ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
In the procedure for the transfer of pension rights laid down in Article 11(2) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations, it is the decision adopted by the appointing authority or the authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment, as the case may be, once the capital representing the pension rights acquired by the person concerned before entering the service of the EU has actually been transferred, which constitutes an act adversely affecting him, against which he may bring an action under Article 270 TFEU and Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations. On the other hand, a proposal concerning the crediting of pension rights, if accepted by the person concerned, does not constitute an act adversely affecting him which may be the subject of an action under Article 270 TFEU and Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations.

Additional pensionable years may be credited only where the official concerned gives his consent to the procedure for transferring to the EU pension scheme the capital representing pension rights he has acquired previously with the external pension fund concerned, that consent being informed by the proposal for the additional pensionable years to be credited made by the appointing authority or the authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment on the basis of the provisional amount of capital declared by the national pension fund concerned.

In that regard, at the stage when the proposal for the pension rights to be credited is made, the institution concerned merely undertakes to apply correctly to the situation of the official concerned Article 11(2) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations and the general implementing provisions. That obligation on the institution arises directly from the provisions of the Staff Regulations in question, even if the institution does not expressly give such an undertaking.

Thus, such an undertaking expressed in a proposal for pensionable years to be credited does not give rise to a fresh obligation on the institution in question nor, consequently, to a change in the legal position of the person concerned, in particular because, even where the person gives his consent to the transfer to the EU pension scheme of pension rights which he acquired under a different scheme, the institution making the proposal is not under a corresponding obligation, once the amount of capital declared by the national fund has actually been transferred, automatically to award the person concerned the number of pensionable years stated in the original proposal, in the light of which the official confirmed his intention to transfer the capital to the EU pension scheme.

(see paras 32-36)

See:

Judgments of 13 October 2015 in Commission v Verile and Gjergji, T‑104/14 P, EU:T:2015:776, paras 50, 52, 53 and 74; Commission v Cocchi and Falcione, T‑103/13 P, EU:T:2015:777, para. 66, and Teughels v Commission, T‑131/14 P, EU:T:2015:778, paras 37, 46, 48, 49, 58 and 70
ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

(First Chamber)

16 December 2013

CL

v

European Environment Agency (EEA)

‛Civil service — Temporary staff — Sick leave — Reinstatement — Duty to have regard for the welfare of officials — Psychological harassment’

Application:

under Article 270 TFEU, in which CL seeks, in essence, annulment of the letter of 21 February 2012 concerning his reinstatement following extended sick leave, annulment of the decision of 20 September 2012 rejecting his complaint of 21 May 2012 against that letter, and an order that the European Environment Agency (EEA) is to pay him the equivalent of a year’s salary by way of compensation for the damage suffered.

Held:

The action is dismissed. CL is to bear his own costs and is ordered to pay the costs incurred by the European Environment Agency.

Summary

Officials — Administration’s duty to have regard for the welfare of officials — Scope — Stricter obligation where an official’s mental health is affected

(Staff Regulations, Art. 24)

The administration’s duty to have regard for the welfare of officials reflects the balance of reciprocal rights and obligations established by the Staff Regulations in the relationship between the administration and its staff. That balance implies, inter alia, that when the administration takes a decision concerning the situation of an official, it must take into consideration all the factors which may affect its decision, and when doing so it should take into account not only the interests of the service but also those of the official concerned.

The duty to have regard for the welfare of officials requires the administration, where there is doubt as to the medical origin of the difficulties encountered by an official in performing the tasks falling to him, to take all necessary steps to dispel that doubt. Moreover, the obligations imposed on the administration by the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials are substantially reinforced when what is at issue is the particular situation of an official in respect of whom there are doubts regarding his mental health and, consequently, his ability to defend his own interests. Consequently, in that particular context, the onus is on the administration to insist on the official’s agreeing to undergo a further medical examination, in particular relying on the right of the institution to have the official examined by the medical officer, pursuant to the third subparagraph of Article 59(1).

(see paras 45-46)

See:

28 May 1980, 33/79 and 75/79 Kuhner v Commission, para. 22; 29 June 1994, C‑298/93 P Klinke v Court of Justice, para. 38

13 December 2006, F‑17/05 de Brito Sequeira Carvalho v Commission, para. 72; 28 October 2010, F‑92/09 U v Parliament, paras 65 and 85
For a decision to be duly notified, within the meaning of Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations, it must not only have been communicated to its addressee, but the addressee must also have been able to have effective knowledge of its content.

In particular in a situation where the person concerned is in active employment within the meaning of Article 35(a) of the Staff Regulations, it must be considered that, in principle, where the administration agrees to the submission by e-mail of a request within the meaning of Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations, in the present case from the office e-mail address provided by the administration, the administration is entitled, given the choice of that method of communication made by the official concerned himself and under the principle of parallelism of forms, also to reply to that official by sending an e-mail from the e-mail address of the appointing authority, the addressee of the official’s request, to the official’s office e-mail address.

