ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 311/7

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Sofiyski gradski sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 13 August 2012 — Siegfried János Schneider

(Case C-386/12)

2012/C 311/09

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Sofiyski gradski sad

Party to the main proceedings

Applicant: Siegfried János Schneider

Question referred

Is Article 22(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 (1) of 22 December 2000 applicable only to contentious proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property, or does the provision also apply to non-contentious proceedings in which nationals of a Member State who have been declared by a court of that State, in accordance with its national law, to be lacking full legal capacity and for whom a guardian has been appointed (who is also a national of that Member State), and who seek to dispose of immovable property belonging to them which is situated in another Member State?

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 9/27

Appeal brought on 3 September 2012 by the Council of the European Union against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 14 June 2012 in Case T-338/08 Stichting Natuur en Milieu, Pesticide Action Network Europe v Commission

(Case C-404/12 P)

2013/C 9/45

Language of the case: Dutch

Parties

Appellant: Council of the European Union (represented by: M. Moore and K. Michoel, Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings:

Stichting Natuur en Milieu,

Pesticide Action Network Europe,

European Commission,

Republic of Poland

Form of order sought

The Council claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of 14 June 2012 in Case T-338/08;

— dismiss the action of the applicants at first instance in its entirety;

— order the applicants at first instance jointly and severally to pay the Council’s costs in the present case.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Council takes the view that the judgment of the General Court in the abovementioned case is based on errors of law. Although the Council does not contest the General Court’s finding that that the Commission did not act as legislature in the present case, the Council is none the less of the view that the General Court did not correctly interpret and apply the ‘Nakajima’ (1) and ‘Fediol’ (2) case-law. Consequently, the Council is of the view that the General Court erred in finding that it could review the legality of Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 (3) in the light of the Aarhus Convention (4) on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.

Furthermore, the Council is of the view that the choice made by the legislature in Regulation No 1367/2006 is any event fully consistent with the Aarhus Convention. In this respect, the General Court’s interpretation of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention is incorrect, in so far as the General Court disregards the discretion afforded to the contracting parties.

The Council therefore requests the Court of Justice to set aside the judgment of the General Court in Case T-338/08, and to give final judgment in the matter by dismissing the applicants’ action in its entirety.

(1) Case C-69/89 Nakajima v Council [1991] ECR I-2169.

(2) Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission [1989] ECR 1825.

(3) Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (OJ 2006 L 264, p. 13).

(4) Aarhus Convention of 25 June 1998 on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, approved by Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 (OJ 2005 L 124, p. 1).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 399/9

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Gerechtshof te ’s-Hertogenbosch (Netherlands), lodged on 18 September 2012 — X; Other party: Voorzitter van het managementteam van het onderdeel Belastingdienst/Z van de rijksbelastingdienst

(Case C-426/12)

2012/C 399/15

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Gerechtshof te ’s-Hertogenbosch

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: X

Other party: Voorzitter van het managementteam van het onderdeel Belastingdienst/Z van de rijksbelastingdienst

Questions referred

1. Is there dual use within the meaning of Article 2(4)(b) of Directive 2003/96/EC (1) in the case where coal (products within the CN codes 2701, 2702 and 2704) is used as heating fuel in a lime kiln, while the carbon dioxide generated in that lime kiln from the coal (and limestone) is used for the production of lime-kiln gas, which is subsequently used in, and is indispensable for, the purification of the raw juice obtained from sugar beet?

2. Is there dual use within the meaning of Article 2(4)(b) of Directive 2003/96/EC in the case where coal (products within the CN codes 2701, 2702 and 2704) is used as heating fuel, while 66 % of the carbon dioxide generated during the heating and taken up by the lime-kiln gas is absorbed, during the subsequent purification referred to above, by earth foam, which is sold as lime fertiliser to the agricultural sector?

3. In the event that there is dual use within the meaning of Article 2(4)(b) of Directive 2003/96/EC: having regard to the (literal) text of the opening words of Article 2(4) of Directive 2003/96/EC, is that directive not applicable, with the result that the appellant cannot rely (for the interpretation in national legislation of the concept of dual use as referred to in Article 20(e) Wbm (2)) on the direct effect of that directive?

