ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
2.

Where computer software is supplied to a principal’s customers by way of the grant to the customer of a perpetual licence to use a copy of the computer software, does that constitute a ‘sale of goods’ within the meaning of that term as it appears in the definition of commercial agent in Article 1(2) of the Directive?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Ondernemingsrechtbank Antwerpen (Belgium) lodged on 10 May 2019 — Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v BVBA Weareone.World, NV Wecandance

(Case C-372/19)

(2019/C 270/19)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Ondernemingsrechtbank Antwerpen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM)

Defendants: BVBA Weareone.World, NV Wecandance

Questions referred

Must Article 102 TFEU, whether or not read in conjunction with Article 16 of Directive 2014/26/EU (1) on collective management of copyright and related rights and the multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market, be interpreted as meaning that there is abuse of a dominant position if a copyright management company which has a de facto monopoly in a Member State, applies a remuneration model to organisers of musical events for the right to communicate musical works to the public, based among other things on turnover,

1. which uses a flat-rate tariff in tranches, instead of a tariff that takes into account the precise share (making use of advanced technical tools) of the music repertoire protected by the management company played during the event?

2. which makes licence fees dependent on external elements such as, inter alia, the admission price, the price of refreshments, the artistic budget for the performers and the budget for other elements, such as decor?

(1) OJ 2014 L 84, p. 72.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 18 June 2019 by Qualcomm, Inc., Qualcomm Europe, Inc. against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 9 April 2019 in Case T-371/17: Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission

(Case C-466/19 P)

(2019/C 263/41)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Qualcomm, Inc., Qualcomm Europe, Inc. (represented by: M. Pinto de Lemos Fermiano Rato, advogado, M. Davilla, dikigoros)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— annul Commission Decision C(2017) 2258 final of 31 March 2017 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 18(3) and to Article 24(1)(d) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (1) in Case AT.39711 — Qualcomm (Predation) (the ‘Decision’);

— in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for determination in accordance with the judgment of the Court of Justice, and

— order the European Commission to pay the appellant’s costs before the Court of Justice and the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First plea in law: the General Court failed to address arguments raised by the appellant.

Second plea in law: the finding that the Decision was adequately reasoned is based on manifest errors of fact, of law and inadequate reasoning.

Third plea in law: the finding that the information requested by the Decision was necessary is based on manifest errors of law and fact, a distortion of the evidence, inadequate reasoning, and a failure to consider all the relevant evidence.

Fourth plea in law: the finding that the information requested by the Decision was proportionate is based on manifest errors of fact, a distortion of the evidence, and inadequate reasoning.

Fifth plea in law: the General Court misapplied the rules governing the burden of proof regarding alleged infringements of Article 102 TFEU.

Sixth plea in law: the General Court made findings that infringe the right to avoid self-incrimination.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ 2003, L 1, p. 1).
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Kammergericht Berlin (Germany) lodged on 26 June 2019 — Criminal proceedings against NJ

(Case C-489/19)

(2019/C 280/43)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Kammergericht Berlin

Party to the main proceedings

Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin

v

NJ

Questions referred

Does the dependence of a public prosecutor's office on instructions prevent him from effectively issuing a European arrest warrant, (1) even if that decision is subject to a full judicial review before the execution of the European arrest warrant?

(1) See Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Koblenz (Germany) lodged on 5 June 2019 — Remondis GmbH v Abfallzweckverband Rhein-Mosel-Eifel

(Case C-429/19)

(2019/C 288/38)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberlandesgericht Koblenz

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant and appellant: Remondis GmbH

Defendant and respondent: Abfallzweckverband Rhein-Mosel-Eifel

Other party: Landkreis Neuwied

Question referred

Is Article 12(4)(a) of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (1) to be interpreted as meaning that cooperation does indeed exist if a contracting authority responsible for waste disposal within its territory performs a disposal task — which is incumbent on it under national law and for the performance of which several operations are required — not entirely by itself, but rather commissions another contracting authority that is independent of it and is likewise responsible for waste disposal within its territory to carry out one of the necessary operations in return for consideration?

(1) OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65.
2.

In light of the provisions of Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union (2) which are laid down in Article 8(2) to (4) thereof and concern the principles of the exequatur procedure, and also in the light of Article 19(1) and (2) thereof — which provides that an amnesty or pardon may be granted by the issuing State and also by the executing State (paragraph 1); only the issuing State may decide on applications for review of the judgment imposing the sentence to be enforced under this Framework Decision (paragraph 2) — and of the first sentence of Article 17(1) thereof — which provides that the enforcement of a sentence is to be governed by the law of the executing State — is it possible to pass an aggregate sentence which would include the sentences imposed by a judgment delivered in a State of the European Union that was taken over for execution in another State of the European Union, together with a conviction handed down in the latter State, within the framework of the aggregate sentence?
2.

