Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1 Actions for annulment - Time-limits - Point from which time starts to run - Date on which the measure came to the applicant's knowledge - Subsidiary criterion - Date of publication

(ECSC Treaty, Art. 33, third para.)

2 ECSC - Steel aid - Commission authorisation possible - General decisions and individual decisions - Adoption of individual decisions to authorise aid falling outside the categories authorised by a general decision - Powers of the Commission

(ECSC Treaty, Arts 4(c) and 95; General Decision No 3855/91)

3 ECSC - Steel aid - Commission authorisation possible - Conditions - Treaty objectives to be reconciled - Discretion of the Commission - Judicial review - Limits

(ECSC Treaty, Arts 3, 4(c) and 95)

4 ECSC - Steel aid - Aid granted without prior notification - Subsequent Commission decision declaring the aid compatible with the common market - Lawful - Actions may be brought before the national courts

(ECSC Treaty, Arts 4(c) and 95)

5 Community law - Principles - Equal treatment - Discrimination - Meaning

6 Acts of the institutions - Choice of legal basis - Criteria - Article 95 of the ECSC Treaty - Scope

(ECSC Treaty, Art. 95; EC Treaty, Art. 235 (now Art. 308 EC))

7 Community law - Principles - Protection of legitimate expectations - Limits - Predicated upon traders being prudent and discriminating

8 ECSC - Steel aid - Commission authorisation possible - Conditions - Observance of the principle of proportionality - Whether the Commission is required to impose capacity reductions - No such obligation - Political, economic and social considerations may be taken into account

(ECSC Treaty, Arts 5 and 95, first para.)

9 Acts of the institutions - Statement of reasons - Obligation - Scope - ECSC Decision

(ECSC Treaty, Arts 5, 15 and 33, second para.)

Summary

1 In the absence of publication or notification, it is for the party which has knowledge of a measure concerning it to request the whole text thereof within a reasonable period; subject to that, however, time for the purposes of bringing an action can start to run only from the moment when the third party concerned acquires precise knowledge of the content of the measure in question and of the reasons on which it is based, in such a way as to enable it to exercise its right of action.

However, the criterion of the date when a measure came to the knowledge of an applicant, as the starting point of the period prescribed for instituting proceedings, is subsidiary to the criteria of publication or notification of the measure.

2 The Fifth Community Code governing aid to the steel industry constitutes an exhaustive and binding legal framework only for the types of aid which it lists and which it deems compatible with the ECSC Treaty. In the case of aid within the exempted categories which it defines, it establishes a comprehensive system intended to ensure uniform treatment governed by a single procedure. This system is thus binding on the Commission only when it must determine whether aid covered by the Code is compatible with the Treaty. Consequently, it cannot authorise such aid by an individual decision which runs counter to the general rules established by that Code.

Conversely, aid not falling within the categories exempted from the prohibition by the provisions of the Code may qualify for an individual derogation if the Commission considers, in the exercise of its discretion under Article 95 of the Treaty, that such aid is necessary to attain the objectives of the Treaty. The Fifth Code cannot be intended to prohibit aid which does not fall into any of the categories which it lists exhaustively.

3 Article 4(c) of the ECSC Treaty prohibits in principle State aid in so far as it is liable to compromise attainment of the Community's primary objectives laid down in the Treaty, particularly the establishment of conditions of free competition.

However, Article 4(c) does not prevent the Commission from authorising, by way of derogation, aid contemplated by the Member States and compatible with the objectives of the Treaty, on the basis of the first and second paragraphs of Article 95, with a view to dealing with unforeseen situations. The Commission is empowered to take all measures necessary to attain the objectives of the Treaty and, accordingly, under the procedure thereby established, to authorise such aid as it may consider necessary in order to attain those objectives. The criterion of need is satisfied in particular where the sector concerned is in a state of exceptional crisis. In that connection, there is a close link, for the purposes of implementing the Treaty, in times of crisis, between the granting of aid to the steel industry and the restructuring which that industry is required to undertake. In the context of that implementation, the Commission determines at its discretion whether aid to accompany restructuring measures is compatible with the fundamental principles of the Treaty. In its review of legality in such matters, the Court must confine itself to determining whether the Commission has exceeded the scope of its discretion by a distortion or manifest error of assessment of the facts or by misuse of powers or abuse of process.

