ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Order of the Court of First Instance (First Chamber) of 29 April 1999. - Unione provinciale degli agricoltori di Firenze, Unione pratese degli agricoltori, Consorzio produttori dell'olio tipico di oliva della provincia di Firenze, Francesco Miari Fulcis, Bonaccorso Gondi, Simone Giannozzi and Antonio Morino v Commission of the European Communities. - Action for annulment - Regulation (EC) No 644/98 - Registration of a geographical indication - "Tuscan" olive oil - Interest in bringing proceedings - Inadmissible. - Case T-78/98.



European Court reports 1999 Page II-01377



Summary



Keywords

Actions for annulment - Interest in bringing proceedings - Regulation registering a name as a protected geographical indication pursuant to Regulation No 2081/92 - Action brought by producers using a name other than that registered and by associations representing the interests of those producers - Inadmissible

(EC Treaty, Art. 173, fourth para.; Council Regulation No 2081/92, Art. 13; Commission Regulation No 644/98)

Summary

The admissibility of an action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person is dependent upon the condition that the person concerned demonstrate a legal interest in bringing proceedings. In particular, he must be able to demonstrate a personal interest in the annulment of the contested decision.

Consequently, an action is inadmissible which is brought by olive oil producers for annulment of Regulation No 644/98 in so far as that measure registers the name `Toscano' as a protected geographical indication, where those producers use other names for the marketing of their products. In that connection it is irrelevant that those names are defined as `geographical sub-areas' or `variants' in the product specification drawn up for the purposes of registering the name `Toscano', since they are not registered names within the meaning of Article 13 of Regulation No 2081/92 and no Community protection whatever is conferred on them under that regulation. Since, therefore, the commercial use of those names by olive-oil producers like the applicants is not affected by Regulation No 644/98, and their right to submit an application for registration of the names in question as designations of origin or geographical indications remains unimpaired, the maintenance in force of Regulation No 644/98 can in no way affect their interests.

An action for annulment of Regulation No 644/98 is also inadmissible where brought by associations which rely solely on the fact that they represent the interests of olive oil producers using the names at issue, and do not refer to individual producers other than the applicants, whose action for annulment of that regulation is inadmissible. Unless there are special circumstances such as the role played in the procedure leading to adoption of the act at issue, an action for annulment brought by such an association is inadmissible if it could not have been brought by the association's members individually.
61998B0044(02)

Order of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) of 29 September 1999. - Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v Commission of the European Communities. - Association regime for overseas countries and territories - Decisions 91/482/EEC and 97/803/EC - Regulation (EC) No 2553/97 - Proceedings for interim measures - Extension of interim measures. - Case T-44/98 R II.



European Court reports 1999 Page II-02815
Keywords



Keywords

1 Applications for interim measures - Suspension of operation of a measure - Interim relief - Conditions for granting - Prima facie case - Urgency - Cumulative requirements

(EC Treaty, Arts 185 and 186 (now Arts 242 EC and 243 EC); Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2))

2 Applications for interim relief - Suspension of operation of a measure - Suspension of operation of the obligation to lodge a bank guarantee as a condition for postponing the immediate recovery of a fine - Conditions for granting - Exceptional circumstances

(EC Treaty, Arts 185 and 186 (now Arts 242 EC and 243 EC); Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2))
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

Actions for annulment - Time-limits - Time-barred

(EC Treaty, Art. 173, fifth para. (now, after amendment, Art. 230, fifth para., EC)

Summary

$$The time-limit for bringing proceedings provided for in the fifth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 230, fifth paragraph, EC) is designed to ensure not only that the applicant has a reasonable amount of time in which to assess whether there exist grounds for contesting a measure and, if so, to prepare his application, but also that a measure cannot be the subject of an application for annulment after a certain time has elapsed. Only by means of the strict application of the time-limit thus prescribed is it possible to fulfil the requirements of legal certainty and the need to avoid any discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice.
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

Actions for annulment - Natural or legal persons - Measures of direct and individual concern to them - Supplement to regulation on organic production of agricultural products and indications referring thereto on agricultural products and foodstuffs - Action brought by associations of economic operators and by a company in the sector affected - Inadmissible

(Arts 230, fourth para., EC and 249 EC; Council Regulation (EC) No 1804/1999 supplementing Regulation No. 2092/91, Art. 1(7))

Summary

$$An action brought by associations of economic operators and by a company in the sector affected, seeking the annulment of Article 1(7) of Regulation No 1804/1999 supplementing Regulation No 2092/91 on organic production of agricultural products and indications referring thereto on agricultural products and foodstuffs to include livestock production, is inadmissible.

