ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Grondwettelijk Hof (Belgium) lodged on 21 December 2020 — Orde van Vlaamse Balies, IG, Belgian Association of Tax Lawyers, CD, JU v Vlaamse Regering

(Case C-694/20)

(2021/C 128/13)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Grondwettelijk Hof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Orde van Vlaamse Balies, IG, Belgian Association of Tax Lawyers, CD, JU

Defendant: Vlaamse Regering

Question referred

Does Article 1(2) of Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 (1) of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements infringe the right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the right to respect for private life as guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in that the new Article 8ab(5) which it inserted in Council Directive 2011/16/EU (2) of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC, provides that, where a Member State takes the necessary measures to give intermediaries the right to waiver from filing information on a reportable cross-border arrangement where the reporting obligation would breach the legal professional privilege under the national law of that Member State, that Member State is obliged to require the intermediaries to notify, without delay, any other intermediary or, if there is no such intermediary, the relevant taxpayer, of their reporting obligations, in so far as the effect of that obligation is to oblige a lawyer acting as an intermediary to share with another intermediary, not being his client, information which he obtains in the course of the essential activities of his profession, namely, representing or defending clients in legal proceedings and giving legal advice, even in the absence of pending legal proceedings?

(1) OJ 2018 L 139, p. 1.

(2) OJ 2011 L 64, p. 1.
Appeal brought on 16 December 2020 by Eleanor Sharpston against the order of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 6 October 2020 in Case T-550/20, Sharpston v Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States

(Case C-685/20 P)

(2021/C 310/11)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Eleanor Sharpston (represented by: N. Forwood, Barrister-at-Law, J. Robb, Barrister, J. Flynn QC and H. Mercer QC)

Other parties to the proceedings: Council of the European Union, Representatives of the Governments of the Member States

By order of 16 June 2021, the Court of Justice (First Chamber) decided that the appeal is dismissed as, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded and ordered the appellant to bear her own costs.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 11 November 2020 — NT, RV, BS, ER v British Airways plc

(Case C-592/20)

(2021/C 228/15)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Düsseldorf

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: NT, RV, BS, ER

Defendant: British Airways plc

The Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) held, by order of 22 April 2021, that Article 2(b) and Article 7(1) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (1) are to be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of connecting flights, comprised of two legs of a journey and booked under a single reservation, a passenger who suffers a delay in reaching his or her destination of 3 hours or more, the cause of that delay arising in the cancellation of the second leg, which ought to have been operated by an operating air carrier other than the one with whom the passenger has a contract of carriage, may bring an action for compensation pursuant to Article 7(1) of that regulation against the former air carrier and require it to pay the amount of compensation provided for in that provision according to the total distance of the journey, including its connecting flight, from the first point of departure until the final destination of the second leg.

(1) OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1.
2.

Is the concept of ‘liberalisation of the market in electricity’ to be interpreted as meaning that liberalisation must be deemed to have already occurred where certain aspects of free trade exist, such as, for example, contracts concluded by a public operator with suppliers from other Member States? Can liberalisation of the market in electricity be deemed to begin when the law grants some electricity users (for example, electricity users connected to the transport network or non-domestic electricity users connected to the distribution network) the right to change electricity distributor? What effect do developments in the regulation of the electricity market in Latvia have on the assessment of aid granted to electricity producers in the light of Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (for the purposes of the answer to question 1), in particular, the situation prior to 2007?
2.

Is it compatible with EU law, and in particular Article 3(27) of Directive 2007/46/EC to allow — in relation to the supply through public procurement of replacement parts for buses intended for public service — an individual tenderer to describe itself as ‘manufacturer’ of a specific non-original replacement part intended for a particular vehicle, especially where it falls into one of the categories of components covered by the technical rules listed in Annex IV (List of requirements for the purpose of EC type-approval of vehicles) to Directive 2007/46/EC, or must that tenderer prove — for each of the replacement parts thus subject to tender and in order to certify their equivalence to the technical specifications of the tender — that it is the entity who is responsible to the approval authority for all aspects of the type-approval and for ensuring conformity of production and the related level of quality and is directly involved in at least some of the stages of the construction of the component which is the subject of the approval, and if so, by what means is such proof to be provided?
2.

