ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
12

As regards, next, the examination of the substance of the appeal, the Board of Appeal considered, first, that the assessment carried out by the EBA, to the effect that the two directors implicated in the applicant’s complaint did not hold key functions within the financial institution concerned, was without error and that the claims relating to the third director had not been established. Secondly, the Board of Appeal stated that, in the light of the fact that the applicant was not amongst the entities entitled to request the EBA to initiate an investigation into an alleged breach of EU law, this case concerned a refusal on the part of that authority to initiate an investigation on its own initiative. Moreover, it found that, in the light of the evidence furnished by the applicant in support of its claim that there had been a breach of EU law and the Internal Rules, it had not been demonstrated that the EBA had erred in the exercise of its discretion. Thirdly, the Board of Appeal stated that the failure on the part of the EBA to have given the applicant the opportunity to make known its views before adopting its decision, as required under Article 39(1) of Regulation No 1093/2010, did not constitute a procedural defect such as to invalidate that decision. Fourthly, it had not been shown that the procedure envisaged prior to the adoption of the decision of the EBA was not followed. Fifthly and finally, the Board of Appeal found that no breach by the EBA of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union had been established.
5

So far as concerns the Community’s financial contribution, Article 3 of Annex II states the following: ‘1. The Community’s financial contribution shall be paid in accordance with the following principles: (a) An initial advance shall be paid to the coordinator within a maximum period of 60 days running from the date of the last signature of the contracting parties. The coordinator shall allocate the advance in accordance with the table of the indicative breakdown of estimated eligible costs following the signatures to this contract. ... 3. Subject to Article 26 of this Annex, all payments shall be treated as advances until the last project deliverable is approved. 4. ... In the event of non-reimbursement by the contractor within the time-limit set by the Commission, the latter shall add interest to the sums due at the rate applied by the European Central Bank for its main refinancing operations on the first day of the month during which the time-limit set by the Commission has expired, plus one and a half percentage points, unless interest is due pursuant to another provision of this contract. The interests shall cover the period running from the day after the expiry of the time-limit until the date of receipt of the funds to be reimbursed.’
39

In particular in paragraphs 27 to 29, 33, 35, 36 and 43 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal set out the reasons why it considered that the application for registration of the mark at issue was part of that unlawful filing strategy. Thus, in paragraphs 27 to 29 of the contested decision, it concluded that, since 2003, the sign LUCEO had been the subject of applications for national trade marks both in Austria and in Germany and that, from 2005, applications followed on a six-monthly basis, in accordance with the system ‘in Austria in March, in Germany in September’. That six-month rhythm corresponds precisely with the six-month period of reflection in order to claim priority. Those applications were successively cancelled due to non-payment of the registration fee. In particular in paragraph 33 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal concluded that it was only after the intervener had applied for registration of the European Union trade mark LUCEA LED that Copernicus had applied for registration of the mark at issue and claimed priority for the latter by relying on the last link in the chain of applications for registration of the national trade mark LUCEO, namely on the application for registration of the Austrian trade mark filed on 16 March 2009. The Board of Appeal deduced from that that the objective pursued by Mr A. by filing the different applications for registration of the national trade mark LUCEO was to be able to claim priority for the mark at issue over the course of years after having filed the first application for registration of the sign LUCEO as a national trade mark, although Article 29 of Regulation No 207/2009 provided only for a six-month period of reflection. In paragraphs 36 and 43 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal concluded that Mr A. had himself stated that he did not intend to use the trade mark LUCEO personally and was unable to state the names of clients who had expressed their interest in using it. In paragraphs 35, 36 and 43 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal considered that the argument that the LUCEO mark had been ‘developed’ through applications for registration of national trade marks constituted merely a pretext. In that regard, first, it stated that conduct consisting of repeatedly filing applications for national trade marks without the intention to pay the registration fees or to have them registered could not be regarded as development of a trade mark, any more than the fact of slightly modifying the classes during each new application. Secondly, it considered that, after the filing of an application for registration of a sign already ‘found’, in this case, LUCEO, the decision to register it as a European Union trade mark did not require years of reflection. The Board of Appeal deduced from that that the sole objective of the application for registration of the mark at issue was to ‘short-circuit’ the application for registration of the European Union trade mark LUCEA LED, filed by the intervener.
115

