ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.

Under circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, in which a producer organisation within the meaning of Article 11(1) and Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 of 28 October 1996 on the common organization of the market in fruit and vegetables (Regulation No 2200/96) (1) supplies goods to the producers that are its members and receives for this from the producers a payment which does not cover the purchase price, a) is an exchange with a cash supplement deemed to exist because the producers, in return for the supply, have contractually undertaken vis-a-vis the producer organisation to deliver fruit and vegetables to the producer organisation for the duration of the earmarking period, with the consequence that the taxable amount of the supply is the purchase price for the capital goods paid by the producer organisation to the upstream suppliers? b) is the entirety of the amount which the operational fund actually pays to the producer organisation for the supply a ‘subsidy directly linked to the price of such supplies’ within the meaning of Article 11(A)(1)(a) of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes (Directive 77/388/EEC), (2) with the consequence that the taxable amount also encompasses the financial assistance within the meaning of Article 15 of Regulation No 2200/96 which has been granted to the operational fund by the competent authorities on the basis of an operational programme?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 21 September 2018 by The Goldman Sachs Group Inc. against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 12 July 2018 in Case T-419/14: The Goldman Sachs Group v European Commission

(Case C-595/18 P)

(2018/C 445/07)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: The Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (represented by: A. Mangiaracina, avvocatessa, J. Koponen, advokat)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Prysmian SpA, Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi Srl

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— annul, in whole or in part (e.g. from May 2007 or November 2007 onwards, where GS Group and its affiliates held only around 45 % and 26 % of Prysmian’s shares respectively), Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Commission Decision C(2014) 2139 (1) dated 2 April 2014 insofar as they concern the appellant; and/or

— reduce the fine imposed on the appellant by Article 2 of Commission Decision C(2014) 2139 dated 2 April 2014; and

— order the Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First Plea: The General Court misapplied Article 101 TFEU and Article 23.2 of Regulation 1/2003 (2) by holding the appellant liable for an infringement committed by Prysmian from 29 July 2005 to 3 May 2007 (‘the pre-IPO period’).

Second Plea: The appellant did not exercise decisive influence in the sense required by the case law between 3 May 2007 to 28 January 2009 (‘the post-IPO period’).

Third Plea: Request that the Court of Justice affords the appellant the benefit of any reduction of the fine granted to Prysmian.

(1) Commission Decision of 2 April 2014 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39610 — Power Cables).

(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ 2003, L 1, p. 1).
2.

Does the discretion which the Member States are allowed, as referred to in Article 7(2) of Directive 2003/96/EC (‘Member States may differentiate between commercial and non-commercial use of gas oil used as propellant, provided that the Community minimum levels are observed and the rate for commercial gas oil used as propellant does not fall below the national level of taxation in force on 1 January 2003’), render the provision which includes, within the definition of commercial gas oil, that used for ‘the carriage of passengers by occasional service’, not immediately effective and unconditional?
1.

Does the limitation period for the exercise of the powers to recover aid, provided for in Article 17(1) of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 (1) of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, apply only to relations between the European Union and the Member State to which the decision to recover aid is addressed, or does it apply also to relations between that Member State and the opponent, as the beneficiary of the aid considered incompatible with the Single Market?
Action brought on 28 September 2018 — European Commission v Slovak Republic

(Case C-614/18)

(2018/C 445/10)

Language of the case: Slovak

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: A. Tokár and C. Cattabriga, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Slovak Republic

Form of order sought

The European Commission claims that the Court should:

— declare that the Slovak Republic, by denying third-country nationals who are not family members of EU citizens, whose visa application has been refused or whose visa has been annulled or revoked, the right to institute court proceedings as defined in EU law, has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, read in conjunction with Article 32(3), Article 34(7) and Article 35(7) of Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 (1) (Visa Code);

— order Slovak Republic to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of its action, the Commission submits that the legal questions at issue in the present case have been clearly resolved by the judgment of the Court in Case C-403/16, El Hassani, in which the Court ruled that Article 32(3) of Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 610/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, (2) read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that it requires Member States to provide for an appeal procedure against decisions refusing visas, the procedural rules for which are a matter for the legal order of each Member State in accordance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. Those proceedings must, at a certain stage of the proceedings, guarantee a judicial appeal.

