ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Appeal brought on 4 January 2022 by RQ against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 17 November 2021 in Case T-147/17, Anastassopoulos and Others v Council and Commission

(Case C-7/22 P)

(2022/C 119/35)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: RQ (represented by: M. Meng-Papantoni, H. Tagaras, avocats)

Other parties to the proceedings: Council of the European Union, European Commission

Form of order sought

— Allow the appeal and set aside the judgment under appeal;

— decide on the further course of action as a matter of right;

— order the defendants to pay the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In the first place, the appellant submits that the General Court distorted the appellant’s application as regards the act adversely affecting it.

In the second place, the appellant submits that the General Court made several errors of law:

As regards, first, the liability of the European Union for unlawful conduct, the General Court disregarded the principles of the rule of law and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by holding that the acts and omissions of the Eurogroup could not, in any event, give rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union. The General Court also failed to have regard to the principle of equal treatment by holding that the mere acquisition of bonds, subsequently discounted, by natural and legal persons, was sufficient to consider them to be in an identical or comparable situation within the meaning of the case-law.

Next, the General Court made errors of law concerning strict liability. First, according to the appellant, the General Court wrongly excluded the very existence of strict liability. Second, the General Court erred in law in its assessment of the ‘abnormal’ nature of the damage.
Does EU law, in particular Article 31 of the Third Life Assurance Directive (1) and Article 15(1) of the Second Life Assurance Directive, (2) read where appropriate in the light of Article 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, preclude national legislation under which full consumer information is only provided with the insurance policy, that is after the consumer has made an application (‘policy model’)?

If so: Does that of itself substantiate the consumer’s right to object, that is to demand reversal of the insurance contract?

Might the exercise of such a right be prevented by a plea of forfeiture or abuse of rights or is the exercise of that right subject to any other limits, such as time limits?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Symvoulio tis Epikrateias (Greece) lodged on 14 February 2022 — Kapniki A. Michailides AE v Organismos Pliromon kai Elegchou Koinotikon Enischyseon Prosanatolismou kai Eggyiseon (OPEKEPE), Ypourgos Agrotikis Anaptyxis kai Trofimon

(Case C-99/22)

(2022/C 191/22)

Language of the case: Greek

Referring court

Symvoulio tis Epikrateias

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Kapniki A. Michailides SA

Respondents: Organismos Pliromon kai Elegchou Koinotikon Enischyseon Prosanatolismou kai Eggyiseon (OPEKEPE), Ypourgos Agrotikis Anaptyxis kai Trofimon

Question referred

Does Article 3(3) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2062/92 of 30 June 1992, (1) which states that, where the quantity of tobacco of low class purchased by a processor exceeds, relative to his total purchases of the variety in question, the percentage indicated in Annex IV, the premium shall be reduced by 30 % in respect of the quantity in excess of the percentage in question, infringe the principle of the non-retroactivity of legal rules and the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations?

(1) Council Regulation (EEC) No 2062/92 of 30 June 1992 fixing, for the 1992 harvest, the norm and intervention prices and the premiums granted to purchasers of leaf tobacco, the derived intervention prices for baled tobacco, the reference qualities, and the production areas (OJ 1992 L 215, p. 22).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 8 February 2022 by QB against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 8 December 2021 in Case T-71/21, QB v Commission

(Case C-88/22 P)

(2022/C 207/18)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: QB (represented by: R. Wardyn, radca prawny)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The Appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under the appeal, in whole; and, therefore — annul the decisions of the European Commission of 6 th April 2020 and 3rd November 2020, or, failing that, — refer the case back to the General Court for judgment, and

— order the European Commission to pay its own costs of the process as well as those of the Applicant in both instances.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the Appellant relies on one plea in law alleging violation of article 4 (1) of Annex VII of Staff Regulations and claims that the General Court:

— erred in determining the main occupation of the Appellant as it disregarded the work done by the Appellant for the State of Poland and his status of a judge;

— erred in defining the conditions of ‘work done for another state’;
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Graz (Austria) lodged on 28 February 2022 — TLL The Longevity Labs GmbH v Optimize Health Solutionsmi GmbH and BM

(Case C-141/22)

(2022/C 198/37)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Graz

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: TLL The Longevity Labs GmbH

Defendants: Optimize Health Solutionsmi GmbH, BM

Questions referred

1. Is Article 3(2)(a)(iv) of Regulation (EU) [2015/2283] (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on novel foods to be interpreted as meaning that ‘sprouted buckwheat flour with a high spermidine content’ is a novel food, inasmuch as only sprouted buckwheat flour without a raised spermidine content was used for human consumption to a significant degree within the European Union before 15 May 1997 or has a history of safe food use thereafter, irrespective of how the spermidine comes to be in the sprouted buckwheat flour?

