ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
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First, in violation of Articles 107(1) and 108(2) TFEU, the General Court erred by concluding that the Commission did not err in law and did not experience serious difficulties in holding that the State guarantees and State loans granted to A/S Femern Landanlæg for the Danish rail Hinterland Connections were not liable to distort competition as the relevant market is not open to competition. The appellants argue that this erroneous conclusion of the General Court is based on four errors in law, corresponding to four sub-pleas: a) The General Court erred in law by holding that the State guarantees and State loans granted to A/S Femern Landanlæg are not liable to affect competition although the Fixed Link (operated by Femern A/S) and the Danish rail Hinterland Connections (operated by Femern Landanlæg) together constitute one integrated project and the State guarantees and State loans granted to Femern A/S have already been found to be liable to distort competition. b) The General Court erred in law by holding that the market for the management of railway infrastructure in Denmark is not ‘de lege’ open to competition. c) The General Court erred in law by holding that the market for the management of railway infrastructure in Denmark is not ‘de facto’ open to competition. d) The markets for the construction and maintenance of the railway infrastructure, which are open to competition, are separate from the market for the management and operation, in the strict sense, of the railway infrastructure
2.

Second ground of appeal alleging an error of law The General Court erred in law by holding that the fact that an applicant who has been the victim of an unlawful sanction adopted by the Council of the European Union has brought an action and has secured the annulment of that sanction renders nugatory the possibility of invoking a sufficiently serious breach of the right to effective judicial protection.
Appeal brought on 21 February 2019 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-684/14: Krka v Commission

(Case C-151/19 P)

(2019/C 148/27)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: B. Mongin, F. Castilla Contreras, C. Vollrath, Agents, D. Bailey, Barrister)

Other party to the proceedings: Krka Tovarna Zdravil d.d.

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside points 1 to 4 of the operative part of the judgment of the General Court of the European Union in Case T-684/14;

— refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union pursuant to Article 61 of the Statute;

— order Krka to pay the Commission’s costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The first plea alleges that the General Court erred in law in holding that Krka was not a source of competitive pressure on Servier at the time of the agreements in question.

The second plea alleges errors of law by the General Court in assessing the content and objectives of the licence agreement as an incentive for Krka to accept the restrictions of the settlement agreement.

The third plea alleges errors of law in the application of the concept of restriction of competition by object within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU.

The fourth plea alleges errors of law in the General Court’s analysis of the parties' intentions for the purposes of applying Article 101 TFEU.

The fifth plea alleges that the General Court erred in law by taking into account the pro-competitive effects of the licence in markets that are not within the scope of the infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU found by the Decision.

The sixth plea alleges that the General Court erred in law in assessing the object of the assignment agreement.

The seventh plea alleges General Court erred in law in the application of the concept of the restriction of competition by effect within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU.
1.

Is a situation such as that in the case under examination — in which a Lithuanian national whose habitual place of residence on the day of her death was possibly in another Member State, but who in any event had never severed her links with her homeland, and who, inter alia, had drawn up, prior to her death, a will in Lithuania and left all of her assets to her heir, a Lithuanian national, and at the time of the opening of the succession it was established that the entire estate comprised immovable property located solely in Lithuania, and a national of that other Member State surviving his spouse expressed in clear terms his intention to waive all claims to the estate of the deceased, did not take part in the court proceedings brought in Lithuania, and consented to the jurisdiction of the Lithuanian courts and the application of Lithuanian law — to be regarded as a succession with cross-border implications within the meaning of Regulation No 650/2012 and to which that regulation must be applied?
2.

In light of the Court’s judgments of 18 September 2003 in Joined Cases C-292/01 and C-293/01 and of 21 February 2008 in Case C-296/06, does Directive 97/13/EC preclude a final national judgment given on the basis of an incorrect interpretation or misconstruction of that directive, with the result that the ruling in that judgment may be disapplied by a different court hearing a dispute which concerns the same substantive legal relationship but is different in that it concerns a demand for payment that is merely ancillary by comparison with that which was the subject of the case which led to the incorrect ruling?
1.

