ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.

Does EU law (in particular the principle of free administration by public authorities and the principle that the different rules governing the award of service contracts and the management of services relevant to public authorities must be essentially equivalent) preclude a national law (such as that set out in Article 192(2) of the Italian Public Procurement Code, Legislative Decree No 50 of 2016), which places the in-house award of contracts on a subordinate level to award by means of public tender procedure and establishes it as an exception to the latter, by: (i) permitting contracts to be awarded in house only when there is clear evidence of failure in the relevant market, and (ii) requiring authorities intending to make an award by inter-organisational delegation to provide specific reasons with regard to the benefits for society at large accruing from that form of award?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 22 February 2019 — FZ v DER Touristik GmbH

(Case C-153/19)

(2019/C 182/23)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: FZ

Defendant: DER Touristik GmbH

Question referred

Do a traveller’s claims against a travel organiser, under a contract for travel, for a price reduction because of shortcomings in the flight on account of a flight delay constitute claims to further compensation under Article 12 of Regulation No 261/2004 (1), and can compensation granted as a result of the flight delay in application mutatis mutandis of Article 7 of the Regulation be deducted from those claims in accordance with Article 12 of that regulation?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
1.

In the case of an appeal as referred to in Article 32(3) of the Visa Code (1) against a final decision refusing a visa on the ground referred to in Article 32(1)(a)(vi) of the Visa Code, can it be said that there is an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 47 of the EU Charter under the following circumstances: — where, in its reasons for the decision, the Member State merely stated: ‘you are regarded by one or more Member States as a threat to public policy, internal security, public health as defined in Article 2.19 or 2.21 of the Schengen Borders Code, or to the international relations of one or more Member States’; — where, in the decision or in the appeal, the Member State does not state which specific ground or grounds of those four grounds set out in Article 32(1)(a)(vi) of the Visa Code is being invoked; — where, in the appeal, the Member State does not provide any further substantive information or substantiation of the ground or grounds on which the objection of the other Member State (or Member States) is based?
1.

Does the change in reservation of a passenger at check-in, who has a confirmed reservation on a specific flight, to a later flight against his will constitute denied boarding within the meaning of Article 4(3) of the Air Passenger Rights Regulation, (1) if the flight on which the passenger had a confirmed reservation is then carried out?
1.

Can the provision in Article 70(1) of Law No 4235/2014, to the effect that ‘In the case of mortgages or pre-notices of mortgages, which have been recorded in the registers of mortgages and in the Land Registry if appropriate in favour of the Bank known as “Αgrotiki Trapeza tis Ellados ΑΕ” (“the Bank”), which has now entered into special liquidation, which affect farmers who are natural persons or third party farmers who are natural persons and are over their agricultural immovable property or their agricultural production plant in order to secure claims of the Bank of any kind which arise from loans — such as claims on the principal, interest, interest on arrears, including interest on interest as it falls due and on interest on arrears, charges, costs and expenses and all other outlays as specified in the relevant loan agreement — with respect to the granting by the Bank to farmers, natural persons, of short-term and medium-term loans which relate exclusively to their agricultural activity and repayment of which is overdue, wholly or in part, the amount of the loan with respect to which there has been recorded a mortgage or a pre-notice of mortgage shall be restricted in the proportion of 120 for every hundred (120 %) of the principal amount of the loan, provided that the total sum of the abovementioned claims of the Bank of any kind, as arising from the loan, do not exceed (including amounts already paid) an amount that is double the initial principal, and shall be restricted to the sum that is double the amount of the due principal of the loan if the total amount of the claims is greater than double, at the time when the present article enters into force and the loan becomes, if it has not already so become, payable and due in full as from that date. In the event that there is a recorded mortgage or pre-notice of mortgage on more than one agricultural immovable property, of a natural person, or of a third natural person, the mortgage or pre-notice of mortgage shall be limited by the Bank to the immovable property or properties which secure its claim up to the above maximum figures and preferably to the immovable property or properties which do not constitute the first residence and/or the main stock of agricultural equipment of the farmer or that third party’, be classified as State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU?
1.

