ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EU competition law refers to the activities of undertakings and the concept of an undertaking covers any entity engaged in an economic activity, irrespective of its legal status and the way in which it is financed. When such an entity infringes competition rules, it falls, according to the principle of personal responsibility, to that entity to answer for that infringement.

When an entity that committed an infringement of the competition rules is subject to a legal or organisational change, that change does not necessarily create a new undertaking free of liability for its predecessor’s infringements of the competition rules, when, from an economic point of view, the two are identical. Thus, where two entities constitute one economic entity, the fact that the entity that committed the infringement still exists does not as such preclude imposing a penalty on the entity to which its economic activities were transferred.

As regards, in particular, the transfer by a parent company of its activities in the sector in which the infringement of the competition rules occurred to one of its subsidiaries, the relevant date for assessing whether the transfer of activities is within a group or between independent undertakings, for the purpose of establishing the existence of economic continuity, must be that of the transfer itself.

Whilst in order to establish the existence of economic continuity there must, on that date, be structural links between the transferor and the transferee on the basis of which it may be considered, in accordance with the principle of personal responsibility, that the two entities form a single undertaking, those links need not, in view of the purpose of the principle of economic continuity, subsist throughout the rest of the infringement period or until the adoption of a decision penalising the infringement. Nor is it necessary that the structural links on the basis of which economic continuity may be established subsist for a minimum period.

In that context, the principle of legal certainty precludes taking into consideration, for the purpose of examining the existence of economic continuity, the objective of the transfer of activities. The taking into consideration of the economic reasons which led to that transfer would introduce into the application of the principle of economic continuity subjective factors which are incompatible with a transparent and predictable application of that principle.

(see paras 39-41, 50-53)
Article 6(1) of Council Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as not precluding a national provision under which the national court hearing mortgage enforcement proceedings is required to adjust the amounts due under a term in a mortgage-loan contract providing for default interest at a rate more than three times greater than the statutory rate in order that the amount of that interest may not exceed that threshold, provided that the application of that national provision:

— is without prejudice to the assessment by that national court of the unfairness of such a term and

— does not prevent that court removing that term if it were to find the latter to be ‘unfair’, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of that directive.

When the national court is faced with a contractual term relating to default interest at a rate less than that provided by national law, the setting of that legislative ceiling does not prevent that court from assessing the possible unfairness of that clause, within the meaning of Article 3 of Directive 93/13. Accordingly, a default interest rate less than three times the statutory rate is not necessarily to be considered to be fair within the meaning of that directive. In contrast, when the default interest rate laid down in a term in a mortgage-loan contract is higher than that provided by national law and must, in accordance with that law, be subject to a limitation, such a fact must not preclude the national court from, above and beyond that measure of moderation, drawing all the inferences of possible unfairness — in the light of Directive 93/13 — of the term which contains that rate, if necessary by annulling it.

(see paras 40-42, operative part)
Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 4 December 2014 — Spain v Commission

(Case C‑513/13 P) ( 1 )

‛Appeal — Cohesion Fund — Project concerning the drainage and purification of the urban water of Zaragoza (Spain) — Reduction in the financial assistance — Existence of a time-limit — Failure to comply with the prescribed time-limit — Consequences’

Economic, social and territorial cohesion — Structural assistance — EU financing — Withdrawal of, or reduction in, financial assistance following irregularities — Financial corrections — Time-limit for the Commission to adopt the decision — Not possible to adopt the decision after expiry of the time-limit (Council Regulations No 1164/1994, as amended by Regulations No 1264/1999 and No 1265/1999, Annex II, Art. H(2)) (see paras 36-39)

Operative part

The Court:

1. Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union in Case T‑358/08 Spain v Commission;

2. Annuls Commission Decision C(2008) 3249 of 25 June 2008, relating to a reduction of the aid granted by virtue of the Cohesion Fund to the Kingdom of Spain for project No 96/11/61/018 — ‘Saneamiento de Zaragoza’;

3. Orders the Commission to pay the costs incurred by the Kingdom of Spain and declares that the Commission is to bear its own costs both in the proceedings at first instance and in the present appeal.

