ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats’s-Hertogenbosch (Netherlands) lodged on 16 December 2019 — LH v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid

(Case C-921/19)

(2020/C 103/15)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats’s-Hertogenbosch

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: LH

Defendant: Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid

Questions referred

1. Is the determination by a determining authority of a Member State that original documents can never constitute new elements or findings if the authenticity of those documents cannot be established compatible with Article 40(2) of the Procedures Directive, (1) read in conjunction with Article 4(2) of the Qualification Directive (2) and Articles 47 and 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union? If not, does it make any difference if, in a subsequent application, copies of documents or documents originating from a non-objectively verifiable source are submitted by the applicant?

2. Must Article 40 of the Procedures Directive, read in conjunction with Article 4(2) of the Qualification Directive, be interpreted as allowing the determining authority of a Member State, when assessing documents and assigning probative value to documents, to distinguish between documents submitted in an initial application and those submitted in a subsequent application? Is it permissible for a Member State, when submitting documents in a subsequent application, no longer to comply with the obligation to cooperate if the authenticity of those documents cannot be established?

(1) Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (the Procedures Directive) (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60).

(2) Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (the Qualification Directive) (OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9).
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Općinski sud u Osijeku (Croatia) lodged on 4 December 2019 — S.B. v Klinički bolnički centar Osijek

(Case C-889/19)

(2020/C 103/14)

Language of the case: Croatian

Referring court

Općinski sud u Osijeku

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: S.B.

Defendant: Klinički bolnički centar Osijek

By order of the Court of 6 December 2019, Case C-889/19 is removed from the register of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 22 July 2019 by Hochmann Marketing GmbH against the order of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 22 May 2019 in Case T-754/18, Hochmann Marketing GmbH v European Parliament

(Case C-557/19 P)

(2020/C 201/02)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Hochmann Marketing GmbH (represented by: J Jennings, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament

By order of 30 April 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Seventh Chamber) dismissed the appeal as being manifestly unfounded and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 18 November 2019 — Autostrada Torino Ivrea Valle d’Aosta — Ativa SpA v Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti, Ministero dell’Economia and delle Finanze, Autorità di bacino del Po

(Case C-835/19)

(2020/C 161/22)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Autostrada Torino Ivrea Valle d’Aosta — Ativa SpA

Defendants: Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti, Ministero dell’Economia and delle Finanze, Autorità di bacino del Po

Question referred

With regard to the award of concessions, does [EU] law, in particular the principles laid down in Directive [2014/23], (1) specifically freedom of choice as regards award procedures in accordance with the principles of transparency and [equal] treatment, as referred to in recital 68 and Article 30 of the directive, preclude the application of the provisions laid down in Article 178(8-bis) of Legislative Decree No 50 of 18 April 2016, which unconditionally prohibit the award by administrative authorities of motorway concessions in respect of concessions that have expired or are due to expire, using the procedures laid down in Article 183 [of the decree], which governs project financing?

(1) Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 1).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 6 June 2019 by Abaco Energy SA and Others against the order of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 25 March 2019 in Case T-186/18, Abaco Energy and Others v Commission

(Case C-436/19 P)

(2020/C 297/26)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Abaco Energy SA and Others (represented by: P. Holtrop, abogado)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 21 July 2020, the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) held that the appeal is dismissed as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded and that the appellants shall bear their own costs.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 24 November 2019 by Nathaniel Magnan against the order of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 25 September 2019 in Case T-99/19 Nathaniel Magnan v Commission

(Case C-860/19 P)

(2020/C 209/03)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Nathaniel Magnan (represented by: J. Fayolle, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 26 March 2020, the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) dismissed the appeal.
Action brought on 4 February 2020 — European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany

(Case C-57/20)

(2020/C 87/23)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: R. Pethke and J. Jokubauskaitė, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Federal Republic of Germany

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by applying the flat-rate scheme to all farmers as a rule regardless of whether the application of the normal VAT arrangements or the special scheme for small enterprises would give rise to difficulties for them, and by applying a flat-rate compensation tax rate which leads to a structural over-compensation of the input tax paid, the Federal Republic of Germany has infringed its obligations under Articles 296(1) and 299 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax; (1)

— order the Federal Republic of Germany to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First plea in law — Infringement of Article 296(1) of Directive 2006/112/EC

By its first plea in law, the Commission claims that, by applying the flat-rate scheme to all farmers regardless of any difficulties encountered by them in applying the normal VAT arrangements or the special scheme for small enterprises, the Federal Republic of Germany infringed Article 296(1) of Directive 2006/112.

