ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 24, first sentence, of Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters provides for a rule of jurisdiction based on the entering of an appearance by the defendant in respect of all disputes where the jurisdiction of the court seised is not derived from other provisions of that regulation. That provision applies also in cases where the court has been seised in breach of the provisions of that regulation and implies that the entering of an appearance by the defendant may be considered to be a tacit acceptance of the jurisdiction of the court seised and thus a prorogation of that court’s jurisdiction.

Article 27(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that, except in the situation where the court second seised has exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of that regulation, the jurisdiction of the court first seised must be regarded as being established, within the meaning of that provision, if that court has not declined jurisdiction of its own motion and none of the parties has contested its jurisdiction prior to or up to the time at which a position is adopted which is regarded in national procedural law as being the first defence on the substance submitted before that court.

The interpretation of Article 27(2) of that regulation, according to which, in order to establish the jurisdiction of the court first seised within the meaning of that provision, it is necessary that that court has impliedly or expressly accepted jurisdiction by a judgment which has become final would, by increasing the risk of parallel proceedings, deprive the rules intended to resolve situations of lis pendens, laid down by that regulation, of all their effectiveness.

Additionally, where the court first seised has not declined jurisdiction of its own motion and no objection of lack of jurisdiction has been raised before it, the fact that the court second seised declines jurisdiction cannot result in a negative conflict of jurisdiction since the jurisdiction of the court first seised can no longer be contested.

(see paras 41, 43, 45, operative part)
Case C‑132/13

Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV Frankfurt am Main

v

ILME GmbH

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Approximation of laws — Directive 2006/95/EC — Definition of ‘electrical equipment’ — CE conformity marking — Housing for multipole electrical connectors’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber), 13 March 2014

Approximation of laws — Electrical equipment designed for use within certain voltage limits — Directive 2006/95 — Definition of electrical equipment — Housing for multipole connectors for industrial use — Included — Conditions — Limits

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2006/95, Arts 1 and 2(1))

Article 1 of Directive 2006/95 on the harmonisation of the laws of Member States relating to electrical equipment designed for use within certain voltage limits must be interpreted as meaning that housing for multipole connectors for industrial use is covered by the definition of ‘electrical equipment’ for the purposes of that provision and must, therefore, bear the CE marking as long as its proper incorporation and use for the purpose for which it was made does not mean that it ceases to comply with the relevant safety requirements for which it has been examined.

However, since Article 2(1) of Directive 2006/95 states, essentially, that only electrical equipment which does not endanger the safety of persons or property may be placed on the market, the CE marking cannot be affixed to a component which constitutes electrical equipment where its safety depends essentially on the manner in which it is incorporated into the final electrical appliance. In such circumstances, first, since the quality of that component does not enable the safety of the electrical appliance into which it is incorporated to be prejudged, the affixation of the CE marking on that component would be likely to mislead the user of that appliance. Second, incorporation might alter the conformity of that component with the safety requirements which had been previously established and that of the electrical appliance into which the component at issue has been incorporated.

(see paras 33, 34, 40, operative part)
To determine whether goods or services are similar, account must be taken primarily of the point of view of a typical consumer. Goods or services are similar where they have similar characteristics and meet the same needs from the point of view of consumers, the test being whether their use is comparable, and where the differences between them do not have a significant influence on the decision of the average consumer to use one or other of those goods or services.

As the average consumer’s assessment is liable to vary according to the different degree of penetration of new technologies in each national market and the degree of access to the technical equipment enabling the consumer to make use of books published on physical supports other than paper, it is the average consumer in each Member State who must be taken as a reference.

In those circumstances, it is for the referring court to ascertain whether books published in paper form and books published on other physical supports are goods which are liable to be regarded by the average consumer as similar. For that purpose, it will have to assess whether those books have similar characteristics and meet the same needs, using the criterion of whether their use is comparable, in order to ascertain whether or not the differences between them have a significant or tangible influence on the average consumer’s decision to choose one or other of those books.

