ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
The bids submitted by tenderers in a call for tenders may fall within the scope of the exception relating to the protection of commercial interests, within the meaning of the first indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 on public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, on account of the economic and technical information contained in those bids.

Furthermore, the protection of tenderers’ bids vis-à-vis other tenderers is consistent with the relevant provisions of Regulation No 966/3012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (the Financial Regulation), in particular Article 113(2) thereof, which does not provide for the disclosure of the tenders submitted, even after written application by the unsuccessful tenderers. That restriction is integral to the objective of EU rules on public procurement, which is based on undistorted competition. In order to attain that objective, it is important that the contracting authorities do not release information relating to contract award procedures which could be used to distort competition, whether in an ongoing procurement procedure or in subsequent procedures.

In that regard, there is a general presumption that access to bids submitted by tenderers in principle undermines the protection of commercial interests, within the meaning of the first indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001. That presumption does not exclude the possibility of demonstrating that a given document disclosure of which has been requested is not covered by that presumption, or that there is a higher public interest justifying its disclosure. However, the documents covered by it do not fall within an obligation of disclosure, in full or in part, of their content.

(see paras 47-50, 80)
3.

EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Earlier trade mark constituted by an EU trade mark—Refusal to register on a ground relating to refusal even limited to part of the Union (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 20)
Competition—Administrative procedure—Examination of complaints—Determination of priorities by the Commission—No obligation on the Commission to adopt a decision as to the existence of an infringement—Account to be taken of the EU interest in investigating a case—Discretionary power of the Commission—Obligation to state reasons for the decision to close the file—Scope—Judicial review—Limits

(Arts 101 TFEU, 102 TFEU and 105(1) TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003; Commission Regulation No 773/2004, Art. 7(2))

(see paras 61-66, 70, 71)
Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 17 February 2017 —

Unilever v EUIPO — Technopharma (Fair & Lovely)

(Case T‑811/14)

(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU figurative mark Fair & Lovely — Earlier national and Benelux word marks FAIR & LOVELY — Decision on the appeal — Article 64(1) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Right to be heard — Second sentence of Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009 — Suspension of the administrative proceedings — Rule 20(7)(c) and Rule 50(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 — Legitimate expectations — Misuse of powers — Manifest errors of assessment)

1. EU trade mark — Appeals procedure — Appeal against a decision of the Opposition Division of EUIPO — Examination by the Board of Appeal — Scope — Observance of the rights of the defence (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 64(1), and 75) (see paras 31, 35-37)

2. EU law — Principles — Protection of legitimate expectations — Conditions — Specific assurances given by the authorities (see para. 39)

3. EU trade mark — Appeals procedure — Appeal to a Board of Appeal — Stay of proceedings — Conditions (Commission Regulation No 2868/95, Art. 1, Rules 20(7)(c), and 50(1)) (see paras 54-56, 61)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 6 October 2014 (Case R 1004/2013-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Technopharma and Unilever.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 6 October 2014 (Case R 1004/2013‑4) concerning opposition proceedings between Technopharma Ltd et Unilever NV;

2. Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay half of the costs incurred by Unilever;
In contrast, it is not necessary to verify that those distribution networks do not have the effect of eliminating all competition. If the conditions mentioned above are met, that is sufficient to consider that a selective system constitutes an element of competition which is in conformity with Article 101(1) TFEU.

The organisation of a selective repair system is not, consequently, prohibited by Article 101(1) TFEU, to the extent that resellers are chosen on the basis of objective criteria of a qualitative nature, laid down uniformly for all potential resellers and not applied in a discriminatory fashion, that the characteristics of the product in question necessitate such a network in order to preserve its quality and ensure its proper use and, finally, that the criteria laid down do not go beyond what is necessary.

The conditions used in order to determine whether a selective distribution system is in conformity with Article 101 TFEU may also be used in order to evaluate whether a selective repair system, which constitutes an after-sales service, has harmful effects on competition. Selective repair systems are therefore in conformity with Article 101(1) TFEU, provided that they are objectively justified, non-discriminatory and proportionate.

The applicability to an agreement of Article 101 TFEU does not prevent Article 102 TFEU being applied to the conduct of the parties to the same agreement, provided that the conditions for the application of each provision are fulfilled, and that, consequently, the fact that operators subject to effective competition have a practice which is authorised under Article 101 TFEU does not mean that the adoption of that same practice by an undertaking in a dominant position can never constitute an abuse of that position. Accordingly, a finding that conduct is lawful under Article 101 TFEU does not, in principle, mean that that conduct is lawful under Article 102 TFEU; rather, it is necessary to verify whether or not the conditions for the application of that latter provision are fulfilled.

