ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
14

Having been called, on 15 June 2009, to an interview preliminary to possible dismissal, Ms Bougnaoui was dismissed by a letter of 22 June 2009 that stated as follows: ‘... As part of your duties, you are called upon to take part in assignments for our customers. We asked you to work for the customer … on 15 May, at their site in .... Following that work, the customer told us that the wearing of a veil, which you in fact wear every day, had upset a number of its employees. It also requested that there should be “no veil next time”. When you were taken on by our company, in your interviews with your Operational Manager … and the Recruitment Manager …, the subject of wearing a veil had been addressed very clearly with you. We said to you that we entirely respect the principle of freedom of opinion and the religious beliefs of everyone, but that, since you would be in contact internally or externally with the company’s customers, you would not be able to wear the veil in all circumstances. In the interests of the business and for its development we are obliged, vis-à-vis our customers, to require that discretion is observed as regards the expression of the personal preferences of our employees. At our interview on 17 June, we reaffirmed that principle of the need for neutrality to you and we asked you to apply it as regards our customers. We asked you again whether you could accept those professional requirements by agreeing not to wear the veil, and you answered in the negative. We consider that those facts justify, for the aforementioned reasons, the termination of your contract of employment. Inasmuch as your position makes it impossible for you to carry out your functions on behalf of the company, since we cannot contemplate, given your stance, your continuing to provide services at our customers’ premises, you will not be able to work out your notice period. Since that failure to work during the notice period is attributable to you, you will not be remunerated for your notice period. We regret this situation as your professional competence and your potential had led us to hope for a long-term working relationship.’
3

Under Article 29(1) and (2) of the Customs Code: ‘1. The customs value of imported goods shall be the transaction value, that is, the price actually paid or payable for the goods when sold for export to the customs territory of the Community, adjusted, where necessary, in accordance with Articles 32 and 33, provided: (a) that there are no restrictions as to the disposal or use of the goods by the buyer, other than restrictions which: — are imposed or required by a law or by the public authorities in the Community; — limit the geographical area in which the goods may be resold or — do not substantially affect the value of the goods; (b) that the sale or price is not subject to some condition or consideration for which a value cannot be determined with respect to the goods being valued; (c) that no part of the proceeds of any subsequent resale, disposal or use of the goods by the buyer will accrue directly or indirectly to the seller, unless an appropriate adjustment can be made in accordance with Article 32 and (d) that the buyer and seller are not related, or, where the buyer and seller are related, that the transaction value is acceptable for customs purposes under paragraph 2. (a) In determining whether the transaction value is acceptable for the purposes of paragraph 1, the fact that the buyer and the seller are related shall not in itself be sufficient grounds for regarding the transaction value as unacceptable. Where necessary, the circumstances surrounding the sale shall be examined and the transaction value shall be accepted provided that the relationship did not influence the price. If, in the light of information provided by the declarant or otherwise, the customs authorities have grounds for considering that the relationship influenced the price, they shall communicate their grounds to the declarant and he shall be given a reasonable opportunity to respond. If the declarant so requests, the communication of the grounds shall be in writing. (b) In a sale between related persons, the transaction value shall be accepted and the goods valued in accordance with paragraph 1 wherever the declarant demonstrates that such value closely approximates to one of the following occurring at or about the same time: (i) the transaction value in sales, between buyers and sellers who are not related in any particular case, of identical or similar goods for export to the Community; (ii) the customs value of identical or similar goods, as determined under Article 30(2)(c); (iii) the customs value of identical or similar goods, as determined under Article 30(2)(d); In applying the foregoing tests, due account shall be taken of demonstrated differences in commercial levels, quantity levels, the elements enumerated in Article 32 and costs incurred by the seller in sales in which he and the buyer are not related and where such costs are not incurred by the seller in sales in which he and the buyer are related. (c) The tests set forth in subparagraph (b) are to be used at the initiative of the declarant and only for comparison purposes. Substitute values may not be established under the said subparagraph.’
14

