ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
2)

Does Commission Decision 2013/448/EU infringe Article 10a(5)(a) of the Emissions Trading Directive, in so far as the Commission, when establishing the industry cap, did not take into account: (i) some of the verified emissions for the period 2005 to 2007 of activities and installations which for the period 2008 to 2012 were included within the scope of the Emissions Trading Directive, but for which in the period 2005 to 2007 there was no verification obligation and which were therefore not registered in the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL); (ii) new activities included for the periods 2008 to 2012 and 2013 to 2020 within the scope of the Emissions Trading Directive, in so far as they had not in the period 2005 to 2007 been included within the scope of that Directive and were not carried out at installations which in the period 2005 to 2007 were already within the scope of the Emissions Trading Directive; (iii) emissions from installations decommissioned before 30 June 2011, although in fact in the period 2005 to 2007 and partially also in the period 2008 to 2012 there were verified emissions from those installations? In the event that the questions 2 (i) to (iii) are to any extent to be answered in the affirmative, is Commission Decision 2013/448/EU with respect to the application of the cross-sectoral correction factor invalid, so that it should not be applied?
4)

If a waste shipment is to be regarded as illegal because it enters the country of transit at a place which differs from that stated in the consent or the notification document, is it possible to regard the fine which has been imposed for that reason as proportionate if the amount is the same as the amount of the fine prescribed for a breach of the requirement to obtain consent and to give prior notification in writing?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 46/16

Appeal brought on 26 May 2014 by FTI Touristik GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 21 March 2014 in Case T-81/13 FTI Touristik GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

(Case C-253/14 P)

(2015/C 046/22)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: FTI Touristik GmbH (represented by: A. Parr, Rechtsanwältin)

Other party to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Pleas in law and main arguments

By its order of 11 December 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Sixth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
3)

Are Article 49 et seq. TFEU and Article 56 et seq. TFEU, considered also in the light of the principles set out in the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 16 February 2012 [in Joined Cases C-72/10 and C-77/10], to be interpreted as precluding the imposition of an obligation to transfer, free of charge, the use of tangible and intangible assets represented by the betting management and collection network in the event that the activity has ceased owing to the expiry of the licence or as a result of measures disqualifying the licence-holder or withdrawing the licence?
3)

Should the answer to those two questions be in the affirmative, where the debtor is a contracting authority, can it rely on the freedom of contract of the parties in order to avoid its obligation to pay interest for late payment and compensation for recovery costs?’
1.

Is EU law infringed if an aid scheme makes use of the special procedure under Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 (‘GBER’) (1) in accordance with Article 25 in order to be exempt from the obligation to notify under Article 108(3) TFEU, but does not comply with various obligations of Chapter I of the GBER and, moreover, does not make any reference to the GBER?
—

annul Council Decision 2014/699/EU of 24 June 2014 in so far as it refers to the amendment of Article 12 of the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF — Basic Convention) and of Appendices B (Uniform Rules concerning the Contract of International Carriage of Goods by Rail — CIM), D (Uniform Rules concerning Contracts of Use of Vehicles in International Rail Traffic — CUV) and E (Uniform Rules concerning the Contract of Use of Infrastructure in International Rail Traffic — CUI) thereto (Article 1 of the decision in conjunction with point 3, items 4 (in so far as Article 12 of the COTIF — Basic Convention is affected), 5, 7 and 12 of the annex), and
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 65/21

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Netherlands) lodged on 24 November 2014 — Toorank Productions BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën

(Case C-532/14)

(2015/C 065/31)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hoge Raad der Nederlanden

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Toorank Productions BV

Defendant: Staatssecretaris van Financiën

Question referred

Should heading 2206 of the CN be interpreted as meaning that a beverage with an alcoholic strength by volume of 13,4 % vol, obtained by mixing a purified, alcoholic beverage (base) known as ‘Ferm Fruit’, obtained by fermentation from apple concentrate, with sugar, aromatic substances, colouring and flavouring agents, thickening agents, preservatives and distilled alcohol — in the sense that that alcohol does not exceed, either in volume or in percentage, 49 per cent of the alcohol occurring in the beverage, whereas 51 per cent thereof consists of alcohol obtained by fermentation — should be classified under that heading? If not, should subheading 2208 70 of the CN be interpreted as meaning that a beverage such as that should be classified as liqueur under that subheading?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 89/5

