ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
The issue whether Article 34 TFEU should not be interpreted because Directive 2007/46 establishing a framework for the approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles fully harmonised the area in question is not a ground of inadmissibility and must be assessed in the context of the consideration of the questions referred.

Article 34 TFEU and Article 31(1) and (12) of Directive 2007/46 establishing a framework for the approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which makes the marketing in a Member State of new spare parts for road vehicles, which are not included in the list in Annex XIII to the directive, subject to the application of an approval or homologation procedure in that Member State, provided that that legislation also lays down exceptions such as to ensure that parts lawfully produced and marketed in other Member States are exempted or, failing this, that the parts in question are capable of posing a significant risk to the correct functioning of systems that are essential for the safety of the vehicle or its environmental performance and that that approval or homologation procedure is strictly necessary and proportionate in relation to the objectives of protection of road safety or of protection of the environment. Where a part or piece of equipment has not yet been included in the list in Annex XIII to Directive 2007/46, and therefore pending a decision by the Commission in that respect, the Member States may maintain national provisions dealing with parts or equipment which are capable of posing a significant risk to the correct functioning of systems that are essential for the safety of the vehicle or its environmental performance, although those national provisions are to cease to be valid once a decision in this regard has been taken.

The conditions for proving that such parts have already been approved or homologated or constitute original parts or parts of matching quality are governed, in the absence of EU rules on the matter, by the law of the Member States, subject to the principles of equivalence and of effectiveness.

(see paras 36, 41-44, 46, operative part)
Case C‑290/14

Criminal proceedings

against

Skerdjan Celaj

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Firenze)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Area of freedom, security and justice — Directive 2008/115/EC — Return of illegally staying third-country nationals — Return decision accompanied by an entry ban of three years’ duration — Breach of an entry ban — Third-country national previously removed — Sentence of imprisonment in case of new unlawful entry into the national territory — Compatibility’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) 1 October 2015

Border controls, asylum and immigration — Immigration policy — Return of illegally staying third-country nationals — Directive 2008/115 — Decision to return such a national accompanied by an entry ban of three years’ duration — Breach of an entry ban by that national — National legislation providing for the imposition of a penalty of imprisonment on such a third-country national — Lawfulness — Conditions — Verification by the national court

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/115, Art. 11)

Directive 2008/115 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals must be interpreted as not, in principle, precluding legislation of a Member State which provides for the imposition of a prison sentence on an illegally staying third-country national who, after having been returned to his country of origin in the context of an earlier return procedure, unlawfully re-enters the territory of that State in breach of an entry ban.

Nevertheless, in so far as the situation of the third-country national concerned, which led to the removal preceding the new unlawful entry into the territory of a Member State, fell within the scope of Directive 2008/115, the imposition of a criminal law sanction, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, is admissible only on the condition that the entry ban issued against that national complies with Article 11 of that directive, a matter which is for the referring court to determine.

Last, the imposition of such a criminal law sanction is moreover subject to full observance both of fundamental rights, particularly those guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights and, as the case may be, of the Geneva Convention, in particular Article 31(1) thereof.

(see paras 31-33, operative part)
Article 2(2)(d) of Directive 2006/123 on services in the internal market must be interpreted as meaning that, subject to the checks to be carried out by the referring court, an activity which consists in providing, for payment, a service of carrying passengers on a boat for a waterway tour of a city for event-related purposes, does not constitute a service in the ‘field of transport’ within the meaning of that provision which is excluded from the scope of that directive.

In that regard, in order to understand the scope of the exclusion laid down in Article 2(2)(d) of Directive 2006/123, the concept of ‘services in the field of transport’ must be interpreted by reference not only to the wording of that provision, but also to its purpose and general structure, in the context of the scheme laid down by that directive.

