ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 155/14

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Finanzgericht Baden-Württemberg (Germany) lodged on 20 February 2015 — Robert Fuchs AG v Hauptzollamt Lörrach

(Case C-80/15)

(2015/C 155/15)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Finanzgericht Baden-Württemberg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Robert Fuchs AG

Defendant: Hauptzollamt Lörrach

Question referred

Must Article 555(1)(a) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 (1) laying down provisions for the Customs Code as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 2286/2003 of 18 December 2003 (2) be interpreted as meaning that remunerated flight training with helicopters in which a trainer and trainee are in the helicopter also amounts to a commercial use of a means of transport?

(1) Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ 1993, L 253, p. 1).

(2) Commission Regulation (EC) No 2286/2003 of 18 December 2003 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ 2003, L 343 p. 1).
1.

Does Community law, and in particular recital 31 in the preamble to, and Article 5(2)(b) of, Directive 2001/29/EC (1), preclude national rules (in particular, Article 71-sexies of the Italian Legge sul Diritto d’autore (Law on copyright), in conjunction with Article 4 of the [Decree of] 30 December 2009) that provide that, in the case of media and devices acquired for purposes clearly unrelated to private copying (that is to say, for professional use only), determination of the criteria for ‘ex ante’ exemption from the levy is left to private negotiation, or ‘free bargaining’, with particular regard to the ‘application protocols’ referred to in Article 4 above, failing any general provisions and any guarantee of equal treatment between the SIAE and persons obliged to pay the compensation, or their trade or professional associations?
1.

Must Articles 2 and 3 of Directive 94/19/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes, where appropriate read in conjunction with Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2) and with the general principle of equality, be interpreted as meaning that: (a) they impose an obligation on the Member States to guarantee the shares of recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector in the same way as deposits? (b) they preclude a Member State from entrusting to the body which is partially responsible for guaranteeing the deposits referred to in that directive the task of also guaranteeing, in an amount up to EUR 1 00 000, the value of the shares of the members, being natural persons, of a recognised cooperative operating in the financial sector?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 198/21

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Netherlands) lodged on 26 March 2015 — G.E. Security BV; other party: Staatssecretaris van Financiën

(Case C-143/15)

(2015/C 198/27)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hoge Raad der Nederlanden

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: G.E. Security BV

Other party: Staatssecretaris van Financiën

Question referred

Should headings 8517, 8521, 8531 and 8543 of the Combined Nomenclature be interpreted as meaning that a product such as a video multiplexer — which was developed to form part of a system which is able to analyse images and sounds derived from cameras and alarm sensors connected to it, and which, if required, records, stores, processes and displays images and sounds on a monitor connected to it, and/or which, when the images or sounds so warrant, emits a warning signal in the form of an e-mail to one or more of the users connected to the system, and/or which can activate devices which emit sound or light signals — is to be classified under one of those headings?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 190/7

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 9 April 2015 — Abdelhafid Bensada Benallal v Belgian State

(Case C-161/15)

(2015/C 190/07)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Abdelhafid Bensada Benallal

Defendant: Belgian State

Question referred

Does the general principle of European Union Law upholding the rights of the defence, including the right of an individual to be heard by a national authority before any decision is taken by that authority likely adversely to affect that individual’s interests such as a decision ending that individual’s residence authorisation, carry in the legal system of the European Union an equivalent importance to that held by the rules of public policy in the Belgian legal system, and does the principle of equivalence require that a plea can be raised for the first time before the Conseil d’État hearing an appeal in cassation based on breach of the general principle of EU law of the right to a fair hearing as is permitted in the national law for pleas based on public policy?
1.

Is Article 5(4)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 543/2008 (1) compatible with the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in conjunction with Articles 15(1) and 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 228/4

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 21 April 2015 — Daimler AG v Együd Garage Gépjárműjavító és Értékesítő Kft.

(Case C-179/15)

(2015/C 228/05)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Fővárosi Törvényszék

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Daimler AG

Defendant: Együd Garage Gépjárműjavító és Értékesítő Kft.

