ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
6

Article 4 of that directive reads as follows: ‘1. Notwithstanding Article 2(1) and (2), Member States may provide that a difference of treatment which is based on a characteristic related to any of the grounds referred to in Article 1 shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate. 2. Member States may maintain national legislation in force at the date of adoption of this Directive or provide for future legislation incorporating national practices existing at the date of adoption of this Directive pursuant to which, in the case of occupational activities within churches and other public or private organisations the ethos of which is based on religion or belief, a difference of treatment based on a person’s religion or belief shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of these activities or of the context in which they are carried out, a person’s religion or belief constitute a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement, having regard to the organisation’s ethos. This difference of treatment shall be implemented taking account of Member States’ constitutional provisions and principles, as well as the general principles of Community law, and should not justify discrimination on another ground. Provided that its provisions are otherwise complied with, this Directive shall thus not prejudice the right of churches and other public or private organisations, the ethos of which is based on religion or belief, acting in conformity with national constitutions and laws, to require individuals working for them to act in good faith and with loyalty to the organisation’s ethos.’
27

Taking the view that the action can be founded only if the Federal Republic of Germany and not the Commission may adopt the measures requested by the applicant, the Verwaltungsgericht Köln (Administrative Court, Cologne) decided to stay its proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Is Article 11 of Regulation [No 1380/2013] to be interpreted as precluding measures of a Member State in respect of waters under its sovereignty or jurisdiction which are necessary in order to meet the obligations of a Member State under Article 6 of [Directive 92/43], which have effects on the fishing vessels of other Member States, and which imposes a total prohibition on commercial sea fishing using fishing gear that touches the seabed and fixed nets (“trammel and gillnets”) in Natura 2000 sites? In particular: (a) Is Article 11 of Regulation [No 1380/2013] to be interpreted as meaning that the concept of “conservation measures” includes the prohibition of the fishing techniques listed in Question 1? (b) Is Article 11 of Regulation [No 1380/2013] to be interpreted as meaning that the concept of “fishing vessels of other Member States” also includes fishing vessels of another Member State which sail under the flag of the Federal Republic of Germany? (c) Is Article 11 of Regulation[No 1380/2013] to be interpreted as meaning that such measures adopted by a Member State which merely promote the objectives listed in that Union legislation also fall within the concept of “meet[ing] the objectives of the relevant Union legislation”? (2) Is Article 11 of Regulation[No 1380/2013] to be interpreted as precluding measures adopted by a Member State in respect of waters under its sovereignty or jurisdiction which are necessary in order to meet its obligations under Directive[2004/35] with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage? (3) If as Question 1 and Question 2 are to be answered, either individually or cumulatively, in the negative, does the exclusive competence of the European Union in the field of conservation of marine biological resources under the Common Fisheries Policy pursuant to Article 3(1)(d) TFEU preclude the adoption of the aforementioned measures by the Member State?’
10

It is in that context that the Conseil d’État (Council of State, France) decided to stay proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) In a situation in which an aid scheme is financed by allocated resources, where a Member State has regularly notified the Commission of legal changes having a significant impact on that scheme prior to their implementation, and in particular of changes relating to the method by which the scheme is financed, does a substantial increase in revenue from fiscal resources allocated to the scheme, compared to the projections submitted to the European Commission, constitute a significant change within the meaning of Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty, now Article 108 TFEU, which would require a new notification to be made? (2) In the same situation, how is Article 4 of Regulation No 794/2004 to be applied, pursuant to which an increase in the original budget of an existing aid scheme exceeding 20% constitutes a change to that aid scheme and, in particular: (a) how does it combine with the obligation to notify the Commission in advance of an aid scheme, laid down in Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty, now Article 108 TFEU; (b) if exceeding the 20% threshold of the original budget of an existing aid scheme provided for under Article 4 of Regulation No 794/2004 requires a new notification, must that threshold be assessed in relation to the amount of expenditure allocated or to the expenditure actually granted to the beneficiaries, excluding the sums placed in the reserve or those having been made subject to a levy for the benefit of the State; (c) assuming that compliance with the 20% threshold must be assessed in relation to the expenditure dedicated to the aid scheme, must such an assessment be made by comparing the overall level of expenditure in the approval decision with the overall budget subsequently allocated to all aid schemes granted by the body responsible for such allocations, or by comparing the levels notified under each of the categories of aid identified in that decision with that body’s corresponding budget heading?’
22

