ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.

Is Article 17(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to be interpreted as meaning that a national provision such as that pursuant to Article 242(8) of the Nakazatelen kodeks (Criminal Code, ‘the NK’) of the Republic of Bulgaria, according to which a means of transport used to commit aggravated smuggling which belongs to a third person who neither knew nor could or should have known that its employee was committing the offence must be confiscated for the benefit of the State, is unlawful on the grounds that it undermines the fair balance between the public interest and the need to protect the right to property?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 11 April 2019 — Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale v VR

(Case C-303/19)

(2019/C 288/18)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte suprema di cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale

Respondent and cross-appellant: VR

Question referred

Should Article 11(1)(d) of Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 (1) and the principle of equal treatment for long-term residents and national citizens be interpreted to the effect that they preclude national legislation under which, unlike the provisions laid down for nationals of the Member State, the family members of a worker who is a long-term resident and a citizen of a third country are excluded when determining the members of the family unit, for the purpose of calculating the family unit allowance, where those individuals live in the third country of origin?

(1) Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents (OJ 2004 L 16, p. 44).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 13 May 2019 — Benedetti Pietro e Angelo S.S. and Others v Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA)

(Case C-377/19)

(2019/C 312/05)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: Benedetti Pietro e Angelo S.S., Capparotto Giampaolo e Lorenzino S.S., Gonzo Dino S.S., Soc. Agr. Semplice F.Lli Isolan, Mantovani Giuseppe e Giorgio S.S., Azienda Agricola Padovani Luigi, Az. Agr. La Pila di Mastrotto Piergiorgio e C. S.S., Azienda Agricola Mastrotto Giuseppe

Respondent: Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA)

Question referred

In circumstances such as those described, does Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004 (1) preclude a national provision, such as that laid down in Article 9 of Decree-Law No 49/2003 in conjunction with Article 2(3) of Decree-Law No 157 of 24 June 2004, which lays down the criterion for identifying the priority category to which a levy unduly charged is to be refunded as whether or not the purchaser has made a regular monthly payment?

(1) Commission Regulation (EC) No 595/2004 of 30 March 2004 laying down detailed rules for applying Council Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003 establishing a levy in the milk and milk products sector (OJ 2004 L 94, p. 22).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Finland) lodged on 24 June 2019 — Veronsaajien oikeudenvalvontayksikkö

(Case C-480/19)

(2019/C 295/10)

Language of the case: Finnish

Referring court

Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: E

Other party: Veronsaajien oikeudenvalvontayksikkö

Question referred

Are Articles 63 and 65 TFEU to be interpreted as meaning that they preclude a national interpretation according to which income received by a natural person residing in Finland from an undertaking for collective investment in transferable securities based in another Member State of the Union and constituted in accordance with statute within the meaning of the Investment Fund Directive 2009/65/EC (1) (UCITS fund in the form of an investment company) is not, for the purposes of income tax, treated in the same way as income received from a Finnish investment fund constituted in accordance with contract law within the meaning of the same Directive (UCITS fund in contract form), because the legal form of the UCITS located in the other Member State does not correspond to the legal structure of the national investment fund?

(1) Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) (OJ 2009 L 302, p. 32).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 11 July 2019 — NM, acting as insolvency administrator in the insolvency proceedings concerning the assets of NIKI Luftfahrt GmbH v ON

(Case C-530/19)

(2019/C 328/28)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberster Gerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Defendant, respondent and appellant on a point of law: NM, acting as insolvency administrator in the insolvency proceedings concerning the assets of NIKI Luftfahrt GmbH

Applicant, appellant and respondent in the appeal on a point of law: ON

Questions referred

1. Is an air carrier which, under Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (the Flight Passenger Rights Regulation), (1) is required to offer assistance under Article 9(1)(b) of that regulation liable on the basis of that regulation for damage resulting from an injury incurred by the passenger as a result of the negligent conduct of employees of the hotel provided by the air carrier?

