Provisional text

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Grand Chamber)

27 July 2022 ( )

[Text rectified by order of 14 October 2022]

(Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine – Temporary prohibition of broadcasting and suspension of authorisations for the broadcasting of content by certain media outlets – Listing of entities to which the restrictive measures apply – Competence of the Council – Rights of the defence – Right to be heard – Freedom of expression and information – Proportionality – Freedom to conduct a business – Principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality)

In Case T‑125/22,

RT France, established in Boulogne-Billancourt (France), represented by E. Piwnica and M. Nguyen Chanh, lawyers,

applicant,

v

Council of the European Union, represented by S. Lejeune, R. Meyer and S. Emmerechts, acting as Agents,

defendant,

supported by

Kingdom of Belgium, represented by C. Pochet, M. Van Regemorter and L. Van den Broeck, acting as Agents,

by

Republic of Estonia, represented by N. Grünberg and M. Kriisa, acting as Agents,

by

French Republic, represented by A.-L. Desjonquères, J.-L. Carré, W. Zemamta and T. Stéhelin, acting as Agents,

by

Republic of Latvia, represented by K. Pommere, J. Davidoviča, I. Hūna, D. Ciemiņa and V. Borodiņeca, acting as Agents,

by

[Text rectified by order of 14 October 2022] Republic of Lithuania, represented by K. Dieninis and V. Kazlauskaitė-Švenčionienė, acting as Agents,

by

Republic of Poland, represented by B. Majczyna and A. Miłkowska, acting as Agents,

by

European Commission, represented by D. Calleja Crespo, V. Di Bucci, J.‑F. Brakeland and M. Carpus Carcea, acting as Agents,

and by

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, represented by F. Hoffmeister, L. Havas and M.A. De Almeida Veiga, acting as Agents,

interveners,

THE GENERAL COURT (Grand Chamber),

composed of S. Papasavvas, President, H. Kanninen, V. Tomljenović, S. Gervasoni, D. Spielmann, S. Frimodt Nielsen, J. Schwarcz, E. Buttigieg, U. Öberg, R. Mastroianni (Rapporteur), M. Brkan, I. Gâlea, I. Dimitrakopoulos, D. Kukovec and S. Kingston, Judges,

Registrar: E. Coulon,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 10 June 2022,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, RT France, seeks the annulment of Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/351 of 1 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 65, p. 5, ‘the contested decision’) and of Council Regulation (EU) 2022/350 of 1 March 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 65, p. 1, ‘the contested regulation’) (together ‘the contested acts’), in so far as those acts relate to the applicant.

Background to the dispute

2 The applicant is a single-shareholder simplified limited company established in France, whose activity consists in the publication of specialised television channels. The applicant’s entire share capital is held by the association ANO ‘TV Novosti’ (‘TV Novosti’), an autonomous not-for-profit association in the Russian Federation, without share capital, having its headquarters in Moscow (Russia), which is almost entirely funded by the budget of the Russian State.

3 On 2 September 2015, the applicant entered into an agreement with the Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel (Audiovisual High Council (CSA), France), now the Autorité de régulation de la communication audiovisuelle et numérique (Authority for the regulation of audiovisual and digital communication (Arcom), France), for the broadcasting of the terrestrial television service called RT France. It has been operational in France since 2017 and its content is also broadcast in all French-speaking countries via satellite or the internet.

4 In March 2014, the Russian Federation unlawfully annexed the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and has since engaged in continued destabilisation actions in eastern Ukraine. In retaliation, the European Union has introduced restrictive measures in view of the actions of the Russian Federation, restrictive measures in view of actions compromising or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and restrictive measures in response to the illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation.

5 From the spring of 2021 onwards, the situation on the border between Russia and Ukraine became tense, with the deployment by the Russian Federation of substantial military forces near its border with Ukraine.

6 In its conclusions of 24 and 25 June 2021, the European Council called on the Russian Federation to fully assume its responsibility in ensuring the full implementation of the ‘Minsk Agreements’ as the key condition for any substantial change in the Union’s stance. It emphasised the need for a ‘firm and coordinated response by the EU and its Member States to any further malign, illegal and disruptive activity by Russia, making full use of all instruments at the [European Union]’s disposal, and ensuring coordination with partners’. To that end, the European Council also invited the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘the High Representative’) to present options for additional restrictive measures, including economic sanctions.

