ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
5.

Is a judicial practice which, in the case of an alleged absence of a compulsory requirement of consumer credit agreement, presumes that that fact was already known to the consumer at the time the credit agreement was signed, in particular where the consumer separately confirmed that he or she had acquainted him or herself with the credit agreement by signing other related credit documents (for example standard consumer credit information form, the list of documents received, etc.) contrary to Council Directive 93/13/EEC as a whole, and in particular the fifth recital thereof (whereas, generally speaking, consumers do not know the rules of law which, in Member States other than their own, govern contracts for the sale of goods or services; whereas this lack of awareness may deter them from direct transactions for the purchase of goods or services in another Member State)?
4.

Are the concepts ‘core inventive advance’, ‘central inventive step’ and/or ‘subject matter of the invention’ of the basic patent relevant to the interpretation of Article 3(c) of the SPC Regulation and, if any or all of those concepts are relevant, how are they to be understood for purposes of interpreting Article 3(c) of the SPC Regulation? For the purposes of applying those concepts, does it make any difference whether the product in question consists of a single active ingredient (‘mono-product’) or a combination of active ingredients (‘combination product’) and, if so, in what way? How is the latter question to be assessed in a case in which the basic patent contains, on the one hand, a patent claim for a mono-product and, on the other hand, a patent claim for a combination product, the latter patent claim relating to a combination of active ingredients consisting of the active ingredient of the mono-product plus one or more active ingredients from the known prior art?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof (Germany) lodged on 6 January 2022 — RF v Finanzamt G

(Case C-15/22)

(2022/C 165/34)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesfinanzhof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: RF

Defendant: Finanzamt G

Question referred

Are Article 4(3) of the TEU and Article 208, read in conjunction with Article 210 of the TFEU, to be interpreted as precluding a national administrative practice according to which tax is not waived in cases where a development cooperation project is financed by the European Development Fund, while salary that a worker earns from a current employment relationship in respect of an activity associated with German official development assistance within the framework of technical or financial cooperation that is financed to at least 75 % by a Federal Ministry responsible for development cooperation or else by a state-owned private development assistance association is, in certain conditions, exempted from taxation?
1.

Should Article 27 of the Framework Decision (1) be interpreted as meaning that a decision to surrender a person creates a legal relationship between him, the executing State and the requesting State such that any issue taken to have been finally determined in that decision must also be taken to have been determined for the purposes of the procedure for obtaining consent to further prosecution or punishment for other offences?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 25 February 2022 — BM, NP v Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca

(Case C-132/22)

(2022/C 207/25)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: BM, NP

Defendant: Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca

Question referred

Must Article 45(1) and (2) TFEU and Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 (1) be interpreted as precluding a rule, such as that laid down in Article 1(655) of Law No 205/2017, according to which, in order to take part in the procedure for inclusion on the lists compiled for the award of permanent and temporary teaching contracts in Italian AFAM institutions, professional experience gained by candidates at those national institutions alone is taken into account, and not experience gained at peer institutions in other European countries, given that the procedure in question is specifically intended to counter the phenomenon of precarious employment in Italy? If the Court of Justice does not hold the Italian legislation to be contrary, in abstract terms, to the European regulatory framework, can the measures envisaged by that legislation be regarded as proportionate, in concrete terms, in view of the abovementioned public-interest objective?

(1) Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union (OJ 2011 L 141, p. 1).
3.

Do the principle of legality and the prohibition of arbitrary actions allow a national provision such as Article 219(2) of the Nakazatelno-protsesualen kodeks (Code of Criminal Procedure, Bulgaria; ‘the NPK’), which provides that the investigating authority may formally accuse a person in the record of the first investigative act against him or her, if national law does not recognise the legal concept of ‘suspect’ and the rights of defence under national law arise only from the time at which the person is formally ‘accused’, which in turn is at the discretion of the investigating authority, and does such a national procedure impair the effective exercise and the essence of the right of access to a lawyer under Article 3(3)(b) of Directive 2013/48/EU?
Appeal brought on 10 February 2022 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 1 December 2021 in Case T-546/20, Sopra Steria Benelux and Unisys Belgium v Commission

(Case C-101/22 P)

(2022/C 207/19)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: L. André, M. Ilkova, O. Verheecke, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Sopra Steria Benelux, Unisys Belgium

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside paragraphs 52 to 57, 60, 61, 66, 68 and 69 of the judgment under appeal;

— dismiss the action for annulment;

— order Sopra Steria Benelux and Unisys Belgium to pay the costs of the present proceedings before the Court of Justice and of the proceedings before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In its appeal, the Commission raises three grounds of appeal.

The first ground alleges that the General Court erred in law by qualifying the letter of the applicants at first instance of 10 July 2020 as an ‘express request’ for the reasons which led the contracting authority not to consider the successful tender as appearing to be abnormally low.

The second ground alleges a distortion of the facts, by incorrectly assessing the content of the Commission’s reply of 20 July 2020.

The third ground alleges failure to have regard to the scope of the contracting authority’s obligation to state reasons under Article 296 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 170(3) of the Financial Regulation where the contracting authority considers that the successful tender does not appear to be abnormally low.
1.

