Joined Cases T-222/99, T-327/99 and T-329/99

Jean-Claude Martinez and Others

v

European Parliament

‛Action for annulment — Act of the European Parliament concerning a provision of its Rules of Procedure — Statement of formation of a group under Rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament — Admissibility — Objection of illegality — Equal treatment — Observance of fundamental rights — Principles of democracy and proportionality — Freedom of association — Protection of legitimate expectations — Parliamentary traditions of the Member States — Breach of essential procedural requirements — Misuse of procedure’

Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber, Extended Composition), 2 October 2001 II-2835

Summary of the Judgment

Community law — Principles — Protection of legitimate expectations — Conditions — Opposition by the Parliament to the statement of formation of a political group not displaying the characteristics of existing groups — Frustration of the legitimate expectations of the Members comprising that group — None

Parliament — Organisation of Members in political groups — Requirement of political affinities — Appraisal — Statement of formation of a political group providing for free voting and political independence of Members in that group — Compliance with the abovementioned requirement as an expression of the principle of the unfettered exercise of a parliamentary mandate — Limits

Whilst the purpose of the rules of procedure of a Community institution is to organise the internal functioning of its services in the interests of good administration, and the rules laid down therefore have as their essential purpose to ensure the smooth conduct of procedure, that consideration alone does not preclude an act of the Parliament providing a general interpretation of a provision of its Rules of Procedure proposed by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs from having legal effects in regard to third parties and thus from being capable of forming the subject-matter of an action for annulment brought before the Community judicature under Article 230 EC. The Parliament cannot claim that that act purports merely to give a general and abstract interpretation of the provisions at issue not capable of forming the subject-matter of an action for annulment. (see paras 32, 56-57)

Elected under Article 1 of the Act of 20 September 1976 concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage as representatives of the peoples of the States brought together in the Community, the Members of the Parliament must, in regard to an act emanating from the Parliament and producing legal effects as regards the conditions under which the electoral mandate is exercised, be regarded as third parties within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 230 EC. (see para. 61)

Rule 29(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament, which provides that Members may form themselves into groups according to their political affinities and appears in a rule dealing with the ‘formation of political groups’, must necessarily be construed as meaning that Members who choose to form a group within the Parliament may do so only on the basis of political affinities. Any argument as to the optional nature of the criterion of political affinities referred to in that provision is therefore invalidated by the very terms of that provision, in conjunction with its heading. In that regard, the attitude previously adopted by the Parliament in regard to the statements of formation of certain groups must be regarded as reflecting an assessment as to observance of the requirement of political affinities dependent upon the specific content and context of each of those statements. Conversely, it cannot be deemed to constitute a legal interpretation according to which the requirement of political affinities mentioned in successive versions of the Parliament's Rules of Procedure could be regarded as optional. (see paras 80-81, 85)

As is clear from Rule 180 of the Parliament's Rules of Procedure, it has competence to ensure, if need be by referring a matter to the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, that its Rules of Procedure are being correctly applied and interpreted. In that respect it has competence specifically to monitor compliance with the requirement of political affinity laid down in Rule 29(1) by a group declaring its formation to the President of the Parliament under Rule 29(4). To deny the Parliament that monitoring power would be tantamount to compelling it to deprive Rule 29(1) of all effectiveness. (see para. 101)

The concept of political affinity in Rule 29(1) of the Parliament's Rules of Procedure must be understood as having in each specific case the meaning which the Members forming themselves into a political group under Rule 29 intend to give to it, without necessarily openly so stating. It follows that Members declaring that they are organising themselves into a group under this provision are presumed to share political affinities, however minimal. However, that presumption cannot be regarded as irrebuttable. Pursuant to its supervisory competence, the Parliament has the power to examine whether the requirement laid down in Rule 29(1) has been observed where the Members declaring the formation of a group openly exclude any political affinity between themselves, in patent noncompliance with the abovementioned requirement. (see paras 103-104)

The reference in the statement of formation of a parliamentary group to the fact that the various signatories comprising it retain their voting freedom both in committee and in plenary assembly does not warrant the conclusion that there are no political affinities between those signatories. In fact, that is an expression of the principle of the independent mandate enshrined in Article 4(1) of the Act of 20 September 1976 concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage and Rule 2 of the Parliament's Rules of Procedure and cannot therefore have any influence on assessment of a group's compliance with Rule 29(1). Nor does the fact that Members forming themselves into a group declare that they remain politically independent from one another suffice to warrant a finding that they do not share political affinities. A declaration of that kind is similarly in keeping with the principle of the independent mandate. None the less, that is not the case where the members of the group concerned categorically rejected any common political affinity, undertook on no account to give the impression of sharing any such affinity and precluded in advance any action, even of an ad hoc nature, which might during the currency of that legislature have been conducive to that end. (see paras 108-109, 111)

