ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.

In the case of an applicant for asylum who, before the point at which the age of majority is reached by his child, by way of whom a family existed in the country of origin and to whom subsidiary protection status was granted, following the attainment of majority, on the basis of an application for protection filed before the age of majority was reached (‘the beneficiary of protection’), entered the host Member State of the beneficiary of protection and also made an application for international protection there (‘the applicant for asylum’), and in the case of a national provision which, in relation to the granting of a right to be granted subsidiary protection, that right being derived from the beneficiary of subsidiary protection, makes reference to Article 2(j) of Directive 2011/95/EU, (1) is the point in time at which the decision on the asylum application of the applicant for asylum is taken or an earlier point in time to be taken into account for the question as to whether the beneficiary of protection is a ‘minor’ within the meaning of the third indent of Article 2(j) of Directive 2011/95/EU, such as the point in time at which (a) the beneficiary of protection was granted subsidiary protection status, (b) the applicant for asylum made his asylum application, (c) the applicant for asylum entered the host Member State, or (d) the beneficiary of protection made his asylum application?
Appeal brought on 2 September 2019 by Mr Klaus Nonnemacher against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) of 20 June 2019 in Case T-390/18 Klaus Nonnemacher v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

(Case C-660/19 P)

(2020/C 10/30)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Klaus Nonnemacher (represented by: C. Rohnke, Rechtsanwalt)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Paul Ingram

By order of 19 November 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) decided that the appeal should not be allowed to proceed and ordered the appellant to bear his own costs.
3.

Does the applicant’s service, by which, for a fee of 1 % of the amount of the bill of exchange charged to the issuer thereof, it transferred the bill of exchange obtained to a factoring company, and transferred the amount obtained from the factoring company to the issuer of the bill of exchange, and guaranteed to the factoring company that the issuer of the bill of exchange will pay the liability arising from the bill of exchange when it becomes due, constitute: (a) a service exempt from VAT under Article 135(1)(b) of the VAT Directive; or (b) a service exempt from VAT under Article 135(1)(d) of the VAT Directive? a
1.

Does the fact that a national court has a significantly heavier workload than the other courts of the same instance and the judges of that court are therefore prevented from examining the documents submitted to them on the basis of which provisional enforceability is to be ordered or may be ordered and at the same time from delivering their decisions within a reasonable period of time constitute, as such, an infringement of the EU law on consumer protection or of other fundamental rights?
Appeal brought on 4 December 2019 by Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 24 September 2019 in joined cases T-755/15 and T-759/15, Luxembourg and Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe v Commission

(Case C-885/19 P)

(2020/C 45/28)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe (represented by: J. Rodriguez, abogado, N. de Boynes, avocat, M. Engel, Rechtsanwalt, G. Maisto, avvocato)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Ireland

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber, Extended Composition) of 24 September 2019 in joined Cases T-755/15 and T-759/15;

— annul the contested decision of the Commission of 21 October 2015 (1) in accordance with Article 263(4) TFEU; or in the alternative, if and to the extent that the Court should be unable to make a final decision, refer the case back to the General Court; and

— order the Commission to pay Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe’s costs pursuant to Articles 138(1), 184(1) and (2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and to pay Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe’s costs at first instance.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First plea in law: the General Court’s analysis of whether Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe derived an advantage from the advance pricing agreement (‘APA’) breaches Article 107 TFEU by virtue of (i) the General Court’s misapplication of the legal test of whether the APA endorsed a methodology that exceeded the applicable margin of appreciation, and (ii) the General Court’s failure to properly define the relevant undertaking that was the beneficiary of the APA.

Second plea in law: the GCEU’s analysis of the legal basis for the Commission’s arm’s length principle (‘ALP’) is inadequate and contradictory and breaches the general principle to give adequate and coherent reasons.

Third plea in law: the GCEU breached the fundamental principle of legal certainty by (i) endorsing the Commission’s ill-defined ALP without addressing its scope or contents, and by (ii) upholding the application of the selectivity presumption to the APA.