The Commission therefore concludes that the arguments put forward by the Slovak Republic during the pre-litigation procedure in the present case cannot succeed, and reiterates its own position that the Slovak Republic is failing to fulfil its obligations as set out in the application.

(1) Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) (OJ 2009 L 243, p. 1).

(2) Regulation (EU) No 610/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, Council Regulations (EC) No 1683/95 and (EC) No 539/2001 and Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2013 L 182, p. 1).
Action brought on 30 October 2018 — European Commission v Kingdom of Belgium

(Case C-676/18)

(2019/C 16/38)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: M. Condou-Durande, C. Cattabriga and G. von Rintelen, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Kingdom of Belgium

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by failing to adopt, by 30 September 2016, all the laws, regulations and administrative provisions to comply with Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014, (1) or, in any event, by failing to notify such laws, regulations and provisions to the Commission, the Kingdom of Belgium has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 28(1) of that directive;

— order the Kingdom of Belgium, pursuant to Article 260(3) TFEU, to pay a periodic penalty payment of EUR 49 906,50 per day into an account to be notified by the Commission from the date of delivery of the judgment in the present case for failure to fulfil the obligation to notify the measures transposing Directive 2014/36/EU;

— order the Kingdom of Belgium to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Member States were required, under Article 28(1) of Directive 2014/36/EU, to take the national measures necessary to transpose the obligations of that directive by 30 September 2016. In the absence of notification of any measures transposing the directive by Belgium, the Commission has decided to bring an action before the Court of Justice.

In its application, the Commission proposes that a daily periodic penalty payment of EUR 49 906,50 be imposed on Belgium. The amount of the penalty payment has been calculated by taking into account the seriousness and length of the infringement, as well as the dissuasive effect on the basis of that Member State’s ability to pay.

(1) Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 375).
1.

Is Article 1 of the Ovršni zakon (Law on enforcement, published in Narodne novine No 112/12, 25/13, 93/14, 55/16 and 73/17), a provision of national legislation which empowers notaries to enforce debts on the basis of an authentic document by issuing an enforcement order, such as a writ of execution, without the express consent of the debtor against whom enforcement is sought, in accordance with Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 18 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, having regard to the judgments of the Court in Cases C-484/15 and C-551/15?
2.

Does the concept of implied prorogation of jurisdiction laid down in and governed by Article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 require, in all respects, an autonomous interpretation common to all the Member States? Is it therefore unable to be made subject to limitations laid down in Member States’ rules on domestic jurisdiction, such as a provision that such jurisdiction is not valid in proceedings which, because of the small sum involved, are required by the Spanish Law on Civil Procedure to be heard under the simplified procedure?
1.

In the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning the liability of the Italian State for manifest infringement of Community law by courts adjudicating at last instance in the judgments [of 30 September 2003, Köbler, C-224/01, EU:C:2003:513; of 13 June 2006, Traghetti del Mediterraneo, C-173/03, EU:C:2006:391 and of 24 November 2011, Commission v Italy, C-379/10, EU:C:2011:775], must the general principles of European Union law presently in force concerning legal certainty, the protection of legitimate expectations, procedural equality, effective judicial protection, the right to an independent court or tribunal and, more generally, the right to due process laid down in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in conjunction with Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning that those provisions and the cited case-law of the Court of Justice preclude a Member State from adopting, to benefit itself or its public authorities, as in the present case, legislation such as that introduced by Law No 18/2015, with the declared intention of implementing the cited decisions of the Court of Justice, but with the essential objective of frustrating the effects thereof and affecting domestic jurisdiction, which, in the new version of Article 2(3) and (3bis) of Law No 117 of 13 April 1988 on the civil liability of judges, introduces a notion of liability for intentional fault or serious misconduct ‘in the event of manifest infringement of this law or the law of the European Union? That national legislation gives the national magistrate a choice — and the fact that it is made in any event gives rise to civil liability and liability to disciplinary action in relation to the State in cases in which the public authority itself is a substantive party —, as in the present case, of either infringing national legislation by disapplying it and applying European Union law, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, or infringing European Union law by applying the provisions of national law precluding effective protection and incompatible with Articles 1(3) and 7 of Directive 2003/88, Clauses 2 and 4 of the framework agreement on fixed-term work implemented by Directive 1999/70 and Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as interpreted by the case-law of the Court of Justice in the judgments [of 1 March 2012, O’Brien, C-393/10, EU:C:2012:110; and of 29 November 2017, King, C-214/16, EU:C:2017:914];
1.

