ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 30 March 2020 — Rad Service Srl Unipersonale and Others v Del Debbio SpA and Others

(Case C-210/20)

(2020/C 279/38)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Rad Service Srl Unipersonale, Cosmo Ambiente Srl, Cosmo Scavi Srl

Defendants: Del Debbio SpA, Gruppo Sei Srl, Ciclat Val di Cecina Soc. Coop., Daf Costruzioni Stradali Srl, as representative of the ad hoc tendering consortium formed with GARC SpA and Edil Moter Srl

Question referred

Does Article 63 of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014, (1) concerning reliance on the capacities of other entities, in conjunction with the principles of freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services enshrined in Articles 49 and 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), preclude the application of the provisions of Italian law relating to reliance on the capacities of other entities and exclusion from award procedures set out in the fourth sentence of Article 89(1) of the Public Procurement Code referred to in decreto legislativo 18 aprile 2016, n. 50 (Legislative Decree No 50 of 18 April 2016), under which, if untruthful declarations are made by an ancillary undertaking regarding the existence of convictions in criminal proceedings that have become final, which may demonstrate serious professional misconduct, the contracting authority must in all cases exclude the economic operator taking part in the tender procedure, without requiring or permitting that operator to indicate another suitable ancillary undertaking to replace the former undertaking, which is, conversely, permitted in other cases where the entities on whose capacities the economic operator intends to rely fail to meet a relevant selection criterion or are subject to mandatory grounds for exclusion?

(1) Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65).
2.

Must Article 5(1) of the Directive be interpreted as meaning that the condition that ‘the bankruptcy proceedings or any analogous insolvency proceedings are under the supervision of a competent public authority’ is fulfilled if the transfer of (part of) the undertaking is prepared in a pre-pack prior to the declaration of bankruptcy and is carried out after the declaration of bankruptcy, and (i) is monitored, prior to the declaration of bankruptcy, by a prospective insolvency administrator and a prospective Rechter-commissaris who have been appointed by the Rechtbank but who do not have legal powers, (ii) under Dutch law, prior to the declaration of bankruptcy, the prospective insolvency administrator is obliged to be guided by the interests of the joint creditors and by other social interests, such as the preservation of jobs, and the prospective Rechter-commissaris is obliged to exercise a supervisory function in that regard, (iii) the duties of the prospective insolvency administrator and the prospective Rechter-commissaris do not differ from those of the insolvency administrator and the Rechter-commissaris in a bankruptcy, (iv) the agreement on the basis of which the company is transferred and which has been prepared during a pre-pack is only concluded and executed after the bankruptcy has been declared, (v) the Rechtbank, when declaring the bankruptcy, may proceed to appoint an insolvency administrator or a Rechter-commissaris other than the prospective insolvency administrator or the prospective Rechter-commissaris, and (vi) the same requirements of objectivity and independence apply to the insolvency administrator and the Rechter-commissaris as apply to an insolvency administrator and a Rechter-commissaris in a bankruptcy that was not preceded by a pre-pack and, irrespective of the degree of their involvement prior to the declaration of bankruptcy, they are obliged by virtue of their statutory duty to assess whether the transfer of (part of) the undertaking prepared prior to the declaration of bankruptcy is in the interests of the joint creditors, and if they answer that question in the negative, to decide that such a transfer will not take place, while they are also always entitled to decide on other grounds, for example, because other social interests, such as the interest of employment, are opposed to it, that the transfer of (part of) the undertaking prepared prior to the declaration of bankruptcy will not take place?
1.

Is Article 392 of [Council] Directive [2006/112/EC] of 28 November 2006 (1) [on the common system of value added tax] to be interpreted as reserving the application of the margin taxation scheme to transactions for the supply of immovable property the purchase of which has been subject to VAT, without the taxable person who subsequently resells the property having the right to deduct that tax, or does it permit that scheme to be applied to transactions for the supply of immovable property the purchase of which has not been subject to VAT, either because that purchase falls outside the scope of VAT or because it falls within the scope of VAT but is exempt from it?
Appeal brought on 12 May 2020 by Claudio Necci against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 25 March 2020 in Case T-129/19, Necci v Commission

(Case C-202/20 P)

(2020/C 304/07)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Claudio Necci (represented by: S. Orlandi, T. Martin, lawyers)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, European Parliament, Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the order of 25 March 2020 of the General Court of the European Union in Case T-129/19, Necci v Commission;

— refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union for it to be adjudged afresh;

— reserve the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant seeks to have aside the order of 25 May 2020 in Case T-129/19, by which the General Court of the European Union dismissed his action for annulment as inadmissible and ordered him to pay the costs.

