ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
11

The explanatory memorandum of the Budgetbegleitgesetz 2001, cited by the referring court, states, with regard to the interim tax: ‘… from 2001[, i]nterest earned on deposit securities and debt securities is to be subject to a form of interim tax, and at a specially reduced rate. The tax falls due first when the income accrues. If gifts are (subsequently) made by a private foundation, however, a tax credit will be granted in accordance with the detailed statutory rules. Consequently, the amount of the gifts does not affect the overall tax charge. The system is implemented by amendments to the law in two areas. First, the previous exemption provisions in Paragraph 13(2) [of the KStG 1988] are correspondingly modified. Previously exempt income will be taxed in the form of schedular taxation at a reduced rate of 12.5% (Paragraph 13(3) [of the KStG 1988]) by way of assessment. No tax will be due where distributions are made in the year when interest earnings accrue. Secondly, a tax credit at the same rate as that of the reduced tax is provided for in Paragraph 24(5) [of the KStG 1988]; this is effected by way of assessment. The tax credit presupposes, first, that the reduced tax has in fact been paid at the date when the tax return is submitted. In addition, there must be gifts from which capital gains tax has been withheld. The tax credit is granted at a rate of 12.5% of a gift, which is the same as the reduced rate of the tax. In terms of form, an account must be kept, detailing the movements and balance of the sums that may be used for a tax credit. For example: in 2001 a private foundation receives income from interest in the amount of 2000000 Austrian schillings (‘ATS’). Gifts in that year total ATS 500000. Interim tax at a rate of 12.5%, that is to say ATS 187500, is due. In 2002, income from interest amounts to ATS 2500000. No gifts are made in that year. Interim tax for 2002 is ATS 312500. In 2003, income from interest is ATS 2000000 and gifts total ATS 2100000. No interim tax is due for that year. Consequently, 12.5% of ATS 100000, that is to say ATS 12500, is credited from the interim tax paid in 2001 and 2002.’
1.

Officials — Social security — Sickness insurance — Former members of the institutions — Request for affiliation made by a former member of the civil service tribunal — Decision of refusal — Challenge — Remedies — Action for annulment within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU — Application lodged out of time — Inadmissibility (Arts 257, fourth para., TFEU, 263 TFEU, 270 TFEU and 336 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Annex I, Art. 3(1); Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 102(2); Staff Regulations of Officials, Arts 1a and 91(1) and (3); Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union, Art. 6; Rules on the insurance of officials of the European Union against the risk of accident and of occupational disease, Art. 35(1); Council Regulations No 422/67 and No 5/67) (see paras 32-38, 41-43)
1.

Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union in Klein v Commission (T‑309/10, EU:T:2014:19) in so far as, by that judgment, the General Court dismissed the action in that it sought that the European Commission be ordered to pay compensation for the damage allegedly suffered by Mr Christoph Klein from 15 September 2006;
There is nothing in the wording of Article 1(1)(a) of Directive 59/59 to suggest that a different meaning is to be given to the terms ‘establishment’ or ‘establishments’ in the same subparagraph of that provision. The fact that the legislature offers Member States a choice between the alternative and substantially equivalent options set out in Article 1(1)(a)(i) and (a)(ii) of Directive 98/59 indicates that the term ‘establishment’ cannot have a completely different meaning depending on the option chosen by the Member State concerned and such a major difference would be contrary to the need, emphasised in recital 7 of Directive 98/59, to promote the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies. The term ‘establishment’, which is not defined in Directive 98/59, is a term of EU law and cannot be defined by reference to the laws of the Member States. It must, on that basis, be interpreted in an autonomous and uniform manner in the EU legal order.

The term ‘establishment’ in Article 1(1)(a)(ii) of Directive 98/59 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies must be interpreted in the same way as the term in Article 1(1)(a)(i) of that directive.

Article 1(1)(a)(ii) of Directive 98/59 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation that lays down an obligation to inform and consult workers in the event of the dismissal, within a period of 90 days, of at least 20 workers from a particular establishment of an undertaking, and not where the aggregate number of dismissals across all of the establishments or across some of the establishments of an undertaking over the same period reaches or exceeds the threshold of 20 workers.