Regulation No 1804/1999, which contains rules of general scope which apply to all the traders concerned, is therefore of a legislative nature and does not constitute a decision within the meaning of Article 249 EC. Article 1(7) of that regulation, which contains a temporary derogation to the principle that only products obtained in accordance with the rules laid down in Regulation No 2092/91 may bear indications referring to an organic method of production, applies to objectively determined situations and involves legal consequences for a category of trade mark holders viewed in a general and abstract manner. The temporary derogation at issue must therefore be regarded as forming an integral part of the provisions as a whole in which it is contained and is of the same general nature as those provisions.

Moreover, the applicants cannot be considered to be individually concerned by the contested provision, which is of general application, since they are not affected by it by reasons of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons.

( see paras 34-35, 37-38, 45 )
Order of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) of 1 June 1999. - Karl L. Meyer v Council of the European Union. - Manifest inadmissibility. - Case T-74/99.



European Court reports 1999 Page II-01749



Summary



Keywords

Actions for annulment - Time-limits - Time-barred

(EC Treaty, Art. 173, fifth para. (now, after amendment, Art. 230, fifth para., EC)

Summary

$$The time-limit for bringing proceedings provided for in the fifth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 230, fifth paragraph, EC) is designed to ensure not only that the applicant has a reasonable amount of time in which to assess whether there exist grounds for contesting a measure and, if so, to prepare his application, but also that a measure cannot be the subject of an application for annulment after a certain time has elapsed. Only by means of the strict application of the time-limit thus prescribed is it possible to fulfil the requirements of legal certainty and the need to avoid any discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice.
The limitation period for actions against the Community concerning non-contractual liability, laid down by Article 43 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, cannot begin to run before all the requirements governing the obligation to make good the damage are satisfied and, in particular, in cases where liability stems from a legislative measure, before the injurious effects of the measure have been produced, it being the case that those conditions consist of the existence of unlawful conduct on the part of the Community institutions, the existence of the damage alleged and the existence of a causal link between that conduct and the loss claimed.

Damage suffered by a milk producer as a result of being unable to use a reference quantity arises on the date when, following the expiry of his non-marketing undertaking signed pursuant to Regulation No 1078/77, the producer concerned would have been able to resume milk deliveries, without having to pay the additional levy, if he had not been refused a reference quantity under Regulation No 857/84. Therefore it is on that date that the requirements for an action for damages against the Community are satisfied. The damage was not caused instantaneously but recurred on a daily basis. The time bar under Article 43 of the Statute of the Court of Justice applies to the period preceding by more than five years the date of the event which interrupted the limitation period and does not affect rights which arose during subsequent periods.

(see paras 40-41, 44-45)
61999B0178

Order of the Court of First Instance (First Chamber) of 6 December 1999. - Sonia Marion Elder and Robert Dale Elder v Commission of the European Communities. - Transparency - Decision 94/90/ECSC, EC, Euratom, on public access to Commission documents - Advisory Committee on Value Added Tax - Decision refusing access to documents - Withdrawal of contested measure - No need to adjudicate. - Case T-178/99.



European Court reports 1999 Page II-03509
Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 20 July 1999. - Ventouris Group Enterprises SA v Commission of the European Communities. - Competition - Payment of the fine - Bank guarantee - Procedure for interim measures - Suspension of enforcement. - Case T-59/99 R.



European Court reports 1999 Page II-02519



Keywords

1 Applications for interim measures - Suspension of operation of a measure - Interim relief - Conditions for granting - Prima facie case - Urgency - Cumulative requirements

(EC Treaty, Arts 185 and 186 (now Arts 242 EC and 243 EC); Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2))

2 Applications for interim relief - Suspension of operation of a measure - Suspension of operation of the obligation to lodge a bank guarantee as a condition for postponing the immediate recovery of a fine - Conditions for granting - Exceptional circumstances

(EC Treaty, Arts 185 and 186 (now Arts 242 EC and 243 EC); Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2))
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. Procedure - Intervention - Application for interim measures - Persons concerned - Main proceedings relating to the annulment of a regulation authorising Member States to exchange fishing quotas - Local or regional bodies - Inadmissibility

(EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 37, second para., and 46, first para.,)

2. Applications for interim measures - Conditions of admissibility - Admissibility of the main action - Irrelevance - Limits

(Arts 242 and 243 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(1))

Summary

1. An interest in the result of the case, within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 37 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, means a direct and present interest in the decision on the claims. In particular, the Court must ascertain that the prospective intervener is directly affected by the measure in question and that his interest in the result of the case is certain.

