ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.

How should the term ‘intentional non-compliance’ in Article 51(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 (1) of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) …, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 74/2009 (2) of 19 January 2009, in Article 23 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1975/2006 (3) of 7 December 2006 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation No 1698/2005 …, and in Article 67(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 796/2004 (4) of 21 April 2004 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of cross-compliance, modulation and the integrated administration and control system provided for in Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers …, be understood? In order to assume that intentional non-compliance has occurred, is it sufficient that there is non-compliance with long-established, settled policy as described in Article 8(2)(c) of the national Beleidsregels normenkader randvoorwaarden Gemeenschappelijk Landbouwbeleid (Netherlands Policy Rules governing the Cross-Compliance Standards Framework for the Common Agricultural Policy)?
1.

Must Article 30(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 (1) be interpreted as meaning that it is not possible to undertake an assessment of whether the assignment results in substantial income for the contracting authority and undue advantages for the concession-holder without first establishing whether the project has undergone substantial modification? If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: (a) Does that provision refer only to physical modifications — in the sense that the structure set in place is not as specified in relation to the project approved for funding — or does it also include modifications in regard to function and, in the latter case, has there been substantial modification if the structure is used ‘also’ — but not predominantly — for activities other than those envisaged in the notice or in the application to participate in the notice? If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative: (b) Does that provision, with reference to those cases in which the public funding is used to carry out works the management of which is likely to be financially significant, apply only at the stage when the project is being carried out, or does the requirement to comply with the rules on a competitive tendering procedure also continue to apply when the project management is assigned?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 379/14

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), lodged on 14 September 2012 — Wikom Elektrik GmbH v VG Media Gesellschaft zur Verwertung der Urheber- und Leistungsschutzrechte mbH

(Case C-416/12)

2012/C 379/23

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Claimant: Wikom Elektrik GmbH

Defendant: VG Media Gesellschaft zur Verwertung der Urheber- und Leistungsschutzrechte mbH

Question referred

Does the concept of communication to the public within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC (1) include the rebroadcasting, by wire, of a broadcast work in the case where the original broadcast can also be received by wireless means in the catchment area, the work is rebroadcast to the owners of reception equipment who receive the broadcast personally or within their own private or family circles, and the rebroadcasting is carried out for profit-making purposes by a broadcasting organisation other than the original one?

(1) Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (OJ 2001 L 167, p. 10).
3.

If, as a consequence of acts or inactivity of the proprietor, a trade mark has become a common name for end consumers, but not in the trade, is that trade mark liable to be revoked if, and only if, end consumers have to use this name because there are no equivalent alternatives?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 389/3

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 2 October 2012 — Karin Gawelczyk v Generali Lebensversicherung AG

(Case C-439/12)

2012/C 389/05

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Hamburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Karin Gawelczyk

Defendant: Generali Lebensversicherung AG

Question referred

Must the first indent of Article 15(1) of Council Directive 90/619/EEC of 8 November 1990 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance, laying down provisions to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide services and amending Directive 79/267/EEC (Second Life Assurance Directive), (1) having regard to Article 31(1) of Council Directive 92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance and amending Directives 79/267/EEC and 90/619/EEC (Third Life Assurance Directive), (2) be interpreted as precluding a provision — such as the fourth sentence of Paragraph 5a(2) of the Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (Law on insurance contracts) in the version of the Drittes Gesetz zur Durchführung versicherungsrechtlicher Richtlinien des Rates der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Third Law implementing directives of the Council of the European Communities on insurance law) of 21 July 1994 — under which a right of cancellation lapses one year at the latest after payment of the first premium even if the policy-holder has not been informed about the right of cancellation?

(1) OJ 1990 L 330, p. 50.

(2) OJ 1992 L 360, p. 1.
1.

