ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 6(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 of 29 September 2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers and amending Regulations (EEC) No 2019/93, (EC) No 1452/2001, (EC) No 1453/2001, (EC) No 1454/2001, (EC) No 1868/94, (EC) No 1251/1999, (EC) No 1254/1999, (EC) No 1673/2000, (EEC) No 2358/71 and (EC) No 2529/2001, Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1782/2003, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 146/2008, and Article 23(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006 and (EC) No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation No 1782/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that reductions in direct payments due to non-compliance with the cross-compliance rules must be calculated on the basis of payments granted or to be granted in the year during which that non-compliance occurred.

Article 66(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 796/2004 of 21 April 2004 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of cross-compliance, modulation and the integrated administration and control system provided for in Regulation No 1782/2003 (OJ 2004 L 141, p. 18) and Article 70(8)(a) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1122/2009 of 30 November 2009 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation No 73/2009 as regards cross-compliance, modulation and the integrated administration and control system, under the direct support schemes for farmers provided for in that Regulation, as well as for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards cross-compliance under the support scheme provided for the wine sector, must be interpreted as meaning that reductions in direct payments thus calculated are to be applied to payments received or to be received in the calendar year during which the non-compliance with the cross-compliance rules is found.

(see para. 59, operative part 1)
Article 16(a) of Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008 on the definition, description, presentation, labelling and the protection of geographical indications of spirit drinks and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 1576/89 must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purpose of establishing that there is ‘indirect commercial use’ of a registered geographical indication, the disputed element must be used in a form that is either identical to that indication or phonetically and/or visually similar to it. Accordingly, it is not sufficient that that element is liable to evoke in the relevant public some kind of association with the indication concerned or the geographical area relating thereto.

Article 16(b) of Regulation No 110/2008 must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purpose of establishing that there is an ‘evocation’ of a registered geographical indication, the referring court is required to determine whether, when the average European consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect is confronted with the disputed designation, the image triggered directly in his mind is that of the product whose geographical indication is protected. In making that determination, the referring court, in the absence of (i) any phonetic and/or visual similarity between the disputed designation and the protected geographical indication and (ii) any partial incorporation of that indication in that designation, must take account of the conceptual proximity, if any, between the designation and the indication.

Article 16(b) of Regulation No 110/2008 must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purpose of establishing that there is an ‘evocation’ of a registered geographical indication, account is not to be taken either of the context surrounding the disputed element, or, in particular, of the fact that that element is accompanied by an indication of the true origin of the product concerned.

(see paras 56, 60, operative part 2)
Case C‑14/17

VAR Srl

and

Azienda Trasporti Milanesi SpA (ATM)

v

Iveco Orecchia SpA

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Public procurement — Directive 2004/17/EC — Article 34 — Supply of spare parts for buses and trolley-buses — Technical specifications — Equivalent products — Whether proof of equivalence may be provided after the contract has been awarded)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 12 July 2018

Approximation of laws — Procedures for awarding contracts in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors — Directive 2004/17 — Award of contracts — Technical specifications referring to a specific mark, origin or production — Obligation of the contracting authority to require, already in the tenderer’s tender, proof that the proposed products are equivalent to those defined in the technical specifications

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/17, Art. 34(8))

Article 34(8) of Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors must be interpreted as meaning that, when the technical specifications in the contract documentation refer to a specific mark, origin or production, the contracting authority must require the tenderer to submit, already in its tender, proof that the products which it proposes are equivalent to those defined in the technical specifications.

