ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul București (Romania) lodged on 3 June 2022 — VS, TU, RW v Ryanair DAC

(Case C-362/22)

(2022/C 368/22)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Tribunalul București

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants and appellants: VS, TU, RW

Defendant and respondent: Ryanair DAC

Question referred

[I]s Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the compensation provided for in Article 7, in conjunction with Article 4(3), is also payable to persons travelling with the person who is denied boarding and who, although not denied boarding themselves, no longer wish to travel or are no longer interested in travelling without the person who has been denied boarding[?]

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
1.

Must Article 1(2)(b) of the Brussels Ia Regulation (Regulation No 1215/2012 (1)) in conjunction with Article 3(1) of the Insolvency Regulation (Regulation No 1346/2000 (2)) be interpreted as meaning that the term ‘bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings’ in Article 1(2)(b) of the Brussels Ia Regulation includes also proceedings in which the claim is described in the summons as a pure trade receivable, without any mention of the respondent’s previously declared bankruptcy, whereas the actual legal basis of that claim is the specific derogating provisions of Netherlands bankruptcy law (Article 25(2) of the Wet van 30 september 1893, op het faillissement en de surséance van betaling (Law of 30 September 1893 on bankruptcy and suspension of payment; ‘NFW’)) and whereby: — it must be determined whether such a claim must be considered a verifiable claim (Article 26 NFW in conjunction with Article 110 thereof) or an unverifiable claim (Article 25(2) NFW), — it appears that the question whether both claims can be brought simultaneously and whether one claim does not appear to exclude the other, taking into account the specific legal consequences of each of those claims (inter alia, in terms of the possibilities of calling for a bank guarantee deferred after the bankruptcy), may be determined in accordance with the rules specific to Netherlands bankruptcy law? And further
3.

Can Article 5(2)(b) of Council Directive 2008/7/EC of 12 February 2008 be interpreted as precluding the levying of stamp duty on fees charged for financial intermediation services provided by a bank in relation to (i) the repurchase of debt securities, (ii) the issue and placing on the market of negotiable securities and (iii) the increase of capital through a public subscription of the shares issued, where such services include the obligation to identify and contact investors in order to distribute transferrable securities, receive subscription or purchase orders and, in some cases, purchase the transferrable securities to which the offer relates?
1.

Does the right to compensation for a delay in a flight of more than three hours after the scheduled time of arrival under Articles 5, 6 and 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1) require that, in accordance with Article 3(2)(a) thereof, the passenger must present himself or herself for check-in at the time indicated by the air carrier, the tour operator or an authorised travel agent, but not later than 45 minutes before the published departure time, or is the case of a long delay in the above sense exempt from that requirement — as in the case where a flight is cancelled?
2.

How is the content of the ‘instrument […] in any form […] by which the right to carry out the business is granted’ within the meaning of Article 4(1)(42) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 to be interpreted, and does it include both the authorisation scheme and the registration scheme which grant approval for credit operations?
5.

Is the principle of prohibition of abusive practices to be interpreted as applying to a transfer of company shares such as that in the present case, which, in essence, has a result equivalent to a dividend payment, and the legal form of which was chosen by the taxpayer with the fundamental aim of obtaining a tax advantage deriving from national law and strictly applicable to capital gains on securities, in circumstances such as those of the present case, in which the grant to the taxpayer of the tax advantage concerned depends on whether that taxpayer is able to rely on and exercise the right of establishment under Article 49 TFEU and/or free movement of capital under Article 63 TFEU?
Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market (2) (in particular recitals 1, 6, 8, 17 and 26, Article 1(1), Article 2(10) and Article 5(1));

read in the light of Articles 17(1) (right to property), 20 (equality before the law), 21(1) (non-discrimination) and 52(1) (principle of proportionality) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union;

and therefore must it be interpreted as meaning [that] the national legislation laid down in Article 5-bis of Decree-Law No 1 of 24 January 2012 (as amended by Conversion Law No 27 of 24 March 2012) — which added paragraphs 7-ter and 7-quater to Article 10 of Law No 287/1990 — is contrary to EU law as stated above?
2.

If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative, must Articles 49 TFEU, 56 TFEU and/or 63 TFEU be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which the deduction of the interest on a loan debt contracted with an entity related to the taxable person and regarded as (part of) a wholly artificial arrangement, being a debt connected with the acquisition or extension of an interest in an entity which, following that acquisition or extension, is a related entity, is disallowed in full when determining the profits of the taxable person, even where that interest in itself does not exceed the amount that would have been agreed upon between companies which are independent of one another?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgerichts Wien (Austria) lodged on 28 June 2022 — VK v N1 Interactive Ltd.

(Case C-429/22)

(2022/C 451/11)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberlandesgericht Wien

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: VK

Defendant: N1 Interactive Ltd.

