ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Although it is true that it would be inconsistent with the objective of an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU to interpret the conditions under which the action is admissible so restrictively as to limit the availability of this procedure merely to the categories of measures referred to by Article 288 TFEU, the fact remains that that power of interpretation and application of the provisions of the Treaty by the EU judicature does not apply where the applicant’s legal position falls within the contractual relationships whose legal status is governed by the national law agreed to by the contracting parties.

Were the EU judicature to hold that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the annulment of acts falling within purely contractual relationships, not only would it risk rendering Article 272 TFEU — which grants the Courts of the European Union jurisdiction pursuant to an arbitration clause — meaningless, but would also risk, where the contract does not contain such a clause, extending its jurisdiction beyond the limits laid down by Article 274 TFEU, which specifically gives national courts or tribunals ordinary jurisdiction over disputes to which the European Union is a party. It follows from this that, where there is a contract between the applicant and one of the institutions, an action may be brought before the European Union judicature on the basis of Article 263 TFEU only where the contested measure aims to produce binding legal effects falling outside of the contractual relationship between the parties and which involve the exercise of the prerogatives of a public authority conferred on the contracting institution acting in its capacity as an administrative authority.

In that regard, a debit note issued by the Commission in the framework of Community financial assistance falls within a contractual relationship since the note’s purpose is the recovery of a debt which is grounded on the provisions of the contract entered into between that institution and the beneficiary of that financial assistance. That debit note must be understood as a formal demand for payment setting out the maturity date and also the payment terms and it cannot be equated to an enforcement order, even though it refers to enforcement pursuant to Article 299 TFEU as a possible option among others open to the Commission where a party fails to perform an obligation by the delivery date laid down. Moreover, in the event that an institution, specifically the Commission, chooses to allocate financial contributions by means of a contract falling within the framework of Article 272 TFEU, it is bound to stay within that framework. Accordingly, the institution is obliged, in particular, to ensure that it does not use, in the context of relationships with its counterparties, ambiguous formulations which might be understood by the parties to the contract as constituting unilateral decision-making powers going beyond the contractual provisions.

(see paras 17-21, 23)
The General Court’s obligation to state the reasons for its judgments does not in principle extend to requiring it to justify the approach taken in one case as against that taken in another case, even if the latter concerns the same Commission decision relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU.

An undertaking which has participated in a single and complex infringement of the competition rules by its own conduct, which fell within the definition of an agreement or concerted practice having an anticompetitive object within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU and was intended to help bring about the infringement as a whole, may be responsible also in respect of the conduct of other undertakings in the context of the same infringement throughout the period of its participation in the infringement. That is the position where it is shown that the undertaking intended, through its own conduct, to contribute to the common objectives pursued by all the participants and that it was aware of the offending conduct planned or put into effect by other undertakings in pursuit of the same objectives or that it could reasonably have foreseen it and was prepared to take the risk.

Moreover, for the purpose of characterising various instances of conduct as a single and continuous infringement, it is not necessary to ascertain whether they present a link of complementarity, in the sense that each of them is intended to deal with one or more consequences of the normal pattern of competition, and, through interaction, contribute to the attainment of the set of anticompetitive effects desired by those responsible, within the framework of a global plan having a single objective.

In addition, the text of Article 101(1) TFEU refers generally to all agreements and concerted practices which, in either horizontal or vertical relationships, distort competition on the internal market, irrespective of the market on which the parties operate, and only the commercial conduct of one of the parties need be affected by the terms of the arrangements in question.

(see paras 48, 50, 51)
In setting the amount of fines imposed for infringement of the competition rules, regard must be had to the duration of the infringement and to all the factors capable of affecting the assessment of the gravity of that infringement. The factors capable of affecting the assessment of the gravity of the infringements include the conduct of each of the undertakings, the role played by each of them in the establishment of the cartel, the profit which they were able to derive from the cartel, their size, the value of the goods concerned and the threat that infringements of that type pose to the objectives of the European Union.