Appeal brought on 22 December 2014 by the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 24 October 2014 in Case T-543/12 Grau Ferrer v OHIM — Rubio Ferrer (Bugui Va)

(Case C-597/14 P)

(2015/C 089/06)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: S. Palmero Cabezas and A. Folliard-Montguiral, Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Xavier Grau Ferrer, Juan Cándido Rubio Ferrer and Alberto Rubio Ferrer

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— deliver a new judgment on the substance of the case, dismissing the action brought against the contested decision, or refer the case back to the General Court;

— order the applicant before the General Court to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

1. The General Court infringed Article 76(2) of the CTR (1) and the third paragraph of Rule 50(1) of Regulation No 2868/95 (2) by considering that those provisions were applicable in the present case on the basis of incorrect assessment criteria.

2. The General Court infringed Article 76(2) of the CTR and the third paragraph of Rule 50(1) of Regulation No 2868/95 by basing its findings on an incorrect interpretation of the discretion arising from those provisions. In particular, by considering that the Board of Appeal enjoys such a discretion irrespective of whether the evidence presented for the first time before it is additional or not. The question whether the Boards of Appeal’s discretion under Article 76(2) of the CTR and the third paragraph of Rule 50(1) of Regulation No 2868/95 exists in any event, that is to say, even when the evidence presented out of time before the Board of Appeal is new, is a point of law which must be clarified by the Court of Justice.

3. The General Court erroneously applied Article 15(1), second paragraph, point (a) of the CTR by concluding that the earlier Community trade mark had been used in a form differing in elements which did not alter the distinctive character of the mark in the form in which it was registered.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1), as amended (replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1)).

(2) Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 of 13 December 1995 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1995 L 303, p. 1).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 81/2

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Szczecinie (Poland) lodged on 1 July 2014 — ASPROD sp. z o.o. v Dyrektor Izby Celnej w Szczecinie

(Case C-313/14)

(2015/C 081/03)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Szczecinie

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: ASPROD sp. z o.o.

Defendant: Dyrektor Izby Celnej w Szczecinie

By order of 3 December 2014, the Court of Justice (Second Chamber) ruled that Article 27(1)(f) of Council Directive 92/83/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the harmonisation of the structures of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages (1) must be interpreted as precluding national rules, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which make the application of the exemption from the harmonised excise duty provided for under that provision subject to the condition that the trader concerned must hold a decision from the tax administration fixing the maximum limits for use of the products exempted under that provision.

(1) OJ 1992 L 316, p. 21.
2)

In the light of Law No 9/2012 and the purpose of the tax provided for thereunder, must Article 110 TFEU be interpreted as precluding a Member State of the European Union from establishing a tax on pollutant emissions, applicable upon the registration of motor vehicles from another Member State of the European Union, but which, in the case of domestic motor vehicles, is payable only upon the transfer of ownership of such vehicles, the result being that a foreign vehicle cannot be used unless the tax is paid, but a domestic vehicle can be used for an unlimited time without the tax being paid, until the ownership of that vehicle is transferred, if ever, followed by its registration in the name of the new owner?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 96/2

Appeal brought on 10 September 2014 by Jyoti Ceramic Industries PVT. Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 1 July 2014 in Case T-239/12 Jyoti Ceramic Industries PVT. Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

(Case C-420/14 P)

(2015/C 096/02)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Jyoti Ceramic Industries PVT. Ltd (represented by: D. Jochim and R. Egerer, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), DeguDent GmbH

By order of 5 February 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Seventh Chamber) dismissed the appeal and decided to order the appellant to bear its own costs.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 389/12

Appeal brought on 24 November 2014 by Giorgio Giorgis against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 25 September 2014 in Case T-474/12: Giorgio Giorgis v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

(Case C-531/14 P)

(2015/C 389/14)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Giorgio Giorgis (represented by: I.M. Prado, A. Tornato, avvocati)

Other parties to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), Comigel SAS

By order of 2 September 2015 the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) has dismissed the appeal and ordered Mr Giorgio Giorgis to bear his own costs.
a)

