her continuing to hold a judicial office?
3.

If Question 2 is answered in the affirmative: Is Article 9(1) of Directive 2008/94/EC to be interpreted as meaning that the guarantee institution responsible for meeting the outstanding claims of an employee who works or habitually works in two Member States is a) the guarantee institution of the Member State to the legislation of which he or she is subject in the context of the coordination of social security (social insurance) systems where the guarantee institutions pursuant to Article 3 of Directive 2008/94/EC in both States are structured in such a way that the employer’s contributions to the financing of the guarantee institution are payable as part of the compulsory social insurance contributions; or b) the guarantee institution of the other Member State in which the undertaking which is in a state of insolvency has its registered office; or c) the guarantee institutions of both Member States, with the result that the employee can choose which one he or she wants to claim from when submitting his or her application?
Appeal brought on 10 November 2021 by Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 1 September 2021 in Case T-561/20, Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe v EUIPO

(Case C-679/21 P)

(2022/C 148/15)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe Ltd (represented by: S. Malynicz, BL)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 22 February 2022, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe Ltd shall bear its own costs.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 22 December 2021 by YG against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 20 October 2021 in Case T-599/20, YG v European Commission

(Case C-818/21 P)

(2022/C 191/10)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: YG (represented by: A. Champetier, avocate, S. Rodrigues, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The Appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the contested judgment, declare the Appellant’s requests in Case T-599/20 admissible and well-founded, and consequently

— annul the contested decisions in first instance;

or, if this is not possible,

— refer the case before the General Court for judgment, and, in any case,

— order the Commission to bear the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appeal is lodged against the judgment of 20 October 2021 adopted by the General Court of the European Union, dismissing the action lodged by the Appellant in case T-599/20, YG v European Commission.

In support of his appeal, the Appellant raises the following pleas in law:

— Distortions of evidence;

— Misconstructions of pleas — Errors of reasoning — Breach of rights of defence;
Appeal brought on 10 December 2021 by TUIfly GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 29 September 2021 in Case T-619/18 TUIfly GmbH v European Commission

(Case C-764/21 P)

(2022/C 257/25)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: TUIfly GmbH (represented by: L. Giesberts and D. Westarp, Rechtsanwälte)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 19 May 2022, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Tenth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
Appeal brought on 16 December 2021 by Daw SE against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 6 October 2021 in Case T-32/21, Daw SE v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-781/21 P)

(2022/C 222/15)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Daw SE (represented by: A. Haberl, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 28 March 2022, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) decided that the appeal should not be allowed to proceed and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
2.

Must Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as precluding a national provision that makes it possible to uphold in court proceedings and make final a criminal administrative penalty against a legal person in respect of unlawful conduct in the form of unfair commercial practices, for which a final criminal conviction has been handed down against that person in the meantime in a different Member State, where the latter criminal conviction became final before the legal challenge to the former criminal administrative penalty became res judicata?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Pesti Központi Kerületi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 25 January 2022 — PannonHitel Pénzügyi Zrt. v WizzAir Hungary Légiközlekedési Zrt. (Wizz Air Hungary Zrt.)

(Case C-51/22)

(2022/C 165/36)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Pesti Központi Kerületi Bíróság

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: PannonHitel Pénzügyi Zrt.

Defendant: WizzAir Hungary Légiközlekedési Zrt. (Wizz Air Hungary Zrt.)

Question referred

Must Article 5(1)(a), the first indent of Article 8(1)(a) and Article 8(2) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, (1) be interpreted as meaning that a passenger may exercise his or her right to reimbursement of the full cost of the ticket at the price at which it was bought directly against the air carrier, even where the passenger has booked the ticket with the help of a third party acting as an intermediary, to whom the passenger paid the ticket price, and it was the intermediary who purchased the ticket from the air carrier and who paid [the carrier] the ticket price, and there is no indication that the intermediary was acting as the authorised agent of the air carrier or that it was a tour operator?

(1) OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1.
1.

Does Article 1(3) of Directive 89/665 (1) preclude a competitor who is definitively excluded from a contractor selection procedure from being denied the possibility of a review of the refusal to annul the award, when it is intended to show that the successful tenderer, and all other shortlisted competitors, are guilty of grave professional misconduct, consisting of having entered into anticompetitive agreements which were determined by a court only after the competitor had been excluded, in order to have the opportunity to participate in a rerun of the procedure?
1.

Is Article 185(1) of Directive 2006/112/EC (1) to be interpreted as meaning that, where goods are written off, in the sense that assets or inventories are derecognised on the taxable person’s statement of financial position because they are not expected to be of any further economic benefit, for example because they are worn, faulty or unsuitable or cannot be used for their intended purpose, that is a change in the factors used to determine the amount to be deducted in relation to the VAT already paid when the goods were purchased, which occurred after the VAT return was made in accordance with the Zakon za danak varhu dobavenata stoinost (Law on value added tax, ‘the ZDDS’) and which therefore gives rise to the obligation to adjust the deduction if the goods written off were subsequently sold as goods listed in Annex 2 and hence as a taxable supply?
1.

