ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Case C‑332/17

Starman AS

v

Tarbijakaitseamet

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Riigikohus)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Consumer protection — Directive 2011/83/EU — Article 21 — Consumer contracts — Telephone communications — Practice of a telecommunication services provider consisting in offering its customers who have already concluded a contract a speed dial number at a rate higher than the basic rate)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber), 13 September 2018

Consumer protection — Consumer contracts — Directive 2011/83 — Communications by telephone — Operation of several telephone lines by a trader to enable consumers to contact him in relation to a concluded contract — Telephone lines accessible through a landline or speed dial number — Cost of a call to a speed dial number higher than the basic rate — Not permissible

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2011/83, Art. 21, first para.)

The first subparagraph of Article 21 of Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council must be interpreted as precluding a situation in which, if a trader has made available to all its customers one or more speed dial numbers at a rate higher than the basic rate, consumers who have concluded a contract with the trader in question pay more than the basic rate when contacting that trader by telephone in relation to that contract.

This interpretation is in no way called into question by the fact that the trader has informed the consumer in a comprehensible and easily accessible manner of the existence of a telephone number at the basic rate. That information does not release the trader from his obligation not to charge a consumer who has already concluded a contract with him more than the basic rate where the consumer contacts him by telephone in relation to that contract.

Similarly, the fact that the consumer, when contacting the trader, chose voluntarily to use the speed dial number with a higher rate than the basic rate has no bearing on that interpretation. If Articles 21 and 25 of Directive 2011/83 are read together, it is apparent that the consumer cannot voluntarily waive his rights under the Directive and pay more than the basic rate when he contacts a trader by telephone.

(see paras 31-33, operative part)
Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a European order for payment procedure and Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents), and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 must be interpreted as meaning that, where a European order for payment is served on the defendant without the application for the order, annexed to the order, being written in or accompanied by a translation into a language he is deemed to understand, as required by Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1393/2007, the defendant must be duly informed, by means of the standard form in Annex II to Regulation No 1393/2007, of his right to refuse to accept the document in question.

If that formal requirement is omitted, the procedure must be regularised in accordance with the provisions of Regulation No 1393/2007, by communicating to the addressee the standard form in Annex II to that regulation.

In that case, as a result of the procedural irregularity affecting the service of the European order for payment together with the application for the order, the order does not become enforceable and the period in which the defendant may lodge a statement of opposition cannot start to run, so that Article 20 of Regulation No 1896/2006 cannot apply.

(see paras 55-57, operative part)
Appeal—Grounds—Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence—Inadmissibility—Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence—Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Art. 256(1), second para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, al. 1)

(see paras 20, 22)
Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 7 June 2018 — ANKO v Commission

(Case C‑6/17 P) ( 1 )

(Appeal — Arbitration clauses — Perform and Oasis contracts concluded in the context of the Seventh framework programme for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007-2013) — Eligible costs — Reimbursement of sums paid — Counter-claim)

1. Appeal—Grounds—Inadequate statement of reasons—Reliance by the General Court on implied reasoning—Lawfulness—Conditions (see paras 20, 36)

2. Appeal—Grounds—Plea directed against a superfluous ground—Invalid plea in law—Rejection (see paras 28, 29)

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the appeal;

2. Orders ANKO AE Antiprosopeion, Emporiou kai Viomichanias to pay the costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 63, 27.2.2017.
Case C‑329/17

Gerhard Prenninger and Others

v

Oberösterreichische Landesregierung and Netz Oberösterreich GmbH

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Environment — Directive 2011/92/EU — Assessment of the effects of certain projects on the environment — Annex II — Point 1(d) — Concept of ‘deforestation for the purposes of conversion to another type of land use’ — Clearance of a path in a forest in connection with the construction and operation of an overhead electrical power line)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber), 7 August 2018

Environment — Assessment of the effects of certain projects on the environment — Directive 2011/92 — Making the projects listed in Annex II to the directive subject to assessment — Deforestation for the purposes of conversion to another type of land use — Meaning — Clearance of a path in a forest in connection with the construction and operation of an overhead electrical power line — Included

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2011/92, Annex II, point 1(d))

Point 1(d) of Annex II to Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment must be interpreted as meaning that the clearance of a path in a forest for the purpose of the construction and operation of an overhead electrical power line, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, and for the duration of its lawful existence is covered by the concept of ‘deforestation for the purposes of conversion to another type of land use’ within the meaning of that provision.

It follows from the wording of point 1(d) of Annex II to the directive that it does not cover any deforestation, but only deforestation operations carried out for the purpose of conferring a new use on the land concerned. It must be stated that, in so far as the clearance of a path in a forest, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, is planned for the purpose of the construction and operation of an overhead electrical power line, the land concerned is put to new use. Consequently, a clearance, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, is covered by point 1(d) of Annex II to the EIA Directive.

