The finding that the three product sub-groups belong to distinct product markets since they are not substitutable from either a demand or supply side perspective and are different products from a technological, business and aesthetic point of view does not undermine the evidence which led the Commission to conclude that those practices must be considered to form part of a single infringement, in view of their interdependence and the existence of an overall plan.

When examining whether the unlawful practices in question constitute several infringements or a single infringement, it is necessary to examine not whether the practices in question concern products belonging to the same market, but whether the undertakings themselves regarded those practices as forming part of such an overall plan.

In competition matters, an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU may result not only from isolated agreements or concerted practices which fall to be penalised as separate infringements, but also from a series of agreements or from related concerted practices with the result that they must be considered to be constituent elements of a single infringement. In order to establish the existence of a single infringement, it is for the Commission to establish that the agreements or concerted practices, although they relate to distinct goods, services or territories, form part of an overall plan knowingly implemented by the undertakings in question with a view to achieving a single anti-competitive objective.

In competition matters, as is apparent from points 9 to 11 of the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, the Commission’s methodology when calculating fines entails two stages. First, the Commission determines a basic amount for each undertaking or association of undertakings. Second, it may adjust that basic amount upwards or downwards, taking account in that regard of aggravating or mitigating circumstances which characterise the participation of each of the undertakings concerned.

As regards, more specifically, the first stage of the methodology for calculating fines, in accordance with points 21 to 23 of the 2006 Guidelines, the proportion of the value of the undertaking’s sales taken into account (‘multiplier for “gravity of the infringement”’) is set at a level of up to 30%, regard being had to a number of factors, such as the nature of the infringement, the combined market share of all the undertakings concerned, the geographic scope of the infringement and whether or not the infringement has been implemented, since price-fixing, market-sharing and output-limitation agreements are, by their very nature, among the most harmful restrictions of competition. Under point 25 of the 2006 Guidelines, it is stated that, for the purpose of deterrence, the Commission will include in the basic amount of the fine a proportion, used to calculate an additional amount (‘multiplier for the “additional amount”’), of between 15 and 25% of the value of sales, taking account of the aforementioned factors.

Therefore, the difference in geographic scope resulting from the participation of undertakings in the single infringement in its entirety covering six Member States, on the one hand, and only in one Member State, on the other, justifies the application of different multipliers for the ‘gravity of the infringement’ and the ‘additional amount’. An infringement covering six Member States and relating to three product sub-groups cannot properly be regarded as being of the same gravity as an infringement committed in one Member State and relating to two product sub-groups. Having regard to the scope of the effects of the infringement on competition within the European Union, that former infringement must be considered to be more serious than the latter.

(see paras 103, 104, 118)