ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
4

Article 25 of Directive 2014/65, entitled ‘Assessment of suitability and appropriateness and reporting to clients’, provides, in paragraphs 2, 3, 5 and 8 thereof: ‘2. When providing investment advice or portfolio management the investment firm shall obtain the necessary information regarding the client’s or potential client’s knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to the specific type of product or service, that person’s financial situation including his ability to bear losses, and his investment objectives including his risk tolerance so as to enable the investment firm to recommend to the client or potential client the investment services and financial instruments that are suitable for him and, in particular, are in accordance with his risk tolerance and ability to bear losses. Member States shall ensure that where an investment firm provides investment advice recommending a package of services or products bundled pursuant to Article 24(11), the overall bundled package is suitable. 3. Member States shall ensure that investment firms, when providing investment services other than those referred to in paragraph 2, ask the client or potential client to provide information regarding that person’s knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to the specific type of product or service offered or demanded so as to enable the investment firm to assess whether the investment service or product envisaged is appropriate for the client. Where a bundle of services or products is envisaged pursuant to Article 24(11), the assessment shall consider whether the overall bundled package is appropriate. Where the investment firm considers, on the basis of the information received under the first subparagraph, that the product or service is not appropriate to the client or potential client, the investment firm shall warn the client or potential client. That warning may be provided in a standardised format. Where clients or potential clients do not provide the information referred to under the first subparagraph, or where they provide insufficient information regarding their knowledge and experience, the investment firm shall warn them that the investment firm is not in a position to determine whether the service or product envisaged is appropriate for them. That warning may be provided in a standardised format. … 5. The investment firm shall establish a record that includes the document or documents agreed between the investment firm and the client that set out the rights and obligations of the parties, and the other terms on which the investment firm will provide services to the client. The rights and duties of the parties to the contract may be incorporated by reference to other documents or legal texts. … 8. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 89 to ensure that investment firms comply with the principles set out in paragraphs 2 to 6 of this Article when providing investment or ancillary services to their clients, including information to obtain when assessing the suitability or appropriateness of the services and financial instruments for their clients …’
33

The referring court is of the opinion that, before opening the oral stage of the criminal trial, it must rule on the existence and scope of any immunity held by AB. It raises the issue of whether AB’s status as Governor of the Central Bank of Latvia, from which he also derives his status as member of the Governing Council of the ECB, automatically confers on him immunity from criminal prosecution and judicial proceedings. If it does, that court takes the view that it is necessary to determine whether a waiver of immunity should be sought in all circumstances or whether the authority responsible for the proceedings, that is to say, the Office of the Public Prosecutor, in the preliminary phase, or the court hearing the substance of the case, in the court proceedings, has competence to determine whether, in the specific context of the proceedings in question, there is a European Union interest in the person concerned enjoying such immunity and, if there is such an interest, to seek a waiver of that immunity only where the acts relate to performance of duties at an EU institution, namely the ECB. If a member of the Governing Council of the ECB is granted immunity from criminal proceedings, the referring court also asks at what stage of the proceedings the waiver of that immunity must be requested. Lastly, it observes that, in so far as the conduct and acts of a person are determined by all the information at his or her disposal, it is not always easy, in practice, to separate immunity granted in the interests of the European Union from acts performed outside the scope of that immunity.
8