If Question 1 is answered in the negative: Must the second microbiological criterion ‘Absence in 25 g’ set out in Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2073/2005 and point 1.2 of the table in Chapter 1 of Annex I thereto be interpreted, having regard to that regulation, the protection of public health and the objectives pursued by Regulations No 178/2002 and No 882/2004, as meaning that, irrespective of whether the food business operator is able to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the competent authority that the food will not exceed the limit of 100 cfu/g during the shelf-life, two alternative microbiological criteria then apply to that food, namely (1) the criterion ‘Absence in 25 g’ while the food is under the control of the food business operator, and (2) the criterion ‘100 cfu/g’ after the food has left the control of the food business operator?
Action brought on 26 February 2021 — European Commission v Ireland

(Case C-125/21)

(2021/C 148/14)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: J. Tomkin, and S. Grünheid, Agents)

Defendant: Ireland

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that by failing to adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union (1) or, in any event, by failing to notify such provisions to the Commission, Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 29(1) and (2) of that Framework Decision;

— order Ireland to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

According to Articles 29(1) and (2) of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, Member States were to take the measures necessary to comply with the provisions of this Framework Decision by 5 December 2011 and to notify such measures to the Commission.

The Commission considers that Ireland has infringed its obligations under Article 29(1) and (2) of the Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, by failing to adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with the Framework Decision or, in any event, by failing to notify such provisions to the Commission.

(1) OJ 2008, L 327, p. 27.
3.

Must the wood panels and mouldings at issue in the main proceedings, which have a profile and decorative finish which objectively establish that their use in the manufacture of doors, door frames and thresholds is foreseeable, but which, prior to assembly of the door, must be cut to adjust their length and must have spaces made on them for fixing, and, if necessary, must have spaces for hinges and spaces for locks included in them, be classified under subheading 4418 20 or, based on the features of the specific panels or mouldings, under headings 4411 and 4412 of the Combined Nomenclature?
4.

Does Article 7 of the Charter, read in conjunction with Article 1 of the Charter and Article 4 of the Charter, and in the light of the Return Directive, require that the medical condition of the foreign national and the treatment he is undergoing in the Member State be assessed when determining whether private life considerations should result in permission to stay being granted? Does Article 19(2) of the Charter, read in conjunction with Article 1 of the Charter and Article 4 of the Charter, and in the light of the Return Directive, require that private life and family life, as referred to in Article 7 of the Charter, be taken into account when assessing whether medical problems may constitute an obstacle to expulsion?
1.

How is Article 13(2)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems (1) to be interpreted where, from a quantitative point of view, the centre of interest of the activities of a person is in a non-Member State in which that person also resides and, furthermore, that person also pursues an activity in two Member States (Federal Republic of Germany and Austria), the activity in the two Member States being distributed in such a way that the bulk of the activity clearly takes place in one Member State (in this specific case, the Federal Republic of Germany)? In the event that that provision is interpreted to the effect that Austria has competence, [the following question] is [asked]:
4.

If the third question is answered in the affirmative, is the court required, and, if so, under what conditions, to take into account of its own motion the consequences of the unfairness of a term in the case where it has available to it information about a payment based on that term, inter alia by offsetting that payment against other outstanding debts under the contract?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 2 February 2021 — Leinfelder Uhren München GmbH & Co. KG v E. Leinfelder GmbH, TL, SW, WL

(Case C-62/21)

(2021/C 189/09)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant and appellant in the appeal on a point of law: Leinfelder Uhren München GmbH & Co. KG

Defendants and respondents in the appeal on a point of law: E. Leinfelder GmbH, TL, SW, WL

Questions referred

1. Does the circumstance that an application for revocation of an EU trade mark on the grounds of non-use may be submitted by any natural or legal person and any body having the capacity to sue and be sued, as provided for in Article 56(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009 (1) and Article 63(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, (2) lead to the ineffectiveness of a contractual agreement by which a third party undertakes vis-à-vis the proprietor of an EU trade mark not to file an application for the revocation of that EU trade mark on the grounds of non-use with the European Union Intellectual Property Office?

2. Does the circumstance that an application for revocation of an EU trade mark on the grounds of non-use may be submitted by any natural or legal person and any body having the capacity to sue and be sued, as provided for in Article 56(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009 and Article 63(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, have the effect that a final judgment of a court of a Member State requiring the defendant to withdraw an application for the revocation of an EU trade mark on the grounds of non-use filed by him or her directly or via a person instructed by him or her is to be disregarded in revocation proceedings before the European Union Intellectual Property Office and the Courts of the European Union?

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (codified version) (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1).

(2) Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).
4.

