ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
As regards an action brought by a member of staff of the European Central Bank containing claims directed against a decision rejecting his special appeal, those claims need not be examined independently since their only effect is to bring before the judicature the acts adversely affecting the applicant against which the application for pre-litigation review was submitted.

As regards additional salary advancements awarded to members of staff of the European Central Bank whose performance has been assessed as outstanding for two of the three years preceding the decision to award the advancement, in so far as Article 2(3) of Administrative Circular No 1/2011 on Additional Salary Advancements places a staff representative in a discriminatory position because it is absolutely impossible for him to demonstrate a second year of outstanding performance as a result of his full-time activity as a staff representative during the three years in question, that provision is unlawful. In that regard, it cannot reasonably be claimed that the exercise by the person concerned of his right to dispensations from service in order to carry out his duties within the Staff Committee is his personal choice. The choice of being able to claim dispensations from service in order to carry out a term of office as a staff representative is a fundamental right, as is clear from Articles 27 and 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

Moreover, the exercise of the fundamental right to equal treatment, enshrined by Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter, may not be restricted by rules which place staff representatives in an unfavourable and discriminatory position compared with other staff members, where those limitations are unnecessary and do not serve an objective in the public interest or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.

Since the situation of a staff representative and that of a staff member are factually different, they may not be treated in the same way, and they may therefore only have applied to them eligibility conditions for the additional salary advancement which take account of the differences in status between staff members and staff representatives, allowing the latter, like any other staff member, to demonstrate a second year of outstanding performance out of a period of three years, even where they choose to carry out duties in the Staff Committee full-time and for more than a year.

(see paras 51-54, 60)

Judgment of 14 September 2010 in Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission, C‑550/07 P, EU:C:2010:512, paras 54 and 55 and the case-law cited therein

Judgment of 2 December 2014 in Migliore v Commission, F‑110/13, EU:F:2014:257, para. 40
25

Subsequently, having learned in December 2011 that two colleagues who, like her, had English as an active language had been included in the list of candidates from the Unit for the English summer course in Ireland, the applicant asked the Head of Unit by e-mail of 14 December 2011 to provide her with further clarification on the subject. On 15 December 2011, the Head of Unit replied that the selection criteria remained unchanged and that the colleagues included in the list of candidates from the Unit fully met the criteria set by the Director-General. Being ‘[v]ery surprised by [that] assertion’, given that two of the three colleagues included in that list had not recently added English as a passive language to their skillset and were not, in her opinion, ‘new’ to the team, the applicant, replying by e-mail that same day, sought ‘[a more detailed] explanation’. By e-mail of 16 December 2011, the Head of Unit once again explained that the applicant did not meet the criteria and that she should apply to the Director ‘[i]f [she was] not satisfied’. The applicant, not wishing to ‘bother’ the Director ‘with a non-issue’, once again asked the Head of Unit, in an e-mail sent that same day, to explain her ‘assertion’ that two colleagues — Ms J. and Ms K. — met the selection criteria even though their situation was ‘identical to [her own]’. The Head of Unit did not answer that question. Subsequently, not being able to understand why the Head of Unit had not wished to respond ‘to what was[, in her view,] but a legitimate question’, the applicant once again asked the Head of Unit, by e-mail of 11 January 2012, to specify ‘which criteria set by the Director-General’ were met by her two colleagues who were included in the list of candidates from the Unit. The Head of Unit made no written reply to that last question either.
103

Although there is nothing in the CEOS which prevents the AECE, by means of contractual provisions which are more favourable for staff, from limiting, in the interests of those staff, its power under Article 47 of the CEOS to terminate employment contracts which have been lawfully concluded (judgments of 30 November 1994 in Düchs v Commission, T‑558/93, EU:T:1994:279, paragraph 43, and 7 July 2004 in Schmitt v EAR, T‑175/03, EU:T:2004:214, paragraph 53), it may not, however, outside the situations contemplated by the CEOS, unilaterally release itself from its contractual undertaking with the staff member concerned. In particular, an offer of employment addressed to a candidate with a view to his appointment as a member of the temporary staff is, admittedly, merely a statement of intent and, as such, a preparatory measure which does not create rights and may be withdrawn, for example where the AECE discovers, after making the offer of employment, that the person concerned does not satisfy one of the conditions of engagement laid down in the CEOS, the vacancy notice or internal rules (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 October 2012 in Eklund v Commission, F‑57/11, EU:F:2012:145, paragraph 66, and the order of 10 July 2014 in Mészáros v Commission, F‑22/13, EU:F:2014:189, paragraph 73). However, the situation is different where such an offer has been accepted, has been expressed in a decision of the AECE, such as the decision of 7 November 2013, and the new contractual relationship has, in fact, already begun to be put into practice. In such a situation, the mutual agreement between the contracting parties gives rise to new contractual obligations which limit the AECE’s power to act unilaterally outside the situations expressly provided for by the CEOS, such as those referred to in Article 47 of the CEOS, and, in any event, to act retroactively.
In assessing merits, reporting officers have a very wide discretion and accordingly, the review carried out by the EU courts must be limited to verifying that there has been no error of fact, manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers.