Does European Union law as it stands at present, in particular 1. the general principle in European Union law of equal treatment, 2. the general principle of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age within the meaning of Article 6(3) TEU and Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 3. the prohibition of discrimination in connection with freedom of movement for workers in Article 45 TFEU, 4. Directive 2000/78/EC, (1) preclude national rules — partly legislative, partly in collective agreements — which by agreement are incorporated into an individual contract of employment, and under which previous periods of service of employees in the rail transport sector are not taken into account at all if they were acquired before reaching the age of 18, and if they were acquired after reaching the age of 18, where they were not completed with a ‘quasi-public’ undertaking in national territory or with the defendant national employer itself, are taken into account only to the extent of one half, regardless of the skills and knowledge acquired by the employee in the particular case?
1.

As regards the ‘transfer of a part of a business’, does European Union legislation (in particular, Article 1(1)(a) and (b) of Council Directive 2001/23/EC (1) of 12 March 2001, read in conjunction with Article 3(1) thereof) preclude a rule of national law, such as that laid down in the fifth paragraph of Article 2112 of the [Italian] Civil Code, which permits the transferee to take over the employment relationships of the transferor, without the consent of the employees transferred being necessary, even where the part of the business transferred is not a functionally independent economic entity already existing before the transfer and identifiable as such by the transferor and the transferee at the time when it is transferred?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 26/22

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Netherlands), lodged on 25 October 2012 — Minister van Financiën; other party: X BV

(Case C-480/12)

2013/C 26/41

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hoge Raad der Nederlanden

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Minister van Financiën

Other party: X BV

Questions referred

1. (a) Must Articles 203 CCC [Community Customs Code] and 204 CCC, (1) read in conjunction with Article 859 (in particular Article 859(2)(c)) CCIP [Regulation implementing the Community Customs Code], (2) be interpreted as meaning that the (mere) exceeding of the transportation time-limit set in accordance with Article 356(1) CCIP does not lead to a customs debt being incurred by reason of a removal from customs supervision within the meaning of Article 203 CCC, but to a customs debt being incurred on the basis of Article 204 CCC? (b) Does an affirmative answer to Question 1 require that the persons concerned supply the customs authorities with information regarding the reasons for exceeding the time-limit or that they at least explain to the customs authorities where the goods were held during the time which elapsed between the time-limit set in accordance with Article 356 [CCIP] and the time at which they were actually presented at the customs office of destination?

2. Must the Sixth Directive, (3) in particular Article 7 of that directive, be interpreted as meaning that VAT becomes chargeable when a customs debt is incurred exclusively on the basis of Article 204 CCC?

(1) Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ 1992 L 302, p. 1).

(2) Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ 1993 L 253, p. 1).

(3) Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 26/19

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Handelsgericht Wien (Austria) lodged on 22 October 2012 — Krejci Lager & Umschlagbetriebs GmbH v Olbrich Transport und Logistik GmbH

(Case C-469/12)

2013/C 26/35

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Handelsgericht Wien

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Krejci Lager & Umschlagbetriebs GmbH

Defendant: Olbrich Transport und Logistik GmbH

Question referred

Is a contract for the storage of goods a contract for the ‘provision of services’ within the meaning of Article 5(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 (1) of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters?

(1) OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1.
4.

When payment is made by a third party pursuant to an agreement between the transferor of the goods an the third party as a consequence of the presentation to the transferor of a card which the transferee of the goods has no authority to use is the payment obtained from the third party ‘in return for the supply’ within Article 73?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 26/35

Action brought on 19 November 2012 — European Commission v Germany

(Case C-525/12)

2013/C 26/67

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: E. Manhaeve and G. Wilms, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Federal Republic of Germany

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

1. declare that the Federal Republic of Germany has failed to fulfil its obligations under Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy (the Water Framework Directive) (1) and in particular under Article 2(38) and Article 9, because it has adopted an interpretation which excludes certain services from the concept of ‘water services’.

2. order the Federal Republic of Germany to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Commission considers that the abstraction, impoundment, storage, treatment and distribution of surface water or ground water for the purposes of hydro electric power production, navigation and flood protection are also included within water services. Further, personal consumption is also be categorised under water services.

The use of the concept ‘water services’ by the defendant is contrary to Article 9 of the Water Framework Directive (WFD). The defendant excludes water services such as impoundment which is intended for hydro electric power production, navigation and flood protection from the scope of water services within the meaning of the Directive. Such a narrow interpretation is not compatible with the WFD, undermines the effectiveness of Article 9 WFD and thereby jeopardises the attainment of the Directive’s objectives.