An application on the part of a local or regional body of a Member State for leave to intervene in proceedings for interim relief aimed at obtaining, firstly, the suspension of the operation of a regulation authorising two other Member States to exchange fishing quotas and, secondly, its annulment, must be dismissed where it has not been shown that the economic and social structure of that entity depends primarily on the fisheries sector.

( see paras 15, 17-18 )

2. The problem of the admissibility of an action before the court ruling on the facts must not, in principle, be examined in the framework of proceedings for interim relief because otherwise the decision on the substance may be prejudiced. It may nevertheless be found necessary where, as in the present case, it is claimed that the main action with which the application for interim relief is connected is manifestly inadmissible, to establish the existence of certain factors justifying a conclusion that that action is prima facie admissible.

( see para. 21 )
ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

31 January 2001

Case T-373/00 R

Carmine Salvatore Tralli

v

European Central Bank

‛Procedure for interim relief — Urgency — None’

Full text in German II-83

Application for:

suspension of operation of the decision of the European Central Bank of 29 November 2000 dismissing the applicant at the end of his probationary period.

Held:

The application for interim relief is dismissed. The costs are reserved.

Summary

Applications for interim measures — Suspension of operation of a measure — Conditions for granting — Urgency — Serious and irreparable damage — Burden of proof — Employee of the European Central Bank dismissed at the end of his probationary period

(Art. 242 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2))

The urgency of an application for interim measures must be assessed in relation to the need for an interim order in order to avoid serious and irreparable damage being caused to the party who requests the interim measure. It is for that party to adduce proof that it cannot await the outcome of the main action without suffering such damage.

Purely financial harm cannot as a matter of principle be regarded as irreparable, or even difficult to repair, because financial compensation can be made for it subsequently. However, it is for the judge hearing the application for interim relief to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of each case, whether the immediate execution of the contested decision may cause the applicant serious and imminent harm that even the annulment of the decision at the close of the main proceedings would be unable to repair.

The fact that a former employee of the European Central Bank dismissed at the end of his probationary period is forced, by reason of his family circumstances, to find new employment does not as such constitute serious and irreparable harm. It is merely a consequence of the fact that the European Central Bank, as an employer, has, both in principle and under its rules, the right to terminate the contract of the party concerned. Moreover, any employee knows that there is a risk inherent in any employment relationship of the type in question that his contract will be terminated at the end of the probationary period.

(see paras 23-24, 26-27)

See: C-213/91 R Abertal and Others v Commission [1991] ECR I-5109, para. 24; T-73/98 R Prayon-Rupelv Commission [1998] ECR II-2769, para. 36; T-203/98 R Tzikis v Commission [1999] ECRSC I-A-37 and II-167, para. 52; T-70/99 R Alpharma v Council [1999] ECR II-2027, para. 128; T-169/00 R Esedra v Commission [2000] ECR II-2951, paras 43 and 44; C-278/00 R Greece v Commission [2000] ECR I-8787, para. 14
Keywords

Operative part



Keywords

1. Applications for interim measures - Suspension of operation of a measure - Conditions for granting - Urgency - Serious and irreparable damage - Decision withdrawing marketing authorisation for a medicinal product

(Art. 242 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(1) and (2))

2. Applications for interim measures - Suspension of operation of a measure - Conditions for granting - Balancing of all the interests involved - Decision withdrawing marketing authorisation for a medicinal product

(Art. 242 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104 (1) and (2))

Operative part

hereby orders:

1. Operation of the Commission Decision of 9 March 2000 concerning the withdrawal of marketing authorisations of medicinal products for human use which contain the substances clobenzorex, fenbutrazate, fenproporex, mazindol, mefenorex, norpseudoephedrine, phenmetrazine, phendimetrazine and propylhexedrine (C(2000) 608) is suspended in relation to the applicant.

