ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
6

Article 7 of that directive, entitled ‘Right of residence for more than three months’, is worded as follows: ‘(1) All Union citizens shall have the right of residence on the territory of another Member State for a period of longer than three months if they: (a) are workers or self-employed persons in the host Member State; or (b) have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their period of residence and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State; or (c) – are enrolled at a private or public establishment, accredited or financed by the host Member State on the basis of its legislation or administrative practice, for the principal purpose of following a course of study, including vocational training; and – have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State and assure the relevant national authority, by means of a declaration or by such equivalent means as they may choose, that they have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their period of residence; or (d) are family members accompanying or joining a Union citizen who satisfies the conditions referred to in points (a), (b) or (c). 2. The right of residence provided for in paragraph 1 shall extend to family members who are not nationals of a Member State, accompanying or joining the Union citizen in the host Member State, provided that such Union citizen satisfies the conditions referred to in paragraph 1(a), (b) or (c). 3. For the purposes of paragraph 1(a), a Union citizen who is no longer a worker or self-employed person shall retain the status of worker or self-employed person in the following circumstances: (a) he/she is temporarily unable to work as the result of an illness or accident; (b) he/she is in duly recorded involuntary unemployment after having been employed for more than one year and has registered as a job-seeker with the relevant employment office; (c) he/she is in duly recorded involuntary unemployment after completing a fixed-term employment contract of less than a year or after having become involuntarily unemployed during the first twelve months and has registered as a job-seeker with the relevant employment office. In this case, the status of worker shall be retained for no less than six months; (d) he/she embarks on vocational training. Unless he/she is involuntarily unemployed, the retention of the status of worker shall require the training to be related to the previous employment. 4. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1(d) and 2 above, only the spouse, the registered partner provided for in Article 2(2)(b) and dependent children shall have the right of residence as family members of a Union citizen meeting the conditions under 1(c) above. Article 3(2) shall apply to his/her dependent direct relatives in the ascending lines and those of his/her spouse or registered partner.’
35

In the present case, the Italian Republic submits that prior authorisation from the Court is required in view of, first, the fact that sums deriving from the ESF must be allocated to particular expenditure and, secondly, the nature of the tasks devolved in that regard to the Region of Lombardy under EU law. Thus it argues that resources deriving from the Funds must be hypothecated to particular expenditure, meaning that those resources must be designated for the implementation of EU policies and cannot be diverted from that purpose. That hypothecation remains intact when those resources are transferred to the national entities that are then regarded as mere managing authorities. It takes the view that the hypothecation of the resources to particular expenditure ends only once the objective pursued by the European Union has been fully realised and, therefore, only once the sums have passed into the ownership of the beneficiary. Furthermore, the Italian Republic claims that, in accordance with the organisational model of indirect implementation, national authorities are thus contributing to the implementation of a task falling within the competence of EU bodies. It follows that, in carrying out that activity, the national authorities are not performing their own tasks, but are rather performing European tasks, on the basis of their own legislative and administrative powers.
21

On 17 July 2015, Spliethoff received an email, signed by the INEA team responsible for evaluation (‘the email of 17 July 2015’), the content of which, drafted in English, was as follows: ‘Dear Sir/Madam, Following the calls for proposals published on 11 September 2014 under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) in the field of transport, the evaluation of the eligible proposals has taken place and the Commission has drawn up a list of proposals selected for receiving [European] Union financial assistance. On 10 July 2015, the CEF Coordination Committee of Member States’ representatives gave a positive opinion on this draft list. We regret to inform you that your application has not been successful in the above procedure, as explained below: ... Procedural steps for the adoption by the European Commission of a decision on the selection and award of grants for actions contributing to projects of common interest under the [CEF] in the field of trans-European transport infrastructure is currently ongoing. In the unlikely case that the adoption of this decision results in changes in relation to your proposal, you will be informed separately by email. ... Any request you may make and any reply from us, or from the Commission, or any complaint for maladministration, will have neither the purpose nor the effect of suspending the time limit for lodging an action for annulment of the Commission’s decision notified by this message, which must be done within two months of notification of this message. The court responsible for hearing annulment procedures is the General Court of the European Union: ... INEA Evaluation Team.’
39