However, since selective repair or distribution systems do not fall within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU, in so far as they are regarded as being elements of competition as a result of their fulfilling certain criteria, the Commission, when exercising its broad discretion in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 34 above, could consider that the conformity of such systems with that provision was an indication which, in conjunction with other elements, was capable of establishing that it was unlikely that those systems had the effect of eliminating all competition within the meaning of the case-law relating to Article 102 TFEU.

(see paras 94, 96)
Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Determination of the basic amount — Determination of the value of sales — Sales carried out in direct or indirect relation to the infringement — Value of sales for setting the base amount of a subsidiary’s fine — Account taken of sales made by the parent companies — Parent companies’ sales made on a market affected by the agreement, decision or concerted practice — Parent companies and subsidiary within the same economic unit — Lawfulness

(Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2) and (3); Commission notice 2006/C 210/02, points 13 and 18)

(see paras 207-219)
63

In recital 37 of the contested regulation, the Council noted that the domestic prices and international prices of the main raw materials followed the same trends and that the difference between those prices corresponded to the export taxes imposed on them. In recital 38 of that regulation, it stated that the domestic prices of the main raw materials used by biodiesel producers in Argentina were artificially lower than the international prices owing to the distortion created by the DET system. However, by merely stating that the difference between the domestic prices and the international prices of the main raw materials corresponded essentially to the export taxes on the latter, the Council did not establish the effects that the difference between the rate of the taxes on those raw materials and the rate of tax on biodiesel could have had in itself on the prices of those raw materials on the Argentinian market. The finding in recital 37 of that regulation at most allows conclusions to be drawn as regards certain effects that imposing an export tax could have on the prices of the main raw materials, but does not allow conclusions to be drawn on the effects that the difference between the rate of the taxes on those raw materials and the rate of the tax on biodiesel could have had on the prices of those raw materials on that market.
66

The applicant complains that the Council, by adopting the contested decision (paragraph 34 above) and the measures at issue (third indent of paragraph 44, above) (together, ‘the contested measures’), infringed the obligation to state reasons, the principle of respect for the rights of the defence and the right to effective legal protection, as interpreted by the EU Courts and the European Court of Human Rights, in that it failed to communicate to the applicant either the specific grounds or the evidence and documents which justified maintenance, following review, of its name on the list at issue. The applicant submits that, according to the case-law, the failure to state reasons amounts to an infringement of essential procedural requirements that cannot be remedied merely by the person concerned learning the reasons for the decision taken in respect of it during the proceedings before the EU Courts. The only reasons that were communicated to it, before the commencement of the present action, are those referred to in paragraph 5 above. As was noted in the judgment of 11 December 2012, Sina Bank v Council (T‑15/11, EU:T:2012:661), that statement of reasons is inadequate because too terse and general. Moreover, no evidence was provided to it in respect of its alleged links with the ‘Daftar’ and a possible contribution by it to the financing of ‘strategic interests of the regime’, which, moreover, are not identified. In any event, the reasons communicated are erroneous since, on the one hand, there is no evidence that the applicant is still controlled by the Foundation or that it is controlled by or linked to the ‘Daftar’ and, on the other, almost all of its funding is directed to individuals and private undertakings, with very little going to the government and state-owned bodies. The additional reasons given in the letter of 5 December 2011 (paragraph 16 above) do not provide an adequate statement of reasons for the measures at issue. The Council merely indicates that its majority shareholder is the Foundation, without stating what are the ‘strategic interests of the regime’ that it is alleged to have financed, or which specific provisions of Decision 2010/413 and Regulation No 267/2012 justified the maintenance of its name on the list at issue. Despite its requests to that effect, the Council gave it no detailed information on the reasons for the maintenance of its name on the list at issue. The only elements which were communicated to it or of which it availed itself did not provide evidence of what was alleged in the contested measures. The lack of specific and concrete details in the statement of reasons for the contested measures does not enable the applicant to understand their scope, and therefore affects the exercise of the applicant’s rights of defence and its right to effective judicial protection.
Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 1 March 2016 —

1&1 Internet v OHIM — Unoe Bank (1e1)

(Case T‑61/15)

‛Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for the Community word mark 1e1 — Earlier national word mark UNO E and earlier figurative mark unoe — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

1. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 19, 20, 66)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Word mark 1e1 — Word mark UNO E and figurative mark unoe (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 21, 27, 41, 42, 46-48, 52, 63-65, 71)

3. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Assessment of the likelihood of confusion — Determination of the relevant public — Attention level of the public (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 22)

4. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity between the goods or services in question — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 28, 36, 43)

5. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity of the marks concerned — Criteria for assessment — Composite mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 53, 54, 61)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 4 December 2014 (Case R 101/2014-5) relating to opposition proceedings between Unoe Bank, SA and 1&1 Internet AG.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Annuls the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 4 December 2014 (Case R 101/2014-5) relating to opposition proceedings between Unoe Bank, SA and 1&1 Internet AG;

2. Orders OHIM to bear its own costs and to pay the costs incurred by 1&1 Internet AG;
Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 21 January 2016 —

Rod Leichtmetallräder v OHIM — Rodi TR (ROD)

(Case T‑75/15)

‛Community trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — Community figurative mark ROD — Earlier national figurative marks RODI — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) and Article 53(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Earlier opposition proceedings — Rule 39(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2868/95’

1. Community trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Relative grounds for invalidity — Existence of an identical or similar earlier mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 8(1)(b), and (2)(a)(ii), and 53(1)(a)) (see paras 14, 26, 59)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity between the goods or services in question — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 8(1)(b), and 53(1)(a)) (see para. 16)

3. Community trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Relative grounds for invalidity — Existence of an identical or similar earlier mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Figurative marks ROD and RODI (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 8(1)(b), and 53(1)(a) (see paras 58, 60, 66)

4. Community trade mark — Decisions of the Office — Principle of equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — OHIM’s previous decision-making practice — Principle of legality (Council Regulation No 207/2009) (see para. 65)

5. Community trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Invalidity proceedings — Admissibility — Conditions — Need to send a colour copy of the earlier mark to the Office but not to the defendant (Commission Regulation No 2868/95, Art. 1, Rule 39(3) (see paras 73-75)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 17 December 2014 (Case R 281/2014-5) relating to invalidity proceedings between Rodi TR, SL and Rod Leichtmetallräder GmbH.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 31 May 2016 —

Jochen Schweizer v EUIPO (Du bist, was du erlebst.)

(Case T‑301/15)

‛EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark Du bist, was du erlebst. — Absolute ground for refusal — Mark consisting of an advertising slogan — Lack of distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

1. Procedure — Application initiating proceedings — Formal requirements — Brief summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based (Rules of Procedure of the General Court (1991), Art. 44(1)(c)) (see para. 11)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Concept — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 17, 18, 35)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Marks constituted of advertising slogans — Distinctive character — Application of specific criteria for assessment — Not permissible (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 19, 20)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Marks constituted of advertising slogans — Slogan with a fantasy character (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 21)

5. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Marks constituted of advertising slogans — Flattering promotional formula (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 22, 30)

6. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Marks constituted of advertising slogans — Slogan carrying an objective message (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 26)

7. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Word mark Du bist, was du erlebst. (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 39, 51, 55, 56)

8. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Separate examination of the grounds for refusal in relation to each of the goods or services covered by the application for registration — Obligation to state the reasons for refusing to register — Scope (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 75, first sentence) (see para. 47)

9. EU trade mark — Appeals procedure — Appeal to a Board of Appeal — Competence of the Boards of Appeal — New full examination of the merits (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 64(1)) (see para. 54)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 9 April 2015 (Case R 3114/2014-4) concerning an application for registration of the word sign Du bist, was du erlebst. as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
2.

EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity of the marks concerned — Assessment only on the basis of the dominant element of a complex mark — Conditions (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 18)
EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Absolute grounds for refusal—Separate examination of the grounds for refusal in relation to each of the goods or services covered by the application for registration—Obligation to state the reasons for refusing to register—Scope

(Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 7(1), and 75, first sentence)

(see paras 80, 81)
Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 25 May 2016 — Ice Mountain Ibiza v EUIPO — Marbella Atlantic Ocean Club (ocean beach club ibiza)

(Case T-5/15)

‛EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU figurative mark ocean beach club ibiza — Earlier national figurative marks OC ocean club and OC ocean club Ibiza — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Similarity of the signs — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009’

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Assessment of the likelihood of confusion — Criteria (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 17-20, 64)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Figurative mark ocean beach club ibiza — Figurative marks OC ocean club and OC ocean club Ibiza (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 21, 24, 25, 54, 57, 62, 72)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity of the marks concerned — Criteria for assessment — Composite mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 26, 27)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Similarity of the marks concerned — Assessment of the distinctiveness of an element composing a trade mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 35)

5. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Coexistence of earlier marks on the market — Effect (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 36, 37, 70)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 October 2014 (Case R 2292/2013-1) relating to opposition proceedings between Marbella Atlantic Ocean Club and Ice Mountain Ibiza.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;