ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
52

According to Article 80/J of that law: ‘1. The asylum application must be lodged in person with the competent authority, and exclusively in the transit zone, unless the asylum applicant: (a) is the subject of a coercive measure, a measure or a penalty restricting his or her personal liberty; (b) is the subject of a detention measure ordered by the competent asylum authority; (c) is staying legally in Hungarian territory and does not seek accommodation in a reception centre. 2. The asylum applicant shall be subject to the asylum procedure from the lodging of his or her application for international protection with the competent authority until notification of the decision adopted at the end of the procedure when it is no longer subject to a remedy. 3. The police shall escort a foreign national staying illegally in Hungarian territory who declares his or her intention to lodge an application for asylum beyond the gate of a facility for maintaining order at the border, as provided for by the Az államhatárról szóló 2007. évi LXXXIX. törvény (Law No LXXXIX of 2007 on State borders). The person concerned may lodge his or her application for asylum in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1. 4. For the duration of the procedure, asylum applicants staying in the transit zone shall not enjoy the rights referred to in Article 5(1)(a) and (c). 5. The competent asylum authority shall designate the transit zone as the asylum applicant’s place of stay until the transfer order under [Regulation No 604/2013] or the decision which is no longer subject to a remedy has become enforceable. The asylum applicant may leave the transit zone through the exit gate. 6. If the asylum applicant is an unaccompanied minor under 14 years of age, the competent asylum authority shall conduct the asylum procedure in accordance with the general rules, after the minor has entered Hungarian territory. That authority shall find him or her temporary accommodation without delay and, simultaneously, request the competent guardianship authority to appoint a guardian to protect and represent the minor. The guardian must be appointed within eight days of receipt of the competent asylum authority’s request. The competent guardianship authority shall notify the name of the designated guardian to the unaccompanied minor and the competent asylum authority without delay.’
26

It was in those circumstances that the Riigikohus (Supreme Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Is Article 15(1) of Directive [2002/58], in conjunction with Articles 7, 8, 11 and 52(1) of the [Charter], to be interpreted as meaning that in criminal proceedings the access of State authorities to data making it possible to establish the source and destination, the date, the time, the duration and the type of the communication, the terminal used and the location of the mobile terminal used, in relation to a telephone or mobile telephone communication of a suspect, constitutes so serious an interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in those articles of the Charter that that access in the area of prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences must be restricted to the fighting of serious crime, regardless of the period to which the retained data to which the State authorities have access relate? (2) Is Article 15(1) of Directive [2002/58], on the basis of the principle of proportionality expressed in the judgment of [2 October 2018, Ministerio Fiscal (C‑207/16, EU:C:2018:788)], paragraphs 55 to 57, to be interpreted as meaning that, if the amount of data mentioned in the first question, to which the State authorities have access, is not large (both in terms of the type of data and in terms of its temporal extent), the associated interference with fundamental rights is justified by the objective of prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences generally, and that the greater the amount of data to which the State authorities have access, the more serious the criminal offences which are intended to be fought by the interference must be? (3) Does the requirement mentioned in the judgment of [21 December 2016, Tele2 (C‑203/15 and C‑698/15, EU:C:2016:970)], second point of the operative part, that the data access of the competent State authorities must be subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative authority mean that Article 15(1) of Directive [2002/58] must be interpreted as meaning that the public prosecutor’s office which directs the pre-trial procedure, with it being obliged by law to act independently and only being bound by the law, and ascertains the circumstances both incriminating and exonerating the accused in the pre-trial procedure, but later represents the public prosecution in the judicial proceedings, may be regarded as an independent administrative authority?’
5.