Paragraph 29/A(1), (4), (6) and (7) of the Law on road tolls, inserted into that Law by Law No LIV of 2014, with effect from 9 November 2014, provides: ‘(1) In the circumstances set out in subparagraphs (2) to (4), applicants who present an application to the body designated to collect the toll (“the body responsible for collecting the toll”), in accordance with the provisions of subparagraphs (6) and (7) (“the application”), shall be exempt under the provisions of this Law from the payment of the fine imposed for driving without authorisation along a route defined in Paragraph 14(a), at a time between 1 July 2013 and 31 March 2014. … (4) On the basis of an application that is well founded under subparagraph (7), the applicant shall be exempt from the payment of the fine imposed for breach of Paragraph 14(a) where the imposition of the fine was triggered by use of a section of a toll road system or a road in the same direction — within the period of validity of the route ticket and on no more than one occasion at a particular checkpoint for each direction of travel — that is considered to be functionally parallel, from the point of view of the road system, to the section in respect of which the vehicle in question had an authorisation to travel at the same period of time, and did not in fact use that authorisation during its period of validity. … (6) In addition to what is provided for in Paragraphs (2) to (4), in order to obtain an exemption from the fine, before making the application, the applicant is required to have paid to the body responsible for collecting the toll, in respect of each fine, a service charge in the sum of HUF 12000 [approximately EUR 39], including VAT, and this payment must have been paid at the time that the application is lodged. … (7) An application may be lodged within 60 days following the entry into force of Law No LIV of 2014, amending [the Law on road tolls]. The body responsible for collecting the toll, on the basis of an application that is lodged, where the content of the application complies with the requirements of this Law and the information does not differ from the data held by the body responsible for collecting the toll, shall issue a certificate stating that the applicant is exempt from payment of the fine since it satisfies the conditions under Paragraphs (2) and (4). Such a certificate shall not be issued where the data contained in the application does not accord with the information held in the database of the body responsible for collecting the toll. The body responsible for collecting the toll shall issue the certificate within 120 days following receipt of the application. ...’
5

Article 12 of Directive 2004/35, headed ‘Request for action’, provides: ‘1. Natural or legal persons: (a) affected or likely to be affected by environmental damage, or (b) having a sufficient interest in environmental decision making relating to the damage or, alternatively, (c) alleging the impairment of a right, where administrative procedural law of a Member State requires this as a precondition, shall be entitled to submit to the competent authority any observations relating to instances of environmental damage or an imminent threat of such damage of which they are aware and shall be entitled to request the competent authority to take action under this Directive. What constitutes a “sufficient interest” and “impairment of a right” shall be determined by the Member States. To this end, the interest of any non-governmental organisation promoting environmental protection and meeting any requirements under national law shall be deemed sufficient for the purpose of subparagraph (b). Such organisations shall also be deemed to have rights capable of being impaired for the purpose of subparagraph (c). 2. The request for action shall be accompanied by the relevant information and data supporting the observations submitted in relation to the environmental damage in question. 3. Where the request for action and the accompanying observations show in a plausible manner that environmental damage exists, the competent authority shall consider any such observations and requests for action. In such circumstances the competent authority shall give the relevant operator an opportunity to make his views known with respect to the request for action and the accompanying observations. 4. The competent authority shall, as soon as possible and in any case in accordance with the relevant provisions of national law, inform the persons referred to in paragraph 1, which submitted observations to the authority, of its decision to accede to or refuse the request for action and shall provide the reasons for it. 5. Member States may decide not to apply paragraphs 1 and 4 to cases of imminent threat of damage.’
21

In those circumstances, the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) decided to stay proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Is it compatible with the freedom of establishment, the free movement of capital, or the freedom to provide services for a Member State to enact and maintain legislation such as Section 80 [TCGA] under which a charge to tax arises on the unrealised gains in value of the assets comprised in a trust fund if the trustees of a trust become at any time neither resident nor [habitually] resident in the Member State? (2) On the assumption that such a charge to tax restricts the exercise of the relevant freedom, is such a charge justifiable in accordance with the balanced allocation of powers of taxation, and is such a charge proportionate where the legislation neither grants the trustees the option to defer the charge to tax or to pay in instalments, nor does it take into account any subsequent fall in the value of the trust assets? Specifically, the following questions are referred: (3) Are any of the fundamental freedoms engaged where a Member State imposes a charge to tax on unrealised capital gains on the increase in value of assets held by trusts at the time when the majority of the trustees cease to be resident or [habitually] resident in that Member State? (4) Is a restriction on the freedom created by that exit charge justified in order to ensure balanced allocation of powers of taxation, in circumstances where it was possible that capital gains tax might still be imposed on the realised gains, but only if specific circumstances arose in the future? (5) Is proportionality to be determined on the facts of the individual case? In particular, is the restriction created by such a charge to tax proportionate in circumstances where: (a) the legislation makes no provision for an option to defer the payment of tax or for payment in instalments, or for account to be taken of any subsequent fall in the value of the trust assets after the exit, (b) but in the particular circumstances of the assessment to tax under appeal, the assets were sold before the tax was payable and the relevant assets did not decrease in value between the relocation of the trust and the date of sale?’
18

