ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
3.

Does the principle of the rule of law, in the form of effective judicial protection and the equivalence of remedies, preclude national legislation which: (a) prevents any judicial review of the correct application of the ESA 2010 by the [Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), Italy] for the purpose of defining the scope of sector S.13 and thus the accuracy, transparency and reliability of budgetary balances, as a means of verifying Italy’s convergence towards the MTO (infringement of the principle of effective protection)? (b) exposes the applicant — should the defendant’s interpretation of the rule be deemed correct, whether by a law governing its authentic interpretation or otherwise — to the burden of two separate legal challenges and the consequent risks of conflicting rulings as to the existence of a legal status under [EU] law, making impossible the effective protection of its right within the time allowed for fulfilment of the ensuing obligations (in other words, the financial year) and undermining the legal certainty as to the existence of general government status? (c) provides that — should the defendant authority’s interpretation of the rule be deemed correct, whether by a law governing its authentic interpretation or otherwise — the correct definition of the budgetary scope should be determined by a different court to that which has jurisdiction in matters of budgetary law under the Italian Constitution?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank van eerste aanleg Oost-Vlaanderen, afdeling Gent (Belgium) lodged on 27 May 2021 — The Escape Center BVBA v Belgische Staat

(Case C-330/21)

(2021/C 338/11)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank van eerste aanleg Oost-Vlaanderen, afdeling Gent

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: The Escape Center BVBA

Defendant: Belgische Staat

Question referred

Must Article 98(2) of Directive 2006/112, (1) read in conjunction with point (14) of Annex III to that directive, be interpreted as meaning that the right to use sporting facilities is subject to the reduced rate of VAT only if no individual or group guidance is provided?

(1) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 9 July 2021 — Ministero dell’Interno v TO

(Case C-422/21)

(2021/C 368/11)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Ministero dell’Interno

Respondent: TO

Question referred

Does Article 20(4) and (5) of Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 (1) preclude national legislation which provides for the withdrawal of reception measures from adult applicants who are not categorised as ‘vulnerable persons’, if such an applicant is deemed to have engaged in particularly violent behaviour outside the accommodation centre involving the use of physical force against public officials and/or public servants, causing such injuries to the victims that they were required to seek emergency treatment?

(1) Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast) (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 96).
Does Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 (1) of 18 December 1995 preclude national legislation under which a limitation period of four or eight years may not be applied in judicial enforcement proceedings which have been commenced, since that issue may be assessed only in the context of an administrative-law action brought against the measure ordering the repayment of sums received in error on the ground that an irregularity has been established?

If that question is answered in the negative, the following question is raised:
5.

If FIFA and UEFA, as entities which have conferred on themselves the exclusive power to organise and give permission for international club football competitions in Europe, were to prohibit or prevent the development of the Super League on the basis of the abovementioned provisions of their statutes, would Article 101 TFEU have to be interpreted as meaning that those restrictions on competition qualify for the exception laid down therein, regard being had to the fact that production is substantially limited, the appearance on the market of products other than those offered by FIFA/UEFA is impeded, and innovation is restricted, since other formats and types are precluded, thereby eliminating potential competition on the market and limiting consumer choice? Would that restriction be covered by an objective justification which would permit the view that there is no abuse of a dominant position for the purposes of Article 102 TFEU?
1.

Are Articles 30 and 60 of Directive 2006/112/EC (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the place of importation under VAT legislation of a means of transport registered in a third country and imported into the EU in breach of customs legislation is located in the Member State in which the customs legislation was infringed and the means of transport was first used as such in the EU, or is it located in the Member State in which the person who failed to comply with customs obligations resides and uses the vehicle?
1.