The grounds for restricting the choice of language 2 of the selection procedure only to English, French and German are set out in Section IV of the call for expressions of interest as follows: ‘Following the judgment handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber) [of 27 November 2012, Italy v Commission (C‑566/10 P, EU:C:2012:752),] the European Parliament must state the reasons for limiting the choice of the second language in the context of this call for expressions of interest to a small number of official EU languages. Candidates are thus informed that the three second-language options for this call for expressions of interest, i.e. English, French and German, have been laid down in the interests of the service, which require newly recruited staff to be immediately operational and able to communicate effectively in their daily work. It has long been the practice to use mainly English, French, and German for internal communication in the European Parliament, and these are also the languages most often needed when communicating with the outside world and in performing day-to-day work. Furthermore, in staff reports for 2013, 92%, 84% and 56% of all staff stated that they had a satisfactory knowledge of English, French and German respectively. For no other official language did that figure exceed 50%. Therefore, in balancing the interests of the service and the needs and abilities of candidates, and given the specific area in which this selection procedure is being held, the European Parliament is entitled to require knowledge of one of those three languages to ensure that, whatever their first official language, all candidates are proficient in at least one of them. In addition, in the interests of equality of treatment, all candidates, even if they have one of those three languages as their first official language, are required to have a satisfactory knowledge of a second language, which must be one of those three languages. The assessment of specific skills enables the European Parliament to judge whether the candidates can be immediately operational in an environment similar to that in which they will be required to work.’
Article 13(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, read in conjunction with Article 11(1)(b) of that regulation, must be interpreted as meaning that it may not be relied on by a natural person, whose professional activity consists, inter alia, in recovering claims for damages from insurers and who relies on a contract for the assignment of a claim concluded with the victim of a road accident, to bring a civil liability action against the insurer of the person responsible for that accident, which has its registered office in a Member State other than the Member State of the place of domicile of the injured party, before a court of the Member State in which the injured party is domiciled.

Although it is true that recital 18 of Regulation No 1215/2012 states that the purpose of Section 3 of Chapter II of that regulation is to protect the weaker party by rules of jurisdiction more favourable to his interests than the general rules, it is apparent that the action at issue in the main proceedings concerns relations between professionals and that it is not such as to affect the procedural situation of a party deemed to be weaker (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 January 2016, SOVAG, C‑521/14, EU:C:2016:41, paragraphs 29 and 30). In that regard, the fact that a professional, such as Mr Hofsoe, carries out his business on a small scale, cannot lead to the conclusion that he is deemed to be a weaker party than the insurer. A case-by-case assessment of the question whether such a professional may be considered as a ‘weaker party’ in order to be covered by the definition of ‘injured party’, within the meaning of Article 13(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012, would give rise to the risk of legal uncertainty and would be contrary to the objective of that regulation, laid down in recital 15 thereof, according to which the rules of jurisdiction must be highly predictable (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 July 2017, MMA IARD, C‑340/16, EU:C:2017:576, paragraph 34).

(see paras 44, 45, 47, operative part)
Case C‑250/17

Virgílio Tarragó da Silveira

v

Massa Insolvente da Espírito Santo Financial Group SA

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Insolvency proceedings — Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 — Article 15 — Effects of insolvency proceedings on lawsuits pending concerning an asset or a right of which the debtor has been divested — Concept of ‘lawsuit pending’ — Substantive proceedings for the recognition of the existence of a debt)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 6 June 2018

