ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 156/23

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal Administrativo (Portugal) lodged on 5 February 2016 — Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas

(Case C-64/16)

(2016/C 156/32)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Supremo Tribunal Administrativo

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses

Defendant: Tribunal de Contas

Question referred

In view of the mandatory requirements of eliminating the excessive budget deficit and of financial assistance regulated by EU rules, must the principle of judicial independence, enshrined in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (1) and in the case-law of the Court of Justice, be interpreted as meaning that it precludes the measures to reduce remuneration that are applied to the judiciary in Portugal, where they are imposed unilaterally and on an ongoing basis by other constitutional authorities and bodies, as is the consequence of Article 2 of Law No 75/2014 of 12 September?

(1) OJ 2000 C 364, p. 1.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 191/10

Appeal brought on 27 February 2016 by Orange Polska SA against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 17 December 2015 in Case T-486/11: Orange Polska SA v European Commission

(Case C-123/16 P)

(2016/C 191/12)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Orange Polska SA (represented by: D.M. Beard QC, A. Howard, Barristers, M. Modzelewska de Raad, adwokat, P. Paśnik, adwokat)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Polska Izba Informatyki i Telekomunikacji, European Competitive Telecommunications Association

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— annul the Judgment;

— annul the Decision in its entirety; alternatively

— annul Article 2 of the Decision in its entirety; or in the alternative,

— reduce the fine there stated, as appropriate; or in the alternative

— remit the decision in relation to the fine to the Commission; and

— order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of its appeal, the Appellant raises three pleas in law — the first plea challenges the substantive validity of the finding of infringement in the contested Commission Decision, whereas as the latter two are directed against the level of the fine imposed by virtue of Article 2 of the Decision.

a. First, the Appellant contends that the General Court has committed an error of law and reasoning by failing to require the Commission to demonstrate any legitimate interest in pursuing an investigation and in adopting an infringement decision regarding historic conduct.

b. Secondly, the General court has committed a number of errors of law and/or distorted the evidence in upholding the Commission’s appraisal of the impact of the infringement for the purpose of calculating the level of the fine.
1.

Must Articles 2(g) and 3(2)(a) of the regulation (1) be interpreted as meaning that a passenger must have a reserved seat (that is to say, the right to his own seat in the aeroplane) or is it sufficient for the passenger to have received confirmation of his booking on the flight (that is to say, the right to be transported in the aeroplane) for compensation to be payable?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Kúria (Hungary) lodged on 20 February 2016 — Damien Zöldség, Gyümölcs Kereskedelmi és Tanácsadó Kft. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatóság

(Case C-114/16)

(2016/C 211/31)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Kúria

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Damien Zöldség, Gyümölcs Kereskedelmi és Tanácsadó Kft.

Respondent: Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatóság

Question referred

Are the provisions of Articles 167, 168, 178 and 179 of the VAT Directive (1) to be interpreted to the effect that the revenue authority is required to recognise, in the course of a tax audit, a taxable person’s right of deduction in circumstances in which, although there is no indication in the taxable person’s VAT return of the tax paid, the taxable person possesses invoices consistent with that directive and, during the audit, requests recognition of its right of deduction?

(1) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).
3.

Is an interpretation to the effect that, although a pre-formulated clause allows accelerated maturity in a long-term contract for breach that is not serious, leaving the consumer in worse circumstances than those resulting from the supplemental national provision, the clause would not be void solely because a corrective rule exists in the national procedural provision that is applicable only in the specific procedure chosen by the seller or supplier and only if certain conditions are fulfilled, compatible with Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13?
Appeal brought on 14 April 2016 by the Federal Republic of Germany against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) of 4 February 2016 in Case T-620/11 GFKL Financial Services AG v European Commission

(Case C-209/16 P)

(2016/C 222/07)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Federal Republic of Germany (represented by: T. Henze and R. Kanitz, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: GFKL Financial Services AG, European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 4 February 2016 in Case T-620/11 in so far as it dismissed the action as unfounded;

— annul Commission Decision of 26 January 2011, C(2011)275 final, in State aid case C 7/10 — Scheme for the carry-forward of tax losses in the case of restructuring of companies in difficulty (Sanierungsklausel), under Article 61(1) of the Statute of the Court of Justice;

— order the Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings before the General Court and the Court of Justice.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of its appeal, the appellant relies on one ground of appeal.