Must Articles 4 and 5 of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, (1) particularly in view of the right to an effective remedy laid down in Article 27 of that regulation, be interpreted as meaning that the applicant, who has challenged before the courts of the requesting State the transfer decision adopted by the Dublin Unit of that State in the context of a take back procedure under Article 18(1)(b), is entitled to invoke the infringement by the requested State of the duty to provide information laid down in Article 4 or of the obligation to arrange a personal interview with the applicant under Article 5 of that regulation, and if the answer is in the affirmative, what is the relevance of such an infringement?
2.

In order to ensure compliance with the principle set out in Article 153(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, according to which the producer members of a producer organisation must scrutinise democratically their organisation and its decisions: — is it necessary, in order to assess the independence of the members of the organisation, to take account exclusively of the holding of their capital by the same natural or legal person, or also of other links such as, for non-producer members, affiliation to the same union confederation, or, for producer members, the exercise of management responsibilities within such a confederation? — is it sufficient, in order to conclude that producer members do have control over the organisation, for those members to have a majority of the votes, or is it necessary to examine whether, in view of the distribution of votes among members who are genuinely independent, the voting share of one or more non-producer members enables them, even without a majority, to control the decisions taken by the organisation?
Appeal brought on 13 February 2022 by KY against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 1 December 2021 in Case T-433/20 KY v Court of Justice of the European Union

(Case C-100/22 P)

(2022/C 237/33)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: KY (represented by: N. Maes, J.-N. Louis, avocats)

Other party to the proceedings: Court of Justice of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant submits that the Court of Justice should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court of 1 December 2021 in Case T-433/20;

— giving judgement itself:

— declare the application admissible and well founded;

— annul the decision to reject the appellant’s request for repayment;

— order the respondent to pay the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant claims that, in examining its action for annulment, the General Court made a number of errors of law, arising mainly from confusion between an action for unjust enrichment and a hypothetical challenge of rules as regards the award of pension rights.

The first ground of appeal alleges an error of law, in that the General Court found the existence of a legal basis for unjust enrichment, as well as a lack of reasoning for the contested decision.

The ground of appeal alleges an error of law on the part of the General Court as regards the application of the minimum subsistence figure rule.

The third ground of appeal alleges an error of law in that the General Court found an absence of impoverishment.

The fourth ground of appeal alleges infringement of EU law, the General Court having failed to take account of the case-law arising from the judgment of 18 September 2018, Barroso Truta and Others v Court of Justice of the European Union (T-702/16 P, EU:T:2018:557, paragraphs 104 to 106).
Reference for a preliminary ruling from High Court (Ireland) made on 8 April 2022 — Z.K. and M.S. v The Minister for Justice and Equality

(Case C-248/22)

(2022/C 237/51)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

High Court (Ireland)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Z.K. and M.S.

Respondent: The Minister for Justice and Equality

Question referred:

Does Council Directive 2004/38/EC (1) prohibit the simultaneous conferral of derived rights of residence on the estranged spouse and the de facto, durable partner of a European Union citizen lawfully exercising his right of free movement as a worker under the Directive?

(1) Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004, L 158, p. 77).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 3 March 2022 by MG against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 21 December 2021 in Case T-573/20, MG v European Investment Bank

(Case C-173/22 P)

(2022/C 244/19)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: MG (represented by: L. Levi, avocate)

Other party to the proceedings: European Investment Bank

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— Declare the appeal admissible and well founded;

— Set aside the judgment of the General Court of 21 December 2021 in Case T-573/20;

— In consequence thereof, grant the appellant the relief sought at first instance and, accordingly: — Annul the EIB decision of 11 October 2018 by which the appellant was denied family allowances (including inter alia day care and CPE costs unduly deducted by the EIB from the appellant’s salary until November 2019) and derived financial rights (including inter alia tax reliefs and reimbursement of the medical expenses of the appellant’s dependent children); — If necessary, annul the letter/decision of 7 January 2019 rejecting all of the appellant’s requests; — If necessary, annul the EIB decision dated 30 July 2020 noting the absence of conciliation and confirming the decision of 11 October 2018; — Provide compensation for the material and non-material harm suffered by the appellant.

— Order the respondent to pay the entire costs of both proceedings.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant puts forward the following grounds of appeal:

— The judgment under appeal misconstrued the concept of the right to a fair hearing;

— The judgment under appeal infringed the applicable regulatory framework relating to the obligation to state reasons;

— The judgment under appeal distorted the file and misconstrued the concept of a manifest error of assessment. It also infringed the principles of equal treatment and proportionality by rejecting the plea of illegality raised in respect of the administrative provisions relating to family allowances;

— The judgment under appeal infringed the applicable legislative framework (Article 3(4) of Regulation No 260/68 (1));

— The judgment under appeal distorted the file in rejecting the fifth plea in law, infringed Article 85 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court and erred in its classification of the facts. The General Court did not respond to all of the complaints raised and failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons.

