ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 10 May 2011 – Emram v OHIM – Guccio Gucci (G)

(Case T-187/10)

Community trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for the Community figurative mark G – Earlier national and Community figurative marks G – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009

1. Community trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark – Signs capable of constituting a mark – Signs composed of a letter or combination of letters – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services – Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark – Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 4, 7 and 8(1)(b)) (see para. 49)

2. Community trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services – Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 55, 74, 78)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 11 February 2010 (Case R 1281/2008-1), concerning opposition proceedings between Guccio Gucci SpA and Mr Maurice Emram.

Information relating to the case

Applicant for the Community trade mark: Maurice Emram Community trade mark sought: Figurative trade mark G for goods in Classes 9, 18 and 25 – Application No 2421402 Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: Guccio Gucci SpA Mark or sign cited in opposition: Community and national figurative trade marks G for goods in Classes 9, 18 and 25 Decision of the Opposition Division: Opposition dismissed Decision of the Board of Appeal: Decision of the Opposition Division annulled; registration refused





Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 11 October 2011 – Chestnut Medical Technologies v OHIM (PIPELINE)

(Case T-87/10)

Community trade mark – Application for registration of the Community word mark PIPELINE – Absolute ground for refusal – Descriptive character – Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 – Duty to state reasons – Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009

1. Community trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark – Absolute grounds for refusal – Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications which may serve to designate the characteristics of goods (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 23, 27-29)

2. Community trade mark – Procedural provisions – Statement of reasons for decisions (Art. 296 TFEU; Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 75) (see paras 39-41)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 10 December 2009 (Case R 968/2009‑2) concerning an application for registration of the word mark PIPELINE as a Community trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 21 September 2011 – Nike International v OHIM (DYNAMIC SUPPORT)

(Case T-512/10)

Community trade mark – Application for Community word mark DYNAMIC SUPPORT – Absolute ground for refusal – Descriptive character – Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009

Community trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark – Absolute grounds for refusal – Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications which may serve to designate the characteristics of goods (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 17, 25)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 25 August 2010 (Case R 640/2010-4), concerning an application for registration of the word sign DYNAMIC SUPPORT as a Community trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) of 24 November 2011 – Saupiquet v Commission

(Case T-131/10)

Customs duty – Repayment of import duties – Canned tuna originating in Thailand – Tariff quota – Opening date – Sunday – Exhaustion of quota – Article 239 of the Community Customs Code – Articles 308a to 308c of Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 – Regulation (EC) No 975/2003

1. Own resources of the European Union – Customs destinations – Release for free circulation – Tariff quota management – Tariff quota opening on a Sunday, closing day of the customs offices in a Member State, and exhausted the same day – Exclusion from the tariff quota thus exhausted, of an operator established in that Member State – Lawfulness (Council Regulation No 2913/92, as amended by Regulation No 2700/2000, Art. 239; Commission Regulation No 2454/93, as amended by Regulation No 214/2007, Arts 308a to 308c) (see paras 27-28)

2. Own resources of the European Union – Customs destinations – Release for free circulation – Tariff quota management – Exclusion of an EU importer from a tariff quota opened on a Sunday, by reason of the Sunday closing of customs offices in the Member State of that importer – Infringement by the Commission of the obligation to make necessary legislative provisions to ensure equal and non-discriminatory access to the tariff quota – None (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts 20 and 21; Council Regulations No 2913/92, as amended by Regulation No 2700/2000, Arts 247 and 247a, and No 975/2003, Art. 7; Commission Regulation No 2454/93, as amended by Regulation No 214/2007, Arts 308a to 308c) (see paras 30-32, 35-38, 43-45)

Re:

APPLICATION for annulment of Commission Decision C(2009) 10005 final of 16 December 2009 finding no justification for repayment to the applicant of import duties on cans of tuna originating in Thailand.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 15 November 2011 – Abbott Laboratories v OHIM (RESTORE)

(Case T-363/10)

Community trade mark – Application for the Community word mark RESTORE – Absolute ground for refusal – Descriptive character – Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 – Lack of distinctiveness – Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 – Infringement of the right to be heard – Duty to state reasons – Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009

Community trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark – Absolute grounds for refusal – Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications which may serve to designate the characteristics of goods (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 29, 36-37)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 9 June 2010 (Case R 1560/2009-1), concerning an application for registration of the word mark RESTORE as a Community trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the application;
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 24 January 2012 – El Corte Inglés v OHIM – Ruan (B)

(Case T-593/10)

Community trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for Community figurative mark containing the letter ‘B’ – Earlier Community figurative mark containing the letter ‘B’ – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009

Community trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services – Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 20, 47-49)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 4 October 2010 (Case R 576/2010-2) relating to opposition proceedings between El Corte Inglés and Jian Min Ruan.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 29 March 2012 — Omya v OHIM – Alpha Calcit (CALCIMATT)