Do Articles 7, 11 [and] 15 of Council Directive 92/83/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the harmonization of the structures of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages (1) and Article 5 of Council Directive 92/84/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the approximation of the rates of excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages (2) preclude the provisions of Article I(21) and Article IV(1) of Ordonanța de urgență [a Guvernului] nr. 54 din 23 iunie 2010 privind unele măsuri pentru combaterea evaziunii fiscale (Government Emergency Order No 54 of 23 June 2010 laying down certain measures to address tax evasion)?
2.

Must Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 8(5) of Directive 2011/24/EU (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients' rights in cross-border healthcare, in conjunction with Article 21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may refuse to grant the authorisation referred to in Article 8(1) of that directive where hospital care, the medical effectiveness of which is not contested, is available in the person’s Member State of affiliation, even though the method of treatment used is contrary to that person’s religious beliefs?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte dei Conti — Sezione Giurisdizionale Per la Regione Puglia (Italy) lodged on 25 February 2019 — IC v Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale

(Case C-169/19)

(2019/C 206/25)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte dei Conti — Sezione Giurisdizionale Per la Regione Puglia

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: IC

Defendant: Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale

Question referred

Must Articles 18 TFEU and 21 TFEU be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which provides for the taxation, in that Member State, of the income of a person resident in another Member State who receives all of his income from the first Member State but who does not hold the nationality of the second Member State, without the benefit of the tax advantages provided by that second Member State?
Appeal brought on 26 March 2019 by Cham Holding Co. SA against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 16 January 2019 in Case T-413/16 Cham v Council

(Case C-261/19P)

(2019/C 187/54)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Cham Holding Co. SA (represented by: E. Ruchat, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant submits that the Court should:

— Declare the appeal admissible and well founded;

— Accordingly, set aside the judgment of 16 January 2019, Cham v Council, T-413/16;

And, giving judgment itself,

— Annul Decision (CFSP) 2016/850 of 27 May 2016 and its subsequent implementing acts, in so far as they concern the appellant;

— Order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The first ground of appeal alleges an error of law in that the General Court disregarded the applicant’s right, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, to be heard prior to the adoption of new restrictive measures.

The second ground of appeal alleges an error of law and distortion of the facts in that the General Court disregarded the items submitted by the applicant in support of its action for annulment to demonstrate that it did not support the Syrian regime.

The third ground of appeal alleges an error of law in so far as the General Court did not hold that Articles 27 and 28 of Decision 2013/255/CFSP, according to which membership of the Al-Assad or Makhlouf families constitutes an autonomous criterion justifying the imposition of sanctions, were illegal and in so far as it, on the same occasion, reversed the burden of proof.
Appeal brought on 29 April 2019 by Almashreq Investment Fund against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 28 February 2019 in Case T-415/16 Almashreq Investment Find v Council

(Case C-349/19 P)

(2019/C 213/21)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Almashreq Investment Fund (represented by: E. Ruchat, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant submits that the Court should:

— Declare the appeal admissible and well founded;

— Accordingly, set aside the judgment of 28 February 2019 (T-415/16);

And, giving judgment itself,

— Annul Decision (CFSP) 2016/850 of 27 May 2016 (1) and its subsequent implementing acts, in so far as they concern the appellant;

— Order the Council to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The first ground of appeal alleges an error of law in that the General Court disregarded the applicant’s right, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, to be heard prior to the adoption of new restrictive measures.

The second ground of appeal alleges an error of law and distortion of the facts in that the General Court disregarded the items submitted by the applicant in support of its action for annulment to demonstrate that it did not support the Syrian regime.

The third ground of appeal alleges an error of law in so far as the General Court did not hold that Articles 27 and 28 of Decision 2013/255/CFSP, according to which membership of the Al-Assad or Makhlouf families constitutes an autonomous criterion justifying the imposition of sanctions, were illegal and in so far as it, on the same occasion, reversed the burden of proof.

(1) Council Decision (CFSP) of 27 May 2016 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria (OJ 2016 L 141, p. 125).
1.

