ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
3.

Should Article 6(4) of the Return Directive be interpreted as meaning that, if an unaccompanied minor does not comply with his obligation to return and the Member State does not and will not undertake any concrete actions to proceed with removal, the obligation to return should be suspended and lawful residence should be granted? Should Article 8(1) of the Return Directive be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State imposes a return decision on an unaccompanied minor without then undertaking any removal actions until the unaccompanied minor reaches the age of eighteen, that must be considered to be contrary to the principle of loyalty and the principle of sincere cooperation in the Union?
3.

Must Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that, where — a person who has had imposed upon him by the competent authority of a Member State an administrative financial penalty for non-compliance with an administrative decision, requiring him to provide information in connection with an exchange of information between national tax authorities pursuant to Directive 2011/16, where the national law of the requested Member State does not make provision for an action to be brought against the latter decision, and where the person concerned has challenged the legality of that decision within an action brought against the financial penalty, and — has only obtained disclosure of the minimal information referred to in Article 20(2) of Directive 2011/16 in the course of the judicial procedure set in motion by the bringing of that action, that person is entitled, in the event of a definitive incidental finding upholding the validity of the decision requiring the requested information and of the decision imposing a fine on him, to a period of grace for the payment of that fine, so that he has an opportunity, having thus been given disclosure of the material supporting the contention — definitively accepted by the competent court — that the test of foreseeable relevance is met, to comply with the decision requiring the requested information?
1.

Must Article 4(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Directive be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of an application for registration of a trade mark which characterises services and where the application relates to a sign, placed in a particular position, which covers large areas of the physical objects used to perform the services, it must be assessed whether the mark is not independent of the appearance of the objects concerned?
1.

Must Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts (1) be interpreted as precluding the legislation of a Member State, with an objective of promoting accountability in public procurement, from not giving an economic operator that has been convicted by final judgment of an offence of specific gravity, and that, on that ground, is the subject of a measure prohibiting it from participating in a procedure for procurement by a concession contract for a period of five years, the opportunity of providing evidence to the effect that the measures it has taken are sufficient to demonstrate its reliability despite the existence of that ground for exclusion?
2.

Should Article 49, 56, 45, 34, 35, 101 or 102 of the TFEU, whether or not in conjunction with Article 106(1) of the TFEU, be interpreted as precluding the rule introduced by Article 4(1), subparagraphs 2, 3, 6 and 8 of the Royal Decree of 5 July 2004 as replaced or inserted respectively by Article 4, subparagraphs 2, 3, 4 and 6 of the contested Koninklijk Besluit van 10 juli 2016 (Royal Decree of July 10, 2016), namely, the rule that lays down as a condition for recognition as a docker that the worker (a) has been declared medically fit by the external service for prevention and protection at the work with which the employer organisation designated as an agent under Article 3a of the Wet van 8 juni 1972‘betreffende de havenarbeid’ (Law of 8 June 1972‘organising dock work’) is associated, and (b) has passed the psychotechnical tests conducted by the body designated for that purpose by the recognised employer organisation designated as an agent under the same Article 3a of the Wet van 8 juni 1972, (c) has attended for three weeks the preparatory courses on safety at work and the attainment of professional competence and has passed the final test and (d) already be in possession of an employment contract in the case of a docker who is not included in the pool, which, read in conjunction with Article 4(3) of the Royal Decree of 5 July 2004, means that foreign dockers must be able to prove that they satisfies comparable conditions in another Member State so that, for the purpose of the application of the contested rule, they are no longer subject to those conditions?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Schwerin (Germany) lodged on 8 May 2019 — FD v Staatliches Amt für Landwirtschaft und Umwelt Mittleres Mecklenburg

(Case C-365/19)

(2019/C 288/26)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgericht Schwerin

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: FD

Defendant: Staatliches Amt für Landwirtschaft und Umwelt Mittleres Mecklenburg

Question referred

Does Article 30(6) of Regulation (EU) 1307/2013 (1) — possibly in conjunction with Article 28(2) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 639/2014 (2) — establish a legal right to allocation of payment entitlements for the 2016 claim year for a young farmer even when, on the basis of Article 24 of Regulation (EU) 1307/2013, he has already been allocated payment entitlements free of charge from the 2015 national ceiling corresponding to his area of land at that time?

