JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber, Extended Composition)

27 September 2018 ( *1 )

(Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in Egypt — Freezing of funds — Admissibility — Objectives — Criteria for inclusion of persons targeted — Renewal of designation of the applicants on the list of persons targeted — Factual basis — Plea of illegality — Legal basis — Proportionality — Right to fair trial — Presumption of innocence — Right to good administration — Error of law — Manifest error of assessment — Right to property — Rights of the defence — Right to effective judicial protection)

In Case T‑288/15,

Ahmed Abdelaziz Ezz, residing in Giza (Egypt),

Abla Mohammed Fawzi Ali Ahmed Salama, residing in Cairo (Egypt),

Khadiga Ahmed Ahmed Kamel Yassin, residing in Giza,

Shahinaz Abdel Azizabdel Wahab Al Naggar, residing in Giza,

Represented initially by J. Lewis, B. Kennelly, QC, J. Pobjoy, Barrister, J. Binns, S. Rowe, Solicitors, and J.-F. Bellis, lawyer, and subsequently by B. Kennelly, J. Pobjoy, S. Rowe and H. de Charette, lawyer,

applicants,

v

Council of the European Union, represented by M. Bishop and I. Gurov, acting as Agents,

defendant,

APPLICATION pursuant to Article 263 TFEU seeking, first, the annulment of Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/486 of 20 March 2015 amending Decision 2011/172/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt (OJ 2015 L 77, p. 16), secondly, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/411 of 18 March 2016 amending Decision 2011/172/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt (OJ 2016 L 74, p. 40) and, thirdly, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/496 of 21 March 2017 amending Decision 2011/172/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt (OJ 2017 L 76, p. 22), in that those acts concern the applicants,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber, Extended Composition),

composed of D. Gratsias (Rapporteur), President, I. Labucka, A. Dittrich, I. Ulloa Rubio and P. G. Xuereb, Judges,

Registrar: L. Grzegorczyk, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure and further to the hearing on 4 July 2017,

gives the following

Judgment

I. Background to the dispute and factual context

A. Acts adopted by the Council in respect of the applicants

1 In the wake of political events which took place in Egypt from January 2011, the Council of the European Union adopted, on 21 March 2011, on the basis of Article 29 TEU, Council Decision 2011/172/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt (OJ 2011 L 76, p. 63).

2 Recitals 1 and 2 of Decision 2011/172 read as follows: ‘(1) On 21 February 2011, the European Union declared its readiness to support the peaceful and orderly transition to a civilian and democratic government in Egypt based on the rule of law, with full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and to support efforts to create an economy which enhances social cohesion and promotes growth. (2) In this context, restrictive measures should be imposed against persons having been identified as responsible for misappropriation of Egyptian state funds and who are thus depriving the Egyptian people of the benefits of the sustainable development of their economy and society and undermining the development of democracy in the country.’

3 Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/172, as amended by the corrigendum to that decision (OJ 2014 L 203, p. 113), provides as follows: ‘All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by persons having been identified as responsible for misappropriation of Egyptian state funds, and natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them, as listed in the Annex, shall be frozen.’

5 The applicants, Ahmed Abdelaziz Ezz, Abla Mohamed Fawzi Ali Ahmed Salama, Khadiga Ahmed Ahmed Kamel Yassin and Shahinaz Abdel Azizabdel Wahab Al Naggar, were designated since the adoption of Decision 2011/172, respectively, in the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth lines of the list in the annex to that decision. The identifying information relating to each of them, which appeared on that list, was, with respect to the first applicant, ‘Former Member of Parliament; Date of birth: 12.01.1959; Male’, in relation to the second applicant, ‘Wife of Ahmed Abdelaziz Ezz; Date of birth: 31.01.1963; Female’, in relation to the third applicant, ‘Wife of Ahmed Abdelaziz Ezz; Date of birth: 25.05.1959; Female’, and, in relation to the fourth applicant, ‘Wife of Ahmed Abdelaziz Ezz; Date of birth: 09.10.1969; Female’. Decision 2017/496 made a correction concerning the name of the second applicant.

6 The ground for the designation of the applicants, as amended by the corrigendum to Decision 2011/172, was as follows: ‘Person subject to judicial proceedings by the Egyptian authorities in respect of the misappropriation of state funds on the basis of the United Nations Convention against corruption’. That ground has remained identical in successive renewals of that decision. In particular, the amendments relating to the ground for designation, introduced by Decision 2017/496, did not concern the applicants, but only other persons designated on the same list.

7 On the basis of Article 215(2) TFEU and Decision 2011/172, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 270/2011 of 21 March 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt (OJ 2011 L 76, p. 4). That regulation reproduces, in essence, the provisions of Decision 2011/172 and the list in Annex I thereto is identical to that in the annex to that decision. Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/491 of 21 March 2015 implementing Regulation No 270/2011 (OJ 2017 L 76, p. 10), made amendments to the list in Annex I to that regulation, corresponding to those introduced by Decision 2017/496.

B. Proceedings brought by the applicants before the courts of the European Union before or at the same time as the present proceedings

8 By an action brought on 20 May 2011, registered at the Registry of the General Court under number T‑256/11, the applicants sought the annulment of Decision 2011/172 and Regulation No 270/2011, in so far as those acts concern them.

9 On 24 May 2013, the applicants brought a new action, registered at the Registry of the General Court under number T‑279/13, by which they sought the annulment of Decision 2011/172, as amended by Decision 2013/144 and Regulation No 270/2011, ‘renewed by decision of the Council notified to the applicants by letter dated 22 March 2013’ in so far as those acts concern them.

10 The action brought by the applicants in Case T‑256/11 was dismissed by the judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council (T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93). On 5 May 2014, the applicants brought an appeal against that judgment.

11 On 30 May 2014, each of the applicants brought a separate action against Decision 2014/153 (Cases T‑375/14, Al Naggar v Council, T‑376/14, Yassin v Council, T‑377/14, Ezz v Council and T‑378/14, Salama v Council).

12 The judgment of 5 March 2015, Ezz and Others v Council (C‑220/14 P, EU:C:2015:147), dismissed the applicants’ appeal referred to in paragraph 10 above.

13 On 29 May 2015, the applicants lodged a statement of modification intended to extend the original form of order sought in the action brought by them in Case T‑279/13 to ‘Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/485 of 20 March 2015 amending Decision 2011/172/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt’.

14 By order of 15 February 2016, Ezz and Others v Council (T‑279/13, not published, EU:T:2016:78), made on the basis of Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the applicants’ action in the case at issue was dismissed. First, the General Court rejected as manifestly inadmissible the form of order sought in the statement of modification referred to in paragraph 13 above on the ground of lis pendens. The General Court held that the parties, submissions and subject matter in the present action and in the statement of modification were identical and that the latter had been lodged after that action (order of 15 February 2016, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑279/13, not published, EU:T:2016:78, paragraphs 22 to 30). Secondly, it rejected the form of order sought in the action as manifestly lacking any foundation in law (order of 15 February 2016, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑279/13, not published, EU:T:2016:78, paragraphs 43 to 79).

15 By orders of 21 March 2016 of the President of the Eighth Chamber of the General Court, Cases T‑375/14, T‑376/14, T‑377/14 and T‑378/14 were removed from the register following the withdrawal from the proceedings of the applicants (orders of 21 March 2016, Al Naggar v Council, T‑375/14, not published, EU:T:2016:185, of 21 March 2016, Yassin v Council, T‑376/14, not published, EU:T:2016:186, of 21 March 2016, Ezz v Council, T‑377/14, not published, EU:T:2016:187 and of 21 March 2016, Salama v Council, T‑378/14, not published, EU:T:2016:188).

16 By application registered at the Court Registry on 26 May 2016, registered at the Court Registry under number T‑269/16, the first applicant brought an action against Decision 2016/411, in so far as that decision concerns him. By separate application, registered on the same day at the Court Registry under number T‑269/16, the second, third and fourth applicants brought an action against Decision 2016/411, in so far as that decision concerns them.

17 On 12 September 2016, the General Court, by order, dismissed as manifestly inadmissible the applicants’ actions referred to in paragraph 16 above on the ground of lis pendens in relation to the lodging of the applicants’ statement of modification in the present action against Decision 2016/411, which is referred to in paragraph 22 below (orders of 12 September 2016, Ezz v Council, T‑268/16, not published, EU:T:2016:606, paragraph 15, and of 12 September 2016, Salama and Others v Council, T‑269/16, not published, EU:T:2016:607, paragraph 15).

II. Procedure and forms of order sought

18 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 29 May 2015, the applicants brought the present action. According to the first page and paragraph 1 of the application, the applicants seek the annulment of ‘Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/485 of 20 March 2015 amending Decision 2011/172/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt’, in so far as that decision relates to them. They also claim that the Council should be ordered to pay the costs.

19 In a letter to the Registry of the General Court dated 24 August 2015, the applicants indicated that the application was to be read as referring to Decision 2015/486, the reference to ‘2015/485’ resulting from a typographical error.

20 On 15 February 2016, the Council lodged its defence. In that document it claims that the Court should: – dismiss the action; – order the applicants to pay the costs.

21 The reply and the rejoinder were lodged on 31 March 2016 and 27 May 2016 respectively.

22 On 25 May 2016, on the basis of Article 86 of the Rules of Procedure, the applicants lodged a statement of modification in which they claim that the Court should: – annul Decision 2016/411, in so far as that decision relates to the applicants; – order the Council to pay the costs.

