ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
31

In those circumstances, the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad (Specialised Criminal Court, Bulgaria) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Is national case-law according to which the continuation of a coercive measure of “pre-trial detention” (four months after the accused’s arrest) is subject to the existence of “reasonable grounds”, understood as a mere “prima facie” finding that the accused may have committed the criminal offence in question, compatible with Article 3, the second sentence of Article 4(1), Article 10, the fourth and fifth sentences of recital 16 and recital 48 of Directive 2016/343 and with Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter? Or, if it is not, is national case-law according to which the term “reasonable grounds” means a strong likelihood that the accused committed the criminal offence in question compatible with the abovementioned provisions? (2) Is national case-law according to which the court determining an application to vary a coercive measure of “pre-trial detention” that has already been adopted is required to state the reasons for its decision without comparing the incriminating and exculpatory evidence, even if the accused’s lawyer has submitted arguments to that effect — the only reason for that restriction being that the judge must preserve his impartiality in case that case should be assigned to him for the purposes of the substantive examination —, compatible with the second sentence of Article 4(1), Article 10, the fourth and fifth sentences of recital 16 and recital 48 of Directive 2016/343 and with Article 47 of the Charter? Or, if it is not, is national case-law according to which the court is to carry out a more detailed and specific examination of the evidence and to give a clear answer to the arguments put forward by the accused’s lawyer, even if it thus takes the risk that it will be unable to examine the case or deliver a final decision on guilt if the case is assigned to it for the purposes of the substantive examination, — which implies that another judge will examine the substance of the case — compatible with the abovementioned provisions?’
3

Article 17(2) and (6) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1), as amended by Council Directive 95/7/EC of 10 April 1995 (OJ 1995 L 102, p. 18) (‘the Sixth Directive’) provided: ‘2. In so far as the goods and services are used for the purposes of his taxable transactions, the taxable person shall be entitled to deduct from the tax which he is liable to pay: (a) [VAT] due or paid within the territory of the country in respect of goods or services supplied or to be supplied to him by another taxable person; … 6. Before a period of four years at the latest has elapsed from the date of entry into force of this Directive, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, shall decide what expenditure shall not be eligible for a deduction of [VAT]. [VAT] shall in no circumstances be deductible on expenditure which is not strictly business expenditure, such as that on luxuries, amusements or entertainment. Until the above rules come into force, Member States may retain all the exclusions provided for under their national laws when this Directive comes into force.’
47

In the present case, the Spanish Government argues that the context in which compensation is paid under Article 49(1)(c) of the Workers’ Statute is different from that in which compensation is paid under Article 53(1)(b) of that statute. Compensation under Article 49(1)(c) is payable on completion of the task which is the subject matter of a fixed-term contract, such as the contracts for a specific task or service at issue in the main proceedings, whereas the compensation under Article 53(1)(b), which is at a higher rate, is paid where workers are dismissed on one of the grounds set out in Article 52 of that statute, such as economic or technical grounds or grounds relating to the employer’s organisation or production. The Spanish Government states, in essence, that the Article 49 compensation is paid on the occurrence of an event that, at the time of concluding his or her fixed-term employment contract, the worker could have expected. The compensation under Article 52, by contrast, is intended to compensate a worker for the frustration, as a result of his dismissal on one of the grounds set out in Article 52 of the statute, of the legitimate expectation he may have had that his employment relationship would continue. That different context, according to the Spanish Government, justifies that the level of compensation awarded to a worker on termination of his employment contract is not the same in both cases.
13

Part One of the CN contains ‘preliminary provisions’. In that part, under Section I, which contains the general rules, Part A, entitled ‘General rules for the interpretation of the [CN]’, provides: ‘Classification of goods in the [CN] shall be governed by the following principles. 1. The titles of sections, chapters and sub-chapters are provided for ease of reference only; for legal purposes, classification shall be determined according to the terms of the headings and any relative section or chapter notes and, provided such headings or notes do not otherwise require, according to the following provisions. … 6. For legal purposes, the classification of goods in the subheadings of a heading shall be determined according to the terms of those subheadings and any related subheading notes and, mutatis mutandis, to the above rules, on the understanding that only subheadings at the same level are comparable. For the purposes of this rule, the relative section and chapter notes also apply, unless the context requires otherwise.’
30