(1) Regulation (EEC, Euratom ECSC) No 260/68 of the Council of 29 February 1968 laying down the conditions and the procedure for applying the tax for the benefit of the European Communities (OJ 1968 L 56, p. 8).
Appeal brought on 12 April 2022 by Pilatus Bank plc against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 2 February 2022 in Case T-27/19, Pilatus Bank and Pilatus Holding v ECB

(Case C-256/22 P)

(2022/C 237/53)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Pilatus Bank plc (represented by: O. Behrends, Rechtsanwalt)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Central Bank (ECB), European Commission, Pilatus Holding ltd.

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgement under appeal;

— declare void, pursuant to Article 264 TFEU, the ECB’s decision of 2 November 2018 regarding the withdrawal of the licence of Pilatus Bank;

— refer the case back to the General Court for it to rule on the action for annulment as far as the Court of Justice is not able to take a decision on the merits;

— order the ECB to pay the appellant's costs and the costs of the appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on four pleas in law.

First ground of appeal alleging that the General Court erroneously assumed that it is legally relevant whether the ECB is responsible for the preceding de facto license withdrawal and in particular whether the ECB was under an obligation to prevent the de facto license withdrawal by means of an intervention pursuant to Article 6(5)(c) of Single supervisory mechanism Regulation (SSMR) (1).

Second ground of appeal alleging that the rejection by the General Court of the appellant’s second plea in law is based on the General Court’s erroneous view that the concept of reputation in Article 23 of Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) (2) does not necessarily have to be interpreted in accordance with the European Union legal order so that an indictment in a third country may damage a shareholder’s reputation even if the relevant conduct is not illegal in the European Union order and even if the conduct is covered by a Blocking Statute.

Third ground of appeal alleging that the judgement under appeal is based on a number of further errors which include that the General Court misinterpreted the concept of proportionality by failing to consider that a proportionality analysis needs to be based on the grounds on which the decision is based.

Fourth ground of appeal alleging that the appellant’s procedural rights were violated.

(1) Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ 2013 L 287, p. 63).

(2) Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 338).
2.

Is the outcome produced by the rules interpreting Article 7(b) of Ministerial Order No 199/94 in conjunction with Article 26 of that order, according to which the occurrence of adverse weather conditions in the years following the evaluation year (which is the year following the year of the restocking) results in partial repayment of the premiums, whereas where the same outcomes, caused by the same adverse weather conditions, occur in the year following the restocking, this results in total loss of entitlement to premiums, consistent with the rules of EU law?
Action brought on 16 May 2022 — European Commission v Republic of Slovenia

(Case C-328/22)

(2022/C 257/37)

Language of the case: Slovenian

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: B. Rous Demiri, E. Sanfrutos Cano)

Defendant: Republic of Slovenia

Form of order sought

The Commission claims that the Court should:

1. declare that, by failing to ensure establishment of appropriate collecting systems for urban waste water — under Article 4 of Council Directive 91/271/EEC, (1) for the agglomerations of Kočevje, Trbovlje, Loka and Ljubljana, — under Article 5 of Council Directive 91/271/EEC, for the agglomerations of Kočevje, Trbovlje and Loka, and — under Article 15 of, and sections B and D of Annex I to, Council Directive 91/271/EEC, for the agglomerations of Ljubljana and Ptuj, declare that the Republic of Slovenia has failed to fulfil its relevant obligations under Articles 4, 5 and 15 of, and sections B and D of Annex I to, Council Directive 91/271/EEC concerning urban waste-water treatment;

2. order the Republic of Slovenia to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The present case concerns the implementation in Slovenia of Council Directive 91/271/EEC of 21 May 1991 concerning urban waste-water treatment. The case concerns a long and comprehensive procedure seeking to establish failure to fulfil obligations provided for in EU law, which has been ongoing since 2014 and during the course of which the Commission established various infringements.

The infringement concerns the non-compliance with the directive of the waste water of certain agglomerations and the inadequate monitoring of discharge from the urban waste-water treatment plants. The number of agglomerations which failed to comply varied during the course of the procedure, given that certain infringements were remedied during the period in question, but others remain and constitute the basis of the present action.

(1) Council Directive 91/271/EEC concerning urban waste-water treatment (OJ 1991 L 135, p. 40).
4.

If the answer to the third question is in the affirmative, must the second subparagraph of Article 19(1), Article 2, Article 4(3) and Article 6(3) TEU, in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter and Article 267 TFEU, be interpreted in such manner that non-binding means that — a judgment given by a court of final instance, established in the manner described in paragraph 3, is not a judgment in a legal sense (is a non-existent judgment) within the meaning of EU law, and the assessment in that regard may be made by an ordinary court which satisfies the requirements laid down on a court within the meaning of EU law, — or is the judgment given by the court of final instance, established in the manner described in paragraph 3, a judgment that does exist in a legal sense, but the ordinary court retrying the case is entitled and obliged to disapply the application of provisions of national law concerning the consequences of that judgment to the extent necessary to ensure that individuals are afforded effective legal protection?
2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, are Article 1(2) and (3) and Articles 3 and 4 of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA compatible with Articles 7 and 24(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, also considering the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to Article 8 of the [Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms] and the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, in so far as they require the surrender of the mother, thus severing ties with minor children living with her without considering the best interest of the child?