ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
As regards the nature of the employment relationship, according to Article 13 of the Staff Regulations of the European Investment Bank, relations between the Bank and the members of its staff are, in principle, governed by individual contracts in conjunction with those Staff Regulations.

Where contracts are concluded with a European Union body entrusted with public interest responsibilities and authorised, like the European Investment Bank, to lay down, by regulation, provisions applicable to its staff, the consent of the parties to such a contract is necessarily circumscribed by all manner of obligations deriving from those particular responsibilities and incumbent upon both the management bodies of that body and its staff.

The European Investment Bank’s relations with its contract staff are, to a large extent, determined by the Staff Regulations, by which staff agree to be bound when they countersign the letter of appointment. More particularly, it is clear from the first and second paragraphs of Article 20 of the Staff Regulations and from Annexes I and II thereto that basic salaries and supplementary allowances are fixed by regulation. Moreover, when it comes to awards, Article 16 of the Staff Regulations confers discretion on the President of the European Investment Bank both as regards the principle of granting those awards and in determining their amount.

The European Investment Bank, in order to carry out its public interest responsibilities, therefore has discretion to organise its departments and to fix unilaterally the remuneration of its staff, notwithstanding the legal instruments of a contractual nature on which that employment relationship is based.

(see paras 48, 50-52)

Judgment of 14 October 2004 in Pflugradt v ECB, C‑409/02 P, ECR, EU:C:2004:625, para. 34
1.

Actions for annulment — Interest in bringing proceedings — Interest to be assessed at the time at which an action is brought — Action against an act imposing restrictive measures on the applicant — Repeal of the contested act in the course of the proceedings — Declaration that no need to adjudicate — Inadmissibility — Applicant maintaining an interest in obtaining recognition that the contested act unlawful (Art. 263 TFEU; Council Decision 2014/119/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2014/216/CFSP; Council Regulation No 208/2014, as amended by Regulation No 381/2014) (see paras 26-29)
It is apparent from the wording of Article 8(3) of Regulation No 216/96, laying down the rules of procedure of the Boards of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) that, in the context of proceedings before the Board of Appeal, the defendant may, in its submissions, exercise its right to challenge the decision that is contested. Thus, simply by virtue of its status as a defendant, it is allowed to challenge, inter alia, the validity of a decision of the Opposition Division. Nor does that provision limit that right to the pleas in law already raised in the appeal. It provides, in fact, that the submissions may relate to a point not raised in the appeal. Moreover, that provision does not make any reference to the fact that the defendant could itself have brought an appeal against that decision. Accordingly, that decision may be challenged either in separate proceedings, as provided for in Article 60 of Regulation No 207/2009, or in the submissions provided for in Article 8(3) of Regulation No 216/96.

To accept of the admissibility of the applicant’s submissions in its response does not amount to permitting the defendant before the Board of Appeal to bring an action disregarding the time limit and payment of the fee for appeal provided for in Article 60 of Regulation No 207/2009. It is clear from the wording of Article 8(3) of Regulation No 216/96 that the possibility of seeking a decision annulling or altering the contested decision on a point not raised in the appeal is limited to inter partes proceedings. Those submissions may be made in the response submitted in the context of those proceedings. That is why that provision states that those submissions are to cease to have effect should the appellant discontinue the proceedings before the Board of Appeal. Thus, in order to challenge a decision of the Opposition Division, separate proceedings, as provided for in Article 60 of Regulation No 207/2009, are the only legal remedy by which it is certain that the appellant’s objections may be asserted. It follows that submissions seeking a decision annulling or altering the contested decision on a point not raised in the appeal within the meaning of Article 8(3) of Regulation No 216/96 differ from the appeal provided for in Article 60 of Regulation No 207/2009. Accordingly, the conditions laid down in Article 60 of Regulation No 207/2009 do not apply to those submissions.

Accordingly, a defendant that submits in its response, within the prescribed time limit, submissions seeking a decision altering the decision of the Opposition Division is not required to comply with the time limit or to pay the fee for appeal provided for in Article 60 of Regulation No 207/2009.