According to Article 296 of Directive 2006/112, farmers who could benefit from the flat-rate scheme must be selected appropriately. Accordingly, as an eligibility criterion, eligible farmers would have to encounter difficulties in applying the normal VAT arrangements or the special scheme under Chapter 1. The Federal Republic of Germany failed to select eligible farmers on the basis of that eligibility criterion.

By its second plea in law, the Commission claims that the Federal Republic of Germany infringed Article 299 of Directive 2006/112 in that the flat-rate compensation tax rate applied by it results in a structural over-compensation of the input tax actually paid by flat-rate farmers.

In the calculation, the agricultural services provided by commercial contractors are deducted from the turnover of the whole agricultural sector, on the one hand, whilst only the input tax burden on farmers subject to the normal VAT arrangements, and not the input tax burden on commercial contractors, is deducted from the input tax burden on the whole agricultural sector, on the other. This leads to a structural over-compensation due to the reimbursement at a flat rate of the flat-rate farmers’ input tax.

(1) OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.
1.

The second subparagraph of Article 6(1) of Directive 2013/32/EU (1) provides for the situation where applications for international protection are made before other authorities that are not competent to register them under national law, in which event Member States are to ensure that the registration takes place no later than six working days after the application is made. Is the foregoing to be interpreted as meaning that examining magistrates who are competent to adjudicate on the detention or otherwise of foreign nationals under Spanish national law are to be regarded as one of those ‘other authorities’, which are not competent to register an application for international protection but before which applicants may nonetheless indicate their intention to make such an application?
2(b)

Must Article 30(9) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU, in so far as it makes the limiting of access to information concerning beneficial owners conditional upon a ‘risk’, be interpreted as limiting the assessment of the existence and extent of that risk solely to the relationship which the beneficial owner has with the legal entity with regard to which he seeks specifically to have access limited in respect of information concerning his status as beneficial owner or as involving taking into account the relationship which the beneficial owner concerned has with other legal entities? If it is necessary to take into account relationships with other legal entities, is it necessary to take into account only the status as beneficial owner in relation to other legal entities or is it necessary to take into account any relationship whatsoever with other legal entities? If it is necessary to take into account any relationship whatsoever with other legal entities, is the assessment of the existence and extent of the risk affected by the nature of that relationship?
2.

Would the principle of direct effect in EU law be undermined if the national court refused to grant relief in this case due to the entry into force of Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2019/6 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 (the application of which is deferred until 28 January 2022), in spite of the fact that the national court decided that national law has failed to give effect to the duty in Articles 61(1), 58(4) and 59(3) of Directive 2001/82/EC (2), that duty being that the packaging and labelling of veterinary products must be in the official languages of the Member State, that is to say, in Irish as well as English, in Ireland?
1.

(a) In the case where a mobile communications tariff including a monthly data allowance and providing for reduced transmission speed once that data volume has been used can be extended by a free option which allows certain services provided by content partners of the telecommunications company to be used without offsetting the data volume used for those services against the monthly data allowance included in the mobile communications tariff, and the end-user agrees to limitation of the bandwidth to a maximum of 1,7 Mbit/s for video-streaming, irrespective of whether the video-streaming service is provided by content partners or other providers, is Article 3(2) of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 (1) to be understood as meaning that agreements on the characteristics of internet access services within the meaning of Article 3(2) of that regulation must fulfil the requirements of Article 3(3) thereof? (b) If the answer to Question 1.(a) is in the affirmative: Is Article 3(3), third subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 to be understood as meaning that, in a situation such as that at issue in the present case, bandwidth limitation qualifies as the slowing down of one category of service? (c) If the answer to Question 1.(b) is in the affirmative: Is the term ‘impending network congestion’ within the meaning of Article 3(3), third subparagraph, point c), of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 to be understood as meaning that it covers only (impending) exceptional or temporary network congestion? (d) If the answer to Question 1.(b) is in the affirmative: Is Article 3(3), third subparagraph, point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 to be understood as meaning that, in a situation such as that at issue in these proceedings, the need for equal treatment of equivalent categories of traffic precludes bandwidth limitation that applies in the case of one optional add-on only, but not in the case of other mobile communication tariffs, and applies, moreover, to video-streaming alone? [Or. 3] (e) If the answer to Question 1.(b) is in the affirmative: Is Article 3(3), third subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 to be understood as meaning that, in a situation such as that at issue in these proceedings, bandwidth limitation that depends on the addition of the optional add-on and that the end-user can, moreover, deactivate at any time for up to 24 hours fulfils the requirement that one category of service may be slowed down only for as long as is necessary to achieve the objectives of Article 3(3), third subparagraph, points (a) to (c), of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120?
—

