Case T-59/02

Archer Daniels Midland Co.

v

Commission of the European Communities

(Competition – Cartels – Citric acid – Article 81 EC – Fine – Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 – Guidelines on the method of setting fines – Leniency Notice – Principles of legal certainty and non-retroactivity – Principle of proportionality – Equal treatment – Duty to state reasons – Rights of the defence)

Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber), 27 September 2006

Summary of the Judgment

1. Community law – General principles of law – Non-retroactivity of penal provisions

(Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15; Commission Notices 96/C 207/04 and 98/C 9/03)

2. Competition – Fines – Guidelines on the method of setting fines

(Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15(2); Commission Notice 98/C 9/03)

3. Competition – Fines – Community penalties and penalties imposed in a Member State or a non-member State for infringement of national competition law

(Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15)

4. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination

(Arts 81(1) EC and 82 EC; EEA Agreement, Art. 53(1); Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15(2))

5. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Criteria – Gravity of the infringement

(Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15(2))

6. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Deterrent effect of the fine

(Art. 81 EC; Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15)

7. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Criteria – Actual impact on the market

(Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15(2); Commission Notice 98/C 9/03, Section 1A, first para.)

8. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Criteria – Gravity of the infringement

(Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15(2))

9. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Criteria – Gravity of the infringement – Attenuating circumstances

(Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15)

10. Competition – Administrative procedure – Observance of the rights of the defence

(Arts 81 EC and 82 EC; Council Regulation No 17, Art. 11)

11. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Criteria – Gravity of the infringement – Aggravating circumstances

(Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15; Commission Notice 98/C 9/03, Section 2)

12. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination

(Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15(2))

13. Competition – Community rules – Infringements – Fines – Amount – Determination

(Art. 81 EC; Council Regulation No 17)

14. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Criteria – Gravity of the infringement – Attenuating circumstances

(Art. 81(1) EC; Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15(2); Commission Notice 98/C 9/03, Section 3, third indent)

15. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Criteria – Gravity of the infringement – Attenuating circumstances

(Art. 81(1) EC; Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15)

16. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination

(Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15; Commission Notice 96/C 207/04, Sections B, C and D)

17. Competition – Administrative procedure – Statement of objections – Necessary content

(Council Regulation No 17, Art. 19(1))

18. Competition – Administrative procedure – Statement of objections – Necessary content

(Council Regulation No 17, Art. 19(1))

19. Competition – Fines – Amount – Discretion of the Commission – Judicial review

(Art. 229 EC)

1. The principle of non-retroactivity of criminal laws, enshrined in Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights as a fundamental right, constitutes a general principle of Community law which must be observed when fines are imposed for infringement of the competition rules. That principle requires that the penalties imposed correspond with those fixed at the time when the infringement was committed.

The adoption of guidelines capable of modifying the general competition policy of the Commission as regards fines may, in principle, fall within the scope of the principle of non-retroactivity.

First, the Guidelines are capable of producing legal effects. Those effects stem not from any attribute of the Guidelines as rules of law in themselves, but from their adoption and publication by the Commission. By adopting and publishing the Guidelines, and indeed the Leniency Notice, the Commission imposes a limit on its own discretion; it cannot depart from those rules under pain of being found, where appropriate, to be in breach of the general principles of law, such as equal treatment or the protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty.

Second, as an instrument of competition policy, the Guidelines fall within the scope of the principle of non-retroactivity, just like a new interpretation by the courts of a rule establishing an offence, in conformity with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 7(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights which holds that that provision precludes the retroactive application of a new interpretation of a rule establishing an offence. According to that case-law, that is the case in particular where there is an interpretation by the courts which produces a result which was not reasonably foreseeable at the time when the offence was committed, having regard notably to the interpretation of the rule applied in the case-law at the material time. It follows however from that same case-law that the scope of the notion of foreseeability depends to a considerable degree on the content of the text in issue, the field it covers and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed. Thus, a law may still satisfy the requirement of foreseeability even if the person concerned has to take appropriate legal advice to assess, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. More specifically, this is true particularly in relation to persons carrying on a professional activity, who are used to having to proceed with a high degree of caution when pursuing their occupation. They can on this account be expected to take special care in assessing the risks that such an activity entails.

In order to ensure that the principle of non-retroactivity is observed, it is necessary to ascertain whether the modification, which consisted in the adoption of the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty, was reasonably foreseeable at the time when the infringements at issue were committed. In that regard, the main innovation in the Guidelines consisted in taking as a starting point for the calculation a basic amount, determined on the basis of brackets laid down for that purpose by the Guidelines; those brackets reflect the various degrees of gravity of infringements but, as such, bear no relation to the relevant turnover. The essential feature of that method is thus that fines are determined on a tariff basis, albeit one that is relative and flexible.

Next, the fact that the Commission, in the past, imposed fines of a certain level for certain types of infringement does not mean that it is estopped from raising that level within the limits indicated in Regulation No 17 if that is necessary to ensure the implementation of Community competition policy: on the contrary, the proper application of the Community competition rules requires that the Commission may at any time adjust the level of fines to the needs of that policy.

It follows that undertakings involved in an administrative procedure in which fines may be imposed cannot acquire a legitimate expectation that the Commission will not exceed the level of fines previously imposed or in a method of calculating the fines.

Consequently, those undertakings must take account of the possibility that the Commission may decide at any time to raise the level of the fines by reference to that applied in the past. That is true not only where the Commission raises the level of the amount of fines in imposing fines in individual decisions but also if that increase takes effect by the application, in particular cases, of rules of conduct of general application, such as the Guidelines.

(see paras 41-49, 409)

2. The application by the Commission of the method set out in the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty in calculating the fine imposed on an undertaking does not constitute discriminatory treatment by comparison with undertakings which infringed the Community competition rules at the same time but, for reasons pertaining to the time when the infringement was discovered or to the conduct of the administrative procedure initiated against them, were sanctioned before the adoption and publication of the Guidelines.

(see para. 53)

3. The principle of ne bis in idem prohibits the same person from being sanctioned more than once for the same unlawful conduct in order to protect one and the same legal interest. The application of that principle is subject to three cumulative conditions: the identity of the facts, the unity of offender and the unity of legal interest protected.

Therefore, an undertaking may be made the defendant to two parallel sets of proceedings concerning the same infringement and, thus, incur concurrent sanctions, one imposed by the competent authority of the Member State in question, the other a Community sanction, to the extent that the two sets of proceedings pursue different ends and that the legal rules infringed are not the same.

It follows that the principle of ne bis in idem cannot, a fortiori, apply in a case where the procedures conducted and penalties imposed by the Commission on the one hand and the authorities of non‑member States on the other clearly pursue different ends. The aim of the first is to preserve undistorted competition within the European Union and the European Economic Area, whereas the aim of the second is to protect the markets of non‑member States. The condition of the unity of the legal interest protected, which is necessary for the principle of ne bis in idem to apply, is in that case not fulfilled.

(see paras 61-63)

4. The Commission’s power to impose fines on undertakings which intentionally or negligently commit an infringement of Article 81(1) EC or Article 82 EC is one of the means conferred on the Commission in order to enable it to carry out the task of supervision entrusted to it by Community law. That task encompasses the duty to pursue a general policy to apply, in competition matters, the principles laid down by the Treaty and to guide the conduct of undertakings in the light of those principles.

It follows that the Commission has the power to decide the level of fines in order to reinforce their deterrent effect when infringements of a particular type, although established as being unlawful at the outset of Community competition policy, are still relatively frequent on account of the profit that certain of the undertakings concerned are able to derive from them.

The objective of deterrence pursued by the Commission relates to the conduct of undertakings within the Community or the European Economic Area (EEA). Consequently, the deterrent effect of a fine imposed on an undertaking for infringement of the Community competition rules cannot be assessed by reference solely to the particular situation of that undertaking or by reference to whether it has complied with the competition rules in non-member States outside the EEA.

(see paras 70-72)

5. The gravity of infringements of the competition rules has to be determined by reference to numerous factors, such as the particular circumstances of the case and its context; moreover, there is no binding or exhaustive list of the criteria which must be applied.

Furthermore, the criteria for assessing the gravity of an infringement may include the volume and value of the goods in respect of which the infringement was committed and the size and economic power of the undertaking and, consequently, the influence which it was able to exert on the relevant market. It follows that, on the one hand, it is permissible, for the purpose of fixing a fine, to have regard both to the total turnover of the undertaking, which gives an indication, albeit approximate and imperfect, of the size of the undertaking and of its economic power, and to the market share of the undertakings concerned on the relevant market, which gives an indication of the scale of the infringement. On the other hand, it follows that it is important not to confer on one or other of those figures an importance which is disproportionate in relation to other factors and the fixing of an appropriate fine cannot therefore be the result of a simple calculation based on total turnover.

(see paras 98-99)

6. Deterrence is one of the main considerations which must guide the Commission when setting fines imposed for an infringement of the Community competition rules.

If the fine were set at a level which merely negated the profits of the cartel, it would not be a deterrent. It is reasonable to assume that when making financial calculations and management decisions, undertakings take account rationally not only of the level of fines that they risk incurring in the event of an infringement but also the likelihood of the cartel being detected. In addition, if the purpose of the fine were to be confined merely to negating the expected profit or advantage, insufficient account would be taken of the fact that the conduct in question constitutes an infringement of Article 81(1) EC. To regard the fine merely as compensating for the damage incurred would be to overlook not only the deterrent effect, which can relate only to future conduct, but also the punitive nature of such a measure in relation to the actual infringement committed.

