ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Case C‑150/16

Fondul Proprietatea SA

v

Complexul Energetic Oltenia SA

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Craiova)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — State aid — Debt owed to a company of which the Romanian State is the majority shareholder by a company of which that State is the sole shareholder — Transfer in lieu of payment — Definition of ‘State aid’ — Obligation to notify the European Commission)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 18 May 2017

State aid—Definition—Aid from State resources—Aid granted to a public undertaking—Resources of the undertaking constantly under public control—Included (Art. 107(1) TFEU) State aid—Definition—Aid granted to a public undertaking—Undertaking controlled by the State—Imputability to the State of the aid measure—Set of indicators to be taken into consideration (Art. 107(1) TFEU) State aid—Definition—Assessment according to the criterion of the private investor—Grant, by an undertaking controlled by the State, of payment facilities to another undertaking—Assessment of all factors relevant to the transaction at issue and its context (Art. 107(1) TFEU) State aid—Effect on trade between Member States—Adverse effect on competition—Criteria for assessment—Liberalised sector (Art. 107(1) TFEU) State aid—Definition—Aid granted to a public undertaking—Grant, by an undertaking controlled by the State, of payment facilities to another undertaking—Measure liable to constitute State aid—Conditions (Art. 107(1) TFEU) State aid—Planned aid—Duty of prior notification and provisional suspension of the implementation of the aid—Scope—Measured classified as State aid by the national court—Included (Art. 108(3) TFEU)
Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC and Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) must be interpreted as precluding a national provision, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which contains a general prohibition on offering for sale or selling goods at a loss and which lays down grounds of derogation from that prohibition that are based on criteria not appearing in that directive.

In that regard, the Court has held that the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive fully harmonises the rules relating to unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices and that the Member States may therefore not adopt stricter measures than those provided for in the directive, as expressly laid down in Article 4 thereof, even in order to achieve a higher level of consumer protection (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 January 2010, Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft, C‑304/08, EU:C:2010:12, paragraph 41, and order of 30 June 2011, Wamo, C‑288/10, EU:C:2011:443, paragraph 33).

(see paras 39, 43, operative part)
2.

European Union—Judicial review of the legality of the acts of the institutions—Restrictive measures taken having regard to the situation in Ukraine—Freezing of funds of persons involved in the misappropriation of public funds and of natural or legal persons, bodies or organisations associated with them—Ambit of the review—Assessment of whether the investigations relating to the person affected by the decision to freeze funds are well founded—Not included—Assessment, on the basis of the documents on which the decision is based, of whether the decision to freeze funds is well founded—Included (Council Decisions 2015/143/CFSP and 2015/364/CFSP; Council Regulations No 2015/138 and No 2015/357) (see paras 69, 75)
Case C‑350/16 P

Salvatore Aniello Pappalardo and Others

v

European Commission

(Appeal — Common fisheries policy — Non-contractual liability of the European Union — Claim for compensation — Regulation (EC) No 530/2008 — Emergency measures adopted by the European Commission — Sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law — Whether possible to rely on that breach — Principle of non-discrimination — Res judicata)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 13 September 2017

EU law—Principles—Equal treatment—Need to comply with the principle of legality—Impossible to rely on an unlawful act committed in favour of a third party

Judicial proceedings—Res judicata—Scope—Judgment of the Court concerning the validity of an EU act—Later judgment of the Court defining the exact scope of the earlier judgment—Due regard for the force of res judicata attaching to the first judgment of the Court

By virtue of the force of res judicata attaching to decisions of the Court of Justice concerning the validity of an EU act, such decisions have full effect despite any differences of interpretation to which they may give rise. Thus, even when any uncertainty there may have been as to the exact scope of a judgment of the Court has been finally dispelled only as a result of the clarification provided in another judgment of the Court, the fact remains that the first judgment must be deemed to have had, from the time of its delivery, the scope as defined in the second judgment. Moreover, the force of res judicata extends only to the matters of fact and law actually or necessarily settled by a judicial decision. (see paras 34, 35, 37)