(see para. 35, operative part)
Appeal—Grounds—Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence—Inadmissibility—Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence—Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see paras 67-69)
Case C‑227/17

Medtronic GmbH

v

Finanzamt Neuss

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Finanzgericht Düsseldorf)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 — Customs Union and Common Customs Tariff — Tariff classification — Combined Nomenclature — Subheadings 90211010, 90211090 and 90219090 — Spinal fixation systems — Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1214/2014)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber), 12 April 2018

Customs union — Common Customs Tariff — Tariff headings — Spinal fixation system assembled in accordance with the specific needs of the patient and intended to treat degenerative disc diseases, spinal stenoses and spinal dislocations or failures in earlier spinal fusions, tumours, scolioses or bone fractures — Classification under subheadings 90219090 or 90211010 or 90211090 — Verification by the national court

(Council Regulation No 2658/87, as amended by Regulation No 2015/1754, Annex I)

The Combined Nomenclature set out in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, as amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1754 of 6 October 2015, must be interpreted as meaning that spinal fixation systems such as those at issue in the main proceedings may not be classified under subheading 90219090 of the Combined Nomenclature if they are covered by another subheading of heading 9021 of the Combined Nomenclature. Whether those systems may be classified under subheading 90211010 or subheading 90211090 of the Combined Nomenclature will depend on the principal function they perform, which is a matter for the referring court to determine by having regard to the objective characteristics and properties of such systems as well as to their intended and actual use.

(see para. 65, operative part)
Joined Cases C‑397/17 and C‑398/17

Profit Europe NV

v

Belgische Staat

(Requests for a preliminary ruling from the Nederandstalige rechtbank van eerste aanleg Brussel)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 — Customs Union and Common Customs Tariff — Tariff classification — Combined Nomenclature — Subheadings 73071110, 73071910 and 73071990 — Cast tube or pipe fittings, of spheroidal graphite cast iron)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber), 12 July 2018

Customs union — Common Customs Tariff — Classification of goods — Cast tube or pipe fittings of spheroidal graphite cast iron — Classification under tariff subheading 73071990

(Council Regulation No 2658/87, as amended by Regulation No 1001/2013, Annex I, subheadings 730711 and 730719)

The Combined Nomenclature set out in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, as amended by Commission Regulation (EU) No 1001/2013 of 4 October 2013, must be interpreted as meaning that the cast tube or pipe fittings of spheroidal graphite cast iron must be classified under subheading 73071990 thereof.

(see para. 52, operative part)
Case C‑90/17

Turbogás — Produtora Energética SA

v

Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa))

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive 2003/96/EC — Taxation of energy products and electricity — Third subparagraph of Article 21(5) — Entity producing electricity for its own use — Small producers of electricity — Article 14(1)(a) — Energy products used for the production of electricity — Obligation to exempt)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 27 June 2018

Tax provisions — Harmonisation of laws — Taxation of energy products and electricity — Directive 2003/96 — Exemption of energy products used to produce or maintain the ability to produce electricity — Obligation to exempt — Scope — Energy products produced by an entity producing electricity for its own use — Included — Burden of proof of use

(Council Directive 2003/96, Arts 14(1)(a) and 21(5), third para.)

The third subparagraph of Article 21(5) and Article 14(1)(a) of Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity must be interpreted as meaning that an entity such as the one in question in the main proceedings, which generates electricity for its own use, regardless of its size and irrespective of its main economic activity, must be regarded as a ‘distributor’, within the meaning of the first of those provisions, whose consumption of electricity for the production of electricity, however, comes under the mandatory exemption provided for in Article 14(1)(a).

It must be pointed out, however, that Directive 2003/96 does not govern how proof that energy products have been used for purposes giving rise to a right to exemption is to be adduced. On the contrary, as is clear from Article 14(1) thereof, Directive 2003/96 gives the Member States responsibility for laying down the conditions for the exemptions referred to in that provision, in order to ensure the correct and straightforward application of such exemptions and to prevent any evasion, avoidance or abuse. The fact remains that the Member States, when exercising their power to lay down the conditions to which the exemptions provided for in Article 14(1) of the directive are subject, must observe the general principles of law which form part of the legal order of the European Union, including, inter alia, the principle of proportionality (judgment of 2 June 2016, Polihim-SS, C‑355/14, EU:C:2016:403, paragraphs 57 and 59). While Member States may provide for a financial penalty to be imposed for non-compliance with formal requirements (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 June 2016, ROZ-ŚWIT, C‑418/14, EU:C:2016:400, point 40), such non-compliance cannot call into question entitlement to the mandatory exemption provided for in Article 14(1)(a) of Directive 2003/96 if the substantive conditions relating to its application are fulfilled (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 July 2017, Vakarų Baltijos laivų statykla, C‑151/16, EU:C:2017:537, paragraph 51).

