Judgment of the Court of 1 June 1961. - Meroni & Co., Acciaieria Ferriera di Roma (FERAM), Società Industriale Metallurgica di Napoli (SIMET) v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. - Joined cases 5, 7 and 8-60.



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Summary

Parties

Subject of the case

Grounds

Decision on costs

Operative part



Keywords

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COSTS - COSTS INCURRED UNREASONABLY

( RULES OF PROCEDURE, ART 69 ( 3 ))

Summary

IF, AFTER A FACT HAS ARISEN, ONE OF THE PARTIES TO LEGAL PROCEEDINGS NO LONGER HAS AN INTEREST IN THEM AND DECIDES TO CONTINUE THE ACTION, THE SUBSEQUENT COSTS OF THE ACTION ARE TO BE CONSIDERED AS COSTS UNREASONABLY INCURRED AND SHALL BE BORNE BY THAT PARTY .

Parties

IN JOINED CASES 5, 7 AND 8/60

( 1 ) MERONI & CO ., A COMPANY LIMITED BY SHARES INCORPORATED UNDER ITALIAN LAW, HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE IN MILAN ( CASE 5/60 ), REPRESENTED BY ALDO MERONI, ENGINEER, SOLE DIRECTOR,

( 2 ) ACCIAIERIA FERRIERA DI ROMA ( FERAM ), A COMPANY LIMITED BY SHARES INCORPORATED UNDER ITALIAN LAW, HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE IN NAPLES ( CASE 7/60 ), REPRESENTED BY ALDO ALLIATA, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS,

( 3 ) SOCIETA INDUSTRIALE METALLURGICA DI NAPOLI ( SIMET ), A COMPANY LIMITED BY SHARES, HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE IN NAPLES ( CASE 8/60 ), REPRESENTED BY ALBERTO UMMARINO, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS,

EACH OF THE SAID COMPANIES HAVING AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE CHAMBERS OF GEORGES MARGUE, ADVOCATE, 6 RUE ALPHONSE - MUNCHEN;

ASSISTED BY ARTURO COTTRAU, ADVOCATE AT THE TURIN BAR AND WITH THE CORTE DI CASSAZIONE, ROME; APPLICANTS,

V

HIGH AUTHORITY OF THE COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, REPRESENTED BY ITS LEGAL ADVISER, PROFESSOR GIULIO PASETTI, ASSISTED BY ALBERTO TRABUCCHI, PROFESSOR AT PADUA UNIVERSITY, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT HIS OFFICES, 2 PLACE DE METZ, DEFENDANT,

Subject of the case

APPLICATION :

1 . BY THE FIRST APPLICANT FOR THE ANNULMENT OF THE DECISION OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY OF 28 OCTOBER 1959 ORDERING IT TO PAY THE SUM OF LIT . 3 358 438 BY WAY OF EQUALIZATION FOR THE MONTHS OF OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 1958, TOGETHER WITH INTEREST FOR DELAY IN PAYMENT CALCULATED UP TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1959, AMOUNTING TO LIT . 76 713 .

2 . BY THE SECOND APPLICANT FOR THE ANNULMENT OF THE DECISION OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY OF 28 OCTOBER 1959 ORDERING IT TO PAY THE SUM OF LIT . 4 627 750 BY WAY OF EQUALIZATION FOR THE MONTHS OF AUGUST TO NOVEMBER 1958, TOGETHER WITH INTEREST FOR DELAY IN PAYMENT AMOUNTING TO LIT . 127 244 .

3 . BY THE THIRD APPLICANT FOR THE ANNULMENT OF THE DECISION OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY OF 28 OCTOBER 1959 ORDERING IT TO PAY THE SUM OF LIT . 6 988 825 BY WAY OF EQUALIZATION FOR THE MONTHS OF JULY TO NOVEMBER 1958, TOGETHER WITH INTEREST FOR DELAY IN PAYMENT AMOUNTING TO LIT . 215 513 .

Grounds

P . 111

THE HIGH AUTHORITY SUBMITS THAT BY REASON OF THE REVOCATION OF THE CONTESTED DECISIONS THE ACTION NO LONGER HAS ANY PURPOSE .

THE APPLICANTS REPLY THAT IT IS FOR THE COURT TO DECIDE THE QUESTION WHETHER THE EFFECT OF THE REVOCATION BY THE DEFENDANT OF THE CONTESTED DECISIONS IS THAT THE ACTION IS WITHOUT PURPOSE .

SINCE THE CONTESTED DECISIONS HAVE BEEN REVOKED THEY HAVE BECOME INAPPLICABLE .

THEREFORE, THE APPLICATIONS NOW HAVE NO PURPOSE .

CONSEQUENTLY THERE IS NO GROUND FOR PROCEEDING TO JUDGMENT .

Decision on costs

THE DEFENDANT OFFERS TO PAY THE COSTS UP TO THE DATE OF REVOCATION OF THE CONTESTED DECISIONS AND ASKS FOR THE COSTS INCURRED SUBSEQUENT TO THE SAID REVOCATION TO BE BORNE BY THE APPLICANTS .

THE APPLICANTS ASK THAT THE HIGH AUTHORITY BE ORDERED TO PAY THE WHOLE OF THE COSTS OF THE ACTION .

UNDER ARTICLE 69 ( 5 ) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE WHERE A CASE DOES NOT PROCEED TO JUDGMENT THE COSTS SHALL BE IN THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT .

UNDER ARTICLE 69 ( 4 ) THE COSTS SHOULD IN PRINCIPLE BE BORNE BY THE HIGH AUTHORITY .

NEVERTHELESS THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE PARTIES SINCE THE NOTIFICATION OF THE REVOCATION OF THE CONTESTED DECISIONS COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF THE APPLICANTS HAD DISCONTINUED THEIR APPLICATIONS AT THAT TIME .

WHEN THE APPLICANTS WERE INFORMED THAT THE CONTESTED DECISIONS HAD BEEN REVOKED THEY WERE NOT BOUND TO DISCONTINUE THEIR APPLICATIONS .

HOWEVER, FROM THAT MOMENT ONWARDS THEY NO LONGER HAD AN INTEREST IN CONTINUING THE PROCEEDINGS; IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE TO THEIR ADVANTAGE TO DISCONTINUE THEIR APPLICATIONS .

BECAUSE THEY HAD NO SUCH INTEREST, THE COSTS INCURRED AFTER THE NOTIFICATION OF THE DECISIONS REVOKING THE INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS MUST BE CONSIDERED AS COSTS WHICH HAVE BEEN UNREASONABLY INCURRED WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 69 ( 3 ) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE AND MUST THEREFORE BE BORNE BY THE APPLICANTS .

Operative part

THE COURT

HEREBY :

1 . DECLARES THAT THERE IS NO GROUND FOR PROCEEDING TO JUDGMENT;

2 . ORDERS THAT THE HIGH AUTHORITY SHALL BEAR THE COSTS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE COSTS INCURRED AFTER THE NOTIFICATION OF THE DECISIONS REVOKING THE INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS WHICH SHALL BE BORNE BY THE APPLICANTS .