Under Article 3e of that directive, headed ‘Allocation and issue of allowances to aircraft operators’: ‘1. For each period referred to in Article 3c, each aircraft operator may apply for an allocation of allowances that are to be allocated free of charge. An application may be made by submitting to the competent authority in the administering Member State verified tonne-kilometre data for the aviation activities listed in Annex I performed by that aircraft operator for the monitoring year. … Any application shall be made at least 21 months before the start of the period to which it relates … 2. At least 18 months before the start of the period to which the application relates …, Member States shall submit applications received under paragraph 1 to the Commission. 3. At least 15 months before the start of each period referred to in Article 3c(2) …, the Commission shall calculate and adopt a decision setting out: (a) the total quantity of allowances to be allocated for that period in accordance with Article 3c; (b) the number of allowances to be auctioned in that period in accordance with Article 3d; (c) the number of allowances in the special reserve for aircraft operators in that period in accordance with Article 3f(1); (d) the number of allowances to be allocated free of charge in that period by subtracting the number of allowances referred to in points (b) and (c) from the total quantity of allowances decided upon under point (a); and (e) the benchmark to be used to allocate allowances free of charge to aircraft operators whose applications were submitted to the Commission in accordance with paragraph 2. … 4. Within three months from the date on which the Commission adopts a decision under paragraph 3, each administering Member State shall calculate and publish: (a) the total allocation of allowances for the period to each aircraft operator whose application it submitted to the Commission in accordance with paragraph 2, calculated by multiplying the tonne-kilometre data included in the application by the benchmark referred to in paragraph 3(e); and (b) the allocation of allowances to each aircraft operator for each year, which shall be determined by dividing its total allocation of allowances for the period calculated under point (a) by the number of years in the period for which that aircraft operator is performing an aviation activity listed in Annex I. 5. By 28 February 2012 and by 28 February of each subsequent year, the competent authority of the administering Member State shall issue to each aircraft operator the number of allowances allocated to that aircraft operator for that year under this Article or Article 3f.’
55

In that regard, it must also be stated, as the Court has already held, that, under Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, Member States are required to order their national law in such a way that the processing of the appeals referred to in that provision includes a ‘full and ex nunc’ examination, at least in appeals procedures before a court or tribunal of first instance, of all the facts and points of law necessary in order to make an up-to-date assessment of the case at hand. As the Court has already made clear, the expression ‘ex nunc’ and the adjective ‘full’ contained in that provision point to the obligation of the court or tribunal to make an assessment which takes into account, where appropriate, both the evidence which the determining authority took into account or should have taken into account and that which has arisen following the adoption of the decision under appeal. The power of the court or tribunal to take into consideration new evidence on which that authority has not taken a decision is consistent with the purpose of Directive 2013/32, which is intended, inter alia, as can be seen from recital 18 thereof, to ensure that applications for international protection are dealt with ‘as soon as possible …, without prejudice to an adequate and complete examination being carried out’ (judgment of 13 January 2021, Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Refugee status of a stateless person of Palestinian origin), C‑507/19, EU:C:2021:3, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
3

Recitals 7, 27, 30, 43 and 82 of Regulation No 650/2012 state: ‘(7) The proper functioning of the internal market should be facilitated by removing the obstacles to the free movement of persons who currently face difficulties in asserting their rights in the context of a succession having cross-border implications. In the European area of justice, citizens must be able to organise their succession in advance. The rights of heirs and legatees, of other persons close to the deceased and of creditors of the succession must be effectively guaranteed. … (27) The rules of this Regulation are devised so as to ensure that the authority dealing with the succession will, in most situations, be applying its own law. This Regulation therefore provides for a series of mechanisms which would come into play where the deceased had chosen as the law to govern his succession the law of a Member State of which he was a national. … (30) In order to ensure that the courts of all Member States may, on the same grounds, exercise jurisdiction in relation to the succession of persons not habitually resident in a Member State at the time of death, this Regulation should list exhaustively, in a hierarchical order, the grounds on which such subsidiary jurisdiction may be exercised. … (43) The rules of jurisdiction laid down by this Regulation may, in certain cases, lead to a situation where the court having jurisdiction to rule on the succession will not be applying its own law. When that situation occurs in a Member State whose law provides for the mandatory appointment of an administrator of the estate, this Regulation should allow the courts of that Member State, when seised, to appoint one or more such administrators under their own law. … In order to ensure a smooth coordination between the law applicable to the succession and the law of the Member State of the appointing court, the court should appoint the person(s) who would be entitled to administer the estate under the law applicable to the succession, such as for instance the executor of the will of the deceased or the heirs themselves or, if the law applicable to the succession so requires, a third-party administrator. … … (82) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice, annexed to the [TEU] and to the [TFEU], those Member States are not taking part in the adoption of this Regulation and are not bound by it or subject to its application. This is, however, without prejudice to the possibility for the United Kingdom and Ireland of notifying their intention of accepting this Regulation after its adoption in accordance with Article 4 of the said Protocol.’
10

