ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 22 January 2015 —

GRE v OHIM

(Case C‑495/13 P) 1 ( 1 )

‛Appeal — Community trade mark — Regulation (EC) No 40/94 — Article 8(1)(b) — Figurative mark in colour, consisting of the verbal components ‘LIBERTE american blend’ on a red background — Opposition by the holder of the Community trade mark ‘La LIBERTAD’ — Refusal of registration’

Appeals — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 35-40)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. GRE Grand River Enterprises Deutschland GmbH is ordered to pay the costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 325, 09.11.2013

Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 22 January 2015 —

GRE v OHIM

(Case C‑495/13 P) 1 ( 1 )

‛Appeal — Community trade mark — Regulation (EC) No 40/94 — Article 8(1)(b) — Figurative mark in colour, consisting of the verbal components ‘LIBERTE american blend’ on a red background — Opposition by the holder of the Community trade mark ‘La LIBERTAD’ — Refusal of registration’

Appeals — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 35-40)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. GRE Grand River Enterprises Deutschland GmbH is ordered to pay the costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 325, 09.11.2013
Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 30 April 2015 –

Castel Frères v OHIM

(Case C‑622/13 P) 1 ( 1 )

‛Appeal — Community trade mark — Regulation (EC) No 40/94 — Article 7(1)(c) and (j) — Word mark CASTEL — Indication of geographical origin — Application for a declaration of invalidity brought by the proprietor of the indication of geographical origin ‘Castell’ — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Appeal manifestly inadmissible in part and manifestly unfounded in part’

1. Community trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Invalidity proceedings — Admissibility — Misuse of rights — No effect (Council Regulation No 40/94, Arts 51(1)(a) and 55(1)(a)) (see paras 42-47)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications which may serve to designate the characteristics of goods — Word mark composed of several elements — Taking into account the overall perception of the mark by the relevant public (Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 70, 71)

3. Appeals — Grounds — Mere repetition of the pleas and arguments put forward before the General Court — Inadmissibility (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 168(1)(d) and 169(2)) (see para. 82)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. Castel Frères SAS is ordered to pay the costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 24, 25.1.2014.

Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 30 April 2015 –

Castel Frères v OHIM

(Case C‑622/13 P) 1 ( 1 )

‛Appeal — Community trade mark — Regulation (EC) No 40/94 — Article 7(1)(c) and (j) — Word mark CASTEL — Indication of geographical origin — Application for a declaration of invalidity brought by the proprietor of the indication of geographical origin ‘Castell’ — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Appeal manifestly inadmissible in part and manifestly unfounded in part’

1. Community trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Invalidity proceedings — Admissibility — Misuse of rights — No effect (Council Regulation No 40/94, Arts 51(1)(a) and 55(1)(a)) (see paras 42-47)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications which may serve to designate the characteristics of goods — Word mark composed of several elements — Taking into account the overall perception of the mark by the relevant public (Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 70, 71)

3. Appeals — Grounds — Mere repetition of the pleas and arguments put forward before the General Court — Inadmissibility (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 168(1)(d) and 169(2)) (see para. 82)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. Castel Frères SAS is ordered to pay the costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 24, 25.1.2014.
10

In the action brought by DZNLN against that decision, the Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Budapest Court of Public Administration and Labour) asks whether the decision complied with Regulations Nos 1698/2005 and 1974/2006. That court accordingly decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court of Justice: ‘1. Can [Regulations Nos 1698/2005 and 1974/2006] be interpreted as meaning that local action groups set up in the context of agricultural aid can operate only in a form of organisation determined by law in a given Member State? 2. Can a distinction be made on the basis of the above regulations in such a way that the legislature of the Member State gives recognition only to local action groups constituted as certain legal forms of organisation, laying down conditions which are different from or stricter than those in Article 62(1) of Regulation No 1698/2005? 3. Is it sufficient under the above regulations if local action groups in a Member State fulfil only the requirements laid down in Article 62(1) of Regulation No 1698/2005? May the Member State restrict that provision by imposing other formal or legal obligations on the bodies which meet the requirements laid down in Article 62(1) of Regulation No 1698/2005? 4. Can the above regulations be interpreted as meaning that the decision to abolish local action groups operating in accordance with the requirements imposed by Article 62(1) of Regulation No 1698/2005 and which complied with all the relevant national and Community legislation throughout the time they were operating falls within the margin of discretion of a Member State and as permitting only the operation of local action groups which have a new legal form? 5. Can the above regulations be interpreted as meaning that, even as regards aid programmes which are already under way or during the programming period, a Member State may, where appropriate, alter the legal framework for the operation of local action groups? 6. How must the above regulations be interpreted in the event that local action groups which have hitherto conducted their activities efficiently and legally are abolished? What happens in such a case to the obligations undertaken and the rights acquired by local action groups, having particular regard to the whole group of bodies affected by the abolition? 7. Can Article 62(2) of [Regulation No 1698/2005] be interpreted as meaning that a national provision is acceptable and complies with the law if, under it, a Member State requires Leader local action groups which take the form of non-profit-making companies to convert into associations within a year on the ground that only the association as a legal form of company organisation can properly guarantee the creation of a network between local members, given that, under the applicable Hungarian law, the fundamental aim of a company is the obtaining of profits and the involvement of economic interests prevents the attraction of the public and the recruitment of new members?’
Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 30 September 2014 –