In particular, an error may only be said to be manifest where it may easily be detected in the light of the criteria to which the legislature intended the exercise of decision-making powers to be subject. Consequently, the evidence, which it is for the applicant to adduce, must be sufficient to show that the factual assessments made in the contested appraisal report are entirely lacking in plausibility. In other words, a complaint alleging a manifest error of assessment must be rejected if, in spite of the evidence put forward by the applicant, the contested assessment still appears to be plausible.

(see paras 35, 36)

See:

Judgments of 10 November 2009 in N v Parliament, F‑93/08, EU:F:2009:151, para. 58, and 18 March 2015 in Rajala v OHIM, F‑24/14, EU:F:2015:10, paras 41 to 43 and the case-law cited
Staff case summary



Staff case summary

Summary

Procedure – Applicant’s failure to act – Application devoid of purpose – No need to adjudicate

(Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal, Art. 75)

In the interest of the proper administration of justice, it is for the Civil Service Tribunal, in the light of an applicant’s persistent failure to act, to find of its own motion, in accordance with Article 75 of its Rules of Procedure, that an action has become devoid of purpose and that there is no longer any need to adjudicate on it.

(see para. 28)

See:

Judgment of 20 June 2008 in T-299/06 Leclercq v Commission , not published in the ECR
ORDER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL (First Chamber)

16 May 2007

Case F-100/05 DEP

Eleni Chatziioannidou

v

Commission of the European Communities

(Procedure – Taxation of costs)

Application: under Article 92(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, applicable mutatis mutandis to the Civil Service Tribunal pursuant to Article 3(4) of Council Decision 2004/752/EC, Euratom of 2 November 2004 establishing the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (OJ 2004 L 333, p. 7), until the entry into force of its rules of procedure, in which Mrs Chatziioannidou seeks taxation of the costs relating to the judgment in Case F‑100/05 Chatziioannidou v Commission [2006] ECR‑SC I-A-1-000 and II‑A‑1-000.

Held: The amount of the costs recoverable by the applicant in Case F‑100/05 is fixed at EUR 10 222.

Summary

Procedure – Costs – Taxation – Elements to be taken into consideration

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 91(b); Council Decision 2004/752, Art. 3(4))

When assessing the scale of work involved in the proceedings before the Court in order to determine the amount of recoverable costs, the primary consideration of the Community judicature is the total number of hours of work which may appear to be objectively necessary for the purpose of those proceedings. The amount of an adviser’s fees cannot depend on the length of the documents he produces. Concise documents may be as much a reflection of their author’s ability to summarise, saving the Court and the other party time, as a sign of quick work. The brevity of a document cannot, in principle, be regarded as reflecting rapid or cursory work by the person who produces it.

(see paras 23-24)

See:

T-290/94 DEP Kaysersberg v Commission [1998] ECR II‑4105, para. 20; T-171/00 DEP Spruyt v Commission [2002] ECR‑SC I‑A‑225 and II‑1127, para. 29
Staff case summary



Staff case summary

Summary

Officials – Actions – Act adversely affecting an official – Definition

(Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91)

The termination of a procedure constitutes a decision adversely affecting an official only if it results from the institution’s rejection of the application and not from the applicant’s withdrawal from the procedure.

(see para. 28)
Staff case summary



Staff case summary

Summary

1. Officials – Actions – Prior administrative complaint – Time-limits

(Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91)

2. Officials – Actions – Claim for compensation linked to an application for annulment – Inadmissibility of the claim for annulment entailing inadmissibility of the claim for compensation

(Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91)

3. Procedure – Application initiating proceedings – Formal requirements

1. The time-limits laid down in Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations for lodging complaints and appeals are mandatory and cannot be left to the discretion of the parties or the Court, since they were established in order to ensure that legal positions are clear and certain. Any exceptions to or derogations from those time-limits must be interpreted restrictively. Only the existence of new and material facts may justify the submission of a claim seeking reconsideration of a decision which was not challenged within the time-limits. Furthermore, even the subsequent discovery by an applicant of an already existing factor cannot, in general, be treated as a new fact capable of justifying the reopening of time-limits, without undermining the principle of legal certainty.