23 On 30 June 2016, the Council submitted observations on the statement of modification, in which it states that it maintains the form of order sought in the defence.

24 On 25 July 2016, the applicants requested a hearing.

25 By decision of 4 October 2016, the case was reassigned to the Fifth Chamber.

26 On 31 March 2017, by way of a measure of organisation of procedure, the Court requested the parties to provide it with a number of documents.

27 The applicants and the Council replied to those requests on 11 and 21 April 2017 respectively.

28 On a proposal from the Fifth Chamber, the General Court, by decision of 5 April 2017, referred the case to the Fifth Chamber (Extended Composition).

29 On 18 May 2017, by way of a measure of organisation of procedure, the General Court, first, requested the parties to provide it with additional information and, secondly, questioned them on the issue of the impact, in the present case, of some of its previous decisions.

30 On 26 May 2017, the applicants lodged a second statement of modification, in which they claim that the Court should annul, first, Decision 2017/496 and secondly, Implementing Regulation 2017/491, in so far as those acts concern them.

31 The parties replied to the General Court’s requests referred to in paragraph 29 above by letters dated 1 and 8 June 2017.

32 By a procedural document dated 8 June 2017, the applicants requested the Court to adopt, on the basis of Article 92(1), Article 93(1) and Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure, a measure of inquiry providing for the examination of their legal representative in Egypt as a witness. On 19 June 2017, the Council submitted its observations on that request for a measure of inquiry.

33 On 26 June 2017, the Council lodged observations on the statement of modification, in which it stated that it maintains the form of order sought in the defence.

34 The hearing was held on 4 July 2017. At the request of the applicants, the hearing took place in camera, having heard the Council. The applicants specified, however, that that request did not imply the confidential treatment of certain information in the General Court’s decision terminating the proceedings. [confidential] ( 1 ).

35 On 19 September 2017, the Court reopened the oral phase of the proceedings and invited the parties to comment on the possible impact on the present action of the judgment of 26 July 2017, Council v LTTE (C‑599/14 P, EU:C:2017:583). The parties provided their reply to the Court on 4 October 2017.

III. Law

A. The admissibility of the form of order sought in the application

36 In the statement of defence, the Council relies on several pleas of inadmissibility against the form of order sought in the action for annulment of ‘Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/485 of 20 March 2015 amending Decision 2011/172/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt’, in so far as that decision relates to them. First, the Council considers that those conclusions refer either to a non-existent act, or to an act against which the applicants manifestly do not have standing to bring proceedings. Secondly, it takes the view that, in so far as the correction by the applicants in their letter of 24 August 2015 was made after the expiry of the time limit of two months provided for in respect of actions based on Article 263 TFEU, the action against Decision 2015/486 is out of time. Finally, it contends that, if the present action is shown to have been brought after the statement of modification in Case T‑279/13, lodged by the applicants on the same day, that action must be declared to be inadmissible on the ground of lis pendens.

37 In the reply, the applicants submit that the reference to ‘2015/485’ was merely a typing error, which was confirmed by the General Court in the order of 15 February 2016, Ezz and Others v Council (T‑279/13, not published, EU:T:2016:78). Furthermore, they contest the existence of lis pendens regarding that order.

38 In that regard, in relation, first of all, to the first plea of inadmissibility, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the requirement that, under Article 76 of the Rules of Procedure, the application must contain the subject matter of the proceedings implies that the statement must be sufficiently clear and precise as to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to decide the case, if necessary without other supporting information (see judgment of 13 September 2013, Anbouba v Council, T‑592/11, not published, EU:T:2013:427, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

39 However, the contested act can be identified by implication from the content of the application (see, to that effect, order of 13 April 2011, Planet v Commission, T‑320/09, EU:T:2011:172, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited). Moreover, the Court of Justice and the General Court have already accepted the possibility of reclassifying heads of claim that designate in an imprecise or erroneous manner the contested act or acts, where the content of the application and the factual and legal context make it possible to identify those acts unambiguously (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 7 July 1993, Spain v Commission, C‑217/91, EU:C:1993:293, paragraphs 14 to 16, and of 13 September 2013, Anbouba v Council, T‑592/11, not published, EU:T:2013:427, paragraph 24).

40 In the present case, whereas, as indicated in paragraph 18 above, the applicants, on the first page and in paragraph 1 of the application, make reference to ‘2015/485’ to indicate the contested decision in the application, it must be noted that, by contrast, they refer to the full title of Decision 2015/486. Moreover, the provisions cited by the applicants in the body of the application are those of Decision 2015/486 and not those of Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/485 of 20 March 2015 extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative in Kosovo (OJ 2015 L 77, p. 12). In addition, the applicants attached to the application a copy of Decision 2015/486 and not of Decision 2015/485.

41 The applicants confirmed, moreover, in their letter to the Registry of the Court of 24 August 2015 (see paragraph 19 above), that the present action must be regarded as seeking the annulment of Decision 2015/486, in so far as that act refers to them, since the reference ‘2015/485’ in the application constitutes a mere typographical error which does not affect the admissibility of that action. Consequently, the present action cannot be regarded as relating to a non-existent act, or to an act against which the applicants manifestly do not have standing to bring proceedings.

42 Secondly, as regards the second plea of non-admissibility, contrary to what the Council maintains, the date of lodging the application, namely 29 May 2015, and not the date of lodging of the applicants’ letter of 24 August 2015, must be taken into account when considering whether the time limit for bringing an action against Decision 2015/486 has been complied with in the present case. As is apparent from paragraphs 40 and 41 above, the content, alone, of the application and its annexes makes it possible to identify without difficulty that decision as being the subject matter of the action. Having regard to the date of 24 March 2015 which appears on the letter by which the Council notified that decision to the applicants, the lodging of the application on 29 May 2015 satisfies the time limit for bringing an action against that decision, in accordance with the provisions of the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 60 of the Rules of Procedure.

43 Finally, with regard to the third plea of non-admissibility, as the Council accepted in the reply, moreover, the General Court found, in paragraphs 22 to 30 of the order of 15 February 2016, Ezz and Others v Council (T‑279/13, unpublished, EU:T:2016:78), that the lodging of the statement of modification submitted in Case T‑279/13, to adapt the forms of order sought and the pleas in law of the application to Decision 2015/486, was subsequent to the lodging of the present action and that that statement of modification should therefore be dismissed as manifestly inadmissible on the ground of lis pendens. The form of order in the application is therefore not inadmissible on that ground.

44 The pleas of inadmissibility referred to in paragraph 36 above must therefore be rejected.

B. Substance

45 In the present action, the applicants seek the annulment of the Council decisions by which, in the context of adopting Decision 2015/486, Decision 2016/411 and Decision 2017/496, their designation in the annex to Decision 2011/172 was renewed, respectively, in 2015, 2016 and 2017 (‘the contested decisions’). In support of those claims, the applicants put forward five pleas in law. In the first plea, they rely on a plea of illegality in respect of Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/172, as renewed by Decisions 2015/486, 2016/411 and 2017/496, and in respect of Article 2(1) of Regulation No 270/2011, alleging, in essence, a lack of legal basis and an infringement of the principle of proportionality. The second, third, fourth and fifth pleas in law allege, respectively, infringement by the Council of Article 6 TEU, considered together with Article 2 and Article 3(5) TEU, and of Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), in that the Council failed to ensure that the legal proceedings in Egypt concerning the applicants respected fundamental rights, infringement of the general criteria laid down in the abovementioned provisions of Decision 2011/172 and Regulation No 270/2011, infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to effective judicial protection and an unjustified and disproportionate restriction on the applicants’ right to property and damage to their reputation.

46 As a preliminary point, it is appropriate to examine the Council’s argument that pleas in law which are identical, at least in essence, to the pleas set out in paragraph 45 above have already been examined and rejected in the judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council (T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93) and, following the appeal against that judgment, in the judgment of 5 March 2015, Ezz and Others v Council (C‑220/14 P, EU:C:2015:147). The Council concludes from this that the present action should be dismissed, by way of an order, as manifestly lacking any foundation in law, on the basis of Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure.

47 In that regard, first, it should be noted that, in the context of the first and second pleas in law, the applicants complain that the Council failed to take into account certain items of information concerning political and judicial developments which have occurred since the adoption of Decision 2011/172 and which reveal, in general, infringements by the Egyptian authorities of the rule of law and of fundamental rights and, in particular, breaches of the right to a fair trial and respect for the presumption of innocence of the first applicant in the context of the ongoing criminal proceedings brought against him. The applicants claim that they informed the Council of that information, in particular in their letter of 23 December 2014. In the statements of modification, they argue that they submitted additional information of the same nature to the Council prior to the renewal of their designation in 2016 and 2017.

48 In the judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council (T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93), and in the order of 15 February 2016, Ezz and Others v Council (T‑279/13, not published, EU:T:2016:78), ruling on the applicants’ actions referred to in paragraphs 8 and 9 above, that complaint was not considered by the General Court. Furthermore, the applicants withdrew in the course of proceedings in their actions in Cases T‑375/14 to T‑378/14.

49 In addition, it should be recalled that Article 2(3) of Decision 2011/172 provides that, where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review its decision and inform the person or entity concerned accordingly. Furthermore, in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 5 of that decision, the latter is to be kept under constant review and is to be renewed if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met.

