ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
2.

If such an exclusive right is compatible with EU law, does the latter preclude such a right from additionally concerning the structures through which the sale of such products takes place, in the sense that such structures must be mainly or exclusively owned by one or more veterinary surgeons?
1.

Does the legal relationship between a company that has acquired the right to a debt under an assignment of claim agreement and a natural person whose indebtedness arose under a consumer credit agreement, where the company carries out acts of debt recovery, fall within the scope of Directive 2005/29/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 326/16

Reference for a preliminary ruling from Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (United Kingdom) made on 22 June 2016 — MP v Secretary of State for the Home Department

(Case C-353/16)

(2016/C 326/28)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Supreme Court of the United Kingdom

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: MP

Defendant: Secretary of State for the Home Department

Question referred

Does article 2(e), read with article 15(b), of EU Council Directive 2004/83/EC (1) cover a real risk of serious harm to the physical or psychological health of the applicant if returned to the country of origin, resulting from previous torture or inhuman or degrading treatment for which the country of origin was responsible?

(1) Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted

OJ L 304, p. 12
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 343/28

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Milano (Italy) lodged on 22 June 2016 — Sacko Moussa v Commissione Territoriale per il riconoscimento della Protezione internazionale di Milano

(Case C-348/16)

(2016/C 343/40)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale di Milano

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Sacko Moussa

Defendant: Commissione Territoriale per il riconoscimento della Protezione internazionale di Milano

Question referred

Must Directive 2013/32/EU (1) (in particular Articles 12, 14, 31 and 46) be interpreted as permitting a procedure, such as the Italian procedure (under Article 19(9) of Legislative Decree No 150 of 2011), whereby a judicial authority seised by an asylum-seeker — whose application has been rejected by the administrative authority responsible for considering applications for asylum after it has conducted a full examination, including an interview — may, in cases where the application for judicial review is manifestly unfounded and the administrative authority’s rejection of the application is thus incontrovertible, dismiss the application for judicial review without preparatory inquiries and without being required to afford the applicant a further opportunity to be heard?

(1) Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60).
1.

Infringement of Article 76 (2) CTMR Both oppositions brought by KENZO S.A. are based on Article 8 (5) CTMR (1). In both cases, the Board of Appeal took into account evidence in support of the reputation claim which was filed by the Opponent before the Opposition Division in order to establish genuine use of the mark. It is undisputed that the documents concerned were filed after the expiry of the time limits for submitting evidence of the existence, validity and scope of protection of the earlier right pursuant to Rule 19 (1) CTMIR (2). It follows from Rule 19 (1), (2) and 20 (1) CTMIR that an opposition based on Article 8 (5) must be rejected if the opponent fails to prove the reputation of the earlier trademark within the period specified by the Office. Nevertheless, the General Court comes to the conclusion that the Board of Appeal had discretion as to whether the evidence concerned should be taken into account in support of the reputation claim, that the Board recognized and did exercise its discretion and provided proper reasons for taking that evidence into account. The appellant, on the other hand, is of the opinion that the finding of the General Court awarding discretion to the Board of Appeal is flawed by an error in law and amounts to misapplication of Rules 19 (1), (2) and 20 (1) CTMIR. The appellant is aware that the other parties to the proceedings claim that the admissibility of the consideration of documents filed in support of genuine use in support of the reputation claim is to be guided not by Rule 20 (1) CTMIR, but by Rule 50, paragraph 1, alinea 3, of Regulation No 2868/95 as a special procedural Rule before the Board of Appeal. Even if the discretion of the Board of Appeal were to be construed in line with Rule 50 (1) (iii) CTMR, that discretion was exercised incorrectly by the Board of Appeal and the General Court misapplied Article 76 (2) by approving the Board of Appeal's considerations on the indissociable link between proof of use and proof of reputation as proper exercising of its discretion. In fact, the Board of Appeal did not even determine the scope of its discretion, i.e. by determining whether the discretion in the subject case must be exercised restrictively or not. If the Board of Appeal had exercised its discretion correctly, it should have recognized that the discretion must, in conformity with the Rintisch judgment (Case C-120/12 P, Bernhard Rintisch v. OHIM) be exercised restrictively. In the circumstances, the only way of correctly exercising discretion would have been not to take into consideration the documents supporting the reputation claim. The General Court overlooked the fact that the Board of Appeal failed to correctly determine the scope of its discretion and to apply its discretion within that scope and, by so doing, infringed Article 76 (2) CTMR.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 350/14

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 24 May 2016 — Kamin und Grill Shop GmbH v Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs Frankfurt am Main e.V.

