OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

SZPUNAR

delivered on 16 June 2022 ( 1 )

Case C‑230/21

X, acting in her own name and as legal representative of her minor children, Y and Z

v

Belgische Staat

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen (Council for asylum and immigration proceedings, Belgium))

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Immigration policy – Directive 2003/86/EC – Right to family reunification – Concept of ‘unaccompanied minor’ – Right of a refugee to family reunification with his or her parents – Refugee minor married at the time he or she entered the territory of another Member State – Child marriage not recognised in that Member State)

I. Introduction

1. Does being married prevent a refugee minor from being regarded as an ‘unaccompanied minor’ and from enjoying the right to family reunification with her ascendant relative under the provisions of Directive 2003/86/EC? ( 2 )

2. That is the question which the Court will have to answer in the present case, which will lead it to rule on particularly sensitive situations involving the marriage of minors, bearing in mind that they may constitute forced marriages, and, in so doing, particularly serious breaches of the fundamental rights of the individual, in particular of women and children. ( 3 )

II. Legal context

A. Directive 2003/86

3. Under recitals 2, 6, 8, 9 and 11 of Directive 2003/86: ‘(2) Measures concerning family reunification should be adopted in conformity with the obligation to protect the family and respect family life enshrined in many instruments of international law. This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular in Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. … (6) To protect the family and establish or preserve family life, the material conditions for exercising the right to family reunification should be determined on the basis of common criteria. … (8) Special attention should be paid to the situation of refugees on account of the reasons which obliged them to flee their country and prevent them from leading a normal family life there. More favourable conditions should therefore be laid down for the exercise of their right to family reunification. (9) Family reunification should apply in any case to members of the nuclear family, that is to say the spouse and the minor children. … (11) The right to family reunification should be exercised in proper compliance with the values and principles recognised by the Member States, in particular with respect to the rights of women and of children; …’

4. Article 2(f) of that directive defines the concept of ‘unaccompanied minor’ as ‘third country nationals or stateless persons below the age of eighteen, who arrive on the territory of the Member States unaccompanied by an adult responsible by law or custom, and for as long as they are not effectively taken into the care of such a person, or minors who are left unaccompanied after they entered the territory of the Member States’.

5. Article 4(1), (2) and (5) of that directive provides: ‘1. The Member States shall authorise the entry and residence, pursuant to this Directive and subject to compliance with the conditions laid down in Chapter IV, as well as in Article 16, of the following family members: (a) the sponsor’s spouse; (b) the minor children of the sponsor and of his/her spouse, including children adopted in accordance with a decision taken by the competent authority in the Member State concerned or a decision which is automatically enforceable due to international obligations of that Member State or must be recognised in accordance with international obligations; (c) the minor children including adopted children of the sponsor where the sponsor has custody and the children are dependent on him or her. Member States may authorise the reunification of children of whom custody is shared, provided the other party sharing custody has given his or her agreement; (d) the minor children including adopted children of the spouse where the spouse has custody and the children are dependent on him or her. Member States may authorise the reunification of children of whom custody is shared, provided the other party sharing custody has given his or her agreement. The minor children referred to in this Article must be below the age of majority set by the law of the Member State concerned and must not be married. … 2. The Member States may, by law or regulation, authorise the entry and residence, pursuant to this Directive and subject to compliance with the conditions laid down in Chapter IV, of the following family members: (a) first-degree relatives in the direct ascending line of the sponsor or his or her spouse, where they are dependent on them and do not enjoy proper family support in the country of origin; … 5. In order to ensure better integration and to prevent forced marriages Member States may require the sponsor and his/her spouse to be of a minimum age, and at maximum 21 years, before the spouse is able to join him/her.’

6. Article 5(5) of the same directive provides: ‘When examining an application, the Member States shall have due regard to the best interests of minor children.’

7. Article 10 of Directive 2003/86, which appears in Chapter V of that directive, entitled ‘Family reunification of refugees’, provides, in point (a) of paragraph 3 thereof: ‘If the refugee is an unaccompanied minor, the Member States: (a) shall authorise the entry and residence for the purposes of family reunification of his/her first-degree relatives in the direct ascending line without applying the conditions laid down in Article 4(2)(a)’.

