ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
12

The fourth, sixth and eighth paragraphs in the preamble to that agreement state: ‘Recalling that, pursuant to Article 50 TEU, in conjunction with Article 106a of the Euratom Treaty, and subject to the arrangements laid down in this Agreement, the law of the Union and of Euratom in its entirety ceases to apply to the United Kingdom from the date of entry into force of this Agreement, … Recognising that it is necessary to provide reciprocal protection for Union citizens and for United Kingdom nationals, as well as their respective family members, where they have exercised free movement rights before a date set in this Agreement, and to ensure that their rights under this Agreement are enforceable and based on the principle of non-discrimination; recognising also that rights deriving from periods of social security insurance should be protected, … Considering that it is in the interest of both the Union and the United Kingdom to determine a transition or implementation period during which – notwithstanding all consequences of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the Union as regards the United Kingdom’s participation in the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, in particular the end, on the date of entry into force of this Agreement, of the mandates of all members of institutions, bodies and agencies of the Union nominated, appointed or elected in relation to the United Kingdom’s membership of the Union – Union law, including international agreements, should be applicable to and in the United Kingdom, and, as a general rule, with the same effect as regards the Member States, in order to avoid disruption in the period during which the agreement(s) on the future relationship will be negotiated’.
26

As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and will enable the national court to determine the case before it. Consequently, even if, formally, the referring court has limited its question to the interpretation of a particular provision of EU law, that does not prevent the Court from providing the referring court with all the elements of interpretation of EU law which may be of assistance in adjudicating in the case pending before it, whether or not the referring court has referred to them in the wording of its questions. It is, in this regard, for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision to make the reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation in view of the subject matter of the dispute in the main proceedings (judgment of 15 July 2021, DocMorris, C‑190/20, EU:C:2021:609, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
25

In those circumstances the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions, which are worded identically in Cases C‑273/20 and C‑355/20, to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) (a) In the case of subsequent immigration in order to join an unaccompanied minor refugee in accordance with Article 10(3)(a) and Article 2(f) of [Directive 2003/86], can the continued existence of the refugee’s minority be a “condition” within the meaning of Article 16(1)(a) of [that directive]? Is legislation of a Member State under which parents who immigrated subsequently to join an unaccompanied minor refugee for the purposes of Article 2(f) of Directive 2003/86 are granted a (derived) right of residence in the Member State only for as long as the refugee is actually still a minor compatible with the aforesaid provisions? (b) If the questions in 1(a) are answered in the affirmative: Is Article 16(1)(a), read in conjunction with Article 10(3)(a) and Article 2(f), of Directive 2003/86 to be interpreted as meaning that a Member State under whose legislation the parents’ (derived) right of residence is limited to the period up until when the child comes of age is allowed to reject an application for entry and residence for the purpose of family reunification submitted by parents still resident in a third country if the refugee has come of age before the adoption of a final decision, in administrative or court proceedings, on an application lodged within three months of recognition of the child’s refugee status? (2) If the answer to Question 1 is that it is not permissible to refuse family reunification: What requirements are to be imposed in terms of a real family relationship within the meaning of Article 16(1)(b) of Directive 2003/86 in cases of subsequent immigration of parents to join a refugee who comes of age before a decision is adopted on the application for entry and residence for the purpose of family reunification? In particular: (a) Does a first-degree relationship in the direct ascending line suffice (Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86/EC) or is a real family life also necessary? (b) If a real family life is also necessary: How close must it be? For example, do occasional or regular visits suffice, must the family cohabit in a single household or must they also be part of a support unit whose members are reliant upon one another? (c) For the subsequent immigration of parents who are still in a third country and who have submitted an application for family reunification to join a child with recognised refugee status who has since come of age, must there be the expectation that, following their entry, family life will be (re-)established in the Member State in the manner required in Question 2(b)?’
Officials – Reorganization of departments – Assignment of staff – Reassignment – Compliance with the principle of assignment to an equivalent post – Scope – Failure to assign tasks – Not permissible – Obligation for the administration to provide a remedy – Scope – Ongoing investigation into the alleged psychological harassment of the person concerned – Irrelevant

(Staff Regulations of Officials, Arts 7 and 24; Conditions of Employment of Other Servants, Art. 10(1))

(see paras 126-129, 131, 132)
Article 16(l) of Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council must be interpreted as meaning that the exception to the right of withdrawal provided for in that provision may be relied on against a consumer who has concluded, with an intermediary acting in its name, but on behalf of the organiser of a leisure activity, a distance contract for acquiring a right of access to that activity, provided that, first, the termination of the obligation to perform that contract vis-à-vis the consumer by means of withdrawal, in accordance with Article 12(a) of that directive, would place the risk linked to the setting aside of the capacity thus released on the organiser of the activity concerned and, second, the leisure activity to which that right gives access is scheduled to take place on a specific date or within a specific period.
20