( 1 ) OJ C 336, 16.11.2013

Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 4 December 2014 — Spain v Commission

(Case C‑513/13 P) ( 1 )

‛Appeal — Cohesion Fund — Project concerning the drainage and purification of the urban water of Zaragoza (Spain) — Reduction in the financial assistance — Existence of a time-limit — Failure to comply with the prescribed time-limit — Consequences’

Economic, social and territorial cohesion — Structural assistance — EU financing — Withdrawal of, or reduction in, financial assistance following irregularities — Financial corrections — Time-limit for the Commission to adopt the decision — Not possible to adopt the decision after expiry of the time-limit (Council Regulations No 1164/1994, as amended by Regulations No 1264/1999 and No 1265/1999, Annex II, Art. H(2)) (see paras 36-39)

Operative part

The Court:

1. Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union in Case T‑358/08 Spain v Commission;

2. Annuls Commission Decision C(2008) 3249 of 25 June 2008, relating to a reduction of the aid granted by virtue of the Cohesion Fund to the Kingdom of Spain for project No 96/11/61/018 — ‘Saneamiento de Zaragoza’;

3. Orders the Commission to pay the costs incurred by the Kingdom of Spain and declares that the Commission is to bear its own costs both in the proceedings at first instance and in the present appeal.

( 1 ) OJ C 336, 16.11.2013
Case C‑628/13

Jean-Bernard Lafonta

v

Autorité des marchés financiers

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation (France))

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Approximation of laws — Directive 2003/6/EC — Article 1, point (1) — Directive 2003/124/EC — Article 1(1) — Inside information — Concept of ‘information of a precise nature’ — Potential effect in a particular direction on the prices of financial instruments)’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 11 March 2015

Approximation of laws — Insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) — Prohibition — Inside information — Information of a precise nature — Meaning — Inferring from the information that its potential effect on the prices of financial instruments will be in a particular direction — Not required

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/6, Art. 1, point. (1); Commission Directive 2003/124, Art. 1(1))

See the text of the decision.

(see para. 38)

Case C‑628/13

Jean-Bernard Lafonta

v

Autorité des marchés financiers

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation (France))

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Approximation of laws — Directive 2003/6/EC — Article 1, point (1) — Directive 2003/124/EC — Article 1(1) — Inside information — Concept of ‘information of a precise nature’ — Potential effect in a particular direction on the prices of financial instruments)’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 11 March 2015

Approximation of laws — Insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) — Prohibition — Inside information — Information of a precise nature — Meaning — Inferring from the information that its potential effect on the prices of financial instruments will be in a particular direction — Not required

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/6, Art. 1, point. (1); Commission Directive 2003/124, Art. 1(1))

See the text of the decision.

(see para. 38)
Article 3(a) and (c) of Regulation No 469/2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products must be interpreted as meaning that, where a basic patent includes a claim to a product comprising an active ingredient which constitutes the sole subject-matter of the invention, for which the holder of that patent has already obtained a supplementary protection certificate, as well as a subsequent claim to a product comprising a combination of that active ingredient and another substance, that provision precludes the holder from obtaining a second supplementary protection certificate for that combination.

It cannot be accepted that the holder of a basic patent in force may obtain a new supplementary protection certificate, potentially for a longer period of protection, each time he places on the market in a Member State a medicinal product containing, on the one hand, an active ingredient, protected as such by the holder’s basic patent and constituting the subject-matter of the invention covered by that patent, and, on the other, another substance which does not constitute the subject-matter of the invention covered by the basic patent It follows that, in order for a basic patent to protect as such an active ingredient within the meaning of Articles 1(c) and 3(a) of Regulation No 469/2009, that active ingredient must constitute the subject-matter of the invention covered by that patent.

(see paras 37-39, operative part)
2.

Institutions of the European Union — Right of public access to documents — Regulation No 1049/2001 — Exceptions to the right of access to documents — No prior classification of a document as being sensitive — No impact on the ability of an institution to refuse access on the basis of one of those exceptions (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 1049/2001, Arts 4 and 9) (see paras 36, 37)
An undertaking which has participated in a single and complex infringement of the competition rules by its own conduct, which fell within the definition of an agreement or concerted practice having an anticompetitive object within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU and was intended to help bring about the infringement as a whole, may thus be responsible also in respect of the conduct of other undertakings in the context of the same infringement throughout the period of its participation in the infringement. That is the position where it is shown that the undertaking intended, through its own conduct, to contribute to the common objectives pursued by all the participants and that it was aware of the offending conduct planned or put into effect by other undertakings in pursuit of the same objectives or that it could reasonably have foreseen it and was prepared to take the risk. As those two conditions are alternative, the General Court, where it finds that that undertaking was aware of the offending conduct, is not required to determine whether the undertaking could reasonably have foreseen that conduct and took the risk.