7 In the conclusions adopted at the meeting held on 16 December 2021, the European Council stressed the urgent need for the Russian Federation to de-escalate tensions caused by the military build-up along its border with Ukraine. It reiterated its full support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. While encouraging diplomatic efforts, the European Council stated that any further military aggression against Ukraine would have massive consequences and severe cost in response, including restrictive measures coordinated with partners.

8 On 24 January 2022, the Council of the European Union approved conclusions in which it had condemned the Russian Federation’s continued aggressive actions and threats against Ukraine, and called on the Russian Federation to de-escalate the situation, abide by international law and engage constructively in dialogue through the established international mechanisms. Recalling the conclusions of the European Council of 16 December 2021, the Council reaffirmed that any further military aggression would have massive consequences and severe costs, including through a wide array of sectoral and individual restrictive measures that would be adopted in coordination with partners.

9 On 15 February 2022, the Gosudarstvennaya Duma Federal’nogo Sobrania Rossiskoï Federatsii (State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation) voted in favour of asking President Vladimir Putin to recognise as independent States the parts of eastern Ukraine claimed by separatists.

10 On 21 February 2022, the President of the Russian Federation signed a decree recognising the independence and sovereignty of the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and the ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ and ordered that Russian military forces be deployed in those areas.

11 On 22 February 2022, the High Representative published a declaration on behalf of the European Union condemning those actions, since they constituted a serious violation of international law. The High Representative announced that the European Union would respond to those latest violations by the Russian Federation by adopting additional restrictive measures as a matter of urgency.

12 On 23 February 2022, the Council adopted a first package of restrictive measures. Those measures concerned, first, restrictions applicable to economic relations with the non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk; second, restrictions on access to capital markets, in particular by prohibiting the financing of the Russian Federation, its Government and its Central Bank; and, third, the addition of members of the government, banks, businesspersons, generals and 336 Members of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation to the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures.

13 On 24 February 2022, the President of the Russian Federation announced a military operation in Ukraine and on the same day Russian armed forces attacked Ukraine at a number of places in the country.

14 On the same date, the High Representative published a declaration on behalf of the European Union condemning the ‘unprovoked invasion’ of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation and stated that the European Union’s response would include both sectoral and individual restrictive measures. In its conclusions adopted at its special meeting on the same day, the European Council condemned in the strongest possible terms that ‘unprovoked and unjustified … aggression’, being of the view that, by its illegal military actions, to which the European Council had to react, the Russian Federation was grossly violating international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter and undermining European and global security and stability. It demanded, in particular, that the Russian Federation stop its disinformation campaign, and agreed on further restrictive measures covering a number of sectors and having massive and severe consequences for the Russian Federation.

15 On 25 February 2022, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe decided to suspend the Russian Federation from its rights of representation within the Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, signed at London on 5 May 1949, with immediate effect as regards its rights of representation in the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

16 In his statement of the same day, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) reminded all sides conducting hostilities on the territory of Ukraine that, pursuant to the declaration lodged on 8 September 2015 accepting jurisdiction of that court, he would have jurisdiction over and would investigate any act of genocide, crime against humanity or war crime committed within the territory of Ukraine since 20 February 2014.

17 On the same date, the Council adopted a second package of restrictive measures. These included, first, a number of individual measures against politicians and businesspersons involved in undermining the integrity of the Ukrainian territory; second, a number of restrictive measures applicable in the fields of finance, defence, energy, the aviation sector and the space industry; and third, a number of measures suspending the application of certain provisions of the Agreement providing for facilitations for certain categories of citizens of the Russian Federation applying for short-stay visas.

18 On 28 February 2022, the Prosecutor of the ICC announced his decision to seek authorisation to open an investigation into the situation in Ukraine, on the basis of his office’s earlier conclusions arising from a preliminary examination, as he was satisfied that there was a reasonable basis to believe that the alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed in relation to the events already assessed during the preliminary examination.

