ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 3(1) of Council Directive 72/166 on the approximation of the laws of Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and to the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability, read in the light of Article 1(4) of Directive 84/5 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, must be interpreted as not including, among the obligations which that provision imposes on Member States, that of establishing a body to ensure that compensation is provided to victims of road accidents in situations where, although the persons responsible for the damage had taken out insurance covering their civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, the insurer has become insolvent. The payment of compensation by such a body was considered to be a measure of last resort, envisaged only for cases in which the vehicle that caused the injury or damage is uninsured or unidentified or has not satisfied the insurance requirements referred to in Article 3(1) of Directive 72/166. By contrast, the insolvency of an insurer is not one of those specific, clearly identified cases.

(see paras 30, 32-33, 35, operative part)
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. Actions for failure to fulfil obligations — Judgment of the Court establishing the failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations — Period for implementation — Reference date for assessing whether there has been a failure to fulfil obligations

(Art. 260(2) TFEU)

2. Member States — Obligations — Failure to fulfil obligations — National system pleaded as justification — Not permissible

(Art. 260 TFEU)

3. Actions for failure to fulfil obligations — Judgment of the Court establishing the failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations — Breach of the obligation to comply with the judgment — Pecuniary penalties — Lump sum — Calculation of the amount — Criteria — Conduct of the Member State concerned, the duration and seriousness of the infringement

(Art. 260(2) TFEU)

Summary

1. See the text of the decision.

(see para. 23)

2. See the text of the decision.

(see para. 48)

3. See the text of the decision.

(see paras 50-55)
Case C-313/11

European Commission

v

Republic of Poland

‛Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 — Animal feed — Genetically modified feed — Production, placing on the market or use — National prohibition not yet in force’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 18 July 2013

Actions for failure to fulfil obligations — Examination of the merits by the Court — Situation to be taken into consideration — Situation on expiry of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion — National measure coming into force after the expiry of that period — Action dismissed (Art. 258 TFEU) Actions for failure to fulfil obligations — Action seeking a declaration that a Member State failed to fulfil the obligations incombant on it under a regulation relating to genetically modified food and feed — Genetically modified food — National prohibition on production, marketing or use — Prohibition not yet in force — Action dismissed (Art. 258 TFEU; European Parliament and Council Regulation No 1829/2003)

While it is true that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, a national measure which is not in force during that period cannot be the subject of an such an action for failure to fulfil obligations brought in respect of it. (see paras 45, 47) An action, the purpose of which is to find that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations under Regulation No 1829/2003 on genetically modified food and feed could succeed only where that regulation required, before the entry into force of a national prohibition on the production, placing on the market, and use in animal feed of genetically modified feed, that State to comply with certain obligations. Such obligations would require, in particular, the Member States to refrain from adopting rules likely to produce negative effects contrary to the objectives of that regulation even before they came into force. (see para. 48)

Case C-313/11

European Commission

v

Republic of Poland

‛Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 — Animal feed — Genetically modified feed — Production, placing on the market or use — National prohibition not yet in force’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 18 July 2013

Actions for failure to fulfil obligations — Examination of the merits by the Court — Situation to be taken into consideration — Situation on expiry of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion — National measure coming into force after the expiry of that period — Action dismissed (Art. 258 TFEU) Actions for failure to fulfil obligations — Action seeking a declaration that a Member State failed to fulfil the obligations incombant on it under a regulation relating to genetically modified food and feed — Genetically modified food — National prohibition on production, marketing or use — Prohibition not yet in force — Action dismissed (Art. 258 TFEU; European Parliament and Council Regulation No 1829/2003)
It is not apparent from the wording of Article 102(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, pursuant to which the period of time allowed for commencing proceedings against a published measure adopted by an institution runs from the end of the 14th day after publication of the measure in the Official Journal of the European Union, that that article applies only to measures published in the Official Journal.

The first part of the sentence which makes up Article 102(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court is capable of referring, like the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, to the publication of measures in general. The reference to the Official Journal of the European Union in the second part of the sentence may thus be explained by the simple fact that a publication in the Official Journal was the only envisageable form of publication at the time those Rules of Procedure were adopted. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that Article 102(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court applies to a measure which is published only on the internet, such as a decision of the European Chemicals Agency concerning the inclusion of a substance on the list of substances satisfying the criteria set out in Article 57 of Regulation No 1907/2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) and published in accordance with Article 59(1) of that regulation.

Moreover, where the wording of a provision is unclear, account should be taken of the context of that provision and of the objectives which it pursues. In that regard, it must be considered that the objective of the 14-day time-limit laid down in Article 102(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court is to ensure that interested parties have sufficient time within which to bring an action against published measures and, consequently, to observe the right to effective judicial protection, as is now laid down in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In so far as it is possible to interpret Article 102(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court as referring to any published measure, irrespective of the means of publication, that provision must be interpreted in that way so as to ensure that the interested parties are not deprived, by relying on an additional 14 days within which to bring an action, of effective judicial protection.

