ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 4(1) of Directive 2010/13 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services, as well as the principle of equal treatment and Article 56 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding, in principle, a national rule which lays down shorter hourly television advertising limits for pay-TV broadcasters than those set for free-to-air broadcasters, provided that the principle of proportionality is observed, which is a matter for the referring court to assess.

In that regard, the principles and objectives of the rules on the television advertising limits laid down by the directives on the supply of audiovisual media services, are intended to establish a balanced protection, on the one hand, of the financial interests of television broadcasters and advertisers, and, on the other hand, of the interests of rights holders, namely writers and producers, in addition to consumers as television viewers. The balanced protection of those interests differs according to whether or not the broadcasters transmit their programmes for payment, since the former generate revenue from subscriptions taken out by viewers, whereas the latter do not benefit from such a direct source of financing and must finance themselves either by generating income from television advertising, or by other sources of financing. Moreover, the situation of viewers is objectively different owing to the fact that, contrary to subscribers of a free-to-air broadcaster, subscribers of a pay-TV broadcaster have a direct commercial relationship with their broadcaster and pay to enjoy television programmes.

Finally, as regards the freedom to provide services set out in Article 56 TFEU, the national rule at issue is capable of constituting a restriction of that freedom. However, the protection of consumers against abuses of advertising constitutes an overriding reason relating to the general interest which may justify restrictions on the freedom to provide services on condition that such restrictions must still be applied so as to ensure achievement of the aim pursued and not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose.

(see paras 18-20, 22, 24-26, operative part)
Articles 45 TFEU and 48 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding rules of a Member State which do not allow its nationals employed in an international organisation, established in the territory of another Member State, to transfer to the social security scheme of that organisation the capital value representing the pension rights they have acquired previously in the territory of their Member State of origin, where there is no arrangement between that Member State and the international organisation providing for the possibility of such a transfer.

Where a mechanism for transferring the capital value representing the pension rights acquired previously in a Member State to the pension scheme of a new employer in another Member State cannot apply, Article 45 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding rules of a Member State which do not allow account to be taken of employment periods which a European Union national completed with an international organisation, established in the territory of another Member State, for the purposes of conferring entitlement to an old-age pension.

Such rules would give rise to a situation where persons who have exercised their right of free movement, including employment or contribution periods which do not amount to the minimum period required under national legislation for vesting entitlement to a pension, risk losing the opportunity of receiving old-age benefits to which they would have been entitled had they not accepted employment in another Member State with an international organisation. Such rules are, therefore, liable to impede their exercise of their right to free movement.

(see paras 46, 49, operative part)
As regards the method of calculation which is to be used in a review procedure for an anti-dumping duty, the exception, provided for by Article 11(9) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation No 384/96, replaced by Regulation No 1225/2009, whereby the institutions may, in the review procedure, apply a method different from that used in the original investigation when the circumstances have changed must be interpreted strictly, for a derogation from or exception to a general rule must be interpreted narrowly. The burden of proof relating to such a change in circumstances lies with the institutions, which must prove that those circumstances have changed in order to apply, in the review investigation, a method different from that implemented during the original investigation. However, as regards the fact that such a change in circumstances for the purposes of Article 11(9) of the basic anti-dumping regulation constitutes an exception, the requirement that a provision be interpreted strictly cannot permit the institutions to interpret and apply the provision in a manner inconsistent with its wording and purpose. In particular, the method applied must be consistent with Article 2 of that regulation.

As regards the method of calculation which is to be used in a review procedure for an anti-dumping duty, given that Article 11(9) of basic anti-dumping Regulation No 384/96, replaced by Regulation No 1225/2009, expressly requires the method applied in the review to comply with the requirements of Article 2 of that regulation, such a review may not give rise to an adjustment that is not authorised, in particular, by Article 2(10)(b) of that regulation.