The fact that an undertaking did not belong to the ‘hard core’ of the cartel because, amongst other things, it had not played a part in the creation and maintenance of the cartel does not, in any event, show that the General Court should have held that multipliers for the ‘gravity of the infringement’ and for the ‘additional amount’ at a rate of 15% are not appropriate or are too high, where such a rate was warranted by reason of the very nature of the infringement at issue, namely the implementation of coordinated price increases. Such an infringement is among the most harmful restrictions of competition for the purposes of points 23 and 25 of the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 and 15% is the lowest rate on the scale of penalties prescribed for such infringements under those guidelines.

Accordingly, the General Court is fully entitled to hold that the Commission has not infringed the principle of proportionality in setting the multipliers for the ‘gravity of the infringement’ and for the ‘additional amount’ at 15%, even though the geographic scope of the undertaking’s participation in the infringement at issue is limited.

(see paras 57, 58, 60-62)
24

In those circumstances, the Administrativen sad Sofia-grad decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Does Article 243(1) of the [Customs Code], read in conjunction with Article 245 of that code, and having regard to the principles of respect for the rights of defence and res judicata, permit a national provision such as Article 220 and Article 211a of the [ZM] under which more than one decision of a customs authority which fixes an additional customs debt with a view to its subsequent recovery may be challenged, even where, under the circumstances of the main proceedings, a final decision within the meaning of Article 181a(2) of [Regulation No 2454/93] could be adopted in order to fix that customs debt? (2) Is Article 243(2) of the [Customs Code] on the right of appeal to be interpreted as meaning that it does not provide that a final decision within the meaning of Article 181a(2) of Regulation No 2454/93 must first be the subject of an administrative appeal in order for judicial proceedings to be permitted? (3) Is Article 181a(2) of Regulation No 2454/93 to be interpreted, under the circumstances of the main proceedings, as meaning that, if the procedure laid down in that provision in relation to the right to be heard and the right to raise objections was not observed, the decision of the customs authority adopted in contravention of those rules does not constitute a final decision within the meaning of that provision, but is merely part of the procedure for the adoption of the final decision? In the alternative, is that provision to be interpreted, under the circumstances of the main proceedings, as meaning that the decision adopted in breach of the abovementioned procedural provisions is directly subject to judicial proceedings before a court which must give judgment on the merits of the action? (4) Is Article 181a(2) of Regulation No 2454/93 to be interpreted, under the circumstances of the main proceedings and having regard to the principle of legality, as meaning that, if the procedure laid down in that provision in relation to the right to be heard and the right to raise objections was not observed, the decision of the customs authority adopted in contravention of those rules is null and void on account of a material procedural defect which is comparable to an infringement of an essential procedural requirement, non-compliance with which results in the nullity of the act irrespective of the actual consequences of the infringement, with the result that the court is required to rule on an action brought against that act, without being able to consider referring the matter back to the administrative authority for it to make a final decision on the basis of the applicable rules?’
29

In those circumstances, the Finanzgericht Baden-Württemberg decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) In circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, in which, on 17 October 2012, a German family benefits office granted and paid (by way of set-off) the child benefit due for the period from October 2006 to November 2011 in the amount of the difference between the family allowances payable in the Swiss Confederation and the corresponding German benefits, in accordance with Article 10(1)(a) of Regulation (EEC) No 574/2, is the conversion of Swiss family allowances from Swiss francs into euros to be carried out in accordance with Article 107(1) of Regulation No 574/72, Article 107(6) of Regulation No 574/72 or Article 90 of Regulation No 987/2009, read in conjunction with [Decision No H3]? (2) If the answer to Question 1 is that the conversion must be carried out wholly or in part in accordance with Article 107(6) of Regulation No 574/72: in the circumstances set out in Question 1, is the relevant date for the purposes of conversion the date on which the foreign benefit to be set off was paid or the date on which the domestic benefit against which the foreign benefit is set off is paid? (3) If the answer to Question 1 is that the conversion must be carried out wholly or in part in accordance with Article 107(1) of Regulation No 574/72: in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, how must the reference period provided for in Article 107(2) and (4) of Regulation No 574/72 be determined? Is the relevant date for the purposes of conversion the date on which the Swiss institution granted or paid the family benefit to be set off? (4) If the answer to Question 1 is that the conversion must be carried out wholly or in part in accordance with Article 90 of Regulation No 987/2009, read in conjunction with Decision No H3 ...: in accordance with which provision (paragraph 2, paragraph 3(a) or paragraph 3(b)) of Decision No H3 ... and in what manner must the conversion of family benefits be carried out if the national law relating to the domestic family benefit itself provides for an exclusion of benefits (Paragraph 65(1), point 2, of the [Law on income tax]) and the benefit is granted on the basis of EU law alone? Is the relevant date for the purposes of conversion the date on which the Swiss institution granted or paid the family benefits?’
3