(1) Commission Decision (EU) 2016/2326 of 21 October 2015 on State aid SA.38375 (2014/C ex 2014/NN) which Luxembourg granted to Fiat (notified under document C(2015) 7152) (OJ 2016, L 351, p. 1).
1.

Does the interpretation of Article 5(2) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and of Article [2](1), (2) and (3) and Article 4(1) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC (1) of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation lead to the conclusion that it is permissible for a person without the ability to see to be able to work as a court assessor and participate in criminal proceedings, or:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 26 November 2019 — Prefettura Ufficio territoriale del governo di Firenze v MI

(Case C-870/19)

(2020/C 54/38)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte suprema di cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Prefettura Ufficio territoriale del governo di Firenze

Defendant: MI

Question referred

May Article 15 [(7) of Regulation No 3821/85] (1) be interpreted, in the specific case of the driver of the motor vehicle, as a rule which prescribes a single, overall form of conduct and, therefore, entails the commission of a single infringement and the imposition of a single penalty, or may it result, through the cumulation of penalties for each act of omission, in as many infringements and penalties as the number of days in relation to which the record sheets for the tachograph have not been produced in the context of the timeframe laid down (‘current day and the previous 28 days’)?

(1) Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 of 20 December 1985 on recording equipment in road transport (OJ 1985 L 370, p. 8).
5.

Is Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 applicable to an employment relationship in which, although an employment contract was entered into in Austria for the performance of work in Germany, the female employee, who remained in Austria and was prepared for several months to work, did not perform any work, if it is possible to apply a national provision which enables an employee to bring an action in the place where she was resident during the employment relationship or at the time when the employment relationship ended (thus facilitating the process of bringing an action), as is the case with Paragraph 4(1)(a) of the ASGG, or if it is possible to apply a national provision which enables an employee to bring an action in the place where the remuneration is to be paid or was to be paid upon termination of the employment relationship (thus facilitating the process of bringing an action), as is the case with Paragraph 4(1)(d) of the ASGG?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Gliwicach (Poland) lodged on 4 December 2019 — A. v Dyrektor Krajowej Informacji Skarbowej

(Case C-895/19)

(2020/C 54/44)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Gliwicach

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: A.

Defendant: Dyrektor Krajowej Informacji Skarbowej

Question referred

Is Article 167 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (as amended), (1) in conjunction with Article 178 thereof, to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which makes the exercise of the right to deduct input tax in the same accounting period as that in which the tax due was payable on the transactions constituting Community acquisitions of goods subject to entry of the tax due on those transactions in the appropriate tax declaration submitted within the mandatory period (in Poland, three months) following the end of the month in which the tax liability arose in relation to the goods and services acquired?

(1) OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.
1.

Must Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union, Article 325(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 58 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, (1) [and] Article 4 of Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law, (2) drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests of 26 June 1995, be interpreted as precluding the adoption of a decision by a body outside the judicial system, the Curtea Constituțională a României (Constitutional Court of Romania), which adjudicates on a procedural objection alleging that the composition of the panel seized of the case is unlawful, in the light of the principle that the judges of the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice, Romania) must be specialised (not provided for in the Romanian Constitution), and which obliges a judicial body to refer cases which are at the (full-merits) appeal stage for re-examination within the first procedural cycle before the same court?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 1 August 2019 by L’Oréal against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 19 June 2019 in Case T-182/16 RENV, L’Oréal v EUIPO — Guinot

(Case C-589/19 P)

(2020/C 77/24)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: L’Oréal (represented by T. de Haan and P. Péters, avocats)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office and Guinot

By order of 7 October 2019, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) ruled that the appeal should not be allowed to proceed.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Salzburg (Austria) lodged on 31 October 2019 — CT v VINI GmbH

(Case C-805/19)

(2020/C 77/28)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landesgericht Salzburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: CT

Defendant: VINI GmbH

Question referred

Are Article 31 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 7(2) of Directive 2003/88/EC (1) (the Working Time Directive) to be interpreted as meaning that the rule of national law laid down in Paragraph 10(2) of the Urlaubsgesetz (Austrian Law on Annual Leave, ‘the UrlG’), under which a payment in lieu of annual leave in respect of the current (last) working year is not payable if the worker resigns prematurely, is not applicable?

