ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Appeal brought on 9 June 2022 by LATAM Airlines Group SA, Lan Cargo SA against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 30 March 2022 in Case T-344/17, Latam Airlines Group and Lan Cargo v Commission

(Case C-375/22 P)

(2022/C 303/29)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: LATAM Airlines Group SA, Lan Cargo SA (represented by: B. Hartnett, Barrister, O. Geiss, Rechtsanwalt, and W. Sparks, advocaat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal insofar as it dismisses the action for annulment;

— annul the Commission Decision C(2017) 1742 final of 17 March 2017 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU, Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and Article 8 of the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport (Case AT.39258 — Airfreight) (the Decision) insofar as it relates to the appellants. In the alternative, annul the Decision in part and reduce the fine imposed on the appellants to such an amount the Court sees fit;

— in the alternative, if the Court finds it cannot give final judgment, refer the case back to the General Court; and

— order the Commission to bear all costs of the proceedings before this Court and the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the appellants rely on the following grounds of appeal:

The first ground of appeal relates to manifest errors of law when determining the legal consequences of upholding the first plea. Instead of proceeding to annul the Decision in its entirety, the General Court only partially annulled the Decision without assessing whether the elements for which the appellants were found not to be liable, are severable, despite clear case law defining this to be the relevant test.

The second ground of appeal relates to manifest errors of law when rejecting the sixth plea on rights of defence relating to the Commission’s failure to provide its reasoning why it did not pursue claims against other airlines and a service provider. Moreover, the General Court distorted the clear sense of the evidence when assessing the e-mail of 22 July 2005 without taking into account that the key elements relied on by the General Court were actions by airlines against whom the Commission has dropped charges after the Statement of Objections.

The third ground of appeal relates to manifest errors in law when rejecting the third part of the fourth plea (first limb) in relation to the Commission’s jurisdiction to make certain findings.

The fourth ground of appeal relates to manifest errors in law when rejecting the third part of the fourth plea (second limb) in relation to the Decision’s ambiguity as regards to the geographical scope of the infringement.
Appeal brought on 3 May 2022 by United Parcel Service, Inc. against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 23 February 2022 in Case T-834/17, United Parcel Service v Commission

(Case C-297/22 P)

(2022/C 284/21)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: United Parcel Service, Inc. (represented by: A. Ryan, Solicitor, W. Knibbeler, F. Roscam Abbing, A. Pliego Selie and T. C. van Helfteren, advocaten, and F. Hoseinian, Advokat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court as requested in this appeal;

— render final judgment and compensate the Appellant for the damages incurred and applicable interest as requested at first instance as part of these Article 340 TFEU proceedings, or, in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for determination in accordance with the judgment of the Court of Justice; and

— order the Commission to pay the costs of these proceedings and of the proceedings before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By the first ground of appeal, the Appellant claims that the General Court committed errors of law in concluding that the serious procedural error committed by the Commission in relation to the econometric model (and the substantive irregularities which it accepts) were insufficient to establish causation, and by failing to qualify the substantive irregularities in relation to the econometric model as a sufficiently serious breach establishing liability.

By the second ground of appeal, the Appellant claims that the General Court committed an error of law in concluding that the break fee is irrecoverable because it is incurred ‘freely’.

By the third ground of appeal, the Appellant claims that the General Court committed an error of law in concluding that the foregone synergies are irrecoverable.

By the fourth ground of appeal, the Appellant claims that the General Court committed an error of law in concluding that the Commission has a discretion to accept efficiencies and thus that the Commission did not commit a sufficiently serious error as regards the efficiency assessment.

By the fifth ground of appeal, the Appellant claims that the General Court committed an error of law in concluding that UPS did not make the necessary requests to the hearing officer for FedEx documents.

