5.

The question raised in this case is whether the Commission is required to give notice of its decisions at the place indicated by the person to whom they are addressed. I consider that the reply to that question should be in the negative. The Commission could, of course, have acceded to such a wish. It was not obliged to do so. In its judgment of 12 July 1984 in Case 209/83 (Ferriera Vahabbia SpA v Commission [1984] ECR 3089), the Court considered that: ‘The strict application of Community rules on procedural time-limits meets the requirement of legal certainty and the need to avoid any discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice’ (paragraph 14). The Rules of Procedure of the Court do not define the arrangements for the notifications referred to in Article 81 (1), which states that: ‘The period of time allowed for commencing proceedings against a measure adopted by an institution shall run from the day following the receipt by the person concerned of notification of the measure ... ’. However, the Court has held that: ‘A decision is properly notified within the meaning of the Treaty’ (in that case it was the EEC Treaty) ‘if it reaches the addressee and puts the latter in a position to take cognizance of it’ (judgment of 21 February 1973 in Case 6/72 Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215, paragraph 10 at p. 241). In the judgment of 30 May 1984 in Case 224/83 (Ferrriera Vittoria v Commission [1984] ECR 2349), the Court, after referring to the third paragraphof Article 33 of the ECSC Treaty and Article 81 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, which also apply to the present case, stated that: ‘The measure in question was notified by registered letter with an acknowledgement of receipt... That is a method which enables the date from which time begins to run to be determined with certainty’. Thus, the Court does not require that notification be in any particular form but it has decided that a registered letter with an acknowledgement of receipt is an appropriate form. The Court has also not laid down any rule as to the place at which notice must be given, the essential being that the person to whom the decision is addressed acquires actual knowledge of it. In this case, it is not contended that the registered letter was delivered to a person not authorized to receive it. It is therefore, difficult to accept that notice given to a company at its registered office (that is to say, at its domicile) does not permit it to have knowledge of the measure of which notice is being given. What must be regarded as a mere preference expressed by Cockerill-Sambre as to the place at which notice of decisions should be given cannot, having regard to the relevant provisions and to the judgments of the Court, impose an obligation on the Commission nor can it have an effect on the time-limits. Legal certainty requires that the interpretation and application of procedural rules not be subject to the vagaries of the internal organization of the undertakings concerned. A strict application of the Community rules leads to the conclusion that in this case, since notice of the decision at issue was duly given on 9 January 1985, the time-limit for challenging it expired on 12 February 1985.