ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
A decision of a Community institution communicated to all its staff and intended to guarantee the officials concerned the same treatment regarding the reporting procedure, even though it cannot be regarded as a general implementing provision within the meaning of Article 110 of the Staff Regulations, constitutes an internal directive and must, as such, be regarded as a rule of conduct, indicating the practice to be followed, which the administration imposes on itself and from which it may not depart without specifying the reasons for doing so, since otherwise the principle of equality of treatment would be infringed.

A rule adopted by a department and regarded by the assessor as binding, which sets out, in a departure from the guide to the reporting procedure in force, a specified maximum number of points and an average, interferes with the assessor's freedom of judgment in assessing an official's performance.

The administration must ensure that staff reports are drawn up periodically on the dates laid down by the Staff Regulations and that they are drawn up in a proper form, both for reasons of sound administration and in order to safeguard the interests of officials. A delay in the drawing up of a staff report may in itself be prejudicial to the official for the simple reason that his career progress may be affected by the absence of such a report at a time when decisions concerning him must be taken. An official in possession of an irregular and incomplete personal file thereby suffers nonmaterial damage as a result of being put in an uncertain and anxious state of mind with regard to his professional future. In the absence of special circumstances justifying the delays found to have occurred, therefore, the administration commits an administrative fault giving rise to liability on its part.

On the other hand, an official cannot complain of delay in the drawing up of his periodic report when that delay is attributable to him, if only partially, or where he contributed considerably to the delay. However, the mere fact that the official has, during the reporting procedure, made use of the opportunity available under the relevant rules in force to refer his case to various bodies authorised to intervene in the procedure does not mean that the official is, to any significant extent, responsible for a delay.

(see paras 58-65)

See: 156/79 and 51/80 Gratreau v Commission [1980] ECR 3943. para. 15: 173/82. 157/83 and 186/84 Castille v Commission [1986] ECR 497. para. 36;T-73/89 Barbi vCommission [1990] ECR II-619, para. 41; T-20/89 Moritz v Commission [1993] ECR II-1423, para. 50; T-59/96 Burban v Parliament [1997] ECRSC I-A-109 and II-331, paras 44 and 50; T-187/01 Melione v Commission [2002] ECRSC I-A-81 and II-389, paras 77, 78 and 79
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. Agriculture — Common agricultural policy — Food aid — Implementation — Delivery of products — Transfer of the burden of risk from the supplier to the recipient — Point of departure — Goods actually made available after unloading — Effects — (Commission Regulation No 2200/97, Art. 15)

2. Agriculture — Common agricultural policy — Food aid — Implementation — Delivery of products — Rights and obligations arising from the award not transmissible — Effect — Successful tenderer ' s responsibility maintained when transport handled by another undertaking — (Commission Regulations Nos 2200/87, Art. 12(3) and 2608/97)

Summary

1. Where delivery is to be made " free-at-destination" , Article 15 of Regulation No 2200/87 laying down general rules for the mobilisation in the Community of products to be supplied as Community food aid links the transfer from supplier to beneficiary of the burden of the risks to which the goods may be exposed to their being actually made available, after unloading, inside the warehouse at their destination. These risks cover all loss and damage to which the goods may be exposed. As regards the contractual relationship between the Commission and the successful tenderer, it is accordingly unnecessary to establish the reasons for which any losses of goods may have arisen, if they arose before the actual supply of the goods to the warehouse at their destination.

Likewise, if the unloading of the goods in the warehouses at their destination is incorrectly handled, it is the duty of the carrier, as the successful tenderer ' s representative, to act so as to avoid any errors in the calculation and the unloading of the different boxes coming from the different containers. Given that the risk in the goods remains with the successful tenderer up to the time when the goods are actually unloaded and placed in the warehouse at their destination, the successful tenderer, or its representative, is also under a duty to ensure that unloading is properly carried out.

see paras 46-47, 64

2. Article 12(3) of Regulation No 2200/87 laying down general rules for the mobilisation in the Community of products to be supplied as Community food aid provides that " the rights and obligations arising from the award shall not be transmissible" . The fact that carriage of the goods was handled by an undertaking other than the successful tenderer thus does not alter in any way the successful tenderer ' s duty to deliver the quantity agreed in the contract to the place specified in Regulation No 2608/97 on the supply of vegetable oil as food aid.

