ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law which does not permit a court seised of an individual action brought by a consumer seeking a declaration that a term of a contract binding him to a seller or supplier is unfair to adopt interim relief of its own motion, for as long as it considers appropriate, pending a final judgment in an ongoing collective action, the outcome of which may be applied to the individual action, when such relief is necessary in order to ensure the full effectiveness of the judgment to be given on the existence of the rights claimed by the consumer under Directive 93/13.

If it is not possible for the court seised to grant interim relief of its own motion, in cases in which a consumer has not expressly applied for such relief, in the context of an individual action, in order to have the application of a ‘floor’ clause suspended pending a final judgment in an ongoing parallel collective action, that court cannot prevent that consumer from paying, during potentially lengthy court proceedings, higher monthly payments than those that would in fact be payable if the term concerned had to be disregarded. That is a fortiori the case when there is a genuine and immediate risk that that consumer’s ability to pay may be compromised in the meantime and that the financial institutions initiate mortgage enforcement proceedings for the purposes of obtaining, through the seizure of the dwelling of the consumer and his family, the payment of sums that may not be due.

(see paras 35, 37, operative part)
3.

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted — Ground of appeal alleging distortion of the clear sense of the evidence — Necessity of indicating precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted and showing the errors of appraisal which led to that distortion (Art. 256(1), second para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 168(1)(d)) (see paras 26, 32, 40, 41)
ORDER OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)

24 October 2017 ( *1 )

(Rectification of judgment)

In Case C-413/14 P-REC,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 26 August 2014,

Intel Corporation Inc., established in Wilmington (United States), represented by D.M. Beard QC and by A. Parr and R. Mackenzie, Solicitors,

appellant,

the other parties to the proceedings being:

European Commission, represented by T. Christoforou, V. Di Bucci, M. Kellerbauer and N. Khan, acting as Agents,

defendant at first instance,

Association for Competitive Technology Inc., established in Washington (United States), represented by J.-F. Bellis, avocat,

Union fédérale des consommateurs — Que choisir (UFC — Que choisir),

interveners at first instance,

THE COURT (Grand Chamber),

composed of K. Lenaerts, President, A. Tizzano, Vice-President, R. Silva de Lapuerta, M. Ilešič, J.L. da Cruz Vilaça (Rapporteur), A. Rosas, J. Malenovský and E. Levits, Presidents of Chambers, E. Juhász, M. Berger, F. Biltgen, K. Jürimäe, C. Lycourgos, M. Vilaras and E. Regan, Judges,

Advocate General: N. Wahl,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

after hearing the Advocate General,

makes the following

Order

1 On 6 September 2017, the Court (Grand Chamber) delivered the judgment in Intel v Commission (C‑413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632).

2 That judgment contains, in the version in the language of the case, a clerical error which it is appropriate for the Court to rectify of its own motion in accordance with Article 154(1) of its Rules of Procedure, which applies to the procedure on appeal pursuant to Article 190(1) of those rules.

On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby orders:

1. Paragraph 140 of the judgment of 6 September 2017, Intel v Commission (C‑413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632), in the version in the language of the case, shall be rectified as follows: ‘The analysis of the capacity to foreclose is also relevant in assessing whether a system of rebates which, in principle, falls within the scope of the prohibition laid down in Article 102 TFEU, may be objectively justified. In addition, the exclusionary effect arising from such a system, which is disadvantageous for competition, may be counterbalanced, or outweighed, by advantages in terms of efficiency which also benefit the consumer (judgment of 15 March 2007, British Airways v Commission, C‑95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, paragraph 86). That balancing of the favourable and unfavourable effects of the practice in question on competition can be carried out in the Commission’s decision only after an analysis of the intrinsic capacity of that practice to foreclose competitors which are at least as efficient as the dominant undertaking.’

2. The original of this order shall be annexed to the original of the rectified judgment. A note of this order shall be made in the margin of the original of the rectified judgment.

