ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 295/20

Appeal brought on 16 July 2012 by Pi-Design AG, Bodum France and Bodum Logistics A/S against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 8 May 2012 in Case T-416/10: Yoshida Metal Industry Co. Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

(Case C-339/12 P)

2012/C 295/35

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Pi-Design AG, Bodum France, and Bodum Logistics A/S, (represented by: H. Pernez, Advocate)

Other parties to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) and Yoshida Metal Industry Co. Ltd

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

— Squash the judgment of the General Court

— Annul the Community trademark 1 372 580

Subsidiairily

— Refer the case back to the General Court with the obligation to refer the case back to the Board of Appeal in the case of annulment of the latter's decision.

— Order YOSHIDA METAL INDUSTRY CO. LTD. to bear the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellants submit that the contested judgment should be annulled on the ground that the General court infringed Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of the Community trade mark regulation by applying incorrect criteria in the identification of the essential characteristics of the contested sign and by distorting the evidence before it.
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declare that, by not adopting the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to give effect to Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, (1) and in any event by not informing the Commission of those provisions, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 5 of that directive;
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 9/25

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 27 July 2012 — Wolfgang Glatzel v Freistaat Bayern

(Case C-356/12)

2013/C 9/41

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Wolfgang Glatzel

Defendant: Freistaat Bayern

Question referred

Is point 6.4 of Annex III to Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on driving licences (1) as amended by Commission Directive 2009/113/EC of 25 August 2009 (2) compatible with Article 20, Article 21(1) and Article 26 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in so far as that provision requires — without permitting any derogation — that applicants for Category C1 and Category C1E driving licences have a minimum visual acuity of 0.1 in their worse eye even if those persons use both eyes together and have a normal field of vision when using both eyes?

(1) OJ 2006 L 403, p. 18.

(2) OJ 2009 L 223, p. 31.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 303/16

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank van Koophandel te Gent (Belgium) lodged on 19 July 2012 — Euronics Belgium CVBA v Kamera Express BV & Kamera Express Belgium BVBA

(Case C-343/12)

2012/C 303/28

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank van Koophandel te Gent

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Euronics Belgium CVBA

Defendants:

Kamera Express BV

Kamera Express Belgium BVBA

Question referred

Is Article 101 of the (Belgian) Law on market practices and consumer protection (Wet betreffende marktpraktijken en consumentenbescherming), which, inter alia, is intended to protect the interests of consumers and is worded as follows:

‘Article 101(1)All undertakings shall be prohibited from offering for sale or selling goods at a loss. A sale at a loss shall mean any sale at a price which is not at least equal to the price at which the undertaking purchased the item or which the undertaking would have to pay to replenish its stock, after any discounts granted and definitively obtained. In order to determine whether a sale is a sale at a loss, no account shall be taken of discounts which, whether exclusive or non-exclusive, are granted in exchange for commitments entered into by the undertaking other than for the purchase of goods’,

contrary to Directive 2005/29/EC (1) in so far as it prohibits sales at a loss, whereas Directive 2005/29/EC appears not to prohibit such sales practices and the Belgian Law may be stricter than the provisions of Directive 2005/29/EC and the prohibition under Article 4 of that directive?

(1) Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2005 L 149, p. 22).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 319/3

Action brought on 6 August 2012 — European Commission v Council of the European Union

(Case C-377/12)

2012/C 319/04

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: G. Valero Jordana, S. Bartelt, F. Erlbacher, Agents)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— annul the Decision of the Council of 14 May 2012 on the signing, on behalf of the Union, of the Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of the Philippines, of the other part (2012/272/EU) (1) insofar as the Council has added the legal bases relating to transport (Articles 91 and 100 TFEU), readmission (Article 79(3) TFEU) and environment (Article 191(4) TFEU);

— maintain the effects of the contested decision;

— order Council of the European Union to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By way of the present application the Commission seeks the annulment of the Decision of the Council on the signing, on behalf of the Union, of the Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of the Philippines, of the other part of 14 May 2012 (2012/272/EU) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the contested decision’), insofar as the Council has added the legal bases relating to transport (Articles 91 and 100 TFEU), readmission (Article 79(3) TFEU) and environment (Article 191(4) TFEU).