2. If Question 1 is answered in the negative: Is Article 3(2)(a)(vii) of Regulation (EU) [2015/2283] of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on novel foods to be interpreted as meaning that the term ‘production process’ for food includes primary production processes?

3. If Question 2 is answered in the affirmative: Does the novelty of a production process within the meaning of Article 3(2)(a)(vii) of Regulation (EU) [2015/2283] of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on novel foods depend on whether the production process itself has never before been used for any food or whether it has not been used for the food under assessment?

4. If Question 2 is answered in the negative: Does the germination of buckwheat seed in a nutrient solution containing spermidine qualify as a primary production process for a plant to which food legislation, including Regulation (EU) 2015/2283 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on novel foods, does not apply, as the plant is not a food prior to harvesting (Article 2(c) of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002)? (2)

5. Does it make a difference if the nutrient solution contains natural or synthetic spermidine?

(1) Regulation (EU) 2015/2283 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on novel foods, amending Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 258/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1852/2001 (OJ 2015 L 327, p. 1).

(2) Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety (OJ 2002 L 31, p. 1).
4.

If the answer to the first question is in the negative, do the provisions of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2080/92 of 30 June 1992 instituting a Community aid scheme for forestry measures in agriculture preclude, taking into account the provisions of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995, an interpretation of a provision of national law that, in implementing the provisions of Regulation No 2080/92, provides, in the event of an irregularity found in the granting of the aid, for the disqualification from receiving that aid and the repayment of amounts received on that basis, in the sense that the beneficiary is required to repay the entire amount received on that basis and not merely to repay the amounts for the year in respect of which the irregularity in the granting of the aid was found?
2.

Does the General Data Protection Regulation — particularly in the light of the second subparagraph of Article 6(3) thereof — preclude a national provision that provides for the disclosure of the name of the persons concerned by the decision of the Independent Arbitration Committee, the duration of the ban and the reasons for it, without it being possible to infer the health data of the person concerned? Is it relevant that disclosure of that information to the general public can only be omitted under the national provision if the person concerned is a recreational athlete, a minor or a person who has contributed significantly to the detection of potential anti-doping violations by disclosing information or other indications?
2.

Do Article 7 of Directive 2003/88/EC or Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union preclude an interpretation of a rule of national law such as Paragraph 7(3) BUrlG according to which the as yet unexercised entitlement to paid annual leave of a worker who, in the course of the holiday year, moves from the work phase to the release phase is forfeited at the end of the holiday year or at a later time if the employer — without having previously fulfilled its obligations to cooperate in the realisation of the leave entitlement — has granted the worker the entire annual leave in line with his or her application for a period immediately prior to the start of the release phase, but the leave entitlement could not be fulfilled — at least in part — because the worker became unfit for work due to illness after the leave was granted?
Appeal brought on 2 February 2022 by the European Investment Bank against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 24 November 2021 in Case T-370/20, KL v European Investment Bank

(Case C-68/22 P)

(2022/C 213/31)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: European Investment Bank (EIB) (represented by: G. Faedo and I. Zanin, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: KL

Form of order sought

By its appeal, the EIB claims that the Court should:

— declare the appeal admissible and well founded;

— set aside the judgment of the General Court in Case T-370/20;

— if the Court considers that the state of the proceedings so permits, grant the EIB the form of order sought at first instance;

— order KL to pay the entirety of the costs at both instances.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of its appeal, the EIB raises two grounds.

The first ground of appeal, divided into four sub-grounds, concerns the misinterpretation of the EIB’s internal rules on invalidity.