(1) Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 637/2008 and Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 (OJ 2013 L 347, p. 608).

(2) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 639/2014 of 11 March 2014 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy and amending Annex X to that Regulation (OJ 2014 L 181, p. 1).
2.

Is Article 2(2) of that decision to be interpreted as meaning that a mobile satellite system must be principally based on a satellite element, or can the view be taken, on a correct interpretation of that provision, that it is immaterial what the respective roles of the satellite and ground elements may be, even where the satellite element serves a purpose only where communication with the ground element is impossible? Can complementary ground components covering the entire territory of the European Union be installed on the basis that communications with the space stations cannot be ensured with the required quality in any respect, within the meaning of Article 2(2)(b) of the same decision?
If the first question is answered in the affirmative and the second question is answered in the negative:

Can a legal act of a Member State whose currency is the euro which is adopted in the context of the European Union’s exclusive competence in the area of monetary policy be applied to the extent to which, and for so long as, the European Union has not made use of its competence?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 6 May 2019 — Telecom Italia SpA and Others v Roma Capitale and Others

(Case C-368/19)

(2019/C 312/03)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: Telecom Italia SpA, Wind Tre SpA, Vodafone Italia SpA and Lindam Srl

Respondents: Roma Capitale, Regione Lazio, Vodafone Italia SpA, Telecom Italia SpA, Wind Tre SpA and Wind Telecomunicazioni SpA

Question referred

Does EU law preclude a provision of national legislation, such as Article 8(6) of legge 22 febbraio 2001, n. 36 (Law No 36 of 22 February 2001), which is understood and applied as allowing individual local authorities to define siting criteria for mobile telephone apparatus, which may be expressed in the form of prohibitions, such as a prohibition on placing antennae in specific areas or within a certain distance of a certain type of building?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 17 July 2019 by ABLV Bank AS against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 6 May 2019 in Case T-281/18: ABLV Bank v European Central Bank (ECB)

(Case C-551/19 P)

(2019/C 305/34)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: ABLV Bank AS (represented by: O.H. Behrends, M. Kirchner, Rechtsanwälte)

Other party to the proceedings: European Central Bank (ECB)

Forms of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the order of the General Court of 6 May 2019 in case T-281/18;

— declare that the application for annulment is admissible;

— refer the case back to the General Court for it to determine the action for annulment; and

— order the ECB to pay the appellant's costs and the costs of the appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellant puts forward two pleas in law in support of its appeal:

1) That the General Court erred in law and violated Art. 263 TFEU by failing to base its order on the decision which the ECB actually adopted.

2) That the order under appeal is based on an incorrect interpretation of Art. 18(1) SRMR (1).

(1) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014, L 225, p. 1).
1.

Is the term ‘resting place’ within the meaning of Article 12(1)(d) of the Habitats Directive (1) to be interpreted as also including former resting places that have since been abandoned? If the answer to that question is in the affirmative: Is every former resting place that has since been abandoned a ‘resting place’ within the meaning of Article 12(1)(d) of the Habitats Directive? If the answer to that question is in the negative: Which factors determine whether a former resting place that has since been abandoned is a ‘resting place’ within the meaning of Article 12(1)(d) of the Habitats Directive?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 22 July 2019 — Société Eco TLC v Ministre de la transition écologique et solidaire

(Case C-556/19)

(2019/C 328/32)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Société Eco TLC

Defendant: Ministre de la transition écologique et solidaire

Other party: Fédération des entreprises du recyclage

Question referred

Must Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that a system such as that described in paragraphs 9 to 11, whereby a private, non-profit eco-body, approved by the public authorities, receives contributions from those who place on the market a particular category of product and who enter into a contract with it to that effect, in return for a service consisting in the organisation on their behalf of the treatment of the waste from those products, and redistributes to operators responsible for the sorting and recovery of that waste, subsidies the amount of which is set out in the approval, in the light of environmental and social targets, is to be regarded as State aid within the meaning of that provision?
1.

