ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
10

Article 266 of the wetboek van de inkomstenbelastingen 1992 (Income Tax Code 1992), in the version applicable to the main proceedings (‘the ITC 1992’), provides: ‘The King may, under the conditions and within the limits which He shall specify, refrain, totally or partially, from levying advance tax on income from capital and movable property, and miscellaneous income, provided that it is income received by parties whose identity can be established, or by collective investment undertakings governed by foreign law which have jointly owned assets managed by a management company on behalf of the participants where their shares are not the subject of a public issue in Belgium and are not traded in Belgium, or income from bearer securities and dematerialised securities falling into one of the following categories: 1. income which is statutorily exempt from movable property tax or real estate tax or which is taxable at a rate of less than 15%, and which is generated from securities issued before 1 December 1962; 2. income from certificates from Belgian collective investment institutions; 3. issue premiums for bonds, deposit certificates and other loan securities issued on or after 1 December 1962. In no circumstances may He waive the levying of withholding tax on income from: 1. loan securities for which the interest is capitalised … 2. securities on which no periodic interest is payable, which are issued … at a discount equivalent to the capitalised interest up to the maturity of the security … … Paragraph 2 shall not apply to securities derived from the splitting of linear bonds issued by the Belgian State.’
28

This is the case with regard to Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation, which explicitly requires that objective criteria defining the existence of a risk of absconding be ‘defined by law’. Since those criteria have been established neither by that regulation nor in another EU legal act, the elaboration of those criteria, in the context of that regulation, is a matter for national law. That finding is, moreover, confirmed by a combined reading of, on the one hand, Article 8(3)(f) of the Reception Directive, under which an applicant may be detained in accordance with Article 28 of the Dublin III Regulation, and, on the other hand, the final sentence of Article 8(3) of the Reception Directive which specifies that the grounds for such detention are to be laid down in national law. Furthermore, recital 20 of the Dublin III Regulation provides, in turn, that, as regards the general guarantees governing detention, as well as detention conditions, where appropriate, Member States should apply the provisions of the Reception Directive also to persons detained on the basis of that regulation, that directive specifically containing, in its Article 8, a direct reference to national law. It follows that criteria such as those listed in Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation require implementation in the national law of each Member State.
46

While it is true that that double reference is not devoid of any ambiguity because it seems to refer both to the rules on taxing the supply on the basis of the dealer’s profit margin and to those exempting the supply from VAT, it should however be noted, as the European Commission has observed, that it is not obvious that that double reference is such as to arouse the suspicions of a prudent trader who is not a VAT expert as to the existence of an infringement or fraud committed by a trader at an earlier stage. It is not inconceivable that the taxable person may interpret the double reference as confirming that the supply was carried out, pursuant to Article 314(d) of the VAT Directive, by another taxable dealer, in so far as the supply by that other taxable dealer had been subject to VAT in accordance with the margin scheme. Both the reference to exemption from VAT and the reference to the margin scheme on the invoices at issue in the main proceedings could also be interpreted by the taxable person, as Litdana submitted at the hearing, as confirming that the dealer’s margin alone is being taxed, the value of the goods concerned remaining exempt, a matter which is for the referring court to ascertain.
15

Article 7 of the directive, concerning the procedure for limiting the number of rights of use to be granted for radio frequencies, provides: ‘1. Where a Member State is considering whether to limit the number of rights of use to be granted for radio frequencies or whether to extend the duration of existing rights other than in accordance with the terms specified in such rights, it shall inter alia: (a) give due weight to the need to maximise benefits for users and to facilitate the development of competition; (b) give all interested parties, including users and consumers, the opportunity to express their views on any limitation in accordance with Article 6 of [the Framework] Directive; (c) publish any decision to limit the granting of rights of use or the renewal of rights of use, stating the reasons therefor; (d) after having determined the procedure, invite applications for rights of use; and (e) review the limitation at reasonable intervals or at the reasonable request of affected undertakings. 2. Where a Member State concludes that further rights of use for radio frequencies can be granted, it shall publish that conclusion and invite applications for such rights. 3. Where the granting of rights of use for radio frequencies needs to be limited, Member States shall grant such rights on the basis of selection criteria which must be objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate. Any such selection criteria must give due weight to the achievement of the objectives of Article 8 of [the Framework] Directive and of the requirements of Article 9 of that directive. 4. Where competitive or comparative selection procedures are to be used, Member States may extend the maximum period of six weeks referred to in Article 5(3) for as long as necessary to ensure that such procedures are fair, reasonable, open and transparent to all interested parties, but by no longer than eight months. …’
29