It has already been held that where an undertaking comprises several entities meeting the criteria set out in the judgment in Rockfon (C‑449/93) and the judgment in Athinaïki Chartopoiïa (C‑270/05), it is the entity to which the workers made redundant are assigned to carry out their duties that constitutes the ‘establishment’ for the purposes of Article 1(1)(a) of Directive 98/59.

An interpretation of the term ‘establishment’ as all of the establishments of an undertaking would, first, be contrary to the objective of ensuring comparable protection for workers’ rights in all Member States and, secondly, entail very different costs for the undertakings that have to satisfy the information and consultation obligations under Articles 2 to 4 of that directive in accordance with the choice of the Member State concerned, which would also go against the EU legislature’s objective of rendering comparable the burden of those costs in all Member States.

It follows that the definition in Article 1(1)(a)(i) and (a)(ii) of Directive 98/59 requires that account be taken of the dismissals effected in each establishment considered separately.

(see paras 52, 61, 63, 68, 71, operative part)
The second subparagraph of Article 11(4) of Directive 92/85 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391) must be interpreted as precluding a Member State from granting a worker a maternity allowance on the ground that, as an established public servant having obtained non-active status for personal reasons in order to work as a salaried employee, she has not completed, in the context of her work as a salaried employee, the minimum contribution period required under national law in order to be eligible to receive that maternity allowance, even if she has worked for over 12 months immediately prior to the presumed date of confinement.

The objective of Directive 92/85, which was adopted on the basis of Article 118A of the EEC Treaty, to which Article 153 TFEU corresponds, is to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or who are breastfeeding. In that context, and as can be seen from the 17th recital in the preamble to Directive 92/85, in view of the risk that the provisions relating to maternity leave would be ineffective if rights connected with the employment contract were not maintained, the EU legislature provided, in Article 11(2)(b) of Directive 92/85, that maintenance of a payment to, and/or entitlement to an adequate allowance for workers to whom the directive applies must be ensured in the case of the maternity leave referred to in Article 8 of that directive. To require a new minimum contribution period upon each change of employment status or post would amount to undermining the minimum level of protection laid down in Article 11(2) of Directive 92/85 where the worker concerned has not completed the six-month minimum contribution period in her new post, even though she has completed periods of employment in excess of 12 months immediately prior to the presumed date of confinement.

In that respect, neither the second subparagraph of Article 11(4) of Directive 92/85 nor any other provision of that directive lays down any condition as to the nature of those periods of employment. In those circumstances, the ‘periods of previous employment’ referred to in that provision cannot be limited solely to the employment ongoing prior to the presumed date of confinement. Those periods of employment must be understood as comprising the various successive posts occupied by the worker concerned prior to that date, including for different employers and under various employment statuses.

(see paras 40, 41, 44-46, 49, 51, operative part)
Articles 2(1) and 3(a) of Directive 2002/96 on waste electrical and electronic equipment, and Annexes I A, point 6, and I B, point 6, thereto, and Article 2(1)(a) and 2(3)(b), and Article 3(1)(a) and (b), of Directive 2012/19 on waste electrical and electronic equipment and Annexes I, point 6, and II, point 6, thereto, must be interpreted as meaning that garage-door operating devices which are dependent on an electric current of approximately 220 to 240 volts to work properly, designed to be incorporated into the building structure together with the relevant garage door and can at any time be dismantled, re-installed and/or added to that structure, fall within the scope of Directive 2002/96 and, during the transitional period fixed in Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 2012/19, that of the latter directive.

It follows from Article 2 of Directive 2002/96 that products must fulfil three cumulative conditions to fall within its scope: (i) they must constitute electrical and electronic equipment (EEE); (ii) they must fall under the categories set out in Annex I A to that directive, and (iii) they must neither be part of another type of equipment falling outside the scope of that directive nor constitute such equipment.

So far as the first condition is concerned, those operating devices may constitute EEE within the meaning of Directive 2002/96 and are EEE within the meaning of Directive 2012/19 inasmuch they are dependent on electric currents of a voltage rating of lower than the limits set in those directives.

So far as the second condition is concerned, the operating devices at issue constitute electrical and electronic tools within the meaning of those directives inasmuch as, once supplied with electricity, they enable garage-doors to be moved and controlled. Moreover, those operating devices may be described neither as ‘industrial tools’ within the meaning of Directive 2002/96, since they are not used in the manufacture or industrial processing of products, nor as ‘large-scale stationary industrial tools’ within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of Directive 2012/19.

