ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Germany) lodged on 28 January 2020 — F. v Stadt Karlsruhe

(Case C-47/20)

(2020/C 161/39)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesverwaltungsgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: F.

Defendant: Stadt Karlsruhe

Question referred

Do Article 2(1) and Article 11(4), second subparagraph, of Directive 2006/126/EC (1) preclude a Member State, within the sovereign territory of which the holder of an EU driving licence for vehicles in categories A and B issued by another Member State had his right to drive vehicles in the first Member State under that driving licence withdrawn because of drink-driving, from refusing to recognise a driving licence for those categories which was issued to the person concerned in the second Member State, after that right had been withdrawn, through renewal of the licence pursuant to Article 7(3), second subparagraph, of Directive 2006/126/EC?

(1) Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on driving licences (OJ 2006 L 403, p. 18).
2.

If the first question is to be answered to the effect that the procedure referred to in point 1 has to be regulated solely in the network statement of the infrastructure managers involved in a freight corridor, is the review of the network statement by a national regulatory body governed in this respect by Article 20 of Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 or likewise exclusively by the provisions of Directive 2012/34/EU and the national legislation adopted for its transposition? (a) If the review is governed by Article 20 of Regulation (EU) No 913/2010, is it compatible with the provisions of that article for a national regulatory body to object to a regulation in the network statement such as that referred to in point 1, without acting jointly and in a substantively uniform manner with the regulatory bodies of the other States involved in the freight corridor or at least consulting them beforehand in order to ensure a uniform approach? (b) In so far as the review is governed by the provisions of Directive 2012/34/EU and the national legislation adopted for its transposition, is it compatible with those provisions, in particular with the general duty of coordination laid down in the second sentence of Article 57(1) of that directive, for a national regulatory body to object to such a regulation, without acting jointly and in a substantively uniform manner with the regulatory bodies of the other States involved in the freight corridor or at least having consulted them beforehand in order to ensure a uniform approach?
(a)

Must clause 4 of the framework agreement on fixed-term work, concluded on 18 March 1999 and annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999, (1) be construed as requiring that the periods of service carried out by a fixed-term worker employed by the Authority, in duties which coincide with those of a permanent employee in the corresponding category of that authority, be taken into account to determine his or her length of service, even where his or her subsequent permanent recruitment takes place further to an open competition, and notwithstanding the specific features of the open competition procedure, which, for the reasons already stated, leads to a complete novation of the relationship and, with an interruption acknowledged by the participant in the open competition procedure, to a new relationship characterised by official recruitment, special obligations and the special features of greater permanency?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzgericht (Austria) lodged on 4 February 2020 — DBKAG v Finanzamt Linz

(Case C-59/20)

(2020/C 191/11)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesfinanzgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: DBKAG

Defendant: Finanzamt Linz

Question referred

Must Article 135(1)(g) of Directive 2006/112/EC (1) be interpreted as meaning that, for the purposes of the tax exemption provided for by that provision, the term ‘management of special investment funds’ also includes the granting by a third-party licensor to an investment management company (‘IMC’) of a right to use specialist software specifically designed for the management of special investment funds where, as in the case in the main proceedings, that specialist software is intended exclusively to perform specific and essential activities in connection with the management of the special investment funds but runs on the technical infrastructure of the IMC and can perform its functions only subject to the minor participation of the IMC and subject to ongoing recourse to market data provided by the IMC?

(1) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).
1.

Do Articles 12 EC, 18 EC, 39 EC, 43 EC and 56 EC preclude national legislation, such as that in dispute in the main proceedings, that, by default, subjects capital gains resulting from the disposal of immovable property situated in a Member State, where that disposal was made by a resident of another Member State, to tax treatment different from that which would apply, in relation to the same type of transaction, to capital gains realised by a resident of the State in which that immovable property is situated, but provides that the non-resident taxable person can elect to be taxed in the same way as a resident taxable person?
2.