B. The Dublin III Regulation

8. Under Article 2(g) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013: ( 4 ) ‘For the purposes of this Regulation: (g) “family members” means, in so far as the family already existed in the country of origin, the following members of the applicant’s family who are present on the territory of the Member States: – … – when the beneficiary of international protection is a minor and unmarried, the father, mother or another adult responsible for him or her whether by law or by the practice of the Member State where the beneficiary is present; …’

9. Article 8(1) of the Dublin III Regulation states: ‘Where the applicant is an unaccompanied minor, the Member State responsible shall be that where a family member or a sibling of the unaccompanied minor is legally present, provided that it is in the best interests of the minor. Where the applicant is a married minor whose spouse is not legally present on the territory of the Member States, the Member State responsible shall be the Member State where the father, mother or other adult responsible for the minor, whether by law or by the practice of that Member State, or sibling is legally present.’

III. The dispute in the main proceedings, the questions referred for a preliminary ruling and the procedure before the Court

10. On 8 December 2016, when she was a minor, the daughter of X, the applicant in the main proceedings, entered into a marriage in Lebanon with YB, who held a valid residence permit in Belgium.

11. On her arrival in Belgium, on 28 August 2017, she was deemed to be an unaccompanied foreign minor by the guardianship service of the FOD Justitie (Federal Public Service for Justice, Belgium) and she was assigned a guardian on 29 August 2017.

12. On 20 September 2017, the Dienst Vreemdelingenzaken (Office for asylum and immigration, Belgium) refused to recognise the Lebanese marriage certificate pursuant to Articles 21 and 27 of the Belgian Code de droit international privé (Belgium Code of private international law), because it related to a child marriage, which is considered incompatible with public policy.

13. That same day, X’s daughter lodged an application for international protection and, on 26 September 2018, she obtained refugee status.

14. On 18 December 2018, the applicant in the main proceedings, a Palestinian national, applied to the Belgian representation in Beirut (Lebanon) for a family reunification visa in order to join her minor daughter, born on 2 February 2001. On the same day, she also applied for humanitarian visas for her minor sons, Y and Z.

15. On 20 August 2019, X’s daughter gave birth to a daughter, a Belgian national.

16. By three decisions of 21 June 2019, the authorised representative of the minister van Sociale Zaken en Volksgezondheid, en van Asiel en Migratie (Minister for Social Affairs and Public Health, and of Asylum Policy and Migration, Belgium; ‘the authorised representative’) refused the visa applications made by X. The referring court annulled those decisions by a judgment of 7 November 2019. On 17 March 2020, the authorised representative adopted three new decisions refusing to grant those visas.

17. The authorised representative argued, in essence, that, under the first subparagraph of Article 10(1)(4) of the Law on foreign nationals and Article 4(1) of Directive 2003/86, the nuclear family consists of spouses and unmarried minor children and that, therefore, X’s daughter, whose marriage is valid in her country of origin, is no longer a member of her parents’ nuclear family.

18. By applications of 10 August 2020, X lodged an appeal before the referring court against the three decisions taken by the authorised representative on 17 March 2020.

19. In support of her appeal, she claims that neither the Belgian Law on foreign nationals nor Directive 2003/86 requires the refugee minor sponsor to be unmarried in order to be able to enjoy the right to family reunification with her parents. In addition, she submits that since her daughter’s marriage certificate has not been recognised in Belgium, that marriage does not have any legal effect within the Belgium legal order. She argues that only two conditions have to be met by her daughter for her to enjoy the right to family reunification with her parents, namely that she must be a minor and unaccompanied, within the meaning of Article 2(f) of that directive, and that those conditions are satisfied in the present case.

20. In the view of the Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen (Council for asylum and immigration proceedings, Belgium), the situation of the daughter of the applicant in the main proceedings appears to be that of an ‘unaccompanied minor’ within the meaning of Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86, read in conjunction with Article 2(f) thereof. In that regard, that court notes that that directive makes no mention of the marital status of the ‘unaccompanied minor’. It does however observe, referring to the arguments raised by the authorised representative, that the family reunification rules laid down in Article 9 of the Dublin III Regulation requires a refugee minor to be unmarried in order for the Member State in which he or she resides to be responsible for examining his or her parents’ application for international protection.

