ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
5

Under points 23 to 26 of the 2006 Leniency Notice, set out in Section III thereof, entitled ‘Reduction of a fine’: ‘(23) Undertakings disclosing their participation in an alleged cartel affecting the [Union] that do not meet the conditions under section II above may be eligible to benefit from a reduction of any fine that would otherwise have been imposed. (24) In order to qualify, an undertaking must provide the Commission with evidence of the alleged infringement which represents significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the Commission’s possession and must meet the cumulative conditions set out in points (12)(a) to (12)(c) above. (25) The concept of “added value” refers to the extent to which the evidence provided strengthens, by its very nature and/or its level of detail, the Commission’s ability to prove the alleged cartel. In this assessment, the Commission will generally consider written evidence originating from the period of time to which the facts pertain to have a greater value than evidence subsequently established. Incriminating evidence directly relevant to the facts in question will generally be considered to have a greater value than that with only indirect relevance. Similarly, the degree of corroboration from other sources required for the evidence submitted to be relied upon against other undertakings involved in the case will have an impact on the value of that evidence, so that compelling evidence will be attributed a greater value than evidence such as statements which require corroboration if contested. (26) The Commission will determine in any final decision adopted at the end of the administrative procedure the level of reduction an undertaking will benefit from, relative to the fine which would otherwise be imposed. For the: – first undertaking to provide significant added value: a reduction of 30-50%, – second undertaking to provide significant added value: a reduction of 20-30%, – subsequent undertakings that provide significant added value: a reduction of up to 20%. In order to determine the level of reduction within each of these bands, the Commission will take into account the time at which the evidence fulfilling the condition in point (24) was submitted and the extent to which it represents added value. If the applicant for a reduction of a fine is the first to submit compelling evidence in the sense of point (25) which the Commission uses to establish additional facts increasing the gravity or the duration of the infringement, the Commission will not take such additional facts into account when setting any fine to be imposed on the undertaking which provided this evidence.’
10

Article 28 of Ley 24/1988, de 28 de julio, del Mercado de Valores (Law 24/1988 on the Securities Market of 29 July 1988, (BOE No 181 of 29 July 1988, p. 23405), in the version applicable in the main proceedings, provided: ‘1. Responsibility for the information given in a prospectus attaches at least to the issuer, the offeror or the person asking for the admission to trading on an official secondary market and the directors of those persons, in accordance with the provisions laid down by regulation. … 2. The persons responsible for the information in the prospectus shall be clearly identified in the prospectus by their names and functions or, in the case of legal persons, their names and registered offices. They must also declare that, to the best of their knowledge, the information contained in the prospectus is in accordance with the facts and that the prospectus makes no omission likely to affect its import. 3. In accordance with the provisions laid down by regulation, all the persons referred to in the preceding paragraphs shall, where appropriate, be liable for any damage caused to the holders of securities acquired as a result of incorrect information or the omission of relevant data from the prospectus or from the document to be prepared, where appropriate, by the guarantor. … 4. No liability shall attach to the persons referred to in the preceding paragraphs on the basis of the summary, or of its translation, unless it is misleading, inaccurate or inconsistent when read together with the other parts of the prospectus, or does not provide, when read together with the other parts of the prospectus, key information that will assist investors when deciding whether or not to invest in the securities.’
31

In those circumstances, the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha (High Court of Justice, Castilla-La Mancha, Spain) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. In the light of Article 68 of the Civil Code which provides that spouses must live together, is the requirement that a Spanish citizen who has not exercised his right of free movement must satisfy the conditions laid down in Article 7(1) of Royal Decree 240/2007, as a necessary condition for a right of residence being granted to the third-country minor child of the third-country spouse, in accordance with Article 7(2) [of that Royal Decree], liable, in the event that those conditions are not satisfied, to constitute an infringement of Article 20 TFEU if, as a result of the refusal to grant that right, the Spanish citizen is compelled to leave the territory of the European Union as a whole? 2. In any event, notwithstanding the foregoing and the answer to the first question, in the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice including, in particular, the judgment of 8 May 2018, K.A. and Others (Family reunification in Belgium) (C‑82/16, EU:C:2018:308), does the practice of the Spanish State of automatically applying the rule laid down in Article 7 of Royal Decree 240/2007, and refusing to grant a residence permit to the third-country national who is the minor child of a Union citizen’s third-country spouse, where that Union citizen has never exercised freedom of movement (those spouses in turn having a Spanish child who is a minor who has also never exercised freedom of movement), solely and exclusively on the ground that the Union citizen does not satisfy the conditions laid down in that provision, without having examined specifically and individually whether there exists a relationship of dependency between that Union citizen and the third-country national of such a nature that, for any reason and in the light of the circumstances, it would mean that were the third-country national refused a right of residence, the Union citizen could not be separated from the family member dependent on him and would have to leave the territory of the European Union, infringe Article 20 TFEU in the terms set out above? And is this the case in particular where the Spanish citizen and his third-country spouse are in turn the parents of a Spanish minor who could also have to leave Spanish territory to follow his parents?’
Agriculture – Approximation of laws – Placing of plant protection products on the market – Regulation No 1107/2009 – Approval of an active substance – Definition of ‘confirmatory information’

