Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. Acts of the institutions - Statement of reasons - Obligation - Scope

(EC Treaty, Art. 190 (now Art. 253 EC))

2. Fisheries - Conservation of the resources of the sea - System of fishing quotas - Allocation among the Member States of the volume of available catches - Principle of relative stability - Implementation where a stock is managed in the framework of an international organisation - Whether Council required to base itself on a given number of years - Not so required - Discretion of the Community legislature in finding basic facts - Judicial review - Limits

(Council Regulation No 49/1999, Art. 2(1))

3. Fisheries - Conservation of the resources of the sea - System of fishing quotas - Influence of the Community's accession to the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas on the allocation between Member States of the volume of available catches - Council entitled to take account of overfishing by a Member State in 1997 when Regulation No 49/1999, fixing and allocating the share available to the Community of bluefin tuna stocks in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean for 1999, was adopted - Measure not ranking as a punitive penalty

(Council Regulation No 49/1999, Art. 2(2))

4. Fisheries - Conservation of the resources of the sea - System of fishing quotas - Allocation among the Member States of the volume of available catches - Allocation, by Regulation No 49/1999, of quotas of bluefin tuna in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean for 1999 - Principle of non-discrimination - No breach

(Council Regulation No 49/1999, Art. 2(2))

Summary

1. The statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the Treaty (now Article 253 EC) must be appropriate to the measure at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent court to exercise its power of review. The requirement to state reasons must be evaluated according to the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 190 of the Treaty must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. That is a fortiori the case where the Member States have been closely associated with the process of drafting the contested measure and are thus aware of the reasons underlying the measure.

The fact that a measure departs from a more general rule normally increases the need for a statement of reasons since the addressees of the measure must be in a position to assess the reasons which prompted the institution concerned to depart from the rule in question and to assess the breadth and scope of the derogation from that rule. That requirement is reinforced by the fact that the derogation changes the existing situation and is thereby liable to harm the interests of those addressees.

( see paras 28-29, 53 )

2. Neither in Community legislation nor in the case-law of the Court has it ever been established that application of the principle of relative stability to a stock of fish for which no total allowable catch or quota has previously been fixed requires, whatever the circumstances, that the catch quotas should be based on a given number of years' fishing rather than on one year only. Flexibility regarding the reference period to be used is particularly important where the stock in question is managed under the auspices of an international fisheries organisation and the percentages allocated within the Community are normally based on decisions taken within the framework of that organisation.

Moreover, the Community legislature enjoys a considerable power of discretion in circumstances where it is necessary to evaluate a complex economic situation, as is the case as far as the common agricultural and fisheries policies are concerned. Its discretion is not limited solely to the nature and scope of the measures to be taken but also, to some extent, to the finding of basic facts. Accordingly, in reviewing the exercise of such a power, the Court must confine itself to examining whether there has been a manifest error or misuse of power or whether the authority in question has clearly exceeded the bounds of its discretion.

( see paras 42, 44 )

3. By acceding to the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, as amended by the Protocol signed in Paris on 10 July 1984, the Community was, under Article XIV(6) of that Convention, subrogated to the rights and obligations of the Member States which were already parties to it. The Community was therefore fully empowered to discuss, in the context of negotiations within the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas relating to the Community quota for which it alone was competent, all relevant parameters, including the consequences of overfishing on the part of certain Member States before the date of their accession to that organisation. The Community was therefore bound by that Commission's earlier recommendations and, in particular, by Recommendation No 96-14 which imposes the principle that fishing quotas will be reduced if, during a given management period, a contracting party exceeded its catch limits. The reductions for overfishing in 1997 were in fact imposed on the Community, by way of deduction from the quota available to it for 1999.

In those circumstances, a Member State cannot claim that it should have its own role in the proceedings of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas regarding the manner in which account is taken of overfishing, since the Community has assumed full responsibility for such negotiations. Nor can that State claim, in that context, that it is entitled to defend its own particular interests. It was only through defence of the Community interest, a matter for which the Community and its institutions have sole responsibility, that the interests of that State, like those of the other Member States, were taken into account.

When Regulation No 49/1999 fixing and allocating the share available to the Community of bluefin tuna stocks in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean for 1999 was adopted, it was entirely proper, and did not exceed the bounds of its discretion, for the Council, faced with the need to apply to the Member States concerned the reductions which related to overfishing by those Member States in 1997 but were imputed directly to the Community by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, to make a State bear the consequences of its overfishing in 1997, those consequences having nevertheless been mitigated by a Community solidarity mechanism. Such a measure, designed to ensure that a Member State does not gain an advantage in the future from overfishing carried out in the past, does not rank as a punitive penalty.

( see paras 63-65, 73, 75 )

4. There can be no discrimination unless different rules are applied to comparable situations or the same rule is applied to different situations. When Regulation No 49/1999 fixing and allocating the share available to the Community of bluefin tuna stocks in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean for 1999 was adopted, the Council took fully into account the differences between the Member States concerned since the allocation of the Community quota for bluefin tuna for 1999 takes account both of the principle of relative stability of fishing activities of those States and of any overfishing by them during 1997. The Council did not therefore infringe the principle of equal treatment in any way.

( see paras 80-81 )