ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 371/17

Appeal brought on 21 September 2015 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 15 July 2015 in Case T-314/13 Portugal v Commission

(Case C-495/15 P)

(2015/C 371/20)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: D. Recchia and P. Guerra e Andrade, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: Portuguese Republic

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court of 15 July 2015, delivered in Case T-314/13;

— refer the case back to the General Court for further adjudication;

— order the Portuguese State to pay the costs of the present proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law: — The Commission submits, primarily, that the General Court erred in law in holding that the Commission must adopt the decision on financial corrections in the framework of the Cohesion Fund within the time limit prescribed by the basic legislative provision from the date on which the Member State was heard.

In the alternative, the Commission submits that the General Court erred in law in holding that the time limit for the Commission to adopt the decision on financial corrections is mandatory, failure to comply with which constitutes a material infringement, thus invalidating a decision adopted out of time.

Main arguments — The Commission submits, primarily, that, in the present case, Article 100 of Regulation No 1083/2006 (1) did not apply, but that Article H(2) of Annex II to Regulation No 1164/94 (2) did apply. In the Commission’s opinion, the General Court’s interpretation of Article 108 of Regulation No 1083/2006 is wrong. Article 108 applies only to co-financed projects, approved in accordance with the new rules (period 2007 to 2013). In the present case, by virtue of Article 105 of Regulation No 1083/2006, the applicable provision was Article H(2) of Annex II to Regulation No 1164/94. In the Commission’s opinion, Regulation No 1164/94 makes no provision for a time limit within which the Commission must take the decision on financial corrections.

In the alternative, the Commission submits that the EU legislature did not lay down any mandatory time limit within which the Commission must adopt decisions on financial corrections. The essential purpose of a decision on financial corrections concerns the protection of the European Union’s financial interests. The legislation does not make provision for any penalty or any consequence in connection with the failure to observe the time limit. Thus, the time limit for taking a decision on financial corrections is sequential in nature.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 (OJ 2006 L 210 p. 25).

(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 1164/94 of 16 May 1994 establishing a Cohesion Fund (OJ 1994 L 130, 25.5., p. 1).
3.

Is the decision in the judgment in Commission v Hungary, C-288/12 (4), applicable to a situation in which the officers of a national telecommunications regulatory authority are dismissed before their term of office has expired owing to the requirements of the new legal framework which creates a supervisory body grouping together various national regulatory authorities for regulated sectors? May that early dismissal, due only to the entry into force of a new national law and not to an unforeseen change in the circumstances of the office-holders as previously established in national law, be considered compatible with the provisions of Article 3 (3a) of Directive 2002/21/EC?
—

By the first ground of appeal, the Appellants submit that the General Court erred in law and infringed their rights of defence and the essential procedural requirements when rejecting the Appellants’ claim regarding the unlawfulness of the transfer of the documents gathered by the Italian tax authorities during a national tax investigation to the Commission, and the consequences of such unlawfulness. First, the General Court erred in law by ruling that the Commission does not have a distinct obligation under EU law to prevent the fundamental rights of defence from being irremediably compromised during the administrative phase of a competition inquiry. Second, the General Court erred in law by disregarding the Commission’s infringement of the Appellants’ rights of defence and essential procedural requirements as reflected in Article 12(2) of Regulation 1/2003 (1) Third, the General Court erred in law by distorting the clear meaning of the evidence before it, when it ruled that the unlawfulness of the acquisition of documents used in evidence by the Commission was irrelevant.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 381/22

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 11 September 2015 — Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato v Albini & Pitigliani SpA

(Case C-483/15)

(2015/C 381/24)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato

Defendant: Albini & Pitigliani SpA

Question referred

Does the principle of proportionality, which must guide the process of quantifying fines — as affirmed by Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — preclude an interpretation of Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 (1), in the version consolidated by the European Commission through the Guidelines on the method of setting fines (2006/C 201/02), and practice, including national practice, according to which the fine to be applied to undertakings which have breached the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements is to be calculated by applying the circumstances to the basic amount resulting from the calculation of the various factors which have to be taken into account under EU law, and in any event before the reduction to 10 % of turnover, with the risk that the application of the extenuating circumstances to the basic amount may prove entirely unsuitable for having the effect of personalising the fine, the circumstances of which, by contrast, are predetermined by the adjustment of the relevant amount according to the characteristics of the specific case?