21. It is in those circumstances that the Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen (Council for asylum and immigration proceedings) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Should European Union law, in particular Article 2(f) read in conjunction with Article 10(3)(a) of [Directive 2003/86] be interpreted as meaning that a refugee who is an “unaccompanied minor”, and who resides in a Member State, must be unmarried under her national law in order to enjoy the right to family reunification with relatives in the direct ascending line? (2) If so, can a refugee minor whose marriage contracted abroad is not recognised for public policy reasons be regarded as an “unaccompanied minor” within the meaning of Articles 2(f) and 10(3) of [Directive 2003/86]?’

22. Written observations were submitted by the applicant in the main proceedings, the Belgian Government and the European Commission. The same parties presented oral argument at the hearing which took place on 31 March 2022.

IV. Analysis

A. The first question referred for a preliminary ruling

23. By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether a refugee minor who resides in a Member State must be unmarried in order to be regarded as an ‘unaccompanied minor’, within the meaning of Article 2(f) of Directive 2003/86, and, therefore, enjoy the right to family reunification with her ascendant relative provided for in Article 10(3)(a) of that directive.

24. I would point out, at the outset, that that question does not concern all aspects of the concept of ‘unaccompanied minor’, but rather only the condition that the minor concerned is unmarried. In other words, the Court does not have to make a positive determination as to what is covered by that concept and, in so doing, as to whether X’s daughter is an ‘unaccompanied minor’ within the meaning of Directive 2003/86, but simply whether being married prevents the minor concerned from being regarded as an ‘unaccompanied minor’ and from enjoying the right to family reunification with her ascendant relative.

25. It follows from the Court’s settled case-law that a provision of EU law must be interpreted autonomously and uniformly considering not only its wording but also its context and the objectives of the legislation of which it forms part. ( 5 )

26. In my view, both a literal interpretation and a teleological/systemic interpretation of those two provisions of Directive 2003/86 require that that question be answered in the negative, for the reasons which I will now set out.

1. Literal interpretation

27. With regard to Article 2(f) of Directive 2003/86, which defines the concept of ‘unaccompanied minor’ within the meaning of that directive, as the Court has already held, and as the Commission observes, that provision lays down two conditions, namely that the person concerned is a ‘minor’ and that he or she is ‘unaccompanied’. ( 6 )

28. The wording of that definition does not therefore refer to the minor’s marital status and thus does not contain any condition that the minor must be unmarried in order to be regarded as an ‘unaccompanied minor’ within the meaning of Directive 2003/86.

29. Nor does Article 10(3)(a) of that directive lay down such a condition. That provision governs the family reunification of an unaccompanied refugee minor and states that the Member States are to authorise the entry and residence of first-degree relatives in the direct ascending line without any further conditions.

30. Moreover, I note that other provisions of Directive 2003/86 expressly lay down the condition that a minor is unmarried in order to enjoy the right to family reunification. ( 7 ) The non-inclusion of that condition in the wording of Articles 2(f) and 10(3)(a) of that directive in relation to unaccompanied minors therefore indicates that the condition does not apply in their situation. ( 8 )

31. There is therefore no basis for taking the view, on reading Articles 2(f) and 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86, that it was the legislature’s intention to restrict the right to family reunification enjoyed by unaccompanied refugee minors to unmarried minors.

32. The result of the literal interpretation of those two provisions is, in my view, confirmed by their systemic and teleological interpretation.

2. Systemic interpretation

33. I would observe, first of all, as the Belgium Government points out, that other provisions of that directive do expressly cover situations in which a minor is married. In particular, Article 4(1) of that directive, which determines which of the sponsor’s family members are able to enjoy the right to family reunification, provides that ‘the minor children referred to in this Article must … not be married’. Similarly, Article 4(5) of Directive 2003/86 allows Member States to require the sponsor and his/her spouse to be of a minimum age in order to enjoy the right to family reunification.

34. Under those provisions, the minor children of a parent sponsor can enter and reside in the European Union on the basis of the right to family reunification only if they are unmarried and, if they are married, they can enjoy that right together with their spouse only if both persons are of a minimum age.

35. The fact that the EU legislature laid down such conditions in relation to a parent sponsor or spouse sponsor but did not do so in respect of an unaccompanied minor sponsor shows the legislature’s intention not to restrict the benefit of Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86 to unmarried unaccompanied minors only.