Similarly, in the case of an undertaking which is active on a large number of markets and has a particularly large financial capacity, to take into account turnover on the relevant market cannot suffice to ensure that the fine has deterrent effect. The larger an undertaking is and the more overall resources it has at its disposal which enable it to act independently on the market, the more it must be aware of the importance of its role as regards the smooth functioning of competition on the market. Consequently, the factual circumstances, and in particular the overall turnover, relating to the economic power of an undertaking which has been found guilty of an infringement must be taken into account when considering the gravity of the infringement.

(see paras 129-131)

7. According to Section 1A, first paragraph, of the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty, the Commission is to take account, inter alia, of the actual impact of the infringement on the market, where this can be measured, when calculating the fine on the basis of the gravity of the infringement. That measurable impact of the cartel must be regarded as having been sufficiently demonstrated if the Commission is able to provide specific and credible evidence indicating with reasonable probability that the cartel had an impact on the market.

Consideration of the impact of a cartel on the market necessarily involves recourse to assumptions. In this respect, the Commission must in particular consider what the price of the relevant product would have been in the absence of a cartel. When examining the causes of actual price developments, it is hazardous to speculate on the part played by each of those causes. Account must be taken of the objective fact that, because of the price cartel, the parties specifically waived their freedom to compete with one another on prices. Thus, the assessment of the influence of factors other than that voluntary decision of the parties to the cartel not to compete with one another is necessarily based on reasonable probability, which is not precisely quantifiable.

Therefore, unless the criterion of Section 1A, first paragraph, is to be deprived of its effectiveness, the Commission cannot be criticised for referring to the actual impact on the market of a cartel having an anti‑competitive object, such as a price or sales quota cartel, even though it does not quantify that impact or provide any assessment in figures in this respect.

(see paras 157-161)

8. When determining the gravity of an infringement of competition law, particular account should be taken of the legislative background and economic context of the conduct complained of. In this respect, in order to assess the actual effect of an infringement on the market the Commission must take as a reference the competition that would normally exist if there were no infringement.

It follows, first, that in the case of price agreements the Commission must find – with a reasonable degree of probability – that the agreements have in fact enabled the parties concerned to achieve a higher level of price than that which would have prevailed had there been no cartel. Second, it follows that, in making its assessment, the Commission must take into account all the objective conditions in the relevant market and have regard to the economic context and, if appropriate, also the legislative background. Account should be taken of the existence of any ‘objective economic factors’ which indicate that, had there been a ‘free play of competition’, prices would not have developed in the same way as the prices which were actually charged.

(see paras 181-182)

9. The fact that the parties to a cartel did not comply with their agreement and did not entirely implement the agreed prices does not mean that, in so doing, they applied the prices that they would have charged in the absence of a cartel and does not therefore constitute a factor which should be taken into account as an attenuating circumstance. An undertaking which despite colluding with its competitors follows a more or less independent policy on the market may simply be trying to exploit the cartel for its own benefit.

(see para. 189)

10. There is no provision that prevents the Commission from relying, as evidence that could be used to find that there has been a breach of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC and to set a fine, on a document which was established in the context of a procedure which was not conducted by the Commission itself.

However, it is acknowledged that one of the general principles of Community law, of which fundamental rights are an integral part and in the light of which all Community laws must be interpreted, is the right of undertakings not to be compelled by the Commission, under Article 11 of Regulation No 17, to admit their participation in an infringement. The protection of that right means that, in the event of a dispute as to the scope of a question, it must be determined whether an answer from the undertaking to which the question is addressed would in fact be equivalent to the admission of an infringement, such as to undermine the rights of the defence.

Where the Commission, when freely assessing the evidence in its possession, relies on a statement made in a context different from that of the procedure initiated before it, and where that statement potentially contains information that the undertaking concerned would have been entitled to refuse to provide to it if the Commission had put questions to that undertaking on the same subject, it is required to guarantee to the undertaking concerned procedural rights equivalent to those conferred on the undertaking to which it puts questions.

Compliance with those procedural safeguards entails, in such a context, the need for the Commission to carry out an examination automatically if, prima facie, there is serious doubt as to whether the procedural rights of the parties concerned were complied with in the procedure during which they provided such statements. If there is no such serious doubt, the procedural rights of the parties concerned must be deemed to have been adequately safeguarded if, in the statement of objections, the Commission clearly indicates, if necessary by annexing the relevant documents to it, that it intends to rely on the statements in question. In this way, the Commission makes it possible for the parties concerned to comment not only on the content of those statements, but also on any irregularities or special circumstances concerning their composition or submission to the Commission.

(see paras 261-265)

11. Where an infringement of the competition rules has been committed by several undertakings, it is appropriate, when setting the amount of the fines, to consider the relative gravity of the participation of each of them, which implies in particular that the roles played by each of them in the infringement for the duration of their participation in it should be established.

It follows, in particular, that the role of ‘ringleader’ played by one or more undertakings in a cartel must be taken into account in setting the fine, in so far as undertakings which have played such a role must therefore bear a special responsibility by comparison with other undertakings.

(see paras 296-297)

12. The Commission has a discretion when setting the amount of the fine for infringement of the competition rules. The fact that in the past the Commission imposed a particular rate of increase in the amount of fines where there were aggravating circumstances does not mean that it is estopped from raising those rates, within the limits set out in Regulation No 17 and in the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty, if that is necessary in order to ensure the implementation of Community competition policy.

(see para. 312)

13. When applying Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 to each individual case, that is to say when it imposes fines for infringement of the Treaty’s competition rules, the Commission must observe general principles of law, which include the principle of equal treatment as interpreted by the Community courts. An undertaking may however contest the amount of the fine imposed on it by pleading infringement of that principle only if it demonstrates that the facts of the cases in the decisions to which it refers, such as markets, products, the countries, the undertakings and periods concerned, are comparable to those of the present case.

(see paras 315-316)

14. In assessing the gravity of an infringement of the competition rules for the purpose of fixing the amount of the fine, the Commission must take into consideration not only the particular circumstances of the case but also the context in which the infringement occurs and must ensure that its action has the necessary deterrent effect. Only by taking into account those factors is it possible to ensure that the action taken by the Commission for the purpose of maintaining undistorted competition on the common market is fully effective.

A purely literal analysis of the third indent of paragraph 3 of the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty could give the impression that the mere fact that an offender terminates an infringement as soon as the Commission intervenes constitutes, generally and without reserve, an attenuating circumstance. However, such an interpretation would reduce the effectiveness of the provisions for maintaining effective competition, as it would weaken both the penalty which could be imposed for an infringement of Article 81 EC and the deterrent effect of such a penalty.

Unlike other attenuating circumstances, the fact of terminating an infringement as soon as the Commission intervenes is not inherent in any particular individual characteristic of the offending party itself or the specific facts of the particular case, since it results mainly from the – external – intervention of the Commission. Thus, termination of an infringement only after the Commission has intervened should not be rewarded in the same way as an independent initiative of the offending party, and merely constitutes an appropriate and normal reaction to that intervention. Moreover, the fact of termination merely marks a return by the offending party to lawful conduct and does not enhance the effectiveness of the actions taken by the Commission. Lastly, the alleged attenuating nature of the fact of termination cannot be justified solely by the incentive to terminate the infringement to which it relates. In this respect, the classification of the continuation of an infringement after the Commission intervenes as an aggravating circumstance already rightly constitutes an incentive to terminate the infringement, which does not reduce the penalty or its deterrent effect.

Thus, if termination of an infringement as soon as the Commission intervenes were to be recognised as an attenuating circumstance, that would unduly impair the effectiveness of Article 81(1) EC by weakening both the penalty and its deterrent effect. Consequently, the Commission cannot place itself under an obligation to consider the mere fact that the infringement was terminated as soon as it intervened to be an attenuating circumstance. Accordingly, the third indent of paragraph 3 of the Guidelines must be interpreted restrictively so as not to undermine the effectiveness of Article 81(1) EC, and as meaning that solely the particular circumstances of the specific case in which an infringement is actually terminated as soon as the Commission intervenes can warrant that termination being taken into account as an attenuating circumstance.

In the case of a particularly serious infringement, whose object is price fixing and market sharing, committed intentionally by the undertakings concerned, its termination cannot be regarded as an attenuating circumstance where it was terminated as a result of the Commission’s intervention.

(see paras 334-338, 340-341)

15. Whilst it is important that an undertaking takes steps to prevent fresh infringements of Community competition law from being committed in the future by members of its staff, the taking of such steps does not alter the fact that an infringement has been committed. The Commission is therefore not required to take a circumstance such as that into account as an attenuating circumstance, especially where the infringement in question amounts to a manifest infringement of Article 81(1) EC.

(see para. 359)

16. In order to ensure that it does not conflict with the principle of equal treatment, the Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases must be applied in such a way that, as regards the reduction of fines, the Commission must treat in the same way undertakings that provide the Commission, at the same stage of the procedure and in similar circumstances, with similar information concerning the conduct imputed to them. The mere fact that one of those undertakings was the first to acknowledge the alleged facts in response to the questions put to them by the Commission at the same stage of the procedure cannot constitute an objective reason for treating it differently.