Do Article 90 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax and the principle of VAT neutrality (1) preclude national legislation (or an administrative practice based on unclear legislation) which denies an undertaking the right to deduct VAT in proportion to the value of a discount applied to national supplies of goods on the ground that the tax invoice issued by the intra-Community supplier (as representative of an economic group) shows the global discount granted for both intra-Community and domestic products supplied under the same framework agreement but recorded as purchased from the Member State of reference (from one member of the group, with a different VAT number from that borne by the invoice relating to the discount)?
Appeal brought on 27 November 2018 by Duferco Long Products SA against the judgment delivered on 18 September 2018 in Case T-93/17 Duferco Long Products v Commission

(Case C-738/18 PP)

(2019/C 35/19)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Duferco Long Products SA (represented by: J.-F. Bellis, R. Luff, M. Favart, Q. Declève, avocats)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court of Justice of the European Union should:

1. Set aside the judgment under appeal (T-93/17, EU:T:2018:558);

2. Annul Article 1(f), and Article 2 of the Commission Decision of 20 January 2016 on State aid SA.33926 2013/C (ex 2013/NN, 2011/CP) implemented by Belgium in favour of Duferco;

3. Order the defendant to pay the costs of these proceedings and the costs of the proceedings before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By its appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law by refusing to examine two errors of calculation made by the Commission in the context of the assessment of the pari passu nature of the sixth measure referred to in the Commission Decision of 20 January 2016 on State aid SA.33926 2013/C (ex 2013/NN, 2011/CP) and in the application of the private investor in a market economy test.

In particular, the applicant submits that:

— The General Court did not carry out an adequate judicial review of the manner in which the Commission applied the private investor in a market economy test
2.

If it does, are the payment of the child-rearing allowance for a disabled child and the supplement thereto, or, in its place, the disability compensation allowance, on the one hand, and the social assistance for the integration of children and young people with mental disabilities, provided for in Paragraph 35a of the Eighth Book of the Sozialgesetzbuch (German Social Code), on the other hand, of an equivalent nature within the meaning of Article 5(a) of Regulation No 883/2004, having regard to the purpose of Article L. 351-4-1 of the French Social Security Code aimed at the taking into account of the costs inherent in raising a child with a disability for the purposes of the determination of the insurance period providing entitlement to a retirement pension?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rēzeknes tiesa (Latvia) lodged on 28 November 2018 — Elme Messer Metalurgs v Latvijas Investīciju un attīstības aģentūra

(Case C-743/18)

(2019/C 54/12)

Language of the case: Latvian

Referring court

Rēzeknes tiesa

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: SIA ‘Elme Messer Metalurgs’

Defendant: Latvijas Investīciju un attīstības aģentūra

Question referred

Must Article 2(7) of Council Regulation No 1083/2006 (1) be interpreted as meaning that a situation in which the beneficiary of funding is unable to achieve the expected level of turnover during the relevant period because, during that period, the business of its sole partner has been suspended or that partner has become insolvent is to be considered an act or omission by an economic operator (the beneficiary of funding) which has, or would have, the effect of prejudicing the general budget of the European Union?