(a) Does an entry ban issued against a third-country national for purposes ‘not related to migration’ come within the scope of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, (1) at any rate if the Member State has not made use of the option under Article 2(2)(b) of that directive? (b) If Question 1(a) is answered in the negative: Does such an entry ban not come under Directive 2008/115/EC if the third-country national is already staying illegally regardless of an expulsion order issued against him, to which the entry ban is linked, and therefore in principle comes within the scope of the Directive? (c) Do entry bans issued for purposes ‘not related to migration’ include entry bans issued in connection with an expulsion ordered for reasons of public safety and order (in this case: solely on general preventive grounds with the objective of combating terrorism)?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d’appel (Luxembourg) lodged on 25 July 2019 — Parquet général du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg v JR

(Case C-566/19)

(2019/C 337/09)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour d’appel

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Parquet général du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg

Defendant: JR

Questions referred

Can the French Public Prosecutor’s Office at the investigating court or trial court, which has jurisdiction in France, under the law of that State, to issue a European arrest warrant, be considered to be an issuing judicial authority, within the autonomous meaning of that term in Article 6(1) of Council Framework Decision No 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002, (1) in circumstances where, deemed to monitor compliance with the conditions necessary for the issue of a European arrest warrant and to examine whether such a warrant is proportionate in relation to the details of the criminal file, it is, at the same time, the authority responsible for the criminal prosecution in the same case?

(1) Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States — Statements made by certain Member States on the adoption of the Framework Decision (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 28 June 2019 by Victor Lupu against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 30 April 2019 in Case T-558/18: Lupu v EUIPO - Et Djili Soy Dzhihangir Ibryam (Djili DS)

(Case C-499/19 P)

(2019/C 357/17)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Victor Lupu (represented by: P.A. Acsinte, avocat)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Et Djili Soy Dzhihangir Ibryam

By order of 5 September 2019 the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 3 July 2019 — Go Sun Srl, Malby Energy 4 Srl v Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico and Others

(Case C-512/19)

(2019/C 357/19)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Go Sun Srl, Malby Energy 4 Srl

Defendants: Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Autorità di Regolazione per l’Energia, Reti e Ambiente, Gestore dei Servizi Energetici SpA — GSE

Questions referred

Does EU law preclude the application of a provision of national law, such as that in Article 26(3) of Decree-Law No 91/2014, as converted by Law No 116/2014, which significantly reduces the payment of incentives already granted by law and defined on the basis of corresponding agreements concluded by undertakings generating electrical energy by means of photovoltaic conversion with Gestore dei servizi energetici s.p.a, a public company responsible for that process?

In particular, is that provision of national law compatible with the general principles of EU law relating to legitimate expectation, legal certainty, sincere cooperation and effectiveness, with Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, with Directive 2009/28/EC (1) and with the rules governing support schemes laid down in that directive, and with Article 216(2) TFEU, in particular in relation to the European Energy Charter Treaty?

(1) Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (OJ 2009 L 140, p. 16).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia (Spain) lodged on 8 July 2019 — CB v Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Regional de Galicia

(Case C-521/19)

(2019/C 363/11)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: CB

Defendant: Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Regional de Galicia

Questions referred

Must Articles 73 and 78 of the VAT Directive, (1) in the light of the principles of neutrality, prohibition of tax evasion and abuse of rights, and prohibition of the illegal distortion of competition, be interpreted as precluding national legislation and the case-law interpreting it, pursuant to which, where the tax authorities discover concealed transactions subject to value added tax for which no invoice was issued, the price agreed by the parties for those transactions must be regarded as already including value added tax?

Is it therefore possible, in cases of fraud in which the transaction was concealed from the tax authorities, to consider, as may be deduced from the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 28 July 2016 (Case C-332/15, Astone (2)), of 5 October 2016 (Case C-576/15, Marinova (3)) and of 7 March 2018 (C-159/17, Dobre (4)), that the amounts paid and received do not include value added tax in order to conduct the proper assessment and impose the appropriate penalty?

(1) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).

(2) Judgment of 28 July 2016, Astone (C-332/15, EU:C:2016:614).

(3) Judgment of 5 October 2016, Marinova (C-576/15, EU:C:2016:740).

