ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
36

In those circumstances, the Landesverwaltungsgericht Tirol (Regional Administrative Court, Tyrol) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Is Article 15(2) of the [Charter] to be understood as precluding legislation of a Member State which, as in the case of Paragraph 19[a](3) [of the Police Law], makes it possible for bodies of an authority, even without a prior administrative procedure, to be able to take measures of direct authority and coercive power, such as, in particular, the on-the-spot closure of a business establishment, without these merely being interim measures? (2) From the perspective of equality of arms and the perspective of an effective legal remedy, is Article 47 of the Charter, potentially in conjunction with Articles 41 and 52 thereof, to be understood as precluding legislation of a Member State which, as laid down in Paragraph 19[a](3) and (4) [of the Police Law], provides for de facto measures of direct authority and coercive power, such as, in particular, closures of business establishments, without documentation and without providing confirmation to the person concerned? (3) From the perspective of equality of arms, is Article 47 of the Charter, potentially in conjunction with Articles 41 and 52 thereof, to be understood as precluding legislation of a Member State which, for the purpose of annulling de facto measures of direct authority and coercive power, such as, in particular, closures of business establishments, requires a substantiated application to lift that closure from the person affected by those de facto measures, as laid down in Paragraph 19[a](3) and (4) [of the Police Law]? (4) From the perspective of an effective legal remedy, is Article 47 of the Charter, in conjunction with Article 52 thereof, to be understood as precluding legislation of a Member State which, as in the case of Paragraph 19[a](4) [of the Police Law], allows only for a right to apply for annulment that is restricted to specific conditions in the case of a de facto coercive measure in the form of the closure of a business establishment?’
7

The Ley sobre responsabilidad civil y seguro en la circulación de vehículos a motor (Law on civil liability and motor vehicle insurance), codified by Real Decreto Legislativo 8/2004 por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley sobre responsabilidad civil y seguro en la circulación de vehículos a motor (Royal Decree-Law 8/2004 approving the revised text of the Law on civil liability and motor vehicle insurance) of 29 October 2004 (BOE No 267 of 5 November 2004, p. 36662), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings, provides in Article 1(1): ‘Because of the risk involved in driving motor vehicles, drivers shall be liable for damage caused to persons or property as a consequence of its use. In the case of damage to persons, he will be exempt from this liability only if he can prove that the damage was due to the exclusive fault of the person harmed or to force majeure unconnected with the driving or functioning of the vehicle; defects in the vehicle or breakage or failure of any of its parts or mechanisms will not be considered force majeure. The driver shall be liable to third parties for damage to property if he bears civil liability under the provisions of Article 1902 et seq. of the [Código Civil (Spanish Civil Code)], Article 109 et seq. of the [Código Penal (Spanish Criminal Code)] or the provisions of this Law. If both the driver and the victim have been negligent, liability shall be apportioned fairly and compensation calculated on the basis of the liability of each party. Vehicle owners who were not driving and are related to the driver in one of the ways set out in Article 1903 of the Civil Code and Article 120(5) of the Criminal Code shall be liable for any physical injury or damage to property caused by the driver. The owner shall not be liable upon providing proof that he acted with all due care to prevent the damage. If the owner of a vehicle who was not driving is not covered by compulsory insurance, he shall bear joint civil liability with the driver for any physical injury or damage to property caused by the vehicle, unless he proves that the vehicle was stolen.’
39

As to the remainder, as regards the issue, which has not been addressed by the referring court, of ascertaining to which of the acquisitions of the chain at issue in the main proceedings the single intra-Community transport must be ascribed and which must, therefore, alone be classified as an intra-Community acquisition, it is for the referring court to carry out an overall assessment of all the specific circumstances of the individual case and to determine, in particular, when the transfer to Kuršu zeme of the right to dispose of the goods as an owner occurred (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 December 2018, AREX CZ, C‑414/17, EU:C:2018:1027, paragraphs 70 and 72). The classification as an intra-Community acquisition of one of the acquisitions of the chain at issue in the main proceedings and the extent of Kuršu zeme’s right to deduct VAT, or even its right to a VAT refund, will depend on the point at which that transfer is deemed to have taken place, namely whether before or after the intra-Community transport (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 February 2018, Kreuzmayr, C‑628/16, EU:C:2018:84, paragraphs 43 and 44, and of 11 April 2019, PORR Építési Kft., C‑691/17, EU:C:2019:327, paragraphs 30 and 42).
29