4. In the event that there is dual use within the meaning of Article 2(4)(b) of Directive 2003/96/EC and the latter is (consequently) inapplicable: in the case of the levying of a tax such as the present fuel tax, does European Union law preclude a more restrictive interpretation of the concept of dual use under domestic law as compared with an interpretation in accordance with Directive 2003/96/EC?

(1) Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (OJ 2003 L 283, p. 51).

(2) Wet belastingen op milieugrondslag (Netherlands Law introducing taxes for the protection of the environment).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 399/13

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof (Germany) lodged on 10 October 2012 — Karin Oertel v Finanzamt Würzburg mit Außenstelle Ochsenfurt

(Case C-455/12)

2012/C 399/22

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesfinanzhof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Karin Oertel

Defendant: Finanzamt Würzburg mit Außenstelle Ochsenfurt

Question referred

Having regard to the principle of neutrality, does the third subparagraph of Article 12(3)(a) in conjunction with Annex H, Category 5, of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 (1) on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes preclude national rules which provide for a reduced rate of turnover tax for local passenger transport by taxi, whereas local passenger transport by minicab is subject to the standard rate of tax?

(1) Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment; OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1.
7.

Only if the answer to Question 5 is in the affirmative and the answers to Questions 6 and 3 are in the negative: In the present case, is no value added tax to be levied on the total turnover of the gaming machines, or is it to be levied only on the part that cannot be passed on, and how is that part to be determined: for example, on the turnover at which the stake per game could not be increased, or on the turnover at which the contents of the cash box per hour could not be increased?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 26/21

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Bundespatentgericht (Germany) lodged on 24 October 2012 — Hogan Lovells International LLP v Bayer CropScience K.K.

(Case C-477/12)

2013/C 26/39

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundespatentgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Hogan Lovells International LLP

Defendant: Bayer CropScience K.K.

Question referred

For the purpose of the application of Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1610/96, (1) must account be taken exclusively of a marketing authorisation under Article 4 of Directive 91/414/EEC or Article 8(1) thereof, or can a certificate also be granted on the basis of a marketing authorisation which has been granted under Article 8(4) thereof?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 1610/96 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 1996 concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for plant protection products (OJ 1996 L 198, p. 30).
1.

Are Articles 6(1), 7(1) and 8 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC (1) on unfair terms in consumer contracts and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in conjunction with Article 38 thereof, to be interpreted as precluding national legislation such as Paragraph 37(1) and (3) of the Exekučný poriadok, which does not allow a consumer protection association to intervene in enforcement proceedings?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 26/26

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Tivoli (Italy) lodged on 7 November 2012 — Elisabetta Gentile v Ufficio Finanziario della Direzione Ufficio Territoriale di Tivoli and Others

(Case C-499/12)

2013/C 26/51

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale di Tivoli

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Elisabetta Gentile

Defendants: Ufficio Finanziario della Direzione Ufficio Territoriale di Tivoli, Fabrizio Penna, Gianfranco Di Nicola

Question referred

Does Article 130 of Presidential Decree No 115 of 30 May 2002 on legal aid in Italian law — insofar as it stipulates that amounts payable to the defending council, the auxiliary to the judge and the court legal assessor are to be reduced by half — comply with Article 47(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which stipulates that legal aid is to be made available to those who lack sufficient resources insofar as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice?
2.

If the first question must be answered in the affirmative, how should Article 3(c) of the Regulation be interpreted in the situation where there is one basic patent in force which protects several products, and where, at the date of the application for a certificate in respect of one of the products (A) protected by the basic patent, no certificates had in fact yet been granted in respect of other products (B, C) protected by the same basic patent, but where certificates were nevertheless granted in respect of those applications in respect of the products (B, C) before a decision was made with regard to the application for a certificate in respect of the first-mentioned product (A)?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 32/5

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per la Puglia (Italy) lodged on 19 November 2012 — Dirextra Alta Formazione Srl v Regione Puglia

(Case C-523/12)

2013/C 32/07

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per la Puglia

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Dirextra Alta Formazione Srl

