ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.

Do Article 12(2)(a) and (d) of Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (1) and Article 23(2)(g) and (h) of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse, (2) which replaced that directive from 3 July 2016, read in the light of recital 65 of that regulation, not imply that, account being taken of the covert nature of the information exchanged and the fact that the potential subjects of investigation are members of the general public, the national legislature must be able to require electronic communications operators to retain connection data on a temporary but general basis in order to enable the administrative authority referred to in Article 11 of the Directive and Article 22 of the regulation, in the event of the emergence of grounds for suspecting certain persons of being involved in insider dealing or market manipulation, to require the operator to surrender existing records of traffic data in cases where there are reasons to suspect that the records so linked to the subject matter of the investigation may prove relevant to the production of evidence of the actual commission of the breach, to the extent, in particular, that they offer a means of tracing the contacts established by the persons concerned before the suspicions emerged?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 15 July 2020 — Facebook Ireland Limited v Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände — Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V.

(Case C-319/20)

(2020/C 359/04)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Facebook Ireland Limited

Respondent: Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände — Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V.

Question referred

Do the rules in Chapter VIII, in particular in Article 80(1) and (2) and Article 84(1), of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (1) preclude national rules which — alongside the powers of intervention of the supervisory authorities responsible for monitoring and enforcing the Regulation and the options for legal redress for data subjects — empower, on the one hand, competitors and, on the other, associations, entities and chambers entitled under national law, to bring proceedings for breaches of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, independently of the infringement of specific rights of individual data subjects and without being mandated to do so by a data subject, against the infringer before the civil courts on the basis of the prohibition of unfair commercial practices or breach of a consumer protection law or the prohibition of the use of invalid general terms and conditions?

(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ 2016 L 119, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky (Slovakia) lodged on 28 February 2020 — Slovenský plynárenský priemysel, a.s. v Finančné riaditel’stvo Slovenskej republiky

(Case C-113/20)

(2020/C 390/24)

Language of the case: Slovak

Referring court

Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Slovenský plynárenský priemysel, a.s.

Defendant: Finančné riaditel’stvo Slovenskej republiky

By order of 1 October 2020, the Court (Sixth Chamber) ruled as follows:

Council Directive 90/435/EEC (1) of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States does not apply in a situation in which in which the tax authorities of a Member State recover from the taxpayer unpaid corporation tax in respect of a tax period preceding the accession of that Member State to the European Union by means of a tax adjustment issued after that accession.

(1) OJ 1990 L 225, p. 6.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 18 September 2020 by European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 8 July 2020 in Case T-110/17, Jiangsu Seraphim Solar System v Commission

(Case C-439/20 P)

(2020/C 378/26)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: T. Maxian Rusche, G. Luengo, Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Jiangsu Seraphim Solar System Co. Ltd, Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 8 July 2020 in Case T-110/17 Jiangsu Seraphim Solar System Co. Ltd v Commission;

— reject the application at first instance as inadmissible;

— in the alternative: reject the application at first instance as unfounded; and in any event;

— order the applicant to pay the costs of the appeal and of the first instance.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellant submits four grounds of appeal.

First, the General Court committed an error in law related to the admissibility and effectiveness of the application at first instance.

Second, the General Court committed errors in law concerning the qualification of the collection of duties as ‘retroactive’.

Third, the General Court erred in the interpretation of Article 8(1), (9) and (10), and Article 10(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (1) and Article 13(1), (9) and (10), and Article 16(5) of Regulation (EC) No 597/2009 (2) when concluding that the collection of duties on imports that have breached the undertaking was not possible.

Fourth, the General Court erred in the interpretation of Article 14(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 and 24(1) of Regulation (EC) No 597/2009 when concluding that the Council lacked the legal basis to provide that wherever the Commission invalidates an undertaking invoice, the duty was to be collected.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (OJ 2009, L 343, p. 51).