On the basis of Article 260(1) TFEU, the Hellenic Republic is obliged to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court in Case C-149/14. However, the Hellenic Republic failed to take all the necessary measures to comply with the operative part of that judgment. In particular, the Hellenic Republic failed to undertake a programme of work in relation to vulnerable areas characterised by the presence of bodies of surface water or groundwater which are affected by pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources. Consequently, the Commission decided to bring an action before the Court.
2.

In deciding the issue of whether there is a well-founded fear of being persecuted within the meaning of Article 2(e) of the QD and the issue of whether there is protection available against such persecution, pursuant to Article 7 QD, is the ‘protection test’ or ‘protection inquiry’ to be applied to both issues and, if so, is it governed by the same criteria in each case?
Appeal brought on 18 February 2019 by Vans, Inc. against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 6 December 2018 in Case T-817/16, Vans, Inc. v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

(Case C-123/19 P)

(2019/C 220/21)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Vans, Inc. (represented by: M. Hirsch and M. Metzner, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Deichmann SE

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

1. set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union (Ninth Chamber) of 6 December 2018 in Case T-817/16, annul the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of 21 September 2016 in Case R2030/2015-4 and reject the opposition in its entirety;

2. order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The General Court incorrectly proceeded on the basis that the intervener had sufficiently substantiated the earlier mark; in particular, the General Court interpreted the concept of ‘equivalent document’ under Rule 19(2)(a)(ii) of Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 (1) (now Article 7(2)(a)(ii) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625) (2) too broadly;

— Contrary to what the General Court found, an extract from the TMView database is not an ‘equivalent document’ within the meaning of Rule 19(2)(a)(ii) of Regulation No 2868/95; this is apparent, first, from the clear wording of the provision, which refers, in respect of authorised equivalent documents, to the nature, not the origin, of the document, and, second, from the rationale behind the provision;

— Nor can an extract from TMView be established as substantiating evidence on the basis of the properties of the database;

— The opposition would therefore have to be rejected simply because the earlier right was not substantiated;

— Furthermore, the General Court incorrectly proceeded on the basis that there is a likelihood of confusion between the signs at issue; in particular, while the General Court noted the existing differences between the signs, it did not consider them any further when assessing the visual similarity of the signs, but merely stated generally and without further reasoning that the signs were visually similar to an average degree.

(1) Commission Regulation of 13 December 1995 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 on the Community trade mark (OJ L 303, 15.12.1995, p. 1).

(2) Commission Regulation of 5 March 2018 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union trade mark, and repealing Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/1430 (OJ L 104, 24.4.2018, p. 1).
Appeal brought on 14 February 2019 by China Construction Bank Corp. against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 6 December 2018 in Case T-665/17: China Construction Bank v EUIPO

(Case C-115/19 P)

(2019/C 213/03)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: China Construction Bank Corp. (represented by: A. Carboni, J. Gibbs, Solicitors)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Groupement des cartes bancaires

Form of order sought

The Appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court dated 6 December 2018 in Case T-665/17;

— give final judgment in respect of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 (1) or alternatively that the case be remitted to the General Court, and

— order the EUIPO and any intervening parties in this appeal to bear their own costs and pay the Appellant’s costs of these proceedings and those of the proceedings before the General Court in Case T-665/17.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Appellant has three grounds of appeal in respect of the contested decision, which are that the General Court:

1. infringed Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR; and

2. failed to state reasons for its finding that the intervener's earlier mark relied on (‘earlier mark’) had enhanced distinctive character in relation to ‘financial affairs, monetary affairs, banking’, and/or

3. distorted the facts both in relation to its assessment of the earlier mark and the opposed mark and in reaching the said finding of enhanced distinctive character.

The Appellant’s plea of infringement of Article 8(1)(b) can be further sub-divided into the following errors made by the General Court in its assessment of the case:

1. the General Court took account of the reputation of the earlier mark at the first stage of assessing the similarity of the marks, as well as when conducting the global assessment of likelihood of confusion, which was an incorrect approach and resulted in impermissible ‘double counting’;

2. the General Court wrongly treated both the earlier mark and opposed mark as if they were essentially word marks, paying insufficient regard to their figurative nature, which adversely affected the assessment of both the visual and the aural similarities of the marks in issue and the relative weight to be given to each;

3. the General Court made a number of errors in relation to identifying the services in class 36 for which it held that the earlier mark had a reputation and thus distinctive character, and

4. both as a result of the foregoing errors and as a result of ignoring additional important factors, the General Court failed to conduct a proper global assessment of the likelihood of confusion between the earlier mark and the opposed mark.

