ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. Agriculture — EAGGF — Grant of aid and premiums — Obligation on Member States to organise an effective system of administrative and on-site inspections — Scope

(Council Regulation No 4045/89, Art. 2)

2. Agriculture — EAGGF — Grant of aid and premiums — Obligation on Member States to organise an effective system of administrative and on-site inspections — Concept of scrutiny period — Period from 1 July of one year to 30 June of the following year — Possibility for a Member State to carry out scrutiny operations beyond the end of that period — Included — Irregularity of procedure — None

(Council Regulations No 4045/89, Art. 2(4) first para., and No 2988/95, Art. 3)

Summary

1. See the text of the decision.

(see paras 20-26)

2. The first subparagraph of Article 2(4) of Regulation No 4045/89 on scrutiny by Member States of transactions forming part of the system of financing by the Guarantee Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund must be interpreted as meaning that the authorities may, if necessary, carry out the scrutiny operations — notified during the scrutiny period falling between 1 July of one year and 30 June of the following year — beyond the end of that period, without causing the procedure to be marred by an irregularity which the operator under scrutiny may rely on against the decision giving due effects to the results of the scrutiny.

Accordingly, Article 2(4) of Regulation No 4045/89 cannot be construed as conferring upon the operators concerned a right enabling them to oppose checks other or broader than those envisaged by that provision. In so far as it might have the effect of preventing the recovery of aid which has been unlawfully collected or used, such a right would imperil the protection of the financial interests of the European Union. In any event, the checks required under Regulation No 4045/89 concern operators who voluntarily signed up for the support scheme established by the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF and who, in order to receive aid, accepted the performance of inspections to verify that the European Union’s resources had been used properly. Those operators cannot validly call into question the lawfulness of such scrutiny simply because it was not in conformity with the organisational rules concerning the relations between the Member States and the Commission.

The possibility that the recipient of aid granted under the support scheme established by the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF may have to undergo an inspection outwith the period specified in Article 2(4) of Regulation No 4045/89 cannot be regarded as undermining legal certainty, so long as proceedings in that connection are not yet time-barred. Pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation No 2988/95 on the protection of the European Communities financial interests, proceedings are, as a rule, time-barred after four years have elapsed from the time of the infringement of a provision of EU law as a result of an act or omission on the part of an economic operator, which has, or would have, the effect of adversely affecting the budget of the Union.

(see paras 30-34, operative part)
The principle of repayment of taxes levied in a Member State in infringement of the rules of EU law must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude that State from refusing to repay part of the value added tax, the deduction of which had been precluded by a national measure contrary to European Union law, on the ground that that part of the tax had been subsided by aid granted to the taxable person and financed by the European Union and by that State, provided that the economic burden relating to the refusal to deduct value added tax has been completely neutralised, which is for the national court to determine.

In that regard, the national court must examine, in particular, the question whether the amount of the aid granted to the taxable person would have been less if the latter had not been prevented from exercising its right to deduct. Accordingly, in order to neutralise the economic burden relating to the prohibition on deducting VAT, the amount of the repayment which the taxable person may claim must correspond to the difference between, first, the amount of VAT which it was unable to deduct due to the national legislation at issue, and, second, the amount of the aid granted to the taxable person which exceeds that which would have been granted had it not been prevented from exercising its right to deduct.

(see paras 32, 33, 35, operative part)
Keywords

Summary

Keywords Approximation of laws — Telecommunications sector — Electronic communications networks and services — Authorisation — Directive 2002/20 — ‘Excise’ duty applicable to operators offering mobile telephony services — The amount of the duty based on a percentage of the charges paid by user of the services — Lawfulness — Conditions — Verification by the national court (European Parliament and Council Directive 2002/20, Art. 12) Summary Article 12 of Directive 2002/20 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive) must be interpreted as not precluding the legislation of a Member State, such as the legislation at issue in the main proceedings, under which operators providing mobile telephony services are liable to pay ‘excise’ duty, calculated as a percentage of the charges paid to them by the users of those services, provided the trigger for that duty is not linked to the general authorisation procedure for access to the electronic communications services market but to the use of mobile telephony services provided by the operators and the duty is ultimately borne by the user of those services, which is a matter for the national court to verify. (see para. 29, operative part)

Case C-71/12

Vodafone Malta ltd. and Mobisle Communications ltd.