(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 597/2009 of 11 June 2009 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Community (OJ 2009, L 188, p. 93).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 23 September 2020 — PJ v Agenzia delle dogane e dei monopoli — Ufficio dei monopoli per la Toscana and Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze

(Case C-452/20)

(2020/C 423/43)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: PJ

Respondents: Agenzia delle dogane e dei monopoli — Ufficio dei monopoli per la Toscana and Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze

Question referred

Does the second paragraph of Article 25 of regio decreto 24 dicembre 1934, n. 2316 (Royal Decree No 2316 of 24 December 1934), as replaced by Article 24(3) of decreto legislativo n. 6 del 2016 (Legislative Decree No 6 of 2016) (transposing Directive 2014/40/EU (1) on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related products and repealing Directive 2001/37/EC) — inasmuch as it provides that ‘anyone who sells or supplies tobacco products or electronic cigarettes or refill containers containing nicotine or novel tobacco products to minors under the age of 18 shall be liable to a financial administrative penalty of EUR 500 to EUR 3 000 and a 15-day trading licence suspension’ — infringe the EU principle of proportionality and the precautionary principle, as set out in Article 5 TEU, in Article 23(3) of Directive 2014/40, and in recitals 21 and 60 of that directive, by giving precedence to the precautionary principle without mitigating it with the principle of proportionality, and thus disproportionately sacrificing the interests of economic operators to the protection of the right to health, thereby failing to ensure that a proper balance is struck between the different fundamental rights and, what is more, doing so by means of a penalty that, contrary to recital 8 of the directive, does not effectively pursue the objective of discouraging smoking prevalence among young people?

(1) OJ 2014 L 127, p. 1.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 10 July 2020 by Abarca — Companhia de Seguros SA against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 29 April 2020 in Case T-106/19, Abarca v EUIPO — Abanca Corporación Bancaria (ABARCA SEGUROS)

(Case C-313/20 P)

(2020/C 414/29)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Abarca — Companhia de Seguros SA (represented by: J. M. Pimenta, advogado, Á. Pinho, advogada)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Abanca Corporación Bancaria, SA

By order of 13 October 2020, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) decided that the appeal is not allowed to proceed and ordered Abarca — Companhia de Seguros SA to bear its own costs.
2.

Mandatory information required under Article 10(2) of Directive 2008/48/EC (a) Is Article 10(2)(a) of Directive 2008/48/EC to be interpreted as meaning that, as regards the type of credit, if the credit agreement is a linked credit agreement, information must be provided to that effect? If not: (b) Is Article 10(2)(l) of Directive 2008/48/EC to be interpreted as meaning that the interest rate applicable in the case of late payments as applicable at the time of the conclusion of the credit agreement must be specified as an absolute number or, at the very least, that the current reference interest rate (in this case, the base rate in accordance with Paragraph 247 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code, ‘the BGB’)), from which the interest rate applicable in the case of late payments is obtained by adding a premium (in this case, a premium of five percentage points in accordance with Paragraph 288(1), second sentence, of the BGB), must be specified as an absolute number? If not: (c) Forfeiture of the right of withdrawal in accordance with Article 14(1), first sentence, of Directive 2008/48/EC: If any of the above Questions 2(a) to (c) is answered in the affirmative: (d) Is Article 14(1), second sentence, point (b), of Directive 2008/48/EC to be interpreted as meaning that the period of withdrawal does not begin until the information required under Article 10(2) of Directive 2008/48/EC has been provided fully and correctly, regardless of whether a missing or incorrect item of information is capable of affecting the consumer’s ability to assess the scope of his obligation? If the above Question 1(a) and/or one of Questions 2(a) to (c) is answered in the affirmative:
2.

In the light of the right to a fair trial established in Article 47 of the Charter and the general principles of legal certainty, proportionality and protection of legitimate expectations enshrined as general principles of EU law, can Article 2(3) and Article 31 of Directive 78/660/EEC (1) (the Fourth Directive) be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of an economic activity which relates to several financial years, if the tax authority replaces the accounting principles chosen by the taxpayer with other accounting principles and, as a result, makes a change to an accounting entry which also affects the returns for adjacent years, the tax authority must extend its inspection to cover the other financial years to which the economic activity relates and which are therefore also affected by the findings in respect of the period under inspection? When carrying out an ex-post check on the taxpayer’s return for a particular year, must the tax authority take into account the entries that were amended in a supplementary declaration for the year prior to the year under examination, which resulted in an overpayment by the taxpayer due to the fact that he paid tax before the date on which it became due; or is a declaration by the tax authority that the taxpayer has a tax debt, in spite of the existence of an overpayment, compatible with the aforesaid principles and with the prohibition of abuse of rights in Article 54 of the Charter?
1.

