ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 94/7

Appeal brought on 7 December 2017 by Aanbestedingskalender BV, Negometrix BV, CTM Solution BV, Stillpoint Applications BV, Huisinga Beheer BV against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 28 September 2017 in Case T-138/15: Aanbestedingskalender BV and Others v European Commission

(Case C-687/17 P)

(2018/C 094/08)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Aanbestedingskalender BV, Negometrix BV, CTM Solution BV, Stillpoint Applications BV, Huisinga Beheer BV (represented by: C. T. Dekker, L. Fiorilli, advocaten)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Slovak Republic

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

— set aside, in whole or in part, the judgment under appeal in so far as it dismissed the action brought by appellant in Case T-138/15 and, consequently:

— annul the decision at issue, in whole or in part; and/or

— in the alternative, set aside in whole or in part the judgment under appeal in so far as it dismissed the action brought by appellants in Case T-138/15 and refer the case back to the General Court for an adjudication on the merits in the light of the guidance with which the Court will provide it;

— order the Commission to pay the costs at first instance and on appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellants submit that the General Court erred in law, incorrectly assessed the relevant facts and failed to state a proper and consistent reasoning by considering and finding that the applicant’s single plea in law must be rejected and the action therefore dismissed in its entirety because the Commission was entitled to find that the activities performed by TenderNed were not economic in nature and that the measure at issue in the present case did not involve State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.

The appellants claim that the economic or non-economic nature of TenderNed’s activities, especially its submission module, cannot be considered as facets of one single activity and that TenderNed’s submission module should be considered as economic in nature and as separable from public powers. The appellants claim that the General Court did not comply with the Court of Justice’s case-law regarding the test of whether an activity is economic or non-economic in nature.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 83/12

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Nejvyšší správní soud (Czech Republic) lodged on 15 December 2017 — D. H. v Ministerstvo vnitra

(Case C-704/17)

(2018/C 083/18)

Language of the case: Czech

Referring court

Nejvyšší správní soud

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: D. H.

Defendant: Ministerstvo vnitra

Question referred

Does the interpretation of Article 9 of Directive 2013/33/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 96) in conjunction with Articles 6 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union preclude national legislation which does not allow the Nejvyšší správní soud (Supreme Administrative Court) to review a judicial decision concerning detention of a foreign national after the foreign national has been released from detention?

(1) OJ 2013 L 180, p. 96.
2.

If the answer to the first question referred for a preliminary ruling is in the affirmative, does Article 9(7) of that Directive preclude opposition to the legislation of a Member State by virtue of which the rules to be applied to the compensation referred to in that provision of the Directive are the general rules of that Member State on civil liability and compensation according to which the court cannot oblige the applicant to provide compensation for losses caused by a provisional measure which was subsequently held to be unfounded due to the invalidity of the patent, and which were incurred as a result of the defendant’s failure to act as would generally be expected in the circumstances in question, or losses for which the defendant is responsible for that same reason, provided that, when requesting the provisional measure, the applicant acted as would generally be expected in those circumstances?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 104/13

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy w Siemianowicach Śląskich (Poland) lodged on 9 November 2017 — Powszechna Kasa Oszczędności (PKO) Bank Polski S.A. v Jacek Michalski

(Case C-632/17)

(2018/C 104/16)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy w Siemianowicach Śląskich

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Powszechna Kasa Oszczędności (PKO) Bank Polski S.A.

Defendant: Jacek Michalski

Question referred

Must the provisions of Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, (1) and in particular Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) thereof, and the provisions of Directive 2008/48/EC of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, (2) and in particular Article 10 and Article 22(1) thereof, be interpreted as precluding the pursuit of a claim by a bank (the creditor) against a consumer (the debtor) on the basis of a banking ledger excerpt, signed by persons authorised to make statements regarding the bank’s property rights and obligations and bearing the bank’s stamp, and on the basis of proof that a request for payment had been submitted to the debtor in writing, in the context of an order-for-payment procedure as defined in Article 485 § 3 et seq. of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure?

(1) OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29.

(2) OJ 2008 L 133, p. 66.
1.

