ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN
ReportsofCases
ECLI:EU:C:2015 :200 1Case C-3 1 6 / 1 3
Gérard Fenoll
v
Centre d’aide p ar le travail ‘La Jouvene’
and
Association de p arents et d ’amis de p ersonnes handicapées mentales (APEI) d’Avignon
(Request for a p reliminary ruling from th e Cour de cassation (France))
(Reference for a p reliminary ruling — Social policy — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union — Article 31(2) — Directive 2003 /88/EC — Article 7 — Definition o f ‘worker’ — 
Disabled pe rson — Right to paid a nnual leave — National legislation incompatible with EU law — 
Role of the national court)
Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Ch amber), 26 March 2015
1. Social policy — Protection of the safety and health of workers — Organisation of working time — 
Right to paid annual leave — Definition of worker — Disabled p erson admitted t o a w ork 
rehabilitation centre — Included — Verification a m atter for the national court
(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Eu ropean U nion, Art. 31(2); Eu ropean Parliament and 
Council Directive 2003 /88, Art. 7))
2. Social policy — Protection of the safety and health of workers — Organisation of working time — 
Right to paid annual leave — National legislation incompatible with EU law — Duty of the 
national courts to interpret national law in conformity with an EU d irective — Limits — 
Whether the Member State concerned is obliged t o make good loss caused t o individuals
(Art. 4(3), TEU; European Parliament and Council Directive 2003 /88, Art. 7)
1. The term ‘worker’, within th e me aning of Article 7 of Directive 2003 /88/EC concerning certain 
aspects of the organisation o f working time a nd of Article 31 o f the Ch arter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, must be interpreted to the effect that it may include a pe rson ad mitted to a w ork 
rehabilitation c entre who, as a di sabled pe rson, is unable to work in no rmal conditions. The activities 
carried out at that centre by di sabled pe rsons do no t in fact appear to be purely m arginal and 
ancillary, inasmuch as they are no t created for the sole purpose of providing an occupation, derivative 
if necessary, for the pe rsons concerned, but offer a c ertain economic value too, by me ans of work 
adapted to th e capabilities of those pe rsons. Those activities make it possible to give v alue to th e 
productivity of severely disabled pe rsons, however reduced it may be, while at the same t ime e nsuring 
the social protection th ey are entitled to.
2 ECLI:EU:C:2015 :200SUMM ARY—CASEC–316/13
FENOLL
The national court must in particular ascertain whether the services actually pe rformed by the pe rson 
concerned can be regarded as forming part of the no rmal labour market. For that purpose, account 
may be taken no t only of the statute and practices of the centre concerned in its role as a c are facility 
and of the various aspects of the aim of its social aid p rogramme , but also of the nature of the services 
and the manner in which they are performed.
(see paras 39, 40, 42, 43, operative p art)
2. See th e text of the decision.
(see para. 48)
Articles 2(a) of Regulation No 273/2004 on drug precursors and of Regulation No 111/2005 laying down rules for the monitoring of trade between the Community and third countries in drug precursors respectively must be interpreted as meaning that a medicinal product as defined in Article 1(2) of Directive 2001/83 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, as amended by Regulation No 1901/2006, cannot be categorised as a ‘scheduled substance’ as such, even if it contains a substance referred to in Annex I to Regulation No 273/2004 and in the annex to Regulation No 111/2005 and can easily be used or extracted by readily applicable or economically viable means.

It is not apparent from any part of Regulation No 273/2004 that it seeks to make medicinal products containing a substance referred to in Annex I thereto and able easily to be used or extracted by readily applicable or economically viable means subject to an additional authorisation and control system other than that applicable to medicinal products under Directive 2001/83. With regard to Regulation No 111/2005, although it does indeed provide a set of precise rules which do not correspond to any in Directive 2001/83 on medicinal products, it cannot be deduced from that fact alone that the EU legislature intended to make medicinal products containing a substance referred to in Annex I thereto and able easily to be used or extracted by readily applicable or economically viable means subject not only to Directive 2001/83 but also to this regulation. It is also for that reason that the EU legislature decided, in the context of Regulation No 1259/2013, amending Regulation No 111/2005, to make only medicinal products containing two scheduled substances subject to the control system for trade in drug precursors between the EU and third countries.