The appellant raises three grounds of appeal in that regard:

The first ground alleges a distortion of the subject matter of the dispute in so far as the General Court of the European Union took the view that the decision of 18 July 2011 adversely affected the appellant.

The second ground of appeal alleges infringement of his right to effective legal protection in so far as, if his appeal is inadmissible, the applicant will have no remedy to challenge the fact that he no longer enjoys any social protection, despite the fact that he has worked for his whole life.

The third ground of appeal alleges infringement of the principle of single applicable legislation in so far as the General Court of the European Union held that the loss of all social protection in Italy following the transfer ‘follows from the legal norms specific to the national law at issue and … has no bearing whatsoever on his situation in respect of the JSIS’.
2.

Does Directive 93/13, interpreted in the light of the principle of effectivity of Community law, preclude national case-law in which a term or set of terms, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, are considered to be ‘plain [and] intelligible’ for the purposes of the directive, on the grounds that: — the preliminary loan offer sets out in detail the exchange transactions carried out during the life of the credit and makes clear that the euro/Swiss franc exchange rate will be that applicable two working days before the date of the event that determines the transaction and which is published on the website of the European Central Bank; — it is stated in the offer that the borrower agrees to the Swiss franc/euro and euro/Swiss franc exchange transactions necessary for the transaction and repayment of the credit, and that the lender will convert the balance of the monthly payments after payment of the charges associated with the credit into Swiss francs; — the offer states that, if the exchange transaction results in a sum lower than the amount payable in Swiss francs, the amortisation of the capital will be less rapid and any unpaid capital in respect of a repayment period will be entered on the debit side of the account in Swiss francs, and that it is made clear that the amortisation of the capital of the loan will change according to upwards or downwards variations in the exchange rate applied to the monthly payments that that change may result in the extension or reduction of the loan amortisation period and, where appropriate, alter the total repayment cost; — the articles ‘internal account in euros’ and ‘internal account in Swiss francs’ describe the transactions carried out in each payment period to the credit and the debit of each account, and the contract explains in transparent terms the actual functioning of the foreign currency conversion mechanism in transparent terms; and although there is no express reference in the offer to the ‘exchange risk’ which is borne by the borrower since he or she does not receive income in the account currency, or any explicit reference to the ‘interest rate risk’?
Appeal brought on 8 April 2020 by WV against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) made on 29 January 2020 in Case T-471/18, WV v EEAS

(Case C-162/20 P)

(2020/C 320/05)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: WV (represented by: É. Boigelot, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European External Action Service (EEAS)

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— Set aside the order of 29 January 2020 of the General Court of the European Union in Case T-471/18, in so far as it dismissed the present appellant’s initial action for annulment as being, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded in law, and ordered the appellant to pay the costs;

— Order the original defendant to pay all of the costs, including the costs before the General Court of the European Union, in accordance with Article 184 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Union;

— Refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union in order for it to rule on the action.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant submits that, in issuing the order under appeal, the General Court failed to have regard to the principle of unfettered evaluation of evidence and the concept of a body of consistent evidence and, therefore, failed to have regard to the rules relating to the burden of proof, in particular as regards the proof and evidence submitted by the appellant concerning the alleged infringement of Articles 1e and 12a of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union.

The single ground of appeal raised by the appellant also alleges a denial of justice, discrimination, distortion of the facts by the order under appeal and manifest errors of assessment made by the General Court resulting in imprecise legal reasoning.
1.