By the sixth ground of appeal, the Appellant claims that the General Court committed an error of law in concluding that the damage emanating from the loss of opportunity constitutes a new head of damage which would be inadmissible.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Vestre Landsret (Denmark) lodged on 8 June 2022 — Skatteministeriet v Danish Fluid System Technologies A/S

(Case C-368/22)

(2022/C 303/26)

Language of the case: Danish

Referring court

Vestre Landsret

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Skatteministeriet

Defendant: Danish Fluid System Technologies A/S

Question referred

Is subheading 7307 22 10 of the Combined Nomenclature of the Common Customs Tariff, as amended by Annex I to Commission Regulation (EU) No 861/2010 (1) of 5 October 2010 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, to be interpreted as covering articles such as those at issue in the main proceedings?

(1) OJ 2010 L 284, p. 1.
3.

If the first and second questions are answered in the affirmative, or regardless of the answers to those two questions as set out above, must Article 9(3), (4) [and] (5) of the Convention and [the first and second paragraphs of Article 47 of the Charter], read in conjunction with [the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU], be interpreted as meaning that the expression that adequate and effective remedies, including the adoption of a judicial decision, should not be ‘prohibitively expensive’, presupposes rules and/or criteria to limit the costs that may be incurred by the unsuccessful party to the proceedings, in the sense that a national court or tribunal must ensure that the requirement that the cost not be prohibitively expensive is met, taking into account [both] the interest of the person who wishes to defend his or her rights and the public interest in the protection of the environment?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Krajský soud v Brně (Czech Republic) lodged on 9 May 2022 — CROSS Zlín a.s. v Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže

(Case C-303/22)

(2022/C 311/06)

Language of the case: Czech

Referring court

Krajský soud v Brně

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: CROSS Zlín a.s.

Defendant: Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže

Question referred

Is it compatible with Articles 2(3) and 2a(2) of Directive 89/665/EEC, (1) interpreted in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, for Czech legislation to permit a contracting authority to conclude a public contract before an action is brought before a court competent to review the legality of a second-instance decision of the Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže (Office for the Protection of Competition) to exclude a tenderer?

(1) Council Directive of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts (OJ 1989 L 395, p. 33).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 8 April 2022 by Ignacio Carrasco SL against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) delivered on 23 February 2022 in Case T-209/21, Ignacio Carrasco SL v EUIPO, Santos Carrasco Manzano SA

(Case C-247/22 P)

(2022/C 326/05)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: Ignacio Carrasco SL (represented by: J .L. Donoso Romero, abogado)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Santos Carrasco Manzano SA

By order of 14 July 2022, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) ruled that the appeal should not be allowed to proceed and ordered Ignacio Carrasco SL to bear its own costs.
2.

Must Article 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts and the principle of effectiveness be interpreted as precluding provisions of national law or a judicial interpretation of those provisions under which the consumer must have a legal interest in order for an action brought by the consumer against a seller or supplier for a declaration that a contract or part thereof that contains unfair terms is void or ineffective to be upheld?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 20 June 2022 — Ministre de l’Économie, des Finances et de la Relance v Bricolage Investissement France SA

(Case C-408/22)

(2022/C 340/27)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Ministre de l’Économie, des Finances et de la Relance

Respondent: Bricolage Investissement France SA

Question referred

Does Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union preclude legislation of a Member State relating to a tax integration scheme under which a tax-integrated parent company benefits from the neutralisation of the proportion of costs and expenses added back in respect of dividends received by it from resident companies which are parties to the integration and, for the purpose of taking account of the judgment of 2 September 2015, Groupe Steria SCA (C-386/14), in respect of dividends received from subsidiaries established in another Member State which, had they been resident, would objectively have been eligible, if they so elected, for the tax integration scheme but which refuses the benefit of that neutralisation to a resident parent company which, despite the existence of capital links with other resident entities allowing for the constitution of a tax-integrated group, has not opted to belong to such a group, both in respect of the dividends distributed to it by its resident subsidiaries and in respect of those from subsidiaries established in other Member States which meet the eligibility criteria other than residence?
Action brought on 8 July 2022 — European Commission v Republic of Slovenia

(Case C-457/22)

(2022/C 326/24)

Language of the case: Slovenian

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: M. Kocjan, L. Malferrari, E. Manhaeve and U. Małecka)

