ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
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Summary



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1 Applications for interim measures - Conditions for admissibility - Admissibility of the main action - Irrelevant - Limits

(EC Treaty, Art. 185; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(1))

2 Applications for interim measures - Suspension of operation of a measure - Conditions for granting - Serious and irreparable damage - Meaning - Onus of proof

(EC Treaty, Art. 185; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2); Commission Regulation No 228/96)

Summary

3 The admissibility of the main action must not as a matter of principle be examined in a procedure for interim measures. It must be reserved for the examination of the main application, unless it is apparent at first sight that the latter is manifestly inadmissible, so as not to prejudge the Court's decision on the substance of the case.

4 The urgency of the adoption of interim measures must be considered by examining whether the implementation of the contested measures, prior to the adoption of the decision of the Community judicature on the main issue, is such as to give rise, for the party requesting the measures, to serious and irreparable damage which could not be made good if the contested decision were annulled or which, despite its interim nature, would be disproportionate to the defendant's interest in having the measures implemented, even when they are the subject of legal proceedings. It is for the applicant to prove that those conditions are satisfied.

An application for interim measures seeking the suspension of the operation of a decision adopted in connection with the implementation of Regulation No 228/96, whereby the Commission determined the criteria for substituting peaches and apricots for the apples and oranges initially envisaged as payment for the supply of fruit juice and fruit jams for the people of Armenia and Azerbaijan, must be rejected where the applicant has failed to adduce any evidence to support its claims to the effect that the adoption of the contested decision would result in serious distortion of competition in the market in the industrial processing of peaches, causing serious and irreparable damage.
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Procedure - Costs - Taxation - Recoverable costs - Matters to be taken into consideration - Intervener

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 91(b))

Summary

$$The Community judicature is not empowered to tax the fees payable by the parties to their own lawyers but to determine the part of that remuneration which may be recovered from the party ordered to pay the costs. In that regard, as Community law does not lay down any provisions on scales of costs, the Community judicature must freely assess the circumstances of the case, taking into account the subject-matter and nature of the dispute, its importance in terms of Community law and the difficulties of the case, the extent of the work which the proceedings before the Court could have caused to the agents or advisers acting in the case and the economic interests which the dispute represented for the parties. To this end, it does not have to take account of a national scale of costs fixing lawyers' fees or any agreement concluded in this respect between the party concerned and its agents or advisers.

As regards taxation of the costs of an intervener, account must be taken of the fact that, as a general rule, the procedural task of an intervener is significantly aided by the work of the main party in support of which it has intervened. As an intervention is, by its nature, subordinate to the main action, it cannot therefore present as many difficulties as that action, save in exceptional cases.

Finally, although in principle the remuneration of a single lawyer may be regarded as falling within the concept of expenses necessarily incurred within the meaning of Article 91(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, the primary consideration is none the less the total number of hours of work which may appear to be objectively necessary for the purpose of the proceedings before the Court, irrespective of the number of lawyers who may have provided the services in question.

( see paras 18-20, 28 )
Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 14 October 1996. - Valio Oy v Commission of the European Communities. - Application for interim measures - Admissibility - Common agricultural policy - Standards for spreadable fats - Prohibition of the use of reserved sales descriptions - Application - Division of powers between the Commission and the national authorities. - Case T-137/96 R.



European Court reports 1996 Page II-01327



Summary



Keywords

Applications for interim measures - Conditions of admissibility - Admissibility of the main action - Not relevant - Limits - Main application seeking annulment of a decision allegedly contained in a letter from the Commission interpreting a provision of a regulation - Commission not having decision-making power because of the exclusive competence of the Member States to implement the provision in question - Inadmissible

(EC Treaty, Art. 185; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(1); Council Regulation No 2991/94)

Summary

In principle, the issue of the admissibility of the main action should not be examined in proceedings relating to an application for interim measures. It should be reserved for the examination of the main application, so as not to prejudge the Court's decision on the substance of the case, unless it is apparent at first sight that the main action is manifestly inadmissible.

