ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
3

Recitals 11, 12 and 17 to 19 in the preamble to Regulation No 1346/2000 state as follows: ‘(11) This Regulation acknowledges the fact that as a result of widely differing substantive laws it is not practical to introduce insolvency proceedings with universal scope in the entire Community. The application without exception of the law of the State of opening of proceedings would, against this background, frequently lead to difficulties. … This Regulation should take account of this … [by making provision for] national proceedings covering only assets situated in the State of opening [which] should also be allowed alongside main insolvency proceedings [“the main proceedings”] with universal scope. (12) … To protect the diversity of interests, this Regulation permits secondary proceedings to be opened to run in parallel with the main proceedings. Secondary proceedings may be opened in the Member State where the debtor has an establishment. … … (17) Prior to the opening of the main … proceedings, the right to request the opening of insolvency proceedings in the Member State where the debtor has an establishment should be limited to local creditors and creditors of the local establishment or to cases where main proceedings cannot be opened under the law of the Member State where the debtor has the centre of his main interest. The reason for this restriction is that cases where territorial insolvency proceedings are requested before the main … proceedings are intended to be limited to what is absolutely necessary. If the main … proceedings are opened, the territorial proceedings become secondary. (18) Following the opening of the main … proceedings, the right to request the opening of insolvency proceedings in a Member State where the debtor has an establishment is not restricted by this Regulation. The liquidator in the main proceedings or any other person empowered under the national law of that Member State may request the opening of secondary … proceedings. (19) Secondary … proceedings may serve different purposes, besides the protection of local interests. Cases may arise where the estate of the debtor is too complex to administer as a unit or where differences in the legal systems concerned are so great that difficulties may arise from the extension of effects deriving from the law of the State of the opening to the other States where the assets are located. For this reason the liquidator in the main proceedings may request the opening of secondary proceedings when the efficient administration of the estate so requires.’
7

Article 15 of Regulation No 2201/2003, entitled ‘Transfer to a court better placed to hear the case’, states: ‘1. By way of exception, the courts of a Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter may, if they consider that a court of another Member State, with which the child has a particular connection, would be better placed to hear the case, or a specific part thereof, and where this is in the best interests of the child: (a) stay the case or the part thereof in question and invite the parties to introduce a request before the court of that other Member State in accordance with paragraph 4; or (b) request a court of another Member State to assume jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 5. 2. Paragraph 1 shall apply: (a) upon application from a party; or (b) of the court’s own motion; or (c) upon application from a court of another Member State with which the child has a particular connection, in accordance with paragraph 3. A transfer made of the court’s own motion or by application of a court of another Member State must be accepted by at least one of the parties. 3. The child shall be considered to have a particular connection to a Member State as mentioned in paragraph 1, if that Member State: (a) has become the habitual residence of the child after the court referred to in paragraph 1 was seised; or (b) is the former habitual residence of the child; or (c) is the place of the child’s nationality; or (d) is the habitual residence of a holder of parental responsibility; or (e) is the place where property of the child is located and the case concerns measures for the protection of the child relating to the administration, conservation or disposal of this property. 4. The court of the Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter shall set a time limit by which the courts of that other Member State shall be seised in accordance with paragraph 1. If the courts are not seised by that time, the court which has been seised shall continue to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 8 to 14. 5. The courts of that other Member State may, where due to the specific circumstances of the case, this is in the best interests of the child, accept jurisdiction within six weeks of their seisure in accordance with paragraph 1(a) or 1(b). In this case, the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction. Otherwise, the court first seised shall continue to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 8 to 14. 6. The courts shall cooperate for the purposes of this Article, either directly or through the central authorities designated pursuant to Article 53.’
20

