6.

The submissions put forward by the applicant in support of the admissibility of its action are unconvincing. Under Article 35 of the ECSC Treaty proceedings may be brought against the Commission in the event of the latter's silence only where the applicant has first raised the matter with the Commission. The Court has emphasized the essential nature of that ‘initial requirement’, referring in particular to ‘the need for notification which, by impugning the inaction of the [Commission], forces it to take a decision within a limited period regarding the legality or otherwise of its inaction’ (Case 17/57 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority [1959] ECR 1 at p. 8). Hence, for the purposes of the Treaty, a communication laying a matter before the Commission must display certain characteristics permitting it to have its full effect, particularly with regard to the period within which the Commission is required to act. In reality ‘the fiction of an implied decision of refusal arising on the expiry of a period of two months’ (Case 59/70 Netherlands v Commission [1971] ECR 639 at p. 652, paragraph 12 of the decision) necessarily presupposes an explicit request on the part of the applicant calling upon the Commission under Article 35 of the ECSC Treaty to act in accordance with certain provisions of primary or secondary legislation. That is to say, the communication formally bringing before the Commission the claims which the person concerned intends, if necessary, to pursue before the Court must state unambiguously the obligations based on primary or secondary legislation with which the Commission is asked to comply and the intention of that person to enforce compliance with those obligations. As Advocate General Roemer put it, ‘according to a correct interpretation the request submitted to the administration must be sufficiently clear to show which measures are expected of the High Authority and will, if necessary, be enforced by bringing legal proceedings’ (Joined Cases 22 and 23/60 Elz v High Authority referred to above, at p. 192). The Court's case-law would appear to confirm that analysis. The formal notice given to the Commission must permit the content of the decision it is called upon to make ‘to be presumed with sufficient accuracy’ (Joined Cases 21 to 26/61 Meroni v High Authority referred to above, at p. 77; see also Joined Cases 24 and 34/58 Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérurgie de l'Est de la France v High Authority [1960] ECR 281, in particular at p. 299), indicate the ‘measures defined specificaly’ which the person making the request wishes it to adopt or ‘give [some] details as to their content’ (Case 75/69 Hake v Commission referred to above, at paragraphs 7 and 8 of the decision). The request must be made in the form of a ‘formal notice intended to encourage the defendant to take a preliminary express or implied decision which may be challenged in proceedings before the Court’; it must therefore contain a ‘formal request or indicate an intention to pursue the matter’ and ‘show sufficiently clearly that it constitutes the beginning of the period for lodging an application’ (Joined Cases 22 and 23/60, Elz v High Authority, referred to above, at p. 188).