Legge n. 374 – Istituzione del giudice di pace (Law No 374 establishing the office of magistrate) of 21 November 1991 (Ordinary Supplement to GURI No 278 of 27 November 1991, p. 5) provides, in the version applicable to the main proceedings (‘Law No 374/1991’): ‘Article 1 Establishment of the office and duties of magistrates 1. The office of magistrate is hereby created. A magistrate shall exercise jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters and shall conduct settlement procedures in civil matters in accordance with the provisions laid down by this law. 2. The office of magistrate shall be held by an “honorary” judge who is a member of the judiciary. … Article 4 Appointment to office 1. The “honorary” judges called on to serve as magistrates are appointed by decree of the President of the Republic, following deliberation in the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, on a proposal of the judicial council with territorial jurisdiction, assisted by five representatives designated, by common agreement, by the Councils of the Bar Association for the appeal court district. … Article 10 Duties of magistrates 1. Magistrates are subject to the duties of ordinary judges. … … Article 11 Compensation paid to magistrates 1. The office of magistrate is “honorary”. 2. The honorary judges who carry out the duties of magistrate shall receive compensation of 70000 [Italian lire (ITL) (approximately EUR 35)] for each civil or criminal hearing, even when there is no oral hearing, and for apostilling documents, as well as ITL 110000 [(approximately EUR 55)] for any other procedure allocated which is closed or removed from the register. 3. They shall further receive compensation of ITL 500000 [(approximately EUR 250)] for each month of actual service by way of reimbursement of training fees, retraining costs and costs related to the general services of the office. … 4a. The compensation provided for in the present article may be received concurrently with pensions and retirement benefits, irrespective of how they are designated. 4b. The compensation provided for in the present article may not, in any event, exceed EUR 72000 gross per annum.’
13

By judgment of 15 March 2020, the Bezirksgericht Schwechat (District Court, Schwechat) found that some of the passengers on the aircraft in question had, before JR, taken the same mobile stairway as JR and that none of them had complained of a slippery area on that stairway or had fallen. That court found, in particular, that the stairway in question was made of metal and was not covered, as no covered stairways were available at Vienna-Schwechat, that its steps were wide enough for two people to walk down the stairs alongside each other, that the corrugated surface of those steps ensured a particular non-slip quality and that that stairway was a certified piece of equipment tested by the Technischer Überwachungsverein (Technical inspection association, Austria). That court found that the stairway in question showed no signs of defects or damage and that, although those steps were wet, they were not slippery, oily, greasy or covered by dirt, with some dot-shaped pieces of dirt of unknown consistency on the last three steps only. It concluded that it was not possible to determine the reasons why JR had fallen.
6

Article 2 of that regulation, entitled ‘Determination of dumping’, provides: ‘1. The normal value shall normally be based on the prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting country. However, where the exporter in the exporting country does not produce or does not sell the like product, the normal value may be established on the basis of prices of other sellers or producers. … 2. Sales of the like product intended for domestic consumption shall normally be used to determine the normal value if such sales volume constitutes 5% or more of the sales volume of the product under consideration to the Union. However, a lower volume of sales may be used when, for example, the prices charged are considered representative for the market concerned. 3. When there are no or insufficient sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade, or where, because of the particular market situation, such sales do not permit a proper comparison, the normal value of the like product shall be calculated on the basis of the cost of production in the country of origin plus a reasonable amount for selling, general and administrative costs and for profits, or on the basis of the export prices, in the ordinary course of trade, to an appropriate third country, provided that those prices are representative. … 9. In cases where there is no export price or where it appears that the export price is unreliable because of an association or a compensatory arrangement between the exporter and the importer or a third party, the export price may be constructed on the basis of the price at which the imported products are first resold to an independent buyer, or, if the products are not resold to an independent buyer or are not resold in the condition in which they were imported, on any reasonable basis. … 11. Subject to the relevant provisions governing fair comparison, the existence of margins of dumping during the investigation period shall normally be established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted average of prices of all export transactions to the Union, or by a comparison of individual normal values and individual export prices to the Union on a transaction-to-transaction basis. However, a normal value established on a weighted average basis may be compared to prices of all individual export transactions to the Union, if there is a significant difference in the pattern of export prices among different purchasers, regions or time periods, and if the methods specified in the first sentence of this paragraph would not reflect the full degree of dumping being practised. This paragraph shall not preclude the use of sampling in accordance with Article 17.’
17

