ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
18

In those circumstances the High Court of Justice (England and Wales) (Chancery Division) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. Does the right to authorise or prohibit a “communication to the public of their works by wire or wireless means” in Article 3(1) of [Directive 2001/29] extend to a case where: (a) Authors authorise the inclusion of their works in a terrestrial free-to-air television broadcast which is intended for reception either throughout the territory of a Member State or within a geographical area within a Member State; (b) A third party ([that is to say,] an organisation other than the original broadcaster) provides a service whereby individual subscribers within the intended area of reception of the broadcast who could lawfully receive the broadcast on a television receiver in their own homes may log on to the third party’s server and receive the content of the broadcast by means of an internet stream? 2. Does it make any difference to the answer to the above question if: (a) The third party’s server allows only a “one-to-one” connection for each subscriber whereby each individual subscriber establishes his or her own internet connection to the server and every data packet sent by the server onto the internet is addressed to only one individual subscriber? (b) The third party’s service is funded by advertising which is presented “pre-roll” ([that is to say,] during the period of time after a subscriber logs on but before he or she begins to receive the broadcast content) or “in-skin” ([that is to say,] within the frame of the viewing software which displays the received programme on the subscriber’s viewing device but outside the programme picture) but the original advertisements contained within the broadcast are presented to the subscriber at the point where they are inserted in the programme by the broadcaster? (c) The intervening organisation is: (i) providing an alternative service to that of the original broadcaster, thereby acting in direct competition with the original broadcaster for viewers; or (ii) acting in direct competition with the original broadcaster for advertising revenues?’
18

As regards communication between the appellant and a special advocate, rule 36 of the SIAC Procedure Rules provides: ‘(1) The special advocate may communicate with the appellant or his representative at any time before the Secretary of State serves material on him which he objects to being disclosed to the appellant. (2) After the Secretary of State serves material on the special advocate as mentioned in paragraph (1), the special advocate must not communicate with any person about any matter connected with the proceedings, except in accordance with paragraph (3) or (6)(b) or a direction of [SIAC] pursuant to a request under paragraph (4). (3) The special advocate may, without directions from [SIAC], communicate about the proceedings with– (a) [SIAC]; (b) the Secretary of State, or any person acting for him; (c) the relevant law officer, or any person acting for him; (d) any other person, except for the appellant or his representative, with whom it is necessary for administrative purposes for him to communicate about matters not connected with the substance of the proceedings. (4) The special advocate may request directions from [SIAC] authorising him to communicate with the appellant or his representative or with any other person. (5) Where the special advocate makes a request for directions under paragraph (4)– (a) [SIAC] must notify the Secretary of State of the request; and (b) the Secretary of State must, within a period specified by [SIAC], file with [SIAC] and serve on the special advocate notice of any objection which he has to the proposed communication, or to the form in which it is proposed to be made. (6) Paragraph (2) does not prohibit the appellant from communicating with the special advocate after the Secretary of State has served material on him as mentioned in paragraph (1), but– (a) the appellant may only communicate with the special advocate through a legal representative in writing; and (b) the special advocate must not reply to the communication other than in accordance with directions of [SIAC], except that he may without such directions send a written acknowledgment of receipt to the appellant’s legal representative.’
9

Article 1 of Royal Decree No 3 of 10 December 1969, on deductions for the application of VAT (Moniteur belge of 12 December 1969, p. 9), provides: ‘1. Subject to the application of Article 45(1a), (2) and (3) of the [VAT] Code, the taxable person shall be entitled to make deductions of taxes on goods and services used to effect transactions referred to in Article 45(1)(1) to (5) of the Code, in accordance with Articles 2 and 4 of the present Decree. Where the taxable person, in the course of his economic activities, effects other transactions which do not give rise to entitlement to deduction, he shall comply, for the determination of the deductions, with Articles 46 and 48 of the [VAT] Code and with Articles 12 to 21 of the present Decree. 2. Under no circumstances shall there be a deduction for taxes on goods and services which a taxable person intends for private use or purposes other than those coming within his economic activity. Where a good or service is intended to be partially used for such purposes, the deduction shall not be allowed in so far as it is put to that use. The extent thereof shall be determined by the taxable person under the supervision of the authorities.’
11

Item 4.8.4 of the NRD provides: ‘In the event of unforeseen disruption of rail traffic due to a technical failure or an accident, the infrastructure manager shall take all the measures necessary to ensure that the situation is restored to normal. In particular, it shall apply the procedure of the RGE [General Technical Operating Rules] laid down in the event of incidents and accidents. In the event of an emergency and where absolutely necessary, in particular in the event of an accident or defect rendering the infrastructure temporarily unusable or for any other circumstances preventing the use of the infrastructure under normal safety conditions, the train paths allocated may be withdrawn without notice during the time necessary for facilities to be restored or until the cause of the stoppage of trains no longer exists. The [ACF] shall assign alternative capacities corresponding as closely as possible to the specifications of the railway undertakings concerned. If it considers it necessary, the infrastructure manager may require the railway undertakings to make available to it the means which it considers most appropriate in order to restore the situation to normal as soon as possible or to implement its own rescue or lifting methods. The resulting costs are to be borne by the party responsible for the disruption.’
6