(see paras 32, 33, 41, operative part)
Case C‑602/17

Benoît Sauvage and Kristel Lejeune

v

État belge

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the tribunal de première instance de Liège)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Freedom of movement for workers — Income received in a Member State other than the Member State of residence — Bilateral convention for the prevention of double taxation — Allocation of powers of taxation — Member State of residence’s power to levy tax — Connecting factors)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber), 24 October 2018

Freedom of movement for persons — Workers — Equal treatment — Remuneration — Income tax — Bilateral convention for the prevention of double taxation — National tax scheme under that convention exempting the income of a resident which arises in another Member State and relates to salaried employment in that State only if the activity is actually performed in that State — Lawfulness

(Art. 45 TFEU)

Article 45 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding a tax scheme of a Member State under a tax convention for the purpose of preventing double taxation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which makes the exemption of the income of a resident which arises in another Member State and relates to salaried employment in that State subject to the condition that the activity in respect of which the income is paid is actually performed in that State.

First, as has been stated in paragraph 22 of the present judgment, as the Member States are free to determine connecting factors for the purposes of allocating their powers of taxation, the mere fact that it has been decided to make the power to levy tax of the State in which the income is received dependent on the physical presence of a salaried resident on the territory of that State does not constitute discrimination or a difference in treatment prohibited by virtue of the free movement of workers (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 May 1998, Gilly, C‑336/96, EU:C:1998:221, paragraph 30).

Secondly, the objective of an agreement on double taxation is to prevent the same income from being taxed in each of the two parties to that agreement; it is not to ensure that the tax to which the taxpayer is subject in one State is no higher than that to which he or she would be subject in the other contracting State (judgment of 19 November 2015, Bukovansky, C‑241/14, EU:C:2015:766, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

(see paras 27, 28, 37, operative part)
Case C‑413/17

Proceedings brought by ‘Roche Lietuva’ UAB

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Public supply contract for medical diagnostic equipment and materials — Directive 2014/24/EU — Article 42 — Award — Margin of appreciation of the contracting authority — Detailed formulation of the technical specifications)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber), 25 October 2018

Approximation of laws — Procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts — Directive 2004/18 — Temporal application — Decision of the contracting authority choosing the type of procedure to be followed for the award of a contract adopted after that directive was repealed — Inapplicability of the directive (European Parliament and Council Directives 2004/18 and 2014/24, Art. 91, first para.)

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Limits — General or hypothetical questions — Questions relating to a terminated procurement procedure — Remaining interest in the resolution of the dispute established by the referring court — Absence of hypothetical nature — Admissibility (Art. 267 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 94)

Approximation of laws — Procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts — Directive 2014/24 — Laying down technical specifications — Discretion of the awarding authority — Limits — Respect for the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency — Detailed formulation of the technical specifications — Requirement to add the words ‘or equivalent’ after the designation of a particular product (European Parliament and Council Directive 2014/24, Art. 42)
Article 8(1) and (2) of Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, read in conjunction with Article 3(1) thereof, and Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which, as interpreted by the relevant national courts, the owner of an internet connection used for copyright infringements through file-sharing cannot be held liable to pay damages if he can name at least one family member who might have had access to that connection, without providing further details as to when and how the internet was used by that family member.

It must be held that if, in situations such as those at issue in the main proceedings, national legislation, as interpreted by the relevant national courts, has the effect of creating an obstacle to a national court before which a tortious action has been brought from being able to compel, on application of the claimant, the providing and obtaining of evidence relating to the opposing party’s family members, proving the alleged infringement of copyright and who was responsible for that infringement are rendered impossible, and, consequently, the fundamental rights to an effective remedy and to intellectual property, enjoyed by the holder of the copyright, are seriously infringed, and thereby the requirement to ensure a fair balance between the various fundamental rights in question is not respected (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 July 2015, Coty Germany, C‑580/13, EU:C:2015:485, paragraph 41). Therefore, by guaranteeing an almost absolute protection for the family members of the owner of an internet connection, through which copyright infringements were committed by means of file-sharing, the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings cannot, contrary to the requirements set by Article 8(1) of Directive 2001/29, be considered to be sufficiently effective and capable of ultimately leading to effective and dissuasive sanctions against the perpetrator of that infringement. Furthermore, the procedure initiated in respect of the remedy at issue in the main proceedings is not capable of ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights required by Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/48. In addition, it is, ultimately, for the referring court to determine whether, if applicable, there are, in the national law concerned, any other means, procedures or remedies which would allow the competent judicial authorities to order that information necessary for proving, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, an infringement of copyright and who infringed it be provided (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2015, Coty Germany, C‑580/13, EU:C:2015:485, paragraph 42).