However, that applies only in the context of cooperation of undertakings which does not fall within the scope of Sections B and C of the Leniency Notice.

Unlike those sections, Section D does not provide for different treatment for the undertakings concerned on the basis of the order in which they cooperate with the Commission.

(see paras 400-401, 403)

17. The statement of objections must be couched in terms that, albeit succinct, are sufficiently clear to enable the parties concerned properly to identify the conduct complained of by the Commission. It is only on that basis that the statement of objections can fulfil its function under the Community regulations of giving undertakings all the information necessary to enable them properly to defend themselves, before the Commission adopts a final decision.

(see para. 416)

18. Provided that the Commission indicates expressly in the statement of objections that it will consider whether it is appropriate to impose fines on the undertakings concerned and that it sets out the principal elements of fact and of law that may give rise to a fine, such as the gravity and the duration of the alleged infringement and the fact that it has been committed ‘intentionally or negligently’, it fulfils its obligation to respect the undertakings’ right to be heard. In doing so, it provides them with the necessary elements to defend themselves not only against a finding of infringement but also against the fact of being fined.

Therefore, as regards determining the amount of fines, the rights of defence of the undertakings in question are guaranteed before the Commission through the opportunity to make submissions on the duration, the gravity and the foreseeability of the anti-competitive nature of the infringement. That conclusion is all the more compelling because, by publishing the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty, the Commission has informed interested parties in detail of the method for calculating any fine and the manner in which it will take account of those guidelines. It is not called in question by the fact that the guidelines make no express reference to a multiplier, since they state that it is necessary to take account of the effective economic capacity of offenders to cause significant damage to other operators and to set the fine at a level which ensures that it has a sufficiently deterrent effect.

(see paras 434-435)

19. Where the examination of the pleas raised by an undertaking against the legality of a Commission decision imposing on it a fine for infringement of the Community competition rules has revealed an illegality, it is necessary for the Court of First Instance to consider whether it must, making use of its unlimited jurisdiction, amend the contested decision.

(see para. 443)

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Third Chamber)

27 September 2006 ( )

(Competition – Cartels – Citric acid – Article 81 EC – Fine – Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 – Guidelines on the method of setting fines – Leniency Notice – Principles of legal certainty and non-retroactivity – Principle of proportionality – Equal treatment – Obligation to state reasons – Rights of the defence)

In Case T‑59/02,

Archer Daniels Midland Co., established in Decatur, Illinois (United States), represented by C.O. Lenz, lawyer, L. Martin Alegi, M. Garcia, and E. Batchelor, Solicitors,

applicant,

v

Commission of the European Communities, represented by P. Oliver, acting as Agent,

defendant,

APPLICATION for annulment of Article 1 of Commission Decision 2002/742/EC of 5 December 2001 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/E-1/36.604 – Citric acid) (OJ 2002 L 239, p. 18) in so far as it finds that the applicant infringed Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement by agreeing to restrict capacity in the market in question and to designate a producer who was to lead price increases in each national segment of the said market, and for the annulment of Article 3 of the same decision in so far as it pertains to the applicant and, in the alternative, for the reduction of the fine imposed on it,

THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Third Chamber),

composed of J. Azizi, President, M. Jaeger and F. Dehousse, Judges,

Registrar: J. Plingers, Administrator,

having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 9 June 2004,

gives the following

Judgment

Facts

1 The applicant, Archer Daniels Midland Co. (‘ADM’), is the parent company of a group of companies which operate in the cereal and oil seed processing industry. It entered the citric acid market in 1991.

2 Citric acid is the most widely used acidulant and preservative in the world. It exists in different types and is used in a variety of applications, mainly in food and beverages, household detergents and cleaners, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, and in various industrial processes.

3 In 1995 total worldwide sales of citric acid were approximately EUR 894.72 million, those in the European Economic Area (EEA) being approximately EUR 323.69 million. In 1996 approximately 60% of the worldwide citric acid market was in the hands of the five addressees of the Decision, namely, in addition to ADM, Jungbunzlauer AG (‘JBL’), F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG (‘HLR’), Haarmann & Reimer Corp. (‘H&R’), belonging to the Bayer AG Group (‘Bayer’), and Cerestar Bioproducts BV (‘Cerestar’), together referred to as ‘the parties concerned’.

4 In August 1995 the United States Department of Justice informed the Commission of an investigation into the citric acid market. Between October 1996 and June 1998 all the parties concerned, including ADM, pleaded guilty to taking part in a cartel. As a result of plea agreements with the Department of Justice, fines were imposed on the companies by the United States authorities. In addition, several individuals charged were fined. Investigations were also carried out in Canada and some of the same companies, including ADM, were fined there.

5 On 6 August 1997 the Commission sent requests for information under Article 11 of Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962, First Regulation implementing Articles [81] and [82] of the Treaty (OJ, English Special Edition 1959-1962, p. 87) to the four largest producers of citric acid in the Community. In addition, in January 1998 the Commission sent requests for information to the main purchasers of citric acid in the Community and in June and July 1998 it sent further requests for information to the main producers of citric acid in the Community.

6 Following receipt of the first request for information which had been sent to it in July 1998, Cerestar contacted the Commission and, in the course of a meeting on 29 October 1998, expressed a wish to cooperate with the Commission under the Commission Notice of 18 July 1996 on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ 1996 C 207, p. 4; ‘the Leniency Notice’). At the meeting Cerestar gave an oral account of the cartel activity in which it had been involved. On 25 March 1999 it sent the Commission a written statement confirming what it had said at the meeting.

7 By letter of 28 July 1998 the Commission sent JBL a further request for information, to which the latter replied by letter of 28 September 1998.

8 At a meeting on 11 December 1998 ADM expressed its willingness to cooperate with the Commission and gave an oral account of the anti-competitive activity in which it had been involved. On 15 January 1999 it sent the Commission a written statement confirming that account.

9 On 3 March 1999 the Commission sent additional requests for information to HLR, JBL and Cerestar.

10 On 28 April, 21 May and 28 July 1999 respectively, Bayer, on behalf of H&R, JBL and HLR made statements on the basis of the Leniency Notice.

11 On 29 March 2000 the Commission, on the basis of the information supplied to it, sent a statement of objections to ADM and the other parties concerned for infringement of Article 81(1) EC and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement (‘the EEA Agreement’). ADM and the other parties concerned submitted written observations in response to the Commission’s objections. None of the parties requested an oral hearing, nor did they substantially contest the facts as set out in the statement of objections.

12 On 27 July 2001 the Commission sent additional requests for information to ADM and the other parties concerned.

13 On 5 December 2001 the Commission adopted Decision C(2001) 3923 final relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/E-l/36.604 – Citric acid) (‘the Decision’). The Decision was notified to ADM by letter of 17 December 2001.

14 The Decision includes the following provisions:

‘Article 1

[ADM], [Cerestar], [H&R], [HLR] and [JBL] have infringed Article 81(1) of the Treaty and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement by participating in a continuing agreement and/or concerted practice in the sector of citric acid.

The duration of the infringement was as follows:

– in the case of [ADM], [H&R], [HLR] and [JBL]: from March 1991 to May 1995;

– in the case of [Cerestar]: from May 1992 to May 1995.

…

Article 3

For the infringement referred to in Article 1, the following fines are imposed:

(a) [ADM]: EUR 39.69 million

(b) [Cerestar]: EUR 170 000

(c) [HLR]: EUR 63.5 million

(d) [H&R]: EUR 14.22 million

(e) [JBL]: EUR 17.64 million.’

15 At recitals 80 to 84 of the Decision, the Commission stated that the cartel involved the allocation of specific sales quotas to each member and their adherence to those quotas, the fixing of target and/or floor prices, the elimination of price discounts and the exchange of specific information on customers.

16 For calculating the fines, the Commission used in the Decision the method described in the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty (OJ 1998 C 9, p. 3; ‘the Guidelines’) and the Leniency Notice.

17 First, the Commission determined the basic amount of the fine by reference to the gravity and duration of the infringement.

18 In that context, as regards the gravity of the infringement, the Commission found, first, that, taking into account the nature of the infringement, its actual impact on the EEA citric acid market and the scope of the relevant geographic market, the parties concerned had committed a very serious infringement (recital 230 of the Decision).

19 Next, the Commission considered that it was necessary to take account of the actual economic capacity of the offenders to cause significant damage to competition, and to set the fine at a level which ensured that it had sufficient deterrent effect. Consequently, taking as its basis the worldwide turnover of the parties concerned from the sale of citric acid in the last year of the infringement, namely 1995, the Commission divided them into three categories as follows: in the first category, H&R with a worldwide market share of 22%, in the second, ADM and JBL with worldwide market shares of [confidential] ( ) and HLR with a market share of 9%, and in the third category Cerestar, with a worldwide market share of 2.5%. On this basis the starting amounts fixed by the Commission were EUR 35 million for the company in the first category, EUR 21 million for those in the second and EUR 3.5 million for that in the third category (recital 239 of the Decision).

