ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
19

Paragraph 95 of the LuftVZO is worded as follows: ‘(1) An application for authorisation shall contain the following information: 1. the name and address of the owner of the aircraft; 2. the aircraft type and its registration status and registration number; 3. the predicted date and time of arrival and the likely time of its return flight or its flight to another destination; 4. the departure and arrival airports and, where appropriate, the transit airports within federal territory; 5. the number of passengers and the nature and volume of the cargo, the purpose of the flight, in particular in the case of carriage of a specific group and the place where that group was initially assembled; 6. in the case of a charter flight, the name, address and branch of the operator. The authority issuing the authorisation may require other information. The Bundesminiterium für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung, or any other authority designated by it, shall provide details of the procedure for the application for authorisation in the form of general administrative provisions. (2) With the exception of the case referred to in subparagrah (3), application for an authorisation in respect of flights outside the regular schedules requiring landing facilities for commercial purposes (charter flights) must be made to the issuing authority not later than two whole working days before take-off of the intended flight and, in the case of a series of more than four flights, not later than four weeks before the take-off of the intended flights. Saturday is not deemed to be a working day for the purposes of calculation of the time-limit. ...’
Article 11(2) of the Statutes of the Galileo Joint Undertaking, set out in the annex to Regulation No 876/2002 setting up the Galileo Joint Undertaking, must be interpreted as meaning that the conditions of employment of other servants of the European Communities and, in particular, the salary rates defined therein, do not apply to members of staff of Galileo who have fixed-term contracts.

(see para. 46, operative part)
The failure by the competent customs authorities to inform the exporter of the existence of a likelihood of fraud committed by the exporter’s contractor does not constitute a case of force majeure for the purposes of Regulation No 3665/87 laying down common detailed rules for the application of the system of export refunds on agricultural products, as amended by Regulation No 2945/94, and, in particular, the first indent of the third subparagraph of Article 11(1) thereof. While such a failure is liable to constitute an exceptional case within the meaning of the second indent of the third subparagraph of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 3665/87, it cannot, however, release that exporter from its obligation to reimburse export refunds unduly received, that exporter being exempted only from having to pay sanctions due under that article.

In that context, the provisions of the second indent of the third subparagraph of Article 11(1) of that regulation release exporters only from the payment of the sanctions, but not from the reimbursement of the refunds paid in advance. It is not possible to add a new exception, based in particular on the absence of fault on the part of the exporter, to the exhaustive list contained in the third subparagraph of Article 11(1) of the regulation at issue. Even if the fault or error committed by the exporter’s contracting partner is apt to constitute a circumstance beyond his control, they are none the less an ordinary commercial risk, including in the event of a criminal conviction of that contracting partner for falsification of documents in respect of export refunds, and cannot be considered to be unforeseeable in the context of commercial transactions. The exporter is fully at liberty to select his trading partners and it is up to him to take the appropriate precautions, either by including the necessary clauses in the contracts which he concludes with them or by effecting appropriate insurance.

(see paras 42, 43, 49, operative part)
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

Freedom of movement for persons — Workers — Equal treatment — Social advantages — National rules making the grant of financial aid for higher education subject to a condition of residence on national territory — Refusal to grant aid to students, who are Union citizens not residing in national territory, one of whose parents is a frontier worker — Indirect discrimination — Justification — Increase in the proportion of residents with a higher education degree — Disproportionate nature of those rules

(Council Regulation No 1612/68, as amended by Directive 2004/38, Art. 7(2))

Summary

Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, as amended by Directive 2004/38, must be interpreted as precluding, in principle, legislation of a Member State which makes the grant of financial aid for higher education studies conditional upon residence by the student in that Member State and gives rise to a difference in treatment, amounting to indirect discrimination, between persons who reside in the Member State concerned and those who, not being residents of that Member State, are the children of frontier workers carrying out an activity in that Member State.

