ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.

Must Article 30(2)(e) of Directive 2001/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2001 on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification (1) be interpreted as conferring on a railway undertaking which uses or intends to use railway infrastructure the right to participate in the procedure conducted by a regulatory body for setting the level of charges for access to railway infrastructure by the railway infrastructure manager?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Hannover (Germany) lodged on 10 November 2020 — Landkreis Northeim v Daimler AG

(Case C-588/20)

(2021/C 53/25)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Hannover

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Landkreis Northeim

Defendant: Daimler AG

Interveners: Iveco Magirus AG, MAN SE, MAN Truck & Bus SE, MAN Truck & Bus Deutschland GmbH

Question referred

Must the decision of the European Commission of 19 July 2016 (1)– C(2016) 4673 final — relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA agreement (Case AT.39824 — Trucks) be interpreted as meaning that special-purpose/specialised vehicles, in particular refuse collection vehicles, are also covered by the findings of that Commission Decision?

(1) Notified under document C(2016) 4673 final, summary notice in OJ 2017 C 108, p. 6.
3.

Must Articles 2 and 4(2) in conjunction with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and the right to a fair trial be interpreted as meaning that: a) the national court is required to disapply the prohibition on ‘challenging the authority of the courts’ and on ‘the courts’ determining or assessing the lawfulness of a judge’s appointment or of his resulting authority to perform judicial tasks’, such as that stipulated in Article 29(2) and (3) of the Law of 8 December 2017 on the Supreme Court (consolidated text: Dz. U. of 2019, item 825 as, amended), since the European Union’s respect for the constitutional identity of the Member States does not entitle the national legislature to enact solutions which undermine the fundamental values and principles of the European Union? b) the constitutional identity of a Member State must not result in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial before an independent court or tribunal established by law where the appointment procedure preceding the delivery of the document of appointment included the irregularities described in the questions referred for a preliminary ruling in Cases C-487/19 and C-508/19, and the prior judicial review of that procedure was deliberately prevented in a manner that is clearly contrary to the national constitution?
Reference for a preliminary ruling from the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (United Kingdom) made on 29 July 2020 — NB, AB v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Intervenor: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

(Case C-349/20)

(2021/C 62/12)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber)

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: NB, AB

Respondent: Secretary of State for the Home Department

Intervenor: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Questions referred

In assessing whether there has been a cessation of protection or assistance from UNRWA (1) within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 12(1) (a) of the QD (2) to an UNRWA-registered stateless Palestinian in respect of the assistance afforded to disabled persons:

1. Is the assessment purely an historic exercise of considering the circumstances which are said to have forced an applicant to leave the UNRWA area of operations when he did, or is it also an ex nunc, forward-looking assessment of whether the applicant can avail himself of such protection or assistance presently?

2. If the answer to Question 1 is that assessment includes a forward-looking assessment, is it legitimate to rely analogically on the cessation clause in Article 11, so that where historically the applicant can show a qualifying reason as to why he or she left the UNRWA area, the evidential burden falls upon the Member State to show that such reason no longer holds?

3. In order for there to be justifiable objective reasons for the departure of such a person related to UNRW[A]'s provision of protection or assistance, is it necessary to establish intentional infliction of harm or deprivation of assistance (by act or omission) on the part of UNRWA or the state in which it operates?

4. Is it relevant to take into account the assistance provided to such persons by civil society actors such as NGOs?

(1) United Nations Relief and Works Association.

(2) Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted (the Qualification Directive; hereafter: ‘QD’)(OJ 2004, L 304, p. 12).
1.

Is a national authority, when classifying a cosmetic product as a medicinal product by function, within the meaning of Article 1(2)(b) of Directive 2001/83/EC (1) of 6 November 2001, and, in so doing, examining all the characteristics of that product, entitled to base the necessary scientific assessment of the pharmacological properties of that product and the risks associated with it on a ‘structural analogy’, in a case where the active substance used has only recently been developed, is comparable in its structure to pharmacological active substances which are already known and studied, but no comprehensive pharmacological, toxicological or clinical studies of the new substance in relation to its effects and its dosage, which are necessary only if Directive 2001/83/EC is applicable, have been submitted by the applicant?
2.