Actions for failure to fulfil obligations – Judgment of the Court establishing the failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations – Breach of the obligation to comply with the judgment – Pecuniary penalties – Lump sum – Calculation of the amount – Criteria – Duration of the infringement – Assessment at the date of examination of the facts by the Court (Art. 260(2) TFEU) (see paras 55, 56)
Acts of the institutions – Statement of reasons – Obligation – Scope – Decision to freeze funds directed against certain persons and entities suspected of terrorist activities – Minimum requirements

(Art. 296, second para., TFEU; Council Common Position 2001/931, Art. 1(4); C 2011/430/CFSP, 2011/872/CFSP, 2012/333/CFSP, 2012/765/CFSP, 2013/395/CFSP, 2014/72/CFSP and 2014/483/CFSP; Council Regulations No 687/2011, No 1375/2011, No 542/2012, No 1169/2012, No 714/2013, No 125/2014 and No 790/2014)

(see paras 53, 54)
Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted — Plea alleging distortion of the facts — Need to indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted and show the errors of appraisal which led to that distortion

(Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 168(1)(d))

(see paras 69-71)
Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures against Syria – Freezing of funds of persons, entities or bodies associated with the Syrian regime – Rights of the defence – Notification of inculpatory evidence – Subsequent decision maintaining the name of the applicant on the list of persons covered by those measures – No new grounds – Inculpatory evidence identical to the evidence previously admitted in the earlier decision – Infringement of the right to be heard – Absence

(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 41; Council Decisions (CFSP) 2017/917 and (CFSP) 2018/778)

(see paras 43-47)
Appeal – Grounds – Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence – Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted – Ground of appeal alleging distortion of the clear sense of the evidence – Need to indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted and show the errors of appraisal which led to that distortion

(Art. 256(1), second subpara.., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 51, first para., and 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 168(1)(d))

(see paras 45, 46)
7

Article 3 of that directive, entitled ‘Public service obligations and customer protection’, provides in paragraphs 1 to 3: ‘1. Member States shall ensure, on the basis of their institutional organisation and with due regard to the principle of subsidiarity, that, without prejudice to paragraph 2, natural gas undertakings are operated in accordance with the principles of this Directive with a view to achieving a competitive, secure and environmentally sustainable market in natural gas, and shall not discriminate between those undertakings as regards their rights or obligations. 2. Having full regard to the relevant provisions of the [FEU] Treaty, in particular Article [106] thereof, Member States may impose on undertakings operating in the gas sector, in the general economic interest, public service obligations which may relate to security, including security of supply, regularity, quality and price of supplies, and environmental protection, including energy efficiency, energy from renewable sources and climate protection. Such obligations shall be clearly defined, transparent, non-discriminatory, verifiable and shall guarantee equality of access for [EU natural gas undertakings] to national consumers. In relation to security of supply, energy efficiency [and] demand-side management …, Member States may introduce the implementation of long-term planning, taking into account the possibility of third parties seeking access to the system. 3. Member States shall take appropriate measures to protect final customers, and shall, in particular, ensure that there are adequate safeguards to protect vulnerable customers. In this context, each Member State shall define the concept of vulnerable customers which may refer to energy poverty and, inter alia, to the prohibition of disconnection of gas to such customers in critical times. Member States shall ensure that rights and obligations linked to vulnerable customers are applied. … They shall ensure high levels of consumer protection, particularly with respect to transparency regarding contractual terms and conditions, general information and dispute settlement mechanisms. …’
3

Under Article 5 of Directive 2008/95: ‘1. The registered trade mark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive rights therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade: (a) any sign which is identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical with those for which the trade mark is registered; (b) any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade mark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public; the likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association between the sign and the trade mark. 2. Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade any sign which is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, where the latter has a reputation in the Member State and where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark. 3. The following, inter alia, may be prohibited under paragraphs 1 and 2: (a) affixing the sign to the goods or to the packaging thereof; (b) offering the goods, or putting them on the market or stocking them for these purposes under that sign, or offering or supplying services thereunder; (c) importing or exporting the goods under the sign; (d) using the sign on business papers and in advertising. …’
29

