ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
In the event that Questions 1 and 2 are answered in the negative:

Is Article 7(4) of Directive 2002/65/EC to be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which provides that, after withdrawal from a distance consumer loan contract has been declared, the supplier must also pay to the consumer, beyond the sum he has received from the consumer in accordance with the distance contract, compensation for the benefit of use on this sum?
Case C-207/18: Action brought on 22 March 2018 — European Commission v Kingdom of Spain

Action brought on 22 March 2018 — European Commission v Kingdom of Spain

(Case C-207/18)

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: É. Gippini Fournier, G. von Rintelen and J. Samnadda, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Kingdom of Spain

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by failing to adopt, by 10 April 2016 at the latest, all of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market ( 1 ) or, in any event, by failing to notify those measures to the Commission, the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 43 of that directive;

— impose on the Kingdom of Spain, in accordance with Article 260(3) TFEU, a daily penalty payment of EUR 123928,64, with effect from the date of delivery of the judgment declaring the failure to fulfil the obligation to adopt, or, in any event, to notify to the Commission, the measures necessary to comply with Directive 2014/26/EU;

— order the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Under Article 43(1) of Directive 2014/26/EU, Member States were required to adopt and publish, by 10 April 2016 at the latest, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with that directive, and immediately to inform the Commission thereof.

Given that the Kingdom of Spain has failed fully to transpose Directive 2014/26/EU and has failed to notify the Commission of the transposition measures, the Commission has instituted the present proceedings before the Court of Justice.

The Commission proposes that the Kingdom of Spain should be ordered to pay, from the date of delivery of the judgment, a daily penalty of EUR 123928,64, calculated with due regard to the seriousness and duration of the infringement as well as to the need to ensure a deterrent effect in the light of the financial capacity of that Member State.

( 1 ) OJ 2014 L 84, p. 72.
iii)

in so far as the answer to (ii) requires that EU trade mark court to identify whether the undertaking has taken active steps in Member State B, which criteria are to be taken into account in determining whether the undertaking has taken such active steps?
3.

Must the provisions of the VAT directive and, insofar as they are concerned, the fundamental principle of respect for the rights of the defence and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, be interpreted as precluding national practice under which the findings, in the context of the inspection of the parties to a legal relationship to which the tax liability relates, made by the tax authorities at the conclusion of a procedure instigated in respect of the issuer of the invoices and including the finding that that issuer actively participated in tax evasion, must be taken into account as a matter of course by the tax authorities when carrying out an inspection in respect of the recipient of the invoices, it being understood that that recipient has no rights attaching to the status of a party in the inspection procedure carried out at the premises of the issuer of the invoices, and cannot therefore exercise any right of appeal in an inspection procedure the findings of which must be taken into account as a matter of course by the tax authorities in the inspection procedure concerning the tax liability of the recipient and may be adopted as evidence against that recipient, and that [the tax authorities] do not make available to the recipient the relevant files relating to the inspection carried out in respect of the issuer, in particular the documents underpinning the findings, the reports and administrative decisions, but disclose only part of them to the recipient in the form of a summary, the tax authorities thus apprising the recipient of the contents of the files only indirectly, making a selection according to their own criteria and over which the recipient may exercise no control?
1.

Does Article 1(1) of Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses ( 1 ) apply when an undertaking ceases to hold the contract for the service it is engaged to provide for a client as a result of termination of the contract for the provision of the service, in a labour-intensive business (cleaning of facilities), and the new holder of the contract for the services takes over the majority of the employees assigned to the performance of that service, when those employment contracts are taken over in accordance with the terms of the collective agreement on employment in the cleaning sector?
Case C-175/18 P: Appeal brought on 6 March 2018 by PTC Therapeutics International Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 5 February 2018 in Case T-718/15: PTC Therapeutics International Ltd v European Medicines Agency (EMA)

Appeal brought on 6 March 2018 by PTC Therapeutics International Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 5 February 2018 in Case T-718/15: PTC Therapeutics International Ltd v European Medicines Agency (EMA)

(Case C-175/18 P)

