JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber)

5 October 2017 ( *1 )

(Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Tunisia — Measures taken against persons responsible for misappropriation of State funds and associated persons and entities — Freezing of funds — List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds — Continued listing of the applicant’s name — Inadequate factual basis — Manifest error of assessment — Error of law — Right to property — Principle of good administration — Obligation to adjudicate within a reasonable time — Presumption of innocence — Request for modification — Confirmatory measure — Inadmissibility)

In Case T‑175/15,

Mohamed Marouen Ben Ali Ben Mohamed Mabrouk, residing in Tunis (Tunisia), represented by J.-R. Farthouat, J.-P. Mignard, N. Boulay, lawyers, and S. Crosby, Solicitor,

applicant,

v

Council of the European Union, represented initially by Á. de Elera-San Miguel Hurtado and G. Étienne, and subsequently by Á. de Elera‑San Miguel Hurtado, acting as Agents,

defendant,

APPLICATION pursuant to Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/157 of 30 January 2015 amending Decision 2011/72/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Tunisia (OJ 2015 L 26, p. 29), in so far as it concerns the applicant, the Council’s Decision of 16 November 2015 rejecting the applicant’s request of 29 May 2015 to remove his name from the list in the Annex to Council Decision 2011/72/CFSP of 31 January 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Tunisia (OJ 2011 L 28, p. 62) and Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/119 of 28 January 2016 amending Decision 2011/72 (OJ 2016 L 23, p. 65), in so far as it concerns the applicant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber),

composed of D. Gratsias (Rapporteur), President, I. Labucka and I. Ulloa Rubio, Judges,

Registrar: M. L. Grzegorczyk, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure and further to the hearing on 14 December 2016,

gives the following

Judgment

Background to the dispute and factual context

1 On 31 January 2011, following political developments in Tunisia during the months of December 2010 and January 2011, the Council of the European Union adopted, on the basis of Article 29 TEU, Decision 2011/72/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Tunisia (OJ 2011 L 28, p. 62).

2 Recitals 1 and 2 of Decision 2011/72 read as follows: ‘(1) On 31 January 2011, the Council reaffirmed its full solidarity and support with Tunisia and its people in their efforts to establish a stable democracy, the rule of law, democratic pluralism and full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. (2) The Council further decided to adopt restrictive measures against persons responsible for misappropriation of Tunisian State funds and who are thus depriving the Tunisian people of the benefits of the sustainable development of their economy and society and undermining the development of democracy in the country.’

3 Article 1(1) and (2) of Decision 2011/72 provides as follows: ‘1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by persons responsible for misappropriation of Tunisian State funds, and natural or legal persons or entities associated with them, as listed in the Annex, shall be frozen. 2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of, natural or legal persons or entities listed in the Annex.’

4 Article 2 of Decision 2011/72 provides: ‘1. The Council, acting upon a proposal by a Member State or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall establish and amend the list in the Annex. 2. The Council shall communicate its decision, including the grounds for the listing, to the person or entity concerned, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing such person or entity with an opportunity to present observations. 3. Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review its decision and inform the person or entity concerned accordingly.’

5 Article 3(1) of Decision 2011/72 reads as follows: ‘The Annex shall include the grounds for listing the persons and entities.’

6 Article 5 of Decision 2011/72, in its original version, provided: ‘This Decision shall apply for a period of 12 months. It shall be kept under constant review. It shall be renewed, or amended as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met.’

7 The list originally annexed to Decision 2011/72 contained only the names of Mr Zine el Abidine Ben Hamda Ben Ali, former President of the Republic of Tunisia, and Ms Leïla Bent Mohammed Trabelsi, his wife.

8 On 4 February 2011, on the basis of Article 2(1) of Decision 2011/72 and Article 31(2) TEU, the Council adopted Implementing Decision 2011/79/CFSP implementing Decision 2011/72 (OJ 2011 L 31, p. 40). Article 1 of that implementing decision provided that the Annex to Decision 2011/72 was to be replaced by the text set out in the annex to the implementing decision. That annex listed the names of 48 natural persons including, in particular, on the first and second lines, the names of the two persons referred to in paragraph 7 above and, on line 28, the name of the applicant, Mr Mohamed Marouen Ben Ali Ben Mohamed Mabrouk. Line 28 of that annex also stated, in the column entitled ‘Identifying information’, as follows: ‘Tunisian, born in Tunis 11 March 1972, son of Jaouida El BEJI, married to Sirine BEN ALI, CEO, residing at 8 rue du Commandant Béjaoui — Carthage — Tunis, holder of NIC No 04766495’; and, in the column entitled ‘Grounds’: ‘Person subject to judicial investigation by the Tunisian authorities in respect of the acquisition of movable and immovable property, the opening of bank accounts and the holding of financial assets in several countries as part of money-laundering operations.’

9 The applicant’s initial listing in the Annex to Decision 2011/72, as amended by Implementing Decision 2011/79, was subsequently extended by Council Decision 2012/50/CFSP of 27 January 2012 (OJ 2012 L 27, p. 11), Council Decision 2013/72/CFSP of 31 January 2013 (OJ 2013 L 32, p. 20) and Council Decision 2014/49/CFSP of 30 January 2014 (OJ 2014 L 28, p. 38).

10 Following the judgments of 28 May 2013, Trabelsi and Others v Council (T‑187/11, EU:T:2013:273), of 28 May 2013, Chiboub v Council (T‑188/11, not published, EU:T:2013:274), and of 28 May 2014, Al Matri v Council (T‑200/11, not published, EU:T:2013:275), the Council modified the grounds for including the names of the persons listed in the Annex to Decision 2011/72, as amended by Implementing Decision 2011/79. In so far as the applicant is concerned, the grounds for his inclusion were modified by Decision 2014/49 as follows: ‘Person subject to judicial investigations by the Tunisian authorities for complicity in the misappropriation of public monies by a public office-holder, complicity in the misuse of office by a public office-holder to procure an unjustified advantage for a third party and to cause a loss to the administration, and complicity in exerting wrongful influence over a public office-holder with a view to obtaining directly or indirectly an advantage for another person.’

11 By letter of 12 January 2015, the Council notified the applicant of its intention once again to extend the restrictive measures directed against him and enclosed with that letter an attestation dated 19 December 2014 provided by the Tunisian authorities, relating to ongoing judicial proceedings in Tunisia pertaining to him. By letter of 15 January 2015, the applicant submitted his observations and requested that the Council remove him from the list annexed to Decision 2011/72, as amended by Decision 2014/49, for the reasons set out in that letter.

12 On 30 January 2015, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2015/157 amending Decision 2011/72 (OJ 2015 L 26, p. 29). Article 1(1) of that decision provides that the text of Article 5 of Decision 2011/72 is to be replaced by the following: ‘This Decision shall apply until 31 January 2016. It shall be kept under constant review. It may be renewed or amended, as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met.’ The applicant’s name and the grounds for his inclusion on the list annexed to Decision 2011/72, as amended by Decision 2014/49, were maintained.

13 By letter of 4 February 2015, the Council responded to the applicant’s observations dated 15 January 2015. In essence, it indicated that, for the reasons stated, it considered that the restrictive measures directed against him should remain in force and enclosed with that letter a copy of Decision 2015/157. However, it stated that, in the light of the applicant’s observations concerning the status of the ongoing judicial investigation concerning him in Tunisia, it would carry out a further review of those restrictive measures before 31 July 2015.

14 The applicant submitted observations on 18 February, 29 May and 7 September 2015. By letter of 16 November 2015, the Council responded to those observations. In the first place, the Council rejected the request made by the applicant in his letter of 18 February 2015 for access to the file concerning him, stating that the attestation referred to in paragraph 11 above formed the basis of its decision to extend the restrictive measures directed against the applicant and that it did not possess any other documents. In the second place, the Council stated that it was enclosing with its letter extracts from two documents dated 11 May 2015, provided by the Tunisian authorities, relating to judicial proceedings against the applicant. In the third place, after addressing the arguments raised by the applicant in his observations of 29 May 2015 and rejecting his request for a hearing, the Council indicated that the restrictive measures directed against him were to be maintained.

15 On 30 November 2015, the applicant submitted further observations, to which the Council replied by letter of 18 December 2015. The Council stated, in its conclusion to that letter, its intention to renew the restrictive measures directed against the applicant and to amend the ground for his designation as follows: ‘Person subject to judicial investigations by the Tunisian authorities for complicity in the misappropriation of public monies by a public office-holder, complicity in the misuse of office by a public office-holder to procure an unjustified advantage for a third party and to cause a loss to the administration, and exerting wrongful influence over a public office-holder with a view to obtaining directly or indirectly an advantage for another person.’ On 5 January 2016, the applicant submitted further observations in response to that letter.

16 On 28 January 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/119 amending Decision 2011/72 (OJ 2016 L 23, p. 65), which, under Article 1(1) thereof, extended Decision 2011/72 until 31 January 2017. Under Article 1(2) thereof, the annex to that decision replaces the Annex to Decision 2011/72. The applicant’s name appears on line 28 of the new annex. The wording of the grounds for the applicant’s listing is identical to that communicated to him by the Council in its letter of 18 December 2015. As the Council indicated to the applicant in its letter of 29 January 2016, the new wording is based on an attestation provided by the Tunisian authorities dated 20 October 2015, which was enclosed with that letter.