20 In addition, the starting amount was adjusted to ensure that the fine had a sufficient deterrent effect. The Commission thus found that, taking account of the size and overall resources of the parties concerned, as expressed by their total worldwide turnover, the starting point for the fines on ADM and HLR should be multiplied by 2 and that for the fine on H&R by 2.5 (recitals 50 and 246 of the Decision).

21 As regards the duration of the infringement committed by each undertaking, the resulting starting amount was increased by 10% per year, giving an increase of 40% for ADM, H&R, HLR and JBL, and 30% for Cerestar (recitals 249 and 250 of the Decision).

22 Accordingly, the Commission set the basic amounts of the fines at EUR 58.8 million for ADM, while those for Cerestar, HLR, H&R and JBL were set at EUR 4.55 million, EUR 58.8 million, EUR 122.5 million and EUR 29.4 million respectively (recital 254 of the Decision).

23 Second, the basic amounts for ADM and HLR were increased by 35% to take account of aggravating factors on the ground that they had acted as ringleaders of the cartel (recital 273 of the Decision).

24 Third, the Commission examined and rejected the arguments of certain undertakings with regard to attenuating circumstances (recitals 274 to 291 of the Decision).

25 Fourth, pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17, the Commission adjusted the resulting amounts for Cerestar and H&R so that they did not exceed the 10% limit of their worldwide turnover (recital 293 of the Decision).

26 Fifth, under Section B of the Leniency Notice, the Commission allowed Cerestar a ‘very substantial reduction’ (namely 90%) in the fine which would have been imposed if it had not cooperated. By virtue of Section D of the Notice, the Commission allowed ADM a ‘significant reduction’ (namely 50%), while JBL, H&R and HLR were granted reductions of 40%, 30% and 20% respectively (recital 326).

Procedure and forms of order sought by the parties

27 ADM brought the present action by application lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 28 February 2002.

28 By separate document received by the Court Registry on 28 February 2002, ADM requested that certain information in the pleadings and in certain annexes be treated as confidential.

29 Upon hearing the Report of the Judge-Rapporteur, the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) decided to open the oral procedure and, in the context of measures of organisation of procedure under Article 64 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, put written questions to the parties to which they replied within the prescribed period.

30 The parties presented oral argument and replied to the Court’s questions at the hearing on 9 June 2004.

31 ADM claims that the Court should:

– annul Article 1 of the Decision to the extent that it finds that it violated Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement by agreeing to restrict capacity in the market in question and to designate a producer who was to lead price increases in each national market of the market in question;

– annul Article 3 of the Decision in so far as it pertains to ADM;

– in the alternative, reduce the fine;

– order the Commission to pay the costs.

32 The Commission contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order ADM to pay the costs.

Law

I – Whether the Guidelines apply

A – Arguments of the parties

33 First, ADM submits that the method of calculating fines laid down by the Guidelines differs fundamentally from the Commission’s previous fining practice which, as it acknowledged in the Decision (recital 253), entailed determining the fine according to a base rate representing a certain percentage of sales in the relevant Community market. Conversely, the Guidelines introduce a fixed rate fine, for example EUR 20 million for a very serious infringement, regardless of the volume of sales of the product concerned.

34 ADM observes that during the period to which this case relates (1991 to 1995), the Commission consistently applied this practice and imposed fines of generally between 2.5% and 9% of the value of sales of the relevant product in the Community market. By contrast, implementation of the new policy deriving from the Guidelines results in fines of 10 to 34 times higher than those imposed on the basis of the former practice.

35 ADM acknowledges that the Commission has discretion to increase fines where competition law policy requires higher dissuasive fines. However, in imposing a fine of 10 to 34 times that which would have been fixed under its former approach, the Commission manifestly overstepped any such discretion. Contrary to the Commission’s contention, that conclusion is borne out by the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-16/99 Lögstör Rör v Commission [2002] ECR II-1633, paragraph 237. In that judgment, the Court of First Instance made the Commission’s ability to increase the level of fines within the limits indicated in Regulation No 17 subject to the condition that doing so is necessary to ensure the implementation of Community competition policy. The Commission has not provided any explanation nor put forward any evidence in either the Decision or its pleadings such as to show that the implementation of that policy required the imposition of fines 10 to 34 times higher than those resulting from the former standard practice. ADM also observes that in Lögstör Rör v Commission and all the other cases dealing with the pre-insulated pipes cartel, apart from the case concerning ABB (Case T‑31/99 ABB Asea Brown Boveri v Commission [2002] ECR II-1881), the Commission imposed fines of a level comparable to the level prevailing when its earlier practice was followed. ADM asserts that the undertakings participating in that cartel were fined only between 3% and 14% of the affected sales and even ABB’s fine represented only 44% of its affected sales.

36 ADM submits that undertakings must be able to carry on business in conditions which are not unpredictable. In accordance with the Guidelines (first paragraph), the Commission must follow a coherent and non-discriminatory policy when setting the amount of the fines. Lack of legal certainty in the assessment of fines is antithetical to the notion of effectively implementing the deterrent constituted by a fine. For a fine to act as an effective deterrent, it is essential that the undertakings concerned have prior knowledge of applicable penalties. An effective general amnesty or leniency policy requires that the penalties in cases of non-cooperation are clearly defined in advance. Likewise, it is unconscionable to maintain a state of constant uncertainty as to the level of fines which may be imposed for competition law violations, especially given the long period of time taken to complete investigations of such infringements. Consequently, legal certainty requires that the approach adopted by the Commission in calculating fines under Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 may be predicted with a sufficient degree of certainty.

37 ADM adds that it is apparent from the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Section 1B1.11(b)(1); ‘the US Guidelines’) and from the decision of a federal Court of Appeals (United States v Kimler 167 F. 3d 889 (5th Cir. 1999) that retroactive application of new guidelines in the matter of fines is prohibited by the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution when it results in the imposition of a punishment more severe than the punishment provided for when the infringement occurred.

38 Consequently, in ADM’s submission, where the new policy laid down in the Guidelines is applied retroactively to an infringement which, as is the case in this instance, took place prior to their publication and has the effect of imposing on ADM a much higher fine than those imposed when former practice prevailed without that increase being necessary to ensure compliance with competition law policy, such application offends against the principle of legal certainty and is unlawful.

39 Second, ADM submits that the application of the Guidelines violates the principle of equal treatment since it differentiates between undertakings which have infringed competition law by reference not to the date of the infringement but to the date on which the Commission’s decision was adopted, which was fixed by the Commission in an arbitrary manner. By way of example, the undertakings referred to in Commission Decision 97/624/EC of 14 May 1997 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article [82] of the EC Treaty (IV/34.621, 35.059/F-3 – Irish Sugar plc) (OJ 1997 L 258, p. 1) and in Commission Decision 94/210/EC of 29 March 1994 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Articles [81] and [82] of the EC Treaty (IV/33.941 – HOV-SVZ/MCN) (OJ 1994 L 104, p. 34) were fined on the basis of only 6.8% and 5% of their relevant market sales respectively, although the infringements concerned were contemporaneous with the citric acid cartel.

40 The Commission contends that the pleas should be rejected.

B – Findings of the Court

41 The Court observes, first of all, that the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal laws, enshrined in Article 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, as a fundamental right, constitutes a general principle of Community law which must be observed when fines are imposed for infringement of the competition rules and that that principle requires that the penalties imposed correspond with those fixed at the time when the infringement was committed (Joined Cases C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri v Commission [2005] ECR I‑5425, paragraph 202; Case T‑23/99 LR AF 1998 v Commission [2002] ECR II‑1705, paragraphs 218 to 221; and Case T‑224/00 Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission [2003] ECR II‑2597, paragraph 39).

42 Next, the Court considers that the adoption of guidelines capable of modifying the general competition policy of the Commission as regards fines may, in principle, fall within the scope of the principle of non‑retroactivity.

43 First, the Guidelines are capable of producing legal effects. Those effects stem not from any attribute of the Guidelines as rules of law in themselves, but from their adoption and publication by the Commission. By adopting and publishing the Guidelines, the Commission imposes a limit on its own discretion; it cannot depart from those rules under pain of being found, where appropriate, to be in breach of the general principles of law, such as equal treatment or the protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty (see, to that effect, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, paragraph 41 above, paragraphs 209 to 212).

44 Second, as an instrument of competition policy, the Guidelines fall within the scope of the principle of non‑retroactivity, just like a new interpretation by the courts of a rule establishing an offence, in conformity with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 7(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (see, in particular, Eur. Court H.R., S.W. v. United Kingdom and C.R. v. United Kingdom, judgments of 22 November 1995, Series A Nos 335-B and 335-C, §§ 34 to 36 and §§ 32 to 34; Cantoni v. France, judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 1996-V, §§ 29 to 32, and Coëme and Others v. Belgium, judgment of 22 June 2000, Reports, 2000-VII, § 145) which holds that that provision precludes the retroactive application of a new interpretation of a rule establishing an offence. According to that case-law, that is the case in particular where there is an interpretation by the courts which produces a result which was not reasonably foreseeable at the time when the offence was committed, having regard notably to the interpretation of the rule applied in the case-law at the material time. It should however be stated that it follows from that same case-law that the scope of the notion of foreseeability depends to a considerable degree on the content of the text in issue, the field it covers and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed. Thus, a law may still satisfy the requirement of foreseeability even if the person concerned has to take appropriate legal advice to assess, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. More specifically, in accordance with Cantoni v. France (§ 35), this is true particularly in relation to persons carrying on a professional activity, who are used to having to proceed with a high degree of caution when pursuing their occupation. They can on this account be expected to take special care in assessing the risks that such an activity entails (Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, paragraph 41 above, paragraphs 215 to 223).