Admittedly, when prompted to interpret Article 5(1) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1), the wording of which is identical to that of Article 14(1) of the VAT Directive, the Court held that ‘supply of goods’ in Article 5(1) must be interpreted as meaning the transfer of the right to dispose of tangible property as owner, even if there is no transfer of legal ownership of the property (judgment of 8 February 1990, Shipping and Forwarding Enterprise Safe, C‑320/88, EU:C:1990:61, paragraph 9). However, in the context of the present request for a preliminary ruling, the referring court has raised the question of whether there can be a ‘supply of goods’ within the meaning of Article 14(2)(a) of the VAT Directive in circumstances where only a legal transfer of ownership of the goods has occurred, in return for the payment of compensation, while the party having economic control over the relevant goods remained the same. That particularity of Polish administrative law, according to which, in the event of expropriation by the Public Treasury of immovable property belonging to a county city, those goods are to continue to be administered by that same entity, represented by the mayor, may be sufficient to deprive the transfer of ownership at issue, at least partially, of its economic nature, on the ground that the expropriating authority does not have the power to dispose of the goods at issue as an owner.
17

Paragraph 8c of the Disability Services Law, entitled ‘Personal assistance’, provides: ‘For the purposes of this law, “personal assistance” means the assistance necessary for a severely disabled person at home and outside the home: (1) in everyday activity; (2) in work and study; (3) in hobbies; (4) in participation in society; or (5) in maintaining social interaction. The purpose of personal assistance is to help a severely disabled person to implement his own choices in performing the activities referred to in the first subparagraph. Provision of personal assistance presupposes that the severely disabled person has the means to determine the content of the assistance and the manner in which it is delivered. For the purposes of the arrangements for personal assistance, a person is to be regarded as severely disabled if, as a result of long-term or progressive disability or illness, he necessarily and repeatedly needs another person’s help in order to carry out the activities referred to in the first subparagraph and this need is not primarily attributable to age-related disability or illness. Personal assistance is to be arranged for everyday activities, work and study to the extent that the severely disabled person necessarily requires it. For the activities referred to in points (3) to (5) of the first subparagraph above, personal assistance must be provided for at least 30 hours per month, unless a lesser number of hours is sufficient to ensure the provision of the assistance necessarily required by the severely disabled person.’
11

Article 67 of Directive 2014/24, entitled ‘Contract award criteria’, provides, in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 thereof: ‘1. Without prejudice to national laws, regulations or administrative provisions concerning the price of certain supplies or the remuneration of certain services, contracting authorities shall base the award of public contracts on the most economically advantageous tender. 2. The most economically advantageous tender from the point of view of the contracting authority shall be identified on the basis of the price or cost, using a cost-effectiveness approach, such as life-cycle costing in accordance with Article 68, and may include the best price-quality ratio, which shall be assessed on the basis of criteria, including qualitative, environmental and/or social aspects, linked to the subject-matter of the public contract in question. Such criteria may comprise, for instance: (a) quality, including technical merit, aesthetic and functional characteristics, accessibility, design for all users, social, environmental and innovative characteristics and trading and its conditions; (b) organisation, qualification and experience of staff assigned to performing the contract, where the quality of the staff assigned can have a significant impact on the level of performance of the contract; or (c) after-sales service and technical assistance, delivery conditions such as delivery date, delivery process and delivery period or period of completion. The cost element may also take the form of a fixed price or cost on the basis of which economic operators will compete on quality criteria only. Member States may provide that contracting authorities may not use price only or cost only as the sole award criterion or restrict their use to certain categories of contracting authorities or certain types of contracts. … 4. Award criteria shall not have the effect of conferring an unrestricted freedom of choice on the contracting authority. They shall ensure the possibility of effective competition and shall be accompanied by specifications that allow the information provided by the tenderers to be effectively verified in order to assess how well the tenders meet the award criteria. In case of doubt, contracting authorities shall verify effectively the accuracy of the information and proof provided by the tenderers.’
Where the issuing Member State has provided for a criminal procedure involving several degrees of jurisdiction which may thus give rise to successive judicial decisions, at least one of which has been handed down in absentia, the concept of ‘trial resulting in the decision’, within the meaning of Article 4a(1) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, must be interpreted as relating only to the instance at the end of which the decision is handed down which finally rules on the guilt of the person concerned and imposes a penalty on him, such as a custodial sentence, following a re-examination, in fact and in law, of the merits of the case.

