ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 363/19

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 10 July 2015 — Stadt Wiener Neustadt

(Case C-348/15)

(2015/C 363/23)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant on a point of law: Stadt Wiener Neustadt

Intervener: A.S.A. Abfall Service AG

Respondent authority: Niederösterreichische Landesregierung

Question referred

Does EU law, in particular Directive 2011/92/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, in particular Article 1(4) thereof, or Council Directive 85/337/EEC (2) of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, in particular Article 1(5) thereof, preclude a provision of national law whereby projects subject to an obligation to carry out an environmental impact assessment, which have not benefited from a consent granted under the national Umweltverträglichkeitsprüfungsgesetz 2000 (Law on Environmental Impact Assessments of 2000) (UVP-G 2000) but have benefited only from consents granted under individual sectoral laws (such as the Abfallwirtschaftsgesetz (Law on Waste Management)) which, since 19 August 2009 (date of entry into force of the UVP-G-Novelle 2009 (Law of 2009 amending the Law on Environmental Impact Assessments)), can no longer be annulled following the expiry of a three-year time-limit laid down in national law (Paragraph 3(6) of the UVP-G 2000), are regarded as approved under the UVP-G 2000, or is such a provision consistent with the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations established in EU law?

(1) OJ 2012 L 26, p. 1.

(2) OJ 1985 L 175, p. 40.
(4)

If the three foregoing questions (or any of them) are answered in the affirmative and the decision to dismiss the worker, previously professionally well regarded, merely because he was subject to temporary incapacity — of uncertain duration — as a result of an accident at work, when he is receiving health assistance and financial benefits from Social Security, is to be interpreted as falling within the ambit and/or protection of one or more articles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, may those articles be applied by the national court in order to settle a dispute between private individuals, either on the view that — depending on whether a ‘right’ or ‘principle’ is at issue — that they enjoy horizontal effect or by virtue of application of the ‘principle that national law is to be interpreted in conformity with an EU directive’? If the four foregoing questions should be answered in the negative, a fourth question is referred:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 381/12

Appeal brought on 22 April 2015 by Marpefa, S.L. against the order of 3 February 2015 of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) in Case T-708/14, Marpefa v OHIM

(Case C-181/15 P)

(2015/C 381/14)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: Marpefa, S.L. (represented by: I. Barroso Sánchez-Lafuente, abogado)

Other parties to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs),

Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment

By order of 6 October 2015, the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) dismissed the appeal.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 381/12

Appeal brought on 9 July 2015 by Changshu City Standard Parts Factory, Ningbo Jinding Fastener Co. Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 29 April 2015 in Joined Cases T-558/12 and T-559/12: Changshu City Standard Parts Factory and Ningbo Jinding Fastener Co. Ltd v Council of the European Union

(Joined Cases C-376/15 P and C-377/15 P)

(2015/C 381/15)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Changshu City Standard Parts Factory, Ningbo Jinding Fastener Co. Ltd (represented by: R. Antonini, avvocato, E. Monard, avocat)

Other parties to the proceedings: Council of the European Union, European Commission, European Industrial Fasteners Institute AISBL (EIFI)

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

1) set aside the judgment of the General Court in Joined Cases T-558/12 and T-559/12 Changshu City Standard Parts Factory and Ningbo Jinding Fastener Co. Ltd v Council of the European Union;

2) grant the form of order sought by the Appellants in their application made to the General Court and annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 924/2012 of 4 October 2012 amending Regulation EC No 91/2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China (1), insofar as it relates to the Appellants;

3) order the Council to bear the costs of the proceedings before the General Court and the Court of Justice, including those of the Appellants;

4) order the intervening parties to bear their own costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Appellants argue that the General Court, in particular as regards the notion of ‘all [comparable] export transactions’ and the relationship between the provisions concerned, erred in law by misconstruing Articles 2(10) and 2(11) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (2) and Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994; and imposed an unreasonable burden of proof on the Appellants.

