ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.

Must Article 1(2), Article 2(1)(a) and (c), Article 14(1), Article 24(1), Article 73, Article 78(b), and Article 135(1)(b) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (1) of 28 November 2006 (‘the VAT Directive’) be interpreted as meaning that a supply of goods and a grant of a loan made in accordance with a contract concluded between an integrator and an integrated producer constitute distinct and independent transactions for the purposes of VAT liability, or as meaning that a single transaction is carried out, the tax base of which includes, in addition to the consideration for the goods supplied, the interest on the loan granted?
Must the Benelux Convention on Intellectual Property (Trademarks and Designs) (BCIP) (whether or not on the grounds set out in paragraphs 28 to 34 of the judgment of the Gerechtshof Den Haag (Regional Court of Appeal, The Hague) of 26 November 2013) be considered to be a subsequent convention, with the result that Article 4.6 of the BCIP cannot be considered to be a special rule for the purposes of Article 71 of Regulation No 44/2001 (1)?

If that question is answered in the affirmative:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 262/2

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 29 April 2015 — Ciclat Soc. Coop. v Consip SpA, Autorità per la Vigilanza sui Contratti pubblici di lavori, servizi e forniture

(Case C-199/15)

(2015/C 262/02)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Ciclat Soc. Coop.

Respondents: Consip SpA, Autorità per la Vigilanza sui Contratti pubblici di lavori, servizi e forniture

Question referred

Do Article 45 of Directive 18/2004 (1), read also in the light of the principle of reasonableness, and Articles 49 and 56 TFEU preclude national legislation which, in relation to a threshold-based procurement procedure, allows a request to be made by the contracting authority on its own initiative for the certificate issued by the social security institutions (‘DURC’) and obliges that authority to exclude the tenderer if the certificate discloses an earlier failure to pay contributions, in particular one existing at the time of participation but not known to that operator, which took part on the strength of a positive currently valid DURC, but that infringement in any case no longer exists at the time of the award or of the verification carried out on the contracting authority’s own initiative?

(1) Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 262/9

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank van eerste aanleg te Antwerpen (Belgium) lodged on 29 May 2015 — Vivium SA v Belgische Staat

(Case C-250/15)

(2015/C 262/12)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank van eerste aanleg te Antwerpen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Vivium SA

Defendant: Belgische Staat

Question referred

Does EU law, and in particular the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, preclude the application of legislation of a Member State on the basis of which the administrative or judicial remedies which are available against acts and regulations of administrative authorities based on a national-law provision are not made available in the case where a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, delivered pursuant to Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (ex Article 234 EC), rules that a national-law provision is incompatible with EU law, whereas every interested party can bring an action for annulment of a national-law provision before the national Constitutional Court in the case where a judgment of the Constitutional Court, concerning a preliminary issue referred by a national court, has determined that that national-law provision is unconstitutional, and the annulling judgment of the Constitutional Court delivered in that action makes available the administrative or judicial remedies that are available to challenge acts and regulations of administrative authorities based on that national-law provision which has been annulled?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 279/25

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour administrative d'appel de Paris (France) lodged on 29 June 2015 — Overseas Financial Limited, Oaktree Finance Limited v Ministre de l’économie, de l'industrie et du numérique

(Case C-319/15)

(2015/C 279/31)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour administrative d'appel de Paris

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Overseas Financial Limited, Oaktree Finance Limited

Defendant: Ministre de l'économie, de l'industrie et du numérique

Question referred

Do the provisions of Article 17 of Council Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 of 25 October 2010 (1) infringe Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the first article of the first additional protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which protect the right to property, read together with Article 47 of that Charter and the first paragraph of Article 6 of the Convention, which guarantee the implementation of a judicial decision within a reasonable period of time, particularly to the extent that those provisions do not provide for the release of frozen funds where a third person relies on a right to payment of debt acquired by virtue of a judicial decision ordering a person designated in a freezing measure to pay an indemnity to him, given at the end of proceedings commenced before that designation, and that those two persons have no relationship, even indirect, connected to the activities covered by the regulation?

