ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Order of the Court (Third Chamber) of 3 September 2015 — Vivium

(Case C‑250/15) ( 1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Factual and regulatory background to the dispute in the main proceedings — Lack of sufficient information — Manifest inadmissibility’

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Admissibility — Need to provide the Court with sufficient information on the factual and legislative context — Statement of the reasons why it is necessary to receive an answer to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling (Art. 267 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court, Art. 94) (see paras 8-10)

Operative part

The request for a preliminary ruling from the rechtbank van eerste aanleg te Antwerpen (Belgium), made by decision of 13 May 2015 (Case C‑250/15), is manifestly inadmissible.

( 1 ) JO C 262 du 10.8.2015.
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 21 January 2016 — Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission

(Case C‑103/15 P) ( 1 )

‛Appeal — Access to EU institution documents — Actions in areas interesting developing countries — Refusal to grant access to certain documents of the file concerning contract ‘LIEN 97-2011’ — Execution of a judgment of the General Court’

Judicial proceedings — Application initiating proceedings — Formal requirements — Brief summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based — Pleas in law not set out in the application — Reference to elements in an annex — Inadmissibility — Development of arguments in the reply — No effect (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 21, 53, first para, and 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 168(1)(d); Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 44(1)(c)) (see paras 27, 30-33, 39)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. Internationaler Hilfsfonds eV is ordered to pay the costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 302, 14.9.2015.
1.

Appeal — Grounds — Mistaken assessment of the facts — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of Justice of the assessment of the facts put before the General Court — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (se para. 30)
3.

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 32, 33)
Order of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 23 February 2016 —

Garzón Ramos and Ramos Martín

(Case C‑380/15) ( 1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Right to effective judicial protection — Mortgage enforcement proceedings — Powers of the court hearing the declaratory proceedings — No implementation of EU law — Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Clear lack of jurisdiction of the Court’

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Limits — Request for an interpretation of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union — National legislation not constituting a measure implementing EU law and not having any other connection with EU law — Clear lack of jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 6(1), TEU; Art. 267 TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 51(1) and (2); Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 53(2)) (see paras 20-28, operative part)

Operative part

The Court of Justice of the European Union manifestly lacks jurisdiction to provide an answer to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling from the Audiencia Provincial de les Illes Balears (Provincial Court of the Balearic Islands, Spain), by judgment of 1 July 2015.

( 1 ) OJ C 354, 26.10.2015.
1.

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted — Ground of appeal alleging distortion of the clear sense of the evidence — Necessity of indicating precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted and showing the errors of appraisal which led to that distortion — Requirement for the distortion to be obvious from the documents on the Court’s file (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 168(1)(d)) (see paras 28, 29)
Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 14 April 2016 —

Best-Lock (Europe) v EUIPO

(Case C‑451/15 P)

‛Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Community trade mark — Three-dimensional trade mark in the shape of a toy figure with protrusion — Invalidity proceedings — Rejection’

Procedure — Application initiating proceedings — Formal requirements — Brief summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based — Pleas in law not set out in the application — General reference to other documents — Inadmissibility (Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 44(1)(c)) (see paras 14, 15)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.
1.

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see para. 16)
Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 24 May 2016 —

Leonmobili and Leone

(Case C‑353/15) ( 1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 — Article 3(1) and (2) — Insolvency proceedings — International jurisdiction — Centre of a debtor’s main interests — Transfer of a company’s registered office to another Member State — No establishment in the Member State of origin — Presumption that the centre of main interests is the place of the new registered office — Proof to the contrary’

1. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Questions the answer to which may be clearly deduced from the Court’s existing case-law — Application of Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure (Art. 267 TFEU ; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 99) (see paras 18, 19)

2. EU law — Primacy — Contrary national law — Inapplicability as a matter of law of existing standards — Obligation to comply with the instructions of a higher court which are not in accordance with EU law — Not permissible (Art. 267 TFEU) (see paras 21-25)

3. Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Insolvency proceedings — Regulation No 1346/2000 — International jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings — Courts of the Member State in which the centre of the debtor’s main interests is situated — Centre of a debtor’s main interests — Independent concept of EU law (Council Regulation No 1346/2000, Art. 3(1)) (see para. 32)

4. Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Insolvency proceedings —Regulation No 1346/2000 — International jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings — Courts of the Member State in which the centre of the debtor’s main interests is situated — Criteria for determining that State — Presumption in favour of the place where companies have their registered office — Rebuttable presumption — Need for objective information verifiable by third parties — Transfer of the registered office of the debtor company before a request to open insolvency proceedings is lodged — Presumption in favour of the new registered office (Council Regulation No 1346/2000, Art. 3(1)) (see paras 33-41, operative part)

Operative part

Article 3(1) of Council regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings must be interpreted as meaning that, where a company’s registered office has been transferred from one Member State to another Member State, the court seised, subsequent to that transfer, of an application to open insolvency proceedings in the Member State of origin may disregard the presumption that that company’s centre of main interests is situated at the place of the new registered office and find that the centre of those interests remained, as at the date on which that application was brought before it, in that Member State of origin, although the company no longer had an establishment there, only if it is apparent from other objective evidence, ascertainable by third parties, that, nonetheless, the company’s actual centre of management and supervision and of the management of its interests was still located there at that date.

( 1 ) OJ C 302, 14.9.2015.
Case C‑322/15

Google Ireland Limited

and

Google Italy Srl

v

Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Lazio)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 53(2) and Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Lack of sufficient information concerning the factual and legal context of the dispute in the main proceedings and the reasons justifying the need for a reply to the question referred — Manifest inadmissibility’

Summary — Order of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 8 September 2016

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Admissibility — Need to provide the Court with sufficient information on the factual and legislative context — Scope — Application not providing sufficient detail on the factual and legal context — Impossibility for the Court to provide a useful answer to the referring court — Manifest inadmissibility

(Art. 267 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 53(2) and 94)

A request for a preliminary ruling is manifestly inadmissible if it is limited to stating that a decision of a national communications safeguards authority was adopted following legislative amendments for the purposes of extending to advertising concessionaires which negotiate advertising space on the internet and to companies having their headquarters abroad the obligation to disclose economic system information, but that neither the scope, the content nor the detailed rules on the obligation which had its scope extended, are explained in that request.

It is essential that the request for a preliminary ruling should indicate the tenor of the national provisions applicable in the case in the main proceedings and, where appropriate, the relevant national case-law, in order to allow those referred to in Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and the Court itself to assess whether that obligation is compliant with EU law, having regard in particular to its nature, content and scope.

Where, in a case, the subject matter of which relates to a possible restriction of a fundamental freedom, the referring court has not put the Court in a position to be able to assess the existence and extent of such a restriction and, if appropriate, to examine its justification, including, in particular, the examination of the proportionality of that restriction, the Court is not in a position to provide a useful answer to the referring court. In particular, while it is true that the protection of competition and pluralism constitute compelling reasons of general interest capable of justifying restrictions of the freedom to provide services, only a sufficiently detailed description of how that objective is pursued by that decision would allow the Court to determine whether and to what extent it is suitable and necessary for the purpose of attaining the public-interest objective pursued.

(See paras 25-32, operative part)
A request for a preliminary ruling relating to a public procurement procedure for supplies of a value not exceeding the threshold set by Directive No 2004/18 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, as amended by Commission Regulation No 1251/2011, must be declared manifestly inadmissible where the national court did not submit any element enabling the Court to have available to it any information regarding the existence of certain cross-border interest. As is clear from Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure, the Court must be able to find in a request for a preliminary ruling a summary of the facts on which the questions are based and the connection, in particular, between those facts and the questions. Therefore, the findings necessary to verify the existence of certain cross-border interest, and more generally all the findings to be made by the national courts and on which the applicability of an act of secondary and primary legislation of the European Union depends, must be made before the questions are referred to the Court.

