ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
By granting reduced fares on public transport in principle only to students whose parents are in receipt of national family allowances, a Member State fails to fulfil its obligations under the combined provisions of Articles 18 TFEU, 20 TFEU and 21 TFEU and also Article 24 of Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.

Making the reduced transport fares subject to the grant of family allowances in the host Member State gives rise to unequal treatment as between students of that Member States pursuing their studies there and students from other Member States pursuing their studies there as well, since such a condition is more easily fulfilled by students of that Member State because their parents as a rule receive those allowances. Such inequality of treatment is contrary to the principles which underpin the status of citizen of the Union, namely the guarantee of receiving the same treatment in law in the exercise of their right of free movement.

Such indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality can be justified only if it is based on objective considerations independent of the nationality of the persons concerned and is proportionate to the legitimate objective of the national provisions. In that regard, it is legitimate for a host Member State to wish to ensure that there is a genuine link between a claimant to a benefit and the competent Member State. Accordingly a national scheme requiring a student to provide proof of such a link with the host member State could, in principle, reflect a legitimate objective capable of justifying restrictions.

However, the proof required to demonstrate the genuine link must not be too exclusive in nature and, moreover, the genuine link required need not be fixed in a uniform manner for all benefits, but should be established according to the constitutive elements of the benefit in question, including its nature and purposes. As regards reduced transport fares for students, the existence of a genuine link between the student pursuing his studies in the host Member State could actually be ascertained, inter alia, by checking whether the person in question is enrolled at a private or public establishment, accredited or financed by the host Member State.

(see paras 50 to 52, 59 to 66, operative part)
In contrast to procedural time-limits, the limitation period in question, laid down in Article 46(1) of the Statute of the Court of Justice for the institution of proceedings alleging non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union, by resulting in the extinction of the legal action, is a matter of substantive law. It has the function, inter alia, firstly, of ensuring protection of the rights of the aggrieved person, who must have sufficient time in which to gather the appropriate information with a view to a possible action, and, secondly, of preventing the aggrieved person from being able to delay indefinitely the exercise of his right to damages.

Limitation therefore constitutes an objection to admissibility which, unlike procedural time-limits, is not absolute, but extinguishes the action for liability solely at the request of the defendant.

To that end, as is apparent from Article 46(1) of the Statute of the Court of Justice, which lays down the duration of the limitation period, the calculation of the limitation period cannot be based on criteria which are anything other than strictly objective nor can that calculation differ according to whether the interruption of that period is caused by the bringing of an action or the making of a prior application. Thus, application of the extension on account of distance to the limitation period would have the consequence that limitation would occur at the end of a different period depending on whether the aggrieved party has chosen to bring the matter directly before the General Court or to make a prior application to the competent European Union institution, something which would be at variance with the requirement of legal certainty necessary for the application of limitation periods. Accordingly, the duration of the limitation period, laid down in Article 46(1) of the Statute of the Court of Justice, does not appear comparable to that of the periods for the bringing of an action or an appeal, with the result that it cannot be claimed that the application of an extension to that limitation period on account of distance is necessary in order to ensure genuine enjoyment of the right to damages referred to in the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU.

(see paras 52-56, 58)
Article 39 EC precludes a national provision which makes the right to a tideover allowance for the benefit of young people looking for their first job subject to the condition that the person concerned has completed at least six years’ studies in an educational establishment of the host Member State, insofar as that condition prevents other representative factors liable to establish the existence of a real link between the person claiming the allowance and the geographic labour market concerned being taken into account and accordingly goes beyond what is necessary to attain the aim pursued by that provision which is to ensure that such a link exists.

Such legislation makes that right subject to a condition which is more likely to be met by nationals of that Member State, and therefore may well place nationals of other Member States, above all, at a disadvantage.

That legislation can be justified only where, by imposing that condition, the national legislature wished to ensure that there was a real link between the applicant for that allowance and the geographic employment market concerned.

That is not the case of legislation which prevents the taking into account, for the purpose of assessing the existence of such a link, of the fact that the applicant, in making use of the freedom of movement guaranteed to Union citizens by Article 18 EC, moved to the host Member State in order to establish her marital residence there following her marriage to a national of that State and that she had resided there for some time, and of the fact that she had been registered for some time as a job seeker with an employment service of that Member State, whilst at the same time actively looking for work there. Those facts are capable of demonstrating that such a link exists.

(see paras 31, 33, 40, 46-48, 50, 52, operative part)
The third indent of Article 1(2)(a) of Directive 93/42 concerning medical devices must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘medical device’ covers an object conceived by its manufacturer to be used for human beings for the purposes of investigating a physiological process only if it is intended for a medical purpose.

In so far as Directive 93/42 must reconcile the free movement of medical devices with the protection of patient’s health, it cannot have the effect of limiting the free movement of medical devices by providing for an obligation of certification and CE marking in respect of those products only where such a limitation is necessary for the protection of public health. It follows that the certification of a product as a medical device cannot be required for a product which is not concerned by its manufacturer to be used for medical purposes even if it is used in a medical context.