(see paras 22-25)
7.

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Weighing elements of similarity or difference between the signs — Taking into account of the intrinsic characteristics of the signs or the conditions in which the goods or services are marketed (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 87)
4.

EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity between the goods or services in question — Complementary nature of the goods or services (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 48, 49, 55-57)
1.

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 21, 70)
Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 12 May 2016 — Ivo-Kermartin v EUIPO — Ergo Versicherungsgruppe (ELGO)

(Case T‑750/14)

‛EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU word mark ELGO — Earlier EU word and figurative marks ERGO — Relative ground for refusal — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Likelihood of confusion — Successive restrictions on the application for registration — Article 43(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 — Second sentence of Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009 — Right to be heard — Rule 69 of Regulation (EC) No 2868/95’

1. EU trade mark — Procedural provisions — Decisions of the Office — Observance of the rights of the defence — Scope of the principle (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 75, second sentence) (see paras 34-36)

2. EU trade mark — Appeals procedure — Action before the EU judicature — Limitation of the list of products and services after the decision of the Board of Appeal — Consequences (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 43(1)) (see paras 42, 43)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 22 August 2014 (Case R 473/2014-4) relating to opposition proceedings between Ergo Versicherungsgruppe AG and Ivo-Kermartin GmbH.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 16 June 2016 — Fútbol Club Barcelona v EUIPO — Kule (KULE)

(Case T‑614/14)

‛European Union trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for European Union word mark KULE — Earlier national word marks and well-known mark CULE — Relative grounds for refusal — No genuine use of the earlier trade marks — Article 42(2) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 — Article 8(5) of Regulation No 207/2009’

1. EU trade mark — Appeals procedure — Action before the EU judicature — Jurisdiction of the General Court — No power to issue directions (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 65(6)) (see para. 16)

2. EU trade mark — Appeals procedure — Action before the EU judicature — Jurisdiction of the General Court — Re-evaluation of the facts in the light of evidence produced for the first time before it — Not included (Rules of Procedure of the General Court (1991), Art. 135(4); Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 65) (see para. 19)

3. EU trade mark — Appeals procedure — Appeal against a decision of the Opposition Division of EUIPO — Examination by the Board of Appeal — Scope — Facts and evidence not produced in support of the opposition within the period prescribed for that purpose — Account taken — Discretion of the Board of Appeal — Board of Appeal’s duty to state reasons (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 76(2)) (see paras 25, 26)

4. EU trade mark — Observations of third parties and opposition — Examination of the opposition — Proof of use of the earlier mark — Genuine use — Concept — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 42(2) and (3)) (see paras 36-39, 49)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 18 June 2014 (Case R 2375/2013-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Fútbol Club Barcelona and Kule.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 17 February 2017 — Construlink v EUIPO — Wit-Software (GATEWIT)

(Case T‑351/14)

(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU word mark GATEWIT — Earlier EU figurative mark wit software — Earlier national business name Wit-Software, Consultoria e Software para a Internet Móvel, SA — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Similarity of the signs — Article 8(1)(b) and (4) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)

1. EU trade mark—Appeals procedure—Action before the EU judicature—Legality of the decision of a Board of Appeal adjudicating in opposition proceedings—Challenged by the adducing of new facts—Not permissible—Account taken, for the purposes of interpreting EU law, of EU national or international case-law not cited before the OHIM bodies—Lawfulness (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 65) (see para. 29)

2. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 36, 37, 39, 105)

3. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Assessment of the likelihood of confusion—Determination of the relevant public—Attention level of the public (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 45-47)

4. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Similarity of the marks concerned—Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 63, 64)

5. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Word mark GATEWIT—Figurative mark wit software and national business name Wit-Software, Consultoria e Software para a Internet Móvel, SA (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 77, 84, 90, 97, 99, 106, 107)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 6 March 2014 (Case R 1059/2013-1), relating to opposition proceedings between Wit-Software, Consultoria e Software para a Internet Móvel and Construlink — Tecnologias de Informação.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 3 May 2017 — Sotiropoulou and Others v Council

