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In the light of those considerations, the General Court held, in paragraphs 123 to 129 of the judgment under appeal, as follows: ‘123 First, as regards [Frucona Košice’s] argument that the Commission did not take the duration of a bankruptcy procedure in Slovakia and third party reports in this regard into consideration, the Court would point out first of all that, contrary to [Frucona Košice’s] submission, the Commission not only stated, in recital 54 of the contested decision, that, according to the Slovak Republic, the duration of a bankruptcy procedure would have been lower than average in the light of the specific circumstances of the case, but also mentions, in recital 40 of the contested decision, that, according to [Frucona Košice], the bankruptcy procedure lasts on average 3 to 7 years in Slovakia. The Commission stated that [Frucona Košice] based its position on material, statistics and an example of a Slovak company allegedly in a similar situation to its own. It cannot therefore be alleged that the Commission ignored that question and [Frucona Košice’s] position in this respect. 124 In addition, as regards the evidence available to the Commission, the Court would point out that the data, which were themselves provided by [Frucona Košice], do not satisfy the requirements of reliability and consistency. The assessments of the duration of a bankruptcy procedure in Slovakia that [Frucona Košice] submitted to the Commission were general and did not take account of the characteristics of this case. Similarly, some of those assessments were of an approximate nature and, to a certain extent, were inconsistent with one another. [Frucona Košice] relies on four reports, referred to in paragraph 96 above, in which that duration was assessed variously at 4 years and 8 months, at a period of between 3 years and 7 years, or at more than 6 years. 125 The other reports to which [Frucona Košice] refers are the Commission reports of 2002 and 2003 on the Slovak Republic’s progress towards accession to the European Union. [Frucona Košice] submits that in those reports the Commission referred to the concerns and improvements necessary as regards bankruptcy and insolvency procedures in Slovakia. However, it must be pointed out that those Commission reports relate to the bankruptcy procedure in Slovakia in general and do not take account of the characteristics of this case. 126 Moreover, the Court observes that [Frucona Košice] failed to refer to the results of the K report in relation to the possible duration of a bankruptcy procedure concerning it. In [the K report], which [Frucona Košice] itself submitted in this case, that duration was assessed at “ca. 2 years (depending on conditions and trustee’s work)”. The Court would point out that not only was that assessment of the duration of such a bankruptcy procedure clearly much more optimistic than the other assessments submitted by [Frucona Košice] but it also referred specifically to [that company]. 127 In addition, as the Commission maintains, where, as is the case here, the number of the debtor’s creditors is small and there are assets with a positive liquidation value, the bankruptcy procedure can be carried out in a shorter than average period. That is especially true in the present case since it is undisputed between the parties that the Slovak tax authorities’ claim over [Frucona Košice] represented approximately 99% of [the latter’s] liabilities and that those authorities had the status of a preferential creditor. It follows that the Slovak tax authorities would have had a decisive influence on the duration of the bankruptcy procedure. It is true that [Frucona Košice] asserts that the characteristics, the geographical location and the outdated nature of most of its assets would have made it difficult to find a buyer and, therefore, slowed down the course of the bankruptcy procedure. However, as the Commission stated in recital 88 of the contested decision, several factors, and in particular the fact that some of [Frucona Košice’s] production assets found a user after the withdrawal of its licence for the production and processing of alcohol and spirits, tend to show that that assertion ... is unfounded. … 129 It follows from the foregoing that the Commission did not commit a manifest error in its assessment of the duration of the bankruptcy procedure.’