An institution cannot presume that an internal e-mail, in the present case an e-mail notifying the existence and availability on-line of a decision of the appointing authority, has reached the addressee because he is physically present at his place of work. However, such a presumption may be made where the institution concerned relies, not only on mere indications, but also on evidence, including that provided by the official concerned, showing that, as the addressee, he received an e-mail at his office e-mail address and that, in all probability, he was able to open it and thus, by means of a hyperlink, have effective knowledge of the decision, the existence of which was thus notified in the e-mail.

The fact that the administration did not ask the official concerned to acknowledge that he had read the e-mail is irrelevant as regards the date on which it may be considered that the official concerned was able to have effective knowledge of the appointing authority’s decision, given that the official concerned sorted out which messages he read according to those which he regarded as being important and, hence, which he considered it appropriate to acquaint himself with.

(see paras 39, 42-44, 46, 47)

15 June 1976, 5/76 Jänsch v Commission, para. 10

25 April 2007, F‑71/06 Lebedef-Caponi v Commission, paras 29 to 31 and 34; 7 October 2009, F‑101/08 Pappas v Commission, para. 43; 16 December 2010, F‑25/10 AG v Parliament, paras 38 and 39
ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

(Third Chamber)

4 September 2014

Olivier Prigent

v

European Commission

‛Civil service — Open competition — Notice of open competitions EPSO/AD/230/12 (AD 5) and EPSO/AD/231/12 (AD 7) — Professional experience condition to be eligible for Competition EPSO/AD/231/12 (AD 7) not fulfilled — Reassignment to Competition EPSO/AD/230/12 (AD 5) — Inclusion in the reserve list of Competition EPSO/AD/230/12 (AD 5) — Interest in bringing proceedings — Complaint submitted out of time — Successive requests for reconsideration’

Application:

under Article 270 TFEU, applicable to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to Article 106a thereof, in which Mr Prigent seeks, in particular, annulment of the decision of the selection board in open competition EPSO/AD/231/12 (AD 7), notified by a letter of 16 July 2012 from the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO), not to invite him to the assessment centre for that competition, but, having reassigned him to open competition EPSO/AD/230/12 (AD 5), to invite him to the assessment centre for the latter competition.

Held:

The action is dismissed as being, in part, clearly inadmissible and, in part, clearly unfounded . Mr Prigent is to bear his own costs and is ordered to pay the costs incurred by the European Commission.

Summary

Officials — Competitions — Competition based on qualifications and tests — Conditions for admission — Supporting documents — Candidates’ obligation to ensure that documents are adequate

(Staff Regulations, Annex III, Art. 2)

It is, as a general rule, for a candidate in a competition to provide the selection board with all the information and documents which he regards as necessary for the purposes of examining his application in order to enable the selection board to determine whether he fulfils the conditions laid down by the competition notice, all the more so if he has been expressly and formally requested to do so. The selection board, when giving its decision on the admission of candidates to a competition or their exclusion from it, is therefore entitled to limit its examination to the application forms and the documents annexed thereto.

(see para. 43)

See:

judgment in Belardinelli and Others v Court of Justice, 225/87, EU:C:1989:309, para. 24

judgments in Burban v Parliament, T‑133/89, EU:T:1990:36, paras 31 and 34; and Martínez Alarcón v Commission, T‑357/00, T‑361/00, T‑363/00 and T‑364/00, EU:T:2002:66, para. 76

judgment in Demeneix v Commission, F‑96/12, EU:F:2013:52, para. 44
ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

(Second Chamber)

16 July 2015

Valéria Anna Gyarmathy

v

European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)

‛Civil service — Judgment by default — Application to set aside made by the applicant — Manifest inadmissibility’

Application:

application to set aside made on the basis of Article 124 of the Rules of Procedure (which reproduces — with amendments — Article 116(4) to (6) of the Rules of Procedure in force until 30 September 2014), by which Ms Gyarmathy seeks to challenge the judgment of the Tribunal of 18 May 2015 in Gyarmathy v EMCDDA (F‑79/13, EU:F:2015:49) given by default against the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA).

Held:

The application to set aside made by Ms Gyarmathy is manifestly inadmissible. Ms Gyarmathy is to bear her own costs.

Summary

Judicial proceedings — Action before the Civil Service Tribunal — Application to set aside made by the applicant against a judgment given by default — Inadmissibility

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 41; Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal, Arts 121 and 124)

Pursuant to Article 41 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Articles 121 and 124 of the Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal, a judgment can be given by default only against a defendant and only if that party has failed to file written submissions in defence within the prescribed time-limit. Furthermore, only the defendant is entitled to make an application to set aside that judgment.