Does the decision taken by a public administrative authority to change the mandatory place of registration of an asylum applicant in a reception centre, where the primary mission of that centre is to facilitate the transfer of that individual to the Member State with jurisdiction to examine his application for protection, interpreted as a preparatory measure for the effective transfer, where that individual has lodged a motion to set aside and suspend that removal order before a national court, already constitute the enforcement of that removal order within the meaning of the Dublin III Regulation? (1)
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Helsingin hallinto-oikeus (Finland) lodged on 23 July 2020 — A SCPI

(Case C-342/20)

(2020/C 339/07)

Language of the case: Finnish

Referring court

Helsingin hallinto-oikeus

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: A SCPI

Other party: Veronsaajien oikeudenvalvontayksikkö

Question referred

Are Articles 49, 63 and 65 TFEU to be interpreted as meaning that they preclude national legislation under which only foreign open-ended investment funds constituted by contract can be regarded as equivalent to Finnish investment funds exempt from income tax, meaning that foreign investment funds established in a legal form other than by contract are subject to withholding tax in Finland, even though there are otherwise no significant objective differences between their situation and that of Finnish investment funds?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte costituzionale (Italy) lodged on 30 July 2020 — O.D., R.I.H.V., B.O., F.G., M.K.F.B., E.S., N.P. and S.E.A. v Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS)

(Case C-350/20)

(2020/C 329/10)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte costituzionale

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: O.D., R.I.H.V., B.O., F.G., M.K.F.B., E.S., N.P. and S.E.A.

Defendant: Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS)

Question referred

Is Article 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, proclaimed at Nice on 7 December 2000 and adjusted at Strasbourg on 12 December 2007, to be interpreted as applying to childbirth and maternity allowances under Article 3(1)(b) and (j) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, (1) referred to in Article 12(1)(e) of Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit, (2) and is EU law therefore to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which fails to extend the abovementioned benefits, which are already granted to foreign nationals holding a long-term resident’s EU residence permit, to foreign nationals who hold a single permit under that directive?

(1) OJ 2004 L 166, p. 1.

(2) Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State (OJ 2011 L 343, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 13 July 2020 — Colt Technology Services SpA, Wind Tre SpA, Telecom Italia SpA, Vodafone Italia SpA v Ministero della Giustizia, Ministero dello sviluppo economico, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, Procura Generale della Repubblica presso la Corte d’appello di Reggio Calabria, Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Cagliari, Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Roma, Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Locri

(Case C-318/20)

(2020/C 348/08)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: Colt Technology Services SpA, Wind Tre SpA, Telecom Italia SpA, Vodafone Italia SpA

Respondents: Ministero della Giustizia, Ministero dello sviluppo economico, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, Procura Generale della Repubblica presso la Corte d’appello di Reggio Calabria, Procura della Repubblica preso il Tribunale di Cagliari, Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Roma, Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Locri

Question referred

Do the general principles laid down in Articles 18, 26 and 102 et seq. TFEU preclude a provision of national law that identifies procedures for calculating the rate applied for the performance by telecommunications operators of interception activities ordered by the judicial authorities, where that provision does not require compliance with the principle of the full reimbursement of costs?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 29 January 2020 by ZW against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 21 November 2019 in Case T-727/18, ZW v EIB

(Case C-50/20 P)

(2020/C 348/02)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: ZW (represented by: T. Petsas, dikigoros)

Other party to the proceedings: European Investment Bank (EIB)

By order of 3 September 2020, the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) decided that the appeal is dismissed as in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
2.

If the answer to Question 1 is that it is not permissible to refuse family reunification: What requirements are to be imposed in terms of a real family relationship within the meaning of Article 16(1)(b) of Directive 2003/86 in cases of subsequent immigration of parents to join a refugee who comes of age before a decision is adopted on the application for entry and residence for the purposes of family reunification? In particular: (a) Does a first-degree relationship in the direct ascending line suffice (Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86) or is a real family life also necessary? (b) If a real family life is also necessary: How close must it be? For example, do occasional or regular visits suffice, must the family cohabit in a single household or must they also be part of a support unit whose members are reliant upon one another? (c) For the subsequent immigration of parents who are still in a third country and who have submitted an application for family reunification to join a child with recognised refugee status who has since come of age, must there be the expectation that, following their entry, family life will be (re-)established in the Member State in the manner required in Question 2(b)?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Krajský soud v Brně (Czech Republic) lodged on 20 August 2020 — ELVOSPOL v Odvolací finanční ředitelství