Article 241 EC gives expression to the general principle conferring upon any party to proceedings the right to challenge, in order to seek annulment of a decision of direct and individual concern to that party, the validity of a previous act of the institutions which forms the legal basis of the decision which is being challenged, if that party was not entitled under Article 230 EC to bring a direct action challenging that act, by which it was thus affected without having been in a position to ask that it be declared void. In that regard, the scope of that article must extend to acts of the institutions which were relevant to the adoption of the decision forming the subject-matter of the action for annulment, even if such acts did not formally constitute the legal basis of that decision. (see paras 133, 135)

The Parliament is authorised by virtue of the power to determine its own internal organisation conferred on it by Articles 25 CS, 199 EC and 112 EA to take appropriate measures to ensure the proper functioning and conduct of its proceedings. In that connection, the combined provisions of Rule 29(1) and Rule 30 of the Parliament's Rules of Procedure allowing within the Parliament only the formation of groups founded on political affinities and providing that the Members not belonging to a political group are to sit as nonattached Members under the conditions laid down by the Bureau of the Parliament, rather than authorising them to form a technical group or to constitute a mixed group, constitute measures of internal organisation which are warranted by the special characteristics of the Parliament, the constraints under which it operates and the responsibilities and objectives assigned to it by the Treaty. (see paras 144, 149)

The principle of nondiscrimination, which constitutes a fundamental principle of law, prohibits comparable situations from being treated differently or different situations from being treated in the same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified. In that regard, the Members of the Parliament all have a mandate bestowed on them democratically by the electorate and all assume the same task of political representation at European level. In that respect they are all in the same situation. It is certainly the case that Rule 29(1) in conjunction with Rule 30 of the Parliament's Rules of Procedure, by allowing only the formation of groups based on political affinities, introduces a distinction between two categories of Members, those belonging to a political group within the meaning of the Parliament's internal rules and those who sit as nonattached Members under the conditions laid down by the Bureau of the Parliament. That distinction is justified, however, by the fact that the former satisfy, unlike the latter, a requirement under the Rules of Procedure dictated by the pursuit of legitimate objectives. Accordingly, such a distinction cannot be held to constitute an infringement of the principle of nondiscrimination. (see paras 150-153)

It is for the Parliament to determine whether the situation arising from application of the various internal provisions governing the status of the nonattached Member is in all respects in conformity with the principle of equal treatment. In that connection, although the attainment of the legitimate objectives pursued by the Parliament by means of its organisation in political groups justifies the fact that those groups, and thus the Members belonging to them, enjoy certain privileges and facilities denied to nonattached Members, it is for the Parliament to examine under the relevant internal procedures whether the differences in treatment as between those two categories of Member stemming from the abovementioned provisions are all necessary and thus objectively justified in the light of the abovementioned objectives. If appropriate, it will be for the Parliament under its power of internal organisation to remedy the inequalities inherent in those provisions which do not satisfy that requirement of necessity and which might consequently be held to be discriminatory on review by the Community judicature of acts of the Parliament adopted under those provisions. (see para. 157)

The principle of protection of legitimate expectations, which is one of the fundamental principles of the Community, presupposes that the Community institution in question gave to those concerned specific assurances giving rise on their part to reasonable expectations. In that connection, the absence in the past of opposition by the Parliament to statements concerning the formation of political groups not having the same characteristics as a group whose formation is now being declared cannot be regarded as a specific assurance giving rise in the minds of the Members who declared that they were forming that group reasonable expectations as to its compliance with the requirement of political affinities laid down in Rule 29(1) of the Parliament's Rules of Procedure. (see paras 183-184)

Whilst the principle of democracy is a founding principle of the European Union, it does not preclude the Parliament from adopting measures of internal organisation, such as Rule 29(1) in conjunction with Rule 30 of the Parliament's Rules of Procedure, which allow only the formation of groups based on political affinities and which enable it to perform as well as possible, in keeping with its special characteristics, the institutional role and the objectives assigned to it by the treaties. (see para. 200)

In compliance with the internal procedures provided for in that regard and subject to possible review by the Community judicature, it is for the Parliament to determine whether the situation of nonattached Members within the meaning of Rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament who in the exercise of their functions are deprived by various provisions of the internal rules of the Parliament of the benefit of a number of material, administrative, financial and parliamentary privileges which are accorded to the political groups is in all respects compatible with the principle of democracy. Under that principle the conditions under which Members who have been democratically vested with a parliamentary mandate exercise that mandate cannot be affected by their not belonging to a political group to an extent which exceeds what is necessary for the attainment of the legitimate objectives pursued by the Parliament through its organisation in political groups. (see paras 201-202)