Recitals 13, 19 and 23 to 25 in the preamble to Regulation No 1896/2006 read as follows: ‘(13) In the application for a European order for payment, the claimant should be obliged to provide information that is sufficient to clearly identify and support the claim in order to place the defendant in a position to make a well-informed choice either to oppose the claim or to leave it uncontested. … (19) Due to differences between Member States’ rules of civil procedure and especially those governing the service of documents, it is necessary to lay down a specific and detailed definition of minimum standards that should apply in the context of the European order for payment procedure. In particular, as regards the fulfilment of those standards, any method based on legal fiction should not be considered sufficient for the service of the European order for payment. … (23) The defendant may submit his statement of opposition using the standard form set out in this Regulation. However, the courts should take into account any other written form of opposition if it is expressed in a clear manner. (24) A statement of opposition filed within the time-limit should terminate the European order for payment procedure and should lead to an automatic transfer of the case to ordinary civil proceedings unless the claimant has explicitly requested that the proceedings be terminated in that event. For the purposes of this Regulation the concept of ordinary civil proceedings should not necessarily be interpreted within the meaning of national law. (25) After the expiry of the time-limit for submitting the statement of opposition, in certain exceptional cases the defendant should be entitled to apply for a review of the European order for payment. Review in exceptional cases should not mean that the defendant is given a second opportunity to oppose the claim. During the review procedure the merits of the claim should not be evaluated beyond the grounds resulting from the exceptional circumstances invoked by the defendant. The other exceptional circumstances could include a situation where the European order for payment was based on false information provided in the application form.’
5

Article 4 of that directive stated: ‘1. “Taxable person” shall mean any person who independently carries out in any place any economic activity specified in paragraph 2, whatever the purpose or results of that activity. 2. The economic activities referred to in paragraph 1 shall comprise all activities of producers, traders and persons supplying services … The exploitation of tangible or intangible property for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis shall also be considered an economic activity. 3. Member States may also treat as a taxable person anyone who carries out, on an occasional basis, a transaction relating to the activities referred to in paragraph 2 and in particular one of the following: (a) the supply before first occupation of buildings or parts of buildings and the land on which they stand; Member States may determine the conditions of application of this criterion to transformations of buildings and the land on which they stand. Member States may apply criteria other than that of first occupation … “A building” shall be taken to mean any structure fixed to or in the ground; (b) the supply of building land. “Building land” shall mean any unimproved or improved land defined as such by the Member States. … 5. … [L]ocal government authorities … shall not be considered taxable persons in respect of the activities or transactions in which they engage as public authorities, even where they collect dues, fees, contributions or payments in connection with these activities or transactions. However, when they engage in such activities or transactions, they shall be considered taxable persons in respect of these activities or transactions where treatment as non-taxable persons would lead to significant distortions of competition. … Member States may consider activities of [local government authorities] which are exempt under Article 13 or 28 as activities which they engage in as public authorities.’
8