(1) Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (OJ 2003 L 299, p. 9).
1.

Is Article 5(1)(c)(iii) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the re-routing referred to therein which allows the passenger to depart no more than one hour before the scheduled time of departure is to be carried out from the same airport of departure as that of the booked flight or could a departure from another airport also be considered?
1.

Is it compatible with the relevant provisions [on the deduction of VAT] of Directive 2006/112 (1) and with the principle of tax neutrality for national interpretation and practice to operate with the effect that the tax authority denies the right [to deduct VAT] on an economic transaction between the parties, on the basis that it finds the form of the legal relationship between them (a works contract) to be fraudulent because it gives rise to a right to deduct tax and, therefore, classifies it, under Article 1(7) [of the General Law on Tax Procedure] as an activity (agency) that does not give rise to a right to deduct, taking the view that the parties’ conduct was intended to evade tax since the activity carried on by the addressee of the invoice did not necessarily have to take [that form of business activity], and since it could also have performed that activity as an agent? In that context, are taxable persons obliged, as a requirement for [deducting VAT], to choose the form of economic activity that places the greater tax burden on them, or is there an abusive practice where, in exercise of their freedom to contract and for purposes unrelated to tax law, they choose a contractual form for the economic activity carried on between them that also has the unintended consequence of entitling them to deduct the tax?
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Općinski sud u Velikoj Gorici (Croatia) lodged on 7 November 2019 — RE v Privredne banke Zagreb d.d.

(Case C-820/19)

(2020/C 103/11)

Language of the case: Croatian

Referring court

Općinski sud u Velikoj Gorici

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: RE

Defendant: Privredne banke Zagreb d.d.

By order of the Court of 6 December 2019, Case C-820/19 was removed from the register of the Court of Justice of the European Union
2.A

Must the principle of judicial independence referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that that principle is breached where the president of the National Office of the Judiciary, who is responsible for the central administration of the courts and who is appointed by the parliament, the only body to which he or she is accountable and which may remove him or her from office, fills the post of president of a court — a president who, inter alia, has powers in relation to organisation of the allocation of cases, commencement of disciplinary procedures against judges, and assessment of judges — by means of a direct temporary nomination, circumventing the applications procedure and constantly disregarding the opinion of the competent self-governance bodies of judges?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Poland) lodged on 31 December 2019 — M.A. v Konsul Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w N.

(Case C-949/19)

(2020/C 191/03)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: M.A.

Defendant: Konsul Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w N.

Question referred

Must Article 21(2a) of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (1) in conjunction with the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that a third-country national who has been refused a long-stay visa and who cannot exercise the right to move freely within the territories of the other Member States under Article 21(1) of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement must have the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal?

(1) OJ 2000 L 239, p. 19.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 24 July 2019 by EMB Consulting SE against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 23 May 2019 in Case T-107/17, Frank Steinhoff and Others v European Central Bank

(Case C-571/19 P)

(2020/C 161/20)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: EMB Consulting SE (represented by: O. Hoepner and D. Unrau, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: Frank Steinhoff, Ewald Filbry, Vereinigte Raiffeisenbanken Gräfenberg-Forchheim-Eschenau-Heroldsberg eG, Werner Bäcker, European Central Bank

By order of 12 March 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Seventh Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 29 October 2019 by Paix et justice pour les juifs séfarades en Israël against the order of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 5 September 2019 in Case T-337/19, Paix et justice pour les juifs séfarades en Israël v Commission and Council of Europe

(Case C-798/19 P)

(2020/C 279/21)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Paix et justice pour les juifs séfarades en Israël (represented by: R. Paternel, avocat)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Council of Europe

By order of 27 May 2020, the Court (Seventh Chamber) dismissed the appeal as manifestly inadmissible.
1.