v

Avukat Ġenerali and Others

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Qorti Kostituzzjonali)

‛Electronic communications networks and services — Directive 2002/20/EC — Articles 12 and 13 — Administrative charges and fees for rights of use — Charge applicable to mobile telephony operators — National legislation — Method of calculating the charge — Percentage of the costs paid by users’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 27 June 2013

Approximation of laws — Telecommunications sector — Electronic communications networks and services — Authorisation — Directive 2002/20 — ‘Excise’ duty applicable to operators offering mobile telephony services — The amount of the duty based on a percentage of the charges paid by user of the services — Lawfulness — Conditions — Verification by the national court

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2002/20, Art. 12)

Article 12 of Directive 2002/20 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive) must be interpreted as not precluding the legislation of a Member State, such as the legislation at issue in the main proceedings, under which operators providing mobile telephony services are liable to pay ‘excise’ duty, calculated as a percentage of the charges paid to them by the users of those services, provided the trigger for that duty is not linked to the general authorisation procedure for access to the electronic communications services market but to the use of mobile telephony services provided by the operators and the duty is ultimately borne by the user of those services, which is a matter for the national court to verify.

(see para. 29, operative part)
Articles 1(u)(i) and 4(1)(h) of Regulation No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community must be interpreted as meaning that a parental leave allowance which is granted on the basis of a legally defined position, without any individual and discretionary assessment of personal needs, constitutes a ‘family benefit’ within the meaning of that regulation.

First, such an allowance may not be classified as ‘pay’ within the meaning of Article 157 TFEU since (i) the worker is in a situation which is characterised by the suspension of the employment contract and (ii) it is not apparent that the allowance is paid, even indirectly, by the employer itself.

Second, such an allowance does not constitute substitute income akin to unemployment benefit since the person receiving it has not lost his employment, but has merely decided to suspend the employment relationship.

Third, family benefits are intended to provide social assistance for workers with dependent families in the form of a contribution by society towards their expenses. In that regard, the concept of meeting family expenses mentioned in Article 1(u)(i) of Regulation No 1408/71 refers, in particular, to a public contribution to a family’s budget to alleviate the financial burdens involved in the maintenance of children. A career break allowance granted, subject to certain conditions, to a worker taking a break from his career using parental leave – which is similar to the parental leave allowance – must be treated as a family benefit.

(see paras 41-44, 49, 51-55, 58-60, operative part)
Article 74(2) of Regulation No 40/94 on the Community trade mark provides that the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) may disregard facts or evidence which are not submitted in due time by the parties concerned. It results from the wording of that provision that, as a general rule and unless otherwise specified, the submission of facts and evidence by the parties remains possible after the expiry of the time-limits to which such submission is subject under the provisions of Regulation No 40/94 and that OHIM is in no way prohibited from taking account of facts and evidence which are submitted or produced late. In stating that the latter ‘may’, in such a case, decide to disregard evidence, Article 74(2) grants OHIM broad discretion to decide, while giving reasons for its decision in that regard, whether or not to take such evidence into account.

Although the first subparagraph of Rule 50(1) of Regulation No 2868/95 implementing Regulation No 40/94 lays down the principle that the provisions relating to proceedings before the department which has made the decision against which the appeal is brought are to be applicable to appeal proceedings mutatis mutandis, the third subparagraph of Rule 50(1) constitutes a special rule derogating from that principle. That special rule is specific to the appeal proceedings brought against the Opposition Division’s decision and specifies the rules, before the Board of Appeal, governing the facts and evidence submitted after the expiry of the time-limits set or specified at first instance. The third subparagraph of Rule 50(1) of Regulation No 2868/95 must therefore be applied, at this particular stage of the appeal proceedings against the Opposition Division’s decision, in place of the provisions relating to the proceedings before that division, which include Rule 20(1) of Regulation No 2868/95.

Under the third subparagraph of Rule 50(1) of Regulation No 2868/95, where the appeal is directed against a decision of an Opposition Division, the Board of Appeal must limit its examination of the appeal to facts and evidence presented within the time-limits set or specified by the Opposition Division, unless the Board considers that additional or supplementary facts and evidence must be taken into account pursuant to Article 74(2) of Regulation No 40/94. Regulation No 2868/95 therefore expressly provides that the Board of Appeal enjoys, when examining an appeal directed against a decision of the Opposition Division, the discretion deriving from the third subparagraph of Rule 50(1) of Regulation No 2868/95 and from Article 74(2) of Regulation No 40/94 to decide whether or not to take into account additional or supplementary facts and evidence which were not presented within the time-limits set or specified by the Opposition Division.