Question referred

Must Article 5(1)(b) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC (1) of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks be interpreted as meaning that the trade mark proprietor is entitled to take action against a third party named in an advertisement on the internet, which features a sign likely to be confused with the trade mark, referring to a service of that third party identical to the goods or services for which the trade mark is registered, in such a way that the public might be given the mistaken impression that there is an official commercial relationship between the undertaking of that third party and the trade mark proprietor, even though the advertisement was not placed on the internet by the person featuring in it or on his behalf, and it is possible to access that advertisement on the internet despite the fact that the person named in it took all reasonable steps to have it removed, but did not succeed in doing so?

(1) First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 213/17

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag (Netherlands) lodged on 17 April 2015 — Vereniging Openbare Bibliotheken v Stichting Leenrecht; interveners: Nederlands Uitgeversverbond and Others

(Case C-174/15)

(2015/C 213/27)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank Den Haag

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Vereniging Openbare Bibliotheken

Defendant: Stichting Leenrecht

Interveners: Nederlands Uitgeversverbond, Stichting LIRA, Stichting Pictoright

Questions referred

1) Are Articles 1(1), 2(1)(b) and 6(1) of Directive 2006/115 (1) to be construed as meaning that ‘lending’ as referred to in those provisions also means making copyright-protected novels, collections of short stories, biographies, travelogues, children’s books and youth literature available for use, not for direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage, via a publicly accessible establishment — by placing a digital copy (reproduction A) on the server of the establishment and enabling a user to reproduce that copy by downloading it on to his/her own computer (reproduction B), — in such a way that the copy made by the user when downloading (reproduction B) is no longer usable after a limited period, and — in such a way that other users cannot download the copy (reproduction A) on to their computers during that period?

2) If Question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative: does Article 6 of Directive 2006/115 and/or any other provision of EU law preclude Member States from imposing on the application of the restriction on the lending right included in Article 6 of Directive 2006/115 a condition that the copy of the work made available by the establishment (reproduction A) must have been brought into circulation by an initial sale or other transfer of ownership of that copy within the European Union by the rightholder or with his consent within the meaning of Article 4(2) of Directive 2001/29 (2)?

3) If Question 2 is to be answered in the negative: does Article 6 of Directive 2006/115 lay down other requirements for the source of the copy (reproduction A) provided by the establishment, for instance the requirement that the copy was obtained from a lawful source?

4) If Question 2 is to be answered in the affirmative: is Article 4(2) of Directive 2001/29 to be construed as meaning that the initial sale or other transfer of ownership of material as referred to in that provision also means making available remotely by downloading, for use for an unlimited period, a digital copy of copyright-protected novels, collections of short stories, biographies, travelogues, children’s books and youth literature?

(1) Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property (codified version) (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 28).

(2) Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (OJ 2001 L 167, p. 10).
1.

Must Directive 2004/80/EC (1) (Article 12(2)) be interpreted as precluding national implementing legislation which refers, with regard to the payment of compensation chargeable to the State, to special legal provisions in favour of victims of crime, but does not grant to victims of ordinary violent crimes access to a substantive system of compensation of general scope and governs only procedural aspects, in cross-border cases, of access to that system?
2.

Does failure to observe the time limits stipulated in Article 17 of the Framework Decision of the 13th June, 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between member States (2002/584/JHA) give rise to rights on the part of an individual who has been held in custody pending a decision on his/her surrender for a period in excess of those time periods?
2.

The different tax treatment of residents in Greece and non-residents constitutes unjustified different treatment of comparable situations, in so far as non-residents can move to Greece, when they will be in the same situation as those who are already resident in Greece, and in so far as the exemption is not related to personal occupancy of the inherited immoveable property, and consequently the place where a person is resident cannot be the criterion for the granting of the tax exemption. The place of residence conceals the criterion of nationality, since residents in Greece will predominantly be Greeks and the converse is the case.
1.