There is no need in this regard to establish the reasons for the delay in unloading and actually making the goods available inside the warehouses at their destination, as the goods were under the control of the successful tenderer who, accordingly, should have organised their monitoring during these operations.

see paras 55-56
Case T-82/01





Josanne vof and Others

v

Commission of the European Communities





«(Inland waterway transport – Community fleet capacity – Conditions for putting new vessels into service (old-for-new rule) – Exemption)»

Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber), 8 May 2003

Summary of the Judgment

1.. Transport – Inland waterway transport – Structural improvements – Regulation No 718/1999 – Scope – Dredgers not used for carrying goods – Exemption – Restrictive interpretation – Burden of proof

(Council Regulation No 718/1999, Arts 1 and 2(2)(g))

2.. Transport – Inland waterway transport – Structural improvements – Contribution to inland waterways fund – Exemption for specialised vessels – Restrictive interpretation – Burden of proof

(Council Regulation No 718/1999, Art. 4(6))

3.. Transport – Inland waterway transport – Structural improvements – Contribution to inland waterways fund – Commission decision rejecting an application for exemption in favour of specialised vessels – Absence of reasoning in relation to a non-binding opinion given by a group of experts – No bearing on the lawfulness of the decision

(Council Regulation No 718/1999, Art. 4(6))

4.. Community law – Principles – Rights of the defence – Observance thereof during administrative proceedings – Obligation on the party concerned to show due diligence



1.

2.

3.

4.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Third Chamber)

19 March 2003

((ECIP Programme – Project to set up a joint venture for professional training in India – Refusal of funding – Action for compensation)) In Case T-273/01, Innova Privat-Akademie GmbH, established in Berlin (Germany), represented by R. Wöstmann, lawyer, applicant, v Commission of the European Communities, represented by M. de Pauw and B. Martenczuk, acting as Agents, with an address for service in Luxembourg defendant, APPLICATION for compensation for the loss allegedly suffered by the applicant following the refusal to finance a project under the ECIP (European Community Investment Partners) financial instrument to set up a joint venture for professional training in India,



THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Third Chamber),



composed of: K. Lenaerts, President, J. Azizi and M. Jaeger, Judges, Registrar: D. Christensen, Administrator, having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 11 December 2002

gives the following

Judgment

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9

10

11

Facts forming the basis of the proceedings

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15

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21

─ order the defendant to pay the sum of DM 78 172.39, together with interest;

─ order the defendant to pay the costs.

22

─ dismiss the application;

─ order the applicant to pay the costs.

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39

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43

44

45

On those grounds,

THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Third Chamber),

1.

2.

Lenaerts Azizi Jaeger

H. Jung K. Lenaerts
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Fourth Chamber)

9 July 2003

((Community trade mark – Colours – Combination of orange and grey – Absolute ground for refusal – Distinctive character – Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94))

applicant,

v

defendant,

THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Fourth Chamber),

having regard to the application lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 28 September 2001,having regard to the response of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 20 December 2001,further to the hearing on 19 March 2003,
Joined Cases T-142/01 and T-283/01





Organización de Productores de Túnidos Congelados (OPTUC)

v

Commission of the European Communities





«(Fisheries – Common organisation of the markets – Compensation for producers of tuna intended for the processing industry – Allocation between producers' organisations – Change of membership by producers – Effect on the allocation of the allowance – Legal basis – Principle of protection of legitimate expectations)»

Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fourth Chamber), 28 January 2004

Summary of the Judgment

1.. Agriculture – Common organisation of the markets – Rules – Lacuna – Solution



2.. Fisheries – Common organisation of the markets – Compensation for producers of tuna intended for the processing industry – Allocation between producers' organisations – Change of membership by producers – Effect on the allocation of the allowance

(Council Regulation No 3759/92, Art. 18(4) and (5))

3.. Acts of the institutions – Adoption foreseeable by a prudent and circumspect operator – Principle of the protection of legitimate expectations – Inapplicable – Reliance on that principle in order to require the repetition of a misinterpretation of an act – Inadmissible



1.

2.

3.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Fourth Chamber)

21 April 2004

Case T-313/01

R

v

Commission of the European Communities

(Officials – Social security – Refusal of prior authorisation of a surgical procedure – Refusal on the ground of the exclusively cosmetic nature attributed by the administration to the operation – Infringement of the provisions of the Community rules)

Full text in Greek II - 0000

Application: for, first, annulment of the refusal of prior authorisation of a surgical procedure and, second, reimbursement of the costs of the operation at issue.

Held: The decision of 22 May 2001 rejecting the application for prior authorisation submitted by the applicant is annulled. The Commission is ordered to reimburse the applicant 85% of the cost of the surgical procedure as set out by the applicant’s surgeon in his prescription of 16 May 2001. The parties are ordered to determine by agreement the amount to be reimbursed to the applicant for the costs of the operation undergone according to the terms of the prescription and inform the Court of the agreed amount within a period of three months from the delivery of this judgment. In the absence of agreement, the parties are ordered to submit to the Court, within a period of three months from the delivery of this judgment, the figures they propose in respect of the amount to be reimbursed. The costs, including those incurred for the purposes of the expert medical report, are reserved.