This application is based on a single plea of law, namely that the Council has violated the rules of the Treaties and the case-law of the Court in relation to the choice of the legal basis for the adoption of a Union measure, including a decision on the signature of an international agreement.

The Commission takes the view that the addition of the above mentioned legal bases was unnecessary and illegal. Indeed, the provisions of the PCA which have triggered the addition of these legal bases by the Council relate to cooperation on specific policy matters which form an integral part of the development cooperation policy of the EU and do not impose extensive obligations distinct from those of development cooperation. Therefore, all these provisions of the PCA are covered by Article 209 TFEU.

(1) OJ L 134, p. 3
3.

If question 2 is to be answered in the negative, is an activity closely related even if the care is exempt from tax not under Article 13A(1)(b) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes but under subparagraph (c) of that provision?
1.

Is Article 19 in conjunction with Article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that, following the agreement of a Member State in accordance with those provisions, that Member State is the State responsible for examining the asylum application within the meaning of the introductory part of Article 16(1) of Regulation No 343/2003, or does European law oblige the national review authority where, in the course of an appeal or review procedure in accordance with Article 19(2) of Regulation (EC) No 343/2003, irrespective of that agreement, it comes to the view that another State is the Member State responsible pursuant to Chapter III of Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 (even where that State has not been requested to take charge or has not given its agreement), to determine that the other Member State is responsible for the purposes of its appeal or review procedure? In that regard, does every asylum seeker have an individual right to have his application for asylum examined by a particular Member State responsible in accordance with those responsibility criteria?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 343/6

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), lodged on 15 August 2012 — Hi Hotel HCF SARL v Uwe Spoering

(Case C-387/12)

2012/C 343/06

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant on a point of law: Hi Hotel HCF SARL

Respondent on a point of law: Uwe Spoering

Question referred

Is Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the harmful event occurred in one Member State (Member State A) in the case where the tort or delict which forms the subject-matter of the proceedings or from which claims are derived was committed in another Member State (Member State B) and consists in participation in the tort or delict (principal act) committed in the first Member State (Member State A)?

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 366/25

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy), lodged on 14 September 2012 — Crono Service Scarl and Others v Roma Capitale

(Case C-419/12)

2012/C 366/45

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Crono Service Scarl and Others

Defendant: Roma Capitale

Question referred

Do Article 49 TFEU, Article 3 TEU, Articles 3 TFEU, 4 TFEU, 5 TFEU, 6 TFEU, 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU preclude the application of Articles 3(3), 8(3) and 11 of Law No 21 of 1992 [on the carriage of passengers by public non-scheduled car and coach services] in so far as the latter provisions respectively provide that ‘[t]he registered office of the carrier, and the garage, must be located, exclusively, within the territory of the municipality which issued the authorisation’, that ‘[i]n order to obtain and maintain an authorisation for a car- and driver-hire service it is necessary to have the use, pursuant to a valid legal title, of a registered office, a garage or a vehicle rank located in the territory of the municipality which issued the authorisation’ and that ‘[b]ookings for car- and driver-hire services shall take place at the garage. Each individual car- and driver-hire service must begin and end at the garage located in the municipality in which the authorisation was issued, returning to that garage, although the collection of the user and the user’s arrival at his destination may take place also in other municipalities’?
1.

