ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 4 September 2019 by Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol sp. z o. o. against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 26 June 2019 in Case T-117/18 Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v EUIPO

(Case C-664/19 P)

(2020/C 77/26)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Appellant: Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol sp. z o. o. (represented by: C. Rogula, lawyer)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 5 December 2019, the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) decided that the appeal is not allowed to proceed.
1.

Is Article 4(1)(a) of the Framework Decision (1) to be interpreted to the effect that the criteria set out therein are satisfied only when the sentenced person has, in the Member State of his nationality, such family, social, professional or other links that it is possible to reasonably assume from those links that enforcement in that State of the sentence may facilitate his social rehabilitation, and as therefore precluding national legislation such as Paragraph 4(1)(a) of Zákon č. 549/2011 Z.z. [Law No 549/2011] (in the version in force until 31 December 2019) which, in such cases, enables a judgment to be recognised and enforced in the event of merely formally recorded habitual residence in the executing State, regardless of whether the sentenced person has concrete links in that State which could enhance his social rehabilitation?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 30 December 2019 — Les Chirurgiens-Dentistes de France, Confédération des Syndicats médicaux français, Fédération des Syndicats pharmaceutiques de France, Syndicat des Biologistes, Syndicat des Médecins libéraux, Union dentaire, Conseil national de l’Ordre des Chirurgiens-Dentistes, Conseil national de l’Ordre des Masseurs-Kinésithérapeutes, Conseil national de l’Ordre des Infirmiers v Ministre des Solidarités et de la Santé, Ministre de l’Enseignement supérieur, de la Recherche et de l’Innovation, Premier ministre

(Case C-940/19)

(2020/C 77/42)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Les Chirurgiens-Dentistes de France, Confédération des Syndicats médicaux français, Fédération des Syndicats pharmaceutiques de France, Syndicat des Biologistes, Syndicat des Médecins libéraux, Union dentaire, Conseil national de l’Ordre des Chirurgiens-Dentistes, Conseil national de l’Ordre des Masseurs-Kinésithérapeutes, Conseil national de l’Ordre des Infirmiers

Defendants: Ministre des Solidarités et de la Santé, Ministre de l’Enseignement supérieur, de la Recherche et de l’Innovation, Premier ministre

Question referred

Does Article 4f(6) of Directive 2005/36/EC of 7 September 2005 (1) preclude a Member State from introducing the possibility of partial access to one of the professions covered by the mechanism for the automatic recognition of professional qualifications laid down by the provisions of Chapter III of Title III of that directive?

(1) Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications (OJ 2005 L 255, p. 22).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 12 December 2019 — Eco Fox Srl v Fallimento Mythen Spa and Others

(Case C-915/19)

(2020/C 95/17)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Eco Fox Srl.

Defendants: Fallimento Mythen Spa, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, Ministero dell’Ambiente e della Tutela del Territorio e del Mare, Ministero delle Politiche agricole, alimentari e forestali, Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Agenzia delle Dogane e dei Monopoli

Question referred

In the view of the Court of Justice of the European Union — in the light of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999, (1) as amended, Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 of 21 April 2004, (2) and any further relevant provisions of [EU] law — does the definition of State aid, as such subject to an obligation of prior notification to the European Commission, cover a secondary regulatory instrument such as the regulation adopted by means of Ministerial Decree No 37/2015 — which is being challenged in these proceedings — which, in direct enforcement of judgments of the Council of State requiring the annulment in part of the previous regulations already notified to the Commission, has retroactively affected the procedures for application of the reduced excise duty on biodiesel by retroactively amending the criteria for distribution of the benefit thereof among the applicant companies without extending the duration of the programme of tax concessions?

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ 1999 L 83, p. 1).

(2) Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 of 21 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ 2004 L 140, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 12 December 2019 — Ministero della Giustizia, in the person of the Minister currently responsible v GN

(Case C-914/19)

(2020/C 87/12)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Ministero della Giustizia, in the person of the Minister currently responsible

Respondent: GN

Intervening parties: HM, JL, JJ

Question referred

Do Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 10 TFEU and Article 6 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC (1) of 27 November 2000, in so far as they prohibit discrimination on the basis of age for access to employment, preclude a Member State from imposing an age limit on access to the profession of notary?

