ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Case C‑496/15

Alphonse Eschenbrenner

v

Bundesagentur für Arbeit

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from the Landessozialgericht Rheinland-Pfalz, Mainz)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Freedom of movement for workers — Article 45 TFEU — Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 — Article 7 — Equal treatment — Frontier worker subject to income tax in the Member State of residence — Benefit paid by the Member State of employment in the event of the employer’s insolvency — Detailed rules for the calculation of the insolvency benefit — Notional taking into account of the income tax of the Member State of employment — Insolvency benefit lower than the previous net remuneration — Bilateral convention for the avoidance of double taxation)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 2 March 2017

Freedom of movement for persons — Workers — Equal treatment — Frontier worker subject to income tax in the Member State of residence — Benefit paid by the Member State of employment in the event of the employer’s insolvency — Detailed rules for the calculation of the insolvency benefit — Notional taking into account of the income tax of the Member State of employment — Lawfulness

(Art. 45 TFEU; European Parliament and Council Regulation No 492/2011, Art. 7)

Article 45 TFEU and Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union must be interpreted as not precluding, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, the amount of the insolvency benefit awarded by a Member State to a frontier worker who is not subject to income tax in that State, and for whom that benefit, under the provisions applicable to him, is not taxable, from being determined by deducting income tax, as it applies in that State, from the remuneration used to calculate that benefit, with the consequence that that frontier worker, unlike persons working and residing in that State, does not receive a benefit corresponding to his previous net remuneration. The fact that that worker does not have a claim against his employer corresponding to the part of his previous gross salary which he has not received because of that deduction has no effect in that regard.

(see para. 59, operative part)
EU law—Principles—Right to effective judicial protection—Judicial review of decisions adopted by the Commission in competition matters—Review of legality and unlimited jurisdiction, in law and in fact—No infringement

(Art. 263 TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 31)

(see paras 24, 27)
Appeal—Grounds—Lack of specific criticism of a point of the General Court’s reasoning and of legal arguments in support of the appeal—Inadmissibility

(Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 168(1)(d) and 169(2))

(see paras 18, 19)
Case C‑535/15

Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg

v

Jost Pinckernelle

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals — Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (REACH Regulation) — General obligation to register and information requirements — Unregistered chemicals — Export of unregistered chemicals outside the territory of the European Union)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 27 April 2017

Approximation of laws — Registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals — REACH Regulation — Obligation to register with the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) — Scope — No obligation to register chemicals intended for export outside the territory of the European Union

(European Parliament and Council Regulation No 1907/2006, Arts 3(12) and 5)

Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC, read in conjunction with Article 3(12) of that regulation, must be interpreted as meaning that substances which have not been registered at the time of their import into the territory of the European Union in accordance with that regulation may be exported outside that territory.

(see para. 49, operative part)
Article 9(1) of Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 on common rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of quality of service, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008, must be interpreted to the effect that a postal items service such as the one at issue in the main proceedings does not fall within the scope of the universal service if it does not involve the permanent provision of a postal service of specified quality at all points in the territory at affordable prices for all users. The provision of a postal items service which does not fall within the scope of the universal service may be subjected only to the issuing of a general authorisation.

It should be pointed out that, even though it is clear from recital 33 of Directive 2008/6 that Member States should be allowed to use general authorisations and individual licences whenever justified and proportionate to the objective pursued, the fact remains that Article 9(1) of Directive 97/67, unlike Article 9(2), does not allow for the provision of postal services to be made subject to the issuing of an individual licence.