Luxembourg, 24 October 2017. A. Calot Escobar Registrar K. Lenaerts President

( *1 ) Language of the case: English.
Order of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 23 October 2015 —

Cruz & Companhia

(Case C‑152/15) ( 1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Agriculture — Common organisation of the markets — Regulation (EEC) No 3665/87 — Articles 4(1) and 13 — Regulation (EEC) No 2220/85 — Article 19(1)(a) — Conditions for the release of the guarantee provided to ensure the repayment of the advance — Conditions for the grant of the refund — Sound and fair marketable quality of the products exported — Taking into account, for the grant of the refund, the facts established by the competent authority following an inspection which took place after the actual export and customs clearance of the products — Interpretation of the judgment in Cruz & Companhia (C‑128/13, EU:C:2014:2432)’

1. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Questions the answer to which may be clearly deduced from the Court’s existing case-law — Application of Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure (Art. 267 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 99) (see paras 14, 15)

2. Agriculture — Common organisation of the markets — Export refunds — Advance payment — Release of the guarantee furnished to ensure the repayment of the advance — Conditions (Commission Regulations No 2220/85, as amended by Regulation No 3403/93, Art. 19(1)(a), and No 3665/87, as amended by Regulation No 1829/94, Art. 13) (see paras 16-19, operative part)

Operative part

Article 19(1)(a) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2220/85 of 22 July 1985 laying down common detailed rules for the application of the system of securities for agricultural products, as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 3403/93 of 10 December 1993, must be interpreted as meaning that the guarantee furnished by an exporter to ensure the repayment of the advance received by way of export refund may be implemented where, following an inspection carried out after the actual export and customs clearance of the products in question, it is established that one of the other conditions for the grant of that refund, in particular the condition of sound and fair marketable quality of the products exported, provided for in Article 13 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3665/87 of27 November 1987 laying down common detailed rules for the application of the system of export refunds on agricultural products, as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1829/94 of 26 July 1994, is not satisfied.

( 1 ) OJ C 205, 22.6.2015.
Order of the Court (Second Chamber) of 20 January 2016 —

Skype v OHIM

(Case C‑384/15 P) ( 1 )

‛Appeal — Community trade mark — No need to adjudicate’

Community trade mark — Appeals procedure — No need to adjudicate — Appeal brought by the applicant for a Community trade mark against a judgment of the General Court upholding the decision of a Board of Appeal which refused the registration — Withdrawal of the opposition brought against the application for registration — End of the dispute (Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 149 and 190(1); Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 65) (see paras 11, 12)

Operative part

1. There is no need to rule on the appeal.

2. Skype Ultd is ordered to pay the costs of the present proceedings.

( 1 ) OJ C 354, 26.10.2015.
2.

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 43, 56)
2.

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see para. 33)
Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 7 April 2016 — Conti

(Case C‑504/15) ( 1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Identical questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Articles 49 TFEU and 56 TFEU — Freedom of establishment — Freedom to provide services — Betting and gaming — National legislation — Reorganisation of the licensing system through the alignment of licence expiry dates — New call for tenders — Licences for a shorter term than that of the former licences — Transfer, free of charge, of the rights to use tangible and intangible assets owned constituting the network for the management and collection of bets — Restriction — Overriding reasons in the public interest — Proportionality’

Freedom to provide services — Freedom of establishment — Restrictions — Betting and gaming — National legislation which requires a licensee to transfer, free of charge, on the cessation of business as a result of the expiry of the final term of the licence, the rights to use tangible and intangible assets which he owns and which constitute his network for the management and collection of bets — Unlawful — Justification — Overriding reasons in the public interest — Proportionality — Verification by the national court (Arts 49 TFEU and 56 TFEU) (see paras 11, operative part)

Operative part

Articles 49 TFEU and 56 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding a restrictive national provision, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which requires a licensee of a betting and gambling service to transfer, free of charge, on the cessation of business as a result of the expiry of the final term of the licence, the rights to use tangible and intangible assets which he owns and which constitute his network for the management and collection of bets, in so far as that restriction goes beyond what is necessary to attain the objective actually pursued by that provision, which is for the referring court to verify.

( 1 ) OJ C 406, 7.12.2015.
2.