In those circumstances, the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Are clauses 2.4 and 2.6 of the framework agreement on parental leave … to be interpreted as precluding the application to an employee who is on part-time parental leave at the time of his dismissal of a provision of domestic law, such as Article L. 3123-13 of the Labour Code, applicable at the material time, under which “the compensation payment for dismissal and retirement benefit payable to an employee who has worked on both a full-time and part-time basis for the same undertaking shall be calculated in proportion to the periods of each of those types of employment completed since the employee joined the undertaking”? (2) Are clauses 2.4 and 2.6 of the framework agreement … to be interpreted as precluding the application to an employee who is on part-time parental leave at the time of his dismissal of a provision of domestic law, such as Article R. 1233-32 of the Labour Code, under which, during a period of redeployment leave which exceeds the notice period, the employee is to receive a monthly payment from the employer of an amount equivalent to at least 65% of the employee’s average gross monthly pay during the 12 months preceding the notice of dismissal, subject to the contributions referred to in Article L. 5422-9 of the Labour Code? (3) If the answer to either of the preceding questions is in the affirmative, is Article 157 [TFEU] to be interpreted as precluding provisions of national law, such as Article L. 3123-13 of the Labour Code, applicable at the material time, and Article R. 1233-32 of that Code, in so far as a far greater number of women than men choose to take part-time parental leave and the indirect discrimination which results therefrom as regards the receipt of redundancy pay and redeployment leave allowance, which are less than those received by employees who have not taken part-time parental leave, is not justified by objective factors unrelated to any form of discrimination?’
25

It is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the referring court has already held, on an interlocutory basis, that the term in the notarial instrument at issue stipulating that the loan is denominated in foreign currency but that it must be repaid in euros is unfair in that it does not provide for an appropriate limitation of the exchange rate risk. Although it relates to the main subject matter of the contract, that term was neither clear nor intelligible for the Kuhars. More generally, the referring court considers that, even though the fact that the exchange rate risk is not limited may affect both the consumer and the bank, there is nevertheless a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract, if only because of the significantly greater resources available to a bank to control such a risk, as a financial establishment of considerable size, which can rely to that end on specialist knowledge, significant data and experience in the field. In addition, that court is of the opinion that, in signing up to a loan to fund the acquisition of a residential property, a reasonable consumer would not expose himself to an unlimited exchange rate risk, which may have damaging and lasting economic consequences for him. On the contrary, if he were able to negotiate with the bank on an equal footing and if he were duly informed by it, such a consumer would commit himself only if the loan contract included a reasonable limitation of such a risk.
21

In those circumstances, the Győri Ítélőtábla (Győr Regional Court of Appeal, Hungary) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘Should the rule on special jurisdiction laid down in Article 7(2) of Regulation … No 1215/2012 … be interpreted as meaning that the court of a Member State has jurisdiction as the court for the ‘place where the harmful event occurred’, where: – the domicile or principal place of economic activity or of the financial interests of the applicant [in the main proceedings] who claims to have suffered the damage or loss is in the State in question; – the claim brought by the applicant [in the main proceedings] — which is against a single defendant, namely a truck manufacturer domiciled in another Member State … — is based on an infringement [established] by [a decision of] the European Commission under Article 101(1) [TFEU], consisting of collusive arrangements on pricing and gross price increases in the EEA, and the decision is addressed to other parties in addition to the defendant [in the main proceedings]; – the applicant [in the main proceedings] only purchased trucks manufactured by other undertakings involved in the cartel; – there is nothing to show that any of the meetings that were found to restrict competition were held in the [Member] State of the court seised; – the applicant [in the main proceedings] generally purchased the trucks — in its view, at distorted prices — in the [Member] State of the court seised, and to that end it entered into financial leasing agreements involving definite transfer of ownership with undertakings that operated in that State but, according to its own statements, the applicant negotiated directly with the vehicle dealerships, and the lessor added its own profit margin and the leasing costs onto the prices agreed by the applicant, and the right of ownership over the vehicles was transferred to the applicant on completion of the leasing agreement, when it expired?’
11