Thus, since the asymmetry which was the reason for an adjustment at the time of the initial procedure, such as an adjustment on a ‘value added tax inclusive’ basis intended to take account of the refund in part of that export tax, ceases to exist, at the time of the review it is no longer necessary to re-establish the symmetry between normal value and export price, which is the aim of any adjustment under Article 2(10) of the basic anti-dumping regulation. From the moment the factor that caused the asymmetry in the original investigation, namely, the partial refund of the export value added tax, ceased to exist, it was no longer necessary to correct that asymmetry or therefore to make any adjustment, regardless of the method of adjustment actually applied. Accordingly, the circumstances that justified an adjustment having changed, the General Court was fully entitled to hold that the point was not whether there had been any change of method but rather that the conditions for such an adjustment were not satisfied and, for the sake of completeness, that, even if there had been a change of method, it would have been warranted by changing circumstances.

(see paras 27, 29, 36-38)
Article 4(8) of Regulation No 65/2011 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation No 1698/2005, as regards the implementation of control procedures as well as cross-compliance in respect of rural development support measures, must be interpreted as meaning that the conditions for its application require both an objective and a subjective element. With regard to the first element, it is for the referring court to consider the objective evidence which may lead to the conclusion that the objective pursued by the support scheme of the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) cannot be achieved. With regard to the second element, it is for the referring court to consider the objective evidence which may lead to the conclusion that, by artificially creating the conditions required for obtaining such a payment under the EAFRD support scheme, the applicant for such a payment intended exclusively to obtain an advantage contrary to the objectives of that scheme. In that regard, the referring court can take as its basis not only elements such as the legal, economic and/or personal links between the persons involved in similar investment projects, but also indications showing that there was intentional coordination between those persons.

In addition, that court must, in particular, take into consideration the definition of a micro-enterprise, the creation and development of which are the object of the support referred to in Article 52 of Regulation No 1698/2005, as follows from Article 2(3) of the annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/361 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises.

(see paras 38, 43, operative part 1)
Article 22(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the Contracting State in which the property is situated does not encompass all actions concerning rights in rem in immovable property, but only those which both come within the scope of the [Brussels Convention] and are actions which seek to determine the extent, content, ownership or possession of immovable property or the existence of other rights in rem therein and to provide the holders of those rights with protection for the powers which attach to their interest.

Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and, in particular, Article 22(1) thereof must be interpreted as not applying to non-contentious proceedings by which a national of a Member State who has been declared to be lacking full legal capacity and placed under guardianship in accordance with the law of that State applies to a court in another Member State for authorisation to sell his share of a property situated in that other Member State, in view of the fact that such proceedings are concerned with the ‘legal capacity of natural persons’ for the purposes of Article 1(2)(a) of Regulation No 44/2001, a matter which falls outside the material scope of that regulation.

In that regard, an application by a person who has been placed under guardianship for authorisation to dispose of his immovable property is directly linked to the legal capacity of the natural person concerned for the purposes of Article 1(2)(a) of Regulation No 44/2001: the fact that judicial authorisation is necessary for the disposal of immovable property belonging to persons under guardianship is the immediate consequence of their lack of full legal capacity, being a requirement laid down for their protection in that context.

In addition, the particular fact that the judicial authorisation to sell, applied for by the person under guardianship, involves a property which belongs to him cannot be regarded as decisive in determining whether those proceedings concern ‘rights in rem in immovable property’ for the purposes of Article 22(1) of Regulation No 44/2001. Those proceedings do not seek to determine the extent, content, ownership or possession of immovable property or to provide the person under guardianship, as the owner of that property, with protection for the powers which attach to his interest. Instead, the sole aim of such proceedings is to determine whether it is in the interests of a person who lacks full legal capacity to dispose of his immovable property; his rights in rem as owner of that property are not being called in question.

(see paras 26, 28, 30, 31, operative part)
Article 3(1) of Directive 72/166 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and to the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability, Article 1(1) and (2) of Second Directive 84/5 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, as amended by Directive 2005/14, and Article 1(1) of Third Directive 90/232 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles must be interpreted as meaning that compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles must cover compensation for non-material damage suffered by the next of kin of the deceased victims of a road traffic accident, in so far as such compensation is provided for as part of the civil liability of the insured party under national law.

