OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE-GENERAL MAYRAS

DELIVERED ON 24 MAY 1972 ( 1 )

Mr President,

Members of the Court,

The origin of the cases on which I am giving my opinion today is the effect of the devaluation of the French franc, which was decided upon during the summer of 1969, on the machinery of the common organization of the agricultural markets and, more particularly, of the market in cereals.

On 11 August 1969, the Council, taking the view that as a result of the devaluation the ratio between the parity of the French currency and the value of the unit of account, which is used as the basis for intra-Community trade, had changed by 11.11 %, and realizing that this alteration in parities would have the effect of increasing production and consumer prices by the same percentage on the French home market, considered that in those circumstances that increase had to be avoided, at least for the time being, until appropriate measures could ensure the progressive adjustment of French prices to the common prices in such a way that the period required for adjustment would not result in difficulties in trade between other Member States and third countries.

In consequence, Article 1 of Regulation 1586/69 on certain measures of conjunctural policy to be taken in agriculture as a result of the devaluation of the French franc (JO of 12 August 1969) provided that the intervention or purchase price to be paid by France on the home market should for the time being be reduced by 11.11 %. But, in Article 3 of the regulation, the Council also laid down that ‘in so far as it is necessary to compensate for the effects of the measures’ on foreign trade, the French Government should grant subsidies for imports from other Member States or from third countries, and that, on the other hand, it should charge compensatory amounts on exports to Member States and third countries.

Under Article 8 of the same regulation, the Commission was empowered to lay down, for the application of the regulation, detailed rules which might provide for other exceptions to the rules of the common agricultural policy, in accordance, moreover, with Article 26(3) of Regulation No 120 of the Council of 13 June 1967 on the common organization of the market in cereals.

It was on this basis and in accordance with this procedure that the Commission adopted, for the 1969/1970 marketing year in the sphere of cereals and rice, the first implementing regulation, Regulation No 1670/69 of 22 August 1969 fixing, in the annex to the regulation, in particular, the amount of the subsidy on imports of common wheat and mesiin, heading No 10.01 A of the Common Tariff, at FF 58.49 per metric ton. The second regulation of the Commission, Regulation No 1505/70 of 28 July 1970 (JO of 29 July 1970), fixed the amount of the subsidy at FF 44.43 per metric ton. The difference between this rate and that fixed in 1969 is explained by the fact that, under a new regulation of the Council, Regulation No 1432/70 on the adjustment of the intervention and purchase prices to be paid by France, the latter were reduced by only 8.44 % with regard to the same cereals.

The Compagnie d'Approvisionnement, de Transport et de Crédit, whose main activity is the purchase and sale, in France and abroad, of grain and cereals and which, accordingly, imports cereals for several French mills and Grands Moulins de Paris, one of its main customers, claimed to have been adversely affected by these measures because the amount of the subsidy did not precisely compensate for the price increases on account of the devaluation of the French franc.

At first, they lodged an application before the Court of Justice for the annulment of Regulation No 1670/69 of the Commission in so far as that regulation had fixed the amount of the said subsidy at FF 58.49 per metric ton.

By judgment of 16 April 1970 this Court dismissed that application as inadmissible on the ground that the contested decision was not of direct and individual concern to the applicants but was a regulation. This was in application of well-established case-law.

The Compagnie d'approvisionnement and Grands Moulins de Paris thereupon, on 16 November 1970, submitted to the Commission two applications relating, respectively, to the measures adopted for the 1969/1970 marketing year and the 1970/1971 marketing year, for compensation for the alleged loss sustained on their wheat imports from third countries on the ground that the decisions fixing the amount of the subsidies on imports were unlawful. The applicants also asked the Commission to annul both an import certificate issued on 2 October 1970 by the Office National Interprofessionnel des Céréales in connexion with the importation of 280 metric tons of Canadian wheat and the decision discharging the said certificate.

As the Commission did not reply, within two months, to their applications, the applicants considered its silence as tantamount to an implied decision of refusal. In any case an express decision rejecting those applications was taken by the Commission on 26 February 1971. The companies thereupon, on the following 16 and 18 March, lodged two applications before the Court for:

1. the annulment both of what they consider as implied decisions rejecting their applications and of the express decisions taken by the Commission rejecting them;

2. a declaration by the Court that they are entitled to compensation for the loss which they claim to have sustained;

3. finally, in respect of Application No 9/71, the annulment of the import certificate issued by the Office National Interprofessionnel des Céréales on 2 October 1970 and the decision discharging that certificate.