(Case C-289/16)

(2016/C 350/17)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Kamin und Grill Shop GmbH

Defendant: Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs Frankfurt am Main e.V.

Question referred

Is there already a ‘direct’ sale to the final customer within the meaning of Article 28(2) of Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 (1) where the operator or his sales personnel sells the products to the final customer without the intervention of a third party, or does a ‘direct’ sale additionally require that the sale occurs at the place where the products are stored when both the operator or his sales personnel and the final consumer are present at the same time?

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 of 28 June 2007 on organic production and labelling of organic products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91 (OJ 2007 L 189, p. 1).
5.

In the event that Article 24 of the Dublin III Regulation applies (analogously) to such a person (question 2(b)): a) Is the submission of a new take back request tied (analogously) to a new time limit under Article 24(2) of the Dublin III Regulation? If so: Does this new time limit start to run when the responsible authority learns of re-entry, or does another event determine its commencement? b) If the other Member State (here, Germany) allows a time limit to expire that is required to be complied with (analogously) under Article 24(2) of the Dublin III Regulation: Does the lodging of a new asylum application pursuant to Article 24(3) of the Dublin III Regulation directly establish the responsibility of the other Member State (here, Germany), or may it, despite the new asylum application, submit a new take back request to the Member State having original responsibility (here, Italy) without being bound by a time limit, or transfer the foreign national to that Member State without submitting a take back request? c) If the other Member State (here, Germany) allows a time limit to expire that is required to be complied with (analogously) under Article 24(2) of the Dublin III Regulation: Is the lis pendens of an asylum application lodged in the other Member State (here, Germany) prior to transfer equivalent to the lodging of a new asylum application pursuant to Article 24(3) of the Dublin III Regulation? d) If the other Member State (here, Germany) allows a time limit to expire that is required to be complied with (analogously) under Article 24(2) of the Dublin III Regulation and the foreign national neither lodges a new asylum application and the lis pendens of an asylum application lodged in the other Member State (here, Germany) prior to transfer is not equivalent to the lodging of a new asylum application pursuant to Article 24(3) of the Dublin III Regulation: Can the other Member State (here, Germany) submit a new take back request to the Member State having original responsibility (here, Italy) without being bound by a time limit, or transfer the foreign national to that Member State without submitting a take back request?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 383/2

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Novara (Italy) lodged on 4 July 2016 — Bruno Dell’Acqua v Eurocom Srl, Regione Lombardia

(Case C-370/16)

(2016/C 383/02)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale di Novara

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Bruno Dell’Acqua

Defendants: Eurocom Srl, Regione Lombardia

Question referred

‘Is prior authorisation in accordance with the [last] sentence of Article 1 of the “Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union” (Official Journal of the European Union C 310/261 of 16.12. 2004) necessary or not, when in attachment proceedings against a third party the sums to be attached are no longer held by the payer, the [European] Commission, but have already been transferred to the national paying agencies?’
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 371/4

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Netherlands) lodged on 18 July 2016 — X BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën

(Case C-398/16)

(2016/C 371/05)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hoge Raad der Nederlanden

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: X BV

Respondent: Staatssecretaris van Financiën

Question referred

Must Articles 43 EC and 48 EC (now Articles 49 TFEU and 54 TFEU) be interpreted as precluding national legislation on the basis of which a parent company established in a Member State is not allowed to deduct interest in respect of a loan associated with a capital contribution made to a subsidiary established in another Member State, whereas that deduction could have been availed of if that subsidiary had been included with that parent company in a single tax entity — with characteristics such as those of a Netherlands single tax entity — in view of the fact that, in that case, by reason of consolidation, there would be no obvious association with such a capital contribution?
2.

