ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 6(1) and (4) of Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives and Article 13(1) of Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, as amended by Directive (EU) 2015/1513 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015, read together, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation under which an application for authorisation to replace methane, as a power source for an electric power plant producing atmospheric emissions, with a substance derived from the chemical treatment of used vegetable oils, must be refused, on the ground that that substance is not included in the list of categories of biomass fuels authorised for that purpose and that that list may be amended only by an internal act of general application, the adoption procedure of which is not coordinated with the administrative procedure for authorising the use of such a substance as fuel, if the Member State could consider, without making a manifest error of assessment, that it has not been demonstrated that the use of that vegetable oil, in such circumstances, satisfies the conditions laid down in Article 6(1) of Directive 2008/98 and, in particular, is devoid of any possible adverse impact on the environment and human health. It falls to the national court to ascertain whether that is the case in the main proceedings.
15

Article 16 of that regulation, headed ‘General principles of congestion management’, provides: ‘1. Network congestion problems shall be addressed with non-discriminatory market-based solutions which give efficient economic signals to the market participants and transmission system operators involved. Network congestion problems shall preferentially be solved with non-transaction based methods, i.e. methods that do not involve a selection between the contracts of individual market participants. 2. Transaction curtailment procedures shall only be used in emergency situations where the transmission system operator must act in an expeditious manner and re-dispatching or countertrading is not possible. Any such procedure shall be applied in a non-discriminatory manner. Except in cases of force majeure, market participants who have been allocated capacity shall be compensated for any curtailment. 3. The maximum capacity of the interconnections and/or the transmission networks affecting cross-border flows shall be made available to market participants, complying with safety standards of secure network operation. 4. Market participants shall inform the transmission system operators concerned a reasonable time in advance of the relevant operational period whether they intend to use allocated capacity. Any allocated capacity that will not be used shall be reattributed to the market, in an open, transparent and non-discriminatory manner. 5. Transmission system operators shall, as far as technically possible, net the capacity requirements of any power flows in opposite direction over the congested interconnection line in order to use that line to its maximum capacity. Having full regard to network security, transactions that relieve the congestion shall never be denied. 6. Any revenues resulting from the allocation of interconnection shall be used for the following purposes: (a) guaranteeing the actual availability of the allocated capacity; and/or (b) maintaining or increasing interconnection capacities through network investments, in particular in new interconnectors. If the revenues cannot be efficiently used for the purposes set out in points (a) and/or (b) of the first subparagraph, they may be used, subject to approval by the regulatory authorities of the Member States concerned, up to a maximum amount to be decided by those regulatory authorities, as income to be taken into account by the regulatory authorities when approving the methodology for calculating network tariffs and/or fixing network tariffs. The rest of revenues shall be placed on a separate internal account line until such time as it can be spent on the purposes set out in points (a) and/or (b) of the first subparagraph. The regulatory authority shall inform the Agency of the approval referred to in the second subparagraph.’
5

Article 8 of Regulation No 40/94, entitled ‘Relative grounds for refusal’, the provisions of which were reproduced in Article 8 of Regulation No 207/2009, provided: ‘1. Upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for shall not be registered: … (b) if because of its identity with or similarity to the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected; the likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark. … 4. Upon opposition by the proprietor of a non-registered trade mark or of another sign used in the course of trade of more than mere local significance, the trade mark applied for shall not be registered where and to the extent that, pursuant to the Community legislation or the law of the Member State governing that sign: (a) rights to that sign were acquired prior to the date of application for registration of the Community trade mark, or the date of the priority claimed for the application for registration of the Community trade mark; (b) that sign confers on its proprietor the right to prohibit the use of a subsequent trade mark. 5. Furthermore, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark within the meaning of paragraph 2, the trade mark applied for shall not be registered where it is identical with or similar to the earlier trade mark and is to be registered for goods or services which are not similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is registered, where in the case of an earlier Community trade mark the trade mark has a reputation in the Community and, in the case of an earlier national trade mark, the trade mark has a reputation in the Member State concerned and where the use without due cause of the trade mark applied for would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trade mark.’
5