(see paras 29-32, 34-36)
Directive 2005/29 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market must be interpreted as meaning that, if a commercial practice satisfies all the criteria specified in Article 6(1) of that directive for being categorised as a misleading practice in relation to the consumer, it is not necessary to determine whether such a practice is also contrary to the requirements of professional diligence as referred to in Article 5(2)(a) of the directive in order for it legitimately to be regarded as unfair and, therefore, prohibited in accordance with Article 5(1) of the directive.

The constituent features of a misleading commercial practice, as set out in Article 6(1) of Directive 2005/29 are in essence expressed with reference to the consumer as the person to whom unfair commercial practices are applied and correspond in substance to the second condition characterising a practice of that nature, as set out in Article 5(2)(b) of that directive. By contrast, there is no mention in Article 6(1) of the condition, set out in Article 5(2)(a) of the directive and relating to the practice’s being contrary to the requirements of professional diligence, which relates to the sphere of the trader.

Such an interpretation is therefore required, having regard both to the wording and to the structure of Articles 5 and 6(1) of that directive, and to its general scheme, and is the only one capable of preserving the effectiveness of the specific rules laid down in Articles 6 to 9 of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.

(see paras 43, 45, 46, 48, operative part)
If an institution applies one of the exceptions to the right of access provided for in Article 4 of Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, it is for that institution to weigh the particular interest to be protected through non-disclosure of the document concerned against, inter alia, the public interest in the document being made accessible, having regard to the advantages of increased openness, as described in recital 2 to Regulation No 1049/2001, in that it enables citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making process and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system.

In that regard, although, in order to justify refusing access to a document, it is not sufficient, in principle, for the document to fall within an activity or an interest referred to in Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001, as the institution concerned must also explain how access to that document could specifically and actually undermine the interest protected by an exception laid down in that provision, it is nevertheless open to that institution to base its decisions in that regard on general presumptions which apply to certain categories of document, as similar general considerations are likely to apply to requests for disclosure relating to documents of the same nature. While, in such a case, the institution concerned would not be under an obligation to carry out a specific assessment of the content of each of those documents, it must nevertheless specify on which general considerations it bases the presumption that disclosure of the documents would undermine one of the interests protected by the exceptions under Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001.

(see paras 32, 72-73)
On a proper construction of Article 11(A)(1)(a), (2)(a) and (3)(c) of Sixth Directive 77/388 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes and Article 73, point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 78 and point (c) of the first paragraph of Article 79 of Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax, a tax such as the ‘screening tax’ provided for under Portuguese legislation for the benefit of the cinematographic and audiovisual arts must be included in the taxable amount for the purposes of the value added tax payable on services consisting in the screening of commercial advertising.

In that regard, the chargeable event for the screening tax coincides with that for the value added tax payable on commercial advertising screening services. The screening tax becomes chargeable as soon as the services are provided and only becomes chargeable if such services are provided.

Such a tax therefore has a direct link with the supply of commercial advertising screening services, since the chargeable events for the screening tax and for the value added tax coincide. It therefore falls within the concept of ‘taxes, duties, levies and charges’ referred to in Article 11(A)(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive and point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 78 of Directive 2006/112.

(see paras 41, 42, 48, operative part)
Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 5 December 2013 — Commission v Edison

(Case C‑446/11 P)

‛Appeals — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — European market for hydrogen peroxide and sodium perborate — Decision finding an infringement of Article 81 EC — Imputability of the unlawful conduct — Obligation to state reasons’

1. Acts of the institutions — Statement of reasons — Obligation — Scope — Decision to apply competition rules — Decision relating to several addresses — Need for an adequate statement of reasons in particular with respect to the entity which must bear the liability for an infringement (Arts 81 EC and 253 EC) (see paras 20‑26, 64)

2. Acts of the institutions — Statement of reasons — Obligation — Scope — Decision to apply competition rules — Statement of reasons based on a matter not set out in the statement of objections — Unlawful — Correction of an error of reasoning during the proceedings before the Court — Not permissible (Arts 81 EC and 253 EC) (see paras 53‑55)

3. Actions for annulment — Grounds — Lack of or inadequate statement of reasons — Separate ground from the one concerning substantive legality (Arts 230 EC and 253 EC) (see para. 63)

Re:

Appeal against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 16 June 2011 in Case T‑196/06 Edison v Commission, by which the General Court annulled Commission Decision C(2006) 1766 final of 3 May 2006 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 [EC] and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/F/38.620 — Hydrogen Peroxide and perborate), in so far as it concerns Edison SpA — Rules on the imputability of the anti-competitive practices of a subsidiary to its parent company — Infringement of the rights of the defence and of the obligation to state reasons.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the appeal;
63