(see para. 12)
ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL (Third Chamber)

9 September 2014 ( *1 )

‛Death of the applicant — Reopening of the oral procedure’

In Case F‑68/13,

ACTION brought pursuant to Article 36.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, annexed to the EU Treaty and to the FEU Treaty,

CY, member of the staff of the European Central Bank, residing in Frankfurt am Main (Germany), represented by L. Levi and M. Vandenbussche, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Central Bank (ECB), represented by E. Carlini and F. Feyerbacher, acting as Agents, and by B. Wägenbaur, lawyer,

defendant,

THE CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL (Third Chamber),

composed of S. Van Raepenbusch, President, E. Perillo and J. Svenningsen (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: W. Hakenberg,

makes the following:

Order

1 By application received at the Registry of the Tribunal on 9 July 2013, CY sought, in essence, first, the annulment of the decision of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank (ECB) of 18 December 2012 closing the internal administrative inquiry opened following her complaint of psychological harassment and the annulment of that inquiry and of the inquiry report drawn up once it had finished and, secondly, the grant of EUR 50 000 by way of compensation for the harm allegedly suffered by her, essentially in connection with the conduct of her line manager.

2 The parties were heard in their oral submissions and in their answers to questions put by the Tribunal at the hearing on 21 May 2014. The oral procedure was closed on that date.

3 The parties were then informed, on 9 July 2014, that the judgment bringing the proceedings to an end would be delivered on 17 September 2014.

4 By letter of 13 August 2014, counsel for the defendant informed the Tribunal of the death of the applicant, which occurred on 11 July 2014. By email of 3 September 2014, counsel for the applicant confirmed that information to the Tribunal Registry.

5 Accordingly, the oral procedure must be reopened in order that the applicant’s legal successors be given an opportunity to state whether they wish to resume the proceedings (see, to that effect, orders in Barbin v Parliament, T‑228/11 P, EU:T:2012:701, and Boyes v Commission, T‑81/98, EU:T:1999:305, paragraphs 5 to 7).

6 Therefore, under Article 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure, it is necessary to order the reopening of the oral procedure in the present case.

On those grounds, THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL (Third Chamber) hereby orders:

1. The oral procedure shall be reopened.

2. The costs are reserved.

Luxembourg, 9 September 2014.

W. Hakenberg Registrar S. Van Raepenbusch President

( *1 ) Language of the case: English
Judgments annulling a measure which are delivered by the Courts of the Union acquire the force of res judicata only in respect of the persons who were formally parties in the corresponding cases. Consequently, the legal effects of those judgments may not be relied on by officials or other Union staff who have failed to use in good time, and in accordance with the applicable legal requirements, the right to bring an action or the right to intervene guaranteed by the Staff Regulations, precisely in order to challenge an administrative act adversely affecting them.

The legal effects of a judgment annulling an administrative measure of a Union institution relate solely to the parties to the case and to persons directly concerned by the annulled measure itself. Such a judgment cannot constitute a new fact capable, consequently, of reopening the time-limits for lodging a complaint or bringing an action against that administrative measure, except in respect of those persons.

Nevertheless, any Union institution may, however, by a decision taken on its own initiative and in the interests of the service, decide to extend the effects of an annulling judgment to members of its staff who were not applicants in the case in question, and to recognise, where appropriate and in accordance with the applicable rules of the Staff Regulations, their entitlement to the rights or benefits arising from that judgment.

That being said, a judgment annulling a measure does not constitute, in respect of a staff member who was not an applicant in the case in question, a new fact capable of obliging an institution to review, of its own motion, his right to the expatriation allowance.

(see paras 33-36)

Judgment of 21 February 1974 in Kortner and Others v Council and Others, 15/73 to 33/73, 52/73, 53/73, 57/73 to 109/73, 116/73, 117/73, 123/73, 132/73 and 135/73 to 137/73, EU:C:1974:16, paras 36 to 40

Order of 11 October 2012 in Cervelli v Commission, T‑622/11 P, EU:T:2012:538, paras 20, 21 and 25

Order of 13 February 2014 in Probst v Commission, F‑75/13, EU:F:2014:20
ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE FIRST CHAMBER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

14 July 2014

(Amicable settlement of the dispute — Article 69(1) of the Rules of Procedure — Amicable settlement requested by the parties — Agreement between the parties — Removal from the register)

In Case F‑3/14,

ACTION brought under Article 270 TFEU,

DJ, a member of the temporary staff of the European Aviation Safety Agency, residing in Cologne (Germany), represented by T. Bontinck and A. Guillerme, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), represented by F. Manuhutu, acting as Agent, and by D. Waelbroeck and A. Duron, lawyers,

defendant,

THE PRESIDENT OF THE FIRST CHAMBER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

makes the following

Order

1 By application received at the Registry of the Tribunal on 10 January 2014, DJ seeks, inter alia, annulment of the decision of 12 March 2013 by which the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) extended his contract for only one year.