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 (OJ 2006 L 210, p. 25).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Nürnberg (Germany) lodged on 9 November 2018 — Geld-für-Flug GmbH v Ryanair DAC

(Case C-701/18)

(2019/C 72/08)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Nürnberg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Geld-für-Flug GmbH

Defendant: Ryanair DAC

Question referred

Is Article 3(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (1) to be interpreted as meaning that a clause contained in a commercial air carrier’s general terms and conditions which has not been individually negotiated and under which an electronically concluded contract with a passenger is subject to the law of the Member State applicable where the air carrier has its registered office and which is not identical to the law of the passenger’s habitual residence is unfair in so far as it misleads the passenger by not indicating that the choice of a different law in accordance with Article 5(2), subsection 2, of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (2) is possible only to a limited extent and not any, but only legal provisions referred to in Article 5(2), subsection 2, of the Rome I Regulation may be relied on?

(1) OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29.

(2) OJ 2008 L 177, p. 6.
2.

Should [Article] 3(1) and [Article] 17 of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 be interpreted as meaning that a court may or must raise, of its own motion, an objection that the Romanian courts lack international jurisdiction to give a ruling on a case concerning a ‘divorce involving a minor’, where there has been no agreement between the parties, who are resident in another Member State [of the European Union] (in the present case, Italy), regarding the choice of the court having jurisdiction (resulting in the action being dismissed as not falling within the jurisdiction of the Romanian courts), which has priority over Article 915(2) of the Codul de procedură civilă (Code of Civil Procedure), pursuant to which an objection may be raised that the Judecătoria Rădăuţi (Court of First Instance, Rădăuţi) does not have exclusive territorial jurisdiction (resulting in its declining jurisdiction to give a ruling on the case in favour of the Judecătoria Sectorului 5 Bucureşti (Court of First Instance, Sector 5, Bucharest) and the case being decided on the merits), especially given that those provisions are less favourable than the provision of national legislation concerned (Article 915(2) of the Codul de procedură civilă (Code of Civil Procedure))?
—

Must EU law, in particular Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, (1) which determines, inter alia, the various exclusive rights conferred on copyright holders, in Articles 2 to 5 thereof, be interpreted as excluding from copyright protection works whose shape is necessary to achieve a technical result?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof (Germany) lodged on 15 November 2018 — Segler-Vereinigung Cuxhaven e.V. v Finanzamt Cuxhaven

(Case C-715/18)

(2019/C 82/08)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesfinanzhof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Segler-Vereinigung Cuxhaven e.V.

Defendant: Finanzamt Cuxhaven

Question referred

Does the tax rate reduction for the letting of places on camping or caravan sites under Article 98(2) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (1) (‘the VAT Directive’), in conjunction with Annex III, No 12, to that directive, also cover the letting of boat moorings?

(1) OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.
1.

Are Articles 5(3) and 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that an operating air carrier which asserts the existence of extraordinary circumstances as the cause of a long delay may rely on the ground for exemption from liability under Article 5(3) of the Flight Compensation Regulation only if it can also assert and demonstrate that the delay suffered by the individual passenger could also not have been prevented by re-booking onto alternative transport?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 29 August 2018 by Lion's Head Global Partners LLP against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 14 June 2018 in Case T-294/17: Lion's Head Global Partners LLP v EUIPO

(Case C-553/18 P)

(2019/C 93/29)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Lion's Head Global Partners LLP (represented by: R. Nöske, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 15 January 2019 the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
Second ground of appeal

Bearing in mind the fact that the General Court interpreted the annexes to the application and also ruled on the merits of that application on the basis of that interpretation, it could not validly hold that it was not under a duty to find and identify the grounds argued by the applicant in those annexes.

The General Court’s requirement, whereby the applicant must state the ‘concrete and tangible’ effects caused by the distortion of competition in its situation and, therefore, establish that the contested legal act is of direct concern to it, impacts the Court’s assessment of the facts. The requirement of direct concern is thereby distorted.