ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Keywords

Subject of the case

Operative part



Keywords

Actions for damages — Autonomous form of action — Exhaustion of national rights of action — Exception — Impossible or excessively difficult to obtain compensation before the national courts — Burden of proof — Scope — Limited to providing indicators capable of raising serious doubts as to the effectiveness of the protection ensured by internal remedies (Arts 268 TFEU and 340, second para., TFEU) (see paras 19, 22, 29)

2. Non-contractual liability — Conditions — Unlawfulness — Damage — Causal link — Cumulative conditions — One of the conditions not satisfied — Claim for compensation dismissed in its entirety (Art. 340, second para., TFEU) (see paras 32, 58)

3. Non-contractual liability — Conditions — Unlawfulness — Sufficiently serious breach of EU law — Requirement that the institutions manifestly and seriously disregard the limits of their discretion — Non-pursuit of investigations during an anti-dumping proceeding — No total disregard of the obligations flowing from the duty of care — Liability of the EU not engaged (Art. 340, second para., TFEU; Council Regulation No 384/96, as amended by Regulation No 1225/2009, Art. 2(7)(a)) (see paras 37, 39, 42-44, 46, 48, 50-53, 55-58)

4. Non-contractual liability — Conditions — Causal link — Concept — Burden of proof (Art. 340, second para., TFEU) (see para. 60)

Subject of the case

Re:

ACTION for damages seeking compensation for the loss allegedly suffered as a result of the adoption of Council Regulation (EC) No 1355/2008 of 18 December 2008 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain prepared or preserved citrus fruits (namely mandarins, etc.) originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ 2008 L 350, p. 35), declared invalid by the judgment of 22 March 2012 in GLS (C‑338/10, ECR, EU:C:2012:158).

Operative part

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Hüpeden & Co. (GmbH & Co.) KG to pay the costs.
Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 23 October 2015 — Bonney v OHIM — Bruno (ATHEIST)

(Case T‑714/14)

‛Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for the Community word mark ATHEIST — Earlier national word mark athé — Relative ground for refusal — Article 8(1)(b) and (2) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

1. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 16, 18, 30)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Word marks ATHEIST and athé (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 17, 19, 31)

3. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity of the marks concerned — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 21)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 5 August 2015 (Case R 803/2013-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Ms Vanessa Bruno and Mr David Bonney.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 28 October 2015 —

Monster Energy v OHIM — Home Focus (MoMo Monsters)

(Case T‑736/14)

‛Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for the Community word mark MoMo Monsters — Earlier Community word marks MONSTER and MONSTER ENERGY and earlier international figurative mark MONSTER ENERGY — Relative ground for refusal — No similarity between the goods — No likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

1. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 16, 17)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity between the goods or services in question — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 22, 26)

3. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity between the goods or services in question — Complementary nature of the goods (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 28)

4. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Word mark MoMo Monsters — Word marks MONSTER and MONSTER ENERGY and figurative mark MONSTER ENERGY (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 31, 34, 35)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 7 August 2014 (Case R 1167/2013-2), concerning opposition proceedings between Monster Energy Company and Home Focus Development Ltd.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) of 25 November 2015 —

bd breyton-design v OHIM (RACE GTP)

(Case T‑520/14)

‛Community trade mark — Application for Community word mark RACE GTP — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

1. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Aim — Need to preserve availability (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 15)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Concept (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 16)

3. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Word mark RACE GTP (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 20, 23, 28-30, 35, 41, 42, 48, 49)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 27 March 2014 (Case R 1230/2013-1) concerning an application for registration of the word sign RACE GTP as a Community trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 3 December 2015 —

Infusion Brands v OHIM (DUALTOOLS)

(Case T‑648/14)

‛Community trade mark — Application for the Community figurative mark DUALTOOLS — Absolute grounds for refusal — Partial refusal of registration — Descriptive character — Lack of distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

1. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Aim — Need to preserve availability (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 16)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Concept (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 17-19)

3. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Figurative mark DUALTOOLS (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 20-24, 27, 30, 34)

4. Community trade mark — Decisions of the Office — Principle of equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — OHIM’s previous decision-making practice — Principle of legality — Need for a strict and complete examination in each particular case (Council Regulation No 207/2009) (see paras 32, 33)

5. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Assessment of the registrability of a sign — EU rules only taken into account — Earlier registration of the mark in certain Member States or third countries — Decisions not binding EU bodies (Council Regulation No 207/2009) (see para. 36)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 1 July 2014 (Case R 398/2014-4), concerning an application for registration of the figurative sign DUALTOOLS as a Community trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) of 16 December 2015 —

CareAbout v OHIM — Florido Rodríguez (Kerashot)

(Case T‑356/14)

‛Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for Community word mark Kerashot — Earlier national figurative mark K KERASOL — Relative grounds for refusal — No likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Partial refusal of registration by the Board of Appeal’

1. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 16, 39, 72)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Assessment of the likelihood of confusion — Attention level of the public (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 17, 23-25)

3. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Word mark ‘Kerashot’ and figurative mark in black and white ‘K KERASOL’ (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 26, 38, 77, 78, 81)

4. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity between the goods or services in question — Complementary nature of the goods or services (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 31, 32)

5. Community trade mark — Appeals procedure — Action before the EU judicature — Jurisdiction of the General Court — Review of the lawfulness of decisions of the Boards of Appeal — Annulment or variation for reasons appearing after judgment was delivered — Exclusion (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 65(2), and 76) (see paras 49, 50)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 24 March 2014 (Case R 1569/2013-4), relating to opposition proceedings between José Luis Florido Rodriguez and CareAbout GmbH.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
2.

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Figurative mark BIG BINGO (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b) and (c)) (see paras 21, 23, 24, 26-30)
4.

Acts of the institutions — Statement of reasons — Obligation — Scope — Decision on the clearance of accounts in respect of expenditure financed by EAGGF, EAGF and EAFRD — Financial corrections — Addressee State having been closely associated with the process of drawing up the decision — Infringement of the duty to state reasons — None (Art. 296 TFEU) (see para. 91)
With regard to a measure or decision which is developed in several phases, intermediate measures, the purpose of which is merely to prepare for the final decision, do not in themselves produce binding legal effects. Such effects arise solely from the measure definitively establishing the position of the institution concerned and, as long as that measure has not yet been adopted, the legal position of those concerned is not directly or immediately changed.

Consequently, if a measure produces, in itself, binding legal effects directly and immediately affecting the position of those concerned, it constitutes an act adversely affecting them which is capable of being the subject of a complaint and then an action before the Courts of the Union, in accordance with Article 90(2) and Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations respectively. The fact that that measure may be taken into account in the subsequent adoption of a different measure and hence may be regarded as forming part of an internal procedure leading to the adoption of that other measure is not sufficient to prevent the first measure from constituting an act adversely affecting those concerned.

Thus, the fact that the adoption of a decision setting objectives for an official for a particular period is a necessary prerequisite for the adoption of a final decision in the subsequent appraisal procedure is not, in itself, sufficient to conclude that the decision setting objectives is not an act adversely affecting the official concerned. It must still be shown that the latter decision does not, in itself, produce binding legal effects directly and immediately affecting the situation of the official in question.

(see paras 26, 27, 29)
Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 19 February 2016 —

Ludwig-Bölkow-Systemtechnik v Commission

(Case T‑53/14)

‛Arbitration clause — Sixth framework programme for research, technological development and demonstration activities — Reimbursement of a portion of the amounts paid and flat-rate compensation — No need to adjudicate in part — Costs eligible for EU funding — Penalty clause — Manifestly excessive character’

Judicial proceedings — General Court seised under an arbitration clause — Contracts concluded under a specific research, technological development and demonstration programme — Refusal by the Commission to consider as eligible costs certain sums advanced by the beneficiary by way of implementation of the contracts — Request for repayment of advances — Beneficiary challenging the method of calculating the eligible costs — Law applicable — Union law — Concept of eligible costs (Arts 272 TFEU and 288 TFEU; European Parliament and Council Regulation No 2321/2002; Council Regulation No 1605/2002, Art. 109(2)) (see paras 41-47)

Re:

APPLICATION for a declaration, first, that the Commission is not entitled to require the applicant to reimburse advances paid under three contracts and, secondly, that the applicant is not required to pay flat-rate compensation to the Commission.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Declares that there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the second and third heads of claim of the action;

2. Declares that the sums payable as flat-rate compensation by Ludwig-Bölkow-Systemtechnik GmbH are to be reduced by an amount equivalent to 10% of the advances to be reimbursed under the contracts concerning the projects HyWays, HyApproval and HarmonHy;

3. Dismisses the action as to the remainder;
The principle of legal certainty aims to ensure that situations and legal relationships governed by EU law remain foreseeable. To that end, it is essential that the EU institutions observe the principle that they may not alter measures which they have adopted and which affect the legal and factual situation of persons, so that they may amend such acts only in accordance with the rules on competence and procedure. Accordingly, the principle of legal certainty cannot, in itself, prevent the amendment of a legal rule.

