ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
9

Article 10 of Regulation No 2201/2003, entitled ‘Jurisdiction in cases of child abduction’, provides: ‘In case of wrongful removal or retention of the child, the courts of the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention shall retain their jurisdiction until the child has acquired a habitual residence in another Member State and: (a) each person, institution or other body having rights of custody has acquiesced in the removal or retention; or (b) the child has resided in that other Member State for a period of at least one year after the person, institution or other body having rights of custody has had or should have had knowledge of the whereabouts of the child and the child is settled in his or her new environment and at least one of the following conditions is met: (i) within one year after the holder of rights of custody has had or should have had knowledge of the whereabouts of the child, no request for return has been lodged before the competent authorities of the Member State where the child has been removed or is being retained; (ii) a request for return lodged by the holder of rights of custody has been withdrawn and no new request has been lodged within the time limit set in paragraph (i); (iii) a case before the court in the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention has been closed pursuant to Article 11(7); (iv) a judgment on custody that does not entail the return of the child has been issued by the courts of the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention.’
ORDER OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COURT

20 July 2018 ( )

(Rectification order)

In Case C‑187/18 P(I)-REC,

APPEAL under the first paragraph of Article 57 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 12 March 2018,

Ute Müller, residing in Brussels (Belgium),

Anna Colombo, residing in Brussels,

Utta Tuttlies, residing in Brussels,

Michael Hoppe, residing in Brussels,

represented by D.O. Reich, Rechtsanwalt,

appellants,

the other parties to the proceedings being:

QH, residing in Woluwé-Saint-Pierre (Belgium), represented by N. Lhoëst and S. Michiels, avocats,

applicant at first instance,

European Parliament, represented by M. Ecker and Í. Ní Riagáin Düro, acting as Agents,

defendant at first instance,

THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COURT,

after hearing the Advocate General, M. Wathelet,

makes the following

Order

1 On 5 July 2018, the Vice-President of the Court made the order Müller and Others v QH (C‑187/18 P(I), not published, EU:C:2018:543).

2 That order contains, in the version in the language of the case, an error which it is appropriate for the Court to correct of its own motion in accordance with Article 154(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, which applies to the procedure on appeal under Article 190(1) of those rules.

On those grounds, the Vice-President of the Court hereby orders:

1. The heading preceding paragraph 33 of the Order of the Vice-President of the Court of 5 July 2018, Müller and Others v QH (C‑187/18 P(I), not published, EU:C:2018:543) shall, in the version in the language of the case, be rectified as follows:

‘On the application to intervene before the General Court’

2. The original of this order shall be annexed to the original of the rectified order. A note of this order shall be made in the margin of the original of the rectified order.





Luxembourg, 20 July 2018.





A. Calot Escobar A. Tizzano
17

In those circumstances, the Court of Appeal decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Subject to the potential justifications described in Questions 2, 3 and 4, is a Member State in breach of the requirement in Article 5(2) of Directive 2004/38 to issue a visa as quickly as possible to the spouse and family members of a Union citizen exercising free movement rights in the Member State in question or intending to exercise such rights where the delays in processing such an application exceed 12 months or more? (2) Without prejudice to Question 1, are delays in processing or otherwise deciding on an application for a visa pursuant to Article 5(2) arising from the necessity to ensure in particular by way of background checks that the application is not fraudulent or an abuse of rights, including that the marriage [does not amount] to a marriage of convenience, whether by virtue of Article 35 of Directive [2004/38] or otherwise and thus not a breach of Article 5(2) [of that directive]? (3) Without prejudice to Question 1, are delays in processing or deciding on an application for a visa pursuant to Article 5(2) arising from the necessity to conduct extensive background and security checks on persons coming from certain third countries because of specific concerns relating to security in respect of travellers coming from those third countries, whether by virtue of Article 27 or Article 35 of Directive [2004/38] or otherwise justifiable and thus not in breach of Article 5(2) [of that directive]? (4) Without prejudice to Question 1, are delays in processing or deciding on an application for a visa pursuant to Article 5(2) arising from a sudden and unanticipated surge in such applications coming from certain third countries which are thought to present real security concerns justifiable and thus not in breach of Article 5(2) [of Directive 2004/38]?’
ORDER OF THE COURT (Ninth Chamber)