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1).
2.

Second ground of appeal: the failure to grant Trame a fine reduction as a result of an inability to pay. Failure to state reasons. Breach of Article 36 and the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice. Breach of Article 117 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. The General Court erred in law by failing to explain adequately, or even by implication, the reasons why it rejected the plea alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment by the Commission when granting relief stemming from an inability to pay, with the result that the appellant was unable to know the reasons on which the judgment under appeal was based and the Court of Justice also prevented from having sufficient information in order to carry out its review. From another point of view, the General Court failed to take into account factors of crucial importance for the purpose of resolving this point. In the light of this, the judgment under appeal is also vitiated in the part concerning the fine imposed on the appellant.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 398/21

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 28 September 2015 — Aiudapds — Associazione Italiana delle Unità Dedicate Autonome Private di Day Surgery e dei Centri di Chirurgia Ambulatoriale v Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco (AIFA) and Ministero della Salute

(Case C-520/15)

(2015/C 398/26)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Aiudapds — Associazione Italiana delle Unità Dedicate Autonome Private di Day Surgery e dei Centri di Chirurgia Ambulatoriale

Respondents: Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco (AIFA) and Ministero della Salute

Other parties: Roche SpA, Novartis Farma SpA, and Regione Marche

Question referred

Do the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01), in which it is stated that everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law and which guarantees the right to a fair trial, Article 54 of that Charter which prohibits abuse of that right, and Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, in which it is stated that everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, preclude national legislation which, pursuant to Article 10 of Presidential Decree No 1199 of 24 November 1971 and Article 48 of Legislative Decree No 104 of 2 July 2010, enables only one of the parties to extraordinary proceedings brought exclusively before the Consiglio di Stato to have those proceedings transferred at first instance to a Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale without the approval or participation of the appellant or any other party to those proceedings?
1.

Do the provisions of Directive 2003/37/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 on type-approval of agricultural or forestry tractors, their trailers and interchangeable towed machinery, together with their systems, components and separate technical units and repealing Directive 74/150/EEC apply to the supply to the EU market and registration of used or second-hand vehicles manufactured outside the European Union or can Member States regulate the registration of such vehicles in a Member State by special national rules and impose requirements applicable to such registration (for example, the obligation to comply with the requirements of Directive 2003/37/EC)?
(ii)

The General Court erred in law in its application of the rules on joint and several liability for fines and in the calculation of the 10 % ceiling, in so far as it fixed the final amount of the fine for which SLM is liable at EUR 1,956 million by applying the legal limit of 10 % of SLM’s worldwide turnover in the reference year mentioned in Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. (1) In the present case, the General Court ought to have found, in the judgment, that SLM was liable, not only individually for the payment of EUR 1,956 million, but for an additional sum of EUR 13,3 million too, jointly and severally with Ori Martin. The ceilings ought to have been calculated separately for SLM, individually, for the period when it participated in the infringement during which it was not controlled by Ori Martin (the ceiling relating to the SLM’s worldwide turnover), and for SLM jointly and severally with Ori Martin, for the period in which that subsidiary was controlled by its parent (the ceiling relating to Ori Martin’s worldwide turnover, which in the present case was not reached).
4.

If question 2 is answered in the affirmative and question 3 is answered in the negative, which of the parties — the applicant worker or the defendant employer — has, in accordance with Article 19 of Directive 2006/54/EC, the burden of proving, once it has been established that performance of the job creates risks to the mother or the breast-fed child, (1) that the adjustment of working conditions or working hours is not feasible or that, despite such adjustment, the working conditions are liable to have an adverse effect on the health of the pregnant worker or breast-fed child (Article 26(2), in conjunction with Article 26(4), of the Law on the Prevention of Occupational Risks, which transposes Article 5(2) of Directive 92/85/EEC), and (2) that it is not technically or objectively feasible to move the worker to another job or that such a move cannot reasonably be required on substantiated grounds (Article 26(3), in conjunction with Article 26(4), of the Law on the Prevention of Occupational Risks, which transposes Article 5(3) of Directive 92/85/EEC)?
2.