Procedure and forms of order sought

17 By application lodged at the Court Registry on 10 April 2015, the applicant brought the present action.

18 The Council lodged its defence on 2 July 2015.

19 The reply and the rejoinder were lodged on 14 September 2015 and 8 January 2016, respectively.

20 On 25 January 2016, on the basis of Article 86 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the applicant submitted an initial statement of modification, seeking to extend the form of order sought in the application to the Council’s decision of 16 November 2015, by which the latter rejected his request of 29 May 2015 for the removal of his name from the Annex to Decision 2011/72. On 4 April 2016, the applicant lodged a second statement of modification, seeking an extension of the form of order sought in the application to Decision 2016/119.

21 On 30 March 2016, the Council submitted its observations on the initial statement of modification and, on 4 May 2016, its observations on the second statement.

22 Following a change in the composition of the Chambers of the General Court, the case was reassigned to the Fifth Chamber, by decision of 3 October 2016.

23 On a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, the Court decided to open the oral part of the procedure.

24 The parties presented oral argument and gave their replies to the questions asked by the Court at the hearing on 14 December 2016.

25 The applicant claims that the Court should: – annul Decision 2015/157, in so far as it concerns the applicant, the Council’s decision of 16 November 2015, by which the Council rejected the applicant’s request of 29 May 2015 to remove him from the Annex to Decision 2011/72, and Decision 2016/119, in so far as that decision concerns the applicant; – order the Council to pay the costs.

26 The Council contends that the Court should: – dismiss the application in its entirety; – order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law

The claims seeking annulment of Decision 2015/157

27 In support of the application, the applicant formally raises six pleas in law. By the first plea, alleging, in essence, an error of law, the applicant submits that the ongoing judicial investigation concerning him in Tunisia does not provide a sufficient factual basis for the continued listing of his name in the Annex to Decision 2011/72. The first plea comprises two parts, alleging, first, failure by the Council to take account of favourable developments in the various judicial proceedings relating to the applicant in Tunisia and, second, failure by that institution to take account of the infringement of the principle that proceedings should be concluded within a reasonable time in the context of the judicial investigation referred to above. The second plea alleges infringement of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), on the ground that the Council itself infringed the principle that proceedings should be concluded within a reasonable time. By the third plea, the applicant contends that Decision 2015/157 is devoid of purpose. The first part of that plea alleges manifest errors of assessment as regards the development of the democratic process in Tunisia and the need for restrictive measures in respect of nationals of that third country responsible for misappropriation of State funds. In the alternative, the applicant alleges failure to state adequate reasons. The second part of the third plea alleges an error of law, in that the Council considered that the evidence produced by the Tunisian authorities established that the applicant was being prosecuted. The fourth plea contains two parts, alleging, first, infringement of Article 48 of the Charter, and, second, infringement of Article 41(1) of the Charter. By the first part of the fourth plea, the applicant alleges infringement of the presumption of innocence as a result of a press release produced by the Council on 31 January 2011. By the second part of that plea, the applicant alleges infringement of the principle of good administration, in particular of the right to have his affairs handled impartially. In the alternative, in the event that the above pleas are rejected, the applicant raises a fifth plea, alleging a ‘manifest error of assessment’ relating to the failure by the Council to give sufficient consideration to the ‘criminal law element’ of Decision 2015/157. The sixth plea alleges infringement of the right to property and of Article 17 of the Charter.

28 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the second part of the third plea, which concerns an alleged error by the Council in its assessment as to the adequacy of the evidence provided by the Tunisian authorities, is in fact linked to the first plea. It must therefore be regarded as forming the third part of that plea. Similarly, all of the fourth plea is in fact linked to the second plea, as it concerns alleged infringements of the applicant’s basic rights, vitiating the procedure which led to the adoption of Decision 2015/157. The second plea must therefore be regarded as comprising three parts, alleging infringement by the Council of Articles 47, 48 and 41(1), respectively, of the Charter. Lastly, it is clear from the forgoing that the fifth and sixth pleas are to be regarded as forming, respectively, the fourth and fifth pleas.

The first plea, alleging an error in law in that the Council was wrong to consider that the ongoing judicial investigation concerning the applicant in Tunisia constituted a sufficient factual basis

29 By the first plea, the applicant submits, in essence, that at the time Decision 2015/157 was adopted, the ongoing judicial investigation concerning him in Tunisia could no longer serve as a basis for maintaining the restrictive measures adopted by the Council in his regard. According to the applicant, that institution erred in law by failing to take account of the evidence which the applicant had brought to its attention on this matter. As stated in the introduction to this plea, the applicant accepts that, on the basis of paragraphs 77 to 84 of the judgment of 5 March 2015, Ezz and Others v Council (C‑220/14 P, EU:C:2014:147) the Council is entitled to adopt restrictive measures under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) if there are ongoing judicial proceedings for misappropriation of State funds. However, the applicant argues that the development of those proceedings and the fact that that may constitute an abuse are relevant for the purpose of determining whether the maintenance of the measures in question is lawful.

31 Moreover, it should be observed that, in a number of judgments in cases seeking the annulment of restrictive measures adopted by the Council in view of the situation in Tunisia, the General Court applied the same principle of broad interpretation to Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/72, which is worded in almost identical terms to Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/172 (judgments of 14 April 2016, Ben Ali v Council, T‑200/14, not published, EU:T:2016:216, paragraph 114; of 30 June 2016, CW v Council, T‑224/14, not published, EU:T:2016:375, paragraph 91; of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraph 85; and of 30 June 2016, CW v Council, T‑516/13, not published, EU:T:2016:377, paragraph 71).

32 In that regard, it is apparent from Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/72 that the purpose of that decision is to freeze the assets of persons responsible for misappropriation of Tunisian State funds and of persons associated with them, as listed in the annex thereto. By hindering the proper functioning of Tunisian public institutions and of the bodies which are dependent of them, those misappropriations ‘are depriving’, according to the wording of recital 2 of that decision, ‘the Tunisian people of the benefits of the sustainable development of their economy and society and undermining the development of democracy in the country’.

33 Moreover, according to case-law, it is apparent from Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/72, read in the light of recitals 1 and 2 thereof, that the freezing of funds imposed by that provision is not intended to punish any misconduct on the part of the persons concerned or to deter them, by coercion, from engaging in such conduct. The sole purpose of the asset freeze is to assist the Tunisian authorities with establishing any misappropriation of State funds that has taken place and to ensure that it remains possible for those authorities to recover the proceeds of misappropriation. It is therefore of a purely precautionary nature and has no criminal law connotations (judgments of 14 April 2016, Ben Ali v Council, T‑200/14, not published, EU:T:2016:216, paragraphs 81 and 82, and of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraphs 62 and 64; see also, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 77, 78 and 206).

34 In particular, in view of the objectives of Decision 2011/72, the concept of persons responsible for misappropriation of Tunisian State funds within the meaning of Article 1(1) of that decision must include not only those persons already found responsible for such acts but also those who are the subject of ongoing judicial investigations to establish such responsibility (judgments of 14 April 2016, Ben Ali v Council, T‑200/14, not published, EU:T:2016:216, paragraph 124; of 30 June 2016, CW v Council, T‑224/14, not published, EU:T:2016:375, paragraph 100; of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraph 86; and of 30 June 2016, CW v Council, T‑516/13, not published, EU:T:2016:377, paragraph 80).

35 It is therefore on the basis of that interpretation of Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/72, which has not in fact been called into question by the applicant (see paragraph 29 above), that the various parts of the first plea must be examined. It should also be noted that, notwithstanding certain variations in the terminology used in the application, the first plea must be regarded as alleging an error in the legal characterisation of the evidence forming the factual basis of the restrictive measures at issue, not a claim that there is no legal basis for those measures.

– The first part of the first plea, alleging failure by the Council to take account of favourable developments in the various judicial proceedings relating to the applicant in Tunisia

36 In the first part of the first plea, the applicant submits, in essence, that judicial developments in his favour mean that is it unlikely that he will be put on trial in Tunisia. The applicant puts forward three factors in support of that argument. In the first place, he relies on the judgment of the Tunisian Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) of 1 July 2014, which ruled that the assets he inherited from his father included, for the purpose of Tunisian Decree Law No 2011-47 of 31 May 2011, the income from those assets and from the reinvestment thereof. According to the applicant, that judgment establishes that his Tunisian assets are lawful. In the second place, the applicant relies on three decisions by Tunisian courts, dated 28 May 2013, 21 August 2014 and 17 December 2014 respectively, which lifted the ban on leaving Tunisia that had been imposed on him. In the third place, the applicant maintains that he is not charged with holding illicit assets outside Tunisia. In the reply, he adds that the Council was under an obligation to satisfy itself that there was a reasonable prospect of a trial and, if there was not, to drop the restrictive measures at issue, failing which it would become party to an abuse of process on the part of the Tunisian authorities, consisting, according to the applicant, in prolonging indefinitely the judicial procedures concerning him.