In those circumstances, the Eparkhiako Dikastirio Lefkosias decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Bearing in mind that the laws of the Member States on defamation affect the capacity to provide information services by electronic means both at national level and within the European Union, might those laws be regarded as restrictions on the provision of information services for the purposes of applying Directive 2000/31 …? (2) If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative, do the provisions of Articles 12, 13 and 14 of Directive 2000/31 …, on the question of liability, apply to private civil matters, such as civil liability for defamation, or are they limited to civil liability in matters concerning business to consumer transactions? (3) Bearing in mind the purpose of Articles 12, 13 and 14 of Directive 2000/31 … relating to the liability of information society service providers and the fact that, in many Member States, an action must exist in order for a prohibitory injunction to be granted which will remain in force pending full completion of the proceedings, do those articles create individual rights which may be pleaded as defences in law in a civil action for defamation, or must they operate as an obstacle in law to the bringing of such actions? (4) Do the definitions of “information society service” and “service provider” in Article 2 of Directive 2000/31 … and Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34 … cover online information services the remuneration for which is provided not directly by the recipient, but indirectly by means of commercial advertisements posted on the website? (5) Bearing in mind the definition of “information service provider”, laid down in Article 2 of Directive 2000/31/EC and Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34 … could the following, or any of them, be regarded as a “mere conduit” or “caching” or “hosting” for the purposes of Articles 12, 13 and 14 of Directive 2000/31: (a) a newspaper that operates a free website on which the online version of the printed newspaper, with all its articles and advertisements, is posted in pdf format or another similar electronic format; (b) an online newspaper which is freely accessible but the provider obtains money from commercial advertisements posted on the website, where the information contained in the online newspaper comes from the newspaper’s staff and/or freelance journalists; (c) a website which provides (a) or (b) above for a subscription?’
6

Article 5 of Directive 2008/7, entitled ‘Transactions not subject to indirect tax’, provides: ‘1. Member States shall not subject capital companies to any form of indirect tax whatsoever in respect of the following: (a) contributions of capital; (b) loans, or the provision of services, occurring as part of contributions of capital; (c) registration or any other formality required before the commencement of business to which a capital company may be subject by reason of its legal form; (d) alteration of the constituent instrument or regulations of a capital company, and in particular the following: (i) the conversion of a capital company into a different type of capital company; (ii) the transfer from a Member State to another Member State of the centre of effective management or of the registered office of a capital company; (iii) a change in the objects of a capital company; (iv) the extension of the period of existence of a capital company; (e) the restructuring operations referred to in Article 4. 2. Member States shall not subject the following to any form of indirect tax whatsoever: (a) the creation, issue, admission to quotation on a stock exchange, making available on the market or dealing in stocks, shares or other securities of the same type, or of the certificates representing such securities, by whomsoever issued; (b) loans, including government bonds, raised by the issue of debentures or other negotiable securities, by whomsoever issued, or any formalities relating thereto, or the creation, issue, admission to quotation on a stock exchange, making available on the market or dealing in such debentures or other negotiable securities.’
7

Article 4 of that directive provides: ‘1. Member States shall have the option to limit the liability of the guarantee institutions referred to in Article 3. 2. When Member States exercise the option referred to in paragraph 1, they shall specify the length of the period for which outstanding claims are to be met by the guarantee institution. However, this may not be shorter than a period covering the remuneration of the last three months of the employment relationship prior to and/or after the date referred to in Article 3. Member States may include this minimum period of three months in a reference period with a duration of not less than six months. Member States having a reference period of not less than 18 months may limit the period for which outstanding claims are met by the guarantee institution to eight weeks. In this case, those periods which are most favourable to the employee are used for the calculation of the minimum period. 3. Furthermore, Member States may set ceilings on the payments made by the guarantee institution. These ceilings must not fall below a level which is socially compatible with the social objective of this Directive. When Member States exercise this option, they shall inform the Commission of the methods used to set the ceiling.’
6

Under Article 100, entitled ‘Procedure’ of Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund (OJ 2006 L 210, p. 25): ‘1. Before taking a decision on a financial correction, the Commission shall open the procedure by informing the Member State of its provisional conclusions and requesting the Member State to submit its comments within two months. Where the Commission proposes a financial correction on the basis of extrapolation or at a flat rate, the Member State shall be given the opportunity to demonstrate, through an examination of the documentation concerned, that the actual extent of irregularity was less than the Commission’s assessment. In agreement with the Commission, the Member State may limit the scope of this examination to an appropriate proportion or sample of the documentation concerned. Except in duly justified cases, the time allowed for this examination shall not exceed a further period of two months after the two-month period referred to in the first subparagraph. 2. The Commission shall take account of any evidence supplied by the Member State within the time limits mentioned in paragraph 1. 3. Where the Member State does not accept the provisional conclusions of the Commission, the Member State shall be invited to a hearing by the Commission, in which both sides in cooperation based on the partnership shall make efforts to reach an agreement concerning the observations and the conclusions to be drawn from them. 4. In case of an agreement, the Member State may reuse the Community funds concerned in conformity with the second subparagraph of Article 98(2). 5. In the absence of agreement, the Commission shall take a decision on the financial correction within six months of the date of the hearing taking account of all information and observations submitted during the course of the procedure. If no hearing takes place, the six-month period shall begin to run two months after the date of the letter of invitation sent by the Commission.’
3