In that connection, although it is true that, among the goods or interests protected by Article 36 TFEU, the protection of health and life of humans is ranked in first position and that it is for the Member States, within the limits imposed by the FEU Treaty, to decide the level of protection they wish to afford, in particular, as regards how strict the checks to be carried out are to be, the fact remains that, in accordance with settled case-law, a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports can be justified, for example, on grounds of the protection of the health and life of humans, within the meaning of that article, only if that measure is appropriate for securing the achievement of the objective pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see, to that effect, judgments of 20 May 1976, de Peijper, 104/75, EU:C:1976:67, paragraphs 15 to 17, and of 23 December 2015, Scotch Whisky Association and Others, C‑333/14, EU:C:2015:845, paragraph 33).
21

In those circumstances, the Finanzgericht Baden-Württemberg (Finance Court, Baden-Württemberg) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Which provision of Decision No H3 … is to be applied in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings for the purposes of a currency conversion of family benefits relating to children and taking the form of child allowance? (2) How is the applicable provision of that decision to be interpreted specifically for the purposes of determining the amount of the differential supplement to child allowance, which is dependent on the exchange rate? (a) If paragraph 2 of Decision No H3 is to be applied: within the meaning of that provision, which day is the day “when the operation is performed by the institution”? (b) If paragraph 3(b) (where necessary, in combination with paragraph 4) of Decision No H3 is to be applied: within the meaning of that provision, which month is the month “when the provision must be applied”? (c) If paragraph 5 of Decision No H3 is to be applied: is the saving clause relating to national law compatible with the enabling provision in Article 90 of [Regulation No 987/2009]? If yes: in order for it to be “provided for differently” in national legislation, is legislation under a formal statute necessary or is an administrative instruction from the national administrative authorities sufficient? (3) Are there any special features to be taken into account specifically in the case of a currency conversion of Swiss child allowance by the German family allowances office? (a) When Decision No H3 is applied in relation to Switzerland, is it significant that the German national rule in point 2 of the first sentence of Paragraph 65(1) of [the EStG] in itself lays down an exclusion from the payment of benefits? (b) Is the relevant date for the purposes of the currency conversion pursuant to Decision No H3 the date on which the Swiss institution granted or paid the family benefits? (c) Is the relevant date for the purposes of the currency conversion pursuant to Decision No H3 the date on which the German institution refused or granted the differential supplement to child allowance?’
15

Article 27 of Regulation No 882/2004, entitled ‘Fees or charges’, is worded as follows: ‘1. Member States may collect fees or charges to cover the costs occasioned by official controls. 2. However, as regards the activities referred to in Annex IV, section A, and Annex V, section A, Member States shall ensure the collection of a fee. 3. Without prejudice to paragraphs 4 and 6, fees collected as regards the specific activities mentioned in Annex IV, section A, and Annex V, section A, shall not be lower than the minimum rates specified in Annex IV, section B, and Annex V, section B. However, for a transitional period until 1 January 2008, as regards the activities referred to in Annex IV, section A, Member States may continue to use the rates currently applied pursuant to [Council] Directive 85/73/EEC [of 29 January 1985 on the financing of health inspections and controls of fresh meat and poultrymeat (OJ 1985 L 32, p. 14)]. … 4. Fees collected for the purposes of official controls in accordance with paragraph 1 or 2: … (b) may be fixed at a flat-rate on the basis of the costs borne by the competent authorities over a given period of time or, where applicable, at the amounts fixed in Annex IV, section B or in Annex V, section B. 5. In setting the fees Member States shall take into consideration: (a) the type of business concerned and relevant risk factors; (b) the interests of businesses with a low throughput; (c) traditional methods used for production, processing and distribution; (d) the needs of businesses located in regions subject to particular geographical constraints. 6. When, in view of own-check and tracing systems implemented by the feed or food business as well as of the level of compliance found during official controls, for a certain type of feed or food or activities, official controls are carried out with a reduced frequency or to take account of the criteria referred to in paragraph 5(b) to (d), Member States may set the official control fee below the minimum rates referred to in paragraph 4(b), provided that the Member State concerned provides the Commission with a report specifying: (a) the type of feed or food or activity concerned; (b) the controls performed in the feed and food business concerned; and (c) the method for calculating the reduction of the fee. …’
5

