ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
14

Since it had doubts concerning the determination of the applicable law and the powers of the Hungarian data protection authority under Articles 4(1) and 28 of Directive 95/46, the Kúria (Supreme Court, Hungary) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Can Article 28(1) of Directive 95/46 be interpreted as meaning that the provisions of national law of a Member State are applicable in its territory to a situation where a data controller runs a property dealing website established only in another Member State and also advertises properties situated in the territory of that first Member State and the property owners have forwarded their personal data to a facility (server) for data storage and data processing belonging to the operator of the website in that other Member State? (2) Can Article 4(1)(a) of [Directive 95/46], read in conjunction with recitals 18 to 20 of its preamble and Articles 1(2) and 28(1) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that the Hungarian [data protection authority] may not apply the Hungarian law on data protection, as national law, to an operator of a property dealing website established only in another Member State, even if it also advertises Hungarian property whose owners transfer the data relating to such property probably from Hungarian territory to a facility (server) for data storage and data processing belonging to the operator of the website? (3) Is it significant for the purposes of interpretation that the service provided by the data controller who operates the website is directed at the territory of another Member State? (4) Is it significant for the purposes of interpretation that the data relating to the properties in the other Member State and the personal data of the owners are uploaded in fact from the territory of that other Member State? (5) Is it significant for the purposes of interpretation that the personal data relating to those properties are the personal data of citizens of another Member State? (6) Is it significant for the purposes of interpretation that the owners of the undertaking established in Slovakia live in Hungary? (7) If it appears from the answers to the above questions that the Hungarian data protection authority may act but must apply the law of the Member State of establishment and may not apply national law, must Article 28(6) of [Directive 95/46] be interpreted as meaning that the Hungarian data protection authority may only exercise the powers provided for by Article 28(3) of [Directive 95/46] in accordance with the provisions of the legislation of the Member State of establishment and accordingly may not impose a fine? (8) May the term “adatfeldolgozás” (technical manipulation of data) used in both Article 4(1)(a) and in Article 28(6) of the [Hungarian version of Directive 95/46 to translate ‘data processing’] be considered to be equivalent to the usual term for data processing, “adatkezelés”, used in connection with that directive?’
24

Having doubts as to the interpretation of EU law in the case before it, the Birmingham Employment Tribunal decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Is the “pro rata temporis principle”, as set out in clause 4.2 of the Framework Agreement, to be interpreted as requiring a provision of national law, such as regulations 13, 13A and 14 of the Working Time Regulations, to have the effect that, in circumstances where there is an increase in the working hours of an employee, the amount of leave already accumulated must be adjusted proportionally to the new working hours, with the result that the worker who increases his/her working hours has his/her entitlement to accrued leave recalculated in accordance with the increased hours? (2) Is either clause 4.2 of the Framework Agreement or Article 7 of the Working Time Directive to be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law, such as regulations 13, 13A and 14 of the Working Time Regulations, from having the effect that in circumstances where there is an increase in the working hours of an employee, the amount of leave already accumulated is to be adjusted proportionally to the new working hours, with the result that the worker who increases his/her working hours has his/her entitlement to accrued leave recalculated in accordance with the revised hours? (3) If the answer to question 1 and/or 2 is yes, does the recalculation apply only to that portion of the holiday year during which the employee worked the increased hours or to some other period? (4) When calculating the period of leave taken by a worker, is either clause 4.2 of the Framework Agreement or Article 7 of the Working Time Directive to be interpreted as requiring a provision of national law, such as regulations 13, 13A and 14 of the Working Time Regulations, to have the effect of adopting a different approach as between calculating an employee’s allowance in lieu of paid annual leave entitlement upon termination and when calculating an employee’s remaining annual leave entitlement when they remain employed? (5) If the answer to question 4 is yes, what is the difference in approach required to be adopted?’
4