(see paras 59, 61, 62, 65, 67, operative part)
It is for the referring court, in order to make a tariff classification of the raw shelled pumpkin seeds, to ascertain whether those seeds are normally used for the extraction of edible or industrial oils and fats, but are not covered by headings 1201 to 1206 of the Combined Nomenclature set out in Annex I to Regulation No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff. If that is the case, those seeds must be classified under heading 1207 of the Combined Nomenclature because they are oilseeds, whether or not they are actually used for the extraction of edible or industrial oils and fats or for sowing or human consumption. If that is not the case, those seeds will come under heading 1209 of the Combined Nomenclature if they could still be germinated when they were imported, whether or not they are actually used for the extraction of edible or industrial oils and fats or for sowing or human consumption, or under heading 1212 of the Combined Nomenclature if they could not still be germinated.

(see para. 58, operative part)
Article 13(2)(a) of Regulation No 1408/71 as amended and updated by Regulation No 118/97, as amended by Regulation No 1992/2006, must be interpreted as meaning that a resident of a Member State, who comes within the scope of that regulation, as amended, and who works for several days per month on the basis of an on-call contract in the territory of another Member State, is subject to the legislation of the State of employment both on the days on which he performs the employment activities and on the days on which he does not.

The legislation of the Member State of employment continues to be applicable for as long as the person concerned is employed in the territory of that Member State. To that end, the existence of an employment contract and the type of employment, whether partial or casual, or even the number of hours worked by the employee, are irrelevant.

(see paras 50, 53, operative part 1)
Chapter 1, paragraphs 2, and 13, of Annex X to the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded must be interpreted as meaning that the Republic of Austria is entitled to restrict the hiring-out of workers on its territory, in accordance with Chapter 1, paragraph 2 of that annex, even though that provision does not concern a sensitive sector, within the meaning of Chapter 1, paragraph 13, thereof.

The fact that the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Austria have negotiated a specific derogation, set out in Chapter 1, paragraph 13, of Annex X to that act, concerning certain sensitive sectors for which those two Member States are entitled to restrict the freedom to provide services involving a movement of workers cannot, be regarded as leaving them less room for manoeuvre than the other Member States which have not negotiated such a derogation to regulate the influx of Hungarian workers on their territory.

(see paras 27, 29, 30, operative part 1)
1.

Declares that, by refusing autonomously to delimit the market at issue in the context of Commission Decision 2012/636/EU of 25 January 2012 concerning measure C 36/07 (ex NN 25/07) implemented by Germany for Deutsche Post AG, in order to ascertain whether the parcel delivery service from one undertaking to another constituted, between 2003 and 2012, on the one hand, and with effect from 2012, on the other, a separate market in the goods at issue, the Federal Republic of Germany has failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 108(2) TFEU and 14(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article [108 TFEU], and Articles 1 and 4 to 6 of that decision;
Observance of the normal residence condition, within the meaning of Article 12 of Directive 2006/126 on driving licences, is an essential element of the system established by that directive, the linchpin of which is the principle of mutual recognition of driving licences. Only the Member State issuing a driving licence is competent to verify compliance with the normal residence condition. That rule is equally valid for the Member State in which the holder of a driving licence applies to have it renewed.

Article 12 of Directive 2006/126 on driving licences must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State under which the only way in which a person who applies for the issue or renewal of a driving licence in that Member State can prove that he satisfies the condition of normal residence, within the meaning of that article, in the territory of that Member State, set out in Article 7(1)(e) and 7(3)(b) of that directive, is to establish that he has a declared place of residence in the territory of the Member State concerned.

Although it is true that the conditions for proving compliance with the normal residence condition to the authorities responsible for issuing and renewing driving licences come within the powers of the Member States and that Directive 2006/126 lays down only, as is clear from recital 8 in the preamble thereto, the minimum conditions for the issue of a driving licence by the Member States, those conditions must not go beyond what is necessary to enable the Member State authorities responsible for issue and renewal to satisfy themselves that the person concerned meets that condition of normal residence in the light of the criteria set out in Article 12 of Directive 2006/126. In that regard, the absolute obligation to have a declared place of residence in the territory of a Member State, and therefore the refusal for an applicant for a driving licence to use other forms of evidence to establish that he fulfils those criteria, goes beyond what is necessary. Likewise, such legislation favours an element which does not reflect all of the criteria set out in Article 12 of Directive 2006/126, in that it excludes all other elements representing the situations referred to in that article.