37 In the defence, the Council replies, first of all, that the judgment of the Tunisian Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) of 1 July 2014 does not establish, contrary to the applicant’s contentions, that all the assets held by him in Tunisia are lawful. Next, the Council contends that the applicant’s arguments relating to, first, the lifting of the ban prohibiting him from travelling abroad and, second, the lack of any connection between the charges against the applicant and the assets held by him outside Tunisia are irrelevant. Thus, according to the Council, the applicant equates, incorrectly, the restrictive measures at issue with acts of judicial assistance.

38 It is clear, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 33 and 34 above, that the applicant’s arguments in the first part of the first plea must be rejected.

39 In the present case, what the Council must ascertain is, first, whether it is possible to establish, on the basis of the evidence in its possession, that the applicant is the subject of one or more ongoing judicial proceedings in respect of acts that may be characterised as misappropriation of State funds, and, second, whether those proceedings are such that the applicant may be categorised as a person responsible for such misappropriation or a person associated with such an individual within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/72 (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 April 2016, Ben Ali v Council, T‑200/14, not published, EU:T:2016:216, paragraph 156, and of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraph 65).

40 Accordingly, in the context of Decision 2011/72, it is not, in principle, for the Council itself to examine and assess the relevance and accuracy of the evidence relied on in the judicial proceedings concerning the persons listed in the annex to that decision. As stated in paragraph 33 above, by adopting that decision and the subsequent decisions, the Council is not seeking to punish the misappropriation of State funds being investigated by the Tunisian authorities itself, but to ensure that it remains possible for those authorities to establish misappropriation and to recover the proceeds thereof. It is therefore for the competent Tunisian authorities to verify that evidence and to draw the appropriate conclusions (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 April 2016, Ben Ali v Council, T‑200/14, not published, EU:T:2016:216, paragraph 158, and of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraph 66). Accordingly, in principle, it is not for the Council or the General Court to ascertain whether such proceedings are well founded but simply to establish whether the decision freezing the funds is justified in the light of the information provided by the Tunisian authorities (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 5 March 2015, Ezz and Others v Council, C‑220/14 P, EU:C:2015:147, paragraph 77).

41 It is true that the Council cannot adopt, in all circumstances, the findings made by the Tunisian judicial authorities in the documents provided by those authorities. According to case-law, it was for the Council to examine carefully and impartially the evidence that had been sent to it by the competent authorities, namely, in this case, the Tunisian authorities, in the light, in particular, of the comments and any exculpatory evidence submitted by the applicant. That obligation also arises from the principle of good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 99 and 114; of 14 April 2016, Ben Ali v Council, T‑200/14, not published, EU:T:2016:216, paragraphs 158 and 159; and of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraphs 58 and 67).

42 Nonetheless, according to that same line of case-law, it is for the Council, in discharging its duty of careful and impartial examination, to assess whether it is necessary to seek disclosure of further information or evidence from the competent authorities, in the light of the observations and factual evidence submitted by the applicant. In particular, while it is not for the Council to take the place of the Tunisian judicial authorities in assessing whether the ongoing judicial investigations concerning the applicant are well founded, it is not inconceivable that the Council might be obliged to seek clarification from those authorities with regard to the material on which those investigations are based (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 115, and of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraph 68).

43 In the present case, it should be recalled that, as indicated in paragraph 11 above, in order to extend the listing of the applicant in the Annex to Decision 2011/72, the Council relied on an attestation provided by the Tunisian authorities, dated 19 December 2014, relating to the ongoing judicial investigation concerning the applicant. That attestation, which is annexed to the application, was provided by the Tribunal de première instance de Tunis (Court of First Instance, Tunis, Tunisia) and is signed by the Registrar of the principal investigating magistrate (Office No 1). The attestation states that ‘the case in question (registered as Case No 19592/1), brought against Zine El Abidine Ben Haj Hamda Ben Haj Hassen Ben Ali and others, is currently being investigated and concerns the aforesaid Mohamed Marouen Ben Ali Ben Mohamed Mabrouk, who is being prosecuted for, inter alia, complicity in the misappropriation of public monies by a public office-holder, complicity in the misuse of office by a public office-holder to procure an unjustified advantage for a third party and to cause a loss to the administration, and complicity in exerting wrongful influence over a public office-holder with a view to obtaining directly or indirectly an advantage for another person’.

44 The applicant does not dispute that that attestation is sufficient to establish that he is the subject of an ongoing judicial investigation in Tunisia to determine whether he was involved in acts that may be categorised as misappropriation of State funds. The exculpatory evidence produced by the applicant is simply intended to establish, as he acknowledges himself, that there is no reasonable prospect, as far as he is concerned, of a trial at the end of the investigation. In other words, the applicant appears to take the view that, as the investigation proceeds, the evidence against him will become weaker or even disappear. On the other hand, he does not in any way claim to have evidence proving that the Tunisian judicial authorities have closed the investigation on the basis that there are no grounds for committing him to trial for the acts being investigated.

45 Contrary to what the applicant claims, as the judicial investigation has not come to an end, the existence of judicial developments suggesting that the evidence against him has become weaker, even if established, cannot oblige the Council, once it has knowledge of that evidence, to remove him from the list annexed to Decision 2011/72.

46 Indeed, as indicated in paragraph 40 above, it is not for the Council but for the competent Tunisian authorities to verify the evidence on which that judicial investigation is based and to draw the appropriate conclusions as to the outcome of the investigation. If that were not the case, there could be situations in which the Council would draw premature conclusions as regards the merits of the investigation which might differ from those drawn by the Tunisian authorities themselves. Such a situation could have the paradoxical result that, when the person concerned is tried and, as the case may be, found guilty of misappropriation of State funds by those authorities, that person’s assets in the European Union would no longer be frozen, thus precluding the possibility of recovering the proceeds of the misappropriation with which that person is charged. Obviously, the effectiveness of Decision 2011/72 would not be guaranteed (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 14 April 2016, Ben Ali v Council, T‑200/14, not published, EU:T:2016:216, paragraph 124, and of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraph 86).

47 Moreover, according to case-law, while it is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of a challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, namely that those reasons are not well founded, it is necessary, in order to assess the nature, form and degree of the proof that the Council may be required to provide, to take account of the specific nature and scope of the restrictive measures and of their objective (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 121; of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraphs 74 to 85; and of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraphs 50 and 74).

48 In the present case, as the Council has adduced evidence of the existence of an ongoing judicial investigation concerning the applicant, the reliability of which is not in dispute, it is for the applicant to indicate the concrete evidence on which he relies in order to challenge the validity of that investigation (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraph 74). Admittedly, as the applicant states in the reply, the obligation the Council is under to carry out checks may be justified by the need, for the Council, to avoid colluding in conduct on the part of the Tunisian authorities that may be abusive, consisting in leaving the investigation open indefinitely in the absence of any inculpatory evidence concerning the applicant. However, that is not the case where there is no concrete evidence such as to give rise, on the part of the Council, to legitimate questions as to why the investigation has not been closed.

49 Contrary to the applicant’s assertions, the exculpatory evidence produced by him is not such as to give rise to legitimate questions regarding the prospect of a judgment at the end of the judicial investigation concerning him or the reasons why the investigation has not been closed.

50 In the first place, the applicant has failed to provide any evidence that makes it possible to understand how the judgment of the Tunisian Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) of 1 July 2014 could have any effect on the assessment of his involvement in the criminal offences to which the judicial investigation concerning him relates.

51 In that regard, according to the information given by the applicant’s lawyer in his letter of 2 September 2014, annexed to the application, the Tunisian Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) took the view, in its judgment of 1 July 2014, that the assets which were inherited and therefore excluded from the scope of the confiscation imposed by Decree Law No 2011-47 of 31 May 2011 consist not only of assets passed on by way of inheritance but also the income from those assets and the proceeds of all forms of reinvestment of those assets. In that letter, the applicant’s lawyer in Tunisia infers from that judgment that ‘the effect of [its] application should be that all the [applicant’s] assets are excluded from the scope of the Decree Law on confiscation, as those assets are either directly inherited from his father or derive from reinvestment of the inherited assets and the income thereon’.

52 Suffice it to note in that regard that it is not possible, on the basis of the abovementioned considerations concerning the judgment of the Tunisian Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) of 1 July 2014 alone, to rule out that the ongoing judicial investigation concerning the applicant will find that the applicant is responsible for acts entailing the misappropriation of Tunisian State funds.

53 It may be concluded from those considerations simply that the income from the assets which the applicant inherited and the proceeds of the reinvestment of those assets cannot be confiscated under Decree Law No 2011-47 of 31 May 2011. On the other hand, it is not possible to draw any conclusion regarding the outcome of the judicial investigation in question. Thus, even if it were established, the applicant’s claim that he may freely deal with his Tunisian assets as a result of that judgment does not prejudge the outcome of that investigation, which, in view of the acts being investigated, may call into question whether the applicant is lawfully entitled to certain of the assets in his possession.