An appeal proceeding, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in principle falls within that concept. It is nonetheless up to the referring court to satisfy itself that it has the characteristics set out above.

(see paras 98, 99, operative part)
Case C‑81/17

Zabrus Siret SRL

v

Direcţia Generală Regională a Finanţelor Publice Iaşi — Administraţia Judeţeană a Finanţelor Publice Suceava

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Suceava)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Taxation — Directive 2006/112/EC — Common system of value added tax (VAT) — Deduction of input tax — Right to a refund of VAT — Transactions relating to a tax period that has already been the subject of a tax inspection which has concluded — National legislation — Possibility for the taxable person to correct tax returns which have already been covered by a tax inspection — Precluded — Principle of effectiveness — Fiscal neutrality — Legal certainty)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber), 26 April 2018

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Deduction of input tax — Rules governing exercise of the right of deduction — Correction of value added tax returns — Five-year limitation period — Exception — Condition — Respect for the principles of effectiveness, fiscal neutrality and legal certainty — National legislation excluding correction in respect of a period that has already been the subject of a tax inspection which has concluded — Not permissible

(Council Directive 2006/112, as amended by Directive 2010/45, Arts 167, 168, 179, 180 and 182)

Articles 167, 168, 179, 180 and 182 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, as amended by Council Directive 2010/45/EU of 13 July 2010, and the principles of effectiveness, fiscal neutrality and proportionality must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which, by way of derogation from the five-year limitation period imposed by national law for the correction of value added tax (VAT) returns, prevents, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, a taxable person from making such a correction in order to claim his right of deduction on the sole ground that that correction relates to a period that has already been the subject of a tax inspection.

(see para. 56, operative part)
Case C‑475/17

Viking Motors and Others

v

Tallinna linn

and

Maksu- ja Tolliamet

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Riigikohus)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Taxation — Common system of value added tax (VAT) — Directive 2006/112/EC — Article 401 — Domestic taxes which can be characterised as turnover taxes — Prohibition — Concept of ‘turnover tax’ — Local sales tax — Essential characteristics of VAT — None)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber), 7 August 2018

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Prohibition on the levying of other domestic taxes which can be characterized as turnover taxes — Scope — Estonian local sales tax — Lawfulness

(Council Directive 2006/112, Art. 401)

Article 401 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted to the effect that it does not preclude the maintenance or introduction of a tax such as the sales tax at issue in the main proceedings.

In order to decide whether a tax, duty or charge can be characterised as a turnover tax within the meaning of Article 401 of the VAT Directive, it is necessary, in particular, to determine whether it has the effect of jeopardising the functioning of the common system of VAT by being levied on the movement of goods and services and on commercial transactions in a way comparable to VAT (see, by analogy, judgment of 11 October 2007, KÖGÁZ and Others, C‑283/06 and C‑312/06, EU:C:2007:598, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

In that regard, it must be pointed out, as is apparent from the file before the Court, that the legislation governing the sales tax at issue in the main proceedings did not require taxpayers to add the amount of that tax to the sale price or to indicate separately on the invoice delivered to the purchaser the amount of the tax to be paid. Thus, the passing-on of that tax to the final consumer was a possibility and not an obligation for the retailers who could at any time choose to bear that tax themselves, without increasing the prices of the goods and services provided. The Court has already held that a tax levied on production in such a way that it is not certain that it will be borne, like a tax on consumption such as VAT, by the final consumer is likely to fall outside the scope of Article 401 of the VAT Directive (judgment of 11 October 2007, KÖGÁZ and Others, C‑283/06 and C‑312/06, EU:C:2007:598, paragraph 50). Whereas, through the mechanism of the deduction of VAT, that tax is charged only to the final consumer and is completely neutral as regards the taxable persons involved in the production and distribution process prior to the stage of final taxation, regardless of the number of transactions involved, that is not the case with a tax such as the sales tax (see, by analogy, judgment of 11 October 2007, KÖGÁZ and Others, C‑283/06 and C‑312/06, EU:C:2007:598, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