36. Indeed, since the EU legislature expressly refers to the situation of married minors who wish to join their parent or spouse sponsor, the view should be taken that the legislature’s silence vis-à-vis the marital status of refugee minors who are themselves sponsors reflects its intention not to make them subject to the same conditions. If the legislature had wanted to state that an unaccompanied minor must be unmarried, it would have specifically done so.

37. In that connection, I would point out that, contrary to the claim made by the Belgium Government, an interpretation to the effect set out above does not give rise to discrimination to the detriment of a married minor applying for family reunification with his or her parent sponsor or spouse sponsor who resides in a Member State. As the Commission and X state, the situation of a minor who joins his or her parent sponsor or spouse sponsor is objectively different from that of an unaccompanied minor on the territory of a Member State who might be joined by his or her parent. Whilst, in both cases, the minor may indeed be regarded as being vulnerable, in the second situation the unaccompanied minor is in a position of particular vulnerability, ( 9 ) since he or she entered and is residing alone in the territory of a State that is not his or her State of origin, unlike a minor who resides in his or her State of origin where they retain their ties. ( 10 )

38. In addition, whereas Article 4 of Directive 2003/86 lays down general provisions governing the right to family reunification, Article 10 of that directive expressly relates to the right to family reunification of refugees, whose situation demands special attention and in respect of whom more favourable conditions should be laid down for the exercise of their right to family reunification. ( 11 ) An analogy cannot therefore be drawn between the two sets of rules since the logic behind them is different.

39. Next, for the same reason, it is necessary to reject the Belgium Government’s argument that an individual examination of a minor’s circumstances should be undertaken in order to determine, in the light of all relevant factors, such as the birth of a child, whether the fraudulent nature of the marriage may be ruled out and, therefore, whether that marriage precludes the minor sponsor from being able to enjoy the right to family reunification with his or her parents, like the examination conducted to determine whether a minor may join his or her spouse sponsor on the basis of Article 4(5) of Directive 2003/86.

40. In this regard, I note that Article 17 of Directive 2003/86 requires an individual examination of applications for family reunification. ( 12 ) However, that requirement to take into account the situation of the person making an application for family reunification cannot have the effect of allowing Member States to require that that person satisfy conditions that are not laid down in that directive. In other words, the individual examination of an application for family reunification concerning an unaccompanied minor cannot lead to the classification as ‘unaccompanied minor’ being changed by the addition of a condition (that of being unmarried) that was not laid down by the EU legislature.

41. In addition, as the basis for that line of argument, the Belgium Government here again draws a parallel between the situation of a sponsor joined by his or her spouse and that of an unaccompanied minor who is himself/herself a sponsor, even though those situations are objectively different and address different objectives. In those circumstances, an individual examination of the situation of a married minor sponsor, as advocated by the Belgium Government, has no basis in Directive 2003/86.

42. I would add, in that regard, that the factors deemed relevant, for the purposes of that examination, by the Belgium Government appear to me to be immaterial in any case. In particular, the birth of a child within a marriage is not, on its own, capable of demonstrating the absence of fraud or abuse within that marriage, especially in the case of a marriage involving a minor where there are increased risks of that minor being exposed to serious forms of violence. ( 13 )

43. Lastly, the Belgium Government refers, first, to the Dublin III Regulation and to the definition provided therein of the concept of ‘family member’, which assumes that the minor is unmarried, and, second, to the Belgian Law on foreign nationals which, in transposing Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86, provides that the parents of an unaccompanied minor are allowed to reside in Belgium provided that they ‘come to live with him/her’.

44. None of those factors appears to me to have any bearing on the proper interpretation of the provisions of Directive 2003/86, since the Dublin III Regulation does not cover the family reunification of unaccompanied minors and the wording used by national legislatures in the transposition of a directive cannot influence the interpretation of that directive.