Must the second sentence of Article 36 TFEU, read in conjunction with Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark, (1) and in conjunction with the second sentence of Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union, be interpreted as precluding the practice of the national courts of the Member States, which is that the courts — when upholding claims by right holders to prohibit the importation, exportation and advertising of goods bearing the EU trade mark or to order their withdrawal from the market; — when ruling, in proceedings to secure claims, on the seizure of goods bearing the EU trade mark, refer in their rulings to ‘goods which have not been put on the market within the European Economic Area by the right holder or with his consent’, with the result that it is left to the enforcement authority, in view of the general wording of the ruling, to determine which items bearing the EU trade mark are subject to the injunctions and prohibitions granted (that is to say, which items have not been put on the market within the European Economic Area by the right holder or with his consent) [and the authority relies, in making the findings set out, on statements of the right holder or tools supplied by him (including IT tools and databases)], while the possibility of challenging the aforementioned findings of the enforcement authority before a court in declaratory proceedings is excluded or limited by the nature of the legal remedies available to the defendant in proceedings to secure claims and in enforcement proceedings?
Appeal brought on 22 July 2021 by Engie Global LNG Holding Sàrl, Engie Invest International SA and Engie SA against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 12 May 2021 in Joined Cases T-516/18 and T-525/18, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and Others v Commission

(Case C-454/21 P)

(2021/C 382/27)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellants: Engie Global LNG Holding Sàrl, Engie Invest International SA and Engie SA (represented by: C. Rydzynski, B Le Bret, M. Struys and F. Pili, avocats)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

— declare the present appeal admissible and well founded;

— annul the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 12 May 2021 in Joined Cases T-516/18 and T-525/18, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and Others v Commission;

— give a final ruling on the substance in accordance with Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and, primarily, grant the form of order sought by Engie at first instance or, in the alternative, annul Article 2 of Commission Decision (EU) 2019/421 of 20 June 2018 on State aid SA.44888 (2016/C) (ex 2016/NN) implemented by Luxembourg in favour of ENGIE (OJ 2019 L 78, p. 1), in so far as it orders the recovery of the aid;

— in the further alternative, refer the case back to the General Court;

— order the Commission to pay all the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of the appeal, Engie Global LNG Holding, Engie Invest International and Engie rely on three grounds of appeal.

According to the appellants, the General Court erred in law and distorted the facts in its definition of the narrow reference framework by (i) excluding the Parent-Subsidiary Directive when defining that reference framework, (ii) creating a link between Articles 164 and 166 of the Law on income tax in Luxembourg, (iii) finding that the ZORA accretions constituted profit distributions, and (iv) considering that the tax rulings at issue granted a selective advantage.

Furthermore, the General Court erred in law and distorted the facts in its demonstration of the existence of a selective advantage in the light of the Luxembourgish provision on abuse of law (i) in respect of the reference framework used, (ii) when identifying a selective advantage, and (iii) when interpreting the Luxembourgish law.

Following on the first and second grounds of appeal, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law by rejecting the arguments that they set out in the action for annulment in respect of the Commission’s limited competence under Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 TFEU on the division of powers between the European Union and the Member States, read in conjunction with Articles 113 to 117 TFEU.

Lastly, the recovery of the aid ordered by the General Court was contrary to the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations.
2.

Is Article 27(3) of the Dublin III Regulation, where appropriate read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that an application for suspension of a decision to transfer an applicant to a Member State responsible for examining his or her application for international protection suspends the implementation of the transfer until a decision is given on the application for suspension only if that application has been made on grounds of extreme urgency, where the applicant is the subject of a removal or refoulement order the enforcement of which is imminent, in particular where he or she is held in detention or is placed at the disposal of the government, and where he or she has not yet applied for the ordinary suspension of the decision at the same time as applying for its annulment?
2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, are third-country nationals who, irrespective of the reasons, have adopted comparable western norms and values through actual residence in the Member State during the phase of their lives in which they form their identity to be regarded as ‘members of a particular social group’ within the meaning of Article 10(1)(d) of the Qualification Directive? Is the question of whether there is a ‘particular social group that has a distinct identity in the relevant country’ to be assessed from the perspective of the Member State or must this, read in conjunction with Article 10(2) of the Qualification Directive, be interpreted as meaning that decisive weight is given to the ability of the foreign national to demonstrate that he or she is regarded in the country of origin as belonging to a particular social group or, at any rate, that this is attributed to him or her? Is the requirement that Westernisation can lead to refugee status only if it stems from religious or political motives compatible with Article 10 of the Qualification Directive, read in conjunction with the prohibition on refoulement and the right to asylum?
Appeal brought on 20 July 2021 by Petrus Kerstens against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 17 May 2021 in Case T-672/20 Kerstens v Commission

