The Court of Justice can declare an appeal to be inadmissible where an event subsequent to the judgment of the General Court has removed its prejudicial effect for the appellant. An interest in bringing the appeal proceedings assumes that the appeal is likely, if successful, to procure an advantage to the party bringing it. When a regulation, adopted subsequent to the judgment of the General Court, repeals only ex nunc and not ex tunc the regulation annulled by that court, the appellant retains an interest in bringing the proceedings as regards the annulment of the effects produced by the annulled regulation between the date on which it entered into force and the date of its repeal.

Provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of EU law by the General Court, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal. Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the General Court, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose.

As regards the interpretation of the criteria laid down, in order to grant market economy treatment, in the first indent of Article 2(7)(c) of basic anti-dumping Regulation No 384/96, the General Court is fully entitled to hold that State control — evidenced by the facts that the State shareholders, even though minority shareholders, control the general meeting of a company and appoint the members of the board of directors and some of the directors of that company are connected to it by employment contracts or by a contract for the supply of services — cannot be equated, as a matter of principle, to ‘significant State interference’ within the meaning of that Article and cannot therefore relieve the Council and the Commission of the obligation to take into account the evidence, submitted by the producer concerned, of the real factual, legal and economic context in which it operates.

It clearly follows from the wording of the first indent of Article 2(7)(c) of Regulation No 384/96 that that provision is not directed at all types of State interference in producer undertakings, but only that concerning their decisions regarding prices, costs and inputs. In addition, the use of the word ‘interference’ indicates that it is not sufficient that a State may have a certain amount of influence over those decisions, but implies actual interference in them. Furthermore, the interference in the producer’s decisions regarding prices, costs and inputs must be ‘significant’. It is therefore not in dispute that Article 2 of Regulation No 384/96 allows a certain degree of State interference in those decisions.

Whether or not such State interference in the decisions is significant must be assessed in relation to the purpose of that provision, which is to ensure that a producer operates under market economy conditions and, in particular, that the costs to which it is subject and the prices which it charges are the result of market forces. Consequently, State interference that is neither by its nature nor effect capable of rendering a producer’s decisions regarding prices, costs and inputs incompatible with market economy conditions cannot be considered significant.

However, such an interpretation does not eliminate the criterion that the producer must take its decisions regarding prices, costs and inputs without such interference. Even when a producer has taken the decisions in response only to market signals, the criterion in question precludes granting it market economy treatment in the event that the State has significantly interfered with the operation of market forces, acting, for example, directly on the price of certain raw materials or the price of labour. In any event, it is for the producer to adduce evidence capable of proving that it does not suffer significant State interference when it takes its commercial decisions, and the Council and the Commission enjoy a wide discretion in that regard.

(see paras 78-83, 89-91)