2.

All the parties rightly assume that, according to the wording of the definition of collective redundancies given in Article 1 (1) (a), the directive applies only to ‘dismissals effected by an employer’ (Entlassungen die ein Arbeitgeber... vornimmt, afskedigelser, som foretages af en arbejdsgiver, licenciements effectués par un employeur, ogni licenziamento effettuato da un datore di lavoro, het ontslag door een werkgever). Thus the directive mainly contains obligations for the employer. According to Article 2, workers are to be consulted before collective redundancies are effected and according to Article 3 all projected collective redundancies are to be notified to the competent authorities. Moreover, the directive contains no express provision that termination of employment by the workers is to be treated in certain cases as dismissal by the employer. It remains further tc consider whether, as Specialarbejderforbundet contends, the object of the directive, contrary to its wording, requires that termination of their employment by the workers in the specific circumstances of the present case should be treated as dismissal by the employer. In the view of the trade union, the declared objective of the directive to protect workers in the event of collective redundancies would not be achieved if in a case such as the present, in which the payment of wages is no longer guaranteed on account of suspension of payment of debts, the termination of their employment by the workers were not treated as dismissal by the employer. That teleological interpretation assumes, in my opinion, a purpose which the directive does not have. The directive does not have the objective of guaranteeing a form of social security for workers whose employer encounters financial difficulties, but seeks, as is apparent from the preamble, simply to strengthen the protection of the worker against unilateral acts by the employer in the form of collective redundancies. As is apparent from Article 2 of the directive, prior consultations with representatives of the workers are intended to contribute to avoiding or reducing collective redundancies and alleviating their consequences. The obligation to give notice of projected collective redundancies contained in Articles 3 and 4 of the directive is intended to put the competent authorities in a position to seek solutions to the problems caused by the projected collective redundancies in good time. Achievement of that objective would, as the intervener in the main proceedings and the Commission stress, at least be made more difficult, if not altogether frustrated, if unilateral termination of employment by the workers, on account of the employer's notifying the bankruptcy court that payment of his debts is being suspended, were to be treated as equivalent to dismissal by the employer. In such an event the workers would have the power to bring about collective redundancies even contrary to the intention of the employer and without the employer being able to fulfil his obligations under the directive in respect of consultations and notice. The directive's intention of avoiding or reducing collective redundancies by means of consultations and the requirement of notification to the competent authorities would be stood on its head. If Council Directive No 75/129 were applied to cases such as the present, the worker would ultimately be at liberty to create the conditions giving rise to the claim for compensation under national law. Moreover, application of Council Directive No 75/129 to a case such as the present might jeopardize the objective of notice to the bankruptcy court or suspension of the payment of debts. That procedure is intended as far as possible to prevent the consequences associated with insolvency. The application of the rules on collective redundancies to such a case would however be likely to hasten the liquidation of an undertaking. In conclusion, it therefore remains to observe that the purpose of Council Directive No 75/129 does not require that it should be applied, contrary to its unambiguous and clear wording, to termination of their employment by the workers in the circumstances described. The question whether a different answer would be called for, as the Commission proposes, if the employer, without seriously trying to stay in business, had forced the workers to give notice in order to escape the obligations imposed by the directive, need not be discussed in the present case, since the request for a preliminary ruling contains no grounds for such an assumption.