There has been an infringement of the first paragraph of Article 107 TFEU. The General Court disregarded the fact that Paragraph 8c(1a) of the Körperschaftsteuergesetz (Law on corporation tax; ‘the KStG’), the ‘restructuring clause’, is not selective:

— The ‘restructuring clause’ is not a priori selective, since it does not provide for any derogation from the relevant system of reference and is a general provision capable of benefiting any undertaking in the territory of the Member State.
1.

Does a national court, when a claim is lodged with it against a consumer in relation to the performance of a contract and that court, under national procedural rules, has the power only to examine of its own motion whether the claim is contrary to mandatory national rules, have the power to examine in the same manner, of its own motion, even in the event of the consumer’s non-appearance at the hearing, and to determine whether the contract in question comes within the scope of [Council Directive 93/13/EEC (1) of 5 April 1993] on unfair terms in consumer contracts, as implemented in Belgian law?
1)

Is the principle of abuse of rights, as recognised in the judgment of the Court in Halifax as being applicable in the sphere of VAT, directly effective against an individual in the absence of a national measure, whether legislative or judicial, giving effect to that principle, in circumstances where, as here, the redefining of the pre-sale transactions and the purchaser sales transactions (collectively referred to as the appellants' transactions), as advocated by the Commissioners, would give rise to a liability on the part of the appellants to VAT, where such liability, on the proper application of the provisions of national legislation in force at the relevant time to the appellants' transactions, did not arise?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 232/6

Appeal brought on 11 April 2016 by SolarWorld AG against the order of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 1 February 2016 in Case T-142/14: SolarWorld AG and Others v Council of the European Union

(Case C-205/16 P)

(2016/C 232/07)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: SolarWorld AG (represented by: L. Ruessmann, Avocat, J. Beck, Solicitor)

Other parties to the proceedings: Brandoni solare SpA, Solaria Energia y Medio Ambiente, SA, Council of the European Union, European Commission, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products (CCCME)

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare the Appeal admissible and well-founded;

— set aside the General Court's Order in Case T-142/14;

— rule on the substance and annul Article 2 of Regulation 1239/2013, or refer the case back to the General Court for a decision on the substance of the Application for annulment; and

— order the Council to pay the Appellant's costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The General Court committed an error in law in finding that Article 2 of Regulation 1239/2013 (1) is not severable from the remainder of that regulation. Changing the form of measures does not change the scope of the Regulation imposing them. The scope of countervailing measures is all imports from producers found to have engaged in injurious subsidisation, and their objective, regardless of the form, is to be adequate to remove the injury suffered by the EU producers. This scope is not changed by the annulment of Article 2.

The Contested Order violates the Appellant's right under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as it denies the EU industry a legal remedy in trade defence cases against definitive measures which fail to respect the requirements of the Basic Regulation. In addition, the Contested Order violates the Appellant's right under Article 20 of the of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union by putting exporting producers in a better position than the EU industry, as the jurisprudence recognises their right of appeal.

(1) Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1239/2013 of 2 December 2013 imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (i.e. cells) originating in or consigned from the People's Republic of China

OJ L 325, p. 66
(i)

Must/may the ‘place where the employee habitually carries out his work’, within the meaning of the abovementioned provision of Community law, be interpreted as being the place of the airport where the aircraft to be flown by the employee is stationed, where he begins the journey at the start of his duties? And/or must/may the ‘place where the employee habitually carries out his work’ be interpreted as corresponding to the place which the parties designate as the gateway airport, from which the employee was transported to the airport where the aircraft to be flown by him was stationed, and to which he later returned? And/or must/may the ‘place where the employee habitually carries out his work’ be the place of registration of the aircraft flown by him? And/or must/may the ‘place where the employee habitually carries out his work’ be the place from where the employee received instructions, communications and information about the flight operations, various aspects of his professional relationship with the defendant and the process which led to its termination?
2.

Must Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 be interpreted as constituting an obstacle to the imposition by a Member State on natural gas suppliers of obligations relating to the volumes of gas stored and the withdrawal rates attached thereto, and to the holding of storage capacities acquired by virtue of rights reflecting the obligation to hold stocks on the territory of that Member State, whilst at the same time providing that the Minister, in assessing a supplier’s storage capacities, is to take account of the other regulatory instruments available to that supplier?
2.