Must Regulation No 1698/2005[/EC] (1), in particular Article 71(3) thereof, pursuant to which the rules on eligibility of expenditure are to be set at national level, subject to the special conditions laid down by that regulation for certain rural development measures, be interpreted as precluding the national legislation set out in Article 79(4) of [the Decree on measures implementing Axes 1, 3 and 4 of the Rural Development Programme of the Republic of Slovenia for the period 2007-2013, in the years 2010 to 2013 (‘the RDP Decree’)] and in point 3 of Section VI of the invitation to tender, pursuant to which only expenses incurred after the date of adoption of the decision on the right to obtain funding (until the end of the investment period or, at the latest, 30 June 2015) constitute eligible investment expenditure?
1)

Must Article 49 TFEU, as well as the principles of equal treatment and effectiveness, be interpreted as precluding national legislation in the field of betting and gambling which provides for the organisation of a fresh call for tenders (as governed by Article [10(9)g] of Law No 44 of 26 April 2012) for the award of licences that includes clauses excluding from the tendering procedure undertakings which have failed to meet the condition relating to economic and financial standing, as a result of the failure to provide for criteria other than the requirement of two bank references from two separate banks?
1)

Given that the Italian legislature has exercised the power which is accorded by Article 90(2) and the second subparagraph of Article 185(2) of Directive 2006/112/EC (1) (and, prior to the adoption of that directive, by Article 1(C)(1) and the second sentence of Article 20(1)(b) of Directive 77/388/EEC (2)) in relation to the downward adjustment of the taxable amount and the adjustment of the VAT charged on taxable transactions in cases where the consideration agreed by the parties remains totally or partially unpaid, is it compatible with the principles of proportionality and effectiveness, which are guaranteed by the TFEU, and the principle of neutrality which governs the application of VAT, to impose limits that make it impossible or excessively costly for the taxable person to recover the tax on the consideration which remains totally or partially unpaid?
3.

Does the quoted phrase apply (1) to provisions which require cable networks to retransmit certain broadcasts or (2) to provisions which permit the retransmission by — cable of broadcasts (a) where the retransmissions are simultaneous and limited to areas in which the broadcasts were made for reception and/or (b) where the retransmissions are of broadcasts on channels which are subject to certain public service obligations?
Case C-239/15 P: Appeal brought on 22 May 2015 by RFA International, LP against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 17 March 2015 in Case T-466/12: RFA International, LP v European Commission

Appeal brought on 22 May 2015 by RFA International, LP against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 17 March 2015 in Case T-466/12: RFA International, LP v European Commission

(Case C-239/15 P)

Parties

Appellant: RFA International, LP (represented by: B. Evtimov, lawyer, Prof. D. O'Keeffe, Solicitor, E. Borovikov, lawyer)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— Set aside the judgment of the General Court;

— Give a final judgment on the pleas of the appellant’s action for annulment where the stage of the procedure so permits, and partially annul the decisions contested at first instance;

— In the alternative, refer the case for reconsideration to the General Court;

— Order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Appellant submits that the General Court infringed EU law in its appraisal of the appellant’s pleas in law in its judgment as follows:

— The General Court erred in its legal assessment of the Commission’s position on the relevance of a single economic entity (an integrated sales department of the exporting producer, located outside of the country of export) for the purposes of applying Article 2(9) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 ( 1 ) (‘the Basic Anti-dumping Regulation’) and erred in law by abstaining from ruling on the arguments of the Appellant based on the case law in Interpipe and Nikopolsky, thereby affecting the appellant’s right to judicial review,

— The General Court erred in law, including in its assessment of the case law it examined, when it placed the burden of proof concerning the extent of the amount of adjustment under Article 2(9) of the Basic Anti-dumping Regulation on the interested party who claims that the adjustment is excessive on account of a demonstrated existence of a single economic entity;

— The General Court erred in law by ruling that the existence of a single economic entity was not an issue in the contested decisions and before the General Court, and by basing its ruling on the premise that the Commission’s rejection of the existence of a single economic entity was not contained in the text of the contested decisions; the General Court failed to assess that such a rejection by the Commission was made in the parallel interim review investigation conducted pursuant to Article 11(3) of the Basic Anti-dumping Regulation, relating to the same imports and covering the same investigation period.

( 1 ) Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (codified version), OJ L 343, p. 51
2.

