ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Action brought on 4 January 2019 — Algebris (UK) and Anchorage Capital Group v SRB

(Case T-2/19)

(2019/C 82/72)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: Algebris (UK) Ltd (London, United Kingdom) and Anchorage Capital Group LLC (New York, New York, United States) (represented by: T. Soames, lawyer, R. East, Solicitor, N. Chesaites, and D. Mackersie, Barristers)

Defendant: Single Resolution Board (SRB)

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

— annul the SRB’s decision to the effect that ex-post definitive valuations of Banco Popular Español S.A. were not required pursuant to Article 20(11) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014; (1)

— order the SRB to pay the applicants’ legal costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on four pleas in law.

1. First plea in law, alleging that the SRB’s decision that ex-post definitive valuations of Banco Popular Español S.A. were not required pursuant to Article 20(11) of Regulation 806/2014 rests on an error of law in breach of Article 20(11) and/or Article 20(12) of that Regulation, which requires an ex-post definitive valuation in circumstances where a provisional valuation that did not meet the requirements of Article 20(1) and (4) to (9) of Regulation 806/2014 is relied on to take resolution measures.

2. Second plea in law, alleging that the SRB committed manifest errors of assessment in its application of Article 20(11) of Regulation 806/2014 in the contested decision, because, in adopting the contested decision, the SRB proceeded on the erroneous basis that no ex-post definitive valuations are required in this case.

3. Third plea in law, alleging that, insofar as the contested decision implies a decision by the SRB not to increase the value of the EUR 1 consideration paid by Banco Santander, S.A., this amounts to an error of law and/or manifest error of assessment in breach of Article 20(11) and (12) of Regulation 806/2014.

4. Fourth plea in law, alleging that the SRB has breached its obligation to provide reasons for the contested decision, contrary to Article 296 TFEU.

(1) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 225, p. 1).
Official Journal of the European Union

Action brought on 7 January 2019 — Nowhere v EUIPO — Junguo Ye (APE TEES)

(Case T-12/19)

(2019/C 72/57)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Nowhere Co. Ltd (Tokyo, Japon) (represented by: A. Norris, Barrister)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Junguo Ye (Elche, Spain)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark APE TEES — Application for registration No 14 319 578

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 October 2018 in Case R 2474/2017-2

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— annul the contested decision;

— reject the contested mark in respect of all of the contested goods;

— alternatively, remit the matter to the EUIPO for re-consideration;

— order the payment of the costs incurred by the applicant in connection with the appeal and opposition proceedings.

Plea in law
3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 3(3) TEU, Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and breach of the general principle of non-discrimination on the basis of language and of the principle of equality between the Member States. Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 infringes Article 3(3) TEU, Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and breaches the general principle of non-discrimination on the basis of language and the principle of equality between the Member States in so far as it discourages citizens who wish to establish themselves in a Member State which is not their own Member State from learning the official language or one of the official languages of that Member State, and also in so far as it imposes the generalisation of the use of one unique working language, which in that way becomes the de facto European language of public services and administrations.
Official Journal of the European Union

Action brought on 7 February 2019 — DK Company v EUIPO — Hunter Boot (DENIM HUNTER)

(Case T-74/19)

(2019/C 112/58)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: DK Company A/S (Ikast, Denmark) (represented by: S. Hansen, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Hunter Boot Limited (Edinburgh, United Kingdom)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark DENIM HUNTER — Application for registration No 14 649 891

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 16 November 2018 in Case R 849/2018-2

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— annul the contested decision;

— reverse the contested decision;

— order EUIPO to pay the costs including cost incurred by the applicant.

Plea in law
First plea in law, alleging that the defendant breached Article 10(1) of Directive 2010/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 (2) and exceeded its legal competence as permitted by Article 290 TFEU by adopting an empty receptacle testing method in the Delegated Regulation No 665/2013.