(see paras 43-45, operative part)
The concept of ‘communication to the public’, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, must be interpreted as meaning that it covers the posting on one website of a photograph previously posted, without any restriction preventing it from being downloaded and with the consent of the copyright holder, on another website.

Taking account of those elements, it must be held, in the light of the case-law set out in paragraph 24 of the present judgment, that the posting of a work protected by copyright on one website other than that on which the initial communication was made with the consent of the copyright holder, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, must be treated as making such a work available to a new public. In such circumstances, the public taken into account by the copyright holder when he consented to the communication of his work on the website on which it was originally published is composed solely of users of that site and not of users of the website on which the work was subsequently published without the consent of the rightholder, or other internet users. It is irrelevant to the objective considerations set out in paragraphs 29 to 35 of the present judgment that, as in the case in the main proceedings, the copyright holder did not limit the ways in which internet users could use the photograph. The Court has already held that the enjoyment and the exercise of the right provided for in Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 may not be subject to any formality (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 November 2016, Soulier and Doke, C‑301/15, EU:C:2016:878, paragraph 50).

(see paras 35, 36, 47, operative part)
Case C‑601/17

Dirk Harms and Others

v

Vueling Airlines SA

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hamburg)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Air transport — Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 — Article 8(1) — Reimbursement of the price of a ticket in the event of cancellation of a flight — Commission collected by a person acting as an intermediary between the passenger and the air carrier when the ticket was bought — Included)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber), 12 September 2018

Transport — Air transport — Regulation No 261/2004 — Compensation and assistance to passengers — Reimbursement of the price of the ticket in the event of cancellation of a flight — Calculation — Account to be taken of the commission collected by a person acting as an intermediary between the passenger and the air carrier when the ticket was bought — Conditions

(European Parliament and Council Regulation No 261/2004, Art. 2(f) and 8(1)(a))

Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, and in particular Article 8(1)(a) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that the price of the ticket to be taken into consideration for the purposes of determining the reimbursement owed by the air carrier to a passenger in the event of cancellation of a flight includes the difference between the amount paid by that passenger and the amount received by the air carrier, which corresponds to a commission collected by a person acting as an intermediary between those two parties, unless that commission was set without the knowledge of the air carrier, which it is for the referring court to ascertain.

In that regard, Article 2(f) of Regulation No 261/2004 defines a ‘ticket’ as a document or an equivalent in paperless form, including electronic form, issued or authorised by an air carrier or an agent authorised by such an air carrier. It follows from that definition that the various elements of such a ticket, including its price, must, if that ticket is not issued by the air carrier itself, in any event be authorised by it, and therefore cannot be set without its knowledge. A component of the price of the ticket which is set without the knowledge of the air carrier cannot be regarded as necessary in order to avail of the service proposed by the air carrier.

(see paras 17, 19, 20, operative part)
Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, read together with the principle of equivalence, must be interpreted as meaning that it precludes national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which prevents a consumer protection organisation from intervening, in the interests of the consumer, in proceedings seeking an order for payment concerning an individual consumer or lodging an objection in the absence of a challenge to that order by the consumer if that legislation in fact subjects intervention by consumer associations, in disputes falling within the scope of Union law, to less favourable conditions than those applicable to disputes exclusively within the scope of national law, which is for the referring court to ascertain.

Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that it precludes national legislation, such as that in the main proceedings, which, although providing, at the stage at which the order for payment is made against the consumer, for an assessment of the unfair nature of the terms in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer, first, entrusts the power to grant that order to an administrative officer of a court who is not a magistrate and, second, provides for a period of 15 days within which to lodge a statement of opposition and requires that the latter contain reasons on the substance, where there is no provision for such an assessment by the court of its own motion at the stage of enforcement of that order, which is for the referring court to ascertain.