Summary

1. Officials – Social security – Sickness insurance – Medical expenses – Treatment requiring prior authorisation – Grounds for refusing reimbursement of costs incurred – No application for prior authorisation, or application not submitted properly

(Rules on sickness insurance, Art. 11(1)(c))

2. Officials – Social security – Sickness insurance – Decision rejecting a request for prior authorisation for a surgical procedure – Refusal on the ground of the exclusively cosmetic nature attributed to the operation – Incorrect appraisal by the competent authority

(Rules on sickness insurance, Annex I, Section II(5))

3. Officials – Actions – Subject-matter – Unlimited jurisdiction – Application for reimbursement of medical expenses under the Joint Sickness Insurance Scheme – Admissibility

(Staff Regulations, Art. 91(1))

4. Officials – Actions – Prior administrative complaint – Requirement that subject-matter and grounds be the same – Application for reimbursement of medical expenses relating to a treatment adjoined to an action against the refusal to grant prior authorisation for that treatment – Admissibility

(Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91)
The fact that an appraisal of the performance of a servant of the European Central Bank contains, in an annex, messages sent by or addressed to that servant and/or to one or both of the authors of that appraisal, exchanged through the institution's internal email system, may not be regarded as interference in the private life of the person concerned or as a breach of Regulation No 45/2001 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data, or of Directive 95/46 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, where it is established that the data were not collected without the knowledge of the person concerned, that the messages, which are not substantially different from messages exchanged by letter, are of a purely professional nature, and that they have not been disclosed or forwarded to third persons.

(see paras 28-32)
The Commission enjoys a broad margin of assessment with regard to the factors to be taken into account for the purpose of deciding to award a contract following an invitation to tender. Review by the Community Courts is therefore limited to checking compliance with the applicable procedural rules and the duty to give reasons, the correctness of the facts found and that there is no manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers.

It is essential, in the interests of legal certainty, that the authority awarding a contract in a tender procedure should be able to ascertain precisely what tenders mean and, in particular, whether they comply with the conditions set out in the call for tenders. Thus, where a tender is ambiguous and it is not possible to establish what it actually means quickly and efficiently, the contracting institution has no choice but to reject that tender.

However, where the evaluation committee is empowered, in accordance with the instructions to tenderers, to seek clarification of tenders submitted, the Community law principle of good administration imposes an obligation to exercise that power in circumstances where it is both practically possible and necessary to obtain such clarification. Thus, while the evaluation committees are not obliged to seek clarification in every case where a tender is ambiguously drafted, they have a duty to exercise a certain degree of care when considering the content of each tender, with the result that, where the terms of a tender itself and the surrounding circumstances indicate that the ambiguity probably has a simple explanation and is capable of being easily resolved, it is, in principle, contrary to the requirements of good administration for an evaluation committee to reject the tender without exercising its power to seek clarification. A decision to reject a tender in such circumstances is liable to be vitiated by a manifest error of assessment on the part of the institution in the exercise of that power.

It would, moreover, be contrary to the principle of equality for an evaluation committee to enjoy an unfettered discretion to seek or not to seek clarification of an individual tender regardless of objective considerations and free from judicial supervision. In addition, the principle of equality does not preclude an evaluation committee from allowing tenderers to clarify any ambiguities in their tenders, since the instructions to tenderers expressly provide for requests for such clarification and the evaluation committee is obliged to treat all tenderers in a similar manner with regard to the exercise of this power.

Furthermore, the principle of proportionality requires that measures adopted by Community institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives pursued and, where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous.

(see paras 34-39)
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Single Judge)

23 October 2003

Case T-24/02

Maddalena Lebedef-Caponi

v

Commission of the European Communities

‛Officials — Staff report — Late preparation — Action for damages’

Full text in French II-1227

Application for:

first, annulment of the Commission's decisions partially rejecting the applicant's complaints seeking damages to compensate her for the nonmaterial damage caused by the delay in the preparation of the Staff Reports concerning her for the periods 1993/1995, 1995/1997 and 1997/1999 and, secondly, for damages to compensate her for that nonmaterial damage.

Held:

The Commission is ordered to pay the applicant the sum of EUR 2500, in addition to the sum of EUR 1500 already awarded by the Appointing Authority. The remainder of the action is dismissed. The Commission is ordered to pay the costs.