The defendant Commission objected to those applications on the ground that they were inadmissible and this Court requested the parties to put forward their view-point, at the hearing on 29 June last, on the issue of admissibility alone.

On 14 July last, Mr Advocate-General Dutheillet de Lamothe was of the opinion that the applications were admissible except the conclusions for the annulment of the import certificate, which is a French administrative measure of which this Court cannot take cognizance. I am in complete agreement with the point of view he expressed. Moreover this Court itself, in a very similar case, gave a ruling to the same effect with regard to admissibility (Case 5/71, Aktien-Zuckerfabrick Schöppenstedt v Council of the European Communities, 2 December 1971). There is no need to go over this point again and I now turn to my opinion on the substance of the dispute.

Section I

Liability based on the wrongful act arising from an infringement of a superior rule of law

The applicant companies invoke the Community's non-contractual liability on the basis of the second paragraph of Article 215 of the Treaty of Rome. In the first place they maintain that the cause of the damage for which they seek compensation is the infringement by the Commission both of the provisions laid down by the Council in Regulation No 1586/69 and of the principles established by Regulation No 120/67, which is the basic regulation on the subject of the common organization of the markets in cereals. They complain that the Commission fixed the amount of the subsidies on the basis of the intervention prices alone and that in so doing it failed to calculate this sum so as to take precise account of the price increases of imported cereals as a result of the devaluation. It was argued on their behalf during the hearing that the amount of the subsidies, which was calculated on the basis of the intervention prices which are intra-Community prices, was permissible for cereals from Member States but that this was not so in the case of imports from third countries, for which the amount of the subsidy should, to comply with the law, have been calculated on the threshold price applicable to cereals imported from countries outside the Common Market.

For this reason the applicants claim that the Commission acted illegally in fixing the amount of the subsidies on imports coming from third countries on the basis of the intervention price alone. They add that even supposing that this method of calculation was the result of a straightforward misinterpretation of the regulations applicable and not of culpable negligence, such a mistake of law is, in itself, a wrongful act or omission such as to incur liability on the part of the Community.

Before examining the merits of this argument it is necessary to recall the purposes and machinery of import subsidies.

The original development which controls and explains the measures adopted in this case by the Community authorities is the devaluation of the French franc which the Government of France alone decided in exercise of its sovereign power.

What effects can devaluation be expected to have on the foreign trade of a state? We were reminded of them at the hearing. Essentially, it has a favourable effect on exports; on the other hand, it restricts imports unless, within a short time, a rise in home prices reduces, if not extinguishes, the advantages aimed at.

On the other hand, at the time when France decided to devalue, the common agricultural market was in being and in operation and one of its principal features is that, within it, prices and stabilization machinery are determined by the Community authorities alone and are therefore outside the jurisdiction of the national authorities.

Those agricultural prices, uniformly fixed for the six Member States, are expressed in units of account (that unit representing a given weight of fine gold) and are then converted into national currencies on the basis of the parity of each currency in relation to the unit of account.

In these circumstances, the devaluation of the French franc, in other words, its reduction in value in relation to gold and, also, in relation to the value of the unit of account, in the absence of any protective measures, automatically results, in intra-Community trade, in a rise in Community prices in French francs.

That was the very result which could not be allowed because it would not only have destroyed the expected effects of the devaluation of the franc but also seriously disturbed the functioning of the common agricultural market. For that reason the Council resolved, as a matter of conjunc-tural policy, temporarily to ‘insulate’ the French market or, rather, to protect it by providing for a reduction in the intervention prices on the market for two agricultural marketing years. In this way, the increase in prices could be controlled and gradually brought about which would otherwise have occurred suddenly and abruptly. By way of compensation, that measure called for the grant of import subsidies (and correspondingly the levying of compensatory amounts on exports) within the context of trading transactions. Finally, the amount of these subsidies and compensatory charges was to be calculated on the basis of the progressive adjustment of the intervention prices expressed in French francs.

As one of the Commission's representatives explained at the hearing, these were the objectives of the action taken by the Community authorities. In so doing did they act unlawfully?