19 Between 28 February and 1 March 2022, the Council adopted a third package of restrictive measures, namely individual and economic measures involving, in particular, the closure of European Union airspace to Russian aircraft, the financial messaging system SWIFT and the resources of the Russian Central Bank.

20 On 1 March 2022, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the Russian aggression against Ukraine (2022/2564(RSP)), in which, inter alia, it condemned in the strongest possible terms the Russian Federation’s ‘illegal, unprovoked and unjustified military aggression’ against and invasion of Ukraine, and demanded that the Russian Federation immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all military and paramilitary forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and fully respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders; underlined that the military aggression and invasion constituted a serious violation of international law and called for the scope of sanctions to be broadened, and also underlined that the sanctions were aimed at strategically weakening the Russian economy and industrial base, in particular the military-industrial complex and thereby the ability of the Russian Federation to threaten international security in the future. In point 31 of that resolution, the Parliament also condemned the use of information warfare by Russian authorities, state media and proxies to create division with denigrating content and false narratives about the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Ukraine, with the aim of creating plausible deniability for the Russian ‘atrocities’, and called on all Member States therefore to immediately suspend broadcast licensing to all Russian state media channels, including the rebroadcasting thereof.

21 Against that background, on 1 March 2022 the Council adopted, on the basis of Article 29 TEU, the contested decision and, on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, the contested regulation, in order to prohibit continuous and concerted propaganda actions in support of military aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation, targeted at civil society in the European Union and neighbouring countries, channelled through a number of media outlets under the permanent direct or indirect control of the leadership of the Russian Federation, since such actions constituted a threat to the EU’s public order and security.

22 Recitals 1 to 11 of the contested acts set out the circumstances that preceded the adoption of the restrictive measures which they lay down (‘the restrictive measures at issue’). More specifically, recitals 5 to 11 of the contested decision are worded as follows:

‘(5) In its conclusions of 10 May 2021, the Council underlined the need to further strengthen the Union’s and Member States’ resilience as well as their ability to counter hybrid threats, including disinformation, ensuring the coordinated and integrated use of existing and possible new tools for countering hybrid threats at Union and Member States’ level, and possible responses in the field of hybrid threats including, inter alia, to foreign interference and influence operations, which may cover preventive measures as well as the imposition of costs on hostile state and non-state actors.

(6) The Russian Federation has engaged in a systematic, international campaign of media manipulation and distortion of facts in order to enhance its strategy of destabilisation of its neighbouring countries and of the Union and its Member States. In particular, the propaganda has repeatedly and consistently targeted European political parties, especially during election periods, as well as targeting civil society, asylum seekers, Russian ethnic minorities, gender minorities, and the functioning of democratic institutions in the Union and its Member States.

(7) In order to justify and support its aggression against Ukraine, the Russian Federation has engaged in continuous and concerted propaganda actions targeted at civil society in the Union and neighbouring countries, gravely distorting and manipulating facts.

(8) Those propaganda actions have been channelled through a number of media outlets under the permanent direct or indirect control of the leadership of the Russian Federation. Such actions constitute a significant and direct threat to the Union’s public order and security.

(9) Those media outlets are essential and instrumental in bringing forward and supporting the aggression against Ukraine, and for the destabilisation of its neighbouring countries.

(10) In view of the gravity of the situation, and in response to Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, it is necessary, consistent with the fundamental rights and freedoms recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in particular with the right to freedom of expression and information as recognised in Article 11 thereof, to introduce further restrictive measures to urgently suspend the broadcasting activities of such media outlets in the Union, or directed at the Union. These measures should be maintained until the aggression against Ukraine is put to an end, and until the Russian Federation, and its associated media outlets, cease to conduct propaganda actions against the Union and its Member States.

(11) Consistent with the fundamental rights and freedoms recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in particular with the right to freedom of expression and information, the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property as recognised in Articles 11, 16 and 17 thereof, these measures do not prevent those media outlets and their staff from carrying out other activities in the Union than broadcasting, such as research and interviews. In particular, these measures do not modify the obligation to respect the rights, freedoms and principles referred to in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, including in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and in Member States’ constitutions, within their respective fields of application.’