The preamble to decreto ministeriale — Attuazione dell’art. 25 del decreto legislativo del 3 marzo 2011, n. 28, recante incentivazione della produzione di energia elettrica da impianti solari fotovoltaici (Ministerial Decree implementing Article 25 of Legislative Decree No 28 of 3 March 2011 introducing incentive measures for the production of electricity by solar photovoltaic plants) of 5 July 2012 (Ordinary Supplement to GURI No 159 of 10 July 2012) (‘the Fifth Energy Tariff’), is worded as follows: ‘With regard to solar photovoltaic energy, the sharp fall in the costs of plants has led to rapid growth in the number of plants, one of the effects of which has been to raise the costs relating to the provision of support, as well as agricultural land being taken over. A number of other European countries have adopted measures to reduce the number of incentives for photovoltaic plants in view of the high level of support‑related costs and the fall in the cost of plants. It is also necessary, for the purpose of maintaining competition and protecting end users, to adopt European incentive standards. As regards the future development of the sector, there is significant room for reducing incentives by comparison with those granted in recent years, bearing in mind the level of incentives given in other European countries and the usual return on investments. The future development of solar photovoltaic energy must focus on applications which make it possible to reduce the amount of agricultural land being taken over, to stimulate technological innovation and energy efficiency and to make further advances in so far as concerns environmental protection and economic benefits …’
5

Article 2 of that regulation provides: ‘1. The levy shall be payable on all quantities of milk or milk equivalent marketed during the 12-month period in question in excess of the relevant quantity referred to in Article 3. It shall be shared between the producers who contributed to the overrun. In accordance with a decision of the Member State, the contribution of producers towards the levy payable shall be established, after the unused reference quantities have been reallocated or not, either at the level of the purchaser, in the light of the overrun remaining after unused reference quantities have been allocated in proportion to the reference quantities of each producer, or at national level, in the light of the overrun in the reference quantity of each individual producer. 2. As regards deliveries, before a date and in accordance with detailed rules to be laid down, the purchaser liable for the levy shall pay to the competent body of the Member State the amount payable, which he shall deduct from the price of milk paid to producers who owe the levy or, failing this, collect by any appropriate means. … Where quantities delivered by a producer exceed his reference quantity, the purchaser shall be authorised, by way of an advance on the levy payable, in accordance with detailed rules laid down by the Member State, to deduct an amount from the price of the milk in respect of any delivery by that producer in excess of his reference quantity. 3. As regards direct sales, the producer shall pay the levy payable to the competent body of the Member State before a date and in accordance with rules to be laid down. 4. Where the levy is payable and the amount collected is greater than that levy, the Member State may use the excess to finance the measures referred to in the first indent of Article 8 and/or redistribute it to producers who fall within priority categories established by the Member State on the basis of objective criteria to be determined or who are affected by an exceptional situation resulting from a national provision unconnected with this scheme.’
6

Article 68 of that regulation lays down priority rules in the event of overlapping, as follows: ‘1. Where, during the same period and for the same family members, benefits are provided for under the legislation of more than one Member State the following priority rules shall apply: (a) in the case of benefits payable by more than one Member State on different bases, the order of priority shall be as follows: firstly, rights available on the basis of an activity as an employed or self-employed person, secondly, rights available on the basis of receipt of a pension and finally, rights obtained on the basis of residence; (b) in the case of benefits payable by more than one Member State on the same basis, the order of priority shall be established by referring to the following subsidiary criteria: (i) in the case of rights available on the basis of an activity as an employed or self-employed person: the place of residence of the children, provided that there is such activity … … 2. In the case of overlapping entitlements, family benefits shall be provided in accordance with the legislation designated as having priority in accordance with paragraph 1. Entitlements to family benefits by virtue of other conflicting legislation or legislations shall be suspended up to the amount provided for by the first legislation and a differential supplement shall be provided, if necessary, for the sum which exceeds this amount. …’
22

