ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Keywords

Subject of the case

Operative part



Keywords

Actions for annulment — Admissibility — Decision to dismiss the action on the merits without ruling on admissibility — Discretion of the Courts of the Union (Art. 263 TFEU) (see para. 18)

2. EU public contracts — Conclusion of a contract following a call for tenders — Discretion of the institutions — Judicial review — Limits (see para. 25)

3. EU public contracts — Conclusion of a contract following a call for tenders — Criteria for selecting candidates — Criterion requiring a full legal education for providing legal translation services at the Court of Justice — Lawfulness (Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 42; Council Regulation No 966/2012; Commission Regulation No 1268/2012) (see paras 29, 30)

4. Actions for annulment — Grounds — Misuse of powers — Concept (Art. 263 TFEU) (see para. 56)

5. EU public contracts — Tender procedure — Applicability of directives — Limits — Comparison of diplomas and qualifications obtained in the various Member States in accordance with the provisions of Directive 2005/36 — Discretion of the awarding authority — Limits — Compliance with the principles of free movement of persons and freedom of establishment (Arts 45 TFEU, 49 TFEU and 288, third para., TFEU; European Parliament and Council Regulation No 2005/36, Title III) (see paras 65, 77, 78, 81, 93)

6. Judicial proceedings — Application initiating proceedings — Formal requirements — Identification of the subject-matter of the dispute (Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 21, first para., and 53, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 44(1)(c)) (see para. 67)

7. Freedom of movement for persons — Freedom of establishment — Freedom to provide services — Workers — Access to professions — No harmonisation of conditions for access — Competence of the Member States — Limits (Arts 45 TFEU and 49 TFEU; European Parliament and Council Directive 2005/36) (see paras 88-91)

8. EU law — Principles — Proportionality — Scope (see para. 103)

9. EU public contracts — Tender procedure — Duty to comply with the principles of equal treatment of tenderers and transparency — Scope — No obligation to inform the sub-contractors proposed by a tenderer in the event of their not satisfying the conditions on professional capacity laid down in the contract notice (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 966/2012, Arts 102(1), and 113(2)) (see paras 110, 111)

Subject of the case

Re:

ACTION for annulment of the letters of 5 June 2013 that the Court of Justice of the European Union addressed to IDEST Communication SA, by which it invited that company, first, to submit tenders in the context of a negotiated tender procedure relating to the conclusion of framework contracts for the translation of legal texts from certain official languages of the European Union into French (OJ 2013/S 47-075037) and, second, to confirm that the applicant would not be engaged in providing the services required under the contract.

Operative part

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Mr Alain Laurent Brouillard to pay the costs.
Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) of 17 September 2013 (Case R 1502/2012-2) as regards the goods in Class 25 of the Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and the ‘[r]etailing of women’s underwear and lingerie, perfumes, toilet water and cosmetic lotions, household and bath linen’ services in Class 35 of that agreement covered by the mark applied for;
5.

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Weighing elements of similarity or difference between the signs — Taking into account of the intrinsic characteristics of the signs or the conditions in which the goods or services are marketed — Clothing sector (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 8(1)(b), and 53(1)(a)) (see paras 70, 71)
Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 18 November 2015 —

Mustang v OHIM — Dubek (Mustang)

(Case T‑606/13)

‛Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for Community figurative mark Mustang — Earlier national word and figurative marks MUSTANG — No risk of detriment to the reputation of the earlier marks — Article 8(5) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

1. Community trade mark — Appeals procedure — Action before the EU judicature — Jurisdiction of the General Court — Review of the lawfulness of decisions of the Boards of Appeal — Re-examination of the facts in the light of evidence not previously submitted before OHIM bodies — Not included (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 65(2)) (see para. 17)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark enjoying a reputation — Protection of well-known earlier mark extended to dissimilar goods or services — Aim — Proof to be adduced by proprietor — Future, non-hypothetical risk of unfair advantage or damage (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(5)) (see paras 21, 22, 28)

3. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark enjoying a reputation — Protection of well-known earlier mark extended to dissimilar goods or services — Conditions (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(5)) (see paras 23, 24)

4. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark enjoying a reputation — Protection of well-known earlier mark extended to dissimilar goods or services — Conditions — Link between the marks — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(5)) (see paras 50-52)

5. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark enjoying a reputation — Protection of well-known earlier mark extended to dissimilar goods or services — Conditions — Detriment to the repute of the earlier trade mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(5)) (see para. 60)

6. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark enjoying a reputation — Protection of well-known earlier mark extended to dissimilar goods or services — Figurative mark Mustang — Word and figurative marks MUSTANG (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(5)) (see paras 62-66)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 13 September 2013 (Case R 416/2012-4) relating to opposition proceedings between Mustang — Bekleidungswerke GmbH & Co. KG and Dubek Ltd.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Under the combined provisions of Article 8(1)(b) and Article 66(3) of Regulation No 207/2009 on the Community trade mark, a collective Community trade mark enjoys like any other Community mark protection against any infringement resulting from the registration of a Community trade mark that involves a likelihood of confusion.

While it is true that the essential function of a geographical indication is to guarantee to consumers the geographical origin of goods and the special qualities inherent in them, the same cannot be said of the essential function of a Community collective mark. The fact that the latter consists of an indication which may serve to designate the geographical origin of the goods covered does not affect the essential function of all collective marks as stated in Article 66(1) of Regulation No 207/2009, which is to distinguish the goods or services of the members of the association which is the proprietor of that mark from those of other associations or undertakings. Consequently, the function of a Community collective mark is not altered as a result of its registration under Article 66(2) of Regulation No 207/2009. More specifically, a Community collective mark is a sign allowing goods or services to be distinguished according to which association is the proprietor of the mark and not according to their geographical origin.

Although Article 66(2) of Regulation No 207/2009 introduces an exception to Article 7(1)(c) of that regulation by relaxing the conditions for registration and allowing marks describing the origin of the goods covered to be registered, that regulation is applicable, pursuant to Article 66(3) thereof, unless otherwise expressly provided, to all Community collective marks, including those registered under Article 66(2) thereof.

Consequently, since none of the provisions in the chapter of Regulation No 207/2009 dedicated to Community collective marks allows it to be inferred that the essential function of such marks, including those consisting of an indication which may serve to designate the geographical origin of the goods covered, is different from the essential function of Community individual marks, it must be held that the essential function of the former — as it is for the latter — is to distinguish the goods or services covered according to the specific body from which they originate and not according to their geographical origin.

Where, therefore, in the context of opposition proceedings, the signs at issue are collective marks on the one hand and individual marks on the other, the comparison of the goods and services covered must be carried out using the same criteria as those which apply to an assessment of the similarity or identity of goods and services covered by two individual marks.

(see paras 35, 41-43, 49)
Regulation No 2868/95 implementing Regulation No 40/94 on the Community trade mark, provides that, when examining an appeal directed against a decision of the Opposition Division, the Board of Appeal enjoys the discretion deriving from the third subparagraph of Rule 50(1) of Regulation No 2868/95 and from Article 76(2) of Regulation No 207/2009 to decide whether or not to take into account additional or supplementary facts and evidence which were not presented within the time-limits set or specified by the Opposition Division.

The various language versions of the third subparagraph of Rule 50(1) do not fully correspond. Moreover, the expression ‘faits ou preuves nouveaux’, construed to the effect that in the proceedings before the lower instance there was allegedly no fact or item of evidence submitted, does not appear in certain language versions of that provision. In that regard, it is apparent from the various language versions that the ‘new’ facts or evidence as provided for in the French version must supplement facts or evidence already submitted so that, for evidence to be so characterised (as ‘new’ or supplementary), other evidence must have been submitted at an earlier stage of the proceedings.

That interpretation also applies having regard to the Board of Appeal’s discretionary power, which cannot extend to evidence submitted for the first time before it where no evidence had been submitted before the Cancellation Division.