Defendants: Republic of Slovenia

Form of order sought

The Commission claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by failing to adopt all the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to transpose Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code, (1) or by having failed to notify the Commission thereof in each case, the Republic of Slovenia has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 124(1) of that directive;

— order the Republic of Slovenia to pay a penalty payment, under Article 260(3) TFEU, in the sum of EUR 6 256,17 per day, as from the day of delivery of the Court’s judgment in the present case since it has failed to fulfil its obligation to notify the Commission of the measures transposing Directive (EU) 2018/1972;

— order the Republic of Slovenia, in accordance with Article 260(3) TFEU, to pay a lump sum of EUR 1 390,77 per day multiplied by the number of days for which the infringement continues, that lump sum being at least EUR 383 000;

— order the Republic of Slovenia to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code creates a legal framework to ensure the freedom to provide electronic communications networks and services at EU level. The deadline for transposing that directive was 21 December 2020.

At the time the deadline for transposing that directive was reached, the Republic of Slovenia had not notified the Commission of any measures transposing it. On 4 February 2021, the Commission sent a letter of formal notice to the Republic of Slovenia and, on 23 September 2021, sent a reasoned opinion to the latter. In spite of this, the Republic of Slovenia is still yet to adopt the measures necessary to transpose that directive into national law and therefore has not notified the Commission that it has done so.

(1) Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (Recast) Text with EEA relevance (OJ 2018 L 321, p. 36).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 11 July 2022 — BM v LO

(Case C-462/22)

(2022/C 359/59)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: BM

Respondent in the appeal on a point of law: LO

Question referred

Does the waiting period of one year or six months under the fifth and sixth indents, respectively, of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 (1) begin to run with respect to the applicant only upon establishment of his or her habitual residence in the Member State of the court seised, or is it sufficient if, at the beginning of the relevant waiting period, the applicant initially has mere de facto residence in the Member State of the court seised, and his or her residence becomes established as habitual residence only subsequently, in the period before the application was made?

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (OJ 2003 L 338, p. 1).
1.

In circumstances in which, in accordance with national law, interest on the amount of excess deductible VAT which could not be recovered because of the paid consideration condition (‘interest on the VAT’) is calculated by the application of an interest rate which undisputedly covers the short-term money market credit interest rate and which corresponds to the central bank’s base rate increased by two percentage points, in relation to the VAT reporting period, so that that the interest runs from the day following the lodging of the VAT return form on which the taxable person indicated an excess of VAT that had to be carried forward to the following reporting period because of the paid consideration condition until the last day for lodging the next VAT return form, must European Union law, in particular Article 183 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (1) of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (‘the VAT Directive’); the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, direct effect and proportionality; and the judgment of the Court of Justice of 23 April 2020 in Joined Cases Sole-Mizo and Dalmandi Mezőgazdasági (C-13/18 and C-126/18) (‘judgment in Sole-Mizo and Dalmandi Mezőgazdasági’), be interpreted as precluding a practice of a Member State, such as that at issue in the present case, which does not permit, in addition to interest on the VAT, the payment of interest to compensate the taxable person for the monetary erosion of the amount in question caused by the passage of time following that reporting period up until the actual payment of that interest?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD) (Portugal) lodged on 31 May 2022 — NM v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

(Case C-349/22)

(2022/C 359/27)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: NM

Defendant: Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

Question referred

Does Article 110 TFEU preclude a situation in which a rule of national law, such as Article 8(1)(d) of the CISV [(Código do Imposto Sobre Veículos; Code on Vehicle Tax)], which provides that private vehicles that satisfy certain environmental criteria are to be subject to tax on the release for consumption of motor vehicles ([imposto sobre veículos;] ISV) at a reduced rate of 25 %, remains in force and, under the version of the legislation in force from 1 January 2021 — which is more restrictive than the version previously in force — applies both to new Portuguese vehicles and to second-hand vehicles from other Member States of the European Union which are registered for the first time in Portugal from that date onwards, thereby providing the same tax treatment for those vehicles but giving rise to what could be considered unequal treatment between second-hand vehicles which have been in use for the same length of time and which satisfy the less demanding environmental criteria that previously applied but which do not satisfy the requirements in the new law, under which treatment is dependent on whether (a) they were originally sold and registered in Portugal before the date on which the new version of the law came into force, in which case they will have benefited from the reduced tax rate of 25 %, which is likely to be reflected in the purchase price of second-hand vehicles; or (b) they were registered in another Member State while the previous version of the law was in force and were released for consumption in Portugal after that date, in which case they are subject to tax at the rate of 100 %?
Action brought on 8 July 2022 — European Commission v Kingdom of the Netherlands