Article 48 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 795/2004 of 21 April 2004 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of the single payment scheme provided for in Regulation No 1782/2003 (OJ 2004 L 141, p. 1), stated as follows: ‘1. The additional payment provided for [in] Article 69 of Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 shall be granted, without prejudice to Article 37(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999 and its implementing rules, under the conditions provided for in paragraphs 2 to 6 of this Article. 2. The payment shall be made only to farmers within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003, irrespective [of] whether they have applied or not to the single payment scheme or they hold payment entitlements. 3 “In the sector or sectors concerned by the retention” shall mean that the payment may be claimed, in principle, by all the farmers producing, at the time for lodging an application for the additional payment and under the conditions provided for by this Article, the products covered by the sector or sectors referred to in Annex VI to Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003. 4. In case the payment covers types of farming or quality and marketing measures for which no specific production is identified or the production is not directly covered by a sector, payment may be provided for under the condition that the retention is done in all the sectors referred to in Annex VI to Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 and only the farmers belonging to any of the sectors referred to in that Annex shall participate to the scheme. 5. In case of application of Article 69 of Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 at regional level, the retention shall be calculated on the basis of the component of the payments of the sectors concerned in the region concerned. Member States shall define the region at the appropriate territorial level in accordance with objective criteria and in such a way as to ensure equal treatment between farmers and to avoid market and competition distortion. 6. Member States concerned shall communicate the details of the payment they intend to grant and, in particular, the eligibility conditions and the sectors concerned by 1 August of the year preceding the first year of application of the single payment scheme at the latest. ...’
12

Article 17 of Regulation No 1371/2007 states as follows: ‘1. Without losing the right of transport, a passenger may request compensation for delays from the railway undertaking if he or she is facing a delay between the places of departure and destination stated on the ticket for which the ticket has not been reimbursed in accordance with Article 16. The minimum compensations for delays shall be as follows: (a) 25% of the ticket price for a delay of 60 to 119 minutes, (b) 50% of the ticket price for a delay of 120 minutes or more. Passengers who hold a travel pass or season ticket and who encounter recurrent delays or cancellations during its period of validity may request adequate compensation in accordance with the railway undertaking’s compensation arrangements. These arrangements shall state the criteria for determining delay and for the calculation of the compensation. Compensation for delay shall be calculated in relation to the price which the passenger actually paid for the delayed service. Where the transport contract is for a return journey, compensation for delay on either the outward or the return leg shall be calculated in relation to half of the price paid for the ticket. In the same way the price for a delayed service under any other form of transport contract allowing travelling several subsequent legs shall be calculated in proportion to the full price. The calculation of the period of delay shall not take into account any delay that the railway undertaking can demonstrate as having occurred outside the territories in which the Treaty establishing the European Community is applied. 2. The compensation of the ticket price shall be paid within one month after the submission of the request for compensation. The compensation may be paid in vouchers and/or other services if the terms are flexible (in particular regarding the validity period and destination). The compensation shall be paid in money at the request of the passenger. 3. The compensation of the ticket price shall not be reduced by financial transaction costs such as fees, telephone costs or stamps. Railway undertakings may introduce a minimum threshold under which payments for compensation will not be paid. This threshold shall not exceed EUR 4. 4. The passenger shall not have any right to compensation if he is informed of a delay before he buys a ticket, or if a delay due to continuation on a different service or re‑routing remains below 60 minutes.’
Article 168(a) and the second paragraph of Article 176 of Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax (‘VAT’) must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which a taxable person which incurs costs for transport services, work clothing, protective gear and business trips for staff working for that taxable person does not have the right to a deduction of the VAT relating to those costs on the ground that that staff is provided to it by another entity and accordingly cannot be regarded, for the purposes of that legislation, as members of the taxable person’s staff, despite the fact that those costs can be regarded as having a direct and immediate link with the general costs connected with all the economic activities of that taxable person.

The second paragraph of Article 176 of Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as precluding a Member State, on its accession to the European Union, from introducing a limitation on the right to a deduction under a national legislative provision which provides for the exclusion from the right to a deduction of goods and services intended to be supplied free of charge or for activities outside the scope of the taxable person’s economic activity, when such an exclusion was not provided for in the national legislation in force until the date of that accession.

It is for the referring court to interpret the relevant provisions of domestic law, so far as possible, in accordance with EU law. Where such an interpretation proves impossible, the referring court is required to set aside those provisions on the ground that they are incompatible with the second paragraph of Article 176 of Directive 2006/112.