(see paras 51-55)
Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 27 April 2016 —

Pappalardo and Others v Commission

(Case T‑316/13)

‛Non-contractual liability — Fisheries — Conservation of fisheries resources — Reconstitution of stocks of bluefin tuna — Emergency measures prohibiting fishing by purse seiners — Sufficiently serious infringement of a rule of law conferring rights on individuals’

1. Non-contractual liability — Conditions — Unlawfulness — Damage — Causal link — Cumulative conditions — No obligation on the court to examine in a given order — One of those conditions lacking — Claim for compensation dismissed in its entirety (Art. 340, second para., TFEU) (see paras 16, 17)

2. Non-contractual liability — Conditions — Unlawfulness — Sufficiently serious breach of EU law — Requirement that the institutions manifestly and seriously disregard the limits of their discretion — Introduction of a prohibition on red tuna fishing in the Eastern Atlantic from a different date for Spanish seiners than for seiners of other Member States — No sufficiently serious breach of the principle of non-discrimination — EU not liable (Art. 340, second para., TFEU; Council Regulation No 2371/2002, Art. 7; Commission Regulation No 530/2008) (see paras 23, 34-40)

3. Judicial proceedings — Res judicata — Scope — Judgment of the General Court finding an EU measure invalid on the basis of a misinterpretation of a judgment of the Court of Justice partially annulling that measure — Subsequent judgment of the Court of Justice specifying the correct interpretation of its first judgment — Judgment of the General Court not having the authority of res judicata (Commission Regulation No 530/2008) (see paras 25-27, 30, 31)

Re:

ACTION for compensation in respect of damage allegedly suffered by the applicants following the adoption of Commission Regulation (EC) No 530/2008 of 12 June 2008 establishing emergency measures as regards purse seiners fishing for bluefin tuna in the Atlantic Ocean, east of longitude 45 W, and in the Mediterranean Sea (OJ 2008 L 155, p. 9).

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
The European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) cannot validly rely on the first subparagraph of Article 6(3) of the Annex to Recommendation 2003/361 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises to demand, at the time of registration of a substance, that an applicant seeking to benefit from the reduction in the fee for medium-sized undertakings provide information concerning an undertaking that is not a partner enterprise of applicant within the meaning of Article 3(2) of the Annex to Recommendation 2003/361. It is clear from that provision that it applies for assessing the data of partner enterprises of the enterprise in question, that is to say, the enterprise which is the subject-matter of a review, in connection with Recommendation 2003/361, the purpose of which is to determine its size. In that regard, the concept of ‘indirect enterprise partner’ is not included in Recommendation 2003/361.

Moreover, the words ‘enterprise in question’ cannot be interpreted as covering all the enterprises from which data should be collected. Apart from the fact that that interpretation is not consistent with the objective of Recommendation 2003/361, which is to determine the size of the enterprise in question and not the sizes of those enterprises which have links with it, it could lead, in certain cases, to there being no limit as to the consideration of the data of the enterprises situated either upstream or downstream of the enterprise in question.

(see paras 44, 47)
133

In those circumstances, it cannot be considered that the general and absolute refusal to disclose set out in the contested decision could be justified by the considerations relied on by the Commission’s services in the decision of 7 March 2012, according to which: ‘In order to reconcile the legitimate interest in the transparency of its administrative procedures and the interest in preserving the attractiveness of the leniency programme, the Commission publishes a non-confidential version of its final decisions, in which it identifies all of the cartel participants and sets out the constituent elements of this infringement of the competition rules. For reasons which will be explained below, information concerning correspondence from parties that have submitted an application under the leniency programme or correspondence exchanged with them … which is included in the table of contents and which has not yet been disclosed by way of a published decision … is covered by [the exceptions laid down in the first and third indents of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001]. … In those circumstances, the provision of information on correspondence exchanged within the framework of the leniency programme other than the information contained in the public version of the [Carglass] decision … would undermine the protection of commercial interests. … In the provisional public version of the [Carglass] decision, the Commission already disclosed some of the information set out in the table of contents (in particular, the identity of the undertakings that had submitted an application under the leniency programme and the date of the decision granting their application). Before doing so, it weighed up the importance of such disclosure against the possible adverse consequences of such disclosure on the effective implementation of the leniency programme (and, therefore, on the application of Article 101 TFEU). All other references concerning this kind of correspondence were, however, expunged from the annexed table of contents, because any further identification [of the] documents [in question] could undermine the “purpose of the Commission’s investigations” and the “commercial interests” of the parties to the proceeding’ (penultimate and final subparagraph of point 1.1, final subparagraph of point 1.2, and penultimate subparagraph of point 1.3 of the decision of 7 March 2012).
58