(1) Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo (Spain) lodged on 17 December 2019 — Van Ameyde España S.A. v GES Seguros y Reaseguros S.A.

(Case C-923/19)

(2020/C 103/17)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Supremo

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Van Ameyde España S.A.

Defendant: GES Seguros y Reaseguros S.A.

Question referred

Does the final paragraph of Article 3 of Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability, read in conjunction with Article 1 of that directive, preclude an interpretation of national law (Article 5(2) of the Ley sobre responsabilidad civil y seguro en la circulación de vehículos a motor (Law on civil liability and insurance for the use of motor vehicles)) which, in cases such as that in the main proceedings, treats damage to the semi-trailer as being excluded from the cover provided by the compulsory insurance for the truck tractor or tractor unit, on the grounds that the semi-trailer is equated with items being transported in the truck tractor or tractor unit, or even that, for the purposes of damage to property, the semi-trailer forms a single vehicle with the truck tractor or tractor unit?

(1) OJ 2009 L 263, p. 11.
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Trgovački sud u Zagrebu (Croatia) lodged on 18 March 2019 — EOS Matrix d.o.o. v Entazis d.o.o.

(Case C-234/19)

(2020/C 103/07)

Language of the case: Croatian

Referring court

Trgovački sud u Zagrebu

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: EOS Matrix d.o.o.

Defendant: Entazis d.o.o.

By order of 6 November 2019, the Court declared that it manifestly lacks jurisdiction to answer the questions referred by the Trgovački sud u Zagrebu (Croatia).
Appeal brought on 20 December 2019 by Rubik's Brand Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 24 October 2019 in Case T-601/17, Rubik's Brand Ltd v EUIPO — Simba Toys

(Case C-936/19 P)

(2020/C 201/11)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Rubik's Brand Ltd (represented by: K. Szamosi, M. Borbás, ügyvédek)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Simba Toys GmbH & Co. KG

By order of 23 April 2020, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) decided that the appeal should not be allowed to proceed and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 3 December 2019 by Pink Lady America LLC against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 24 September 2019 in Case T-112/18, Pink Lady America v CPVO

(Case C-886/19 P)

(2020/C 161/23)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Pink Lady America LLC (represented by: R. Manno, S. Sernia, avvocati)

Other parties to the proceedings: Community Plant Variety Office, Western Australian Agriculture Authority (WAAA)

By order of 3 March 2020 the Court of JusticeJustice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal is not allowed to proceed and that Pink Lady America LLC shall bear its own costs.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 29 July 2019 by GMP-Orphan (GMPO) against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 16 May 2019 in Case T-733/17, GMPO v Commission

(Case C-575/19 P)

(2020/C 287/39)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: GMP-Orphan (GMPO) (represented by: J. Mulryne, L. Tsang, Solicitors, C. Schoonderbeek, avocate)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 11 June 2020, the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) decided that the appeal should be dismissed as being manifestly inadmissible and ordered GMP-Orphan SA to bear its own costs.
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal de commerce de Bordeaux (France) lodged on 18 November 2019 — Boé Aquitaine SELARL v Mercialys SA

(Case C-838/19)

(2020/C 209/02)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal de commerce de Bordeaux

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Boé Aquitaine SELARL

Defendant: Mercialys SA

By order of 19 March 2020, the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) declared the request for a preliminary ruling manifestly inadmissible.
1.

Is Article 5(1) of Council Directive 91/250/EEC (1) of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs to be interpreted as permitting the lawful purchaser of a computer program to decompile all or part of that program where such decompilation is necessary to enable that person to correct errors affecting the operation of the program, including where the correction consists in disabling a function that is affecting the proper operation of the application of which the program forms a part?
1.

Does a V I 1 document issued under Commission Regulation (EC) No 555/2008 (1) of 27 June 2008 laying down detailed rules for implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2008 on the common organisation of the market in wine as regards support programmes, trade with third countries, production potential and on controls in the wine sector, and containing a certificate issued by an authorised body from a third country certifying that the product has been produced in accordance with oenological practices recommended and published by the OIV or approved by the Community constitute a mere administrative condition for the entry of wine into the territory of the European Union?
2.

