Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. Non-contractual liability - Conditions - Legislative measure involving choices of economic policy - Sufficiently serious breach of Community law - Meaning

(Art. 288, second para., EC)

2. Fisheries - Conservation of marine resources - System of fishing quotas - Allocation between Member States of the volume of available catches - Discretion of the Community institutions

(Council Regulation No 3760/92, Art. 8(4))

3. Community law - Principles - Proportionality - Measures to conserve marine resources - Discretion of the Community institutions - Judicial review - Limits

4. Community law - Principles - Protection of legitimate expectations - Limits - Amendments to rules concerning the common agricultural policy - Amendments made to a total allowable catch or a fishing quota in the context of international negotiations

5. Fisheries - Conservation of marine resources - System of fishing quotas - Principle of relative stability - Application to measures determining, and not distributing, the volume of available catches for the Community in the context of international negotiations - Excluded

(Council Regulations No 3760/92, Art. 8(4), and No 1761/95)

6. Non-contractual liability - Conditions - Lawful act - Real damage, causal link and unusual and special damage - Cumulative nature

(Art. 288 EC)

Summary

1. For Community law to recognise a right to reparation for loss caused by legislative measures, three conditions must be met, namely that the rule of law infringed be intended to confer rights on individuals, that the breach be sufficiently serious, and, finally, that there be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the Community and the damage sustained by the injured parties.

For there to be a sufficiently serious breach of the rule of law in question, there must be a serious and obvious disregard by a Community institution of the limits on its discretion.

( see paras 42, 45 )

2. When, in implementing the common agricultural policy, Community institutions are called upon to evaluate a complex economic situation, the discretion which they have is not limited solely to the nature and scope of the measures to be taken but also applies, to some extent, to the finding of basic facts. That is so where, pursuant to Article 8(4) of Regulation No 3760/92 establishing a Community system for fisheries and aquaculture, the Council fixes the total allowable catches and distributes fishing opportunities among Member States. It is a fortiori so where the conservation measure has been decided upon not by the Community alone but by an international organisation in which the Community participates in the same way as all the other contracting parties.

( see paras 46-47 )

3. In order to establish whether a provision of Community law complies with the principle of proportionality it is necessary to ascertain whether the means which it employs are appropriate and necessary to attain the objective sought. However, in an area such as conserving marine resources, where the Community institutions have a broad discretion, the lawfulness of a measure can be affected only if it is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective pursued. The Court's review must be limited in particular if the Council has to reconcile divergent interests and thus select options within the context of the policy choices which are its own responsibility.

( see para. 78 )

4. Whilst the protection of legitimate expectations is one of the fundamental principles of the Community, economic operators cannot have a legitimate expectation that an existing situation which is capable of being altered by the Community institutions in the exercise of their discretion will be maintained, especially in an area such as the common agricultural policy, in which the institutions have a wide discretion. It follows that economic operators cannot claim a vested right to the maintenance of an advantage arising from Community legislation and which they enjoyed at a given time. That applies even more strongly in the context of international negotiations which, by their very nature, imply concessions on either side and the negotiation of a compromise accepted by all the contracting parties. An applicant cannot therefore claim to have a legitimate expectation in the maintenance of a total allowable catch or a quota where fishing takes place in the waters of non-member countries or under the authority of an international organisation and the volume of catches must necessarily be negotiated with non-member countries whose wishes do not necessarily coincide with those of the Community.

( see paras 122-124 )

5. The principle of relative stability, laid down in Article 8(4) of Regulation No 3760/92 establishing a Community system for fisheries and aquaculture, is intended to ensure for each Member State a share of the Community's total allowable catches, determined essentially on the basis of the catches from which traditional fishing activities, the local populations dependent on fisheries and related industries of that Member State benefited before the quota system was established. That principle, which is peculiar to Community law, relates only to the allocation among the various Member States of the volume of catches available to the Community. However, the bilateral fisheries agreement with Canada in the context of the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the North West Atlantic Fisheries and Regulation No 1761/95 establishing for 1995 a Community quota of 5 013 tonnes for catches of Greenland halibut in North Atlantic Fisheries Organisation sub-areas 2 and 3 do not allocate the volume of catches available to the Community among the Member States but determine that volume, and are thus at a different stage from that to which that principle applies. Moreover, that determination took place in the context of international negotiations subject only to rules of international law, to which the principle in question is unknown.

( see paras 150-151 )

6. Should the principle of no-fault liability of the Community be recognised in Community law, a precondition for such liability would in any event be the cumulative satisfaction of three conditions, namely the reality of the damage allegedly suffered, the causal link between it and the act complained of on the part of the Community institutions, and the unusual and special nature of that damage. The cumulative nature of those conditions means that if one of them is not satisfied, the Community cannot incur non-contractual liability in respect of a lawful act of its institutions.

( see paras 171, 179 )