ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
5

Article 60 of the REACH Regulation, entitled ‘Granting of authorisations’, is worded as follows: ‘1. The Commission shall be responsible for taking decisions on applications for authorisations in accordance with this Title. 2. Without prejudice to paragraph 3, an authorisation shall be granted if the risk to human health or the environment from the use of a substance arising from the intrinsic properties specified in Annex XIV is adequately controlled in accordance with Section 6.4 of Annex I and as documented in the applicant’s chemical safety report, taking into account the opinion of the Committee for Risk Assessment referred to in Article 64(4)(a). When granting the authorisation, and in any conditions imposed therein, the Commission shall take into account all discharges, emissions and losses, including risks arising from diffuse or dispersive uses, known at the time of the decision. The Commission shall not consider the risks to human health arising from the use of a substance in a medical device regulated by Council Directive 90/385/EEC of 20 June 1990 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to active implantable medical devices, Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning medical devices or Directive 98/79/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 1998 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices. 3. Paragraph 2 shall not apply to: (a) substances meeting the criteria in Article 57(a), (b), (c) or (f) for which it is not possible to determine a threshold in accordance with Section 6.4 of Annex I; (b) substances meeting the criteria in Article 57(d) or (e); (c) substances identified under Article 57(f) having persistent, bioaccumulative and toxic properties or very persistent and very bioaccumulative properties. 4. If an authorisation cannot be granted under paragraph 2 or for substances listed in paragraph 3, an authorisation may only be granted if it is shown that socio-economic benefits outweigh the risk to human health or the environment arising from the use of the substance and if there are no suitable alternative substances or technologies. ...’
8

Section 135D of the Finance Act 1992, relating to the repayment of amounts of vehicle registration tax on the export of certain vehicles, was inserted by the Finance Act 2012 and has been applicable since 8 April 2013. Section 135D(2)(b) of the Finance Act 1992 was, however, introduced by the Finance Act 2014. Thus amended, section 135D of the Finance Act 1992 states: ‘(1) The [Revenue] Commissioners may repay to a person an amount calculated in accordance with this section of vehicle registration tax based on the open market selling price of a vehicle which has been removed from the State, where— (a) the vehicle is a category M1 vehicle, (b) the vehicle has been registered under section 131 and the vehicle registration tax has been paid, (c) the vehicle was, immediately prior to being so removed, registered under section 131, (d) within 30 days prior to being so removed— (i) the vehicle and any documentation to which paragraph (b) or (c) relates, and (ii) where applicable, a valid test certificate … in respect of the vehicle, have been examined by a competent person and all relevant matters have been found by that person to be in order, (e) at the time of examination to which paragraph (d) relates, the open market selling price of the vehicle (being the price to which subsection (2) relates) is not less than EUR 2000, and (f) the requirements of subsection (3) have been complied with. (2) The amount of vehicle registration tax to be repaid shall— (a) be calculated by reference to the open market selling price (being that price as determined by the [Revenue] Commissioners) of the vehicle at the time of the examination referred to in subsection (1)(d), and (b) include an amount that is calculated by means of one or more than one formula or other means of calculation as may be prescribed by the Minister by regulations made by him or her under section 141. (3) A claim for repayment for an amount of vehicle registration tax under this section shall be made in such manner and in such form as may be approved by the [Revenue] Commissioners for that purpose and shall be accompanied by— (a) documentation to prove to the satisfaction of the [Revenue] Commissioners that the vehicle was removed from the State within 30 days of its examination under this section, and (b) proof that the vehicle has subsequently been registered in another Member State or has been permanently exported outside the European Union. (4) The amount of vehicle registration tax calculated for repayment under this section in respect of a vehicle shall be reduced to take account of— (a) the net amount of any remission or repayment of that tax previously allowed on the vehicle under this Chapter, and (b) an administration charge of EUR 500. (5) Any repayment of vehicle registration tax under this section shall be to the person named, at the time of the examination referred to in subsection (1)(d), on the records maintained under section 60 of the Finance Act 1993.’
The term ‘judicial authority’, referred to in Article 6(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299, is an autonomous concept of EU law and that provision must be interpreted as precluding an organ of the executive, such as the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Lithuania, from being designated as an ‘issuing judicial authority’, within the meaning of the same Article 6(1), meaning that the European arrest warrant issued by it with a view to executing a judgment imposing a custodial sentence cannot be regarded as a ‘judicial decision’, within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299.