(see paras 36, 45, 47, 48, 53, operative part)
Article 1(2)(a) of Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts must be interpreted as meaning that a farm advisory scheme, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, through which a public entity admits all the economic operators who meet the suitability requirements set out in the invitation to tender and who pass the examination referred to in that invitation to tender, even if no new operator can be admitted during the limited validity period of that scheme, does not constitute a public contract within the meaning of that directive.

In so far as the Agency admits all the candidates who satisfy those requirements, it is clear, as the Advocate General has pointed out in point 39 of his Opinion, that it makes no selection among the admissible tenders and that it confines itself to ensuring that qualitative criteria are respected. The fact that, as is clear from the decision to refer, access to the farm advisory scheme at issue in the main proceedings is limited to a preliminary period, which ends when the examination is organised or, at the latest, when the final award decision is published, and that it is therefore not possible for an adviser, such as Ms Tirkkonen, to join that farm advisory scheme, cannot call that assessment into question. As the Advocate General has pointed out in points 51 and 52 of his Opinion, the fact that, unlike the context that gave rise to the judgment of 2 June 2016, Falk Pharma (C‑410/14, EU:C:2016:399), a farm advisory scheme, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, is not permanently open to interested economic operators is irrelevant. In the present case, the decisive factor is that the contracting authority has not referred to any award criteria for the purpose of comparing and classifying admissible tenders. In the absence of that factor, which is, as is apparent from paragraph 38 of the judgment of 2 June 2016, Falk Pharma (C 410/14, EU:C:2016:399), intrinsically linked to the regulation of public contracts, a farm advisory scheme, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, cannot constitute a public contract within the meaning of Article 1(2)(a) of Directive 2004/18.

(see paras 33-35, 41, operative part)
Case C‑97/17

European Commission

v

Republic of Bulgaria

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Protection of nature — Directive 2009/147/EC — Conservation of wild birds — Special Protection Area (SPA) — Classification as SPAs of the most suitable territories in number and size for the conservation of the bird species listed in Annex I to Directive 2009/147 — Important Bird Area (IBA) — IBA Rila — Partial classification of IBA Rila as an SPA)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 26 April 2018

Environment—Conservation of wild birds—Directive 2009/147—Classification as a special protection area—Obligation of the Member States—Failure to fulfil obligations—Criteria for assessment—Taking into consideration of the list of areas of importance for the conservation of birds in Europe—Lawfulness

See the text of the decision. (see paras 18, 19)

See the text of the decision. (see paras 23, 24)

The Member States’ margin of discretion in choosing the most suitable territories for classification as Special Protection Areas (SPAs) concerns not the appropriateness of classifying as SPAs the territories which appear most suitable according to ornithological criteria, but only the application of those criteria for identifying the most suitable territories for conservation of the species listed in Annex I to the Birds Directive. Thus, on the one hand, a decision on the classification and delimitation of SPAs must be based solely on the ornithological criteria laid down in the Birds Directive. On the other, a Member State cannot, on the ground that it has discretion as regards the choice of SPAs, classify as SPAs sites the number and total area of which are manifestly less than the number and total area of the sites considered to be the most suitable. (see paras 64-66)

In proceedings under Article 258 TFEU for failure to fulfil obligations, it is incumbent upon the Commission to prove the alleged failure. It must provide the Court with the information necessary for it to determine whether the infringement is made out, and the Commission may not rely on any presumption for that purpose. However, the Commission, which does not have investigative powers of its own in the matter, is largely reliant on the information provided by any complainants, private or public bodies active in the territory of the Member State concerned and that Member State itself. Similarly, any official document issued by the authorities of the Member State concerned can be regarded as a valid source of information for the purposes of the initiation, by the Commission, of the procedure referred to in Article 258 TFEU. (see paras 69, 70)