(see paras 43, 44, 46, 50, 51, operative part)
In the context of setting fines for infringement of EU competition law, the final paragraph of point 23(b) of the Commission Notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (the 2002 Leniency Notice) must be interpreted as meaning that evidence provided by an undertaking in the context of its application under that notice may be considered to be evidence relating to facts previously unknown to the Commission only if it objectively presents significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the Commission’s possession. That interpretation follows, first, from the general scheme of the 2002 Leniency Notice. In accordance with points 7, 21 and 23(a) of that notice, a reduction of the fine imposed by the Commission under that notice presupposes that undertakings seeking to benefit from it provide evidence to the Commission which has a significant added value compared to that already in the Commission’s possession. The same is also true as regards the partial immunity laid down in the final paragraph of point 23(b) of that notice. Second, for the purposes of the application of that provision, it must be held that the Commission’s possession of evidence amounts to knowledge of its content, regardless of whether that evidence was actually examined and analysed by its services.

(see paras 70-72)
Article 13B(d)(6) of Sixth Directive 77/388 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes, as amended by Directive 91/680, must be interpreted as meaning that investment companies in which capital is pooled by several investors who bear the risk connected with the management of the assets assembled in those companies with a view to purchasing, owning, managing and selling immovable property in order to derive a profit therefrom which will be distributed to all unit-holders in the form of a dividend, those unit-holders benefiting also from an increase in the value of their holding, may be regarded as special investment funds within the meaning of that provision, provided that the Member State concerned has made those companies subject to specific State supervision.

In that regard, in so far as investments, whether composed of transferable securities or immovable property, are subject to comparable specific State supervision, there is direct competition between those forms of investment. In both cases, what matters for the investor is the interest he derives from those investments. The principle of fiscal neutrality precludes treating similar supplies of services, which are thus in competition with each other, differently for value added tax purposes.

(see paras 63, 64, operative part 1)
18

Article 695-46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Code de procédure pénale), as amended by Law No 2009-526 of 12 May 2009 simplifying and clarifying the law and alleviating procedures (Loi no 2009-256, du 12 mai 2009, de simplification et de clarification du droit et d’allègement des procédures, JORF, 13 May 2009, p. 7920), aims to transpose Articles 27 and 28 of the Framework Decision into French law. Article 695-46 reads as follows: ‘The indictment division before which the requested person has appeared shall hear any request from the competent authorities of the issuing Member State with a view to consenting to a prosecution or the execution of a sentence or detention order in respect of offences other than those which were the grounds for surrender which were committed before the surrender. The indictment division is also competent to rule, after the surrender of the requested person, on any request from the competent authorities of the issuing Member State with a view to consenting to the surrender of the requested person to another Member State for the purpose of conducting a prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order for any offence prior to the surrender different from the offence which was the ground for surrender. In either case a record of the statements made by the requested person shall also be forwarded by the competent authorities of the issuing Member State and produced to the indictment division. Those statements may, if appropriate, be supplemented by the observations of a lawyer of his choice or, in default thereof, assigned by the chairman of the bar. The indictment division shall give its ruling, not subject to appeal, after satisfying itself that the request also contains the information prescribed in Article 695-13 and, if appropriate, after obtaining guarantees with respect to the provisions of Article 695-32, within a period of 30 days from receipt of the request. Consent shall be given where the acts in respect of which it is sought constitute one of the offences listed in Article 695-23 and fall within the scope of Article 695-12. Consent shall be refused on one of the grounds referred to in Articles 695-22 and 695-23 and may be refused on one of the grounds mentioned in Article 695-24.’
Case C‑613/13 P

European Commission

v

Keramag Keramische Werke GmbH and Others

(Appeal — Competition — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Bathroom fittings and fixtures markets of Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Austria — Coordination of selling prices and exchange of sensitive business information — Obligation to state reasons)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 26 January 2017

Appeal—Grounds—Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence—Inadmissibility—Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence—Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted—Failure to observe the rules of evidence—Question of law amenable to judicial review on appeal (Art. 256(1), second subpara., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

Competition—Administrative procedure—Commission decision finding an infringement—Means of proof—Documentary proof—Assessment of the probative value of a document—Criteria—Declarations of other undertakings concerned (Art. 101(1) TFEU)

