ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
6

The sixth, eighth and ninth paragraphs of the preamble to the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (OJ 2020 L 29, p. 7, ‘the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom’), which was adopted on 17 October 2019 and entered into force on 1 February 2020, state: ‘Recognising that it is necessary to provide reciprocal protection for Union citizens and for United Kingdom nationals, as well as their respective family members, where they have exercised free movement rights before a date set in this Agreement, and to ensure that their rights under this Agreement are enforceable and based on the principle of non-discrimination; recognising also that rights deriving from periods of social security insurance should be protected, … Considering that it is in the interest of both the Union and the United Kingdom to determine a transition or implementation period during which – notwithstanding all consequences of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the Union as regards the United Kingdom’s participation in the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, in particular the end, on the date of entry into force of this Agreement, of the mandates of all members of institutions, bodies and agencies of the Union nominated, appointed or elected in relation to the United Kingdom’s membership of the Union – Union law, including international agreements, should be applicable to and in the United Kingdom, and, as a general rule, with the same effect as regards the Member States, in order to avoid disruption in the period during which the agreement(s) on the future relationship will be negotiated, Recognising that, even if Union law will be applicable to and in the United Kingdom during the transition period, the specificities of the United Kingdom as a State having withdrawn from the Union mean that it will be important for the United Kingdom to be able to take steps to prepare and establish new international arrangements of its own, including in areas of Union exclusive competence, provided such agreements do not enter into force or apply during that period, unless so authorised by the Union’.
12

As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, according to the explanations provided by the referring court, for the financial years 1999 and 2000, Article 31 of the EBF provided for 50% of dividends received to be taken into account and had been applied, having regard to the objective pursued by that article, only in so far as concerns dividends received in respect of shares listed on the Portuguese stock exchange. On the one hand, it is apparent from the written observations of the Portuguese Government that, pursuant to that article, which was introduced in 1989 and repealed in 2008, 60% rather than 50% of the amount of those dividends could be deducted from the basis of assessment of income tax in respect of the financial year 2000. On the other hand, Real Vida Seguros disputes the interpretation of Article 31 of the EBF made by both the court of first instance and the referring court, according to which that article applies only to dividends received in respect of shares listed on the Portuguese stock exchange, since no such condition appears in the wording of that article.
The first indent of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 concerning the making available on the market and use of biocidal products, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 334/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014, read in conjunction with Article 3(1)(c) of that regulation, must be interpreted as meaning that a product intended to destroy, deter or render harmless harmful organisms, which contains an active substance approved under an implementing regulation of the Commission, in accordance with Article 9(1)(a) of that regulation, does not, solely because of that approval, come under the definition of ‘biocidal product’ within the meaning of the first indent of Article 3(1)(a) of that regulation, with the result that it falls to the competent national court to ascertain whether that product satisfies all the conditions laid down by that provision in order to come under that definition. However, where the composition of that product is identical to the composition of the biocidal product presented as representative at the time of the application for approval of that active substance, that court is required to consider that that product comes under that definition.
3

Recitals 17 to 23 of Directive 91/250 state: ‘Whereas the exclusive rights of the author to prevent the unauthorised reproduction of his work have to be subject to a limited exception in the case of a computer program to allow the reproduction technically necessary for the use of that program by the lawful acquirer; Whereas this means that the acts of loading and running necessary for the use of a copy of a program which has been lawfully acquired, and the act of correction of its errors, may not be prohibited by contract; whereas, in the absence of specific contractual provisions, including when a copy of the program has been sold, any other act necessary for the use of the copy of a program may be performed in accordance with its intended purpose by a lawful acquirer of that copy; Whereas a person having a right to use a computer program should not be prevented from performing acts necessary to observe, study or test the functioning of the program, provided that these acts do not infringe the copyright in the program; Whereas the unauthorised reproduction, translation, adaptation or transformation of the form of the code in which a copy of a computer program has been made available constitutes an infringement of the exclusive rights of the author; Whereas, nevertheless, circumstances may exist when such a reproduction of the code and translation of its form within the meaning of Article 4(a) and (b) are indispensable to obtain the necessary information to achieve the interoperability of an independently created program with other programs; Whereas it has therefore to be considered that in these limited circumstances only, performance of the acts of reproduction and translation by or on behalf of a person having a right to use a copy of the program is legitimate and compatible with fair practice and must therefore be deemed not to require the authorisation of the rightholder; Whereas an objective of this exception is to make it possible to connect all components of a computer system, including those of different manufacturers, so that they can work together; Whereas such an exception to the author’s exclusive rights may not be used in a way which prejudices the legitimate interests of the rightholder or which conflicts with a normal exploitation of the program’.
23