The first question is whether Regulations Nos 1670/69 and 1505/70 of the Commission, in so far as they fixed, respectively, the amount of the subsidy on imports of common wheat and mesiin at FF 58.49 and at FF 44.43 per metric ton, complied with the provisions of Regulation No 1586/69 of the Council.

There can be no doubt in this connexion that the Council deliberately referred only to the intervention (or purchase) prices to be paid by France as the basis for all compensatory measures commensurate with the objective which I have just recalled. At no time did the Council make any reference to the threshold prices. Nor is this an omission or error, for the Council's intention was to remedy only the effects of the devaluation on common prices; this moreover is made clear by the recitals of the preamble to Regulation No 1586/69 and the specific wording of Article 2 thereof.

The amount of the import subsidies, which were a compensatory measure, had to be fixed by straightforward transposition of the percentage reductions in the intervention prices in France as determined, in turn, at 11.11 % for the 1969/1970 marketing year by Regulation No 1586/69 and at 8.44 % for the following marketing year by Regulation No 1432/70.

The Commission therefore applied these regulations of the Council correctly and lawfully.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to go further and, as the arguments of the applicants urge, to inquire whether, when the Council only referred to the intervention prices and not to the threshold prices, it was infringing a rule which it had previously laid down for itself: in other words, whether the regulation of 11 August 1969 conflicts with the basic regulation, No 120/67 on the common organization of the market in cereals.

I do not think so. That regulation draws a clear distinction between the system which, on the one hand, is to be applied to the intra-Community market, which is the subject of Title I and, on the other hand, the system of trade with third countries, which is the subject of Title II. The system of Community prices depends on the existence of target prices and intervention prices based on the target prices; these prices are fixed by the Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after consultation with the Parliament. The target price applicable in particular to common wheat is the standard price at which the Council hopes business will be transacted inside the Common Market. It is a price to be aimed at.

The intervention price is the price at which the agencies empowered by the Member States (in France, the Office National Interprofessionnel des Céréales) must buy in the cereals offered to them under certain conditions (relating to quantity, quality and geographical location) and are empowered to put on sale cereals bought in this manner either on the intra-Community market or on the world market.

Finally, in Community terminology, the concept of purchase price has no significance other than that of intervention price.

On the other hand, cereals from third countries must be imported into the Community at prices which do not endanger either the internal organization or the objectives of the common policy, and to this end, variable levies are charged on importation into the Community on the basis of a threshold price, the levy for each product being equal to the threshold price less the cif price.

The threshold prices in particular for common wheat are fixed by reference to the target price for those products and must be determined in such a way that the selling price for the imported product on the Dulsberg pilot market is close to the target price, differences in quality being taken into account.

In my opinion, there are three reasons which, in the circumstances of this case, justify the Council's not relying on the threshold price:

1. The object of its action was to avoid a rise in the intervention prices on the French internal market, which would have been the automatic effect of altering the parity of the French franc in relation to the unit of account. Accordingly, action had clearly to be taken in respect of the intervention prices.

2. No provision of the Treaty or superior rule of law placed the Community authorities under an obligation to compensate French traders for the effects of the devaluation of the fanc on trade between France and third countries. Devaluation is an operation which is the subject of a unilateral and sovereign decision by a national government; it was neither for the Council nor the Commission to act as guarantors for French cereal importers or to ‘insure’ them against the risks of the devaluation of the franc, especially when France produces a surplus of cereals and when, even if, as was argued at the hearing, French millers could not abandon certain imports of ‘strong wheat’ from Canada in particular because of the special qualities of this wheat for baking there was, in terms of the proper functioning of the common agricultural market, no reason for ‘subsidizing’ these imports.

3. As we have seen, the measures adopted form part of conjunctural policy, which means that their purpose is to meet an unforeseen situation liable to disturb the functioning of the common market; in my view, therefore, the Council could, in the circumstances, lawfully take such measures even if they departed from the basic rules laid down in Regulation No 120/67 or had the effect of temporarily suspending its application in certain respects. This is, moreover, what the Council was expressing when it stated in the regulation of 11 August 1969 that in the procedure for applying that regulation the Commission might include other exceptions to the rules of the common agricultural policy.

I do not therefore consider that the manner in which the Commission fixed the amount of the subsidies on cereal imports was at all illegal especially as the contested regulations necessarily entailed ‘a choice of economic policies’; in consequence, the Commission had freedom of judgment that is, a margin of discretion, which is by no means synonymous with arbitrary power but which means that the judicial review of this Court is, in such matters, comparatively limited inasmuch as, inevitably, it is essential that the Community authorities should have greater freedom of action.