If the law of the Member State in which an insurer from which the licence has been withdrawn has its head office, and in respect of which a provisional liquidator has been appointed, provides that, in the event that a provisional liquidator has been appointed, all court proceedings against that company must be stayed, must that legislation be applied by the courts of the other Member States, even if this is not expressly provided for in their national law, pursuant to Article 274 of Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II)?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 17 July 2019 by Ernests Bernis, Oļegs Fiļs, OF Holding SIA, Cassandra Holding Company SIA against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 6 May 2019 in Case T-283/18: Bernis e.a. v European Central Bank (ECB)

(Case C-552/19 P)

(2019/C 305/35)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Ernests Bernis, Oļegs Fiļs, OF Holding SIA, Cassandra Holding Company SIA (represented by: O.H. Behrends, M. Kirchner, Rechtsanwälte)

Other party to the proceedings: European Central Bank (ECB)

Forms of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

— set aside the order of the General Court of 6 May 2019 in case T-283/18;

— declare that the application for annulment is admissible;

— refer the case back to the General Court for it to determine the action for annulment; and

— order the ECB to pay the appellants' costs and the costs of the appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellants put forward two pleas in law in support of their appeal:

1) That the General Court erred in law and violated Art. 263 TFEU by failing to base its order on the decision which the ECB actually adopted.

2) That the order under appeal is based on an incorrect interpretation of Art. 18(1) SRMR (1).

(1) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014, L 225, p. 1).
3.

If the answer is that the broad interpretation should continue to apply, where the newly elected member was in temporary custody in proceedings for serious offences sufficiently in advance of the commencement of the electoral process, is the judicial authority which ordered that that person be remanded in custody obliged, in the light of the phrase ‘while they are travelling to and from the place of meeting of the European Parliament’ in Article 9 of Protocol No 7, to lift the custody measure absolutely, almost automatically, to enable compliance with the formalities and the requirement of travel to the European Parliament, or should account be taken of a balancing exercise in the specific case between, on the one hand, the rights and interests arising from the interests of justice and due process and, on the other, those relating to the concept of immunity, as regards the need to ensure the functioning and independence of the Parliament and the elected representative’s right to hold public office?
Appeal brought on 26 July 2019 by European Road Transport Telematics Implementation Coordination Organisation — Intelligent Transport Systems & Services Europe (Ertico — ITS Europe) against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 22 May 2019 in Case T-604/15: Ertico — ITS Europe v Commisison

(Case C-572/19 P)

(2019/C 312/11)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: European Road Transport Telematics Implementation Coordination Organisation — Intelligent Transport Systems & Services Europe (Ertico — ITS Europe) (represented by: M. Wellinger and K. T'Syen, avocats)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— quash the judgment of the General Court of 22 May 2019 in Case T-604/15;

— annul the Contested Decision (1) and confirm the SME (micro, small and medium-sized enterprise) status of the appellant; and

— order the Commission to bear the costs of these proceedings, including the proceedings before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on three pleas in law.

1) The contested judgment is vitiated by an error of law in that it finds that (i) sections 1.2.6 and 1.2.7 of the Annex to Commission Decision 2012/838/EU (2) of 18 December 2012 on the adoption of the Rules to ensure consistent verification of the existence and legal status of participants, as well as their operational and financial capacities, in indirect actions supported through the form of a grant under the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities and under the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Atomic Energy Community for nuclear research and training activities and (ii) Article 22 of Council Regulation No. 58/2003 (3) of 19 December 2002 laying down the statute for executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community programmes relate to separate remedies.

2) The contested judgment misapplies and violates the SME Recommendation (4) and violates the fundamental legal principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations (and is therefore vitiated by an error of law) by finding that it is legally permitted to deny the appellant the status of SME based on the ‘purpose and spirit’ of the SME Recommendation despite the fact that the appellant formally satisfies the criteria of the SME Recommendation (which is not contradicted by the contested judgment).

3) The contested judgment is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment and substantively invalid, in so far as it finds that the appellant ‘did not have to contend with the handicaps usually faced by SMEs’ (and that the appellant therefore would not be an SME under the ‘purpose and spirit’ of the SME Recommendation).

(1) Decision of the Validation Panel of the European Commission of 18 August 2015.

(2) OJ 2012, L 359, p. 45.

(3) OJ 2003, L 11, p. 1.

(4) Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ 2003, L 124, p. 36).
1)

Where there has been a failure to perform or an improper performance of the obligations arising under the contract of an organizer or retailer with a consumer to provide a package holiday to which Council Directive 90/314/EEC (1) of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and package tours applies, and that failure to perform or improper performance is the result of the actions of an employee of a hotel company which is a provider of services to which that contract relates: a) is there scope for the application of the defence set out in the second part of the third alinea to article 5(2); and, if so, b) by which criteria is the national court to assess whether that defence applies?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Poznaniu (Poland) lodged on 26 June 2019 – Kancelaria Medius SA, established in Kraków v RN

(Case C-495/19)

(2019/C 337/06)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Okręgowy w Poznaniu

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Kancelaria Medius SA, established in Kraków

Defendant: RN

Question referred

Should Article 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (1) be interpreted as precluding procedural rules under which a court may issue a default judgment on the basis merely of an applicant’s statements contained in the application, and which the court is obliged to accept as true, in a case where the defendant (a consumer), who has been duly notified of the date of the hearing, does not appear when summoned and does not mount a defence?