Parties

Appellant: PTC Therapeutics International Ltd (represented by: G. Castle, Solicitor, B. Kelly, Solicitor, K. Ewert, Rechtsanwalt, M. Demetriou QC, C. Thomas, Barrister)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Medicines Agency, European Confederation of Pharmaceutical Entrepreneurs (Eucope)

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— grant PTC’s appeal and set aside the judgment of the General Court;

— annul the decision communicated by the EMA to PTC on 25 November 2015 to release certain information under the Transparency Regulation ( 1 );

— remit the said decision back to the EMA for further consideration regarding redaction of confidential passages for consultation with PTC; and

— order the EMA to pay PTC’s legal and other costs and expenses in relation to this matter.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The judgment should be annulled for the following reasons:

— the General Court failed to find that the documents in issue were protected by a general presumption of confidentiality;

— the General Court failed to find that the documents in issue in their entirety constitute commercially confidential information that is protected by Article 4(2) of the Transparency Regulation;

— the General Court failed to find that the documents in issue should be protected by Article 4(3) of the Transparency Regulation; and

— the EMA failed to carry out a balancing exercise as required by law.

( 1 ) Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001, L 145, p. 43).
Case C-224/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Poland) lodged on 28 March 2018 — Budimex S.A.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Poland) lodged on 28 March 2018 — Budimex S.A.

(Case C-224/18)

Referring court

Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Budimex S.A.

Other party to the proceedings: Minister Finansów

Question referred

In a situation where the parties to a transaction have agreed that payment for construction works or construction/installation works requires express acceptance by the client of their performance in the formal record of acceptance for the works, does the performance of services, for the purposes of Article 63 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, ( 1 ) in respect of such a transaction occur at the time of actual performance of the construction or construction/installation works, or at the time of acceptance of the performance of the works by the client, expressed in the formal record of acceptance?

( 1 ) OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.
3.

When there are pending court proceedings concerning the validity of a patent for a pharmaceutical drug and whether a generic product infringes that patent, and it is not possible to determine the likelihood of either party succeeding in those proceedings, is there a restriction of competition ‘by object’ for the purpose of Article 101(1) when the parties make an agreement to settle that litigation whereby: (a) the generic company agrees not to enter the market with its generic product and not to continue its challenge to the patent for the duration of the agreement (which is no longer than the unexpired period of the patent), and (b) the patent holder agrees to make a transfer of value to the generic company in an amount substantially greater than the avoided litigation costs (including management time and disruption) and which does not constitute payment for any goods or services supplied to the patent holder?
Case C-306/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Krajský soud v Ostravě — pobočka v Olomouci (Czech Republic) lodged on 7 May 2018 — KORADO, a.s. v Generální ředitelství cel

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Krajský soud v Ostravě — pobočka v Olomouci (Czech Republic) lodged on 7 May 2018 — KORADO, a.s. v Generální ředitelství cel

(Case C-306/18)

Referring court

Krajský soud v Ostravě — pobočka v Olomouci

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: KORADO, a.s.

Defendant: Generální ředitelství cel

Questions referred

1. Is Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/23 ( 1 ) of 5 January 2015, in which the goods described in column 1 of the table in the annex are classified under sub-heading 7 307 93 19 of the Combined Nomenclature, valid?

2. If that Regulation is invalid, could the articles concerned be classified under sub-heading 7 322 19 00 of the Combined Nomenclature?

3. If that Regulation is valid, must the articles concerned be classified under sub-heading 7 307 93 19 of the Combined Nomenclature?

( 1 ) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/23 of 5 January 2015 concerning the classification of certain goods in the Combined Nomenclature, OJ 2015 L 4, p. 15.
Case C-327/18: Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland) made on 18 May 2018 — Minister for Justice and Equality v R O

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland) made on 18 May 2018 — Minister for Justice and Equality v R O

(Case C-327/18)

Referring court

High Court (Ireland)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Minister for Justice and Equality

Defendant: R O

Questions referred

Having regard to:

(a) the giving by the United Kingdom of notice under Article 50 of the TEU;

(b) the uncertainty as to the arrangements which will be put in place between the European Union and the United Kingdom to govern relations after the departure of the United Kingdom; and

(c) the consequential uncertainty as to the extent to which the respondent would, in practice, be able to enjoy rights under the Treaties, the Charter or relevant legislation, should he be surrendered to the United Kingdom and remain incarcerated after the departure of the United Kingdom,

1. Is a requested Member State required by European Union Law to decline to surrender to the United Kingdom a person the subject of a European arrest warrant, whose surrender would otherwise be required under the national law of the Member State, (i) In all cases? (ii) In some cases, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case? (iii) In no cases?