(Case C-459/22)

(2022/C 359/58)

Language of the case: Dutch

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: W. Roels, acting as Agent)

Defendant: Kingdom of the Netherlands

Form of order sought

The Commission claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by approving and maintaining in force the requirements for pension capital transfer as set out in Articles 19a(1)(d) and 19b(1) and (2) of the Wet op de Loonbelasting 1964 (Law on wages tax); Article 40c of the Uitvoeringsregeling Invorderingswet (Decree implementing the Law on the collection of taxes); Article 10d(3) of the Uitvoeringsbesluit Loonbelasting 1965 (Decision implementing the Law on wages tax), as well as Annex IV to Decision DGB2012/7010M on international aspect of pensions, the Kingdom of the Netherlands has failed to fulfil the obligations incumbent on that Member State under Articles 45, 56 and 63 TFEU;

— order the Kingdom of the Netherlands to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Commission is of the view that the Netherlands legislation on the requirements for transfer of pension capital transfers accrued in the so-called ‘second pillar’, the supplementary pension accrual via the employer, is incompatible with the free movement of workers, services and capital. Although those requirements are applicable to domestic and foreign transfers, they are more easily fulfilled by domestic pension providers than for foreign pension providers that wish to provide in their own Member State of establishment pension services to employees working there who have previously accrued pension capital in the Netherlands. In the event of failure to comply with the requirements set by the legislation, the pension capitals accrued in the Netherlands are included in the levy.
1.

Should the criterion for the designation of safe countries of origin for the purposes of Article 37(1) of Directive 2013/32/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection in Annex I(b) to [that directive] — i.e., that the country concerned provides protection against persecution and ill treatment through observance of the rights and freedoms laid down in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in particular the rights from which derogation cannot be made under Article 15(2) of that convention — be interpreted as meaning that, if the country withdraws from its commitments under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in time of emergency under Article 15 of the Convention, it no longer meets the criterion for being designated as a safe country of origin?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal Administrativo (Portugal) lodged on 30 June 2022 — Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira v HPA — Construções, SA

(Case C-433/22)

(2022/C 380/04)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Supremo Tribunal Administrativo

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

Respondent: HPA — Construções, SA

Question referred

Does paragraph 2 of Annex IV to the VAT Directive (1) preclude a provision of national law under which the reduced rate of VAT may be applied only to works contracts for the repair and renovation of buildings in private dwellings which are inhabited at the time when those works are carried out?

(1) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).
1.

Do Articles 12 and 24(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, (1) read in conjunction with Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, preclude a requested person, whose surrender for the purpose of executing a custodial sentence was definitively authorised but has been postponed ‘so that he or she may be prosecuted in the executing Member State … for an act other than that referred to in the European arrest warrant’, from being detained for the duration of that criminal prosecution in order to execute the European arrest warrant?
4.

Lastly, can the expression ‘or as a consequence of authorisation by the competent authorities of the Member State’, also contained in Article 7(4), be understood as the possibility for the Member State to identify another general category (slight negligence) that might have a bearing on the definition of release for consumption in the event of destruction or loss of the product, or does that expression preclude a clause of that type, it having to be understood, rather, as referring to specific cases that are individually authorised or otherwise identified by precedents in which the objective elements are defined?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative:

Is Article 12(3) of Directive (EU) 2015/2302 to be interpreted as meaning that there are no unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances in a case where the traveller, who is aware of the travel warning and the uncertainty as to the subsequent development of the pandemic, has nevertheless stated that he wishes to proceed with the journey and that it would not have been impossible for the organiser to carry it out?