Judicial cooperation in civil matters—Insolvency proceedings—Regulation No 1346/2000—Effects of insolvency proceedings on lawsuits pending—Concept of lawsuits pending—Enforcement proceedings—Not included (Council Regulation No 1346/2000, Art. 15) Judicial cooperation in civil matters—Insolvency proceedings—Regulation No 1346/2000—Effects of insolvency proceedings on lawsuits pending—Concept of lawsuits pending—Substantive proceedings for the recognition of the existence of a debt—Included (Council Regulation No 1346/2000, Art. 15)
Case C‑110/17

European Commission

v

Kingdom of Belgium

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Free movement of capital — Article 63 TFEU — Article 40 of the EEA Agreement — Tax on the income of Belgian residents — Calculation of income from immovable property — Application of two different calculation methods depending on the place in which the immovable property is situated — Calculation on the basis of the cadastral value for immovable property located in Belgium — Calculation based on the actual rental value for immovable property located in another Member State of the European Union or the European Economic Area (EEA) — Difference in treatment — Restriction on the free movement of capital)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber), 12 April 2018

Free movement of capital and liberalisation of payments — Restrictions — Tax legislation — Income tax — Calculation of income from immovable property — National legislation providing for two different calculation methods depending on the place in which the immovable property is situated — Calculation on the basis of the cadastral value for immovable property located in the Member State concerned — Calculation based on the actual rental value for immovable property located in another Member State — Failure to fulfil obligations

(Art. 63 TFEU; EEA Agreement, Art. 40)

By retaining provisions under which, in respect of the estimation of income relating to unrented immovable property or immovable property rented either to natural persons who do not use them for professional purposes or to legal persons which make such property available to natural persons for private purposes, the tax base is calculated on the basis of the cadastral value so far as immovable property on national territory is concerned, and on the actual rental value so far as immovable property located abroad is concerned, a Member State fails to fulfil its obligations under Article 63 TFEU and Article 40 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area.

(see para. 65, operative part)
Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, as amended by Commission Regulation (EU) No 1251/2011 of 30 November 2011, and the general principles underlying that directive are to be interpreted as not precluding national rules, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which do not provide for periodic price review after a contract has been awarded in the sectors covered by that directive.

In this respect, it should be noted that it is not apparent from any provision of that directive that it must be interpreted as precluding rules of national law, such as Article 115, in conjunction with Article 206, of Legislative Decree No 163/2006, which do not provide for periodic review of prices after contracts are awarded in the sectors covered by the directive, since the latter does not impose any specific obligation on Member States to lay down provisions requiring the contracting entity to grant its contractual partner an upwards review of the price after the contract has been awarded. Similarly, the general principles underlying Directive 2004/17, in particular the principle of equal treatment and the consequent obligation of transparency enshrined in Article 10 of that directive do not preclude such rules either. On the contrary, it cannot be ruled out that a price review after the contract has been awarded may run counter to that principle and that obligation (see, by analogy, judgment of 7 September 2016, Finn Frogne, C‑549/14, EU:C:2016:634, paragraph 40). Indeed, as the Commission points out in its written observations, the contract price is an element of great importance in the assessment of tenders by a contracting entity, as well as in its decision to award the contract to an operator. This is also clear from the reference to the price in both of the criteria for the award of contracts mentioned in Article 55(1) of Directive 2004/17. In those circumstances, rules of national law which do not provide for periodic price review after the award of contracts in the sectors covered by that directive are, in fact, likely to encourage compliance with those principles.

(see paras 29, 30, 36, operative part)
Case C‑323/17

People Over Wind and Peter Sweetman

v

Coillte Teoranta

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland))

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Environment — Directive 92/43/EEC — Conservation of natural habitats — Special areas of conservation — Article 6(3) — Screening in order to determine whether or not it is necessary to carry out an assessment of the implications, for a special area of conservation, of a plan or project — Measures that may be taken into account for that purpose)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber), 12 April 2018

Environment — Conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora — Directive 92/43 — Special areas of conservation — Obligations of the Member States — Assessment of a project’s implications for a site — Screening in order to determine whether or not it is necessary to carry out an assessment of the implications, for a special area of conservation, of a plan or project — Measures that may be taken into account for that purpose

(Council Directive 92/43, Art. 6(3))

Article 6(3) of Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to determine whether it is necessary to carry out, subsequently, an appropriate assessment of the implications, for a site concerned, of a plan or project, it is not appropriate, at the screening stage, to take account of the measures intended to avoid or reduce the harmful effects of the plan or project on that site.