That is so in the case of an application for annulment of a `decision' contained in a letter from the Commission addressed to a Member State, relating to the interpretation of a provision of Regulation No 2991/94 laying down standards for spreadable fats, a provision whose implementation is within the exclusive competence of the Member States. In so far as neither the content nor the form nor the context of such a letter suggests a decision taken by the Commission in the exercise of its competence to adopt the detailed rules for the application of that regulation, the letter merely constitutes an opinion which is not binding on the national authorities, and cannot therefore be regarded as a decision capable of affecting the applicant's legal position. It is for the applicant, if the national authorities adopt the non-binding interpretation suggested by the Commission, to make use at the appropriate time of the remedies available in national law to challenge in the national courts the measures taken with respect to it, with the national court being able to refer, if appropriate, the question of the interpretation or validity of the regulation to the Court of Justice.

Since it is ancillary to a main application which is prima facie inadmissible, the application for suspension of operation of the `decision' contained in that letter must be dismissed.
Order of the Court of First Instance (Fourth Chamber) of 19 February 1997. - Paolo Salvatore Affatato v Commission of the European Communities. - Legal aid. - Case T-157/96 AJ.



European Court reports 1997 Page II-00155

Page IA-00033

Page II-00093



Summary



Keywords

Procedure - Application for legal aid - Lodging of the application without the assistance of a lawyer subsequent to the initiation of proceedings by a lawyer - Admissible

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 94(2), second subpara.)

Summary

Under the second subparagraph of Article 94(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, an application for legal aid need not be made through a lawyer. That exemption applies not only where the application is made prior to the proceedings which the applicant wishes to commence, but also where it is made after the proceedings have been initiated by a lawyer.
Order of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) of 3 October 1997. - Mutual Aid Administration Services NV v Commission of the European Communities. - Tendering procedure for the transport of free supplies of agricultural products intended for the peoples of Armenia and Azerbaijan - Commission`s refusal to pay to the successful tenderer the whole of the price claimed - Action for annulment - Action constituting, in reality,an action for performance of a transport contract - Manifest lack of jurisdiction of the Court of first Instance - Manifest inadmissibility of the action for annulment. - Case T-186/96.



European Court reports 1997 Page II-01633



Summary



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Actions for annulment - Action constituting, in reality, an action for performance of a contract - Lack of jurisdiction of the Community judicature - Action brought by a successful tenderer for the transport of food aid - Inadmissible

(EC Treaty, Arts 173, 181 and 183)

Summary

In the absence of an arbitration clause within the meaning of Article 181 of the Treaty, the Court of First Instance manifestly lacks jurisdiction, when proceedings for annulment are brought before it on the basis of Article 173 of the Treaty, to adjudicate on an action which, in reality, constitutes a claim for performance based in contract. For the Court to do so would be to extend its jurisdiction beyond the limits placed by Article 183 of the Treaty on the disputes of which it may take cognizance, since that article specifically gives national courts or tribunals ordinary jurisdiction over disputes to which the Community is a party.

Consequently, proceedings for annulment brought by a successful tenderer for the transport of food aid to third countries against the Commission's refusal to pay it the whole of the transportation price are manifestly inadmissible, since an application of that kind, although lodged on the basis of Article 173 of the Treaty, constitutes, in reality, an action for performance of a contract concluded between the tenderer and the Commission for the transport of the supplies in issue.
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Actions for annulment - Actionable measures - Refusal of the Commission to initiate the procedure for failure to fulfil obligations - Not included

(EC Treaty, Art. 169)

Summary

An action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person in respect of a refusal on the part of the Commission to initiate the procedure for failure to fulfil obligations is inadmissible.

Such a refusal is not actionable both because under Article 169 of the Treaty the Commission is not bound to initiate such a procedure - it has, rather, a discretionary power precluding the right of individuals to require it to adopt a particular position or to bring an action for annulment against its refusal to take action - and because the only act which could be refused would be a reasoned opinion, which itself cannot form the subject-matter of proceedings for annulment.
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Procedure - Costs - Discontinuance justified by the conduct of the other party

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 87(5), first subpara.)
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Actions for annulment - Action contesting a regulation imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty - Supervening regulation imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty - Effects on the interest in bringing an action

(EC Treaty, Art. 173)

