Case C-12/03 P

Commission of the European Communities

v

Tetra Laval BV

(Appeal – Competition – Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 – Decision declaring a ‘conglomerate-type’ concentration incompatible with the common market – Leveraging – Scope of judicial review – Factors to be taken into consideration – Behavioural commitments)

Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano delivered on 25 May 2004

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 15 Feburary 2005

Summary of the Judgment

1. Competition – Concentrations – Examination by the Commission – Assessments of an economic nature – Conglomerate-type concentration – Discretion as regards assessment – Review by the Court – Limits

(Council Regulation No 4064/89, Art. 2)

2. Competition – Concentrations – Assessment of compatibility with the common market – Conglomerate-type concentration – Presentation of a close prospective examination supported by convincing evidence

(Council Regulation No 4064/89, Art. 2(2) and (3))

3. Competition – Concentrations – Assessment of compatibility with the common market – Conglomerate-type concentration – Taking into account of foreseeable anti‑competitive conduct capable of resulting in leveraging – Whether permissible – No obligation on the Commission to assess its likelihood having regard to the risks inherent in its adoption by an undertaking

(Art. 82 EC; Council Regulation No 4064/89, Art. 2(2) and (3))

4. Competition – Concentrations – Examination by the Commission – Commitments by the undertakings concerned capable of rendering the notified operation compatible with the common market – Taking into account of behavioural and structural undertakings

(Council Regulation No 4064/89 Arts 2(2) and (3) and 8(2))

5. Competition – Concentrations – Assessment of compatibility with the common market – Taking into account of the elimination or significant reduction of potential competition tending to reinforce a dominant position – Whether permissible – Obligation of the Commission to establish the alleged reinforcement – Mere finding as to the existence of a clear dominant position on the part of the acquiring undertaking not sufficient

(Council Regulation No 4064/89, Art. 2(1), (2) and (3))

1. The basic provisions of Regulation No 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, in particular Article 2, confer on the Commission a certain discretion, especially with respect to assessments of an economic nature. Consequently, review by the Community Courts of the exercise of that discretion, which is essential for defining the rules on concentrations, must take account of the margin of discretion implicit in the provisions of an economic nature which form part of the rules on concentrations.

Whilst the Court recognises that the Commission has a margin of discretion with regard to economic matters, that does not mean that the Community Courts must refrain from reviewing the Commission’s interpretation of information of an economic nature. Not only must the Community Courts, inter alia, establish whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it. Such a review is all the more necessary in the case of a prospective analysis required when examining a planned merger with conglomerate effect.

(see paras 38-39)





2. A prospective analysis of the kind necessary in merger control must be carried out with great care since it does not entail the examination of past events – for which often many items of evidence are available which make it possible to understand the causes – or of current events, but rather a prediction of events which are more or less likely to occur in future if a decision prohibiting the planned concentration or laying down the conditions for it is not adopted.

Thus, the prospective analysis consists of an examination of how a concentration might alter the factors determining the state of competition on a given market in order to establish whether it would give rise to a serious impediment to effective competition. Such an analysis makes it necessary to envisage various chains of cause and effect with a view to ascertaining which of them are the most likely.

The analysis of a conglomerate-type concentration is a prospective analysis in which, first, the consideration of a lengthy period of time in the future and, secondly, the leveraging necessary to give rise to a significant impediment to effective competition mean that the chains of cause and effect are dimly discernible, uncertain and difficult to establish. That being so, the quality of the evidence produced by the Commission in order to establish that it is necessary to adopt a decision declaring the concentration incompatible with the common market is particularly important, since that evidence must support the Commission’s conclusion that, if such a decision were not adopted, the economic development envisaged by it would be plausible.

(see paras 42-44)

3. The Commission’s analysis of the effects of a conglomerate-type concentration must comprise a comprehensive examination of the probability of the adoption of anti-competitive conduct capable of resulting in leveraging, that is to say, it must take into account both the incentives to adopt such conduct and the factors liable to reduce, or even eliminate, those incentives, including the possibility that such conduct is unlawful.

However, it would run counter to the purpose of prevention of Regulation No 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings to require the Commission to examine, for each proposed merger, the extent to which the incentives to adopt anti-competitive conduct would be reduced, or even eliminated, as a result of the unlawfulness of the conduct in question, the likelihood of its detection, the action taken by the competent authorities, both at Community and national level, and the financial penalties which could ensue.

Such an assessment would make it necessary to carry out an exhaustive and detailed examination of the rules of the various legal orders which might be applicable and of the enforcement policy practised in them. Moreover, if it is to be relevant, such an assessment calls for a high probability of the occurrence of the acts envisaged as capable of giving rise to objections on the ground that they are part of anti-competitive conduct.

It follows that, at the stage of assessing a proposed merger, an assessment intended to establish whether an infringement of Article 82 EC is likely and to ascertain that it will be penalised in several legal orders would be too speculative and would not allow the Commission to base its assessment on all of the relevant facts with a view to establishing whether they support an economic scenario in which a development such as leveraging will occur.





(see paras 74-77)

4. As regards commitments offered by the undertakings concerned which are capable of rendering the notified concentration compatible with the common market, the principle is that these must enable the Commission to conclude that the concentration at issue will not create or strengthen a dominant position within the meaning of Article 2(2) and (3) of Regulation No 4068/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings. It is to be inferred from that principle that the categorisation of a proposed commitment as behavioural or structural is immaterial and that the possibility cannot automatically be ruled out that commitments which are prima facie behavioural, for instance a commitment not to use a trade mark for a certain period or to make part of the production capacity of the entity arising from the concentration available to third-party competitors or, more generally, to grant access to essential facilities on non-discriminatory terms, may also be capable of preventing the emergence or strengthening of a dominant position.

(see para. 86)

5. It follows from Article 2(1) of Regulation No 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings that the Commission, when assessing the compatibility of a concentration with the common market, must take account of a number of factors, such as the structure of the relevant markets, actual or potential competition from undertakings, the position of the undertakings concerned and their economic and financial power, possible options available to suppliers and users, any barriers to entry and trends in supply and demand.

Accordingly, the mere fact that the acquiring undertaking already holds a clear dominant position on the relevant market, although constituting an important factor, does not in itself suffice to justify a finding that a reduction in the potential competition which that undertaking must face constitutes a strengthening of its position.

The potential competition represented by a producer of substitute products on a segment of the relevant market is only one of the set of factors which must be taken into account when assessing whether there is a risk that a concentration might strengthen a dominant position. It cannot be ruled out that a reduction in that potential competition might be compensated by other factors, with the result that the competitive position of the already dominant undertaking remains unchanged.

(see paras 125-127)