Do Article 2(1) and Article 6(1) and (3) of Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 preclude a provision of law enacted by a Member State under which, in criminal proceedings, an accused person who is not resident in that Member State must nominate a person authorised to accept service of a penalty order made against him, and service on a person authorised to accept service is automatically sufficient for the purpose of calculating the period within which an objection may be lodged, where, in the event of failure to comply with the period calculated in this way, the accused person can apply to have his position restored to the status quo ante and, in those circumstances, an adequate excuse for such failure is that the penalty order was forwarded to him and, after it had been forwarded, he lodged an objection within the prescribed period, that is to say where, by having his position restored to the status quo ante, he can retroactively rely on the unreduced period for lodging an objection, even though, by law, a penalty order is generally declared enforceable in the event of failure to comply with the period for lodging an objection?
3.

In the event that the answer to questions 1and/or 2 above is in the affirmative: a. Whether any of the relevant authorisations, implementing legislation or administrative arrangements can and should be interpreted so as to make an allowance in respect of either (i) irrecoverable VAT on Sales Aids or Third Party Goods and Services borne by unregistered resellers and used by such unregistered resellers for the purposes of their economic activities; OR (ii) VAT in excess of the tax avoided being collected by Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs OR (iii) the potential unfair competition that arises between direct sellers, their unregistered resellers and non-direct selling businesses. b. Whether: i. The authorisation of the UK's derogation from Article 11A(1)(a) of the Sixth Directive was unlawful. ii. a derogation from Article 17 of the Sixth Directive is necessary alongside the derogation from Article 11A(1)(a). If so, whether the UK acted unlawfully by failing to ask the Commission or the Council to authorise it to derogate from Article 17. iii. the UK are acting unlawfully by failing to administer VAT in such a way as to allow direct sellers to claim a credit for either Sales Aids or Third Party Goods and Services VAT incurred by unregistered resellers for the purposes of their economic activities. iv. all or any part of the relevant authorisations, implementing legislation or administrative arrangements are therefore invalid and/or unlawful. c. Whether the appropriate remedy is, from the Court of Justice of the European Union or from the national Tribunal or Court: i. a direction that the Member State is required to give effect to the Derogation in domestic law by providing for an appropriate adjustment for any of (a) irrecoverable VAT on Sales Aids or Third Party Goods and Services borne by unregistered resellers and used by such unregistered resellers for the purposes of their economic activities; OR (b) VAT in excess of the tax avoided being collected by Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs; OR (iii) the potential unfair competition that arises between direct sellers, their unregistered resellers and non-direct selling businesses; or ii. a declaration that the authorisation of the Derogation, and by extension the derogation itself, is invalid; or iii. a declaration that the domestic legislation is invalid; or iv. a declaration that the Notice of Direction is invalid; or v. a declaration that the UK is obliged to apply for authorisation for a further derogation so to provide for an appropriate adjustment for any of (a) irrecoverable VAT on Sales Aids or Third Party Goods and Services borne by unregistered resellers and used by such unregistered resellers for the purposes of their economic activities; OR (b) VAT in excess of the tax avoided being collected by Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs; OR (iii) the potential unfair competition that arises between direct sellers, their unregistered resellers and non-direct selling businesses.
Must Article 101 TFEU to be interpreted as precluding a rule such as that laid down in Article 36 of Law 1/1996, which makes the remuneration of lawyers who provide legal aid services, if the application is upheld, subject to a scale of fees previously approved by those lawyers, from which the authorities of the Member State may not depart?

Does that rule satisfy the requirements of necessity and proportionality to which Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/123/EC (2) refers?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 305/19

Appeal brought on 6 July 2016 by Aughinish Alumina Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 22 April 2016 in Joined Cases T-50/06 RENV II and T-69/06 RENV II: Ireland and Aughinish Alumina Ltd v European Commission

(Case C-373/16 P)

(2016/C 305/28)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Aughinish Alumina Ltd (‘AAL’) (represented by: C. Little, C. Waterson, solicitors)

Other parties to the proceedings: Ireland, European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— quash the judgment of the General Court dated 22 April 2016 in Case T-69/06 RENV II.

— order the Commission to pay all of the costs incurred by AAL in these proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

AAL submits two grounds of appeal against the Judgment.