As regards, first, the wording of Article 2(2)(d), the concept of ‘services in the field of transport’ adopted by the EU legislature as part of Directive 2006/123 corresponds to services falling within the scope of Title VI of Part Three of the FEU Treaty, which contains Articles 90 to 100 of that Treaty relating to the common transport policy, which are excluded, under Article 58(1) TFEU, from the provisions of that Treaty relating to the free movement of services. Although the provisions of Title VI do not provide a definition of the concept of ‘transport’, it follows from Article 100(1) TFEU that transport by ‘inland waterway’ falls under that title. Thus several maritime transport services have been the subject of specific common rules adopted by the EU legislature under Article 100(2) TFEU. With respect, next, to the purpose and scheme of Article 2(2)(d) of Directive 2006/123, the exclusion of services in the field of transport is intended to cover inter alia urban transport services. However, it does not follow from that exclusion that any service consisting in the provision of transport by waterway must automatically be classified as ‘transport’ or ‘urban transport’ within the meaning of that directive.

Even if, prima facie, the activity at issue in the main proceedings constitutes transport by ‘inland waterway’ within the meaning of Article 100(1) TFEU, it is intended to provide the recipients of that service with the pleasant context of a celebration rather than point-to-point transport in the city of Amsterdam. In that regard, that service does not fall within any of the specific common rules adopted by the EU legislature under Article 100(2) TFEU. It follows that, although it is for the referring court to verify, the main purpose of that activity does not appear to be to provide a transport service within the meaning of Article 2(2)(d) of Directive 2006/123 and that, therefore, as the other exclusions provided for under Article 2(2) do not apply, that activity falls within the scope of that directive.

(see paras 46-50, 56-59, operative part1)
Article 78(3) of Regulation No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code, as amended by Regulation No 2700/2000, must be interpreted as precluding national rules under which a restriction is placed on the customs authorities’ powers to conduct re-examinations or post-clearance examinations and to regularise the situation by fixing a new customs debt, provided that that restriction refers to a three-year period from the time the initial customs debt was incurred, which it is for the national court to verify.

Given that once the three-year time-limit from the time the customs debt was incurred has expired, it is no longer possible to communicate a new customs debt and thus regularise the situation arising from a revision or post-clearance examination within the meaning of Article 78(3) of the Customs Code, the principle of legal certainty requires that Member States must be free to limit the use of the procedure provided for under that provision after expiry of the three-year period as from the date on which the initial customs debt was incurred, inter alia by imposing a time-limit on revision. During that three-year period, however, a Member State’s national rules must allow the customs authorities once again to take measures to restore the situation arising from a revision or post-clearance examination under Article 78(3) of the Customs Code, inter alia by amending the customs debt. It must, moreover, be possible take such a measure even after expiry of that period in a situation where a customs debt is the result, within the meaning of Article 221(4) of the Customs Code, of an act which, on the date it was committed, could give rise to criminal court proceedings, which it is for the referring court to verify.

The principle of the protection of legitimate expectations does not preclude the customs authorities from subsequently revising or conducting post-clearance examinations and regularising the situation as provided for in Article 78(3) of the Customs Code. During the three-year period which runs from the time when the initial customs debt is incurred, a taxable person must, as an economic operator, accept the risk and make the necessary arrangements in order to guard against the risks of the customs authorities revising their decision on the customs debt in the light of new information in their possession following examinations.

(see paras 36, 37, 41, 42, 46, operative part)
In EU competition law, although Article 2 of Regulation No 1/2003 expressly governs the allocation of the burden of proof, that regulation does not contain any provisions on more specific procedural aspects. Thus, in particular, that regulation does not contain any provision in relation to the principles governing the assessment of evidence and the standard of proof in national proceedings for the application of Article 101 TFEU. That conclusion is confirmed by recital 5 of Regulation No 1/2003, which expressly states that the regulation does not affect national rules on the standard of proof.

In the absence of EU rules on the matter, it is for the national legal order of each Member State to establish them in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy.

In that context, the answer to the question whether the mere dispatch of a message indicating that the discounts on products sold through an information system, intended to enable travel agencies to sell travel packages on their websites, will henceforth be capped and, following the dissemination of that message, the system in question undergoes the technical modifications necessary to implement that measure may, having regard to all of the circumstances of the case, constitute sufficient evidence to establish that its addressees were aware, or ought to have been aware, of its content, does not follow from the concept of a ‘concerted practice’ and is not intrinsically linked to that concept. That question must be regarded as relating to the assessment of evidence and to the standard of proof, with the result that it is governed — in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy and subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness — by national law. In that respect, the principle of effectiveness requires that an infringement of EU competition law may be proven not only by direct evidence, but also through indicia, provided that they are objective and consistent.

