ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Case C-137/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Dresden (Germany) lodged on 22 February 2018 — hapeg dresden gmbh v Bayrische Straße 6-8 GmbH & Co. KG

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Dresden (Germany) lodged on 22 February 2018 — hapeg dresden gmbh v Bayrische Straße 6-8 GmbH & Co. KG

(Case C-137/18)

Referring court

Landgericht Dresden

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: hapeg dresden gmbh

Defendant: Bayrische Straße 6-8 GmbH & Co. KG

Question referred

Is EU law, in particular Article 15(3)(b) and (c) and the first, second and third sentences of Article 16(1)(b) and (c) of Directive 2006/123/EC ( 1 ) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 (‘the Services Directive’) to be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that applicable in the main proceedings, which prohibits the agreement in contracts with architects and/or engineers of a fee that is lower than the minimum fee resulting from the Honorarordnung für Architekten und Ingenieure (Rules on Fees and Emoluments for Architects and Engineers)?

( 1 ) Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 36).
(b)

If Question 2(a) is answered in the affirmative, must Article 221(3) of Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 be interpreted as meaning that the communication to the debtor referred to in that provision must have been received within the three-year period after a customs debt was incurred, or is it sufficient that that communication was sent to the debtor within that period?
Case C-434/18: Action brought on 29 June 2018 — European Commission v Italian Republic

Action brought on 29 June 2018 — European Commission v Italian Republic

(Case C-434/18)

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: M. Patakia and G. Gattinara, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Italian Republic

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— find that, by not having sent its national programme for the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste to the Commission, the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligation under Article 15(4), in conjunction with Article 13(1), of Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom of 19 July 2011 establishing a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. ( 1 )

— order the Italian Republic to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Article 15(4), in conjunction with Article 13(1), of Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom of 19 July 2011 establishing a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste establishes that Member States are to notify the Commission for the first time ‘as soon as possible’, but not later than 23 August 2015, of the content of their national programmes regarding all items set out in Article 12 of the directive.

The Commission claims that it is apparent from the information provided by the Italian Republic during the pre-litigation stage that that notification never took place, in as much as the Italian authorities have not yet sent the Commission the final text of the national programme adopted for the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.

( 1 ) OJ 2011 L 199, p 48.
Case C-338/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 23 May 2018 — Cooperativa Novalat Scrl and Others v Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA), Regione Veneto

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 23 May 2018 — Cooperativa Novalat Scrl and Others v Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA), Regione Veneto

(Case C-338/18)

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: Cooperativa Novalat Scrl, Antico Giuseppe e Figli s.s., Impresa Barutta Livio, Impresa Cusinato Giulio, Impresa Danesa Cisino, Impresa Faggian Rudi, Furlan Diego e Stefano s.s., Impresa Furlan Marco, Impresa Massaro Leo Valter, Impresa Reginato Guido, Impresa Sachespi Lucio, Impresa Salmaso Luigi, Impresa Schiavon Denis, Impresa Zanetti Narciso

Respondents: Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA), Regione Veneto

Questions referred

1. In a situation such as that described in the case in the main proceedings, must EU law be interpreted to the effect that the consequence of the conflict of a legislative provision of a Member State with the third subparagraph of Article 2(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 ( 1 ) is that producers are not obliged to pay the additional levy if the conditions laid down by that Regulation are met?

2. In a situation such as that described in the case in the main proceedings, must EU law and, in particular, the general principle of protection of legitimate expectations, be interpreted as meaning that the expectations of persons who have performed an obligation laid down by a Member State and have benefited from the effects associated with performance of that obligation may not be protected, if that obligation has proved to be in conflict with EU law?

3. In a situation such as that described in the case in the main proceedings, do Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1392/2001 ( 2 ) of 9 July 2001 and the EU concept of ‘priority category’ preclude a provision of a Member State, such as Article 2(3) of Decree-Law No 157/2004, adopted by the Republic of Italy, which lays down varying methods for refunding an additional levy that has been over-charged, drawing a distinction, in terms of timetables and methods of repayment, between producers who have relied upon due compliance with a national provision that has proved to be in conflict with EU law and producers who have not complied with such a provision?

( 1 ) Council Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 of 28 December 1992 establishing an additional levy in the milk and milk products sector (OJ 1992 L 405, p. 1).

( 2 ) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1392/2001 of 9 July 2001 laying down detailed rules for applying Council Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 establishing an additional levy on milk and milk products (OJ 2001 L 187, p. 19).
Case C-359/18 P: Appeal brought on 1 June 2018 by European Medicines Agency against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 22 March 2018 in Case T-80/16: Shire Pharmaceuticals Ireland v EMA

Appeal brought on 1 June 2018 by European Medicines Agency against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 22 March 2018 in Case T-80/16: Shire Pharmaceuticals Ireland v EMA

(Case C-359/18 P)

Parties

Appellant: European Medicines Agency (represented by: S. Marino, A. Spina, S. Drosos, T. Jabłoński, Agents)

Other part to the proceedings: Shire Pharmaceuticals Ireland Ltd,

European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— grant EMA’s appeal and set aside the judgment of the General Court in Case T-80/16;

— reject the application of annulment as unfounded; and

— order the applicant at first instance to pay all the costs of these proceedings (including the costs before the General Court).