Can a right to compensation under Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1) also exist in the case where a passenger fails to catch a direct connecting flight due to a delay in arrival of less than three hours, with the result that there is a delay in arrival at the final destination of three hours or more, but the two flights were operated by different air carriers?
1)

First Plea: Error in law and manifest error of assessment regarding the application of a general presumption in relation to the exception for the protection of the purpose of EU investigations — The Commission’s error in law regarding the application of the general presumptions in relation to the application of exception to requests for access to specific and identified pre-existing documents; — The Commission’s error in law regarding the protection of the purpose of ongoing investigations in relation to requests for access to specific and identified pre-existing documents; — The Commission’s error in law and manifest error of assessment regarding the assessment of the overriding public interest of ensuring an effective judicial review (Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights); and — The Commission’s error in law regarding the application of the fundamental right of access to documents (Article 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights).
Case C-671/17 P: Appeal brought on 27 November 2017 by Anastasia-Soultana Gaki against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) made on 27 September 2017 in Case T-366/16, Gaki v Europol

Appeal brought on 27 November 2017 by Anastasia-Soultana Gaki against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) made on 27 September 2017 in Case T-366/16, Gaki v Europol

(Case C-671/17 P)

Parties

Appellant: Anastasia-Soultana Gaki (represented by: G. Keisers, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol)

By order of 7 June 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Tenth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as being in part manifestly unfounded and in part manifestly inadmissible and ordered the appellant to bear her own costs.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 142/21

Appeal brought on 24 October 2017 by Vassil Monev Valkov against the order of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 27 September 2017 in Case T-558/17: Valkov / European Court of Human Rights and Supreme Court of the Republic of Bulgaria

(Case C-701/17 P)

(2018/C 142/28)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Vassil Monev Valkov (represented by: K. Mladenova, адвокат)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Court of Human Rights, Supreme Court of the Republic of Bulgaria

By order of 22 February 2018 the Court of Justice (Tenth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
Case C-356/17: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hannover (Germany) lodged on 9 June 2017 — Johannes Büker and Ursula Münsterteicher v TUIfly GmbH

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hannover (Germany) lodged on 9 June 2017 — Johannes Büker and Ursula Münsterteicher v TUIfly GmbH

(Case C-356/17)

Referring court

Amtsgericht Hannover

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Johannes Büker, Ursula Münsterteicher

Defendant: TUIfly GmbH

By decision of the Court of Justice of 17 May 2018 the case was removed from the Court’s register.
Case C-429/17: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 17 July 2017 — Bially e.a. v TUIfly GmbH

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 17 July 2017 — Bially e.a. v TUIfly GmbH

(Case C-429/17)

Referring court

Amtsgericht Düsseldorf

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Bially e.a.

Defendant: TUIfly GmbH

By decision of the Court of Justice of 28 May 2018 the case was removed from the Court’s register.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 83/16

Appeal brought on 5 January 2018 by Ms against the order of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 31 May 2017 in Case T-17/16 Ms v Commission

(Case C-19/18 P)

(2018/C 083/23)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Ms (represented by: L. Levi, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

— Set aside the order of the General Court of 31 May 2017 in Case T-17/16;

— consequently, refer the case back to the General Court for judgment on the substance of the action brought before it at first instance, or if the Court of Justice were to consider that the state of the proceedings permits final judgment, to grant the appellant the relief sought at first instance and, accordingly,

— hold that the Commission is non-contractually liable on the basis of Article 268 and the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU;

— order the production of the documents declared confidential by the Commission and providing the necessary basis for the exclusion decision;

— order payment of compensation for the non-material harm resulting from the Commission’s wrongful conduct, assessed ex aequo et bono at EUR 20 000;

— order the Commission to publish a letter of apology to the applicant and to reinstate him within Team Europe;

— order the European Commission to pay the costs at first instance and on appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The order under appeal is vitiated by an error of law in the legal classification of the basis of the action for damages brought before the General Court and infringement of the General Court’s duty to state reasons.