3. Teleological interpretation

45. The Court has held that Directive 2003/86 pursues not only, in a general way, the objective of promoting family reunification and granting protection to third-country nationals, in particular minors, but, by Article 10(3)(a) thereof, seeks specifically to guarantee an additional protection for those refugees who are ‘unaccompanied minors’. ( 14 )

46. A restrictive interpretation of the concept of ‘unaccompanied minor’ that excludes married minors would therefore, in my view, run counter to that objective of special protection. Indeed, the effect of such an interpretation would be that a married minor whose spouse resides on the territory of the European Union would be unable to enjoy the additional protection afforded to him or her by Directive 2003/86, even though the particular vulnerability of minors is not mitigated by virtue of the marriage. On the contrary, the fact that a minor is married may point, specifically in the case of minor girls, to exposure to the serious form of violence that is child marriage and forced marriage.

47. This is a fortiori the case since, under recital 11 of Directive 2003/86, the right to family reunification should be exercised in proper compliance with the values and principles recognised by the Member States, which include inter alia the protection of the rights of women and children. That directive therefore also pursues the objective of preventing forced marriages. ( 15 ) Article 5(5) of that directive provides, in addition, that due regard must be had to the best interests of children when examining an application for family reunification. Similarly, Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that the child’s best interests are a primary consideration in all actions relating to him or her. Any interpretation that would make being an ‘unaccompanied minor’ conditional on that minor being unmarried would, in my view, likewise be contrary to those principles, because it would have the effect of preventing the family reunification of those children with their ascendant relatives, despite their particularly vulnerable situation.

48. The Belgium Government argues that the marriage of a minor automatically means that that minor is no longer ‘dependent’ on his or her parents but rather on his or her spouse. According to that government, the condition that the parents are responsible for the minor underlies the exercise of the right to family reunification, meaning that the conditions governing the exercise of that right for a parent sponsor joined by his or her children can be transposed to the situation of an unaccompanied minor sponsor, since the legislature’s intention is to reunite parents with the minor children in their custody.

49. However, for the reasons previously set out in points 37 and 38 of this Opinion, I am of the view that an analogy cannot be drawn between the situation of a minor who wishes to join his or her parent sponsor residing on the territory of a Member State and that of a refugee minor residing on the territory of a Member State, since the legislature clearly intended different rules to apply to those two situations.

4. Proposed answer to the first question referred for a preliminary ruling

50. I therefore propose that the first question referred for a preliminary ruling be answered to the effect that Articles 2(f) and 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86 cannot be interpreted as meaning that a minor residing on the territory of a Member State must be unmarried in order to be regarded as an ‘unaccompanied minor’ within the meaning of Article 2(f) of that directive and, therefore, enjoy the right to family reunification with his or her ascendant relative, as provided for in Article 10(3) of that directive. ( 16 )

B. The second question referred for a preliminary ruling

51. By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether, if the first question is answered in the affirmative, a refugee minor whose marriage contracted abroad is not recognised for public policy reasons can be regarded as an ‘unaccompanied minor’ within the meaning of Articles 2(f) and 10(3) of Directive 2003/86.

52. Since I am of the view that the first question referred for a preliminary ruling should be answered in the negative, there is therefore no need to answer the second question referred for a preliminary ruling. For the sake of completeness, and in the event that the Court does not agree with my analysis of the first question, I will however consider the second question, working on the assumption that the concept of ‘unaccompanied minor’, within the meaning of Articles 2(f) and 10(3) of Directive 2003/86, requires the minor to be unmarried.

53. Directive 2003/86 does not define the concept of ‘marriage’. However, it cannot be inferred from that fact, in my view, that that concept can be regarded as an autonomous concept of EU law. Not only does EU law not appear to me to provide, as it currently stands, sufficient information vis-à-vis the definition of ‘marriage’, but it would also be difficult to accept the determination of whether or not a marriage exists, within the meaning of the provisions of that directive, falling within the exclusive competence of the European Union. On the contrary, I believe that, generally speaking, an assessment of the personal situations of the individuals covered by that directive, such as their parentage and marital ties, cannot be made independently of the law applicable to those situations.

54. Accordingly, in my view, the lack of a definition of the concept of ‘marriage’ shows that the EU legislature intended to leave a certain margin of discretion to the Member States in their understanding of that concept, subject to the requirement not to impair the effectiveness of EU law and, therefore, the objectives pursued by Directive 2003/86. ( 17 )

55. In other words, if Directive 2003/86 provides (quod non) that only unmarried minors are to be regarded as ‘unaccompanied minors’, it does however leave it to the Member States to determine whether a minor is married in compliance with the objectives pursued by that directive, namely promoting family reunification, whilst granting additional protection to unaccompanied minors and preventing forced marriages.

