ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 14 April 2021 – Casa di Cura Città di Parma

(Case C‑573/20) ( 1 )

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Articles 53(2) and 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court – Taxation – Common system of value added tax (VAT) – Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC – Article 17(2)(a) – Mixed taxable person – Deductible proportion – Public or private health structures carrying out exempt activities – National legislation excluding the deduction of VAT relating to the purchase of goods or services used for the requirements of those exempt activities)

1. Harmonisation of fiscal legislation – Common system of value added tax – Deduction of input tax – Origin and scope of the right to deduct – Goods and services used for the purposes of the taxable person’s taxable transactions – Public or private health structures carrying out tax-exempt activities – Refusal to deduct tax on the purchase of goods or services used for the requirements of those exempt activities – Whether permissible (Council Directive 77/388, Art. 17(2)(a)) (see paras 20-23, 25-27, operative part)

2. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Admissibility – Questions referred without sufficient information on the factual and legislative context – Manifest inadmissibility (Art. 267 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 53(2)) (see paras 32-34, 36)

Operative part

Article 17(2)(a) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which does not permit the deduction of input value added tax (VAT) paid for the purchase of goods and services used for the requirements of exempt activities and which provides, consequently, that the right of a mixed taxable person to deduct VAT is calculated on the basis of a proportion corresponding to the ratio of the amount of the transactions in respect of which there is a right to deduct and the total amount of the transactions carried out over the course of the year concerned, including the exempt medical-healthcare services.

( 1 ) OJ C 35, 1.2.2021.
2.

Acts of the institutions – Statement of reasons – Obligation – Scope – Decision of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) establishing the ex ante contributions to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) – Not necessary to include, in that decision, all figures necessary for verifying the accuracy of the calculation of the contribution – Weighing the obligation to state reasons against the general principle of protection of the commercial confidentiality of the institutions concerned – Legality of the provisions of Regulation 2015/63 concerning the method for the calculation of the ex ante contributions to the SFR (Art. 296, second para., TFEU; European Parliament and Council Regulation No 806/2014; Commission Regulation 2015/63; European Parliament and Council Directive 2014/59) (see paras 72-84)
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Admissibility – Questions referred lacking sufficient information regarding the legislative context and the reasons justifying the need for an answer to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Impossibility for the Court to determine the applicability and relevance of the provisions of EU law relied on – Manifest inadmissibility

(Art. 267 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 23; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 53(2) and 94(b) and (c))

(see paras 18-21, 25-27, 31, operative part)
42

As regards how the principle emphasised in the judgment of 29 February 1996, INZO (C‑110/94, EU:C:1996:67), to the effect that the right of deduction is retained even where an activity is brought to an end before it gives rise to any taxable transactions, must be combined with the rules of the VAT Directive regarding the adjustment of deductions and, in particular, whether a provision such as Chapter 9, Paragraph 11, of the Law on VAT may nevertheless be allowed in the light of those rules, it should be recalled that the Court has, first, held that the adjustment mechanism provided for in Articles 184 to 187 of the VAT Directive is an integral part of the VAT deduction scheme established by that directive and aims to establish a close and direct relationship between the right to deduct the input VAT paid and the use of the goods or services concerned for taxed output transactions (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 July 2020, Finanzamt Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler, C‑374/19, EU:C:2020:546, paragraph 20, and of 17 September 2020, Stichting Schoonzicht, C‑791/18, EU:C:2020:731, paragraph 26). Secondly, it has held that, where goods or services acquired by a taxable person are used for the purposes of transactions that are exempt or do not fall within the scope of VAT, no output tax can be collected or input tax deducted (judgment of 9 July 2020, Finanzamt Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler, C‑374/19, EU:C:2020:546, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 30 June 2021 –

Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções and Others v Court of Justice of the European Union and Others

(Case C‑21/21 P)

(Appeal – Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union – Appeal lodged out of time – Appeal brought against an order of the General Court of the European Union dismissing as inadmissible an application for rectification – Appeal manifestly inadmissible)

1. Appeal – Grounds – Grounds which are manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded – Dismissal at any point, by reasoned order, without an oral procedure (Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 181) (see para. 8)

2. Appeal – Grounds – Ground of appeal seeking rectification of the order of the General Court – Lack of jurisdiction of the Court – Inadmissibility (Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 164 and 165) (see paras 15, 16)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed as inadmissible.
Appeals – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Burden of proof

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 170b)

(see para. 13)
Order of the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) of 26 November 2021 – Giro Travel Company v Andréas Stihl and EUIPO

(Case C‑327/21 P)

(Appeal – EU trade mark – Determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Article 170b of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Request failing to demonstrate that an issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Refusal to allow the appeal to proceed)

1. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Burden of proof (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b) (see para. 11)

2. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Request that an appeal be allowed to proceed – Formal requirements – Scope (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b) (see paras 12-14)

3. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Incompatibility with the case-law of the Court of Justice or of the General Court – Request that the appeal be allowed to proceed failing to demonstrate that the issue is significant – Appeal not allowed to proceed (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b) (see paras 15-18)

Operative part

1. The appeal is not allowed to proceed.
Order of the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) of 17 January 2022 – AM.VI. and Quinam v EUIPO

(Case C‑599/21 P)

(Appeal – EU trade mark – Determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Article 170 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Request failing to demonstrate that an issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Appeal not allowed to proceed)

1. Appeals – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Burden of proof (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 170b) (see para. 14)

2. Appeals – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Request that an appeal be allowed to proceed – Formal requirements – Scope (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 170a (1) and (170b)) (see paras 15-17)

3. Appeals – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence – Not included (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 170b) (see paras 18, 20)

4. Appeals – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Distortion of facts and evidence Distortion of facts and evidence – Not included (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 170b) (see para. 19)

Operative part

1. The appeal is not allowed to proceed.
Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 13 December 2021 – SESCAM

(Case C‑151/21)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Directive 1999/70/EC – Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP – Clause 4 – Principle of non-discrimination – Field of public health – Calculation of length-of-service increments – National legislation refusing to take into account, as regards permanent staff regulated under administrative law, for the purpose of calculating length-of-service increments, periods corresponding to activities temporarily exercised in a higher professional category)

1. Social policy – Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP – Directive 1999/70 – Conditions of employment – Concept – Three-yearly length-of-service increments – Included (Council Directive 1999/70, Annex, Clause 4(1)) (see para. 28)

2. Social policy – Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP – Directive 1999/70 – Scope – Permanent member of staff of the public health service – Not included – Temporary exercise by that member of staff of activities in a higher professional category – National legislation denying him or her the right to the three-yearly length-of-service increments corresponding to that category – Right otherwise granted to fixed-term workers – Whether permissible (Council Directive 1999/70, Annex, Clause 4) (see paras 29-32)

Operative part

Clause 4 of the framework agreement on fixed-term work, concluded on 18 March 1999, which is set out in the annex to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which provides that, for a permanent worker who temporarily performs duties in a professional category that is higher than the one to which he or she belongs, the three-yearly length-of-service increments to which he or she is entitled are those corresponding to that latter category, even though, for a fixed-term worker placed in the same situation, the three-yearly length-of-service increments correspond to those of the professional category in which his or her duties were actually performed.
Order of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 31 January 2022 – TM (Loss of earnings following a road traffic accident)

(Case C‑28/21) ( 1 )

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles – Directive 2009/103/EC – Article 3 – Compulsory cover of damage to property – Scope – Legislation of a Member State excluding loss of earnings from cover by compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles)

1. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Questions the answer to which may be clearly deduced from the Court’s existing case-law – Application of Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure (Art. 267 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 99) (see paras 24, 25)

2. Approximation of laws – Insurance against civil liability in respect of motor vehicles – Directive 2009/103 – Obligation to insure vehicules – Scope – Limits (European Parliament and Council Directive 2009/103, Art. 3) (see paras 27-32)

3. Approximation of laws – Insurance against civil liability in respect of motor vehicles – Directive 2009/103 – Obligation to insure vehicules – Obligation to cover material damage – National legislation excluding loss of profit from coverage by compulsory motor third party liability insurance – Whether permissible – Condition (European Parliament and Council Directive 2009/103, Art. 3, para. 1) (see paras 33-36, operative part)

Operative part

Must the first paragraph of Article 3 of Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability be interpreted as not precluding a provision of national law under which compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles does not cover damage consisting of loss of earnings, on condition that that limitation of cover applies without any difference in treatment depending on the Member State of residence of the injured party or of the owner or holder of the damaged vehicle.

( 1 ) OJ C 182, 10.5.2021.
Appeal – Grounds – Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence – Inadmissibility – Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence – Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see paras 93, 94)
Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 26 April 2022 – Universitat de Barcelona

(Case C‑464/21)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Social policy – Directive 1999/70/EC – Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP – Successive fixed-term contracts in the public sector – Clause 2 and Clause 3(1) – Scope – Concept of ‘fixed-term worker’)

Social policy – Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP – Directive 1999/70 – Scope – Worker employed on the basis of successive fixed-term employment contracts in the public sector – Reclassification of the employment relationship, as a penalty, as a non-permanent contract of indefinite duration – Included

(Council Directive 1999/70, Annex, Clauses 2 and 3 (1))

(see paras 22-26)

Operative part

Clause 2 and Clause 3(1) of the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded on 18 March 1999, which is annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP must be interpreted as meaning that a worker bound to his or her public sector employer by successive fixed-term contracts and whose employment relationship may be reclassified, as a penalty, as a ‘non-permanent contract of indefinite duration’, falls within the scope of that framework agreement.
22