(see paras 26, 30-37)
The general principle which ensures that any person has the right to plead, in an action brought against a national measure which adversely affects that person, that the EU act on which that measure is based is invalid does not preclude such a right from being subject to the condition that the person concerned did not have the right to apply directly to the Courts of the European Union for annulment of that act under Article 263 TFEU. However, it is only if it can be held that a person would undoubtedly have been entitled to apply for the annulment of the act in question under the conditions laid down in that article that that person is prevented from pleading before the national court having jurisdiction that the act is invalid.

Since Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation No 1225/2009 does not specify the scope of the concept of ‘product under consideration’, it is necessary to interpret that concept in the light of the 1994 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Anti-Dumping Agreement) and in particular in the light of Article 2 thereof. However, that article does not specify the scope of that concept either and, in particular, there is nothing in its wording to support the idea of a specific requirement for homogeneity or similarity between the products at issue. That being said, taking account of the interpretation given to the detailed rules contained in that agreement by the European Union’s major trading partners, as stated in recital 4 to Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation No 1225/2009, some of those trading partners took the view that the product under consideration had to be homogeneous in nature and consist of similar products. Accordingly, they argued that the requirement that the product under consideration be homogeneous should not be entirely excluded from the interpretation of that regulation.

(see paras 40, 41, 44, 45)
2.

Environment — Atmospheric pollution — Directive 2003/87 — Scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading — Integrated system of registers of the Union and the Member States — Data concerning allowance transactions — Communication and confidentiality — Applicable rules — Annex to Decision 13/CMP.1 of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol — Exclusion (European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/87, Art. 1) (see paras 64-67)
Article 7(2) of Directive 2008/118 concerning the general arrangements for excise duty and repealing Directive 92/12/EEC must be interpreted as meaning that the sale of excise goods held by an authorised warehousekeeper in a tax warehouse does not bring about their release for consumption until the time at which those goods are physically removed from that tax warehouse. Since excise duty is, as is recalled in recital 9 to Directive 2008/118, a tax levied on consumption and not on sale, the time at which it becomes chargeable must be very closely linked with the consumer.

In that regard, Article 7(1) of Directive 2008/118 defines the time at which excise duty becomes chargeable as the time of release for consumption of the excise goods. Furthermore, it is clear from Article 7(2)(a) of that directive that ‘release for consumption’ is to be understood, in particular, as ‘the departure of excise goods, including irregular departure, from a duty suspension arrangement’. Accordingly, the departure of excise goods from a duty suspension arrangement means the physical departure of those goods from the tax warehouse and not their sale.

Such an interpretation corresponds to the objectives pursued by that directive. Since excise duty is a tax levied on consumption and not on sale, the time at which it becomes chargeable must be very closely linked with the consumer. Accordingly, so long as the goods in question remain in the tax warehouse of an authorised warehousekeeper, there can be no consumption, even if those goods have been sold by that authorised warehousekeeper.

Furthermore, the reference, in particular, to the possibility of an irregular departure of excise goods from a duty suspension arrangement cannot be understood other than as meaning the physical removal of goods from such an arrangement.

Finally, insofar as that excise goods under a duty suspension arrangement are held by an authorised warehousekeeper in a tax warehouse, excise duties are not chargeable so long as the goods concerned are held by that warehousekeeper in such a warehouse.

(see paras 46-55, operative part 1)
Case C‑506/14

Yara Suomi Oy and Others

v

Työ-ja elinkeinoministeriö

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from the Korkein hallinto-oikeus)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme within the European Union — Directive 2003/87/EC — Article 10a — Method of allocating free allowances — Calculation of the uniform cross-sectoral correction factor — Decision 2013/448/EU — Article 4 — Annex II — Validity — Application of uniform cross-sectoral correction factor to facilities in sectors which are deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage — Determination of the product benchmark for hot metal — Decision 2011/278/EU — Article 10(9) — Annex I — Validity’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber), 26 October 2016

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Identification of the relevant aspects of EU law — Reformulation of the questions (Art. 267 TFEU)