The fact that the national legislation confers jurisdiction regarding the grant of orders for payment to officials who do not have the status of magistrate does not compromise the effectiveness of Directive 93/13, so long as an assessment by a court ensuring that there are no unfair terms in the contract concerned is provided for at the stage of enforcement of the order for payment or when an objection is lodged.

That being the case, as stated in paragraph 46 of the present judgment, the existence of such a review only if an objection is lodged preserves the effectiveness of Directive 93/13 only if consumers are not dissuaded from lodging such an objection.

In the present case, the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings provides only for a period of 15 days within which a consumer may lodge an objection against the order for payment and also requires him to give reasons in the statement opposition.

Therefore, there is a significant risk with such legislation that the consumer concerned does not lodge an objection and that, therefore, the court does not undertake of its own motion an assessment as to the inclusion of unfair terms in the contract concerned.

(see paras 50-54, operative part 2)
According to Article 11(1) of Regulation No 479/2008 on the common organisation of the market in wine, the purpose of measures for the restructuring of vineyards is to increase the competitiveness of wine producers. In the light of that objective, a comparatively modest measure, limited to managing the vines better by protecting the plants by various means, which leads to a significant increase in competitiveness for growers is capable of being classified as a restructuring measure. In particular, it does not follow from the wording of Article 11(3) of Regulation No 479/2008 that measures having recourse to existing or even age-old techniques can be eligible for support for the restructuring of vineyards only on condition that they are combined with new technologies and concepts. Consequently, as Regulation No 479/2008 is silent as to the eligibility for support of measures to protect vineyards inter alia against damage caused by game and birds, there is no legal basis for refusing to allow a Member State to include a measure for the protection of vineyards against damage caused by animals and birds among measures for the restructuring and conversion of vineyards, where that measure contributes to improving the competitiveness of wine producers in that Member State.

(see paras 46, 47, 51, 52)
Appeal — Grounds — Mistaken assessment of the facts — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of Justice of the assessment of the facts put before the General Court — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted — Plea alleging distortion of the facts — Need to indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted and show the errors of appraisal which led to that distortion

(Art. 256(1), second para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see paras 23, 24, 32)
Article 56 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which the competent authorities can order a commissioning party established in that Member State to suspend payments to his contractor established in another Member State, or even to pay a security in an amount equivalent to the price still owed for the works in order to guarantee payment of the fine which might be imposed on that contractor in the event of a proven infringement of the labour law of the first Member State.

On this point, it must be observed that the social protection of workers and combating fraud, particularly social security fraud, and preventing abuse are objectives that are among the overriding reasons in the public interest capable of justifying a restriction of the freedom to provide services (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 December 2012, Commission v Belgium, C‑577/10, EU:C:2012:814, paragraph 45, and of 3 December 2014, De Clercq and Others, C‑315/13, EU:C:2014:2408, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

As regards the proportionality of such legislation with respect to those objectives, it must be observed, first, that it makes it possible for the competent authorities to require the commissioning party to suspend his payments to the service provider and to pay a security in the amount of the price still owed for the works, on the basis of ‘reasonable suspicion of an administrative offence’ against the national rules in the field of labour law. That legislation thus allows such measures to be adopted even before a finding is made by the competent authority of an administrative offence disclosing fraud, in particular social security fraud, or abuse or a practice capable of affecting the protection of workers.

Next, that legislation does not provide that the service provider against whom there is such reasonable suspicion can, before the adoption of those measures, put forward his observations on the acts of which he is accused.

Finally, the amount of the security that may be required from the recipient of the services corresponds, in accordance with the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, to the price still owed for the works at the time of the adoption of that measure. Since the amount of the security may thus be fixed by the competent authorities without taking account of possible construction faults or other defective performance of the contract for works by the service provider, it could exceed, perhaps substantially, the amount that the commissioning party would in principle have to pay on completion of the works.

(see paras 44, 46-48, 50, operative part)