ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
The examination of Article 1(2) and Article 2(1)(c) of Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax, in the light of the right to an effective remedy and the principle of equality of arms under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union has not revealed anything which might affect their validity in so far as those provisions impose VAT on services supplied by lawyers to clients who do not qualify for legal aid under a national legal aid scheme.

On the one hand, the protection conferred by the right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter does not extend to the imposition of VAT on the services supplied by lawyers. In the case of clients who are not entitled to legal aid and, according to the relevant provisions of national law, are deemed to have sufficient resources to have access to justice by being represented by a lawyer, the right to an effective remedy does not, in principle, guarantee a right to the exemption from VAT of the supply of services by lawyers. Moreover, the imposition of such costs can be challenged in the light of that right only where those costs represent an insurmountable obstacle or where they make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by the EU legal order. However, no close or mechanical correlation can be established between the charging of VAT on the services supplied by lawyers and an increase in the price of those services. In any event, the amount of value added tax in question does not constitute the largest part of the costs of a judicial proceeding. On the other hand, the principle of equality of arms, whose aim is to ensure the procedural balance between the parties to a judicial proceeding, implies that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case, including his evidence, under conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent, guaranteeing the equality of rights and obligations of those parties as regards, inter alia, the rules that govern the bringing of evidence and the adversarial hearing before the court. This principle does not entail the obligation to put the parties on an equal footing in terms of the financial costs incurred in connection with legal proceedings.

(see paras 28, 31, 35, 36, 38, 40-42, 47, operative part 1)
A request for a preliminary ruling concerning the validity of an act of the European Union can be dismissed only in the event that, although the action for annulment of an act of the European Union would unquestionably have been admissible, the natural or legal person capable of bringing such an action abstained from doing so within the prescribed period and is pleading the unlawfulness of that act in national proceedings in order to encourage the national court to submit a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice concerning the validity of that act, thereby circumventing the fact that that act is final as against him once the time limit for his bringing an action has expired (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 March 1994, TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf, C‑188/92, EU:C:1994:90, paragraph 18, and of 15 February 2001, Nachi Europe, C‑239/99, EU:C:2001:101, paragraph 30).

It is not obvious, within the meaning of the case-law based on the judgments of 9 March 1994, TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf (C‑188/92, EU:C:1994:90), and of 15 February 2001, Nachi Europe (C‑239/99, EU:C:2001:101), that actions for annulment of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 610/2010 of 12 July 2010 implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation No 2580/2001 and repealing Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1285/2009 or the acts of the European Union preceding that implementing regulation and relating to the inclusion of the ‘Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)’ on the list referred to in Article 2(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism, brought before the General Court of the European Union by persons in a situation such as that of the appellants in the main proceedings, would have been admissible.

First of all, the appellants in the main proceedings were not themselves included on the list of those whose funds are to be frozen.

Next, it is not obvious that they were ‘individually’ concerned by those acts for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. Indeed, the inclusion of the LTTE on the list of those whose funds are to be frozen is of general application with regard to persons other than that entity, in that it serves to impose on an indeterminate number of persons an obligation to comply with specific restrictive measures against that entity (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraphs 241 to 244; of 29 June 2010, E and F, C‑550/09, EU:C:2010:382, paragraph 51; and of 23 April 2013, Gbagbo and Others v Council, C‑478/11 P to C‑482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258, paragraph 56).

Lastly, the situation of the appellants in the main proceedings was directly affected, not by the acts of the European Union relating to that inclusion, but by the imposing of sanctions based solely on Netherlands law, which took into account, among other factors, that inclusion.