Article 9 of Regulation 2017/1001 reads as follows: ‘1. The registration of an EU trade mark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive rights therein. 2. Without prejudice to the rights of proprietors acquired before the filing date or the priority date of the EU trade mark, the proprietor of that EU trade mark shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade, in relation to goods or services, any sign where: (a) the sign is identical with the EU trade mark and is used in relation to goods or services which are identical with those for which the EU trade mark is registered; (b) the sign is identical with, or similar to, the EU trade mark and is used in relation to goods or services which are identical with, or similar to, the goods or services for which the EU trade mark is registered, if there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public; the likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association between the sign and the trade mark; (c) the sign is identical with, or similar to, the EU trade mark irrespective of whether it is used in relation to goods or services which are identical with, similar to or not similar to those for which the EU trade mark is registered, where the latter has a reputation in the Union and where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the EU trade mark. 3. The following, in particular, may be prohibited under paragraph 2: … (b) offering the goods, putting them on the market, or stocking them for those purposes under the sign, or offering or supplying services thereunder; …’
7

According to Article 6 of Directive 2002/65, which is headed ‘Right of withdrawal’: ‘1. The Member States shall ensure that the consumer shall have a period of 14 calendar days to withdraw from the contract without penalty and without giving any reason. … The period for withdrawal shall begin: – either from the day of the conclusion of the distance contract … or – from the day on which the consumer receives the contractual terms and conditions and the information in accordance with Article 5(1) or (2), if that is later than the date referred to in the first indent. … 2. The right of withdrawal shall not apply to: … (c) contracts whose performance has been fully completed by both parties at the consumer’s express request before the consumer exercises his right of withdrawal. 3. Member States may provide that the right of withdrawal shall not apply to: (a) any credit intended primarily for the purpose of acquiring or retaining property rights in land or in an existing or projected building, or for the purpose of renovating or improving a building, or (b) any credit secured either by mortgage on immovable property or by a right related to immovable property, … … 6. If the consumer exercises his right of withdrawal he shall, before the expiry of the relevant deadline, notify this following the practical instructions given to him in accordance with Article 3(1)(3)(d) by means which can be proved in accordance with national law. The deadline shall be deemed to have been observed if the notification, if it is on paper or on another durable medium available and accessible to the recipient, is dispatched before the deadline expires. …’
10

Legea nr. 571 privind Codul fiscal (Law No 571 on the Tax Code) of 22 December 2003 (Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I, No 927 of 23 December 2003), as amended and completed by Legea nr. 343 (Law No 343) of 17 July 2006 (Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I, No 662 of 1 August 2006), which transposed, inter alia, the VAT Directive into Romanian law provides in Article 159 thereof: ‘(1) Correction of the information entered in the invoice or in other documents used in its place shall be carried out as follows: (a) where the document has not been sent to the recipient, it shall be annulled and a new document shall be issued; (b) where the document has been sent to the recipient, either a new document, which must contain, first, the information from the initial document, the number and date of the corrected document, and the values with a minus sign (“–”) and, secondly, the correct information and values, shall be issued, or a new document containing the correct information and values shall be issued at the same time as a document with the values with a minus sign in which the number and date of the corrected document are entered. … (3) Taxable persons who have been subject to a tax inspection and in respect of whom errors have been established as regards the correct determination of the tax levied, and who are required to pay those amounts on the basis of the administrative act issued by the competent tax authority, may issue to the recipients corrected invoices within the meaning of paragraph (1)(b). The invoices issued shall state that they were issued following an inspection and be entered under a separate heading in the VAT return. The recipients have the right to deduct the tax entered in those invoices within the limits and under the conditions laid down in Articles 145 to 147b.’
3