The Appellants further argue that the General Court erred in law by misconstruing Articles 2(10) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community and Article 2.4 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, failed to address certain claims of the Appellants and erred in law when assessing the requirement to state reasons under Article 296 TFEU.

(1) OJ L 275, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 343, p. 51.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 398/14

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Finanzgericht Bremen (Germany) lodged on 12 August 2015 — Madaus GmbH v Hauptzollamt Bremen

(Case C-441/15)

(2015/C 398/17)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Finanzgericht Bremen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Madaus GmbH

Defendant: Hauptzollamt Bremen

Question referred

Is the Combined Nomenclature in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 (1) of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and the statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, in the version of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 927/2012 of 9 October 2012 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, to be interpreted as meaning that a raw material with the designation ‘DESTAB Calcium Carbonate 90SE Ultra 250’, used for the manufacture of calcium tablets in the form of simple tablets, effervescent tablets and chewable tablets, consisting of chemically defined calcium carbonate in powder form and, to improve suitability for use in tablets, modified starch, and with a starch content — determined in accordance with Commission Regulation (EU) No 118/2010 of 9 February 2010 amending Regulation (EC) No 900/2008 laying down the methods of analysis and other technical provisions necessary for the application of the arrangements for imports of certain goods resulting from the processing of agricultural products — of less than 5 %, is to be classified under subheading 3824 9097 990?

(1) (OJ 1987 L 256, p. 1) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 927/2012 of 9 October 2012 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (OJ 2012 L 304, p. 1).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 389/17

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Berlin (Germany) lodged on 28 August 2015 — Schaefer Kalk GmbH & Co. KG v Federal Republic of Germany

(Case C-460/15)

(2015/C 389/19)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgericht Berlin

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Schaefer Kalk GmbH & Co. KG

Defendant: Federal Republic of Germany

Questions referred

1. Is Commission Regulation (EU) No 601/2012 (1) invalid and does it infringe the aims of Directive 2003/87/EC (2) in so far as the second sentence of Article 49(1) provides that CO2 that is not transferred within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 49(1) is to be considered emitted by the installation producing the CO2?

2. Is Commission Regulation (EU) No 601/2012 invalid and does it infringe the aims of Directive 2003/87/EC in so far as point 10 of Annex IV provides that CO2 that is transferred to another plant for the production of precipitated calcium carbonate (PCC) is to be considered emitted by the installation producing the CO2?

(1) Commission Regulation (EU) No 601/2012 of 21 June 2012 on the monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2012 L 181, p. 30).

(2) Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ 2003 L 275, p. 32).
Are Articles 34, 35, 207(2), 207(3) and 207(4) of Law 1/2000 [on Civil Procedure], which govern the administrative procedure for recovery of unpaid fees (‘jura de cuentas’), incompatible with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (1) in that they preclude the possibility of judicial review? If that is the case:

In the context of the procedure provided for in Articles 34 and 35 of Law 1/2000, is a Secretario Judicial a ‘court or tribunal’ for the purposes of Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union?
2.

Does the definition of the concepts ‘overriding reasons relating to the public interest’, ‘proportionality’ and ‘necessity’ in Articles [4] and [15] of the Directive on services in the internal market (1) as applied by the EU courts, allow the courts of the Member States, in circumstances where there is State regulation in relation to the fixing of fees and there is an implied declaration, in the absence of any rules in the implementing legislation, that there is an overriding reason relating to the public interest, although its inconsistency with EU case-law does not allow it to be upheld, to hold in a particular case that there is a limitation which is not in the public interest and, therefore, to disregard or to amend the legal provision imposing rules on the remuneration of procuradores?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 414/22

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Bergamo (Italy) lodged on 1 October 2015 — Criminal proceedings against Luca Menci

(Case C-524/15)

(2015/C 414/27)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale di Bergamo

Party to the main proceedings

Luca Menci

Question referred

Does Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, interpreted in the light of Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the related case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, preclude the possibility of conducting criminal proceedings concerning an act (non-payment of VAT) for which a definitive administrative penalty has been imposed on the defendant?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 16/25