Must Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1) be interpreted as meaning that that regulation also applies to an air route booked under a single booking but consisting of two flights, both of which are operated by (the same) Community air carrier, if both the place of departure of the first flight and place of arrival of the second flight are in a third country and only the place of arrival of the first flight and the place of departure of the second flight are in the territory of a Member State? If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative:
II.

Does Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95 preclude national legislation according to which the beneficiary of a subsidy may not rely on the expiry of the four- or eight-year time limit in the course of judicial proceedings for enforcement which have been brought against him, since that issue can be assessed only in the context of an administrative-law action brought against the measure ordering repayment of the amounts received unduly by reason of the establishment of an irregularity? In the event that the aforementioned questions are answered in the negative:
4.

Is Article 99а(r) of Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 to be interpreted as meaning that it is only permissible to impose a penalty on a management company (for each of the investment funds managed by it) in the event of repeated non-compliance with obligations concerning information to be provided to investors imposed in accordance with the national provisions transposing Articles 68 to 82 of Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009?
2.

Can it be considered, without depriving the rights conferred by Directive 2003/88/EC of practical effect, that, in the context of Article 18 of Directive 2003/88/EC, with respect to a reference period of 12 months, it is permissible for compensatory rest not to be granted expressly and that compensatory rest is, where applicable, granted automatically to a worker in the education sector, such as a teacher at a boarding school, who works, inter alia, at night, on the understanding that periods of school holiday, in particular those in the summer, compensate even for the most extensive extra work carried out by that worker?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 23 October 2020 — Schneider Electric SA and Others v Premier ministre, Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de la Relance

(Case C-556/20)

(2021/C 9/16)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Schneider Electric SA, Axa SA, BNP Paribas, ENGIE, Orange SA, L’Air liquide, société anonyme pour l’étude et l’exploitation des procédés Georges Claude

Defendants: Premier ministre, Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de la Relance

Question referred

Does Article 4 of Directive 90/435/EC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States (1), in view, in particular, of Article 7(2) thereof, preclude a provision such as Article 223 sexies of the General Tax Code, which provides, in order to ensure the correct implementation of a scheme designed to eliminate economic double taxation of dividends, for a levy when a parent company redistributes profits which have been distributed to it by subsidiaries established in another Member State?

(1) OJ 1990 L 225, p. 6.
If the first question is answered in the affirmative:

Is Article 8(1)(b) CUI to be interpreted in such a way that the liability of the manager for loss of or damage to property as codified therein also includes the costs incurred by the carrier as a result of having to lease locomotives to replace his existing locomotives due to damage caused to them?
5.

Must Article 14(5) of Directive 2015/849 be interpreted as meaning that the obliged entity is required to apply due diligence measures to existing commercial customers even where there is no indication of any significant changes in the customer’s circumstances and the time limit laid down by the competent authority of the Member State for the adoption of new monitoring measures has not expired, and that that obligation is applicable only in relation to customers that have been categorised as representing a high risk?
1.

Does the issue of vouchers for third party retailers to employees by a taxable person as part of a recognition programme for high performing employees constitute a supply ‘for his private use or for that of his staff or, more generally, for purposes other than those of his business’ within the meaning of Article 26(1)(b) of the Principal VAT Directive (1)?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Germany) lodged on 13 October 2020 — DS v Koch Personaldienstleistungen GmbH

(Case C-514/20)

(2021/C 19/23)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesarbeitsgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant on a point of law: DS

Respondent in the appeal on a point of law: Koch Personaldienstleistungen GmbH

Question referred

Do Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 7 of Directive 2003/88/EC (1) preclude a provision in a collective labour agreement which, for the purpose of calculating whether an employee is entitled to overtime pay and for how many hours, takes account only of the hours actually worked and not also of the hours during which the employee takes his paid minimum annual leave?

(1) Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (OJ 2003 L 299, p. 9).
3.

