ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
24

The contested order also states: ‘The Respondents must, within 7 days after being provided with a copy of this order … take all steps reasonably within their power to prevent the directors of the companies referred to [in the present order] from in any way disposing of, dealing with or diminishing the [Ventbunkers] interests held by the said companies. Such steps, if reasonably within their power, shall include, but not be limited to, immediately formally instructing the said companies through their directors … and, to the extent that they are able, prohibit any disposition of, dealing with or diminution in value of any [Ventbunkers] interests held by the said companies. … This order does not prohibit the Respondents from disposing of, dealing with or diminishing the value of any of the Respondents’ assets other than the [Ventbunkers] interests. This order does not prohibit the Respondents from dealing with or disposing of the [Ventbunkers] interests in the ordinary and proper course of business, but before doing so the Respondents must tell the Applicants’ legal representatives. … A Respondent who is an individual who is ordered not to do something must not do it himself or in any other way. He must not do it through others acting on his behalf or on his instructions or with his encouragement. … The terms of this order will affect the following persons in a country or state outside the jurisdiction of this court: (a) The Respondents; (b) any person who: — is subject to the jurisdiction of this court; — has been given written notice of this order at his residence or place of business within the jurisdiction of this court; and — is able to prevent acts or omissions outside the jurisdiction of this court which constitute or assist in a breach of the terms of this order; and (c) any other person, only to the extent that this order is declared enforceable by or is enforced by a court in that country or state.’
6

Section 3 of that methodology states that the concept of ‘stranded costs’ covers commitments or guarantees of operation that may, in practice, take a variety of forms, and in particular long-term purchase contracts, investment undertaken with an implicit or explicit guarantee of sale, as well as investment undertaken outside the scope of normal activity. In particular, point 3.3 of the Stranded Costs Methodology provides that, in order to qualify as eligible stranded costs, capable of being recognised as such by the Commission, those commitments or guarantees of operation must: ‘… run the risk of not being honoured on account of the provisions of Directive 96/92/EC. In order to qualify as stranded costs, commitments or guarantees must consequently become non-economical on account of the effects of the Directive and must significantly affect the competitiveness of the undertaking concerned. Among other things, this must result in that undertaking’s making accounting entries (e.g. provisions) designed to reflect the foreseeable impact of the commitment or guarantee. Especially where, as a result of the commitments or guarantees in question, the viability of the undertakings might be jeopardised in the absence of aid or any transitional measures, the commitments or guarantees are deemed to meet the requirements laid down in the preceding paragraph. The effect of such commitments or guarantees on the competitiveness or viability of the undertakings concerned will be assessed at the consolidated level. For commitments or guarantees to constitute stranded costs, it must be possible to establish a cause-and-effect relationship between the entry into force of Directive 96/92/EC and the difficulty that the undertakings concerned have in honouring or securing compliance with such commitments or guarantees. In order to establish such cause-and-effect relationship, the Commission will take into account any fall in electricity prices or market share losses suffered by the undertakings concerned. Commitments or guarantees that could not have been honoured irrespective of the entry into force of the Directive do not constitute stranded costs.’
8

Article 19 of that regulation provides: ‘1. Member States shall lay down rules on penalties applicable to infringements of this regulation and Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. Those penalties shall be effective, proportionate, dissuasive and non-discriminatory. No infringement of this regulation and Regulation … No 3821/85 shall be subjected to more than one penalty or procedure. The Member States shall notify the Commission of these measures and the rules on penalties by the date specified in the second subparagraph of Article 29. The Commission shall inform the Member States accordingly. 2. A Member State shall enable the competent authorities to impose a penalty on an undertaking and/or a driver for an infringement of this regulation detected on its territory and for which a penalty has not already been imposed, even where that infringement has been committed on the territory of another Member State or of a third country. By way of exception, where an infringement is detected: — which was not committed on the territory of the Member State concerned, and — which has been committed by an undertaking which is established in, or a driver whose place of employment is, in another Member State or a third country, a Member State may, until 1 January 2009, instead of imposing a penalty, notify the facts of the infringement to the competent authority in the Member State or the third country where the undertaking is established or where the driver has his place of employment. 3. Whenever a Member State initiates proceedings or imposes a penalty for a particular infringement, it shall provide the driver with due evidence of this in writing. 4. Member States shall ensure that a system of proportionate penalties, which may include financial penalties, is in force for infringements of this regulation or Regulation … No 3821/85 on the part of undertakings, or associated consignors, freight forwarders, tour operators, principal contractors, subcontractors and driver employment agencies.’
An action in which one parent asks the court to remedy the lack of agreement of the other parent to their child travelling outside his Member State of residence and a passport being issued in the child’s name is within the material scope of Regulation No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, even though the decision in that action will have to be taken into account by the authorities of the Member State of which the child is a national in the administrative procedure for the issue of that passport.

Regulation No 2201/2003 applies in civil matters relating inter alia to the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental responsibility. The concept of ‘parental responsibility’ is given a broad definition in Article 2(7) of Regulation No 2201/2003, in that it includes all rights and duties relating to the person or the property of a child which are given to a natural or legal person by judgment, by operation of law or by an agreement having legal effect.