Appeal brought on 13 November 2015 by Diapharm GmbH & Co. KG against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 16 September 2015 in Case T-620/14 Diapharm GmbH & Co. KG v European Commission

(Case C-597/15 P)

(2016/C 016/31)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Diapharm GmbH & Co. KG (represented by: M. Weidner, T. Guttau, N. Hußmann, Rechtsanwälte)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— conduct an oral hearing;

— set aside the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 16 September 2015 in Case T-620/14;

— order the European Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the form of order which it seeks, the appellant relies on two grounds of appeal:

— Procedural errors: the General Court partially provided an inadequate statement of grounds for its decision. The General Court did not address in detail the content of the Commission’s letter allegedly putting an end to the failure to act and thus reached a wrong decision.

— Infringement of EU law: the General Court wrongly refused to recognise the conditions of Article 265 TFEU, since the Commission’s failure to act was not brought to an end. In addition, the General Court incorrectly assessed Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006, (1) in particular Articles 17 and 28 thereof. Deferred and authorised health claims cannot be treated as equivalent. The legal consequences resulting from the transitional provisions are not sufficiently predictable. Lastly, contrary to the view taken by the General Court, the appellant is directly and adversely affected by the Commission’s continuing failure to act.

(1) Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on nutrition and health claims made on foods, OJ 2006 L 404, p. 9.
2.

In accordance with Article 28 of Directive 2012/27/EU, the Member States are obliged to adopt the national provisions necessary to comply with the directive by 5 June 2014 and, more specifically, with respect to particular obligations which are referred to in particular articles, which are referred to in Article 28, by the dates specified in those articles, and to communicate the measures which they adopt to the Commission. That communication is an intrinsic element of the obligation to transpose EU directives into national law and of the duty of sincere cooperation, and that fact is also reflected in Article 260(3) TFEU.
2.

Second plea: The General Court should afford Panasonic and MTPD the same relief as may be granted to Toshiba Corporation (‘Toshiba’) in any appeal that it may bring in relation to the period of time for which Toshiba was found jointly and severally liable with Panasonic and MTPD. In T-104/13 Toshiba v Commission, the General Court held that any annulment or alteration of the Decision in relation to the imputation of the unlawful conduct of the joint venture MTPD to Panasonic also benefitted Toshiba. Consequently, Panasonic contends that, should Toshiba obtain an order from this Court setting aside the judgment of the General Court insofar as it did not annul the Decision and/or annul or reduce the fine in relation to the period of time for which Toshiba was found jointly and severally liable for an infringement with Panasonic and MTPD, the General Court would also have erred in not granting Panasonic and MTPD the same relief as ought to have been granted to Toshiba.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 27/27

Appeal brought on 23 November 2015 by Schniga GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 10 September 2015 in joined Cases T-91/14 and T-92/14: Schniga GmbH v Community Plant Variety Office

(Case C-625/15 P)

(2016/C 027/31)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Schniga GmbH (represented by: G. Würtenberger, R. Kunze, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: Community Plant Variety Office, Brookfield New Zealand Ltd, Elaris SNC

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— annul the judgement of the General Court of 10 September 2015 in joined cases T-91/14 and T-92/14;

— order the CPVO and the Interveners to bear the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The General Court committed a legal error in the application of Article 7 of Regulation No. 2100/94 (1) on Community Plant Variety Rights (hereinafter: CPVR) as well as of Articles 22 and 23 of Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1239/95 (2) of 31 May 1995.

The General Court wrongly assessed the competence of the President of the Community Plant Variety Office in the inclusion of additional characteristics in the examination process of a variety to be granted Community plant variety protection.

The General Court wrongly assessed the legal nature of technical protocols and guidelines to be applied in the technical examination of an applied for Community plant variety right, resulting in a wrong assessment of the time frame in which the President of the Community Plant Variety Office may decide that a new characteristic for determination of distinctness of the new variety may be taken into account.