54 Furthermore, the applicant has not been able to explain the relationship between, on the one hand, that decree law and the civil proceedings in which the judgment of the Tunisian Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) of 1 July 2014 was delivered and, on the other, the judicial investigation in question. When questioned on this subject at the hearing, he merely confirmed that Decree Law No 2011-47 of 31 May 2011 is applicable not only to himself but also to a number of other persons who are the subject of similar judicial investigations and that it was possible that the case in which that judgment was delivered, which concerned him, might also concern some of those other persons. The fact that, in parallel with the judicial investigations directed at the applicant and other persons, the scope of the administrative confiscation measures taken by the Tunisian authorities in their regard was restricted by a decision of the Tunisian Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) is not sufficient to raise legitimate questions as to whether the reasons for initiating those judicial investigations were well founded.

55 In the second place, nor is the lifting of the ban on leaving Tunisia to which the applicant was subject, as a result of the three judgments of the Tunisian courts of 28 May 2013, 21 August 2014 and 17 December 2014, sufficient to raise such questions. Indeed, it is apparent from the applicant’s assertions and the documents before the Court that the judgments in question were handed down in cases separate from the criminal proceedings that gave rise to that investigation, which, at the time Decision 2015/157 was adopted, was still ongoing. Moreover, the applicant does not claim that those judgments were handed down in cases that were in any way connected with that investigation. The fact that, as a result of those judgments, the applicant might be free to leave Tunisia is, even if it were established, wholly immaterial.

56 It is true that the lifting of the ban on leaving Tunisian territory as a result of the first of those judgments followed on, as is apparent from the documents before the Court, from the acquittal of the applicant by that judgment in a case in which the applicant was tried before the court at issue for offences of a comparable nature to those forming the subject matter of the judicial investigation in question. However, it has neither been established nor even claimed that the applicant’s acquittal in that case would lead to his acquittal in the case covered by that investigation or constitute exculpatory evidence in the latter case.

57 In the third place, as regards the applicant’s argument that he has not been ‘charged’ with holding illicit assets outside Tunisia, it should be recalled that the fact that the judicial investigation in question concerns acts that may be categorised as misappropriation of State funds constitutes a sufficient factual basis to justify the freezing of his funds in the European Union. As indicated in paragraph 33 above, the sole purpose of that measure is to assist the Tunisian authorities with establishing any misappropriation of State funds that has taken place and to ensure that it remains possible for those authorities to recover the proceeds of the misappropriation. Its purpose is not, therefore, to facilitate the establishment of the offence of holding illicit funds outside Tunisia and, more specifically, within the European Union. Furthermore, it is not disputed that the acts with which that investigation is concerned, in particular the act of complicity in misappropriation by a public office holder of State funds, has a clear and direct link with the notion of misappropriation of State funds within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/72. It is therefore irrelevant that the attestation of the Tunisian authorities of 19 December 2014, on which the Council relies, and the grounds for listing the applicant do not refer to acts entailing the holding of unlawful assets outside Tunisia and, in particular, within the European Union (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraph 116).

58 It follows from all the foregoing that the first part of the first plea must be rejected.

– The second part of the first plea, alleging failure by the Council to take account of the infringement of the principle that proceedings should be concluded within a reasonable time in the context of the judicial investigation concerning the applicant

59 In the second part of the first plea, the applicant submits that the ongoing judicial investigation concerning him in Tunisia does not have due regard for the principle that proceedings should be concluded within a reasonable time. He observes, in that regard, that that principle is enshrined in Article 7(1)(d) of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, adopted in Nairobi (Kenya) on 27 June 1981 (‘the African Charter), which has been ratified by the Tunisian Republic. Next, the applicant observes that, in the present case, the investigation has been under way for over four years and there is no prospect of it ending. He adds that the delay is entirely attributable to the Tunisian authorities. Lastly, the applicant concludes by stating that, having regard to the duration of the investigation and developments which have taken place in his favour, the investigation should have been completed. Those arguments, it is alleged, are confirmed by the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 3 May 2012, Masár v. Slovakia (CE:ECHR:2012:0503JUD006688209). In the reply, the applicant states, in essence, that the review which, in his view, the Council must carry out of the lawfulness of the judicial proceedings in Tunisia must lead to the removal of his name from the Annex to Decision 2011/72 as those proceedings have been going on for an unreasonably long time.

60 For its part, the Council submits that it is for the Council to assess not the conduct of third countries, but only the relevance and adequacy of the evidence produced by the authorities of those countries. In its view, it was on the basis of that principle that it indicated to the applicant in the letter which it sent to him on 4 February 2015 that it took due note of his arguments and would review his situation before July 2015. In the rejoinder, the Council added that it had in its possession evidence showing that the judicial proceedings in Tunisia concerning the applicant were ongoing and that the delays in those proceedings were not unreasonable, given the complexity of all the cases concerned. It annexed to the rejoinder the documents containing that evidence.

61 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, the lawfulness of an EU measure is to be assessed on the basis of the facts and the law as they stood at the time when the measure was adopted (see judgments of 3 September 2015, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Commission, C‑398/13 P, EU:C:2015:535, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited, and of 4 September 2015, NIOC and Others v Council, T‑577/12, not published, EU:T:2015:596, paragraph 112 and the case-law cited). In the present case, the complaints made by the applicant in the second part of the first plea cannot be examined in the light of matters which postdated Decision 2015/157. That is the case as regards the letter of 4 February 2015 from the Council to the applicant and, a fortiori, of the review of the applicant’s situation, which the Council undertook in that letter to carry out subsequently. Similarly, the documents annexed to the rejoinder on which the Council relies in that pleading to show that the length of judicial proceedings concerning the applicant in Tunisia is not unreasonable were drawn up by the Tunisian authorities on 11 May 2015. It follows that those documents were unknown to the Council at the time it adopted Decision 2015/157 and cannot be taken into account by the Court.

62 As regards the substance, in the second part of the first plea, the applicant maintains, in essence, that as the judicial proceedings concerning him are inconsistent with the principle that proceedings should be concluded within a reasonable time and are thus unlawful, the Council was not entitled to maintain his listing in the Annex to Decision 2011/72 in reliance on those proceedings. As a consequence, with regard to the part of the plea under consideration, the Court must confine itself to verifying whether or not the Council was entitled to consider that the length of the judicial proceedings did not justify bringing to an end the restrictive measures targeting the applicant.

63 In that regard, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraph 46 above, it should be noted that it is for the Tunisian courts to determine whether there has been any breach of the principle that proceedings should be concluded within a reasonable time in the judicial proceedings concerning the applicant. In particular, as the applicant himself acknowledges, the Tunisian Republic is a party to the African Charter and Article 7(1)(d) of that international convention lays down the right to be tried within a reasonable period by an impartial court or tribunal. As a consequence, it is for the Tunisian courts, should the applicant make an application to them, to determine whether the provisions of that article have been observed in those judicial proceedings. Furthermore, neither the European Union nor the Member States are party to the African Charter, so that the Council and the General Court cannot interpret that international convention or apply it (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2011, Air Transport Association of America and Others, C‑366/10, EU:C:2011:684, paragraphs 52 and 62).

64 It is true that, according to case-law, compliance with the principles of the rule of law and human rights, as well as respect for human dignity, is required of all actions of the European Union, including actions under the CFSP, as is clear from the provisions, read together, set out in the first subparagraph of Article 21(1), Article 21(2)(b) and (3) TEU, and Article 23 TEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 June 2016, Parliament v Council, C‑263/14, EU:C:2016:435, paragraph 47). In particular, Article 21(1) TEU provides that the Union’s action on the international scene is to seek to advance in the wider world, inter alia, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and respect for international law. The principle that proceedings should be concluded within a reasonable time forms part of the right to a fair trial, which is safeguarded by the provisions of a number of binding instruments of international law, in particular by Article 14(3)(c) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966, to which all the Member States and the Tunisian Republic are parties. Moreover, as stated in recital 1 of Decision 2011/72, that decision and the subsequent decisions were adopted as part of a policy of providing support to Tunisia based, inter alia, on the objectives of promoting respect for human rights and the rule of law, as laid down in Article 21(2)(b) TEU.

65 As a consequence, it cannot be ruled out that, where there is objective, reliable, specific and consistent evidence such as to raise legitimate questions concerning observance of an applicant’s right to have his case heard within a reasonable time in the context of the ongoing judicial investigation concerning him, which serves as the basis for the freezing of his assets in the European Union, the Council may be required to carry out the necessary verifications.

66 However, the second part of the first plea is based on the assumption that, in view of the excessive length of that judicial investigation, which, according to the applicant, should already be concluded, and of the fact that the investigation is therefore unlawful, the Council was required to bring to an immediate end the freezing of his assets in the European Union. That assumption cannot be accepted.

67 In the first place, it has neither been established nor indeed claimed that, under Tunisian law, the effect of failure to have regard for the principle that a case must be concluded within a reasonable time in criminal proceedings is that the proceedings are terminated or discontinued.