In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the question referred is that where a national court has before it, on the basis of its national law, an action for annulment of a national measure constituting a ‘plan’ or ‘programme’ within the meaning of Directive 2001/42 and it finds that the ‘plan’ or ‘programme’ was adopted in breach of the obligation laid down by that directive to carry out a prior environmental assessment, that court is obliged to take all the general or particular measures provided for by its national law in order to remedy the failure to carry out such an assessment, including the possible suspension or annulment of the contested ‘plan’ or ‘programme’. However, in view of the specific circumstances of the main proceedings, the referring court can exceptionally be authorised to make use of its national provision empowering it to maintain certain effects of an annulled national measure in so far as: — that national measure is a measure which correctly transposes Directive 91/676; — the adoption and entry into force of the new national measure containing the action programme within the meaning of Article 5 of that directive do not enable the adverse effects on the environment resulting from the annulment of the contested measure to be avoided; — annulment of the contested measure would result in a legal vacuum in relation to the transposition of Directive 91/676 which would be more harmful to the environment, in the sense that the annulment would result in a lower level of protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources and would thereby run specifically counter to the fundamental objective of that directive; and — the effects of such a measure are exceptionally maintained only for the period of time which is strictly necessary to adopt the measures enabling the irregularity which has been established to be remedied.
Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 10 November 2011 – LG Electronics v OHIM

(Case C‑88/11 P)

Appeal – Community trade mark – Word sign ‘KOMPRESSOR PLUS’ – Refusal to register – Regulation (EC) No 40/94 – Article 7(1)(c) – Descriptive character – Consideration of new evidence by the General Court – Distortion of the facts and evidence

1. Community trade mark – Procedural provisions – Examination of the facts of the Office’s own motion – Scope – No obligation to prove matters of common knowledge – Issue before the General Court – Documents produced in order to substantiate the accuracy of a fact of common knowledge (Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 74(1)) (see paras 26-30)

2. Appeals – Grounds – Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence – Inadmissibility – Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence – Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 36-37)

Re:

Appeal against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 16 December 2010 in Case T-497/09 LG Electronics v OHIM dismissing the appellant’s action against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 23 September 2009 (Case R 397/2009-1) concerning an application for registration of the word sign KOMPRESSOR PLUS as a Community trade mark – Descriptive nature of the mark – Article 7(1)(c) of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1) – Consideration of new facts by the General Court – Distortion of the evidence.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the appeal;
4

Recital 1 and recitals 4 to 8 in the preamble to the Regulation read as follows: ‘(1) Experience acquired in the motor vehicle sector regarding the distribution of new motor vehicles … makes it possible to define categories of vertical agreements which can be regarded as normally satisfying the conditions laid down in Article 81(3). ... (4) The benefit of the exemption should be limited to vertical agreements for which it can be assumed with sufficient certainty that they satisfy the conditions of Article 81(3). (5) Vertical agreements falling within the categories defined in this Regulation can improve economic efficiency within a chain of production or distribution by facilitating better coordination between the participating undertakings. In particular, they can lead to a reduction in the transaction and distribution costs of the parties and to an optimisation of their sales and investment levels. (6) The likelihood that such efficiency-enhancing effects will outweigh any anti-competitive effects due to restrictions contained in vertical agreements depends on the degree of market power held by the undertakings concerned and therefore on the extent to which those undertakings face competition from other suppliers of goods or services regarded by the buyer as interchangeable or substitutable … (7) Thresholds based on market share should be fixed in order to reflect suppliers’ market power. Furthermore, this sector-specific Regulation should contain stricter rules than those provided for by Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999, in particular for selective distribution. The thresholds below which it can be presumed that the advantages secured by vertical agreements outweigh their restrictive effects should vary with the characteristics of different types of vertical agreement. It can therefore be presumed that in general, vertical agreements have such advantages where the supplier concerned has a market share of up to 30% on the markets for the distribution of new motor vehicles or spare parts, or of up to 40% where quantitative selective distribution is used for the sale of new motor vehicles… (8) Above those market share thresholds, there can be no presumption that vertical agreements falling within the scope of Article 81(1) will usually give rise to objective advantages of such a character and magnitude as to compensate for the disadvantages which they create for competition. However, such advantages can be anticipated in the case of qualitative selective distribution, irrespective of the supplier’s market share.’
8

Article 6(3) of that regulation provides: ‘For the application of paragraph 2, the competent authorities of the new Member States shall dispose on 1 May 2004 of a system for the identification of traded or produced surplus quantities of sugar as such or in processed products, isoglucose or fructose, at the level of the main operators concerned. That system may in particular rely on import tracking, fiscal monitoring, surveys based on operators’ accounts and physical stocks, and include measures such as risk guarantees. The system of identification shall be based on risk assessment that takes due account in particular of the following criteria: — type of activity of the operators concerned, — capacity of storage facilities, — level of activities. The new Member State shall use that system to compel the operators concerned to eliminate from the market at their own expense an equivalent quantity of sugar or isoglucose of their determined individual surplus quantity. The operators concerned shall provide the proof, to the satisfaction of the new Member State, that products were eliminated from the market by 30 November 2005 at the latest. [If] such proof is not provided, the new Member State shall charge an amount equal to the quantity in question multiplied by the highest import charges applicable to the product concerned during the period from 1 May 2004 to 30 November 2005, increased by EUR 1.21/100 kg in white sugar or dry matter equivalent. The amount referred to in the third subparagraph shall be assigned to the national budget of the new Member State.’