1.

In examining the matters at issue I shall look at the question of transferring the remuneration of the applicant to Luxembourg. (a) In the first place we must examine the general question whether under the Staff Regulations there exists such a right for Luxembourg officials who are employed in Brussels or whether the interpretation of the provisions of the Staff Regulation set out by the Commission in its defence of its refusal in August 1974 is correct. Under Article 63 of the Staff Regulations the official's remuneration shall be expressed in Belgian francs and paid in the currency of the country in which the official performs his dudes. Article 62 further refers to Annex VII to the Staff Regulations; it provides expressly that officials are entitled to remuneration in accordance with this Annex. In Annex VII, Article 17 (1) — that is the basic provision which I have already cited — provides that payment shall be made to the official at the place and in the currency of the country where he carries out his duties. Article 17 (2) sets out exceptions to the basic rule. It permits regular transfers in other currencies and to other places; however this only applies to one part of the emoluments, namely to the expatriation allowance ‘and to amounts which are necessary to cover expenditure which arises out of commitments proved to have been regularly entered into by the official outside the country where the institution has its seat or where the official carries out his duties. Article 17 (3) contains a further concession whereby in exceptional circumstances for reasons supported by evidence an official may be authorized to transfer sums which he may desire to have available in the currencies’ mentioned in paragraph (2). In the present case we are only concerned with the scope of the first paragraph of Article 17. The applicant only relies on that provision and not on the facilities offered by the other paragraphs of Article 17. On consideration of the whole system of Article 17 and in particular of the wording of its first paragraph there can in my opinion be no doubt that only the interpretation advocated by the Commission can be correct. While Article 17 (1) does provide that payment shall be made to each official at the place and in the currency of the country where he carries out his duties, this obviously does not include payments to be made in the currency of another Member State and in a place which lies outside the country where the institution has its seat. In my opinion where the wording is clear, as is Article 17 (1), it would conflict with all current principles of interpretation to apply considerations of the object of the law and relying on these to seek an interpretation which is not compatible with the wording and which, if it had been intended, could quite easily have been specified by using a different wording. Apart from that it must also be said that the applicant's arguments relating to the scheme of Article 17 — avoidance of payments into the various Member countries and avoidance of disruption of the currency policy of the Member States — are not merely unsupported by anything such as preparatory documents; according to the submissions of the Commission they are definitely incorrect. This may be said as the Commission makes use of banking machinery for the payment of remuneration and because it has accounts in all the Member States. Therefore the scheme of Article 17, as the Commission correctly pointed out, is rather to be seen in conjunction with the official's obligation as to residence based on Article 20 of the Staff Regulations, that is the duty to reside either in the place of employment or at not greater distance therefrom as is compatible with the proper performance of his duties. Indeed Article 17 of Annex VII is nothing more than the logical consequence of the duty of residence and thus primarily it guarantees the uniform treatment of all officials as to payment of remuneration. In addition it is in my opinion not possible to justify the interpretation of Article 17 desired by the applicant by reference to the special relationship between Belgium and Luxembourg that is by reference to the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union. In this respect it is decisive that this particular relationship was well known when the Staff Regulations were drafted but was not taken into consideration. From that, it may only be deduced that even for Belgian and Luxembourg officials or more generally, for officials with special connexions with these countries, transfer of remuneration beyond the borders of the country in which the institution has its seat in derogation from Article 17 (1) can only be undertaken in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) of this article which apply to all officials. Accordingly we may first decide that the Commission has correctly interpreted Article 17 (1) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations and that on the basis of this provision the applicant has no right to have his remuneration transferred to Luxembourg. (b) In this connexion it must further be considered what significance is to be attached to the fact that in spite of his transfer to Brussels in 1968 the applicant's remuneration was in fact transferred for many years to Luxembourg. It must therefore be asked whether this may give rise to vested rights which cannot simply be overridden. In this respect we can at least leave open the question whether such a practice appeared acceptable in view of the particular circumstances in which the applicant found himself after his transfer