In addition, in paragraphs 54 to 60 of each of the judgments under appeal, the General Court noted that the EU legislation on medicinal products applicable when the MA application was made for Aclasta did not govern the issue whether a development of that medicinal product must be authorised by a variation of the terms of the initial MA or whether it could be authorised by the grant of a separate MA. It was only after the entry into force of Regulation No 726/2004 that a restriction on the grant of several MAs was introduced. Accordingly, when it filed its MA application for Aclasta, Novartis had the choice of either submitting an application for the variation of the terms and extension of the MA for Zometa, or submitting a separate MA for a medicinal product bearing a different name, which it did for commercial reasons, as is clear from the contents of its letter of 26 February 2001 to the EMA, and from the Public Assessment Report on Aclasta. According to the General Court, the market strategy of an undertaking cannot affect the data protection period for a given active substance. It referred, in that respect, to point 57 in the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Novartis Pharmaceuticals (C‑106/01, EU:C:2003:49, paragraph 57), according to which, to exclude the application of the case-law established in the judgment of 3 December 1998, Generics (UK) and Others (C‑368/96, EU:C:1998:583), whenever a subsequently authorised variant of a reference product had been given a new designation would elevate form over substance, and would create an easy route for applicants to gain additional data protection in circumvention of that case-law. According to the General Court, if an independent data protection period automatically started to run as a result of the authorisation of a variation consisting in the improvement of a reference medicinal product by the grant of a separate MA, the holder of the MA of a reference medicinal product would be able to extend the date protection period in relation to that medicinal product indefinitely.
13

Article 30 of Directive 2001/14, entitled ‘Regulatory body’, which forms part of Chapter IV, entitled ‘General measures’, provides: ‘1. Without prejudice to Article 21(6), Member States shall establish a regulatory body. This body, which can be the Ministry responsible for transport matters or any other body, shall be independent in its organisation, funding decisions, legal structure and decision-making from any infrastructure manager, charging body, allocation body or applicant. The body shall function according to the principles outlined in this Article whereby appeal and regulatory functions may be attributed to separate bodies. 2. An applicant shall have a right to appeal to the regulatory body if it believes that it has been unfairly treated, discriminated against or is in any other way aggrieved, and in particular against decisions adopted by the infrastructure manager or where appropriate the railway undertaking concerning: (a) the network statement; (b) criteria contained within it; (c) the allocation process and its result; (d) the charging scheme; (e) [the] level or structure of infrastructure fees which it is, or may be, required to pay; … 3. The regulatory body shall ensure that charges set by the infrastructure manager comply with Chapter II and are non-discriminatory. Negotiations between applicants and an infrastructure manager concerning the level of infrastructure charges shall only be permitted if these are carried out under the supervision of the regulatory body. The regulatory body shall intervene if negotiations are likely to contravene the requirements of this directive. 4. The regulatory body shall have the power to request relevant information from the infrastructure manager, applicants and any third party involved within the Member State concerned, which must be supplied without undue delay. 5. The regulatory body shall be required to decide on any complaints and take action to remedy the situation within a maximum period of two months from receipt of all information. Notwithstanding paragraph (6), a decision of the regulatory body shall be binding on all parties covered by that decision. In the event of an appeal against a refusal to grant infrastructure capacity, or against the terms of an offer of capacity, the regulatory body shall either confirm that no modification of the infrastructure manager’s decision is required, or it shall require modification of that decision in accordance with directions specified by the regulatory body. 6. Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that decisions taken by the regulatory body are subject to judicial review.’
6

