ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.

First ground of appeal: manifest distortion of, and failure to have regard to, the facts and the clear sense of the evidence adduced at first instance, failure to examine a crucial fact, and illogical and incorrect reasoning. According to the General Court, the documentary evidence is not sufficient to establish that the decision of the Italian authorities was decisively influenced by the Commission or, conversely, to show that those authorities did not take an autonomous decision, on the basis of their own assessments regarding timings, methods and requirements, to resolve the Banca delle Marche. In essence, in the General Court’s view, the resolution of the Banca delle Marche by the Italian authorities was determined essentially by its failure. On that ground, as it merely hindered/prevented the adoption of a rescue measure by the F.I.T.D., the Commission cannot be considered responsible in respect of the decision to resolve the Banca delle Marche. Such an interpretation is a manifest distortion of the clear sense of the evidence. All the facts, the evidence put forward, the indicia that came to light and the confidential documents obtained during the course of the proceedings appear unambiguous: the Italian authorities stressed, at every stage, the real and incontrovertible influence of the specific instructions received from the European Commission. It is clear from the documents submitted at first instance that: (i) the Italian authorities attempted to pursue every possible option other than resolving the Banca delle Marche, but the European Commission’s opposition made it impossible to pursue each of those options; and (ii) those options would have significantly limited the detrimental effects on shareholders and bondholders.
1.

Are the provisions of Article 6(1)(a) and (b) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the lawfulness of contractual provisions in general terms of service for platform agreements such as that in the main proceedings (in particular, contractual provisions such as: ‘Instead of paying … by using the Facebook Products covered by these Terms you agree that we can show you ads … We use your personal data … to show you ads that are more relevant to you.’) which provide for the processing of personal data with a view to aggregating and analysing it for the purposes of personalised advertising must be assessed in accordance with the requirements of Article 6(1)(a) of the GDPR, read in conjunction with Article 7 thereof, which cannot be replaced by invoking Article 6(1)(b) thereof?
Appeal brought on 14 June 2021 by Apologistics GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) delivered on 21 April 2021 in Case T-282/20, Apologistics GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-369/21 P)

(2021/C 462/28)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Apologistics GmbH (represented by: H. Hug, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Markus Kerckhoff

By order of 22 September 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that the appellant shall bear its own costs.
1.

For the purposes of granting a VAT exemption for transport operations and services relating to the importation of goods, in accordance with Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, (1) are the provisions of Article 86(1)(b) and (2) to be interpreted as meaning that the recording of an import operation (for example, the raising of an entry summary declaration by the customs authority by means of the allocation of a number referred to as the MRN or Master Reference Number) always entails the inclusion, in the basis of calculation of the customs value, of the transport costs up to the first place of destination of the goods in the territory of the Member State of importation. Does the existence of an MRN, in relation to which there is no valid evidence of fraud, implicitly substantiate the fact that all the expenses provided for in Article 86(1)(a) and (b) have been included in the customs taxable basis?
2.

If the answer to Question 1 is that visibility under certain conditions of use or from a certain observer perspective is the decisive factor: (a) When assessing the ‘normal use’ of a complex product by the end user within the meaning of Article 3(3) and (4) of Directive 98/71, is it the use intended by the manufacturer of the component part or complex product that is relevant, or the customary use of the complex product by the end user? (b) What are the criteria for assessing whether the use of a complex product by the end user constitutes a ‘normal use’ within the meaning of Article 3(3) and (4) of Directive 98/71?
2.

Taking into account the judgment in Sturgeon and Others, (2) is Article 5 of Regulation No 261/2004, in conjunction with Article 7 thereof, to be interpreted as meaning that — where the operating air carrier cannot avoid liability, as provided for in Article 5(3) of that regulation — the passenger has the right to compensation if: — the flight is delayed in arriving at the final destination by at least three hours, — it was already apparent prior to boarding that the flight would reach its final destination with a delay of at least three hours, and — the passenger did not appear for the boarding of that flight? If Question 2 is answered in the affirmative:
a.