Recitals 10, 12 and 14 to 16 in the preamble to Directive 95/46 state: ‘(10) … the object of the national laws on the processing of personal data is to protect fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy, which is recognised both in Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in the general principles of Community law; … for that reason, the approximation of those laws must not result in any lessening of the protection they afford but must, on the contrary, seek to ensure a high level of protection in the Community; ... (12) … there should be excluded the processing of data carried out by a natural person in the exercise of activities which are exclusively personal or domestic, such as correspondence and the holding of records of addresses; ... (14) … given the importance of the developments under way, in the framework of the information society, of the techniques used to capture, transmit, manipulate, record, store or communicate sound and image data relating to natural persons, this Directive should be applicable to processing involving such data; (15) … the processing of such data is covered by this Directive only if it is automated or if the data processed are contained or are intended to be contained in a filing system structured according to specific criteria relating to individuals, so as to permit easy access to the personal data in question; (16) … the processing of sound and image data, such as in cases of video surveillance, does not come within the scope of this Directive if it is carried out for the purposes of public security, defence, national security or in the course of State activities relating to the area of criminal law or of other activities which do not come within the scope of Community law.’
6

Paragraphs 2 and 6 of Article 5 of the Authorisation Directive, entitled ‘Rights of use for radio frequencies and numbers’, provide: ‘2. … Without prejudice to specific criteria and procedures adopted by Member States to grant rights of use of radio frequencies to providers of radio or television broadcast content services with a view to pursuing general interest objectives in conformity with Community law, the rights of use for radio frequencies and numbers shall be granted through open, objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate procedures, and, in the case of radio frequencies, in accordance with the provisions of Article 9 of [the Framework Directive]. An exception to the requirement of open procedures may apply in cases where the granting of individual rights of use of radio frequencies to the providers of radio or television broadcast content services is necessary to achieve a general interest objective as defined by Member States in conformity with Community law. When granting rights of use, Member States shall specify whether those rights can be transferred by the holder of the rights, and under which conditions. In the case of radio frequencies, such provision shall be in accordance with Articles 9 and 9b of [the Framework Directive]. … 6. Competent national authorities shall ensure that radio frequencies are efficiently and effectively used in accordance with Articles 8(2) and 9(2) of [the Framework Directive]. They shall ensure competition is not distorted by any transfer or accumulation of rights of use of radio frequencies. For such purposes, Member States may take appropriate measures such as mandating the sale or the lease of rights to use radio frequencies.’
18

In those circumstances, the Centrale Raad van Beroep (Higher Social Security Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) (a) Must EU law, in particular Article 45 TFEU and Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1612/68, be interpreted as precluding the Member State of the European Union (namely, the Kingdom of the Netherlands) from terminating the right to receive study finance for education or training outside the European Union of an adult dependent child of a frontier worker with Netherlands nationality who lives in Belgium and works partly in the Netherlands and partly in Belgium, at the point in time at which the frontier work ceases and work is then performed exclusively in Belgium, on the ground that the child does not meet the requirement that she must have lived in the Netherlands for at least three of the six years preceding her enrolment at the educational institution concerned? (b) If Question (1)(a) must be answered in the affirmative: does EU law preclude the granting of study finance for a period shorter than the duration of the education or training for which study finance was granted, it being assumed that the other requirements governing eligibility for study finance have been satisfied? If, in answering Questions (1)(a) and (b), the Court of Justice should conclude that the legislation governing the right of freedom of movement for workers does not preclude a decision not to grant Ms Martens any study finance during the period from November 2008 to June 2011 or for part of that period: (2) Must Articles 20 TFEU and 21 TFEU be interpreted as precluding the Member State of the European Union (namely, the Kingdom of the Netherlands) from not extending the study finance for education or training at an educational institution which is established in the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) (in the present case, in Curaçao), to which there was an entitlement because the father of the person concerned worked in the Netherlands as a frontier worker, on the ground that the person concerned does not meet the requirement, applicable to all European Union citizens, including its own nationals, that she must have lived in the Netherlands for at least three of the six years preceding her enrolment for that education or training?’
8