Defendant: Regione Puglia

Question referred

Is a provision of law — such as Article 2(3) of Puglia Regional Law No 12/2009, in force at regional level — which regulates in a restrictive manner access to the market for the provision of certain specific services designed to enhance the level of education locally (post-graduate Masters degree courses), making such access conditional upon meeting a single requirement which, in relation to the purpose of the Community measure (enhancement of the quality of education and, accordingly, selection of individuals with suitable qualifications) is arbitrarily chosen and expressed (a number of hours spread over an unnecessarily long period) and not differentiated according to the actual duration of the specific service, compatible with Article 56 et seq. and Article 101 et seq. (formerly Article 49 et seq. and Article 81 et seq. of the EC Treaty) and Article 107 et seq. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (in the version in force from 1 December 2009) and with the principles of competition, proportionality, non-discrimination and equal treatment which may be inferred from those rules, and with Articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 2 of the Additional Protocol thereto and Articles 11 and 14 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 46/13

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hof van Beroep te Gent (Belgium) lodged on 9 November 2012 — Bloomsbury NV v Belgische Staat

(Case C-510/12)

2013/C 46/23

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hof van Beroep te Gent

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Bloomsbury NV

Defendant: Belgische Staat

Question referred

Should Article 2.3-4-5 of the Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, (1) be interpreted as meaning that, in a case where a company acquires an important asset free of charge and there is therefore no purchase value which it can enter in the accounts, with the result that a misleading impression is created of the company’s assets, liabilities, financial position and profit or loss, the important asset in question acquired free of charge should nevertheless be entered in the accounts at its true value?

(1) OJ 1978 L 222, p. 11.
1.

Is the authorisation provided by Article 1(2) of Legislative Decree No 212 of 24 April 2001, within the meaning conferred on it by the national case-law, compatible with the rules in Directive 2001/18/EC (1) or does it conflict with those rules?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 38/11

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 22 November 2012 — Andrea Lange v ERGO Lebensversicherung AG

(Case C-529/12)

2013/C 38/13

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Hamburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Andrea Lange

Defendant: ERGO Lebensversicherung AG

Question referred

Must the first indent of Article 15(1) of Council Directive 90/619/EEC of 8 November 1990 (1), having regard to Article 31(1) of Council Directive 92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 (2), be interpreted as precluding a provision — such as the fourth sentence of Paragraph 5a(2) of the Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (Law on insurance contracts) in the version of the Drittes Gesetz zur Durchführung versicherungsrechtlicher Richtlinien des Rates der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Third Law implementing directives of the Council of the European Communities on insurance law) of 21 July 1994 — under which a right of cancellation lapses one year at the latest after payment of the first premium even if the policy-holder has not been informed about the right of cancellation?

(1) Council Directive 90/619/EEC of 8 November 1990 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance, laying down provisions to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide services and amending Directive 79/267/EEC (OJ 1990 L 330, p. 50)

(2) Council Directive 92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance and amending Directives 79/267/EEC and 90/619/EEC (Third Life Assurance Directive) (OJ 1992 L 360, p. 1)
2.

Do the general principle of the effectiveness of Community law and Articles 22 and 23 of Directive 2008/48/EC preclude the creditor’s being able to establish proof of fulfilment of its pre-contractual and contractual obligations solely by means of the standard terms in credit agreements whereby the consumer acknowledges that those obligations have been fulfilled, without producing before the court the documents issued by the creditor and supplied to the borrower?
1.