(1) Council Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 of 25 October 2010 on restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 (OJ 2010 L 281, p. 1).
1)

Must the general interpretative rules 2(b) and 3(b), in Commission Regulation (EC) No 1031/2008 ( 1 ) of 19 September 2008, amending Annex I to Regulation No 2658/87, and in Commission Regulation (EC) No 948/2009 ( 2 ) of 30 September 2009, amending Annex I to Regulation No 2658/87, be interpreted as meaning that if the essential character of the goods (liquefied petroleum gas) is determined by all the components of the gas mixture together and no component of that mixture may be identified separately as the factor giving that gas its essential character, it must be presumed that the factor which gives the goods their essential character within the meaning of the general interpretative rule 3(b) is that substance which is present in the greatest proportion in the mixture?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 294/38

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Korkein oikeus (Finland) lodged on 25 June 2015 — TrustBuddy AB v Lauri Pihjalaniemi

(Case C-311/15)

(2015/C 294/48)

Language of the case: Finnish

Referring court

Korkein oikeus

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: TrustBuddy AB

Defendant: Lauri Pihjalaniemi

Question referred

Is Article 3(b) of Directive 2008/48/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC to be interpreted as meaning that that a trader is to be regarded as a creditor if it markets credit to consumers via the internet in the form of so-called peer-to-peer lending and exercises, as regards the consumers, the decision-making power generally appertaining to creditors with respect to the terms and conditions, the granting of credit and debt recovery, even though the funds for credits come from anonymous private individuals and are kept separate from the trader’s own funds?

(1) Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC (OJ 2008 L 133, p. 66).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 294/23

Appeal brought on 2 June 2015 by Makro autoservicio mayorista SA against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 12 March 2015 in Case T-269/12: Makro autoservicio mayorista v Commission

(Case C-264/15 P)

(2015/C 294/29)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Makro autoservicio mayorista SA (represented by: P. De Baere et P. Muñiz, lawyers)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Kingdom of Spain

Form of order sought

The appellant requests the Court:

— To set aside, in whole, the judgment delivered by the General Court in Case T-269/12;

— To rule that the appeal is admissible;

— To return the case to the General Court for a ruling on the substantive grounds of appeal;

— To order the defendant to pay the costs of these proceedings and those before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

This appeal is brought by Makro Autoservicio Mayorista S.A. against the judgment of 12 March 2015, in case T-269/12, Makro Autoservicio Mayorista S.A. v. Commission, in which the General Court dismissed as inadmissible the application for annulment of Commission Decision COM (2010) 22 final, on the ground that the Commission decision is not of direct concern to the appellant.

The appellant submits that the General Court erred in law since the Spanish authorities have no discretion with regard to the result when they implement the Commission decision, and the Commission decision is therefore of direct concern to the appellant.

More in particular, the appellant submits the following grounds of appeal:

— The General Court erred in law when it held that the national authorities have a margin of discretion in the implementation of the contested decision with regard to the appellant.

— Even if the national authorities have a margin of discretion, quod non, the General Court erred in law because the mere existence of discretion is insufficient to exclude direct concern.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 294/39

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour constitutionnelle (Luxembourg) lodged on 29 June 2015 — ArcelorMittal Rodange et Schifflange SA v State of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg

(Case C-321/15)

(2015/C 294/51)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour constitutionnelle

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: ArcelorMittal Rodange et Schifflange SA

Defendant: State of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg

Question referred

Is Article 13(6) of the amended Law of 23 December 2004 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading, in so far as it allows the competent minister to order the surrender, without full or partial compensation of allowances issued in accordance with Article 12(2) and (4) of that law, but not used, compatible with Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (1), and more particularly with the broad logic of the emissions trading scheme provided for by that directive, that question encompassing the issue of the legal validity of the surrender of allowances which have been issued but not used, and, if that question is answered in the affirmative, of their classification, as well as that of the possible classification of such allowances as property?