45 In view of the foregoing, it is therefore necessary to ascertain whether the modification, which consisted in the adoption of the Guidelines, was reasonably foreseeable at the time when the infringements at issue were committed.

46 In that regard, it should be noted that the main innovation in the Guidelines consisted in taking as a starting point for the calculation a basic amount, determined on the basis of brackets laid down for that purpose by the Guidelines; those brackets reflect the various degrees of gravity of infringements but, as such, bear no relation to the relevant turnover. The essential feature of that method is thus that fines are determined on a tariff basis, albeit one that is relative and flexible (Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, paragraph 41 above, paragraph 225).

47 Next, it should be recalled that the fact that the Commission, in the past, imposed fines of a certain level for certain types of infringement does not mean that it is estopped from raising that level within the limits indicated in Regulation No 17 if that is necessary to ensure the implementation of Community competition policy. On the contrary, the proper application of the Community competition rules requires that the Commission may at any time adjust the level of fines to the needs of that policy (see, to that effect, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, paragraph 41 above, paragraph 227; Joined Cases 100/80 to 103/80 Musique diffusion française and Others v Commission [1983] ECR 1825, paragraph 109; Case C‑196/99 P Aristrain v Commission [2003] ECR I‑11005, paragraph 81; Case T‑12/89 Solvay v Commission [1992] ECR II‑907, paragraph 309; Case T‑304/94 Europa Carton v Commission [1998] ECR II‑869, paragraph 89; and Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission, paragraph 41 above, paragraph 56).

48 It follows that undertakings involved in an administrative procedure in which fines may be imposed cannot acquire a legitimate expectation that the Commission will not exceed the level of fines previously imposed or in a method of calculating the fines (Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, paragraph 41 above, paragraph 228).

49 Consequently, the undertakings in question must take account of the possibility that the Commission may decide at any time to raise the level of the fines by reference to that applied in the past. That is true not only where the Commission raises the level of the amount of fines in imposing fines in individual decisions but also if that increase takes effect by the application, in particular cases, of rules of conduct of general application, such as the Guidelines (Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, paragraph 41 above, paragraphs 229 and 230).

50 Thus, ADM is wrong to contend in essence that, in the context of the cartel, the increase in the level of the fines by the Commission is manifestly disproportionate to the objective of ensuring the implementation of competition policy.

51 Similarly, the fact alleged by ADM – even if it were established – that the application of the new policy results in fines of 10 to 34 times higher than those imposed on the basis of the former practice is not capable of leading to a breach of the principle of non­‑retroactivity. Having regard in particular to the case‑law cited in paragraph 44 of this judgment, it must have been reasonably foreseeable for ADM that the Commission could at any time review the general level of fines when implementing another competition policy. Thus, ADM should reasonably have been able to foresee such an increase – even if it were established – at the time when the infringements at issue were committed.

52 Finally, in so far as ADM claims that, to ensure that fines have a deterrent effect, it is essential that undertakings have prior knowledge of the level of fines which they must expect if they commit an infringement of the Community competition rules, it is sufficient to note that the deterrent effect of fines in no way presupposes that undertakings have prior knowledge of the exact level of the fine which they must expect for a particular type of anti‑competitive conduct.

53 As regards the infringement of the principle of equal treatment alleged by ADM, it should be noted that it has already been held that application of the method set out in the Guidelines in calculating the fine imposed on ADM does not constitute discriminatory treatment of ADM by comparison with undertakings which infringed the Community competition rules at the same time but, for reasons pertaining to the time when the infringement was discovered or to the conduct of the administrative procedure initiated against them, were sanctioned before the Guidelines were adopted and published (see, to that effect, Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission, paragraph 41 above, paragraphs 69 to 73; Joined Cases T‑202/98, T‑204/98 and T‑207/98 Tate & Lyle and Others v Commission [2001] ECR II‑2035, paragraphs 118 and 119).

54 Consequently, the complaint alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment must be rejected.

II – Effect of fines already imposed in other countries

A – Arguments of the parties

55 ADM contends that, by refusing to deduct from the fine imposed by the Decision an amount corresponding to the fines already imposed on ADM in the United States and Canada, the Commission infringed the principle that a second penalty may not be imposed for the same offence. As the judgment in Case 7/72 Boehringer v Commission [1972] ECR 1281 shows, the Commission has a duty to set off a penalty imposed by the authorities of a third country against any other penalty if the facts alleged against the applicant by the Commission are the same as those alleged by those authorities. According to the applicant, that is precisely the case here because, by contrast with the case which gave rise to the judgment in Case 7/72 Boehringer v Commission, the cartel sanctioned by the United States and Canadian authorities was the same, in object, geographical extent and duration, as that sanctioned by the Commission, which, moreover, acted on the basis of evidence obtained by the United States authorities.

56 In this connection, ADM contests the assertion made in the Decision that the fines imposed by the United States and Canadian authorities took account of the anti-competitive effects of the cartel only in the area of their jurisdictions (recital 333 of the Decision). On the contrary, according to the applicants, it is clear from the judgment delivered against ADM in the United States on 15 October 1996 that the cartel sanctioned therein was worldwide in scope and affected trade ‘in the United States and elsewhere’. Moreover, the fine was particularly large because of the geographical extent of the offence. In the case brought in Canada, specific account was taken also of the worldwide scope of the cartel.

57 In any event, even if the Commission’s assertion were correct, the fact that other authorities took into account only the local effects of an offence is irrelevant for the purpose of applying the principle that a second penalty may not be imposed for the same offence. According to the judgment in Boehringer v Commission, paragraph 55 above, the sole determining factor in this respect is whether or not the acts complained of are identical. That is confirmed by the Commission’s own decision-making practice: in a 1983 decision it set off against the fines which it imposed on undertakings participating in a cartel fines imposed by the German authorities, although it was ruling only on the aspects of the cartel outside Germany (see Decision 83/546/EEC of 17 October 1983 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article [81] of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (IV/30.064 ─ Cast iron and steel rolls) (OJ 1983 L 317, p. 1)).

58 ADM contends that, when determining the amount of the fine, the Commission failed to take account of the fact that it had already been ordered, in non-member countries, to pay fines and damages in such an amount to deter it from committing any further breaches of competition law. ADM has therefore been punished enough.

59 Furthermore, according to ADM, the Commission is mistaken in finding that the damages paid by ADM in the United States and the Canadian actions were purely compensatory. The damages paid in settlement took account of the treble damages claims of the purchasers in question. They were therefore more than a purely compensatory amount and included a penal element. Consequently the Commission ought to have taken account of the penal amounts in accordance with the principle that a second penalty may not be imposed for the same infringement.

60 The Commission contends that the plea should be rejected.

B – Findings of the Court

61 It should be noted that the principle of ne bis in idem prohibits the same person from being sanctioned more than once for the same unlawful conduct in order to protect one and the same legal interest. The application of that principle is subject to three cumulative conditions: the identity of the facts, the unity of offender and the unity of legal interest protected (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C‑211/00 P, C‑213/00 P, C‑217/00 P and C‑219/00 P Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission [2004] ECR I‑123, paragraph 338).

62 The Community judicature has therefore held that an undertaking may be made the defendant to two parallel sets of proceedings concerning the same infringement and, thus, incur concurrent sanctions, one imposed by the competent authority of the Member State in question, the other a Community sanction, to the extent that the two sets of proceedings pursue different ends and that the legal rules infringed are not the same (Case 14/68 Wilhelm and Others [1969] ECR 1, paragraph 11; Case T-141/89 Tréfileurope v Commission [1995] ECR II‑791, paragraph 191; and Case T‑149/89 Sotralentz v Commission [1995] ECR II‑1127, paragraph 29).

63 It follows that the principle of ne bis in idem cannot, a fortiori, apply in a case such as this one where the procedures conducted and penalties imposed by the Commission on the one hand and the United States and Canadian authorities on the other clearly pursued different ends. The aim of the first was to preserve undistorted competition within the European Union and the EEA, whereas the aim of the second was to protect the United States and Canadian markets (see, to that effect, Joined Cases T‑236/01, T‑239/01, T‑244/01, T‑246/01, T‑251/01 and T‑252/01 Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission [2004] ECR II‑1181, paragraph 134, and the case‑law cited therein). The condition of the unity of the legal interest protected, which is necessary for the principle of ne bis in idem to apply, is not therefore fulfilled.

64 ADM is therefore wrong to rely on the principle of ne bis in idem in the present case.

65 That finding is not called in question by Boehringer v Commission, paragraph 55 above, relied on by ADM. In that case, the Court did not state that the Commission was required to set off a penalty imposed by the authorities of a non-member State where the facts with which the Commission charges an undertaking are the same as those alleged by the first authorities but merely stated that that question should be decided when it arises (Boehringer v Commission, paragraph 55 above, paragraph 3).