Are the principles of equal treatment and transparency laid down in Article 18(1) of [Directive 2014/24] and Articles 33 and 49 of [Directive 2014/24], in conjunction with points 7 and 10(a) of Part C of Annex V to Directive 2014/24, to be interpreted as meaning that either the contract notice or the tender specifications must set a maximum quantity and/or a maximum value of the supplies under the framework contract to which the tender relates, such that the framework contract in question will no longer have any effect when that limit is reached? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, the Court is also asked whether the above provisions are to be interpreted as meaning that the above maximum limit must be indicated in respect of the framework contract (a) as a whole and/or (b) in respect of the original contracting authority which stated its intention to conclude an agreement on the basis of the invitation to tender (in the present case: Region Nordjylland) and/or (c) in respect of the original contracting authority which merely stated that it is participating in one option (in the present case: Region Syddanmark). If the answer to Question 1 and/or Question 2 is in the affirmative, the Court is further asked — in so far as it is relevant to the content of those answers — to answer the following question:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal du travail de Nivelles (Belgium) lodged on 27 February 2020 — SD v Habitations sociales du Roman Païs SCRL, TE, acting as liquidator in the insolvency of Régie des Quartiers de Tubize ASBL

(Case C-104/20)

(2020/C 161/49)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal du travail de Nivelles

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: SD

Defendants: Habitations sociales du Roman Païs SCRL, TE, acting as liquidator in the insolvency of Régie des Quartiers de Tubize ASBL

Questions referred

Must Articles 3, 5 and 6 of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, (1) read in the light of Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and Articles 4(1), 11(3) and 16(3) of Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work, (2) to the extent that they preclude the legislation of a Member State that does not require employers to set up a system enabling the duration of time worked each day by each worker to be measured (judgment of 14 May 2019, CCOO, C-55/18, EU:C:2019:402), be interpreted as precluding national legislation, in the present case Article 1315 of the Belgian Civil Code, which requires a party claiming performance of an obligation to prove that the obligation exists, where that legislation fails to establish that the burden of proof is reversed where workers claim to have exceeded their normal working time and where:

— that national legislation, in the present case the Belgian legislation, does not require employers to set up a reliable system enabling the duration of time worked each day by each worker to be measured; and

— the employer has not spontaneously set up such a system,

— so that it is impossible in practice for a worker to demonstrate that he has exceeded normal working time?’

(1) OJ 2003, L 299, p. 9.

(2) OJ 1989, L 183, p. 1.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 3 January 2020 — B

(Case C-1/20)

(2020/C 137/40)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant in the appeal on a point of law: B

Respondent authority: Finanzamt Wien

Question referred

Is Article 132(1)(g) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the services of a lawyer provided in his or her capacity as a court-appointed guardian — in so far as those services are not services typically provided by a lawyer — are exempt from VAT?

(1) OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 21 February 2020 by Bruno Gollnisch against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 10 December 2019 in Case T-319/19 Bruno Gollnisch v European Parliament

(Case C-122/20 P)

(2020/C 175/06)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Bruno Gollnisch (represented by: B. Bonnefoy-Claudet, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:

— set aside the order of the General Court of the European Union of 10 December 2019 in case number T-319/19;

— refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union for a fresh judgment;

— also order that the sum of EUR 5 000 be paid to the appellant in respect of the costs incurred in the present appeal proceedings;

— order the European Parliament to pay the costs.

If the Court of Justice considers that it has sufficient information, the appellant claims further that the Court of Justice should:

— rule on the substance of the case itself;

— annul the decision of the Bureau of the European Parliament of 10 December 2018 amending the Implementing Measures for the Statute for Members of the European Parliament;

— rule on the form of order sought by the appellant at first instance, without prejudice to the claims made against the order under appeal;

— order the European Parliament to pay all the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

It is alleged that the order wrongly held that the decision at issue did not individually concern the appellant, that, consequently, his complaint of 27 February 2019 did not constitute a pre-litigation procedure and that, since that complaint was not taken into account, the time limits for the judicial proceedings must be regarded as having expired.
2.