Article 5 of Regulation No 987/2009 provides as follows: ‘1. Documents issued by the institution of a Member State and showing the position of a person for the purposes of the application of [Regulation No 883/2004] and of [this] Regulation, and supporting evidence on the basis of which the documents have been issued, shall be accepted by the institutions of the other Member States for as long as they have not been withdrawn or declared to be invalid by the Member State in which they were issued. 2. Where there is doubt about the validity of a document or the accuracy of the facts on which the particulars contained therein are based, the institution of the Member State that receives the document shall ask the issuing institution for the necessary clarification and, where appropriate, the withdrawal of that document. The issuing institution shall reconsider the grounds for issuing the document and, if necessary, withdraw it. 3. Pursuant to paragraph 2, where there is doubt about the information provided by the persons concerned, the validity of a document or supporting evidence or the accuracy of the facts on which the particulars contained therein are based, the institution of the place of stay or residence shall, in so far as this is possible, at the request of the competent institution, proceed to the necessary verification of this information or document. 4 Where no agreement is reached between the institutions concerned, the matter may be brought before the Administrative Commission by the competent authorities no earlier than one month following the date on which the institution that received the document submitted its request. The Administrative Commission shall endeavour to reconcile the points of view within six months of the date on which the matter was brought before it.’
11

Article 24 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 809/2014 of 17 July 2014 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the integrated administration and control system, rural development measures and cross compliance (OJ 2014 L 227, p. 69), as amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/746 of 18 May 2018 (OJ 2018 L 125, p. 1) (‘Implementing Regulation No 809/2014’), entitled ‘General principles’, provides: ‘1. Administrative checks and on-the-spot checks provided for in this Regulation shall be made in such a way as to ensure effective verification of: (a) the correctness and completeness of the information provided in the aid application, application for support, payment claim or other declaration; (b) compliance with all eligibility criteria, commitments and other obligations for the aid scheme and/or support measure concerned, the terms under which aid and/or support or exemption from obligations are granted; (c) the requirements and standards relevant for cross-compliance. 2. Member States shall ensure that compliance with all conditions applicable established by Union law or laid down in relevant national law and documents containing implementing arrangements or by the rural development programme can be checked according to a set of verifiable indicators to be established by the Member States. 3. The results of the administrative and on-the-spot checks shall be assessed to establish whether any problems encountered could in general entail a risk for other similar operations, beneficiaries or other bodies. The assessment shall also identify the causes of such situations, any further examination which may be required and necessary corrective and preventive actions. 4. The competent authority shall carry out physical inspections in the field in the event that photo-interpretation of satellite or aerial ortho-images or other relevant evidence including evidence provided by the beneficiary at the request of the competent authority do not provide results that would permit definitive conclusions to be drawn to the satisfaction of the competent authority concerning the eligibility or, where applicable, the correct size of the area that is the subject of administrative or on-the-spot checks. 5. This Chapter shall apply to all checks carried out under this Regulation and without prejudice to specific rules provided for in Title IV and V. Paragraph 3 shall however not apply to Title V.’
11

Decreto legislativo n. 112 – Revisione della disciplina in materia di impresa sociale (Legislative Decree No 112, amending the legislation on social enterprises) of 3 July 2017 (GURI No 167 of 19 July 2017) (‘Legislative Decree No 112/2017’), provides in Article 3, entitled ‘Non-profit-making objective’: ‘1. Without prejudice to paragraph 3 and to Article 16, a social enterprise shall allocate any profits and operating surpluses to the pursuit of its activities under its articles of association or to the increase of its assets. 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the distribution, including indirectly, of profits and operating surpluses, of funds and reserves, irrespective of their designation, to the founders, members or partners, employees and associates, administrators and other members of the enterprise’s bodies shall be prohibited, including in the event of termination or any other case of individual termination of the relationship. In the case of social enterprises established in the forms referred to in Book V of the Civil Code, repayment to the member of the capital actually invested and, where appropriate, revalued or increased within the limits referred to in paragraph 3(a), shall be permitted. For the purposes of the present paragraph, ‘indirect distribution of profits’ shall, in any event, mean: (a) the payment to the administrators, auditors and any person exercising a social mandate, of individual remuneration which is not proportionate to the activity carried out, to the responsibilities assumed and to the specific skills or, in any event, which is greater than the remuneration paid in entities operating in identical or similar sectors and circumstances. … 2a. For the purposes referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, the distribution, between members, of rebates associated with an activity in the general interest referred to in Article 2, carried out in accordance with Article 2545e of the Civil Code and in compliance with the conditions and limits laid down by law and their articles of association, by social enterprises incorporated in the form of cooperative societies, shall not be considered to be a distribution, even indirectly, of profits and operating surpluses, provided that their articles of association or instrument of incorporation indicate the criteria for the distribution of rebates to members in proportion to the quantity and quality of mutual exchanges and provided that a mutual operating surplus is recorded. …’
2