66 In any event, even if the principle of fairness could, in certain specific circumstances, compel the Commission to take account of sanctions imposed by the authorities of non‑member States where those States also punish conduct in the Community, ADM has failed to demonstrate that that is the case in this instance and that the United States and Canadian authorities sanctioned the cartel to the extent that it related to the territories of the Community or the EEA.

67 The mere reference in the agreement entered into with the United States authorities to the fact that the cartel related to ‘the United States and elsewhere’ does not show that when calculating the fine the United States authorities took account of applications of the cartel or its effects other than in respect of the United States and, in particular in the EEA (see, to that effect, Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission, paragraph 63 above, paragraph 143).

68 Similarly, as regards the high level of the fine on account of the geographical extent of the infringement, that mere assertion is not sufficient to show that the cartel’s impact on the EEA was taken into consideration.

69 So far as concerns the agreement entered into with the Canadian authorities, ADM fails to adduce the slightest evidence that when determining the amount of the fine those authorities had regard to the applications of the cartel or its effects other than in respect of Canada and, in particular, to those found in the EEA. The reference by the Canadian authorities to the worldwide scope of the cartel, relied on by ADM, was made only to establish the importance of the cartel on the whole of the Canadian market.

70 As regards the deterrent effects of fines already imposed and damages, including non‑compensatory, treble damages, the Court recalls that the Commission’s power to impose fines on undertakings which intentionally or negligently commit an infringement of Article 81(1) EC or Article 82 EC is one of the means conferred on the Commission in order to enable it to carry out the task of supervision entrusted to it by Community law. That task encompasses the duty to pursue a general policy to apply, in competition matters, the principles laid down by the Treaty and to guide the conduct of undertakings in the light of those principles (Musique diffusion française and Others v Commission, paragraph 47 above, paragraph 105).

71 It follows that the Commission has the power to decide the level of fines in order to reinforce their deterrent effect when infringements of a particular type, although established as being unlawful at the outset of Community competition policy, are still relatively frequent on account of the profit that certain of the undertakings concerned are able to derive from them (Musique diffusion française and Others v Commission, paragraph 47 above, paragraph 108).

72 ADM cannot validly argue that there was in its case no such deterrent effect because it had already been sanctioned on the basis of the same facts by the courts of non-member States. The objective of deterrence pursued by the Commission relates to the conduct of undertakings within the Community or the EEA. Consequently, the deterrent effect of a fine imposed on ADM for infringement of the Community competition rules cannot be assessed by reference solely to the particular situation of ADM or by reference to whether it has complied with the competition rules in non-member States outside the EEA (see, to that effect, Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission, paragraph 63 above, paragraphs 146 and 147).

73 The plea that no account was taken of fines imposed in other States must therefore be rejected.

III – The gravity of the infringement

A – Introduction

74 ADM claims that the Commission incorrectly assessed the gravity of the infringement when calculating the amount of the fine. The pleas relied on in that respect concern (i) the failure to have regard to, or to have sufficient regard to the relevant product turnover, (ii) the application of a multiplier to the starting amount and (iii) the actual impact of the cartel on the market.

75 Before ruling on the merits of the various pleas put forward in this connection, it is necessary to summarise the method followed by the Commission in this case in assessing and taking account of the gravity of the infringement, as set out in the recitals of the Decision.

76 It is apparent from the Decision that, in assessing the gravity of the infringement, the Commission found, first, that, having regard to the nature of the infringement, its actual impact on the EEA citric acid market and the scope of the relevant geographic market, namely the whole of the EEA, the parties concerned had committed a very serious infringement (recitals 204 to 232 of the Decision).

77 Next, the Commission considered that it was necessary to apply to the parties concerned differential treatment in order to ‘take account of the effective economic capacity of the offenders to cause significant damage to competition and … set the fine at a level which ensures a sufficiently deterrent effect’. In that context, the Commission stated that it would take account of the specific weight and therefore the real impact of the offending conduct of each undertaking on competition (recitals 233 and 234 of the Decision).

78 For the purposes of assessing those elements, the Commission chose to rely on the worldwide citric acid turnover of the parties concerned during the last year of the infringement, namely 1995. In this respect, the Commission found that given that the citric acid market is global, ‘these figures give the most appropriate picture of the participating undertakings’ capacity to cause significant damage to other operators in the common market and/or the EEA’ (recital 236 of the Decision). The Commission added that, in its view, that approach was supported by the fact that this was a global cartel, the object of which was inter alia to allocate markets on a worldwide level. It found, moreover, that the worldwide turnover of any given party to the cartel also gave an indication of its contribution to the effectiveness of the cartel as a whole or, conversely, of the instability which would have affected the cartel had that party not participated (recital 236 of the Decision).

79 On that basis, the Commission decided to divide the undertakings into three categories: it placed H&R in the first category, arguing that ‘with a worldwide market share of 22%, [it] was the largest player in the market’. It placed ADM, JBL and HLR in the second category, stating that the first two held ‘similar market shares of [confidential]’ and that the latter had a market share of 9%. Lastly, it placed Cerestar in the third category on the ground that it was ‘by far the smallest player’ with a market share of 2.5% in 1995. Thus, the Commission set a starting amount of EUR 35 million for H&R, EUR 21 million for ADM, JBL and HLR, and EUR 3.5 million for Cerestar (recitals 237 to 239 of the Decision).

80 Finally, in order to ensure that the fine had a sufficiently deterrent effect, the Commission adjusted the starting amount on the basis of the size and the worldwide resources of the parties concerned. Thus, the Commission applied a multiplier of 2 (that is an increase of 100%) to the starting amount for ADM, which was thus raised to EUR 42 million, and a multiplier of 2.5 (that is an increase of 150%) to the starting amount for HLR, which therefore rose to EUR 87.5 million (recitals 240 to 246 of the Decision).

B – The failure to have regard to the relevant product turnover

1. Arguments of the parties

81 ADM complains that the Commission failed to have regard to, or had insufficient regard to, relevant product turnover when calculating the basic amount of the fine.

82 First, ADM submits that it is apparent from the case-law of the Court of First Instance that relevant product turnover is an important element in the assessment of fines (Case T-77/92 Parker Pen v Commission [1994] ECR II-549, paragraphs 92 to 95; Joined Cases T-24/93 to T-26/93 and T-28/93 Compagnie maritime belge transports and Others v Commission [1996] ECR II-1201, paragraph 233; Case T-229/94 Deutsche Bahn v Commission [1997] ECR II-1689, paragraph 127; and Case T-327/94 SCA Holding v Commission [1998] ECR II-1373, paragraph 176).

83 ADM submits that consideration of EEA sales in the relevant product is an appropriate starting point for assessing both the damage to competition on the relevant product market within the Community and the relative importance of the participants in the cartel in relation to the products concerned. That conclusion is borne out by the case-law of the Court of First Instance (Europa Carton v Commission, paragraph 47 above, paragraph 126; Case T-309/94 KNP BT v Commission [1998] ECR II-1007, paragraph 108, upheld on appeal by the Court of Justice in Case C-248/98 P KNP BT v Commission [2000] ECR I-9641).

84 Furthermore, the judgment in LR AF 1998 v Commission, paragraph 41 above, confirms that attributing disproportionate importance to an undertaking’s total size in assessing the fine is unlawful.

85 Similarly, ADM submits that, in comparable cases in recent years (Commission Decision 94/601/EC of 13 July 1994 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EC Treaty (IV/C/33.833 – Cartonboard) (OJ 1994 L 243, p. 1); Commission Decision 94/815/EC of 30 November 1994 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EC Treaty (Cases IV/33.126 and 33.322 – Cement) (OJ 1994 L 343, p. 1); Commission Decision 86/398/EEC of 23 April 1986 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/31.149 – Polypropylene) (OJ 1986 L 230, p. 1); Commission Decision 89/515/EEC of 2 August 1989 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/31.553 – Welded steel mesh) (OJ 1989 L 260, p. 1); Commission Decision 94/215/ECSC of 16 February 1994 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty concerning agreements and concerted practices engaged in by European producers of beams (OJ 1994 L 116, p. 1)) the Commission took as its basis sales of the relevant product in the Community market, as it indeed acknowledged in the Decision (recital 253). In relying in those decisions on that basis of calculation, the Commission set fines of between 2.5% and 9% of the undertakings’ relevant product turnover. If the Commission had also applied that basis of calculation in this instance, it would have imposed a fine on ADM of between EUR 1.15 million and EUR 4.14 million. However, in failing to adhere to that basis of calculation, the Commission imposed on ADM fines which were 10 to 34 times higher than those which would have been imposed on that basis.

86 ADM submits that the Commission was also wrong in stating that it took account of the turnover of the parties concerned by dividing them into three categories according to the size of their shares in the worldwide market for citric acid (recital 236). The Commission ought also to have taken account of the limited value of ADM’s citric acid sales in the EEA in 1995.