While the objective of increasing the proportion of residents with a higher education degree in order to promote the development of the economy of that same Member State is a legitimate objective which can justify such a difference in treatment and while a condition of residence, such as that provided for by the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, is appropriate for ensuring the attainment of that objective, such a condition nevertheless goes beyond what is necessary in order to attain the objective pursued, to the extent that it precludes the taking into account of other elements potentially representative of the actual degree of attachment of the applicant for the financial aid with the society or with the labour market of the Member State concerned, such as the fact that one of the parents, who continues to support the student, is a frontier worker who has stable employment in that Member State and has already worked there for a significant period of time.

(see para. 83, operative part)
The concept of ‘non-commercial carriage of goods’ laid down in Article 3(h) of Regulation No 561/2006 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport and amending Regulations No 3821/85 and No 2135/98 must be interpreted as covering the carriage of goods by a private individual for his own purposes purely as part of his hobby where that hobby is in part financed by financial contributions from external persons or undertakings and where no payment is made for that carriage per se.

Firstly, the non-commercial carriage of goods designates, in particular, the carriage of goods by a private individual as part of a recreational activity outside his professional activity. Secondly, the regulation aims to improve social conditions for employees who are covered by it, enabling compliance with driving times and drivers’ rest periods to be monitored. In consequence, the provisions of that regulation apply essentially to professional drivers and not to individuals driving for private purposes who are not professional heavy goods vehicle drivers and do not supply transport services but who transport for their own purposes, solely as part of a hobby, their own rally car which they drive as amateur rally drivers.

(see paras 24, 25, 28, 29, 31, 39, operative part)
Directive 1999/44 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which does not allow the national court hearing the dispute to grant of its own motion an appropriate reduction in the price of goods which are the subject of a contract of sale in the case where a consumer who is entitled to such a reduction brings proceedings which are limited to seeking only rescission of that contract and such rescission cannot be granted because the lack of conformity in those goods is minor, even though that consumer is not entitled to refine his initial application or to bring a fresh action to that end.

Such a system obliges the consumer to anticipate the outcome of the competent court’s analysis of the legal characterisation regarding the lack of conformity in the goods, which is final, making the protection provided for the consumer under Article 3(5) of Directive 1999/44 completely uncertain in nature, and thereby rendering that protection inadequate. This is all the more true where such an analysis proves to be particularly complex, with the result that that characterisation depends mainly on the manner in which the court dealing with the case carries out its inquiries. In those circumstances, that legislation does not appear to comply with the principle of effectiveness, in so far as, in proceedings brought by consumers in cases where the goods delivered are not in conformity with the contract of sale, it makes the enforcement of the protection which Directive 1999/44 seeks to provide to those consumers excessively difficult, if not impossible. It is for the national court to identify which national rules are applicable to the dispute before it and to do whatever lies within its jurisdiction with a view to ensuring that Article 3(5) of Directive 1999/44 is fully effective and to achieving an outcome which is consistent with the objective pursued by that directive.

(see paras 39, 40-43, operative part)
Indeed, it is not possible to apply Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation No 1610/96 to an emergency marketing authorisation, which is restricted to products which do not comply with the requirements of Article 4 of Directive 91/414 and in respect of which that directive does not require a prior scientific evaluation of the risks.

Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation No 1610/96 concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for plant protection products must be interpreted as precluding the issue of a supplementary protection certificate for a plant protection product in respect of which an emergency marketing authorisation has been issued under Article 8(4) of Directive 91/414 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market, as amended by Directive 2005/58.

Articles 3(1)(b) and 7(1) of Regulation No 1610/96 concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for plant protection products must be interpreted as precluding an application for a supplementary protection certificate being lodged before the date on which the plant protection product has obtained the marketing authorisation referred to in Article 3(1)(b) of that regulation.

The grant of that certificate requires that the four cumulative conditions set out in Article 3(1) of Regulation No 1610/96 be met. That provision provides, essentially, that a supplementary protection certificate may be granted only if, at the date of the application, the plant protection product is protected by a basic patent in force and has not already been the subject of a certificate.