(see para. 54, operative part 2)
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. EU law — Direct effect — Individual rights — Safeguarding by the national courts — Legal action — Principle of procedural autonomy — Determination of the courts with jurisdiction to hear and determine actions based on Community law and of the procedural rules governing the action — Limits — Observance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness — Verification by the national court

2. EU law — Direct effect — Individual rights — Safeguarding by the national courts — Legal action — Principle of procedural autonomy — Determination of the courts with jurisdiction to hear and determine actions based on Community law and of the procedural rules governing the action — National rule of jurisdiction conferring on a single court all disputes relating to decisions of a national authority responsible for the payment of agricultural support under the European Union common agricultural policy — Lawfulness — Conditions

(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47)

Summary

1. See the text of the decision.

(see paras 35-39, 42, 43, 48)

2. EU law, in particular the principles of equivalence and effectiveness and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, does not preclude a national rule of jurisdiction which results in conferring on a single court all disputes relating to decisions of a national authority responsible for the payment of agricultural support under the European Union common agricultural policy, provided that actions intended to ensure the safeguarding of the rights which individuals derive from EU law are not conducted in less advantageous conditions than those provided for in respect of actions intended to protect the rights derived from any aid schemes for farmers established under national law, and that jurisdiction rule does not cause individuals procedural problems in terms, inter alia, of the duration of the proceedings, such as to render the exercise of the rights derived from EU law excessively difficult, which it is for the referring court to ascertain.

(see para. 61, operative part)
The classification of a product in one Member State as a medical device bearing a CE marking, in accordance with Directive 93/42 concerning medical devices, as amended by Directive 2007/47, does not preclude the competent authorities of another Member State from classifying the same product, on the basis of its pharmacological, immunological or metabolic action, as a medicinal product within the meaning of Article 1(2)(b) of Directive 2001/83 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, as amended by Regulation No 1901/2006.

In this connection, as regards the distinction between medicinal products and medical devices, Article 1(5)(c) of Directive 93/42 specifically requires the competent authorities to take particular account of the principal mode of action of the product. Under Article 1(2)(a) of that directive, only a product which does not achieve its principal intended action in or on the human body by pharmacological, immunological or metabolic means may be classified as a medical device.

None the less, as EU law currently stands, until harmonisation of the measures necessary to ensure the protection of health is more complete, it will be difficult to avoid the existence of differences in the classification of products as between Member States in the context of Directive 2001/83.

Asymmetries in scientific information, new scientific developments and differing assessments of risks to human health and the desired level of protection can explain why different decisions are taken by the competent authorities of two Member States as regards the classification of a product.

Moreover, the fact that a product is classified as a medical device in accordance with Directive 93/42 in one Member State does not prevent it being classified, in another Member State, as a medicinal product in accordance with Directive 2001/83 if it displays the characteristics of such a product.

(see paras 44-48, operative part 1)
The duty incumbent upon the General Court under Article 36 and the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union to state reasons for its judgments does not require the General Court to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments articulated by the parties to the case. The grounds stated may therefore be implicit, on condition that they enable the persons concerned to know the reasons for which a particular ruling was made and provide the competent court with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review.

An examination of the grounds for refusal must be carried out in relation to each of the goods or services for which trade mark registration is sought. Where the same ground of refusal is given for a category or group of goods or services, the reasoning may be general for all of the goods or services concerned. However, such a power extends only to goods and services which are interlinked in a sufficiently direct and specific way, to the point where they form a sufficiently homogeneous category or group of goods or services. The mere fact that the goods or services in question come within the same class of the Nice Agreement is not sufficient for that purpose, since the classes often contain a wide variety of goods or services which are not necessarily interlinked in a sufficiently direct and specific way. Where the General Court itself has drawn a distinction between goods within the same class of the Nice Agreement on the basis of the conditions under which they are marketed, it is incumbent on it to set out reasons for its decision with regard to each group of goods which it established within that class.

(see paras 25-28)
In providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment, Directive 2003/35, which inserted Article 10a into Directive 85/337 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, a provision which extended the rights of members of the public concerned to challenge the decisions, acts or omissions referred to in that directive, must, since it provides that it is to be transposed into national law by 25 June 2005 at the latest, be interpreted as meaning that the rules of national law adopted for the purposes of transposing that article into national law are intended also to apply to administrative development consent procedures initiated before 25 June 2005 when the latter have resulted in the granting of consent after that date.

Article 10a of Directive 85/337 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, as amended by Directive 2003/35, which provides that that the decisions, acts or omissions referred to therein must be actionable before a court of law through a review procedure to challenge their substantive or procedural legality, must be interpreted as precluding the Member States from limiting the applicability of the provisions transposing that article to cases in which the legality of a decision is challenged on the ground that no environmental impact assessment was carried out, while not extending that applicability to cases in which such an assessment was carried out but was irregular.

Subparagraph (b) of Article 10a of Directive 85/337 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, as amended by Directive 2003/35, must be interpreted as not precluding national courts from refusing to recognise impairment of a right within the meaning of that article if it is established that it is conceivable, having regard to the circumstances of the case, that the contested decision would not have been different without the procedural defect invoked by the applicant.

None the less, that will be the case only if the court of law or body hearing the action does not in any way make the burden of proof fall on the applicant and makes its ruling, where appropriate, on the basis of the evidence provided by the developer or the competent authorities and, more generally, on the basis of all the documents submitted to it, taking into account, inter alia, the seriousness of the defect invoked and ascertaining, in particular, whether that defect has deprived the public concerned of one of the guarantees introduced with a view to allowing that public to have access to information and to be empowered to participate in decision-making, in accordance with the objectives of Directive 85/337.

(see paras 51, 53, 54, 57, operative part 3)