Recitals 10 to 14, 18 and 19 in the preamble to Regulation No 805/2004 state: ‘(10) Where a court in a Member State has given judgment on an uncontested claim in the absence of participation of the debtor in the proceedings, the abolition of any checks in the Member State of enforcement is inextricably linked to and dependent upon the existence of a sufficient guarantee of observance of the rights of the defence. (11) This Regulation seeks to promote the fundamental rights and takes into account the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [(“the Charter”)]. In particular, it seeks to ensure full respect for the right to a fair trial as recognised in Article 47 of the Charter. (12) Minimum standards should be established for the proceedings leading to the judgment in order to ensure that the debtor is informed about the court action against him, the requirements for his active participation in the proceedings to contest the claim and the consequences of his non-participation in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence. (13) Due to differences between the Member States as regards the rules of civil procedure and especially those governing the service of documents, it is necessary to lay down a specific and detailed definition of those minimum standards. In particular, any method of service that is based on a legal fiction as regards the fulfilment of those minimum standards cannot be considered sufficient for the certification of a judgment as a European Enforcement Order. (14) All the methods of service listed in Articles 13 and 14 are characterised by either full certainty (Article 13) or a very high degree of likelihood (Article 14) that the document served has reached its addressee. In the second category, a judgment should only be certified as a European Enforcement Order if the Member State of origin has an appropriate mechanism in place enabling the debtor to apply for a full review of the judgment under the conditions set out in Article 19 in those exceptional cases where, in spite of compliance with Article 14, the document has not reached the addressee. ... (18) Mutual trust in the administration of justice in the Member States justifies the assessment by the court of one Member State that all conditions for certification as a European Enforcement Order are fulfilled to enable a judgment to be enforced in all other Member States without judicial review of the proper application of the minimum procedural standards in the Member State where the judgment is to be enforced. (19) This Regulation does not imply an obligation for the Member States to adapt their national legislation to the minimum procedural standards set out herein. It provides an incentive to that end by making available a more efficient and rapid enforceability of judgments in other Member States only if those minimum standards are met.’
73

It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the answer to the questions referred is that EU law must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances where a court is seised of a procedure, such as that in the main proceedings, concerning the designation of the court of the Member State of origin of a European order for payment having territorial jurisdiction and examines, in those circumstances, the international jurisdiction of the courts of that Member State to hear the contentious proceedings concerning the debt which gave rise to such an order for payment against which the defendant has entered a statement of opposition within the time-limit prescribed for that purpose: — since Regulation No 1896/2006 does not provide any indications as to the powers and obligations of that court, those procedural questions continue, pursuant to Article 26 of that regulation, to be governed by the national law of that Member State; — Regulation No 44/2001 requires the question of the international jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State of origin of the European order for payment to be decided by application of procedural rules which enable the effectiveness of the provisions of that regulation and the rights of the defence to be guaranteed, whether it is the referring court or a court which the referring court designates as the court having territorial and substantive jurisdiction to hear a claim such as that at issue in the main proceedings under the ordinary civil procedure which rules on that question; — if a court such as the referring court rules on the international jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State of origin of the European order for payment and finds that there is such jurisdiction in the light of the criteria set out in Regulation No 44/2001, that regulation and Regulation No 1896/2006 require such a court to interpret national law in such a way that it permits it to identify or designate a court having territorial or substantive jurisdiction to hear that procedure, and, — if a court such as the referring court finds that there is no such international jurisdiction, that court is not required of its own motion to review that order for payment by analogy with Article 20 of Regulation No 1896/2006.
12

Under Article 14 of that directive, entitled ‘Retention of the right of residence’: ‘1. Union citizens and their family members shall have the right of residence provided for in Article 6, as long as they do not become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State. 2. Union citizens and their family members shall have the right of residence provided for in Articles 7, 12 and 13 as long as they meet the conditions set out therein. In specific cases where there is a reasonable doubt as to whether a Union citizen or his/her family members satisfies the conditions set out in Articles 7, 12 and 13, Member States may verify if these conditions are fulfilled. This verification shall not be carried out systematically. 3. An expulsion measure shall not be the automatic consequence of a Union citizen’s or his or her family member’s recourse to the social assistance system of the host Member State. 4. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2 and without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter VI, an expulsion measure may in no case be adopted against Union citizens or their family members if: (a) the Union citizens are workers or self-employed persons, or (b) the Union citizens entered the territory of the host Member State in order to seek employment. In this case, the Union citizens and their family members may not be expelled for as long as the Union citizens can provide evidence that they are continuing to seek employment and that they have a genuine chance of being engaged.’
9