(see paras 25, 30, 31)
Case C‑269/13 P

Acino AG

v

European Commission

‛Appeal — Medicinal products for human use — Suspension of the marketing and the withdrawal of certain consignments of medicinal products containing the active ingredient Clopidogrel — Variation of marketing authorisations — Prohibition on marketing — Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 and Directive 2001/83/EC — Precautionary principle — Proportionality — Obligation to state reasons’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber), 10 April 2014

Appeals — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

Appeals — Grounds — Mere repetition of the pleas and arguments put forward before the General Court — Error of law relied on not identified — Inadmissibility — Challenge to the interpretation or application of EU law by the General Court — Admissibility (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 169(2))

Approximation of laws — Medicinal products for human use — Authorisation to market — Variation of the authorisation — Withdrawal and prohibition on marketing — Justification under the precautionary principle where there is uncertainty as to the existence and extent of risks to health (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 726/2004; European Parliament and Council Directive 2001/83, Art. 116)

Approximation of laws — Medicinal products for human use — Authorisation to market — Obligation for the holder of the authorisation to comply with good practice (European Parliament and Council Directive 2001/83, Art. 46(f))
Article 11A(1)(a) of Sixth Directive 77/388 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes and Article 73 of Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that a lump-sum payment constitutes the consideration for the healthcare provided for consideration by a residential care home for the elderly to its residents and, on that basis, falls within the scope of value added tax.

Firstly, a supply of services is effected for consideration within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive, and hence is taxable, only if there is a legal relationship between the provider of the service and the recipient pursuant to which there is reciprocal performance, the remuneration received by the provider of the service constituting the value actually given in return for the service supplied to the recipient.

Secondly, the taxable amount in respect of a supply of services is, in any event, everything which makes up the consideration for the service.

In that regard, it is not necessary for the consideration for that supply to be obtained directly from the person to whom those goods or services are supplied, since it may be obtained from a third party.

Moreover, where the supply of services in question is characterised, inter alia, by the permanent availability of the service provider to supply, at the appropriate time, the healthcare services required by the residents, it is not necessary, in order to recognise that there is a direct link between that service and the consideration received, to establish that a payment relates to a personalised supply of healthcare at a specific time carried out at the request of a resident.

Accordingly, the fact that the healthcare provided to residents is neither defined in advance nor personalised and that the payment is made in the form of a lump sum is also not such as to affect the direct link between the supply of services made and the consideration received, the amount of which is determined in advance on the basis of well-established criteria.

(see paras 29, 30, 34, 36-38, operative part)
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

Border controls, asylum and immigration — Immigration policy — Return of illegally staying third-country nationals — Directive 2008/115 — Detention for the purpose of removal — Obligation on a Member State with a federal structure to detain the third-country nationals, as a rule, in a specialised detention facility even if there are no such facilities in the competent federated state

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/115, Art. 16(1))

Summary

Article 16(1) of Directive 2008/115 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals must be interpreted as requiring a Member State, as a rule, to detain illegally staying third-country nationals for the purpose of removal in a specialised detention facility of that State even if the Member State has a federal structure and the federated state competent to decide upon and carry out such detention under national law does not have such a detention facility.

The obligation, laid down in the first sentence of Article 16(1) of Directive 2008/115, requiring detention to take place as a rule in specialised detention facilities is imposed upon the Member States as such, and not upon the Member States according to their respective administrative or constitutional structures.

The national authorities responsible for applying the national legislation transposing Article 16 of Directive 2008/115 must therefore be able to detain third-country nationals in specialised detention facilities.

This interpretation of Article 16(1) of Directive 2008/115 nevertheless does not mean that a Member State which has a federal structure is obliged to set up specialised detention facilities in each federated state. However, it must be ensured, inter alia pursuant to agreements providing for administrative cooperation, that the competent authorities of a federated state that does not have such facilities can provide accommodation for third-country nationals pending removal in specialised detention facilities located in other federated states.

(see paras 28, 29, 31, 32, operative part)
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Deduction of input tax — Goods and services used both for transactions in respect of which VAT is deductible and for transactions in respect of which it is not deductible — Leasing transactions — Proportional deduction — Calculation — Formula other than the turnover-based method — Lawfulness — Condition

(Council Directive 77/388, Art. 17(5), third para., (c))

Summary

Point (c) of the third subparagraph of Article 17(5) of Sixth Directive 77/388 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes must be interpreted as not precluding a Member State from requiring a bank, which, inter alia, carries out leasing activities, to include in the numerator and denominator of the fraction used to determine a single deductible proportion for all of its mixed use goods and services just the part of the rental payments made by customers as part of their leasing agreements that corresponds to interest, where that use of the goods and services is primarily caused by the financing and management of those contracts.