The Framework Decision aims to introduce a simplified system of surrender directly between judicial authorities that seeks to replace a traditional system of cooperation between sovereign States — which involves action and assessment by a sovereign — in order to ensure the free circulation of court decisions in criminal matters, within an area of freedom, security and justice. Designating an organ of the executive, such as the Lithuanian Ministry of Justice, as a competent authority for the issue of the European arrest warrant would amount to according the executive a decision-making power in the procedure for surrendering wanted persons, which the Framework Decision specifically aims to prevent. Moreover, the principle of mutual recognition, enshrined in Article 1(2) of the Framework Decision, pursuant to which the executing judicial authority is required to execute the arrest warrant issued by the issuing judicial authority, is founded on the premiss that a judicial authority has intervened in advance of the execution of the European arrest warrant, for the purposes of exercising its review. The issue of an arrest warrant by an entity coming under the executive, such as the Lithuanian Ministry of Justice, does not provide the executing judicial authority with an assurance that the issue of that European arrest warrant has undergone such judicial approval and cannot, therefore, suffice to found the high level of confidence between the Member States which forms the very basis of the Framework Decision.

(see paras 41-45, 48, operative part)
The third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that a court against whose decisions there is a judicial remedy under national law may not be regarded as a court adjudicating at last instance, where an appeal on a point of law against a decision of that court is not examined because of discontinuance by the appellant.

As the Court has pointed out on a number of occasions, a court adjudicating at last instance is by definition the last judicial body before which individuals may assert the rights conferred on them by EU law. Courts adjudicating at last instance have the task of ensuring at national level the uniform interpretation of rules of law (see, to that effect, judgments of 30 September 2003, Köbler, C‑224/01, EU:C:2003:513, paragraph 34, and of 13 June 2006, Traghetti del Mediterraneo, C‑173/03, EU:C:2006:391, paragraph 31).

It follows that the Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen (Council for asylum and immigration proceedings) cannot be regarded as a court adjudicating at last instance, in so far as its decisions may be reviewed by a higher court before which individuals can assert the rights conferred on them by EU law. The decisions it makes do not therefore come from a national court against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU.

The fact that, in accordance with Article 18 of the Royal Decree of 30 November 2006 laying down the procedure for appeals on a point of law before the Council of State, an appellant who has brought an appeal on a point of law against a decision of the Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen (Council for asylum and immigration proceedings) is irrebuttably presumed to have discontinued the action if he fails to request the proceedings to be continued within a period of 30 days from the date on which he was served with the auditeur’s report proposing that the appeal should be declared inadmissible or dismissed does not affect the fact that the decisions of the Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen (Council for asylum and immigration proceedings) can be challenged before a higher court, and consequently come from a court that is not adjudicating at last instance.

(see paras 34, 36-38, operative part 1)
Case C‑253/16

Flibtravel International SA

and

Léonard Travel International SA

v

AAL Renting SA and Others

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the cour d’appel de Bruxelles)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 96 TFEU — Applicability — National legislation prohibiting taxi services from offering individual seats — National legislation prohibiting taxi services from predetermining their destination — National legislation prohibiting taxi services from touting for custom)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 15 March 2017

Freedom to provide services — Provisions of the Treaty — Scope — Transport — National legislation prohibiting taxi services from offering individual seats, predetermining their destination and touting for custom — Not included

(Art. 96 TFEU)

Article 96(1) TFEU must be interpreted as not applying to restrictions, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, imposed on taxi operators.

The purpose of that provision is to prevent Member States from adopting supportive or protective measures indirectly benefiting the customers of the operator concerned, which applies those rates and conditions to them, without adopting supportive or protective measures directly benefiting other operators which are in competition with the operator concerned.

That interpretation is borne out by Article 96(2) TFEU, pursuant to which the Commission, in order to authorise a measure in principle prohibited by Article 96(1) TFEU, must take into consideration, in particular, the requirements of an appropriate regional economic policy, the needs of underdeveloped areas and the problems of areas seriously affected by political circumstances.

