ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
The concept of ‘optional price supplements’, referred to in the last sentence of Article 23(1) of Regulation No 1008/2008, on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community, must be interpreted as meaning that it covers costs, connected with the air travel, arising from services, such as a flight cancellation insurance, supplied by a party other than the air carrier and charged to the customer by the person selling that travel, together with the air fare, as part of a total price.

The last sentence of Article 23(1) of Regulation No 1008/2008 concerns optional price supplements relating to services which, supplementing the air service itself, are neither compulsory nor necessary for the carriage of passengers or cargo, with the result that the customer chooses either to accept or refuse them. It is precisely because a customer is in a position to make that choice that such price supplements must be communicated to him in a clear, transparent and unambiguous way at the start of any booking process, and that their acceptance by the customer must be on an opt-in basis.

In addition, for the purposes of granting the protection referred to in that provision, what matters is not that the optional additional service and the corresponding price supplement are offered by the air carrier concerned or by a service provider linked to it, but that that service and the corresponding price are offered in relation to the flight itself during the flight booking process.

(see paras 14, 18, 20, operative part)
Article 112(1)(a) of Regulation No 918/83 setting up a Community system of reliefs from customs duty, as amended by Regulation No 1315/88, Article 107(1)(a) of Regulation No 1186/2009 setting up a Community system of reliefs from customs duty, Article 82(1)(a) of Directive 83/181 determining the scope of Article 14(1)(d) of Directive 77/388 as regards exemption from value added tax on the final importation of certain goods, as amended by Directive 88/331 and Article 84(1)(a) of Directive 2009/132 determining the scope of Article 143(b) and (c) of Directive 2006/112 as regards exemption from value added tax on the final importation of certain goods must be interpreted as meaning that they do not apply to locomotives.

Regarding a possible difference in treatment between rail transport and road transport, different modes of transport are not generally interchangeable and the situation of undertakings operating in each of those different transport sectors is accordingly not comparable. Moreover, given the objective pursued by the European Union legislature in adopting those provisions, consisting, on the one hand, in making it easier for individuals to cross the external borders of the European Union and, on the other, to lighten the customs and tax checks to be conducted by the competent authorities, locomotives are not in a comparable situation to that of road vehicles. It follows that the principle of equal treatment does not require the provisions at issue to be interpreted as also applying to locomotives.

(see paras 36, 37, 46-49, operative part)
Regulation No 1206/2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters is, as a general rule, applicable only if the court of a Member State decides to take evidence in accordance with one of the methods laid down by that regulation, namely, first, the taking of evidence by the requested court in accordance with Articles 10 to 16 thereof following a request from the requesting court of another Member State and, second, the taking of evidence directly by the requesting court in another Member State, the detailed rules for which are set out in Article 17 of the regulation. In those cases, that court is required to follow the procedures relating to those methods. However, that regulation does not contain any provision governing or excluding the possibility, for the court in one Member State, of summoning a party residing in another Member State to appear and make a witness statement directly before it.

Accordingly, the provisions of Regulation No 1206/2001, in particular Article 1(1) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that the competent court of a Member State which wishes to hear as a witness a party residing in another Member State has the option, in order to perform such a hearing, to summon that party before it and hear him in accordance with the law of its Member State. Furthermore, if a party fails to appear as a witness without a legitimate reason, that court remains free to take any measures laid down by the law of its Member State, provided that they are applied in accordance with European Union law.

(see paras 26-28, 38, 39, operative part)
Case C-471/11

Cido Grupa SIA

v

Valsts ieņēmumu dienests

(Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākās Tiesas Senāts)

‛Accession of new Member States — Transitional measures — Agricultural products — Sugar — Regulation (EC) No 60/2004 — Basis of assessment and rate applicable for the charge on surplus stocks’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber), 6 September 2012

Accession of new Member States — Act of Accession 2003 — Agriculture — Common organisation of the markets — Transitional measures in the sugar sector — Elimination of surplus stock — Regulation No 60/2004 — Charge on surplus stock — Setting the basis of assessment for the charge and its rate

Commission Regulation No 60/2004, Art. 6(3), third para.)