(see paras 28, 30, operative part 1)
Case C‑598/15

Banco Santander SA

v

Cristobalina Sánchez López

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Jerez de la Frontera)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive 93/13/EEC — Consumer contracts — Unfair terms — Powers of the national court — Effectiveness of the protection afforded to consumers — Mortgage loan agreement — Extrajudicial enforcement procedure — Simplified declaratory court procedure for recognition of the real rights of the successful bidder)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 7 December 2017

Consumer protection — Unfair terms in consumer contracts — Directive 93/13 — Scope — Extrajudicial mortgage enforcement procedure of consisting in the award of a consumer’s immovable property to his creditor without protest on the part of the consumer — Proceedings independent of the relationship between the creditor and the consumer — Not included

(Council Directive 93/13, Art. 6(1) and 7(1))

Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer do not apply to proceedings such as those at issue in the main proceedings, brought by the successful bidder in an auction of immovable property, following extrajudicial enforcement of a mortgage granted over that property by a consumer to a creditor acting in the course of trade, such proceedings having been brought for the purpose of protecting real rights lawfully acquired by the successful bidder, provided that, first, the proceedings are independent of the legal relationship between that creditor and the consumer and, second, the mortgage has been enforced, the immovable property sold, the real rights over that property transferred, and the consumer has not availed himself of the legal remedies provided in that context.

In any event, in the first place, although the objective of Directive 93/13 is to ensure the protection it confers on consumers is guaranteed, to the point of requiring a national court, of its own motion, to review the unfairness of a contractual term falling within the scope of that directive, it should nevertheless be borne in mind that the provisions of the directive cannot be relied on where there is no corroborating evidence of an unfair term in a loan agreement secured by a mortgage which has been the subject of extrajudicial enforcement. In the second place, as stated by the Advocate General in point 70 of his Opinion and subject to verification by the referring court, it appears that Ms Sánchez López had the opportunity, at the time of the extrajudicial procedure for transfer of the property, to challenge or seek a suspension of the procedure on the ground that the mortgage loan agreement contained an unfair term, and apply for interim measures so as to suspend the sale of the immovable property of which she was the owner. It is within the course of the mortgage enforcement procedure that the court seised could, if necessary of its own motion, have carried out a review of the potential unfairness of terms stipulated in the mortgage loan agreement.

(see paras 48-50, operative part)
8

Under Article 15 of the regulation, ‘Transfer to a court better placed to hear the case’: ‘1. By way of exception, the courts of a Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter may, if they consider that a court of another Member State, with which the child has a particular connection, would be better placed to hear the case, or a specific part thereof, and where this is in the best interests of the child: (a) stay the case or the part thereof in question and invite the parties to introduce a request before the court of that other Member State in accordance with paragraph 4; or (b) request a court of another Member State to assume jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 5. 2. Paragraph 1 shall apply: (a) upon application from a party; or (b) of the court’s own motion; or (c) upon application from a court of another Member State with which the child has a particular connection, in accordance with paragraph 3. A transfer made of the court’s own motion or by application of a court of another Member State must be accepted by at least one of the parties. 3. The child shall be considered to have a particular connection to a Member State as mentioned in paragraph 1, if that Member State: (a) has become the habitual residence of the child after the court referred to in paragraph 1 was seised; or (b) is the former habitual residence of the child; or (c) is the place of the child’s nationality; or (d) is the habitual residence of a holder of parental responsibility; or (e) is the place where property of the child is located and the case concerns measures for the protection of the child relating to the administration, conservation or disposal of this property. 4. The court of the Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter shall set a time limit by which the courts of that other Member State shall be seised in accordance with paragraph 1. If the courts are not seised by that time, the court which has been seised shall continue to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 8 to 14. 5. The courts of that other Member State may, where due to the specific circumstances of the case, this is in the best interests of the child, accept jurisdiction within six weeks of their seisure in accordance with paragraph 1(a) or 1(b). In this case, the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction. Otherwise, the court first seised shall continue to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 8 to 14. …’
5