If a liquidator brings an action before a German court against a director of a private company limited by shares under English and Welsh law, in respect of whose assets in Germany insolvency proceedings have been opened pursuant to Article 3(1) of the Insolvency Regulation (1), the purpose of the action being to seek reimbursement of payments which the director made before the opening of the insolvency proceedings but after the company had become unable to pay its debts, is that action governed by German insolvency law within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the Insolvency Regulation?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 96/7

Action brought on 14 January 2015 — European Parliament v Council of the European Union

(Case C-14/15)

(2015/C 096/09)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: European Parliament (represented by: F. Drexler, A. Caiola, M. Pencheva, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

— annul Council Decision 2014/731/EU of 9 October 2014 on the launch of automated data exchange with regard to Vehicle Registration Data (VRD) in Malta (1), Council Decision 2014/743/EU of 21 October 2014 on the launch of automated data exchange with regard to Vehicle Registration Data (VRD) in Cyprus (2), and Council Decision 2014/744/EU of 21 October 2014 on the launch of automated data exchange with regard to Vehicle Registration Data (VRD) in Estonia (3);

— order Council of the European Union to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Parliament invokes two pleas in law alleging infringement of the Treaties, first, and infringement of an essential procedural requirement, secondly, in support of its action for annulment.

In the first place, the Parliament considers that the Council used an inappropriate legal basis in order to adopt the contested decisions.

In the second place, the Parliament complains that the Council used a decision-making procedure which is legally incorrect.

(1) OJ 2014 L 302, p. 56.

(2) OJ 2014 L 308, p. 100.

(3) OJ 2014 L 308, p. 102.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 127/10

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Budapest Környéki Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 21 January 2015 — Criminal proceedings against István Balogh

(Case C-25/15)

(2015/C 127/15)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Budapest Környéki Törvényszék

Party to the main proceedings

István Balogh

Question referred

Article 1(1) of Directive 2010/64/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings reads: ‘This Directive lays down rules concerning the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings and proceedings for the execution of an European arrest warrant’. Must this formulation be taken to mean, inter alia, that, during a special procedure (Chapter XXIX of a büntetőeljárásról szóló 1998. évi XIX. törvény (Law XIX of 1998 on criminal procedure)), a court in Hungary must apply this Directive, that is to say, must a special procedure under Hungarian law be regarded as being covered by the expression ‘criminal proceedings’, or must this expression be interpreted as referring only to procedures which conclude with a final decision concerning the criminal liability of the defendant?

(1) OJ 2010 L 280, p. 1.
1.

Does Article 56 TFEU preclude national tax legislation under which financial institutions not resident in Portuguese territory are subject to tax on interest income received in that territory, withheld at source at the definitive rate of 20 % (or at a lower rate if there is an agreement to avoid double taxation), a tax applied to gross income with no possibility of deducting business expenses directly related to the financial activity carried out, whereas the interest received by resident financial institutions is incorporated in the total taxable income, with deduction of any expenses related to the activity pursued when determining the profit for the purposes of corporation tax, so that the basic rate of 25 % is applied to the net interest income?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 138/38

Action brought on 12 February 2015 — European Commission v Hellenic Republic

(Case C-66/15)

(2015/C 138/52)

Language of the case: Greek

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: M. Wasmeier and D. Τriantafillou, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Hellenic Republic

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that the Hellenic Republic, by levying the whole amount of the registration tax payable on the registration of a vehicle which is rented or leased by a customer who is a Greek national from a supplier established in another Member State, without taking into consideration the duration of the rental contract or lease contract and the duration of use of the vehicle concerned in the national territory of Greece, has failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 56 to 62 TFEU in relation to the freedom to provide services;

— order the Hellenic Republic to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Hellenic Republic, by imposing the whole of the registration tax payable on the registration by a supplier established in another Member State of vehicles which are leased or used on a hire-purchase agreement by nationals of Greece, without taking into consideration the duration of the lease (rental) contract and of use in the national territory of Greece, failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 56-62 TFEU.