The defendant would have disregarded an essential element of Article 10(1) of Directive 2010/30/EU and would have exceeded its competence contrary to Article 290 TFEU.
Official Journal of the European Union

Action brought on 4 March 2019 — Pilatus Bank v ECB

(Case T-139/19)

(2019/C 139/108)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Pilatus Bank plc (Ta’Xbiex, Malta) (represented by: O. Behrends, M. Kirchner and L. Feddern, lawyers)

Defendant: European Central Bank

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare the contested decision void pursuant to Article 264 TFEU, by which the ECB refused to take over direct supervision of the applicant pursuant to Article 6(5)(b) SSMR. (1)

— order the defendant to bear the costs of the applicant pursuant to Articles 134 and 135 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on nine pleas in law.

1. First plea in law, alleging an erroneous assumption of the ECB that it no longer has competence for supervision of the applicant following the withdrawal of its licence agreement.

2. Second plea in law, alleging that the ECB is obliged to take over supervision as it has to maintain high supervisory standards.

3. Third plea in law, alleging a violation of the right to an effective remedy and of the principle of equality of arms.

4. Fourth plea in law, alleging a violation of the principle of legitimate expectations and legal certainty.

5. Fifth plea in law, alleging a violation of the principle of proportionality.

6. Sixth plea in law, alleging a misuse of power.

7. Seventh plea in law, alleging a lack of appropriate reasoning.

8. Eighth plea in law, alleging a violation of the right to be heard.

9. Ninth plea in law, alleging a violation of the nemo auditor principle.

(1) Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 concerning specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63.
Action brought on 3 February 2019 — Almashreq Investment Fund v Council

(Case T-62/19)

(2019/C 139/68)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Almashreq Investment Fund (Damascus, Syria) (represented by: E. Ruchat, lawyer)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should:

— Declare the applicant’s action admissible and well founded;

— Accordingly, order the European Union to pay compensation in respect of all of the harm suffered by the applicant, in the amount determined, in equity, by the General Court;

— In the alternative, order the appointment of an expert with a view to establishing the scale of the harm suffered by the applicant;

— Order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on one main plea in law and a plea in the alternative, alleging harm suffered by the applicant for which liability rests with the Council of the European Union.

The main plea alleges that the disputed restrictive measures, namely Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/778 of 28 May 2018 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria and its subsequent implementing acts, are unlawful. First, it is claimed that those measures infringe the obligation to state reasons as provided in Article 296 TFEU and Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Freedoms of the European Union; and, second, that they infringe the applicant’s right to property and its right to respect for its reputation. It is claimed that that infringement has directly caused significant non-material and material harm to the applicant consisting, respectively, in (i) damage to its reputation and (ii) breach of contract, loss of equipment and loss of revenue, in respect of which it is entitled to compensation.

The plea in the alternative alleges the existence of a system of strict liability under EU law.
Official Journal of the European Union

Action brought on 20 February 2019 — Kampete v Council

(Case T-113/19)

(2019/C 139/94)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Ilunga Kampete (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo) (represented by: T. Bontinck, P. De Wolf, M. Forgeois, and A. Guillerme, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1940 of 10 December 2018, in so far as the applicant remains at No 1 in Annex II to Decision 2010/788/CFSP;

— annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1931 of 10 December 2018, in so far as the applicant remains at No 1 in Annex Ia to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005;

— rule that the provisions of Article 3(2)(b) of Decision 2010/788/CFSP and Article 2b(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) 1183/2005/EC are unlawful;

— order the Council to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law which are in essence identical or similar to those raised in Case T-103/19, Mende Omalanga v Council.
Action brought on 1 March 2019 — Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v Commission

(Case T-136/19)

(2019/C 164/57)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: Bulgarian Energy Holding EAD (Sofia, Bulgaria), Bulgartransgaz EAD (Sofia), Bulgargaz EAD (Sofia) (represented by: K. Struckmann, lawyer, M. Powell and A. Kadri, Solicitors)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

— adopt the measures of organisation of procedure or measures of inquiry specified in section 3.6 of the application, or any other such measures as the Court deems necessary;

— annul in whole or in part the Commission decision C(2018) 8806 final, of 17 December 2018, relating to proceedings under Article 102 of TFEU (AT.39849 — BEH Gas);

— annul or reduce the level of the fine imposed;

— order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on seven pleas in law.