(European Parliament and Council Regulation No 1107/2009, Art. 6(f) and Annex II, point 2.2)

(see paras 50, 51)
4

Article 58(1) and (4) of that directive provides: ‘1. Except in the case of the medicinal products referred to in Article 17(1), the competent authority shall approve the immediate packaging and outer packaging of veterinary medicinal products. Packaging shall bear the following information, which shall conform with the particulars and documents provided pursuant to Articles 12 to 13d and the summary of product characteristics, and shall appear in legible characters: (a) the name of the medicinal product, followed by its strength and pharmaceutical form; The common name shall appear if the product contains only one active substance and its name is an invented name. (b) A statement of the active substances expressed qualitatively and quantitatively per unit or according to the form of administration for a particular volume or weight, using the common names; (c) Manufacturer’s batch number; (d) Marketing authorisation number; (e) Name or corporate name and permanent address or registered place of business of the marketing authorisation holder and, where appropriate, of the representative designated by the marketing authorisation holder; (f) The species of animal for which the veterinary medicinal product is intended; the method and, if necessary, the route of administration. Space shall be provided for the prescribed dose to be indicated; (g) The withdrawal period for veterinary medicinal products to be administered to food-producing species, for all the species concerned and for the various foodstuffs concerned (meat and offal, eggs, milk, honey), including those for which the withdrawal period is zero; (h) Expiry date, in plain language; (i) Special storage precautions, if any; (j) Specific precautions relating to the disposal of unused medicinal products or waste derived from veterinary medicinal products, where appropriate, as well as a reference to any appropriate collection system in place; (k) Particulars required to be indicated pursuant to Article 26(1), if any; (l) The words ‘For animal treatment only’ or, in the case of the medicinal products referred to in Article 67, the words ‘For animal treatment only – to be supplied only on veterinary prescription’. […] 4. ‘The particulars mentioned in paragraph 1(f) to (l) shall appear on the outer package and on the container of the medicinal products in the language or languages of the country in which they are placed on the market.’
5

Title II of that directive, entitled ‘Free provision of services’, comprises Articles 5 to 9 thereof. Article 5, entitled ‘Principle of the free provision of services’, provides: ‘1. Without prejudice to specific provisions of [EU] law, as well as to Articles 6 and 7 of this Directive, Member States shall not restrict, for any reason relating to professional qualifications, the free provision of services in another Member State: (a) if the service provider is legally established in a Member State for the purpose of pursuing the same profession there (hereinafter referred to as the Member State of establishment), and (b) where the service provider moves, if he has pursued that profession in one or several Member States for at least one year during the last 10 years preceding the provision of services when the profession is not regulated in the Member State of establishment. The condition of one year’s pursuit shall not apply if the profession or the education and training leading to the profession is regulated. 2. The provisions of this title shall only apply where the service provider moves to the territory of the host Member State to pursue, on a temporary and occasional basis, the profession referred to in paragraph 1. The temporary and occasional nature of the provision of services shall be assessed case by case, in particular in relation to its duration, its frequency, its regularity and its continuity. 3. Where a service provider moves, he shall be subject to professional rules of a professional, statutory or administrative nature which are directly linked to professional qualifications, such as the definition of the profession, the use of titles and serious professional malpractice which is directly and specifically linked to consumer protection and safety, as well as disciplinary provisions which are applicable in the host Member State to professionals who pursue the same profession in that Member State.’
17