If the first question is answered in the negative: does the principle of freedom of movement for workers under Article 45 TFEU preclude a provision of national law, such as that applicable in the main proceedings, which makes disbursement of the remuneration for doctors studying to become specialists subject to presentation of a declaration by the recipient doctor undertaking to work for at least five years in the public health service of the Autonomous Province of Bolzano/Bozen within ten years of completing training as a specialist and which, in the event of a total failure to honour that undertaking, expressly permits the Autonomous Province of Bolzano/Bozen, as the body funding the remuneration, to reclaim up to 70 % of the allowance paid together with statutory interest calculated from the moment at which the administration paid each individual instalment?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 392/6

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Symvoulio tis Epikrateias (Greece) lodged on 22 July 2016 — Ypourgos Esoterikon, Ypourgos Paideias kai Thriskevmaton v Maria-Eleni Kalliri

(Case C-409/16)

(2016/C 392/08)

Language of the case: Greek

Referring court

Symvoulio tis Epikrateias (Greece)

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: Ypourgos Esoterikon, Ypourgos Paideias kai Thriskevmaton

Respondent: Maria-Eleni Kalliri

Question referred

Is Article 1(1) of Presidential Decree 90/2003, which amended Article 2(1) of Presidential Decree 4/1995 and provides that civilian candidates for the Officers’ School and the School for Policemen of the Police Academy must, amongst other qualifications, ‘be of a height (in the case of men and women) of at least 1.70 m’, compatible with Directives 76/207/EEC, (1) 2002/73/EC (2) and 2006/54/EC, (3) which prohibit any indirect discrimination on grounds of sex as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, in the public sector (unless that ultimate different treatment is attributable to factors which are objectively justified and are unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex, and does not go beyond what is appropriate and necessary in order to serve the objective pursued by the measure)?

(1) Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions (OJ 1976 L 39, p. 40).

(2) Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions (OJ 2002 L 269, p. 15).

(3) Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (OJ 2006 L 204, p. 23).
3.

Is it also necessary, in order to resolve the question posed in [the preceding] paragraph …, to take account of the interpretation of the rules on exclusive jurisdiction in Regulation No 44/2001, and in particular in Article 22, which provides for such jurisdiction, inter alia in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, trade marks and designs but not in cases regarding negative declarations, and in Article 24, which provides for the possibility that the defendant may accept a different jurisdiction, except where jurisdiction is derived from other provisions of the regulation, thereby establishing the jurisdiction of the court seised by the applicant?
2.

In the First Ground of Appeal, the Appellant alleges that the General Court ruled ultra petita in breach of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court and Articles 76 (1) and 84 (1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, or in the alternative erred in law in ruling that a violation of the principles of equal opportunities and due diligence could lead to an annulment of the Contested Decision, by holding that the Contested Decision should be annulled in so far as EUIPO did not request nor obtain extracts from the judicial records of Siemens SA and Siemens SL demonstrating the absence of any of the exclusion grounds listed in Art. 93 and 94 FR. In the second part of the first ground of appeal, the Appellant also demonstrates that the General Court has distorted the facts by holding that EUIPO did not request nor produce any evidence which was in accordance to Article 134b Implementing rules sufficient to demonstrate the absence of exclusion grounds for Siemens SL, as the case file does contain an extract from the registro mercantil which is an equivalent document to an extract from the judicial record in the sense of Article 134b Implementing rules.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 428/12

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Giudice di Pace di Taranto (Italy) lodged on 8 September 2016 — Criminal proceedings against Antonio Semeraro

(Case C-484/16)

(2016/C 428/12)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Giudice di Pace di Taranto

Party to the main proceedings

Antonio Semeraro

Question referred

Does Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, (1) implemented in Italy by Legislative Decree No 212 of 15 December 2015 (Gazzetta Ufficiale General Series No 3 of 5 January 2016), in particular recitals 9, 66 and 67 and Article 2(1)(a) thereof, preclude the repeal of the criminal offence set out in Article 594 of the Criminal Code referred to in Articles [1] et seq. of Legislative Decree No 7 of 15 January 2016, having regard to Article 83 TFEU and Articles 2 and 3 of the Italian Constitution and to Articles 49, 51, 53 and 54 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?

(1) OJ 2012 L 315, p. 57.
3.

