ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.2.

Must Article 18(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims be interpreted as meaning that, if the proceedings in the Member State of origin do not meet the procedural requirements as set out in Articles 17 of Regulation (EC) No 805/2004, for such non-compliance to be cured all the information listed in Article 18(1)(b) must have been notified to the debtor in due time in or together with the judgment? Specifically, is the issue of a European Enforcement Order excluded if the debtor has not been notified of the address of the institution with which a challenge must be lodged but he has been notified of all the other information listed in Article 18(1)(b)?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 239/27

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 4 May 2017 — XC and Others

(Case C-234/17)

(2017/C 239/33)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberster Gerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: XC, YB, ZA

Question referred

Is EU law, in particular Article 4(3) TEU in conjunction with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness inferred from it, to be interpreted as requiring the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria), upon application by the person concerned, to review a final decision delivered by a criminal court with respect to an alleged infringement of EU law (in this case, Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 54 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement), where national law (Paragraph 363a of the Strafprozeßordnung (Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure)) provides for such a review only with respect to an alleged violation of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or one of the protocols thereto?
2.

If the answer to question 1(a) is in the negative: (a) What are the requirements for the copyright protection of the taste of a food product? (b) Is the copyright protection of a taste based solely on the taste as such or (also) on the recipe of the food product? (c) What evidence should a party who, in infringement proceedings, claims to have created a copyright-protected taste of a food product, put forward? Is it sufficient for that party to present the food product involved in the proceedings to the court so that the court, by tasting and smelling, can form its own opinion as to whether the taste of the food product meets the requirements for copyright protection? Or should the applicant (also) provide a description of the creative choices involved in the taste composition and/or the recipe on the basis of which the taste can be considered to be the author’s own intellectual creation? (d) How should the court in infringement proceedings determine whether the taste of the defendant’s food product corresponds to such an extent with the taste of the applicant’s food product that it constitutes an infringement of copyright? Is the decisive factor here that the overall impressions of the two tastes are the same?
4.

Which of the following is the meaning of the expression ‘In the case of multiannual programmes, the limitation period shall in any case run until the programme is definitively terminated’: (a) the limitation period never expires before the definitive termination of a multiannual programme? (b) the limitation period is suspended as long as the programme lasts, that is, until its definitive termination, and starts running again as of that moment? (c) the limitation period continues to run and, therefore, even if the programme in question is multiannual, proceedings may be time-barred before the definitive termination of the programme if, in the meantime, that period has expired?
1.

Are Council Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China (1) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 924/2012 amending Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China, (2) and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 519/2015 of 26 March 2015 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China, as extended to imports of certain iron or steel fasteners consigned from Malaysia, whether declared as originating in Malaysia or not, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (3) invalid/unlawful/incompatible with Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994 and the decision of the WTO DSB of 28 July 2011?
Is Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 (1) applicable to directly awarded public service contracts within the meaning of Article 2(i) of the regulation which do not, for the purposes of the second sentence of Article 5(1) of the regulation, take the form of service concessions contracts under Directives 2004/17/EC or 2004/18/EC?

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 283/16

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 15 May 2017 — Bernhard Schloesser, Petra Noll v Société Air France SA

(Case C-255/17)

(2017/C 283/22)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Hamburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Bernhard Schloesser, Petra Noll

Defendant: Société Air France SA

Question referred

In circumstances where a contract has been entered into with an operating air carrier for a journey comprising two legs, and providing for a change of aircraft by the passenger, and the first leg of the journey is subject to a significant delay, do the courts of the place of final destination have jurisdiction in respect of a claim for compensation brought against that air carrier pursuant to Regulation No 261/2004? (1)

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1.
(2)

if the answer to question (1) should be in the negative, Can Articles 2(5) and 32 of Directive 2004/18/EU and Article 33 of Directive 2014/24/EU be interpreted as allowing the conclusion of a framework agreement in which: (a) a contracting authority acts on its own behalf and on behalf of other contracting authorities specifically indicated, which do not, however, play a direct part in the conclusion of that framework agreement; (b) the quantity of services that may be required by the non-signatory contracting authorities when they enter into the subsequent contracts envisaged in the framework agreement itself is determined by reference to their usual requirements.
1.