In those circumstances, the tribunal de première instance du Luxembourg (Court of First Instance, Luxembourg) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Does Article 45 TFEU preclude rules such as those at issue in the main proceedings – irrespective of whether or not they are laid down in a convention for the avoidance of double taxation – whereby a taxpayer forfeits, in the calculation of the income tax payable by him or her in his or her State of residence, part of the tax-free amount of that income and of his or her other personal tax advantages (such as a tax reduction for long-term savings, that is to say, premiums paid under an individual life insurance contract, and a tax reduction for costs incurred in energy savings) because, during the year in question, he or she also received income in another Member State which was taxed in that State? (2) If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, does that answer remain in the affirmative if the income received by the taxpayer in his or her State of residence is neither quantitatively nor proportionately significant but that State is nevertheless in a position to grant him or her those tax advantages? (3) If the answer to the second question is in the affirmative, does that answer remain in the affirmative if, under a convention for the avoidance of double taxation between the State of residence and the other State, the taxpayer has enjoyed in that other State, in respect of income taxable in that other State, personal tax advantages under the tax legislation of that other State but those tax advantages do not include certain tax advantages to which the taxpayer is in principle entitled in the State of residence? (4) If the answer to the third question is in the affirmative, does that answer remain in the affirmative if, notwithstanding the latter difference, the taxpayer obtains in that other State a tax reduction in an amount at least equivalent to that which he or she has lost in his or her State of residence? (5) Are the answers to the questions the same in the light of [Article 63(1) and Article 65(1)(a) TFEU] in relation to rules such as those at issue in the main proceedings – irrespective of whether or not they are laid down in a convention for the avoidance of double taxation – whereby a taxpayer forfeits, in the calculation of the income tax payable by him or her in his or her State of residence, part of the tax-free amount of that income and of his or her other personal tax advantages (such as a tax reduction for long-term savings, that is to say premiums paid under an individual life insurance contract, and a tax reduction for costs incurred in energy savings) because, during the year in question, he or she also received rental income in respect of a property owned by him or her in another Member State which was taxed in that State?’
24

In those circumstances, the Oberlandesgericht Köln (Higher Regional Court, Cologne) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Is it necessary, for a declaration of lack of jurisdiction by the court previously seised, as provided for in Article 7(a) of [the Succession Regulation], that that court should expressly decline jurisdiction, or may even a non-express declaration suffice if it supports the inference, through interpretation, that that court has declined jurisdiction? (2) Is the court of the Member State whose jurisdiction is intended to follow from a declaration of lack of jurisdiction by the court previously seised in the other Member State competent to examine whether the conditions governing a decision by the court previously seised, as provided for in Articles 6(a) and 7(a) of [the Succession Regulation], were met? To what extent is the decision of the court previously seised binding? In particular: (a) Is the court of the Member State whose jurisdiction is intended to follow from a declaration of lack of jurisdiction by the court previously seised in the other Member State competent to examine whether the deceased validly chose the law of the Member State in accordance with Article 22 of [the Succession Regulation]? (b) Does the court of the Member State whose jurisdiction is intended to follow from a declaration of lack of jurisdiction by the court first seised in the other Member State have the power to examine whether a request for a declaration of lack of jurisdiction, as provided for in Article 6(a) of [the Succession Regulation], has been brought by one of the parties to the proceedings before the court previously seised? (c) Does the court of the Member State whose jurisdiction is intended to follow from a declaration of lack of jurisdiction by the court first seised in the other Member State have the power to examine whether the court previously seised rightly assumed that the courts of the Member State of the chosen law are better placed to rule on the succession? (3) Are Articles 6(a) and 7(a) of [the Succession Regulation], which presuppose a choice of law “pursuant to Article 22”, applicable even where the deceased has made no express or implied choice of law in a testamentary disposition made before 17 August 2015, but the law applicable to the succession is capable of being inferred only from Article 83(4) of [the Succession Regulation]?’
39

It thus follows from paragraphs 34 to 38 of the present judgment that respect for the right to a fair trial and the rights of the defence requires the authorities of the Member States, which impose a financial penalty within the meaning of Article 1(a) of Framework Decision 2005/214, to ensure that, upon notification of the decision containing that penalty, the person concerned is informed, in a language which he or she understands, of the elements of that decision which are essential for him or her to understand what he or she is accused of, and to be able fully to exercise his or her rights of defence or, if needed, to obtain a full translation of those elements. Those elements include, in particular, the facts on which the notified decision is based, the offence committed, the penalty imposed, the legal remedies available against that decision, the time limit laid down for that purpose and the identification of the body before which the appeal must be lodged. Where the person concerned claims that a translation is needed, it is for the competent authorities of the issuing Member State to take all necessary steps to ensure that such a translation is prepared as soon as possible.
12