Can Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Directive 79/1072/EEC, in conjunction with Article 17(2) and (3)(a) of Directive 77/388/EEC, be interpreted as meaning that the right to a refund of VAT may be denied in the case where the subsequent transaction planned, in connection with which the imported goods were intended to be used, is no longer carried out? In those circumstances, does the actual intended use of the goods, that is to say, whether they were used in any event, in what way and in which territory, namely in that of the Member State in which the VAT was paid or outside that State, have any relevance?
I.3.

Is EU law, in particular Articles 69 and 70 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 of 7 June 2011 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 in respect of the fruit and vegetables and processed fruit and vegetables sectors, to be interpreted as meaning that a court required to rule on an appeal brought against a decision by which an administrative authority, in connection with a particular annual segment of the operational programme, gave a final adjudication on an application for the payment of financial assistance under Article 103 g(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation), in the version of Council Regulation (EC) No 361/2008 of 14 April 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (‘Single CMO Regulation’), is prevented from examining the question of the legality of the value-of-the-marketed-production calculation used as the basis for the ceiling on aid by a pre-existing final decision approving the operational programme and the amounts of funds and by the decision on the ‘approved amount of aid’?
2.

Is Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 to be interpreted as meaning that a consumer in a Member State can also invoke at the same time as his own claims arising from a consumer supply at the claimant’s place of jurisdiction the claims of others consumers on the same subject who are domiciled a. in the same Member State, b. in another Member State: or c. in a non-Member State, if the claims assigned to him arise from consumer supplies involving the same defendant in the same legal context and if the assignment is not part of a professional or trade activity of the applicant, but rather serves to ensure the joint enforcement of claims?
3.

In the event that, under certain conditions, the binding effect of documents within the meaning of Article 19(2) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 is limited: Does it contravene the prohibition on replacement set forth in Article 12(1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 if the replacement occurs not in the form of a posting by the same employer but instead by another employer? Does it matter whether a) the second employer has its registered office in the same Member State as the first employer, and b) the first and the second posting employer share staffing and/or organisational resources?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6/23

Appeal brought on 2 June 2016 by Ukraine against the order of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 11 March 2015 in Case T-346/14: Yanukovych v Council

(Case C-317/16 P)

(2017/C 006/29)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Ukraine (represented by: M. Kostytska, avocat)

Other parties to the proceedings: Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych, Council of the European Union, European Commission, Republic of Poland

By order of 5 October 2016 the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
2.

If the answer to the first question is that, when issuing a national marketing authorisation, the competent authorities of a Member State are not competent to determine the time from which the period of data exclusivity of the reference medicinal product starts to run: — is the court of that Member State when dealing with an appeal by the holder of the marketing authorisation for the reference medicinal product required to determine the time from which the period of data exclusivity starts to run, or is it subject to the same limit as the national authorities of that Member State? — in those circumstances, how is the national court to give effect to the right of the holder of the marketing authorisation of the reference medicinal product under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 10 of Directive 2001/83 to effective legal protection with regard to data exclusivity? — does the claim for effective legal protection require the national court to examine whether the original marketing authorisation granted in another Member State was issued in accordance with the rules laid down by Directive 2001/83?
2.

Insofar as Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 is applicable: When passengers are transported on two flights without any significant stopover at the connecting airport, is the final destination of the passengers to be regarded as being the place where the services were provided under the second indent of Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, even if the claim advanced in the application for compensation under Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 is based on the disruption of the first leg of the journey and the claim has been brought against the air carrier which operated the first flight, which is not a party to the contract of carriage?
1.

Must point (o) of Article 3 of the Directive on payment services in the internal market (Directive 2007/64/EC) (1) be interpreted as meaning that the possibility to withdraw cash in an officially authorised gaming arcade by means of a debit card and PIN from a cash terminal, also functioning as a change machine, where the bank- and account-related processing is carried out by an external service provider (‘network provider’) and the cash is dispensed to the customer only when the network provider, after checking whether funds are available, sends an authorisation code to the terminal, whereas the arcade operator merely loads the multi-functional change machine with cash and receives a credit from the bank whose customer withdrew cash corresponding to the amount withdrawn, constitutes an activity within the meaning of point (o) of Article 3 of the Directive and is consequently not subject to authorisation?