50 It follows from the combination of those provisions that the Council may, in any review prior to the renewal of Decision 2011/172, or at any time, determine, on the basis of substantial evidence or observations submitted to it, whether the factual situation has changed since the applicants’ original designation or since a previous review, so that their designation is no longer justified (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 26 July 2017, Council v LTTE, C‑599/14 P, EU:C:2017:583, paragraph 46).

51 In the present case, it cannot be excluded, without examination, that the evidence presented by the applicants in their correspondence with the Council, prior to the adoption of the contested decisions, was of such a substantial nature as to call into question the renewal of their designation under the contested decisions.

52 Moreover, it is true that, in the decisions of the General Court and of the Court of Justice referred to in paragraph 46 above, similar pleas in law to the third, fourth and fifth pleas have already been examined. Consequently, in the context of the latter pleas, the applicants are not entitled to call into question the lawfulness of their original designation or of the renewal of their designation by Decision 2013/144 by submitting to the General Court questions already decided by the abovementioned decisions of the European Union judicature, as such a challenge is incompatible with the relative authority of res judicata which attaches not only to the operative part of those decisions, but also to the ratio decidendi on which they are based (see, to that effect, judgments of 1 June 2006, P & O European Ferries (Vizcaya) and Diputación Foral de Vizcaya v Commission, C‑442/03 P and C‑471/03 P, EU:C:2006:356, paragraphs 39 to 41; of 15 May 2008, Spain v Council, C‑442/04, EU:C:2008:276, paragraph 25, and of 5 September 2014, Éditions Odile Jacob v Commission, T‑471/11, EU:T:2014:739, paragraph 117). Moreover, objections or arguments raised against the contested decisions, which are based on the same elements of facts or points of law as those already examined by the EU judicature in the context of the applicants’ earlier actions, may be rejected as manifestly unfounded (see, to that effect and by analogy, order of 15 February 2016, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑279/13, not published, EU:T:2016:78, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

53 However, there is no reason to presume, without an assessment of the merits of the factual and legal elements presented in the context of the present action, in support of those pleas, that those elements have already been examined by the EU judicature (see, to that effect, order of 15 February 2016, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑279/13, not published, EU:T:2016:78, paragraph 41).

54 Consequently, the present action cannot be dismissed by the General Court as manifestly lacking any foundation in law without examining the arguments put forward by the applicants in support of the pleas in law in that action.

55 It is necessary to examine, first of all, the first and second pleas, which are based on the complaint set out in paragraph 47 above.

1. The first and second pleas in law, raising, first, a plea of illegality in respect of Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/172, as renewed by Decisions 2015/486, 2016/411 and 2017/496, and in respect of Article 2(1) of Regulation No 270/2011 and, secondly, alleging infringement by the Council of Article 6 TEU, in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 TEU and Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter

(a) Preliminary observations

56 As a preliminary point, it must be determined, first, whether the scheme of restrictive measures provided for in Decision 2011/172 may require the Council to take into account circumstances such as those relied on by the applicants in support of the complaint referred to in paragraph 47 above and, secondly, the factual context in which the applicants informed the Council of those circumstances and the treatment of that information by the Council.

(1) Legal background

57 First of all, it should be recalled that Article 2 TEU and Article 3(5) TEU require the institutions of the European Union to promote, in particular in international relations, the values and principles on which the European Union is founded, namely, in particular, respect for human dignity, the rule of law and fundamental rights.

58 Secondly, as the Court of Justice has pointed out, respect for those values and for the principles on which the European Union is founded is required of all actions of the European Union, including those in the area of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), as is apparent from the provisions, read together, set out in the first subparagraph of Article 21(1), Article 21(2)(b) and (3) TEU, and Article 23 TEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 June 2016, Parliament v Council, C‑263/14, EU:C:2016:435, paragraph 47).

59 In particular, Article 21(1) TEU provides that the European Union’s action on the international scene is to seek to advance in the wider world, inter alia, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and respect for international law.

60 Finally, with regard more particularly to the right to a fair trial and to respect for the presumption of innocence, the breach of which is alleged in the present case, it should be noted that, according to the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECtHR’), the right to a fair trial, as enshrined in Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’), which correspond, in the EU legal order, to Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter, holds a prominent place in a democratic society, particularly in criminal matters (ECtHR, 7 July 1989, Soering v. United Kingdom, CE:ECHR:1989:0707JUD001403888, §113).

61 Similarly, it should be stressed that the principles of independence and impartiality of justice and the right to effective judicial review are essential standards for respect for the rule of law, which itself forms one of the primary values on which the European Union is founded, as is clear from Article 2 TEU, the preambles of the EU Treaty and of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 September 2016, Klyuyev v Council, T‑340/14, EU:T:2016:496, paragraphs 87 and 88).

62 As the ECtHR has stated, in essence, the requirements arising from the right to a fair trial and respect for the presumption of innocence aim, in particular in criminal matters, to guarantee that the final decision on the merits of the charges against the person concerned is reliable and to prevent it from being vitiated by a denial of justice or even arbitrariness, which would constitute the very denial of the rule of law (see, to that effect and by analogy, ECtHR, 17 January 2012, Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom, CE:ECHR:2012:0117JUD000813909, §260, and 21 June 2016, Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland, CE:ECHR:2016:0621JUD000580908, §145 and 146 ( 2 )).

63 In the present case, the characteristics of the scheme set out in Decision 2011/172 do not justify an exception to the Council’s general obligation, when adopting restrictive measures, to respect fundamental rights that form an integral part of the EU legal order (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 July 2017, Council v LTTE, C‑599/14 P, EU:C:2017:583, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited), which would have the effect of exempting it from any verification of the protection of fundamental rights in Egypt.

64 In that regard, it should be noted that, under Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/172, the purpose of that decision is to freeze the assets of persons responsible for misappropriation of Egyptian state funds and of persons associated with them, as listed in the annex thereto. As is apparent from recital 1, that decision is part of a policy of support for the Egyptian authorities based, in particular, on the objectives of consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law set out in Article 21(2)(b) TEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraph 44). The sole purpose of the freezing of assets enacted by that decision is to assist the Egyptian authorities with establishing any misappropriation of state funds that has taken place and to ensure that it remains possible for those authorities to recover the proceeds of misappropriation. It is therefore purely precautionary and has no criminal connotation (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 77, 78 and 206, and of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraphs 62 and 64).

65 Accordingly, when considering whether to designate a person on the list annexed to Decision 2011/172 or to renew that designation, it is for the Council to verify, first, that the evidence at its disposal makes it possible to establish that that person is the subject of one or more ongoing legal proceedings in respect of acts that may be characterised as the misappropriation of state funds, and, secondly, whether those proceedings are such as to allow that person to be classified as satisfying the criteria laid down in Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/172 (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 14 April 2016, Ben Ali v Council, T‑200/14, not published, EU:T:2016:216, paragraph 156, and of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraph 65).

66 It follows from the foregoing that, in the context of cooperation with the Egyptian authorities, it is not, in principle, for the Council to assess the accuracy and relevance of the information on which the Egyptian legal proceedings are based (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraph 66 and case-law cited), it being for the Egyptian authorities to make such an assessment. The Court held, in that regard, that it was not for the Council or the General Court to verify whether the investigations to which the applicants were subject were well founded, but only to verify whether that was the case as regards the decision to freeze funds in the light of the request for assistance by the Egyptian authorities (judgment of 5 March 2015, Ezz and Others v Council, C‑220/14 P, EU:C:2015:147, paragraph 77). However, the Council may be required, taking into account in particular the applicant’s observations, to seek from those authorities clarifications concerning that information if those observations lead it to doubt the adequacy of the evidence they have already supplied (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited).

67 Accordingly, it is the task of the competent European Union authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. However, to the extent that the Council has provided evidence of the existence of judicial proceedings against the applicant, it is incumbent upon the applicant to provide solid evidence that is at least relevant and credible in support of his allegations (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraphs 72 to 75 and the case-law cited).

68 Consequently, first, in so far as Decision 2011/172 is part of a policy of support for the Egyptian authorities based, in particular, on the objectives of consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law, the hypothesis that that decision is manifestly inappropriate in the light of those objectives owing to the existence of serious and systematic fundamental rights infringements cannot be completely ruled out. Moreover, the purpose of that decision, recalled in paragraph 64 above, is irrelevant having regard, in particular, to those objectives, if the Egyptian authorities’ finding that state funds have been misappropriated is vitiated by a denial of justice or by arbitrariness.

69 On the other hand, whereas, as is apparent from paragraphs 65 and 66 above, the existence of ongoing legal proceedings in Egypt constitutes, in principle, a sufficiently solid factual basis for the designation of the persons on the list annexed to Decision 2011/172 and its renewal, that is not the case when the Council must form a reasonable presumption that the decision taken at the end of those proceedings will not be reliable, especially since it is not, in principle, for the Council to assess the accuracy and relevance of the evidence on which those proceedings are based.

70 Therefore, in the context of the scheme of restrictive measures such as those provided for in Decision 2011/172, it cannot be excluded that the Council is obliged to assess whether the legal proceedings on which they are based can be considered as reliable in the light of the evidence submitted by the persons concerned relating to infringements of the rule of law and fundamental rights, in particular the right to a fair trial, provided that there is objective, reliable, specific and consistent evidence such as to raise legitimate questions concerning the observance of that right.