It is true that the Member States enjoy a certain margin of discretion on the basis of Article 9 WFD to exclude water services from recovery of costs. They might first have regard to the social, environmental and economic effects of the recovery of costs as well as the geographic and climatic conditions. Further, a Member state might under Article 9(4) WFD decide not to apply the provisions of the second sentence of Article 9(1) WFD in relation to water-pricing policies and recovery of the costs of water services. That option is subject to the condition that there is an established practice in the Member State and that the purposes and the achievement of the objectives of the Directive are not compromised.

However, the complete exclusion of a substantial range of water services, as effected by the defendant, goes far beyond that margin of discretion.

(1) OJ 2000 L 321, p. 1
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 26/32

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 13 November 2012 — Octapharma France v Agence nationale de sécurité du médicament et des produits de santé (ANSM), Ministère des affaires sociales et de la santé

(Case C-512/12)

2013/C 26/61

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Octapharma France

Defendants: Agence nationale de sécurité du médicament et des produits de santé (ANSM), Ministère des affaires sociales et de la santé

Questions referred

1. Is plasma from whole blood which is prepared by a method involving an industrial process and which is intended for transfusions capable of having the provisions of Directive 2001/83 (1) [as amended by Directive 2004/27 (2)] and those of Directive 2002/98 (3) applied to it simultaneously, as regards not only its collection and testing, but also its processing, storage and distribution; for that purpose may the rule laid down in Article 2(2) of Directive 2001/83 be interpreted as meaning that the Community legislation on medicinal products alone applies to a product which falls simultaneously within the scope of another piece of Community legislation only where that latter is less strict than the legislation on medicinal products?

2. Must Article 4(2) of Directive 2002/98 be interpreted, where necessary in the light of Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as allowing the maintenance or introduction of national provisions which, because they submit plasma which is prepared by a method involving an industrial process to a stricter scheme than that to which medicinal products are subject, provide justification for setting aside the application of all or part of the provisions of Directive 2001/83, in particular those which make the marketing of medicinal products subject to the sole condition of the prior grant of a marketing authorisation and, in the affirmative, under what conditions and to what extent?

(1) Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (OJ 2001 L 311, p. 67)

(2) Directive 2004/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (Text with EEA relevance) (OJ 2004 L 136, p. 34)

(3) Directive 2002/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003 setting standards of quality and safety for the collection, testing, processing, storage and distribution of human blood and blood components and amending Directive 2001/83/EC (OJ 2003 L 33, p. 30)
1.

The Swedish electricity certificate system is a national support scheme which requires electricity suppliers and certain electricity users in the Member State to purchase an electricity certificate, corresponding to a certain share of their sales or use, without there being a specific requirement also to purchase electricity from the same source. The electricity certificate is issued by the Swedish State and is proof that a certain amount of renewable electricity has been produced. The producers of electricity obtained from renewable sources receive, by the sale of the electricity certificate, extra revenue as an additional income from its production of electricity. Are Article (2(k)) and Article 3(3) of Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (1) to be interpreted as meaning that they permit a Member State to apply a national support scheme as above, in which only producers situated in the territory of that country can participate and which has the result that those producers have an economic advantage over producers who cannot be issued with an electricity certificate?
3.

Is it relevant for the answer to question 1 and question 2, where the access obligation takes the form of a requirement, for example, to install drop cables between the distribution point in an access network and the terminating segment at an end-user’s premises, that the owner of an electronic communications network must undertake investment which considerably exceeds the acquisition cost of the electronic communications network to which access must be provided?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 86/10

Reference for a preliminary ruling from High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) Patents Court (United Kingdom) made on 18 December 2012 — Astrazeneca AB v Comptroller-General of Patents

(Case C-617/12)

2013/C 86/15

Language of the case: English

Referring court

High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) Patents Court

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Astrazeneca AB

Defendant: Comptroller-General of Patents

Questions referred

1. Is a Swiss marketing authorisation not granted pursuant to the administrative authorisation procedure laid down in Directive 2001/83/EC (1), but automatically recognised by Liechtenstein, capable of constituting the ‘first authorisation to place the product on the market’ for the purposes of Article 13(1) of Regulation 469/2009/EC (2)?