(see paras 23, 30)
9

Regulation No 864/2007 provides in its Article 5, which is entitled ‘Product liability’: ‘1. Without prejudice to Article 4(2), the law applicable to a non‑contractual obligation arising out of damage caused by a product shall be: (a) the law of the country in which the person sustaining the damage had his or her habitual residence when the damage occurred, if the product was marketed in that country; or, failing that, (b) the law of the country in which the product was acquired, if the product was marketed in that country; or, failing that, (c) the law of the country in which the damage occurred, if the product was marketed in that country. However, the law applicable shall be the law of the country in which the person claimed to be liable is habitually resident if he or she could not reasonably foresee the marketing of the product, or a product of the same type, in the country the law of which is applicable under (a), (b) or (c). 2. Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraph 1, the law of that other country shall apply. A manifestly closer connection with another country might be based in particular on a pre-existing relationship between the parties, such as a contract, that is closely connected with the tort/delict in question.’
22

In those circumstances the Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. Must Article 3(1)(b) of [Regulation No 765/2006] be interpreted as meaning that the authority which is responsible for application of the derogation set out in Article 3(1)(b) of that regulation enjoys an absolute discretion when taking a decision on whether to grant that derogation? 2. If the answer to the first question is in the negative, by which criteria should that authority be guided, and by which criteria is it bound, when taking a decision on whether to grant the derogation set out in Article 3(1)(b) of [Regulation No 765/2006]? 3. Must Article 3(1)(b) of [Regulation No 765/2006] be interpreted as meaning that the authority which is responsible for granting the aforementioned derogation is entitled or obliged, when carrying out the assessment as to whether to grant the derogation sought, to have regard for, inter alia, the fact that the applicants submitting the request are seeking to give effect to their fundamental rights (in this case, the right to a judicial remedy), although it must also ensure that if, in the specific case, the derogation is granted, the objective of the sanction provided for will not be negated and that the derogation will not be misused (for example, if the amount of money earmarked for securing a legal remedy would be manifestly disproportionate in relation to the scale of the legal services provided)? 4. Must Article 3(1)(b) of [Regulation No 765/2006] be interpreted as meaning that one of the bases capable of providing justification for not granting the derogation set out in that provision may be the illegal nature of the acquisition of the funds in respect of the use of which that derogation is to be implemented?’
3

Recitals 9, 11, 13, 20, 21, 23 and 61 in the preamble to Regulation No 1698/2005 state that: ‘(9) On the basis of the strategic guidelines, each Member State should prepare its rural development national strategy plan constituting the reference framework for the preparation of the rural development programmes. … ... (11) To ensure the sustainable development of rural areas it is necessary to focus on a limited number of core objectives at Community level relating to agricultural and forestry competitiveness, land management and environment, quality of life and diversification of activities in those areas, taking into account the diversity of situations, ranging from remote rural areas suffering from depopulation and decline to peri-urban rural areas under increasing pressure from urban centres. ... (13) To achieve the objective of improving the competitiveness of the agricultural and forestry sectors it is important to build clear development strategies aimed at enhancing and adapting human potential, physical potential and the quality of agricultural production. ... (20) With regard to physical potential, a set of measures on the modernisation of agricultural holdings, improvement of the economic value of forests, adding value to agricultural and forestry products, promoting the development of new products, processes and technologies in the agriculture and food sector and in the forestry sector, improvement and development of agricultural and forestry infrastructure, restoring agricultural production potential damaged by natural disasters and introduction of appropriate prevention measures should be made available. (21) The purpose of Community farm investment aid is to modernise agricultural holdings to improve their economic performance through better use of the production factors including the introduction of new technologies and innovation, targeting quality, organic products and on/off-farm diversification, including non-food sectors and energy crops, as well as improving the environmental, occupational safety, hygiene and animal welfare status of agricultural holdings … ... (23) Improvements in the processing and marketing of primary agricultural and forestry products should be encouraged by means of support for investments aimed at improving efficiency in the processing and marketing sector, promoting the processing of agricultural and forestry production for renewable energy, introducing new technologies and innovation, opening new market opportunities for agricultural and forestry products, putting emphasis on quality, improving environmental protection, occupational safety, hygiene and animal welfare, as appropriate, by targeting, as a general rule, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises and other enterprises under a certain size, which are better placed to add value to local products … ... (61) In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity and subject to exceptions, there should be national rules on the eligibility of expenditure.’
13