In those circumstances, the Landgericht Düsseldorf (Regional Court, Düsseldorf) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Does a passenger have a “confirmed reservation” within the meaning of Article 3(2)(a) of [Regulation No 261/2004] if he [or she] has received, from a tour operator with which he [or she] has a contract, “other proof” within the meaning of Article 2(g) [of that regulation], by which he [or she] is assured transport on a particular flight, individualised by points of departure and destination, times of departure and arrival and flight number, without the tour operator having made a seat reservation for that flight with the air carrier concerned and having received confirmation from the latter? (2) Is an air carrier to be regarded as an “operating air carrier” within the meaning of Article 2(b) of [Regulation No 261/2004] in relation to a passenger if, despite the fact that that passenger has a contract with a tour operator which has promised him [or her] carriage on a particular flight, individualised by points of departure and destination, times of departure and arrival and flight number, the tour operator has not, however, reserved a seat for the passenger and has therefore not established a contractual relationship with the air carrier in respect of that flight? (3) Can the “scheduled time of arrival” of a flight within the meaning of Article 2(h), Article 5(1)(c), the second sentence of Article 7(1) and Article 7(2) of [Regulation No 261/2004] be determined, for the purposes of compensation for cancellation or long delay in arrival, from “other proof” issued to a passenger by a tour operator, or must the ticket pursuant to Article 2(f) [of that regulation] be taken into account for that purpose? (4) Has there been a cancellation of a flight within the meaning of Article 2(l) and Article 5(1) of [Regulation No 261/2004] if the operating air carrier brings a flight booked as part of a package tour forward by at least 2 hours and 10 minutes within the same day? (5) Can the operating air carrier reduce the compensation under Article 7(1) of [Regulation No 261/2004] in accordance with Article 7(2) of that regulation if the amount of time by which a flight has been brought forward is within the periods specified in that provision? (6) Does it constitute an offer of re-routing within the meaning of Article 5(1)(a) and Article 8(1)(b) of [Regulation No 261/2004] if a passenger is informed, before the beginning of his [or her] journey, that his [or her] flight has been brought forward? (7) Does Article 14(2) of [Regulation No 261/2004] oblige the operating air carrier to inform the passenger of the exact company name and address from which he [or she] can request a sum on a sliding scale based on distance, the amount of that sum and, if applicable, the documents that he [or she] should attach to his [or her] request?’
32

In those circumstances, the Administrativen sad Sofia-grad (Administrative Court of the City of Sofia) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Must Article 20 TFEU and Article 21 TFEU and Articles 7, 24 and 45 of the [Charter] be interpreted as meaning that the Bulgarian administrative authorities to which an application for a document certifying the birth of a child of Bulgarian nationality in another Member State of the [European Union] was submitted, which had been certified by way of a Spanish birth certificate in which two persons of the female sex are registered as mothers without specifying whether one of them, and if so, which of them, is the child’s biological mother, are not permitted to refuse to issue a Bulgarian birth certificate on the grounds that the applicant refuses to state which of them is the child’s biological mother? (2) Must Article 4(2) TEU and Article 9 of the [Charter] be interpreted as meaning that respect for the national identity and constitutional identity of the Member States of the European Union means that those Member States have a broad discretion as regards the rules for establishing parentage? Specifically: Must Article 4(2) TEU be interpreted as allowing Member States to request information on the biological parentage of the child? Must Article 4(2) TEU in conjunction with Article 7 and Article 24(2) of the Charter be interpreted as meaning that it is essential to strike a balance of interests between, on the one hand, the national identity and constitutional identity of a Member State and, on the other hand, the best interests of the child, having regard to the fact that, at the present time, there is neither a consensus as regards values nor, in legal terms, a consensus about the possibility of registering as parents on a birth certificate persons of the same sex without providing further details of whether one of them, and if so, which of them, is the child’s biological parent? If this question is answered in the affirmative, how could that balance of interests be achieved in concrete terms? (3) Is the answer to Question 1 affected by the legal consequences of [the Withdrawal Agreement] in that one of the mothers listed on the birth certificate issued in another Member State is a United Kingdom national whereas the other mother is a national of an EU Member State, having regard in particular to the fact that the refusal to issue a Bulgarian birth certificate for the child constitutes an obstacle to the issue of an identity document for the child by an EU Member State and, as a result, may impede the unlimited exercise of her rights as [a Union] citizen? (4) If the first question is answered in the affirmative: does EU law, in particular the principle of effectiveness, oblige the competent national authorities to derogate from the model birth certificate [which is one of the model civil status certificates] applicable [at a national level]?’
3