The contrary interpretation, advocated by the defendants in the main proceedings, would moreover be such as to undermine the effectiveness of Article 58 TFEU, which implies, in accordance with Article 91 TFEU, that application of the principles governing freedom to provide transport services must be achieved by introducing a common transport policy (see judgment of 22 December 2010, Yellow Cab Verkehrsbetrieb, C‑338/09, EU:C:2010:814, paragraph 30), inasmuch as Article 96(1) TFEU would thus have the effect of directly prohibiting a large proportion of the measures which could be described as restrictions on the freedom to provide transport services without such a rule having been adopted by the EU legislature.

(see paras 20, 21, 23, 24, operative part)
The refusal, on the part of the competent authorities of a Member State, to issue a router for access to the private virtual network for lawyers to a lawyer duly registered at a Bar of another Member State, for the sole reason that that lawyer is not registered at a Bar of the first Member State, in which he wishes to practise his profession as a free provider of services, in situations where the obligation to work in conjunction with another lawyer is not imposed by law, constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services under Article 4 of Council Directive 77/249/EEC of 22 March 1977 to facilitate the effective exercise by lawyers of freedom to provide services, read in the light of Article 56 TFEU and the third paragraph of Article 57 TFEU. It is for the national court to determine whether such a refusal, in the light of the context in which it is put forward, genuinely serves the objectives of consumer protection and the proper administration of justice which might justify it and whether the resulting restrictions do not appear to be disproportionate in regard to those objectives.

(see para. 42, operative part)
Case C‑126/16

Federatie Nederlandse Vakvereniging and Others

v

Smallsteps BV

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from the Rechtbank Midden-Nederland)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive 2001/23/EC — Articles 3 to 5 — Transfers of undertakings — Safeguarding of employees’ rights — Exceptions — Insolvency proceedings — ‘Pre-pack’ — Survival of an undertaking)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 22 June 2017

Social policy — Approximation of laws — Transfers of undertakings — Safeguarding of employees’ rights — Directive 2001/23 — Scope — Transfer of an undertaking following a declaration of insolvency and in the context of a ‘pre-pack’ when that ‘pre-pack’ is prepared before the declaration of insolvency and put into effect immediately after that declaration — Included

(Council Directive 2001/23, Arts 3, 4 and 5(1))

Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses, and in particular Article 5(1) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that the protection of workers guaranteed by Articles 3 and 4 of that directive applies in a situation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in which the transfer of an undertaking takes place following a declaration of insolvency and in the context of a ‘pre-pack’ where that ‘pre-pack’ is prepared before the declaration of insolvency and put into effect immediately after that declaration, and, in particular, a court-appointed prospective insolvency administrator investigates the possibilities for continuation of the activities of that undertaking by a third party and prepares for acts which must be carried out shortly after the insolvency to enable such continuation and, moreover, it is irrelevant in that regard that the ‘pre-pack’ is also aimed at maximising the proceeds of the transfer for all the creditors of the undertaking in question.

In those circumstances, and subject to determination by the referring court, it must be held that since such a procedure is not ultimately aimed at liquidating the undertaking, the economic and social objectives it pursues are no explanation of, or justification for, the employees of the undertaking concerned losing the rights conferred on them by Directive 2001/23 when all or part of that undertaking is transferred (see, by analogy, judgment of 7 December 1995, Spano and Others, C‑472/93, EU:C:1995:421, paragraphs 28 and 30).

(see paras 50, 59, operative part)
The principles that a true and fair view must be given and that valuation must be made on a prudent basis set out in Articles 2(3) and 31(1)(c) respectively of Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 based on Article [50(2)(g) TFEU] on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, as amended by Directive 2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2003, must be interpreted as not precluding an accounting method according to which a company issuing a share option may recognise as income the grant date price of that option in the course of the accounting year in which that option is exercised or at the end of its period of validity.

As regards share options, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, the directive contains no specific guidance as to the method according to which the price of those options must be recognised. As the Commission noted in its observations submitted to the Court, there are, therefore, necessarily various methods compatible with Directive 78/660 provided that they comply with the general principles set out in that directive.