(Case T‑531/14)

(Non-contractual liability — Economic and monetary policy — Decisions addressed to a Member State with a view to remedying an excessive deficit situation — Reduction in and withdrawal of pension rights in Greece — Sufficiently serious infringement of a rule of law conferring rights on individuals)

1. Actions for damages — Jurisdiction of the EU judicature — Limits — Jurisdiction to hear a claim for compensation for damage allegedly caused by a decision imputable to the Council — Inclusion (Arts 268 TFEU and 340, second and third paras, TFEU) (see paras 56-60)

2. Non-contractual liability — Conditions — Unlawfulness — Damage — Causal link — One of the conditions not satisfied — Claim for compensation dismissed in its entirety (Art. 340, second para., TFEU) (see paras 64, 65)

3. Non-contractual liability — Conditions — Unlawfulness — Sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals — Rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals — Concept — Principles for allocating jurisdiction and of subsidiarity — Not included (Arts 5(2) and (3) TFEU and 340, second para., TFEU) (see paras 69-72)

4. Economic and monetary policy — Economic policy — Procedure for monitoring excessive public deficits — Council Decisions addressed to a Member State in excessive deficit with a view to reinforcing and deepening budgetary oversight and putting it on notice to take deficit reduction measures — No infringement of the principles for allocating jurisdiction and of subsidiarity (Arts 5(2) and (3) TFEU, 126(9) TFEU and 136 TFEU; Council Decisions 2010/320 and 2011/734) (see paras 73, 74)

5. Non-contractual liability — Conditions — Unlawfulness — Sufficiently serious breach of EU law — Requirement that the institutions manifestly and seriously disregard the limits of their discretion — Council Decisions putting a Member State in excessive deficit on notice to take deficit reduction measures, including reduction and suspension of pension rights in that Member State — Justification of the measures by the need to rationalise the budget, reduce public spending, support the pensions system, and maintain budgetary discipline and the financial stability of the eurozone — No unjustified and disproportionate restriction on rights of access to social security benefits and social services — EU not liable (Arts 126(9) TFEU, 136 TFEU and 340, second para., TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts 34 and 52(1); Council Decisions 2010/320 and 2011/734) (see paras 77-79, 81, 83-91)

Re:

ACTION on the basis of Article 268 TFEU seeking compensation for the loss allegedly suffered by the applicants as a result of the adoption of the decisions of the Council addressed to the Hellenic Republic in activation of the mechanism provided for in Article 126 TFEU.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Ms Leïmonia Sotiropoulou and the other applicants whose names are listed in the annex to the judgment to pay the costs;
The European Union can be held liable only for damage which is a sufficiently direct consequence of the wrongful conduct of the institution concerned. Where representation by a lawyer or adviser in the pre-litigation procedure is not mandatory, there is no causal link between the alleged damage, namely the cost of such representation, and any exceptionable conduct on the part of the institution or body. Although it is not possible to prohibit those concerned from seeking legal advice even at that stage, it is their own decision and the institution or agency concerned cannot be held liable for the consequences.

Although representation by a lawyer is not mandatory in proceedings before the European Union Intellectual Property Office, Article 85 of Regulation No 207/2009 and Rule 94 of Regulation No 2868/95 lay down rules concerning the apportionment of costs and the limits of the scales concerning the recoverable costs where a party designates a representative. However, those provisions apply only to opposition proceedings and in respect of the apportionment of costs between the parties to that procedure.

In that regard, it should also be noted that no provision of Regulation No 207/2009 or Regulation No 2868/95 provides for the reimbursement of the costs of legal representation incurred in respect of an appeal where the department which adopted the contested decision decides to revise it in accordance with Article 62 of Regulation No 207/2009. In particular, no provision of those rules grants the successful party reimbursement by EUIPO of the costs of legal representation in such proceedings. Only the reimbursement of appeal fees is provided for by Rule 51(a) of Regulation No 2868/95, under which the department whose decision has been impugned is to order the reimbursement of appeal fees where it allows the revision in accordance with Article 61 or Article 62 of Regulation No 207/2009.