If Question I is to be answered in the affirmative: In such a case, is it necessary that the parents of the third-country national comply with the period for submitting an application for family reunification referred to in the judgment of the Court of Justice of 12 April 2018, C-550/16, A and S (2), paragraph 61, namely ‘in principle, […] within a period of three months of the date on which the “minor” concerned was declared to have refugee status’?
2.

Does a provision of national law limiting review by the Constitutional Court of a resolution of the Národná rada Slovenskej republiky (Parliament of the Slovak Republic) which revoked an amnesty or an individual pardon and was adopted under Article 86(i) of the Ústava SR (Constitution of the Slovak Republic), merely to an assessment of the resolution’s compliance with the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, without taking into account binding acts adopted by the European Union, in particular the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Treaty on European Union, comply with the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and with Article 82 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with the right to a fair trial, guaranteed in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and with the right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence, guaranteed in Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union? If the answer to this question is in the negative, is the national court bound by such a ruling of the national Constitutional Court?
1.

Must EU law — in particular Article 2 TEU and the value of the rule of law expressed therein, the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and the principles of primacy, sincere cooperation and legal certainty — be interpreted as precluding the application of a Member State’s legislation, such as Article 41b(1) and (3) of the Ustawa z dnia 27 lipca 2001 r. — Prawo o ustroju sądów powszechnych (Law of 27 July 2001 on the System of Ordinary Courts, ‘the LSOC’), in such a manner that the president of a court may, independently and without judicial review, decide to change the composition of a court as a result of an authorisation granted by a body such as the Izba Dyscyplinarna [Sądu Najwyższego] (Disciplinary Chamber [of the Supreme Court, Poland]) for the criminal prosecution or detention of a judge included in the original panel (Regional Court Judge I. T.), which involves the mandatory suspension of that judge from his or her duties and entails, in particular, prohibiting that judge from sitting on panels in the cases assigned to him or her, including the cases assigned to him or her before the authorisation was granted?
3.

The General Court erred in law in the interpretation and application of the principles of legitimate expectations and legal certainty, in the context of the monitoring of State aid under Article 108 TFEU, by its method of analysis and by rendering meaningless the content of both principles.
3.

On the hypothesis that Article 34(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 does not apply, if recognition and enforcement of a judgment of another Member State would be contrary to domestic public policy on the grounds that it would violate the principle of res judicata by reason of a prior domestic arbitration award or a prior judgment entered in the terms of the award granted by the court of the Member State in which recognition is sought, is it permissible to rely on Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 as a ground of refusing recognition or enforcement or do Articles 34(3) and (4) of the Regulation provide the exhaustive grounds by which res judicata and/or irreconcilability can prevent recognition and enforcement of a Regulation judgment?
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal correctionnel de Limoges (France) lodged on 23 October 2020 — Criminal proceedings against DS

(Case C-557/20)

(2021/C 163/13)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal correctionnel de Limoges

Party to the main criminal proceedings

DS

Interested party: Union française des maréchaux-ferrants

By order of 16 March 2020, the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) declared that the request for a preliminary ruling made by the Tribunal correctionnel de Limoges (Criminal Court, Limoges, France), by decision of 11 September 2020, is manifestly inadmissible.
3.

Should the condition laid down in Article 4(5) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA that the ‘sentence has been served … or may no longer be executed under the law of the sentencing country’ be interpreted as covering a situation in which the requested person has been finally sentenced, for the same acts, to a custodial sentence that he or she has served in part in the sentencing country and the remainder of which has been remitted by a non-judicial authority of that country, as part of a general leniency measure that also applies to convicted persons who have committed serious acts, such as the requested person, and is not based on rational criminal policy considerations?
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sofiyski gradski sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 21 December 2020 — ‘PONS HOLDING’ AD

(Case C-703/20)

(2021/C 297/14)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Sofiyski gradski sad

Party to the main proceedings

‘PONS HOLDING’ AD

By order of 6 May 2021, the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) held:

The Court of Justice of the European Union manifestly lacks jurisdiction to answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Sofiyski gradski sad (Sofia City Court, Bulgaria) by decision of 9 December 2020.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Okrazhen sad Razgrad (Bulgaria) lodged on 20 October 2020 — BNP Paribas Personal Finance S.A., Bulgaria Branch v T.G.M.