The principle of proportionality requires measures adopted by the Community institutions to be appropriate and necessary for meeting the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question, and where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, the least onerous measure must be used. In that connection, the combined provisions of Rule 29(1) and Rule 30 of the Parliament's Rules of Procedure, which only allow the formation of groups based on political affinities, constitute measures of internal organisation which are appropriate and necessary in the light of the legitimate objectives pursued by the Parliament. In fact, in the light of the Parliament's specific characteristics and operating constraints, only groups made up of Members sharing political affinities within the meaning of Rule 29(1) enable the Parliament to perform the institutional tasks and the objectives assigned to it by the Treaty. If Members declaring that they are forming a group as provided for in Rule 29(1) share no political affinity, the Parliament has no choice but to prohibit the formation of such a group and, as provided for by Rule 30, to deem them to be nonattached, since otherwise it would jeopardise the attainment of the legitimate objectives which it pursues by means of its organisation in political groups. Accordingly, Rule 29(1) in conjunction with Rule 30 cannot be regarded as measures which, in breach of the principle of proportionality, go beyond what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the legitimate objectives pursued. (see paras 215-217)

It is for the Parliament to consider, in compliance with the internal procedures provided for in that regard and subject to possible review by the Community judicature, whether the situation of Members who are nonattached within the meaning of Rule 30 of the Parliament's Rules of Procedure and, in the exercise of their functions, do not enjoy the same advantages as those conferred on the members of political groups complies with the principle of proportionality, by verifying whether in the case of each of the relevant provisions of the Parliament's internal rules, a less stringent solution would be just as appropriate for achieving the legitimate objectives pursued by the Parliament by way of its political group structure. (see paras 218-219)

The principle of freedom of association which is enshrined in Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights and stems from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States is one of the fundamental rights which, as the Court has consistently held and as is reaffirmed in the preamble to the Single European Act and in Article 6(2) EU, are protected in the Community legal order. Nevertheless, even if that principle were intended to apply to the internal organisation of the Parliament, it should be stressed that it is not absolute. Restrictions may be imposed, for legitimate reasons, on the exercise of freedom of association, provided that those restrictions do not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, disproportionate and unreasonable interference undermining the very substance of that right. In that regard, the principle of freedom of association does not preclude the Parliament in the context of its power of internal organisation from making formation of a group of Members of the Parliament subject to a requirement of political affinity dictated by the pursuit of legitimate objectives and from prohibiting the formation of a group which is in patent breach of that requirement. Such measures, which are based on legitimate grounds, do not affect the right of Members concerned to organise themselves into a group provided that the conditions laid down in that connection by the Rules are observed. (see paras 231-233)

Even if the case-law to the effect that in ensuring that fundamental rights are safeguarded the Community judicature is obliged to draw inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States applies by analogy to the parliamentary traditions common to the latter, the act of the Parliament banning the formation of groups whose members abjure any political affinity cannot be adjudged contrary to a parliamentary tradition common to the Member States. In fact, even though the formation of technical or mixed groups is permitted by one or other of the national parliaments, it does not appear that the national parliaments which, like the Parliament, make formation of a group within the parliament subject to a requirement of political affinity would interpret a statement concerning the formation of a group such as a group abjuring any political affinity as between its members in a manner differing from the Parliament's interpretation. Nor does it appear that formation of a group whose members expressly state that it is entirely unpolitical, would be possible in the majority of national parliaments. (see paras 240-242)

Under Rule 180(5) and (6) of the Parliament's Rules of Procedure, interpretations by the Parliament are adopted in the form of explanatory notes to the corresponding rule or rules and those explanatory notes constitute precedents in particular for the application of the rules concerned. Unlike Rule 181(3), which concerns amendments to those Rules, and under which any such amendment is to enter into force only on the first day of the partsession following its adoption, under the abovementioned provisions of Rule 180 the application to a specific case of the interpretation of a provision of the Rules of Procedure adopted by the Parliament is not subject to any timelimit or formality. Thus, the interpretation by the Parliament of a rule elucidates and specifies its meaning and scope as it ought to be and ought to have been understood and applied from the time of its entry into force. It follows that the provision as so construed may be applied to situations arising prior to the adoption of the interpretative decision. (see paras 251-252)

Point XV 8 of Annex VI and Rule 180(1) and (3) of the Parliament's Rules of Procedure must be construed as giving competence to the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, where a question is referred to it, to propose to the Parliament its interpretation of the rule in connection with the specific problem giving rise to such referral. (see para. 259)