Summary

An institution's decision rejecting a claim for compensation forms an integral part of the preliminary administrative procedure which precedes an action to establish liability before the Court of First Instance. Consequently, claims for annulment of that rejection brought by the official cannot be assessed in isolation from the claims relating to liability. The measure setting out the position adopted by the institution during the pre-litigation stage only has the effect of allowing the party who has suffered damage to apply to the Court for compensation. (see para. 41) See: T-90/95 Gill v Commission [1997] ECRSC I-A-471 and II-1231, para. 45; T-77/99 Ojha v Commission [2001] ECRSC I-A-61 and II-293, para. 68; T-209/99 Hoyer v Commission [2002] ECRSC I-A-243 and II-1211, para. 32

The signature of the member of staff reported on is not essential for a report to be included in his personal file where all the rules relating to the drawing up of the report have been complied with by the administration beforehand. (see para. 77)
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. Community trade mark — Provisions governing procedure — Restitutio in integrum — Time-limit for appeal — Starting point — (Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 78(2))

2. Community trade mark — Provisions governing procedure — Restitutio in integrum — Appeal — Formal requirements — (Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 78(1) and (3))

3. Community trade mark — Appeal procedure — Time-limit and form of the appeal — Statement of grounds to be filed within the time-limit — Conditions of admissibility — (Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 59; Commission Regulation No 2868/95, Art. 1, Rule 49)

Summary

1. The two-month period stipulated in Article 78(2) of Regulation No 40/94 on the Community trade mark for bringing an application for the re-establishment of rights ( restitutio in integrum ) starts to run from the removal of the impediment which prevented the applicant from complying with a time-limit in relation to the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), and not from the date on which the Office gives notification of a delay which may have occurred in the step having to be taken.

see para. 41

2. It is clear from Article 78(1) and (3) of Regulation No 40/94 on the Community trade mark that an application for the re-establishment of rights must be submitted in an application stating the grounds on which it is based and setting out the facts on which it relies. In addition, an application for the re-establishment of rights must be made by a separate act, distinct from the act by which the appeal is brought.

see para. 44

3. Having regard to the combined provisions of Article 59 of Regulation No 40/94 on the Community trade mark and rule 49 of Regulation No 2868/95 implementing Regulation No 40/94, it a condition for the admissibility of an appeal before the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) that a statement setting out the grounds of appeal be filed within four months of notification of the contested decision.

see paras 53-54
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. Community trade mark – Definition and acquisition of Community trade mark – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar trade mark registered for identical or similar goods or services – Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark – Word and figurative mark ‘HAPPY DOG’ and word mark ‘HAPPIDOG’)

(Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 8(1)(b))

2. Community trade mark – Effects of Community trade mark – Limitation – Article 12 of Regulation No 40/94 – Subject-matter – Not applicable to the procedure for registration

(Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 12)

Summary

1. There is a likelihood of confusion, on the part of the average consumer in the United Kingdom, between the word and figurative mark HAPPY DOG, for which registration as a Community trade mark is sought for ‘foodstuffs for dogs’ falling within Class 31 of the Nice Agreement, and the word mark HAPPIDOG, registered earlier in the United Kingdom for the same goods.

The conflicting signs do have the same conceptual content in that they suggest to the relevant public that, by eating the goods, dogs will become happy. Given that those goods are identical, that the signs in question are conceptually similar, and that the signs are phonetically identical, visual differences between the signs are incapable of ruling out a likelihood of confusion on the part of that public.

The likelihood of confusion cannot, moreover, be called into question by the argument that the expression ‘happy dog’ is descriptive when used in relation to foodstuffs for dogs, with the result that the earlier word mark would itself be regarded as being distinctive only to a small degree. As the factors relevant to the assessment of the likelihood of confusion are interdependent, the fact that the goods concerned are identical and that there is a high degree of similarity between the conflicting signs is sufficient for a finding that that likelihood exists.

(see paras 42, 44-46)

2. Article 12 of Regulation No 40/94 on the Community trade mark, concerning limitation of the effects of a trade mark, is not applicable to the procedure for registration of a trade mark. That provision concerns the limitations on the right conferred by a Community trade mark on its proprietor with respect to use in the course of trade. Thus, an alleged infringer of the rights of the proprietor of a Community trade mark composed of terms designating the quality or other characteristics of the goods concerned may, where appropriate, rely on that article as a defence against any such infringement proceedings. Account cannot therefore be taken of Article 12 during the procedure for registration of a trade mark because it does not entitle third parties to use such terms as a trade mark but merely ensures that they may use them in a descriptive manner, that is to say, as indications concerning the quality or other characteristics of the goods, subject to the condition that they use them in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters.

(see paras 55-56)