On this point, although admittedly, there are cases in which the Court, without any express information provided in that regard by the referring court, can infer from the information in the order for reference the possible existence of certain cross-border interest, this is not so where, for want of any information of that kind in the order for reference, the Court considers that it cannot make such an inference. In those circumstances, the Court is unable to give a helpful answer to the questions raised by the referring court in order to resolve the case before it, which is the objective of the cooperation established by Article 267 TFEU.

(see paras 29-32, operative part)
1.

Judicial proceedings — Costs — Taxation — Recoverable costs — Expenses necessarily incurred by the parties — Definition — Fees paid by a party to its lawyer — Included — Elements to be taken into consideration for the purposes of taxation (Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 144(b) and 184(1)) (see paras 20-22)
23

The harm suffered by the appellants would be irreparable, in so far as, first, the fact of making information available to a certain public is immediate and irreversible, so that the annulment of the contested decision would not redress the harm caused by it. The same can also be said of the information in question and of a prohibition of its disclosure decided after that information has been disclosed. Secondly, the appellants’ financial loss is, in their view, unquantifiable. In the first place, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law, in particular the order of the Vice-President of the Court in Commission v Pilkington Group (C‑278/13 P(R), EU:C:2013:558), that that loss is likely to vary, both as to its nature and as to its scope, depending on whether the persons who acquire knowledge of that information are customers, competitors and suppliers of the appellants or financial analysts or members of the general public. In that regard, the appellants state that it is impossible to identify the number and status of all the persons who could acquire knowledge of the information in question and thus assess the actual negative effects arising from publication of that information. In the second place, as a result of the carglass decision, the appellants are, it is claimed, already facing a number of claims for compensation, either directly as defendants, or in the context of their joint liability with the other addressees of that decision. In that context, publication of the information in question would weaken the position of the appellants in those court proceedings and in negotiations with a view to settlements out of court. Finally, the appellants argue that the adverse financial effects linked to the publication of the information in question cannot be fully quantified. In fact, having regard to all the amounts that would come to be payable by the appellants in respect of damages or payment transactions, it will not be possible to quantify the portion attributable solely and directly to the disclosure of the information in question.
14

It is in those circumstances that the Sąd Rejonowy dla Wrocławia-Śródmieścia we Wrocławiu (District Court, Labour and Social insurance division of the Wrocław-Śródmieście in Wrocław) decided to stay the proceedings before it and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Must Article 8(8) of Regulation No 561/2006, which provides that, where a driver chooses to do this, daily rest periods and reduced weekly rest periods away from base may be taken in a vehicle, as long as it has suitable sleeping facilities for each driver and the vehicle is stationary, be interpreted as meaning that where the employer (the transporter) makes available to the employee (the driver) at no charge sleeping facilities in the cabin of the vehicle, it precludes the national rules laid down in Article 9(4) of the Regulation of 19 December 2002, as amended, applicable until 28 February 2013, and Article 16(4) of the Regulation … of 29 January 2013, applicable from 1 March 2013, with the effect that the employee is therefore entitled to the reimbursement of accommodation costs under the conditions laid down by Article 9(1) to (3) of the Regulation of 19 December 2002 and Article 16(1) to (3) of the Regulation of 29 January 2013, or to the more favourable conditions and amounts laid down by the contract of employment, a collective labour agreement or by other rules of employment law? (2) Must Article 8 of Regulation No 561/2006 be interpreted as meaning that, if a driver chooses to do so, rest periods away from base, as defined in Article 4(f) to (i) thereof, may be taken in a vehicle, as long as it has suitable sleeping facilities for each driver and the vehicle is stationary?’
8