Article 13(1) of the Amending Law of 12 July 2017 amended Article 100(1) of the Law on the ordinary courts and inserted Article 100(4a) and (4b). Following those amendments, Article 100 provided: ‘1. A judge who has been retired in the event of changes to the system of the courts or changes to the boundaries of judicial districts shall be entitled, until reaching the age of 60 years, in the case of women, and 65 years, in the case of men, to emoluments in the amount of remuneration received in the post most recently occupied. 2. A judge who has retired or who has been retired on the grounds of age, illness or loss of strength shall be entitled to emoluments in the amount of 75% of the basic salary and length-of-service allowance received in the post most recently occupied. 3. The emoluments referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be increased in accordance with changes to the amount of the basic salary for serving judges. … 4a. In the situation referred to in paragraph 1, a retired judge shall receive a one-off payment upon reaching the age of 60 years, in the case of women, and 65 years, in the case of men. 4b. A judge who has returned to the post he previously occupied or a post equivalent to that previously occupied, in accordance with Article 71c(4) or Article 74(1a), shall, in the event of retirement or being retired, be entitled to a one-off payment in an amount consisting in the difference between the amount of the payment calculated on the day of retirement or being retired and the amount of the payment already paid. In the situation referred to in paragraph 1, the judge shall be entitled to the payment upon reaching the age of 60 years, in the case of women, and 65 years, in the case of men.’
13

Article 7(1) to (3) of the Verdrag tussen het Koninkrijk België en het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden tot het vermijden van dubbele belasting en tot het voorkomen van het ontgaan van belasting inzake belastingen naar het inkomen en naar het vermogen (Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of tax evasion in respect of taxes on income and capital) of 5 June 2001 (Belgisch Staatsblad, 20 December 2002, p. 57534, ‘the Belgium-Netherlands Convention’) provides: ‘1. The profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that State unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries on business as aforesaid, the profits of the enterprise may be taxed in the other State but only so much of them as is attributable to that permanent establishment. 2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, where an enterprise of a Contracting State carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein, there shall in each Contracting State be attributed to that permanent establishment the profits which it might be expected to make if it were a distinct and separate enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions and dealing wholly independently with the enterprise of which it is a permanent establishment. 3. In determining the profits of a permanent establishment, there shall be allowed as deductions expenses which are incurred for the purposes of the permanent establishment, including executive and general administrative expenses so incurred, whether in the State in which the permanent establishment is situated or elsewhere.’
10

Under Article 49 of loi no 86-1067 du 30 septembre 1986 relative à la liberté de communication (Law No 86-1067 of 30 September 1986 on freedom of communication) (JORF, 1 October 1986, p. 11749), as amended by Article 44 of loi no 2006-961 du 1er août 2006 (Law No 2006-961 of 1 August 2006) (JORF, 3 August 2006, p. 11529) (‘Article 49 as amended’): ‘The [INA], a publicly owned industrial and commercial State body, is responsible for conserving and promoting the national audiovisual heritage. I. — The [INA] shall preserve the audiovisual archives of national broadcasting companies and assist with their exploitation. The nature, chargeable rates, financial conditions of the documentary services and the manner in which these archives may be exploited shall be laid down by agreement between the Institute and each of the companies concerned. These agreements shall be approved by order of the ministers responsible for the budget and communication. II. — The [INA] shall exploit extracts from the audiovisual archives of national broadcasting companies under the conditions laid down in the specifications. As such, it shall have right to exploit these extracts at the end of a period of one year from the date on which they were first broadcast. The [INA] shall remain the owner of the technical media and materials and holder of the rights to exploit the audiovisual archives of national broadcasting companies and the company referred to in Article 58 which were transferred to it before the publication of loi no 2000-719 du 1er août 2000 (Law No 2000-719 of 1 August 2000) (amending Law No 86-1067 of 30 September 1986 on freedom of communication (JORF, 2 August 2000, p. 11903)). However, national broadcasting companies and the company referred to in Article 58 shall each retain a priority right to use these archives. The [INA] shall exercise the exploitation rights to which this paragraph refers having due regard for the personal and economic rights of the holders of copyright or related rights and their successors in title. However, by way of derogation from Articles L. 212-3 and L. 212-4 of the Intellectual Property Code, the terms on which the works of performers in the archives to which this article refers are exploited and the remuneration for that exploitation shall be governed by agreements concluded between the performers themselves or the employee organisations representing performers and the Institute. Those agreements must specify in particular the scale of remuneration and the arrangements for payment of that remuneration.’