Question referred

Is Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 (1) on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (‘the Rome I Regulation’) to be interpreted as meaning that the law of the country in which the consumer has his or her habitual residence is not applicable if the law applicable under Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation, the application of which the applicant seeks and which would be applicable if the applicant lacked consumer status, is more favourable to the applicant?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (OJ 2008 L 177, p. 6).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas (Lithuania) lodged on 20 October 2022 — Bruc Bond UAB v Lietuvos bankas

(Case C-661/22)

(2022/C 482/17)

Language of the case: Lithuanian

Referring court

Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Bruc Bond UAB

Other party to the appeal proceedings: Lietuvos bankas

Question referred

In circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, where a payment institution accepts funds without a specific payment order to transfer them on the same or following business day and the funds remain in the payment institution’s account intended for carrying out payment transactions for longer than the time limits for the execution of the payment service laid down by the legislation, are the actions of the payment institution to be regarded as:

(a) a part of a payment service or a payment transaction, as defined in points 3 and 5 of Article 4 of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC, performed by the payment institution; or

(b) the issuance of electronic money as defined in point 2 of Article 2 of Directive 2009/110/EC (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions amending Directives 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC?

(1) Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC (OJ 2015 L 337, p. 35).

(2) Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions amending Directives 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC (OJ 2009 L 267, p. 7).
1.

What is the meaning of Article 6(2) of the Returns Directive? (1) Does it mean that a third-country national must be requested to return immediately from the Member State in which he or she is staying illegally to the Member State in which he or she has a valid residence permit, unless the third-country national’s immediate departure is required for reasons of public policy or national security?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 8 November 2022 by Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 14 September 2022 in Case T-744/19, Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) v Commission

(Case C-688/22 P)

(2023/C 7/23)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) Ltd (represented by: B. Servais, and V. Crochet, avocats)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Achema AB, Grupa Azoty S.A., Grupa Azoty Zakłady Azotowe Puławy S.A.

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— accept the application at first instance; and

— order the Commission and any intervening party to pay the costs including those incurred at first instance; or alternatively

— refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration; and

— reserve the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on two grounds of appeal.

First, the General Court misinterpreted the rules of Articles 3(2), 3(3) and 9(4) of the Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (1) (the ‘Basic Regulation’) when defining the export price for the purpose of the undercutting and underselling margins calculation in case of exports to the European Union through related entities and, as a result, erroneously concluded that the Commission did not violate Articles 3(1), 3(2), 3(3), 3(5) to 3(8) and 9(4) of the Basic Regulation.

Second, the General Court misconstrued the arguments put forth by Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) Limited in the Reply regarding the Commission’s price depression and price suppression analysis and, as a result, mistakenly declared them inadmissible.

(1) OJ 2016 L 176, p. 21.
2.

(…) In order to avoid a probatio diabolica and to allow the specific implementation of the circumstances derogating from the obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling as indicated by the Court of Justice, is it sufficient to establish that the question referred for a preliminary ruling (concerning the interpretation and correct application of the relevant European provision in the specific case) raised in the national proceedings is manifestly unfounded, by ruling out the existence of reasonable doubts in that regard, having regard, on a purely objective basis — without an enquiry into the specific interpretative approach that might be adopted by different courts or tribunals — to the terminology and meaning in [EU] law attributable to the words of the European provision (relevant in the present case), the European legislative context of which it forms part and the safeguarding aims it seeks to fulfil, and having regard to the stage of development of European law at the time when the provision relevant to the national proceedings is to be applied?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 9 May 2022 by Union nationale des indépendants solidaires (UNIS) against the order of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) delivered on 8 March 2022 in Case T-431/21 UNIS v Commission

(Case C-324/22 P)

(2023/C 24/26)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Union nationale des indépendants solidaires (UNIS) (represented by: F. Ortega, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 1 December 2022, the Court (Sixth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as manifestly unfounded and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
I.

May substances which, although not set out in Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 111/2005 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 December 2004, have been identified as being used for the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances be the subject of the criminal offence of illegal trafficking across national borders for the purposes of Article 242(3) of the NK (as material), given that neither national law nor the applicable EU law requires a special import regime in respect of such substances? Article 242(3) of the NK is a blanket provision and refers to other special provisions that explicitly regulate the import of precursors. Is the national provision in Article 242(3) of the NK (whose content is analogous to that of the provision in the second sentence of Article 354a of the NK) compatible in that sense with Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, given that there is no legal requirement for a registration regime in respect of the import of such materials that could flesh out the blanket provisions under criminal law?
2.