If the answer to Question 2 is in the affirmative: May a Member State exercise the power conferred on it by Article 122 of Directive 2006/112/EC and Article 98(3) of Directive 2006/112/EC to establish the coverage of the reduced rate for supplies of wood for use as firewood using the Combined Nomenclature in keeping with the principle of tax neutrality, in such a way that supplies of various forms of wood for use as firewood, which differ in terms of their objective characteristics and properties but which, from the point of view of the average consumer, address the same need (in this case, heating), on the basis of the criterion of comparability in terms of use, and are thus in competition with each other, are subject to different rates of taxation?
2.

After the right to make an application for provisional/protective measures has been exercised and the court having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter has already ruled on that application, is the court seised of an application for interim relief on the same basis and under Article 35 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/12 of the European Parliament and of the Council to be regarded as not having jurisdiction from the point at which evidence is produced that the court having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter has given a ruling on that application?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 10 July 2020 by Peek & Cloppenburg KG, Düsseldorf against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 13 May 2020 in Case T-444/18, Peek & Cloppenburg KG, Düsseldorf v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

(Case C-311/20 P)

(2021/C 35/29)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Peek & Cloppenburg KG, Düsseldorf (represented by: P. Lange, A. Auler, M. Wenz and C. Möller, lawyers)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Peek & Cloppenburg KG, Hamburg

By order of 29 October 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 9 July 2020 by Peek & Cloppenburg KG, Düsseldorf against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 13 May 2020 in Case T-443/18, Peek & Cloppenburg KG, Düsseldorf v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

(Case C-309/20 P)

(2021/C 35/27)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Peek & Cloppenburg KG, Düsseldorf (represented by: P. Lange, A. Auler, M. Wenz and C. Möller, lawyers)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Peek & Cloppenburg KG, Hamburg

By order of 29 October 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
2.

Would it at the very least: a) where staff of the subsidiary company come out in sympathy with a strike called against the parent company (Lufthansa AG) in order to support parent company cabin crew demands being pursued by the trade union, and b) in particular where the strike in the subsidiary company becomes an ‘independent’ strike, after agreement has been reached with the parent company, because the trade union reiterates the call for and even extends the strike for no apparent reason and the cabin crew of the subsidiary company responds to that call?
Appeal brought on 4 December 2020 by Hermann Albers eK against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 5 October 2020 in Case T-597/18, Hermann Albers v European Commission

(Case C-656/20 P)

(2021/C 44/37)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Hermann Albers eK (represented by: S. Roling, Rechtsanwalt)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Federal Republic of Germany, Land Niedersachsen

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside in part the judgment of the General Court of 5 October 2020, Hermann Albers v Commission (T-597/18, EU:T:2020:467), in the form of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the operative part;

— grant in their entirety the forms of order sought at first instance, by which it was sought that the decision of the European Commission of 12 July 2018, C(2018) 4385 final, (1) be annulled and that the Commission be ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant claims that the General Court misconstrued the meaning of Articles 107 TFEU and 108 TFEU in relation to Paragraph 7a of the Niedersächsisches Nahverkehrsgesetz (Law on local transport of the Land of Lower Saxony; the ‘NNVG’). Paragraph 7a of the NNVG constitutes, contrary to the findings of the General Court, new State aid that is subject to the obligation to notify.

As regards Article 107 TFEU, what is at issue is not merely the domestic transfer of financial resources, since the transport authorities, in their dual role as owners of public transport undertakings, benefit directly from the allocation of resources and use them selectively at the expense of the private sector via direct awards. The transport authorities exercised over the public transport undertakings control similar to that which they exercise over their own departments. The allocation of resources to the transport authorities is inextricably linked with a favouring effect, since at that point in time the use of the resources for the economic activities of municipal undertakings is often already established. This distorts competition and affects trade between Member States.

Moreover, on account of the fact that Paragraph 7a of the NNVG amounts to aid, but also independently therefrom, there has been an infringement of Article 108(3) TFEU, since the Federal Republic of Germany failed to notify Paragraph 7a of the NNVG to the European Commission.

(1) European Commission decision not to raise objections to the measure adopted by the Land Niedersachsen under Paragraph 7a of the Niedersächsisches Nahverkehrsgesetz (Law on local transport of the Land of Lower Saxony) (Case SA. 46697 (2017/NN)) (OJ 2018 C 292, p. 1).