Justiciability 1. Is Article 27 of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 (‘the Dublin III Regulation’), (1) whether or not read in conjunction with Articles 47 and 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), and while noting the provisions of Directive 2003/86/EC, (2) to be interpreted as meaning that the requested Member State is obliged to provide applicants, including children, who are present in the requesting Member State and who are seeking a transfer pursuant to Articles 8, 9 or 10 of the Dublin III Regulation, or the members of their family in the requested Member State within the meaning of Articles 8, 9 or 10 of the Dublin III Regulation, with an effective remedy before a court in the requested Member State against refusal of the request to take charge? 2. In the event that Question a.1 is answered in the negative: In that case, does the right to an effective remedy referred to in a.1 arise directly from Article 47 of the Charter, whether or not read in conjunction with Articles 7, 9 and 33 of the Charter, in the absence of adequate regulation in the Dublin III Regulation (see the judgments of 7 June 2016, Ghezelbash, C-63/15, paragraphs 51 and 52, (3) and of 26 July 2017, Mengesteab, C-670/16, paragraph 58 (4))? 3. In the event that Question a.1. or Question a.2. is answered in the affirmative: Is Article 47 of the Charter, whether or not read in conjunction with the principle of sincere cooperation (see the judgment of 13 November 2018, X, C-47/17 and C-48/17, (5)), to be interpreted as meaning that the requested Member State is obliged to inform the requesting Member State about an appeal brought by the applicants against the refusal of the request to take charge, and that the requesting Member State is obliged to refrain from ruling on the merits of the applicants’ asylum application pending a negative outcome of the appeal proceedings? 4. In the event that Question a.1. or Question a.2. is answered in the affirmative: Is Article 47 of the Charter, whether or not the assessments set out in recital 5 of the Dublin III Regulation are to be considered, to be interpreted in a case such as that described above as meaning that the courts of the requested Member State are obliged to guarantee legal protection by way of summary proceedings? Is there a period within which the courts in the requested Member State must take a decision on the appeal?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Högsta domstolen (Sweden) lodged on 16 September 2021 — CC v VO

(Case C-572/21)

(2021/C 481/24)

Language of the case: Swedish

Referring court

Högsta domstolen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: CC

Defendant: VO

Question referred

Does the court of a Member State retain jurisdiction under Article 8(1) of the Brussels II Regulation (1) if the child concerned by the case changes his or her habitual residence during the proceedings from a Member State to a third country which is a party to the 1996 Hague Convention (see Article 61 of the regulation)?

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (OJ 2003 L 338, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Pfälzisches Oberlandesgericht (Germany) lodged on 24 August 2021 — MS v Saatgut Treuhandverwaltungs GmbH

(Case C-522/21)

(2021/C 513/25)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Pfälzisches Oberlandesgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Defendant and appellant: MS

Applicant and respondent: Saatgut Treuhandverwaltungs GmbH

Question referred

Is Article 18(2) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1768/95 of 24 July 1995 implementing rules on the agricultural exemption provided for in Article 14(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 on Community plant variety rights, (1) in so far as a minimum level of compensation of quadruple the licence fee can be claimed under the conditions laid down therein, compatible with Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights (‘the Basic Regulation’), (2) in particular with the first sentence of Article 94(2) of that regulation?

(1) OJ 1995 L 173, p. 14.

(2) OJ 1994 L 227, p. 1.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation (Belgium) lodged on 24 September 2021 — NY v Herios SARL

(Case C-593/21)

(2021/C 502/21)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour de cassation

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: NY

Respondent: Herios SARL

Question referred

Must Article 17(2)(a), first indent, of Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents (1) be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation such as that in the present case, the goodwill indemnity payable to the main agent by reference to the number of customers brought in by the subagent does not provide ‘a substantial benefit’ to the main agent?

(1) OJ 1986 L 382, p. 17.
Appeal brought on 19 August 2021 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 9 June 2021 in Case T-202/17, Calhau Correia de Paiva v Commission

(Case C-511/21 P)

(2022/C 2/20)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: B. Schima, I. Melo Sampaio, L. Vernier, Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: Ana Calhau Correia de Paiva

Form of order sought

The Appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— dismiss the second, third and fourth pleas of the action brought by the Applicant at first instance;

— refer the case back to the General Court to rule on the first and fifth pleas of the action brought by the Applicant at first instance, and

— reserve the decision on the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The present Appeal is directed against paragraphs 54-58 of the judgment under appeal, i.e. the part of the judgment concerning the admissibility plea of illegality raised by the Applicant against the language regime of the competition at issue.