Article 12 of Joint Action 2008/851, headed ‘Transfer of persons arrested and detained with a view to their prosecution’ provides: ‘1. On the basis of Somalia’s acceptance of the exercise of jurisdiction by Member States or by third States, on the one hand, and Article 105 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, on the other hand, persons suspected of intending, as referred to in Articles 101 and 103 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to commit, committing or having committed acts of piracy or armed robbery in Somali territorial waters or on the high seas, who are arrested and detained, with a view to their prosecution, and property used to carry out such acts, shall be transferred: — to the competent authorities of the Member State or of the third State participating in the operation, of which the vessel which took them captive flies the flag, or — if this State cannot, or does not wish to, exercise its jurisdiction, to a Member State or any third State which wishes to exercise its jurisdiction over the aforementioned persons and property. 2. Persons suspected of intending, as referred to in Articles 101 and 103 of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, to commit, committing or having committed acts of piracy or armed robbery who are arrested and detained, with a view to their prosecution, by Atalanta in the territorial waters, the internal waters or the archipelagic waters of other States in the region in agreement with these States, and property used to carry out such acts, may be transferred to the competent authorities of the State concerned, or, with the consent of the State concerned, to the competent authorities of another State. 3. No persons referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 may be transferred to a third State unless the conditions for the transfer have been agreed with that third State in a manner consistent with relevant international law, notably international law on human rights, in order to guarantee in particular that no one shall be subjected to the death penalty, to torture or to any cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.’
10

The General Court summarised the facts giving rise to the dispute as follows: ‘1. On 23 October 2008, the interveners, Juan Cándido Rubio Ferrer and Alberto Rubio Ferrer, filed an application for registration of an EU figurative mark with [EUIPO], pursuant to Regulation [No 40/94, codified by Regulation No 207/2009]. 2. Registration as a mark was sought for the following figurative sign: … 3. The goods and services in respect of which registration was applied for are in Classes 31, 35 and 39 of the Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended … … 5 On 10 August 2009, [Mr] Grau Ferrer filed a notice of opposition, pursuant to Article 41 of Regulation No 207/2009, to registration of the EU figurative trade mark applied for in respect of the goods and services referred to in paragraph 3 above. 6 The opposition was based on the following earlier figurative marks: — Spanish registration No 2600724 of the figurative sign applied for on 8 June 2004 and registered on 22 November 2004 for all the goods in class 31: … — European Union registration No 2087534 of the figurative sign below, applied for on 14 February 2001 and registered on 14 June 2002 for the goods and services in the following classes: — Class 31: … — Class 32: … — Class 39: … … 8. On 21 December 2010, the Opposition Division partially upheld the opposition. First, it held that [Mr Grau Ferrer] had not provided any documents representing the earlier Spanish figurative mark as registered within the period prescribed for that purpose … Therefore, it rejected the opposition based on the earlier Spanish figurative mark on the ground that its existence and validity had not been sufficiently substantiated within the period prescribed. Second, it upheld the opposition based on the earlier EU mark … It considered, first of all, that the evidence of genuine use of the earlier EU mark had been adduced … 9 On 10 February 2011, [Mr Grau Ferrer] filed a notice of appeal (R 520/2011-4) and on 14 February 2011, the interveners [Messrs Rubio Ferrer] filed a notice of appeal (R 274/2011-4) with EUIPO, pursuant to Articles 58 to 64 of Regulation No 207/2009, against the Opposition Division’s decision. 10 By decision of 11 October 2012 …, the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO upheld the appeal in Case R 274/2011-4 and rejected the appeal in Case R 520/2011-4. Essentially, first, it confirmed the Opposition Division’s decision according to which the evidence of the existence of the earlier Spanish figurative mark had not been produced. Second, it held that the evidence produced was not sufficient to show that the earlier EU mark had, during the relevant period, been put to genuine use in the form under which it was registered or in a form which does not alter its distinctive character for one of the goods for which it was registered. Therefore, it annulled the Opposition Division’s decision of 21 December 2010 and rejected the opposition in its entirety.’
24

