ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Case C‑512/17

Proceedings brought by HR

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy Poznań — Stare Miasto w Poznaniu)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in the matters of parental responsibility — Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 — Article 8(1) — Place of habitual residence of the child — Infant — Decisive circumstances for establishing that place of habitual residence)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 28 June 2018

Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and in the matters of parental responsibility — Regulation No 2201/2003 — Concept of a child’s ‘place of habitual residence’ — Criteria for assessment

(Council Regulation No 2201/2003, Art. 8(1))

Article 8(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that a child’s place of habitual residence for the purpose of that regulation is the place which, in practice, is the centre of that child’s life. It is for the national court to determine, on the basis of a consistent body of evidence, where that centre was located at the time the application concerning parental responsibility over the child was submitted. In that regard, in a case such as that in the main proceedings, having regard to the facts established by that court, the following, taken together, are decisive factors:

– the fact that, from its birth until its parents’ separation, the child generally lived with those parents in a specific place;

– the fact that the parent who, in practice, has had custody of the child since the couple’s separation continues to stay in that place with the child on a daily basis and is employed there under an employment contract of indefinite duration; and

– the fact that the child has regular contact there with its other parent, who is still resident in that place.

By contrast, in a case such as that in the main proceedings, the following cannot be regarded as decisive:

– the stays which the parent who, in practice, has custody of the child has spent in the past with that child in the territory of that parent’s Member State of origin in the context of leave periods or holidays;

– the origins of the parent in question, the cultural ties which the child has with that Member State as a result, and the parent’s relationships with family residing in that Member State; and

– any intention the parent has of settling in that Member State with the child in the future.

(see para. 66, operative part)
Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 7 June 2018 — ANKO v Commission

(Case C‑7/17 P) ( 1 )

(Appeal — Arbitration clauses — Persona and Terregov contracts concluded in the context of the Sixth framework programme for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2002-2006) — Eligible costs — Reimbursement of sums paid — Counter-claim)

1. Appeal—Grounds—Inadequate statement of reasons—Reliance by the General Court on implied reasoning—Lawfulness—Conditions (see paras 20, 33)

2. Appeal—Grounds—Plea directed against a superfluous ground—Invalid plea in law—Rejection (see paras 27, 28)

Operative part

1. Dismisses the appeal;

2. Orders ANKO AE Antiprosopeion, Emporiou kai Viomichanias to pay the costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 63, 27.2.2017.
Articles 64 and 65(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, and Article 395(1) and (5) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 are to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that, where the exposure limits set out in Article 395(1) of that regulation are exceeded, ‘absorption’ interest is to be levied automatically on a credit institution, even if that institution fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 395(5) of the regulation under which a credit institution may exceed those limits.

As the Advocate General observed in point 59 of his Opinion, the situation contemplated in Article 395 of Regulation No 575/2013 and in which Member States may apply, pursuant to Article 67(2) of Directive 2013/36, administrative penalties or other administrative measures, is the situation arising as a result of the combined application of paragraphs 1 and 5 of Article 395 of that regulation. As a consequence, a national provision such as Paragraph 97(1)(4) BGW, which automatically levies ‘absorption’ interest on a credit institution where it exceeds the exposure limits set out in Article 395(1) of Regulation No 575/2013 and does not provide for the possibility of verifying whether the conditions laid down in Article 395(5) of that regulation are met, is not consistent with the prudential supervision requirements established by the regulation.

(see paras 46-48, operative part 1)
The second subparagraph of Article 12(1) of Directive 1999/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 1999 on radio equipment and telecommunications terminal equipment and the mutual recognition of their conformity, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 596/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009, must be interpreted as meaning that, where a manufacturer of radio equipment makes use of the procedure laid down in the second paragraph of Annex III to that directive and uses the harmonised standards in order to define the test suites referred to in that paragraph, he is not required to consult a notified body as referred to in Article 11(1) of that directive and, consequently, is not required to ensure that the CE marking is accompanied by the identification number of that notified body.