The right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations extends to any person whom an institution of the European Union has caused, by giving him precise assurances, to entertain justified hopes. Information which is precise, unconditional and consistent, in whatever form it is given, constitutes such assurances. By contrast, a person may not plead breach of that principle unless he has been given those assurances. Even if a judicial decision were able, on its own, to give rise to a right to entertain justified hopes within the meaning of that case-law, no precise assurance as to the scope of a decision of the Court of Justice can be derived from an order by which the General Court held, on the basis of that decision, that there was no need to adjudicate. (see paras 39, 40)

The principle of equal treatment must be reconciled with the principle of legality, according to which a person may not rely, in support of his claim, on an unlawful act committed in favour of a third party. (see para. 52)
It is for the national court to determine whether the application of the national procedural rules to actions concerning the enforcement of acts covered by Article 299 TFEU is made in a non-discriminatory manner compared to the procedures for deciding national disputes of the same type and in accordance with procedural rules which do not make the recovery of the sums referred to in those acts more difficult than in comparable cases involving the application of the corresponding national provisions.

Article 299 TFEU and Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 of 24 June 1988 on the tasks of the Structural Funds and their effectiveness and on coordination of their activities between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments, Council Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 of 19 December 1988 laying down provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards coordination of the activities of the different Structural Funds between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments and Council Regulation (EEC) No 4256/88 of 19 December 1988, laying down provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) Guidance Section must be interpreted as meaning that they do not define, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, the persons against whom enforcement may be pursued by virtue of an enforceable decision of the Commission ordering the recovery of sums paid. It is for the national court to define those persons, in compliance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.

In that regard, it must be recalled that, under the first subparagraph of Article 299 TFEU, acts of the Council of the European Union, the Commission or the European Central Bank which impose a pecuniary obligation on persons other than States, are to be enforceable. It follows from that provision that those acts may be enforced against persons to whom they relate, other than States. With regard to the national rules on enforcement, it is clear from the second and third subparagraphs of Article 299 TFEU that those rules govern the means of enforcement and not the identity of persons capable of being the object of such enforcement. Accordingly, in the absence of EU law rules specifying those persons and enabling the determination in particular of whether enforcement may be pursued against a person other than the addressee of the Commission decision, it is for the internal legal order of each Member State to establish the persons against whom enforcement may be pursued, on condition, however, that the national rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and that they do not make it excessively difficult or impossible in practice to exercise the rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 February 2015, Baczó and Vizsnyiczai, C‑567/13, EU:C:2015:88, paragraphs 41 and 42 and the case-law cited).

(see paras 28-31, 35, operative part 2)
Clause 4(1) of the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded on 18 March 1999, annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘employment conditions’, referred to in that provision, includes the right for a worker who has been elected to a parliamentary role to benefit from special service leave, provided for by national legislation, under which the employment relationship is suspended such that the worker’s job and his entitlement to promotion are guaranteed until the end of that parliamentary term of office.

With regard to the concept of ‘employment conditions’ within the meaning of Clause 4(1) of the framework agreement, the Court has already held that the decisive criterion for determining whether a measure falls within the scope of that concept is, precisely, the criterion of employment, that is to say the employment relationship between a worker and his employer (judgments of 12 December 2013, Carratù, C‑361/12, EU:C:2013:830, paragraph 35; of 13 March 2014, Nierodzik, C‑38/13, EU:C:2014:152, paragraph 25; of 14 September 2016, de Diego Porras, C‑596/14, EU:C:2016:683, paragraph 26; and order of 9 February 2017, Rodrigo Sanz, C‑443/16, EU:C:2017:109, paragraph 32).

As was noted by the Advocate General in point 22 of her Opinion, the expression ‘employment conditions’ should be understood to mean the rights, entitlements and obligations that define a given employment relationship, including both the conditions under which a person takes up employment and those concerning the termination of that relationship.

In any case, it should be added that an interpretation of Clause 4(1) of the framework agreement which excludes from the definition of ‘employment conditions’ the right to special service leave would limit the scope of the protection granted to fixed-term workers against discrimination, in disregard of the objective pursued by that provision (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 March 2014, Nierodzik, C‑38/13, EU:C:2014:152, paragraphs 27 and 29 and of 14 September 2016, de Diego Porras, C‑596/14, EU:C:2016:683, paragraph 30; and order of the Court of 21 September 2016, Álvarez Santirso, C‑631/15, EU:C:2016:725, paragraph 39).