As regards the third condition concerning the exceptions, to be interpreted restrictively, to the application of those directives, inasmuch as the operating devices at issue can be dismantled, re-installed and/or added to the building structure at any time and are therefore not designed to function exclusively with certain doors, they may not be considered to be ‘specifically designed and installed’ as part of that structure, and therefore do not fall within the scope of the exceptions set out in Article 2(1) of Directive 2002/96 and Article 2(3)(b) of Directive 2012/19.

(see paras 37, 39, 47, 49, 53, 55-59, operative part)
–

by authorising the deposit of excavated earth on plot No 115/1 in the municipal land register of Teharje (Bukovžlak), without ensuring that other waste had not previously or at the same time been deposited at that site, and since no other measure has been adopted to remove from that site the waste not covered by the permit issued, that site must be considered as constituting an illegal landfill which does not comply with the conditions and requirements laid down, first, by Articles 13 and 36(1) of Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives, and secondly, by Articles 5(3)(e), 6, read in conjunction with Council Decision 2003/33/EC of 19 December 2002 establishing criteria and procedures for the acceptance of waste at landfills pursuant to Article 16 of and Annex II to Directive 1999/31/EC, 7 to 9, 11 and 12 of Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste, and by Annexes I to III to that directive, and
Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 16 July 2015 —

Commission v Denmark

(Case C‑468/14) ( 1 )

‛Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Directive 2001/37/EC — Manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products — Articles 2(4) and 8 — Prohibition on the sale of tobacco for oral use — Loose ‘Snus’ (oral tobacco)’

Actions for failure to fulfil obligations — Examination of the merits by the Court — Situation to be taken into consideration — Situation on expiry of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (Art. 258 TFEU) (see para. 28)

Operative part

The Court:

1. declares that, by having continued to authorise the sale of loose ‘snus’ (oral tobacco), the Kingdom of Denmark has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 2(4) in conjunction with Article 8 of Directive 2001/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2001 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products, and;

2. orders the Kingdom of Denmark to pay the costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 439, 8.12.2014.

Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 16 July 2015 —

Commission v Denmark

(Case C‑468/14) ( 1 )

‛Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Directive 2001/37/EC — Manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products — Articles 2(4) and 8 — Prohibition on the sale of tobacco for oral use — Loose ‘Snus’ (oral tobacco)’

Actions for failure to fulfil obligations — Examination of the merits by the Court — Situation to be taken into consideration — Situation on expiry of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (Art. 258 TFEU) (see para. 28)

Operative part

The Court:

1. declares that, by having continued to authorise the sale of loose ‘snus’ (oral tobacco), the Kingdom of Denmark has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 2(4) in conjunction with Article 8 of Directive 2001/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2001 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products, and;

2. orders the Kingdom of Denmark to pay the costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 439, 8.12.2014.
Article 7(2)(a) of Regulation No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community, and Articles 10c to 11a, 12a and 12b of Regulation No 574/72 fixing the procedure for implementing Regulation No 1408/71, as amended and updated by Regulation No 118/97, as amended by Regulation No 647/2005, must be interpreted as meaning that a certificate issued by the competent institution of a Member State in the form of an E 101 certificate in order to certify that a worker is subject to the social security legislation of that Member State, when that worker comes within the scope of the Agreement of 13 February 1961 concerning the Social Security of Rhine Boatmen, signed at Geneva on 30 November 1979, is not binding on the institutions of other Member States. The fact that the issuing institution did not intend to issue a genuine E 101 certificate but used the standard form of that certificate for administrative reasons is irrelevant in that regard.

The third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that a national court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is not required to make a reference to the Court of Justice on the sole ground that a lower national court, in a case similar to the one before it and involving the same legal issue, has referred a question to the Court for a preliminary ruling; nor is it required to wait until an answer to that question has been given.

It is for the national courts alone against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, to take upon themselves independently the responsibility for determining whether the case before them involves an ‘acte clair’.

Thus, although a supreme court of a Member State must bear in mind in its assessment that a case is pending in which a lower court has referred a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, that fact alone does not preclude the supreme court of a Member State from concluding that the case before it involves an ‘acte clair’.