Under Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the General Court pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 53 thereof: ‘The Member States and the institutions of the [European] Union shall be represented before the Court of Justice by an agent appointed for each case; the agent may be assisted by an adviser or by a lawyer. The States, other than the Member States, which are parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area [of 2 May 1992 (OJ 1994 L 1, p. 3),] and also the EFTA Surveillance Authority referred to in that Agreement shall be represented in same manner. Other parties must be represented by a lawyer. Only a lawyer authorised to practise before a court of a Member State or of another State which is a party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area may represent or assist a party before the Court. Such agents, advisers and lawyers shall, when they appear before the Court, enjoy the rights and immunities necessary to the independent exercise of their duties, under conditions laid down in the Rules of Procedure. As regards such advisers and lawyers who appear before it, the Court shall have the powers normally accorded to courts of law, under conditions laid down in the Rules of Procedure. University teachers being nationals of a Member State whose law accords them a right of audience shall have the same rights before the Court as are accorded by this Article to lawyers.’
24

In the first place, the referring court thus questions whether the input services that W transferred to X and to Y as shareholder contributions may be regarded as having been obtained by W for its business and whether the associated costs are part of its general costs, that is, cost components of its input accounting and management transactions for its subsidiaries. That uncertainty is due to the judgment of 8 November 2018, C&D Foods Acquisition (C‑502/17, EU:C:2018:888, paragraph 37 et seq.), from which the referring court infers that, for the purpose of the deduction of the input VAT paid by a holding company, the direct and exclusive reason for that transaction must be the taxable economic activity of that company, or that transaction must constitute the direct, permanent and necessary extension of that activity. Accordingly, without a direct and immediate link between the expenditure related to the input transactions and the taxable economic activity of the holding company, that expenditure cannot be part of W’s general costs and cannot be components of the price of the goods or services supplied by W. The referring court also refers to the judgments of 14 September 2017, Iberdrola Inmobiliaria Real Estate Investments (C‑132/16, EU:C:2017:683); of 3 July 2019, The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Cambridge (C‑316/18, EU:C:2019:559); and of 1 October 2020, Vos Aannemingen (C‑405/19, EU:C:2020:785). Although the cases giving rise to those judgments do not concern holding companies, they confirm the need for a direct link between the input services and the taxed transactions of the company concerned in order to allow a deduction of input VAT. However, in the present case, the referring court considers that the input services could be obtained not for W’s business and its taxed transactions, but for those of its subsidiaries. Those services would, as a result, have a direct and immediate link with the largely tax-exempt activities of those subsidiaries.
34

In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions referred concern the interpretation or the validity of a rule of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling. It follows that questions referred by national courts enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it appears that the interpretation sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its object, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 24 February 2022, Viva Telecom Bulgaria, C‑257/20, EU:C:2022:125, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
29

In those circumstances, the Tribunalul Bucureşti (Regional Court, Bucharest) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Must Article 27(1)(e) of Directive [92/83] be interpreted as meaning that the exemption from excise duty covers only ethyl alcohol-type goods used for the production of flavours intended, in turn, for the production of non-alcoholic beverages with an alcohol strength not exceeding 1.2% volume, or as meaning that that exemption also covers ethyl alcohol-type goods already used for the production of certain favours of that kind which have been or are to be used for the production of non-alcoholic beverages with an alcohol strength not exceeding 1.2% volume? (2) Must Article 27(1)(e) of Directive [92/83], in the context of the objectives and general scheme of that directive, be interpreted as meaning that, once ethyl alcohol-type goods intended to be marketed in another Member State have already been released for consumption in a first Member State, exempt from excise duty as they are used to obtain flavours intended to be used for the production of non-alcoholic beverages with an alcohol strength not exceeding 1.2% volume, the Member State of destination must treat them in an identical manner within its territory? (3) Must Article 27(1)(e) and 27(2)(d) of Directive [92/83], and the [principles] of effectiveness and [proportionality], be interpreted as authorising a Member State to impose procedural requirements, which make the application of the exemption subject to the user having the status of registered consignee and of authorised warehousekeeper, on the seller of excise goods, despite the fact that the Member State in which those goods were acquired does not impose an obligation relating to the status of tax warehousekeeper on the economic operator which markets them? (4) In the light of Article 27(1)(e) of Directive [92/83], do the principles of proportionality and effectiveness, in the context of the objectives and general scheme of that directive, preclude the exemption provided for therein from being denied to the taxable person of a Member State of destination who has received ethyl alcohol-type goods and who relied on the fact that those goods were deemed to be exempt on the basis of an official interpretation of those provisions of that directive by the tax authorities of the Member State of origin, given consistently and over a long period of time and transposed into national law and applied in practice, but which subsequently turns out to be incorrect, in the event that, given the circumstances, it is possible to exclude any possibility of fraud or evasion of excise duty?’
Order of the Court of 14 November 1963. - M. Claude Lassalle v European Parliament. - Case 15-63.