In that regard, it should be noted that it is not apparent from the documents in the case file submitted to the Court that an accounting method, such as that at issue in the actions in the main proceedings, according to which a company issuing a share option may recognise as income the grant date price of that option in the course of the accounting year in which that option is exercised or at the end of its period of validity, does not comply with those principles.

First, the fact that a company issuing a share option recognises as income the grant date price of that option only after the option is exercised or at the end of its validity is not incompatible with the principle that valuation must be made on a prudent basis.

Second, it cannot be ruled out, as the applicants in the main proceedings maintain in their observations submitted to the Court, that, where the grant date price for the option is recognised as income in the course of the tax year in which that option is issued and before being exercised or, where relevant, before the end of its validity, the accounts of issuing companies show, in the tax years following the issuing of the option, liabilities that are greater than those which they show if the purchase price is recognised in the course of the financial year in which the option is exercised or falls due.

(see paras 44-47, operative part)
Although the text of Directive 1999/44 does not define ‘contract of sale’, it is also the case that it does not contain any reference to national laws as regards the meaning to be applied to that term. It therefore follows that it must be regarded, for the purposes of application of the directive, as designating an autonomous concept of EU law which must be interpreted in a uniform manner throughout the European Union (see, by analogy, judgment of 18 October 2011, Brüstle, C‑34/10, EU:C:2011:669, paragraph 26).

Indeed, it is apparent from the provisions of Directive 1999/44 as well as from the context of the directive that the notion of ‘sale’ covers only certain contracts that are capable of falling within other classifications under national legal systems, namely contracts for work or services.

Thus, first, under Article 1(4) of that directive, ‘contracts for the supply of consumer goods to be manufactured or produced shall also be deemed contracts of sale.’ Consequently, a contract whose subject is the sale of an asset that must first be manufactured or produced by the seller does fall within the scope of the directive.

Second, Article 2(5) of Directive 1999/44 deems a lack of conformity resulting from incorrect installation of the consumer goods to be equivalent to lack of conformity of the goods if, among other things, installation forms part of the contract of sale of those goods. Thus, the service for the installation of goods, when associated with the sale, does fall within the scope of that directive.

It follows from the findings above that, first, Directive 1999/44 applies not only to contracts of sale sensu stricto, but also to certain categories of contract involving a supply of services, which, in accordance with applicable national law, are capable of falling within the classification of contracts for services or work, namely contracts for the supply of consumer goods to be manufactured or produced and contracts providing for the installation of such goods linked to the sale.

Second, in order for those categories of contract involving a supply of services to be classified as ‘contracts of sale’ within the meaning of that directive, the supply of services must be ancillary to the sale.

(see paras 32, 34-38)
Joined Cases C‑196/16 and C‑197/16

Comune di Corridonia and Others

v

Provincia di Macerata

and

Provincia di Macerata Settore 10 — Ambiente

(Requests for a preliminary ruling

from the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per le Marche)

(References for a preliminary ruling — Environment — Directive 85/337/EEC — Directive 2011/92/EU — Possibility of carrying out, a posteriori, an environmental impact assessment of an operational plant for the production of energy from biogas with a view to obtaining a new consent)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 26 July 2017

Environment — Assessment of the effects of certain projects on the environment — Directive 85/337 — Obligation of the competent authority to carry out an assessment prior to granting consent — Failure to carry out an assessment — Obligation of the authority to remedy that failure — Scope — Assessment carried out for regularisation purposes after the plant concerned has been constructed and has entered into operation — Conditions

(Art. 4 TEU; Council Directive 85/337, as amended by Directive 2009/31, Art. 2(1))

In the event of failure to carry out an environmental impact assessment required under Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, EU law, on the one hand, requires Member States to nullify the unlawful consequences of that failure and, on the other hand, does not preclude regularisation through the conducting of an impact assessment, after the plant concerned has been constructed and has entered into operation, on condition that:

– national rules allowing for that regularisation do not provide the parties concerned with an opportunity to circumvent the rules of EU law or to dispense with applying them, and

– an assessment carried out for regularisation purposes is not conducted solely in respect of the plant’s future environmental impact, but must also take into account its environmental impact from the time of its completion.

(see para. 43, operative part)