Accordingly, a request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must, in any event, set out clearly and in detail the grounds on which the appeal is based, identify with equal clarity and detail the issue of law raised by each ground of appeal, specify whether that issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law and set out the specific reasons why that issue is significant according to that criterion. As regards, in particular, the grounds of appeal, the request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must specify the provision of EU law or the case-law that has been infringed by the judgment or order under appeal, explain succinctly the nature of the error of law allegedly committed by the General Court, and indicate to what extent that error had an effect on the outcome of the judgment or order under appeal. Where the error of law relied on results from an infringement of the case-law, the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed must explain, in a succinct but clear and precise manner, first, where the alleged contradiction lies, by identifying the paragraphs of the judgment or order under appeal which the appellant is calling into question as well as those of the ruling of the Court of Justice or the General Court alleged to have been infringed, and, second, the concrete reasons why such a contradiction raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (see, to that effect, order of 24 October 2019, Porsche v EUIPO, C‑613/19 P, EU:C:2019:905, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited).
Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 12 July 2022 –

Novais v Portuguese Republic

(Case C‑816/21 P-OST)

(Article 155 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Failure to adjudicate – None)

Judicial proceedings – Failure to adjudicate – Definition – Obligation to rule on all the pleas in law submitted by the parties – No failure to adjudicate

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 155 and 159a)

(see paras 4-7, 12-15)

Operative part

1. The application under Article 155(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, brought on 21 April 2022 by Mr Luís Miguel Novais, is dismissed as manifestly unfounded.
Order of the Vice-President of the Court, 22 July 2022 –

Telefónica de España v Commission

(Case C‑478/22 P(R)-R)

(Interim relief – Articles 278 and 279 TFEU – Appeal – Application for suspension of operation and other interim measures – Public procurement – Article 160(7) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice)

Interim relief – Suspension of operation of a measure – Conditions for granting – Urgency – Assessment in public procurement litigation – Serious damage – Sufficient in the case of a particularly serious prima facie case constituted by an obvious and serious illegality – Conditions – Application for interim measures brought in the standstill period before conclusion of the contract with the successful tenderer

(Art. 278 TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47; European Parliament and Council Regulation 2018/1046, Art. 175(3))

(see paras 12, 13)

Operative part

1. The European Commission shall refrain from signing a contract covered by tendering procedure DIGIT/A 3/PR/2019/010, entitled ‘Trans-European Services for Telematics between Administrations (TESTA)’, until the adoption of the order terminating the present interlocutory proceedings or ruling on the appeal in Case C‑478/22 P(R), whichever is the earlier.
Judicial proceedings – Application initiating proceedings – Formal requirements – Identification of the subject matter of the dispute – Summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based – Unambiguous wording of the form of order sought by the applicant – Requirement not met – Inadmissibility

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 21, first para., and 53, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 76(d))

(see para. 26)
3.

However, the defendant considers the third head of claim to be inadmissible as it was not contained in the letters by which the applicant had previously referred the matter to the Commission. Requests made in the context of an action for failure to act may only concern questions which have been referred to the authority and may only deal with the refusal of that body to take the decision which it has been called upon to adopt (Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérurgie de l'Est de la France v High Authority of the ECSC, Joined Cases 24 and 34/58, 15 July 1960, Rec. 1960, p. 609). The letter of 16 September 1969 only required the Commission to establish that there had been an infringement of the provisions of Article 65 of the Treaty by the German steelworks and the undertakings dealing in ferrous scrap forming part of their group and to take ‘the appropriate sanctions’ against them. The letter of the following 3 October shows no great difference. In it Mr Hake states that his main wish is to have fresh access to the market from which the cartel has gradually excluded him. The requests made in his previous letter must therefore be understood as asking the Commission to take ‘satisfactory and appropriate measures to re-establish and guarantee normal competition on the German market in ferrous scrap’, in particular by prohibiting the agreements and practices which hindered such competition and by imposing fines on the undertakings responsible. The Commission rightly observes that it was justified in understanding the phrase quoted above as merely making a firm request for a prohibition and the imposition of a penalty, which was entirely satisfied by its decision of 21 January 1970. If at that time Mr Hake intended to persuade the Commission to take measures other than those which it adopted, he did not indicate this in his letters; in particular, he never referred to the fixing of a minimum quota of their ferrous scrap requirements up to the amount of which the undertakings would be required to supply themselves from independent dealers. It is true that the applicant objects that this request was already contained in ‘general terms’ in his letter of 3 October 1969 and that he had to express it in greater detail because the Commission did not put forward any precise ideas as to the effective measures to be taken to re-establish and guarantee normal conditions of competition. But this conflicts with the system laid down in Article 35: the implied refusal, a fiction created by that article, may only exist in relation to an express request. If Mr Hake intended to obtain measures other than those which were adopted, it was for him to indicate them precisely when referring the matter to the Commission. It is therefore unnecessary to consider the merits of the third head of claim on which the Commission has put forward detailed explanations, and I can only suggest that you dismiss it as inadmissible.