Must Article 1(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC be interpreted as meaning that only contracts concluded between traders and consumers concerning the sale of goods or supply of services fall within the ambit of that directive or as meaning that contracts (contracts of guarantee and of surety) ancillary to a credit agreement, the beneficiary of which is a commercial company, concluded by natural persons who have no connection with the activities of that commercial company and who acted for purposes unconnected with their trade, business or profession also fall within the ambit of that directive, in the light of the fact that, initially, the applicants were natural persons acting as guarantors of the principal debtor — a legal person of which one of the applicants was director — in connection with a loan agreement concluded with the defendant creditor, but subsequently the agreement in question was amended and the original debtor, of which the applicant referred to above was director, entered into a novation of the loan, with the agreement of the defendant creditor, with another legal person, neither of the applicants holding the position of director of that legal person but having undertaken, as sureties, for the benefit of the new debtor (a legal person), the obligation under the novation vis-à-vis the new debtor?
1.

When the ‘essential activity’ undertaken by the controlled body is assessed, must an activity imposed on it by a non-shareholder public administration and undertaken in favour of non-shareholder public bodies also be taken into account?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 38/21

Appeal brought by Verband der Kölnisch-Wasser Hersteller, Köln e.V. against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 25 November 2014 in Case T-556/13 Verband der Kölnisch Wasser Hersteller e.V. v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), lodged by fax on 26 January 2015

(Case C-29/15 P)

(2016/C 038/30)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Verband der Kölnisch-Wasser Hersteller, Köln e.V. (represented by: T. Schulte-Beckhausen, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

By Order of 3 December 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Eighth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay its own costs.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 48/8

Action brought on 31 July 2015 — Udo Voigt v President of the European Parliament, European Parliament

(Case C-425/15)

(2016/C 048/13)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Udo Voigt (represented by: P. R. Richter, Rechtsanwalt)

Defendants: President of the European Parliament, European Parliament

By Order of 29 October 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union (First Chamber) held that it clearly does not have jurisdiction to decide on the action for annulment brought by Mr Udo Voigt on 31 July 2015 and referred the case to the General Court of the European Union. It reserved the decision on costs.
3.

Are the abovementioned provisions of the Directive, the objective it pursues and the obligation it imposes on national courts to examine of their own motion the unfairness of unfair terms in consumer contracts without the consumer having to request it to be interpreted as allowing the national court, in proceedings such as that established in Article 250. 1.7 of the Law of Civil Procedure or in the ‘extrajudicial sale’ procedure governed by Article 129 of the Law on Mortgages, to disapply national law when the latter it does not permit that judicial review of the court’s own motion, in view of the clarity of the provisions of the Directive and of the affirmations of the CJEU concerning the obligation of national courts to review of their own motion the existence of unfair terms in cases relating to consumer contracts?
1.

In connection with the provision of translation services, the Court of Justice of the European Union submitted that the appellant could not be accepted as a subcontractor of a company invited to tender, on the ground that ‘…the qualification [which he had obtained] from the University of Poitiers (a vocational master’s degree in law, economics and management, private law, lawyer-linguist specialism), even though it [was] a level 2 Master’s Degree, [did] not demonstrate full legal training’ and that ‘that assessment [was] consistent with an established practice of the French translation unit which does not regard the “lawyer-linguist” training offered by the University of Poitiers (Master’s Degree 2) as being legal training which satisfies the requirements set out in paragraph III.2.1 of the contract notice’, it being made clear that ‘[t]he method of obtaining the degree (“VAE”, or validation of acquired experience) [had] had no effect on the assessment …’.
1.

Must Article 4 of Council Directive 85/374/EEC (1) of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products be interpreted as precluding, in the area of liability of pharmaceutical laboratories for the vaccines that they manufacture, a method of proof by which the court ruling on the merits, in the exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction to appraise the facts, may consider that the facts relied on by the applicant constitute serious, specific and consistent presumptions capable of proving the defect in the vaccine and the existence of a causal relationship between it and the disease, notwithstanding the finding that medical research does not establish a relationship between the vaccine and the occurrence of the disease?
3.