(see paras 34-36)

See:

127/84 Esly v Commission [1985] ECR 1437, para. 10

T-506/93 Moat v Commission [1995] ECR-SC I‑A‑43 and II‑147, para. 28; T‑16/97 Chauvin v Commission [1997] ECR-SC I‑A‑237 and II‑681, paras 32 and 37; T-78/96 and T-170/96 W v Commission [1998] ECR-SC I‑A‑239 and II‑745, para. 68

2. Where a claim for compensation is closely related to a claim for annulment which has itself been rejected as inadmissible, the claim for compensation is also inadmissible.

(see para. 49)

See:

33/80 Albini v Council and Commission [1981] ECR 2141, para. 18

T-72/92 Benzler v Commission [1993] ECR II‑347, paras 21 and 22; T-406/03 Ravailhe v Committee of the Regions [2005] ECR‑SC I‑A‑19 and II‑79, para. 62

3. For a claim for compensation to be admissible, the application must contain information identifying the unlawful act which the applicant alleges against the institution, the reasons why he considers there to be a causal link between the conduct and the harm he claims to have suffered, and the nature and extent of that harm. A claim for any unspecified form of damages, on the other hand, is not sufficiently concrete and must therefore be regarded as inadmissible.

(see para. 51)

See:

5/71 Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v Council [1971] ECR 975, para. 9

T-157/96 Affatato v Commission [1998] ECR-SC I‑A‑41 and II‑97, para. 45
Staff case summary



Staff case summary

Summary

Officials – Remuneration – Expatriation allowance – Conditions for granting

(Staff Regulations, Annex VII, Art. 4(1)(a)))

The habitual residence to which Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations refers for the purpose of the grant of the expatriation allowance corresponds to the place in which the official concerned has established, with the intention that it should be of a lasting character, the permanent or habitual centre of his interests, it being understood that, for the purposes of determining habitual residence, all the factual circumstances which constitute such residence and, in particular, the actual residence of the official concerned must be taken into account.

The place where a person carries on their occupation, apart from its relevance as an independent criterion for the application of Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations, is an important indicator for determining habitual residence.

The fact that an official might have the intention of looking for a job other than in his country of residence is not such as to call into question the determination of his habitual residence, since it is not disputed that, throughout the reference period, that official maintained the centre of his interests at the place of his subsequent employment, where he had his home and where, for most of the period, he carried on his occupation. Accordingly, that requirement of an intention to confer stability on the centre of his interests is not to be interpreted as meaning that the official concerned must have excluded the possibility of returning to his country of origin or leaving for another Member State of the European Union.

An official’s other ties with his country of origin, such as ownership of a car, medical consultations, property owned by his parents in that country, the fact of having renewed his official identity papers there, the exercise of his rights as a citizen or the fact of having his tax domicile, financial interests and assets there, including a bank account, and the visits which he makes to it are only those normal ties which people retain with the country in which their parents live and where they have lived for a long time, but are insufficient to establish that they are habitually resident in that country.

(see paras 48, 51, 56, 59)

See:

T-18/91 Costacurta Gelabert v Commission [1992] ECR II‑1655, para. 42; T‑90/92 Magdalena Fernández v Commission [1993] ECR II‑971, para. 30; T‑18/98 Reichert v Parliament [2000] ECR‑SC I‑A‑73 and II‑309, para. 25; T‑60/00 Liaskou v Council [2001] ECR-SC I‑A‑107 and II‑489, paras 53 and 64; T‑283/03 Recalde Langarica v Commission [2005] ECR-SC I‑A‑235 and II‑1075, para. 114; T-83/03 Salazar Brier v Commission [2005] ECR-SC I‑A‑311 and II‑1407, paras 56 and 71, under appeal to the Court of Justice, C‑9/06 P; T-259/04 Koistinen v Commission [2006] ECR-SC I-A-2-177 and II-A-2-879, para. 34; T‑324/04 F v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-A-2-0000 and II-A-2-0000, para. 87
ORDER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL (First Chamber)

11 May 2007

Case F-2/06

Luigi Marcuccio

v

Commission of the European Communities

(Officials – Social security – Insurance against the risk of accident and of occupational disease – Accident at work – Termination of the application procedure under Article 73 of the Staff Regulations)

Application: brought under Articles 236 EC and 152 EA, in which Mr Marcuccio seeks annulment of the Commission’s decision to terminate the procedure for granting the applicant the benefits provided for by Article 73 of the Staff Regulations and linked to an accident he suffered on 10 September 2003.

Held: The action is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible. The parties are to bear their own costs.

Summary

Officials – Actions – Act adversely affecting an official – Definition

(Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91)

The termination of a procedure constitutes a decision adversely affecting an official only if it results from the institution’s rejection of the application and not from the applicant’s withdrawal from the procedure.

