ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.

Is Council Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 (1) of 26 January 2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China invalid due to the infringement of Article 6(6) and (7) and Article 2(10) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (2) of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community or of Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 (3) of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community because the Commission did not give Chinese producers/exporters the opportunity, in good time, to take cognisance of the information regarding product types on the basis of which the normal value was established and/or because the Commission, in the context of the calculation of the dumping margin for the products concerned, when comparing the normal value of the products of an Indian producer with the export prices of similar Chinese products, had refused to take into account adjustments related to import duties on raw materials and indirect taxes in the analogue country, India, and to differences in production (costs)?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht für Strafsachen Wien (Austria) lodged on 2 August 2019 — Criminal proceedings against A***** and further unknown perpetrators

(Case C-584/19)

(2019/C 383/48)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landesgericht für Strafsachen Wien

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Staatsanwaltschaft Wien

Accused: A***** and further unknown perpetrators

Other parties: Staatsanwaltschaft Hamburg

Question referred

Are the terms ‘judicial authority’ within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European Investigation Order (1) in criminal matters and ‘public prosecutor’ within the meaning of Article 2(c)(i) of the aforementioned Directive to be interpreted as also including the public prosecutor’s offices of a Member State which are exposed to the risk of being directly or indirectly subject to orders or individual instructions from the executive, such as the Senator of Justice in Hamburg, in the context of the adoption of a decision on the issuance of a European investigation order?

(1) OJ 2014 L 130, p. 1.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 20 September 2019 by Quanta Storage, Inc. against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 12 July 2019 in Case T-772/15: Quanta Storage, Inc. v European Commission

(Case C-699/19 P)

(2019/C 406/23)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Quanta Storage, Inc. (represented by: B. Hartnett, Barrister, O. Geiss, Rechtsanwalt, W. Sparks, advocaat, T. Siakka, Δικηγόρος)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

a) set aside the contested judgment insofar as it dismisses the action and orders Quanta Storage to bear its own costs and to pay four fifths of the costs incurred by the Commission;

b) annul the Commission Decision of 21 October 2015 (Case AT39639 – Optical disc drives) insofar as it relates to the appellant;

c) in the alternative, reduce the fine imposed on the appellant;

d) in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court; and

e) order the Commission to bear all costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the appellant relies on the following five pleas.

First Plea: alleging that the General Court failed to apply the relevant legal test and distorted the clear sense of evidence in relation to the breach of the rights of defence by the Commission’s finding of several infringements.

Second Plea: alleging that the General Court distorted the clear sense of evidence concerning the right of defence and the right to good administration.

Third Plea: alleging that General Court failed to deal with a relevant point or to understand it properly and/or failed to apply the correct legal test in relation to contradictions concerning the scope of the infringement.

Fourth Plea: alleging a distortion of the clear sense of evidence, failure to apply the correct legal test and/or failure to deal with a relevant point or to understand it properly as regards the Appellant’s liability under Article 101 TFEU.

Fifth Plea: alleging a breach of unlimited jurisdiction, distortion of the clear sense of evidence and defective reasoning in relation to the setting of the fine.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 4 September 2019 — Criminal proceedings against DK

(Case C-653/19)

(2019/C 399/34)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad

Party to the main proceedings

DK

Question referred

Is a national law that, during the trial stage of criminal proceedings, requires a change in circumstances as a condition for granting the defence's application for the release of the accused person from detention, consistent with Article 6 and recital 22 of Directive 2016/343 (1) and with Articles 6 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?

(1) Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ 2016 L 65, p. 1).
Appeal brought on 14 August 2019 by Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 6 June 2019 in Case T-210/18, Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-614/19 P)

(2019/C 413/28)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG (represented by: C. Klawitter, Rechtsanwalt)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Autec AG

By order of 24 October 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) did not allow the appeal to proceed and ordered the appellant to pay its own costs.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 17 September 2019 — mk advokaten GbR v MBK Rechtsanwälte GbR

(Case C-684/19)

(2019/C 413/32)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: mk advokaten GbR

Respondent: MBK Rechtsanwälte GbR

Question referred

Does a third party referred to in an entry published on a website that contains a sign identical to a trade mark ‘use’ that trade mark, within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Directive 2008/95/EC, (1) if the entry was not placed there by the third party itself, but was taken by the website’s operator from another entry that the third party had placed in infringement of the trade mark?