In the appraisal of the question — to be answered in the context of Article 110 TFEU — as to whether the amount of the levy in 2010 in respect of the registration of the passenger car [concerned] is (not) higher than the residual amount of the levy which is incorporated in the value of similar used passenger cars already registered within national territory, should the following be considered to be similar for purposes of determining that residual amount: — a comparable passenger car which, in the year in which the passenger car [concerned] was first put into service (2006), was registered as an unused passenger car, or — also the (other) passenger cars which were available on the market for second-hand passenger cars in 2010, and which, like the passenger car [concerned], were first put into service on 30 May 2006 and are otherwise comparable, but which were (imported and) registered as used passenger cars after 30 May 2006 (after 30 May 2006 and up to 2009), and/or — also the (other) passenger cars which were available on the market for second-hand passenger cars in 2010, and which, unlike the passenger car [concerned], were first put into service after 30 May 2006, but are otherwise comparable, and which were (imported and) registered as unused or used passenger cars after 30 May 2006 (after 30 May 2006 and up to 2009)?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 389/3

Appeal brought on 10 February 2012 by Noscira, SA against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 28 November 2011 in Case T-307/11: Noscira, SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

(Case C-69/12 P)

2012/C 389/03

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Noscira, SA (represented by: A. Sirimarco, advocate)

Other party to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

By order of 21 September 2012 the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 9/30

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 11 October 2012 — Werner Krieger v ERGO Lebensversicherung AG

(Case C-459/12)

2013/C 9/50

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Hamburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Werner Krieger

Defendant: ERGO Lebensversicherung AG

Question referred

Must the first indent of Article 15(1) of Council Directive 90/619/EEC of 8 November 1990 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance, laying down provisions to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide services and amending Directive 79/267/EEC (Second Life Assurance Directive), (1) having regard to Article 31(1) of Council Directive 92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance and amending Directives 79/267/EEC and 90/619/EEC (Third Life Assurance Directive), (2) be interpreted as precluding a provision — such as the fourth sentence of Paragraph 5a(2) of the Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (Law on insurance contracts) in the version of the Drittes Gesetz zur Durchführung versicherungsrechtlicher Richtlinien des Rates der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Third Law implementing directives of the Council of the European Communities on insurance law) of 21 July 1994 — under which a right of cancellation lapses one year at the latest after payment of the first premium even if the policy-holder has not been informed about the right of cancellation?

(1) OJ 1990 L 330, p. 50.

(2) OJ 1992 L 360, p. 1.
2.

Is the first sentence of Article 7(1) of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 to be interpreted as meaning that a design could not reasonably have become known in the normal course of business to the circles specialised in the sector concerned, operating within the European Union, even though it was disclosed to third parties without any explicit or implicit conditions of confidentiality, in the case where (a) it is made available to only one undertaking in the specialised circles, or (b) it is exhibited in a showroom of an undertaking in China which lies outside the scope of normal market analysis?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 108/13

Action brought on 19 October 2012 — Christophe Gassiat v Ordre des avocats de Paris

(Case C-467/12)

2013/C 108/25

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Christophe Gassiat

Defendant: Ordre des avocats de Paris

By order of 21 February 2013, the Court (Seventh Chamber) declared that it clearly has no jurisdiction to rule on the present action. Consequently the action is declared inadmissible. The Court ordered Mr Christophe Gassiat to bear his own costs.
If Question 4 is also answered in the affirmative: does the interpretation of European primary and/or secondary law conflict with a justification of this unrestricted, continuing discrimination by the legislative aim whereby the transitional law is to protect not (only) the acquired rights existing on the transition date but (also) the expectation of the lifetime income in the respective pay grade that was forecast to be paid under the old law on remuneration?

Can the continuing discrimination against existing civil servants be justified by the fact that the regulatory alternative (individual placement also of existing civil servants according to periods of experience) would involve increased administrative expenditure?
6.

If income derived from providing access to sporting facilities to non-members is not to be treated as ‘additional income’ for the purposes of Article 134(b), does Article 133(d) permit a Member State to exclude such income from exemption if it is likely to cause distortion of competition to the disadvantage of commercial enterprises subject to VAT, whilst not at the same time withdrawing the exemption form income derived from providing membership to members of the same non-profit-making organizations if the members’ subscriptions are themselves likely to cause at least some distortion of competition?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 46/13

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Kúria (Hungary) lodged on 19 November 2012 — OTP Bank Nyilvánosan Működő Részvénytársaság v Hochtief Solutions AG

(Case C-519/12)

2013/C 46/24

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Kúria

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: OTP Bank Nyilvánosan Működő Részvénytársaság

Defendant: Hochtief Solutions AG

Question referred

Does a claim between parties which are not in a direct contractual relationship, asserted by an applicant company, which has granted credit, against a (foreign) member of a company which has received credit, that member having had a controlling interest in the latter company at the material time, qualify as a contract under Article 5(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, (1) where the applicant company alleges that the company receiving the loan is liable for the debts of the controlled company?