Article 10 of the directive, entitled ‘Information to be included in credit agreements’, provides: ‘1. Credit agreements shall be drawn up on paper or on another durable medium. All the contracting parties shall receive a copy of the credit agreement. This article shall be without prejudice to any national rules regarding the validity of the conclusion of credit agreements which are in conformity with Community law. 2. The credit agreement shall specify in a clear and concise manner: … (g) the annual percentage rate of charge and the total amount payable by the consumer, calculated at the time the credit agreement is concluded; all the assumptions used in order to calculate that rate shall be mentioned; (h) the amount, number and frequency of payments to be made by the consumer and, where appropriate, the order in which payments will be allocated to different outstanding balances charged at different borrowing rates for the purposes of reimbursement; (i) where capital amortisation of a credit agreement with a fixed duration is involved, the right of the consumer to receive, on request and free of charge, at any time throughout the duration of the credit agreement, a statement of account in the form of an amortisation table. The amortisation table shall indicate the payments owing and the periods and conditions relating to the payment of such amounts; the table shall contain a breakdown of each repayment showing capital amortisation, the interest calculated on the basis of the borrowing rate and, where applicable, any additional costs; where the interest rate is not fixed or the additional costs may be changed under the credit agreement, the amortisation table shall indicate, clearly and concisely, that the data contained in the table will remain valid only until such time as the borrowing rate or the additional costs are changed in accordance with the credit agreement; (j) if charges and interest are to be paid without capital amortisation, a statement showing the periods and conditions for the payment of the interest and of any associated recurrent and non-recurrent charges; … (u) where applicable, other contractual terms and conditions; … 3. Where paragraph 2(i) applies, the creditor shall make available to the consumer, free of charge and at any time throughout the duration of the credit agreement, a statement of account in the form of an amortisation table. 4. In the case of a credit agreement under which payments made by the consumer do not give rise to an immediate corresponding amortisation of the total amount of credit, but are used to constitute capital during periods and under conditions laid down in the credit agreement or in an ancillary agreement, the information required under paragraph 2 shall include a clear and concise statement that such credit agreements do not provide for a guarantee of repayment of the total amount of credit drawn down under the credit agreement, unless such a guarantee is given. …’
8

Article 24 of Regulation No 1024/2013 is worded as follows: ‘1. The ECB shall establish an Administrative Board of Review for the purposes of carrying out an internal administrative review of the decisions taken by the ECB in the exercise of the powers conferred on it by this Regulation after a request for review submitted in accordance with paragraph 5. The scope of the internal administrative review shall pertain to the procedural and substantive conformity with this Regulation of such decisions. … 5. Any natural or legal person may in the cases referred to in paragraph 1 request a review of a decision of the ECB under this Regulation which is addressed to that person, or is of a direct and individual concern to that person. A request for a review against a decision of the Governing Council as referred to in paragraph 7 shall not be admissible. 6. Any request for review shall be made in writing, including a statement of grounds, and shall be lodged at the ECB within one month of the date of notification of the decision to the person requesting the review, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the latter as the case may be. 7. After ruling on the admissibility of the review, the Administrative Board of Review shall express an opinion within a period appropriate to the urgency of the matter and no later than two months from the receipt of the request and remit the case for preparation of a new draft decision to the Supervisory Board. The Supervisory Board shall take into account the opinion of the Administrative Board of Review and shall promptly submit a new draft decision to the Governing Council. The new draft decision shall abrogate the initial decision, replace it with a decision of identical content, or replace it with an amended decision. The new draft decision shall be deemed adopted unless the Governing Council objects within a maximum period of ten working days. … 9. The opinion expressed by the Administrative Board of Review, the new draft decision submitted by the Supervisory Board and the decision adopted by the Governing Council pursuant to this Article shall be reasoned and notified to the parties. 10. The ECB shall adopt a decision establishing the Administrative Board of Review’s operating rules. …’
Article 17(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that a natural person who, under a contract such as a CfD concluded with a brokerage company, carries out transactions on the international FOREX (foreign exchange) market through that company, must be classified as a ‘consumer’ within the meaning of that provision if the conclusion of that contract does not fall within the scope of that person’s professional activity, which it is for the national court to ascertain. For the purpose of that classification, on the one hand, factors such as the value of transactions carried out under contracts such as financial contracts for differences, the extent of the risks of financial loss associated with the conclusion of such contracts, any knowledge or expertise that person has in the field of financial instruments or his or her active conduct in the context of such transactions are, as such, in principle irrelevant, and, on the other, the fact that the financial instruments do not fall within the scope of Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) or that that person is a ‘retail client’ within the meaning of Article 4(1)(12) of Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments, amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC is, as such, in principle irrelevant.
3