Since Article 3(1) of Regulation No 1610/96 expressly requires each of those conditions to be met on the date at which the application for a supplementary protection certificate is lodged, an application for such a certificate can validly be made only after a valid marketing authorisation has come into being.

Moreover, that interpretation is supported by the terms of Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1610/96, from which it is clear that the period for making an application for a supplementary protection certificate starts to run on the date on which the authorisation referred to in Article 3(1)(b) of that regulation to place the product on the market as a plant protection product was granted.

(see paras 42-45, operative part 2)
Article 13(1) of Directive 95/46 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as meaning that Member States have no obligation, but have the option, to transpose into their national law one or more of the exceptions which it lays down to the obligation to inform data subjects of the processing of their personal data.

In that regard, the provisions of Directive 95/46 are necessarily relatively general given that the directive has to be applied to a large number of very different situations, and includes rules with a degree of flexibility and, in many instances, leaves to the Member States the task of deciding the details or choosing between options.

Member States are not obliged to lay down in their national law exceptions for the purposes listed in Article 13(1)(a) to (g) but, on the contrary, the legislature intended to give them the freedom to decide whether, and if so for what purposes, they wish to take legislative measures aimed at limiting, inter alia, the extent of the obligations to inform the data subject.

Furthermore, Member States may lay down such measures only when they are necessary. The requirement that the measures be necessary is thus a precondition for the application of the option granted to Member States by that article, and does not mean that they are required to adopt the exceptions at issue in all cases where that condition is satisfied.

(see paras 31, 32, 53, operative part)
Article 345 TFEU must be interpreted as covering rules within a Member State which prohibit privatisation, which have the effect that shares held in an electricity or gas distribution system operator active in that Member State must be held, directly or indirectly, by the public authorities identified by the national legislation. However, that interpretation does not mean that Article 63 TFEU does not apply to provisions of national law which prohibit the privatisation of electricity or gas distribution system operators, or, further, which prohibit (i) ownership or control links between companies which are members of the same group as an electricity or gas distribution system operator active in that Member State and companies which are members of the same group as an undertaking which generates/produces, supplies, or trades in electricity or gas in that Member State and (ii) engagement by such an operator and by the group of which it is a member in transactions or activities which may adversely affect the operation of the system concerned.

First, Article 345 TFEU is an expression of the principle of the neutrality of the Treaties in relation to the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership. In that regard, the Treaties do not preclude, as a general rule, either the nationalisation of undertakings or their privatisation. It follows that a prohibition of privatisation which precludes ownership by any private individual of shares in an electricity or gas distribution system operator active in a Member State falls within the scope of Article 345 TFEU. However, Article 345 TFEU does not mean that rules governing the system of property ownership current in the Member States are not subject to the fundamental rules of the FEU Treaty, which rules include, inter alia, the prohibition of discrimination, freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital.

Secondly, a prohibition of privatisation which means that no private investor can acquire shares or interests in the capital of an electricity or gas distribution system operator active in the Member State concerned and which includes, additionally, group prohibitions and prohibitions of activities which may adversely affect system operation which hinder or impose qualitative restrictions on cross-border investment constitute restrictions on the free movement of capital within the meaning of Article 63 TFEU.

(see paras 29, 30, 33, 34, 36-38, 43-48, operative part 1)
It follows that other organisations, namely, private organisations, must fulfil the condition of pursuing objects similar to those of bodies governed by public law. In that respect, in so far as point (i) of Article 132(1) of Directive 2006/112 does not specify the conditions or procedures for defining those similar objects, it is, in principle, for the national law of each Member State to lay down the rules in accordance with which that definition may be granted to such organisations.

Point (i) of Article 132(1)(i), Article 133(1) and Article 134 of Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as not precluding educational services provided for commercial purposes by bodies not governed by public law from being exempt from that tax. However, point (i) of Article 132(1) of that directive precludes a general exemption of all supplies of educational services, without consideration of the objects pursued by non-public organisations providing those services.