68 Moreover, the applicant refers to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) concerning the application in criminal proceedings of the principle that a person must be brought to trial within a reasonable time enshrined in Article 6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the CPHR’). Admittedly, that case-law provides a relevant point of comparison in the present case, as Article 6(1) of the CPHR safeguards that principle in the same way as Article 14(3)(c) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 7(1)(d) of the African Charter. However, it is clear that, in the context of that case-law, the ECHR has not inferred from that principle an obligation on the part of national authorities to bring to an end criminal proceedings which have been under way for an unreasonably long period of time (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 28 June 2016, O’Neill and Lauchlan v. United Kingdom, CE:ECHR:2016:0628JUD004151610, paragraph 87).

69 Furthermore, it should be noted that, even when applying Article 5(3) of the CPHR, under which temporary detention in custody or pre-trial detention is subject to the person concerned being brought to trial within a reasonable time, the ECHR does not consider that breach of that requirement should lead to the termination of the judicial investigation in question. Admittedly, it considers that, in such circumstances, the case must be dealt with all due speed. However, it also considers that the speed to which a detained person who has been charged is entitled in the examination of his case must not undermine the work done by the judges in accomplishing their task with all necessary care (ECtHR, 11 December 2007, Pecheur v. Luxembourg, EC:ECHR:2007:1211JUD001630802, paragraph 62, and 5 November 2009, Shabani v. Switzerland, EC:ECHR:2009:1105JUD002904406, paragraph 65).

70 As a consequence, there are no grounds for considering that any infringement of the applicant’s right to have his case heard within a reasonable time in the judicial proceedings concerning him in Tunisia should lead to the termination or discontinuation of those proceedings.

71 In the second place, it should be noted that, in the light of the case-law of the ECHR, observance of a person’s right to be brought to trial within a reasonable time, as enshrined in international law, must be examined in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, which call for an overall assessment on the basis, in particular, of criteria relating to the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the conduct of the relevant authorities (see ECtHR, 28 June 2016. O’Neill and Lauchlan v. United Kingdom, EC:ECHR:2016:0628JUD004151610, paragraph 86 and the case-law cited). In the case-law of the courts within the European Union, similar principles are applied to the examination of observance of a person’s right to have his case brought to trial within a reasonable time (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 November 2013, Groupe Gascogne v Commission, C‑58/12 P, EU:C:2013:770, paragraphs 85 and 86 and the case-law cited).

72 Even if it were possible for it to carry out an overall assessment in the light of the circumstances of the case, in order to do so, the Council would necessarily be required to seek further information concerning the judicial proceedings in question from the Tunisian authorities. As is clear from paragraphs 43 to 45 above, in order to maintain the listing of the applicant in the Annex to Decision 2011/72, the Council is simply required, in the present case, to gather evidence of the existence of ongoing judicial proceedings concerning the applicant in respect of acts that may be classified as misappropriation of State funds. In the light of the requirements set out in paragraph 71 above, such evidence clearly cannot suffice for the purpose of determining whether there has been an infringement in those proceedings of the applicant’s right to have his case brought to trial within a reasonable time. Moreover, even if the evidence produced by the applicant were such as to raise legitimate questions concerning the observance of that right, it could not, in any event, be sufficient to enable the Council to reach the conclusion that that right has been infringed.

73 Accordingly, the Council could not be required to end the listing of the applicant in the Annex to Decision 2011/72 without first carrying out appropriate checks with the Tunisian authorities.

74 In particular, it is in his observations of 15 January 2015 that the applicant submitted evidence to the Council that he relied on in the present action in support of his claim that his right to have his case tried within a reasonable time had been infringed by the Tunisian authorities. By virtue of Article 1(1) of Decision 2014/49, the extension of the restrictive measures concerning the applicant imposed by that decision expired on 31January 2015. Moreover, Decision 2015/157 entered into force the same day. As a consequence, even if that evidence had been such as to justify the Council’s seeking verifications from the Tunisian authorities, that institution could not have been required to carry out such verifications or draw the appropriate conclusions arising therefrom within the time available to it before the expiry of the effects of Decision 2014/49 as regards the applicant and the adoption of a similar new decision, which was just two weeks.

75 Accordingly, it follows from all the foregoing that the applicant was incorrect to maintain that the Council was required, on the basis of that evidence alone, to bring to an end his listing in the Annex to Decision 2011/72.

76 In any event, that evidence was not such as to raise legitimate questions on the part of the Council that would have justified its seeking further verifications from the Tunisian authorities.

77 The length of the judicial proceedings in question, which, according to the applicant, is four years, is not, prima facie, unreasonable, given that they relate, as is apparent from the documents annexed to the application, to an investigation into misappropriation of State funds, in connection with other related judicial proceedings involving a great many other persons and necessitating investigations abroad. Furthermore, the example cited by the applicant in support of his arguments, concerning the handling by the Tunisian authorities of his request that his case be severed from that concerning other persons, does not, in itself, amount to significant evidence to support the claim that the judicial investigation procedure is, as a whole, excessively long. It should be added that, in his observations of 15 January 2015, the applicant stated that the legal characterisation of the acts being investigated by the Tunisian authorities in so far as concerns the applicant have been altered in the course of the investigative procedure. Such a factor may constitute an additional piece of contextual evidence that may explain the length of that procedure. In addition, contrary to what the applicant maintains, the various judicial developments in his favour, which he relies on in the first part of the first plea, do not appear to be capable of justifying, for the reasons given in paragraphs 49 to 58 above, the termination of that procedure.

78 The judgment of the ECtHR of 3 May 2012, Masár v. Slovakia (CE:ECHR:2012:0503JUD006688209), to which the applicant refers in support of the second part of the first plea, cannot call into question the foregoing considerations. That case concerns criminal proceedings relating to offences which bear no similarity to those at issue in the ongoing judicial investigation concerning the applicant in Tunisia. The fact that the ECHR found, in that judgment, that the length of the criminal proceedings in question, which was comparable to that of that investigation, was not consistent with the principle that a person has the right to be tried within a reasonable time enshrined in Article 6(1) CPHR is therefore of no consequence. The same reasoning is applicable to the judgments of that court cited by the applicant at the hearing.

79 It follows from all the foregoing that the second part of the first plea in law must be rejected.

– The third part of the first plea, alleging that the Council erred in law in that it was incorrect to consider that the evidence produced by the Tunisian authorities established that the applicant was being prosecuted

80 In support of the third part of the first plea, the applicant submits that the Council was incorrect to consider that the attestation of the Tunisian authorities of 19 December 2014 established that he was being prosecuted in Tunisia, whereas that attestation merely mentions an ongoing investigation. Accordingly, the attestation does not provide a sufficient factual basis for Decision 2015/157.

81 That argument cannot be accepted.

82 In the first place, the applicant’s argument is directed at the Council’s letter of 4 February 2015, in which the latter states that the attestation of the Tunisian authorities of 19 December 2014 certifies that the applicant is being prosecuted for complicity in misappropriation of Tunisian State funds on the basis of Articles 32, 87, 96 and 99 of the Tunisian Criminal Code. That is a document that postdates the adoption of Decision 2015/157. Moreover, the grounds for the inclusion of the applicant in the Annex to Decision 2011/72, as amended by Decision 2014/49 and extended by Decision 2015/157, do not mention the existence of criminal proceedings against the applicant but simply the existence of judicial investigations concerning him. The maintenance of the restrictive measures directed at the applicant as a result of Decision 2015/157 is not, therefore, based on the fact that the applicant is being prosecuted for the offences mentioned in those grounds for inclusion.

83 In the second place, as indicated in paragraph 34 above and as acknowledged by the applicant himself in the present plea, the existence of ongoing judicial proceedings for misappropriation of State funds, on which the grounds for inclusion are based, constituted, in principle a sufficient basis for the adoption of the restrictive measures. Accordingly, even if the Council had been incorrect to take the view that the attestation of the Tunisian authorities of 19 December 2014 established that the applicant was being prosecuted, that error would have been of no consequence.

84 In any event, it should be noted that that attestation, which the applicant himself annexed to the application, mentions the existence of criminal proceedings against the applicant. The text of the attestation, which is written in French, states that ‘the case in question, registered under No 19592/1, … is currently being investigated and concerns Mohamed Marouen Ben Aki Ben Mohamed Mabrouk, who is being prosecuted, inter alia, for complicity in the misappropriation by a public official of public funds; complicity in the misrepresentation by a public official to procure an unjustified advantage for a third party and to cause a loss to the administration and complicity in exerting undue influence over a public official with a view to obtaining directly or indirectly an advantage for another person’. As a consequence, the factual premiss on which the third part of the first plea is based is incorrect.

85 Accordingly, the third part of the first plea and, as a consequence, the first plea in its entirety, must be rejected.

The second plea, alleging infringements of the applicant’s fundamental rights, vitiating the procedure which led to the adoption of Decision 2015/157

– The first part of the second plea, alleging infringement of Article 47 of the Charter, on account of the Council’s own failure to have due regard for the principle that proceedings must be concluded within a reasonable time

86 In support of the first part of the second plea, the applicant submits, in essence, that Article 47 of the Charter is applicable in the present case because the restrictive measures adopted by the Council were imposed on him in conjunction with judicial proceedings. For the purpose of establishing infringement of the principle that proceeding must be concluded within a reasonable time, the applicant refers to the arguments he put forward in connection with the first plea. The requirement for the Council to have due regard for the reasonable time principle enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter is confirmed by the case-law of the Court of Justice. In the reply, the applicant submits, in response to the Council’s arguments, that it is of no consequence that the Council was not acting in the present case in a judicial capacity. Nor is it of any consequence that the Council’s review process satisfies the requirements of Article 47 of the Charter, as the Council is not an impartial and independent tribunal.