The third subparagraph of Article 6(3) of Regulation No 60/2004 laying down transitional measures in the sugar sector by reason of the accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, as amended by Regulation No 1667/2005, must be interpreted as meaning that the basis of assessment for the charge payable on a surplus stock of sugar syrup (CN code 2106 90 59) is the quantity of white sugar (CN code 1701 99 10) actually contained in that product and the rate of that charge is the rate of the import charge applicable to white sugar, increased by EUR1.21/100 kg.

(see paras 21-23, operative part)

Case C-471/11

Cido Grupa SIA

v

Valsts ieņēmumu dienests

(Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākās Tiesas Senāts)

‛Accession of new Member States — Transitional measures — Agricultural products — Sugar — Regulation (EC) No 60/2004 — Basis of assessment and rate applicable for the charge on surplus stocks’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber), 6 September 2012

Accession of new Member States — Act of Accession 2003 — Agriculture — Common organisation of the markets — Transitional measures in the sugar sector — Elimination of surplus stock — Regulation No 60/2004 — Charge on surplus stock — Setting the basis of assessment for the charge and its rate

Commission Regulation No 60/2004, Art. 6(3), third para.)

The third subparagraph of Article 6(3) of Regulation No 60/2004 laying down transitional measures in the sugar sector by reason of the accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, as amended by Regulation No 1667/2005, must be interpreted as meaning that the basis of assessment for the charge payable on a surplus stock of sugar syrup (CN code 2106 90 59) is the quantity of white sugar (CN code 1701 99 10) actually contained in that product and the rate of that charge is the rate of the import charge applicable to white sugar, increased by EUR1.21/100 kg.

(see paras 21-23, operative part)
To fall within Article 14(2) of Regulation No 1408/71, a person must ‘normally’ be employed in the territory of two or more Member States. It follows that, if employment in the territory of a single Member State constitutes the normal arrangement for the person concerned, such employment cannot fall within the scope of that provision. In such circumstances, the principle set out in Article 13(2)(a) of Regulation No 1408/71 could apply, as well as, where necessary, during the periods of interruption between the employment contracts, the principle set out in Article 13(2)(f).

Article 14(2)(b) of Regulation No 1408/71, in its version as amended and updated by Regulation No 118/97, as amended by Regulation No 1992/2006, must be interpreted as meaning that a person who, under successive employment contracts stating the place of employment to be the territory of several Member States, in fact works during the term of each of those contracts only on the territory of one of those States at a time, cannot fall within the concept of ‘a person normally employed in the territory of two or more Member States’, within the meaning of that provision.

The issuing institution of an E 101 certificate is required to carry out a proper assessment of the facts relevant for the application of the rules relating to the determination of the legislation applicable in the matter of social security for the purposes of Title II of Regulation No 1408/71, in the version amended and updated by Regulation No 118/97 as amended by Regulation No 1992/2006, and, consequently, to ensure the correctness of the information contained in that certificate.

When assessing the facts with a view to determining that legislation, the institution concerned may, where appropriate, take account not only of the wording of those documents, but also of factors such as the way in which employment contracts between the employer and the worker concerned had previously been implemented in practice, the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of those contracts and, more generally, the characteristics and conditions of the work performed by the company concerned, in so far as those factors may throw light on the actual nature of the work in question.

If it is apparent from relevant factors other than contractual documents that an employed person’s situation in fact differs from that described in such documents, it is incumbent on the institution concerned, whatever the wording of those contractual documents, to base its findings on the employed person’s actual situation and, where appropriate, to refuse to issue the E 101 certificate and to withdraw the certificate if the competent institution of a Member State in which the employed person carries out work expresses doubts as to the correctness of the facts on which the certificate is based and/or as to compliance with the requirements of Title II of Regulation No 1408/71.

(see paras 42, 44 to 47)
Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time must be interpreted as meaning that they do not preclude national legislation or practice, such as a social plan agreed between an undertaking and its works council, under which the paid annual leave of a worker on short-time working is calculated according to the rule of pro rata temporis.

Workers on short-time working have indeed, from a formal point of view, a full-time employment contract. However, for the duration of short-time working, the reciprocal obligations of the employee and the employer as regards work and salary are suspended on the basis of the short-time working, or completely eliminated. It follows that workers on short-time working must be qualified as ‘temporary part-time workers’, since their situation is de facto comparable to that of part-time workers, and that the rule of pro rata temporis in Clause 4(2) of the Framework Agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC is applicable to their right to paid annual leave.