(see paras 17, 28-30, 33, operative part)
Framework Decision 2002/584 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299, must be interpreted as meaning that the executing judicial authorities cannot refuse to execute a European arrest warrant on the ground that the requested person was not heard in the issuing Member State before that arrest warrant was issued.

The fact that the European arrest warrant has been issued for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution, without the requested person having been heard by the issuing judicial authorities, does not feature among the grounds for non-execution of such a warrant as provided for by the provisions of Framework Decision 2002/584.

Furthermore, the observance of Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union does not require that a judicial authority of a Member State should be able to refuse to execute a European arrest warrant issued for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution on that ground. First, an obligation for the issuing judicial authorities to hear the requested person before such a European arrest warrant is issued would inevitably lead to the failure of the very system of surrender provided for by Framework Decision 2002/584 and, consequently, prevent the achievement of the area of freedom, security and justice, in so far as such an arrest warrant must have a certain element of surprise, in particular in order to stop the person concerned from taking flight. Secondly, the European legislature, in Articles 8, 13 to 15 and 19 of Framework Decision 2002/584, has ensured that the right to be heard will be observed in the executing Member State in such a way as not to compromise the effectiveness of the European arrest warrant system. None of those provisions lays down an obligation on the issuing judicial authorities to hear the requested person before a European arrest warrant is issued for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution.

(see paras 38-41, 43, operative part)
Article 46a of Regulation No 1408/71, as amended and updated by Regulation No 118/97, as amended by Regulation No 1386/2001, must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude the application of legislative rules of a Member State containing a provision under which a survivor’s pension received in that Member State is reduced as a result of the increase in an old-age pension received under the legislation of another Member State, provided, in particular, that the conditions set out in Article 46a(3)(d) are observed.

In that regard, Article 45 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that it likewise does not preclude the application of such national legislative rules in so far as they do not lead, in respect of the person concerned, to an unfavourable situation in comparison with that of a person whose situation has no cross-border element, and, if such a disadvantage is established, in so far as it is justified by objective considerations and is proportionate in relation to the objective legitimately pursued by national law, this being a matter for the referring court to ascertain.

(see paras 34, 37, 47, operative part)
Article 3(5) of Directive 2001/42 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment, read in conjunction with Article 3(4) thereof, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation pursuant to which breach of a qualitative condition, imposed by the implementing provision of that directive to exempt the adoption of a particular type of building plan from an environmental assessment under that directive, is irrelevant to the legal validity of that plan.

Such a system effectively deprives of its effectiveness Article 3(1) of the directive, which requires an environmental assessment to be carried out in respect of the plans referred to in Article 3(3) and (4) thereof which are likely to have significant effects on the environment.

(see paras 38, 45, operative part)
The measures necessary for restoring normal operating conditions adopted pursuant to Article 29 of Directive 2001/14 on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure, including the withdrawal of train paths, cannot be regarded as directly concerning the essential function of allocating train paths for the purpose of Article 14(2) thereof, a function which must be entrusted to an independent allocation body. Rather, Article 29 deals with ad hoc measures which must be adopted in an emergency to deal with a specific situation and ensure that rights to capacity in the form of train paths may in fact be exercised by the operator holding such rights, in accordance with the working timetable. Therefore, the adoption of such measures falls within traffic management and is not subject to the requirement of independence, so that an infrastructure manager which is simultaneously a railway undertaking may be entrusted with such functions.

However, although the withdrawal of train paths in the event of disruption of traffic is not regarded as an essential function, their re-allocation must be regarded as part of essential functions which may be exercised only by an independent manager or allocation body since, unlike traffic management, which does not involve taking decisions within the meaning of Annex II to Directive 91/440 on the development of Community’s railways, the reallocation of train paths entails adopting decisions relating to train paths.

(see paras 34, 36-38)
Keywords

Summary

Keywords Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Case pending before the national court rendered devoid of purpose — No need to adjudicate (Art. 267 TFEU) Summary See the wording of the judgment. (see paras 25-27, 30-32, operative part)

Case C-492/11

Ciro Di Donna

v

Società imballaggi metallici Salerno srl (SIMSA)

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Giudice di pace di Mercato San Severino)

‛Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Mediation in civil and commercial matters — Directive 2008/52/EC — National legislation providing for a compulsory mediation procedure — No need to adjudicate’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 27 June 2013

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Case pending before the national court rendered devoid of purpose — No need to adjudicate

(Art. 267 TFEU)

See the wording of the judgment.