It is true that, in the exercise of the option, provided for under point (c) of the third subparagraph of Article 17(5) of the Sixth Directive, to derogate from the calculation rule provided for under the directive, all Member States must comply with the purpose and general system of that directive, and the principles on which the common system of VAT is based.

However, having regard to, first, the purpose of point (c) of the third subparagraph of Article 17(5) of the Sixth Directive, secondly, the context of which that provision forms part, thirdly, the principles of fiscal neutrality and proportionality and, fourthly, the purpose of the third subparagraph of Article 17(5) of that directive, any Member State that exercises the option provided for under point (c) of the third subparagraph of Article 17(5) of the Sixth Directive must ensure that the method for calculating the right to deduct makes it possible to ascertain with the greatest possible precision the portion of VAT relating to transactions in respect of which VAT is deductible.

The principle of neutrality, which forms an integral part of the common system of VAT, requires that the method by which the deduction is calculated objectively reflects the actual share of the expenditure resulting from the acquisition of mixed use goods and services that may be attributed to transactions in respect of which VAT is deductible.

To that end, the Sixth Directive does not preclude Member States from using, for a given transaction, a method or formula other than the turnover-based method, provided that the method used guarantees a more precise determination of the deductible proportion of the input VAT than that arising from application of the turnover-based method.

(see paras 27, 30-32, 35, operative part)
Article 5(3)(k) of Directive 2001/29 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘parody’ appearing in that provision is an autonomous concept of EU law.

Article 5(3)(k) of Directive 2001/29 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society must be interpreted as meaning that the essential characteristics of parody are, first, to evoke an existing work, while being noticeably different from it, and secondly, to constitute an expression of humour or mockery. The concept of ‘parody’, within the meaning of that provision, is not subject to the conditions that the parody should display an original character of its own, other than that of displaying noticeable differences with respect to the original parodied work; that it could reasonably be attributed to a person other than the author of the original work itself; that it should relate to the original work itself or mention the source of the parodied work.

The application, in a particular case, of the exception for parody, within the meaning of Article 5(3)(k) of Directive 2001/29, must strike a fair balance between, on the one hand, the interests and rights of persons referred to in Articles 2 and 3 of that directive, and, on the other, the freedom of expression of the user of a protected work who is relying on the exception for parody, within the meaning of Article 5(3)(k).

It is for the national court to determine, in the light of all the circumstances of the case in the main proceedings, whether the application of the exception for parody, within the meaning of Article 5(3)(k) of Directive 2001/29, on the assumption that the drawing at issue fulfils the essential requirements of parody, preserves that fair balance.

(see paras 33-35, operative part 2)
1.

declares that, by failing to ensure that from 1 January 2012 laying hens are no longer reared in unenriched cage systems, the Hellenic Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 3 and Article 5(2) of Council Directive 1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999 laying down minimum standards for the protection of laying hens;
Given that only conferred powers have been vested in the Community, any competence, especially exclusive competence, must have its basis in conclusions drawn from a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the relationship between the international agreement envisaged and the Community law in force. That analysis must take into account the areas covered by the Community rules and by the provisions of the agreement envisaged, respectively, their foreseeable future development and the nature and content of those rules and those provisions, in order to determine whether the agreement is capable of undermining the uniform and consistent application of the Community rules and the proper functioning of the system which they establish.

On a proper construction of the EC Treaty, having regard to the provisions of Directive 2001/77 on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market, the European Community enjoys exclusive external competence precluding a provision of national law which provides for the grant of exemption from the obligation to purchase green certificates owing to the introduction, onto the national consumer market, of electricity imported from a third State, by means of the prior conclusion, between the Member State and third State concerned, of an agreement under which the electricity thus imported is guaranteed as having been produced from renewable energy sources, according to arrangements identical to those set out in Article 5 of that directive.