(see paras 70, 72-75, operative part 1)
13

Article 1322i of the Belgian Judicial Code, as amended by the loi du 30 juillet 2013 portant création du tribunal de la famille [law of 30 July 2013 on the creation of a family court] (‘the Judicial Code’), is worded as follows: ‘§ 1. An order on the non-return of a child issued by a foreign court, together with all accompanying documents, transmitted to the central Belgian authority in accordance with Article 11(6) of [the Regulation], shall be sent by registered post to the Registry of the court of first instance attached to the court of appeal within whose jurisdiction the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention. § 2. Upon receipt of the documents, and by no later than the third working day after receipt, the Registrar shall, by judicial notification, communicate to the parties and to the office of the public prosecutor the information referred to in Article 11(7) of [the Regulation]. The judicial notification shall contain the following information: 1° the text of Article 11 of [the Regulation]; 2° an invitation to the parties to lodge submissions at the Registry within three months of the notification. The lodging of submissions shall constitute the bringing of an action before the family court of first instance. § 3. If at least one of the parties lodges submissions, the Registrar shall forthwith invite the parties to attend a hearing on the first available date. § 4. The bringing of an action before the family court shall give rise to the suspension of any proceedings commenced before courts or tribunals relating to a dispute regarding matters of parental responsibility or a related dispute. § 5. If the parties do not make submissions to the court within the period laid down in § 2(2) the family court shall issue an order recording the absence of submissions, and the Registrar shall give notice of that order to the parties, to the central authority and to the [public prosecutor]. § 6. A judgment on the question of the custody of the child delivered in accordance with Article 11(8) of [the Regulation] may, at the request of one of the parties, also deal with rights of access in the event that the child’s return to Belgium is ordered in that judgment. § 7. The Registrar shall serve notice of the judgment referred to in § 6 on the parties, the [public prosecutor] and the Belgian authority by judicial notification. § 8. The Belgian central authority has sole responsibility to transmit the judgment and the accompanying documents to the competent authorities of the State in which the order on non-return was delivered. § 9. For the application of Article 11(7) and (8) of [the Regulation], the child shall be heard in accordance with Article 42(2)(a) of that regulation and Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters.’
7

Article 5 of the directive was worded as follows: ‘1. “Supply of goods” shall mean the transfer of the right to dispose of tangible property as owner. … 6. The application by a taxable person of goods forming part of his business assets for his private use or that of his staff, or the disposal thereof free of charge or more generally their application for purposes other than those of his business, where the [VAT] on the goods in question or the component parts thereof was wholly or partly deductible, shall be treated as supplies made for consideration. However, applications for the giving of samples or the making of gifts of small value for the purposes of the taxable person’s business shall not be so treated. 7. Member States may treat as supplies made for consideration: (a) the application by a taxable person for the purposes of his business of goods produced, constructed, extracted, processed, purchased or imported in the course of such business, where the VAT on such goods, had they been acquired from another taxable person, would not be wholly deductible; (b) the application of goods by a taxable person for the purposes of a non-taxable area of activity, where the VAT on such goods became wholly or partly deductible upon their acquisition or upon their application in accordance with point (a); …’
22

In those circumstances, the Vrhovno sodišče decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Is Article 8(2) of Directive [2009/54] to be interpreted in such a way that ‘natural mineral water from one and the same spring’ means: (a) water from one and the same point of exit, but not water that is drawn from different exits even when such water originates in the same aquifer or body of groundwater within the meaning of the definitions of “aquifer” and “body of groundwater” given in Directive [2000/60], or (b) water from one and the same point of exit, but not water that is drawn from different exits even when such water originates in the same aquifer or body of groundwater within the meaning of the definitions of “aquifer” and “body of groundwater” given in Directive [2000/60], although, in interpreting the expression, account should be taken of factors such as the distance between exits, the depth of the exits, the specific qualities of the water drawn from individual exits (such as its chemical and microbiological composition), hydraulic connectivity between exits and the confinement of the water held by the aquifer, or (c) water springing from the same aquifer or body of groundwater within the meaning of the definitions of “aquifer” and “body of groundwater” given in Directive [2000/60] irrespective of whether it reaches the surface at a number of different exits, or; (d) water springing from the same aquifer or body of groundwater within the meaning of the definitions of “aquifer” and “body of groundwater” given in Directive [2000/60] irrespective of whether it reaches the surface at a number of different exits, although, in interpreting the expression, account should be taken of factors such as the distance between exits, the depth of the exits, the specific qualities of the water drawn from individual exits (such as its chemical and microbiological composition), hydraulic connectivity between exits and the confinement of the water held by the aquifer? (2) If none of the suggested answers to question 1 should be correct, must the interpretation of the notion of “natural mineral water from one and the same spring” take into account factors such as the distance between exits, the depth of the exits, the specific qualities of the water drawn from individual exits [(such as its chemical and microbiological composition)], hydraulic connectivity between exits and the confinement of the water held by the aquifer?’
29