2. If Question 1 is answered in the negative: Is the air carrier’s obligation under Article 9(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 limited to providing the passenger with a hotel and covering the costs of the accommodation, or is the air carrier liable for the accommodation as such?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
Appeal brought on 2 August 2019 by Deutsche Lufthansa AG against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) made on 17 May 2019 in Case T-764/15, Deutsche Lufthansa AG v European Commission

(Case C-594/19 P)

(2019/C 319/29)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Deutsche Lufthansa AG (represented by: A. Martin-Ehlers, Rechtsanwalt)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Land Rheinland-Pfalz

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:

— set aside the order of the General Court of 17 May 2019 in Case T-764/15;

— grant the form of order sought at first instance and annul the underlying Commission Decision SA.32833 of 1 October 2014; (1)

— in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for judgment; and

— order the Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

By its appeal, the appellant puts forward, in essence, the following grounds of appeal:

— The appellant already had locus standi in accordance with the judgment in Montessori. (2) That is because the granting of a loan from the liquidity pool in the amount of EUR 45 million in favour of Flughafen Frankfurt-Hahn GmbH constitutes an aid scheme. Furthermore, the funds from that loan demonstrably went to Ryanair.

— If the so-called Mory case-law (3) is applied, then the first alternative solution should be applied. The Commission disregarded essential elements of fact and additional benefits. Owing to the infringement of the appellant’s procedural rights, the Commission cannot be deemed to have conducted a proper investigation procedure. In this case too, the appellant was individually concerned and therefore had locus standi.

— Alternatively, the action is also admissible if the second alternative solution of the so-called Mory case-law is applied, according to which the appellant would have to prove that its market position was substantially affected by the aid. In this case the burden of proof is reversed, or at least lessened in favour of the appellant, since the Commission arbitrarily concealed the relevant facts that were known to it. Only in the alternative, the appellant submits that it has in fact also proved that it was substantially affected. The General Court’s legal assessment, which found otherwise, goes beyond the Court of Justice’s case-law and is based on a legally erroneous understanding of the relevant market. In that regard, the General Court distorts and curtails the appellant’s statement of the facts, alters the content of the decision at issue and infringes the rules governing the burden of proof.

(1) Commission Decision (EU) 2016/788 of 1 October 2014 on the State aid SA.32833 (11/C) (ex 11/NN) implemented by Germany concerning the financing arrangements for Frankfurt Hahn airport put into place in 2009 to 2011 (OJ 2016 L 134, p. 1).

(2) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 6 November 2018, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori Srl and Others (C-622/16 P to C-624/16 P, EU:C:2018:873).

(3) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 17 September 2015, Mory SA and Others v European Commission (C-33/14 P, EU:C:2015:609).
1.

Must Article 56 TFEU, Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services (1) and Directive 2014/67/EU (2) be interpreted as precluding a national provision which, for infringements of formal obligations in connection with the cross-border deployment of labour, such as a failure to make available documents relating to pay or a failure to report to the Central Coordination Office (ZKO notifications), provides for very high fines, in particular high minimum penalties, which are imposed cumulatively in respect of each worker concerned?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 16 July 2019 — WV v Landkreis Harburg

(Case C-540/19)

(2019/C 348/08)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Defendant and appellant: WV

Applicant and respondent: Landkreis Harburg

Question referred

Can a public body which has provided a maintenance creditor with social assistance benefits in accordance with provisions of public law invoke the place of jurisdiction at the place of habitual residence of the maintenance creditor under Article 3(b) of the European Maintenance Regulation (1) in the case where it asserts the maintenance creditor’s maintenance claim under civil law, transferred to it on the basis of the granting of social assistance by way of statutory subrogation, against the maintenance debtor by way of recourse?

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations (OJ 2009 L 7, p. 1).
2.

If so, in circumstances where the executing member state has applied in its national legislation the optional grounds for non-execution of the European arrest warrant set out in Article 4.1 and Article 4.7(b) of the Framework Decision, how is the executing judicial authority to make its determination as regards an offence stated to be committed in the third state, but where the surrounding circumstances of that offence display preparatory acts that took place in the issuing state?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 8 July 2019 by Maria Alvarez y Bejarano and Others against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 30 April 2019 in Joined Cases T-516/16 and T-536/16, Alvarez y Bejarano and Others v Commission

(Case C-517/19 P)

(2019/C 357/20)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellants: Maria Alvarez y Bejarano, Ana-Maria Enescu, Lucian Micu, Angelica Livia Salanta, Svetla Shulga, Soldimar Urena de Poznanski, Angela Vakalis, Luz Anamaria Chu, Marli Bertolete, Maria Castro Capcha, Hassan Orfe El, Evelyne Vandevoorde (represented by: S. Orlandi, T. Martin, lawyers)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Council of the European Union, European Parliament

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— annul the decision no longer to allow the appellants, as of 2014, travelling time or reimbursement of annual travel expenses;

— order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellants claim that the judgment under appeal is vitiated by a number of errors of law.