Must Article 2(1)(b) of the REACH Regulation be interpreted as meaning that a substance which is stored in a bonded warehouse (by placing it under procedure J — code 71 00 in box 37 of the single administrative document) also remains outside the scope of the REACH Regulation until it is removed at a later stage and placed under a different customs procedure (e.g. release for free circulation)? If so, must Articles 6(1) and 3(10) and 3(11) of the REACH Regulation be construed as meaning that, in that circumstance, the registration obligation rests on the person who has directly purchased the substance outside the Union and who calls for it (without having previously physically introduced the substance into the customs territory of the Union), even if the substance has already been registered by the third undertaking which previously physically introduced it into the customs territory of the Union?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 21 November 2022 — LivaNova plc v Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze and Others

(Case C-713/22)

(2023/C 45/17)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte suprema di cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: LivaNova plc

Respondents: Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, Ministero dell’Ambiente e della Tutela del Territorio e del Mare, Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri

Question referred

Does Article 3 of the Sixth Council Directive [82/891/EEC], (1) which (under Article 22 thereof) is also applicable to a division by the formation of new companies — in so far as it provides that (a) ‘where a liability is not allocated by the draft terms of division and where the interpretation of these terms does not make a decision on its allocation possible, each of the recipient companies shall be jointly and severally liable for it’, and that (b) ‘Member States may provide that such joint and several liability be limited to the net assets allocated to each company’ — preclude an interpretation of the provision of national law in Article 2506-bis, third paragraph, of the Italian Civil Code according to which the joint and several liability of the recipient refers, in relation to ‘liabilities’ not allocated by the draft terms, not only to liabilities of a nature already determined, but also (i) to those identifiable in the harmful consequences, arising after the division, of conduct (by act or omission) occurring before the division itself or (ii) of subsequent conduct developing from it, which has an ongoing unlawful nature and causes environmental damage, the effects of which, at the time of the division, cannot yet be fully determined?

(1) Sixth Council Directive 82/891/EEC of 17 December 1982 based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty, concerning the division of public limited liability companies (OJ 1982 L 378, p. 47).
Action brought on 4 November 2022 — European Commission v Ireland

(Case C-679/22)

(2023/C 45/14)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: U. Małecka, L. Malferrari, E. Manhaeve, L. Armati, Agents)

Defendant: Ireland

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by failing to adopt (all) the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive (EU) 2018/1808 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 amending Directive 2010/13/EU (2) on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in view of changing market realities; or, in any event, by failing to communicate them to the Commission, Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 2 of the Directive;

— order Ireland to pay to the Commission a lump sum based on a daily amount of EUR 5 544,9 per day with the minimum lump sum of EUR 1 376 000.

— if the failure to fulfil obligations found in paragraph 1 has continued until the date of delivery of the judgment in the present proceedings, order Ireland to pay to the Commission a penalty payment of EUR 33 257,2 per day from the date of the judgment in the present proceedings to the date of compliance with its obligations under the Directive; and

— order Ireland to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 amends Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in view of changing market realities. Both the 2010 and 2018 Directives harmonise national legislation concerning audiovisual media traditional TV broadcasts and on-demand services. The 2018 Directive provides rules to shape technological developments and creates a level playing field for emerging audiovisual media.

By letter of 20 November 2020, the Commission addressed a letter of formal notice in circumstances where the Commission had not received from Ireland any notification concerning the adoption of the necessary provisions to comply with the Directive. By letter of 23 September 2021, in the absence of any further notification regarding the transposition of the Directive, the Commission sent a reasoned opinion to Ireland. Nevertheless, the transposing measures have not yet been adopted by Ireland and, in any event, they have not been notified to the Commission.

(1) OJ 2018, L 303, p. 69.

(2) Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) (OJ 2010, L 95, p. 1).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 22/2

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 6 December 2007 — Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic

(Case C-280/05) (1)

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - State aid - Incompatibility with the common market - Duty to recover - Non-fulfilment)

(2008/C 22/03)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: V. Di Bucci and E. Righini, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Italian Republic (represented by: I.M. Braguglia, acting as Agent, and D. Del Gaizo, lawyer)

Re:

Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Infringement of Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Commission Decision 2004/800/EC of 30 March 2004 declaring incompatible with the common market the aid scheme put into effect by Italy providing for urgent measures to assist employment in firms in financial difficulty, in special administration, and having at least 1 000 employees (Aid No CR 62/2003, ex NN 7/2003 — Italy) (OJ 2004 L 352, p. 10) — Failure to adopt, within the prescribed period, the measures necessary to recover the aid declared incompatible with the common market

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1. Declares that, by failing to adopt, within the prescribed period, the measures necessary to recover from the beneficiaries the aid declared unlawful and incompatible with the common market by Commission Decision 2004/800/EC of 30 March 2004 on the State aid scheme put into effect by Italy providing for urgent measures to assist employment, the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of that decision;

2. orders the Italian Republic to pay the costs.

(1) OJ C 229, 17.9.2005.