Recitals 1, 3, 13 and 16 to 18 of Directive 2002/65 state: ‘(1) It is important, in the context of achieving the aims of the single market, to adopt measures designed to consolidate progressively this market and those measures must contribute to attaining a high level of consumer protection, in accordance with Articles 95 and 153 [EC]. … (3) … In order to safeguard freedom of choice, which is an essential consumer right, a high degree of consumer protection is required in order to enhance consumer confidence in distance selling. … (13) A high level of consumer protection should be guaranteed by this Directive, with a view to ensuring the free movement of financial services. Member States should not be able to adopt provisions other than those laid down in this Directive in the fields it harmonises, unless otherwise specifically indicated in it. … (16) A single contract involving successive operations or separate operations of the same nature performed over time may be subject to different legal treatment in the different Member States, but it is important that this Directive be applied in the same way in all the Member States. To that end, it is appropriate that this Directive should be considered to apply to the first of a series of successive operations or separate operations of the same nature performed over time which may be considered as forming a whole, irrespective of whether that operation or series of operations is the subject of a single contract or several successive contracts. (17) An “initial service agreement” may be considered to be for example the opening of a bank account, acquiring a credit card, concluding a portfolio management contract, and “operations” may be considered to be for example the deposit or withdrawal of funds to or from the bank account, payment by credit card, transactions made within the framework of a portfolio management contract. Adding new elements to an initial service agreement, such as a possibility to use an electronic payment instrument together with one’s existing bank account, does not constitute an “operation” but an additional contract to which this Directive applies. The subscription to new units of the same collective investment fund is considered to be one of “successive operations of the same nature”. (18) By covering a service-provision scheme organised by the financial services provider, this Directive aims to exclude from its scope services provided on a strictly occasional basis and outside a commercial structure dedicated to the conclusion of distance contracts.’
39

Romania contends, secondly, that the imposition of a lump sum constitutes an exception, which applies only when it is apparent from the characteristics of the failure to fulfil obligations at issue, the conduct of the Member State concerned and the assessment of the degree of prejudice to the public and private interests that the application of a periodic penalty payment is insufficient with regard to the objective of putting an end to that failure to fulfil obligations as soon as possible and ensuring that that Member State will not persist in such conduct. Indeed, the Court has held that, in the light of the wording and purpose of Article 260(3) TFEU, an order for the payment of a lump sum should not be made automatically, as the Commission suggests. In the present case, first of all, the Commission has accepted that, in the course of the proceedings before the Court, Romania adopted all the measures necessary to ensure that Directive 2015/849 was transposed in full. Next, even before Legea nr. 129/2019 pentru prevenirea și combaterea spălării banilor și finanțării terorismului, precum și pentru modificarea și completarea unor acte normative (Law No 129/2019 on the prevention and suppression of money laundering and the financing of terrorism, amending and supplementing certain legislative acts), of 11 July 2019 (Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I, No 589 of 18 July 2019), entered into force on 21 July 2019, the provisions of Directive 2015/849 relating to the effects on private and public actors had already been transposed by national legislative acts in force. In addition, for certain obligations laid down in that directive, the transposition period was not yet expired. Lastly, Romania is an average Member State as regards the number of actions for failure to fulfil the obligation to notify the measures transposing directives and thus far has never been found by the Court to have failed to fulfil the obligation to transpose a directive within the prescribed period. Furthermore, the average duration of the pre-litigation procedures involving Romania is the shortest of all the Member States and, in the present case, less than one year elapsed between the commencement of the pre-litigation procedure and the bringing of proceedings before the Court. Consequently, the Commission’s request for a lump sum to be imposed is not only unjustified, but also disproportionate in the light of the facts of the case and the essential aim of that type of financial penalty.
38

In the second place, the Council submits that the competence to determine the location of the seat of an agency of the Union lies with the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States acting by common accord. That competence is thus based on Article 341 TFEU, interpreted in the light of historical developments, the context of which that article forms part, namely Articles 340 and 342 TFEU, Protocol No 6 and Article 2 of the Edinburgh Decision, and the general practice followed. It is apparent in particular from that practice that, first, the location of the seat of an agency of the Union is the result of a legally binding decision taken by common accord of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States. The constitutive effect of such a decision is, moreover, demonstrated by the fact that, in certain cases, the basic legislative act is silent as to the choice of seat, and that did not prevent the establishment of the agency concerned or the conclusion of the Headquarters Agreement. Secondly, the inclusion of the indication of the location of the seat in the basic legislative act establishing an agency of the Union is of purely declaratory and recognition value, as is any reference made in a legislative text to a factual element. The EU legislature cannot therefore depart from the choice already made by the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, which is thus binding. The inclusion, in the basic legislative act, of the indication of the location of the seat is not, however, devoid of any legal significance. Apart from the fact that that indication is an important factor of legal certainty, the legislative text may, as in the present case with the insertion of Article 71a into Regulation No 726/2004 by Regulation 2018/1718, include with that indication a series of other legislative elements, both substantive and procedural, in order to supplement the purely geographical location of the seat.
1.