First, it should be stated that it is not possible to determine from a reading of the summary report whether the reference in that report to the deficiency relating to the ‘control-free period (almost two months) in 2006’ is the result of a mere material error or an intention on the part of the Commission, ultimately, to take account of that deficiency, even though it appeared to have accepted the Hellenic Republic’s explanations during the administrative procedure. On the one hand, the addition of the reference to that deficiency is concomitant with the withdrawal from the position expressed by the Commission, in its final position, to the effect that the deficiency at issue did not have a significant negative impact on the effectiveness of the on-the-spot checks. On the other hand, the Commission itself recognised in its reply to the measure of organisation of procedure that the contradiction at issue was ‘manifestly due to error or uncertainty on the part of the author of the report as regards the “significance” of the deficiency constituted by the lack of controls’. The Commission therefore considers two distinct possible explanations for the reference, in the summary report, to the ‘control-free period (almost two months) in 2006’. As a result, the Hellenic Republic finds itself in a situation in which it must proceed by way of conjecture in order to try to understand why the deficiency at issue is referred to in the summary report but no longer featured in the final decision, and to determine whether that deficiency was taken into account for the purposes of setting the financial correction and, if so, what impact it had on the level at which that correction was set. It should also be pointed out that, in the course of its action before the General Court, the Hellenic Republic put forward arguments on the substance of the case to demonstrate that the Commission committed an error in taking into account the deficiency at issue.
77

Concerning the assessment of the substance of the applicant’s argument alleging an error of law by the Council, it is apparent from the case-law that the legality of an entity’s inclusion on the list of persons or entities covered by restrictive measures on the grounds of its links with another entity included on that list is conditional on the fact that, at the date of listing, that other entity must be lawfully included on that list. Pursuant to that case-law, the freezing of the funds of entities owned or controlled by an entity which has been lawfully included on the list in question, or acting on its behalf, is necessary and appropriate in order to ensure the effectiveness of the measures adopted vis-à-vis the latter entity and to ensure that those measures are not circumvented. Accordingly, if IRISL is not lawfully included on the lists at issue, the inclusion on those lists of entities acting on its behalf or providing essential services to IRISL or to other entities acting on its behalf can no longer be held to be justified by the objective of ensuring the effectiveness of the measures adopted vis-à-vis IRISL and ensuring that those measures are not circumvented (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 September 2013 in Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, T‑489/10, EU:T:2013:453, paragraphs 75 to 77; see also judgment of 9 December 2014 in BT Telecommunications v Council, T‑440/11, not published, EU:T:2014:1042, paragraph 149 and the case-law cited).
2.

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Concept — Mark composed of a word or neologism resulting from a combination of elements (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 15, 17, 18)
Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 12 December 2014 —

Heidrick & Struggles International v OHIM (THE LEADERSHIP COMPANY)

(Case T‑43/14)

‛Community trade mark — Application for Community word mark THE LEADERSHIP COMPANY — Absolute grounds for refusal — Descriptiveness — Lack of distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

1. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Aim — Need to preserve availability (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 17)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Concept (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 18, 19)

3. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Word mark THE LEADERSHIP COMPANY (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 23-28)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 10 October 2013 (Case R 338/2013‑2) concerning an application for registration of the word sign THE LEADERSHIP COMPANY as a Community trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;