(see paras 32, 36, operative part)
However, the General Court may afford OHIM some latitude, in particular where OHIM is called upon to perform highly technical assessments, and restrict itself, in terms of the scope of its review of the Board of Appeal’s decisions in industrial design matters, to an examination of manifest errors of assessment.

In the context of an action for annulment brought against a decision of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), the General Court can carry out a full review of the legality of the decisions of OHIM’s Boards of Appeal, if necessary examining whether those boards have made a correct legal classification of the facts of the dispute or whether their assessment of the facts submitted to them was flawed. Where it is called upon to assess the legality of a decision of the Board of Appeal of OHIM, the General Court cannot be bound by an incorrect assessment of the facts by that board, since that assessment is part of the findings whose legality is being disputed before the General Court.

The concept of ‘informed user’ must be understood as lying somewhere between that of the average consumer, applicable in trade mark matters, who need not have any specific knowledge and who, as a rule, makes no direct comparison between the trade marks at issue, and the sectoral expert, who is an expert with detailed technical expertise. Thus, the concept of the ‘informed user’ may be understood as referring, not to a user of average attention, but to a particularly observant one, either because of his personal experience or his extensive knowledge of the sector in question.

The very nature of the informed user means that, when possible, he will make a direct comparison between the earlier mark and the contested design. However, it cannot be ruled out that such a comparison may be impracticable or uncommon in the sector concerned, in particular because of specific circumstances or the characteristics of the items which the earlier mark and the contested design represent. There being no precise indications to that effect in the context of Regulation No 6/2002 on Community designs, the legislature of the European Union cannot be regarded as having intended to limit the assessment of potential designs to a direct comparison.

(see paras 53, 54, 56)
The first indent of Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80 of the Association Council EEC‑Turkey must be interpreted as precluding the competent national authorities from withdrawing the residence permit of a Turkish worker with retroactive effect from the point in time at which there was no longer compliance with the ground on the basis of which his residence permit had been issued under national law if there is no question of fraudulent conduct on the part of that worker and that withdrawal occurs after the completion of the period of one year of legal employment provided for in the first indent of Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80.

That provision cannot be construed as permitting a Member State to modify unilaterally the scope of the system of gradual integration of Turkish workers in the host Member State’s labour force by denying to a worker who has been permitted to enter its territory and who has lawfully pursued a genuine and effective economic activity for a continuous period of more than one year with the same employer the rights which the three indents of that provision confer on him progressively according to the duration of his employment. Such an interpretation would render Decision No 1/80 meaningless and deprive it of any practical effect, since the wording of Article 6(1) of that decision is general and unconditional in that it does not permit the Member States to restrict the rights which that provision confers directly on Turkish workers.

(see paras 48, 49, 56, operative part)
Article 20 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding a Member State from refusing to grant a third country national a residence permit on the basis of family reunification where that national seeks to reside with his spouse, who is also a third country national and resides lawfully in that Member State and is the mother of a child from a previous marriage who is a Union citizen, and with the child of their own marriage, who is also a third country national, provided that such a refusal does not entail, for the Union citizen concerned, the denial of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by the status of citizen of the Union.

To establish whether the refusal has that effect, it must be taken into account that the third country national who has sole custody of a child who is a Union citizen holds a permanent residence permit in the Member State in question, so that, in law, there is no obligation either for that person or for the dependent Union citizen to leave the territory of that Member State or of the European Union as a whole.

In the context of the assessment of reconstituted families, the effect which a decision by that person to leave the territory of the Member State of which the Union citizen is a national might have on family life is also relevant.

In this respect, however, the mere fact that it might appear desirable, for economic reasons or in order to preserve the family unit in the territory of the Union, for members of a family consisting of third country nationals and a Union citizen who is a minor to be able to reside with that citizen in the territory of the Union in the Member State of which he is a national is not sufficient in itself to support the view that the Union citizen would be forced to leave the territory of the Union if such a right of residence were not granted.

It is not a decisive factor in that assessment that the third country national for whom a right of residence is sought on the basis of family reunification lives or does not live together with the sponsor and the other family members, or that there is no biological relationship between that third country national and the Union citizen.