If the first question is answered in the affirmative and the taxable person fails to fulfil that evidentiary obligation, can the right to deduct input tax be refused without it being established that that taxable person knew or could have known that by acquiring the goods or services in question he was participating in tax fraud?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākā tiesa (Senāts) (Latvia) lodged on 28 February 2020 — Līga Šenfelde v Lauku atbalsta dienests

(Case C-119/20)

(2020/C 201/22)

Language of the case: Latvian

Referring court

Augstākā tiesa (Senāts)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant at first instance and respondent on appeal on a point of law: Līga Šenfelde

Other party to the proceedings: Lauku atbalsta dienests

Questions referred

Must Article 19(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, (1) in conjunction with other provisions of the aforementioned regulation and the European Union Guidelines for State aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural areas 2014 to 2020, be interpreted as meaning that:

1. a farmer loses his or her ‘young farmer’ status solely by virtue of having received small farm development aid, as provided for in Article 19(1)(a)(iii) of the Regulation, two years previously;

2. those provisions authorise Member States to enact legislation to the effect that a farmer is not to be paid the aid provided for in Article 19(1)(a)(i) of the Regulation if he or she has already been granted the aid provided for in Article 19(1)(a)(iii);

3. a Member State is has the power to refuse to cumulate aid for a farmer in the case where the cumulation sequence laid down in the rural development programme agreed with the European Commission has not been complied with?

(1) OJ 2013 L 347, p. 487.
1.

Where (i) a tax authority, the supplier and the trader who is a taxable person misinterpret European VAT legislation and treat a supply, which is taxable at the standard rate, as exempt from VAT, (ii) the contract between the supplier and the trader stated that the price for the supply was exclusive of VAT and provided that if VAT were due the trader should bear the cost of it, (iii) the supplier never claims and can no longer claim the additional VAT due from the trader, and (iv) the tax authority cannot or can no longer (through the operation of limitation) claim from the supplier the VAT which should have been paid, is the effect of the Directive (1) that the price actually paid is the combination of a net chargeable amount plus VAT thereon so that the trader can claim to deduct input tax under article 168(a) of the Directive as VAT which was in fact ‘paid’ in respect of that supply?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 24 February 2020 by Société des produits Nestlé SA against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 19 December 2019 in Case T-40/19, Amigüitos pets & life v EUIPO — Société des produits Nestlé

(Case C-97/20 P)

(2020/C 247/07)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Société des produits Nestlé SA (represented by: A. Jaeger-Lenz, C. Elkemann and A. Lambrecht, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: Amigüitos pets & life SA (represented by: N.A. Fernández Fernández-Pacheco, abogado), European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 4 June 2020, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) decided that the appeal should not be allowed to proceed and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
4.

Are Article 4(1) and the first subparagraph of Article 4(4) of Directive 77/388/EEC to be interpreted as permitting a Member State to regard a person as not being independent within the meaning of Article 4(1) of Directive 77/388/EEC if that person is integrated into the undertaking of another undertaking (‘Organträger’, controlling company) in financial, economic and organisational terms in such a way that the controlling company is able to impose its will on the person and thus prevent the person from forming his own will, which diverges from that of the controlling company?
2.

If the answer to question 1 is in the affirmative, can a worker who is not restricted other than by a requirement to respond to a call- in within a desirable turn-out period of 5 minutes and a maximum turn-out period of 10 minutes, and who is able, without restriction, to be employed contemporaneously by another employer or to engage in business on his own account while ‘on-call’, be regarded as engaged in ‘working time’ on behalf of the employer in respect of which employment he or she is ‘on call’?
1.

