3.

The plaintiff in the main action argues that the term ‘meat or offal, of any kind,’ which is contained in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of subheading 16.02 B III (a) of the Common Customs Tariff in force in 1976 indicates only pigmeat. That view is supported primarily by the wording of the subheading. The words ‘of any kind’ inserted between commas immediately after the expression ‘meat or offal’ is, according to that view, intended to refer only to offal with the result that the meat to be taken into account in the percentage of the product which is relevant for the purposes of the classification should be ‘of domestic swine’ referred to in subheading (a) whilst the offal may be of various kinds (from swine, bovine animals, sheep etc.). From a logical point of view it is certainly correct to rely primarily on the literal text of the tariff: such is moreover expressly laid down in the Rules for the Interpretation of the Nomenclature of the Common Customs Tariff (cf. Council Regulation No 2723/76/EEC, Annex, Pan 1, Section 1, A, Rule 1. However, in the view propounded above the way in which the literal criterion is used is by no means convincing and I cannot share the conclusions drawn by the plaintiff. In this respect I observe that when the tariff seeks to refer to meat or offal of a particular kind it does so in express terms as for example in sub headings 16.02 B III (a) and 16.02 B III (b) 1; thus it appears to be arbitrary to attribute a narrow meaning to the general expression ‘meat’ used in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of subheading (a), making its scope dependent on the expression ‘meat or offal of domestic swine’ which is contained in subheading (a). However, there is a further point: the general term ‘meat or offal’ is immediately followed by the words ‘of any kind’, which appear to have the specific purpose of emphasizing that the tariff heading covers all kinds of meat and offal (swine, bovine animals, sheep, etc.). I further observe that the fact that the words ‘of any kind’ are separated by a comma from the preceding part of the sentence suggests that those words themselves refer both to meat and to offal. Finally I emphasize that meat and offal are considered together both in subheading (a) and in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3; thus it would be inconsistent and unjustified for the term ‘of any kind’ (in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3) to refer only to offal and for the words ‘of domestic swine’ (subheading (a)) to determine the interpretation only of ‘meat’. It should be borne in mind that the view advocated in the submissions of the plaintiff in the main action is in contrast with the opinion of Mr Dittmar which was lodged by the plaintiff and to which the plaintiff referred on a number of occasions both in its written submissions and in the course of the oral procedure. That opinion in fact recognizes — on page 10 — that the expression ‘of any kind’ must refer both to meat and to offal; according to the opinion however those words serve to indicate not the species of animal but the parts of the animal. May I say immediately that I think that that argument too is unfounded as it disregards the fact that the word ‘kind’ is clearly used in the context of tariff heading 16.02 to indicate the kind of animal and it would therefore be extremely strange for the same expression to be used in the same context with different meanings. Still from the point of view of the text the plaintiff in its submissions purports to find support for its arguments from the words ‘including fats of any kind or origin’. The reference to any kind and any origin which is made only in respect of fats supports, it is alleged, the argument that the words ‘meat or offal, of any kind’ relate only to meat and offal of swine. In this respect I observe that once again the plaintiff's submissions are contradictory in extending to offal the statement that the meat referred to in the tariff subheading in question should be from swine (cf. page 5 of the submissions of 13 October 1978) after arguing, as I have said, that the words ‘of any kind’ refer only to offal and mean ‘coming from animals of any species’. That apart, the argument based on the words regarding fats seems to me entirely illogical: as the Commission's representative has observed (page 11 of the submissions of 21 September 1978) those words relate to a specific question — the extension of the tariff heading to fats — which is entirely unconnected with the concept of meat and offal of any kind.