(see paras 21-23, 28, 29, 31, 32)
To give full effect to the principle of the freedom of contract of the parties to a contract, which is the cornerstone of the Rome Convention, reiterated in the Rome I Regulation, it must be ensured that the choice freely made by the parties as regards the law applicable to their contractual relationship is respected in accordance with Article 3(1) of the Rome Convention, so that the plea relating to the existence of a ‘mandatory rule’ within the meaning of the legislation of the Member State concerned, as referred to in Article 7(2) of that convention, must be interpreted strictly.

The classification of national provisions as ‘public-order legislation’ applies to national provisions compliance with which has been deemed to be so crucial for the protection of the political, social or economic order in the Member State concerned as to require compliance therewith by all persons present on the national territory of that Member State and all legal relationships within that State. It is thus for the national court, in the course of its assessment of whether the national law which it proposes to substitute for that expressly chosen by the parties to the contract is a ‘mandatory rule’, to take account not only of the exact terms of that law, but also of its general structure and of all the circumstances in which that law was adopted in order to determine whether it is mandatory in nature in so far as it appears that the legislature adopted it in order to protect an interest judged to be essential by the Member State concerned.

(see paras 47, 49, 50)
Case C‑66/12

Council of the European Union

v

European Commission

‛Annual adjustment of the remuneration and pensions of officials and other servants of the European Union — Staff Regulations — Action for annulment — Communication COM(2011) 829 final — Proposal COM(2011) 820 final — Action for failure to act — Submission of proposals on the basis of Article 10 of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations — Failure of the Commission — Action devoid of purpose — No need to adjudicate’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 19 November 2013

Legal proceedings — Action on the adjustment of remuneration and pensions of officials — Judgment delivered in a related case — Action devoid of purpose — No need to adjudicate

(Art. 263 TFEU; Staff Regulations, Annex XI, Arts 3 and 10)

An action concerning the adjustment of remuneration and pensions of officials and other servants of the European Union for a specific year is devoid of purpose, and there is thus no need to adjudicate on it, where the Court has ruled in another, closely related, case on the division of roles between the institutions, in particular in respect of the determination of the legal basis for that adjustment and the triggering of the exception clause provided for in Article 10 of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations.

(see paras 20-22)

Case C‑66/12

Council of the European Union

v

European Commission

‛Annual adjustment of the remuneration and pensions of officials and other servants of the European Union — Staff Regulations — Action for annulment — Communication COM(2011) 829 final — Proposal COM(2011) 820 final — Action for failure to act — Submission of proposals on the basis of Article 10 of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations — Failure of the Commission — Action devoid of purpose — No need to adjudicate’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 19 November 2013

Legal proceedings — Action on the adjustment of remuneration and pensions of officials — Judgment delivered in a related case — Action devoid of purpose — No need to adjudicate

(Art. 263 TFEU; Staff Regulations, Annex XI, Arts 3 and 10)

An action concerning the adjustment of remuneration and pensions of officials and other servants of the European Union for a specific year is devoid of purpose, and there is thus no need to adjudicate on it, where the Court has ruled in another, closely related, case on the division of roles between the institutions, in particular in respect of the determination of the legal basis for that adjustment and the triggering of the exception clause provided for in Article 10 of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations.

(see paras 20-22)
Article 56 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which requires higher education establishments with which students applying for a regional study grant co-financed by the European Social Fund plan to enrol to demonstrate 10 years’ experience where such establishments are neither universities recognised by that national law nor establishments organising approved Masters degree courses.

Such legislation, by requiring only bodies organising non-approved Masters degree courses to have 10 years’ experience, helps — without being excessive — to ensure that those bodies can demonstrate experience of sufficient duration to support the presumption — in the absence of any monitoring by the public authority and in the absence of any official approval of the Master’s degree courses concerned — that the education provided by such bodies is of the same quality as the education provided by university establishments recognised by national law and by bodies organising approved Masters degree courses.