(1) Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 2008 L 299, p. 25).
1.

Must Articles 49, 56 and 63 TFEU, which guarantee the freedom of establishment, the freedom to provide services and the free movement of capital, respectively, be interpreted as precluding, inter alia, a system of deductions like that laid down for the IDECA in points 2 and 3 of Article 6(7) of Andalusian Law 11/2010 of 3 December on fiscal measures for the reduction of the government deficit and for sustainability?
1.

Declare that: — by allowing the content of judicial decisions to be treated as a disciplinary offence so far as concerns judges of the ordinary courts (Article 107(1) of the Law on the Organisation of the Ordinary Courts and Article 97(1) and (3) of the Law on the Supreme Court), — by failing to guarantee the independence and impartiality of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, which has jurisdiction for the review of decisions issued in disciplinary proceedings against judges (Article 3, point 5, Article 27 and Article 73(1) of the Law on the Supreme Court, in conjunction with Article 9a of the Law on the National Council for the Judiciary), — by conferring on the President of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court the discretionary power to designate the competent disciplinary court of first instance in cases concerning judges of the ordinary courts (Article 110(3) and Article 114(7) of the Law on the Organisation of the Ordinary Courts) and, therefore, by failing to guarantee that disciplinary cases are adjudicated on by a court ‘established by law’, and — by conferring on the Minister for Justice the power to appoint a Disciplinary Representative of the Minister for Justice (Article 112b of the Law on the Organisation of the Ordinary Courts) and, therefore, by failing to guarantee that disciplinary cases against judges of the ordinary courts are heard within a reasonable period, and in providing that: acts connected with the designation of counsel for the defence and that counsel’s conduct of the defence do not have a suspensory effect on the course of the disciplinary proceedings (Article 113a of the Law on the Organisation of the Ordinary Courts) and that the disciplinary court is to conduct the proceedings despite the justified absence of the notified accused or his defence counsel (Article 115a(3) of the Law on the Organisation of the Ordinary Courts) and, therefore, by failing to guarantee the rights of the defence of accused judges of the ordinary courts, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU; and that — by allowing the right of courts to refer questions for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice to be limited by the possibility of the initiation of disciplinary proceedings, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU;
2.

In any event, notwithstanding the foregoing, does the practice of the Spanish State of automatically applying the rule laid down in Article 7 of Royal Decree 240/2007, and refusing to grant a residence permit to a family member of an EU citizen where that EU citizen has never exercised freedom of movement, solely and exclusively on the ground that the EU citizen does not satisfy the conditions laid down in that provision, without having examined specifically and individually whether there exists a relationship of dependency between that EU citizen and the third-country national of such a nature that, for any reason and in the light of the circumstances, it would mean that were the third-country national refused a right of residence, the EU citizen could not be separated from the family member dependent on him and would have to leave the territory of the European Union, infringe Article 20 TFEU in the terms set out above? All of this is in the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, including, inter alia, the judgment of 8 May 2018, C-82/16, K.A. and Others v Belgische Staat. (1)
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Amsterdam (Netherlands) lodged on 7 October 2019 — A v B, C

(Case C-738/19)

(2020/C 19/14)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank Amsterdam

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: A

Defendants: B, C

Question referred

How should Directive 93/13 (1) and, more specifically, the principle of cumulative effect contained therein, be interpreted when assessing whether the sum which a consumer who fails to fulfil his obligations is required to pay in compensation (‘penalty clause’) is disproportionately high within the meaning of point 1(e) of the annex to that directive, in a case in which penalty clauses are associated with shortcomings of various kinds which, by their very nature, do not have to occur together, and indeed do not do so in the present case? Is it also relevant in that regard that, with regard to the shortcoming on the basis of which payment of the fine is sought, compensation in the form of the remittance of unfairly made profits is also sought?