As regards whether the executing judicial authority has the right to conduct a review of respect for the fundamental rights of the person sought in the issuing State: 4.1.- Does Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA enable the executing judicial authority to refuse to surrender the person sought on the grounds that it has identified a serious risk of infringement of that person’s fundamental rights in the issuing Member State, based on the report of a Working Group submitted to the national executing authority by the person sought? 4.2.- For the purposes of the previous question, does such a report constitute information that is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated in order to justify, in the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice, the refusal to surrender the person sought based on a serious risk of infringement of his fundamental rights? 4.3.- If the answer to the previous question is affirmative, what evidence does EU law require in order for a Member State to be able to conclude that the serious risk of infringement of fundamental rights which has been pleaded by the person sought and which constitutes grounds for refusal to execute the EAW exists in the issuing Member State?
May a written agreement be regarded as an invoice, for the purposes of Article 203 of the VAT Directive, (1) only if it contains all of the information that is required to be set out in an invoice in accordance with Chapter 3 (‘Invoicing’) [of Title XI] of the VAT Directive?

In the event that that question is answered in the negative:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven (Netherlands) lodged on 26 March 2021 — R. en R. v Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit

(Case C-189/21)

(2021/C 228/31)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: R. en R.

Defendant: Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit

Question referred

Must management requirement (SMR) 10, as laid down in Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008, (1) which refers to Article 55, first and second sentences, of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC, (2) be interpreted as meaning that that management requirement also covers the situation in which use is made of a plant protection product which is not authorised in the Member State concerned pursuant to that latter regulation?

(1) OJ 2013 L 347, p. 549.

(2) OJ 2009 L 309, p. 1.
1.

Must Articles 184 and 185 of the VAT Directive 2006 (1) be interpreted as meaning that a taxable person who, at the time of acquiring goods or services, has failed to deduct input tax (‘the initial deduction’) within the applicable national time limit in accordance with the intended use for tax purposes, is entitled, when an adjustment is made — on the occasion of the subsequent first use of those goods or services — to make that deduction if the actual use at the time of the adjustment does not differ from the intended use?
2.

If the first question is answered in the affirmative: a) Can the time limit laid down in the first sentence of Article 29(2) of the above-mentioned regulation in any case be extended to one year — with binding effect for the person concerned — in the event of imprisonment by the requesting Member State? b) If not, for what period of time is an extension permissible, for example only for that period of time aa) that the detention actually lasted, or bb) that the imprisonment is likely to last in total, in relation to the date of informing the Member State responsible in accordance with Article 9(2) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1560/2003 (2) of 2 September 2003 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 (OJ 2003 L 222, p. 3), as amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 118/2014 of 30 January 2014 (OJ 2014 L 39, p. 1), plus, if necessary, a reasonable period for the reorganisation of the transfer?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy-Śródmieścia w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 9 February 2021 — B.S., Ł.S. v M.

(Case C-82/21)

(2021/C 242/06)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy-Śródmieścia w Warszawie

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: B.S., Ł.S.

Defendant: M.

Question referred

Must Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC (1) of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, as well as the principles of equivalence, effectiveness and legal certainty, be interpreted as precluding a judicial interpretation of national legislation to the effect that a consumer’s claim for the reimbursement of amounts unduly paid on the basis of an unfair term in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer is subject to a ten-year limitation period which begins to run from the date of each performance by the consumer, even in the case where the consumer was not aware of the unfair nature of that term?

(1) OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Budapest Környéki Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 28 April 2021 — WD v Agrárminiszter

(Case C-273/21)

(2021/C 252/23)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Budapest Környéki Törvényszék

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: WD

Defendant: Agrárminiszter

Question referred

By its single question, the referring court seeks clarification as to whether Article 32(2)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 (1) must be interpreted as meaning that an area, classified in the land registry as ‘aerodrome withdrawn from agricultural use’, and where there is no activity associated with an aerodrome, must be considered as predominantly used for agricultural activities if animals are kept for farming purposes in that area.

(1) Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 637/2008 and Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 (OJ 2013 L 347, p. 608).
Appeal brought on 2 February 2021 by BSH Hausgeräte GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) delivered on 2 December 2020 in Case T-152/20, BSH Hausgeräte GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-67/21 P)

(2021/C 252/11)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: BSH Hausgeräte GmbH (represented by: S. Biagosch, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 12 May 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) did not allow the appeal to proceed and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
3.

Do Articles 4(3) and 19(1) TEU and Articles 2(1) and (2) and 267 TFEU, read also in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, preclude a system such as that concerning Article 106 of the codice del processo amministrativo (Code of Administrative Procedure, Italy) and Articles 395 and 396 of the codice di procedura civile (Code of Civil Procedure, Italy), inasmuch as that system does not permit the use of the remedy of an application for revision to challenge judgments of the Council of State that conflict with judgments of the Court of Justice, and in particular with the legal principles asserted by the Court of Justice in a preliminary ruling on questions referred to it?