Where an action requires the national court to rule on the child’s need to obtain a passport and the applicant parent’s right to apply for that passport and travel abroad with the child without the agreement of the other parent, the object of that action is the exercise of ‘parental responsibility’ for that child within the meaning of Article 1(1)(b) in conjunction with Article 2(7) of Regulation No 2201/2003.

(see paras 26, 27, 29, 35, operative part 1)
Case C‑163/15

Youssef Hassan

v

Breiding Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Community trade mark — Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Article 23 — Licence — Register of Community trade marks — Right of the licensee to bring proceedings for infringement notwithstanding the fact that the licence has not been entered in the Register’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber), 4 February 2016

Community trade mark — Community trade mark as an object of property — Effects in respect of third parties — Right of the licensee to bring proceedings for infringement notwithstanding the fact that the licence has not been entered in the Register

(Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 23(1))

The first sentence of Article 23(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 on the Community trade mark must be interpreted as meaning that the licensee may bring proceedings alleging infringement of a Community trade mark which is the subject of the licence, although that licence has not been entered in the Register of Community trade marks. Despite the fact that, read in isolation, that sentence could be interpreted as meaning that the licensee cannot, if the licence has not been entered in the Register, rely on the rights conferred by that licence vis-à-vis third parties, including the party infringing the trade mark, the Court of Justice points out that, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part.

With regard to the purpose of the rule laid down in the first sentence of Article 23(1) of Regulation No 207/2009, the Court takes the view that the lack of effects, vis-à-vis third parties, of the legal acts referred to in Articles 17, 19 and 22 of the regulation which have not been entered in the Register of Community trade marks is intended to protect a person who has, or may have, rights in a Community trade mark as an object of property. It follows that the first sentence of Article 23(1) of the Regulation does not apply to a situation in which a third party, by infringing the mark, infringes the rights conferred by the Community trade mark.

(see paras 18, 19, 25, 26, operative part)
Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 23 December 2015 —

Firma Theodor Pfister

(Case C‑58/15) ( 1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Agriculture — Health inspections — Official feed and food controls — Financing of controls — Inspection costs relating to slaughter — Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 — Directive 85/73/EEC — Possibility of levying fees covering the actual cost of inspection, exceeding the fees set by that directive’

1. EU law — Interpretation — Texts in several languages — Uniform interpretation — Differences between the various language versions — Context and purpose of the legislation in question as a basis for reference (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 882/2004, Arts 27(3) and 67; Council Directive 85/73, as amended by Directive 97/79) (see para. 25)

2. Approximation of laws — Official control of animal feed and food — Financing — Fees for the costs occasioned by inspections and controls relating to meat hygiene — Transitional period of 2007 — Levy of fees covering costs actually incurred — Lawfulness (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 882/2004, Arts 27(3) and 67; Council Directive 85/73, as amended by Directive 97/79) (see paras 26-33, operative part)

Operative part

The second sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 27(3) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1791/2006 of 20 November 2006, must be interpreted as authorising, for the transitional period of 2007, the levying of fees for the costs occasioned by inspections and controls relating to meat hygiene so as to cover the costs incurred by the competent authority, in accordance with Council Directive 85/73/EEC of 29 January 1985 on the financing of veterinary inspections and controls covered by Directives 89/662/EEC, 90/425/EEC, 90/675/EEC and 91/496/EEC, as amended by Council Directive 97/79/EC of 18 December 1997.

( 1 ) OJ C 171, 26.5.2015.
Case C‑43/15 P

BSH Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte GmbH

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

(Appeal — EU trade mark — Application for registration of a figurative mark including the word elements ‘compressor technology’ — Opposition of the proprietor of the word marks KOMPRESSOR PLUS and KOMPRESSOR — Partial refusal of registration — Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Article 60 — Regulation (EC) No 216/96 — Article 8(3) — ‘Ancillary’ appeal — Regulation (EC) No 40/94 — Article 8(1)(b) — Weak distinctive character of the earlier national marks — Likelihood of confusion)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 8 November 2016

Appeals—Pleas in law—Plea submitted for the first time in the context of the appeal—Inadmissibility (Art. 256(1), second subpara., TFEU; Statue of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

EU trade mark—Appeals procedure—Action before the EU judicature—Jurisdiction of the General Court—Review of the lawfulness of decisions of the Boards of Appeal—Decision upholding the ancillary appeal brought by the defendant in its response—Decision not challenged by the appellant before the General Court on the ground of breach of the adversarial principle—Examination by the General Court of its own motion—Precluded (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 63(2) and 75, second sentence; Commission Regulation No 216/96, Art. 8(3))

EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Weak distinctive character of the earlier mark—Effect (Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 8(1)(b))
Inasmuch as Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, read in conjunction with Article 9(2) and (4) of the Aarhus Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters, enshrines the right to effective judicial protection, in conditions ensuring wide access to justice, of the rights which an environmental organisation meeting the conditions laid down in Article 2(5) of that convention derives from EU law, in this instance from Article 6(3) of Directive 92/43 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora as amended by Directive 2006/105, read in conjunction with Article 6(1)(b) of that convention, it must be interpreted as precluding an interpretation of rules of national procedural law to the effect that an action against a decision refusing such an organisation the status of party to an administrative procedure for authorisation of a project that is to be carried out on a site protected pursuant to Directive 92/43 as amended by Directive 2006/105 does not necessarily have to be examined during the course of that procedure, which may be definitively concluded before a definitive judicial decision on possession of the status of party is adopted, and is automatically dismissed as soon as that project is authorised, thereby requiring that organisation to bring an action of another type in order to obtain that status and to secure judicial review of compliance by the competent national authorities with their obligations stemming from Article 6(3) of that directive.

(see para. 73, operative part)
It follows from Article 3(3) of Directive 2001/42 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment, read in conjunction with recital 10 of that directive, that, for plans and programmes which determine the use of small areas at local level, the competent authorities of the Member State concerned must carry out a prior examination of whether a particular plan or programme is likely to have significant effects on the environment and that those authorities must then require an environmental assessment of that plan or programme, pursuant to that directive, if they reach the conclusion that the plan or programme is likely to have such effects on the environment.

By not excluding any plan or programme likely to have significant effects on the environment from an environmental assessment under that directive, that provision falls within the scope of the objective pursued by that directive of providing a high level of environmental protection. In that regard, it is for the Member States to take, within the sphere of their competence, all the general or particular measures necessary to ensure that all plans or programmes likely to have significant environmental effects within the meaning of Directive 2001/42 are subject, before adoption, to an environmental assessment in accordance with the procedural requirements and the criteria laid down by that directive. In any event, the mere risk that the national authorities, through their conduct, could circumvent the application of Directive 2001/42, is not such as to render Article 3(3) of that directive invalid.

Accordingly, it does not appear that the Parliament and the Council, by adopting Article 3(3) of Directive 2001/42, committed a manifest error of assessment in the light of Article 191 TFEU. Therefore, that provision has revealed nothing which could affect its validity in the light of Article 191 TFEU. It follows that it also reveals nothing which could affect its validity in the light of Article 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

(see paras 50, 56, 58-60, 63, 64, operative part 1)
Article 67(3) of Regulation No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community, in the version amended and updated by Regulation No 118/97, as amended by Regulation No 592/2008, must be interpreted as not precluding a Member State from refusing to aggregate periods of employment necessary to qualify for unemployment benefit to supplement income from part-time employment, where that employment was not preceded by any period of insurance or of employment in that Member State.

There is no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of Article 67(3) of Regulation No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to their families moving within the Community, in the version amended and updated by Regulation No 118/97, as last amended by Regulation No 592/2008.

In that respect, in the first place, Article 48 TFEU does not prohibit the EU legislature from attaching conditions to the rights and advantages which it accords in order to ensure the freedom of movement for workers enshrined in Article 45 TFEU or from determining the limits thereto and, in the second place, the Council made proper use of its discretion in attaching such conditions, inter alia, to Article 67(3) of Regulation No 1408/71, which is designed to encourage unemployed persons to seek work in the Member State where they last paid unemployment insurance contributions, and to make that State bear the burden of providing the unemployment benefits.

In addition, Article 52(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that rights recognised by the Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties are to be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties. In that vein, Article 15(2) of the Charter reiterates inter alia the free movement of workers guaranteed by Article 45 TFEU, as confirmed by the explanations relating to that provision.

(see paras 31, 33, 35, operative part 2)
Article 35 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a federal entity of a Member State which requires every undertaking that has its place of establishment within the territory of that entity to draw up all the details on invoices relating to cross-border transactions exclusively in the official language of that entity, failing which those invoices are to be declared null and void by the national courts of their own motion.

Such legislation can be justified neither by the objective of promoting and encouraging the use of one of the official languages of a Member State nor by the need to protect the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, since it goes beyond what is necessary to attain those objectives and thus cannot therefore be regarded as proportionate.

(see paras 47, 50, 51, 56, 57, operative part)
Article 3(1)(c) of Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation must be interpreted as meaning that national legislation relating to a supplementary tax on pension income, does not fall within the substantive scope of that directive nor, therefore, is it covered by Article 21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

Such taxation is external to the employment relationship and, therefore, to the determination, in that context, with which Directive 2000/78 is solely concerned, of ‘pay’ within the meaning of that directive and Article 157(2) TFEU.

A supplementary tax on retirement pension income without any link to the contract of employment derives directly and exclusively from national tax legislation applicable to all natural persons whose income from retirement pensions exceeds a certain amount, after deduction of the pension income allowance.

Furthermore, since that legislation does not implement any provision of EU law, within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter and does not fall within the scope either of Directive 2000/78 or a directive on taxation, Article 21 of the Charter the cannot be successfully relied on in the context of a dispute concerning that legislation.

(see paras 25, 26, 29, 30, operative part)