Thus, it follows from the wording of Annex III to Directive 1999/5 that the conformity of apparatus with the essential requirements, which, according to Article 10(1) of that directive, are those identified in Article 3 thereof, may be established by the manufacturer himself if he has carried out all the essential radio test suites defined in the harmonised standards. Consequently, based solely on the wording of that annex, that assessment procedure does not call, in all circumstances, for the involvement of a notified body, whether in the identification of the essential radio test suites, or in order to carry out those test suites. Accordingly, where the manufacturer has made use of the harmonised standards when using the conformity assessment procedure identified in Annex III to Directive 1999/5, the wording of the second subparagraph of Article 12(1) of that directive, read in the light of the wording of that annex, must be interpreted as not calling for the involvement of a notified body and, consequently, for the affixing of the CE marking on radio equipment to be accompanied by the identification number of that body.

In addition, Article 5(1) of Directive 1999/5 provides that, where apparatus meets the ‘harmonised standards’, defined in Article 2(h) of that directive as ‘technical specification[s] adopted by a recognised standards body ... for the purpose of establishing a European requirement, compliance with which is not compulsory’, there is also a consequent presumption of compliance with the essential requirements. Accordingly, in such a situation, the involvement of a notified body is not necessary in order to ensure that that equipment does not represent an avoidable hazard to health and is thus also not necessary in order to protect the health and the safety of the user.

(see paras 34, 35, 39, 44, 47, operative part 1)
2.

Orders that, if the failure to fulfil obligations established in point 1 has continued until the day of delivery of the present judgment, the Kingdom of Spain must pay the European Commission a penalty payment of EUR 10950000 for each six-month period of delay in implementing the measures necessary to comply with the judgment of 14 April 2011, Commission v Spain (C‑343/10, not published, EU:C:2011:260), from the date of delivery of the present judgment until the judgment of 14 April 2011, Commission v Spain (C‑343/10, not published, EU:C:2011:260), has been complied with in full, the actual amount of which must be calculated at the end of each six-month period by reducing the total amount relating to each of those periods by a percentage corresponding to the proportion that the number of population equivalents of the agglomerations whose urban waste water treatment and/or collection systems have been rendered compliant with the judgment of 14 April 2011, Commission v Spain (C‑343/10, not published, EU:C:2011:260) at the end of the period in question bears to the number of population equivalents of the agglomerations not having such systems on the day of delivery of the present judgment;
Case C‑548/17

Finanzamt Goslar

v

baumgarten sports & more GmbH

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Taxation — Value added tax (VAT) — Taxation of professional football player agencies — Payment by instalments and subject to a condition — Chargeable event, chargeability and collection of the tax)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber), 29 November 2018

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Chargeable event and chargeability of the tax — Supply of goods and services — Supply of agency services for professional football players — Date when the service in question was supplied — Payments made in conditional instalments over several years further to the placement — Service regarded as supplied when the player is placed — Unlawful

(Council Directive 2006/112, Arts 63 and 64)

Article 63 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, read in conjunction with Article 64(1) thereof, must be interpreted as precluding the chargeable event and chargeability of a tax on the supply of agency services for professional football players by an agent, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, paid in conditional instalments over several years further to the placement, from being regarded as occurring or taking effect when the player is placed.

(see para. 32 and operative part)
Case C‑59/17

Château du Grand Bois SCI

v

Établissement national des produits de l’agriculture and de la mer (FranceAgriMer)

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France))

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Agriculture — Market in wine — Regulation (EC) No 555/2008 — Support for the restructuring and conversion of vineyards — Unannounced on-the-spot checks — Powers of control officials — Whether officials may enter agricultural land without having obtained the vine grower’s permission)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 7 August 2018

Agriculture — Common organisation of the markets — Support for restructuring and conversion in the wine sector — Controls in the wine sector — Unannounced on-the-spot checks — Powers of control officials — No power to enter agricultural land without having obtained the vine grower’s permission

(Commission Regulation No 555/2008, Recitals 72 and 73, Arts 76, 78, 81 and 83(a))

Articles 76, 78 and 81 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 555/2008 of 27 June 2008 laying down detailed rules for implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2008 on the common organisation of the market in wine as regards support programmes, trade with third countries, production potential and on controls in the wine sector, must be interpreted as not authorising officials carrying out an on-the-spot check to enter agricultural land without having obtained the vine grower’s permission.