(see paras 30, 34, 38, 39, operative part 1)
Article 18 du Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products, read in the light of Article 17(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1610/96 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 1996 concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for plant protection products, must be interpreted as meaning that the date of the first authorisation to place the product on the market, as stated in an application for a supplementary protection certificate, on the basis of which the national authority competent for granting such a certificate calculated the duration of the certificate, is incorrect in a situation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, where the date led to a method for calculating the duration of the certificate which does not comply with the requirements of Article 13(1) of Regulation No 469/2009, as interpreted by a subsequent judgment of the Court.

In paragraph 40 of the judgment of 6 October 2015, Seattle Genetics (C‑471/14, EU:C:2015:659), the Court held that Article 13(1) of Regulation No 469/2009 must be interpreted as meaning that the ‘date of the first [MA] in the [European Union]’, within the meaning of that provision, is the date on which notification of the decision granting MA was given to the addressee of the decision. Accordingly, the interpretation adopted by the Court, in the judgment of 6 October 2015, Seattle Genetics (C‑471/14, EU:C:2015:659), in relation to the concept of ‘date of the first [MA] in the [European Union]’, as it appears in Article 13(1) of Regulation No 469/2009, clarifies and defines the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be, or ought to have been, understood and applied from the date of its entry into force.

(see paras 40, 42, 44, operative part 1)
It is apparent from the wording of Article 9(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 that a decision taken on the basis of that article has in particular the effect of making binding the commitments, proposed by undertakings, to meet the competition concerns identified by the Commission in its preliminary assessment. It must be found that such a decision does not certify that the practice, which was the subject of concern, complies with Article 101 TFEU. It follows that a decision taken on the basis of Article 9(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 cannot create a legitimate expectation in respect of the undertakings concerned as to whether their conduct complies with Article 101 TFEU.

Article 16(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101 TFEU] and [102 TFEU] must be interpreted as meaning that a commitment decision concerning certain agreements between undertakings, adopted by the European Commission under Article 9(1) of that regulation, does not preclude national courts from examining whether those agreements comply with the competition rules and, if necessary, declaring those agreements void pursuant to Article 101(2) TFEU. In addition, recitals 13 and 22 of Regulation No 1/2003, read together, expressly state that commitment decisions are without prejudice to the powers of competition authorities and courts of the Member States to decide on the case, and do not affect the power of the courts and the competition authorities of the Member States to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.

Nonetheless, national courts cannot overlook that type of decision. Such acts are, in any event, in the nature of a decision. In addition, both the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU and the objective of applying EU competition law effectively and uniformly require the national court to take into account the preliminary assessment carried out by the Commission and regard it as an indication, if not prima facie evidence, of the anticompetitive nature of the agreement at issue in the light of Article 101(1) TFEU. Since, as provided for in Article 9(1) of Regulation No 1/2003, read in the light of recital 13 of that regulation, the Commission may carry out a mere ‘preliminary assessment’ of the competition situation, without the commitment decision taken on the basis of that article subsequently establishing whether there has been or still is an infringement, it cannot be precluded that a national court may conclude that the practice which is the subject of the commitment decision infringes Article 101 TFEU and that, in so doing, it proposes, unlike the Commission, finding that an infringement of that article has been committed.

(see paras 26, 27, 29, 30, operative part)
Article 267(3) TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that a national court against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy is required, in principle, to refer a question for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of EU law even if, in the course of the same national proceedings, the constitutional court of the Member State concerned has assessed the constitutionality of national rules in the light of regulatory parameters with content similar to rules under EU law.

It follows from the foregoing considerations that the effectiveness of EU law would be impaired and the effectiveness of Article 267 TFEU diminished if, as a result of there existing a procedure for review of constitutionality, the national court were precluded from referring questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling and immediately applying EU law in a manner consistent with the Court’s decision or case-law (judgment of 4 June 2015, Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems, C‑5/14, EU:C:2015:354, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).