(see paras 35, 36)
Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 10 October 2017 — Klement v EUIPO — Bullerjan (Form of an oven)

(Case T‑211/14 RENV)

(European Union trade mark — Revocation proceedings — Three-dimensional EU trade mark — Form of an oven — Genuine use of a mark — Point (a) of the second subparagraph of Article 15(1), and Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Nature of use of the mark — Form differing in elements which do not alter the distinctive character)

1. EU trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Examination of the application — Proof of use of the earlier mark — Use of the mark in a form differing in elements which do not alter the distinctive character of the mark — Subject matter and scope of Article 15(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009 (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 15(1)(a)) (see paras 34-36)

2. EU trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Grounds for revocation — Lack of genuine use of the mark — Use of the mark in a form differing in elements which do not alter the distinctive character of the mark — Three-dimensional trade mark consisting of the form of an oven (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 15(1)(a)) (see paras 42, 47)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 9 January 2014 (Case R 927/2013-1) relating to revocation proceedings between Mr Klement and Bullerjan.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judicial proceedings — Intervention — Pleas different from those of the main party supported — Admissibility — Condition — Connection with the subject-matter of the case

(Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 142(1) and (3))

(see paras 62-65)
EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Separate examination of the grounds for refusal in relation to each of the goods or services covered by the application for registration—Obligation to state the reasons for refusing to register—Scope

(Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 7(1) and 75, first sentence)

(see paras 23-29)
Judicial proceedings — Application initiating proceedings — Formal requirements — Brief summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based — Pleas in law not set out in the application — General reference to documents annexed to the application — Inadmissibility

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 21, first para. and 53, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the General Court (1991), Art. 44(1)(c) and (d))

(see paras 113-116)
Action for annulment — Natural or legal persons — Measures of direct and individual concern to them — Whether directly concerned — Criteria — Restrictive measures taken having regard to the situation in Ukraine — Measures prohibiting all EU operators from carrying out certain types of financial transaction with credit institutions established in Russia included in the lists of entities covered by restrictive measures — Action brought by a credit institution included in those lists — Admissibility

(Art. 263, 4th para. TFEU; Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP, Art. 1(1)(a), and Annex I; Council Regulation No 833/2014, Art. 5(1)(a) and Annex III)

(see paras 47-50, 52)
6

By decision of 14 November 2013 (‘the contested decision’), the First Board of Appeal of OHIM dismissed the action. It found that the mark applied for contained the geographical indication Lemberg, protected in the European Union for wines originating from South Africa under Article 8(b)(ii) of the Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of South Africa on trade in wine (OJ 2002 L 28, p. 4) (‘the Agreement between the Community and the Republic of South Africa’), read in conjunction with Annex II to that Agreement, whilst the wine subject of the mark applied for did not originate from that place of provenance. It took the view that the mark applied for was not simply a new fanciful word in relation to the geographical indication Lemberg and that, in order to justify the refusal of its registration on the ground referred to in Article 7(1)(j) of Regulation No 207/2009, it sufficed that it contained or consisted of elements which enabled that geographical indication to be identified with certainty. It also considered that the fact that the term ‘Lemberg’ referred to an ‘estate’ (vineyard) and not to a region or territory did not call into question the fact that it was a geographical indication protected in accordance with the Agreement between the Community and the Republic of South Africa. It found that the references made by the applicant to other protected geographical indications under the same agreement were not relevant in the assessment of the application for registration in the case in question. Lastly, the Board stated that Article 6ter of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 20 March 1883, as revised and amended (the ‘Paris Convention’) was not applicable in the case in question, since it provides only that marks concerning State emblems, official hallmarks and emblems of intergovernmental organisations are not to be registered.