(1) Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).
b.

If the answer to (a) is yes, is the fact that the claim which the injured person seeks to bring against the policy holder/insured arises out of the same facts as, and is being brought in the same action as the direct claim brought against the insurer sufficient to justify a conclusion that the injured person's claim is a matter relating to insurance?
Appeal brought on 14 August 2019 by CC against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 13 June 2019 in Case T-248/17 RENV, CC v Parliament

(Case C-612/19 P)

(2020/C 19/09)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: CC (represented by: G. Maximini, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment delivered by the General Court on 13 June 2019 in Case T-248/17 RENV, with the exception of point 3 of the operative part of the judgment relating to costs;

— order the Parliament to pay for all of the material and non-material damage suffered by the appellant, in accordance with the calculation method set out in the application initiating proceedings in Case F-9/12;

— order the Parliament to pay the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant seeks to have set aside in part the judgment of 13 June 2019 in Case CC v Parliament, T-248/17 RENV (with the exception of point 3 of the operative part), in which the General Court ordered the Parliament to pay the appellant the sum of EUR 6 000 and all of the costs, with the remainder of the action being dismissed.

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on five grounds of appeal alleging:

— infringement of Article 106 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court — breach of the principle of legal certainty — infringement of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union;

— errors of law in so far as the General Court failed to take the measures of inquiry and of organisation of the procedure requested;

— distortion of the competition notice — failure to comply with the judgment ordering annulment — unlawful substitution of its own assessment — infringement of Article 1d(2) of the Staff Regulations;

— error of law in so far as the General Court excluded certain posts from its assessment of the loss of opportunity;
(3)

Is waiver of the Commissioner’s immunity from legal proceedings/immunity also possible in the context of a civil action brought against him, such as the action under consideration? If it is, who must initiate the waiver procedure in question?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla Łodzi (Poland) lodged on 23 September 2019 — K.S. v A.B.

(Case C-707/19)

(2020/C 27/19)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy dla Łodzi

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: K.S.

Defendant: A.B.

Questions referred

Must Article 3 of Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability (1) be interpreted as meaning that, within the framework of ‘all appropriate measures’, each Member State should make insurance undertakings fully liable under insurance against civil liability, including for consequences of damage in the form of the need to tow the victim’s vehicle to his home country and the cost of necessary parking of vehicles?

If the answer to the above question is affirmative — can this liability be limited in any way by the laws of the Member States?

(1) OJ 2009 L 263, p. 11.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof (Germany) lodged on 24 October 2019 — B-GmbH v D Tax Office

(Case C-797/19)

(2020/C 27/27)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesfinanzhof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant and appellant in the appeal on a point of law: B-GmbH

Defendant and respondent in the appeal on a point of law: D Tax Office

Question referred

Is Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to be interpreted as meaning that State aid falling within the scope of that provision exists if, under the legislation of a Member State, losses incurred (on a permanent basis) by an incorporated company as a result of an economic activity carried out without remuneration that is sufficient to covers costs are to be regarded, in principle, as covert distributions of profits and, accordingly, must not reduce the profits of an incorporated company but, nevertheless, those legal consequences are not to be applied for permanently loss-making business activities in the case of incorporated companies in which the majority of voting rights are directly or indirectly held by legal persons governed by public law, if they carry out the activities concerned for reasons of transport, environmental, social, cultural, educational or health policy?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 21 October 2019 — Criminal proceedings against UC and TD

(Case C-769/19)

(2020/C 27/20)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad

Parties to the main proceedings

UC and TD

Question referred

Is a national law which, in the case of a deficient bill of indictment (the content of which is unclear, incomplete or inconsistent), in no way allows the possibility of these deficiencies being remedied through corrections by the public prosecutor in the preparatory judicial hearing in which the deficiencies are established, and instead always obliges the court to discontinue the judicial proceedings and remit the matter to the public prosecutor’s office for a new bill of indictment to be drawn up, compatible with Article 6 of Directive 2012/13/ЕU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings (JO 2012, L 142, p. 1), the principle of having a hearing within a reasonable time pursuant to Article 47(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the principle of the precedence of EU law and the principle of the preservation of dignity, if this causes a considerable delay in the criminal proceedings and the deficiencies could be rectified immediately in the judicial hearing?
1.