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 41, 42, 49, 50)
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 28 June 2016 — Italsempione — Spedizioni Internazionali

(Case C‑450/15) ( 1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 — Article 23(2)(a) — Interpretation in the light of the principle of proportionality — Determination of the amount of the fine — Criteria — Guidelines for the calculation of fines — National practice — Adjustment of the basic amount of the fine — Account to be taken of aggravating or extenuating circumstances — Application of the maximum limit of 10% of total turnover — Absence of jurisdiction of the Court — Manifest lack of jurisdiction’

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Provisions of EU law rendered directly and unconditionally applicable by national law to situations outside their scope — Included — Condition — Need for the national court to indicate that such a reference exists — No such indication — Clear lack of jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 267, first para., (b), TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 53(2); Council Regulation No 1/2003, Arts 5 and 23(2)) (see paras 15-24)

Operative part

The Court manifestly lacks jurisdiction to reply to the request for a preliminary ruling submitted by the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State, Italy) by decision of 16 June 2015.

( 1 ) OJ C 381, 16.11.2015.
2.

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see para. 4)
As the 10th recital of Directive 93/13 states, the uniform rules of law in the matter of unfair terms should apply to ‘all contracts’ concluded between sellers or suppliers and consumers, as defined in Article 2(b) and (c) thereof. In that connection, the purpose of the contract is, subject to the exceptions listed in that recital, irrelevant in determining the scope of the directive. It is therefore by reference to the capacity of the contracting parties, according to whether or not they are acting for purposes relating to their trade, business or profession, that Directive 93/13 defines the contracts to which it applies.

Articles 1(1) and 2(b) of Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as meaning that that directive applies to a contract of guarantee or a contract providing security concluded between a natural person and a credit institution in order to secure contractual obligations owed by the commercial company to the credit institution under a credit agreement, where that natural person acted for purposes outside his trade, business or profession and has no link of a functional nature with that company, which is for the national court to ascertain.

The concept of a consumer within the meaning of Article 2(b) of Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts is objective in nature and must be assessed by reference to a functional criterion, consisting in an assessment of whether the contractual relation at issue has arisen in the course of activities outside a trade, business or profession. The national court before which an action relating to a contract which may be covered by that directive has been brought is required to determine, taking into account all the circumstances of the case and all of the evidence, whether the contracting party in question may be categorised as a consumer within the meaning of that directive.

As to whether a natural person who agrees to secure obligations that a commercial company has contracted with a credit institution under a credit agreement may be regarded as a consumer, such a contract providing security or a contract of guarantee if it can be described, with regard to its purpose, as a contract which is ancillary to the principal contract which gives rise to the debt it secures, from the point of view of the contracting parties it presents itself as a distinct contract, as it is concluded between persons other than the parties to the principal contract. In the case of a natural person who has given security for the performance of the obligations of a commercial company, it is therefore for the national court to establish whether that person acted for purposes relating to his trade, business or profession or because of functional links he has with that company, such as a directorship or a non-negligible shareholding, or whether he acted for purposes of a private nature.

(see paras 31-34)
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 12 July 2016 —

Vichy Catalán v EUIPO

(Case C‑399/15 P) ( *1 )

‛Appeal — European Union trade mark — Period within which an action must be brought — Unforeseeable circumstances — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Manifest inadmissibility’

Judicial proceedings — Time limit for instituting proceedings — Claim barred by lapse of time — Unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure — Definition — Limits (Art. 263 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 45, second para.) (see paras 23, 24)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. Vichy Catalán SA shall pay the costs.

3. Hijos de Rivera SA shall bear its own costs.

( *1 ) OJ C 406, 7.12.2015.
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 14 December 2017 — MIP Metro v Real Express

(Case C‑309/15 P-DEP)

(Taxation of costs))

Judicial proceedings—Costs—Taxation—Recoverable costs—Definition—Expenses necessarily incurred by the parties—Elements to be taken into consideration

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 144(b))

(see paras 9, 10)

Operative part

The total amount of recoverable costs that Real Express SRL must pay MIP Metro Group Intellectual Property GmbH & Co. KG in Case C‑309/15 P is set at EUR 2749.32.
Consumer protection — Directive 2008/48 — Credit agreements for consumers — Scope — Credit agreements secured by immovable property — Not included — National implementing legislation including those credit agreements within its scope and imposing in their regard obligations on credit institutions — Lawfulness

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/48, Recitals 10 and 14 and Art. 2(2)(b))
7

