5.

As regards the Association's apparent claim that the results of the application of the rules under consideration are not consistent with the principle that the system of derived intervention prices must respect the natural conditions of price formation, no evidence has been advanced proving the validity of this assertion. The description by the applicant of the economic phenomena occurring in periods of good harvest and periods of poor harvest does not prove anything since, according to the principle established by Article 4 (1) of basic Regulation No 120/67, account must be taken of the natural conditions of price formation on the market “given a normal harvest”, and not therefore periods when production is greater or less than normal. The fact that the millers of Champagne no longer succeed in selling to the Paris region the quantities which they have been accustomed to selling, due to-the increase in competition from the millers in central France who have benefited (at least in times of good harvest) from a lower intervention price, is, according to the applicant in the main action, inconsistent with the principle in Article 6 of Regulation No 131/67 which declares that “derived intervention prices … shall be fixed in such -a way that they cannot disturb the normal pattern of trade”. The applicant interprets this provision, which is however expressly prescribed solely for decisions falling within the competence of the Commission, as guaranteeing the maintenance of the traditional pattern of trade existing before the creation of a common agricultural market. This interpretation is unacceptable. Even if one could read into this provision a general criterion, one is, in any case, forced to note that in a common market covering a number of States it is unlikely that the normal pattern of trade will remain the same as it was in the time of individual national markets before the creation of the common market. This is even more true in respect of countries, like for example France, which were characterized by a large degree of protectionism introduced by means of various public measures and acts of intervention restricting freedom of movement and competition. With the abolition of these obstacles following the establishment of the common agricultural market, the pattern cannot remain unchanged, as it has now become possible for consumers in the traditionally most protectionist producer States to turn to a supplier who is better placed in relation to the consumer area, even if it means dealing with a supplier from abroad and thereby changing their former normal supplier who, for reasons which were not at all natural, was traditionally established in their State. In this way, for example, some French producer areas will now have the opportunity of becoming the normal suppliers of cereals to the Ruhr, thereby ousting Bavaria which is the traditional supplier of cereals to this region. It is this new situation to which one must refer when searching for the exact meaning of the concept ‘normal pattern of trade’ referred to in Article 6 of Regulation No 131/67. This pattern of trade can be no other than the one which was created or intended to be created precisely by virtue of the new situation which arose with the establishment of the common agricultural market. In relation to this pattern of trade, the rules on intervention prices must bear a generally neutral character. As regards the alleged infringement of the prohibition on discrimination laid down by Article 40 (3) of the Treaty, it must be recalled first of all that the purpose of this provision is essentially to protect the interests of agricultural producers and consumers and not the interests of processors of and dealers in agricultural products. But even if one considers the matter in the context of the more general prohibition on discrimination inherent in the Treaty which prohibits Community institutions from discriminating in an arbitrary manner between the different classes of people subject to Community rules, the provisions under discussion do not appear to be incompatible with this principle. The differences between derived intervention prices resulting from the criteria of Regulation No 131/67 are not of an arbitrary nature. It has been seen that these differences are based on objective criteria and requirements, and primarily on the criterion of the location of the various production areas in relation to the deficit areas. As the basic intervention price is calculated on the basis of the deficit areas within the Community it seems logical that the derived intervention prices should be established essentially in accordance with the situation of the various non-deficit areas in relation to the deficit areas. Taking account of this criterion which is objective and perfectly consistent not only with the logic of the common organization of the market in cereals and the general market system, but also with the requirement of the movement of goods within the Community, the fixing for Eastern France of a derived intervention price higher than in the surplus region of central France is explained by considering, as does the Commission, that German purchasers in the deficit areas relevant to this region of France offer in the surplus region best placed for them from the point of view of distance, namely Eastern France, prices which are higher than those in the Centre, by reason of the fact that the cost of transport from this more distant region will have a greater effect on the price of the goods. In addition, the statistic supplied by the Commission showing that after the application of the system of derived intervention prices sales of French flour to Germany have almost doubled is not devoid of interest. The differences in question, based on criteria which are not discriminatory and which are consistent with the spirit of the system, are not therefore of an arbitrary nature.