On the other hand, the fact that the third country national for whom a right of residence is sought is not a person on whom that citizen is legally, financially or emotionally dependent must be taken into consideration. It is the relationship of dependency between that citizen and the third country national that is liable to jeopardise the effectiveness of Union citizenship, since it is that dependency that would lead to the Union citizen being obliged, in fact, to leave not only the territory of the Member State of which he is a national but also that of the European Union as a whole, as a consequence of such a refusal.

(see paras 49-56, 58, 82, operative part)
Case C-310/11

Grattan plc

v

The Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs

(Reference for a preliminary ruling from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber))

‛Taxation — VAT — Second Directive 67/228/EEC — Article 8(a) — Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC — Supply of goods — Basis of assessment — Commission paid by a mail order company to its agent — Purchases by third-party customers — Price reduction after the chargeable event — Direct effect’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 19 December 2012

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Directives 67/228 and 77/388 — Degree of harmonisation not comparable (Council Directives 67/228 and 77/388) Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Basis of assessment — Supply of goods — Commission paid by a mail order company to its agent, for supplies already made — Whether possible, under Directive 67/228, to reduce the basis of assessment retrospectively — Not possible (Council Directive 67/228, Art. 8(a))

See the text of the decision. (see para. 33) Article 8(a) of Second Directive 67/228 on the harmonisation of legislation of Member States concerning turnover taxes must be interpreted as not conferring upon a taxable person the right to treat the basis of assessment of a supply of goods as retrospectively reduced where, after the time of that supply of goods, an agent received a credit from the supplier which the agent elected to take either as a payment of money or as a credit against amounts owed to the supplier in respect of supplies of goods that had already taken place. (see para. 37, operative part)

Case C-310/11

Grattan plc

v

The Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs

(Reference for a preliminary ruling from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber))

‛Taxation — VAT — Second Directive 67/228/EEC — Article 8(a) — Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC — Supply of goods — Basis of assessment — Commission paid by a mail order company to its agent — Purchases by third-party customers — Price reduction after the chargeable event — Direct effect’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 19 December 2012

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Directives 67/228 and 77/388 — Degree of harmonisation not comparable (Council Directives 67/228 and 77/388) Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Basis of assessment — Supply of goods — Commission paid by a mail order company to its agent, for supplies already made — Whether possible, under Directive 67/228, to reduce the basis of assessment retrospectively — Not possible (Council Directive 67/228, Art. 8(a))
It is necessary to interpret the first sentence of Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2004/83 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted as meaning that the ground for excluding a person from being a refugee laid down in that provision covers not only persons who are currently availing themselves of assistance provided by organs or agencies of the United Nations but also those who in fact availed themselves of such assistance shortly before submitting an application for asylum in a Member State, provided, however, that that assistance has not ceased within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 12(1)(a) of the directive.

According to the latter provision, the cessation of the protection or assistance provided by a United Nations organ or agency other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ‘for any reason’, which gives the persons concerned ipso fact entitlement to the benefits of Directive 2004/83, includes, inter alia, the situation in which a person who, after actually availing himself of such protection or assistance, ceases to receive it for a reason beyond his control and independent of his volition. Indeed, it is apparent from the words ‘[w]hen such protection or assistance has ceased’ which introduce the second sentence of Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2004/83 that it is primarily the actual assistance provided by United Nations organ or agency and not the existence of that organ or agency itself which must cease in order for the ground for exclusion from refugee status no longer to be applicable. Mere absence from the area of operations of that organ or agency or a voluntary decision to leave it cannot be regarded as cessation of assistance. On the other hand, if the person concerned has been forced to leave for reasons unconnected with that person’s will, such a situation may lead to a finding that the assistance from which that person benefited has ceased within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2004/83.

It is for the competent national authorities of the Member State responsible for examining the asylum application made by such a person to ascertain, by carrying out an assessment of the application on an individual basis, whether that person was forced to leave that area, which will be the case where that person’s personal safety was at serious risk and it was impossible for that organ or agency to guarantee that his living conditions in that area would be commensurate with the mission entrusted to that organ or agency.

(see paras 52, 57, 59, 61, 63-65, operative part 1, 2)