Must Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union, Article 325(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and Article 4 of Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law, (1) adopted pursuant to Article 83(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, be interpreted as precluding the adoption of a decision by a body outside the judicial system, the Curtea Constituțională a României (Constitutional Court of Romania), which requires re-examination of corruption cases decided within a specific period, and which are at the appeal stage, on grounds of failure to establish, within the supreme court, panels seized of the cases which specialise in that field, also recognising the speciality of the judges of which they were composed?
4.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, does Article 11(a) of Protocol No 7 to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on the privileges and immunities of the European Union, read in conjunction with Article 17 of that protocol, allow the person directing the proceedings or, at the corresponding stage of the proceedings, the composition of the court, to assess whether there is a European Union interest in those proceedings and, only where it is found that there is — that is to say, if AB’s alleged conduct relates to the performance of his duties at an EU institution — to request the institution concerned, that is to say, the European Central Bank, to waive that person’s immunity?
2.

If the answer to the foregoing question is in the affirmative, are Articles 18, 49, 63 and 65 TFEU to be construed as precluding national legislation such as that made up of Articles 18, 4 and 29 of Law 8/1975 of 12 March 1975 on areas and facilities of national defence interest, and Article 37 of Royal Decree 689/1978 of 10 February 1978 laying down the rules governing areas and facilities of national defence interest, which implements Law 8/1975 of 12 March 1975 on areas and facilities of national defence interest, in so far as it imposes serious restrictions on the exercise of the right to own property by foreign nationals, including the requirement to obtain military authorisation in order to exercise that right in full, failure to comply with which attracts the imposition of an administrative penalty from the application of which Spanish nationals are excluded in any circumstances, if such restrictions are justified on overriding reasons in the general interest relating to national defence, regard being had exclusively to the significance of the public interest in relation to national defence that lies in safeguarding enclaves of particular strategic importance?
3.

Is a practice which makes a full right of input tax deduction for purchases dependent not solely on the use of the purchases (for taxable or non-taxable activity), but also on the way in which those purchases are financed, namely on the one hand from self-generated income (advertising services inter alia), and on the other hand from State subsidisation, and which grants the right to full input tax deduction only for purchases financed from self-generated income and not for those financed through State subsidies, with the delimitation thereof being required, permissible pursuant to Article 168 of Directive 2006/112/EC?
1.

Is the scheme on compensation in the event of a cancellation under Article 5 in conjunction with Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that passengers who are re-routed to the final destination more than one hour before the scheduled departure time, and who then by virtue of the alternative flight arrive earlier at the final destination than would otherwise have been the case with the scheduled (cancelled) flight, also receive compensation by way of an application by analogy of Article 7 of that regulation?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rayonen sad — Pazardzhik (Bulgaria), lodged on 29 January 2020 — SF v Teritorialna direktsia na Natsionalna agentsia za prihodite — Plovdiv

(Case C-49/20)

(2020/C 137/50)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring Court

Rayonen sad — Pazardzhik

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: SF

Defendant: Teritorialna direktsia na Natsionalna agentsia za prihodite — Plovdiv

Questions referred

First question:

Must Article 2(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/849, (1) read in conjunction with recital 6 and Articles 4 and 5 thereof, be interpreted as precluding a general national legislative provision such as that in question in the main proceedings, under which domestic payments of BGN 10 000 or more are only to be made by transfer or deposit into a payment account and which, in the case of cash payments, disregards the person or the reason for making a cash payment, but rather applies to all cash payments between natural and legal persons?

Second question:

For the purposes of achieving the objective of the directive, in the light of recital 59 thereof, is solely the amount of the payment relevant, without it being dependant on whether the transaction is for consideration or not.

Third question:

Which criteria determine whether the transactions are open to abuse or are high-risk?

(1) Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (OJ 2015 L 141, p. 73).