The General Court interpreted and applied the REACH regulation incorrectly. The General Court interpreted and applied the REACH regulation incorrectly. The appellant remains of the view that the decision of the ECHA was adopted ultra vires, since (i) the ECHA does not have power to supplement the existing identification of the substance DEHP under Article 57(c) of REACH by a new identification of that substance under Article 57(f) of REACH; (ii) the adoption of the decision of the ECHA was preceded by an unlawful procedure; and (iii) the decision of the ECHA circumvents the legally binding procedure laid down by the Council and the European Parliament for the adoption of generally binding/harmonised criteria for the identification of substances with endocrine-disrupting properties.
1.

Must Directive 2005/29/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market be interpreted as precluding the provision in Article II.75(6) of the Codex of Higher Education of 11 October 2013 which imposes a general prohibition on non-accredited educational institutions using the designation ‘master’ on the diplomas they award, where that prohibition is aimed at safeguarding a matter in the general interest, namely, the need to ensure a high standard of education whereby it must be possible to check whether the predefined quality requirements have effectively been met?
1.

Is Directive 93/13, in conjunction with Directive 2005/29 and with Article 47 of the Charter, to be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as Article 35 of Law 1/2000 on Civil Procedure, under which the bodies conducting procedures to settle claims for fees (jura de cuentas) may not ascertain of their own motion, before issuing the enforceable instrument, whether the contract concluded between the lawyer and a consumer contains unfair terms or whether there have been unfair commercial practices?
5.

In the event that the Court of Justice considers that the Member State may or must lay down rules which take account of the specific nature of closed distribution systems, do the provisions of Directive 2009/72/EC — in particular recitals 29 and 30 and Articles 15(7), 37(6)(b) and 26(4) — preclude national legislation, such as that under consideration in the present case, which subjects closed distribution systems to rules on dispatching and unbundling that are very similar to those imposed in respect of public networks and which, as regards general electricity charges, provides that payment of those charges should in part also be commensurate with the energy consumed within the closed system?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 309/29

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas (Lithuania) lodged on 10 July 2017 — UAB ‘Roche Lietuva’ v VšĮ Kauno Dainavos poliklinika

(Case C-413/17)

(2017/C 309/39)

Language of the case: Lithuanian

Referring court

Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: UAB ‘Roche Lietuva’

Other party: VšĮ Kauno Dainavos poliklinika

Question referred

Should the provisions of Articles 2 and 23 of, and of Annex VI to, Directive 2004/18 (1) (whether together or separately, but without limitation to those provisions), be interpreted and understood as meaning that, in the case where a contracting authority — a human health care institution — intends to acquire supplies (medical diagnostic equipment and materials) or specific rights thereto by way of a public procurement procedure in order to be able to carry out tests by itself, its discretion includes the right to lay down in the technical specifications only such requirements for those supplies as do not describe in isolation the individual operational (technical) and use-related (functional) characteristics of the equipment and/or materials but instead define the qualitative parameters of the tests to be carried out as well as the performance of the testing laboratory, the content of which must be separately described in the specifications of the public procurement procedure in question?

(1) Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114).
1.

Is an asylum seeker absconding within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 29(2) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 (1) only where he purposefully and deliberately evades apprehension by the national authorities responsible for carrying out the transfer in order to prevent or impede the transfer, or is it sufficient if, for a prolonged period, he ceases to live in the accommodation allocated to him and the authority is not informed of his whereabouts and therefore a planned transfer cannot be carried out? Is the person concerned entitled to rely on the correct application of the provision and to plead in proceedings against the transfer decision that the transfer time limit of six months has expired, because he was not absconding?
2.