The EU declaration states: ‘In the rail sector, the European Union … shares competence with the Member States of the Union … pursuant to Articles 90 and 91, in conjunction with Article 100(1), and Articles 171 and 172 [TFEU]. … On the basis of [Articles 91 and 171 TFEU] the Union has adopted a substantial number of legal instruments applicable to rail transport. Under Union law, the Union has acquired exclusive competence in matters of rail transport where the [COTIF] or legal instruments adopted pursuant to it may affect or alter the scope of these existing Union rules. For subject matters governed by the [COTIF] in relation to which the Union has exclusive competence, Member States have no competence. Where Union rules exist but are not affected by the [COTIF] or legal instruments adopted pursuant to it, the Union shares competence on matters in relation to the [COTIF] with Member States. A list of the relevant Union instruments in force at the time of the conclusion of the Agreement is contained in the Appendix to this Annex. The scope of the Union competence arising out of these texts has to be assessed in relation to the specific provisions of each text, especially the extent to which these provisions establish common rules. Union competence is subject to continuous development. In the framework of the Treaty on European Union and the TFEU, the competent institutions of the Union may take decisions which determine the extent of the competence of the Union. The Union therefore reserves the right to amend this declaration accordingly, without this constituting a prerequisite for the exercise of its competence in matters covered by the [COTIF].’
8

The background to the dispute was summarised by the General Court in paragraphs 1 to 8 of the judgment under appeal as follows: ‘1 The [appellant], [Mr] … Brown, was originally a national of the United Kingdom [of Great Britain and Northern Ireland] only and lived there until 1996. He studied in Italy in 1996 and 1997, then in Belgium from September 1997 to June 1998. The [appellant] then served as a trainee in the … Commission … from 1 October 1998 to 28 February 1999. Finally, he worked full time in the private sector in Belgium from 1 March 1999 to 31 December 2000. 2 The [appellant] began working for the Commission on 1 January 2001. The Office for the “Administration and Payment of Individual Entitlements” (PMO) of the Commission granted him the expatriation allowance under Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations … 3 … The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom notified the European Council, on 29 March 2017, of the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in accordance with Article 50(2) TEU. 4 On 27 June 2017, the [appellant] applied for Belgian nationality, which he obtained on 3 November 2017. He notified PMO of that change in circumstances on 19 January 2018. 5 On 23 February 2018, the [appellant] was informed, first, that his entitlement to the expatriation allowance was withdrawn with effect from 31 October 2017 because he had obtained Belgian nationality and, secondly, that as a consequence he also lost his entitlement to payment of travel expenses pursuant to Article 8 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations. 6 Following a request for an explanation, the [appellant] received an email, on 5 March 2018, stating that withdrawal of the expatriation allowance was justified under Article 4(1)(b) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations by the fact that he had resided in Belgium since 1997. 7 On 19 March 2018, PMO replaced the decision of 23 February 2018 by [the decision at issue]. 8 On 17 June 2018, the [appellant] filed a complaint, which was rejected by decision of the appointing authority … of 15 October 2018.’
52

That finding is not invalidated by the arguments put forward, in particular, by Daimler, Traton SE and Iveco Magirus, according to which, in the context of the settlement procedure, the requests for information sent to them are necessarily relevant for the purposes of determining whether specialised trucks were among the products covered by the cartel in question in the main proceedings. It is argued that, in its request for information of 30 June 2015, referred to in paragraph 19 above – the purpose of which is to obtain information on the turnover achieved by the undertakings concerned with products directly or indirectly related to the infringement found, for the purposes of determining the amount of the fine – the Commission clearly stated that specialised trucks such as trucks for military use and firefighting trucks did not fall within the concept of ‘trucks’ in respect of which the turnover achieved had to be submitted. In that context, it is submitted that it would be contradictory not to take into account turnover relating to the sales of specialised trucks in the calculation of the fine, but to include those trucks in the concept of ‘trucks’ within the meaning of recital 5 of the decision at issue.