First question — On the basis of the characteristics of national sports law, can the Federazione calcistica italiana (Italian Football Federation, ‘FIGC’) be classified as a body governed by public law in so far as it was established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general interest, not having an industrial or commercial character? — In particular, is the requirement relating to the purpose of the body satisfied in respect of the Federation, even in the absence of a formal act establishing a public authority and despite its membership base, on account of its incorporation into a sector (sports) organised in accordance with models of a public-law nature and the fact that it is required to comply with the principles and rules drawn up by the Comitato olimpico nationale italiano (Italian National Olympic Committee, ‘the CONI’) and international sporting bodies, as a result of the recognition, for sporting purposes, of the national public entity? — Furthermore, can this requirement arise in relation to a sports federation such as the Federazione italiana giuoco calcio, which has the ability to fund itself, in respect of an activity of no significance in the context of public law, such as that at issue in this case, or must the requirement that the application of the rules on public and open tendering be ensured in any event, where such an entity awards any type of contract to third parties, be regarded as taking precedence?
First plea in law — Infringement of the principle of neutrality of VAT

The Federal Republic of Germany infringed the principle of neutrality of VAT established in Articles 170 and 171 of Directive 2006/112 and Article 5 of Directive 2008/9, according to which, upon the acquisition of goods and upon the receipt of services, a settlement of the VAT paid at the preceding stage is to occur to the benefit of the taxable person.

The principle of neutrality of turnover tax requires that an entitlement to a refund is to be granted where the substantive conditions for that entitlement are fulfilled. Where there are doubts whether the substantive conditions for a refund are fulfilled, refund applications under Article 5 in combination with the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article 21 of Directive 2008/9 are to be refused only where requests for information from the Member State of refund under Article 20 of that directive are unsuccessful.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Krajský súd v Trnave (Slovakia) lodged on 9 April 2019 — RN v Home Credit Slovakia a.s.

(Case C-290/19)

(2019/C 213/13)

Language of the case: Slovak

Referring court

Krajský súd v Trnave

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: RN

Defendant: Home Credit Slovakia a.s.

Question referred

Is Article 10[(2)](g) of Directive 2008/48/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC to be interpreted as meaning that a consumer credit agreement satisfies the requirement laid down in that provision if the annual percentage rate of charge is indicated in the agreement, not as a specific percentage, but as a range between two figures (from — to)?

(1) OJ 2008 L 133, p. 66.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Svea Hovrätt, Patent- och marknadsöverdomstolen (Sweden) lodged on 3 May 2019 — Novartis AG v Patent-och registreringsverket

(Case C-354/19)

(2019/C 230/28)

Language of the case: Swedish

Referring court

Svea Hovrätt, Patent- och marknadsöverdomstolen

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Novartis AG

Other party: Patent-och registreringsverket

Question referred

In view of the fundamental purpose which the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products is intended to fulfil, namely that of stimulating pharmaceutical research in the European Union, does Article 3(c) of Regulation No 469/2009, (1) having regard to Article 3(2) of Regulation No 1610/96, preclude an applicant who has previously been granted a supplementary protection certificate in respect of a product protected by a basic patent, in force in respect of the product per se, from being granted a supplementary protection certificate for a new use of the product in a case such as that at issue in the main proceedings in which the new use constitutes a new therapeutic indication which is specifically protected by a new basic patent?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products (OJ 2009 L 152, p. 1).
Appeal brought on 16 May 2019 by Hamas against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 6 March 2019 in Case T-289/15 Hamas v Council

(Case C-386/19 P)

(2019/C 220/33)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Hamas (represented by: L. Glock, avocate)

Other parties to the proceedings: Council of the European Union, European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of 6 March 2019, Hamas v Council, T-289/15;

— give final judgment in the matters that are the subject of the appeal;

— order the Council to pay all the costs of the proceedings before the General Court and the Court of Justice.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The applicant relies on four grounds of appeal.

First, in holding that the facts set out in paragraph 15 of Annex A and paragraph 17 of Annex B to the statement of reasons for the acts of March 2015 were invoked independently by the Council, the General Court distorted the evidence before it, substituted its own grounds for those of the author of the contested acts, failed to comply with the obligation to state reasons for its decision and deprived the applicant of the ability to prepare its defence.

Secondly, the General Court infringed Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931 by accepting that a decision of an administrative authority had been taken by a competent authority within the meaning of that provision, even though it had never been subject to judicial review.

Thirdly, the General Court infringed Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/93, Article 296 TFEU, and the applicant’s rights of the defence and right to effective judicial protection by holding that the British decision was a condemnation decision and that the Council was therefore obliged to defer as far as possible to the assessment conducted by the authority that adopted it.