(Case C-447/21 P)

(2021/C 431/06)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Petrus Kerstens (represented by: C. Mourato, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant submits that the Court of Justice should:

— set aside the order of the General Court of 17 May 2021, Kerstens v Commission (T-672/20);

— declare the action at issue admissible;

— find that the case cannot proceed on the merits, and refer the matter back to the General Court so that it may rule on the merits of the dispute;

— reserve the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The four grounds of appeal relate to the admissibility of the action brought by the applicant at first instance.

By the first ground of appeal, the appellant submits that by declaring inadmissible the action seeking annulment of the decisions of 20 and 31 January 2020, the General Court infringed the rules on the burden of proof and Article 91(3) of the Staff Regulations, and distorted the facts and evidence.

By the second ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court provided an insufficient statement of reasons for the order under appeal.

By the third ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court gravely infringed the principle of legal certainty in determining the date of notification of the contested act.

By his fourth and final ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court infringed the principle of equal treatment of officials in determining the date of notification of acts addressed to them, to which there a judicial follow-up is necessary.
1.

Is the concept of ‘communication to the public’ in Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that such communication is made by the direct operator (not established in the European Union in this case) of a streaming platform, whereby that operator — alone decides on the content and blacking out of TV programmes broadcast by it and implements them from a technical point of view, — has sole administrator rights for the streaming platform, — can influence which TV programmes can be received by the end user via the service, but cannot influence the content of the programmes, — and is the sole point of control as regards which programmes and content can be watched in which territories and when, where, in each case, — the user is provided with access not only to broadcasting content the online use of which has been authorised by the respective rightholders, but also to protected content for which rights clearance has not been obtained, and — the direct operator of the streaming platform is aware that its service also enables the reception of protected broadcasting content without the consent of the rightholders by virtue of the fact that the end customers use VPN services which give the impression that the IP address and device of the end customers are located in areas for which the consent of the rightholder has been obtained, but — the reception of protected broadcasting content via the streaming platform without the consent of the rightholders was in fact possible for several weeks even without VPN tunnelling?
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākā tiesa (Senāts) (Latvia) lodged on 30 August 2021 — SIA Mikrotīkls v Valsts ieņēmumu dienests

(Case C-542/21)

(2021/C 462/31)

Language of the case: Latvian

Referring court

Augstākā tiesa (Senāts)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant at first instance and appellant: SIA Mikrotīkls

Defendant at first instance and respondent: Valsts ieņēmumu dienests

Question referred

Must the combined nomenclature in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, (1) as amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 927/2012 (2) of 9 October 2012 and Commission Implementing Regulation No 1001/2013 (3) of 4 October 2013, be interpreted as meaning that subheading 8517 70 11 of the combined nomenclature can include router aerials configured for use in local area networks (LAN) and/or wide area networks (WAN)?

(1) OJ 1987 L 256, p. 1.

(2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 927/2012 of 9 October 2012 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (OJ 2012 L 304, p. 1).

(3) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1001/2013 of 4 October 2013 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (OJ 2013 L 290, p. 1).
1.

Does Article 1(1) and (2) of Directive 2008/104/EC (1) apply if — as specified in Paragraph 4(3) of the Tarifvertrag für den Öffentlichen Dienst (collective agreement for the public service, ‘the TVöD’) — an employee’s duties are assigned to a third party and this employee must, at the request of his or her current employer while the existing employment relationship with the latter continues, perform his or her contractually agreed work for said third party on a permanent basis and accept technical and organisational instructions from the third party?
Under what circumstances are there other medical nutrient requirements pursuant to the second alternative in Article 2(2)(g) of the FSG Regulation, (1)

namely:

do they require — in addition to the limited, impaired or disturbed capacity to take, digest, absorb, metabolise or excrete ordinary food, as referred to in the first alternative — that there is an increased nutrient requirement brought about by illness, which is to be covered by the food,

or is it sufficient if the patient […] generally benefits from the intake of that food because substances contained therein counteract the disorder or alleviate its symptoms?
3.