In view of the diversity of the objectives set by the Treaty, the Commission's role consists in ensuring at all times that those various objectives are reconciled, by exercising its discretion, in order to meet the requirements of the common interest. If the Commission detects any conflict between the various objectives considered individually, it must grant such priority to one or other of the objectives laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty as appears necessary having regard to the economic facts and circumstances in the light of which it adopted its decision.

Where an undertaking is privatised in order to ensure its viability, and jobs are shed, within reasonable limits, this contributes to attainment of the objectives of the Treaty, given the sensitive nature of the steel industry and the fact that any worsening of the crisis could lead to extremely serious and long-term problems for the economy of the Member State concerned.

4 Lack of prior notification of State aid within the Coal and Steel Community is not sufficient to excuse or even to prevent the Commission from taking action on the basis of Article 95 and, where appropriate, declaring the aid compatible with the common market.

Where the Commission has found that the aid for the restructuring of a steel undertaking was necessary for the proper functioning of the common market and that it did not give rise to unacceptable distortion of competition, the fact that notification has not been made does not affect the legality of the contested decision, whether as a whole or solely in so far as the non-notified aid is concerned.

Furthermore, if the Commission adopts that position, individuals affected by the advance payment of the aid are not thereby prevented from claiming before the national courts that the measures implementing the unlawful aid are illegal or from seeking compensation for any damage suffered, even if the aid has subsequently been declared compatible with the common market.

5 For the Commission to be accused of discrimination, it must be shown to have treated like cases differently, thereby subjecting some traders to disadvantages as opposed to others, without such differentiation being justified by the existence of substantial objective differences.

6 The choice of the legal basis for a measure may not depend simply on an institution's conviction as to the objective pursued but must be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review. Those factors include, in particular, the aim and content of the measure.

The use, by way of a `last resort', of Article 95 of the ECSC Treaty (equivalent to Article 235 of the EC Treaty, now Article 308 EC) as the legal basis for a measure is justified only where no other provision of the Treaty gives the Community institutions the necessary power to adopt the measure in question.

7 Whilst the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations is one of the fundamental principles of the Community, traders cannot have a legitimate expectation that an existing situation which is capable of being altered by the Community institutions in the exercise of their discretionary power will be maintained.

The proper functioning of the common market in steel clearly requires constant adjustments to fluctuations in the economic situation and economic operators cannot claim a vested right to the maintenance of the legal situation existing at a given time. Moreover, where it is possible for prudent and discriminating traders to foresee the adoption of specific measures intended to deal with clear crisis situations, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations cannot be relied upon.

8 According to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty, decisions adopted by the Commission to deal with cases not provided for in the Treaty must conform with Article 5 of the Treaty, according to which the Commission is to carry out its task `with a limited measure of intervention'. The latter provision must be interpreted as embodying the principle of proportionality.

In matters of State aid, the principle of proportionality does not require a quantitative relationship to be established between the amount of aid granted and the size of the capacity reductions required. Nor does it dictate that capacity reductions are the only measures possible and sufficient to counterbalance the authorisation of aid. Where the Commission believes that a capacity reduction is not possible or would not best serve the objectives pursued, it may always impose other counterpart measures, such as production and sales restrictions, provided that they serve to minimise the impact of the aid on competition. The Commission's assessment cannot be reviewed solely by reference to economic criteria. The Commission may legitimately take account of a wide variety of political, economic and social considerations in the exercise of its discretion under Article 95 of the Treaty.

9 The statement of reasons must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the Community judicature to review it. It is not necessary, however, for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law. The statement of reasons must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. It must also be appraised in relation to the interest which the addressees - or other persons concerned by the measure for the purposes of the second paragraph of Article 33 of the ECSC Treaty - may have in obtaining an explanation. Furthermore, the greater the degree to which, through its representative on the Consultative Committee, the undertaking concerned played an active role in the procedure prior to the adoption of the contested decision, and was aware of the factual and legal considerations which led the Commission to consider the aid to be compatible with the common market, the more feeble the foundation of a complaint that the statement of reasons was inadequate.