Declares that, by failing, within the time limit prescribed, to establish, publish and notify to the European Commission the flood risk management plans in respect of the river basin districts ES 120 Gran Canaria, ES 122 Fuerteventura, ES 123 Lanzarote, ES 124 Tenerife, ES 125 La Palma, ES 126 La Gomera and ES 127 El Hierro (Spain), the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 7(1) and (5) and Article 15(1) of Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks; and by failing, within the time limit prescribed, to complete the public consultation and information on the elaboration of flood risk management plans in respect of the river basin districts ES 120 Gran Canaria, ES 122 Fuerteventura and ES 125 La Palma, the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 10(1) and (2) of that directive;
Appeal – Grounds – Mistaken assessment of the facts – Inadmissibility – Review by the Court of the interpretation of a contractual term – Not included

(Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.); Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 169)

(see para. 39)
Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 25 June 2020 –

Schneider v EUIPO

(Case C‑116/19 P) ( 1 )

(Appeal – Civil service – Temporary staff – Internal reorganisation of the services of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) – Reassignment – Legal basis – Article 7 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union – Interests of the service – Substantial changes in tasks – Qualification – Transfer – Change – Misuse of power – Right to be heard – Obligation to state reasons – Right to a fair hearing – Right to effective judicial protection – Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union)

1. Actions brought by officials – Grounds – Misuse of powers – Meaning – Decision in the interest of the service – No misuse of powers (see paras 49, 50)

2. Officials – Organisation of services – Staff allocation – Reassignment in the interest of the service – Right of the person concerned to be heard – Absence (Staff Regulations, Art. 7) (see para. 61)

3. Appeal – Grounds – Specific criticism of a point of the General Court’s reasoning necessary (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 169(2)) (see para. 71)

4. Appeal – Grounds – Plea directed against a superfluous ground – Invalid plea in law – Rejection (Art. 256(1) TFEU) (see paras 76, 106)

5. Appeal – Grounds – Mistaken assessment of the facts – Inadmissible (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see para. 97)

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the appeal;

2. Orders Mr Gregor Schneider to pay the costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 213, 24.6.2019.
Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 25 March 2021 – Carvalho and Others v Parliament and Council

(Case C‑565/19 P) ( 1 )

(Appeal – Action for annulment and for damages – Environment – 2030 climate and energy package – Fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU – Lack of individual concern)

1. Appeal – Grounds – Review by the Court of Justice of the assessment of the facts put before the General Court – Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted – Review of the legal classification given to the facts of the dispute – Included (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 36, 38)

2. Action for annulment – Natural or legal persons – Measures of direct and individual concern to them – Individual concern – Criteria – 2030 climate-energy legislative package – Action brought by individuals relying on a violation of fundamental rights – Not individually concerned – Inadmissibility (Art. 263, fourth para., TFEU; European Parliament and Council Regulations 2018/841, Art. 4, and 2018/842, Art. 4(2) and Annex I; European Parliament and Council Directive 2018/410, Art. 1) (see paras 46-50)

3. Action for annulment – Natural or legal persons – Measures of direct and individual concern to them – Interpretation, contrary to law, of the requirement of being individually concerned – Unlawful (Art. 263, fourth para., TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47); (see paras 67-71, 75-78)

4. Action for annulment – Natural or legal persons – Measures of direct and individual concern to them – Individual concern – Criteria – 2030 climate-energy legislative package – Action by an association representing the sum of the individual interests of its members – Not individually concerned – Inadmissibility (Art. 263, fourth para., TFEU) (see paras 85-94)

5. Appeal – Grounds – Plea raised for the first time in the context of the appeal – Inadmissibility (Art. 256(1), second para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58) (see paras 91, 92)

6. Actions for damages – Autonomy in relation to the action for annulment – Limits – Action seeking the same outcome as an action for annulment – Inadmissibility (Arts 263, 268 and 340, second para., TFEU) (see paras 101-103)

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the appeal.

2. Orders Mr Armando Carvalho and 36 other appellants whose names are set out in the annex to the present judgment to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union.

3. Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 372, 4.11.2019.