On 16 July 2003, the Council adopted Decision 2003/530/EC on the compatibility with the common market of an aid that the Italian Republic intends to grant to its milk producers (OJ 2003 L 184, p. 15), on the basis of the third subparagraph of Article 88(2) EC, which has become the third subparagraph of Article 108(2) TFEU. Recitals 2 to 5 as well as 7 and 8 of that decision state: ‘(2) Italian milk producers have produced milk in excess of their reference quantities during the period from 1995/1996 to 2001/2002 and are due to pay to the Community an amount of EUR 1386475250 by virtue of the additional levy on milk and milk products established in accordance with Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92. (3) This amount has to a large extent not been recovered by the Italian authorities following suspensions of payment obtained by these producers from national Administrative Courts. (4) The current situation in Italy is characterised by the fact that the collection of the additional levy is running into a series of difficulties, which have notably resulted in a vast number of pending court cases which may continue to retard actual payments for a considerable time in the future. (5) The Italian authorities envisage measures to settle this pending litigation and to remove the social tensions that currently exist by allowing these milk producers to settle their outstanding debt by means of deferred payment without interest over a number of years. … (7) The Italian government undertakes to avoid similar problems in the future by imposing the rigorous application of the additional levy on the basis of a new law for the future management of milk quotas, providing a radical overhaul and modernisation of its implementation provisions. According to the Commission’s assessment, this law provides the correct legislative basis for application of the regime and, once fully and correctly implemented, the regime is expected to function well. (8) In order to avoid the imposition of heavy financial burdens on the individual Italian milk producers concerned, which would probably be caused by the immediate recovery in full of all the amounts due, and thus to alleviate the existing social tensions, exceptional circumstances exist which justify considering the aid which the Italian Republic intends to grant to these milk producers in the form of an advance and a deferred payment to be compatible with the common market in derogation from Article 87 of the Treaty, if the conditions laid down in this Decision are fulfilled.’
Joined Cases C‑124/16, C‑188/16 and C‑213/16

Criminal proceedings

against

Ianos Tranca and Others

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from the Amtsgericht München and by the Landgericht München I)

(References for a preliminary ruling — Judicial cooperation in criminal matters — Directive 2012/13/EU — Right to information in criminal proceedings — Right to be informed about the charge — Service of a penalty order — Procedures — Mandatory appointment of person authorised to accept service — Non-resident accused person with no fixed place of residence — Period for lodging an objection running from service on the person authorised to accept service)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 22 March 2017

Judicial cooperation in criminal matters — Right to information in criminal proceedings — Directive 2012/13 — Right to be informed about the charge — Scope — Service of a document imposing a criminal conviction — Procedures — National rules requiring the appointment of a person authorised to accept service for persons not residing in the Member State from which the document originates — Lawfulness — Period for lodging an objection running from service on the person authorised to accept service — Lawfulness — Conditions

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2012/13, Arts 2, 3(1)(c) and 6(1) and (3))

Article 2, Article 3(1)(c), and Article 6(1) and (3) of Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings must be interpreted to the effect that they do not preclude legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which, in criminal proceedings, provides that the accused person who neither resides in that Member State nor has a fixed place of residence in that State or in his Member State of origin is required to appoint an agent for the purposes of service of a penalty order concerning him and that the period for lodging an objection to that order, before it becomes enforceable, runs from service of that order on that agent.

Article 6 of Directive 2012/13, however, requires that when the penalty order is enforced, as soon as the person concerned has actually become aware of the order, he should be placed in the same situation as if that order had been served on him personally and, in particular, that he have the whole of the prescribed period for lodging an objection, where necessary, benefiting from having his position restored to the status quo ante.