The Commission raises a single ground of appeal, which is that the General Court erred in law by concluding that there was a close connection between the statement of reasons of the contested decision and the language regime set out in the notice of competition, thereby admitting that the plea of illegality of this language regime was admissible.

This single ground of appeal is divided in three parts:

(1) First, the General Court made an erroneous legal qualification of the facts, at paragraph 54 of the judgment under appeal, by inferring from the mark obtained by the Applicant for the general competency ‘Communication’ a close connection between the language regime of the competition at issue and the statement of reasons of the contested decision.

(2) Second, at paragraphs 55-57 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court made an erroneous legal qualification of the facts, by admitting the close connection on the basis of the fact that it is more difficult for a candidate to sit tests in his or her Language 2 than in his or her mother tongue. The General Court also distorted the evidence by neglecting the fact that, in the case at hand, the two other languages that the Applicant mastered the best were English and French. The limitation of the choice of the Language 2 to English, French and German thus could not cause her any disadvantage.
2.

Must Article 2 and Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, be interpreted as meaning that, where a court includes in its composition a person appointed in the circumstances described in Question 1 above: (a) those provisions preclude the application of provisions of national law which place the review of the lawfulness of the appointment of such a person to a judicial post within the exclusive jurisdiction of a chamber of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland) composed exclusively of persons appointed to judicial posts in the circumstances described in Question 1 above and which provisions of national law also require that any objections concerning the appointment to a judicial post be disregarded, taking into account the institutional and systemic context; (b) those provisions require, in order to ensure the effectiveness of EU law, provisions of national law to be interpreted in a manner that allows a court to exclude, of its own motion, such a person from hearing the case on the basis of the rules, applicable by analogy, which govern the exclusion of a judge who is incapable of deciding cases (iudex inhabilis); (c) those provisions require the national court, in order to apply EU law and achieve the effet utile, to disregard a judgment of the national constitutional court in so far as that judgment declares it incompatible with national law to hear a motion for the exclusion of a judge on the ground that the appointment of that judge was defective and did not comply with EU requirements of an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law within the meaning of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter; (d) those provisions require the national court, in order to apply EU law and achieve the effet utile, to disregard a judgment of the national constitutional court if it prevents the implementation of an order of the Court of Justice of the European Union granting interim measures, which orders the suspension of the application of national legislation that prevents national courts from examining whether there is compliance with EU requirements concerning an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law within the meaning of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter?
B.

If the answer to Question A. is in the negative (it is not precluded), the national court asks the following questions: B.1 Does Article 47 the Charter, in conjunction with Articles 7 and 38 thereof, Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms, Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices and the principle of effectiveness of EU law preclude case-law which does not preclude the enforcement as to its substance of a lien by means of a private auction of immovable property, consisting of the home of consumers or of other persons and which simultaneously does not have regard to the gravity of the infringement by the consumers of their obligation in relation to the amount of the credit and its term, even where there is another way in which the credit provider’s claim may be satisfied through judicial enforcement, in the context of which the sale of the home over which the lien has been granted does not take precedence? B.2 Is Article 3(1) of Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices to be interpreted as meaning that the protection of consumers against unfair commercial practices in the granting of credit to consumers extends to all forms of satisfaction of the credit provider’s claim, including the agreement on a new loan granted for repayment of the obligations arising from an earlier loan? B.3 Is Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices to be interpreted as meaning that the conduct of a credit provider who repeatedly grants credit to a consumer who is incapable of repaying the credit such that the result is a chain of credit, which the supplier does not in reality pay to the consumer but itself receives for the repayment of the previous loans and the total costs on the credit, is also regarded as an unfair commercial practice? B.4 Must Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2008/48/EC (3) of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC (‘Directive 2008/48/EEC on consumer credit’), read in conjunction with recital 10 thereof, be interpreted as not excluding the application of that directive even in the case of a loan having all the characteristics of consumer credit, where the purpose of the loan has not been agreed upon, the entirety of which loan, with the exception of an insignificant part thereof, the credit provider used to ensure payment of previous consumer loans and as security for which a lien over immovable property was agreed upon? B.5 Is the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-377/14 of 21 April 2016, Radlinger and Radlingerová, ECLI:EU:C:2016:283 to be interpreted as meaning that it also applies to a loan agreement granted to a consumer where, under that agreement, part of the credit granted was designated for the repayment of the credit provider’s costs?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 21 June 2021 by Keun Jig Lee against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 21 April 2021 in Case T-382/20, Lee v EUIPO