As this Court held in its judgment of 2 December 1971 (Case 5/71, Aktien-Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v Council):‘The non-contractual liability of the Community presupposes at the very least the unlawful nature of the act alleged to be the cause of the damage’; as this was a legislative measure involving a choice of economic policies, the Community is not liable in view of the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 215 of the Treaty for any damage suffered by individuals as a consequence of that measure unless a sufficiently clear violation of a superior rule of law for the protection of the individual has occurred.

In my view no such rule has, in the present case, been so violated.

Section II

Liability based on infringement of the rule against discrimination

As the Court is aware, the applicants rely, secondly, on the provision contained in Article 40(3) of the Treaty of the European Economic Community under which the common agricultural policy must ‘exclude any discrimination between producers or consumers within the Community’ and which, as regards prices, specifies that ‘Any common price policy shall be based on common criteria and uniform methods of calculation’.

This rule, which must be observed when secondary Community law is drafted, is no other than the expression, peculiar to the common agricultural market, of the general principle of equality of treatment which is one of the foundation-stones of the Treaty.

The applicant companies consider that they have evidence of an infringement of this principle to their detriment in the protective measures which the Council and the Commission were called upon to take in May 1971 as a result of decisions which, according to the applicants, affected the parity of the German and Netherlands currencies. Comparing these decisions to a temporary revaluation of the Deutschmark and the guilder, the applicants take the view that German and Netherlands exporters found themselves, mutatis mutandis, in situation which was absolutely analogous to that previously experienced by French importers, because the effect of the revaluation in Germany and in the Netherlands were compensated for by the payment of export subsidies, in the absence of which the millers of those countries would have been unable to export except at prices increased by the rate of revaluation.

Under Regulation No 974/71 of 12 May 1971, the Commission, endowed with powers similar to those which it exercised in 1969 after the devaluation of the French franc fixed, in its implementing Regulation No 1014/71 of 17 May, the amount of the export subsidies on bases differing according to whether they related to exports to Member States, or, on the other hand, to third countries.

The Compagnie d'Approvisionnement and Grands Moulins de Paris conclude that when, in 1969, the Commission refused to pay French importers and millers compensation which, in the same way, allowed for differences in the import price according to the origin of the product, whether Member State or third country, it authorized, to their detriment, a ‘distortion in competition’ and was, in consequence, in breach of the principle of equality of treatment. Expressed in this way, the argument appears persuasive.

But in reality, the question is more complicated than the applicants pretend and the analogy they claim exists between the situations does not correspond to the facts. At this point I must briefly describe the circumstances in which the Community authorities acted to counteract the effects of the decisions which, in May 1971, affected the German and Netherlands currencies and the currency of the Belgo-Luxembourg Union as well.

Contrary to what was asserted at the hearing, those decisions did not alter the parity of the Deutschmark or of the guilder nor that of the Belgian or Luxembourg franc. These consisted in widening, for a time, the margins of fluctuation of these currencies so as to enable the actual rates of exchange to vary from the official parity to an extent greater than the limits laid down by the International Monetary Fund. The ‘floating’ of these currencies was liable to call in question all the price mechanisms laid down with regard to the common agricultural market not only in trade with third countries but also in intra-Community trade.

For that reason, moreover, in a resolution of 9 May 1971 concerning the monetary situation, the Council declared that ‘although in normal circumstances the system of a floating rate of exchange is inconsistent with the proper working of the Community, [it] agrees that, in certain cases, these countries (the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union) may for a limited period widen the margin by which the rates of exchange of their currencies fluctuate in relation to their present parity’.

The Council added that, in order to avoid recourse to unilateral measures, which would have endangered the very structure of the common agricultural market and to meet any disturbances in trade in agricultural products, it would, without delay, itself take appropriate measures under Article 103 of the Treaty.