In the situation described above, may it be concluded that the advertising is directed at consumers or traders in Member State Y, where Company B has its registered office, and does an EU trade mark court in Member State Y have jurisdiction to hear an action for infringement of an EU trade mark (1) under Article 125(5) of the EU Trade Mark Regulation where, in the advertising published electronically or on an advertiser’s website connected to that advertising via a link, the geographical area where the goods are to be supplied is not specified, at least not expressly, or no individual Member State is expressly excluded from that area? May the nature of the goods to which the advertising relates and the fact that the market for Company A’s products is allegedly global and thus covers the entire territory of the European Union, including Member State Y, be taken into account in that respect?
2.

The second question is: whether arts. 12 and/or 16 of directive 92/43/EEC (1) and/or those provisions as read in conjunction with art. 9(2) of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters done at Aarhus, Denmark, on 25 June 1998 and/or in conjunction with the principle that member states must take all the requisite specific measures for the effective implementation of the directive have the effect that a rule of domestic procedure whereby an applicant must not raise a ‘hypothetical question’ and ‘must be affected in reality or as a matter of fact’ before she can complain regarding the compatibility of the domestic law with a provision of EU law cannot be relied on to preclude a challenge made by an applicant who has invoked the public participation rights in respect of an administrative decision and who then wishes to pursue a challenge to the validity of a provision of domestic law by reference to EU law in anticipation of future damage to the environment as result of an alleged shortcoming in the domestic law, where there is a reasonable possibility of such future damage, in particular because the development has been authorised in an area which is a habitat for species subject to strict protection and/or because applying the precautionary approach there is a possibility that post-consent surveys may give rise to a need to apply for a derogation under art. 16 of the directive.
Action brought on 4 March 2022 — European Commission v Kingdom of Denmark

(Case C-167/22)

(2022/C 191/29)

Language of the case: Danish

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: L. Grønfeldt and P. Messina, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Kingdom of Denmark

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by limiting to 25 hours the maximum period during which it is possible to park at State-owned rest areas along the motorway network in Denmark, the Kingdom of Denmark has failed to fulfil its obligations under the provisions on the freedom to provide transport services, as laid down in Articles 1, 8 and 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1072/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council; (1)

— order the Kingdom of Denmark to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Commission submits that the 25-hour rule, although it does not amount to direct discrimination, nevertheless constitutes an obstacle to the freedom to provide services, since the rule does not affect Danish hauliers and non-Danish hauliers in the same way. Drivers working for non-Danish hauliers will find it more difficult to comply with their driving and rest time obligations arising from EU law, in particular from Regulation (EC) No 561/2006, (2) than will drivers working for Danish hauliers, which have operating centres in Denmark to which the drivers can return and park during their rest periods.

According to the Commission, the rule cannot be justified by the objectives, relied on by Denmark, of (i) providing greater capacity for drivers to take their breaks and short rest periods, (ii) eliminating illegal and dangerous parking on motorway lay-bys, (iii) ensuring orderly conditions at rest areas by countering the negative effects caused by long-term parking, and (iv) improving the drivers’ environmental and working conditions, since that rule is not suitable for attaining those objectives and, moreover, goes beyond what is necessary to attain them.

(1) Regulation (EC) No 1072/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 on common rules for access to the international road haulage market (OJ 2009 L 300, p. 72).

(2) Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport and amending Council Regulations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EC) No 2135/98 and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 (OJ 2006 L 102, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 1 March 2022 — Association Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers (ADDE) and Others v Ministre de l’Intérieur

(Case C-143/22)

(2022/C 207/26)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Association Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers (ADDE), Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (ANAFE), Association de recherche, de communication et d’action pour l’accès aux traitements (ARCAT), Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués (CIMADE), Fédération des associations de solidarité avec tou-te-s les immigré-e-s (FASTI), Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigré.e.s (GISTI), Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH), Le Paria, Syndicat des avocats de France (SAF), SOS — Hépatites Fédération

Defendant: Ministre de l’Intérieur

Question referred

In the event of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders, under the conditions laid down in Chapter II of Title III of Regulation (EU) 2016/399, (1) can foreign nationals arriving directly from the territory of a State party to the Schengen Convention signed on 19 June 1990 be refused entry, when entry checks are carried out at that border, on the basis of Article 14 of that regulation, without Directive 2008/115/EC (2) being applicable?

(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ 2016 L 77, p. 1).

(2) Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98).
2.

Must Article 75, in conjunction with Article 22, of Regulation No 650/2012 be interpreted as meaning that, in the case where a bilateral agreement between a Member State and a third country does not govern the choice of law applicable to a case involving succession but indicates the law applicable to that case involving succession, a national of that third country residing in a Member State bound by that bilateral agreement may make a choice of law?