It is, moreover, in that particular context that a reading must be made of the applicant’s internal proposal, shown in Annex 2 to the same letter of 5 April 2012 (p. 489) and consisting, without further explanation on the point, in seeking State aid in the amount of EUR 50 million. It is also clear that the table shown on that same page refers only to ‘investment and subsidy possibilities’ (Möglichkeiten der Investitionszulage und des Investitionszuschusses), being the possibility of obtaining aid in an amount corresponding to 12.5% of the investment, i.e. EUR 50 million, without a clear link being drawn to the preceding analyses. The same finding holds true for the reiteration of that proposal in Annex 3 to the letter in question, concerning an internal protocol of the applicant, dated 15 December 2009, on pages 496 to 501, and in Annex 4 to the same letter, on page 505, containing conclusions further to an assessment of the possibilities of obtaining tax or other aid in the various locations compared — analyses also referred to by the applicant in paragraph 39 et seq. of its response to the Court’s measures of organisation. In particular, there is nothing in the documents submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany to the Commission or the applicant’s assertions before the Court showing that the amount of EUR 50 million was quantified on the date of the decision on where the forthcoming investment was to be located, having regard to factors such as foreseeable and even probable scenarios that might arise during the investment implementation. It should also be noted, as indicated by the Commission, that the investment in question was planned for Leipzig, a definitive decision was taken and the project has been implemented following approval of EUR 17 million in aid (see also recital 176 of the contested decision).
Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Discretion of the Commission – Judicial review – Unlimited jurisdiction of the EU judicature – Scope – Reduction of the amount of the fine

(Arts 101 and 261 TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47(1); Council Regulation No 1/2003, Arts 23(2) and 31)

(see paras 25-27, 147, 150, 197)
2.

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Lack of distinctiveness — Trade mark made up of several elements — Possible for the competent authority to examine each of the elements making up the trade mark — Need to take account of the overall perception of the combination by the relevant public (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 16)
4.

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Overlap between the scope of the grounds for refusal set out in subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Article 7(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b) and (c)) (see para. 36)
Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 26 May 2016 —

Bimbo v EUIPO (THE SNACK COMPANY)

(Case T‑331/15)

‛European Union trade mark — Application for European Union figurative mark THE SNACK COMPANY — Absolute grounds for refusal — Descriptive character — Lack of distinctive character — Articles 7(1)(b) and (c) and Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Equal treatment — Obligation to state reasons — Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009’

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Concept (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 18, 20, 21)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Figurative mark THE SNACK COMPANY (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 29-33, 36)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Separate examination of the grounds for refusal in relation to each of the goods or services covered by the application for registration — Obligation to state the reasons for refusing to register — Scope (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 7(1), and 75, first sentence) (see para. 39)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Descriptive character of a sign — Circumstance necessarily implying absence of distinctive character of the sign (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b) and (c)) (see para. 46)

5. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Assessment of the registrability of a sign — EU rules only taken into account — Earlier registration of the mark in certain Member States or third countries — Decisions not binding EU bodies (Council Regulation No 207/2009) (see paras 49, 56)

6. EU trade mark — Decisions of the Office — Principle of equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — EUIPO’s previous decision-making practice — Principle of legality — Need for a strict and complete examination in each particular case (see paras 53, 54)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 31 March 2015 (Case R 954/2014-2) concerning an application for registration of the figurative sign THE SNACK COMPANY as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
5.

EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Lack of distinctive character in relation only to certain products falling within that category not precluding recognition of lack of distinctiveness of the sign in relation to products in that category as a whole (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 47)
2.

EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Assessment of the likelihood of confusion — Determination of the relevant public (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 18, 22)
Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 8 November 2016 —

For Tune v EUIPO — Gastwerk Hotel Hamburg (fortune)

(Case T‑579/15)

(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for the EU figurative mark fortune — Earlier German word mark FORTUNE-HOTELS — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)

1. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 15, 16, 60, 65)

2. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Assessment of the likelihood of confusion—Attention level of the public (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 17, 21)

3. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Figurative mark fortune—Word mark FORTUNE-HOTELS (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 20, 25, 64-68)

4. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Similarity of the marks concerned—Criteria for assessment—Composite mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 26-28, 30, 35, 36)

5. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Similarity of the marks concerned—Assessment of the distinctiveness of an element composing a trade mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 34)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 7 August 2015 (Case R 2808/2014-5), relating to opposition proceedings between Gastwerk Hotel Hamburg and For Tune.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 8 June 2016 — Monster Energy v EUIPO (GREEN BEANS)

(Case T‑585/15)

‛EU trade mark — Application for the EU word mark GREEN BEANS — Application for restitutio in integrum — Non-compliance with the time limit for bringing an action before the General Court’

