The purpose of interim proceedings is not to secure reparation of damage but to guarantee the full effectiveness of the judgment on the substance. In order that the latter objective may be attained, the measures sought must be urgent in the sense that, in order to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the applicant’s interests, they must be ordered and become effective even before the decision in the main proceedings.

In the present case, it must be observed, in view in particular of the pleas in law put forward in support of the claims for annulment, seeking a finding that the institution infringed both the principle that disciplinary proceedings arising out of a criminal offence must await the outcome of the criminal trial and the presumption of innocence, that the interim measure sought — the suspension of operation of the contested decision to remove the applicant from his post — aims to achieve the same result as the main proceedings, so that the interim proceedings are not ancillary to the main proceedings to which they are an adjunct and, consequently, are not of an interim nature, which might, as such, provide grounds for dismissing the application for suspension of operation of the decision.

However, the factual and legal arguments put forward by the applicant raise doubts as to the lawfulness of the contested decision, particularly in the light of the principle that disciplinary proceedings arising out of a criminal offence must await the outcome of the criminal trial. That being so, the judge hearing the application for interim relief may not, without being criticised for infringing that principle himself, dismiss on grounds of lack of urgency an application for suspension of operation of the contested decision, given that the very application for suspension of operation is indissociable from the implementation of that principle, at the very least until the General Court delivers its judgment in the main proceedings. The principle forms part of the fundamental right to a fair trial, protected both by the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and by those of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to which the Charter refers in its preamble.

In other words, given that it appears, prima facie, to have been infringed, the protection of the principle that disciplinary proceedings arising out of a criminal offence must await the outcome of the criminal trial may not be deferred, even provisionally, pending the decision of the court adjudicating on the substance, without causing serious and irreparable harm to the applicant, since, by definition, the outcome of the criminal trial might be seriously affected by the administrative authority’s view of the accuracy of the facts on which that trial is based.

(see paras 57-60)

See:

25 March 1999, C‑65/99 P(R) Willeme v Commission, para. 62; 26 June 2003, C‑182/03 R and C‑217/03 R Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission, para. 142

29 June 1994, T‑146/94 R Williams v Court of Auditors, para. 23; 10 September 1999, T‑173/99 R Elkaïm and Mazuel v Commission, para. 25; 16 November 2012, T‑345/12 R Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission, para. 25 and the case-law cited therein

13 February 2014, F‑5/14 R CX v Commission, para. 80