A taxable person may not claim, in accordance with Article 168 of Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax or the national provision transposing it, a right to deduct input value added tax where, as a result of an exemption provided for by national law in infringement of point (i) of Article 132(1) of that directive, the input supply of its educational services are not subject to that tax.

That taxable person may, however, rely on the incompatibility of that exemption with point (i) of Article 132(1) of Directive 2006/112 so that that exemption is not applied to it where, even taking account of the discretion granted to Member States, that taxable person could not objectively be regarded as an organisation having objects similar to those of an educational body governed by public law, within the meaning of that provision, which is to be determined by the national court.

In the latter case, the educational services supplied by that taxable person will be subject to value added tax and that person could then benefit from the right to deduct input value added tax.

(see para. 56, operative part 2)
Even if a private party comes within the group of persons covered by a directive, the provisions of that directive may not be relied on as such against that person before the national courts. Consequently, the mere fact that a private undertaking which is the exclusive holder of a public service concession is among the entities expressly referred to as constituting the group of persons covered by Directive 93/38 does not mean that the provisions of that directive may be relied on against that undertaking.

Articles 4(1), 14(1)(c)(i) and 15 of Directive 93/38 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, must be interpreted as meaning that they cannot be relied on against a private undertaking solely on the ground that, in its capacity as the exclusive holder of a public-interest service concession, that undertaking comes within the group of persons covered by that directive.

A private undertaking, which has been given responsibility, pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing, under the control of the State, a public-interest service and which has, for that purpose, special powers going beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals, is obliged to comply with the provisions of Directive 93/38 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, and the authorities of a Member State may therefore rely on those provisions against it.

The obligation on a Member State to take all the measures necessary to achieve the result prescribed by a directive is a binding obligation imposed by the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU and by the directive itself. That duty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, is binding on all the authorities of the Member States as well as on bodies which, under the control of those authorities, have been given responsibility for a public-interest service and which have, for that purpose, special powers. It follows that the authorities of the Member States must be in a position to ensure that such bodies comply with the provisions of Directive 93/38.

(see paras 34, 38, 39, operative part)
Case C‑508/12

Walter Vapenik

v

Josef Thurner

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Salzburg)

‛Area of freedom, security and justice — Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 — European enforcement order for uncontested claims — Requirements for certification as an enforcement order — Situation in which the judgment was given in the Member State of the creditor in a dispute between two persons not engaged in commercial or professional activities’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber), 5 December 2013

Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Creation of an enforcement order for uncontested claims — Regulation No 805/2004 — Enforcement orders which may be certified — Judgment given on the basis of a contract concluded between two persons not engaged in commercial or professional activities — Not included

(European Parliament and Council Regulation No 805/2004, Art. 6(1)(d); (Council Regulation No 44/2001, Arts 15(1) and 16(1) and (2))

Article 6(1)(d) of Regulation No 805/2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims must be interpreted as meaning that it does not apply to contracts concluded between two persons who are not engaged in commercial or professional activities.

It is clear from the wording of that provision that a consumer is a person who has concluded a contract for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession. That provision does not state whether or not the status of professional of the consumer’s contracting party plays a role in defining the other party as a ‘consumer’. In that connection, and in order to ensure compliance with the objectives pursued by the European legislature in the sphere of consumer contracts, and the consistency of EU law, account must be taken, in particular, of the definition of ‘consumer’ in other rules of EU law and, more specifically, in Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. Taking account of the objective of protecting consumers laid down by those provisions, which aim to compensate for the imbalance between parties in contracts concluded between a consumer and a professional, their application cannot be extended to persons with respect to whom that protection is not justified. If, in the context of Regulation No 805/2004, a definition were to be adopted, which is wider than that in Regulation No 44/2001, that might lead to inconsistencies in the application of those two regulations. Consequently, the definition of ‘consumers’ within the meaning of Article 6(1)(d) of Regulation No 805/2004 refers to a person who concludes a contract for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession with a person who is acting in the exercise of his trade or profession.

(see paras 24, 25, 31, 37-39, operative part)