Pleas in law and main arguments

EMA submits two grounds of appeal.

1) The first ground of appeal comprises two limbs. Under the first limb of this first ground of appeal, EMA submits that the General Court erred in law when holding, at paragraph 50 of the judgment under appeal, that Article 5(1) of the Orphan Regulation ( 1 ) should be read separately from Article 5(2). Such interpretation stands in violation of Article 5(1), as it undermines the effectiveness of the provision. Under the second limb of the first ground of appeal, EMA submits that the General Court erred in law when holding, at paragraph 64 of the judgment under appeal, that the notion of medicinal product should be relied upon by the EMA when it establishes for the purpose of Article 5(1) whether an application for orphan designation and a previously submitted application for marketing authorisation overlap.

2) Under the second ground of appeal, EMA submits that the General Court relied on an incorrect reading of the notion of medicinal products as set out in Article 1(2) of Directive ( 2 ) 2001/83/EC, insofar as it held that a difference in excipients and routes of administration between two products would render them different for the purpose of Article 5(1) of the Orphan Regulation.

( 1 ) Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1999 on orphan medicinal products (OJ 2000, L 18, p. 1)

( 2 ) Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (OJ 2001, L 311, p. 67)
4.

Is ‘the right to dispose of the goods as owner’ within the meaning of the VAT Directive acquired by a taxable person who buys goods from another taxable person directly for a specific customer in order to fulfil an already existing order (identifying the type of goods, the quantity, place of origin and time of delivery) where he does not physically handle the goods himself since, in the context of concluding the contract of sale, his buyer agrees to arrange transport of the goods from their point of origin, so that he will only provide access to the requested goods via his suppliers and communicate the information necessary for acceptance of the goods (on his own behalf or on behalf of his sub-suppliers in the chain), and his profit from the transaction is the difference between the buying-in price and the selling price of such goods without the cost of transporting the goods being invoiced in the chain?
Can Article 52a of Regulation (EC) No 2419/2001 with its provision regarding the retroactive application of the prescription rule of Article 49(5) of Regulation (EC) No 2419/2001 also be applied analogously to Article 49(6) of Regulation (EC) No 2419/2001?

If the first sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 is applicable (first question), the other questions do not need to be answered; if it is not applicable, the third question becomes devoid of object if the second question is answered in the affirmative.
1.

Must Article 10(h) and recital 28 of Directive 2014/24/EU (1) be interpreted as meaning that: (a) ambulance services that require the presence on board of a driver with emergency response training and at least one emergency responder with the qualifications and skills obtained from completing a course and passing an examination in emergency response, and (b) transport services provided with basic levels of care using emergency vehicles are covered by the exclusion laid down in the above-mentioned Article 10(h), or must they be among the services referred to in Articles 74 to 77 of Directive 2014/24/EU?
1.

Can the creditors of the company being divided, whose credit interests antedate the division, who have not taken advantage of the remedy of lodging an objection under Article 2503 of the Civil Code (and therefore of the protection tool introduced in implementation of Article 12 of [Directive 82/891/EEC]), (1) use an action to set aside under Article 2901 of the Civil Code after the division has been implemented, in order to obtain a declaration that the division in question has no effect against them and, therefore, to take precedence in enforcement over the creditors of the recipient company or companies and to be placed in a preferential position before the shareholders of those companies?
2.

If the answer to Question 1 is that exceptions from Articles 5 to 9 of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 are also permissible in the case where the vehicles concerned, in addition to transporting items forming part of the universal service, also carry other items that do not come under the universal service: a) In that event, what proportion must the share of items which a vehicle carries as part of the universal service represent as a minimum? b) In that event, what proportion may the share of items which do not come under the universal service and which the vehicle carries at the same time as those forming part of the universal service represent as a maximum? c) How is such a proportion, as described in points a) and b), to be determined in each case? d) Must such a proportion, as described in points a) and b), be defined for each individual journey performed by the vehicle concerned or is an average proportion, based on all the journeys performed by the vehicle in question, sufficient?
2.

In the procedure for granting leave for further consideration, are the requirements in relation to a procedure in contradictory matters within the meaning of Article 43(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 satisfied if the respondent is not heard in relation to the appeal before the decision on leave is taken? Are they satisfied if the respondent is heard before the decision on leave for further consideration is taken?
1.