In those circumstances, the Gerechtshof te Amsterdam decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘These questions concern goods originating outside the EEA which, after having been brought into the territory of the EEA (neither by the trade mark proprietor nor with its consent), are placed in a Member State of the European Union under the external transit procedure or under the customs warehousing procedure … (1) Where such goods are subsequently placed under a duty suspension arrangement, as in the present case, must those goods then be regarded as having been imported within the meaning of Article 5(3)(c) of Directive 89/104 with the result that there is “use (of the sign) in the course of trade” that can be prohibited by the trade mark proprietor pursuant to Article 5(1) of that directive? (2) If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative, must it then be accepted that in circumstances such as those in the case at issue, the mere presence in a Member State of such goods (which have been placed under a duty suspension arrangement in that Member State) does not prejudice, or cannot prejudice, the functions of the trade mark, with the result that the trade mark proprietor which invokes national trade mark rights in that Member State cannot oppose that presence?’
30

In those circumstances, the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Must the provisions of Chapter II, Section 5 (Articles 18 to 21) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 be interpreted as precluding the application by the courts of Article 5(1)(a) and Article 5(3) of that Regulation in a case such as the present where the defendant is being sued by the company of which he is the manager, not only in his capacity as manager on the basis that he improperly fulfilled his duties or that he acted wrongfully, but also, quite apart from that capacity, on the basis of his deceit or recklessness in the performance of the contract of employment concluded with that company? (2) (a) If the answer to question 1 is in the negative, must the term ‘matters relating to a contract’ in Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 then be interpreted as applying in particular to a case such as the present where a company is suing a person in his capacity as manager of that company on the basis of a breach of his obligation to perform his duties properly under company law? (b) If the answer to question 2(a) is in the affirmative, must the term ‘place of performance of the obligation in question’ in Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 then be interpreted as referring to the place where the director performed or should have performed his duties under company law, which, as a rule, will be the place where the company concerned has its central administration or its principal place of business for the purposes of Article 60(1)(b) and (c) of that Regulation? (3) (a) If the answer to question 1 is in the negative, must the term ‘matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict’ in Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 therefore be interpreted as applying to a case such as the present where a company sues a person in his capacity as manager of that company on the basis of the improper performance of his duties under company law or on the basis of his wrongful conduct? (b) If the answer to question 3(a) is in the affirmative, must the term ‘place where the harmful event occurred or may occur’ in Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 be interpreted as referring to the place where the director performed or should have performed his duties under company law, which, as a rule, will be the place where the company concerned has its central administration or its principal place of business for the purposes of Article 60(1)(b) and (c) of that Regulation?’
10

Article 22 of the Sixth Directive, which appears in Title XIII thereof, entitled ‘Obligations of persons liable for payment’, provides, in paragraphs 1(a), 3(b), 4(a) and 5 thereof, in the version resulting from Article 28h of the Sixth Directive: (a) Every taxable person shall state when his activity as a taxable person commences, changes or ceases. Member States shall, subject to conditions which they lay down, allow the taxable person to make such statements by electronic means, and may also require that electronic means are used. … … (b) Without prejudice to the specific arrangements laid down by this Directive, only the following details are required for VAT purposes on invoices issued under the first, second and third subparagraphs of point (a): — the date of issue; — a sequential number, based on one or more series, which uniquely identifies the invoice; — the VAT identification number referred to in paragraph 1(c) under which the taxable person supplied the goods or services; — where the customer is liable to pay tax on goods supplied or services rendered or has been supplied with goods as referred to in Article 28c(A), the VAT identification number as referred to in paragraph 1(c) under which the goods were supplied or the services rendered to him; — the full name and address of the taxable person and of his customer; — the quantity and nature of the goods supplied or the extent and nature of the services rendered; — the date on which the supply of goods or of services was made or completed or the date on which the payment on account referred to in the second subparagraph of point (a) was made, insofar as that date can be determined and differs from the date of issue of the invoice; — the taxable amount per rate or exemption, the unit price exclusive of tax and any discounts or rebates if they are not included in the unit price; — the VAT rate applied; — the VAT amount payable, except where a specific arrangement is applied for which this Directive excludes such a detail; … (a) Every taxable person shall submit a return by a deadline to be determined by Member States. That deadline may not be more than two months later than the end of each tax period. The tax period shall be fixed by each Member State at one month, two months or a quarter. Member States may, however, set different periods provided that they do not exceed one year. Member States shall, subject to conditions which they lay down, allow the taxable person to make such returns by electronic means, and may also require that electronic means are used. … 5. Every taxable person shall pay the net amount of the value added tax when submitting the regular return. Member States may, however, set a different date for the payment of that amount or may demand an interim payment.’
18