71 Moreover, notwithstanding its precautionary nature, the freezing of assets under Decision 2011/172 has a substantial negative impact on the freedoms and rights of the persons concerned so that, in order to ensure a fair balance between the objectives of the freezing of assets and the protection of those rights and freedoms, it is essential that the Council should be able, where necessary, to assess appropriately, under the supervision of the EU courts, the risk of such infringements occurring (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 131 and 132).

72 That analysis is not called into question by the arguments provided by the Council in the context of the present action.

73 In the first place, it should be noted that the Council does not dispute, in the present proceedings, that the consideration of the applicants’ allegations relating to the breach of fundamental rights in the Egyptian political and judicial context could be relevant in the context of the review prior to the adoption of the contested decisions. [confidential]. Similarly, in its written reply to the General Court dated 4 October 2017, the Council stated that, during the review of the designation of the applicants on the list annexed to Decision 2011/172 in 2016 and 2017, it had taken due account of the applicants’ allegations of serious human rights violations in the context of legal proceedings in Egypt.

74 In the second place, the Council’s argument that it is not for it to verify whether guarantees equivalent to those offered by EU law in the field of fundamental rights are provided in Egyptian judicial proceedings relates to the scope of the obligation to assess respect for fundamental rights in the Egyptian political and judicial context, but does not call into question the existence of that obligation. [confidential].

75 That interpretation is confirmed by the Council’s reference to paragraph 175 of the judgment of 7 July 2017, Azarov v Council (T‑215/15, under appeal, EU:T:2017:479), which sought, as is apparent from paragraph 166 of that judgment, to reject an argument of the applicant in that case alleging that it was for the Council, before adopting the decision contested in the case at hand, to verify whether the Ukrainian legal system guaranteed protection of fundamental rights at least equivalent to that guaranteed in the European Union.

76 In the third place, relying on the judgments of 5 March 2015, Ezz and Others v Council (C‑220/14 P, EU:C:2015:147), and of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council (T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93), in order to argue, in essence, that the applicants’ allegations only tend to call into question the merits of the judicial proceedings and not their existence, such that the legality of freezing their assets would not be affected by those allegations, the Council does not take account of subsequent developments in that case-law cited, inter alia, in paragraph 66 above.

77 In that regard, it should be pointed out that, in the analogous context of Council Decision 2011/72/CFSP of 31 January 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Tunisia (OJ 2011 L 28, p. 62), the General Court found that it was not apparent from the documents provided by the applicant that the lack of independence of the Tunisian judicial system vis-à-vis the political authorities alleged by him was such as to specifically affect the judicial proceedings against him or that that dysfunction was systemic (judgment of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraph 73). The General Court has, therefore, already examined whether the Council should take into account observations which call into question the basis of the judicial proceedings against the applicant, in particular by invoking serious shortcomings in the judicial system at issue affecting the guarantees offered by the latter with regard to fundamental rights.

78 Moreover, the Council’s argument mentioned in paragraph 76 above is difficult to reconcile with the fact that [confidential].

79 Finally, in the fourth place, the fact that, as the Council contends, it did not adopt Decision 2011/172 and the subsequent decisions on the basis of a decision by a competent Egyptian authority, but with a view to achieving the objectives of the CFSP and within the framework of its autonomous power in that respect confirms the analysis of the General Court. It is specifically for the Council, in the exercise of that autonomous power, to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the case, including the applicants’ allegations of breaches of fundamental rights concerning the judicial proceedings which form the factual basis for their designation in the annex to Decision 2011/172.

80 Consequently, when examining the first and second pleas, it is for the General Court, having regard to the intensity of the judicial review which each of those pleas involve, to rule on the issue of whether the applicants’ allegations relating to breaches of the rule of law and fundamental rights in Egypt constituted objective, reliable, accurate and consistent evidence capable of giving rise to legitimate questions and whether the Council has taken sufficient account of them.

(2) Factual Background

(i) Evidence relating to legal proceedings against applicants in Egypt

81 In the first place, it should be recalled that, as the General Court has already found, the applicants were originally designated in the annex to Decision 2011/172 on the basis of documents issued by the Egyptian authorities showing, on the one hand, that the first applicant was the subject of criminal proceedings in Egypt for conduct which may be characterised as misappropriation of state funds and, on the other hand, that all the applicants were the subject of an order for seizure of their assets related to those criminal proceedings (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 132 to 134 and 137 to 140). It is apparent from the documents in the case file that that original designation was based, inter alia, on information contained in documents annexed to letters from the Egyptian authorities dated 13 and 24 February 2011.

82 Secondly, it is apparent from the documents in the case file that this information was subsequently supplemented and updated by a letter from the Egyptian authorities dated 13 February 2014, to which an updated table of criminal proceedings against the first applicant was annexed.

83 Seven sets of criminal proceedings are mentioned in the document of 13 February 2014. The first two sets of criminal proceedings (Cases Nos 38 and 107 of 2011) concern acts of unlawful profit and the third set of criminal proceedings (Case No 291 of 2011) concern acts of money laundering related to the acts referred to in the first two sets of proceedings. The fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh sets of criminal proceedings (Cases Nos 457 and 541 of 2011 and 156 and 376 of 2013) concern, respectively, tax evasion, abuse of a dominant position, further acts of tax evasion and, finally, money laundering.

84 In the third place, as is apparent from the Council’s response to the General Court’s request, in the context of the measure of organisation of the procedure of 31 March 2017, to provide it with all the information at its disposal concerning the applicants, the documents which the Egyptian authorities had provided to the Council with a view to adoption of Decision 2015/486 included, in particular, a memorandum from the Egyptian Prosecutor General’s Office (‘the PGO’) dated 9 February 2015. The applicants claim that that document was never communicated to them.

85 As stated at the beginning of the PGO memorandum of 9 February 2015, it is intended to respond to a request for clarification expressed in the framework of the Maghreb/Mashreq Council working group, following questions from certain Member States. That request for clarification concerned the legal procedures to be followed in cases such as those concerning the persons designated on the list annexed to Decision 2011/172 and the prescribed period within which they should be dealt with.

86 The PGO memorandum of 9 February 2015 refers, in particular, to the existence of remedies provided for in Egyptian criminal procedure which allow the persons concerned to submit, first, for review by the Court of Cassation of the Arab Republic of Egypt (‘the Egyptian Court of Cassation’) the first instance judgment which convicted them and, secondly, the judgment that again convicted them following the annulment of the first judgment and the referral back of the case. Moreover, it states that, in the latter case, the Egyptian Court of Cassation gives final judgment on the dispute either by dismissing the appeal or by ruling itself on the merits.

87 As to the remainder, it follows from the Council’s written reply of 21 April 2017 that the other documents provided by the PGO in February 2015 merely constituted an update of the information already provided concerning the status of the criminal proceedings against the first applicant, which update did not show any change in those proceedings as compared with the indications in the document of 13 February 2014.

88 Fourthly and finally, it is apparent from the documents of the case file that, prior to the renewal of the applicants’ designation in 2016 and in 2017, the Egyptian authorities provided updated information on the status of the judicial proceedings against the first applicant. In particular, that information showed, firstly, the closure of the investigations in Case No 156 of 2013 following the administrative settlement of the dispute and, secondly, the existence of three additional proceedings in Cases Nos 4 and 5482 of 2011 and No 244 of 2015 concerning, respectively, allegations of offences committed within the finance department of the company El-Dekheila, profiteering and money laundering. In addition, a memorandum dated 5 December 2016 from the Egyptian National Committee for the Recovery of Assets Abroad (‘the NCRAA’) was communicated to the Council on 6 January 2017. However, the content of that memorandum is identical to that of the PGO memorandum of 9 February 2015. In their reply to the questions of the General Court dated 1 June 2017, the applicants acknowledged that they had become aware of that document on 27 January 2017, namely before the renewal of their designation by Decision 2017/496.

(ii) Information supplied by the applicants prior to the renewal of their designation for the years 2015, 2016 and 2017

89 First of all, it should be noted that, in their letter of 23 December 2014 to the Council, to which the applicants refer in the context of the complaint referred to in point 47 above, they expressed, inter alia, their concerns that the criminal proceedings against the first applicant had not been brought in good faith and on the basis of evidence and that they were unfounded and politically motivated. They substantiated those concerns by referring to the context in which those proceedings were brought and to the analysis of those proceedings by the Egyptian Court of Cassation and considered that they were reinforced by a number of documents relating, first, to respect for the right to a fair trial of the first applicant and, secondly, to respect for the rule of law in Egypt since the departure, in February 2011, of the then President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Mr Mohammed Hosni Mubarak.

90 The applicants attached to their letter of 23 December 2014 the documents supporting those concerns, which were annexed to the application. [confidential].

91 First, there are two reports by the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI), dated November 2011 and February 2014, on the situation of the legal professions in Egypt. The 2011 IBAHRI report, entitled ‘Justice at a Crossroads: the Legal Profession and the Rule of Law in the New Egypt’, was drawn up following a survey by that non-governmental organisation in Egypt in June 2011. Its purpose is, first, to examine the difficulties encountered by lawyers in that country in relation to respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights before the events of 2011 and in the period immediately following them and, secondly, to issue recommendations with a view to ensuring compliance with those principles. The IBAHRI report of 2014, entitled ‘Separating Law and Politics: Challenges to the Independence of Judges and Prosecutors in Egypt’, which is based on a survey conducted in Egypt between June and November 2013, aims to follow up on the recommendations of the 2011 IBAHRI report and focuses more specifically on obstacles to the independence of the Egyptian judiciary.