(see paras 59, 60, 63, operative part 2)
Case C‑321/14

Colena AG

v

Karnevalservice Bastian GmbH

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Krefeld)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Approximation of laws — Cosmetic products — Consumer protection — Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 — Scope — Non-corrective colour contact lenses featuring designs — Statement on the outer packaging describing the product in question as a cosmetic product — Consumer protection’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber), 3 September 2015

Approximation of laws — Cosmetic products — Regulation No 1223/2009 — Scope — Non-corrective colour contact lenses featuring designs — Not included

(European Parliament and Council Regulation No 1223/2009)

Regulation No 1223/2009 on cosmetic products must be interpreted as meaning that non-corrective colour contact lenses featuring designs do not fall within the scope of that regulation, notwithstanding the fact that their outer packaging bears the statement ‘cosmetic eye accessory, subject to the EU Cosmetics Directive’.

(see para. 27, operative part)
It is apparent from a combined reading of Article 67 of Regulation No 883/2004 and Article 60(1) of Regulation No 987/2009, first, that a person may claim family benefits for members of his family who reside in a Member State other than that responsible for paying those benefits and, second, that the possibility to apply for family benefits is granted not only to persons who reside in the Member State required to pay the family benefits, but also to all the ‘persons concerned’, who may claim those benefits, including the parents of the child for whom the benefits are claimed.

Article 60(1), second sentence, of Regulation No 987/2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems must be interpreted as meaning that the deeming provision included there may lead to the grant of entitlement to family benefits for a person who does not reside in the Member State responsible for paying those benefits where all the other conditions for the grant of those benefits laid down by national law are met, a matter which is for the referring court to determine.

Article 60(1), third sentence, of Regulation No 987/2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems must be interpreted as meaning that there is no requirement that the parent of the child for whom child benefits are paid, who resides in the Member State obliged to pay those benefits, must be granted entitlement to those benefits on the ground that the other parent, who resides in another Member State, has not applied for them.

It appears both from the wording and the general scheme of Article 60(1) of Regulation No 987/2009 that a distinction must be made between making a claim for family benefits and the right to receive such benefits.

Furthermore, it is also clear from the wording of that article that it is sufficient if one of the persons able to claim those family benefits makes an application for them, for the competent institution of the Member State to be required to take that application into consideration.

However, EU law does not preclude the competent institution of a Member State, by applying national law, from finding that the person entitled to receive child benefits is a person other than the person who applied for those benefits.

Therefore, where all the conditions for the grant of child benefits have been met and those benefits are actually granted, the issue as to which parent is regarded under national law as the person entitled to receive such benefits is irrelevant.

(see paras 46-50, operative part 2)
Article 49 TFEU precludes legislation of a Member State, which, in the context of the taxation of a group of companies, allows a parent company, in the case of the acquisition of a holding in a resident company which becomes a member of such a group, to depreciate the goodwill up to a maximum of 50% of the purchase price of the holding, while such depreciation is prohibited in the case of the acquisition of a holding in a non-resident company.

Where national legislation creates a tax advantage for a parent company acquiring a holding in a resident company, the failure to grant, in the same circumstances, that tax advantage to a parent company which acquires a holding in a non-resident company introduces a difference in tax treatment between parent companies to the detriment of those which acquire an holding in a non-resident company. That difference in treatment is such as to hinder the exercise by the parent company which acquires a holding in a non-resident company of its freedom of establishment for the purposes of Article 49 TFEU by deterring it from acquiring or setting up subsidiaries in other Member States. Such a difference in treatment is permissible only if it relates to situations which are not objectively comparable or if it is justified by an overriding reason in the public interest.

In that regard, where, by virtue of that national legislation, a group of companies can be composed of both resident and non-resident companies the situation of a parent company wishing to form such a group with a resident subsidiary and the situation of a resident parent company wishing to form a group of companies with a non-resident subsidiary are objectively comparable with regard to the aim of the tax scheme at issue, in so far as each seeks to benefit from the advantages of that scheme. Similarly, as regards the possibility of justifying the difference in treatment resulting from such legislation by the need to ensure the coherence of the tax system, in so far as the national legislation does not, by itself, establish a direct link between, first, the tax advantage consisting of the depreciation of the goodwill and, second, the levy consisting of the taxation in so far as concerns the parent company of the capital gain realised upon the disposal of a holding in its subsidiary, it could not be considered that a difference in treatment is justified by the need to ensure the coherence of the tax system of the Member State concerned.

(see paras 27-30, 33, 43, 50, 54, operative part)