In the light of the different language versions of Article 1(1) of the Second Directive, Article 1(1) of the Third Directive and the protective aim of the three directives referred to above, the notion of ‘personal injuries’ covers any type of damage, in so far as compensation for such damage is provided for, as part of the civil liability of the insured, under the national law applicable in the dispute, resulting from an injury to physical integrity, which includes both physical and psychological suffering.

In so far as concerns the issue as to who is entitled to compensation for such non-material damage, the protection which must be assured under Directive 72/166 extends to anyone who is entitled, under national civil liability law, to compensation for damage caused by motor vehicles.

Consequently, the Member States are required to ensure that compensation payable, under their national civil liability law, for non-material harm suffered by the next of kin of victims of road traffic accidents is covered by compulsory insurance of at least the minimum amounts laid down in Article 1(2) of the Second Directive.

(see paras 47, 51, 55, 59, operative part)
Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 on the development of the Association, adopted by the Association Council set up by the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, must be interpreted as meaning that where a measure taken by a host Member State seeks to define the criteria for the lawfulness of the Turkish nationals’ situation, by adopting or amending the substantive and/or procedural conditions relating to entry, residence and, where applicable, employment, of those nationals in its territory, and where those conditions constitute a new restriction of the exercise of the freedom of movement of Turkish workers, within the meaning of the ‘standstill’ clause set out in Article 13, the mere fact that the purpose of the measure is to prevent, before an application for a residence permit is made, unlawful entry and residence, does not preclude the application of that clause.

While the measures that may be taken against Turkish nationals whose position is not lawful may apply to the effects of such unlawfulness without falling outside the scope of the ‘standstill’ clause set out in Article 13 of Decision No 1/80, they must not seek to define the unlawfulness itself. Such a restriction, whose purpose or effect is to make the exercise by a Turkish national of the freedom of movement of workers in national territory subject to conditions more restrictive than those applicable at the date of entry into force of Decision No 1/80, is prohibited, unless it falls within the restrictions referred to in Article 14 of that decision or in so far as it is justified by an overriding reason in the public interest. In that regard, whilst the objective of preventing unlawful entry and residence constitutes an overriding reason in the public interest, it is important too that the measure at issue should be suitable for securing the attainment of that objective and that it does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.

(see paras 36, 38, 40-42, operative part 1)
Articles 3 and 9 of Directive 2001/24 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions must be interpreted as meaning that reorganisation or winding-up measures adopted by the legislature, which subject financial institutions under a moratorium to a scheme which has certain effects linked to winding-up proceedings, are to be regarded as measures adopted by an administrative or judicial authority for the purposes of those articles of Directive 2001/24, where those measures, in the form of transitional provisions, take effect only by means of judicial decisions granting a moratorium to a credit institution.

It is the reorganisation and winding-up measures decided by the administrative and judicial authorities of the home Member State which are the subject of recognition under Directive 2001/24, with the effects which the law of that Member State confers on them. Accordingly, the effects which reorganisation and winding-up measures taken by the administrative or judicial authorities of the home Member State may have in the other EU Member States are determined, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 3(2) and the second subparagraph of Article 9(1) of Directive 2001/24, by the law of the home Member State. Therefore, that directive does not prevent that Member State from amending, even with retroactive effect, the legal scheme applicable to such measures.

Furthermore, as is apparent from those provisions, in the context of the system established by Directive 2001/24, the reorganisation and winding-up measures of the home Member State are recognised without any further formalities. In particular, that directive does not make the recognition of reorganisation and winding-up measures subject to a condition that it be possible to bring an action against them. Similarly, according to the second subparagraph of Article 3(2), the host Member State may likewise not make that recognition subject to a condition of that type for which its national rules may provide.