Faktor B i W. Gęsina v Commission

(Case C‑138/14 P)

‛Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Actions for annulment — Original copy of the application lodged at the Registry of the General Court after the deadline set — Postal delay — Notions of ‘force majeure and unforeseen circumstances’ — Appeal, in part, manifestly unfounded and, in part, manifestly inadmissible’

1. Judicial proceedings — Time-limit for instituting proceedings — Proceedings brought by fax — Time-limit for lodging the signed original — No extension of the prescribed time-limit for bringing an action (Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 43(6)) (see para. 15)

2. Judicial proceedings — Time-limit for instituting proceedings — Claim barred by lapse of time — Unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure — Meaning — Postal delay (Art. 263 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 45, second para.) (see paras 16-20, 22, 23)

3. Appeals — Grounds — Plea submitted for the first time in the context of the appeal — Inadmissibility (see para. 26)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.
1.

The second subparagraph of Article 2(3) of Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity must be construed as precluding national provisions, such as those in issue in the main proceedings, which impose excise duty on additives coming under heading 3811 of the Combined Nomenclature set out in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1031/2008 of 19 September 2008, at a rate which differs from that applied to the fuel to which they are added.
Given, first, that the judgment under appeal is, in so far as it dismisses the action in its entirety, comparable to a negative decision, in respect of which it cannot be envisaged that an application for suspension of operation, which would in no way alter the appellant’s situation, could be granted save in exceptional circumstances and, second, that the obligation to repay the unlawful aid stems from the decision challenged before the General Court, that application must for reasons connected with the right to effective judicial protection be declared admissible.

The fact that an application for interim measures made in connection with an appeal against a judgment of the General Court, which dismissed action for annulment of a Commission decision finding State aid to be incompatible with the internal market and ordering its recovery, seeks suspension of operation of that decision and thus goes beyond suspension of operation of the judgment under appeal does not make that application inadmissible.

The requirement of a prima facie case is satisfied if, at the stage of the proceedings for interim relief, there is a major legal or factual disagreement whose resolution is not immediately obvious, so that the action is not prima facie without reasonable substance. Since the purpose of the interim proceedings is to guarantee that the final decision to be taken is fully effective, in order to avoid a lacuna in the legal protection ensured by the Court, the judge hearing the application for interim relief must restrict himself to assessing ‘prima facie’ the merits of the grounds put forward in the main proceedings in order to ascertain whether the action has a sufficiently probable chance of success.

As regards an application for interim measures made in connection with appeal proceedings against a judgment of the General Court dismissing an action for annulment brought against a Commission decision declaring State aid to be incompatible with the internal market and ordering its recovery, the fact that that application is for the grant of suspension of operation of the decision at issue, and not of the judgment under appeal, entails consequences for the assessment as to whether there is a prima facie case.

However serious the pleas and arguments put forward by the appellant against the judgment under appeal may be, they cannot suffice to justify, prima facie, in law suspension of operation of the act in question before the General Court. In order to establish that the condition relating to a prima facie case is satisfied, the applicant must succeed in showing, in addition, that the pleas and arguments relied on against the legality of that act in the action for annulment are such as to justify, prima facie, the grant of the suspension of operation sought, despite the fact that a European Union court has already examined them and held them to be unfounded.

(see paras 20-22, 24)
3.

Appeals — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted — Plea alleging a distortion of the facts — Necessity of indicating precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted and showing the errors of appraisal which led to that distortion (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 168(1)(d)) (see para. 43)
1.

Appeals — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see para. 26)
Order of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 3 September 2015 —

Orrego Arias

(Case C‑456/14) ( 1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Area of freedom, security and justice — Directive 2001/40/EC — Mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third country nationals — Article 3(1)(a) — Concept of ‘offence punishable by a penalty involving deprivation of liberty of at least one year’ — Decision on the expulsion of a third country national owing to a criminal conviction — Situation which is not covered by Directive 2001/40 — Manifest lack of jurisdiction’

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Limits — Jurisdiction of the national court — Establishing and assessing the facts of the dispute — Necessity of a question referred and relevance of the questions raised — Assessment by the national court — Clearly irrelevant questions and hypothetical questions put in a context not permitting a useful answer — Questions bearing no relation to the subject matter of the case in the main proceedings (Art. 267 TFEU) (see paras 15-20, 24-26)

Operative part

The Court of Justice of the European Union manifestly lacks jurisdiction to answer the question referred by the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha (Spain) by decision of 4 September 2014 (Case C‑456/14).

( 1 ) OJ C 439, 8.12.2014.
6.