Firstly, the General Court erred in law in paragraphs 67 and 75 of the judgment in limiting the extent of the judicial review it is required to carry out to ‘manifest’ cases.

Secondly, the General Court erred in law in paragraphs 70 to 73 of the judgment in finding that the appellants were not in a comparable situation to staff members who retained the benefit of travelling time and reimbursement of their annual travel expenses.

Thirdly, the General Court erred in law in finding, in paragraphs 69 and 80 to 86 of the judgment, that the regulations at issue do not infringe the principle of proportionality.
2)

Failure to fulfil obligations under Article 5 of Directive 2000/60/EC, read in conjunction with point 2.2 of Annex II to that directive. Article 5 of Directive 2000/60/EC sets out the procedure to be followed for the river basin district, imposing in each case an analysis of the characteristics of the district, a study of the impact of human activity on the status of surface water and groundwater, and an economic analysis of water use. Where, following the initial analysis of the characteristics, a body of groundwater is identified as posing a risk, Member States are required, pursuant to point 2.2 of Annex II to the Directive, to carry out an additional characterisation. The Commission considers that the Kingdom of Spain has not correctly applied Article 5(1) of Directive 2000/60/EC, read in conjunction with point 2.2 of Annex II to that Directive, in so far as it has not carried out an additional characterisation of the groundwater bodies in the district of Doñana which exposed to a risk, without determining the necessary measures either. The Commission therefore concludes that the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 5 of Directive 2000/60/EC, read in conjunction with point 2.2 of Annex II to that directive.
Action brought on 4 September 2019 — European Commission v Kingdom of Spain

(Case C-658/19)

(2019/C 357/34)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by D. Nardi, G. von Rintelen and S. Pardo Quintillán, Agents)

Defendant: Kingdom of Spain

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— Declare that, by failing to adopt, by 6 May 2018, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on [the protection of natural persons with regard] to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, (1) or, in any event, by failing to notify those measures to the Commission, the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 63(1) of that directive;

— Impose on the Kingdom of Spain, in accordance with Article 260(3) TFEU, a daily penalty payment of EUR 89 548,20, with effect from the date of delivery of the judgment declaring the failure to fulfil the obligation to adopt or, in any event, the failure to notify to the Commission, the measures necessary to comply with Directive (EU) 2016/680, to be paid into an account to be indicated by the Commission;

— Impose on the Kingdom of Spain, in accordance with Article 260(3) TFEU, a lump-sum payment, the amount of which corresponds to the daily amount of EUR 21 321,00 multiplied by the number of days on which the infringement continues, provided that that amount exceeds the minimum lump-sum payment of EUR 5 290 000, to be paid into an account to be indicated by the Commission;

— Order the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In accordance with Article 63(1) of Directive (EU) 2016/680, the Member States were to adopt and publish, by 6 May 2018, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with that directive, and forthwith notify to the Commission the text of those provisions.

The Commission has not been informed of the adoption and entry into force of any of the required transposition measures, and is not aware of any other information indicating that the directive has been transposed.

The Kingdom of Spain has, therefore, failed to transpose Directive (EU) 2016/680, more than a year after the expiry of the period for transposition.

(1) OJ 2016 L 119, p. 89
1.

Is the first alternative in the first subparagraph of Article 24(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (1)(‘Brussels Ia Regulation’) to be interpreted as meaning that actions brought by a co-owner seeking to prohibit another co-owner from carrying out changes to his property subject to co-ownership, in particular to its designated use, arbitrarily and without the consent of the other co-owners, concern the assertion of a right in rem?
Appeal brought on 12 September 2019 by Fulmen against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 2 July 2019 in Case T-405/15, Fulmen v Council

(Case C-680/19 P)

(2019/C 372/28)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Fulmen (represented by: A. Bahrami, N. Korogiannakis, lawyers)

Other parties to the proceedings: Council of the European Union, European Commission

Form of order sought

Primarily:

— set aside the judgment under appeal in part;

— give final judgment in the matter;

— order the Council to pay Fulmen the sum of EUR 6 456 507 in respect of material damage and EUR 100 000 in respect of non-material damage, together with default interest;

— order the Council to pay all of the costs.