If the second question is answered in the affirmative, and having regard to the fact that the data relating to civil identity are not particularly sensitive data, that only those data may be collected and they may be collected solely for the purposes of preventing failures to fulfil obligations which have been defined precisely, exhaustively and restrictively by national law, and that the systematic review of access to the data of each user by a court or a third-party administrative entity with binding power would be liable to jeopardise the fulfilment of the public service task entrusted to the administrative authority which collects those data, which is itself independent, does the directive preclude the review from being performed in an adapted fashion, for example as an automated review, as the case may be under the supervision of a department within the body which offers guarantees of independence and impartiality in relation to the officials who have the task of collecting the data?
Action brought on 28 September 2021 — European Commission v Republic of Poland

(Case C-601/21)

(2021/C 490/24)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: A. Stobiecka-Kuik, G. Wils and P. Ondrůšek, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Republic of Poland

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by adding exemptions, relating to the production of certain documents, printed matter and stamps and markings, which are not provided for in Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement, (1) the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 1(1) and (3) and Article 15(2) and (3) of Directive 2014/24/EU, read in conjunction with Article 346(1)(a) TFEU;

— order the Republic of Poland to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In transposing Directive 2014/24, Poland exempted the production of a wide range of documents, printed matter and stamps and markings from the scope of the procedures provided for in that directive. The exemptions introduced by Poland concern public documents (such as, for instance, national ID cards, passport documents and sailors’ service record books); excise stamps, legal markings and vehicle inspection stickers; ballot papers and holographic markings placed on voting rights certificates; microprocessors with software used for the management of public documents; and IT systems and databases essential for the use of public documents. According to the Commission, the introduction of those exemptions amounts to infringement of Directive 2014/24, since the scope of that directive has been limited in a manner that is not justified by the provisions of Directive 2014/24 or Article 346 TFEU. The Commission relies on the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-187/16, Commission v Austria, as an important precedent in that regard.

In the context of the pre-litigation procedure, Poland has argued that there is a need to protect the security of official documents. While agreeing that there is a need to guarantee the security and authenticity of those documents, the Commission considers that Poland has not demonstrated that the required protection, including protection against falsification or protection connected with the provisions on the protection of personal data, cannot be realised in the context of the public procurement procedure provided for in Directive 2014/24.

(1) OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65.
1.

Must Article 26(2) TFEU, Articles 20, 21(1) and 45(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Articles 4, 5 and 6 of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (1) be interpreted as precluding national legislation which does not permit the issue of an identity card — which may serve as a travel document within the European Union — to a national of a Member State on the ground that he has established his domicile in a different Member State?
2.

Can VAT Directive 2006/112 in general, and Articles 167, 168(a), 178(a) and 179 in particular, and the principles of proportionality and neutrality, be interpreted, in a specific context such as that of the dispute in the main proceedings, as: (a) recognising the possibility of conferring the right of deduction on a taxable person, where he does not owe tax or has not paid personally the input VAT on goods and services used in connection with the taxable transactions, and the VAT is due/paid at the preceding stage by natural persons in respect of whom the status of taxable person has not been established, but who are parties to a contract relating to an association without legal personality [concluded] with the taxable person liable for tax on output transactions which he should have collected, since the association contract was not registered with the tax authorities before the activity commenced? (b) recognising the possibility of conferring the right of deduction on a taxable person, in a specific context such as that of the dispute in the main proceedings, where he does not owe tax or has not paid personally the input VAT on goods and services used in connection with the taxable transactions, and the VAT is due/paid at the preceding stage by a natural person in respect of whom the status of taxable person has been established, who is party to a contract relating to an association without legal personality and who, together with the taxable person, intends also to exercise, or could exercise, his own right of deduction, and the latter are liable for tax on output transactions which they should have collected, since the association contract was not registered with the tax authorities before the activity commenced?