(4) Judgment of 7 March 2018, Dobre (C-159/17, EU:C:2018:161).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha (Spain) lodged on 11 July 2019 — SR v Subdelegación del Gobierno en Ciudad Real

(Case C-534/19)

(2019/C 372/12)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: SR

Defendant: Subdelegación del Gobierno en Ciudad Real

Question referred

Is an interpretation such as that set out in judgments of the Spanish Supreme Court No 191/2019 of 19 February 2019, appeal in cassation 5607/2017 (ECLI:ES:TS:2019:580), and No 257/2019 of 27 February 2019, appeal in cassation 5809/2017 (ECLI:ES:TS:2019:663), according to which, through an interpretation of Directive 2001/40/EC, (1) it is possible to come to the conclusion that any third-country national holding a long-term residence permit who has committed an offence punishable by a sentence of at least one year in duration can and should be ‘automatically’ removed, that is to say, [without] needing to give any consideration to his personal, family, social or employment circumstances, compatible with Article 12 of Council [Directive] 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, (2) and with — inter alia — the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 7 December 2017 (Case C-636/16 (3)) and of 8 December 2011 (Case C-371/08 (4))?

(1) Council Directive 2001/40/EC of 28 May 2001 on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third country nationals (OJ 2001 L 149, p. 34).

(2) OJ 2004 L 16, p. 44.

(3) Judgment of 7 December 2017, López Pastuzano (C-636/16, EU:C:2017:949).

(4) Judgment of 8 December 2011, Ziebell (C-371/08, EU:C:2011:809).
4.

Whether Article 6(1) and Article 17 of Directive 2003/109 should be interpreted as meaning that, under the case-law established by the Court of Justice that directives have vertical direct effect, the national court has authority to apply the content of Article 6(1) and Article 17 directly, and may do so in order to assess a criminal record, having regard to the gravity of the offence, the length of the sentence, and the danger represented by the applicant.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha (Spain) lodged on 25 July 2019 — LP v Subdelegación del Gobierno en Toledo

(Case C-567/19)

(2019/C 372/18)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: LP

Defendant: Subdelegación del Gobierno en Toledo

Question referred

Is an interpretation such as that set out in judgments of the Spanish Supreme Court No 191/2019 of 19 February 2019, appeal in cassation 5607/2017 (ECLI:ES:TS:2019:580), and No 257/2019 of 27 February 2019, appeal in cassation 5809/2017 (ECLI:ES:TS:2019:663), according to which, through an interpretation of Directive 2001/40/EC, (1) it is possible to come to the conclusion that any third-country national holding a long-term residence permit who has committed an offence punishable by a sentence of at least one year in duration can and should be ‘automatically’ removed, that is to say, [without] needing to give any consideration to his personal, family, social or employment circumstances, compatible with Article 12 of Council [Directive] 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, (2) and with — inter alia — the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 7 December 2017 (Case C-636/16 (3)) and of 8 December 2011 (Case C-371/08 (4))?

(1) Council Directive 2001/40/EC of 28 May 2001 on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third country nationals (OJ 2001 L 149, p. 34).

(2) OJ 2004 L 16, p. 44.

(3) Judgment of 7 December 2017, López Pastuzano (C-636/16, EU:C:2017:949).

(4) Judgment of 8 December 2011, Ziebell (C-371/08, EU:C:2011:809).
2.

If the answer to the first question is in the negative: has the condition been met that the decision of the Public Prosecutor to issue an EAW and, in particular, the question of its proportionality, must be capable of being the subject of court proceedings which meet in full the requirements inherent in effective judicial protection as referred to in paragraph 75 of the judgment of the Court of Justice of 27 May 2019 (Cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:456) if, after his actual surrender, the requested person can avail of a legal remedy under which the invalidity of the EAW may be invoked before a court in the issuing Member State and under which that court examines, inter alia, whether the decision to issue that EAW was proportionate?
2.

Second ground of appeal — Manifest error of assessment and error in law in relation to the alleged infringement of Article 23 of Regulation No 1/2003 By the second ground of appeal, the appellants claim that the General Court manifestly erred in law by rejecting the plea relating to the incorrect application of the 10 % limit laid down in Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, in that the Commission applied that limit to a turnover different to the consolidated turnover, calculated on the basis of the EU accounting consolidation rules. Moreover, the General Court infringed the principles of proportionality and adequacy because of the unacceptable difference in treatment, for the purpose of the calculation of the consolidated turnover referred to in Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, of, on the one hand, the areas of activity which were transferred on a definitive basis and, on the other hand, those which were leased, on the ground of a presumed difference in terms of economic and substantial profitability.