The conclusion of such agreements by Member States, when Directive 2001/77 in no way authorises this, could interfere, on the one hand, with that directive’s objective of promoting an increase in the contribution of renewable energy sources to electricity production in the internal market for electricity and, on the other hand, with the Member States’ obligation to increase their production of green electricity so as to contribute to achieving the national indicative targets allocated to them pursuant to Article 3 of that directive and thus to participate in pursuing the global indicative target at the level of the Community itself.

In that regard, a provision of national law setting in motion a process that could lead to the conclusion of such an agreement is sufficient to affect the exclusive external competence of the Community.

(see paras 38, 55, 59, 60, 65, operative part 1)
Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 22 October 2014 — British Telecommunications v Commission

(Case C‑620/13 P) ( 1 )

‛Appeal — State aid — Exemption of a pension fund from the obligation to pay a contribution to a pension protection fund in respect of certain employees — Selective nature of the measure’

1. Appeals — Grounds — Inadequate statement of reasons — Reliance by the General Court on implied reasoning — Lawfulness — Conditions (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 36 and 53, first para.) (see paras 29, 56)

2. Appeals — Grounds — Inadequate or contradictory grounds — Admissibility — Scope of the obligation to state reasons — Scope of the Court’s review of judgments of the General Court (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 36 and 58, first para.) (see para. 55)

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the appeal;

2. Orders British Telecommunications plc and BT Pension Scheme Trustees Ltd to pay the costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 61, 1.3.2014

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 22 October 2014 — British Telecommunications v Commission

(Case C‑620/13 P) ( 1 )

‛Appeal — State aid — Exemption of a pension fund from the obligation to pay a contribution to a pension protection fund in respect of certain employees — Selective nature of the measure’

1. Appeals — Grounds — Inadequate statement of reasons — Reliance by the General Court on implied reasoning — Lawfulness — Conditions (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 36 and 53, first para.) (see paras 29, 56)

2. Appeals — Grounds — Inadequate or contradictory grounds — Admissibility — Scope of the obligation to state reasons — Scope of the Court’s review of judgments of the General Court (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 36 and 58, first para.) (see para. 55)

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the appeal;

2. Orders British Telecommunications plc and BT Pension Scheme Trustees Ltd to pay the costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 61, 1.3.2014
3.

Agriculture — EAGGF — Clearance of accounts — Disallowance of expenses arising from irregularities in applying EU rules — Challenge by the Member State concerned — Burden of proof — Allocation between the Commission and the Member State (Council Regulations No 1258/1999 and No 1290/2005) (see paras 58, 59)
As regards the amount of the penalty payment imposed on a Member State and the form it should take, it is for the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, to set the penalty payment in such a way that it is both appropriate to the circumstances and proportionate to the infringement established and the ability of the Member State concerned to pay.

The Commission’s proposals concerning the penalty payment cannot bind the Court and constitute merely a useful point of reference. Similarly, guidelines such as those set out in the communications of the Commission are not binding on the Court but contribute to ensuring that the Commission’s own actions are transparent, foreseeable and consistent with legal certainty when that institution makes proposals to the Court. In proceedings under Article 260(2) TFEU relating to a failure to fulfil obligations on the part of a Member State that has persisted notwithstanding the fact that that same failure to fulfil obligations has already been established in a first judgment delivered under Article 226 EC or Article 258 TFEU, the Court must remain free to set the penalty payment to be imposed in an amount and in a form that the Court considers appropriate for the purposes of inducing that Member State to bring to an end its failure to comply with the obligations arising under that first judgment of the Court.

Therefore, in the context of the Court’s assessment, the basic criteria which must be taken into consideration in order to ensure that the penalty payment has coercive effect and that EU law is applied uniformly and effectively are, in principle, the duration of the infringement, assessed by reference to the time when the Court assesses the facts, not the time when the case is brought before it by the Commission, its seriousness and the capacity of the Member State concerned to pay by taking account of recent trends in the GDP of a Member State at the time of the Court’s examination of the facts. In applying those criteria, the Court must have regard, in particular, to the effects on public and private interests of the failure to comply and to the urgency for the Member State concerned to be induced to fulfil its obligations.

(see paras 52, 53, 57, 58)