the compatibility of Article 7 of the Code of Administrative Procedure in force in the Italian Republic, which, pursuant to Article 103 of the Italian Constitution, provides that ‘[t]he administrative courts shall have jurisdiction to hear disputes concerning issues of legitimate interests and, in the specific areas laid down by law, disputes involving individual rights, relating to the exercise of or failure to exercise administrative powers in relation to measures, acts, agreements or conduct involving the exercise of those powers, including indirectly, on the part of public authorities. Acts or measures adopted by the Government in the exercise of political power may not be challenged before the courts’, with Article 6 of the [European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms] and Articles 47 and 52(3) of the [Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union], as incorporated following the amendment of Article 6 [TEU]: (a) in so far as it allocates to different judicial bodies the power to rule on individual legal situations which are distinguished in abstracto (legitimate interests and individual rights) but the positive identification of which is in fact difficult or indeed impossible in the absence of provisions specifying their actual content; (b) in so far as it provides that the courts have jurisdiction to rule on the same matters on the basis of criteria (the identification of different individual legal situations) which no longer reflect factual reality after the introduction of the possibility of bringing an action for compensation in respect of legitimate interests (for which provision is now made as of the year 2000 in order to bring domestic legislation in line with Community principles), with significant differences, including with regard to the procedural rules for bringing actions; as well as, in general,
1.

To what extent is a taxable person, in relation to two transactions concerning the same goods, entitled both (i) to invoke the direct effect of one provision of EC Council Directive 77/388 (1) (‘the Sixth VAT Directive’) in respect of one transaction and (ii) to rely on the provisions of national law in relation to the other transaction, when to do so would produce an overall fiscal result in relation to the two transactions which neither national law nor the Sixth VAT Directive applied separately to those two transactions produces or is intended to produce?
Third, more than three years and five months passed between the closure of the written procedure and the General Court’s decision to open the oral procedure. This delay infringed the Appellants’ right under Article 47 of the Charter to an effective remedy and hearing within a reasonable time. It exceeds what this Court has considered unreasonable in the past, and cannot be explained by any factors such as complexity or the volume of evidence before the General Court. On the contrary, this was a straightforward case with Guardian the only company to lodge an application to annul the Decision. The evidentiary record was limited to a handful of short documents and statements, all in the language of the procedure. Guardian did all it could to simplify and speed up the General Court’s handling of its appeal, including by foregoing a second round of written pleadings despite the importance of its appeal and — given the infringement’s extremely short duration — the unprecedented fine imposed by the Commission.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 86/9

Reference for a preliminary ruling from Supreme Court (Ireland) made on 27 December 2012 — HN v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Ireland and the Attorney General

(Case C-604/12)

2013/C 86/14

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Supreme Court

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: HN

Defendants: Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Ireland and the Attorney General

Question referred

Does Council Directive 2004/83/EC (1), interpreted in the light of the principle of good administration in the law of the European Union and, in particular, as provided by Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, permit a Member State, to provide in its law that an application for subsidiary protection status can be considered only if the applicant has applied for and been refused refugee status in accordance with national law?

(1) Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted

OJ L 304, p. 2
—

declare that, by failing to adopt all the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Article 2(1), (22), (32) and (33), Article 3(7), (8) and (13), Article 6(1) and (3), Article 9 as well as Articles 13 to 14 and Articles 17 to 23, Articles 10 and 11, Article 16(1) and (2), Article 26(2)(b), (c) and (d), third and fourth sentences, Article 29, Article 38(1) to (4), Article 39(1) to (4) and Article 40(1) to (3) and (5) to (7) of, and points 1 and 2 of Annex I to, Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, (1) and in any event by not notifying the Commission of such provisions, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 49(1) of that directive;
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 225/53

Appeal brought on 29 November 2012 by Alexandru Octavian Concal against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 25 September 2012 in Case T-320/12: Concal v Commission

(Case C-570/12 P)

2013/C 225/98

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Alexandru Octavian Concal (represented by: R. Neagu, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 27 June 2013 the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
1.

Can Article 30 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that that provision is intended to guarantee the possibility of a legal remedy only for unlawful and unjustified dismissal?
4.

Is Article 181a(2) of Regulation No 2454/93 to be interpreted, under the circumstances of the main proceedings and having regard to the principle of legality, to the effect that, if the procedure laid down in that provision in relation to the right to be heard and the right to raise objections was not observed, the decision of the customs authority adopted in contravention of those rules is null and void on account of a material procedural defect which is comparable to an infringement of an essential procedural requirement, non-compliance with which results in the nullity of the act irrespective of the actual consequences of the infringement, with the result that the court is required to rule on an action brought against that act, without being able to consider referring the case back to the administrative authority for the proper termination of the procedure?