investment firms must maintain (and keep up to date) a separate single register (in the form of a database) recording the suitability and appropriateness assessments undertaken for each client with the content provided for in Article 25(2) and (3) of Directive 2014/65/EU and Article [56] of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 of 25 April 2016? Or does it suffice that the abovementioned data are in the possession of the investment firm and are attached to the record [in the Bulgarian version: ‘file/dossier’] for each client in accordance with Article 25(5) of Directive 2014/65/EU and that that information is stored in a way accessible for future reference by the competent authority and in such a form and manner that the conditions of Article 72(1) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 are met?
1.

Is Article 10(2)(l) of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the credit agreement (a) must specify the interest rate applicable in the case of late payments as applicable at the time of the conclusion of the credit agreement as an absolute number or, at the very least, the current reference interest rate (in this case the base rate in accordance with Paragraph 247 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code)), from which the interest rate applicable in the case of late payments is obtained by adding a premium (in this case of five percentage points in accordance with Paragraph 288(1), second sentence, of the BGB), as an absolute number; and (b) must explain the specific arrangements for adjustment of the interest rate applicable in the case of late payments or, at the very least, must reference the national standards from which such arrangements follow (Paragraph 247 and Paragraph 288(1), second sentence, of the BGB)?
2.

(If the answer to the first question is no:) Is Article 31(2) in conjunction with Article 31(4) of the Montreal Convention to be interpreted as meaning that damage to checked baggage which occurred on board the aircraft or during a period within which the checked baggage was in the charge of the carrier must, in the case of a delayed delivery, be notified to the carrier within 21 days from the date on which the baggage was placed at the disposal of the person entitled to delivery, and that, otherwise, no action is to lie against the carrier save in the case of fraud on its part?
2.

Must Article 6(1), in conjunction with Article 3(1), the second sentence of Article 3(2) and Article 2 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts … be interpreted as permitting a national court to find that only certain elements of a contract term relating to the exchange rate fixed by the bank for the currency to which the loan extended to the consumer is indexed (such as in the main proceedings) are unfair, namely, by eliminating the provision allowing the bank’s margin, which is a component of the exchange rate, to be determined unilaterally and in an unclear manner, where leaving an unambiguous provision referring to the average exchange rate announced by the central bank (the Narodowy Bank Polski — National Bank of Poland), which does not require the eliminated term to be replaced with any legal provision, […] will result in real balance between the consumer and the trader being restored, although it will change the essence of the provision concerning the performance by the consumer of his obligation in a manner that is advantageous to him?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Amsterdam (Netherlands) lodged on 4 March 2020 — VG v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken

(Case C-121/20)

(2020/C 209/15)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Amsterdam

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: VG

Defendant: Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken

Question referred

Is the answer to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling in the cases before the Court registered under numbers C-225/19 and C-226/19 different if it has been made known or has become known which country it is that objected to the issuing of a visa to the applicant during the prior consultation as referred to in Article 22 of the Visa Code? (1)

(1) Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (OJ 2009 L 243, p. 1).
1.

