Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. Competition - Community rules - Simultaneous application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty (now Articles 81 EC and 82 EC) - Whether permissible - Respective objectives of Articles 85 and 86

(EC Treaty, Arts 85(1)(a), (b), (d) and (e) and 86(a) to (d) (now Art. 81(1)(a), (b), (d) and (e) EC and 82(a) to (d) EC))

2. Competition - Dominant position - Collective dominant position - Definition - Collective entity

(EC Treaty, Arts 85(1) and (3) and 86 (now Art. 81(1) and (3) EC and 82 EC))

3. Competition - Dominant position - Collective dominant position - Definition - Liner conference

(EC Treaty, Art. 86 (now Art. 82 EC); Council Regulation No 4056/86, Art. 8(2))

4. Acts of the institutions - Decision - Soundness of a legal assessment - Factors to be taken into account

5. Procedure - Introduction of a new plea in law in the course of the proceedings - Approach of the Court of First Instance - Conditions

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 48(2))

6. Transport - Maritime transport - Competition rules - Dominant position - Abuse - Liner conference - Practice known as fighting ships

(EC Treaty, Art. 86 (now Art. 82 EC); Council Regulation No 4056/86)

7. Competition - Community rules - Simultaneous application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty (now Articles 81 EC and 82 EC) - Whether permissible - Application of Article 86 to a practice exempted under Article 85(3) - Whether permissible

(EC Treaty, Arts 85 and 86 (now Art. 81 EC and 82 EC))

8. Transport - Maritime transport - Competition rules - Dominant position - Abuse - Absolute prohibition

(EC Treaty, Art. 86 (now Art. 82 EC); Council Regulation No 4056/86, Arts 3 and 8(1) and (2))

9. Competition - Administrative procedure - Respect for the rights of the defence - Statement of objections - Necessary content - Clear indication of the parties on whom fines may be imposed

(Council Regulation No 17, Art. 19(1); Commission Regulation No 99/63, Art. 4)

Summary

1. It is clear from the very wording of Articles 85(1)(a), (b), (d) and (e) and 86(a) to (d) of the Treaty (now Articles 81(1)(a), (b), (d) and (e) EC and 82(a) to (d) EC) that the same practice may give rise to an infringement of both provisions. Simultaneous application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty cannot therefore be ruled out a priori. However, the objectives pursued by each of those two provisions must be distinguished. Article 85 of the Treaty applies to agreements, decisions and concerted practices which may appreciably affect trade between Member States, regardless of the position on the market of the undertakings concerned. Article 86 of the Treaty, on the other hand, deals with the conduct of one or more economic operators consisting in the abuse of a position of economic strength which enables the operator concerned to hinder the maintenance of effective competition on the relevant market by allowing it to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and, ultimately, consumers.

( see paras. 33-34 )

2. In terms of Article 86 of the Treaty (now Article 82 EC), a dominant position may be held by several undertakings. The concept of undertaking in the chapter of the Treaty devoted to the rules on competition presupposes the economic independence of the entity concerned. It follows that the expression one or more undertakings in Article 86 of the Treaty implies that a dominant position may be held by two or more economic entities legally independent of each other, provided that from an economic point of view they present themselves or act together on a particular market as a collective entity. That is how the expression collective dominant position should be understood.

In order to establish the existence of a collective entity, it is necessary to examine the economic links or factors which give rise to a connection between the undertakings concerned. In particular, it must be ascertained whether economic links exist between those undertakings which enable them to act together independently of their competitors, their customers and consumers. The mere fact that two or more undertakings are linked by an agreement, a decision of associations of undertakings or a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty (now Article 81(1) EC) does not, of itself, constitute a sufficient basis for such a finding. On the other hand, an agreement, decision or concerted practice (whether or not covered by an exemption under Article 85(3) of the Treaty) may undoubtedly, where it is implemented, result in the undertakings concerned being so linked as to their conduct on a particular market that they present themselves on that market as a collective entity vis-à-vis their competitors, their trading partners and consumers.

The existence of a collective dominant position may therefore flow from the nature and terms of an agreement, from the way in which it is implemented and, consequently, from the links or factors which give rise to a connection between undertakings which result from it. Nevertheless, the existence of an agreement or of other links in law is not indispensable to a finding of a collective dominant position; such a finding may be based on other connecting factors and would depend on an economic assessment and, in particular, on an assessment of the structure of the market in question.

Furthermore, a finding that two or more undertakings hold a collective dominant position must, in principle, proceed upon an economic assessment of the position on the relevant market of the undertakings concerned, prior to any examination of the question whether those undertakings have abused their position on the market.