In the alternative:

— set aside the judgment under appeal in part;

— refer the case back to the General Court;

— order the Council to pay all of the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Concerning the material damage, the General Court, in the first place, erred in law, infringed the principle of full reparation and deprived Article 340(2) TFEU and Article 41(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of their practical effect. The standard of proof required by the General Court made any compensation for the harm suffered impossible, despite the existence of a sufficiently serious and flagrant breach of EU law. In the second place, the judgment under appeal was vitiated by an error of law and by contradictory reasoning. In the third place, the General Court distorted the evidence and the facts.

Concerning the non-material damage, the judgment under appeal contains no statement of reasons as regards the criteria taken into account in order to assess ex aequo et bono the amount of the compensation.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 7 February 2019 by Comprojecto-Projectos e Construçoes, Lda, and Others against the order of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-493/18 Comprojecto-Projectos e Construçoes and Others v Portugal

(Case C-98/19 P)

(2019/C 363/06)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Parties

Appellants: Comprojecto-Projectos e Construçoes, Lda, Paulo Eduardo Matos Gomes de Azevedo, Julião Maria Gomes de Azevedo, Isabel Maria Matos Gomes de Azevedo (represented by: M. A. Ribeiro, advogado)

Other party to the proceedings: Portuguese Republic

By order of 11 September 2019, the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as being, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded.
1.

The judgment under appeal is vitiated by a distortion of the facts and an error of law in relation to the infringement of Article 7(1) of Regulation No 2185/96. (1) The General Court failed to take into account the fact that the real subject matter of the action for damages was the question of whether OLAF had infringed Article 7(1) of Regulation No 2185/96 by asking the appellant to allow it to collect data which were in no way related to its investigation. Nor did the Court take account of the fact that the appellant actually authorised OLAF to investigate all the categories of data it had requested.
3.

If the answer to part (a) or part (b) of the second question is in the affirmative, is the national court required to give preference to an interpretation of the law which is consistent with the purpose of Directive 2016/801 in order to arrive at a solution compatible with the objective pursued by that directive, by agreeing to examine as a matter of extreme urgency an application for suspension of enforcement of a decision as referred to in Article 20 of that directive, even though the travaux préparatoires for the law might suggest that that was not the legislature’s intention?
3.

Are Articles 1, 2 and 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 856/84, Articles 1 and 2(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92, Articles 1(1) and 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003 and Articles 55, 64 and 65 of Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007, and the annexes thereto (as well as the national Italian transposition provisions set out in Decree Law No 49 of 28 March 2003, converted into law, with amendments, by Law No 119 of 30 May 2003, and Article 2 of Law No 468 of 26 November 1992, in so far as that provision is referred to in Article 2 of Decree Law No 49/2003), which include rather than excluding in the calculation of the quantities allocated to each Member State milk used for the production of PDO cheeses exported to or intended for markets outside the European Union, in so far as such exports are concerned, at odds with the protection objectives set out in Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92, which protects PDO production, with particular reference to Article 13, as confirmed by Regulation (EEC) No 510/2006 and by Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, and also with reference to the protection objectives set out in Article 4 of the latter regulation, and also at odds with Articles 32 (formerly 27), 39 (formerly 33), 40 (formerly 34) and 41 (formerly 35) TFEU, the principles of legal certainty, legitimate expectations, proportionality and non-discrimination and the principle of freedom to conduct business when exporting goods outside the European Union?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Erding (Germany) lodged on 2 September 2019 — EUflight.de GmbH v Eurowings GmbH

(Case C-648/19)

(2019/C 399/32)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Erding

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: EUflight.de GmbH

Defendant: Eurowings GmbH

Question referred

In order to have a right to compensation under Article 7 of Regulation No 261/2004, (1) is it a condition that the passenger boards the flight even where it is established prior to departure that there will be a long delay to that flight?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).