Fourthly, in holding that Hamas and Hamas IDQ were a single entity, the General Court infringed the rules on the burden of proof, allowed the Council to alter its grounds in the course of the proceedings, took account of evidence without checking its veracity, breached the audi alteram partem rule in relation to the facts, distorted the evidence before it and breached the principle of the independence of proceedings.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Patent- and marknadsdomstolen (Sweden) lodged on 7 May 2019 — Konsumentombudsmannen v Mezina AB

(Case C-363/19)

(2019/C 246/11)

Language of the case: Swedish

Referring court

Patent- and marknadsdomstolen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Konsumentombudsmannen

Defendant: Mezina AB

Questions referred

1. Do Articles 5 and 6, read in conjunction with Articles 10(1) and 28(5) of Regulation No 1924/2006, (1) regulate the burden of proof when a national court is determining whether unpermitted health claims have been made in a situation where the health claims in question correspond to a claim covered by an application under Article 13(2) of Regulation No 1924/2006, but where the application has not yet led to a decision on authorisation or non-authorisation, or is the burden of proof determined according to national law?

2. If the answer to question 1 is that the provisions of Regulation No 1924/2006 regulate the burden of proof, does the burden of proof lie with the trader making a given health claim or with the authority requesting the national court to prohibit the trader from continuing to make the claim?

3. In a situation such as that described in question 1, do Articles 5 and 6, read in conjunction with Articles 10(1) and 28(5) of Regulation No 1924/2006, regulate the evidentiary requirements when a national court is determining whether unpermitted health claims are being made, or are the evidentiary requirements determined according to national law?

4. If the answer to question 3 is that the provisions of Regulation No 1924/2006 regulate the evidentiary requirements, what are the evidentiary requirements imposed?

5. Is the answer to questions 1–4 affected by the fact that Regulation No 1924/2006 (including Article 3(a) of the regulation) and Directive 2005/29 (2) can be applied together in the proceedings before the national court?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on nutrition and health claims made on foods (OJ 2006 L 404, p. 9).

(2) Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) (OJ 2005, L 149, p. 22).
It is alleged in the first ground of appeal that the General Court erred in law in its assessment of the distinctive character of the mark applied for, ‘achtung!’ (word/figure), under Article 7(1)(b) of the European Union Trade Mark Regulation. (1) The General Court erred in law in so far as it accepted in the judgment under appeal that a sign was devoid of any distinctive character if, according to one possible meaning of that sign, it can be interpreted as advertising praise. Further, the General Court assessed the distinctive character of the term ‘Achtung’ instead of that of the sign applied for, ‘achtung!’. In addition, in the course of its assessment of distinctive character, the General Court made an incorrect assumption of fact without taking evidence on the material questions.
Action brought on 23 May 2019 — European Commission v Hungary

(Case C-400/19)

(2019/C 255/34)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: A. Sipos, A. Lewis and E. Manhaeve, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Hungary

Form of order sought

The Commission claims that the Court should:

— Declare that, by restricting the fixing of sale prices of agricultural and food products, having particular regard to Article 3(2)(u) of the a mezőgazdasági és élelmiszeripari termékek vonatkozásában a beszállítókkal szemben alkalmazott tisztességtelen forgalmazói magatartás tilalmáról szóló, 2009. évi XCV. törvény (Law XCV of 2009 prohibiting unfair trading practices by suppliers in respect of agricultural and food products), Hungary has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products; (1)

— Order Hungary to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Law XCV of 2009 prohibiting unfair trading practices by suppliers in respect of agricultural and food products (‘the Tfmtv’) introduced sector-specific provisions in relation to the fixing of the retail prices of the products in question.

The Commission submits that Article 3(2)(u) of the Tfmtv does not refer to the characteristics of agricultural and food products, but solely to their selling arrangements, and must therefore be regarded as a provision relating to sales arrangements within the meaning of the Keck and Mithouard judgment (see judgment of 24 November 1993, Keck and Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, EU:C:1993:905). In analysing the effects of that measure, it can be said to be a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on trade between Member States within the meaning of Article 34 TFEU.

According to the Commission, Article 3(2)(u) of the Tfmtv does not in fact affect the sale of domestic and imported products in equal measure, and is neither an adequate nor proportionate measure with regard to any legitimate aim connected to it.

(1) Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 (OJ 2013 L 347, p. 671).