Furthermore, although it is true that the procedure laid down in Article 267 TFEU is an instrument for cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts, by means of which the former provides the latter with the points of interpretation of EU law necessary in order for them to decide the disputes before them, the fact remains that when there is no judicial remedy under national law against the decision of a court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal is, in principle, obliged to bring the matter before the Court of Justice under the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU where a question relating to the interpretation of EU law is raised before it (see judgment of 9 September 2015, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, C‑160/14, EU:C:2015:565, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

(see paras 23, 24, 26, operative part 1)
The General Court did not err in law in holding, in its assessment of the admissibility of an action seeking annulment of Article 2 of Implementing Regulation No 1239/2013 imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (i.e. cells) originating in or consigned from the People’s Republic of China, that that article was not severable from the remaining provisions of that regulation.

Since the partial annulment of an EU act is possible only if the elements whose annulment is sought may be severed from the remainder of the act, the requirement of severability is not satisfied in the case where the partial annulment of an act would have the effect of altering its substance.

In that regard, it follows from the provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of Implementing Regulation No 1239/2013 that the latter article establishes, by means of the undertaking relating to minimum import prices, an exemption from payment of countervailing duties imposed under Article 1 thereof, up to a certain level of annual imports. The EU legislature, when adopting that regulation, put in place trade defence measures constituting a set or a ‘package’. That regulation imposes two separate and complementary measures which seek to achieve a common goal, namely the removal of the injurious effect on the Union industry of Chinese subsidies relating to the products at issue, while safeguarding the interests of that industry.

Since Implementing Regulation No 1239/2013 is based on the possibility of applying those two separate measures alternatively, the Chinese exporting producers can rely on the undertaking relating to minimum import prices accepted by the Commission, within the meaning of Article 2 of that regulation, and thus avoid an ad valorem countervailing duty, such as that laid down by Article 1 of that regulation, from being imposed on their products. The annulment of Article 2 of that regulation would remove such a possibility and eliminate the alternative which the EU legislature wished to offer to Chinese exporting producers when adopting the regulation at issue. Taking account of the differences in the economic consequences of those two types of trade defence measures, such an annulment would therefore affect the very substance of the regulation at issue.

The application of the undertaking relating to minimum import prices concerned the vast majority of cases with effect from the adoption of Implementing Regulation No 1239/2013. That undertaking therefore appears to be intended to apply primarily in the context of the imports from China concerned by that implementing regulation. Accordingly, the annulment of that undertaking would necessarily affect the substance of the regulation.

(see paras 38, 42, 46, 52, 55, 57)
The condition relating to the selectivity of the advantage is a constituent factor in the concept of ‘State aid’ within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, since this provision prohibits aid ‘favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. The assessment of that condition requires it to be determined whether, under a particular legal regime, a national measure is such as to favour ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’ over others which, in the light of the objective pursued by that regime, are in a comparable factual and legal situation.

However, a measure which benefits only one economic sector or some of the undertakings in that sector is not necessarily selective. It is selective only if, within the context of a particular legal regime, it has the effect of conferring an advantage on certain undertakings over others, in a different sector or the same sector, which are, in the light of the objective pursued by that regime, in a comparable factual and legal situation.

(see paras 58, 61)
Case C‑325/16

Industrias Químicas del Vallés SA

v

Administración General del Estado and Sapec Agro SA

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Agriculture — Directive 91/414/EEC — Directive 2010/28/EU — Article 3(1) — Procedure for re-evaluation by Member States, authorised plant protection products — Time limit — Extension)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber), 17 May 2018

Agriculture — Approximation of laws — Placing of plant protection products on the market — Directive 2010/28 — Inclusion of certain active substances of those products in Annex I of Directive 91/414 — Obligation on the Member States to amend or withdraw existing authorisations for plant protection products containing metalaxyl — Time-limit — No possibility for extension

(Council Directive 91/414, Annex I; Commission Directive 2010/28, Art. 3(1))

Article 3(1) of Commission Directive 2010/28/EU of 23 April 2010 amending Council Directive 91/414/EEC to include the active substance metalaxyl must be interpreted as meaning that the time limit that it lays down, expiring on 31 December 2010, to allow Member State to amend or withdraw, in accordance with Directive 91/414/EEC of 15 July 1991 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market, existing authorisations for plant protection products containing metalaxyl as an active substance, is a mandatory time limit, which cannot be extended by those Member States.

(see para. 41, operative part)