87 The Council submits, in the defence, that it was not acting in the present case in a judicial capacity, a function which, in the interinstitutional system of the European Union, rests exclusively with the Court of Justice of the European Union. Moreover, the General Court has previously held that measures such as the restrictive measures at issue are not in the nature of judicial acts. The Council also takes the view that, even if the principle that proceedings should be concluded within a reasonable time enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter were applicable to it, the length of the procedure before that institution has not infringed the reasonable time requirement as the Council carried out, each year, a review of whether it was necessary to maintain the listing of the applicant in the Annex to Decision 2011/72.

88 It should be noted, at the outset, that the applicant’s argument in the present plea cannot be examined in the light of Article 47 of the Charter.

89 It should be borne in mind, in that regard, that the first sentence of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter provides that everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. It should also be noted that, pursuant to Article 51(1) thereof, the Charter is addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union and to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law. Moreover, Article 51(2) of the Charter states that it does not extend the field of application of EU law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties.

90 In the light of Article 51(1) and (2) of the Charter, the provisions of Article 47 thereof must be interpreted as being directed at the right to effective judicial protection only in proceedings in which the rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law are at stake (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin, C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraph 52).

91 Thus, in the present case, Article 47 of the Charter is applicable in the sense that it provides the applicant with the assurance that the contested asset freeze will be subject to effective judicial review by the General Court, entailing, inter alia, verification that the decision to adopt those measures was taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119). Such an obligation to verify, pursuant to Article 47 of the Charter, therefore rests with the General Court, not with the Council.

92 On the other hand, the provisions of Article 47 of the Charter cannot apply to the applicant’s right to effective judicial protection in the context of the judicial proceedings concerning him in Tunisia, which is a third country. Moreover, the fact that the decision to adopt restrictive measures targeting the applicant was based on those judicial proceedings cannot have the effect of justifying a review of the lawfulness of that decision in the light of those provisions. First, that decision emanated from an EU institution which is not empowered by the Treaties to exercise judicial functions. Second, the decision, which was, moreover, adopted under the CFSP, is not in the nature of a judicial decision, as its object is neither to rule on an action nor to settle a dispute (see, to that effect and by analogy, order of 24 March 2011, Bengtsson, C‑344/09, EU:C:2011:174, paragraphs 22 to 24 and the case-law cited).

93 That interpretation is not affected by paragraphs 178 to 184 and 188 of the judgment of 16 July 2009, Der Grüne Punkt — Duales System Deutschland v Commission (C‑385/07 P, EU:C:2009:456), cited by the applicant in support of the part of the plea under consideration. It is in fact clear from those paragraphs, in particular paragraph 188, that in that judgment the Court of Justice simply applied the principle that proceedings must be concluded within a reasonable time, enshrined in the first sentence of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, to the handling of a case by the General Court, in the context of the procedure followed before that court, and did not intend to extend the application of that principle to EU institutions which do not have judicial authority (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2009, Der Grüne Punkt — Duales System Deutschland v Commission, C‑385/07 P, EU:C:2009:456, paragraphs 178 to 184 and 188 and the case-law cited).

94 Admittedly, the Council is under a duty to handle the affairs of persons targeted by restrictive measures adopted by it within a reasonable time, by virtue of Article 41(1) of the Charter, which lays down the right for every person to good administration.

95 However, even if, notwithstanding the arguments put forward by the applicant, the first part of the second plea were to be interpreted as alleging infringement by the Council of Article 41(1) of the Charter, it is apparent from the considerations set out in paragraphs 62 to 78 above that it must, in any event, be rejected as unfounded.

96 First, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 66 to 75 above, even if those considerations had justified the Council requesting verifications from the Tunisian authorities concerning the status of the ongoing judicial investigation regarding the applicant, they could not have had the effect of obliging it to bring to an end the freezing of the applicant’s assets in the European Union. Second, as indicated in paragraphs 76 to 78 above, the evidence produced by the applicant before the adoption of Decision 2015/157 was not such as to raise legitimate questions as to whether the Tunisian authorities had due regard for the principle that proceedings should be concluded within a reasonable time. Lastly, it should be added that, for the same reasons and contrary to what is claimed by the applicant, the Council cannot be criticised for not informing the Tunisian authorities of the limits on the length of time for which the applicant’s assets may be frozen in the European Union and of the need for a swift judicial investigation.

97 As is apparent from the very wording of the application and the reply, in the present plea, the applicant merely alleges that the Council infringed his right to have his case heard within a reasonable time by failing to take the measures within its competence to ensure that the length of the judicial proceedings concerning him in Tunisia was not unreasonable.

98 Accordingly, as the evidence submitted by the applicant to the Council does not show that the length of those judicial proceedings has been vitiated by such an irregularity, those proceedings cannot, in turn, vitiate the length of the freezing of the applicant’s assets in the European Union.

99 Furthermore, the applicant does not claim that, prior to his letter of 15 January 2015, he submitted to the Council evidence that would have justified that European institution approaching the Tunisian authorities to satisfy itself that his right to have his case heard within a reasonable time in the judicial investigation concerning him was being observed. As a consequence, the applicant cannot take issue with the Council for failing to act with all diligence in that regard in respect of the period prior to the letter of 15 January 2015.

100 In view of all the foregoing, the first part of the second plea cannot be upheld.

– The second part of the second plea, alleging infringement of the presumption of innocence, on account of the Council’s press release of 31 January 2011

101 In support of the second part of the second plea, the applicant submits that the Council’s press release of 31 January 2011 infringes the presumption of innocence in that it encourages the public to believe that the persons designated in that press release as responsible for misappropriation of State funds are in fact guilty of such an offence. In paragraph 126 of the application, the applicant requests the Court to ‘rule that this statement breached the presumption of his innocence contrary to Article 48 of the Charter’. In the reply, the applicant responds to the Council’s arguments in the defence, stating that the fact that the press release is a separate document from Decision 2015/157 does not alter the fact that there has been an infringement, even though ‘the judicial finding is made separately’. Similarly, the fact that no action has been brought for annulment of the press release does not alter its effect. Lastly, it is irrelevant that the press release in question predated that decision by four years, as the decision provides for the continuation of the restrictive measures adopted on the same day as the press release. The applicant adds that the infringement of the presumption of innocence alleged may compromise a fair trial in Tunisia, as it could influence the conduct of the Tunisian authorities towards him.

102 For its part, the Council argues, in the defence, that, by adopting Decision 2015/157, it did not itself state that the applicant was guilty of misappropriation of State funds and did not prejudge the assessment of the facts to be made by the court with jurisdiction in Tunisia. It adds that the press release that is the subject of the applicant’s complaint in the second part of the second plea is separate and distinct from that decision and is not the subject of an action for annulment. It adds that, in any event, the legal nature of the press release is different from that of the decision and their legality must be examined separately. In the rejoinder, the Council submits, in essence, that, viewed within the overall context of the press release, the phrase quoted by the applicant in support of the second plea cannot be regarded as infringing the presumption of innocence.

103 In that regard, it should be noted that the document to which the second part of the second plea relates, which is annexed to the application, is a Council press release of 31 January 2011 (5881/2011 REV 1), in which the Council published the conclusions of the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council of the same date. There is a box on the first page of that document, the second line of which contains the following statement: ‘The Council also discussed events in Tunisia and adopted conclusions stating the EU’s readiness to support the democratic transition, in particular the preparation of elections. It also adopted restrictive measures freezing the assets of people who have embezzled Tunisian public funds.’

104 Moreover, in paragraph 6 of page 8 of the press release referred to in paragraph 103 above, the Council states that ‘in consultation with the Tunisian authorities, the Council has adopted restrictive measures against individuals responsible for misappropriation of State funds’.

105 Those are the two statements which the applicant considers to be vitiated by infringement of the presumption of innocence. With regard to the first statement, the applicant considers that it is worded in such a way as to give the impression that the persons in question have already been found guilty of misappropriation of State funds. With regard to the second, while acknowledging that the Court has previously held that such statements do not prejudge the findings of fact by the court with jurisdiction (judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑256/11, EU:C:2014:93, paragraph 83), the applicant claims, in essence, that the Council gave the expression ‘individuals responsible for misappropriation of State funds’ an absolute character by failing to specify that it was relying on proceedings in which the criminal liability of those individuals has not yet been established.

106 First, it should be noted that, in response to a question put by the Court at the hearing, the applicant clarified that the request made in paragraph 126 of the application, namely that the Court rule that those two statements had infringed the principle of innocence, did not form a separate head of claim from that seeking annulment of Decision 2015/157, but was to be interpreted as a plea in support of that head of claim. It must therefore necessarily be concluded that the applicant is of the view that the alleged infringement of his right to respect for the presumption of innocence resulting from those statements is such as to affect the legality of Decision 2015/157.