Must the effective remedy prescribed in Article 27 of the Dublin III Regulation be interpreted as precluding only the implementation of a measure of enforced transfer while an action brought against that transfer decision is being examined or as prohibiting any measure preparatory to removal, such as relocation to a centre which establishes return paths for asylum seekers who have been requested to have their asylum applications examined in another European country?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg (Luxembourg) lodged on 9 March 2020 — XI v Caisse pour l’avenir des enfants

(Case C-129/20)

(2020/C 191/14)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour de cassation du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: XI

Respondent: Caisse pour l’avenir des enfants

Question referred

Must clauses 1.1, 1.2, 2.1 and 2.3(b) of the framework agreement on parental leave concluded on 14 December 1995 between the general cross-industry organisations UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, which was implemented by Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, (1) be interpreted as precluding the application of a provision of national law, such as Article 29bis of the amended Law of 16 April 1979 laying down the general regulations applicable to State officials in the version resulting from the Law of 22 December 2006 (Mémorial, A, 2006, No 242, p. 4838), which makes the grant of parental leave subject to the twofold condition that the worker is lawfully employed in a workplace and affiliated in that regard to the social security scheme, first, without interruption for a continuous period of at least 12 months immediately preceding the start of the parental leave and, secondly, at the time of the birth or of the reception of the child or children to be adopted, compliance with that second condition being required even if the birth or reception occurred more than 12 months before the start of the parental leave?

(1) OJ 1996 L 145, p. 4.
2.

Does the assumption that a right to damages under Community law for misapplication of EU law, and in particular the incorrect implementation or non-implementation of a directive, exists only where the rule of law infringed is intended to confer rights on individuals, the infringement of the law is qualified in nature (in particular in the form of manifest and grave disregard of a Member State’s discretion in implementing a directive), and the causal link between the infringement and the damage is direct in nature, preclude rules of law of a Member State which, in such cases, confer a right to damages where less stringent conditions are satisfied?
2.

If the answer to Question 1 is that the second alternative applies: Does the first paragraph of Article 5 of Regulation No 2271/96 preclude an understanding under national law that the party giving notice of termination is also able to terminate a continuing obligation with a contracting party named on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List held by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control, including where termination is motivated by compliance with US sanctions, without the need to give a reason for termination and therefore without having to show and prove in civil proceedings that the reason for termination was not to comply with US sanctions?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Rotterdam (Netherlands) lodged on 24 March 2020 — Stichting Rookpreventie Jeugd and Others v Staatssecretaris van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport

(Case C-160/20)

(2020/C 222/20)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank Rotterdam

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Stichting Rookpreventie Jeugd and Others

Defendant: Staatssecretaris van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport

Other party to the proceedings: Vereniging Nederlandse Sigaretten- en Kerftakfabrikanten (VSK)

Questions referred

1. Is the form of the measurement method provided for in Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/14/EU, (1) based on ISO standards which are not freely accessible, in accordance with Article 297(1) TFEU (and Regulation (EU) No 216/2013 (2)) and with the underlying principle of transparency?

2. Must the ISO standards 4387, 10315, 8454 and 8243 referred to by Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/14/EU be interpreted and applied in such a way that, in the interpretation and application of Article 4(1) of that directive, emissions of tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide should not be measured (and verified) only by the prescribed method, but that those emissions may or must also be measured (and verified) in a different manner and with a different intensity?

3. (a) Is Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/14/EU contrary to the underlying principles of that directive and to Article 4(2) thereof as well as to Article 5(3) of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, given that the tobacco industry played a role in determining the ISO standards referred to in Article 4(1) of that directive? (b) Is Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/14/EU contrary to the underlying principles of that directive, to Article 114(3) TFEU, to the spirit of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and to Articles 24 and 35 of the Charter, in so far as the measurement method prescribed therein does not measure the emissions from filter cigarettes during their intended use since, with that method, no account is taken of the effect of the ventilation holes in the filter which are largely closed off during their intended use by the smoker’s lips and fingers?

4. (a) Which alternative measurement method (and verification method) may or must be used should the Court of Justice: — answer question 1 in the negative? — answer question 2 in the affirmative? — answer question 3(a) and/or question 3(b) in the affirmative? (b) [If the Court is unable to give an answer to question 4(a)]: Does the temporary unavailability of a measurement method give rise to a situation such as that referred to in Article 24(3) of Directive 2014/14/EU?

(1) Directive 2014/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related products and repealing Directive 2001/37/EC (OJ 2014 L 127, p. 1).

(2) Council Regulation of 7 March 2013 on the electronic publication of the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ 2013 L 69, p. 1).