92 Secondly, the applicants submitted a report by Mr D., a member of a law firm established in the United Kingdom, dated 27 July 2011 and a report by Mr M., a lawyer in Geneva, dated 4 February 2013, relating to several criminal proceedings against the first applicant. It is apparent from those reports that Mr D. and Mr M. were instructed, as observers, by the legal representatives of the first applicant in Egypt in order to assess compliance with the right to a fair trial of the latter in the context of the criminal proceedings brought against him in Egypt.

93 With regard to Mr D’s report, it concerns the investigations of the Prosecutor General of the Arab Republic of Egypt (‘the Egyptian Prosecutor General’) and the hearings held from 7 to 12 May and from 11 to 15 June 2011 in the first criminal proceedings against the applicant, which, as can be seen from the documents in the file, correspond to Procedure No 107 of 2011 in the documents provided by the Egyptian authorities. According to the report, the former Minister of Industry, a senior official of the Ministry of Industry and the first applicant are accused of having conspired to enable the latter to obtain energy licences for two companies in his group in breach of the rules governing the public procedure for awarding such licences to the steel sector.

94 The content of Mr D.’s report is based on a reading of the prosecution’s file, to which the author had access, and on his direct observations during the various hearings he attended. That report includes a description of the elements contained in the prosecution’s case file as set out in the reference to the Criminal Court of 28 February 2011, a report of the hearings, in particular the hearing of witnesses, and a critical analysis of the evidence gathered by the prosecution.

95 In his report, Mr D. criticises, first, the haste with which he believes the Egyptian authorities handled the case in question and, secondly, the conditions in which the hearings he attended took place, which, in his opinion, give rise to breaches of the presumption of innocence and of the rights of the defence of the first applicant. In view of those observations, he concludes in his report that, ‘having seen the manner in which the Learned Judge directed the proceedings, it does not fill one with confidence that he will reach a correct decision in this case [and that] ... under so much public pressure ... [would feel under pressure to] convict the defendants, thereby leaving it to the Court of Cassation to overturn his verdict’.

96 With regard to Mr M.’s report, it concerns the hearings held in 2012 in two of the criminal proceedings against the first applicant, one relating, according to the terms of the report, to charges of fraudulent acquisition of El-Dekheila shares and the other regarding alleged money laundering related to those charges, which correspond, according to the documents in the file, to Cases Nos 38 and 291 of 2011 in the documents provided by the Egyptian authorities.

97 The assessment made by Mr M. in his report is based, first, on the reports drawn up by Mr A., an Egyptian lawyer instructed to attend the hearings on his behalf, Mr M. stating that he had initially chosen not to attend the hearings personally because of the ‘elevated risk to [his] personal safety [arising from] demonstrations carried out in front of the courthouse ... throughout the course of the proceedings against [the first applicant]’ and, secondly, on his direct observation of one of the hearings in Case No 38 of 2011.

98 The first part of Mr M.’s report contains a description of the courtroom as he himself observed it and analyses, in the second part, the various points in respect of which he identified, in Mr A.’s reports, potential infringements of fundamental rights, namely the presence of a metal cage for the detention of accused persons, the presence of guards in the courtroom, auditory difficulties, the insufficiently impartial attitude of the criminal court and the prejudice caused by the media coverage. In view of those observations, he concludes that, ‘under international human rights standards, it is likely [that the first applicant’s] rights have been infringed and that in particular he has not been afforded a fair trial’. Furthermore, ‘[i]n either the acquisition fraud or the money laundering trials, there is therefore a significant risk of [legally] unsafe convictions’.

99 Thirdly, the applicants refer the Council to three judgments of the Egyptian Court of Cassation, of 2 December 2012, 12 May 2013 and 14 December 2013 respectively. In those judgments, the Egyptian Court of Cassation, first, set aside the first instance judgments, which had held the accused, in particular the first applicant, responsible in each of the cases concerned and which had imposed various penalties on them, including fines and imprisonment and, secondly, referred the cases back to the trial judge for a new decision. As can be seen from the Egyptian authorities’ document referred to in paragraph 82 above, those three judgments were delivered in the criminal proceedings in Cases No 107 of 2011 (unlawfully granted energy licences), No 291 of 2011 (money laundering) and No 38 of 2011 (fraudulent acquisition of shares in the company El-Dekheila) respectively.

100 Fourthly, the applicants relied on a judgment of the Criminal Court of the Swiss Confederation (‘the Swiss Federal Criminal Court’) of 12 December 2012 and two judgments of the Constitutional Court of the Principality of Liechtenstein (‘the Liechtenstein Constitutional Court’) of 28 August 2012 and 30 September 2013. Those judgments concern international mutual legal assistance procedures following requests from the Egyptian authorities. The first of those judgments annulled a decision by the Swiss authorities to grant them access to the file of criminal proceedings against Egyptian nationals, in particular for money laundering offences.

101 In its judgment of 12 December 2012, the Swiss Federal Criminal Court relied on a certain amount of public information available in reports of international organisations or in the press to find that, ‘regardless of the problem of respect of human rights in [Egypt], [that country] is currently facing an uncertain internal transition featuring the instability of institutions and [the apparent questioning of the independence] and the existing respect between [the executive and judicial] authorities’. On the basis of this information, the court considered that ‘there [was] a risk that the [applicants] could incur immediate and irreparable prejudice’.

102 The two judgments of the Constitutional Court of Liechtenstein of 28 August 2012 and 30 September 2013 annulled two judicial decisions dismissing the appeal by a company held by the first applicant against an order freezing its assets because of criminal proceedings against the first applicant in Egypt. That court considered that the sources of information on which that company relied, which included, in particular, the 2011 IBAHRI report and the report of Mr M., were sufficient to consider that it had ‘[demonstrated] the danger of infringements of fundamental rights [of the first applicant in Egypt]’, given that it was merely required to plausibly demonstrate that danger.

103 It is apparent from the documents in the case file that the documents in question, with the exception of the above-mentioned IBAHRI report of 2014, had already been communicated by the applicants in order to support, in particular, their first and second pleas in law in Cases T‑375/14 to T‑378/14 and that the Council, which submitted a defence in which it replied to those pleas, had therefore already been aware of them in that context.

104 In the correspondence with the Council prior to the renewal of the applicants’ designation in 2016 and 2017, the applicants submitted certain additional evidence relating to respect for fundamental rights in Egypt.

105 First, the applicants attached to their letter to the Council dated 29 February 2016 a letter from their Egyptian legal representatives concerning the various legal proceedings against the first applicant mentioned by the Egyptian authorities in documents dated 2 January 2016. In particular, in three of these proceedings (Cases Nos 4 of 2011, 274 of 2012 and 376 of 2013), those legal representatives claimed that they had never been informed of the existence of ‘formal’ investigations and that their request for access to the file had been rejected by the Egyptian authorities. Furthermore, in their letters of 14 March 2016, the applicants, relying on the opinion of an Egyptian lawyer annexed to those letters, claimed that their right to be heard had not been respected before the freezing order adopted by the Egyptian authorities in respect of them had been issued.

106 Secondly, in a letter dated 7 March 2017, the applicants drew the Council’s attention to the fact that the first applicant had been remanded in custody as from that date and that they considered that to be a breach of the guarantees enshrined, inter alia, in Article 5 of the ECHR.

(iii) The Council’s treatment of the evidence provided by the applicants

107 First of all, it is apparent from the documents in the case file that the Council replied to the applicants’ letter of 23 December 2014 in its letter of 24 March 2015. That latter letter does not contain any explicit reference to the applicants’ allegations calling into question respect for fundamental rights in Egypt, and in particular the right to a fair trial of the first applicant, nor to the documents mentioned in paragraphs 91 to 102 above, which support those allegations. However, the Council responded to the applicants’ concerns about the basis of the criminal proceedings brought against the first applicant, which were, inter alia, supported by those allegations, in the following terms: ‘[The] Council does not share your view that the circumstances in which the prosecution was brought against your client show there is no evidence for it and that it is politically motivated’.

108 [confidential]

109 Moreover, it is not apparent from the documents in the case file that the Council’s assessment of the applicants’ observations and of the documents gave rise to ad hoc verification with the Egyptian authorities.

110 It therefore follows from all the above that, in the context of the review of the designation of the applicants prior to the adoption of Decision 2015/486, the Council considered, implicitly but necessarily, that the observations and documents in question, irrespective of their relevance and credibility, were not such as to call into question the renewal of Decision 2011/172. In particular, in the light of the PGO memorandum of 9 February 2015 and the Council’s explanations, it has to be assumed that the Council considered that they did not call into question the assessment of respect for fundamental rights in Egypt carried out on the basis, inter alia, of that memorandum and that they therefore did not call for additional verification.

111 As is apparent from the Council’s letters of 21 March 2016 and 22 March 2017 to the first applicant, that position with regard to the applicants’ allegations concerning infringements of the rule of law and of fundamental rights in Egypt did not change when their designation was renewed in 2016 and 2017.