(see para. 28)
ORDER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL (First Chamber)

25 January 2008

Case F-80/06

Tineke Duyster

v

Commission of the European Communities

(Civil service – Officials – Parental leave – Application to withdraw parental leave – Lis pendens – Manifest inadmissibility)

Application: brought under Articles 236 EC and 152 EA, in which Mrs Duyster seeks, in particular, annulment of the Commission’s decision of 11 May 2006 rejecting her complaint against the Commission’s decision of 22 December 2005 declaring inadmissible her request of 6 December 2005 seeking to end her parental leave with retroactive effect from 8 November 2004.

Held: The action is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible. Each party is ordered to bear its own costs.

Summary

1. Procedure – Admissibility of pleadings – Assessment as at the time when the pleading is submitted

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 114)

2. Procedure – Objection of lis pendens

1. Just as the admissibility of an action must be assessed at the time when it is brought, the admissibility of other pleadings, such as a plea of inadmissibility, must be assessed at the time when they are submitted. Such an interpretation ensures respect for the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations .

(see para. 42)

See:

50/84 Bensider and Others v Commission [1984] ECR 3991, para. 8

T-236/00 R II Stauner and Others v Parliament and Commission [2001] ECR II‑2943, para. 49; T-219/01 Commerzbank v Commission [2003] ECR II‑2843, para. 61

2. An action which is between the same parties and has the same purpose on the basis of the same submissions as an action brought previously must be dismissed as inadmissible.

(see para. 52)

See:

172/83 and 226/83 Hoogovens Groep v Commission [1985] ECR 2831, para. 9; 358/85 and 51/86 France v Parliament [1988] ECR 4821, para. 12

judgment of 14 June 2007 in T-68/07 Landtag Schleswig-Holstein v Commission, not published in the ECR, para. 16
Staff case summary



Staff case summary

Summary

1. Procedure – Admissibility of actions – Assessment by reference to the rules in force when the application was lodged

(Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal, Art. 76)

2. Officials – Actions – Time-limits – Claim for compensation addressed to an institution – Duty to act within a reasonable time

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 46; Staff Regulations, Art. 90)

1. Although the rule laid down in Article 76 of the Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal that the Tribunal may, by way of an order, dismiss an action which is manifestly bound to fail is a procedural rule which, as such, applies from the time when it enters into force to all proceedings pending before the Tribunal, the same is not true of rules on the basis of which the Tribunal may, under that article, regard an action as manifestly inadmissible, and which may only be those applicable on the date when the action is brought.

(see para. 14)

2. The onus is on officials or other staff to submit a claim for compensation from the Community for loss alleged to be attributable to the Community within a reasonable period from the time when they became aware of the situation of which they complain. The reasonableness of a period is to be appraised in the light of the circumstances specific to each case and, in particular, the importance of the case for the person concerned, its complexity and the conduct of the parties.

Account must also be taken of the point of reference provided by the limitation period of five years laid down for actions in non-contractual liability by Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice. However, the five year period does not constitute a rigid and inviolable limit below which any claim is admissible regardless of the time taken by the applicant to submit his claim to the administration and of the circumstances of the case.

(see paras 19-22)

See:

T-144/02 Eagle and Others v Commission [2004] ECR II‑3381, paras 65 and 66; F-125/05 Tsarnavas v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-0000 and II-A-1-0000, paras 76 and 77
Staff case summary



Staff case summary

Summary

1. Officials – Members of the temporary staff and contract staff – Unemployment allowance – Maximum period of payment

(Conditions of Employment of Other Servants, Arts 28a(4), 70 and 96(4))

2. Procedure – Costs – Action in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Arts 87(3), first subpara., and 94(3))

1. The provisions of Article 28a(4) and Article 96(4) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants laying down the maximum period during which, respectively, a former member of the temporary staff and a former member of the contract staff may be paid an unemployment allowance by the Communities do not apply to a former member of the auxiliary staff who, under Article 70 of those Conditions of Employment, is affiliated by the institution employing him to a national compulsory social security scheme and can therefore obtain payment of an unemployment allowance only from that scheme. The provisions of Article 28a(4) and Article 96(4) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants thus do not require the institution to take account, for the purposes of setting the maximum period for which an unemployment allowance is to be paid by the Communities, the periods during which the staff member concerned was employed as a member of the auxiliary staff.

(see para. 20)

2. In a case where, as it was required to do by the provisions of Article 94(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, the Tribunal has rejected an application for legal aid because the action appeared manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, it is nevertheless appropriate, in the procedure dealing with the merits of the case, to apply the provisions of the first subparagraph of Article 87(3) of the Rules of Procedure and, exceptionally, to order the administration to pay, in addition to its own costs, all the costs incurred by the applicant, including any incurred in the context of his application for legal aid, in view of the applicant’s financial situation and the fact that, in the case in question, the contested decision contradicted, without explanation, the information previously provided by the relevant department .

(see paras 32-33)