Article 9 of that same convention, headed ‘Access to justice’, provides in paragraphs 2 to 4: ‘2. Each Party shall, within the framework of its national legislation, ensure that members of the public concerned (a) Having a sufficient interest or, alternatively, (b) Maintaining impairment of a right, where the administrative procedural law of a Party requires this as a precondition, have access to a review procedure before a court of law and/or another independent and impartial body established by law, to challenge the substantive and procedural legality of any decision, act or omission subject to the provisions of Article 6 and, where so provided for under national law and without prejudice to paragraph 3 below, of other relevant provisions of this Convention. What constitutes a sufficient interest and impairment of a right shall be determined in accordance with the requirements of national law and consistently with the objective of giving the public concerned wide access to justice within the scope of this Convention. To this end, the interest of any non-governmental organisation meeting the requirements referred to in Article 2, paragraph 5, shall be deemed sufficient for the purpose of subparagraph (a) above. Such organisations shall also be deemed to have rights capable of being impaired for the purpose of subparagraph (b) above. … 3. In addition and without prejudice to the review procedures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, each Party shall ensure that, where they meet the criteria, if any, laid down in its national law, members of the public have access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private persons and public authorities which contravene provisions of its national law relating to the environment. 4. In addition and without prejudice to paragraph 1 above, the procedures referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above shall provide adequate and effective remedies, including injunctive relief as appropriate, and be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive. Decisions under this article shall be given or recorded in writing. Decisions of courts, and whenever possible of other bodies, shall be publicly accessible.’
Appeal—Grounds—Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence—Inadmissibility—Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence—Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see paras 27, 45, 52)
Case C‑145/16

Aramex Nederland BV

v

Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Douane

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Gerechtshof Amsterdam)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 — Customs union and Common Customs Tariff — Tariff classification — Combined Nomenclature — Validity — Regulation (EU) No 301/2012 — Headings 8703 and 8711 — Three-wheeled motor vehicle called ‘Spyder’)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber), 16 February 2017

Customs union — Common Customs Tariff — Tariff headings — Three-wheeled motor vehicle, fitted with tyres manufactured for three-wheeled motorcycles but similar to those for motor cars, steered using a handlebar and fitted with a steering system based on the Ackermann principle — Classification in heading 8703 of the Combined Nomenclature

(Council Regulation No 2658/87, Annex I, headings 8703 and 8711; Commission Regulation No 927/2012)

The Combined Nomenclature set out in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, as amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 927/2012 of 9 October 2012, must be interpreted as meaning that a three-wheeled vehicle, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, fitted with tyres manufactured for three-wheeled motorcycles but similar to those for motor cars, steered using a handlebar and fitted with a steering system based on the Ackermann principle, falls within heading 8703 of that nomenclature.

(see para. 35, operative part)
1.

Declares that, since the Hellenic Republic failed to submit a report on cost-optimal levels, as is laid down in the second subparagraph of Article 5(2) of Directive 2010/31/ΕU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the energy performance of buildings, as supplemented by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 244/2012 (2) of 16 January 2012 establishing a comparative methodology framework for calculating cost-optimal levels of minimum energy performance requirements for buildings and building elements, the Hellenic Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 5(2) of Directive 2010/31;
Case C‑302/16

Bas Jacob Adriaan Krijgsman

v

Surinaamse Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the rechtbank Noord-Nederland)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Air transport — Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 — Article 5(1)(c) — Compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of cancellation of a flight — Exemption from the obligation to pay compensation — Contract for carriage concluded through an online travel agent — Air carrier having informed the travel agent in good time of a change to the scheduled time for the flight — Travel agent having communicated that information to a passenger by email 10 days before the flight)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber), 11 May 2017

Transport — Air transport — Regulation No 261/2004 — Common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights — Exemption from the obligation to pay compensation — Contract for carriage concluded through an online travel agent — Air carrier having informed the travel agent in good time of a change to the scheduled time for the flight — Travel agent having communicated that information to a passenger by email 10 days before the flight — Included

(European Parliament and Council Regulation No 261/2004, Arts 5(1)(c) and 7)

Article 5(1)(c) and Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, must be interpreted as meaning that the operating air carrier is required to pay the compensation specified in those provisions in the case where a flight was cancelled and that information was not communicated to the passenger at least two weeks before the scheduled time of departure, including in the case where the air carrier, at least two weeks before that time, communicated that information to the travel agent via whom the contract for carriage had been entered into with the passenger concerned and the passenger had not been informed of that cancellation by that agent within that period.