(see paras 28, 30, 38, 40, 42, operative part 1)
Case C‑394/12

Shamso Abdullahi

v

Bundesasylamt

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Asylgerichtshof)

‛Request for a preliminary ruling — Common European Asylum System — Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 — Determination of the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application — Review of compliance with the criteria for determining responsibility for examining the asylum application — Scope of judicial review’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 10 December 2013

Border controls, asylum and immigration — Asylum policy — Criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application — Regulation No 343/2003 — Method of interpretation — Judicial review — Scope — Agreement by the Member State of first entry to take charge of the applicant for asylum challenged by that applicant — Conditions — Systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the conditions for the reception of applicants for asylum in a Member State — Real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment

(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 4; Council Regulation No 343/2003, Arts 10(1) and 19(2))

Article 19(2) of Regulation No 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances where a Member State has agreed to take charge of an applicant for asylum on the basis of the criterion laid down in Article 10(1) of that regulation — namely, as the Member State of the first entry of the applicant for asylum into the European Union — the only way in which the applicant for asylum can call into question the choice of that criterion is by pleading systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the conditions for the reception of applicants for asylum in that Member State, which provide substantial grounds for believing that the applicant for asylum would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

As regards the scope of the appeal provided for in Article 19(2) of Regulation No 343/2003, that regulation must be construed not only in the light of the wording of its provisions, but also in the light of its general scheme, its objectives and its context, in particular its evolution in connection with the system of which it forms part.

(see paras 51, 62, operative part)
Case C‑413/12

Asociación de Consumidores Independientes de Castilla y León

v

Anuntis Segundamano España SL

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Audiencia Provincial de Salamanca)

‛Request for a preliminary ruling — Directive 93/13/EEC — Action seeking an injunction brought by a regional consumer protection association — Jurisdiction of local courts — No remedy against a decision declining jurisdiction delivered at first instance — Procedural autonomy of the Member States — Principles of equivalence and effectiveness’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 5 December 2013

Approximation of laws — Unfair terms in consumer contracts — Directive 93/13 — Means aimed at preventing the continued of unfair terms — Action seeking an injunction brought by a consumer protection association — National rules conferring territorial jurisdiction to hear the action on the court where the defendant is established or has its address — No remedy against a decision declining jurisdiction delivered at first instance — Lawfulness — Respect for the principles of equivalence and effectiveness

(Council Directive 93/13)

Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts and the principles of equivalence and effectiveness must be interpreted as not precluding national procedural rules under which actions for an injunction brought by consumer protection associations must be brought before the courts where the defendant is established or has its address and whereby no appeal lies against a decision declining territorial jurisdiction handed down by a court of first instance.

In the absence of harmonised legal procedural means available to consumer protection associations to prevent the continued use of unfair terms both in the interests of both consumers and competitors, it is for the internal legal order of each Member State, under the principle of procedural autonomy, to establish such rules, provided however that they are not less favourable than those governing similar situations subject to domestic law (principle of equivalence) and that they do not make it impossible in practice or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by EU law on consumer protection associations (principle of effectiveness).

(see paras 30, 53, operative part)
Article 3(c) of Regulation No 469/2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products must be interpreted as precluding the holder of a patent protecting an innovative active ingredient and a marketing authorisation for a medicinal product containing that ingredient as the single active ingredient who has already obtained a supplementary protection certificate for that active ingredient entitling him to oppose the use of that active ingredient, either alone or in combination with other active ingredients, from obtaining — on the basis of that same patent but a subsequent marketing authorisation for a different medicinal product containing that active ingredient in conjunction with another active ingredient which is not protected as such by the patent — a second supplementary protection certificate relating to that combination of active ingredients.

For the purpose of the application of Article 3(c) of that regulation, it cannot be accepted that the holder of a basic patent in force may obtain a new supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products, potentially for a longer period of protection, each time he places on the market in a Member State a medicinal product containing, on the one hand, the principle active ingredient, protected as such by the holder’s basic patent and constituting the core inventive advance of that patent, and, on the other, another active ingredient which is not protected as such by that patent.

(see paras 30, 43, operative part)