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters; OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1.
1.

Do Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol of 23 November 1970 to the Agreement of 12 September 1963 establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey for the transitional stage of the Association (AP) and/or Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 of the EEC-Turkey Association Council of 19 September 1980 (Decision No 1/80) preclude a provision of national law which was introduced for the first time after the abovementioned provisions had come into force and which makes the first entry of a member of the family of a Turkish national who enjoys the legal status under Article 6 of Decision No 1/80 conditional on the requirement that, prior to entry, the family member can demonstrate the ability to make himself or herself understood, in a basic way, in the German language?
I.

By the first plea, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law in proceeding on the basis that in appeal proceedings before the CPVO concerning rejection of an application for cancellation of a Community variety the facts are not to be examined by the CPVO of its own motion. The appellant sees in this an infringement of the rules on the burden of proof and taking of evidence that are applicable in proceedings before the Board of Appeal and a resulting infringement of the General Court’s duty of review, as well as an infringement of the appellant’s rights to a fair hearing, good administration and an effective remedy.
1.

Errores in procedendo, affecting the appellant’s interests, inherent in the serious errores in iudicando, including, inter alia: (a) total failure to investigate adequately and to state reasons in the order under appeal; (b) breach of essential procedural requirements; (c) breach of the principle of mandatory jurisdiction on the part of the proper court specified by law to hear a case; (d) breach of the first subparagraph of Article 64(4) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, of Article 127(1) and (2) of those rules and, lastly, of the procedural right by which the appellant is vested with authority to propose to the Court, at any time, a measure of organisation of procedure relating to the case.
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declare that, by not adopting the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2009/81/EC (1) on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC, or in any event in failing to inform the Commission thereof, the Kingdom of the Netherlands has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 72(1) of that directive;
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 32/9

Appeal brought on 3 December 2012 by J against the judgment delivered by the General Court (Sixth Chamber) on 27 September 2012 in Case T-160/10 J v European Parliament

(Case C-550/12 P)

2013/C 32/12

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: J (represented by: A. Auer, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:

— set aside in its entirety the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 27 September 2012 in Case T-160/10 and declare that ‘The judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 27 September 2012 in Case T-160/10 J v European Parliament is set aside in its entirety. The European Parliament is ordered to pay the costs’.

If the appeal is deemed to be founded, the appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:

— grant in full the application made at first instance for the annulment of the decision of the Committee on Petitions of the European Parliament of 2 March 2010 rejecting petition No 1673/2009 submitted by the appellant on 19 November 2009;

— order the European Parliament to pay the costs incurred at first instance; in the alterative,

— refer the case back to the General Court for a new decision to be taken.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The General Court wrongly found there to have been no infringement of the duty to state reasons on the part of the Committee on Petitions in its declaration of inadmissibility of the appellant’s petition. The appellant submits that, in its petition, it complained expressly of the infringement of the right to property and an infringement of Directive 2004/48/EC (1) by the Austrian authorities. Those infringements were not addressed in the declaration of inadmissibility of the petition — even though they were referred to expressly — with the result that it was not possible for the appellant to understand why the European Parliament deemed its petition to be inadmissible.

Moreover, the General Court wrongly came to the conclusion that the conduct of the Austrian authorities was in no way linked to the implementation of European Union law. The Austrian authorities confiscated documents belonging to the appellant which are protected by copyright, without being provided with any compensation. As a result, the appellant’s right to (intellectual) property within the scope of Directive 2004/48/EC was infringed.

(1) Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (OJ 2004 L 157, p. 45). Corrigenda thereto: OJ 2004 L 195, p. 16 and OJ 2007 L 204, p. 27.