1. EU trade mark — Procedural provisions — Statement of reasons for decisions (Art. 296 TFEU; Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 75, first sentence) (see para. 31)

2. Actions for annulment — Admissibility criteria — Jurisdiction of the EU judicature — Considered of Court’s own motion (Arts 256 and 263 TFEU) (see para. 40)

3. EU trade mark — Appeals procedure — Action before the EU judicature — Action brought out of time against a Board of Appeal decision — No restitutio in integrum (Art. 263 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 45, second para.) (see paras 43, 44)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 22 July 2015 (Case R 3002/2014-2), concerning an application for registration of the word mark GREEN BEANS as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judicial proceedings — Application initiating proceedings — Formal requirements — Brief summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based — General reference to other documents not annexed to the application — Inadmissibility

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 21, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 177(1)(d))

(see para. 50)
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 18 October 2016 — Meissen Keramik v EUIPO (MEISSEN KERAMIK)(Case T‑776/15)

‛EU trade mark — Application for EU figurative mark MEISSEN KERAMIK — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Criteria (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 16-19)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Figurative mark MEISSEN KERAMIK (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 21, 26-29, 33-35)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 28 October 2015 (Case R 531/2015-1), concerning an application for registration of the figurative sign MEISSEN KERAMIK as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 6 July 2016 —

Mozzetti v EUIPO — di Lelio (ALFREDO’S GALLERY alla Scrofa Roma)

(Case T‑97/15)

‛EU trade mark — Proceedings for a declaration of invalidity — Figurative EU trade mark ALFREDO’S GALLERY alla Scrofa Roma — Earlier national word mark L’ORIGINALE ALFREDO — Request for proof of genuine use — Article 57(2) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Relative ground for refusal — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009’

1. EU trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Examination of the application — Proof of use of the earlier mark — Request presented expressly and on time by the applicant — Possibility of submitting the application for the first time before the Board of Appeal — Exclusion (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 57(2)) (see paras 18, 19, 24)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 31, 32)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity of the marks concerned — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 33, 43)

4. EU trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Relative grounds for invalidity — Existence of an identical or similar earlier mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Figurative mark ALFREDO’S GALLERY alla Scrofa Roma — Word mark L’ORIGINALE ALFREDO (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 8(1)(b), and 53(1)(a)) (see paras 34, 35, 55, 57, 58)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 2 December 2014 (Case R 656/2014-1), relating to proceedings for a declaration of invalidity between Ms di Lelio and Mr Mozzetti.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) of 28 September 2016 —

LLR-G5 v EUIPO — Glycan Finance (SILICIUM ORGANIQUE G5 LLR-G5)

(Case T‑539/15)

‛EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for figurative EU trade mark SILICIUM ORGANIQUE G5 LLR-G5 — Earlier international word marks Silicium Organique G5- Glycan 5-Si-Glycan-5-Si-G5 and Silicium Organique G5 — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 21-23, 80)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Figurative mark SILICIUM ORGANIQUE G5 LLR-G5 — Word marks Silicium Organique G5- Glycan 5-Si-Glycan-5-Si-G5 and Silicium Organique G5 (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 25, 26, 81)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity between the goods or services in question — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 29)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity of the marks concerned — Visual similarity between a figurative mark and a word mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 46)

5. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity of the marks concerned — Criteria for assessment — Composite mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 48, 51, 54, 56)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 11 June 2015 (Case R 291/2014-1), relating to opposition proceedings between Glycan Finance Corp. and LLR-G5.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 28 October 2016 —

Unicorn v EUIPO — Mercilink Equipment Leasing (UNICORN)

(Case T‑125/15)

‛EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for the EU figurative mark UNICORN — Earlier national word and figurative marks UNICORN and earlier national figurative mark representing a unicorn’s head — Relative ground for refusal — Reputation — Article 8(5) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark enjoying a reputation — Protection of well-known earlier mark extended to dissimilar goods or services — Conditions — Reputation of the mark in the Member State or the EU — Concept — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(5)) (see paras 35-38, 45)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark enjoying a reputation — Protection of well-known earlier mark extended to dissimilar goods or services — Figurative mark UNICORN — Word and figurative marks UNICORN and figurative mark representing a unicorn’s head (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(5)) (see paras 40, 46, 54)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 13 January 2015 (Case R 150/2014-5), concerning opposition proceedings between Unicorn and Mercilink Equipment Leasing.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;