(Case C-381/21 P)

(2022/C 37/07)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Keun Jig Lee (represented by: F. Jacobacci, avvocato, B. La Tella, avvocatessa)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 30 November 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Keun Jig Lee should bear his own costs.
Are Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (‘the Unfair Contract Terms Directive’) (1) to be interpreted as meaning that, in the examination of a trader’s contractual claim for compensation brought against a consumer based on the consumer’s unjustified withdrawal from the contract, the application of supplementary national law is precluded if the trader’s general terms and conditions (‘the GTCs’) contain an unfair term which, in addition to the provisions of supplementary national law, grants the trader an optional right to flat-rate compensation against a consumer who has acted in breach of contract?

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative:
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 19 July 2021 by Electrodomésticos Taurus, S.L. against the order of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) delivered on 17 May 2021 in Case T-328/20, Electrodomésticos Taurus, S.L. v EUIPO — Shenzen Aukey E-Business Co. Ltd

(Case C-468/21 P)

(2022/C 51/21)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: Electrodomésticos Taurus, S.L. (represented by: E. Manresa Medina, lawyer)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and Shenzen Aukey E-Business Co. Ltd

By order of 6 October 2021, the Vice-President of the Court of Justice dismissed the appeal as inadmissible and ordered Electrodomésticos Taurus, S.L. to bear its own costs.
Appeal brought on 26 August 2021 by CE against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 16 June 2021 in Case T-355/19, CE v Committee of the Regions

(Case C-539/21 P)

(2022/C 37/11)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: CE (represented by: M. Casado García-Hirschfeld, avocate)

Other party to the proceedings: Committee of the Regions

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside in part the judgment of 16 June 2021, CE v Committee of the Regions (T-355/19);

— order the Committee of the Regions to pay all the costs, including those incurred before the General Court relating both to the main proceedings and to the interlocutory proceedings.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of her appeal, the appellant contests in particular paragraphs 69 and 70, 73 to 77, 83 to 91, 109 to 116, 126 to 139, 149 and 150 of the judgment under appeal. The appellant puts forward a single ground of appeal, alleging distortion of the facts and manifest errors of assessment resulting in an inadequate and inaccurate legal reasoning.
Appeal brought on 2 August 2021 by Franz Schröder GmbH & Co. KG against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 2 June 2021 in Case T-855/19, Franz Schröder v EUIPO

(Case C-474/21 P)

(2022/C 64/11)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Franz Schröder GmbH & Co. KG (represented by: L. Pechan, N. Fangmann, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, RDS Design ApS

By order of 8 December 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Franz Schröder GmbH & Co. KG should bear its own costs.
1.

Must Articles 7 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Articles 5, [6(6)] and 13 of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, (1) read in the light of the judgment [of 19 June 2018, Gnandi (C-181/16, EU:C:2018:465)], be interpreted as meaning that a court hearing an appeal against a return decision adopted pursuant to a decision refusing to grant international protection, when assessing the legality of the return decision, may take account of changes in circumstances that may have a significant bearing on the assessment of the situation under Article 5 cited above, only where those changes occurred prior to the disposal of the international protection proceedings by the Council for asylum and immigration proceedings?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 24 August 2021 by Innovative Cosmetic Concepts LLC against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 16 June 2021 in Case T-196/20, Chanel v EUIPO — Innovative Cosmetic Concepts (INCOCO)

(Case C-523/21 P)

(2022/C 64/14)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Innovative Cosmetic Concepts LLC (represented by: J. Oria Sousa-Montes, P. Revuelta Martos and I. Temiño Ceniceros, avocats)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Chanel

By order of 16 December 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) ruled that the appeal should not be allowed to proceed.