13 December 2018 ( )

(Rectification order)

In Case C‑118/18 P-REC,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 12 February 2018,

Hochmann Marketing GmbH, formerly Bittorrent Marketing GmbH, established in Neu-Isenburg (Germany), represented by C. Hoppe, Rechtsanwalt,

appellant,

the other parties to the proceedings being:

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO),

defendant at first instance,

BitTorrent Inc., established in San Francisco (United States),

intervener at first instance,

THE COURT (Ninth Chamber),

composed of C. Lycourgos, President of the Tenth Chamber, acting as President of the Ninth Chamber, E. Juhász and C. Vajda (Rapporteur), Judges,

Advocate General: J. Kokott,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

after hearing the Advocate General,

makes the following

Order

1 On 28 June 2018, the Court (Ninth Chamber) made the order in Hochmann Marketing v EUIPO (C‑118/18 P, not published, EU:C:2018:522).

2 That order contains an obvious slip and a clerical error which it is appropriate for the Court to rectify of its own motion, in accordance with Article 154(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, which applies to the procedure on appeal under Article 190(1) of those rules.

On those grounds, the Court (Ninth Chamber) hereby orders:

1. The heading preceding paragraph 20 of the order of 28 June 2018, Hochmann Marketing v EUIPO (C‑118/18 P, EU:C:2018:522), shall be rectified as follows:

‘Third ground of appeal, concerning the failure to take into account a judgment of the Kammergericht Berlin (Higher Regional Court, Berlin, Germany)’.

2. Paragraph 22 of that order shall be rectified as follows:

‘In the assessment of the genuine use of an EU trade mark, the decision of a national court concerning the genuine use of a national trade mark can neither bind EUIPO nor replace EUIPO’s assessment of the evidence, and that is the case even if that national trade mark is identical to the EU trade mark. The judgment of the Kammergericht Berlin (Higher Regional Court, Berlin) does not therefore constitute a new item of evidence of genuine use of the EU trade mark that EUIPO was obliged to take into account.’

3. Paragraph 25 of the order, in the version in the language of the case, shall be rectified as follows:

‘However, the appellant does not explain to what extent the findings of the General Court are vitiated by an error of law but, as in its action before the General Court, the appellant challenges only the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the evidence. Given that, in an appeal, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is confined to a review of the findings of law on the pleas argued at first instance, this ground of appeal is manifestly inadmissible.’

4. The original of this order shall be annexed to the original of the rectified order. A note of this order shall be made in the margin of the original of the rectified order.

Luxembourg, 13 December 2018.





A. Calot Escobar C. Lycourgos
5

Article 15 of the regulation, entitled ‘Transfer to a court better placed to hear the case’, provides: ‘1. By way of exception, the courts of a Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter may, if they consider that a court of another Member State, with which the child has a particular connection, would be better placed to hear the case, or a specific part thereof, and where this is in the best interests of the child: (a) stay the case or the part thereof in question and invite the parties to introduce a request before the court of that other Member State in accordance with paragraph 4; or (b) request a court of another Member State to assume jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 5. 2. Paragraph 1 shall apply: (a) upon application from a party; or (b) of the court’s own motion; or (c) upon application from a court of another Member State with which the child has a particular connection, in accordance with paragraph 3. A transfer made of the court’s own motion or by application of a court of another Member State must be accepted by at least one of the parties. 3. The child shall be considered to have a particular connection to a Member State as mentioned in paragraph 1, if that Member State: (a) has become the habitual residence of the child after the court referred to in paragraph 1 was seised; or (b) is the former habitual residence of the child; or (c) is the place of the child’s nationality; or (d) is the habitual residence of a holder of parental responsibility; or (e) is the place where property of the child is located and the case concerns measures for the protection of the child relating to the administration, conservation or disposal of this property. 4. The court of the Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter shall set a time limit by which the courts of that other Member State shall be seised in accordance with paragraph 1. If the courts are not seised by that time, the court which has been seised shall continue to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 8 to 14. 5. The courts of that other Member State may, where due to the specific circumstances of the case, this is in the best interests of the child, accept jurisdiction within six weeks of their seisure in accordance with paragraph 1(a) or 1(b). In this case, the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction. Otherwise, the court first seised shall continue to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 8 to 14. 6. The courts shall cooperate for the purposes of this Article, either directly or through the central authorities designated pursuant to Article 53.’
Order of the Vice-President of the Court of 23 May 2019 — Trifolio-M and Others v EFSA