112 First, in its letter of 21 March 2016, the Council stated that the applicants’ complaints concerning the way in which the Egyptian authorities had handled the cases concerning the first applicant should be dealt with under the Egyptian legal system and procedures. Secondly, in its letter of 22 March 2017, it stated that it had assessed the observations of the first applicant concerning the level of protection of his fundamental rights in the judicial proceedings in Egypt and that it had concluded that it was reasonable to continue to support the efforts of the Egyptian authorities to recover the sums lost by the Egyptian State.

113 In that regard, it must be noted that, by the complaint referred to in paragraph 47 above, the applicants submit, in essence, that that position reflects, on the part of the Council, a disregard for the scope of the evidence which they submitted to it and its resulting obligations in respect of that evidence. In the first plea in law, they submit that those errors render Decisions 2015/486, 2016/411 and 2017/496 unlawful in so far as they renew the scheme of restrictive measures in Decision 2011/172 in their entirety. In the second plea in law, they claim that the contested decisions, in so far as they renew their designation, do not comply with the Council’s obligation to respect fundamental rights under Article 6 TEU, in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3(5) TEU and Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter. It is therefore for the General Court, when examining those pleas, to rule on the merits of the Council’s position as regards the evidence submitted to it by the applicants, in the light of the evidence that it otherwise had in its possession relating to the situation in Egypt.

(b) As regards the first plea, alleging that Decisions 2015/486, 2016/411 and 2017/496 and Regulation No 270/2011 are vitiated by illegality

114 This plea consists of two parts, alleging that Decisions 2015/486, 2016/411 and 2017/496 are vitiated by illegality, in so far as they renew Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/172 and that Article 2(1) of Regulation No 270/2011 is unlawful, respectively.

(1) The first part, alleging that Decisions 2015/486, 2016/411 and 2017/496 are vitiated by illegality, in so far as they renew Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/172

115 According to the applicants, even supposing that Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/172 could have been based on the objectives referred to in recital 1 of that decision when it was adopted, that was no longer the case at the date of adoption of Decision 2015/486 because of the changes in the political and judicial context in Egypt reflected by the information which they had transmitted to the Council before that date.

Accordingly, they claim that Decision 2015/486 cannot be based on an objective of support for the new Egyptian authorities because (i) those authorities were deposed after the adoption of Decision 2011/172, (ii) the Egyptian political context is unstable, marked by infringements of fundamental rights and of the rule of law and (iii) because the Council had become aware, through their intervention, of information establishing that the Egyptian authorities did not guarantee fair, impartial and independent judicial treatment of the first applicant, or respect for the rule of law. In the second statement of modification, they further claim that the evidence they provided to establish the lack of legal basis of Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/172 also demonstrates the disproportionate nature of those provisions in relation to the objectives pursued by the Council.

116 The Council disputes that it is open to the applicants to rely on a plea of illegality against Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/172 and Article 2(1) of Regulation No 270/2011, in respect of which, in its view, they could bring an action under Article 263 TFEU. In addition, it contends, in general terms, that the arguments submitted by the applicants in the context of the present plea in law have already been rejected by the General Court and by the Court of Justice. Furthermore, according to the Council, infringement of the criteria for listing is not relevant in respect of the examination of the appropriateness of the legal basis. It also submits that the various circumstances invoked by the applicants in the context of the present plea, namely the political changes in Egypt, the situation of fundamental rights in that country and the alleged infringement of the first applicant’s fundamental rights, are irrelevant in assessing the legality of the measures adopted in the context of Decision 2011/172.

117 It should be noted at the outset that, in the context of this part, the applicants rely on two separate complaints. First, they claim that Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/172, as renewed by Decisions 2015/486, 2016/411 and 2017/496, lacks a legal basis, in that its provisions, it is claimed, no longer meet the objectives of the CFSP. Secondly, they claim, implicitly in the application and the first statement of modification and expressly in the second statement of modification, infringement by the Council of the principle of proportionality on account of the manifestly inappropriate nature of the renewal of those provisions in the light of developments in Egypt.

(i) The complaint alleging lack of legal basis

118 First of all, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, review of the legal basis of an act enables the competence of the author of the act to be verified and the procedure for the adoption of that act to be verified as to whether it is vitiated by any irregularity. Furthermore, the choice of the legal basis for an EU measure must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review, which include the aim and content of that measure (see judgment of 5 March 2015, Ezz and Others v Council, C‑220/14 P, EU:C:2015:147, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited; order of 15 February 2016, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑279/13, not published, EU:T:2016:78, paragraph 47).

119 In the present complaint, the applicants dispute the application, in the present case, of the reasoning by which the General Court, in paragraph 47 of the order of 15 February 2016, Ezz and Others v Council (T‑279/13, unpublished, EU:T:2016:78), held that the ‘social and legal developments’ which had taken place since their original designation, which they relied on in the context of a plea also based on the lack of a legal basis, could only have an impact on the validity of the reasons for the contested decisions and could not be examined in the context of the review of the choice of legal basis for those measures.

120 According to the applicants, it follows from the case-law that, where the aim and content of a measure are premised on a particular social and legal context, the review of its legal basis must necessarily include a consideration of the development of that context.

121 However, it must be pointed out that the reasoning of the General Court criticised by the applicants can be transposed to the present case.

122 In that respect, it should be recalled that, as the General Court held in its judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council (T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraph 44), as regards Decision 2011/172, it is sufficient for that measure to pursue objectives related to those set out in Article 21 TEU for it to be considered as falling within the CFSP. Moreover, as the Court of Justice has held, in view of the broad scope of the aims and objectives of the CFSP, as expressed in Article 3(5) TEU and Article 21 TEU and in the specific provisions relating to the CFSP, in particular Articles 23 and 24 TEU, disputing the validity of that measure in the light of the objectives defined in Article 21 TEU does not establish a lack of legal basis for that measure (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 March 2015, Ezz and Others v Council, C‑220/14 P, EU:C:2015:147, paragraph 46).

123 The same reasoning applies in the context of Decisions 2015/486, 2016/411 and 2017/496, which merely renewed Decision 2011/172 and are part of the same policy aimed, as stated in recital 1 of the latter decision, at supporting Egypt’s political and economic stabilisation process, while respecting the rule of law and fundamental rights.

124 Even supposing that the situation in Egypt in respect of which the Council adopted Decision 2011/172 has evolved, and in a manner contrary to the democratisation process which the policy underpinning that decision is intended to support, that circumstance cannot, in any event, have the result of affecting the competence of that institution to renew that decision on the basis of Article 29 TFEU. Notwithstanding that circumstance, the purposes pursued by Decisions 2015/486, 2016/411 and 2017/496 and the rules whose validity they renew nevertheless fall within the scope of the CFSP, which in the present case is sufficient to dismiss the applicants’ complaint (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 June 2016, Parliament v Council, C‑263/14, EU:C:2016:435, paragraphs 45 to 54).

125 The case-law cited by the applicants cannot call those considerations into question.

126 In the first place, with regard to the judgment of 8 June 2010, Vodafone and Others (C‑58/08, EU:C:2010:321), it suffices to note that the Court did not examine the question as to whether a provision of the EU Treaty falling within the CFSP constituted an appropriate legal basis, but whether this was the case with regard to Article 95(1) EC (now Article 114(1) TFEU), which implies an examination of the general context and the specific circumstances of the area harmonised by the measure adopted on that basis, as those circumstances existed at the time of its adoption (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 June 2010, Vodafone and Others, C‑58/08, EU:C:2010:321, paragraphs 32 to 35 and 39 to 47). The Court’s reasoning in that judgment cannot therefore be transposed in the present case.

127 In the second place, as regards paragraphs 191 to 193 of the judgment of 11 July 2007, Sison v Council (T‑47/03, not published, EU:T:2007:207), those points relate to the General Court’s examination of a plea alleging failure to state reasons and not a plea alleging lack of legal basis. They are therefore irrelevant.

128 In the third place, as regards paragraph 110 of the judgment of 22 April 2015, Tomana and Others v Council and Commission (T‑190/12, EU:T:2015:222), it should be noted that this paragraph must be read in the context of the reasoning of the General Court. By that reasoning, the Court did not seek to review the validity of the assessments made by the Council on the development of the situation in Zimbabwe and on the need to maintain the restrictive measures adopted in the light of that development, but only to verify whether, by those measures, the Council had sought to pursue CFSP objectives (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 April 2015, Tomana and Others v Council and Commission, T‑190/12, EU:T:2015:222, paragraphs 93 to 111).

129 Accordingly, the complaint based on a lack of a legal basis must be rejected.

(ii) The complaint alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality

130 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, in general, the Council has a broad discretion to adopt acts in the framework of the CFSP, which is an area involving political, economic and social choices on its part, in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 120 and case-law cited). Similarly, the case-law recognises that the Council has a broad margin of discretion in defining the general criteria defining the circle of persons who may be the subject of restrictive measures, in the light of the objectives on which those measures are based (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 41, and of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraph 48). A margin of discretion of the same scope must therefore be recognised in respect of extension of the application of those criteria.

131 It is therefore not for the General Court to rule, in the context of the present action, on the merits of the Council’s policy of support for the political stabilisation process in Egypt, referred to in recital 1 of Decision 2011/172, within the framework of which that decision and subsequent decisions fall.