1. First plea in law, alleging that the defendant breached essential procedural requirements, thus infringing the applicants’ rights of defence.

2. Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decision’s definition of the relevant market is vitiated by errors of law and fact, and by a failure to conduct a market analysis and state adequate reasons.

3. Third plea in law, alleging that the contested decision’s finding that Bulgargaz EAD, as one of the applicants, or the applicants together, held a dominant position on the market for capacity services, is vitiated by errors of law and in its appreciation of the facts.

4. Fourth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision infringes the European Union treaties by failing to establish, to the requisite standard, that the conduct described in the contested decision amounts to an infringement of Article 102 TFEU, in light of errors in its application of the law and in its appreciation of the facts.

5. Fifth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision’s findings as to the duration of the alleged infringement are vitiated by errors of law and in its appreciation of the facts.

6. Sixth plea in law, alleging that by adopting a decision pursuant to Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 (1), the EU treaties were infringed, in the process.

7. Seventh plea in law, alleging that the fine should be annulled or reduced in light of the contested decision’s failure to adhere to the defendant’s fining guidelines, or alternatively in the exercise of the Court’s unlimited jurisdiction pursuant to Article 261 TFEU on the basis that the fine is in all the circumstances disproportionate to the conduct being sanctioned.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1).
Action brought on 11 March 2019 — ZU v EEAS

(Case T-154/19)

(2019/C 155/61)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: ZU (represented by: C. Bernard-Glanz, lawyer)

Defendant: European External Action Service (EEAS)

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— annul the decision of the Appointing Authority of the EEAS of 30 November 2018, rejecting the applicant’s complaint of 27 July 2018, insofar as it implicitly rejects his statement of expenses of 26 February 2018;

— order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on a single plea in law, alleging failure to comply with applicable provisions of the Staff Regulations (inter alia, Articles 12a, 56 and 71 thereof) and infringement of Articles 31(1) and (2), 41(1) and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, violation of the ‘reasonable time’ principle, the principle of good administration and the principle of sound financial management (waste of EU resources), misuse of powers and concealing of evidence, breach of the rules governing the reimbursement of travel expenses, failure to comply with the principle of proportionality, manifest error of assessment, violation of the duty of care, and omission of prima facie elements identified in the applicant’s complaint based on Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations.
Official Journal of the European Union

Action brought on 25 February 2019 — Oosterbosch v Parliament

(Case T-131/19)

(2019/C 148/54)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Marc Oosterbosch (Brussels, Belgium) (represented by: M. Casado García-Hirschfeld, lawyer)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that the present application is admissible and well founded;

consequently:

— annul the ‘contested decision’ comprising the payslips for the months of March, April and June 2018;

— declare, if necessary, that the decision of 6 November 2018 rejecting the complaint is annulled;

— order the defendant to pay all the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on a single plea in law, based on infringement of the principles of legality and legal certainty and a plea of illegality: the contested decision was taken on the basis of unlawful internal rules and implementing provisions.
Official Journal of the European Union

Action brought on 20 March 2019 — Hebberecht v EEAS

(Case T-171/19)

(2019/C 172/53)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Chantal Hebberecht (Luxembourg, Luxembourg) (represented by: K. Bicard, lawyer)

Defendant: European External Action Service (EEAS)

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare Ms Hebberecht’s application admissible and well founded;

— annul the penalty imposed on the applicant;

— order the European External Action Service (EEAS) to pay the applicant EUR 36 000 in respect of arrears of salary and default interest;