Article 5 of that regulation, under the heading ‘Opening of investigations’, provides: ‘1. The Director-General may open an investigation when there is a sufficient suspicion, which may also be based on information provided by any third party or anonymous information, that there has been fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union. The decision by the Director-General whether or not to open an investigation shall take into account the investigation policy priorities and the annual management plan of [OLAF] established in accordance with Article 17(5). That decision shall also take into account the need for efficient use of [OLAF’s] resources and for proportionality of the means employed. With regard to internal investigations, specific account shall be taken of the institution, body, office or agency best placed to conduct them, based, in particular, on the nature of the facts, the actual or potential financial impact of the case, and the likelihood of any judicial follow-up. 2. The decision to open an external investigation shall be taken by the Director-General, acting on his own initiative or following a request from a Member State concerned or any institution, body, office or agency of the Union. The decision to open an internal investigation shall be taken by the Director-General, acting on his own initiative or following a request from the institution, body, office or agency within which the investigation is to be conducted or from a Member State. … 4. Within two months of receipt by [OLAF] of a request as referred to in paragraph 2, a decision whether or not to open an investigation shall be taken. It shall be communicated without delay to the Member State, institution, body, office or agency which made the request. Reasons shall be given for a decision not to open an investigation. If, on the expiry of that period of two months, [OLAF] has not taken any decision, [OLAF] shall be deemed to have decided not to open an investigation. Where an official, other servant, member of an institution or body, head of office or agency, or staff member, acting in accordance with Article 22a of the Staff Regulations, provides information to [OLAF] relating to a suspected fraud or irregularity, [OLAF] shall inform that person of the decision whether or not to open an investigation in relation to the facts in question. …’
32

However, Article 33(2)(a) of Directive 2013/32 does not preclude a Member State from exercising the option, available under that provision, to refuse an application for the grant of refugee status as being inadmissible on the ground that the applicant has already been granted international protection by another Member State, where the living conditions that that applicant could be expected to encounter as the beneficiary of international protection in that other Member State would not expose him or her to a substantial risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter. The fact that the beneficiaries of such protection do not receive, in that Member State, any subsistence allowance, or that such allowance as they receive is markedly inferior to that in other Member States, though they are not treated differently from nationals of that Member State, does not allow it to be inferred that Article 4 of the Charter has been infringed, unless, because of the applicant’s particular vulnerability, irrespective of his or her wishes and personal choices, he or she would be in a situation of extreme material poverty that does not allow him or her to meet his or her most basic needs, such as, inter alia, food, personal hygiene and a place to live, and that undermines his or her physical or mental health or puts him or her in a state of degradation incompatible with human dignity (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 March 2019, Ibrahim and Others, C‑297/17, C‑318/17, C‑319/17 and C‑438/17, EU:C:2019:219, paragraphs 89, 90 and 101).
3