(1) OJ 2003 L 275, p. 32.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 302/16

Appeal brought on 15 June 2015 by Slovenská pošta a.s. against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 25 March 2015 in Case T-556/08: Slovenská pošta v Commission

(Case C-293/15 P)

(2015/C 302/21)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Slovenská pošta a.s. (represented by: O. W. Brouwer and A.A.J. Pliego Selie, advocaten)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Slovak Republic, Cromwell a.s., Slovak Mail Services a.s., Prvá Doručovacia, a.s., ID Marketing Slovensko s.r.o. (formerly TNT Post Slovensko s.r.o.)

Form of order sought

The Appellant respectfully requests the Court of Justice to:

1) set aside the contested judgment either in part or in full and pass final judgment on the appeal, annulling the contested decision in full or in part, or — in the alternative — refer the case back to the General Court; and

2) order the Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings before the General Court and the Court of Justice including the costs of the intervening parties.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The General Court dismissed the application for annulment in relation to the Commission of the European Union’s decision of 7 October 2008 on the Slovakian postal legislation relating to hybrid mail services C(2008) 5912, addressed to the Slovak Republic.

Slovenská pošta a.s. respectfully requests the Court of Justice to:

(i) Set aside, in whole or in part, the aforementioned judgment of the General Court on the following grounds: i. First Ground: Errors of law, application of an erroneous standard of proof and misallocation of the burden of proof in finding that the Slovak Republic infringed Article 86(1) read in conjunction with Article 82EC; a. Errors of law in finding that providing an exclusive right can in itself constitute an infringement of Article 86(1) EC read in conjunction with Article 82 EC; b. Errors of law, applying an erroneous standard of proof and misallocating the burden of proof in finding that the Slovak Republic has infringed Article 86(1) in conjunction with Article 82 EC by limiting output to end-users. ii. Second Ground: Errors of law, insufficient standard of review and distortion of evidence in reviewing and accepting the relevant market definition submitted by the Commission of the European Union; a. Error of law and insufficient standard of review in accepting that a relevant market of integrated hybrid mail services could be defined based on the (alleged) existence of demand and supply of a service alone; b. Distortion of the evidence and application of insufficient standard of review in finding that prevailing demand on the market could be derived from the evidence submitted by the Commission.

(ii) Deliver final judgment on the appeal, annulling the contested decision in full or in part, or — in the alternative — refer the case back to the General Court;
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 302/15

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 11 June 2015 — Beca Engineering Srl v Ministero dell’Interno

(Case C-285/15)

(2015/C 302/19)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Beca Engineering Srl

Defendant: Ministero dell’Interno

Question referred

Does Council Directive 89/106/EEC of 21 December 1988 on the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to construction products (1), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1882/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 September 2003 (2), preclude the requirement that flues must ‘be constructed using non-combustible materials’, in accordance with the requirements of Schedule IX to the Fifth Part, Part II, of Legislative Decree No 152 of 3 April 2006 regarding ‘civil heating systems’, which has not been notified?

(1) OJ 1989 L 40, p. 12.

(2) Regulation (EC) No 1882/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 September 2003 adapting to Council Decision 1999/468/EC the provisions relating to committees which assist the Commission in the exercise of its implementing powers laid down in instruments subject to the procedure referred to in Article 251 of the EC Treaty (OJ 2003 L 284, p. 1).
2.

To the extent that separate matters referred to in Foster and Others v British Gas plc (Case C-188/89) may, alternatively, be considered to be factors which should properly be taken into account in reaching an overall assessment, is there a fundamental principle underlying the separate factors identified in that decision which a court should apply in reasoning an assessment as to whether a specified body is an emanation of the State?
1.