First plea: Error in law in assessment of exceptional circumstances; infringement of the principle of legitimate expectations; failure to state reasons.

AAL submits that the General Court erred in law in its assessment of AAL's legitimate expectations, in particular, in assessing the existence of ‘exceptional circumstances’. This plea is split into four parts:

First part: The General Court erred considering the scope and effect of the Judgment of the Court in Case C-272/12 P.

Second part: The General Court erred in finding that AAL's situation should be distinguished from that in Case 223/85 RSV.

Third part: The General Court erred in interpreting the Demesa case law (Case C-183/02 P and C-187/02 P) as bringing an end to AAL's legitimate expectations of non-recovery.

Fourth part: The General Court erred in failing to conduct the requisite balancing exercise between public and private interests. In doing so the General Court infringed the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and compounded its error by a failure to state reasons.

Second plea: Error in law regarding the interpretation of Article 1 (b)(i) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 659/1999 (1).

AAL submits that the General Court erred in law in stating and applying the conditions under which aid will be classified as existing aid. In particular, AAL submits that the General Court erred in its interpretation of Article 1 (b)(i) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 659/1999.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty

OJ L 83, p. 1
1.

In a situation such as that in the main proceedings, in which the disputed administrative measure was adopted before the accession [of the Republic of Romania to the European Union] and the appeal against that measure was decided on by provision of the tax authorities after the accession, does the principle of cooperation in good faith imply that national legislation is to be interpreted in the light of the EU directives applicable to VAT? (1)
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 326/14

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 16 June 2016 — Hanssen Beleggingen BV v Tanja Prast-Knipping

(Case C-341/16)

(2016/C 326/24)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Hanssen Beleggingen BV

Defendant: Tanja Prast-Knipping

Question referred

Does the notion of proceedings which are ‘concerned with the registration or validity of … trade marks’, within the meaning of Article 22.4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, (1) also cover a claim, brought against the formal proprietor of a Benelux trade mark registered in the Benelux trade mark register, which seeks an order requiring that defendant to make a declaration to the Benelux trade mark office that she has no entitlement to the contested mark and that she waives registration as the proprietor of that mark?

(1) OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1.
2.

Second plea: infringement of Article 82 of the Conditions of Employment of other servants contained in the Staff Regulations, by requiring satisfactory knowledge of a second official language of the European Union when that knowledge is not necessary for the performance of the duties that the successful applicants will be called upon to carry out.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 335/31

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Aachen (Germany) lodged on 19 May 2016 — Frank Sleutjes

(Case C-278/16)

(2016/C 335/41)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Aachen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Frank Sleutjes

Other party: Staatsanwaltschaft Aachen

Question referred

Is Article 3 of Directive 2010/64/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings (Celex No 32010L0064) to be interpreted as meaning that the term ‘judgment’ in Paragraph 37(3) of the [Strafprozessordnung (StPO); the Code of Criminal Procedure] also includes penal orders within the meaning of Paragraph 407 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure?

(1) OJ L 280, 26.10.2010, p. 1.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 326/14

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal de première instance de Liège (Belgium) lodged on 22 June 2016 — Jean Jacob, Dominique Lennertz v Belgian State

(Case C-345/16)

(2016/C 326/25)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal de première instance de Liège

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Jean Jacob, Dominique Lennertz

Defendant: Belgian State

Question referred

Is it contrary to Article 39 of the Treaty on European Union for the Belgian tax system, at Article 155 of the CIR/92 and regardless of whether Circular No Ci.RH.331/575.420 of 12 March 2008 is applied, to have the effect that Mr Jacob’s Luxembourg pensions, exempted from tax pursuant to Article 18 of the Convention concluded between Belgium and Luxembourg for the avoidance of double taxation, are taken into account for the purposes of calculating the tax payable in Belgium and used as the basis of assessment for the grant of tax advantages provided for under the CIR 92, and that those advantages, such as the tax-free allowance, long-term savings, costs paid with service vouchers, costs incurred in saving energy in the home, costs incurred in protecting the home against theft or fire, and charitable donations made by the applicant, are reduced or granted to a lesser extent than if both the applicants had income earned in Belgium and if Ms Lennertz, and not Mr Jacob, had received pensions only from Belgium?