and until the end of 1971 (long periods in Luxembourg because of illness and retention of the family residence in Luxembourg). Such circumstances certainly no longer existed in summer 1974. I shall return later to the point, which may also be of some relevance here, that in the summer of 1974 the applicant was granted credit facilities by a bank in Luxembourg. On the decisive question whether a beneficial administrative action — the transfer of his remuneration to Luxembourg — which, as has been shown, was in itself contrary to the Staff Regulations, can, after being applied for many years, be brought to an end in the summer of 1974 with future effect, the applicant in his attempt to justify a complaint against the Commission relies chiefly on the ruling of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases 7/56 and 3 to 7/57 Algera and Others v Common Assembly of the ECSC, Judgment of 12 July 1957, Rec. 1957, p. 83. He deduces from this and from the legal systems of some of the Member States — namely French, Belgian and German law — the principle that the administration must comply with a reasonable time-limit. In addition in his opinion the question is whether there exists a serious infringement of the law and whether its removal is indispensable for the future in order to avoid serious harm to the administration. Since such a situation does not exist in the present instance it cannot be accepted that the Commission was able in the summer of 1974 to revoke a decision taken in 1968 for the benefit of the applicant. In this respect also it is not possible to accept the applicant's view. In the proceedings reference was correctly made to the point that the necessity to comply with a time-limit only applies in principle for the retroactive withdrawal of unlawful beneficial measures. In addition it might be noted that this principle has been considerably qualified in the decided cases on the equalization of scrap (cf. Judgment of 12 July 1962, Case 14/61 Koninklijke Nederlandsche Hoogovens and Staalfabrieken NV v High Authority of the ECSC, supported by Société des Aciéries du Temple, [1962] ECR 253). In the present case, on the other hand, we are solely concerned with alteration of an administrative practice for the future. As regards such a situation the proper course was shown in the decision of the Court in case 15/60 (Judgment of 1 June 1961, Simon v Court of Justice of the European Communities, Rec. 1961, p. 225). These proceedings were concerned with the fact that a separation allowance which had been wrongfully granted to an official was to be withdrawn in the future. In the judgment, it is stated that: ‘If the administrative authority becomes aware that a certain allowance has been granted as a result of a wrong interpretation of a legal provision it has the power to amend the previous decision. Even if in certain cases in view of vested rights withdrawal on grounds of unlawfulness does not have a retroactive effect it always takes effect from the present.’ It may therefore be assumed that even after the lapse of a long period of time the administration is not prevented from modifying, with future effect, a situation which is recognized as unlawful. Contrary to the view of the applicant I do not think that in this connexion it is justifiable to take account of considerations concerning the importance of the infringement of the law. Illegality is illegality, and thus failure to comply with a not particularly important provision does allow of correction for the future when the error is discovered. The arguments of the applicant are finally not supported by a balance of interests referred to in the judgment in Case 14/61. In this respect with regard to the interest of the applicant we must primarily consider the credit facilities granted by the bank in Luxembourg which have been mentioned above and which were subject to the condition that the remuneration of the applicant should be permanently paid to this bank. In this respect it is already important that when the applicant lodged his application in August 1974 he did not mention the offer of credit and therefore did not place the administration in a position to consider his interests. In addition the Commission has shown that even without direct transfer of his remuneration to Luxembourg it would have been possible for the applicant to receive the credit in Luxembourg which he maintains is more favourable. I here refer to two of the letters submitted by the Commission of 3 and 4 December 1975 which show that the Luxembourg bank concerned would have been satisfied with an irrevocable standing order to transfer the applicant's remuneration to Luxembourg given to a Belgian bank and which also shows that a Belgian bank would have accepted such a standing order. Accordingly, it is clear that continuation of the transfer of remuneration to Luxembourg can also not be claimed by reliance on vested rights. The alteration of administrative practice in autumn 1974, which incidentally did not happen overnight but merely with effect from October 1974, was fully justified. (c) With regard to the first issue, it is thus clear the applicant's claims for the annulment of the decision of 27 August 1974 and seeking a ruling that the Commission is obliged to pay the remuneration of the applicant to a Luxembourg bank are without foundation. Furthermore as the Commission's conduct was not unlawful it is also clear, without need to examine further the conditions for the claim, that the applicant's further claim in respect of the liability for breach of official duty is also without foundation.