Environment — Atmospheric pollution — Directive 2003/87 — Scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading — Transitional regime for free allocation of quotas — Allocation method — Calculation on the basis of the annual maximum quantity of such quotas to be allocated — Account taken, in determining that quantity, of electricity producers’ emissions — Not permissible (European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/87, Art. 10a(3) and (5); Commission Decision 2011/278, Art. 15(3))

Environment — Atmospheric pollution — Directive 2003/87 — Scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading — Transitional regime for free allocation of quotas — Benchmarks to be applied in calculating the allocation — Commission decision determining the benchmarks for hot metal — Complex evaluation of economic matters — Manifest error of assessment — Absence (European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/87, Art. 10a(2); Commission Decision 2011/278, Annex I)

Environment — Atmospheric pollution — Directive 2003/87 — Scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading — Transitional regime for free allocation of quotas — Allocation method — Calculation on the basis of the annual maximum quantity of such quotas to be allocated — Correction factor — Application to all installations not covered by Article 10a(3) of Directive 2003/87 — Lawfulness (European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/87, Arts 10a(1), 11 and 12; Commission Decision 2011/278, Art. 10(4) and (9), first para.)

Environment — Atmospheric pollution — Directive 2003/87 — Scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading — Transitional regime for free allocation of quotas — Allocation method — Calculation on the basis of the annual maximum quantity of such quotas to be allocated — Account taken, in determining that quantity, of the emissions generated by installations subject to the quota exchange system before 2013 — Not permissible (European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/87, Art. 10a(5), first para.,(b), and Annex I ; Commission Decision 2013/448, Art. 4 and Annex II]
Article 226 of Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that invoices mentioning only ‘legal services rendered from [a date] until the present date’ do not a priori comply with the requirements of point 6 of that article and that invoices mentioning only‘legal services rendered until the present date’ do not a priori comply either with the requirements of point 6 or with those of point 7 of that article, which is, however, for the referring tribunal to ascertain.

The objective of the details which must be shown in an invoice is to allow the tax authorities to monitor payment of the tax due and, if appropriate, the existence of the right to deduct value added tax. It is therefore in the light of that objective that it should be examined whether invoices comply with the requirements of Article 226(6) of Directive 2006/112.

Thus, as regards the requirement to state the extent and nature of the services rendered, the expression ‘legal services’ does not appear to indicate in sufficient detail the nature of the services concerned. Moreover, that description is so general that it does not appear to disclose the extent of the services rendered. Consequently, the description does not a priori satisfy the conditions required by Article 226(6) of Directive 2006/112.

As regards the requirement to show the date on which the supply of services was made or completed, that requirement makes it possible to check when the chargeable event for tax occurs, and hence to determine the tax provisions which must apply, from a temporal point of view, to the transaction to which that document relates. Consequently, an invoice referring only to ‘legal services rendered until the present date’, without specifying any starting date of the period of account, does not satisfy the conditions required by Article 226(7) of Directive 2006/112.

(see paras 27-30, 33, 35, operative part)
8

Article 6 of Directive 2008/115, entitled ‘Return decision’, provides: ‘1. Member States shall issue a return decision to any third-country national staying illegally on their territory, without prejudice to the exceptions referred to in paragraphs 2 to 5. 2. Third-country nationals staying illegally on the territory of a Member State and holding a valid residence permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay issued by another Member State shall be required to go to the territory of that other Member State immediately. In the event of non-compliance by the third-country national concerned with this requirement, or where the third-country national’s immediate departure is required for reasons of public policy or national security, paragraph 1 shall apply. 3. Member States may refrain from issuing a return decision to a third-country national staying illegally on their territory if the third-country national concerned is taken back by another Member State under bilateral agreements or arrangements existing on the date of entry into force of this Directive. In such a case the Member State which has taken back the third-country national concerned shall apply paragraph 1. 4. Member States may at any moment decide to grant an autonomous residence permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay for compassionate, humanitarian or other reasons to a third-country national staying illegally on their territory. In that event no return decision shall be issued. Where a return decision has already been issued, it shall be withdrawn or suspended for the duration of validity of the residence permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay. 5. If a third-country national staying illegally on the territory of a Member State is the subject of a pending procedure for renewing his or her residence permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay, that Member State shall consider refraining from issuing a return decision, until the pending procedure is finished, without prejudice to paragraph 6. ...’