In that regard, recitals 72 and 73 of the regulation state that it is for the Member States to ensure the effectiveness of the work of the bodies responsible for wine-sector controls, taking the necessary steps to ensure that the staff of those bodies has adequate powers of investigation to guarantee compliance with EU wine-sector rules. In addition, as observed by the Advocate General in point 43 of his Opinion, Article 83(a) of that regulation, concerning the powers of control officials, provides that each Member State must ensure that its officials have access to vineyards and other places and installations necessary for them to carry out their duties, without, however, requiring that it be possible to gain such access without the vine grower’s permission.

It follows that Regulation No 555/2008 gives the Member States responsibility for regulating, under their national law, the powers granted to control officials as well as the greater part of the rules governing the checks to be carried out, including those relating to access to the places to be subjected to checks.

Consequently, Regulation No 555/2008 does not grant authorisation to enter a vine grower’s land without his permission.

(see paras 25-27, 33, operative part)
Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products must be interpreted as meaning that a prior authorisation procedure, under Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning medical devices, as amended by Directive 2007/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007, for a device incorporating as an integral part a substance, within the meaning of Article 1(4) of that directive as amended, cannot be treated in the same way, for the purposes of applying that regulation, as a marketing authorisation procedure for that substance under Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, as amended by Directive 2004/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004, even if that substance was the subject of the assessment provided for in the first and second paragraphs of section 7.4 of Annex I to Directive 93/42, as amended by Directive 2007/47.

(see para. 51, operative part)
Case C‑308/17

Hellenic Republic

v

Leo Kuhn

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 — Jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters — Scope — Article 1(1) — Concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ — Bonds issued by a Member State — Involvement of the private sector in the restructuring of public debt of that State — Unilateral and retroactive adjustment of the borrowing terms — Collective action clauses — Action brought against the State by private creditors who hold those bonds as natural persons — Liability of the State for acts and omissions in the exercise of State authority)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 15 November 2018

Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters — Regulation No 1215/2012 — Scope — Civil and commercial matters — Action brought by an acquirer of bonds issued by a Member State against that State, seeking to contest the exchange of those bonds with bonds of a lower value — Not included

(Council Regulation No 1215/2012, Art. 1(1))

Article 1(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters is to be interpreted as meaning that a dispute relating to an action brought by a natural person having acquired bonds issued by a Member State, against that State and seeking to contest the exchange of those bonds with bonds of a lower value, imposed on that natural person by the effect of a law adopted in exceptional circumstances by the national legislator, according to which those terms were unilaterally and retroactively amended by the introduction of a collective action clause allowing a majority of holders of the relevant bonds to impose that exchange on the minority, does not fall within ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of that article.