The fourth and sixth to eighth recitals of Directive 94/22 state: ‘Whereas Member States have sovereignty and sovereign rights over hydrocarbon resources on their territories; … Whereas steps must be taken to ensure the non-discriminatory access to and pursuit of activities relating to the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons under conditions which encourage greater competition in this sector and thereby to favour the best prospection, exploration and production of resources in Member States and to reinforce the integration of the internal energy market; Whereas, for this purpose, it is necessary to set up common rules for ensuring that the procedures for granting authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons must be open to all entities possessing the necessary capabilities; whereas authorisations must be granted on the basis of objective, published criteria; whereas the conditions under which authorisations are granted must likewise be known in advance by all entities taking part in the procedure; Whereas Member States must retain the options to limit the access to and the exercise of these activities for reasons justified by public interest and to subject to the payment of a financial contribution or a contribution in hydrocarbons, the detailed arrangements of the said contribution having to be fixed in such a way as not to interfere in the management of entities; whereas these options must be used in a non-discriminatory way; whereas, with the exception of the obligations related to the use of this option, steps must be taken to avoid imposing on entities, conditions and obligations which are not justified by the need to perform this activity properly; whereas the activities of entities must be monitored only to the extent necessary to ensure their compliance with these obligations and conditions.’
30

It is, moreover, settled case-law that the terms used to specify the exemptions set out in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person. Nevertheless, the interpretation of those terms must be consistent with the objectives pursued by those exemptions and comply with the requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT. Thus, the requirement of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to specify the exemptions referred to in Article 13 should be construed in such a way as to deprive the exemptions of their intended effect. It is not the purpose of the case-law of the Court to impose an interpretation which would make the exemptions more or less inapplicable in practice (judgment of 11 December 2008, Stichting Centraal Begeleidingsorgaan voor de Intercollegiale Toetsing, C‑407/07, EU:C:2008:713, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
8

Article 7 of the Framework Decision, headed ‘Grounds for non-recognition and non-execution’ provides, in paragraph 2(g) and in paragraph 3: ‘2. The competent authority in the executing State may also refuse to recognise and execute the decision if it is established that: … (g) according to the certificate provided for in Article 4, the person concerned, in case of a written procedure, was not, in accordance with the law of the issuing State, informed personally or via a representative, competent according to national law, of his/her right to contest the case and of the time limits for such a legal remedy; … (i) according to the certificate provided for in Article 4, the person did not appear in person at the trial resulting in the decision, unless the certificate states that the person, in accordance with further procedural requirements defined in the national law of the issuing State: … (iii) after being served with the decision and being expressly informed about the right to a retrial, or an appeal, in which the person has the right to participate and which allows the merits of the case, including fresh evidence, to be re-examined, and which may lead to the original decision being reversed: – expressly stated that he or she does not contest the decision, or – did not request a retrial or appeal within the applicable time frame; … 3. In the cases referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2(c), (g), (i) and (j), before deciding not to recognise and to execute a decision, either totally or in part, the competent authority in the executing State shall consult the competent authority in the issuing State, by any appropriate means, and shall, where appropriate, ask it to supply any necessary information without delay.’
19

Article 815(4) of the LEC provides: ‘If the claim for recovery of a debt is based on a contract between a business or professional person and a consumer or user, the Letrado de la Administración de Justicia (judicial officer), before making an order for payment, shall notify the court so that the latter may examine whether any of the terms on which the application is based, or which have determined the amount payable, are unfair. The court shall examine of its own motion whether any of the terms on which the application is based, or which have determined the amount payable, may be considered to be unfair. If the court finds that any of the terms may be considered to be unfair, it shall hear the parties within 5 days. After hearing the parties, the court shall rule as appropriate by means of an order within the next 5 days. Representation by a lawyer or court agent shall not be mandatory during that procedure. If any of the contractual terms is found to be unfair, the order made shall stipulate the consequences of that finding and rule either that the claim is inadmissible or that the proceedings are to continue without the application of the terms considered to be unfair. If the court finds that there are no unfair terms, it shall make a ruling to that effect and the Letrado de la Administración de Justicia (judicial officer) shall proceed to issue an order for payment against the debtor as laid down in paragraph 1. In any event, an appeal may lie directly against the order made.’