In practice, responsibility for organising social and healthcare services in the area covered by the cooperation lies with the Committee for the Guarantee of Fundamental Social Rights of the City of Pori, which is a joint committee consisting of 18 members, 3 of whom are appointed by the Town of Ulvila, 2 by the Municipality of Merikarvia and the 13 others by the City of Pori. In addition, the healthcare services cooperation agreement provides that the municipal assembly of the City of Pori is to approve the Committee’s regulations and determine its field of activity and tasks. That committee is fully responsible for social and healthcare services, the system of services and the necessary budget. The Committee approves contracts to be concluded within its field of activity and sets charges for the services and other benefits concerned in line with general criteria specified by the municipal assembly of the City of Pori. In addition, each year, the City of Pori’s Committee for the Guarantee of Fundamental Social Rights draws up a service plan that specifically determines the content of services, the draft plan having previously been submitted to the contracting municipalities under the healthcare services cooperation agreement for their opinion. Finally, that agreement provides that the financial management of healthcare and social services is to be based on a jointly established budget, financial plan and plan for those services, and also on the monitoring of expenditure and use of those services. Costs are allocated according to use of social and healthcare services, so that each municipality pays for the actual cost of the services used by its own population and the residents for whom it is responsible.
13

Article 8 of that law, entitled ‘Consumer credit’, provides: ‘… (22) The costs of the consumer credit agreement shall be proportionate and shall comply with fair commercial practice. The total cost of the credit to the consumer shall be calculated in accordance with the procedures laid down in the legal provisions governing consumer credit. (23) The following shall be deemed to be requirements incompatible with subparagraph 22: any total costs to the consumer exceeding 0.55% per day of the amount of the credit from the first to the seventh day (inclusive) of use of the credit; 0.25% per day of the amount of the credit from the eighth to the fourteenth day (inclusive) of use of the credit; and 0.2% per day of the amount of the credit from the fifteenth day of use of the credit In agreements under which the credit is repaid following a demand or in which the period for using the credit is more than 30 days, any total costs of the credit to the consumer exceeding 0.25% per day of the amount of the credit shall not be deemed to be compatible requirements under subparagraph 22. The limitations on the total cost of the credit to the consumer shall not apply to consumer credit agreements in which, as a condition of their conclusion, an item is deposited with the creditor as security and under which the consumer’s liability is limited exclusively to the item pledged. …’
23

First, the first paragraph of that provision allows roaming service providers to ‘offer’ and roaming customers to ‘deliberately choose’ a ‘roaming tariff other than one set in accordance with Articles 6a, 6b and 6c … [which] they would have been accorded in the absence of such a choice’. Article 6e(3) of Regulation No 531/2012 thus establishes an ‘opt-out’ system, according to which, in essence, if a customer does not wish to benefit from the RLAH, he or she must expressly demonstrate it. That interpretation is, moreover, confirmed by the last sentence of the first paragraph of that provision, which provides that ‘the roaming provider shall remind those roaming customers of the nature of the roaming advantages which would thereby be lost [if they had to choose a roaming tariff other than that set in accordance with Articles 6a, 6b and 6c of that regulation]’. Moreover, the wording of that provision does not lay down a temporal framework for its application, from which it may be inferred that such a choice of ‘opt-out’ could be made even before the deadline of 15 June 2017. Thus, in order to exercise such a choice before that date and to maintain another tariff after that date, roaming service providers were required to contact the customers concerned before that date to ask them whether they wished to retain their other tariffs, reminding them of ‘the nature of the roaming advantages which would thereby be lost [by making that choice]’. Under that rule, if a customer replied in the negative or did not reply, he or she was automatically subject to the RLAH tariff.
22

It is in those circumstances that the Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas (Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Is Article 2(2) of Directive [2011/64] to be construed as meaning that water-pipe tobacco, such as that under consideration in the present case (that is to say, consisting of tobacco (up to 24%), sugar syrup, glycerine, flavourings and preservative), is to be regarded as “consisting … in part of substances other than tobacco” for the purposes of the application of that provision? (2) Is Article 5(1) of Directive 2011/64, including in those cases in which it is to be read together with Article 2(2) of that directive, to be construed as meaning that, in the case where the tobacco contained in a blend intended for smoking – in this case, water-pipe tobacco (the contested product in the case under examination) – satisfies the criteria listed in Article 5(1) of Directive 2011/64, that entire blend is to be regarded as smoking tobacco, irrespective of the other substances contained therein? (3) If the second question is answered in the negative, is Article 2(2) and/or Article 5(1) of Directive 2011/64/ to be construed as meaning that the entire contested product, such as that in the main proceedings, made by blending fine-cut tobacco with other liquid and normally fine substances (sugar syrup, glycerine, flavourings and preservative), is to be treated as “smoking tobacco” for the purposes of the application of that directive? (4) If the second question is answered in the negative and the first and third questions are answered in the affirmative, are the provisions in heading 2403 of the CN to be construed as meaning that such components of water-pipe tobacco as (1) sugar syrup, (2) flavourings and/or (3) glycerine are not to be treated as “tobacco substitutes”?’
25