Paragraph 9 of the Allgemeines Eisenbahngesetz (General Railway Act) of 27 December 1993 (BGBl. 1993, I, pp. 2378, 2396; 1994, I, p. 2439) (‘AEG’) provides: ‘(1) Public railway companies 1. which are both railway transport undertakings and railway infrastructure undertakings, or 2. (a) which are solely railway transport undertakings and are linked, through a parent company, to a railway infrastructure undertaking which is a public railway company, or (b) which are solely railway infrastructure undertakings and are linked, through a parent company, to a railway transport undertaking which is a public railway company, or 3. which, as a railway transport undertaking or railway infrastructure undertaking, is the parent company or subsidiary of another railway transport undertaking or railway infrastructure undertaking which is a public railway company shall be obliged, even if they are not operated in the form of capital companies, to draw up, have audited and publish annual accounts and a management report in accordance with the provisions applicable to large capital companies set out in the second section of the third book of the Commercial Code. … (1a) Public railway undertakings within the meaning of point 1 of the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 must separate the two sectors in their accounts; this includes maintaining separate accounts for the ‘provision of transport service’ sector and for the ‘management of railway infrastructure’ sector. For each sector within the meaning of the first subparagraph and for a sector external to them, they must include in the annex to their annual accounts a balance sheet and an additional profit and loss account, kept in accordance with the principles of commercial law. ... (1b) Public funds paid to one of the two sectors of activity referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1a shall not be transferred to the other. The accounts for the two sectors of activity shall be kept in a way that reflects this prohibition. This also applies to undertakings within the meaning of points (2) and (3) in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1. … (1d) For public railway undertakings providing railway services in both for passenger and freight transport, paragraph 1a shall apply mutatis mutandis, with the proviso that the necessity to draw up separate accounts or include in the annex to the annual accounts a balance sheet and an additional profit and loss account applies only in respect of the railway freight sector and that that balance sheet may also be replaced by a statement of assets. Public funds paid for activities relating to the provision of passenger transport services as public-service remits must be shown separately in the relevant accounts and may not be transferred to activities relating to the provision of other transport services or any other business. …’
39

In those circumstances, the Conseil d’État (Council of State) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer to the Court the following questions for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Is Article 12(2)(c) of Directive 2004/83 to be interpreted as necessarily implying that, for the exclusion clause provided for therein to be applied, the asylum seeker must have been convicted of one of the terrorist offences referred to in Article 1(1) of Framework Decision 2002/475? (2) If the first question is answered in the negative, can acts such as those … of which Mr Lounani was found guilty by the Tribunal correctionnel de Bruxelles (Criminal Court, Brussels) on 16 February 2006 and of which he was convicted with respect to his participation in a terrorist organisation, be considered to be acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations within the meaning of Article 12(2)(c) of Directive 2004/83? (3) For the purposes of considering the exclusion, on the grounds of his participation in a terrorist organisation, of a person seeking international protection, is the judgment convicting him of being a member of the leadership of a terrorist organisation, which finds that the person seeking international protection has not committed, attempted to commit or threatened to commit a terrorist act, sufficient for a finding of the existence of an act of participation or instigation within the meaning of Article 12(3) of Directive 2004/83 imputable to that person, or is it necessary for an individual examination of the facts of the case to be made and participation demonstrated in the commission of a terrorist offence or instigation of a terrorist offence as defined in Article 1 of Framework Decision 2002/475? (4) For the purposes of considering the exclusion, on the grounds of his participation, possibly as a leader, in a terrorist organisation, of a person seeking international protection, must the act of instigation or participation referred to in Article 12(3) of Directive 2004/83 relate to the commission of a terrorist offence as defined in Article 1 of Framework Decision 2002/475, or may it relate to participation in a terrorist group as referred to in Article 2 of that framework decision? (5) So far as terrorism is concerned, is the exclusion from international protection provided for in Article 12(2)(c) of Directive 2004/83 possible when there has been no commission or instigation of, or participation in, a violent act of a particularly cruel nature, as referred to in Article 1 of Framework Decision 2002/475?’
Article 13(1) of Directive 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights must be interpreted as permitting a party injured by an intellectual property infringement, who claims compensation for his material damage as calculated, in accordance with heading (b) of the second subparagraph of Article 13(1) of that directive, on the basis of the amount of royalties or fees which would have been due to him if the infringer had requested his authorisation to use that right, also to claim compensation for the moral prejudice that he has suffered, as provided for under heading (a) of the second subparagraph of Article 13(1) of that directive.

In the light of the objectives of Directive 2004/48, the first subparagraph of Article 13(1) of that directive must be interpreted as establishing the principle that the calculation of the amount of damages to be paid to the holder of the intellectual property right must seek to ensure that the latter is compensated in full for the actual prejudice suffered by him, which also includes any moral prejudice. However, setting the amount of damages due as a lump sum on the basis of hypothetical royalties alone covers only the material damage suffered by the intellectual property rightholder concerned; consequently, for the purposes of providing compensation in full, that rightholder must be able to seek, in addition to the damages thus calculated, compensation for any moral prejudice which he has suffered.

(see paras 25-27, operative part)