Appeal—Grounds—Inadequate statement of reasons—Scope of the obligation to state reasons—Duty of the General Court to state the reasons for its assessment of the evidence—Obligation to observe general principles and the rules of procedure relating to the burden of proof and the adducing of evidence and not to distort the true sense of the evidence—Infringement (Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 36 and 53, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the General Court (1991), Art. 81)

Competition—Administrative procedure—Commission decision finding an infringement—Means of proof—Reliance on a body of evidence—Production by the Commission of one leniency statement with a view to corroborating another—Whether permissible (Art. 101(1) TFEU)

Competition—Administrative procedure—Commission decision finding an infringement—Means of proof—Reliance on a body of evidence—Degree of evidential value necessary as regards items of evidence viewed in isolation—Permissibility of an overall assessment of a body of evidence (Art. 101(1) TFEU)

Appeal—Grounds—Mere repetition of the pleas and arguments put forward before the General Court—Inadmissibility (Art. 256(1), second subpara., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)
18

Article 177 of the ZDDS provides as follows: ‘1. A registered person who is the recipient of a taxable supply is liable for the unpaid tax owed by another registered person where the right to deduct input tax directly or indirectly connected with the tax owed but not paid has been exercised. 2. Liability under paragraph 1 arises if the registered person knew or should have known that the tax would not be paid and this is proved by the investigating authority in accordance with Articles 117 to 120 of the Tax and Social Security Code of Procedure. 3. Knowledge is imputed to a person for the purposes of paragraph 2 where the following cumulative conditions are satisfied: (1) the tax owed, within the meaning of paragraph 1, for a particular tax period has ultimately effectively not been paid by any prior provider of a taxable supply of goods or a taxable service, whether or not in the same, a changed or a processed form; (2) the taxable supply merely appears to have been made, circumvents legislation, or is made at a price that differs significantly from the market price. 4. Liability under paragraph 1 is not dependent on obtaining a specific advantage on account of the non-payment of the tax owed. 5. In the circumstances envisaged in paragraphs 2 and 3, the upstream supplier of the taxable person who owes the unpaid tax is also liable. 6. In the cases referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, liability is enforced against the taxable person who is the direct recipient of the supply in respect of which the tax owed has not been paid, and, where recovery fails, liability may be enforced against any downstream recipient in the chain of supply. 7. Paragraph 6 shall also apply mutatis mutandis to upstream suppliers.’
5

Article 2(1), (3) and (5) of that directive contains the following provisions: ‘(1) For the purposes of this Directive, the term “energy products” shall apply to products: (a) … (b) falling within CN codes … 2704 to 2715; (c) falling within CN codes 2901 and 2902; … (3) When intended for use, offered for sale or used as motor fuel or heating fuel, energy products other than those for which a level of taxation is specified in this Directive shall be taxed according to use, at the rate for the equivalent heating fuel or motor fuel. In addition to the taxable products listed in paragraph 1, any product intended for use, offered for sale or used as motor fuel, or as an additive or extender in motor fuels, shall be taxed at the rate for the equivalent motor fuel. In addition to the taxable products listed in paragraph 1, any other hydrocarbon, except for peat, intended for use, offered for sale or used for heating purposes shall be taxed at the rate for the equivalent energy product. … (5) References in this Directive to codes of the combined nomenclature shall be to those of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2031/2001 of 6 August 2001, amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff [OJ 2001 L 279, p. 1]. …’
30

None the less, that court asks, having regard to the judgment in Case C‑370/08 Data I/O EU:C:2010:284, whether that classification is correct in the light of note 2(a) to Section XVI of the CN. That court notes that the Court of Justice held, in paragraph 43 of that judgment, that an adapter such as that used in Data I/O’s programming systems could be classified under heading 8536 of the CN only if it was not covered by headings 8471 and 8473 thereof. A precedence thus appears to have been established in that heading 8473 of the CN takes priority over heading 8536 of the CN, or even a systematic precedence of heading 8473 over the other headings of Chapters 84 and 85 of the CN. However, the referring court, noting that, in that decision, the Court did not give an interpretation of note 2(a) to Section XVI of the CN concerning the tariff classification of parts of machines, doubts whether such parts of machines are to be given precedence by classification under heading 8473 of the CN. By reference to the Explanatory Notes to the HS concerning note 2 to Sections XVI, Chapters 84 and 85 and heading 8473 of that system, the referring court is of the view that heading 8473 of the CN, as regards the classification of parts of machines, does not take precedence over the other headings of Chapters 84 and 85 of the CN.