1.

This action, brought by a former official against the Council, arises from the compensation for partial permanent invalidity paid by the defendant institution in accordance with the decision of an arbitration tribunal specially appointed to determine the rate to be applied. His invalidity was the result of a motor-car accident in July 1968 in which the applicant, at that time employed by the Council, was involved whilst not on duty. The contingency was covered by the ‘individual — group’ insurance which at that time applied to officials of the Council under an insurance policy concluded by the Secretariat-General so as to lay down for the time being the conditions on which the benefits provided for under Article 73 of the Staff Regulations of Officials could be granted. After expressly accepting 20 %, fixed by the arbitration tribunal, as the degree of invalidity, the applicant asked the Council to grant him 30 % on the ground that this was the rate accepted by the appointing authority before he had expressly agreed to the less favourable award of the arbitration tribunal. By drawing a distinction between his relationship with the institution and that between the institution and the insurance organization, the applicant is endeavouring to ensure that his acceptance of the 20 % as the degree of invalidity is effective only as between the insurance organization and the institution, without, according to him, affecting, as between him and the institution, the higher degree of invalidity fixed and previously accepted by the officers of the Council. He claims that the consequence of this is that the institution must make up the difference between the figure agreed with the insurance organization and the figure which the institution had earlier declared itself willing to accept in respect of the applicant as a third party benefiting from the abovementioned individual — group insurance. The applicant bases his contention on the fact that the statement of the doctor who had treated him and who had assessed his patient's degree of invalidity at 30 %, was based on an opinion to the same effect from a specialist, Dr. Olmechette, whom he had consulted. The Council had also accepted the applicant's suggestion that this specialist should be appointed as his own representative on the arbitration tribunal appointed to settle the question of the degree of invalidity. This does not, however, in any way justify the conclusion that the competent authorities of the institution to which the applicant belonged had adopted the previous unilaterally determined figure which was more favourable to the official and which the insurance organization immediately challenged. Apart from its dependence on a presumption, which is not confirmed by the facts, of the Council's acceptance, the applicant's legal case, which is based on a separation of relationships and of procedures for fixing the degree of invalidity, does not appear to correspond to the position in law. The insurance which the defendant institution had concluded in favour of its officials against the risks provided for under Article 73 of the Staff Regulations and the concomitant obligations assumed must clearly have been sufficient to cover the responsibilities' involved in applying the provision contained in the Staff Regulations. As was made clear by the judgment in Case 18/70 Duraffour v Council ([1971] ECR 523), an obligation assumed by the insurer does not replace an obligation imposed directly on an institution in favour of an official; nevertheless, in a case in which an official has been involved in an accident which is one of the risks that the institution has the duty to cover pursuant to Article 73 and has had his degree of invalidity fixed in due manner, the institution certainly cannot legally recognize a higher degree of invalidity, a fortiori if its rate has been determined with the direct participation and agreement of its representative and the person concerned has freely accepted it. Bearing in mind that the insurance scheme in force at the material time was a provisional one and that it might not provide cover for all the obligations placed upon the institution by Article 73 of the Staff Regulations, the most that the institution could, in theory, be imagined as doing would be to intervene on behalf of the official if the amount of benefit determined in accordance with the insurance policy was, in its view, inadequate in the light, for example, of depreciation of the currency or other developments of an economic character. But an institution cannot legally intervene in order to recognize a degree of invalidity higher than that duly fixed in accordance with the machinery provided therefor and then unilaterally assume responsibility for payment of that part of the award which was not covered by the insurance company. The degree of invalidity is determined on the basis of inherently technical considerations and not on the basis of expediency or equity and may not therefore be unilaterally changed by an administrative body responsible for handling public money in accordance with objective rules. The fact that, for the purposes of the arbitration proceedings, the defendant institution consented to the applicant's suggested appointment of the doctor who, when consulted privately by the applicant, had previously stated that he agreed with the assessment of the degree of invalidity at 30 %, does not mean that the institution itself had adopted this assessment as correct but was merely evidence of the length to which the institution had gone to ensure that everything possible was done to safeguard the interests of one of its officials. The fact that, subsequently, the applicant's own medical adviser found it possible to accept a lower degree of invalidity than the one which he had previously favoured certainly does nothing to strengthen the official's case. The latter would be entitled to receive supplementary benefit from his institution only if it were shown that the benefit granted to him by the insurers as third-party beneficiary was less than what the institution must provide in accordance with the conditions laid down by Article 73 of the Staff Regulations. In the present case, however, the applicant is not complaining about the inadequacy of the obligation assumed by the insurance organization, compared with the risk which the institution was required to cover, but the fact that the organization's assessment of the injury actually sustained was unrealistic. But, on this point, his express acceptance, at a time when there was no question of his ability to understand and take decisions, of an assessment at 20 % of the degree of invalidity cuts the ground from beneath his feet. The action for annulment brought by the applicant against the defendant's decision rejecting his request is, therefore, unfounded. The concomitant application for compensation is, for the same reasons, also without foundation.