132 Similarly, it is not for the General Court to substitute its assessment for that of the Council as to the geographical or political context to which Decision 2011/172 relates and the need to renew it in the light of that context. It is for the Court merely to examine whether, in assessing that need, the Council manifestly failed to appreciate the importance and gravity of the factors relating to the Egyptian political and judicial context put forward by the applicants, in the light of the other information at its disposal and the objectives of that decision.

133 It is in the light of those considerations that the various arguments put forward by the applicants in support of the present plea must be examined.

– The first argument, alleging that the ‘new Egyptian authorities’, supported by the Council, have been deposed

134 To start with, the applicants’ argument that Decision 2011/172 could no longer be considered as forming part of a ‘policy of supporting the new Egyptian authorities’, in accordance with paragraph 44 of the judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council (T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93), as those authorities had been deposed, is based on false premises.

135 First, in the light of the purpose of Decision 2011/172, recalled in paragraph 64 above, the restrictive measures imposed in that context must, in principle, be maintained until the conclusion of the legal proceedings in Egypt in order to retain their effectiveness. Therefore, the renewal of these measures cannot depend on successive changes of government in the political transition process following Mr Mubarak’s departure in February 2011.

136 Secondly, it is clear from paragraph 44 of the judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council (T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93), that, by the expression ‘policy of supporting the new Egyptian authorities’ the General Court intended to refer to the ‘readiness to support the peaceful and orderly transition to a civilian and democratic government in Egypt based on the rule of law, with full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’, which is set out in recital 1 of Decision 2011/172. It is true that, as is apparent from the IBAHRI report of 2014, the President of the Republic elected in Egypt in June 2012 in the context of the democratic transition process, Mr Mohammed Morsi, was removed from office in June 2013. However, contrary to the applicants’ assumption, the terms of that recital do not suggest that the policy of support for that process was limited to the support of the government formed by that leader, which was the first civilian government to emerge from elections following Mr Mubarak’s departure in 2011. In any event, as indicated in paragraph 131 above, it is not for the General Court to rule on whether that policy of support remained relevant after Mr Morsi was removed from office.

137 Those considerations clearly cannot be called into question [confidential]. Indeed, it is sufficient to recall that, as indicated in paragraph 135 above, those measures must, in principle, be maintained until the conclusion of judicial proceedings in that country in order to ensure their effectiveness.

138 The argument that the Egyptian ‘new authorities’ have been deposed must therefore be rejected.

– The second argument, alleging risks caused by the instability of the Egyptian political context and alleged infringements of the rule of law and fundamental rights

139 At the outset, it should be noted that, as the applicants maintain, the evidence they produced, in particular that resulting from the IBAHRI reports, point to significant political and institutional instability in Egypt following Mr Mubarak’s departure on 11 February 2011, which, as is apparent from the applicants’ answer of 1 June 2017 to the questions of the General Court, continued until the adoption of a new constitution in January 2014 and the election of Mr Al-Sissi as President of the Republic a few months later. It also follows from those documents that the political context of that period was marked by significant tensions between the authorities and political opponents, giving rise to the loss of human lives.

140 As regards the judicial context, the documents in question suggest that the political tensions referred to in paragraph 139 above have resulted, inter alia, in a repressive criminal policy targeting political opponents and an insufficient level of protection of fundamental rights. Reference is also made to repeated interference or attempts by the executive authorities to interfere with the prerogatives of the judicial authorities, at least during Mr Morsi’s term of office. Similarly, these documents reflect the intense media coverage of criminal proceedings against former leaders and their relatives, in particular those against Mr Mubarak and the first applicant, and the pressure of public opinion that sought to have those persons held responsible and that feared that that process would be compromised by failures of the judicial system.

141 Those documents also contain a description of the functioning of the Egyptian judicial system during the reporting period. Thus, those documents refer to characteristics of that system which, according to their authors, weaken the protection of fundamental rights by the Egyptian judicial authorities, which protection is, in principle, ensured by the legal framework imposed on them. Among those characteristics are mentioned, in particular, the powers conferred on the executive to appoint prosecutors and in respect of the careers of judges, as well as problems relating to the method of recruitment and training of judges in the field of, inter alia, international standards relating to fundamental rights. Those characteristics also include the material conditions in which the criminal hearings described in the reports of Mr D. and Mr M. have been conducted, some of which, according to those reports, appear not to be specific to the hearings described and which, according to their authors, indicate that not all the guarantees resulting from the right to a fair trial are guaranteed.

142 Furthermore, it also follows from those documents that, first, in its judgment of 12 December 2012, the Swiss Federal Criminal Court relied on evidence relating to the political instability prevailing in Egypt in 2012 and on evidence testifying to executive interference in judicial cases, based on various public sources and that, secondly, in its judgments of 28 August 2012 and 30 September 2013, the Constitutional Court of Liechtenstein considered that the evidence of the 2011 IBAHRI report concerning the Egyptian judicial system as well as the evidence of the report of Mr M. was such as to suggest a risk of infringement of the fundamental rights of the first applicant in Egypt.

143 However, even assuming that all the facts referred to in the documents in question can be regarded as established, they cannot, in any event, demonstrate that the renewal of Decision 2011/172 by Decision 2015/486 was manifestly contrary to the objectives referred to in recital 1 of that decision.

144 In the first place, those facts do not lead to the conclusion that the political and institutional instability that characterised the Egyptian political context between 2011 and 2014 would have had the effect of undermining any capacity of the Egyptian judicial system to guarantee respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights, and that the freezing of assets enacted by Decision 2011/172 as part of a policy aimed, inter alia, at ensuring respect for those principles would therefore have become manifestly inappropriate.

145 It is true that it is apparent from the documents in question that the political and institutional instability in Egypt may have been a factor of uncertainty, particularly in 2012, as to the risk of interference by the executive in pending cases to the extent that, from the point of view of a European court, it would justify the annulment of legal assistance measures.

146 However, that instability could not be sufficient justification for the Council to discontinue the renewal of Decision 2011/172, in view of the evidence otherwise available to it on the date when Decision 2015/486 was adopted. First of all, [confidential]. Secondly, none of the evidence provided by the applicants suggests that the criminal proceedings against the persons referred to in Decision 2011/172 in Egypt have been affected by that instability. Finally, when adopting Decisions 2015/486, 2016/411 and 2017/496, the Council had at its disposal an up-to-date report of the criminal proceedings in question (see paragraphs 87 and 88 above) concerning the persons designated in the annex to Decision 2011/172, which did not indicate that the proceedings had been thus affected, as they appeared to have followed their normal course, and in some cases even led to the closure of the case in the absence of evidence or to the annulment of the sentences imposed on those persons by the Egyptian Court of Cassation.

147 Furthermore, the same conclusion must be drawn from the alleged infringements of fundamental rights committed in Egypt during the reporting period, in the context of clashes between the authorities and demonstrators, in particular political opponents, and a repressive criminal policy against the latter. Indeed, it does not appear from the evidence provided by the applicants that those infringements, even if presumed to have occurred, could have had an influence on the criminal proceedings concerning the alleged perpetrators of misappropriation of State funds in respect of which Decision 2011/172 was adopted. With regard to the evidence relating to those criminal proceedings, it must be noted that, while it suggests that the conduct of some of them may have come under pressure from public opinion, it cannot be inferred from this that those proceedings, as a whole, were systematically vitiated by infringements of the right to a fair trial and respect for the presumption of innocence.

148 Those considerations are not called into question by the evidence relating to the functioning of the judicial system which emerges, in particular, from the IBAHRI reports of Mr D. and Mr M. It is true that those reports refer to shortcomings in the protection of the independence of the judicial authorities by the Egyptian legal framework and to practical problems that are likely to weaken the practical implementation of respect for fundamental rights within that system. However, they do not suggest that those circumstances would systematically undermine the ability of the Egyptian judicial authorities to ensure respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights in criminal proceedings such as those on which the Council relied as the basis for Decision 2011/172.

149 Nor are those considerations called into question by the judgment of the Swiss Federal Criminal Court of 12 December 2012 and the judgments of the Constitutional Court of Liechtenstein of 28 August 2012 and 30 September 2013, relied on by the applicants. Even if the judicial measures annulled by those courts were comparable to the measures adopted in the context of Decision 2011/172, it follows, in any event, from those judgments that they were taken in the light of factual and legal circumstances different from those which are relevant to the present plea in law. First, it should be noted that, in those judgments, the courts in question ruled on the facts which could be taken into account in 2012 and 2013, respectively, and not on facts which occurred subsequently. Secondly, the annulled measures did not constitute a scheme of measures, but individual measures, and it was not necessary, in order to put an end to those measures, to demonstrate, as in the present case, the risk of systematic infringements of fundamental rights in the Egyptian judicial context.

150 Finally, the additional documents concerning the general situation of the rule of law and fundamental rights produced by the applicants in 2016 and 2017 do not justify a different analysis with regard to Decision 2016/411 and Decision 2017/496.