2 Following the hearing held on 8 July 2014 in the present case, the Judge-Rapporteur, at the request of the parties and on the basis of the authorisation received by the Chamber, held an informal meeting in the course of which the parties reached an agreement on the terms of an amicable settlement.

3 The terms of the agreement were recorded in minutes of 8 July 2014. That agreement also concerns the costs.

4 It is therefore necessary, pursuant to Article 69(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Tribunal, to remove the present case from the register of the Tribunal.

5 Under Article 69(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the costs are to be borne by the parties in accordance with the terms of their agreement.

On those grounds,

THE PRESIDENT OF THE FIRST CHAMBER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

hereby orders:

1. Case F‑3/14 shall be removed from the register of the Tribunal as a result of the agreement concluded between DJ and the European Aviation Safety Agency.

2. DJ and the European Aviation Safety Agency shall bear the costs in accordance with their agreement.

Luxembourg, 14 July 2014.

W. Hakenberg E. Perillo
ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

(Third Chamber)

21 July 2016

Anne-Claire Simon

v

European Commission

‛Civil service — Officials — Pensions — Article 11(2) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations — Pension rights acquired before entering the service of the European Union under a national pension scheme — Transfer to the EU pension scheme — Proposal concerning additional pensionable years — Concept of an act having an adverse effect — Manifest inadmissibility — Article 81 of the Rules of Procedure’

Application:

under Article 270 TFEU, applicable to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to Article 106a thereof, in which Ms Anne-Claire Simon and Ms Silvia Cobo Benito sought the annulment of the decisions of the appointing authority of the European Commission by which the latter definitively fixed, under the EU pension scheme, the pension rights they had acquired before entering the service of the EU.

Held:

The action is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible. Ms Anne‑Claire Simon is to bear her own costs and is ordered to pay the costs incurred by the European Commission.

Summary

Actions brought by officials — Act adversely affecting an official — Concept — Proposal concerning additional pensionable years with a view to a transfer to the EU pension scheme of pension rights acquired before entry into the service of the EU — Not included

(Staff Regulations, Art. 91(1) and Annex VIII, Art. 11(2))

A proposal concerning additional pensionable years, notified to an official with a view to a transfer to the EU pension scheme of pension rights acquired under another scheme, does not produce binding legal effects which directly and immediately affect the legal situation of the person to whom it is addressed, by significantly altering that situation. Therefore, it does not constitute an act having adverse effect for the purposes of Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations.

(see para. 26)

See:

Judgments of 13 October 2015 in Commission v Verile and Gjergji, T‑104/14 P, EU:T:2015:776, para. 62, and Teughels v Commission, T‑131/14 P, EU:T:2015:778, para. 58
34

The above considerations are all the more valid having regard to the settled case-law according to which the authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment has a wide discretion when comparing the merits of the candidates for a post as a member of the temporary staff (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 December 1990 in Moritz v Commission, T‑20/89, EU:T:1990:80, paragraph 29, and 9 July 2002 in Tilgenkamp v Commission, T‑158/01, EU:T:2002:180, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). It could therefore, in the context of its power of internal organisation and by means of internal rules, such as the Eurojust administrative director’s decision of 27 April 2012, decide that, in general, only candidates having obtained a number of points exceeding a certain threshold, in the present case the threshold of 75% of the points attributed under selection criteria considered essential, could be invited to an interview with the selection board appointed by Eurojust. For the same reasons, those internal rules could provide that, in specific cases, the internal selection board could decide, as in the present case, in a uniform manner for all candidates, to raise the selectivity threshold by requiring a total of 17 out of the 20 points available, across all the selection criteria, to be invited to the next step of the recruitment procedure, whether that is a written test or an interview or both. Moreover, the applicant has not established any infringement of those internal rules.
38

It is clear from the communication of 27 March 2014 that it merely revealed the contents of the evaluation which had already been carried out by the Selection Board and on the basis of which the decision of 27 January 2014 — also communicated to the applicant — had been adopted. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that the confirmation of the rejection of the applicant’s application contained in the communication of 27 March 2014 can be regarded as having been adopted by the authority authorised to conclude employment contracts following examination of a new element of fact or law which arose or was invoked by the applicant after the decision of 27 January 2014. In those circumstances, the communication of the breakdown of the marks, in view of its content and the circumstances in which that breakdown was communicated to the applicant, does not constitute an act adversely affecting the applicant which is separate from the decision of 27 January 2014. Accordingly, it cannot be held that the complaint, which, according to the applicant, concerned the decision of 27 January 2014 as supplemented by the breakdown of the marks drawn up and sent on 27 March 2014, was lodged in compliance with the requirements laid down in the Staff Regulations concerning the pre-litigation phase.