Paragraph 7 of the LTTG, entitled ‘Penalties’, provides: ‘(1) In order to ensure compliance with the obligations set out in Paragraphs 3 to 6, the contracting authorities shall agree with the successful tenderer, for each case of culpable failure to fulfil obligations, a contractual penalty of 1% of the value of the contract; in the case of multiple failures to fulfil obligations, the total amount of penalties cannot exceed 10% of the value of the contract. The successful tenderer shall also be obliged to pay the contractual penalty mentioned in the first sentence where the failure to fulfil obligations is attributable to one of the successful tenderer’s subcontractors and the successful tenderer was aware or ought to have been aware of that failure. If the contractual penalty is disproportionately high, it may be reduced to an appropriate amount by the contracting authority, at the request of the successful tenderer. … (2) The contracting authorities shall agree with the successful tenderer that a failure to fulfil obligations that constitutes at least gross and serious negligence by the successful tenderer with regard to the requirements of Paragraphs 3 to 6 shall entitle the contracting authority to terminate the contract without notice on serious grounds. (3) If the successful tenderer or a subcontractor has failed to fulfil its obligations under the present Law at least as a result of gross negligence or on a repeated basis, the contracting authorities may exclude that tenderer or that subcontractor from the award of public contracts for a period of up to three years. …’
18

In those circumstances, the Szombathelyi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Szombathely Administrative and Labour Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Must Article 18 TFEU be interpreted as precluding a provision of the law of a Member State such as that at issue in the case in the main proceedings in accordance with which, as a rule, only motor vehicles that have administrative authorisation and registration plates issued by the authorities of that Member State may be used on the roads in the Member State, and a person resident in the Member State who is not a worker within the meaning of EU law and who seeks exemption from that provision on the grounds that he is using a vehicle made available to him by an undertaking established in another Member State is required to prove on the spot the lawfulness of its use under the law of the Member State concerned, during a police check, on pain of an immediate fine from which no exemption is possible, the amount of which is equivalent to the fine that may be imposed for failure to register the vehicle? (2) Must Article 20(2)(a) TFEU be interpreted as precluding a provision of the law of a Member State such as that at issue in the case in the main proceedings in accordance with which, as a rule, only motor vehicles that have administrative authorisation and registration plates issued by the authorities of that Member State may be used on the roads in the Member State, and a person resident in the Member State who is not a worker within the meaning of EU law and who seeks exemption from that provision on the grounds that he is using a vehicle made available to him by an undertaking established in another Member State is required to prove on the spot the lawfulness of its use under the law of the Member State concerned, at a police check, on pain of an immediate fine from which no exemption is possible, the amount of which is equivalent to the fine that may be imposed for failure to register the vehicle?’
9

With regard to the termination of co-ownership in undivided shares, Paragraphs 9 and 11 of the Law on co-ownership state: ‘9. A co-owner is entitled to receive his share of the property held in common by way of partition. The partition is to be made mutatis mutandis with the provisions of Paragraph 12(4) of the Inheritance Code. If partition of the property is impossible or it would give rise to disproportionately high costs or would substantially reduce the value of the property the court has the power, on application by the co-owner and after the other co-owners have been summoned to give their views, to order the sale of the property in lieu of partition in order to terminate the relationship of co-ownership. … 11. The court shall, where appropriate, appoint a person who is to have the conduct of the sale and distribute the proceeds thereof. If the property is to be sold by auction the appointee, after consultation with the co-owners, shall determine the conditions of sale to the extent that this has not been determined by the court, publicly announce the holding of the auction and conduct the auction or arrange for it to be held. The appointee shall sign the act of sale if one is drawn up.’