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Must Article 56 TFEU, the requirement of transparency, the principle of equality and the EU-law prohibition of preferential treatment be interpreted as precluding the imposition of penalties for the intermediation of bets on sporting competitions, without a German authorisation, on behalf of a betting organiser licensed in another EU Member State in a situation characterised by the Glücksspieländerungsstaatsvertrag (State Treaty amending the provisions on games of chance) (‘the GlüÄndStV’), applicable for a period of nine years and containing an ‘experimental clause for bets on sporting competitions’, which, for a period of seven years, provides for the theoretical possibility of awarding also to non-State-owned betting organisers a maximum of 20 licences, legally effective in all German Länder, as a necessary condition of authorisation to operate as an intermediary, where: (a) the licensing procedure and disputes raised in that connection are managed by the licensing authority in conjunction with the law firm which has regularly advised most of the Länder and their lottery undertakings on matters relating to the monopoly on sports betting that is contrary to EU law and represented them before the national courts in proceedings against private betting suppliers, and was entrusted with the task of representing the State authorities in the preliminary ruling proceedings in Markus Stoß [and Others, C-316/07, C-358/07, C-359/07, C-360/07, C-409/07 and C-410/07, EU:C:2010:504], Carmen Media [Group, C-46/08, EU:C:2010:505] and Winner Wetten [C-409/06, EU:C:2010:503]; (b) the call for tenders for licences published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 8 August 2012 gave no details of the minimum requirements applicable to the proposals to be submitted, the content of the other declarations and evidence required or the selection of the maximum of 20 licensees, such details not having been communicated until after the expiry of the deadline for submission of tenders, in a so-called ‘information memorandum’ and numerous other documents, and only to tenderers who had qualified for the ‘second stage’ of the licensing procedure; (c) eight months after the start of the procedure, the licensing authority, contrary to the call for tenders, invites only 14 tenderers to present their social responsibility and safety policies in person, because these have fulfilled all of the minimum conditions for a licence, but, 15 months after the start of the procedure, announces that not one of the tenderers has provided ‘verifiable’ evidence that it fulfilled the minimum conditions; (d) the State-controlled tenderer ‘Ods’ (Ods Deutschland Sportwetten GmbH), consisting of a consortium of State-owned lottery companies, is one of the 14 tenderers invited to present their proposals to the licensing authority but, because of its organisational links to organisers of sporting events, is probably not eligible for a licence because the law (Paragraph 21(3) of the GlüÄndStV) requires a strict separation of active sport and the bodies organising it from the organisation and intermediation of bets on sporting competitions; (e) one of the requirements for a licence is to demonstrate ‘the lawful origin of the resources necessary to organise the intended offer of sports betting facilities’; (f) the licensing authority and the gaming board that decides on the award of licences, consisting of representatives from the Länder, do not avail themselves of the possibility of awarding licences to private betting organisers, whereas State-owned lottery undertakings are permitted to organise bets on sporting competitions, lotteries and other games of chance without a licence, and to operate and advertise them via their nationwide network of commercial betting outlets, for up to a year after the award of any licences?