(Case C‑163/19 P(R))

(Appeal — Order for interim relief — Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 — Plant protection products — Review procedure for the evaluation of the active substance azadirachtin — Request for confidential treatment — Rejection — Absence of any prima facie case)

1. Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted — Requirement that the distortion be obvious from the documents in the file (Art. 256(1), second para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 33-37)

2. Application for interim measures — Admissibility criteria — Application — Formal requirements — Pleas establishing a prima facie case for the measures applied for — Pleas in law not set out in the application — Reference to the appeal — Inadmissibility (Arts 278 and 279 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 160(3)) (see paras 38, 56-58)

3. Application for interim measures — Admissibility criteria — Application — Formal requirements — Pleas establishing a prima facie case for the measures applied for — Possibility to supplement the information and evidence submitted in the application — Discretion of the Courts of the Union (Arts 278 and 279 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 160(3)) (see paras 60, 62)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.
Appeal — Grounds — Grounds which are manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded — Dismissal at any point, by reasoned order, without an oral procedure

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 181)

(see paras 12, 13)
Order of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 14 November 2019 — Armostav Místek

(Case C‑520/19) ( 1 )

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 53(2) and Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Lack of sufficient information concerning the factual context of the dispute in the main proceedings and the reasons justifying the need for a reply to the questions referred — Manifest inadmissibility)

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Admissibility — Questions referred lacking sufficient information regarding the factual and legislative context and the reasons justifying the need for an answer to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Manifest inadmissibility

(Art. 267 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 23; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Arts 53(2) and 94)

(see paras 14-22, operative part)

Operative part

The request for a preliminary ruling from the Krajský soud v Ostravě (Regional Court, Ostrava, Czech Republic), made by decision of 18 June 2019, is manifestly inadmissible.

( 1 ) OJ C 328, 30.9.2019.
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 7 November 2019 — P.J.

(Case C‑513/19)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure — Lack of sufficient detail concerning the factual context of the dispute in the main proceedings — Manifest inadmissibility)

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Admissibility — Questions referred lacking sufficient information regarding the factual context — Manifest inadmissibility

(Art. 267 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 23; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 53(2) and 94)

(see paras 14-24, operative part)

Operative part

The request for a preliminary ruling made by the Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy-Woli w Warszawie (District Court for Warsaw-Wola, in Warsaw, Poland), by decision of 21 March 2019, is manifestly inadmissible.
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Limits — Request for interpretation of provisions of EU law manifestly inapplicable in the dispute in the main proceedings — Dispute relating to a purely domestic situation — Lack of jurisdiction of the Court

(Arts 18 and 267 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 53(2); European Parliament and Council Regulations No 805/2004 and No 1215/2012)

(see paras 18-26, 28, 29, operative part)
Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see paras 97, 98)
Judicial proceedings — Action before the General Court — Possibility of a second exchange of pleadings — Discretion of the Court

(Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 83)

(see para. 5)
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 6 November 2019 — BNP Paribas Personal Finance SA Paris Sucursala Bucureşti and Secapital

(Case C‑75/19) ( 1 )

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Directive 93/13/EEC — Consumer contracts — Consumer credit — Enforcement proceedings — Period of 15 days from communication of the enforcement proceedings to invoke the unfair nature of a term)

Consumer protection — Unfair terms in consumer contracts — Directive 93/13 — Enforcement proceedings — National rule making the right of a consumer to invoke the unfair nature of a term subject to a very short time limit in the proceedings in which the consumer contests enforcement — Unlawful — Inconsistent with the principle of effectiveness — National rule establishing the right of a consumer to invoke the unfair nature of a term in separate proceedings from the proceedings in which the consumer contests enforcement — Proceedings not subject to a time limit and irrelevant for the purpose of the enforcement proceedings — Irrelevant

(Council Directive 93/13)

(see paras 28-34, operative part)

Operative part

Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as precluding a rule of national law under which a consumer who has entered into a loan agreement with a credit institution and against whom that seller or supplier has brought enforcement proceedings is precluded, after a period of 15 days from communication of the first enforcement measures, from relying on the fact that terms are unfair when contesting enforcement even if, under national law, the consumer has the right to bring proceedings to establish that the terms are unfair, the exercise of which is not subject to a time limit, but the outcome of which is irrelevant for the purpose of the outcome in the enforcement proceedings, which may be binding on the consumer before the outcome of the action seeking to establish that that the terms are unfair.