Having regard to recital 20 of Directive 2008/101, are Directive 2003/87/EC (1) and Directive 2008/101/EC (2) to be interpreted as precluding the annulment of the free allocation of aviation allowances to an aircraft operator for the years 2018 to 2020 if the allocation for the years 2013 to 2020 has been made and the aircraft operator ceased its aviation activities in 2017 due to insolvency? Is Article 3f(1) of Directive 2003/87 to be interpreted as meaning that the annulment of the allocation decision after aviation activities have been ceased due to insolvency is dependent on whether there has been a continuation of the aviation activities by other air transport operators? Is Article 3f(1) of Directive 2003/87 to be interpreted as meaning that there has been a continuation of aviation activities if landing rights at so-called coordinated airports (slots) have been sold in part (for the insolvent air carrier’s short- and medium-haul operations) to three other air transport operators?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Commissione Tributaria Regionale del Lazio (Italy) lodged on 10 June 2020 — Agenzia delle dogane e dei monopoli — Ufficio delle dogane di Gaeta v Punto Nautica Srl

(Case C-255/20)

(2020/C 279/47)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Commissione Tributaria Regionale del Lazio

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Agenzia delle dogane e dei monopoli — Ufficio delle dogane di Gaeta

Respondent: Punto Nautica Srl

Question referred

Must the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union handed down in Case C-82/12, and Article 3(2) of Council Directive 92/12/EEC, (1) be interpreted as precluding the provisions of Italian law currently in force as set out in Article 17 of Legislative Decree No 398 of 21 December 1990 and in Article 3(1) of Lazio Regional Law … No 19 of 2011, which appear to introduce a regional tax on transport petrol which is not for ‘specific purposes’ as required by the abovementioned Community directive?

(1) Council Directive 92/12/EEC of 25 February 1992 on the general arrangements for products subject to excise duty and on the holding, movement and monitoring of such products (OJ 1992 L 76, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 17 March 2020 — BD v Deutsche Lufthansa AG

(Case C-150/20)

(2020/C 279/30)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: BD

Defendant: Deutsche Lufthansa AG

Questions referred

Is Directive (EU) 2016/681 (1) compatible with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter) in relation to the following points:

(1) Are the PNR data to be transferred under the directive sufficiently specified, having regard to Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter?

(2) In view of its scope and having regard to Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, does the directive provide for sufficient objective differentiation when PNR data are collected and transferred, in relation to the type of flights and the threat level in a particular country and in relation to the comparison against databases and patterns?

(3) Is the blanket, indiscriminating retention period for all PNR data compatible with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter?

(4) Having regard to Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, does the directive provide for adequate procedural protection of passengers in respect of the use of retained PNR data?

(5) Having regard to Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, does the directive adequately safeguard the level of protection of European fundamental rights when PNR data are transferred to third country authorities by third countries?

(1) Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime (OJ 2016 L 119, p. 132).
3.

As regards the interpretation of the first sentence of Article 14(1)(a) of Directive 2008/9/EC, read in conjunction with Article 167 and Article 178 of Directive 2006/112/EC, what are the effects of the annulment of invoices and the issuing of new invoices in respect of purchases of goods made before the ‘refund period’ on the exercise of the right to a refund of the VAT relating to those purchases? To that end, it is necessary to clarify whether, in the event of the annulment, by the supplier, of the invoices initially issued for the purchase of goods and the issuing of new invoices by that supplier at a later date, the exercise of the right of the recipient to apply for a refund of the VAT relating to the purchases is to be linked to the date of the new invoices, in a situation where the annulment of the initial invoices and the issuing of the new invoices is not within the recipient’s control but is exclusively at the supplier’s discretion.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal du travail francophone de Bruxelles (Belgium) lodged on 25 June 2020 — CO, ME, GC and 42 Others v MJ, European Commission, European External Action Service, Council of the European Union, Eulex Kosovo

(Case C-283/20)

(2020/C 297/43)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal du travail francophone de Bruxelles

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: CO, ME, GC and 42 Others

Defendants: MJ, European Commission, European External Action Service, Council of the European Union, Eulex Kosovo

Question referred

Should Articles 8.3 and 10.3 of Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO, (1) before its amendment by Council Decision 2014/349/CFSP of 12 June 2014, (2) where necessary in combination with any other possibly relevant provisions, be read as conferring on the Head of Mission, personally and on his or her own behalf, the status of employer of the international civilian staff members employed in the service of the EULEX KOSOVO Mission during the period before 12 June 2014 or, having regard, in particular, to Articles 8.5 and 9.3 of Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP before its amendment on 12 June 2014, as conferring the status of employer on the European Union and/or an institution of the European Union such as the European Commission, the European External Action Service, the Council of the European Union or any other institution on behalf of which the Head of Mission acted until that date by virtue of a mandate, delegation of power or any other form of representation to be determined where necessary?