The order under appeal is also vitiated by an error of law in the legal classification of the letter of agreement and infringement of the General Court’s duty to state reasons. The latter distorted the file.
—

distortion of the facts and error of law in so far as the General Court classified the decision of 19 May 2005 simultaneously as a list of suitable candidates and as a decision extending the validity of the list of suitable candidates;
2.

Is a practice of a Member State which, when the relevant default-interest provisions are examined, distinguishes between whether the national tax authority failed to refund the tax in compliance with the national provisions then in force — which, moreover, infringed Community law — or whether it failed to do so in breach of such provisions and which, as regards the amount of the interest accrued on the VAT whose refund could not be claimed within a reasonable period due to a national-law requirement declared contrary to EU law by the Court of Justice, sets out two definable periods, with the result that, — in the first period, taxable persons only have the right to receive default interest at the central bank base rate, in view of the fact that since the Hungarian legislation contrary to Community law was still then in force, the Hungarian tax authorities did not act unlawfully by not authorising the payment within a reasonable period of the VAT included in the invoices, whereas — in the second period interest double the central bank base rate — applicable moreover in the event of delay in the legal system of the Member State in question — must be paid only for the late payment of the default interest corresponding to the first period consistent with Community law, in particular with the provisions of the VAT Directive (having regard in particular to Article 183 thereof), and with the principles of equivalence, effectiveness and proportionality?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 123/13

Action brought on 14 February 2018 — European Commission v Italian Republic

(Case C-122/18)

(2018/C 123/19)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: G. Gattinara and C. Zadra, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Italian Republic

Form of order sought

The Commission claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by having failed and by continuing to fail to ensure that the public authorities avoid exceeding the time limits of 30 or 60 calendar days for paying their trade debts, the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on combating late payment in commercial transactions (OJ 2011 L 48, p. 1) and, in particular, its obligations as set out in Article 4 of that directive;

— order the Italian Republic to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The evidence before the Commission, which is based on the information provided by the Italian Republic during the pre-litigation procedure, indicates that the payment periods of 30 and 60 days set out in Article 4 of Directive 2011/7/EU on combating late payment have been exceeded, not by individual entities but by entire categories of public authorities, not in relation to one individual commercial transaction but in terms of the average time taken to pay, that is, in respect of all the transactions concluded by those authorities, and, lastly, not over a limited period but consistently, from September 2014 until the date on which the present action was brought. The Commission therefore considers that sustained and systematic infringement of Article 4 of that directive has been established.
2.

2.1 Under Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13, which has not been transposed into Spanish law, is it contrary to Directive 93/13, and to Article 8 thereof, for a Spanish court to rely upon and apply Article 4(2) of that act when that provision has not been transposed into Spanish law at the wish of the legislature, which sought a full level of protection in relation to all the terms that a seller or supplier may insert into a consumer contract, including those which relate to the main subject-matter of the contract, even if those terms were drafted in plain, intelligible language? 2.2 At all events, must information of promotional material be provided about all or some of the following facts or data, for the purpose of the understanding of an essential term, specifically the IRPH: (i) An explanation of how the reference rate was configured, that is to say, stating that that index includes charges and other costs on top of the nominal interest rate, that it is a simple, unweighted average, that the seller or supplier had to know and notify the fact that he must apply a negative differential and that the data provided is not public, compared with the other usual index, the Euribor? (ii) An explanation of past and possible future fluctuations in the IRPH, notifying and publishing graphs that explain clearly and intelligibly to the consumer the fluctuations in that specific rate in relation to the Euribor, the usual rate on loans secured by a mortgage? 2.3 And, if the Court of Justice concludes that it is for the referring court to examine whether contractual terms are unfair and to draw the necessary inferences in accordance with its national law, the Court is asked whether failure to provide information about all those consequences does not make the term unintelligible, inasmuch as it is not clear to an average consumer (Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13), or whether that failure to provide information amounts to unfair conduct by the seller or supplier and, therefore, the consumer would not have agreed to the use of the IRPH as the reference rate for his loan if he had been properly informed?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 142/22

Appeal brought on 5 January 2018 by Marine Harvest ASA against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 26 October 2017 in Case T-704/14: Marine Harvest ASA v European Commission

(Case C-10/18 P)

(2018/C 142/30)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Marine Harvest ASA (represented by: R. Subiotto QC)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— Set aside the General Court’s judgment, in whole or in part;

— Annul the Commission’s decision of 23 July 2014 or, in the alternative, annul the fines imposed on the appellant pursuant to the decision or, in the further alternative, substantially reduce the fines imposed on the appellant pursuant to the decision;

— Order the Commission to pay the appellant’s legal and other costs, both these proceedings and of the proceedings before the General Court;

— If necessary, remand the case to the General Court for reconsideration in accordance with the Court’s judgment;

— Take any other measures that this Court considers appropriate.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on two pleas in law.