(1) Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017, L 154, p. 1).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 11 January 2019 by the Court of Auditors of the European Union against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 8 November 2018 in Case T-874/16, RA v Court of Auditors

(Case C-27/19 P)

(2019/C 238/05)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Court of Auditors of the European Union (represented by: E. von Bardeleben, C. Lesauvage, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: RA

By order of 24 April 2019, the Court (Ninth Chamber) removed the case from the register of the Court.
1.

(a) Does the term ‘management’ within the meaning of the second indent of the second paragraph of Annex I to Directive 2004/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage (Environmental Liability Directive) (1) include activities inextricably bound up with direct use for land yield purposes? If so: (b) Under what conditions is the management of sites, as defined in habitat records or target documents, to be considered ‘normal’ within the meaning of the Environmental Liability Directive? (c) What is the time-scale for deciding if management is ‘as carried on previously’ by owners or operators within the meaning of the Environmental Liability Directive? (d) Should the question of whether management is as carried on previously by owners or operators within the meaning of the Environmental Liability Directive be answered independently of the habitat records or target documents?
2.

Is Article 2, in conjunction with Article 4(3), of the Treaty on European Union, to be interpreted as meaning that the obligation on Romania to comply with the requirements laid down in reports prepared in accordance with the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), established by Commission Decision 2006/928/EC of 13 December 2006, forms part of the Member State’s obligation to comply with the principles of the rule of law, including in so far as concerns a constitutional court (a politico-judicial institution) refraining from intervening in order to interpret the law and to establish the specific and mandatory rules for the application of the law by judicial bodies, a task which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the judicial authorities, and in order to introduce new legislative measures, a task which falls within the exclusive competence of the legislative authorities? Does EU law require that the effects of any such decision, adopted by a constitutional court, should be disregarded? Does EU law preclude a provision of national law which governs the liability to disciplinary action of the judge who disapplied the decision of the Curtea Constituțională (Constitutional Court), in the context of the question referred?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de Primera Instancia e Instrucción de Ceuta (Spain) lodged on 27 March 2019 — LG, PK v Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A.

(Case C-259/19)

(2019/C 246/07)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de Primera Instancia e Instrucción de Ceuta

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: LG, PK

Defendant: Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A.

Questions referred

Whether, under Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, (1) in particular Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of the directive, the following ruling is compliant with EU law in order to ensure protection for consumers and users and compliance with the relevant case-law: the ruling by the Supreme Court in judgments 44 to 49 of 23 January 2019, which establishes the unambiguous criterion that a term in a consumer mortgage loan agreement that has not been negotiated and that stipulates that all the costs of arranging the mortgage are to be borne by the borrower is unfair, and which apportions the various expenses that are involved in the unfair term found to be void between the bank that imposed the term and the borrower, in order to limit repayments of amounts wrongly paid under national legislation.

And whether, under Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, in particular Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of the directive, in order to ensure protection for consumers and users and compliance with the relevant case-law, it is compliant with EU law for the Supreme Court to adopt an inclusive interpretation of a term that is void for unfairness if the term can be severed and its effects abolished without affecting the continued existence of the mortgage loan agreement.

(1) OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29.
4.

Infringement of the obligation to state reasons The judgment under appeal does not contain sufficient reasoning as to why the General Court accepted the assertion that in the Baltic states a significant proportion of citizens know the meaning of the Russian word ‘пломбир’. In particular, there is a lack of a finding that it is a basic vocabulary word that is also understood by those for whom Russian is not their mother tongue. The judgment under appeal (in particular paragraphs 64 and 65) also contains insufficient reasoning as to why ‘пломбир’ did not refer to a fancy name or trade mark for a product in the former USSR. Finally, the judgment under appeal (paragraph 66) provided no justification as to why the mere mention of a term in the GOST set of technical standards should allow it to be assumed that it is a ‘common word’ in Russian and why this set of standards should be known by the relevant public in the European Union.
4.