107 In that regard, it must be observed, as maintained, in essence, by the Council, that the press release at issue is a separate document from Decision 2011/72 and Decision 2015/157 and its purpose is simply to inform the public of the content of the first of those decisions. Moreover, it is not a document that was prepared in the context of the procedure which led to the adoption of either of those decisions. Lastly, the applicant does not dispute that those decisions do not, in themselves, infringe the presumption of innocence in so far as he is concerned. As a consequence, the applicant cannot validly claim infringement of the presumption of innocence resulting from those statements in the press release in order to challenge Decision 2015/157 on the ground that it is unlawful (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 5 April 2006, Degussa v Commission, T‑279/02, EU:T:2006:103, paragraphs 413 and 423). The second part of the second plea is therefore ineffective.

108 In any event, the second part of the second plea is based on a literal reading of the two statements quoted in paragraphs 103 and 104 above, which fails to take account of the context in which they were made.

109 A reading of the content of the press release in question confirms that, as its title suggests, its sole purpose is to inform the public of the conclusions of the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council of 31 January 2011, in particular of the adoption of Decision 2011/72.

110 Consequently, the two statements at issue must be interpreted by reference to the content of Decision 2011/72. It should be recalled in that regard that Article 1(1) of that decision provides for the freezing of the assets of persons responsible for misappropriation of Tunisian State funds and those of natural or legal persons or entities associated with them. However, as indicated in paragraph 34 above, the term ‘ persons responsible for misappropriation of Tunisian State funds’ within the meaning of Article 1(1) of that decision must include not only the persons already found responsible for such acts but also those who are the subject of ongoing judicial investigations to establish whether or not they are responsible.

111 Furthermore, those statements must also be understood by reference to the grounds for the inclusion of those persons in the Annex to Decision 2011/72. With regard to the applicant, those grounds expressly mention, from the first time his name appears on that list, that he is the subject of judicial investigations relating to acts that may be classified as misappropriation of State funds.

112 Accordingly, the applicant is incorrect to claim that those statements foster the belief that the persons listed in the Annex to Decision 2011/72 are guilty, as their content refers to the content of that decision and the latter, as noted above, does not concern the applicant as a person already found responsible for misappropriation of Tunisian State funds but as a person who is the subject of judicial investigations relating to such misappropriation. For the same reasons, those statements cannot be regarded as likely to influence the competent Tunisian authorities or likely to prejudge the assessment of the facts by the court with jurisdiction. They cannot, therefore, in any event, be regarded as constituting an infringement of the principle of the presumption of innocence.

113 It follows from all the foregoing that the second part of the second plea must be rejected.

– The third part of the second plea, alleging infringement of the right to good administration, in particular to the impartial handling of a person’s affairs under Article 41(1) of the Charter

114 In support of the third part of the second plea, the applicant relies on a set of circumstances which, in his view, demonstrate that he has not been treated impartially by the Council. In the first place, in its ‘initial public statement’, the Council claimed that all the persons listed in the Annex to Decision 2011/72 were guilty of embezzling public funds ‘without any qualification whatsoever’. In the second place, the current grounds for the inclusion of the applicant in that annex no longer have any ‘obvious EU dimension’, which should have led to the fund freezing at issue being withdrawn. In the third place, the Council, in response to the exculpatory evidence produced by the applicant, refused, incorrectly, to verify whether the facts alleged were accurate. In the fourth place, Decision 2015/157 was adopted despite the inactivity of the Tunisian judicial authorities and the resultant lapse of over four years from the time the applicant was charged. In the fifth place, the Council adopted that decision without account being taken of evidence establishing that democracy had been restored in Tunisia. Finally, in the sixth place, the Council adopted that decision without verifying, in particular, the objection that that measure infringed the applicant’s right to have his case heard within a reasonable time.

115 The Council disputes each of those arguments and states, in general, that the fact that the Council disagrees with the applicant in his assessment of the factual and legal elements put forward by him by way of exculpatory evidence cannot be equated to a lack of impartiality on its part.

116 In that regard, it should be noted that, in adopting restrictive measures, the Council is under an obligation to observe the principle of good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter, which, according to settled case-law, entails the obligation for the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case (see judgment of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).

117 In the present case, the applicant reiterates, in essence, in support of the third part of the second plea, the various complaints made in the first and third pleas and in other parts of the second plea. For the reasons given in connection with the examination of those pleas and parts of pleas, those complaints must be rejected.

118 In the first place, assuming that, by the expression ‘initial public statement’, the applicant is referring to the press release the lawfulness of which he disputes in the second part of the second plea, it is apparent from paragraphs 107 to 112 above that the applicant’s arguments concerning the alleged infringement of the presumption of innocence as a result of that press release must be rejected.

119 In the second place, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 39 and 57 above, the fact that the grounds for the inclusion of the applicant in the Annex to Decision 2011/72 do not refer to acts which occurred in the European Union is of no consequence, as those grounds refer only to a judicial investigation concerning acts that may be classified as misappropriation of State funds.

120 In the third place, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 49 to 57 above, the exculpatory evidence produced by the applicant seeking to establish, in particular, that there is no prospect of him being tried, do not oblige the Council to carry out further verifications as to the status of the judicial proceedings concerning him in Tunisia.

121 In the fourth place, for the reasons given in paragraphs 63 to 78 above, the evidence produced by the applicant to establish infringement by the Tunisian authorities of his right to have his case heard within a reasonable time cannot justify an end being put to the freezing of his assets in the European Union.

122 In the fifth place, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 127 to 134 below in connection with the third plea, the Council did nor err in maintaining the restrictive measures at issue notwithstanding developments in the democratic process in Tunisia. Lastly, for the reasons given in paragraphs 88 to 96 above in the context of the first part of the second plea, the sixth argument alleging that the Council itself failed to have due regard to the applicant’s right to have his case heard within a reasonable time must be rejected.

123 As a consequence, it follows from the foregoing that the applicant was incorrect to maintain that the Council infringed the right to good administration, in particular the principle of impartiality. Accordingly, the third part of the second plea and, as a consequence, that plea in its entirety must be rejected.

The third plea, alleging that Decision 2015/157 is devoid of purpose, in the light of developments in the process of democratisation in Tunisia

124 The applicant submits, in support of the third plea, that the Council made manifest errors of assessment with regard to developments in the process of democratisation in Tunisia and the need for restrictive measures in respect of Tunisian nationals responsible for misappropriation of Tunisian State funds. First, according to the applicant, since 31 January 2011, a number of events of a judicial, constitutional and electoral nature have demonstrated the successful completion of the transition to democracy in Tunisia. By maintaining the restrictive measure at issue in view of the ‘situation in Tunisia’, according to the words used in Decision 2011/72, the Council failed to carry out a correct assessment of the nature of those developments or, at the very least, failed to take them into account. Second, the applicant is of the view that, if the Council considered that the transition to democracy had been achieved in Tunisia, it was no longer entitled to rely on the objective of safeguarding the process of democratisation to justify maintaining the restrictive measures at issue. In the alternative, the applicant contends that, by failing to explain why, notwithstanding developments in the transition to democracy in Tunisia, the restrictive measures were still required, the Council vitiated Decision 2015/157 by a lack of reasoning.

125 In the defence, the Council replies that the applicant’s reasoning rests on the incorrect assumption that the process of transition to democracy in Tunisia has been successfully completed. It points out that, as is apparent from, in particular, its conclusions of 19 January 2015, it considered that that process was still ongoing at the time Decision 2015/157 was adopted.

126 First of all, it should be noted that, although the applicant does not expressly refer to Article 277 TFEU, the present plea must be interpreted as raising a plea of illegality as regards Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/72, as extended by Decision 2015/157. The manifest errors of assessment alleged in the present plea do not relate to the continuation of the listing of the applicant in the Annex to Decision 2011/72 as such, but to the continuation, in general, of the freezing of the assets of the persons responsible for misappropriation of Tunisian State funds and of those associated with those persons, as imposed by Article 1(1) of that decision (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraph 31). Thus, what the applicant is disputing is whether it is possible for the Council to continue to maintain, in their entirety, the restrictive measures adopted under Decision 2011/72 in the light of the objectives of that decision and developments in the democratic process in Tunisia.

127 It should be noted, in that regard, first, that, as is apparent from recital 1 thereof, Decision 2011/72, which is based on Article 29 TEU, seeks to support ‘the efforts [by the Tunisian people] to establish a stable democracy, the rule of law, democratic pluralism and full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’. It seeks, inter alia, according to recital 2 thereof, to assist the Tunisian authorities in combating misappropriation of State funds by freezing the assets of persons ‘responsible’ for misappropriation of such funds, who are thus depriving the Tunisian people of the benefits of the sustainable development of their economy and society and undermining the development of democracy in the country.