Article 140 of the consolidated version of the Law on Intellectual Property, which sets out, clarifies and harmonises the legislative provisions in force in that area and was approved by Royal Legislative Decree 1/1996 of 12 April 1996, (Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1996, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley de Propiedad Intelectual, regularizando, aclarando y armonizando las disposiciones legales vigentes sobre la materia) (BOE No 97, p. 14369), as amended by Law 19/2006 of 5 June 2006 extending the means of protection of intellectual and industrial property rights and establishing procedural rules to facilitate the application of various EU regulations (ley 19/2006, por la que se amplían los medios de tutela de los derechos de propiedad intelectual e industrial y se establecen normas procesales para facilitar la aplicación de diversos reglamentos comunitarios) (BOE No 134, p. 21230) (‘Law on Intellectual Property’), provides: ‘1. The damages owed to the injured rightholder shall include not only the value of the loss that he has suffered, but also that of the loss of earnings incurred as a result of the infringement of his right. The amount of damages may include, where appropriate, the investigation costs incurred in order to obtain reasonable evidence of the commission of the infringement at issue. 2. The damages for prejudice shall be set, at the choice of the injured party, in accordance with one of the following criteria: (a) The negative economic consequences, including lost profits suffered by the injured party and the profits obtained by the infringing party through the unlawful use. Where there is moral prejudice, this shall be compensated even if no economic prejudice has been proven. For the purposes of quantification, account shall be taken of the circumstances of the infringement, the severity of the injury suffered and the degree of unlawful dissemination of the work. (b) The amount which the injured party would have received as payment, if the infringer had requested authorisation to use the intellectual property right in question.’
20

In those circumstances, the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Supreme Court of the Netherlands) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Must Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 be interpreted as meaning that the “place where the harmful event occurred” can be construed as being the place in a Member State where the damage occurred, if that damage consists exclusively of financial damage which is the direct result of unlawful conduct which occurred in another Member State? (2) If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative: (a) What criterion or what perspectives should the national court apply, when assessing its jurisdiction on the basis of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001, in order to determine whether in the present case there has been financial damage which is the direct result of unlawful conduct (“initial financial damage” or “direct financial damage”) or whether there has been financial damage which is the result of initial damage which occurred elsewhere or damage which has resulted from damage which occurred elsewhere (“consequential damage” or “derived financial damage”)? (b) What criterion or what perspectives should the national court apply, when assessing its jurisdiction on the basis of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001, in order to determine where, in the present case, the financial damage — whether it be direct or derived financial damage — occurred or is deemed to have occurred? (3) If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, must Regulation No 44/2001 be interpreted as meaning that the national court which is required to determine whether it has jurisdiction pursuant to that regulation in the present case is obliged, when making its determination, to proceed on the basis of the relevant submissions of the claimant or applicant in that regard, or is it obliged also to take into account the arguments put forward by the defendant to refute those submissions?’
6

Part One of the CN consists of a number of preliminary provisions. Under Section I of that part, on ‘General Rules’, part A of which, entitled ‘General rules for the interpretation of the [CN]’, provides: ‘Classification of goods in the [CN] shall be governed by the following principles. 1. The titles of sections, chapters and sub-chapters are provided for ease of reference only; for legal purposes, classification shall be determined according to the terms of the headings and any relative section or chapter notes and, provided such headings or notes do not otherwise require, according to the following provisions. 2. … (b) Any reference in a heading to a material or substance shall be taken to include a reference to mixtures or combinations of that material or substance with other materials or substances. Any reference to goods of a given material or substance shall be taken to include a reference to goods consisting wholly or partly of such material or substance. The classification of goods consisting of more than one material or substance shall be according to the principles of rule 3. 3. When, by application of rule 2(b) or for any other reason, goods are prima facie classifiable under two or more headings, classification shall be effected as follows: (a) the heading which provides the most specific description shall be preferred to headings providing a more general description. However, when two or more headings each refer to part only of the materials or substances contained in mixed or composite goods or to part only of the items in a set put up for retail sale, those headings are to be regarded as equally specific in relation to those goods, even if one of them gives a more complete or precise description of the goods; (b) mixtures, composite goods consisting of different materials or made up of different components, and goods put up in sets for retail sale, which cannot be classified by reference to 3(a), shall be classified as if they consisted of the material or component which gives them their essential character, in so far as this criterion is applicable; (c) when goods cannot be classified by reference to 3(a) or (b), they shall be classified under the heading which occurs last in numerical order among those which equally merit consideration. … 6. For legal purposes, the classification of goods in the subheadings of a heading shall be determined according to the terms of those subheadings and any related subheading notes and, mutatis mutandis, to the above rules, on the understanding that only subheadings at the same level are comparable. For the purposes of this rule, the relative section and chapter notes also apply, unless the context requires otherwise.’
16