As the applicants in the main proceedings and the Commission submit, the fact that, as the referring court has observed, measures intended to avoid or reduce the harmful effects of a plan or project on the site concerned are taken into consideration when determining whether it is necessary to carry out an appropriate assessment presupposes that it is likely that the site is affected significantly and that, consequently, such an assessment should be carried out. That conclusion is supported by the fact that a full and precise analysis of the measures capable of avoiding or reducing any significant effects on the site concerned must be carried out not at the screening stage, but specifically at the stage of the appropriate assessment. Taking account of such measures at the screening stage would be liable to compromise the practical effect of the Habitats Directive in general, and the assessment stage in particular, as the latter stage would be deprived of its purpose and there would be a risk of circumvention of that stage, which constitutes, however, an essential safeguard provided for by the directive.

(see paras 35-37, 40, operative part)
Appeal—Grounds—Mistaken assessment of the facts—Inadmissibility—Review by the Court of the findings of fact—Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see para. 57)
The principle of the retroactive application of the more lenient criminal law, enshrined in the third sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as not precluding a situation in which a person is convicted on the ground that he wrongfully obtained special export refunds provided for in Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1964/82 of 20 July 1982 laying down the conditions for granting special export refunds on certain cuts of boned meat of bovine animals, by means of deceitful practices or the making of false statements as to the nature of the goods in respect of which the refunds were requested, although, as a result of changes in those rules which occurred subsequent to the acts complained of, the goods that were exported by that person have since become eligible for those refunds.

It should be noted, first, that, as is apparent from the file submitted to the Court, since the commission of the offence at issue in the main proceedings, the offence referred to in Article 426(4) of the Customs Code has not been amended by the French legislature. False declarations or deceitful practices having the effect of securing an advantage relating to exports, such as a special export refund under Regulation No 1964/82, therefore remain a criminal offence in the same manner as at the time of the events at issue in the main proceedings. Second, as regards the amendment of the rules of EU law referred to in paragraph 31 of this judgment, it should be noted that, as is apparent from the second recital of Regulation No 2469/97, the introduction of a special export refund for boned cuts from forequarters of adult male cattle was aimed at adapting those rules to the changing realities of the meat market, and in particular to reflect the situation on the world market following the implementation of the agreements concluded in the framework of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Consequently, the choice of the EU legislature to amend the eligibility criteria laid down in Article 1 of Regulation No 1964/82 was based on a purely economic and technical assessment of the situation on the world meat market.

(see paras 34, 36, 37, 41, operative part)
Case C‑88/17

Zurich Insurance plc and Metso Minerals Oy

v

Abnormal Load Services (International) Ltd

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Korkein oikeus)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Cooperation in civil and commercial matters — Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 — Jurisdiction — Second indent of Article 5(1)(b) — Jurisdiction of the courts for the place of performance of the obligation — Place of provision of services — Contract for the carriage of goods between two Member States — Route consisting of several stages and involving a number of means of transport)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 11 July 2018

Judicial cooperation in civil matters—Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters—Regulation No 44/2001—Special jurisdiction—Court for the place of performance of the obligation in question—Contract for the provision of services—Several places at which services are provided in different Member States—Jurisdiction of the courts for the place of the main provision of services (Council Regulation No 44/2001, Art. 5(1)(b), second indent) Judicial cooperation in civil matters—Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters—Regulation No 44/2001—Special jurisdiction—Court for the place of performance of the obligation in question—Contract for the provision of services—Carriage of goods in several stages between two Member States—Determination of the place where the transport services are provided—Place of dispatch and place of delivery of the goods—Included (Council Regulation No 44/2001, Art. 5(1)(b), second indent)