128 As a consequence, as this Court has previously held, Decision 2011/72 forms part of a more general EU policy of support for the Tunisian authorities, intended to promote both the economic and the political stability of the Tunisian Republic. It thus satisfies the objectives of the CFSP, which are defined, in particular, in Article 21(2)(b) and (d) TEU, pursuant to which the European Union is to engage in international cooperation with a view to consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law and, moreover, to fostering the sustainable — notably economic — development of developing countries (see judgments of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited, and of 30 June 2016, CW v Council, T‑516/13, not published, EU:T:2016:377, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).

129 According to settled case-law concerning the CFSP, the Council must be allowed a broad discretion in areas which involve political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments, so that the legality of a measure adopted in those areas can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (see judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph120 and the case-law cited).

130 In the present case, as the Council observes with reference to its conclusions of 19 January 2015, it did not consider, unlike the applicant, that the process of transition to democracy in Tunisia had been successfully completed by the time Decision 2015/157 was adopted. The various developments of a judicial, constitutional and electoral nature put forward by the applicant do not show that the Council made a manifest error in its assessment of that process. Indeed, while those developments are indicative of progress, they did not allow any obvious conclusion to be drawn that that process had been successfully completed, as that process was subject, as the Council stated in the conclusions mentioned above, to, inter alia, the consolidation of the rule of law and the democratic achievements of the new Tunisian constitution.

131 In any event, the third plea is based, by necessary implication if nothing else, on the incorrect premiss that the successful completion of the transition to democracy in Tunisia should oblige the Council to bring to an end the restrictive measures imposed by Decision 2011/72. As indicated in paragraph 33 above, the sole purpose of the asset freeze imposed by Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/72, read in the light of recitals 1 and 2 thereof, is to assist the Tunisian authorities with establishing any misappropriation of State funds that has taken place and to ensure that it remains possible for those authorities to recover the proceeds of misappropriation. Consequently, any repeal of those restrictive measures is dependent only on the completion of the judicial proceedings on which they are based, not on the successful completion of the process of transition to democracy in Tunisia, support for that process being just one of the ultimate objectives of the policy of which that asset freeze forms part, not an additional condition for maintaining the asset freeze (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraph 143).

132 It should be added that, even if that process of transition to democracy were successfully completed, the freezing of his assets does not represent, contrary to what the applicant claims, interference by the ‘legislature’ in matters falling within the jurisdiction of the courts.

133 Irrespective of the fact that, under Article 24 TEU, the Council does not adopt legislative measures under the CFSP, the successful completion of the process of transition to democracy in Tunisia, as indicated in paragraph 131 above, could not have the effect of obliging the Council to withdraw the restrictive measures adopted under Decision 2011/72. As it would be likely to hinder the establishment by the Tunisian authorities of the misappropriation of State funds that has taken place and of the recovery of the proceeds of such misappropriation, the withdrawal of those measures before the ongoing judicial investigations were completed would be likely to undermine the objective of consolidating and supporting democracy and the rule of law in Tunisia laid down in that decision. Thus, the maintenance of those measures, which, as stated in paragraph 33 above, are of a purely precautionary nature and have no criminal law connotations, remains justified, having regard to the objectives of the CFSP. As a consequence, if the applicant’s argument is to be understood as alleging interference by a political authority, such as the Council, in matters falling solely within the jurisdiction of the Tunisian courts, it is clear that the maintenance of those measures does not amount to such interference.

134 Therefore, the plea alleging that the Council made a manifest error of assessment as regards developments in the political situation in Tunisia must be rejected.

135 With regard to the plea alleging, in the alternative, failure to state adequate reasons, it is sufficient to note that it is clear from paragraphs 127 to 133 above that developments in the political situation in Tunisia since Decision 2011/72 was adopted are not a justification for specific reasons to be given for the maintenance, by Decision 2015/157, of the restrictive measures adopted under Decision 2011/72, in the light of those developments. That plea must therefore also be rejected.

136 In the light of all the foregoing, the third plea must be rejected.

The fourth plea alleging, in the alternative, a ‘manifest error of assessment’ relating to the failure by the Council to give sufficient consideration to the ‘criminal law element’ of Decision 2015/157

137 In support of the fourth plea, the applicant argues that the Council did not carry out an objective assessment of the arguments presented by him ‘from the perspective of the criminal law’ in his letter of 15 January 2015. The applicant submits in that regard that the Council dismissed his explanations concerning the weakening of the charges against him in Tunisia on the basis of speculative considerations focused solely on CFSP objectives. The Council thereby failed to examine the applicant’s rights under EU law as a person who is the subject of a judicial investigation. In the reply, the applicant maintains that Decision 2015/157 has a criminal law dimension or, at the very least, criminal law effects or a criminal law purpose, in that it has the same effect as a measure of legal assistance issued by a criminal court on the basis of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, adopted by the United Nations Assembly on 31 October 2003.

138 In the defence, the Council contends that Decision 2015/157 was adopted on the only legal basis possible, namely Article 29 TEU, and does not have any criminal law dimension.

139 By the present plea, the applicant must be regarded as alleging, in essence, an error of law, in so far as the Council reviewed the maintenance of the restrictive measures targeting the applicant, when adopting Decision 2015/157, only in the light of CFSP objectives and, therefore, without applying the requirements and safeguards that are necessary in criminal proceedings. That plea is, however, clearly unfounded.

140 First, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 127 and 128 above, Decision 2011/72 and, as a consequence, Decision 2015/157, which extends it, meet the CFSP objectives laid down in Article 21(2)(b) and (d) TEU. Second, as indicated in paragraph 33 above, the freezing of the applicant’s assets in the European Union, which is not intended to penalise his conduct in Tunisia, is devoid of any criminal law connotation. The Council was therefore entitled, when adopting Decision 2015/157, to do no more than verify whether the evidence in its possession constituted, having regard to the objectives of Decision 2011/72, which form part of the CFSP, a sufficient basis for maintaining the asset freeze. Thus, it was not required to consider whether the asset freeze should be maintained in the light of the requirements of criminal law and by ensuring that the applicant had the benefit of specific safeguards comparable to those available in criminal proceedings.

141 The arguments in the reply by which the applicant seeks to demonstrate that the asset freeze at issue is in the nature of a criminal law measure cannot alter that conclusion.

142 In the first place, the precautionary nature of the asset freeze at issue and the fact that the maintenance of that measure depends on the outcome of criminal proceedings in Tunisia cannot, of itself, turn it into a criminal law measure.

143 As is apparent from paragraphs 33, 127 and 128 above, in implementing a policy of support for the Tunisian authorities to promote democratic stability and the rule of law on the basis of Article 29 TEU, the Council has the power to adopt measures that assist in the effective conclusion of criminal proceedings initiated in Tunisia in respect of misappropriation of State funds. Thus, as the Council is correct to point out, the criminal proceedings in Tunisia do not form the legal basis of the asset freeze at issue, but its factual basis. Moreover, as indicated by the grounds for the inclusion of the applicant in the Annex to Decision 2011/72, which relate to ongoing judicial investigations concerning the applicant, the Council did not adopt Decision 2015/157 on the basis that it was convinced that the applicant had misappropriated State funds.

144 In the second place, the comparison made by the applicant between the effects of the freezing of his funds and the effects of a measure of legal assistance adopted in the context of international cooperation in criminal law is not persuasive.

145 It is true that the freezing of the applicant’s funds imposed by the Council has the concrete effect of immobilising those funds in the European Union in a way that is comparable to what may occur if a national court decided to freeze those funds in the context of international cooperation in criminal law. However, the fact nonetheless remains that the nature of those measures is different.

146 First, the measure freezing the applicant’s funds, adopted on the basis of Article 29 TEU, is an independent measure designed to attain the objectives of the CFSP, not a measure designed to respond to a request by the Tunisian authorities for legal assistance (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 26 October 2015, Portnov v Council, T‑290/14, EU:T:2015:806, paragraph 45).

147 Second, the Council’s powers in the present case, by virtue of Article 21(2)(b) and (d) and Article 29 TEU, are confined to the adoption of measures freezing the funds of the persons concerned as a precautionary measure which, by definition, is temporary and reversible. On the other hand, the powers of national judicial authorities in the context of international cooperation in criminal law are not necessarily confined to the adoption of such measures.

148 In the light of all the foregoing, the fourth plea must be rejected.

The fifth plea, alleging infringement of the right to property and of Article 17 of the Charter.

149 In support of the fifth plea, the applicant submits that, as Decision 2015/157 is unjustified and unlawful, the restrictions on his right to property are also unjustified and infringe Article 17 of the Charter. The Council contests that line of argument.

150 It should be noted in that regard that, in order to comply with EU law, a limitation on the exercise of the right to property must satisfy three conditions. First, the limitation must be ‘provided for by law’. In other words, the measure in question must have a legal basis. Secondly, the limitation must refer to an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union. Thirdly, the limitation may not be excessive: it must be necessary and proportional to the aim sought, and the substance of the right or freedom at issue must not be impaired (see judgments of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 197 to 200 and the case-law cited, and of 30 June 2016, CW v Council, T‑516/13, EU:T:2016:377, paragraphs 165 to 168 and the case-law cited).

151 The applicant simply claims in the present plea that, in so far as he has shown, in the earlier plea