(1) OJ 2008 L 42, p. 92.

(2) Council Decision 2014/349/CFSP of 12 June 2014 amending Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO (OJ 2014 L 174, p. 42).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sofiyski rayonen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 25 June 2020 — ZN v Generalno konsulstvo (General Consulate) of the Republic of Bulgaria in the City of Valencia, Kingdom of Spain

(Case C-280/20)

(2020/C 287/45)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Sofiyski rayonen sad

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: ZN

Defendant: Generalno konsulstvo (General Consulate) of the Republic of Bulgaria in the City of Valencia, Kingdom of Spain

Question referred

Is Article 5(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012, (1) in conjunction with recital (3) thereof, to be interpreted as meaning that the regulation applies for the purpose of determining the international jurisdiction of the courts of a Member State to adjudicate in a dispute between a worker from that Member State and the consular service of that Member State in the sovereign territory of another Member State, or should those provisions be interpreted as meaning that the national jurisdictional rules of the Member State of which both parties are nationals apply to such a dispute?

(1) Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1).
3.

Are the following concepts: a. ‘right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’, as referred to in Article 21 TFEU; b. ‘internal market’ which ‘shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties’, as referred to in Article 26 TFEU; c. ‘freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Union’, as referred to in Article 45 TFEU; d. ‘restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited’, as referred to in Articles 49 to 55 TFEU; [and] e. ‘restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Union shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a Member State other than that of the person for whom the services are intended’, as referred to in Articles 56 to 62 TFEU to be interpreted as meaning that national provisions that could, indirectly, covertly and/or materially, limit or hinder the ability of European citizens to exercise the right of freedom of movement and residence within the territory of the Member States, the right of freedom of movement for workers within the Union, freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services, or in any way affect those rights, are also prohibited?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation (France) lodged on 10 June 2020 — Gtflix Tv v DR

(Case C-251/20)

(2020/C 297/38)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour de cassation

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Gtflix Tv

Defendant: DR

Question referred

Must Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (1) be interpreted as meaning that a person who, considering that his or her rights have been infringed by the dissemination of derogatory comments on the internet, brings proceedings not only for the rectification of information and the removal of content but also for compensation for the resulting non-material and material damage, may claim, before the courts of each Member State in the territory of which content published online is or was accessible, compensation for the damage caused in the territory of that Member State, in accordance with the judgment in eDate Advertising (paragraphs 51 and 52) [judgment of the Court of 25 October 2011, Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10], or whether, pursuant to the judgment in Svensk Handel (paragraph 48) [judgment of the Court of 17 October 2017, Case C-194/16], that person must make the application for compensation before the court with jurisdiction to order rectification of the information and removal of the derogatory comments?

(1) Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 30 July 2020 by Liviu Dragnea against the order of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 12 May 2020 in Case T-738/18, Dragnea v Commission

(Case C-351/20 P)

(2020/C 313/22)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Liviu Dragnea (represented by: C. Toby, O. Riffaud, B. Entringer, avocats)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the disputed order of the General Court in whole;

— annul the Commission decision (OCM(2018)20575) sent to the legal representative of the applicant by letter dated 1 October 2018;

— order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

First plea in law, alleging a breach of articles 9(1), 9(2) and 9(4) of the OLAF Regulation (1) and a violation of the rights of defence of the applicant in the investigations, including the right to be heard and the respect of the presumption of innocence.

Second plea in law, alleging a breach of the principle of sound administration in relation to the investigations as well as the refusal to open an investigation on the conduct of the OLAF investigation.

Third plea in law, alleging a violation of the right of access to documents concerning the OLAF investigations.

(1) Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ 2013, L 248, p. 1).