(1) OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia del País Vasco (Spain) lodged on 7 June 2019 — Vodafone España S.A.U. v Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa

(Case C-443/19)

(2019/C 328/12)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Superior de Justicia del País Vasco

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Vodafone España S.A.U.

Defendant: Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa

Question referred

Whether Article 13 and related and supplementary provisions of Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (1) must be interpreted as precluding the Kingdom of Spain, and specifically the fiscally autonomous historic territory of Guipúzcoa, from making telecommunications operators’ right of use of radio frequencies — which is already subject to what is known as the spectrum fee — subject to the general tax on capital transfers and documented legal acts that applies generally to administrative concessions of publicly owned assets, in accordance with local laws governing the said tax?

(1) OJ 2002 L 108, p. 21.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 19 June 2019 — UBS Real Estate Kapitalanlagegesellschaft mbH v Agenzia delle Entrate

(Case C-479/19)

(2019/C 357/13)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte suprema di cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: UBS Real Estate Kapitalanlagegesellschaft mbH

Respondent: Agenzia delle Entrate

Question referred

Does EU law — in particular the provisions of the Treaty concerning freedom of establishment and free movement of capital, as interpreted by the Court — preclude the application of a provision of national law, such as Article 35(10-ter) of Decree Law No 223/2006 (in so far as it grants relief on mortgage registration tax and the Land Registry fee only in respect of closed-end real estate investment funds)?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Potsdam (Germany) lodged on 11 July 2019 — Möbel Kraft GmbH & Co. KG v ML

(Case C-529/19)

(2019/C 348/07)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Potsdam

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Möbel Kraft GmbH & Co. KG

Defendant: ML

Question referred

Is the right of withdrawal under Article 16(c) of the Consumer Rights Directive (Directive 2011/83/EU) (1) also excluded where goods are made to the consumer’s specifications but the seller has not yet begun to manufacture the goods and would be making adjustments to them itself at the consumer’s premises, not through a third party? Does the answer depend on whether it would be possible to return the goods to the state they were in before customisation with only low dismantling costs, such as some 5 percent of the value of the goods?

(1) Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2011 L 304, p. 64).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 12 August 2019 — Istituto nazionale per l’assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavoro (INAIL) v Zennaro Giuseppe Legnami Sas di Zennaro Mauro & C.

(Case C-608/19)

(2019/C 357/31)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Istituto nazionale per l’assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavoro (INAIL)

Respondent: Zennaro Giuseppe Legnami Sas di Zennaro Mauro & C.

Question referred

Must the rules on the grant of aid laid down in Articles 3 and 6 of Regulation No 1407/2013 (1) be interpreted as meaning that it is possible for an applicant undertaking, which finds itself exceeding the maximum permissible ceiling on account of the cumulation with previous financial assistance, to opt — up to the actual payment of the financial assistance applied for — to reduce the funding (by amending or varying the project) or to forgo (in full or in part) previous financial assistance, possibly already received, in order to fall below the maximum limit payable; and must those provisions be interpreted as meaning that the various options proposed (variation or forgoing) apply even if they are not expressly provided for in the national legislation and/or in the public notice relating to the grant of aid?

(1) Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid (OJ 2013 L 352, p. 1).
(4)

Once the sale at auction has been approved and the property awarded, possibly to the same creditor, and the ownership of the property provided as security, already realised, has even been transferred, is it compatible with EU law to apply an interpretation according to which (i) after the proceedings have concluded and the objective of such proceedings has been fulfilled, that is to say, the security has been realised, a debtor may make further applications for a declaration that an unfair term is invalid, entailing an effect on the enforcement proceedings or (ii) after the transfer has been completed, possibly in favour of the same creditor, and entered in the Land Registry, a court may of its own motion carry out a review which results in the entire enforcement proceedings being annulled or ultimately affects the amounts covered by the mortgage, potentially affecting the terms under which the bids were made?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 13 May 2019 by Wirecard Technologies GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 13 March 2019 in Case T-297/18: Wirecard Technologies GmbH v EUIPO – Striatum Ventures

(Case C-375/19 P)

(2019/C 363/07)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Wirecard Technologies GmbH (represented by: A. Bayer, Rechtsanwalt)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Striatum Ventures

By order of 10 September 2019 the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal is not allowed to proceed.
First ground of appeal, alleging retroactive application in defavorem of subsequent case-law in order to declare the action inadmissible

In order to dismiss the action, the judgment under appeal retroactively, unfavourably and unlawfully applied case-law of the Court from the period after the action was brought, even though the action was explicitly described as admissible under the previously existing situation.
The General Court erred in law in finding, in breach of Articles 107 and 108(2) TFEU, of the obligation to state reasons, of the rights of the defence and of the right to an effective remedy, and in distorting the facts and evidence, that there had been an open, transparent, non-discriminatory and unconditional tender. The market price was not determined in that way. That should have raised doubts which should have led the Commission to initiate the formal investigation procedure.