56. It therefore falls to the Member States to determine, in accordance with their national law, whether a marriage involving a minor can have the effect of denying that minor the status of ‘unaccompanied minor’, provided that such an examination complies, on the one hand, with the objective of family reunification and, on the other, that of preventing forced marriages.

57. In those circumstances, non-recognition of the marriage by that Member State for reasons relating to public policy appears to me to have a decisive effect.

58. A Member State’s refusal to recognise a marriage involving a minor for public policy reasons whilst accepting that that marriage is effective as regards the right to family reunification would, in my view, be contrary both to the objective of family reunification and that of the prevention of forced marriages.

59. Such a solution would mean that the State could deny that minor the right to family reunification with his or her ascendant relatives and refrain from protecting that minor from a marriage which that Member State itself accepts as being contrary to public policy.

60. The minor would then be in a paradoxical situation in which his or her marriage could not have any legal effect in the territory of the Member State, whilst increasing his or her dependence on the unrecognised spouse, since the minor would be unable to enjoy the right to family reunification with his or her ascendant relatives.

61. I am therefore of the view that Articles 2(f) and 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86 should be interpreted as meaning that a refugee minor whose marriage contracted abroad is not recognised by the host Member State for public policy reasons can be regarded as an ‘unaccompanied minor’.

V. Conclusion

62. In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen (Council for asylum and immigration proceedings, Belgium) as follows: Articles 2(f) and 10(3)(a) of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification cannot be interpreted as meaning that a minor residing on the territory of a Member State must be unmarried in order to be regarded as an ‘unaccompanied minor’ within the meaning of Article 2(f) of that directive and, therefore, enjoy the right to family reunification with his or her ascendant relative, as provided for in Article 10(3) of that directive.

( 1 ) Original language: French.

( 2 ) Council Directive of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification (OJ 2003 L 251, p. 12).

( 3 ) See, on this point, Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Noorzia (C‑338/13, EU:C:2014:288, points 1 to 4).

( 4 ) Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 31;‘the Dublin III Regulation’).

( 5 ) Judgments of 17 November 1983, Merck (292/82, EU:C:1983:335, paragraph 12); of 12 May 2021, Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Interpol red notice) (C‑505/19, EU:C:2021:376, paragraph 77); and of 26 April 2022, Landespolizeidirektion Steiermark (Maximum duration of internal border control) (C‑368/20 and C‑369/20, EU:C:2022:298, paragraph 56).

( 6 ) Judgment of 12 April 2018, A and S (C‑550/16, EU:C:2018:248, paragraph 37).

( 7 ) Article 4(1) and (5) of Directive 2003/86.

( 8 ) See, in this regard, point 33 et seq. of this Opinion.

( 9 ) Judgment of 12 April 2018, A and S (C‑550/16, EU:C:2018:248, paragraph 58).

( 10 ) On the particular vulnerability of unaccompanied minors, see point 44 et seq. of this Opinion.

( 11 ) Recital 8 of Directive 2003/86.

( 12 ) Judgment of 4 March 2010, Chakroun (C‑578/08, EU:C:2010:117, paragraph 48).

( 13 ) See preamble to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention), adopted on 7 April 2011 by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Council of Europe Treaty Series No 210.

( 14 ) Judgments of 6 December 2012, O and Others (C‑356/11 and C‑357/11, EU:C:2012:776, paragraph 69), and of 12 April 2018, A and S (C‑550/16, EU:C:2018:248, paragraph 44).

( 15 ) Judgment of 17 July 2014, Noorzia (C‑338/13, EU:C:2014:2092, paragraph 15).

( 16 ) This answer is without prejudice, as in the case of the exercise of any right, to the possibility of a finding that a right has been abused in a specific case, it being understood however that the assessment of the exercise of a right deriving from a provision of EU law cannot alter the scope of that provision or compromise the objectives pursued by it. See judgment of 12 May 1998, Kefalas and Others (C‑367/96, EU:C:1998:222, paragraph 22).

( 17 ) See, to that effect, judgment of 17 July 2014, Noorzia (C‑338/13, EU:C:2014:2092, paragraph 13).