The General Court erred in assessing the consequence of the application of the principles of legal certainty, the objectivity of the Community Plant Variety Office and equal treatment in relation to the decisions of the President of the Community Plant Variety Office in the examination of a new variety.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights

OJ L 227, p. 1.

(2) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1239/95 of 31 May 1995 establishing implementing rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 as regards proceedings before the Community Plant Variety Office

OJ L 121, p. 37.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 38/21

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Netherlands) lodged on 21 October 2015 — J.J. de Lange v Staatssecretaris van Financiën

(Case C-548/15)

(2016/C 038/31)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hoge Raad der Nederlanden

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: J.J. de Lange

Defendant: Staatssecretaris van Financiën

Questions referred

1. Must Article 3 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC (1) of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation be interpreted as meaning that that provision applies to a concession contained in tax legislation on the basis of which study costs may, under certain conditions, be deducted from the taxable income?

In the event that the Court answers the first question referred in the negative:

2. Must the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of age, as a general principle of EU law, be applied to a tax concession on the basis of which training expenditure is only deductible under certain circumstances, even when that concession falls outside the material scope of Directive 2000/78/EC and when that arrangement does not implement EU law?

If the answer to the first or the second question referred is in the affirmative:

3. (a) Can differences in treatment which are contrary to the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of age as a general principle of EU law be justified in a way provided for in Article 6 of Directive 2000/78/EC? (b) If not, what criteria apply to the application of that principle or to the justification of a distinction based on age?

4. (a) Should Article 6 of Directive 2000/78/EC and/or the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of age be interpreted as justifying a difference in treatment on the grounds of age if the ground for that difference in treatment only relates to some of the cases affected by that distinction? (b) Can a distinction based on age be justified by the view of the legislator that beyond a certain age a tax concession need not be available because it is the ‘personal responsibility’ of the person claiming it to achieve the objective pursued by the concession?

(1) OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 27/20

Appeal brought on 13 November 2015 by the Slovak Republic against the order of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 14 September 2015 in Case T-678/14 Slovak Republic v European Commission

(Case C-593/15 P)

(2016/C 027/24)

Language of the case: Slovak

Parties

Appellant: Slovak Republic (represented by: B. Ricziová, Agent)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The Slovak Republic claims that the Court should:

(i) set aside in its entirety the order of the General Court of 14 September 2015 in Case T-678/14 Slovak Republic v European Commission, in which the General Court dismissed as inadmissible the Slovak Republic’s application, brought under Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, for annulment of the European Commission’s decision, contained in its letter of 15 July 2014, formally demanding the Slovak Republic to make funds available corresponding to a loss of traditional own resources;

(ii) itself rule on the admissibility of the Slovak Republic’s application and refer the case back to the General Court for that latter court to rule on the substance of the application;

(iii) order the European Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings.

In the event that the Court should conclude that it does not have sufficient information to make a final decision on the Commission’s objection of inadmissibility, the Slovak Republic claims, in the alternative, that the Court should:

(i) set aside in its entirety the order of the General Court of 14 September 2015 in Case T-678/14 Slovak Republic v European Commission, in which the General Court dismissed as inadmissible the Slovak Republic’s application, brought under Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, for annulment of the European Commission’s decision, contained in its letter of 15 July 2014, formally demanding the Slovak Republic to make funds available corresponding to a loss of traditional own resources;

(ii) refer the case back to the General Court for that latter court to rule on both the admissibility of the Slovak Republic’s application and the substance of that application;

(iii) order the European Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Slovak Republic puts forward two grounds in support of its appeal:

1. In the first ground of appeal, the Slovak Republic alleges that the General Court erred in law so far as concerns (i) the nature of the funds demanded and the applicability of the legal rules concerning own resources and the related case-law, (ii) the criterion of the institution’s competence in the assessment of whether the contested act was open to challenge, and (iii) the right of access to a court and the urgency of the situation.