The HS Explanatory Notes on heading 3204 are worded as follows: ‘(I) — Synthetic organic colouring matter, whether or not chemically defined; preparations as specified in note 3 to this chapter based on synthetic organic colouring matter. Synthetic colouring matter is generally obtained from oils or other products of the distillation of coal tar. The heading applies, inter alia, to: (A) Unmixed synthetic organic colouring matter (whether or not chemically defined compounds) and synthetic organic colouring matter diluted with substances which have no dyeing properties (e.g. anhydrous sodium sulphate, sodium chloride, dextrin, starch) to decrease or standardise their colouring power. The addition of small quantities of surface-active products to encourage penetration and fixation of the dye does not affect the classification of colouring matter. Colouring matter of these descriptions is usually in the form of powder, crystals, pastes, etc. Synthetic organic colouring matter put up in forms or packings for retail sale is classified in heading 3212 (see Part (C) of the Explanatory Note to that heading). … The various types of synthetic organic colouring matter classified here (whether as dyes or pigments) include: … (8) Acridines, quinolones (e.g., cyanines, isocyanines, cryptocyanines). … Synthetic organic colouring matter may be soluble or insoluble in water. It has almost completely replaced natural organic colouring matter, particularly for dyeing or printing textiles, dyeing hides or skins, paper or wood. … Certain of these substances are also used as laboratory reagents or for medical purposes. Substances which in practice are not used for their dyeing properties are excluded, e.g., azulenes (heading 2902), trinitrophenol (picric acid) and dinitroorthocresol (heading 2908), hexanitrodiphenylamine (heading 2921), methyl orange (heading 2927), bilirubin, biliverdin and porphyrins (heading 2933), acriflavine (heading 3824). (II) — Synthetic organic products of a kind used as fluorescent brightening agents or as luminophores, whether or not chemically defined. … (2) Organic products of a kind used as luminophores are synthetic products which, under the action of light rays, produce a luminescent or fluorescent effect. Some of these products also have the character of colouring matter. An example of these luminophores is rhodamine B in plastics, which produces a red fluorescence. It is generally in the form of powder. Most organic products of a kind used as luminophores … are not colouring matter. They are added to colouring pigments to increase their brilliance. These products remain in this heading even when chemically defined but the same chemicals in a non-luminescent form … are excluded (Chapter 29) …’
46

In the light of the above considerations, the answer to Question 1 is that EU law and, in particular, Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which ordinary courts hearing an appeal or adjudicating at final instance are under a duty, if they consider a national statute to be contrary to Article 47 of the Charter, to apply, in the course of the proceedings, to the constitutional court for that statute to be generally struck down, and may not simply refrain from applying that statute in the case before them, to the extent that the priority nature of that procedure prevents — both before the submission of a question on constitutionality to the national court responsible for reviewing the constitutionality of laws and, as the case may be, after the decision of that court on that question — all the other national courts or tribunals from exercising their right or fulfilling their obligation to refer questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. On the other hand, EU law and, in particular, Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding such national legislation to the extent that those ordinary courts remain free: — to make a reference to the Court at whatever stage of the proceedings they consider appropriate, and even at the end of the interlocutory procedure for the review of constitutionality, in respect of any question which they consider necessary, — to adopt any measure necessary to ensure interim judicial protection of rights conferred under the EU legal order, and — to disapply, at the end of such an interlocutory procedure, the national legislative provision at issue if they consider it to be contrary to EU law. It is for the referring court to ascertain whether the national legislation at issue before it can be construed in such a way as to meet those requirements of EU law.