Summary

An importer cannot rely on any legal effect arising from a regulation imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty in order to establish an interest in challenging it before the Community judicature, if the amounts which it had to pay under that provisional regulation have been definitively collected at the rate laid down by the definitive regulation and the amounts which exceeded that rate, or related to products no longer affected by the anti-dumping duty, have been definitively released.
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Summary



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1. Actions for annulment - Action contesting a decision implementing an annulled decision authorising State aid - Adoption by the Commission of a fresh decision authorising the aid which replaces, but does not confirm, the contested implementing decision - Interest in continuing an action for the annulment of the implementing decision - No subsisting interest

(EC Treaty, Art. 173 (now, after amendment, Art. 230 EC))

2. Procedure - Amendment of the pleadings in the course of the proceedings - Detailed rules - Mere manifestation of an intention to contest an act - Insufficient to constitute an amendment of the pleadings

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 44)

Summary

1. Where a Commission decision authorising State aid has been annulled in its entirety by the Community judicature, the effect of that annulment is to remove the legal basis and raison d'être for every implementing decision by which the Commission authorised payment of the various tranches of the aid in question. An act by which the Commission subsequently reaffirms that the aid is compatible with the common market and renews authorisation for payment of the various tranches must be regarded as an autonomous act replacing the earlier authorisation decisions, not as an act which merely confirms them.

Adoption of that new act - which is an instrument creating or altering legal rights and therefore amounts to a new act so far as concerns authorisation of payment of the tranches - causes an applicant to lose all legitimate interest in continuing an action directed to obtaining annulment of the earlier decision authorising payment of a tranche of aid.

( see paras 32-36 )

2. Just as it cannot take the place of an application in conformity with the requirements of Article 44 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, a mere manifestation of an intention of challenging a particular act cannot be treated as an amendment of the pleadings in an action in progress, an option open to applicants in special circumstances and by way of exception.

( see para. 41 )
Order of the Court of First Instance (First Chamber, extended composition) of 29 September 1997. - Roberto D'Orazio and Pierre Hublau v Commission of the European Communities. - State aid - Aid to the steel sector - Action for annulment - Article 33 of the ECSC Treaty - Inadmissibility. - Case T-4/97.



European Court reports 1997 Page II-01505



Summary



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Actions for annulment - Action seeking annulment of a decision adopted under the ECSC Treaty - Action brought by the chairman of a trade union committee of an undertaking - Inadmissible

(ECSC Treaty, Art. 33; EC Treaty, Art. 173)

Summary

The chairman of a trade union committee of an undertaking concerned by a decision adopted under the ECSC Treaty is not entitled to bring an action seeking annulment of that decision, since such persons are not referred to by Article 33 of the ECSC Treaty, which provides an exhaustive list of the persons entitled to bring an action for annulment, and Article 173 of the EC Treaty cannot apply to such an action.
Order of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) of 13 February 1998. - Guérin automobiles v Commission of the European Communities. - Competition - Action for annulment - Time-limit for bringing proceedings - Manifest inadmissibility of the application. - Case T-276/97.



European Court reports 1998 Page II-00261



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Actions for annulment - Time-limits - Mandatory - Point from which time starts to run - Notification - Purely formal errors irrelevant

(EC Treaty, Art. 173)

Summary

The two-month time-limit for bringing an action laid down by Article 173 of the Treaty is a matter of public policy which was established in order to ensure that legal positions are clear and certain and to avoid discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice. The Court of First Instance may determine of its own motion whether it has been complied with.

In that context, an error in the description of the addressee of a decision which is the subject of an action for annulment is a purely formal error which cannot in any event prevent the application of the time-limits laid down by the Treaty, provided that the addressee of the contested decision was able to see that it was addressed to him.
ORDER OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Second Chamber)

19 February 2004

Case T-300/97 DEP

Benito Latino

v

Commission of the European Communities

(Procedure ─ Taxation of costs)

Full text in French II - 0000

Application: for taxation of costs following the judgment of the Court of 15 December 1999 in Case T-300/97 Latino v Commission [1999] ECR-SC I-A-259 and II-1263.

Held: The total amount of costs recoverable pursuant to the judgment of 15 December 1999 in Case T-300/97 Latino v Commission is set at EUR 11 000.