(see paras 28, 30, operative part)
Case C‑300/12

Finanzamt Düsseldorf-Mitte

v

Ibero Tours GmbH

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof)

‛Value-added tax — Operations of travel agents — Granting of price discounts to customers — Determination of the taxable amount for services provided as part of an intermediary activity’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 16 January 2014

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Special scheme for travel agents — Taxable amount — Supply of services by a tour operator provided through a travel agent — Application of the principles laid down by the Court in Elida Gibbs — Condition — Travel agent granting a discount to customers on the price of travel organised by the operator

(Council Directive 77/388)

The provisions of Sixth Council Directive 77/388 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes must be interpreted as meaning that the principles established by the Court of Justice of the European Union of 24 October 1996 in Case C-317/94 Elida Gibbs [1996] ECR I-5339 concerning the determination of the taxable amount for VAT purposes do not apply when a travel agent, acting as an intermediary, grants to the final consumer, on the travel agent’s own initiative and at his own expense, a price reduction on the principal service provided by the tour operator.

(see para. 33, operative part)

Case C‑300/12

Finanzamt Düsseldorf-Mitte

v

Ibero Tours GmbH

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof)

‛Value-added tax — Operations of travel agents — Granting of price discounts to customers — Determination of the taxable amount for services provided as part of an intermediary activity’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 16 January 2014

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Special scheme for travel agents — Taxable amount — Supply of services by a tour operator provided through a travel agent — Application of the principles laid down by the Court in Elida Gibbs — Condition — Travel agent granting a discount to customers on the price of travel organised by the operator

(Council Directive 77/388)

The provisions of Sixth Council Directive 77/388 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes must be interpreted as meaning that the principles established by the Court of Justice of the European Union of 24 October 1996 in Case C-317/94 Elida Gibbs [1996] ECR I-5339 concerning the determination of the taxable amount for VAT purposes do not apply when a travel agent, acting as an intermediary, grants to the final consumer, on the travel agent’s own initiative and at his own expense, a price reduction on the principal service provided by the tour operator.

(see para. 33, operative part)
A commercial practice must be classified as ‘misleading’ for the purposes of Article 6(1) of Directive 2005/29 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market where that practice contains false information, or is likely to deceive the average consumer, and is likely to cause the consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise.

Since the misleading commercial practices referred to in Article 6 of Directive 2005/29 constitute a specific category of unfair commercial practices, referred to in Article 5(2) of that directive, they must necessarily combine all the constituent elements of such unfairness, including, in consequence, the element relating to the ability of the practice to materially distort the economic behaviour of the consumer.

(see paras 30, 38, operative part)
Article 49 TFEU cannot be applied to activities which have no factor linking them with any of the situations governed by EU law and which are confined in all relevant respects within a single Member State. It is true that the Court’s answer to questions concerning fundamental freedoms of the European Union may, even in a purely internal situation, nevertheless be of use to the referring court, especially if its national law were to require it to allow a national to enjoy the same rights as those which a national of another Member State would derive from EU law in the same situation.

A national of another Member State who is in the same situation as a national who is already established in the Member State concerned and is authorised to operate a car and driver hire service in a certain municipality and who is not seeking to establish himself elsewhere but is merely aiming to have the court strike out some of the conditions attached to the authorisation that he already holds would, in theory, already be pursuing an economic activity on a stable and continuous basis from an establishment located in the Member State concerned. In those circumstances, the interpretation of Article 49 TFEU on the freedom of establishment is irrelevant.

(see paras 43-47, 49-51, operative part)
Keywords

Subject of the case

Operative part



Keywords

Actions for failure to fulfil obligations — Examination of the merits by the Court — Situation to be taken into consideration — Situation on expiry of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (Art. 258 TFEU) (see para. 21)

2. Environment — Protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources — Directive 91/676 — Designation of vulnerable zones — Obligations of the Member States — Failure to fulfil obligations (Council Directive 91/676, Arts 3(1) and 4, and Annex I) (see para. 23, operative part)

Subject of the case

Re:

Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Infringement of Article 3(1) and (4) of Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources (OJ 1991 L 375, p. 1) and Annex I thereto — Incomplete identification of vulnerable zones — Excessive nitrate content — Eutrophication — Incorrect four-yearly revision.

Operative part

Operative part:

The Court:

1. Declares that, by failing to designate as vulnerable zones a number of zones characterised by the presence of surface and groundwater bodies which are, or may be, affected by excessive nitrate content and/or eutrophication, the French Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 3(1) and (4) of Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources, and Annex I thereto;

2. Orders the French Republic to pay the costs.