Annex X to the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded (OJ 2003 L 236, p. 33) is entitled ‘List referred to in Article 24 of the Act of Accession: Hungary’. Chapter 3 of that annex, entitled ‘Free movement of capital’, provides in paragraph 2: ‘Notwithstanding the obligations under the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, Hungary may maintain in force for seven years from the date of accession the prohibitions laid down in its legislation existing at the time of signature of this Act on the acquisition of agricultural land by natural persons who are non-residents or non-nationals of Hungary and by legal persons. In no instance may nationals of the Member States or legal persons formed in accordance with the laws of another Member State be treated less favourably in respect of the acquisition of agricultural land than at the date of signature of the Accession Treaty. … Nationals of another Member State who want to establish themselves as self-employed farmers and who have been legally resident and active in farming in Hungary at least for three years continuously, shall not be subject to the provisions of the preceding subparagraph or to any rules and procedures other than those to which nationals of Hungary are subject. … If there is sufficient evidence that, upon expiry of the transitional period, there will be serious disturbances or a threat of serious disturbances on the agricultural land market of Hungary, the [European] Commission, at the request of Hungary, shall decide upon the extension of the transitional period for up to a maximum of three years.’
30

In those circumstances, the Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht in Bremen (Higher Regional Court, Bremen) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Does a declaration concerning the waiver of succession by an heir before the court of a Member State that has jurisdiction for the place of his or her habitual residence, which complies with the formal requirements applicable there, replace the declaration concerning the waiver of succession to be made before the court of another Member State that has jurisdiction to rule on the succession, in such a way that when that declaration is made, it is deemed to have been validly made (substitution)? (2) If Question 1 is to be answered in the negative: In addition to making a declaration before the court that has jurisdiction for the place of habitual residence of the party waiving succession which complies with all formal requirements, is it necessary, in order for the declaration concerning the waiver of succession to be valid, that the latter inform the court that has jurisdiction to rule on the succession that the declaration concerning the waiver of succession has been made? (3) If Question 1 is to be answered in the negative and Question 2 in the affirmative: (a) Is it necessary that the court that has jurisdiction to rule on the succession be addressed in the official language of the location of that court in order for the declaration concerning the waiver of succession to be valid and, in particular, in order to comply with the time limits applicable for making such declarations before that court? (b) Is it necessary that the court that has jurisdiction to rule on the succession receive the original documents drawn up in relation to the waiver by the court that has jurisdiction for the place of habitual residence of the party waiving succession and a translation thereof in order for the declaration concerning the waiver of succession to be valid and, in particular, in order to comply with the time limits applicable for making such declarations before the court that has jurisdiction to rule on the succession?’
1.

Declares that the French Republic, by not having ensured that the daily limit value applicable to concentrations of microparticles (PM10) was not systematically and persistently exceeded, from 1 January 2005 to 2019 inclusive, in the Paris agglomeration and quality zone (FR04A01/FR11ZAG01) and, from 1 January 2005 to 2016 inclusive, with the exception of 2008, in the Martinique/Fort‑de‑France agglomeration and quality zone (FR39N10/FR02ZAR01), failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 13(1) of Directive 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe, read in conjunction with Annex XI of that directive, and – by not having ensured that the air quality plans set out appropriate measures, so that the exceedance period of that limit value could be kept as short as possible in those two zones, from 11 June 2010, failed to fulfil its obligations under the second paragraph of Article 23(1) of Directive 2008/50, read in conjunction with Annex XV of that directive;
31

It should be added that the situations which the national case-law at issue in the main proceedings excludes from the benefit of Law No 118/2000 are not covered by the exceptions laid down in Article 1(2) and (3) of that directive. First, although Article 1(2) of Directive 2008/94 authorises Member States, by way of exception, to exclude claims by certain categories of employee from the scope of that directive, this is subject to the condition that there are other forms of guarantee which offer the persons concerned a degree of protection equivalent to that resulting from that directive. In the present case, however, it is apparent from the order for reference that the national case-law at issue in the main proceedings does not grant such equivalent protection to persons who are members of a statutory body of a company and who also, on the basis of a contract of employment, perform the duties of CEO of that company. Secondly, Article 1(3) of Directive 2008/94 concerns domestic servants employed by a natural person, which is not the case with the persons referred to in the national case-law at issue in the main proceedings.