87 (i) As the Commission itself acknowledges, it must determine the gravity of the infringement and hence the level of the fine by reference to the effects on the EEA. The Commission’s argument on this point at recital 236 of the Decision, to the effect that the worldwide turnover had to be used in that connection because the object of the cartel had been to ‘withhold competitive reserves from the EEA market’ is unfounded. The Decision does not allege that the parties agreed to withhold supplies from the EEA market. ADM states that the cartel agreed quotas on a worldwide basis (recitals 97 to 101 of the Decision) and that there were no separate quotas for Europe. In a cartel affecting EEA consumers, the harm to such consumers is the same whether or not the cartel extends outside the EEA. In this connection, there should be no difference in the assessment of the gravity of the infringement and the fine.

88 (ii) The Commission’s practice is inconsistent. In the ‘Seamless Steel Tubes’ case (Commission Decision 2003/382/EC of 8 December 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 EC (Case IV/E-l/35.860‑B, Seamless steel tubes, OJ 2003 L 140, p. 1) and the ‘Sodium Gluconate’ case (Decision of 2 October 2001 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, COMP/E-l/36.756 – Sodium gluconate) the Commission purported to take into account only EEA sales.

89 (iii) The perverse results that arise if worldwide sales are taken into account are well illustrated in the present case because ADM’s sales in Canada and the United States, which account for almost 50% of its worldwide citric acid sales, were already taken into account by the authorities of those countries when they imposed sanctions on ADM. By taking worldwide sales into account, the Commission imposed a fine which is disproportionate in relation to the ADM sales for which it has already been punished.

90 (iv) ADM maintains that, even if worldwide citric acid sales are an appropriate factor for setting the fine, the Commission did not properly take them into account. The fine on ADM (before applying the Leniency Notice) is 66% of worldwide citric acid sales, which far exceeds any harm to consumers or to competitors occasioned by ADM’s participation in the cartel. Such harm, if any, would have amounted to a fraction of worldwide sales. Rather, the Commission relied exclusively on ADM’s total turnover and resources. ADM submits that disproportionate reliance on total turnover leads to an unlawful fine.

91 Consequently, ADM submits that the Commission not only disregarded the principles deriving from case-law but also violated the principle of proportionality.

92 Second, ADM submits that the Guidelines indicate that it is ‘necessary to take account of the effective economic capacity of the offenders to cause significant damage to other operators, in particular consumers’ and that they also provide, in the case of cartels, for weighting designed to reflect ‘the real impact of the offending conduct of each undertaking on competition’.

93 In ADM’s submission, the economic impact, whether on competition or on other operators, may be assessed only by reference to the amount of affected product sales. Only by taking these sales into account is it possible to assess the scope of the potential harm to consumers or competition in terms of an anti-competitive surcharge or other illegal benefit.

94 Consequently, in failing to take account of relevant product sales, the Commission applied its own guidelines incorrectly.

95 Finally, ADM submits that, in failing to give proper reasons for its decision not to take into account ADM’s EEA sales in the relevant product market, the Commission infringed its obligation to state reasons.

96 The Commission contends that the pleas put forward should be rejected.

2. Findings of the Court

97 ADM alleges infringement, first, of the principle of proportionality and of the Guidelines and, second, of the obligation to state reasons.

a) Infringement of the principle of proportionality

98 As acknowledged by settled case‑law, the gravity of infringements has to be determined by reference to numerous factors, such as the particular circumstances of the case and its context; moreover, there is no binding or exhaustive list of the criteria which must be applied (order in Case C‑137/95 P SPO and Others v Commission [1996] ECR I‑1611, paragraph 54; Case C-219/95 P Ferriere Nord v Commission [1997] ECR I‑4411, paragraph 33; and Case T‑9/99 HFB and Others v Commission [2002] ECR II‑1487, paragraph 443).

99 Furthermore, according to settled case-law, the criteria for assessing the gravity of an infringement may include the volume and value of the goods in respect of which the infringement was committed and the size and economic power of the undertaking and, consequently, the influence which it was able to exert on the relevant market. It follows that, on the one hand, it is permissible, for the purpose of fixing a fine, to have regard both to the total turnover of the undertaking, which gives an indication, albeit approximate and imperfect, of the size of the undertaking and of its economic power, and to the market share of the undertakings concerned on the relevant market, which gives an indication of the scale of the infringement. On the other hand, it follows that it is important not to confer on one or other of those figures an importance which is disproportionate in relation to other factors and the fixing of an appropriate fine cannot therefore be the result of a simple calculation based on total turnover (see, to that effect, Musique diffusion française and Others v Commission, paragraph 47 above, paragraphs 120 and 121; Parker Pen v Commission, paragraph 82 above, paragraph 94; SCA Holding v Commission, paragraph 82 above, paragraph 176; Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission, paragraph 41 above, paragraph 187; and HFB and Others v Commission, paragraph 98 above, paragraph 444).

100 It follows that, although it cannot be denied, as ADM states, that turnover in the relevant product is an appropriate starting point for assessing both the damage to competition on the relevant product market within the Community and the relative importance of the participants in the cartel in relation to the products concerned, the fact remains that that is by no means the only criterion according to which the Commission should assess the gravity of the infringement.

101 Consequently, contrary to what ADM submits, if an assessment of the proportionality of the fine were confined, as it seems to propose, merely to the correlation between the fine imposed and the relevant product turnover, that would confer disproportionate importance on that criterion. It is necessary to assess the proportionality of that fine by reference to all the factors which the Commission must take into account when determining the gravity of the infringement, namely, the actual nature of the infringement, its actual impact on the relevant market and the scope of the geographic market.

102 The merits of the Decision in relation to some of those criteria will be examined on the basis of ADM’s four arguments, which seek in essence to establish that the Commission should, in the present case, have used in this connection the turnover of the undertakings concerned at EEA level and not at worldwide level.

103 By its first argument, ADM criticises in substance the fact that, at recital 236 of the Decision, the Commission found that it was necessary to use the worldwide turnover to divide the parties concerned into three categories because the object of the cartel had been to ‘withhold competitive reserves from the EEA market’. According to ADM, the Decision does not allege that the parties had agreed to withhold supplies from the EEA market.

104 The Court considers that ADM cites that part of the Decision out of its context. When recital 236 of the Decision is read as a whole, it is clear that, in the Commission’s opinion, in the context of a worldwide cartel like that in the present case, only the worldwide turnover makes it possible to assess the effective capacity of the parties concerned to cause damage to the relevant market. Consequently, that first argument is unfounded.

105 By its second argument, ADM seeks to show that, in its recent administrative practice, the Commission itself relied on EEA turnover.

106 The Court notes however that the two decisions which ADM relies on in support of that argument are not relevant in the present case. In the ‘Seamless Steel Tubes’ case (see paragraph 88 above), the Commission did not divide the parties concerned into categories (see recitals 159 to 162 of the decision in that case). As regards the ‘Sodium Gluconate’ case (see paragraph 88 above), the Commission relied on worldwide turnover to divide the undertakings into categories, as in the present case. ADM’s argument is therefore factually incorrect.

107 By its third argument, ADM raises in essence the fact that its citric acid sales in Canada and the United States, which account for almost 50% of its worldwide citric acid sales, were already taken into account by the authorities of those countries when they imposed sanctions on ADM. In so far as, by that argument, ADM repeats in essence the complaint alleging breach of the principle that a second penalty may not be imposed for the same offence, that argument has already been rejected by the Court as unfounded (see paragraphs 61 to 73 above). In so far as, by that argument, ADM submits that it is not for the Commission to set the fine on the basis of conduct outside the Community area, that argument is factually incorrect. The Commission did not use worldwide turnover as a basis for calculating the fine, but only as a means of determining the effective economic capacity of each undertaking to cause damage to competition and to set the fine at a level which ensured that it had sufficient deterrent effect for each undertaking, which is justified in the light of the worldwide nature of the cartel.

108 By its fourth argument, ADM seeks in essence to establish that taking into account worldwide citric acid sales leads to a disproportionate fine in relation to the damage caused to consumers and to competition.

109 It should be recalled that in the present case, the cartel is made up of undertakings operating at worldwide level and holding 60% of the relevant product market at worldwide level and, in particular, concerns, apart from price-fixing, also market sharing by means of allocating sales quotas. In such a case, the Commission may legitimately rely, as it has done in the present case, on the respective worldwide citric acid turnover of the members of that cartel for the purpose of differentiating between the parties concerned. The objective of that differential treatment is to assess the effective economic capacity of offenders to cause damage to competition by their offending conduct and, therefore, to take account of their specific weight within the cartel. Consequently, the Commission did not exceed its wide margin of assessment in this respect in finding that the respective worldwide market share of the cartel members was an appropriate indication.

110 The pleas alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality must therefore be rejected.

b) Infringement of the Guidelines

111 As regards infringement of the Guidelines, the Court notes that they do not provide that fines are to be calculated according to the overall turnover of undertakings or their turnover in the relevant market. However, nor do they preclude the Commission from taking such turnover figures into account in determining the amount of the fine in order to ensure compliance with the general principles of Community law and where circumstances demand it (see, to that effect, LR AF 1998 v Commission, paragraph 41 above, paragraph 283, upheld on appeal in Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, paragraph 41 above, paragraph 258, and Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission, paragraph 41 above, paragraph 187).

112 Consequently, the Guidelines do not provide that the turnover figures of the undertakings concerned – whether the overall turnover or the relevant product turnover – constitute the starting point for calculating the fines and, still less, that they constitute the only relevant criteria for assessing the gravity of the infringement.