Article 24 of Regulation No 726/2004, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1235/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2010 (OJ 2010 L 348, p. 1) (‘Regulation No 726/2004’) provides: ‘1. The [EMA] shall, in collaboration with the Member States and the Commission, set up and maintain a database and data processing network (hereinafter the “Eudravigilance database”) to collate pharmacovigilance information regarding medicinal products authorised in the Union and to allow competent authorities to access that information simultaneously and to share it. The Eudravigilance database shall contain information on suspected adverse reactions in human beings arising from use of the medicinal product within the terms of the marketing authorisation as well as from uses outside the terms of the marketing authorisation, and on those occurring in the course of post-authorisation studies with the medicinal product or associated with occupational exposure. 2. The [EMA] shall, in collaboration with the Member States and the Commission, draw up the functional specifications for the Eudravigilance database, together with a timeframe for their implementation. … The Eudravigilance database shall be fully accessible to the competent authorities of the Member States and to the [EMA] and the Commission. It shall also be accessible to marketing authorisation holders to the extent necessary for them to comply with their pharmacovigilance obligations. The [EMA] shall ensure that healthcare professionals and the public have appropriate levels of access to the Eudravigilance database, while guaranteeing personal data protection. The [EMA] shall work together with all stakeholders, including research institutions, healthcare professionals, and patient and consumer organisations, in order to define the “appropriate level of access” for healthcare professionals and the public to the Eudravigilance database. The data held on the Eudravigilance database shall be made publicly accessible in an aggregated format together with an explanation of how to interpret the data. 3. The [EMA] shall, in collaboration either with the marketing authorisation holder or with the Member State that submitted an individual suspected adverse reaction report to the Eudravigilance database, be responsible for operating procedures that ensure the quality and integrity of the information collected in the Eudravigilance database. 4. Individual suspected adverse reaction reports and follow-ups submitted to the Eudravigilance database by marketing authorisation holders shall be transmitted electronically upon receipt to the competent authority of the Member State where the reaction occurred.’
5

Article 2c of Directive 92/13 provides: ‘Where a Member State provides that any application for review of a contracting entity’s decision taken in the context of, or in relation to, a contract award procedure falling within the scope of Directive 2014/25/EU or Directive 2014/23/EU must be made before the expiry of a specified period, this period shall be at least 10 calendar days with effect from the day following the date on which the contracting entity’s decision is sent to the tenderer or candidate if fax or electronic means are used or, if other means of communication are used, this period shall be either at least 15 calendar days with effect from the day following the date on which the contracting entity’s decision is sent to the tenderer or candidate or at least 10 calendar days with effect from the day following the date of receipt of the contracting entity’s decision. The communication of the contracting entity’s decision to each tenderer or candidate shall be accompanied by a summary of the relevant reasons. In the case of an application for a review concerning decisions referred to in Article 2(1)(b) of this Directive that are not subject to a specific notification, the time period shall be at least 10 calendar days from the date of the publication of the decision concerned.’
6

Paragraph 7i(5) and (7) of the Arbeitsvertragsrechts-Anpassungsgesetz (Law adapting employment contract law, BGBl. 459/1993), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the AVRAG’), is worded as follows: ‘5. Whoever, in his or her capacity as an employer, employs or has employed an employee without paying that employee at least the remuneration to which he or she is entitled under the law, an ordinance or a collective agreement, having regard to the relevant classification criteria, with the exception of the pay components listed in Paragraph 49(3) of the Allgemeines Sozialversicherungsgesetz (General Law on social security; ‘the ASVG’), commits an administrative offence punishable by the district administrative authority by way of a fine. In the case of underpayments covering several pay periods in a continuous manner, a single administrative offence is committed. … Where no more than three workers are affected by the underpayment, the fine shall be, in respect of each worker, EUR 1000 to EUR 10000 and, in the event of a repeat offence, EUR 2000 to EUR 20000, and where more than three workers are affected, the fine shall be, in respect of each worker, EUR 2000 to EUR 20000 and, in the event of a repeat offence, EUR 4000 to EUR 50000. … 7. The limitation period for bringing proceedings (Paragraph 31(1) of the Verwaltungsstrafgesetz (Law on Administrative Penalties; ‘the VStG’) is three years from the date on which the remuneration fell due. In the case of underpayments that cover several wage payment periods in a continuous manner, the limitation period for bringing proceedings within the meaning of the first sentence begins to run from the date on which the remuneration for the last wage payment period of the underpayment fell due. In these cases, the limitation period for the punishment of offences (Paragraph 31(2) of the VStG) is five years. With regard to special payments, the periods pursuant to the first two sentences begin to run from the end of the respective calendar year (third sentence of subparagraph 5).’