(Case T-547/10)

Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for Community word mark CALCIMATT — Prior Community word mark CALCILAN — Relative grounds for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Similarity of the signs — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Refusal of registration

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 26, 36)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 16 September 2010 (Case R 1370/2009-1) concerning opposition proceedings between Alpha Calcit Füllstoffgesellschaft mbH and Omya AG.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 8 March 2012 — Arrieta D. Gross v OHIM – International Biocentric Foundation and Others (BIODANZA)

(Case T‑298/10)

Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for the Community figurative mark BIODANZA — Earlier national word mark BIODANZA — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Death of the trade mark applicant before adoption of the decision of the Board of Appeal — Admissibility of the response — No genuine use of the earlier trade mark — Article 42(2) and (3) of Regulation No 207/2009 — Proceedings before the Board of Appeal — Rights of defence — Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009

1. Community trade mark — Community trade mark as an item of property — Assimilation of the Community trade mark to the national trade mark — Application for a Community trade mark as an item of property (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 16(1), and 24) (see paras 36-37)

2. Community trade mark — Observations of third parties and opposition — Examination of the opposition — Proof of use of the earlier mark — Genuine use — Concept — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 42(2)) (see paras 54-55)

3. Community trade mark — Observations of third parties and opposition — Examination of the opposition — Proof of use of the earlier mark — Genuine use — Concept — Determination of a quantitative threshold of minimum use — Not included (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 42(2)) (see paras 56-57)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 13 April 2010 (Case R 1149/2009‑2), relating to opposition proceedings between Christina Arrieta D. Gross and Rolando Mario Toro Araneda.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Grants leave to the International Biocentric Foundation Ltd, Gabriela Cedilia Toro Acuña and Hilda Pilar Toro Acuña, Rolando Patricio Toro Acuña, Maria Verónica Toro Acuña, Ricardo Marcela Toro Durán and German Toro Gonzalez, Claudia Danae Toro Sanchez, Rodrigo Paulo Toro Sanchez, Mariela Paula Toro Sanchez, Viviana Luz Toro Matuk, Morgana Fonteles Toro, Anna Laura Toro Sant’ana, Joana Castoldi Toro Araneda and Claudete Sant’ana to intervene before the General Court;

2. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 22 May 2012 —

Nordmilch v OHIM — Lactimilk (MILRAM)



(Case T‑546/10)

Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for Community word mark MILRAM — Earlier national word and figurative marks RAM — Relative ground for refusal — Similarity of goods and signs — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 24, 27, 28, 43, 51, 52, 71, 78, 83)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 15 September 2010 (Joined Cases R 1041/2009‑4 and R 1053/2009‑4) relating to opposition proceedings between Lactimilk SA and Nordmilch AG.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 13 June 2012 —

Hartmann v OHIM — Mölnlycke Health Care (MESILETTE)



(Case T-342/10)

Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for Community word mark MESILETTE — Earlier national and international word marks MEDINETTE — Relative ground for refusal — No likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 20-22, 28-39)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 20 May 2010 (Case R 1222/2009-2), concerning opposition proceedings between Paul Hartmann AG and Mölnlycke Health Care AB.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), of 20 May 2010 (Case R 1222/2009-2);
141

As for the take-over of the arbitration clause, the Commune de Millau claims that it only agreed to take over SEMEA’s debt, not the arbitration clause. It is apparent from the purpose of the agreement between SEMEA and the Commune de Millau and the circumstances of the case that, at the time of the take-over, the Commune de Millau intended to submit itself to an arbitration clause such as that contained in Article 10 of the General Terms of the contract. As has been stated above, the Commune de Millau took over SEMEA’s debt to the Union in full knowledge of the facts, and therefore with knowledge of the dispute between SEMEA and the Union concerning the disputed debt. It therefore undertook to pay a debt the content and regime of which were modelled on those of SEMEA’s debt. Since the latter was bound by the arbitration clause laid down in Article 10 of the General Terms of the contract for all disputes concerning the contract, the Commune de Millau is therefore also subject to such a clause. Moreover, it must be said that neither the Commune de Millau nor SEMEA have adduced evidence to show that they expressed a reservation with regard to the take-over of the arbitration clause by the Commune de Millau before the Commission’s application against SEMEA was lodged. Furthermore, an argument in favour of the Commune de Millau being subject to the arbitration clause is the fact that SEMEA and the Commune de Millau could not reasonably expect actual or potential creditors of SEMEA to agree to seek recourse against the Commune de Millau if the content or regime of their claim against the Commune de Millau were less favourable than their claim against SEMEA.
89