In the event that it is established that the Charter is applicable to the present case, does the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial as laid down by Article 47 of the Charter require — without the possibility of restrictions being imposed under Article 52(1) of the Charter — that the competent national court must have unlimited jurisdiction and accordingly the power to review, at least as a result of an objection, the validity of an information order made by the competent authority of a Member State in the execution of a request for exchange of information submitted by the competent authority of another Member State, inter alia, on the basis of Directive 2011/16 in an action brought by the third party holder of the information, to whom that information order is addressed, such action being directed against a decision imposing an administrative pecuniary penalty for that person’s alleged failure to fulfil his obligation to cooperate in the context of the execution of that request?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 68/20

Appeal brought on 12 May 2015 by Edward Guja against the order of the General Court (Second Chamber) made on 14 April 2015 in Case T-823/14 Guja v Poland

(Case C-352/15 P)

(2016/C 068/25)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Appellant: Edward Guja (represented by: M. Szczepara, adwokat)

Other party to the proceedings: Republic of Poland

By order of the Court of Justice (Third Chamber) of 17 December 2015 the appeal was dismissed.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 98/21

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour administrative d’appel de Douai (France) lodged on 21 December 2015 — Wenceslas de Lobkowicz v Ministère des Finances et des Comptes publics

(Case C-690/15)

(2016/C 098/27)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour administrative d’appel de Douai

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Wenceslas de Lobkowicz

Defendant: Ministère des Finances et des Comptes publics

Question referred

Is there any principle of EU law which precludes an official of the European Commission being subject to the contribution sociale généralisée (general social contribution), the prélèvement social (social levy), and additional contributions to that levy at the rate of 0.3 % and 1.1 % on income from real estate received in a Member State of the European Union?
2.

Does Directive 2002/46, in particular in Article 5, as well as the principles resulting from Community case-law on the provisions relating to the free movement of goods, permit the maximum daily doses of vitamins and minerals to be set in proportion to the recommended daily allowances by adopting a value equal to three times the recommended daily allowances for nutrients presenting the least risk, a value equal to the recommended daily allowances for nutrients presenting a risk of the upper safe level being exceeded and a value below the recommended daily allowances or even zero for nutrients involving the most risk?
1.

Does Article 4 of Directive 2000/60/EC (1) establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy (‘the Water Framework Directive’) or the Water Framework Directive as a whole confer on an environmental organisation, in a procedure which is not subject to an environmental impact assessment under Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (‘the EIA Directive’), rights for the protection of which it has access to administrative or judicial procedures under Article 9(3) of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, which was approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2015 (‘the Aarhus Convention’)? If question 1 is answered in the affirmative:
1.

Are the Commission’s explanatory notes to subheading 8525 80 30 and to subheadings 8525 80 91 and 8525 80 99 of the Combined Nomenclature to be interpreted as meaning that there are also ‘at least 30 minutes in a single sequence of video’ in the case where, by means of a ‘video record’ mode, sequences of video together lasting longer than 30 minutes are recorded, but those sequences of video are recorded in separate files, each with a duration of less than 30 minutes, and the user must, when playing back, open each file with a duration of less than 30 minutes separately, although it is possible, with the aid of the software supplied by GoPro, to place the sequences, which have been incorporated into those files, on a personal computer one after another and thereby save a single video sequence of more than 30 minutes’ duration in a single file on a personal computer?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 191/2

Appeal brought on 10 August 2015 by AgriCapital Corp. against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 10 June 2015 in Case T-514/13: AgriCapital Corp. v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)

(Case C-440/15 P)

(2016/C 191/03)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: AgriCapital Corp. (represented by: P. Meyer, Rechtsanwalt, M. Gramsch, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)

By order of 3 March 2016 the Court of Justice (Tenth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 136/6

Appeal brought on 14 April 2015 by Enercon GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 28 January 2015 in Case T-655/13, Enercon GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

(Case C-170/15 P)

(2016/C 136/10)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Enercon GmbH (represented by: R. Böhm, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

By order of 21 January 2016 the Court of Justice of the European Union (Sixth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.