2. If the answer to Question 1 is that set out at (ii) what are the criteria or considerations which a court in the requested Member State must assess to determine whether surrender is prohibited?

3. In the context of Question 2 is the court of the requested Member State required to postpone the final decision on the execution of the European arrest warrant to await greater clarity about the relevant legal regime which is to be put in place after the withdrawal of the relevant requesting Member State from the Union (i) in all cases? (ii) In some cases, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case? (iii) In no cases?
Case C-255/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 11 April 2018 — State Street Bank International GmbH v Banca d’Italia

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 11 April 2018 — State Street Bank International GmbH v Banca d’Italia

(Case C-255/18)

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: State Street Bank International GmbH

Defendant: Banca d’Italia

Questions referred

1. Should the ‘changes of status’ that do not have an effect on the contribution requirement under Article 12 of Regulation 2015/63 ( 1 ) include the merger by acquisition of an institution previously subject to supervision by a national resolution authority with its parent company in another Member State during the contribution period, and does this rule also apply where the merger and the resulting dissolution of the institution took place in 2015, at a time when the Member State had not yet formally established either the national resolution authority or the national resolution fund and the contributions had not yet been calculated?

2. Is Article 12 of Regulation 2015/63, in conjunction with Article 14 of that regulation and Articles 103 and 104 of Directive 2014/59, ( 2 ) to be interpreted as meaning that also in the case of the merger of an institution by acquisition with a parent company in another Member State during the contribution period, the institution is required to pay the contribution for that period in full, not on a pro rata basis according to the months when the institution was subject to supervision by the resolution authority of the first Member State, by analogy with the rules laid down for ‘newly supervised’ institutions under Article 12(1) of the regulation?

3. Are Directive 2014/59, Regulation 2015/63 and the principles governing the system of banking crisis resolution tools to be interpreted as meaning that the rules laid down for the ordinary contribution, in particular Article 12(2) of Regulation 2015/63, also apply, with regard to the timing of the identification of institutions required to contribute and the amount of the contribution, to the extraordinary contribution, bearing in mind the nature of that contribution and the conditions under which it may be imposed?

( 1 ) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 of 21 October 2014 supplementing Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to ex ante contributions to resolution financing arrangements (OJ 2015 L 11, p. 44).

( 2 ) Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2014 L 173, p. 190).
If Question 1 itself is not answered in the affirmative:

Must Article 56 TFEU and Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services and Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC be interpreted as precluding the imposition of cumulative fines for infringements of formal obligations in connection with the cross-border deployment of labour which have no absolute upper limits?
1.

Must Article 56 TFEU and Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services ( 1 ) and Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC ( 2 ) be interpreted as precluding a national provision which, for infringements of formal obligations in connection with the cross-border deployment of labour, such as failure by the hiring-out entity to make documents relating to pay available to the third-party employer, provides for very high fines, in particular high minimum penalties, which are imposed cumulatively in respect of each worker concerned?
Case C-257/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Centrale Raad van Beroep (Netherlands) lodged on 13 April 2018 — M. Güler v Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Centrale Raad van Beroep (Netherlands) lodged on 13 April 2018 — M. Güler v Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen

(Case C-257/18)

Referring court

Centrale Raad van Beroep

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: M. Güler

Defendant: Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen

Questions referred

1. Can a Turkish national who is duly registered as belonging to the labour force of a Member State, has obtained the nationality of that Member State without renouncing his Turkish nationality and subsequently voluntarily renounced the nationality of that Member State and thus Union citizenship rely on Article 6 of Decision 3/80 ( 1 ) to avoid the residence requirement under the TW? ( 2 )

2. If so, at what point must that Turkish national satisfy the requirement that he is not a Union citizen in order to derive rights from Article 6 of Decision 3/80: right from the time he leaves the host Member State or only later, when the benefit to be exported is payable in the foreign country?