2. Costs are reserved.
ORDER OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Fourth Chamber)

6 July 2001

Case T-375/00

Danielle Dubigh and Tamara Zaur-Gora

v

Commission of the European Communities

‛Officials — Replacement staff — Members of the auxiliary staff — Claim to classification as a member of the temporary staff of the European Communities — Action in part lacking in any legal basis and in part inadmissible’

Full text in French II-733

Application for:

annulment of the Commission's decisions of 12 January 2000 rejecting the applicants' requests of 24 September 1999 for régularisation of their administrative situation by recognising them as members of the temporary staff of the European Communities.

Held:

The application is dismissed. Each party is to bear its own costs.

Summary

Officials — Status of member of the temporary staff — Persons employed by a legal person governed by the law of a Member State — Excluded

(Conditions of employment of other servants, Art. 2)

The status of servant of the Communities cannot be conferred on a person whose employer is not the Commission or another institution of the Communities but a legal person governed by the law of a Member State, which cannot be regarded as an administrative unit of the institution in question.

Consequently, by refusing to confer on persons made available to it by temporary employment agencies the status of member of the temporary staff, an institution does not commit, to the detriment of the persons concerned, an abuse of process or a breach of the principles of sound administration and sound personnel management. Conferment of such status is not possible inasmuch as the persons concerned have been engaged by undertakings governed by private law.

(see paras 21, 23)

See: 87/77,130/77,22/83, 9/84 and 10/84 Salerno and Others v Commission and Council [1985] ECR 2523, paras 42-47; 286/83 Alexis and Others v Commission [1989] ECR 2445, para. 11
Under Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations, the admissibility of an action brought by an official against the institution to which he belongs is subject to the prior administrative procedure provided for by those articles taking its proper course. Where a decision adopted by the appointing authority constitutes an act adversely affecting an official, a request within the meaning of Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations is pointless and the official must use the complaints procedure provided for in Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations if he or she seeks the annulment, amendment or withdrawal ofthat decision. The option of requesting the administration to take a decision relating to him pursuant to Article 90(1) does not allow the official to disregard the time-limits in Articles 90 and 91 for submitting a complaint and bringing an action.

Those time-limits are intended to ensure certainty in legal relationships. They are therefore a matter of public policy and cannot be left to the discretion of the parties or the Court.

(see paras 23-24, 33)

See: 227/83 Moussis v Commission [1984] ECR 3133, para. 12; T-19/90 Von Hoessle v Court of Auditors [1991] ECR II-615, para. 23; T-115/92 Hogan v Parliament [1993] ECR II-895, para. 32
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. Procedure - Procedure before the Court of First Instance - Reassignment to the Court sitting in plenary session or to a Chamber composed of a different number of Judges - Designation of an Advocate General - Criteria

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Arts 14, 18, 19 and 51)

2. Actions for annulment - Application concerning, in reality, a contractual dispute - Lack of jurisdiction of the Community judicature - Inadmissible

(Arts 230, fourth para., EC, 240 EC and 249 EC)

Summary

$$1. Articles 14, 18, 19 and 51 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance give the Chamber hearing a case the right to request the Court of First Instance sitting in plenary session to refer the case either to the Court of First Instance sitting in plenary session or to a Chamber composed of a different number of Judges and to designate an Advocate General. That is a right and not an obligation, and its exercise is subject to the criteria specified in the Rules of Procedure; these are, for referral to the Court of First Instance sitting in plenary session or to a Chamber composed of a different number of Judges, the legal difficulty or the importance of the case or special circumstances and, for the designation of an Advocate General, the legal difficulty or the factual complexity of the case.

( see para. 22 )

2. In the absence of an arbitration clause within the meaning of Article 238 EC, the Court of First Instance manifestly lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine an application which, although based on the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, must in fact be regarded as an action resting on a contractual basis. If that were not the case, the Court would be extending its jurisdiction beyond the disputes which it has jurisdiction to determine under Article 240 EC, since that article confers on national courts or tribunals ordinary jurisdiction over disputes to which the Community is a party. Moreover, where the dispute concerns a claim of the Commission for repayment of an advance on the ground that the other party has allegedly failed to fulfil its contractual obligations, the contested measure forms part of a contractual framework from which it is not separable and it is not, therefore, one of the decisions referred to by Article 249 EC, actions for the annulment of which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Community court under the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC.

( see paras 37, 39, 41 )