In the context of an action before the courts of a Member State which comprises three heads of claim concerning (i) the divorce of the parents of a minor child, (ii) parental responsibility for that minor child and (iii) maintenance obligations with regard to that minor child, may Article 3(a) and (d) and Article 5 of Regulation No 4/2009 (1) be interpreted as meaning that the court seised of the divorce petition, being also a court for the place where the defendant is habitually resident and the court before which the defendant has entered an appearance, has jurisdiction to give a decision on the claim concerning maintenance obligations in respect of the minor child, notwithstanding its finding that it has no jurisdiction in the matter of parental responsibility for the minor child, or may the claim concerning maintenance obligations be decided only by a court having jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim concerning parental responsibility for the minor child?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank van eerste aanleg te Antwerpen (Belgium) lodged on 16 July 2018 — Argenta Spaarbank NV v Belgische Staat

(Case C-459/18)

(2018/C 373/07)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank van eerste aanleg te Antwerpen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Argenta Spaarbank NV

Defendant: Belgische Staat

Question referred

Does Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union preclude national tax legislation pursuant to which, for the purpose of calculating the taxable profits of a company subject to full tax liability in Belgium which has a permanent establishment in another Member State, the profits of which are wholly exempt in Belgium by virtue of the application of a double taxation convention between Belgium and the other Member State:

— the deduction for risk capital is reduced by an amount in respect of deduction for risk capital calculated with reference to the positive difference between, on the one hand, the net book value of the assets of the permanent establishment, and, on the other hand, the total liabilities that do not form part of the company’s equity capital and that are attributable to the permanent establishment and

— the aforementioned reduction is not applied in so far as the amount of the reduction is lower than the profits of that permanent establishment,

whereas no reduction of the deduction for risk capital is applied if that positive difference can be attributed to a permanent establishment located in Belgium?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 21 February 2018 by El Corte Inglés SA against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 5 December 2017 in Case T-212/16: El Corte Inglés v EUIPO

(Case C-150/18 P)

(2018/C 392/02)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: El Corte Inglés SA (represented by: J.L. Rivas Zurdo, abogado)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Elho Business & Sport Vertriebs GmbH

By order of 6 September 2018 the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Social de Gerona (Spain) lodged on 9 July 2018 — WA v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social

(Case C-450/18)

(2018/C 399/26)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de lo Social de Gerona

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: WA

Defendant: Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social

Question referred

Does a national legislative provision (specifically, Article 60(1) of the Ley General de Seguridad Social (General Law on Social Security)) which grants the right to receive a pension supplement –– in view of their contribution to social security in terms of demographics –– to women who have had biological or adopted children and are in receipt of a contributory retirement, widow’s or permanent incapacity pension under any scheme within the social security system, but, on the other hand, does not grant that right to men in an identical situation, infringe the principle of equal treatment which prohibits all discrimination on grounds of sex, enshrined in Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and in Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, as amended by Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 (1) and recast by Directive 2006/54/EC (2) of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation?

(1) Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions (OJ 2002 L 269, p. 15).

(2) Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (OJ 2006 L 204, p. 23).
4.

Fourth, an error of law as regards the lack of effects of the infringement, in that the General Court failed to exercise its unlimited jurisdiction under Article 261 TFEU and Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003, and itself reduce the gravity factor to take account of the fact that the majority of sales covered by the contested decision were in fact unaffected by the infringement; and
1.

Must Article 11(1)(b) of Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (1) — hereinafter referred to as: EIA Directive — be interpreted as meaning that a provision of national law is consistent with it, according to which a claimant who is not recognised as an environmental association is entitled to apply for the annulment of a decision due to a procedural defect only if the procedural defect has denied the claimant itself the opportunity — as provided for by statute — of participating in the decision-making process?
Appeal brought on 19 September 2018 by Viscas Corp. against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 12 July 2018 in Case T-422/14: Viscas v Commission

(Case C-582/18 P)

(2018/C 427/27)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Viscas Corp. (represented by: J.-F. Bellis, lawyer)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union in T-422/14, Viscas Corp. v Commission, in so far as it rejected the plea in law alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment as regards the calculation of the amount of the fine imposed on Viscas and ordered Viscas to pay the costs;

— annul Article 2 of Commission Decision C(2014) 2139 final (1) in so far as it sets the amount of the fine imposed on Viscas at EUR 34 992 000;

— set the amount of the fine imposed on Viscas by reason of the infringement established in Article 1 of that decision at EUR 19 595 520;

— order the Commission to pay the costs of these proceedings and of the proceedings before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, Viscas relies on a single plea in law alleging that the General Court’s judgment breaches the principle of equal treatment by upholding the methodology for determining the relevant value of sales, based on Point 18 of the Fining Guidelines (2), applied by the Commission in the contested decision. This methodology provides a substantial discriminatory advantage to the producers involved in both the European cartel and the international cartel configurations of the infringement as compared to those involved only in the international configuration. The determination of the producers’ respective contribution to the infringement indeed takes no account of the European cartel configuration and thus considerably undervalues the weight in the infringement of the producers involved in both cartel configurations, in effect rewarding them for being involved in two cartels rather than one by imposing on them fines which are on average 44 % lower than if the infringement had been limited to the European cartel configuration.

(1) Commission Decision of 2 April 2014 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39610 — Power Cables) (notified under document C(2014) 2139 final) (OJ 2014, C 319, p. 10)

(2) Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 (OJ 2006, C 210, p. 2)