2. Does it make a difference to the answer to the first question if: (a) the set of clinical data upon which the Swiss authority granted the marketing authorisation was considered by the European Medicines Agency as not satisfying the conditions for the grant of a marketing authorisation pursuant to Regulation 726/2004/EC (3); and/or (b) the Swiss marketing authorisation was suspended after grant and was only reinstated following the submission of additional data?

3. If Article 13(1) of Regulation 469/2009 refers solely to marketing authorisations granted pursuant to the administrative authorisation procedure laid down in Directive 2001/83/EC, does the fact that a medicinal product was first placed on the market within the EEA pursuant to a Swiss marketing authorisation automatically recognised in Liechtenstein which was not granted pursuant to Directive 2001/83/EC render that product ineligible for the grant of a supplementary protection certificate pursuant to Article 2 of Regulation 469/2009?

(1) Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use

OJ L 311, p. 67

(2) Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products

OJ L 152, p. 1

(3) Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency

OJ L 136, p. 1
1.

The Contested Judgment should be annulled insofar as it imposes a fine or, in the alternative, referred back to the General Court, because the Contested Judgment is vitiated by an error of law in that the General Court misinterpreted the last paragraph of Point 23(b) of the 2002 Leniency Notice, which provides that, when a leniency applicant ‘provides evidence relating to facts previously unknown to the Commission which have a direct bearing on the gravity or duration of the suspected cartel,’ the Commission may not take those facts into account when setting the fine on the leniency applicant. The General Court ruled that a fact is ‘unknown’ to the Commission only if the Commission has no knowledge whatsoever of a fact. Thus, even if the Commission only has a very general idea about the existence of a cartel and no direct evidence that will allow it to prove the facts relating to the cartel, a leniency applicant that provides such evidence will not be able to benefit from the immunity provided for in the last paragraph of Point 23(b). The Appellants submit that this interpretation of this paragraph is too narrow and wrong as a matter of law.
—

The General Court misapplied Article 44(1) of the Rules of Procedure, in that it held that the contested measure was not defined in its entirety since the documents and other matters on the file in respect of the decision of 1 December 2010 — which in reality, however, are neither part of the contested measure nor other contested measures — were not specified individually. As a result of that ruling, the appellants’ right to judicial protection was impermissibly restricted and the fundamental principle of procedural equality was infringed.
—

Declare that, by keeping in operation a malfunctioning and full landfill site (located at Griparaiika in the area of Kalamaki on Zakinthos) which does not fulfil all the relevant conditions and requirements of the environmental legislation of the European Union, the Hellenic Republic is failing to fulfil its obligations under Articles 13 and 36(1) of Directive 2008/98/EC (1) on waste and Articles 8, 9, 11(1)(a), 12 and 14 of Directive 1999/31/EC (2) on the landfill of waste. In addition, by renewing the permit for the operation of the landfill site without complying with the procedure that is laid down by Article 6(3) of Council Directive 92/43/EEC (3) of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, the Hellenic Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under that article.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 225/55

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 3 October 2012 — Hardimpex Kft (in liquidation) v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Kiemelt Ügyek és Adózók Adó Főigazgatósága

(Case C-444/12)

2013/C 225/102

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest Municipal Court)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Hardimpex Kft (in liquidation)

Defendant: Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Kiemelt Ügyek és Adózók Adó Főigazgatósága

Question referred

Must Article 168(a) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax be interpreted as meaning that it precludes a tax authority from refusing a taxable person the right to deduct from the amount of VAT which it owes the amount of VAT paid or to be paid on a supply of goods to it, because an earlier transaction in the chain of supply was irregular under the VAT legislation or because that taxable person can be criticised for having failed to check the origin of the goods featuring in the invoices issued by its supplier, without the tax authority demonstrating to the requisite legal standard that the taxable person knew or should have known of that irregularity?