The obligation to consult incumbent on the European Central Bank regarding a reform of its pension arrangements means that it must supply the Oversight Committee for the retirement plan with the relevant information throughout the consultation procedure, the objective being to enable the committee to participate in the consultation process as fully and effectively as possible. In order to do so, all new relevant information must be supplied to it by the Bank up until the last moment of that process.

Nonetheless, it does not follow either from the general scope of the Bank’s obligation to consult on the envisaged reform of its pension arrangements, or from the other provisions, specifically Article 6 of the Memorandum of Understanding on Relations between the Executive Board and the Staff Committee of the ECB and Article 30 of the Terms of Reference of the Retirement Plan Oversight Committee, that that obligation to consult enables the Bank to avoid its obligation to maintain the confidentiality of the documents concerned. On the contrary, as the Civil Service Tribunal observed, the Oversight Committee must participate in the consultation process as fully and effectively as possible, whereas, in accordance with the objective of Chapter II of the Memorandum of Understanding, information enabling the Staff Committee to familiarise itself with the subject-matter of a consultation must be presented to it in so far as there is no compelling reason to the contrary.

(see paras 57, 60)
Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 30 November 2016 —

Bank Refah Kargaran v Council

(Case T‑65/14)

(Common Foreign and Security Policy — Restrictive measures against Iran — Freezing of funds — Further listing of the applicant after annulment of the initial listing by the General Court — Error in law — Error in fact — Obligation to state reasons — Rights of the defence — Right to effective judicial protection — Proportionality)

1. European Union—Judicial review of the legality of the acts of the institutions—Restrictive measures against Iran—Measures in the context of the fight against nuclear proliferation—Ambit of the review—Restricted review for general rules—Criteria for adopting restrictive measures—Support for the Iranian Government—Scope—Compliance with the principle of legal certainty requiring clarity, precision and foreseeability of the effects of legal rules (Council Decisions 2010/413/CFSP, Art. 20(1)(c), and 2012/35/CFSP, thirteenth recital; Council Regulation No 267/2012, Art. 23(2)(d)) (see paras 38-40, 119)

2. Actions for annulment—Contested act—Assessment of lawfulness—Criteria (Art. 263 TFEU) (see paras 43, 131)

3. Acts of the institutions—Statement of reasons—Obligation—Scope—Restrictive measures against Iran—Freezing of funds of persons, entities or bodies engaged in or supporting nuclear proliferation—Minimum requirements (Art. 296 TFEU; Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP, as amended by Council Decision 2013/661/CFSP; Council Regulations No 267/2012 and No 1154/2013) (see paras 55-58)

4. European Union—Judicial review of the legality of the acts of the institutions—Restrictive measures against Iran—Measures in the context of the fight against nuclear proliferation—Ambit of the review (Art. 275, second para., TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts 41(2), and 47; Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP) (see paras 78-82)

5. Common foreign and security policy—Restrictive measures against Iran—Freezing of funds of persons, entities or bodies engaged in or supporting nuclear proliferation—Restriction of the right to property and the free exercise of an economic activity—No breach of principle of proportionality (Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP, as amended by Council Decision 2013/661/CFSP; Council Regulations No 267/2012 and No 1154/2013) (see paras 115, 116, 122-126)

Re:

APPLICATION based on Article 263 TFEU and seeking, principally, annulment of Council Decision 2013/661/CFSP of 15 November 2013 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ 2010 L 306, p. 18), and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1154/2013 of 15 November 2013, implementing Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ 2013 L 306, p. 3), in so far as those acts concern the applicant, and, in the alternative, annulment of Decision 2013/661 and of Implementing Regulation No 1154/2013 in so far as those acts concern the applicant as from 20 January 2014.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Bank Refah Kargaran to pay, in addition to its own costs, the costs incurred by the Council of the European Union;