First ground alleging that the General Court erred in law and provided contradictory and insufficient reasoning in the judgment under appeal, in the assessment of the exception relating to the protection of the purpose of investigations as referred to in the third indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 (1). The General Court erred in law in so far as it upheld the Commission’s use to the general presumption of confidentiality in respect of a request for access to specific documents. The General Court’s interpretation of the exception relating to protection of the purpose of investigations under the third indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 introduces a restriction on the right of access to documents which (i) is disproportionate to the purposes of Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001 and (ii) lacks an adequate statement of reasons. With regard to the first objection, the appellant complains that the General Court cannot allow the Commission to oppose the general presumption in favour of a request for access to documents of a state aid procedure which identifies, in a precise and timely manner, the documents requested. This is all the more so when, in a context like the present case, characterised by deplorable procedural infringements attributable to the Commission, such an action ends up transforming the general presumption of confidentiality into an irrebuttable presumption, which cannot be challenged by the party seeking access to the measures, in breach of the provisions of Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001. With regard to the second objection, the appellant complains that, in the judgment under appeal, the General Court failed to provide adequate reasons for considering that it was possible to apply the legal principle set out by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 29 June 2010 in Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, C-139/07 P, ECR, EU:C:2010:376, to cases concerning a request for access not to the entire file but to specifically identified documents.
4.

If the first and third questions are answered in the negative: In light of the foregoing facts and circumstances of the present case, is it necessary in order to comply with the provisions of international and Community law that the specific advance protection against dismissal for persons with disabilities who are employees provided for by the national legislator also be applied to civil servants with the same disabilities?
2)

If the answer to that first question is in the affirmative, is the decision that may be made by the Conseil d’État to maintain, until 1 January 2016, the effects of the provisions of the Article 1 of the Decree of 2 May 2012 concerning the assessment of certain plans and documents having an impact on the environment, which it holds to be illegal, justified in particular by an overriding consideration linked to the protection of the environment?
2.

As regards the phrase ‘whose dietary management cannot be achieved only by modification of the normal diet, by other foods for particular nutritional uses, or by a combination of the two’ in Article 1(2)(b), how should the potential for modification of the diet be assessed? In particular: a. Are considerations of safety and practicability of diet modification relevant in this assessment? If so, how are they to be taken into account? b. Is such potential for modification of the normal diet (and, if relevant, are considerations of safety and practicability) to be assessed: (i) Generically, and in advance, by reference to: (i) a typical person with a typical diet with the typical abilities of such a person to modify their diet; or (ii) a typical sufferer of the Indicated Condition, with the diet typical of such a sufferer, and the ability to modify diet typical of such a sufferer; or (iii) some other assumed set of patient characteristics? (ii) Individually and in the course of patient treatment, using the clinical judgment of the supervising clinician, such that it is enough if a manufacturer reasonably intends the product to be clinically useful because a supervising clinician may come to decide on reasonable patient-specific grounds (for instance, on patient-specific safety or practicability grounds) that the use of a FSMP may be clinically preferable to other forms of diet modification for some patients with the Indicated Condition? Or (iii) Otherwise, and if so how? c. Does ‘modification of the normal diet’ include the use of ‘food supplements’ within the meaning of Directive 2002/46/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to food supplements, or of ‘fortified foods’ falling within Regulation (EC) No 1925/2006 on the addition of vitamins and minerals and of certain other substances to foods? d. Where a patient group suffering from a particular disease, disorder or other medical condition has difficulty remembering to eat a normal diet unless prompted, is a product designed to facilitate the consumption by such patients of nutrients which would form part of the normal diet capable of being a dietary food for medical purposes within Commission Directive 1999/21/EC on dietary foods for special medical purposes?
1.

Is point 6 of Annex III to Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system on value added tax (1), in the version amended by Council Directive 2009/47/EC of 5 May 2009 amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards reduced rates of value added tax (2), invalid on the ground that, during the legislative procedure, the essential formal requirement of consultation with the European Parliament was not complied with?