That was, therefore, the position. What was involved in France, in 1969, was merely a devaluation, in other words a reduction in the value of the French franc in relation to gold and, consequently, to the unit of account, that is, an alteration in parity which was the subject of a final decision and the consequences of which could immediately be assessed. The measures of conjunctural policy adopted by the Council and by the Commission were intended solely to give French traders time to adapt themselves to the consequences of this alteration in the parity of the currency in intra-Community trade; they were not obliged to compensate in full imports, in particular cereals from third countries, for the inevitable rise in prices as a result of the loss on the transaction owing to the devaluation. It must, moreover, be observed in passing that the Commission had taken care not to apply the contested arrangement to imports made under contracts concluded before 11 August 1969. On the contrary, when it was necessary to avoid the consequences no longer of a revaluation, in other words a specific alteration in the parity of the currencies of Germany, the Netherlands and later the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union, but of a fluctuation in the exchange rates, and consequently a margin, which, moreover, might vary from day to day, between the official parity of those currencies and the rates actually prevailing, it was necessary not only to take action with regard to the intervention prices in order to maintain a reasonable balance in intra-Community trade but also to take action with regard to the cif prices both in respect of exports to third countries by means of the payment of subsidies and in respect of imports from third countries by means of the levying of compensatory amounts.

It was necessary to adopt specific and appropriate measures which corresponded to a situation different from that produced by a variation in the parity and which, accordingly, differed from those which had been adopted with regard to France in 1969.

I find this analysis confirmed both by the statement made by Mr Mansholt before the European Assembly on 22 September 1971 and in the special report, by the Commission to the Council dated 27 September, on the effects on the common agricultural policy of the (monetary) situation at the time.

‘The nature of, on the one hand, a devaluation or revaluation and, on the other, a fluctuation in exchange rates, and their effects at national and international level is’, Mr Mansholt said, ‘Entirely different in the case of farmers and importers and exporters, and the protective measures which these various operations require may vary’.

In fact, when fixed parities are altered but fixed at a particular rate for the future (in other words when the rates are not floating) it is still possible to adopt customs measures and impose surcharges or levies or to grant subsidies to farmers in countries where the national level of prices falls as a result of revaluation or, in the reverse situation, where there has been devaluation, to hold down national prices. On the other hand, as soon as the rates of exchange are floating or new fixed parities are not established and fresh alterations may therefore occur at any moment, there is a serious threat of disturbances to trade. Compensatory amounts which may be introduced for exports and imports reflect the actual rates of exchange of floating currencies only after some delay and if the fluctuation exceeds a certain degree; the result is that traders in agricultural products are at greater risk.

There could be no better illustration of the difference between the economic consequences of devaluation (or revaluation) and of the ‘floating’ of certain currencies. Again, in its report to the Council, the Commission, in assessing the outcome of the measures adopted in May 1971, described as follows the ensuing situation, taking account of the alterations which had been made in the position of the dollar:

Germany applied compensatory a-mounts to exports, especially of cereals, at that time calculated as a general rule on the basis of the provisional revaluation rate of the Deutschmark in relation to the dollar;

The Benelux countries also jointly applied compensatory amounts calculated on the basis of the average of the provisional revaluation rates of the Belgian franc and the guilder in relation to the dollar;

— On the other hand, France did not apply compensatory amounts specifically because the ‘commercial franc’ used for the regulation of its agricultural trade was not floating.

— The Commission concluded that the application of the compensatory measures had avoided the main damaging effects which the decisions on currency fluctuations would certainly have had on the machinery of the organization of the agricultural market. In the absence of these measures a confused competitive situation between the various Member States would have been created.

— The Commission added that, while it is true that the system of compensatory amounts had, as the result of devaluation of the French franc, already been put into operation, the conditions under which that policy was applied were, as the result of the floating of certain currencies,‘appreciably different’.

Moreover, from the time when France itself undertook to apply Regulation No 974/71, compensatory amounts were applied to French imports and exports under the same conditions as already obtained in the case of importers and exporters in the Benelux countries and in Germany. This was the subject of Regulation No 2887/71 of 30 December 1971.

In view of this, therefore, the argument relating to equality of treatment, with the implication that the position of the traders concerned was identical, cannot be relied upon with any advantage in the present case since, as we have seen, the situations were clearly different.

It should be added that, although the principle of non-discrimination constitutes a strict requirement in a case where, under the law governing migrant workers, a citizen of the Community must, on the basis of specific social security legislation, be given exactly the same treatment as a national, in my opinion this principle can only be applied in a manner which is necessarily less strict in the economic field, especially when measures of conjunctural policy are involved. Furthermore, it seems to me that the rule against discrimination, enshrined in Article 40(3) of the Treaty, was designed with a view to the interests of agricultural producers and consumers rather than dealers and processers.