Article 540 of the French Code of Civil Procedure, in the version resulting from Decree No 2011-1043 of 1 September 2011 concerning precautionary measures taken after the instituting of a succession procedure and the interlocutory procedure (Journal officiel de la République française of 2 September 2011, p. 14884) (‘the CCP’), provides: ‘If judgment has been given in default of appearance or if the parties are deemed to have been heard, it shall be open to the court to relieve the defendant from the effects of the expiry of the relevant period if the defendant, without any fault on his part, did not have any knowledge of the judgment in sufficient time to commence proceedings or if it was not possible for him to act. An application for relief from the effects of the expiry of the period for commencing proceedings shall be made to the president of the court having jurisdiction to rule on the objection or the appeal. The application to the president shall be made in the same way as in interlocutory proceedings. The application may be made within two months from the date of service of the first document on the person concerned, or, failing that, following the first implementation measure which has the effect of rendering unavailable, in whole or in part, the assets of the debtor. ...’
24

In those circumstances, the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Supreme Court of the Netherlands) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. (a) If anyone other than the copyright holder refers by means of a hyperlink on a website controlled by him to a website which is managed by a third party and is accessible to the general internet public, on which the work has been made available without the consent of the rightholder, does that constitute a “communication to the public” within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29? (b) Does it make any difference if the work was also not previously communicated, with the rightholder’s consent, to the public in some other way? (c) Is it important whether the ‘hyperlinker’ is or ought to be aware of the lack of consent by the rightholder for the placement of the work on the third party’s website mentioned in 1(a) above and, as the case may be, of the fact that the work has also not previously been communicated, with the rightholder’s consent, to the public in some other way? 2. (a) If Question 1 is answered in the negative: If the answer to question 1(a) is in the negative: in that case, is there, or could there be deemed to be, a communication to the public if the website to which the hyperlink refers, and thus the work, is indeed findable for the general internet public, but not easily so, with the result that the publication of the hyperlink greatly facilitates the finding of the work? (b) In answering question 2(a), is it important whether the “hyperlinker” is or ought to be aware of the fact that the website to which the hyperlink refers is not easily findable by the general internet public? 3. Are there other circumstances which should be taken into account when answering the question whether there is deemed to be a communication to the public if, by means of a hyperlink, access is provided to a work which has not previously been communicated to the public with the consent of the rightholder?’
14

Under Article 1 of Directive 2004/18, as amended by Commission Regulation (EU) No 1336/2013 of 13 December 2013 (OJ 2013 L 335, p. 17) (‘Directive 2004/18, as amended’): ‘1. For the purposes of this Directive, the definitions set out in paragraphs 2 to 15 shall apply. (a) “Public contracts” are contracts for pecuniary interest concluded in writing between one or more economic operators and one or more contracting authorities and having as their object the execution of works, the supply of products or the provision of services within the meaning of this Directive. … (d) “Public service contracts” are public contracts other than public works or supply contracts having as their object the provision of services referred to in Annex II. A public contract having as its object both products and services within the meaning of Annex II shall be considered to be a “public service contract” if the value of the services in question exceeds that of the products covered by the contract. A public contract having as its object services within the meaning of Annex II and including activities within the meaning of Annex I that are only incidental to the principal object of the contract shall be considered to be a public service contract. … 4. “Service concession” is a contract of the same type as a public service contract except for the fact that the consideration for the provision of services consists either solely in the right to exploit the service or in this right together with payment. …’