3. Is Article 6(1) of Decision 3/80 to be construed as meaning that a Turkish national who still held the nationality of a Member State at the time of remigration to Turkey but later voluntarily renounced that nationality, from that latter point onwards may not be denied the right to a special benefit not based on non-contributory payments designed to guarantee an income to the amount of the guaranteed minimum income in the Member State concerned, solely because he is resident in Turkey, even if, until the time of departure from the Member State concerned, he was not eligible for that special benefit since the award conditions had not then be satisfied?

( 1 ) Decision No 3/80 of the Association Council of 19 September 1980 on the application of the social security schemes of the Member States of the European Communities to Turkish workers and members of their families (OJ 1983 C 110, p. 60).

( 2 ) Wet van 6 november 1986, houdende verlening van toeslagen tot het relevante sociaal minimum aan uitkeringsgerechtigden op grond van de Werkloosheidswet, de Ziektewet, de Algemene Arbeidsongeschiktheidswet, de Wet op de arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering en de Wet arbeidsongeschiktheidsvoorziening militairen (toeslagenwet) (Law of 6 November 1986 on the award of supplements to the relevant social minimum to persons entitled to benefits under the Law on unemployment, the Law on sicknes, the general Law on incapacity for work, the Law on insurance against incapacity for work, and the Law on incapacity for work of members of the armed forces).
(2)

Is national case-law according to which the court determining an application to vary a coercive measure of ‘remand in custody’ that has already been adopted is required to state the reasons for its decision without comparing the inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, even if the accused’s lawyer has submitted arguments to that effect — the only reason for that restriction being that the judge must preserve his impartiality in case that case should be assigned to him for the purposes of the substantive examination —, compatible with the second sentence of Article 4(1), Article 10, the fourth and fifth sentences of recital 16 and recital 48 of Directive 2016/43 and with Article 47 of the Charter [of Fundamental Rights of the European Union]? Or, if it is not, is national case-law according to which the court is to carry out a more detailed and specific examination of the evidence and to give a clear answer to the arguments put forward by the accused’s lawyer, even if it thus takes the risk that it will be unable to examine the case or deliver a final decision on guilt if the case is assigned to it for the purposes of the substantive examination, — which implies that another judge will examine the substance of the case — compatible with the abovementioned provisions?
3.

On the assumption that the in-house transaction comes within the scope of application of Directive 2014/24: a) Must the provisions of Article 1(4) and Article 12 of the Directive and those of Article 36 of the Charter, either together or separately (but not limited thereto), taking into account the judgments of the Court of Justice in Teckal (C-107/98), Jean Auroux and Others (C-220/05), ANAV (C-410/04), and other cases, be understood and interpreted as meaning that the notion of an ‘in-house transaction’ comes within the scope of EU law, and that the content and application of that notion are not affected by the national law of Member States, inter alia, by limitations on the conclusion of such transactions, for example, the condition that public procurement contracts cannot ensure the quality, availability and continuity of the services to be provided? b) If the answer to the previous question is in the negative, that is to say, the notion of an ‘in-house transaction’, either partially or fully, comes within the scope of the law of the Member States, should the provisions of Article 12 of Directive 2014/24 be interpreted as meaning that Member States have a discretion to establish limitations or additional conditions for the conclusion of in-house transactions (in comparison with EU law and the case-law of the Court of Justice interpreting that law) but can implement that discretion only by means of specific and clear positive legal provisions governing public procurement?
2.

Is Article 9(1) of Regulation No 1889/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council to be interpreted as meaning that it permits national legislation which, for the offence referred to in the first question, provides not only for the penalty of a term of imprisonment of up to five years or a fine in the amount of one fifth of the value of the object of the criminal offence but also for mandatory confiscation of the object of the criminal offence without consideration of the origin of the undeclared sum?