2.

In connection with the second submission, to which I now turn, the applicant points out that according to Vacancy Notice No COM/161/79 one of the conditions for appointment to the vacant post was “thorough knowledge and experience of economic and technical problems in the field of social infrastructures and urban works in the developing countries”. A very exacting condition for the admission of applications was thereby laid down. According to the applicant, that may be inferred from the fact that in an earlier notice relating to the same post (COM/716/75) the adjective “thorough” did not appear, apparently because at that time the duties attaching to the post were narrower in scope and less important. The Commission must, however, be criticized for wrongly assuming, on the basis of the personal file of Mr L. and his previous professional experience, that he fulfilled the requirements stated in the vacancy notice. In any event, it must be reproached for failing to state to what extent Mr L. fulfilled the abovementioned condition. (a) In regard to this submission, if we look first at the formal aspect of the alleged inadequacy of reasons, mentioned in the second place, it is clear that the Commission is right in two respects. Its view, in support of which it can refer to established case-law, that it is not at all necessary to give the reasons for decisions on promotions and appointments because they do not constitute acts adversely affecting the person to whom they are directly addressed, is correct. It is also correct that the rejection of the applicant's complaint does not lack a statement of reasons in the sense that, according to the case-law (judgment of 30 October 1974 in Case 188/73, Daniele Grassi v Council of the European Communities [1974] ECR 1099), in such cases a statement of reasons is required in the form of a reference to the legal conditions on which, under the Staff Regulations, the validity of such a measure depends. In this regard a single look at that measure, which is to be found in Annex 3 to the application, is sufficient. However, in so far as the applicant complains — this clarification is to be found in the reply — that from the Commission's documents it is not clear to what extent it was possible for it to accept that Mr L. had a “thorough knowledge” and that there is therefore a lack of an internal statement of reasons which is required for every administrative decision, it is certainly a sufficient answer that he has not established the existence of a formal principle of law of such a kind. Whether those conditions were in fact laid down is another question to be considered later. It may therefore be concluded without further discussion that the contested decision may certainly not be annulled on the grounds of any form of deficiency in the reasons given for it, but that at most the question of annulment might be considered if in fact the objective conditions for admitting the appointed applicant to the list of admissible candidates were not met. (b) Before I turn to this question, which is central to the case, it seems to me that some clarification with regard to the arguments of the parties is appropriate. (aa) In its defence, the Commission relied mainly on case-law according to which the appointing authority enjoys a very wide discretion in assessing comparative merits in promotion procedures, and that value-judgments which may have to be made in an independent assessment of that nature may be criticized only on the ground of manifest error. It also objected that the applicant had isolated one factor in the vacancy notice and concentrated his arguments on it. According to the Commission, however, it must be noted that a comparison of the applicants with regard to all the conditions contained in the vacancy notice was necessary. On the other hand, as it must be accepted that leadership and management qualities and experience in different sectors are particularly important for the post in question, it can scarcely be contested that Mr L. is better suited for this post than the applicant. In fact it should be noted in regard to this argument, and the applicant has not failed to point this out in his reply, that the Commission is in this way failing, at least in part, to deal with the applicant's arguments. In reality it is not alleged that in the assessment of merits those of Mr L. were incorrectly judged to be greater. The issue is rather whether Mr L. fulfilled one of the conditions stipulated in the vacancy notice and therefore could be admitted to the list of those whose relative merits had to be assessed. In a certain respect, however, the Commission's argument is undoubtedly deserving of consideration. Even if it is certain that the case-law concerning Article 45 of the Staff Regulations may not as such be invoked, one of its principles may well be relevant. Even the judgment as to whether an applicant possesses thorough knowledge in the sense of the vacancy notice, that is to say, knowledge of a particular quality, is undoubtedly a value-judgment. This undoubtedly is something which cannot be reconstructed in every detail by the Court. On the contrary, in this respect, too, it is necessary to proceed on the basis of a discretionary assessment and therefore to limit judicial review to the issue whether there has been a manifest error. On the other hand, the Commission is in my view right in stating that, in checking the assessment of the applicants for the post on the point referred to above all by the applicant, it must be borne in mind that, in addition to that point, a series of other conditions were set out in the vacancy notice. Therefore there was no need for an unduly exacting standard to be applied in connection with the condition mentioned by the applicant, precisely because other aspects, such as leadership and management qualities, are especially important for the purposes of directing Division C 5. The condition relating to “thorough knowledge” might rather be understood, according to the appointing authority's sovereign interpretation of the conditions of eligibility, as meaning that sound knowledge in the field in question is sufficient. (bb) It has thus also become clear — and this brings me to the second clarifying observation on the applicant's point of view — that the basic premise chosen by the applicant, as set out in his supplementary pleading, can certainly not be accepted. Here, as we know, he makes his own level of knowledge the compulsory standard and declares that, because in Division C 5 an official in Grade A 4 has to deal with a great many important projects, it must be accepted that the head of that division must possess at least the same level of knowledge and experience. This, to my mind is not at all convincing and it even seems objectionable because it would inevitably lead to an intolerable and