Having regard to recitals 8 and 14 in the preamble to the directive, are Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 2009/28/EC (1) on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources to be interpreted as meaning that they oblige Member States to guarantee legal certainty for investors in the area of generation of electricity from renewable sources, including solar energy, by means of national measures for implementing the directive? If that question is answered in the affirmative: Is a national provision such as Paragraph 18 PZR ZIDZE, which significantly changes the preferential conditions for the purchase of electricity from renewable sources, even for long-term agreements which have already been entered into for the purchase of electricity from such sources in accordance with the originally adopted national measures for implementing the directive, permissible pursuant to Articles 3 and 4 in conjunction with recitals 8 and 14 of Directive 2009/28?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven (Netherlands) lodged on 3 May 2019 — De Ruiter vof v De Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit

(Case C-361/19)

(2019/C 270/18)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: De Ruiter vof

Defendant: De Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit

Question referred

Are Article 99(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 (1) of the European Parliament and the Council of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy [and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008] and Article 73(4)(a) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 809/2014 (2) of 17 July 2014 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the integrated administration and control system, rural development measures and cross compliance valid, in so far as, in those provisions, the year of the finding of non-compliance is decisive for the determination of the year for which the cross-compliance reduction is calculated, in a situation where the year of the non-compliance with the cross-compliance rules is not the same as the year of the finding of non-compliance?

(1) OJ 2013 L 347, p. 549.

(2) OJ 2014 L 227, p. 69.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Satversmes tiesa (Latvia) lodged on 11 June 2019 — B v Latvijas Republikas Saeima

(Case C-439/19)

(2019/C 280/34)

Language of the case: Latvian

Referring court

Satversmes tiesa

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: B

Defendant: Latvijas Republikas Saeima

Questions referred

1. Must the expression ‘[p]rocessing of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences or related security measures’, used in Article 10 of Regulation 2016/679, (1) be interpreted as meaning that it includes the processing of information relating to penalty points recorded against drivers for motoring offences as provided for in the provision at issue?

2. Irrespective of the answer to the first question, can the provisions of Regulation 2016/679, in particular the principle of ‘integrity and confidentiality’ referred to in Article 5(1)(f) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that they prohibit Member States from stipulating that information relating to penalty points recorded against drivers for motoring offences falls within the public domain and from allowing such data to be processed by being communicated?

3. Must recitals 50 and 154 and Articles 5(1)(b) and 10 of Regulation 2016/679 and Article 1(2)(cc) of Directive 2003/98/EC (2) be interpreted as meaning that they preclude legislation of a Member State which allows information relating to penalty points recorded against drivers for motoring offences to be transmitted for the purposes of re-use?

4. If any of the foregoing questions is answered in the affirmative, must the principle of the primacy of EU law and the principle of legal certainty be interpreted as meaning that it might be permissible to apply the provision at issue and maintain its legal effects until such time as the decision ultimately adopted by the Constitutional Court becomes final?

(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ 2016 L 119, p. 1).

(2) Directive 2003/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 November 2003 on the re-use of public sector information (OJ 2003 L 345, p. 90).
1.

Is Article 44 of Directive 2006/112 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that when a taxable person carrying on a non-economic activity consisting of the purchase and sale of shares and other securities in the course of the management of the assets of a charitable trust acquires a supply of investment management services from a person outside of the Community exclusively for the purposes of such activity, it is to be regarded as ‘a taxable person acting as such’?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Cluj (Romania) lodged on 15 May 2019 — SC Banca E S.A. v G.D.

(Case C-381/19)

(2019/C 288/29)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Cluj

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: SC Banca E S.A.

Respondent: G.D.

Question referred

Given the primacy of EU law, must the principles of legal certainty and effectiveness be interpreted as precluding, in disputes concerning the protection of consumer rights, the alteration of the procedural rules, after the consumer has brought an action before the courts, by means of a binding decision of the Curtea Constituțională (Constitutional Court), to which effect is given in a law amending the Codul de procedură civilă (Code of Civil Procedure), which institutes a new means of appeal, one that can be used by the trader, with the result that the duration of the proceedings is extended and the costs of resolving the dispute are increased?