Does Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 (1) preclude a provision of national law (such as Article 40 of Law No 88/2009) being interpreted as allowing accreditation to be carried out by bodies not established in a Member State of the European Union — and therefore without the party concerned being required to apply to the single accreditation body — where such bodies in any event ensure that standards UNI CEI EN ISO/IEC 17025 and UNI CEI EN ISO/IEC 17011 are complied with and demonstrate (by means of mutual recognition agreements, for example) possession of a qualification which is essentially the same as that of the single bodies referred to in Regulation (EC) No 765/2008?
1.

Must recital 25 of Council Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 (1) of 7 October 2010 on administrative cooperation and combating fraud in the field of value added tax, which states that ‘the time limits laid down in this Regulation for the provision of information are to be understood as maximum periods not to be exceeded’, be interpreted as meaning that those time limits cannot be exceeded and that exceeding them results in the suspension of a tax audit being unlawful?
(a)

Is opposition by the trade mark proprietor as referred to in Article 13(2) of the CTM Regulation to the further commercialisation of goods repaired by third parties excluded if the trade mark is used in such a way that it does not give the impression that there is a commercial connection between the trade mark proprietor (or his licensees) and the party who further commercialises the goods, for example if, by the removal of the brand and/or by the additional labelling of the goods, it is clear after the repair that the repair has not been carried out by or with the consent of the trade mark proprietor or a licensee of the latter?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 20 January 2020 by Rezon OOD against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 20 November 2019 in Case T-101/19, Rezon v EUIPO (imot.bg)

(Case C-26/20 P)

(2020/C 255/11)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Parties

Appellant: Rezon EOOD (represented by: M. Yordanova-Harizanova, advokat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

By order of 21 April 2020, the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) declared the present appeal manifestly inadmissible.
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Linz (Austria) lodged on 9 March 2020 — ZK, AL v Deutsche Lufthansa AG

(Case C-131/20)

(2020/C 247/09)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landesgericht Linz

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: ZK, AL

Defendant: Deutsche Lufthansa AG

The case was removed from the Register of the Court of Justice by order of the Court dated 14 May 2020.
1.

Is Article 8 of Directive 93/13/ΕEC, (1) which provides that the Member States may adopt more stringent provisions to ensure a greater degree of protection for the consumer, to be interpreted as meaning that a Member State need not transpose Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13/ΕEC into national law and may allow judicial review also of terms which reflect statutory or regulatory provisions of mandatory or non-mandatory law?
Appeal brought on 22 May 2020 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 12 March 2020 in Case T-732/16, Valencia Club de Fútbol v European Commission

(Case C-211/20 P)

(2020/C 262/20)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: European Commission

Other parties to the proceedings: Valencia Club de Fútbol, S.A.D. and Kingdom of Spain

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal in so far as, in that judgment, the General Court annuls Commission Decision (EU) 2017/365 of 4 July 2016 on the State aid SA.36387 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) (ex 2013/CP) implemented by Spain for Valencia Club de Fútbol Sociedad Anónima Deportiva, Hércules Club de Fútbol Sociedad Anónima Deportiva and Elche Club de Fútbol Sociedad Anónima Deportiva (OJ 2017 L 55, p. 12) in respect of Measure 1, consisting in the State guarantee provided by the IVF on 5 November 2009 to cover the bank loan to Fundación Valencia for the subscription of shares in Valencia CF, in the context of the operation to increase the capital of Valencia CF;

— refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union; and

— reserve the decision on costs.

Sole ground of appeal:

The Commission bases its appeal on a single ground of appeal, alleging that the General Court erred in law by incorrectly interpreting Article 107(1) of the Treaty, in particular with regard to demonstrating the existence of an advantage. More specifically, in paragraphs 124 to 138 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court (i) misinterpreted the Commission Notice on the application of Articles [107 TFEU] and [108 TFEU] to State aid in the form of guarantees (OJ 2008 C 155, p. 10) in connection with the Communication from the Commission on the revision of the method for setting the reference and discount rates (OJ 2008 C 14, p. 6) and misinterpreted the decision at issue; (ii) erred in law as regards the standard of the burden of proof concerning the existence of an advantage arising from an individual guarantee and as regards the Commission’s obligation of due diligence in a formal investigation procedure; and (iii) distorted the facts.