(Case C-535/20)

(2021/C 217/24)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Okrazhen sad Razgrad

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant and appellant: BNP Paribas Personal Finance S.A., Bulgaria Branch

Defendant and respondent: T.G.M.

By order of 14 April 2021, the Court (Sixth Chamber) ruled as follows:

Article 10(2) and Article 22(1) of Directive 2008/48/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which requires all components of a consumer credit agreement to be presented using the same font type, the same font format and the same font size, that is, no smaller than 12 point.

(1) OJ 2008 L 133, p. 66.
1.

Are Articles 36 and 39 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012, (1) read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the principles of effectiveness and equivalence (principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU), to be interpreted as precluding a provision of a Member State which provides for, as the sole remedy against a decision on enforcement issued by the court without prior adversarial proceedings and without an instrument permitting enforcement, and solely on the basis of the allegations of the party seeking enforcement, an objection, which must be lodged within eight days in the language of that Member State, even if the decision on enforcement is served in another Member State in a language which the addressee does not understand, and the objection is already rejected as being out of time if it is lodged within twelve days?
2.

Are the provisions of Article 13(1)(b) of Regulation No 561/2006 to be interpreted as meaning that the carrying out of transport operations within the scope of that provision, some of which remain within a radius of 100 km from the base of the undertaking and others of which exceed that radius, in a period of one month, in the context of the exemption of the situation referred to in Article 13(1)(b) of Regulation No 561/2006 from application of that regulation pursuant to a provision of national law, results in the exemption of all relevant transport operations from application of the regulation, or only those which [do not] […] exceed the radius of 100 km or none of them?
1.

Must the applicable rules of EU law resulting from the provisions of Article 13(1) […] and of Article 23(1) […] of Directive 2008/50/EC of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe [(OJ 2008 L 152 p. 1)] (1) be interpreted as entitling individuals, in the event of a sufficiently serious breach by an EU Member State of the obligations resulting from those rules, to claim compensation from the Member State concerned for damage to their health in cases where there is a direct and certain causal link with the deterioration in air quality?
1.

Is an approach whereby a court decides to impose the obligation to disclose evidence, even though proceedings are at the same time being conducted by the Commission for the purposes of the adoption of a decision pursuant to Chapter III of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (1) of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (‘the Regulation’), due to which proceedings concerning an action for damages caused by a breach of competition legislation have been suspended on that ground by a court, consistent with the interpretation of Article 5(1) of Directive 2014/104/EU (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union (‘the Directive’)?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Bremen (Germany) lodged on 16 February 2021 — DM v CTS Eventim AG & Co. KGaA

(Case C-96/21)

(2021/C 138/29)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Bremen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: DM

Defendant: CTS Eventim AG & Co. KGaA

Question referred

Is Article 16(l) of Directive 2011/83/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 (‘the Consumer Rights Directive’) to be interpreted as meaning that it is sufficient for the exclusion of the consumer’s right of withdrawal if the trader does not directly provide the consumer with a service related to leisure activities but sells the consumer a right of access to such a service?

(1) Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2011 L 304, p. 64).
Action brought on 5 March 2021 — European Parliament v European Commission

(Case C-144/21)

(2021/C 163/27)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: European Parliament (represented by: L. Visaggio, C. Ionescu Dima, M. Menegatti, Agents)

Defendant: European Commission

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— annul Articles 1(1) and (5), 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 and 10 inasmuch as they concern the authorisations relating to uses 2, 4 and 5 (and use 1, in relation to the formulation of mixtures for uses 2, 4 and 5) and bearing numbers REACH/20/18/0 to REACH/20/18/27 of Commission Implementing Decision C(2020) 8797 of 18 December 2020 partially granting an authorisation for certain uses of chromium trioxide under Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council (Chemservice GmbH and others);