(see paras 25-27, 30-32, operative part)
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Limits — Jurisdiction of the national court — Establishment and assessment of the facts the dispute — Necessity of a question referred and relevance of the questions raised — Assessment by the national court

(Art. 267 TFEU)

2. Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters — Regulation No 1206/2001 — Scope — Taking of evidence ordered by one of the parties in proceedings for interim measures — Included

(Council Regulation No 1206/2001, Art. 1(1) and (2))

3. Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters — Regulation No 1206/2001 — Aim

(Council Regulation No 1206/2001, Recitals 2, 7, 8, 10 and 11)

4. Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters — Regulation No 1206/2001 — Substantive scope — Expert investigation carried out in part directly in another Member State — No obligation for the court ordering the taking of evidence to follow the procedure laid down by the regulation — Limits — Whether the powers of the public authority of the requested Member State are affected

(Council Regulation No 1206/2001, Arts 1(1)(b) and 17)

Summary

1. See the text of the decision.

(see paras 30, 33)

2. See the text of the decision.

(see paras 34, 35)

3. See the text of the decision.

(see paras 43-46)

4. Articles 1(1)(b) and 17 of Regulation No 1206/2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that the court of one Member State, which wishes the task of taking of evidence entrusted to an expert to be carried out in another Member State, is not necessarily required to use the method of taking evidence laid down by those provisions to be able to order the taking of that evidence.

In certain circumstances it may be simpler, more effective and quicker for the court ordering such an investigation to take such evidence without having recourse to Regulation No 1206/2001. However, in the absence of such an agreement or arrangement between the Member States within the meaning of Article 21(2) thereof, the method of taking evidence laid down in Articles 1(1)(b) and 17 of Regulation No 1206/2001 is the only means to enable the court of a Member State to carry out an expert investigation directly in another Member State since it might, in certain circumstances, affect the powers of the Member State in which it takes place, in particular, where it is an investigation carried out in places connected with the exercise of such powers or in places to which access or other action is, under the law of the Member State in which the investigation is carried out, prohibited or restricted to certain persons.

(see paras 45, 47, 48, 54, operative part)
In the context of the system of powers of the European Union, the choice of the legal basis for a measure must be based on objective factors amenable to judicial review, which include the aim and content of that measure and not on the legal basis used for the adoption of other European Union measures which might, in certain cases, display similar characteristics. In that regard, it was possible for Decision 2011/407 on the position to be taken by the European Union within the European Economic Area (EEA) Joint Committee concerning an amendment to Annex VI (Social Security) and Protocol 37 to the EEA Agreement to be legitimately adopted on the basis of Article 48 TFEU.

The objective of that decision is thus to allow the EU acquis on the coordination of social security systems, amended by Regulations Nos 883/2004 and 987/2009, to be applicable also to European Free Trade Association (EFTA) States which are Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement. That decision does not seek only to regulate the social rights of nationals of the three EFTA States concerned, but also, and in the same manner, to regulate the social rights of EU citizens in those EFTA States.

Decision 2011/407 is thus precisely one of the measures by which the law governing the EU internal market is to be extended as far as possible to the EEA, with the result that nationals of the EEA States concerned benefit from the free movement of persons under the same social conditions as EU citizens. Were it not for the amendment contemplated by that decision, free movement of persons could not be exercised within the EEA under the same social conditions as within the European Union, which would undoubtedly undermine the development of the association and the realisation of the objectives pursued by the EEA Agreement. It follows that it is necessary to replicate the modernisation and simplification of the rules on the coordination of social security systems which apply within the European Union, specifically referred to by Decision 2011/407 when replacing Regulation No 1408/71 with Regulation No 883/2004, also at the level of the EEA.

Moreover, Article 79(2) TFEU cannot form the basis for the adoption of a measure such as Decision 2011/407, in so far as, regard being had for the context of the development of the association with EFTA States of which it forms part and, inter alia, the objectives pursued by that association, it is manifestly irreconcilable with the purposes of Article 79(2) TFEU in Chapter 2 of the TFEU, which is entitled ‘Policies on border checks, asylum and immigration’.

(see paras 44, 47, 55, 58-64, 67)
Article 5 of First Directive 89/104 on trade marks to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks precludes a proprietor of trade marks which, in a situation where there has been use shared with a third party, had consented to the use by that third party of signs which are identical to its marks in respect of certain goods in classes for which those marks are registered and which no longer consents to that use, from being deprived of any possibility of asserting the exclusive right conferred upon it by those marks against that third party and of itself exercising that exclusive right in respect of goods which are identical to those of that third party.

As regards the limitations on the exclusive right which inherently follow from Article 5 of Directive 89/104 as such, the exclusive right under that provision was conferred in order to enable the trade mark proprietor to protect his specific interests as proprietor of that mark, that is, to ensure that the trade mark can fulfil its functions. Therefore, the exercise of that right must be reserved to cases in which another party’s use of the sign adversely affects or is liable adversely to affect one of the functions of the trade mark. Those functions include not only the essential function of the trade mark, which is to guarantee to consumers the origin of the goods or services in question, but also its other functions, in particular that of guaranteeing the quality of those goods or services or those of communication, investment or advertising.

It is true, as borne out by the reference by the sixth recital in the preamble to Directive 89/104 to the national law on civil liability, that a national court may impose a penalty on the proprietor of a trade mark or order it to pay compensation for the damage suffered if it finds that that proprietor has unlawfully withdrawn the consent by which it allowed a third party to use signs which are identical to its marks. However, a finding that there has been such conduct cannot have the effect of prolonging, by a court decision and for an unspecified period, the shared use of those marks where the companies concerned no longer have the joint intention of sharing their use.

(see paras 58, 61, 62, operative part)