Regulation No 1408/71 cites as a legal basis, inter alia, Article 51 of the EEC Treaty (subsequently Article 51 of the EC Treaty and, following amendment, Article 42 EC), to which Article 48 TFEU now corresponds. Those Articles concern principally the coordination of the social security schemes of the Member States and the payment of benefits under those coordinated schemes. After that citation, the preamble to Regulation No 1408/71 contains, amongst others, the following recitals: ‘Whereas the provisions for coordination of national social security legislations fall within the framework of freedom of movement for workers who are nationals of Member States and should contribute towards the improvement of their standard of living and conditions of employment; … Whereas the considerable differences existing between national legislations as regards the persons to whom they apply make it preferable to establish the principle that the Regulation applies to all persons insured under social security schemes for employed persons and for self-employed persons or by virtue of pursuing employment or self-employment; Whereas it is necessary to respect the special characteristics of national social security legislations and to draw up only a system of coordination; … Whereas employed persons and self-employed persons moving within the Community should be subject to the social security scheme of only one single Member State in order to avoid overlapping of national legislations applicable and the complications which could result therefrom; … Whereas with a view to guaranteeing the equality of treatment of all workers occupied on the territory of a Member State as effectively as possible, it is appropriate to determine as the legislation applicable, as a general rule, that of the Member State in which the person concerned pursues employment [or] self-employment; Whereas in certain situations which justify other criteria of applicability, it is possible to derogate from this general rule; …’
4

In a judgment of 16 July 1969, that court had established the ‘theory of final withdrawal’. The order for reference indicates, in essence, that that theory was based on the principle that the Federal Republic of Germany, as the State of establishment of a company, lost its right with respect to the taxation of unrealised capital gains, pertaining to an asset of that company, generated on German territory where that asset had been transferred to a permanent establishment located within the territory of another State, to the extent that the Federal Republic of Germany was required to exempt the profits of that permanent establishment under the double taxation agreement with the State in whose territory the permanent establishment was located. The transfer of assets from a company established in Germany to a permanent establishment located within the territory of another State was therefore regarded as a withdrawal, to be valued as part of a going concern, within the meaning of the second sentence of Paragraph 4(1) of the Law on Income Tax (Einkommensteuergesetz, ‘the EStG’).
10

Article 7 of that directive provides: ‘1. A return decision shall provide for an appropriate period for voluntary departure of between seven and thirty days, without prejudice to the exceptions referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4. Member States may provide in their national legislation that such a period shall be granted only following an application by the third-country national concerned. In such a case, Member States shall inform the third-country nationals concerned of the possibility of submitting such an application. The time period provided for in the first subparagraph shall not exclude the possibility for the third-country nationals concerned to leave earlier. 2. Member States shall, where necessary, extend the period for voluntary departure by an appropriate period, taking into account the specific circumstances of the individual case, such as the length of stay, the existence of children attending school and the existence of other family and social links. 3. Certain obligations aimed at avoiding the risk of absconding, such as regular reporting to the authorities, deposit of an adequate financial guarantee, submission of documents or the obligation to stay at a certain place may be imposed for the duration of the period for voluntary departure. 4. If there is a risk of absconding, or if an application for a legal stay has been dismissed as manifestly unfounded or fraudulent, or if the person concerned poses a risk to public policy, public security or national security, Member States may refrain from granting a period for voluntary departure, or may grant a period shorter than seven days.’
2.

The Combined Nomenclature in Annex I to Regulation No 2658/87, in the version resulting from Regulation No 1006/2011, must be interpreted as meaning that the fact that video cameras integrated in sports goggles, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, offer the possibility to record and store on an interchangeable storage medium video and audio files from an external source precludes their classification under subheading 8525 80 91 of that nomenclature if that recording may be made independently and without relying on external materials or software.