If the answer to the first question is that Article 7 of Decision No 2/76 was not completely replaced: is the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 to be fully applied also to the application of Article 7 of Decision No 2/76, with the result that Article 7 of Decision No 2/76 also covers on that basis a national provision, introduced with effect from 5 October 1980, under which the ability of the spouse of a Turkish worker to join that worker for the purpose of family reunification is made dependent on a national visa being issued?
(a)

For the purposes of classifying that aid (as “existing” and, therefore, not “new” aid), is Article 1(b)(v) of Regulation No 659/1999, (1) according to which “(v) aid which is deemed to be an existing aid because it can be established that at the time it was put into effect it did not constitute an aid, and subsequently became an aid due to the evolution of the common market and without having been altered by the Member State. Where certain measures become aid following the liberalisation of an activity by Community law, such measures shall not be considered as existing aid after the date fixed for liberalisation”, applicable and, if so, under what conditions; or is the principle (formally different in scope from that of the abovementioned substantive law provision) established by the General Court in its judgment of 15 June 2000 in Joined Cases T-298/97, T-312/97, T-313/97, T-315/97, T-600/9 to T-607/97, T-1/98, T-3/98 to T-6/98 and T-23/98 (Alzetta and Others v Commission, paragraph 143), and confirmed, by the ruling, of interest in the present case, of the Court of Justice in Case C-298/00 P (paragraphs 66 to 69) — according to which “… a system of aid established in a market that was initially closed to competition must, when that market is liberalised, be regarded as an existing aid system, since at the time of its establishment it did not come within the scope of Article 92(1) of the Treaty [subsequently Article 87(1)], which, having regard to the requirements set out in that provision regarding effect on trade between Member States and repercussions on competition, applies only to sectors open to competition” — applicable and, if so, under what conditions?
1.

Is Article 14(1) of Regulation No 987/2009 (1) of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 September 2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems in conjunction with Article 12(1) of Regulation (EU) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems to be interpreted as meaning that a person who pursues an activity as an employed person is not subject to the legislation of the Member State where the company that recruited him is established if he was not an insured person in this Member State in accordance with the national legislation referred to in Article 1(l) of the basic Regulation immediately before the start of his employment?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 347/5

Action brought on 30 June 2017 — European Commission v Kingdom of the Netherlands

(Case C-395/17)

(2017/C 347/05)

Language of the case: Dutch

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: J.-F. Brakeland and A. Caeiros, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Kingdom of the Netherlands

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that the Kingdom of the Netherlands has failed to comply with its obligations pursuant to Article 5 (subsequently Article 10) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (now Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union) in not compensating the loss of the amounts of own resources which had to be established and made available for the Union budget pursuant to Articles 2, 6, 10, 11 and 17 of Regulation 1552/1989 (1) (now Articles 2, 6, 10, 11 and 17 of Regulation 1150/2000 (2)) if no movement certificates EUR.1 were issued in breach of Article 101(1) of Council Decision 91/482 (3) and Article 12(6) of Annex II to that decision for the import of milk powder and rice from Curacao in the period 1997-2000, Article 35(1) of Council Decision 2001/822 (4) and Article 15(4) of Annex III to that decision respectively for the import of groats and meal from Aruba in the period 2002-2003;

— order the Kingdom of the Netherlands to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The customs authorities of Curacao and Aruba, two overseas countries of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, wrongly issued certificates of origin EUR.1 for milk powder, rice, groats and meal. It is indeed undisputed that the conditions for according preferential status under the relevant decisions concerning the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Economic Community were not met. The irregularities in the certificates led to a loss of own resources for the Union of EUR 18 192 641,95 for the administrative errors in Curacao and of EUR 298 080 for the administrative errors in Aruba.

The Commission is of the view that the Netherlands, as Member State, is responsible under EU law for this loss of own resources caused by its subregions, and that, under the obligation of loyal cooperation, the Netherlands must make the total amount of unestablished and uncollected customs duties and charges (plus rent) available to the EU budget.

(1) Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1552/89 of 29 May 1989 implementing Decision 88/376/EEC, Euratom on the system of the Communities’ own resources (OJ 1989 L 155, p. 1).

(2) Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1150/2000 of 22 May 2000 implementing Decision 94/728/EC, Euratom on the system of the Communities’ own resources (OJ 2000 L 130, p. 1).

(3) Council Decision 91/482/EEC of 25 July 1991 on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Economic Community (OJ 1991 L 263, p. 1).

(4) Council Decision 2001/822/EC of 27 November 2001 on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Community (‘Overseas Association Decision’) (OJ 2001 L 314, p. 1).
3.

