The wording of Article 50(1)(e) of the Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal, which entered into force on 1 October 2014, is more demanding than Article 35(1)(e) of the old Rules of Procedure in that it provides that an application must contain ‘a clear summary of the relevant facts presented in chronological order, and a separate, precise and structured summary of the pleas in law and arguments of law relied on’. The purpose of that amendment was, therefore, in particular, to strengthen the requirement that applicants clearly present their pleas in law by requiring that those pleas set out a precise identification of their legal basis, that the argument presented under each plea in law is exclusively related to that basis and that each plea is strictly distinguished from the others, in the interest of all professionals involved in the work of the judiciary, litigants, lawyers, agents and magistrates.

In exercising the discretion available to it regarding an appointment or engagement, the administration must examine carefully and impartially all the relevant parts of each application and meticulously observe the requirements laid down in the vacancy notice, thus being required to reject any candidate who does not meet those requirements. The vacancy notice constitutes a legal framework which the administration imposes on itself and to which it must adhere strictly.

As to whether there was any error in the choice of the successful candidate, such an error must be manifest and must exceed the wide discretion enjoyed, within the legal framework laid down in the vacancy notice, by the administration in comparing the merits of candidates and in assessing the interests of the service. The Union judicature’s review must be confined to the question whether, having regard to the considerations which influenced the administration in making its assessment, the latter remained within reasonable bounds and did not use its power in a manifestly incorrect way or for purposes other than those for which that power was conferred on it. The Union court cannot therefore substitute its assessment of the merits and qualifications of the candidates for that of the administration where there is nothing in the file to suggest that, in assessing those merits and qualifications, the administration committed a manifest error.

In that regard, the mere fact that a candidate has obvious and acknowledged merits does not exclude the possibility that, in the context of consideration of the comparative merits of candidates, other candidates may have greater merits. Likewise, the fact that a candidate fulfils all of the eligibility criteria contained in the vacancy notice does not in itself suffice to prove that the administration committed a manifest error of assessment.

The above considerations are all the more valid given the wide discretion enjoyed by the authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment when comparing the merits of candidates for a post as a member of the temporary staff. It may therefore, in the context of its power of internal organisation and by means of internal rules, decide that, in general, only candidates having obtained a number of points exceeding a certain threshold can be invited to an interview with the selection board.

In that regard, the fact that a candidate was not selected to participate in the next step of the recruitment procedure cannot, in itself, justify the conclusion that the decisions taken in that respect are discriminatory or arbitrary. On the contrary, it is apparent that the decision rejecting the application results from a consideration of the comparative merits of the various candidates by the selection board. Moreover, the fact that that candidate’s professional experience may have been, quantitatively, superior to that of the successful candidate is not, in itself, relevant.

(see paras 29-31, 33, 34, 37)

Judgments of 30 October 1974 in Grassi v Council, 188/73, EU:C:1974:112, paras 26, 38 and 41, and 4 February 1987 in Bouteiller v Commission, 324/85, EU:C:1987:59, para. 6

Judgments of 13 December 1990 in Moritz v Commission, T‑20/89, EU:T:1990:80, para. 29; 19 February 1998 in Campogrande v Commission, T‑3/97, EU:T:1998:43, para. 124; 16 December 1999 in Cendrowicz v Commission, T‑143/98, EU:T:1999:340, para. 67; 9 July 2002 in Tilgenkamp v Commission, T‑158/01, EU:T:2002:180, paras 50 and 59 and the case-law cited therein, and 18 September 2003 in Pappas v Committee of the Regions, T‑73/01, EU:T:2003:237, para. 54

Judgments of 6 May 2009 in Campos Valls v Council, F‑39/07, EU:F:2009:45, para. 43, and 11 December 2012 in Trentea v FRA, F‑112/10, EU:F:2012:179, paras 101, 102 and 104