(see para. 31, operative part)
Case C‑75/16

Livio Menini

and

Maria Antonia Rampanelli

v

Banco Popolare Società Cooperativa

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Ordinario di Verona)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Consumer protection — Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures — Directive 2008/52/EC — Directive 2013/11/EU — Article 3(2) — Applications by consumers to set an order aside in the context of payment order proceedings instituted by a credit institution — Right of access to the judicial system — National legislation providing for mandatory recourse to a mediation procedure — Obligation to be assisted by a lawyer — Condition for the admissibility of proceedings before the courts)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 14 June 2017

Consumer protection — Consumer rights — Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures — Directive 2013/11 — National legislation requiring the use of a mediation procedure as a condition for the bringing of legal proceedings — Lawfulness — Condition — National legislation providing, in the context of a mediation procedure, that consumers must be assisted by a lawyer and that they may withdraw from the procedure only by demonstrating the existence of a valid reason in support of that decision — Not permissible

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2013/11, Art. 2(1))

Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR) must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which prescribes recourse to a mediation procedure, in disputes referred to in Article 2(1) of that directive, as a condition for the admissibility of legal proceedings relating to those disputes, to the extent that such a requirement does not prevent the parties from exercising their right of access to the judicial system.

On the other hand, that directive must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides that, in the context of such mediation, consumers must be assisted by a lawyer and that they may withdraw from a mediation procedure only if they demonstrate the existence of a valid reason in support of that decision.

(see para. 71, operative part)
Appeal—Grounds—Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence—Inadmissibility—Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence—Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see paras 31-33)
It should be noted that the Commission has broad discretion in determining the benchmarks in individual sectors or subsectors under Article 10a(2) of Directive 2003/87. That exercise entails, on the institution’s part, choices and complex technical and economic assessments as well. The legality of a measure adopted in that area can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate (judgments of 8 September 2016, Borealis and Others, C‑180/15, EU:C:2016:647, paragraph 45, and of 26 October 2016, Yara Suomi and Others, C‑506/14, EU:C:2016:799, paragraph 37).

It is clear from recital 11 of Decision 2011/278 that, when no data were available or the data collected did not comply with the benchmarking methodology, information on present levels of emissions and consumptions and on most efficient techniques, mainly derived from the BREFs, was used to derive benchmark values. In particular, due to a lack of data on the treatment of waste gases, heat exports and electricity production, the values for the product benchmarks for coke and hot metal were derived from calculations of direct and indirect emissions based on information on relevant energy flows provided by the relevant BREF and default emission factors set out in the LDSD 2007 (judgments of 8 September 2016, Borealis and Others, C‑180/15, EU:C:2016:647, paragraph 47, and of 26 October 2016, Yara Suomi and Others, C‑506/14, EU:C:2016:799, paragraph 39).

Furthermore, in respect of waste gases generated during the production of hot metal, according to recital 32 of Decision 2011/278 the product benchmarks take account of the efficient energy recovery of waste gases and emissions related to use of those gases. To that end, for the determination of the benchmark values for products of which the production generates waste gases, the carbon content of those waste gases has been taken into account to a large extent (judgments of 8 September 2016, Borealis and Others, C‑180/15, EU:C:2016:647, paragraph 48, and of 26 October 2016, Yara Suomi and Others, C‑506/14, EU:C:2016:799, paragraph 40).

In such circumstances, it does not appear that, by basing its determination of the benchmark for hot metal in Decision 2011/278 on the data in the iron and steel BREF and the LDSD 2007, the Commission infringed the obligation to use the most exact and up-to-date scientific data available and the principle of sound administration.

(see paras 31-34)