( see paras. 35-36, 38, 41-45 )

3. It emerges from the provisions of Regulation No 4056/86 laying down detailed rules for the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to maritime transport that, by its very nature and in the light of its objectives, a liner conference, as defined by the Council for the purposes of qualification for block exemption under that regulation, can be characterised as a collective entity which presents itself as such on the market vis-à-vis both users and competitors. So seen, it was logical for the Council to lay down in that regulation the provisions necessary to avoid a liner conference having effects incompatible with Article 86 of the Treaty (now Article 82 EC). That in no way prejudges the question whether, in a given situation, a liner conference holds a dominant position on a particular market or, a fortiori, has abused that position. As is clear from Article 8(2) of that regulation, it is by its conduct that a conference holding a dominant position may have effects which are incompatible with Article 86 of the Treaty.

( see paras. 48-49 )

4. The soundness of a legal assessment by the Commission is to be assessed in the light not only of the facts and circumstances expressly mentioned in the part of the decision devoted to that assessment, but also of any other undisputed factor referred to in the same decision.

( see para. 56 )

5. Although it is true that the Court of First Instance must, in principle, reply to the arguments presented in the course of the procedure and give reasons for a decision on the inadmissibility of an application so that the Court of Justice is able, in the context of an appeal, to exercise its power of review, the Court of First Instance cannot be required, every time that a party raises, in the course of the procedure, a new plea in law which clearly does not satisfy the requirements of Article 48(2) of its Rules of Procedure, either to explain in its judgment the reasons for which that plea is inadmissible, or to examine it in detail. The fact that the Court of First Instance does not expressly rule on the admissibility of a plea does not affect the appellant's situation, so long as that plea is clearly inadmissible.

( see paras. 106-108 )

6. There is an abuse of a dominant position where a liner conference in a dominant position, having a share of over 90% of the market in question and only one competitor, selectively cuts its prices in order deliberately to match those of its competitor. The liner conference concerned derives a dual benefit from that practice, known as fighting ships. First, it eliminates the principal, and possibly the only, means of competition open to the competing undertaking. Second, the liner conference concerned can continue to require its users to pay higher prices for the services which are not threatened by that competition.

( see paras. 117, 119-120 )

7. The applicability to an agreement of Article 85 of the Treaty (now Article 81 EC) does not prevent Article 86 of the Treaty (now Article 82 EC) being applied to the conduct of the parties to the same agreement, provided that the conditions for the application of each provision are fulfilled. More particularly, the grant of an exemption under Article 85(3) does not prevent application of Article 86 of the Treaty. The fact that operators subject to effective competition have a practice which is authorised does not mean that adoption of that same practice by an undertaking in a dominant position can never constitute an abuse of that position. Analysis of the conduct of an undertaking in a dominant position must take account of the fact that an undertaking which has a very large market share and has held it for some time is in a position of strength which makes it an unavoidable trading partner.

( see paras. 130-132 )

8. Article 8(1) of Regulation No 4056/86 laying down detailed rules for the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to maritime transport expressly provides that abuse of a dominant position is to be prohibited, no prior decision to that effect being required. That plain wording is fully in harmony with the principles regarding the effectiveness of Article 86 of the Treaty (now Article 82 EC) and the impossibility of exemption. No exemption of any kind may be granted in respect of an abuse of a dominant position. It follows that Article 8(2) of that regulation, which provides that the Commission may withdraw the benefit of the block exemption where it finds, in a particular case, that the conduct of liner conferences benefiting from the exemption laid down in Article 3 has effects which are incompatible with Article 86 of the Treaty, does not and could not restrict the Commission's power to impose fines for infringement of Article 86 of the Treaty.

( see paras. 135-136 )

9. The statement of objections must set forth clearly all the essential facts upon which the Commission is relying at that stage of the procedure pursuant to the Community competition rules. The essential procedural safeguard which the statement of objections constitutes is an application of the fundamental principle of Community law which requires the right to a fair hearing to be observed in all proceedings. It follows that the Commission is required to specify unequivocally, in the statement of objections, the persons on whom fines may be imposed.

A statement of objections which merely identifies as the perpetrator of an infringement a collective entity does not make the companies forming that entity sufficiently aware that fines will be imposed on them individually if the infringement is made out. The fact that the collective entity does not have legal personality is not relevant in this regard. Similarly, a statement of objections in those terms is not sufficient to warn the companies concerned that the amount of the fines imposed will be fixed in accordance with an assessment of the participation of each company in the conduct constituting the alleged infringement.

( see paras. 142-145 )