( 1 ) OJ C 164, 13.5.2019.
Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 24 October 2019 — Porr Építési Kft.

(Case C‑292/19) ( 1 )

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Common system of value added tax (VAT) — Taxable amount — Reduction — Directive 2006/112/EEC — Article 90 — Principle of fiscal neutrality — Debt that became irrecoverable following insolvency proceedings)

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Taxable amount — Obligation to reduce in the event of total or partial non-payment — Scope — Taxable person showing the definitely irrecoverable nature of the debt held — Included — Exception — Case of non-payment coming within the option for Member States to derogate from that obligation

(Council Directive 2006/112, Art. 90)

(see paras 19, 22-26, 28, 29, operative part.)

Operative part

Article 90 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State must allow the taxable amount for value added tax to be reduced where the taxable person can demonstrate that the debt owed to him by the debtor is definitely irrecoverable, which is a matter for the national court to ascertain, since that situation does not amount to a case of non-payment capable of coming under the derogation from the obligation to reduce the taxable amount of the value added tax provided for in Article 90(2) of the directive.

( 1 ) OJ C 220 of 1.7.2019.
2.

Agriculture — Common organisation of the markets — Fruit and vegetables — Temporary exceptional support measures for producers — Sufficient information concerning the market — Finding of the basic facts — Discretion of the Commission (Commission Regulation No 543/2011) (see paras 31, 34)
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Jurisdiction of the Court – Limits – Request for an interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – National legislation not constituting a measure implementing EU law and not having any other connection with EU law – Manifest lack of jurisdiction of the Court

(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 51(1))

(see paras 51-58, 60, operative part two)
Appeal – Grounds – Lack of specific criticism of a point of the General Court’s reasoning and of legal arguments in support of the appeal – Inadmissibility

(Art. 256(1), second para. (d), TFEU; Statue of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 168(1)(d))

(see paras 38, 40, 54)
1.

Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work concluded on 18 March 1999, which is included in the Annex to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must be interpreted as meaning that it is for the national court to assess, in accordance with all the applicable rules of national law, whether national measures providing for the reclassification of a category of temporary staff through the substitution of the status of occasional regulated staff for that of interim regulated staff, and the possible establishment of those staff following selection procedures designed to fill definitively the posts occupied temporarily by them, constitute appropriate measures to prevent and, if necessary, penalise abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships or equivalent legal measures, within the meaning of that provision. If this is not the case, it is for that court to ascertain whether there are other effective measures in the applicable national legislation to prevent and penalise such abuse.
26

By its two questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 1(2) and Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that, where a court of a Member State is hearing a dispute relating to an allegedly unfair contractual term which reflects a provision of national law which is supplementary in nature, it is required to examine, as a matter of priority, the effect of the exclusion from the scope of that directive laid down in Article 1(2) thereof, or the effect of the exception to the assessment of whether contractual terms are unfair provided for in Article 4(2) of that directive, and, in the event that the latter course of action were to be followed, whether a seller or supplier who had not complied with the obligation of transparency arising from Article 4(2) could nevertheless rely on Article 1(2) thereof to prevent the examination of whether such a contractual term was unfair.
Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 12 May 2020 — Comprojecto-Projectos e Construçôes and Others v ECB

(Case C‑251/19 P-OST)

(Article 155 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Omission to give a decision — None)

Judicial proceedings — Omission to give a decision — Meaning — Obligation to rule on all the pleas in law submitted by the parties — No failure to adjudicate

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 155 and 169(1))

(see paras 7-9, 13-18)

Operative part

1. The application under Article 155(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court lodged on 31 October 2019 by Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções Lda, Mr Paulo Eduardo Matos Gomes de Azevedo, Mr Julião Maria Gomes de Azevedo and Ms Isabel Maria Matos Gomes de Azevedo, is rejected.