The imposition of the whole registration tax is disproportionate and hinders the free movement of services (see the case-law of the Court in Cura Anglagen, C-451/99, Coevering, C-242/05, Ilhan, C-42/08, and VAV Autovermietung GmbH, C-91/10).
2)

Do the principles of EU law, and, in particular, those of protection of legitimate expectations, legal certainty and proportionality, preclude a legal rule of a Member State which permits the exclusion from a public tendering procedure of an undertaking which did not understand, because this was not expressly provided in the tender documents, that it was obliged, on pain of exclusion from that procedure, to fulfil the obligation to pay a sum in order to participate in that procedure, even though the existence of that obligation cannot be clearly deduced from the wording of the law in force in the Member State, but can nevertheless be inferred, by means of a twofold legal operation, which involves, first, interpreting extensively certain provisions of that Member State’s positive law and, then, incorporating — in accordance with the outcome of that broad interpretation — the mandatory provisions in the tendering documents?
4.

Fourth ground of appeal: the General Court failed to provide a statement of reasons in relation to the impact of the involvement of the appellant’s directors on the increase in the starting amount of the fine The General Court does not explain what evidence it used as its basis for concluding that the involvement of the appellant’s directors was not a decisive factor in increasing the basic amount of the fine. If the General Court had established that the multiplier applied to the basic amount of the fine imposed on the appellant had been calculated partly on the basis of the involvement of that undertaking’s directors, it should have annulled the Commission’s decision and, consequently, reduced the amount of the fine.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 146/18

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Netherlands) lodged on 19 February 2015 — Sonos Europe BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën

(Case C-84/15)

(2015/C 146/26)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hoge Raad der Nederlanden

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Sonos Europe BV

Defendant: Staatssecretaris van Financiën

Question referred

Should CN headings 8517, 8518, 8519 and 8527 be interpreted as meaning that a product such as that described in this judgment (the ZonePlayer), which receives digital information and without storing it (streaming) reproduces it in the form of amplified sound by means of five (integrated) loudspeakers and/or forwards it to other devices in the local area network, is amenable to classification under one or more of those headings and, if so, which heading(s)? Alternatively, should CN heading 8543 be interpreted as meaning that a device such as the ZonePlayer ought to be classified under that heading as an electrical machine or apparatus with an individual function?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 155/19

Appeal brought on 24 March 2015 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 20 January 2015 in Case T-111/12 Spain v Commission

(Case C-140/15 P)

(2015/C 155/21)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: D. Recchia and S. Pardo Quintillán, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: Kingdom of Spain

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court of 20 January 2015 in Case T-111/12 Spain v Commission;

— refer the case back to the General Court for judgment;

— order the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appeal brought by the Commission concerns the judgment of the General Court of 20 January 2015 in Case T-111/12. In that judgment, the General Court annulled Commission Decision C(2011)9990 of 22 December 2011 reducing the assistance granted under the Cohesion Fund to certain projects.

The Commission relies, in support of its appeal, on two grounds of appeal. By its primary ground of appeal, the Commission claims that the General Court erred in law in finding that the Commission had to adopt the decision on financial corrections within a time-limit, which is determined by the basic act in force on the date of the hearing between the Commission and the Member State. In the alternative, the Commission claims that the General Court erred in law in finding that the time-limit imposed on the Commission for adopting the decision on financial corrections is a mandatory time-limit, non-observance of which constitutes an infringement of an essential procedural requirement that invalidates the decision adopted outside that time-limit.
2.

In answering that question, is it relevant that the legal, financial and/or emotional burden does not rest entirely with that parent and, furthermore, that it cannot be excluded that the other parent, who is a national of the Member State, might in fact be able to care for the child? In that case, should the parent/third-country national have to make a plausible case that the other parent is not able to assume responsibility for the care of the child, so that the child would be obliged to leave the territory of the European Union if the parent/third-country national is denied a right of residence?
1.

Do the new provisions on effective legal remedies in Regulation No 604/2013 (1) (recital 19 in the preamble thereto and Article 27(1) and (5) thereof) mean that an applicant for asylum is also to be able to challenge the criteria in Chapter III of the regulation on the basis of which he or she is to be transferred to another Member State which has agreed to receive him or her, or can effective legal remedies be limited to mean only the right to an examination of whether there are systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and the reception conditions in the Member State to which the applicant is to be transferred (corresponding to the ruling of the Court of Justice in Case C-394/12)?