(see paras 51, 52, 54, 55, operative part)
Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see para. 36)
Article 23(1) in conjunction with Article 2(18) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community must be interpreted as meaning that, when indicating air fares for intra-Community air services, air carriers who do not express those fares in euros are required to choose a local currency that is objectively linked to the service offered. That is the case in particular of the currency which is legal tender in the Member State in which the place of departure or arrival of the flight is located.

Thus, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in which an air carrier established in a Member State in which the euro is legal tender offers on the internet an air service for which the place of departure of the flight is located in another Member State in which a currency other than the euro is legal tender, the air fares may, if they are not expressed in euros, be indicated in the currency which is legal tender in that other Member State.

In this context, it cannot be accepted that, by choosing to express air fares for intra-Community air services in a currency other than the euro, air carriers can make the comparison of prices by the customers concerned more difficult or even impossible in practice, without fundamentally calling into question the objective of price comparability pursued by Article 23(1) of Regulation No 1008/2008 and consequently depriving that provision of a great part of its effectiveness. It should be added that, as the Advocate General essentially observes in point 64 of his Opinion, effective comparability of prices would be facilitated if air carriers indicated air fares in a local currency objectively linked to the service offered.

(see paras 35, 36, 39, 40, operative part)
Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure, as amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 517/2013 of 13 May 2013, must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘parties’ covers solely the applicant and the defendant in the main proceedings.

In that regard, it must be noted, first, that Article 3(1) of Regulation No 861/2007 does not define the concept of ‘parties’, nor does it refer to the law of the Member States on that issue. In those circumstances, the concept of ‘parties’ referred to in Article 3(1) of that regulation must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation within the legal order of the European Union. Regarding the general scheme of Regulation No 861/2007, it must be noted, as the referring court has done, that that regulation provides solely for the rights and obligations of the applicant and defendant in the main proceedings. It therefore follows from the general scheme of Regulation No 861/2007 that the participation of parties intervening in the disputes covered by that regulation was not envisaged.

(see paras 22, 23, 26, 27, 30, operative part 1)
It is true that when the Commission evaluates the Union interest in opening an investigation in competition matters, it is required to assess in each case how serious the alleged interferences with competition are and how persistent their consequences are and that that obligation means in particular that it must take into account the duration and extent of the infringements complained of and their effect on the competition situation in the European Union. However, in view of the fact that the assessment of the Union interest raised by a complaint depends on the circumstances of each case, the number of criteria of assessment the Commission may refer to should not be limited, nor conversely should it be required to have recourse exclusively to certain criteria. Given that, in a field such as competition law, the factual and legal circumstances may differ considerably from case to case, it is permissible to apply criteria which have not hitherto been considered or to give priority to a single criterion for assessing that Union interest.

(see paras 60, 61)
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 7 November 2019 — Aanbestedingskalender and Others v Commission

(Case C‑687/17 P) ( 1 )

(Appeal — State aid — Aid granted by the Netherlands authorities for the creation and introduction of the TenderNed electronic procurement platform — Decision that the measure does not constitute State aid, within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU)

1. Competition — EU rules — Undertaking — Concept — Exercise of an economic activity — Activities connected with the exercise of public power prerogatives — Activities not able to be separated therefrom — Not included (Art. 107(1) TFEU) (see paras 15-19, 44)

2. Competition — EU rules — Undertaking — Concept — Exercise of an economic activity — Electronic public procurement platform offering a certain number of functions, available free of charge to awarding bodies — Activities of the platform connected in part with the exercise of public power prerogatives — Exclusion of those activities and of all connected activities not able to be separated therefrom (Art. 107(1) TFEU) (see paras 39-45)

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the appeal;

2. Orders Aanbestedingskalender BV, Negometrix BV, CTM Solution BV, Stillpoint Applications BV and Huisinga Beheer BV to pay the costs;

3. Orders the Kingdom of the Netherlands to bear its own costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 94, 12.3.2018.
Appeal — Grounds — Inadequate statement of reasons — Scope of the obligation to state reasons — Obligation for the General Court to justify any divergence between different judgments — No such obligation

(Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 36 and 53, first para.)

(see para. 49)
Where a project to increase the capacity of a plant for the production of electricity, such as the project at issue in the main proceedings, has not been subject to a preliminary examination of the need to carry out an environmental impact assessment pursuant to national legislative provisions subsequently declared incompatible with Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment in that regard, EU law requires Member States to nullify the unlawful consequences of that breach and does not preclude that plant from being subject, after completion of the project, to a new assessment by the competent authorities for the purpose of verifying whether it complies with that directive and, where appropriate, to an environmental impact assessment, on condition that the national rules allowing for that regularisation do not provide the parties concerned with an opportunity to circumvent the rules of EU law or to dispense with applying them. The environmental impact of the project from the time of its completion must also be taken into account. Those authorities are entitled to take the view, on the basis of national provisions in force at the time they are required to give a decision, that such an environmental impact assessment is not required, in so far as those provisions are compatible with that directive.