unnecessary restriction on the appointing authority's range of choice. It may not properly be required of the head of an administrative unit that he should possess all the knowledge and experience of his colleagues, but it is only necessary for him to have, in the area which he is to direct, sound knowledge of such a kind that he is able to instruct, supervise and coordinate his colleagues sensibly. (cc) It is therefore clear from the outset that the examination to be undertaken in the context of the present submission may be limited to determining whether the factors of assessment which are cited by the Commission adequately show that it was correctly accepted that the appointed official had a sound and thorough knowledge of the economic and technical problems in the field of social infrastructure and urban works in the developing countries, or whether, upon the examination of those factors, in relation to which the Court obviously does not have to enter into every detail, it is established that there was no basis for a favourable judgment or even that there was a manifest error. (c) In that connection the Commission has referred mainly to two documents which provide information concerning Mr L.'s activities as an architect in Rotterdam and in Rome between 1962 and 1973, that is to say, before he entered the service of the European Association for Cooperation (Annexes 7 and 8 to the defence). It further refers to the fact that Mr L. was able to supplement and reinforce the considerable relevant experience which he accumulated there, both in the period from 1973 to 1976, when he was a delegated controller of the Commission in central Africa, and thereafter in the post of Head of Division B 1 in the Directorate-General for Development. In that regard I have the impression — let me say this at once — that there emerges from this a wholly sound basis for a favourable assessment of the appointed official and that in any event the criticisms raised by the applicant do not disclose any manifest error. (aa) The applicant's chief criticism is, as we know, following the relative importance attached by the Commission to the factors for assessment, directed to Mr L.’s work in the private sector. He takes the view that the experience obtained from that work is a priori to be given only a relative value because it is far from recent. In my view, however, that is mistaken, in view of the relevant periods and the absence of evidence that there had in the meantime been any fundamental change in the field concerned here. Furthermore it is significant that Mr L. was not afterwards involved in a totally different field, but held a post which was perfectly suited to maintaining and widening the experience which he had obtained. The applicant further sought to cast doubt on the value of the experience gained by Mr L. in the private sector by explaining, on the one hand, that social infrastructure in the field of public health, publicly-financed dwellings and education were clearly at the centre of Division C 5 because in fact 95 % of all projects were concerned with those matters, and by pointing out, on the other hand, what the documents submitted by the Commission revealed about Mr L.‘s earlier involvement in projects relating to developing countries. According to these documents the successful applicant was concerned in only a small number of projects, which themselves related to only a few countries, whereas Division C 5 is responsible for between 60 and 80 developing countries. It is also clear that only six of those few projects belonged to the sphere of social infrastructure and urban works, whilst none concerned the sphere of public health and publicly-financed dwellings, and four projects from the field of education related only to a small sector of it. However against that it must be pointed out that, apart from the fact that the applicant examines only one of the two documents laid before the Court by the Commission and makes no comment with regard to the other, a quantitative consideration of that kind is in any event bound to be fundamentally misconceived. Furthermore it must not be overlooked that the document in question indicates only the most important projects and thus does not contain an exhaustive list, and that in addition, with regard to the number of countries concerned, Mr L. was in any event able to obtain useful supplementary experience in his subsequent post. (bb) Moreover, I also find it impossible to accept the applicant's view that, in assessing the appointed candidate, the Commission wrongly took into account his work from 1973 to 1976 as delegated controller in central Africa and after that as head of division in the Commission. Indeed it may be true that, as appears from the description of the activities of Division C 5, the projects are prepared in Brussels and that in general their execution is also supervised from there. Nevertheless it may quite properly be assumed that a delegated controller who, as the Commission has convincingly assured us, not only has to undertake subordinate executive duties, but is to be regarded as a kind of ambassador with wide-ranging and important powers, may certainly also be in a position to acquire from a large number of projects useful knowledge for the purpose of the vacancy notice at issue in the present case. There is therefore plainly no need to go to the trouble of considering in detail the applicant's arguments, some of which are extremely petty, concerning the level of particular projects carried out in central Africa between 1973 and 1976 and the criticism which he has expressed in that regard. On the other hand, so far as Mr L.’s duties as Head of Division B 1 are concerned, it may indeed be taken for granted, in view of the description of the duties furnished in the course of the proceedings, that in this capacity he was less intensively involved in projects than is possible in Division C 5. However since, contrary to what the applicant says, there is obviously more involved in Division B 1 than the mere registration of projects, and in any event it is also stated in his supplementary pleading that project descriptions and financial estimates were prepared, at least partly, by Division B 1 and C 5 jointly, and also at it could not be disputed that since 1976 Mr L. has taken part, in his capacity as head of division in a succession of important meetings in almost all the developing countries for which the division is responsible, it is beyond my understanding that no useful and sound experience could be obtained in this way in relation to the field covered by Division C 5 as well. (d) Therefore the applicant's second submission must also fail, because on the whole I have not gained the impression that the Commission was wrong in assuming that the appointed applicant fulfilled the conditions set out in the vacancy notice.