European Court reports

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Parties

Subject of the case

Grounds

Operative part



Parties

++++

IN CASE 15/63

CLAUDE LASSALLE, AN OFFICIAL OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,

APPLICANT,

V

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,

DEFENDANT,

Subject of the case

APPLICATION TO INTERVENE MADE BY THE STAFF COMMITTEE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, REPRESENTED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ELECTED ON 27 AND 28 FEBRUARY 1963 AND 5 MARCH 1963, ASSISTED BY ERNEST ARENDT OF THE LUXEMBOURG BAR, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE CHAMBERS OF MR ARENDT, 6 RUE W . GOERGEN;

Grounds

WHEREAS IN SUPPORT OF ITS APPLICATION THE INTERVENER MAINTAINS THAT, BY USING THE GENERAL WORD ' PERSON ', ARTICLES 37 ( EEC ) AND 38 ( EAEC ) OF THE PROTOCOLS ON THE STATUTE OF THE COURT EXTEND THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE TO ALL PARTIES REPRESENTING AN ORGANIZED FOCUS OF LEGITIMATE INTERESTS;

WHEREAS THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE AUTHORS OF THE EEC AND THE EAEC TREATIES WISHED TO EXTEND THE OPPORTUNITIES TO INTERVENE TO THE POINT OF ALLOWING INTERVENTION BY ENTITIES LACKING LEGAL PERSONALITY OR EVEN ITS BASIC ASPECTS;

WHEREAS, IN PARTICULAR, THESE ASPECTS INCLUDE INDEPENDENCE AND RESPONSIBILITY EVEN IF LIMITED;

WHEREAS, IN THIS RESPECT, THE PROVISION ESTABLISHING THE STAFF COMMITTEE, NAMELY ARTICLE 9 OF THE STAFF REGULATIONS, SHOULD BE CONSIDERED;

WHEREAS, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE NORMAL FUNCTIONS LAID DOWN BY THE FIRST THREE SUBPARAGRAPHS OF PARAGRAPH ( 3 ) OF THAT ARTICLE WHICH ARE RELEVANT TO THIS CASE, MANIFESTATIONS OF THE WILL OF THE COMMITTEE ARE INTENDED TO BE OPERATIVE ONLY WITHIN THE INSTITUTION;

WHEREAS IN FACT THESE FUNCTIONS ARE SECONDARY TO THE ACTIVITY OF THE INSTITUTION;

WHEREAS, THEREFORE, IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS FUNTIONS LAID DOWN IN THE FIRST THREE SUBPARAGRAPHS OF ARTICLE 9(3 ) OF THE STAFF REGULATIONS THE NATURE OF THE STAFF COMMITTEE IS THAT OF AN INTERNAL AGENCY OF ITS INSTITUTION;

WHEREAS, THEREFORE, IT HAS NO CAPACITY TO BRING LEGAL PROCEEDINGS;

WHEREAS, THEREFORE, ITS APPLICATION TO INTERVENE MUST BE DISMISSED AS INADMISSIBLE;

Operative part

1 . THE APPLICATION TO INTERVENE IS DISMISSED AS INADMISSIBLE;

2 . THE COSTS OF THE INTERVENTION PROCEDURE SHALL BE BORNE AS FOLLOWS :

( A ) IN APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 70 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE THE DEFENDANT IN THE ORIGINAL CASE SHALL BEAR ITS OWN COSTS;

( B ) HAVING BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL IN THEIR CONCLUSIONS THE APPLICANT IN THE ORIGINAL CASE AND THE INTERVENER SHALL EACH BEAR THEIR OWN COSTS .