In the first place, the General Court erred in law as regards the concept of invalidity as provided for in Article 46-1 of the transitional pension scheme regulations applicable to EIB staff (TPSR) and Article 11.1 of the EIB’s administrative measures. By finding that the concept of invalidity within the meaning of those articles must be interpreted as referring to an EIB staff member who has been declared, by an invalidity committee established by the EIB, incapable of resuming his or her duties or equivalent duties within that body, the General Court distorted the letter and the content of the EIB’s internal rules and adopted an interpretation which contradicts the purpose of the invalidity pension as a social protection measure.

In the second place, the General Court erred in law in that it excluded the competence of the invalidity committees established by the EIB to rule on the capacity of a staff member of the EIB to carry out activities outside its premises, on the general labour market.

In the third place, the General Court erred in law by interpreting Articles 46-1 of the TPSR and 11.1 of the EIB’s administrative measures on the basis of reasoning by analogy with Article 78 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union.

In the fourth place, the General Court erred in law by rejecting the EIB’s interpretation of Article 51-1 of the TPSR and by failing to interpret that article in conjunction with Article 46-1 of the TPSR.

The second ground of appeal, divided into two sub-grounds, is based on a dual distortion of the facts.

In the first place, the General Court erred in law by treating as legally binding documents of the Invalidity Committee which were not undersigned by all the members of that committee.

In the second place, the General Court incorrectly assessed the content of the Invalidity Committee’s opinion in so far as it found that the Invalidity Committee had declared that the applicant was incapable of performing duties at the EIB when the forms signed by all the members of that committee declared that the applicant is not invalid.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 11 April 2022 — BM v Gebühren Info Service GmbH (GIS)

(Case C-249/22)

(2022/C 237/52)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: BM

Defendant: Gebühren Info Service GmbH (GIS)

Joined parties: Bundesminister für Finanzen, Österreichischer Rundfunk (ORF)

Questions referred

1. Taking into account the primary law provision of Article 151(1) in conjunction with Annex XV, Part IX, No. 2, letter h, first subparagraph, second indent, of the Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, (1) must consideration such as the programme fee of the Österreichischer Rundfunk (Austrian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘ORF’), which the public service broadcaster sets itself in order to finance its operation, be regarded as consideration within the meaning of Article 2 in conjunction with Article 378(1) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (2) of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax?

2. If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative, must the ORF programme fee referred to therein also be regarded as consideration within the meaning of Directive 2006/112 in so far as persons are obliged to pay it who, although they operate a broadcast receiver in a building which is supplied by the ORF with its terrestrial programmes, cannot receive those ORF programmes because they do not have the necessary receiver module?

(1) Concluded together with the Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Member States of the European Union) and the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, concerning the accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden to the European Union (OJ 1994 C 241, p. 336).

(2) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).
1.

Does European Union law, and in particular Article 18 of the Treaty on European Union, Article 45 of the Treaty on European Union, Article 7(2) of EU Regulation 492/11, (1) Article 11(1)(d) of EU Directive 2003/109, (2) Article 29 of EU Directive 2011/95, (3) Article 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Articles 30 and 31 of the Social Charter of the Council of Europe, preclude national legislation such as that contained in Article 7(1) of Decree-Law No 4 of 28 January 2019, converted into law and amended by Law No 26 of 28 March 2019, read in conjunction with Article 7(2)(1)(a) thereof, in so far as it makes access to basic income subject to the condition relating to residence in Italy for at least ten years (the final two of which, as at the time the application is made and for the entire duration of the benefit, must be consecutive), thus affording treatment to Italian nationals, EU nationals with a right of residence or permanent residence, or non-EU long-term residents who have been resident for less than ten years or for ten years, the final two of which were not consecutive, which is less favourable than that accorded to the same categories who have been resident for ten years, the final two of which were consecutive? If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Upravni sud u Zagrebu (Croatia) lodged on 22 April 2022 — ANTERA d.o.o. v Hrvatska agencija za nadzor financijskih usluga

(Case C-278/22)

(2022/C 244/26)

Language of the case: Croatian

Referring court

Upravni sud u Zagrebu

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: ANTERA d.o.o.