The Gesetz über das Verfahren in Familiensachen und in den Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit (Law on Proceedings in Family Matters and in Matters of Non-contentious Jurisdiction) provides as follows: ‘Paragraph 107. Recognition of foreign decisions in matrimonial matters (1) Decisions delivered abroad by which a marriage is annulled ... shall be recognised only if the Land Justice Administration has found that the requirements for recognition are met. If a court or authority of a State of which both spouses were nationals at the time of the decision has ruled, recognition shall not depend on a finding by the Land Justice Administration. (2) The Justice Administration of the Land in which one of the spouses habitually resides shall have jurisdiction. ... (3) The Länder Governments may delegate, by regulation, the powers conferred by these provisions on the Länder Justice Administrations to one or more Oberlandesgericht presidents. ... (4) The decision shall be made on application. The application may be made by any person showing legal interest in the recognition. ... (6) If the Land Justice Administration finds that the requirements for recognition are met, the spouse who did not make the application may ask the Oberlandesgericht to rule. ... (7) The Civil Chamber of the Oberlandesgericht in the jurisdiction of which the Land Justice Administration has its seat shall be the competent court. ... (8) The above provisions shall apply mutatis mutandis when an application is made for a finding that the requirements for recognition are not met. ... Article 109. Exclusions from recognition (1) A foreign decision shall not be recognised 1. if the courts of the other State do not have jurisdiction under German law; ... 4. where recognition of the decision would lead to a result which is manifestly incompatible with the essential principles of German law and, more particularly, where recognition of that decision is incompatible with the fundamental rights. ...’
ORDER OF THE COURT (Third Chamber)

16 February 2017 ( *1 )

‛Rectification of judgment’

In Joined Cases C‑164/15 P-REC and C‑165/15 P-REC,

TWO APPEALS under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, lodged on 9 April 2015,

European Commission, represented by L. Flynn, D. Grespan, T. Maxian Rusche and B. Stromsky, acting as Agents, with an address for service in Luxembourg,

appellant,

the other parties to the proceedings being:

Aer Lingus Ltd, established in Dublin (Ireland), represented by K. Bacon and A. Robertson, QC, and by D. Bailey, Barrister, instructed by A. Burnside, Solicitor,

applicant at first instance (C‑164/15 P) and intervener at first instance (C‑165/15 P),

Ryanair Designated Activity Company, formerly Ryanair Ltd, established in Dublin (Ireland), represented by B. Kennelly, QC, I.-G. Metaxas-Maragkidis, dikigoros, and E. Vahida, avocat,

applicant at first instance (C‑165/15 P),

Ireland, represented by E. Creedon, J. Quaney and A. Joyce, acting as Agents, and by E. Regan, SC, and B. Doherty, BL,

intervener at first instance (C‑164/15 P and C‑165/15 P),

THE COURT (Third Chamber),

composed of L. Bay Larsen, President of the Chamber, M. Vilaras (Rapporteur), J. Malenovský, M. Safjan and D. Šváby, Judges,

Advocate General: P. Mengozzi,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

after hearing the Advocate General,

makes the following

Order

1 On 21 December 2016 the Court (Third Chamber) delivered its judgment in Commission v Aer Lingus and Ryanair Designated Activity (C‑164/15 P and C‑165/15 P, EU:C:2016:990).

2 That judgment contains, in its English-language version, a clerical error which it is appropriate to rectify, in accordance with Article 154(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to Article 190(1) of those rules.

On those grounds, the Court (Third Chamber) hereby orders:

1. Paragraph 122 of the judgment of 21 December 2016, Commission v Aer Lingus and Ryanair Designated Activity (C‑164/15 P and C‑165/15 P, EU:C:2016:990), in its English-language version, must be rectified as follows: ‘That said, it should be observed that, as is apparent from paragraphs 78 and 79 above, in circumstances such as those of the present cases, the Commission cannot refrain from finding that a case involves State aid on the sole ground that it is possible that the national courts with jurisdiction may order the repayment of the excess ATT to the airlines which did not have the benefit of the lower rate of ATT. As it was under a duty to establish the existence of State aid, the Commission was also under a duty to order the recovery of that aid.’

2. The original of this order shall be annexed to the original of the rectified judgment. A note of this order shall be made in the margin of the original of the rectified judgment. Luxembourg, 16 February 2017.

A. Calot Escobar Registrar L. Bay Larsen President of the Third Chamber

( *1 ) Language of the case: English.
Judicial proceedings — Costs — Taxation — Recoverable costs — Elements to be taken into consideration — Expenses necessarily incurred in relation to taxation proceedings — Standardised procedure characterised by the absence of any difficulty

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 144(b))

(see paras 40, 60)