ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

27 September 2006 ( )

(Legal aid)

In Case F‑90/06 AJ,

APPLICATION for legal aid,

Jeanette Nolan, residing in Abingdon (United Kingdom),

applicant,

v

Commission of the European Communities,

defendant,

THE PRESIDENT OF THE TRIBUNAL,

makes the following

Order

1 By document lodged at the Registry of the Civil Service Tribunal on 18 August 2006, Mrs Nolan applied for legal aid under Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, applicable mutatis mutandis to the Civil Service Tribunal, by virtue of Article 3(4) of Council Decision 2004/752/EC, Euratom of 2 November 2004 establishing the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (OJ 2004 L 333, p. 7), pending the entry into force of the Tribunal’s own Rules of Procedure.

2 According to the application for legal aid, lodged before the bringing of the action, the action which the applicant proposes to bring is an action for damages for the loss sustained as a result of the fact that she was not recruited as a temporary servant of the European Communities during the time she worked at the Joint European Torus (‘JET’) joint undertaking.

3 Under Article 94(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, the grant of legal aid is subject to the requirement that the applicant, because of his or her economic situation, be wholly or partly unable to meet the costs involved in legal assistance and representation by a lawyer in proceedings before the Tribunal. Article 94(3) of the same Rules further specifies that legal aid is to be refused if the action in respect of which the application is made appears to be manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded.

4 Under Article 96(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, before giving its decision on an application for legal aid, the Court of First Instance is to invite the other party to submit its written observations unless it is already apparent from the information produced that the conditions laid down in Article 94(2) have not been satisfied or that those laid down in Article 94(3) have been satisfied.

5 In the present case the admissibility of the proposed action for damages must be examined in the light of the time-limit laid down for bringing it.

6 In that connection, it must be borne in mind that the reasonable time within which an action for damages may be brought cannot exceed five years from the time the applicant became aware of the situation he or she complains of, by analogy with the five-year limitation period laid down by Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice as regards actions for non-contractual liability (Case T‑45/01 Sanders and Others v Commission [2004] ECR-SC I‑A‑267 and II‑1183). In that judgment, the Court of First Instance held, in particular, that, in view of the precarious nature of the employment of the people concerned, it was the conclusion of each initial annual contract, or each renewal thereof, which should be taken as the point at which an applicant became aware of the situation complained of.

7 The applicant argues, essentially, that her situation differs from that which was the subject of the judgment in Sanders and Others v Commission, in that she did not sign an annual contract setting out her rights and obligations, but merely signed weekly time-sheets indicating the hours she had worked. In her submission, the time within which an action for damages had to be brought could not have begun to run while she was working on the JET project but began to run when the judgment in Sanders and Others v Commission was delivered.

8 As to the facts of the present case, the Tribunal notes that the applicant worked on the JET project for a period from 1980 to 1996 during which time her contractual relationship was either with a company supplying manpower, Paterson Employment Agency (from 1980 to 1983, and then from 1992 to 1996) or with the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (from 1983 to 1992).

9 Contrary to the applicant’s submission, the circumstance that she did not sign an annual contract when she had a contractual relationship with Paterson Employment Agency cannot mean that the time within which she could bring an action did not begin to run. The fact that the applicant worked, signed time-sheets and was remunerated is sufficient evidence that her employment status was based on a contract with Paterson Employment Agency, and that she was thus aware of the situation about which she now wishes to complain.

10 That the applicant was so aware when she worked on the JET project is, moreover, confirmed by the letter she sent on 26 February 2001 to the Commission of the European Communities, for the attention of Mrs A. Diamantopoulo, in which she asserts that she had been working under discriminatory conditions for many years, had contributed to funds for the purpose of bringing actions concerning the discrimination created by the different types of status held by those working in the JET joint undertaking and had taken part in strikes organised by the unions in the early 1980s.

11 As the applicant stopped working on the JET project in 1996, it must be held that the reasonable period for bringing an action, which may not exceed five years from the time when the applicant became aware of the situation of which she complains, has expired.

12 It follows that the action proposed by the applicant appears to be manifestly inadmissible.

13 Since it already appears, in the light of the evidence presented, that the conditions laid down by Article 94(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance are satisfied, this application for legal aid must be dismissed without it being necessary to ask the Commission to submit its written observations.

On those grounds,

THE PRESIDENT OF THE TRIBUNAL

hereby orders:

The application for legal aid in Case F‑90/06 AJ is dismissed.

Luxembourg, 27 September 2006.

Registrar President