The Explanatory Notes to the HS concerning heading 3822 are worded as follows: ‘This heading covers diagnostic or laboratory reagents on a backing, prepared diagnostic or laboratory reagents, other than diagnostic reagents of heading 30.02 or diagnostic reagents designed to be administered to the patient and blood grouping reagents of heading 30.06. It also covers certified reference materials. Diagnostic reagents are used in the evaluation of physical, biophysical or biochemical processes and states in animals and humans; their function is based upon a measurable or observable change in the biological or chemical substances constituting the reagent. Prepared diagnostic reagents of this heading may be similar in function to those designed to be administered to patients (subheading 3006,30), with the exception that they are used for in vitro, rather than for in vivo, applications. Prepared laboratory reagents include not only diagnostic reagents, but also other analytical reagents used for purposes other than detection or diagnosis. Prepared diagnostic and laboratory reagents may be used in medical, veterinary, scientific or industrial laboratories, in hospitals, in industry, in the field or, in some cases, in the home. Reagents of this heading are either on a backing or in the form of preparations and thus comprise more than a single constituent. For example, they may consist of admixtures of two or more reagents or of single reagents dissolved in solvents other than water. They may also be in the form of paper, plastics or other materials (used as backings or support), impregnated or coated with one or more diagnostic or laboratory reagents, such as litmus, pH or pole-finding papers or pre-coated immuno-assay plates. Reagents of this heading may also be put up in the form of kits, consisting of several components, even if one or more components are separate chemically defined compounds of Chapter 28 or Chapter 29, synthetic colouring matter of heading 32.04 or any other substance which, when presented separately, would be classifiable under another heading. Examples of such kits are those for testing glucose in blood, ketones in urine, etc., and those based on enzymes. However, diagnostic kits having the essential character of products of heading 30.02 or 30.06 (e.g., those based on monoclonal or polyclonal antibodies) are excluded. The reagents of this heading should be clearly identifiable as being for use only as diagnostic or laboratory reagents. This must be clear from their composition, labelling, instructions for in vitro or laboratory use, indication of the specific diagnostic test to be performed or physical form (e.g., presented on a backing or support). With the exception of the products of Chapter 28 or 29, for the classification of certified reference materials, heading 38.22 shall take precedence over any other heading in the Nomenclature. …’
21

In those circumstances, the Verwaltungsgerichtshof Baden-Württemberg (Baden-Württemberg Higher Administrative Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer to the Court the following questions for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) In accordance with the Annex to [Regulation No 2252/2004,] must the way in which the personal data page of machine readable passports is issued by the Member States satisfy all the compulsory specifications of Part 1 [of Document 9303 of the ICAO]? (2) If, in accordance with the Law on names of a Member State, a person’s name comprises his first name[s] and surname, are the Member States also entitled, in accordance with the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004, in conjunction with Point 8.6 of Section IV of Part 1 [of ICAO Document 9303], to enter the name at birth as a primary identifier in Field 6 of the machine readable personal data page of the passport? (3) If, in accordance with the Law on names of a Member State, a person’s name comprises his first name[s] and surname, are the Member States also entitled, in accordance with the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004, in conjunction with Point 8.6 of Section IV of Part 1 [of ICAO Document 9303], to enter the name at birth as a secondary identifier in Field 7 of the machine readable personal data page of the passport? (4) If either the second or third question is answered in the affirmative: is a Member State, in accordance with whose Law on names a person’s name comprises his first name[s] and surname, required, on the basis of the protection afforded to a person’s name under Article 7 of the [Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“the Charter”)] and Article 8 [of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950], to state, in the relevant caption of the machine readable personal data page of a passport, that the name at birth is also entered in that field? (5) If the fourth question is answered in the negative: by reason of the protection afforded to a person’s name under Article 7 of the Charter and Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, is a Member State, in accordance with whose Law on names a person’s name comprises his first name[s] and surname and under whose Law on passports the fields on the machine readable personal data page of a passport are also to be given in English and French and in Field 6 of that page the name at birth is also to be provided on a separate line, preceded by the abbreviation “geb.” of the word “geboren” (born), also required to provide a translation in English and French of the abbreviation “geb.”? (6) If, in accordance with the Law on names of a Member State, a person’s name comprises his first name[s] and surname, are the Member States entitled, in accordance with the annex to Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004, in conjunction with point 8.6 of Section IV of Part I [of ICAO Document 9303], to enter the name at birth as an optional item of personal data in Field 13 of the machine readable personal data page of the passport?’