It is for the referring court to ensure that the national procedure for the accused person’s position being restored to the status quo ante and the conditions to which the exercise of that procedure is subject are applied in a manner consistent with those requirements and that that procedure thus permits the effective exercise of the rights provided for in Article 6.

(see operative part)
Case C‑51/16

Stryker EMEA Supply Chain Services BV

v

Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst v Douane kantoor Rotterdam Rijnmond

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Noord-Holland)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Common Customs Tariff — Tariff headings — Classification of goods — Implant screws intended to be inserted in the human body for the treatment of fractures or the stabilisation of prostheses — Combined Nomenclature — Heading 9021 — Implementing regulation (EU) No 1212/2014 — Validity)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber), 26 April 2017

Customs union — Common Customs Tariff — Tariff headings — Implant screws intended to be inserted in the human body for the treatment of fractures or the stabilisation of prostheses — Classification under heading 9021 of the Combined Nomenclature — Criteria

(Council Regulation No 2658/87, Annex I, heading 9021)

Heading 9021 of the Combined Nomenclature of the Common Customs Tariff in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, as amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1101/2014 of 16 October 2014, must be interpreted as meaning that medical implant screws such as those at issue in the main proceedings fall under that heading as those goods have characteristics which distinguish them from ordinary goods by the finish of their manufacture and their high degree of precision, as well as by their method of manufacture and the specificity of their purpose. In particular, the fact that medical implant screws such as those at issue in the main proceedings can be inserted in the body only by means of specific medical tools, not by means of ordinary tools, is a characteristic to be taken into consideration in order to distinguish those medical implant screws from ordinary products.

(see para. 57, operative part)
Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 4 May 2017 — Commission v Greece

(Case C‑98/16) ( 1 )

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Taxation — Free movement of capital — Article 63 TFEU — Article 40 of the EEA Agreement — Inheritance taxes — Bequest in favour of not-for-profit bodies — Application of a preferential rate to bodies existing or legally constituted in Greece and to similar bodies outside Greece on a reciprocal basis — Different treatment — Restriction — Justification)

Free movement of capital—Restrictions—Tax legislation—Inheritance tax –Bequest in favour of not-for-profit bodies—Provision reserving a preferential rate for not-for-profit bodies in the Member State concerned and similar bodies in other Member States provided it is on a reciprocal basis—Different treatment—No justifications

(Art. 63 TFEU; EEA Agreement, Art. 40)

(see paras 37, 39-40, operative part)

Operative part

The Court

1. Declares that, by adopting and maintaining in force legislation which provides for a preferential rate of inheritance tax for bequests made in favour of not-for-profit bodies which are established in other Member States of the European Union or the European Economic Area on a reciprocal basis, the Hellenic Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 63 TFEU and Article 40 of the European Economic Area Agreement of 2 May 1992;

2. Orders the Hellenic Republic to pay the costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 145, 25.4.2016.
Case C‑340/16

Landeskrankenanstalten-Betriebsgesellschaft — KABEG

v

Mutuelles du Mans assurances — MMA IARD SA

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof)

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 — Article 9(1) — Article 11(2) — Jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance — Direct action by the injured party against the insurer — Action brought by the employer, a public-law institution, statutory assignee of the rights of its employee, against the insurer of the vehicle involved — Subrogation)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 20 July 2017

Judicial cooperation in civil matters—Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters—Regulation No 44/2001—Jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance—Objectives—Protection of the weaker party—Concept of the weaker party—Concept having wider acceptance in matters relating to insurance than those relating to consumer contracts or individual employment contracts (Council Regulation No 44/2001, Chapter II, Section 3) Judicial cooperation in civil matters—Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters—Regulation No 44/2001—Jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance—Action brought against the insurer—Direct action by the injured party—Concept of the injured party—Employer which continued to pay the salary of its employee absent from work following a road accident, to which have been passed the employee’s rights vis-à-vis the company insuring the civil liability of the vehicle involved in that accident—Included—Employer able to sue, before the courts of the Member States in which it is established, that insurance company which is established in another Member State (Council Regulation No 44/2001, Arts 9(1)(b) and 11(2))