(Case C-398/20)

(2020/C 359/12)

Language of the case: Czech

Referring court

Krajský soud v Brně

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: ELVOSPOL

Defendant: Odvolací finanční ředitelství

Question referred

Is national legislation contrary to the purpose of Article 90(1) and (2) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (1) of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax if it lays down a condition preventing value added taxpayers, where tax becomes chargeable on a taxable supply to another taxpayer who paid for the supply only in part or not at all, from making a correction to the amount of output tax in respect of the value of the claim if that claim arose less than six months before a court decision declaring the other taxpayer insolvent?

(1) OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.
2.

Does the notification nine days prior to the start of the trip of the postponement of a flight from 13:20 (LT) to 16:10 (LT) on the same day constitute an offer of re-routing within the meaning of Article 5(1)(c)(ii) of Regulation No 261/2004, and, if so, must that offer meet the requirements of Articles 5(1)(a) and 8(1) of Regulation No 261/2004?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 5 June 2020 by Giorgio Armani SpA against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 26 March 2020 in Case T-654/18, Armani v EUIPO

(Case C-240/20 P)

(2020/C 390/26)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Giorgio Armani SpA (represented by: S. Martínez-Almeida y Alejos-Pita, abogada)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 30 September 2020, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) decided that the appeal should not be allowed to proceed and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 12 August 2020 — LK v Deutsche Lufthansa AG

(Case C-383/20)

(2020/C 423/30)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: LK

Defendant: Deutsche Lufthansa AG

Question referred

Does a strike by the air carrier’s own employees that is called by a trade union constitute an extraordinary circumstance within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004? (1)

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
2.

If so: is the provision cited in Question 1 to be interpreted as meaning that it is applicable to national legislation under which the author is entitled to equitable remuneration (remuneration for exploitation of the right of reproduction on storage media), in the case: — where a work (which has been broadcast, made available to the public or recorded on a storage medium produced for commercial purposes) is by its nature likely to be reproduced for personal or private use by being stored ‘on a storage medium of any kind which is suitable for such reproduction and, in the course of a commercial activity, is placed on the market in national territory’, — and where the storage method used in that context is that described in Question 1?
3.

Do the principles expressed by the Court of Justice in its judgments of 5 September 2019, Lombardi, C-333/18, of 5 April 2016, PFE, C-689/13, and of 4 July 2013, Fastweb, C-100/12, in connection with Article 1(1) and (3) and Article 2(1) of Directive 89/665/EEC (1), as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC (2), apply to the case in the main proceedings in which an undertaking has challenged its exclusion from a tendering procedure and the award of the contract to another undertaking and the Council of State has examined the substance only of the ground of appeal whereby the excluded undertaking disputed the points awarded to its technical offer, which were below the ‘minimum threshold’, and has examined as a matter of priority the cross-appeals brought by the contracting authority and the successful tenderer, has upheld them and has declared inadmissible (and refrained from examining the substance of) the other grounds of the main appeal disputing the outcome of the tendering procedure for other reasons (imprecise tender assessment criteria in the tendering specifications, failure to justify the marks awarded, unlawful appointment and composition of the tender committee), in accordance with national judicial practice according to which an undertaking that has been excluded from a tendering procedure has no standing to bring a claim disputing the award of the contract to a competitor undertaking, even by way of the lapse of the tendering procedure, it being necessary to determine the compatibility with EU law of the effect of depriving the undertaking of the right to submit for the court’s examination each and every reason for which it disputes the outcome of the tendering procedure, in a situation where that undertaking’s exclusion has not been definitively established and where every competitor may argue a similar legitimate interest in the exclusion of its competitors’ tenders, which could make it impossible for the contracting authority to choose a regular tender and make it necessary to launch a new tendering procedure in which every tenderer might participate?