(see para. 43, operative part)
–

ensures that sponsors recognised as refugees continue to benefit from the more favourable conditions for the exercise of the right to family reunification applicable to refugees, specified in Articles 10 and 11 or in Article 12(2) of the directive. The third subparagraph of Article 12(1) of Directive 2003/86 cannot be interpreted as requiring the Member States to regard failure, without any valid reason, to comply with the time limit for lodging an application for family reunification submitted on the basis of the more favourable rules set out in the first subparagraph of Article 12(1) of that directive as forming only one factor to be taken into consideration for the overall assessment of the merits of that application and as capable of being offset by other factors. First, to accept that interpretation, which is not supported by the wording of Article 12 of the directive, would mean that the rule for distinguishing between the respective scopes of the rules applying to applications for family reunification lodged by refugees, which the Member States are entitled to introduce on the basis of the time limit stipulated in the third subparagraph of Article 12(1) of the directive, would be deprived of its effectiveness and clarity. Second, failure to comply with the time limit for lodging an application for family reunification referred to in the third subparagraph of Article 12(1) of Directive 2003/86 has no direct impact on the authorisation of the entry or stay of the sponsor’s family members, but merely determines the context in which that application must be examined. Article 5(5) and Article 17 of Directive 2003/86 do not justify any other conclusion. However, whilst the EU legislature has allowed the Member States to require that the conditions set out in Article 7(1) of that directive in the case referred to in the third subparagraph of Article 12(1) thereof are satisfied, it did not determine how an application made under the more favourable rules in the first subparagraph of Article 12(1) of the directive should be regarded procedurally if lodged out of time. In those circumstances, in the absence of EU rules in that regard, it is, according to the Court’s settled case-law, for the domestic legal system of the Member State in question to determine those requirements in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy provided, however, that those requirements are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the EU legal order (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 February 2018, INEOS Köln, C‑572/16, EU:C:2018:100, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).. (see paras 48-51, 55, 56, 66, operative part 2)
The criteria for assessing the distinctive character of three-dimensional marks consisting of the appearance of the product itself are no different from those applicable to other categories of trade mark. In addition, for the purpose of applying those criteria, the average consumer’s perception is not necessarily the same in the case of a three-dimensional mark consisting of the appearance of the product itself as it is in the case of a word or figurative mark consisting of a sign which is unrelated to the appearance of the products it denotes. Average consumers are not in the habit of making assumptions about the origin of products on the basis of their shape or the shape of their packaging in the absence of any graphic or word element, and it could therefore prove more difficult to establish the distinctiveness of such a three-dimensional mark than that of a word or figurative mark.

In those circumstances, only a mark which departs significantly from the norm or customs of the sector and thereby fulfils its essential function of indicating origin is not devoid of any distinctive character for the purposes of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 on the European Union trade mark.

(see paras 32, 33)
Article 18(7) of Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, read in conjunction with Commission Implementing Decision 2011/438/EU of 19 July 2011 on the recognition of the ISCC (International Sustainability and Carbon Certification) system for demonstrating compliance with the sustainability criteria under Directives 2009/28/EC and 2009/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which imposes requirements on economic operators which, for the certification of the sustainability of bioliquids, are specific, different and more extensive than those imposed by a voluntary sustainability certification system, such as the ISCC system, recognised by that implementing decision, adopted by the European Commission in accordance with Article 18(4) of that directive, in so far as that system was approved only in respect of biofuels and in so far as those conditions concern only bioliquids.

In that regard, Article 18(7) of that directive provides that, when an economic operator provides proof or data obtained in accordance with an agreement or scheme that has been the subject of a decision adopted by the Commission on the basis of Article 18(4) of Directive 2009/28, to the extent covered by that decision, a Member State cannot require the supplier to provide further evidence of compliance with the sustainability criteria set out in Article 17(2) to (5) of that directive. However, where the Commission has not adopted a decision in relation to a certain certification scheme, or where that decision specifies that the scheme does not cover all the sustainability criteria laid down in Article 17(2) to (5) of Directive 2009/28, Member States are free to require economic operators, to that extent, to comply with national provisions the aim of which is to ensure that fulfilment of those criteria is monitored. Accordingly, to the extent that the ISCC scheme that is the subject of Implementing Decision 2011/438 uses mass balance methodology to prove the sustainability of biofuels, it does not appear to limit the ability of Member States, under Article 18(1) and (3) of Directive 2009/28, to determine the procedures for verifying compliance with the sustainability criteria set out in Article 17(2) to (5) of Directive 2009/28 in relation to bioliquids.

(see paras 33, 34, 36, 41, operative part 1)