Defendant: Hrvatska agencija za nadzor financijskih usluga

Questions referred

1. Do operating leasing and/or long-term car rental services fall within the scope of Directive 2006/123/EC (the Services Directive), (1) as indicated in the Handbook on implementation of the Services Directive of 13 March 2008 issued by the Directorate-General for the Internal Market and Services? Should an entity that engages in operating leasing (but not financial leasing) and/or long-term car rental be considered a financial institution within the meaning of Article 4(1)(26) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013? (2)

2. If the answer to the first question above is in the affirmative and the answer to the second question is in the negative, is granting the Hrvatska agencija za nadzor financijskih usluga (Croatian Agency for the Supervision of Financial Services) (HANFA) the power to supervise the provision of operating leasing and/or long-term car rental services pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Leasing Law, and to impose additional requirements and restrictions on undertakings that engage in such activities, compatible with Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, read in conjunction with Articles 9 to 13 of Directive 2006/123/EC?

3. Must Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Articles 9 to 13 of Directive 2006/123/EC, in circumstances such as those at issue in the present dispute, in which a parent company from one Member State wishes to provide in another Member State, through a subsidiary, services of the same type as those which it provides in the original Member State, be interpreted as permitting a national law (the Leasing Law) to impose additional requirements and restrictions on the subsidiary and thereby hinder or render less attractive engaging in the activity in question?

(1) Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 36).

(2) Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 1).
3.

Within the retention period laid down by law, if there is sufficient evidence of the commission of an offence for which the law prescribes the penalty of life imprisonment or a maximum term of imprisonment of at least three years, determined in accordance with Article 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or of an offence of threatening and harassing or disturbing persons by means of the telephone, where the threat or disturbance is serious, the data may, if relevant to establishing the facts, be acquired with the prior authorisation of the court, by way of reasoned order, at the request of the Public Prosecutor or upon an application by the legal representative of the accused, of the person under investigation, of the injured party or of any other private party’
5.

Is it compatible with Article 101(1)(a) TFEU and the case-law of the European Union for a judicial decision to find that the presence of the objective defining element of an ‘agreement’ between a supplier and its distributors is proved on the basis of: (i) the fixing and imposition, by the former on the latter, on a regular, universal and unchanging basis during the period of the practice, of the terms of business which the latter must fulfil when reselling the products they acquire from the supplier, in particular the prices they charge their customers, principally in terms of minimum prices or average minimum prices; (ii) the fact that the resale prices imposed are notified either verbally or in writing (via e-mail); (iii) the fact that distributors are unable to fix their resale prices independently; (iv) the customary and universal practice whereby the supplier’s employees ask distributors (by telephone or in person) to adhere to the prices indicated; (v) the universal adherence by distributors to the resale prices fixed by the supplier (other than in the event of occasional disagreements) and the finding that the conduct of distributors on the market is generally in keeping with the terms laid down by the supplier; (vi) the fact that, in order not to breach the terms laid down, distributors themselves often ask the supplier to tell them what resale prices to charge; (vii) the finding that distributors frequently complain about the prices set by the supplier rather than simply charging other prices; (viii) the fixing by the supplier of (reduced) distribution margins and the assumption by distributors that those margins correspond to the level of remuneration payable for their business; (ix) the finding that, by imposing low margins, the supplier imposes a minimum resale price, as the distribution margins would otherwise be negative; (x) the supplier’s policy of granting discounts to distributors on the basis of the resale prices actually charged by them — the minimum price previously fixed by the supplier being the level of the price of restocks at sell-out; (xi) the need for distributors — in the light in many cases of the negative distribution margin — to adhere to the resale price levels imposed by the supplier; the practice of lower resale prices is followed only in very specific circumstances and where the distributors ask the supplier for a further discount at sell-out; (xii) the fixing by the supplier of (reduced) distribution margins and the assumption by distributors that those margins correspond to the level of remuneration payable for their business; (xiii) the direct contact between the supplier and the distributors’ customers and the fixing of the terms of business subsequently imposed on distributors; (xiv) the supplier’s intervention, on the distributors’ initiative, inasmuch as it is the supplier that makes the decision to apply certain trade discounts or renegotiates the terms of business for resale; and (xv) the fact that distributors ask the supplier to authorise them to conclude a particular transaction on certain terms in order to ensure their distribution margin?