If the second question is answered in the negative, must Article 1(2) of Directive 86/653/EEC be interpreted as requiring the commercial agent to carry out tasks other than those relating to the negotiation of the sale or purchase of goods on behalf of the principal, or to the negotiation and conclusion of such transactions on behalf of and in the name of the principal, only secondarily?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 357/2

Appeal brought on 20 March 2017 by QuaMa Quality Management GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 17 January 2017 in Case T-225/15, QuaMa Quality Management GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-139/17 P)

(2017/C 357/02)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: QuaMa Quality Management GmbH (represented by: C. Russ, Rechtsanwalt)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Microchip Technology, Inc.

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court of 17 January 2017;

— annul the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 19 February 2015 (Joined Cases R 1809/2014-4 and R 1680/2014-4).

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant bases its appeal, lodged against the judgment of the General Court, on the following considerations:

The appeal alleges an infringement of Article 41(1) of Regulation No 207/2009. (1) The General Court, it is submitted, erred in proceeding on the basis of the premiss that the intervener had, on 9 April 2013, submitted the correct application for registration of the change of ownership and had merely used an incorrect form for that purpose. In fact, the application for a ‘change of name or address of a proprietor’ related to all of SMSC Europe GmbH’s trade marks (14) and was also interpreted by EUIPO in that manner, as the letter of 14 April 2013 makes clear. It is therefore not in dispute that EUIPO dismissed the application of 9 April 2013 in its entirety and upheld only the application lodged on 14 June 2013, after the period for submitting a statement of opposition had expired.

The appeal further alleges infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009. Neither the Opposition Division nor the Board of Appeal, it is submitted, addressed the determination of the relevant public in anything approaching a sufficiently satisfactory manner. The assessment of the likelihood of confusion cannot take place without determination of the relevant public and the distinctiveness in relation to each of the individual goods and services. This is even more so the case as regards the General Court’s finding that the similarity of the signs in question for a specialist public — to which the General Court does not belong — is ‘low’.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1).
I)

Does Article 49 in conjunction with Article 54 TFEU preclude national tax legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings which denies relief from tax on income from capital on distributions of profits to a non-resident parent company whose sole shareholder is a company with its seat within the country, in so far as persons have shareholdings in it who would not be entitled to a refund or exemption if they earned the income directly, and the gross income earned by the foreign company in the relevant trading year does not result from its own economic activity, and 1. there are no economic or other significant reasons for the involvement of the foreign company in relation to that income, or 2. the foreign company does not take part in general economic commerce with an establishment suitably equipped for its business purpose, whereas resident parent companies are granted relief from tax on income from capital without regard to the aforementioned requirements?
3.

In the latter case, must the subjective element showing that the importer (declarant) intended to abuse the VAT scheme be assessed differently from the case of the intra-Community supply of goods referred to in Article 138(1) of the VAT Directive? Must that assessment be more concessive, in the light of the fact that in procedure 42 exemption from payment of VAT must be authorised in advance by the customs authority? Or must it be more restrictive, inasmuch as the transactions concerned are connected with the first entry into the European Union internal market of goods originating from third countries?
2.

In which way are the fundamental rights of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to be taken into account when determining the scope of the exceptions or limitations provided for in Article 5(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC to the exclusive right of authors to reproduce (Article 2(a) of Directive 2001/29/EC) and communicate to the public their works, including the right to make their works available to the public (Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC)?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 382/27

Request for a preliminary ruling from the tribunal du travail de Nivelles (Belgium) lodged on 29 May 2017 — OJ (*1) v Partena, Assurances Sociales pour Travailleurs Indépendants ASBL, Institut national d'assurances sociales pour travailleurs indépendants (Inasti), Union Nationale des Mutualités Libres (Partenamut) (UNMLibres)

(Case C-321/17)

(2017/C 382/33)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal du travail de Nivelles

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: OJ (*1)

Defendants: Partena, Assurances Sociales pour Travailleurs Indépendants ASBL, Institut national d’assurances sociales pour travailleurs indépendants (Inasti), Union Nationale des Mutualités Libres (Partenamut) (UNMLibres)

By order of 5 October 2017, the Court (Eighth Chamber) has declared that the request for a preliminary ruling is manifestly inadmissible.

(*1) Information erased within the framework of the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.