Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1 . AGRICULTURE - COMMON ORGANIZATION OF THE MARKET - SUGAR - SALE - MAXIMUM PRICES - UNILATERAL FIXING BY A MEMBER STATE - PROHIBITION

( REGULATION NO 1009/67 OF THE COUNCIL )

2 . QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS - MEASURES HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT - CONCEPT

( EEC TREATY , ARTICLE 30 )

3 . AGRICULTURE - COMMON ORGANIZATION OF THE MARKET - SUGAR - SALE - MAXIMUM PRICES - UNILATERAL FIXING BY A MEMBER STATE - QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS - MEASURE HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT

( REGULATION NO 1009/67 OF THE COUNCIL , ARTICLE 35 )

4 . AGRICULTURE - COMMON ORGANIZATION OF THE MARKETS - SUGAR - SALE - MAXIMUM PRICES - UNILATERAL FIXING BY A MEMBER STATE - JUSTIFICATION - INADMISSIBILITY

( EEC TREATY , ARTICLES 30 AND 103 ; REGULATION NO 1009/67 OF THE COUNCIL )

Summary

1 . THE UNILATERAL FIXING BY A MEMBER STATE OF MAXIMUM PRICES FOR THE SALE OF SUGAR , WHATEVER THE MARKETING STAGE IN QUESTION , IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH REGULATION NO 1009/67 ONCE IT JEOPARDIZES THE OBJECTIVES AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THIS ORGANIZATION AND IN PARTICULAR ITS SYSTEM OF PRICES .

SUCH IS THE CASE WHERE A MEMBER STATE IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE INTERVENTION PRICE HAS BEEN FIXED AT A LEVEL HIGHER THAN THE TARGET PRICE REGULATES THE PRICES IN SUCH A WAY AS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE SUGAR MANUFACTURERS TO OBTAIN AN EX-FACTORY PRICE AT LEAST EQUAL TO THE SAID INTERVENTION PRICE . SUCH AN INDIRECT OBSTRUCTION EXISTS WHEN THE MEMBER STATE IN QUESTION , WITHOUT REGULATING THE PRICES AT THE PRODUCTION STAGE , FIXES MAXIMUM SELLING PRICES FOR THE WHOLESALE AND RETAIL STAGES AT SUCH A LOW LEVEL THAT THE GROWER FINDS IT PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO SELL AT THE INTERVENTION PRICE SINCE , IF HE WERE TO DO SO , IT WOULD FORCE THE WHOLESALERS OR RETAILERS , BOUND BY THE SAID MAXIMUM PRICES , TO SELL AT A LOSS .

2 . FOR NATIONAL MEASURES TO CONSTITUTE MEASURES HAVING AN EFFECT EQUIVALENT TO QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION , IT IS SUFFICIENT THAT THE MEASURES IN QUESTION ARE LIKELY TO CONSTITUTE AN OBSTACLE , DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY , ACTUALLY OR POTENTIALLY , TO IMPORTS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES .

3 . ALTHOUGH A MAXIMUM PRICE APPLICABLE WITHOUT DISTINCTION TO DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED PRODUCTS DOES NOT IN ITSELF CONSTITUTE A MEASURE HAVING AN EFFECT EQUIVALENT TO QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS , IT MAY HAVE SUCH AN EFFECT , HOWEVER , WHEN IT IS FIXED AT A LEVEL SUCH THAT THE SALE OF IMPORTED PRODUCTS BECOMES , IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE , MORE DIFFICULT THAN THAT OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTS . A MAXIMUM PRICE , IN ANY EVENT IN SO FAR AS IT APPLIES TO IMPORTED PRODUCTS , CONSTITUTES THEREFORE A MEASURE HAVING AN EFFECT EQUIVALENT TO A QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION , ESPECIALLY WHEN IT IS FIXED AT SUCH A LOW LEVEL THAT , HAVING REGARD TO THE GENERAL SITUATION OF IMPORTED PRODUCTS COMPARED TO THAT OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTS , DEALERS WISHING TO IMPORT THE PRODUCT IN QUESTION INTO THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED CAN DO SO ONLY AT A LOSS .

4 . IN SO FAR AS A MAXIMUM PRICE FIXED UNILATERALLY BY A MEMBER STATE IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH ARTICLE 30 OF THE TREATY OR THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGRICULTURAL LAW OF THE COMMUNITY A MEMBER STATE CONCERNED CANNOT BASE ITS JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS FIXING EITHER ON ARTICLE 103 OF THE TREATY OR ON THE NEED TO PROTECT THE ECONOMY FROM SPECULATIVE OPERATIONS OR ON A CHANGE OCCURRING IN THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE SUGAR SECTOR .