The first EFSA opinion and, therefore, the only relevant scientific opinion in the Commission’s possession at that stage, confined itself to finding that there was an unusual endemic situation of the H5N1 virus having infected wild birds in ‘some Asian countries’, while recognising that, given the unprecedented nature of the situation and the lack of knowledge on that phenomenon, its consequences could be unpredictable and were not substantiated by sufficient scientific data (see paragraph 12 above). Moreover, according to a report from the OIE dated 19 August 2009, which contains a list of third countries where cases of HPAI had arisen between 2004 and October 2005, comprising solely Asian countries and some European countries, such information was nevertheless actually available and was such as to show that other continents and countries had not yet been exposed, at the material time, to the spread of HPAI. Since the Commission claims, very vaguely and solely in its defence, that it was only in possession of the first EFSA opinion at that stage and that it was impossible to specify, at the outset, which countries and areas were at risk on account of ‘the migration of wild birds from one continent to another and the fact that little [was] known about migration patterns’, it suffices to state that the Commission did not put forward, in the reasons for Decision 2005/760 or in the course of the proceedings, any evidence substantiated by scientific assessment reports capable of demonstrating that there was a risk of the migration of wild birds from Surinam or Taiwan affecting, inter alia, Africa and Oceania or that proof of migration patterns was in fact impossible. In its defence alone, the Commission confined itself to invoking the migration of wild birds from one continent to another, asserting — without any supporting evidence — that since little was known about migration patterns, it was impossible at the outset to divide up the countries into different risk areas in a realistic way. All the same, in its letter to the European association of bird traders of 31 January 2007, the Commission itself pointed out that prior to 2006, it had always been assumed that wild birds played a minor role on account of the high mortality rate of birds infected with highly pathogenic viruses.
Keywords



Keywords

Community trade mark

—

Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark

—

Relative grounds for refusal

—

Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services

—

Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 31, 68, 73-76

)
Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 7 February 2012 — Run2Day Franchise v OHIM — Runners Point (Run2)

(Case T-64/11)

‛Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for Community figurative mark Run2 — Earlier Community word and figurative marks RUN2DAY — Earlier Benelux figurative mark RUN2DATE — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Similarity of the signs — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 23, 45-51)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 11 November 2010 (Case R 349/2010-1) concerning opposition proceedings between Run2Day Franchise BV and Runners Point Warenhandels GmbH.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Annuls the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) of 11 November 2010 (Case R 349/2010-1);

2. Orders OHIM and Runners Point Warenhandels GmbH to pay, apart from their own costs, those incurred by Run2Day Franchise BV.

Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 7 February 2012 — Run2Day Franchise v OHIM — Runners Point (Run2)

(Case T-64/11)

‛Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for Community figurative mark Run2 — Earlier Community word and figurative marks RUN2DAY — Earlier Benelux figurative mark RUN2DATE — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Similarity of the signs — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 23, 45-51)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 11 November 2010 (Case R 349/2010-1) concerning opposition proceedings between Run2Day Franchise BV and Runners Point Warenhandels GmbH.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Annuls the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) of 11 November 2010 (Case R 349/2010-1);
It is apparent from Article 42(2) and (3) of Regulation No 207/2009 on the Community trade mark and from Rule 22(3) of Regulation No 2868/95, implementing Regulation No 40/94 that questions relating to the proof furnished in support of the grounds for opposition to an application for registration of a Community trade mark and questions relating to the territorial aspect of the use of marks are governed by the relevant provisions of Regulation No 207/2009 and it is not necessary to refer to any provision of domestic law of the Member States.

The fact that earlier national or international marks may be cited in opposition against the registration of Community trade marks does not imply that the national law applicable to the earlier mark cited in opposition is the relevant law as regards Community opposition proceedings.

It is true that, in the absence of relevant provisions in Regulation No 207/2009 or, where appropriate, in Directive 2008/95 relating to trade marks, national law serves as a point of reference.

That is true as regards the date of registration of an earlier mark cited in Community opposition proceedings.

However, that is not so as regards the determination of the territory in which use of the earlier mark must be established. That question is exhaustively governed by Regulation No 207/2009 and it is not necessary to refer to national law.

Under the provisions referred to above, genuine use of an earlier mark, be it a Community, national or international mark, must be proved in the European Union or in the Member State concerned.

(see paras 26-31)
Having regard to the wording of Article 61 of Regulation No 6/2002, the Court’s review of the legality of a decision of the Board of Appeal must relate to the issues of law raised before the Board of Appeal. Therefore, it is not the Court’s function to examine new pleas introduced before it or to review the facts in the light of evidence adduced for the first time before it. To allow the examination of those new pleas or such evidence would be contrary to Article 135(4) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, according to which the parties submissions may not alter the subject-matter of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.

However, the possibility of referring to national judgments does not preclude the possibility of referring to national judgments for the first time before the Court, if it is not alleged that the Board of Appeal failed to take the factual aspects of a specific national judgment into account but rather that it infringed a provision of Regulation No 6/2002 and national case-law is cited in support of that plea.

(see paras 37, 63)