In those circumstances, the Amtsgericht Hamburg (Local Court, Hamburg) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Is Article 14(3) of Directive 2011/83 …, with regard to recital 50 thereof, to be interpreted as meaning that the “amount” to be paid by the consumer “which is in proportion to what has been provided until the time the consumer has informed the trader of the exercise of the right of withdrawal, in comparison with the full coverage of the contract” is to be calculated on a purely pro rata temporis basis in the case of a contract according to the content of which an overall service made up of several sub-services, rather than a single service, is to be provided, if the consumer pays for the overall service on a pro rata temporis basis, but the sub-services are provided within different intervals? (2) Is Article 14(3) of Directive 2011/83 to be interpreted as meaning that the “amount” to be paid by the consumer “which is in proportion to what has been provided until the time the consumer has informed the trader of the exercise of the right of withdrawal, in comparison with the full coverage of the contract” is to be calculated on a purely pro rata temporis basis even if a (sub-)service is continuously provided, but has a higher or lower value for the consumer at the beginning of the contract term? (3) Are point 11 of Article 2 of Directive 2011/83 and point 1 of Article 2 of Directive (EU) 2019/770 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 [on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services (OJ 2019 L 136, p. 1)] to be interpreted as meaning that files which are supplied as a sub-service within the scope of an overall service principally provided as a “digital service” within the meaning of point 2 of Article 2 of Directive 2019/770 may also constitute “digital content” within the meaning of Article 2.11 of Directive 2011/83 and point 1 of Article 2 of Directive 2019/770, with the result that the trader could terminate the right of withdrawal under Article 16(m) of Directive 2011/83 with regard to the sub-service, but the consumer, if the trader fails to do so, could withdraw from the contract as a whole and would not have to pay compensation for that sub-service by reason of Article 14(4)(b)(ii) of Directive 2011/83? (4) Is Article 14(3) of Directive 2011/83, with regard to recital 50 thereof, to be interpreted as meaning that the total price contractually agreed for a service within the meaning of the third sentence of Article 14(3) of Directive 2011/83 is “excessive” if it is significantly higher than the total price agreed with another consumer for a service that is identical in terms of content provided by the same trader for the same contract term and, furthermore, under the same framework conditions?’
3

Article 7 of Legea nr. 571 privind Codul fiscal (Law No 571 establishing the Tax Code) of 22 December 2003 (Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I, No 927 of 23 December 2003), in the version applicable to the main proceedings (‘the Tax Code’), provides: ‘For the purposes of this Code, with the exception of Title VI, the terms listed below shall have the following meanings: … 20. “person”: any natural or legal person; 21. “related person”: a person is related to another person where the relationship between them falls within at least one of the following situations: … (c) a legal person is related to another legal person if, at least: (i) the first legal person directly or indirectly holds, including the holdings of related persons, at least 25% of the value or number of the equity securities or voting rights of the other legal person, or controls that other legal person; (ii) the second legal person directly or indirectly holds, including the holdings of related persons, at least 25% of the value or number of the equity securities or voting rights of the first legal person; (iii) a third legal person directly or indirectly holds, including the holdings of related persons, at least 25% of the value or number of the equity securities or voting rights of both the first and second legal person. … 32. “transfer”: any sale, assignment or disposal of an ownership right, the exchange of an ownership right for services or for another ownership right, or the transfer of fiduciary assets in a trust transaction in accordance with the Civil Code.’