151 First, the statements made on behalf of the European Union between 2011 and 2016, which the applicants rely on in the first statement of modification, do not concern the judicial proceedings on which the Council relied in Decision 2011/172. Furthermore, the fact that EU authorities express their concerns about infringements of fundamental rights and breaches of the rule of law committed in Egypt, or request the Egyptian authorities to refrain from such infringements or breaches, including in the judicial context, does not in itself preclude the Council from assisting those same authorities in specific judicial proceedings. In particular, it should be noted that, in the context of a policy aimed, in particular, at respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights in Egypt, assisting the Egyptian authorities in combating the misappropriation of state funds is not contrary to the expression of concerns or requests seeking to ensure respect for those principles by those authorities themselves, but is, on the contrary, complementary to such concerns.

152 Secondly, with regard to the report of the International Commission of Jurists, dated September 2016, entitled ‘Egypt’s judiciary: A Tool of Repression, Lack of Effective Guarantee of Independence and Accountability’, it is not apparent from any of the evidence in the case file that the applicants communicated that report to the Council prior to the adoption of Decision 2017/496. Therefore, the Council cannot be accused of failing to take into account the evidence contained in that report in determining whether or not the renewal of Decision 2011/172 was consistent with the objectives of the policy under which it was made. Moreover, it is true that that evidence converges with that contained in the IBAHRI reports with regard to the functioning of the Egyptian judicial system, including for the period after that covered by the latter reports. However, that evidence does not relate to the criminal proceedings on which the Council has relied and does not suggest that the ability of that judicial system to ensure respect for fundamental rights is systematically compromised with regard to those proceedings.

153 In the second place, the evidence provided by the applicants does not demonstrate that the Council committed a manifest error of assessment by considering that it had sufficient information at its disposal to consider it reasonable to continue the cooperation with the Egyptian authorities undertaken in the framework of Decision 2011/172, without it being necessary for it to carry out further verification.

154 The applicants do not establish that, by implicitly but necessarily making such an assessment, the Council manifestly erred in weighing up the various factors relevant to the continuation of that cooperation, which involved, in particular, taking into account, first, the purpose of that cooperation and, secondly, the objectives of the policy within which that cooperation was provided, namely support for Egypt’s political and economic stabilisation process while respecting the rule of law and fundamental rights.

155 In that regard, in so far as the sole purpose of the scheme of restrictive measures laid down by Decision 2011/172 is to assist the Egyptian authorities with establishing any misappropriation of state funds that has taken place and to ensure that it remains possible for those authorities to recover the proceeds of misappropriation, it cannot be excluded that the renewal of that scheme is still valid, even in the event of political and judicial developments unfavourable to the progress of democracy, the rule of law or respect for fundamental rights. Accordingly, it was for the Council to assess whether, in the light of the evidence at its disposal, it could reasonably consider that continued assistance to the Egyptian authorities in the fight against the misappropriation of state funds remained, even in such a context, an appropriate means of promoting the objectives of political stability and respect for the rule of law in the country.

156 First, as noted in paragraphs 144 to 152 above, the evidence provided by the applicants alone does not make it possible to conclude that the capacity of the Egyptian judicial authorities to guarantee respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights in the judicial proceedings on which Decision 2011/172 is based is definitively compromised by those political and judicial developments.

157 Secondly, the Council could take into consideration the existence of guarantees offered by the Egyptian legal framework. Thus, it was apparent from the IBAHRI reports that, on the one hand, Egypt is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and to regional instruments of international law relating to the protection of fundamental rights and that, on the other hand, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by the Egyptian Constitution, with progress in this area having been made by the new Constitution adopted in February 2014. Furthermore, it was apparent from the particulars of the PGO memorandum of 9 February 2015 mentioned in paragraph 86 above, concerning the remedies offered by Egyptian criminal procedure to the persons designated by Decision 2011/172, that those procedures were part of a legal framework offering guarantees as to the effective judicial protection of the persons concerned. Moreover, as pointed out in paragraph 146 above, it was apparent from the updated report on the criminal proceedings in question also provided by the Egyptian authorities for the purpose of adopting Decisions 2015/486, 2016/411 and 2017/496 that some of the persons designated in the annex to Decision 2011/172 had obtained the annulment of their convictions.

158 In that regard, with regard, in particular, to the PGO memorandum of 9 February 2015, the applicants cannot argue that it is inadmissible in respect of the present plea in so far as it seeks the annulment of Decision 2015/486, since it is common ground that the Council was able to rely on its content in order to adopt that decision. Furthermore, as noted in paragraph 88 above, the content of that memorandum was taken up in the NCRAA memorandum of 5 December 2016, provided to the applicants prior to the adoption of Decision 2017/496. Furthermore, in its written response, dated 21 April 2017, to a measure of organisation of procedure, the Council added those memoranda to the case file. The applicants were therefore able to make observations with respect to the content of that document, including in their written response, dated 1 June 2017, to the General Court’s questions and at the hearing.

159 Finally, as underlined in paragraph 151 above, the fact that the Council is assisting the Egyptian authorities in the fight against the misappropriation of state funds does not run counter to the concerns and demands expressed by the European Union authorities regarding possible infringements of fundamental rights and the rule of law committed in Egypt.

160 Consequently, the Council did not commit a manifest error of assessment in considering that it had sufficient evidence at its disposal concerning the Egyptian political and judicial context to continue the cooperation with the Egyptian authorities undertaken in the framework of Decision 2011/172 and that the evidence produced by the applicants did not justify additional verification before the renewal of that decision.

– The third argument, alleging that there is a risk that the first applicant’s right to a fair trial may not be respected in the criminal proceedings against him in Egypt

161 As regards this argument, it should be noted that, even if the evidence produced by the applicants indicates a risk that the Egyptian authorities do not guarantee the first applicant’s right to a fair trial, that circumstance is only likely to affect, if applicable, the legality of the renewal of the applicants’ designation in the annex to Decision 2011/172. However, it is not likely to affect the legality of the renewal of the scheme of freezing of funds provided for in Article 1(1) of that decision.

162 The criteria set out in Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/172 provide, in a general and abstract manner, for the designation of persons responsible for misappropriation of Egyptian state funds and persons associated with them. Those criteria do not imply the existence of a link between the designation of those persons and the specific criminal proceedings against the first applicant.

163 Moreover, the risk of infringements of the first applicant’s right to a fair trial cannot, by itself, constitute an indication of systematic infringements of that right likely to affect the rights of all the persons designated in the annex to Decision 2011/172.

164 Consequently, in so far as it supports a plea of illegality in respect of Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/172, as renewed by Decision 2015/486, the present argument is ineffective. That argument can only be relevant in the context of the second plea, alleging breach, by the contested decisions, of the obligation to respect fundamental rights. It must therefore be examined in that context.

165 Accordingly, it follows from all the above that the applicants have not demonstrated the manifestly inappropriate nature of the renewal, by Decisions 2015/486, 2016/411 and 2017/496, of Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/172 in the light of the situation in Egypt and, consequently, the existence of a breach of the principle of proportionality. The first part of the present plea must therefore be rejected as a whole, without there being any need to examine the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Council, in the defence, against the plea of illegality on which that part is based (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).

(2) The second part of the plea, alleging that Article 2(1) of Regulation No 270/2011 has no legal basis

166 The applicants invoke the lack of a legal basis for Regulation No 270/2011 which, in their view, cannot be based either on Article 215(3) TEU, in the absence of a valid decision, or on Article 215(2) TEU, in the absence of a link between them and the government of a third country.

167 In that regard, it suffices to note, first, that, as is apparent from paragraphs 118 to 165 above, the present plea of illegality, in so far as it relates to Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/172, as renewed by Decisions 2015/486, 2016/411 and 2017/496, must be rejected and, secondly, that the General Court has ruled, in the context of the applicants’ actions in Cases T‑256/11 and T‑279/13, that Regulation No 270/2011 was lawfully based on Article 215(2) TFEU, as that provision allows restrictive measures to be adopted against any person, provided that they have been provided for by a decision adopted within the framework of the CFSP (judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council,T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 30 to 33, and order of 15 February 2016, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑279/13, not published, EU:T:2016:78, paragraph 49). The present plea of illegality is therefore unfounded and, there being no need to examine its admissibility, should be rejected.

168 Therefore, this part and, accordingly, the first plea in its entirety must be rejected.

(c) The second plea in law, alleging infringement by the Council of Article 6 TEU, in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 TEU and Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter

169 The second plea in law consists of two parts.

170 In the first part, the applicants argue that, pursuant to Article 6 TEU, in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3(5) TEU, the Council is under an obligation to promote fundamental rights. The applicants claim that the Council, first, failed to satisfy itself that their fundamental rights had been observed and, moreover, proceeded on the basis of an irrefutable presumption that the Egyptian authorities conducted themselves in accordance with those rights, contrary to the requirements of the case-law (judgments of 21 December 2011, N. S. and Others, C‑411/10 and C‑493/10, EU:C:2011:865, paragraphs 105 and 106, and of 16 October 2014, LTTE v Council, T‑208/11 and T‑508/11, EU:T:2014:885, paragraph 139). They believe that their right to a fair trial and to the presumption of innocence, enshrined in Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter, has been infringed in the judicial proceedings against them in Egypt. In their response of 4 October 2017 to the General Court’s question regarding the impact of the judgment of 26 July 2017 in Council v LTTE (C‑599/14 P, EU:C:2017:583) on the present case, the applicants claim that that judgment confirms their position.

171 Furthermore, as indicated in paragraph 164 above, the argument raised by the applicants in the first part of the first plea is also relevant to the present plea, alleging that the objectives of Decision 2011/172 referred to i