I therefore suggest that this Court should dismiss the arguments which the applicants have based on that provision.

Section III

Liability based on the breach of the principle of equality before the administration

Finally the applicants rely, in the alternative, on ‘breach of the principle of equality before the administration’ which they claim is embodied, as far as they are concerned, in the method of fixing import subsidies which follows from Regulations Nos 1670/69 and 1505/70 of the Commission. They claim that this makes the Community liable even in the absence of any wrongful act. Although this new submission was made only in the applicants' reply, I take the view that it is admissible but consider it unfounded.

It raises two questions :

(a) The first involves acceptance of the concept of equality before the administration as the basis for non-contractual liability in Community law. It should be borne in mind that, in French administrative law, this theory, which is simply a product of case-law and excludes the concept of a wrongful act, comes within the liability of the public authority based on risk. Two ideas lie at the root of this judge-made law: — The first is the position of inequality and inferiority of those administered with regard to the administrative authority which acts in the public interest and, in order to do so, enjoys privileges outside the scope of the ordinary law; — The second is the idea that, when the principle of equality of citizens before the administration was been infringed by a legislative or administrative measure which, in the public interest, imposes abnormally heavy burdens upon them, this should be redressed by the award of damages. Although the second paragraph of Article 215 of the Treaty of Rome makes no reference to that concept it does not necessarily preclude its application under Community law. We need merely bear in mind that the case-law of the Court at present in no way confirms that the Community may, in certain cases, incuraliability quite apart from any wrongful act or omission, and it should be noted that, in the Kampffmeyer case, the Court rejected the arguments of certain applicants who sought to base their action on legal grounds other than that of a wrongful act or omission (Joined Cases 5, 7 and 13 to 24/66, Firma E. Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission of the EEC [1967] ECR 245.)

(b) The second question refers to the conditions under which, if admissible at all, the submission based on the breach of the principle of equality may be effectively relied upon in Community law.

In his opinion in the Plaumann case, Mr Advocate-General Roemer expresses the view that, if a decision of the Commission, by reason of its legal effects, ‘must … be equated with a legislative measure’ or, to express it more generally, with a provision of general application, liability on the part of the Commission can, in the absence of a wrongful act or omission, be contemplated only ‘under very stringent conditions, namely when abnormal specific and direct damage is caused, that is to say, when a special loss, affecting only individuals, is established’. (Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v Commission of the European Economic Community [1963] ECR 121).

This formula coincides exactly with the conditions governing the abnormal and special nature of the damage which the French Conseil d'Etat, on whose case-law the applicants rely, requires before a measure of primary or subordinate legislation which is not illegal can, on the basis of the principle of equality before the administration, make the state liable, namely:

— The damage must be particular to one or more persons ;

— It must be so serious as to exceed the duties imposed on each citizen by the requirements of life in a community.

Furthermore, in the case of a measure of subordinate legislation which has caused the alleged damage, particularly in the economic field, that measure must not have been adopted in the interests of public order.

The damage of which the applicants complain does not fulfil any of these criteria. The system of subsidies on imports of cereals established by the contested regulations affected all French millers and dealers in cereals; as Mr Advocate-General Lagrange rightly observed in the Meroni case (Joined Cases 14, 16, 17, 20, 24, 26, 27/60 and 1/61, Rec. 1961, page 349). Damage affecting a whole branch of industry and trade does not constitute special damage.

I do not consider that, in the present case either, the damage suffered by the applicants was abnormally serious. It consisted of an increase, which was in fact moderate, in the import prices for wheat from third countries, especially Canada; in the absence of the subsidies, which they criticize solely because, in their view, the amount thereof was inadequate, the applicants would normally have had to suffer all the consequences of the devaluation of the French franc.

It is, accordingly, quite clear that the regulations adopted by the Commission, at the request of the Council, were adopted in the interests of ‘the economic public policy’ of the common market.

The alternative argument of the Compagnie d'approvisionnement and Grands Moulins de Paris is therefore no more acceptable than their main argument.

I am therefore of the opinion that :

— The applications of the Compagnie d'Approvisionnement and Grands Moulins de Paris in Joined Cases 9 and 11/71 should be dismissed;

— The applicants should bear the costs.

( 1 ) Translated from the French.