Must Article 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (1)… and the recitals thereof [the twentieth and twenty-fourth, under which] contracts should be drafted in plain, intelligible language, the consumer should actually be given an opportunity to examine all the terms and, if in doubt, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer should prevail [and] the courts or administrative authorities of the Member States must have at their disposal adequate and effective means of preventing the continued application of unfair terms in consumer contracts, in conjunction with Article 10(1) and (2) of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC (2)…, and recital 31 thereof, be interpreted as precluding Article 339(2) of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure, construed in such a way that it permits the delivery of a default judgment in a case … concerning the repayment of consumer credit … including where the applicant has failed to submit … the consumer credit agreement …, and consequently no examination of the agreement was carried out from the point of view of potentially unfair terms contained in the agreement and no checks were made on whether the agreement contained all the elements required by law, and at the same time requires, when delivering a default judgment, that the applicant’s statement of facts alone be relied on, with no analysis of the evidence from the point of view of ‘reasonable doubts’ within the meaning of that provision? In the light of the judgments of the Court of Justice of 1 October 2015, ERSTE Bank Hungary (C-32/14, EU:C:2015:637, paragraph 62); of 10 September 2014, Kušionová [Or. 1] (C-34/13, EU:C:2014:2189, paragraph 56); and of 6 October 2009, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones (C-40/08, EU:C:2009:615, paragraph 47), is it also permissible to interpret Article 339(2) of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure as meaning that a default judgment may be delivered in a case [concerning a consumer credit agreement] … in which the applicant failed to attach the agreement to the application, and consequently with no examination of the agreement from the point of view of potentially unfair terms contained therein, and also no checks on whether the agreement contained all the elements required by law, relying solely on the applicant’s statement of facts?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 5 November 2019 — QF v Germanwings GmbH

(Case C-816/19)

(2020/C 45/21)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Hamburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: QF

Defendant: Germanwings GmbH

Question referred

Does a trade union organised strike by an operating air carrier’s own staff constitute an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004? (1)

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy (Poland) lodged on 2 December 2019 — FORMAT Urządzenia i Montaże Przemysłowe v Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych I Oddział w Warszawie

(Case C-879/19)

(2020/C 54/41)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Najwyższy

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: FORMAT Urządzenia i Montaże Przemysłowe

Defendant: Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych I Oddział w Warszawie

Question referred

Is the expression ‘a person normally employed in the territory of two or more Member States’ used in the first sentence of Article 14(2) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community, in the version resulting from Council Regulation (EC) No 118/97 of 2 December 1996, (1) as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1992/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006, (2) to be interpreted as also applying to a person who, during the period covered by and within the framework of one and the same contract of employment concluded with a single employer, performs work in the territory of each of at least two Member States not simultaneously or concurrently, but during directly consecutive, successive periods of several months?

(1) OJ 1997 L 28, p. 1.

(2) OJ 2006 L 392, p. 1.
1.

Is the first paragraph of Article 11 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax — the VAT Directive (1)— to be interpreted as precluding the rule set out in point 2 of Paragraph 2(2) of the Umsatzsteuergesetz (German Law on turnover tax) — the UStG — in so far as that rule prohibits a partnership (in this case: a GmbH & Co. KG (a limited partnership in which the general partner is a limited liability company)) the partners of which, apart from the controlling company, are not exclusively persons financially integrated into the controlling company’s undertaking pursuant to point 2 of Paragraph 2(2) of the UStG, from being a controlled company within the scope of a tax-group arrangement for turnover-tax purposes?