— in the alternative, annul Commission Implementing Decision C(2020)8797 of 18 December 2020 in its entirety;

— order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of its action, the applicant relies on a single plea in law, alleging that the contested decision has been adopted in breach of the requirements laid down in Article 60(4) and (7) of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council and should therefore be annulled inasmuch as it concerns the authorisation for uses 2, 4 and 5 (and use 1, in relation to the formulation of mixtures for uses 2, 4 and 5) and bearing numbers REACH/20/18/0 to REACH/20/18/27. In the alternative, should the Court consider that authorisations in the contested decision for use 6 bearing numbers REACH/20/18/28 to REACH/20/18/34 are so inextricably linked to the authorisations for other uses that the authorisations granted for uses 2, 4 and 5 (and use 1, in relation to the formulation of mixtures for uses 2, 4 and 5) are not severable from the contested decision, the applicant considers that the decision should be annulled in its entirety.

(1) Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC, (OJ 2006, L 396, p. 1).
Appeal brought on 7 January 2021 by the Republic of Estonia against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 28 October 2020 in Case T-594/18, Pharma Mar v European Commission

(Case C-16/21 P)

(2021/C 148/07)

Language of the case: Estonian

Parties

Appellant: Republic of Estonia (represented by: N. Grünberg)

Other parties to the proceedings: Pharma Mar, SA (represented by: M. Merola and V. Salvatore), European Commission (represented by: L. Haasbeek and A. Sipos)

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court of 28 October 2020;

— order each of the parties to bear their own costs incurred in the appeal proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Republic of Estonia puts forward the following arguments:

1. The General Court misconstrued the requirement of impartiality laid down in Article 63 of Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 (1) by finding that, in respect of experts who participate in the work of a scientific advisory group (SAG), owing to the mere fact that they are in an employment relationship with a university hospital, any legitimate doubt as to possible bias that may exist in respect of their impartiality cannot be excluded.

2. First, when examining the principle of impartiality within the meaning of Article 63 of Regulation (EC) No 726/2004, the General Court erred in finding that a university hospital can, as a whole, be equated with a pharmaceutical company.

3. Second, when examining the principle of impartiality the General Court made a manifest error of assessment in the evaluation of the rival medicinal product and the connection between the expert and the manufacture of the ‘rival medicinal product’.

4. Third, when examining the principle of impartiality the General Court erred by failing properly to assess the connection between the experts concerned and the cell therapy centre and the experts’ influence on the SAG’s decisions.

(1) Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency (OJ 2004 L 136, p. 1).
1.

Are Article 1(2), Article 5 [and] Article 4(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC (1) to be interpreted as not excluding from review a term relating to foreign exchange risk which brings within a contract for consideration, based on relationships of strength, a principle expressed by a supplementary rule that is ordinarily applicable to a contract which is free of charge and is intended to place the contracting parties on an equal footing, but has not been assessed by the legislature with a view to striking a reasonable balance between the interests of the seller or supplier and those of the consumer, where the seller or supplier has included that principle in the contract without providing the consumer, at the pre-contractual stage, with information, advice and warnings regarding the particular features of the banking product concerned in terms of the characteristics of the currency of the loan, so that the consumer might understand the economic consequences of the commitment undertaken by him or her?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Constitucional (Portugal) lodged on 3 March 2021 — Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira v VectorImpacto — Automóveis Unipessoal Lda.

(Case C-136/21)

(2021/C 189/13)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Tribunal Constitucional

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

Respondent: VectorImpacto — Automóveis Unipessoal Lda

Question referred

Can Article 110 TFEU, either on its own or in conjunction with Article 191 TFEU, particularly paragraph 2 thereof, be interpreted as not precluding a rule of national law which fails to take account of the environmental component when applying reductions reflecting the average depreciation in the value of vehicles in the national market to the tax levied on second-hand vehicles with a permanent registration plate issued by other Member States of the European Union, thereby enabling the amount of tax calculated in accordance with this provision to be more than the tax levied on equivalent domestic second-hand vehicles?