By its appeal, Cap Actions criticises the General Court for misinterpreting the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice. Essentially, Cap Actions puts forward five grounds of appeal, alleging: — first, an error of law committed by the General Court when applying the principle of equal treatment in that it did not take account of the fact that, before the adoption of the contested decision, there was no re-opening of the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 108(2) TFEU following the annulment by the General Court, by its judgment in Corsica Ferries France v Commission, T‑565/08, EU:T:2012:415, of Commission Decision 2009/611/EC of 8 July 2008 concerning the measures C 58/02 (ex N 118/02) which France has implemented in favour of [SNCM] (OJ 2009 L 225, p. 180); — second, an error of law committed by the General Court in deciding that the fact that Cap Actions represents the collective interest of the employee shareholders of SNCM cannot in itself form the basis for a direct and existing interest of Cap Actions in the result of the case referred to that Court within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice; — third, an error of assessment committed by the General Court in deciding that Cap Actions has not demonstrated that the judicial reorganisation procedure pending at national level would be suspended in the event of annulment of the contested decision; — fourth, an error of law in that the General Court assimilated the interests of the main shareholder, Transdev, which wishes to withdraw from maritime transport, to those of the employee shareholders, represented by Cap Actions, which focus on safeguarding both their financial interests and their employment, and — fifth, an error of assessment committed by the General Court in deciding that the interest of Cap Actions in the result of the case referred to that Court was not distinct from that of SNCM.
EU trade mark—Appeals procedure—Action before the EU judicature—Jurisdiction of the General Court—Permission to lodge a reply—Discretion of the Court

(Rules of Procedure of the General Court (1991), Art. 135(2))

(see paras 5, 6)
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 8 December 2016 —

Rosa Rodriguez v Consejería de Educación de la Junta de Andalucía

(Case C‑509/16 P)

(Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Application for the annulment of a decision adopted by the Spanish regional authorities — Competition to fill vacancies for directors of educational establishments — Conditions of access — Decision not to admit the appellant — Article 169(1) of the Rules of Procedure — Manifest inadmissibility)

Appeal—Grounds—Form of order not seeking the annulment in full or in part of the operative part of the judgment under appeal—Inadmissibility

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 169(1))

(see paras 6-10, 12)

Operative part

1. The appeal brought by Francisco Javier Rosa Rodriguez is inadmissible.
Order of Vice-President of the Court of 16 June 2016 —

ICA Laboratories and Others v Commission

(Case C‑170/16 P(R))

‛Appeal — Order concerning interim measures — Environment — Consumer protection — Regulation setting maximum residue levels for guazatine — Application for suspension of operation of the regulation — Dismissal — No urgency’

Application for interim measures — Suspension of operation of a measure — Conditions for granting — Urgency — Serious and irreparable damage — Financial loss — Adoption of a regulation setting maximum residue levels for guazatine — Risk normally having to be borne by an undertaking operating in the phytopharmaceuticals market — No urgency (Art. 278 TFEU; Commission Regulation No 2015/1910; Council Directive 91/414, Annex I) (see paras 28-37)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.
Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 7 April 2016 — Tonachella

(Case C‑8/16) ( 1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Identical questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Articles 49 TFEU and 56 TFEU — Freedom of establishment — Freedom to provide services — Betting and gaming — National legislation — Reorganisation of the licensing system through the alignment of licence expiry dates — New call for tenders — Licences for a shorter term than that of the former licences — Transfer, free of charge, of the rights to use tangible and intangible assets owned constituting the network for the management and collection of bets — Restriction — Overriding reasons in the public interest — Proportionality’

Freedom to provide services — Freedom of establishment — Restrictions — Betting and gaming — National legislation which requires a licensee to transfer, free of charge, on the cessation of business as a result of the expiry of the final term of the licence, the rights to use tangible and intangible assets which he owns and which constitute his network for the management and collection of bets — Unlawful — Justification — Overriding reasons in the public interest — Proportionality — Verification by the national court (Arts 49 TFEU and 56 TFEU) (see para. 11, operative part)

Operative part

Articles 49 TFEU and 56 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding a restrictive national provision, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which requires a licensee of a betting and gambling service to transfer, free of charge, on the cessation of business as a result of the expiry of the final term of the licence, the rights to use tangible and intangible assets which he owns and which constitute his network for the management and collection of bets, in so far as that restriction goes beyond what is necessary to attain the objective actually pursued by that provision, which is for the referring court to verify.

( 1 ) OJ C 90, 7.3.2016.