113 On the other hand, the Commission may take account of turnover as one among a number of relevant factors. This is particularly so where, in accordance with the third to sixth paragraphs of Section 1A of the Guidelines, the Commission adjusts the amount in order to ensure that the fines have a sufficiently deterrent effect. In that respect, the Commission takes account of the effective economic capacity of the offenders to cause significant damage to other operators and of the need to ensure that the fine has a sufficiently deterrent effect (Section 1A, fourth paragraph) and applies weightings to the amounts determined on the basis of the specific weight and, therefore, the real impact of the offending conduct of each undertaking on competition, particularly where there is considerable disparity between the sizes of the undertakings committing infringements of the same type (Section 1A, sixth paragraph).

114 In the present case, the Commission submitted in its pleadings that it relied on turnover in the relevant product market in order to assess the relative importance of each undertaking. As is clear from recital 236 of the Decision, the Commission did indeed have regard to the worldwide turnover for the product in question in order to take account of the relative importance of the undertakings on the relevant market. As was already held at paragraphs 77 and 78 above, the Commission found that, in order to apply differential treatment to take account of the effective economic capacity of the offenders to cause significant damage to competition and to set the fine at a level which ensures a sufficiently deterrent effect, it chose to rely on the worldwide citric acid turnover of the parties concerned during the last year of the infringement, namely 1995.

115 In the present case, the cartel is made up of undertakings which hold a very large part of the relevant product market at worldwide level. Moreover, the cartel concerns price-fixing and market sharing by means of allocating sales quotas. In such a case, the Commission may legitimately rely on the worldwide citric acid turnover of the members of that cartel for the purpose of differentiating between the undertakings concerned. Since the objective of that differential treatment is to assess the effective economic capacity of offenders to cause damage to competition by their offending conduct and, therefore, to take account of their specific weight within the cartel, the Commission did not exceed its wide margin of assessment in finding that the worldwide market share of the respective members of the cartel was an appropriate indication.

116 Consequently, the plea alleging infringement of the Guidelines must be rejected.

c) Infringement of the obligation to state reasons

117 It is settled case-law that the statement of reasons required by Article 253 EC must show clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the Community authority which adopted the contested measure, so as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for it and to enable the competent court to exercise its power of review. The requirement to state reasons must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. In that regard, it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 253 EC must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (Case C‑367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France [1998] ECR I‑1719, paragraph 63, and Case C‑301/96 Germany v Commission [2003] ECR I‑9919, paragraph 87).

118 In the case of a decision imposing fines on several undertakings for an infringement of the Community competition rules, the scope of the obligation to state reasons must be established, inter alia, in the light of the fact that the gravity of infringements must be determined by reference to numerous factors including, in particular, the specific circumstances of the case and its context; moreover, no binding or exhaustive list of the criteria which must be applied has been drawn up (order in SPO and Others v Commission, paragraph 98 above, paragraph 54).

119 In the present case, the Commission calculated the amount of the fine to be imposed on an undertaking on the basis of its turnover for the relevant product; however it did not take account of the relevant product turnover in the EEA, but at worldwide level (see paragraph 114 above). Contrary to what ADM asserts, the Commission was not required to take account of the turnover for the relevant product in the EEA (see paragraph 111 above). Consequently, it cannot be criticised for failing to state why it did not use that factor in calculating the fine imposed.

120 Accordingly, the plea alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons must also be rejected.

C – Application of a multiplier to the starting amount

1. Arguments of the parties

121 ADM submits that increasing the starting amount by a multiplier of 2 (recital 246 of the Decision) is a manifestly disproportionate measure, which is also inadequately reasoned and in breach of the principle of equal treatment.

122 First, ADM observes that, in the lawsuits brought in the United States and Canada for infringements under competition law, it has already paid fines (30 million United States Dollars (USD) in the United States and 2 million Canadian Dollars (CAD) in Canada), paid compensation (of USD 83 million) to consumers, paid some USD 34 million to settle the action brought against it by its shareholders, had one of its employees sentenced to prison in the United States, and has adopted a global policy of compliance with competition law. All those sanctions and measures make the imposition by the Commission of a new deterrent penalty unnecessary and disproportionate.

123 Second, given that undertakings are rational economic entities, if a fine is to act as a deterrent, it is necessary only that it be set at a level at which the expected amount exceeds the profit from the infringement. If undertakings appreciate that the loss associated with the punishment eliminates the cartel profit, the fine will already act as a deterrent. That approach was endorsed by the Court of Justice in Musique diffusion française and Others v Commission, paragraph 47 above (paragraph 108). It is also reflected in the Guidelines, which provide (at Section 1A, fourth paragraph) that the deterrent effect is to be assessed by reference to the capacity of the cartel participants to cause damage to consumers and consequently require that any illegal cartel surcharge be taken into account when consideration is given to appropriate deterrence. That approach is also commonly found in other Community rules.

124 ADM does not dispute that total turnover may be taken into account for the purposes of calculating the fine. However, attributing disproportionate importance to total turnover results in a disproportionate fine. The Commission confines itself in this regard to defending the uplift applied by comparing it with ADM’s total turnover. There is no rational explanation capable of justifying the fact that calculation of the deterrent uplift concentrated on ADM’s total turnover. The Commission’s approach fails to explain why it was necessary to cancel out ADM’s profits from sales of products which were not related to the infringement at issue in order to discourage the parties concerned from pursuing their activities in a citric acid cartel.

125 Third, ADM repeats that an effective deterrent penalty should nullify the expected profit from the cartel (see paragraph 123 above). In the present case, however, it was JBL that made the highest annual sales in the EEA (EUR 77 million) and therefore received the largest amount from the cartel. However, there was no deterrent increase in JBL’s fine at that stage of the calculation. ADM, in contrast, with annual sales of EUR 46 million in the EEA, had the basic amount of its fine doubled by a deterrent increase of EUR 21 million. ADM infers from this that the Commission infringed the principle of equal treatment.

126 Fourth, ADM submits that the Commission cannot properly claim in its defence that ADM was simultaneously a party to two other cartels in addition to the citric acid cartel. This was not mentioned in the Decision. Furthermore, in each of the decisions relating to those cartels the Commission applied a multiplier to ensure that the fine was sufficiently deterrent.

127 Fifth, ADM asserts that the Decision does not give sufficient reasons in that regard. The Commission did not state the basis on which an increase of such magnitude could be deemed necessary to have a deterrent effect. It merely stated that larger companies should receive higher fines, but failed to show why it was considered appropriate to double ADM’s fine in the present case and whether factors such as the penalties already imposed to deter companies from seeking to profit from the cartel had been taken into account. According to ADM, the Commission had a duty in the present case to set out clearly the reasons for adopting the measure at issue. There are no published cases in which the Commission has added a ‘sufficient deterrent’ uplift as an additional step in the fines calculation procedure. Moreover, the increase represents a significant part of the fine ultimately imposed on ADM.

128 The Commission contends that the pleas put forward should be rejected.

2. Findings of the Court

a) Infringement of the principle of proportionality

129 In so far as ADM claims in essence that, given that undertakings are rational economic entities and that, if a fine is to act as a deterrent, it is necessary only that it be set at a level at which the expected amount exceeds the profit from the infringement, it should be recalled that deterrence is one of the main considerations which must guide the Commission when setting fines (Case 41/69 Chemiefarma v Commission [1970] ECR 661, paragraph 173, and Case 49/69 BASF v Commission [1972] ECR 713, paragraph 38).

130 However, if the fine were set at a level which merely negated the profits of the cartel, it would not be a deterrent. It is reasonable to assume that when making financial calculations and management decisions, undertakings take account rationally not only of the level of fines that they risk incurring in the event of an infringement but also the likelihood of the cartel being detected. In addition, if the purpose of the fine were to be confined merely to negating the expected profit or advantage, insufficient account would be taken of the fact that the conduct in question constitutes an infringement of Article 81(1) EC. To regard the fine merely as compensating for the damage incurred would be to overlook not only the deterrent effect, which can relate only to future conduct, but also the punitive nature of such a measure in relation to the actual infringement committed.

131 Similarly, in the case of an undertaking which, like ADM, is active on a large number of markets and has a particularly large financial capacity, to take into account turnover on the relevant market cannot suffice to ensure that the fine has deterrent effect. The larger an undertaking is and the more overall resources it has at its disposal which enable it to act independently on the market, the more it must be aware of the importance of its role as regards the smooth functioning of competition on the market. Consequently, the factual circumstances of the economic power of an undertaking which has been found guilty of an infringement must be taken into account when considering the gravity of the infringement. Accordingly, taking into account ADM’s total turnover in order to calculate the amount of the fine does not lead to a disproportionate fine in this instance.

132 Consequently, the plea alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality must be rejected.

b) Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

133 Under the principle of equal treatment, the Commission must not treat comparable situations differently and must not treat different situations in the same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified (Case 106/83 Sermide [1984] ECR 4209, paragraph 28, and Case T-311/94 BPB deEendracht v Commission [1998] ECR II‑1129, paragraph 309).

134 ADM claims in essence that, despite JBL’s higher citric acid sales (EUR 77 million as opposed to ADM’s sales of EUR 46 million), the Commission did not increase JBL’s fine by the same amoun