Fundamental rights — Right to effective judicial protection — Review of the legality of EU measures — Procedures — Protection of that right by the Courts of the European Union or by the national courts and tribunals according to the legal nature of the contested act — Possibility of using an action for annulation or a reference for a preliminary ruling on validity (Arts 6(1) TEU and 19(1) TEU; Arts 263, fourth para., TFEU, 267 TFEU and277 TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts 47, 51(1) and 52(7)) (see para. 63)
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 17 December 2015 —

YARA Brunsbüttel

(Case C‑529/14) ( 1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Directive 2003/96/EC — Taxation of energy products and electricity — Article 2(4)(b) — Concept of dual use of energy products — Energy product used for the heat treatment of waste and exhaust gases’

1. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Questions the answer to which may be clearly deduced from the Court’s existing case-law — Application of Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court (Art. 267 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 99) (see paras 20, 21)

2. Tax provisions — Harmonisation of laws — Taxation of energy products and electricity — Directive 2003/96 — Scope — Concept of dual use of energy products — Natural gas used, first, for superheating and drying steam which is then used in the ammonia production process and, secondly, for the thermal decomposition and drawing off of residual gases created by that process — Not included — Grant of a tax exemption — Conditions (Council Directive 2003/96, Art. 2(4)(b), as amended by Directive 2004/75) (see paras 28-31, operative part)

Operative part

Article 2(4)(b) of Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity, as amended by Council Directive 2004/75/EC of 29 April 2004, must be interpreted as meaning that the natural gas used, first, for superheating and drying steam which is then used in the ammonia production process and, secondly, for the thermal decomposition and drawing off of residual gases created by that process, does not constitute, for the purpose of that provision, an energy product that has a dual use to which that directive does not apply. Consequently, the Member States may grant a tax exemption for the use of such an energy product only in so far as that exemption complies with the obligations laid down in Directive 2003/96, as amended by Directive 2004/75.

( 1 ) OJ C 65, 23.2.2015.
Judicial proceedings—Costs—Taxation—Recoverable costs—Elements to be taken into consideration—Fees payable by the parties to their own lawyers—Determination of the fees that may be recovered from the party ordered to pay the costs

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 144(b))

(see para. 11)
1.

Judicial proceedings — General Court seised under an arbitration clause — Contract granting EU assistance for a project in the area of research, technological development and demonstration — Request for reimbursement of subsidies paid after the finding of irregularities — Counterclaim with claim for default interest — Assessment of the merits — Taking account of the terms of the contract at issue (Arts 256(1) TFEU and 272 TFEU) (see para. 40)
8

Articles 1 to 3 of the operative part of the decision at issue are worded as follows: ‘Article 1 1. The compensation paid by [ELGA] to producers of agricultural products in 2008 and 2009 constitutes State aid. 2. The compensation aid granted in 2008 under the special compulsory insurance scheme is compatible with the internal market as regards the aid amounting to EUR 349 493 652.03 which ELGA granted to producers to make good their crop losses and as regards the aid relating to crop losses caused by bears amounting to EUR 91 500 and the corrective action taken within the framework of the abovementioned aid. The compensation aid represented by the remaining amount paid in 2008 under the special insurance scheme is incompatible with the internal market. 3. The compensation aid of EUR 27 614 905 granted in 2009 under Common Ministerial Decree No 262037 of the Ministers of Economic Affairs and of Rural Development of 30 January 2009 is compatible with the internal market. The compensation aid of EUR 387 404 547 granted to producers on dates before 28 October 2009 is incompatible with the internal market. This conclusion shall be without prejudice to aid which, at the time it was granted, met all the conditions laid down in [Commission Regulation (EC) No 1535/2007 of 20 December 2007 on the application of Articles [107 and 108 TFEU] to de minimis aid in the sector of agricultural production (OJ 2007 L 337, p. 35)]. Article 2 1. [The Hellenic Republic] shall take all measures necessary to recover from its beneficiaries the incompatible aid referred to in Article 1, which was granted unlawfully. 2. The aid to be recovered shall include interest calculated from the date on which it was placed at the disposal of the beneficiaries until the date of its recovery. … 4. Recovery shall be effected without delay in accordance with the procedures provided for in national law, provided that they allow the immediate and effective execution of this Decision. Article 3 Recovery of the aid referred to in Article 1(2) and (3) shall be immediate and effective. [The Hellenic Republic] shall ensure that this Decision is implemented within 4 months of the date of its notification.’
10

Paragraph 18 of the Law on emissions trading, entitled ‘Enforcement of the Obligation to Surrender Allowances’ provides, in subparagraphs (1) to (3): ‘(1) Where the responsible person fails to comply with his obligation under Article 6(1), the competent authority shall impose, for every tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent emitted with respect to which the responsible person has failed to surrender allowances, a financial penalty of EUR 100, or of EUR 40 during the first allocation period. A financial penalty may not be imposed where the responsible person is unable to comply with his obligation under Article 6(1) as a result of force majeure. (2) Insofar as the responsible person fails to properly report emissions caused by his activity, the competent authority shall estimate the emissions caused by the activity in the preceding year. The estimate is an irrebuttable basis for the obligation under Article 6(1). The estimate shall not apply where the responsible person complies with his obligation to report in the context of the hearing relating to the notice of assessment. (3) The operator responsible shall remain subject to the obligation to surrender the missing allowances, in the cases covered by subparagraph (2) in accordance with the estimate, by 30 April of the following year ... ‘