Summary

Procedure – Costs – Taxation – Recoverable costs – Concept – Factors to be taken into account – Costs arising from a change of adviser during the procedure – Precluded except where the initial adviser could not be retained

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 91)

Since Community law does not contain any provisions laying down a scale of fees, the Community judicature must consider, in connection with the taxation of costs, all the facts of the case, taking into account the purpose and nature of the proceedings, their significance from the point of view of Community law, as well as the difficulties presented by the case, the amount of work generated by the dispute for the agents and advisers involved and the financial interest which the parties had in the proceedings. The Community judicature alone has jurisdiction to determine the amount owed by the losing party to the successful party in recoverable costs. It need not take account of any national scale of fees for lawyers or of any agreement concluded on the subject between the party concerned and his agents or advisers.

The costs and additional fees incurred by a party as a result of a change of adviser between the conclusion of the written procedure and the hearing may be regarded as recoverable costs within the meaning of Article 91(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance only if that change was justified by reasons which made it impossible for the initial adviser to continue to perform his duties.

(see paras 12, 15, 19)

See: 318/82 DEP Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek v Commission [1985] ECR 3727, paras 2 and 3; T-94/96 DEP Hagleitner v Commission, not published in the ECR, para. 11
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

Applications for interim measures - Suspension of operation of a measure - Conditions for granting - Urgency - Serious and irreparable damage - Burden of proof - Applicant's interest in obtaining the suspension requested

(EC Treaty, Art. 185; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2))

Summary

When deciding whether to grant interim measures, it is necessary to ascertain whether the applicant has established an interest in obtaining the measures requested.

Furthermore, the urgency of an application for interim measures must be assessed in relation to the necessity for an interim order to prevent serious and irreparable damage to the party applying for those measures. It is for the party seeking suspension of the operation of a contested decision to prove that it cannot wait for the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering damage that would entail serious and irreparable consequences. In this connection, the risk of harm which is dependent on the occurrence of a number of factors must be established with a sufficient degree of probability.
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1 Procedure - Time-limits for bringing proceedings - Mandatory - Time-barred - Excusable error - Meaning

(ECSC Treaty, Art. 33)

2 Procedure - Requirement as to the facts to be adduced - Facts adduced must be specific and detailed

Summary

1 The period prescribed for bringing an action for annulment is mandatory and is not subject to the discretion of the parties or the Court, since it was established in order to ensure that legal positions are clear and certain and to avoid any discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice. The notion of excusable error by virtue of which it may be possible to obtain an extension of the mandatory time-limit concerns only exceptional circumstances in which, in particular, the conduct of the institution concerned has been, either alone or to a decisive extent, such as to give rise to a pardonable confusion in the mind of the party concerned.

2 A party may only put forward, in support of its claims, facts which are sufficiently specific and detailed for the Court to regard them, at the very least, as credible and to enable the opposing party to contest them in an effective manner and, if appropriate, to submit evidence in rebuttal. That requirement as to the facts to be adduced, which relates to matters known only to the applicants, ensures that the Court does not come to rule on circumstances which are purely theoretical or are contrived solely for the purposes of the action.
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Procedure - Application initiating proceedings - Formal requirements - Application signed by a lawyer not authorised to practise before a court of a Member State or of a State which is a party to the European Economic Area Agreement - Inadmissible

(EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 17, third and fourth paras, and Art. 19, first and second paras; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 43(1))

Summary

$$For an action to be admissible, the original of the application must bear the handwritten signature of a person authorised to represent the applicant in accordance with Article 17 of the Statute of the Court of Justice. As the Statute of the Court of Justice and the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance stand at present, the handwritten signature on the original of every procedural document constitutes the sole means of ensuring that responsibility for such a document is assumed by a person entitled to represent a party before a Community court.

Whatever rules may apply within a law firm concerning signature by one person on behalf of another, the signature of a person who is not him or herself entitled to undertake procedural steps before the Court of First Instance cannot validly replace that of the lawyer who is authorised to practise before a court of a Member State or of another State which is a party to the EEA Agreement, and who has been instructed by the party.

( see paras 22, 26, 29-30 )