Does this conclusion also apply where a national provision such as point (1) of Paragraph 21(2) of the Arzneimittelgesetz is interpreted to mean that no marketing authorisation is required for medicinal products that are intended for administration to humans and, on account of the proven frequency with which they are the subject of medical and dental prescriptions, the essential manufacturing steps for such are carried out in a pharmacy as part of the normal pharmacy business producing in the course of one day up to one hundred packages ready for dispensation and intended for supply under the existing pharmacy operating licence, provided that the medicinal product is either supplied to an individual patient in accordance with a medical prescription, not necessarily submitted before the preparation of the medicinal product, or is prepared in the pharmacy in accordance with the prescriptions of a pharmacopoeia and is intended to be supplied directly to patients?
1.

In the case of an in vitro diagnostic medical device for self-testing blood sugar levels which has undergone a conformity assessment by the manufacturer in accordance with Article 9 of Directive 98/79/EC (1) in Member State A (specifically: in the United Kingdom), which bears the CE marking of conformity in accordance with Article 16 of that directive and which meets the essential requirements set out in Article 3 of, and Annex I to, that directive, is a third party required to subject that device to a new or additional conformity assessment in accordance with Article 9 of Directive 98/79/EC before it places the device on the market in Member State B (specifically: in the Federal Republic of Germany) in packaging which contains instructions in the official language of Member State B, which differs from the official language of Member State A (specifically: German as opposed to English) and the instructions for the use of which are enclosed in the official language of Member State B rather than in that of Member State A?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 294/39

Action brought on 26 June 2015 — European Commission v French Republic

(Case C-314/15)

(2015/C 294/50)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: O. Beynet and E. Manhaeve, acting as Agents)

Defendant: French Republic

Form of order sought

— a declaration that in not having assured the secondary treatment or equivalent of urban waste water from 15 agglomerations having a population equivalent between 10 000 and 15 000 for all discharges outside sensitive areas, being a population equivalent of between 2 000 and 10 000 for all discharges in fresh water and estuaries, the French Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 4(1) and (3) of Council Directive 91/271/EEC of 21 May 1991 concerning urban waste-water treatment (1).

— that the French Republic should pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By its action the Commission complains that France has failed to implement correctly, in 15 agglomerations, Council Directive 91/271/EEC of 21 May 1991 concerning urban waste-water treatment.

Pursuant to Article 4(1) and (3) of Directive 91/271/EEC, agglomerations where the population equivalent (p.e.) is between 10 000 and 15 000 for all discharges outside sensitive areas, being a population equivalent of between 2 000 and 10 000 for all discharges in fresh water and estuaries, must be equipped with collecting systems and waste water undergo a secondary treatment or the equivalent by 31 December 2005 at the latest.

(1) OJ 1991 L 135, p. 40.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 294/24

Appeal brought on 2 June 2015 by Vestel Iberia, SL against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 12 March 2015 in Case T-249/12: Vestel Iberia v Commission

(Case C-265/15 P)

(2015/C 294/30)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Vestel Iberia, SL (represented by: P. De Baere et P. Muñiz, lawyers)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission, Kingdom of Spain

Form of order sought

The appellant requests the Court:

— To set aside, in whole, the judgment delivered by the General Court in Case T-249/12;

— To rule that the appeal is admissible;

— To return the case to the General Court for a ruling on the substantive grounds of appeal;

— To order the defendant to pay the costs of these proceedings and those before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

This appeal is brought by Vestel Iberia S.L. against the judgment of 12 March 2015, in Case T-249/12, Vestel Iberia S.L. v Commission, in which the General Court dismissed as inadmissible the application for annulment of Commission Decision COM (2010) 22 final, on the ground that the Commission decision is not of direct concern to the appellant.

The appellant submits that the General Court erred in law since the Spanish authorities have no discretion with regard to the result when they implement the Commission decision, and the Commission decision is therefore of direct concern to the appellant.

More in particular, the appellant submits the following grounds of appeal:

— The General Court erred in law when it held that the national authorities have a margin of discretion in the implementation of the contested decision with regard to the appellant.

— Even if the national authorities have a margin of discretion, quod non, the General Court erred in law because the mere existence of discretion is insufficient to exclude direct concern.