1. By its first plea, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law in failing to apply Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) (‘EUMR’) in this case. a. First, the General Court erred in law in the interpretation of the ‘single concentration’ concept, in particular in dismissing Recital 20 of EUMR as a basis for interpreting the EU legislator’s intent to treat as a ‘single concentration’ all transactions that ‘are linked by a condition’. b. Second, the General Court erred in law in the interpretation of the rationale of Article 7(2) EUMR.

2. By its second plea, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law in imposing two fines for the same conduct. a. The judgment violated the principle of ne bis in idem by fining Marine Harvest twice for acquiring title to Mr. Malek’s 48,5 % shareholding: €10 million once on the basis of Article 14(2)(a) EUMR for allegedly implementing the concentration prior to notification (alleged infringement of Article 4(1) EUMR) and a further €10 million on the basis of Article 14(2)(b) EUMR for allegedly implementing the concentration prior to clearance (alleged infringement of Article 7(1) EUMR). b. In the alternative, the judgment violated the set-off principle because it failed to take into account the first penalty when determining the second penalty. c. In the further alternative, the judgment erred in law in failing to apply the principle of concurrent offences: the alleged breach of the notification obligation in Article 4(1) was the more specific offence and therefore subsumed the alleged breach of the standstill obligation in Article 7(1) EUMR, which was the more general offence.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) (OJ 2004, L 24, p. 1).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 152/20

Action brought on 28 February 2018 — European Commission v Kingdom of Spain

(Case C-165/18)

(2018/C 152/25)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (representatives: P. Ondrůšek, E. Sanfrutos Cano and G. von Rintelen, Agents)

Defendant: Kingdom of Spain

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court of Justice should:

— Declare that, by failing to adopt, by 18 April 2016, all of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014, (1) or, in any case, by failing to notify those measures to the Commission, the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 106(1) of that directive;

— Impose on the Kingdom of Spain, in accordance with Article 260(3) TFEU a daily penalty payment of EUR 123 928,64, with effect from the date of delivery of the judgment declaring the failure to fulfil the obligation to adopt or, in any case, notify to the Commission, the measures necessary to comply with Directive 2014/25/EU;

— Order the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The period prescribed for adapting national law to Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council ended on 18 April 2016.

(1) Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 243).
1.

Must Articles 45 TFEU and 48 TFEU be interpreted as meaning that, in a case such as that at issue here, those provisions preclude a national rule such as Article 6a, introductory sentence and (b), of the AKW? (1) That rule means that a resident of the Netherlands is not insured for purposes of the social security scheme of that State of residence if that resident works in another Member State and is subject to the social security legislation of the State of employment on the basis of Article 13 of Regulation No 1408/71. (2) The present case is characterised by the fact that, on the basis of the legislation of the State of employment, the interested party does not qualify for child benefit because of the limited scope of her work there?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 166/25

Request for a preliminary ruling from the justice de paix de Schaerbeek (Belgium) lodged on 13 March 2018 — Société nationale de chemins de fer belges (SNCB) v Gherasim Sorin Rusu

(Case C-190/18)

(2018/C 166/33)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Justice de paix de Schaerbeek

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Société nationale de chemins de fer belges (SNCB)

Defendant: Gherasim Sorin Rusu

Question referred

Do Council Directive 93/13/EC on terms in consumer contracts (1) and Regulation No 1371/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council on rail passengers’ rights and obligations (2) apply to relations between the SNCB and passengers caught without a valid ticket?

(1) Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).

(2) Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations (OJ 2007 L 315, p. 14).