— order the EEAS to pay the applicant EUR 450 000 as compensation for injury to her health, material and non-material damage;

— in the alternative, order the EEAS to pay the applicant EUR 300 000 as compensation for those damages;

— in the further alternative, order the EEAS to pay the applicant EUR 150 000 as compensation for those damages;

— in the still further alternative, order the EEAS to pay the applicant EUR 50 000 as compensation for those damages;

— order the EEAS to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant claims that the findings made against her by the tribunal de première instance du Hainaut (Court of First Instance, Hainaut, Belgium) in its judgment of 13 December 2017, relied on by the EEAS as constituting a particularly serious failure to comply with the obligations of officials, inter alia under Article 12 of the Staff Regulations, are incorrect. She also claims that the penalties imposed on her are discriminatory.
—

The applicant submits in that regard that the Commission fails to state the reasons for which it does not accept the arguments which, concerning territorial selectivity, the Kingdom of Spain had been substantiating throughout the proceedings. The contested decision is a measure materially lacking a statement of reasons, as a result of its incorrect interpretation of the judgment of the General Court of 18 December 2008, Government of Gibraltar v Commission, T-211/04 and T-215/04, EU:T:2008:595. After that judgment was set aside by the Court of Justice (judgment of 15 November 2011, Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom, C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P, EU:C:2011:732), the position set out in Commission Decision 2005/261/EC of 30 March 2004 was reinstated without any reasons being stated for that change of position.
Official Journal of the European Union

Action brought on 5 April 2019 — Armani v EUIPO — Invicta Watch Company of America (GLYCINE)

(Case T-209/19)

(2019/C 182/43)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Giorgio Armani SpA (Milan, Italy) (represented by: J. Rether and M. Kinkeldey, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Invicta Watch Company of America, Inc. (Hollywood, Florida, United States)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark in colours black and white — Application for registration No 15 910 301

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 4 February 2019 in Case R 578/2018-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— annul the contested decision;

— order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Plea in law
—

The applicants argue that all the evidence in this case indicates that the Commission should have had doubts about the compatibility of the State aid with the internal market and therefore should have opened a formal investigation. The evidence ranges from the length of the preliminary investigation, other circumstances under which the contested decision was adopted and the flaws reflected in the content of the decision, which is insufficiently reasoned and vitiated by serious errors of assessment. Moreover, it is alleged that the Commission ignored very relevant aspects that should have been considered before concluding that it had enough information to declare the aid compatible with the internal market.
Official Journal of the European Union

Action brought on 18 April 2019 — nanoPET Pharma v EUIPO — Miltenyi Biotec (viscover)

(Case T-264/19)

(2019/C 206/83)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Applicant: nanoPET Pharma GmbH (Berlin, Germany) (represented by: C. Onken, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Miltenyi Biotec GmbH (Bergisch Gladbach, Germany)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: EU figurative mark ‘viscover’ — EU trade mark No 9 197 732

Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 17 January 2019 in Case R 1288/2017-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— annul the contested decision;

— order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

— Infringement of Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;
2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection as enshrined in the fundamental principles of EU law and set out in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and of Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission wrongfully excludes the applicant, therefore breaching Article 136(1)(c) of Regulation 2018/1046 and the rights of defence of the applicant by not clearly stating what exactly constitutes grave professional misconduct. Furthermore, the Commission allegedly errs in stating that the applicant is also excluded from on-going tenders since this does not follow from the operative part of the contested decision, by excluding the applicant for conduct related to media and marketing rights in sports in a tender for audio-visual coverage of EU current affairs since these are different markets that do not impact each other so that the reliability of the applicant in contracts for the European Union can be demonstrated, and in deciding that the applicant should be excluded since it did not have sufficient evidence to reach the contested decision and the non-prosecution agreement of the applicant with the US Department of Justice does not state that the applicant or its CEO’s are guilty.