23 Article 4g of Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 13), as amended by the contested decision, reads as follows:

‘1. It shall be prohibited for operators to broadcast, or to enable, facilitate or otherwise contribute to broadcast, any content by the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex IX, including through transmission or distribution by any means such as cable, satellite, IP-TV, internet service providers, internet video-sharing platforms or applications, whether new or pre-installed.

2. Any broadcasting licence or authorisation, transmission and distribution arrangement with the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex IX shall be suspended.’

24 The applicant’s name was included in Annex IX of Decision 2014/512, as amended by the contested decision.

25 Article 2f of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 1), as amended by the contested regulation, reads as follows:

‘1. It shall be prohibited for operators to broadcast or to enable, facilitate or otherwise contribute to broadcast, any content by the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex XV, including through transmission or distribution by any means such as cable, satellite, IP-TV, internet service providers, internet video-sharing platforms or applications, whether new or pre-installed.

2. Any broadcasting licence or authorisation, transmission and distribution arrangement with the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex XV shall be suspended.’

26 The applicant’s name was included in Annex XV to Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by the contested regulation.

27 In application of those provisions, the broadcast by any means of content originating with, inter alia, the applicant was temporarily prohibited in all countries of the European Union.

28 In accordance with Article 9 thereof, Decision 2014/512, as amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/327 of 25 February 2022 (OJ 2022 L 48, p. 1), is to apply until 31 July 2022 and is to be kept under constant review. It is to be renewed, or amended as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met.

Procedure and forms of order sought

29 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 8 March 2022, the applicant brought the present action.

30 By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on the same day, the applicant submitted an application for interim measures. That application was dismissed by order of 30 March 2022, RT France v Council (T‑125/22 R, not published, EU:T:2022:199), on the grounds that the condition relating to urgency had not been satisfied and that the balance of interests at stake weighed in favour of the Council. Costs were reserved.

31 By decision of 22 March 2022, the General Court (Fifth Chamber) decided, of its own motion and after hearing the parties, to adjudicate under an expedited procedure, pursuant to Article 151(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

32 On a proposal from the President of the General Court, the latter decided, in application of Article 28 of the Rules of Procedure, to refer the case to the Grand Chamber.

33 As three members of the Grand Chamber were prevented from sitting, the President of the General Court designated three other judges to complete the Chamber.

34 On 3 May 2022, the Council lodged its defence.

35 By way of measures of organisation of procedure as provided for in Article 89(3) of the Rules of Procedure, notified to the applicant and the Council on 6 and 18 May 2022 respectively, those parties were allowed, pursuant to Article 154(3) of the Rules of Procedure, to lodge a reply and a rejoinder, confined to certain specific points.

36 The applicant lodged the reply on 16 May 2022 and the Council lodged the rejoinder on 25 May 2022.

37 By documents lodged at the Court Registry on 14, 18 and 30 March and also on 13 April and 10 and 13 May 2022, respectively, the Commission, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Poland, the French Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the High Representative, the Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of Latvia sought leave to intervene in the present proceedings in support of the form of order sought by the Council. The President of the Grand Chamber, by decisions of 4, 20 and 24 May 2022, granted leave to intervene to the Commission, the Kingdom of Belgium, the French Republic, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of Latvia, and, by order of 11 May 2022, to the High Representative.

38 On 25 May 2022, the written part of the procedure was closed.

39 By way of measures of organisation of procedure provided for in Article 89(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the parties were asked to answer at the hearing certain questions put to them.

40 Acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, the General Court (Grand Chamber) decided to open the oral part of the procedure and, of its own motion, that a hearing would be held.

41 The parties submitted oral argument and answered the oral questions put by the Court at the hearing on 10 June 2022.

42 The applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should:

– annul the contested acts in so far as they relate to it;

– order the Council to pay the costs.

43 The Council contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

44 The Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Estonia, the French Republic, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, the Commission and the High Representative submitted at the hearing that the action should be dismissed.

Law

45 In support of its action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law, alleging breach of, respectively, the rights of the defence, freedom of expression and information, freedom to conduct a business and the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. In the context of the second plea, it also expresses doubt, as an incidental point, as to the Council’s competence to adopt the contested acts. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the lack of competence of the authority which adopted the measure adversely affecting a party is a ground involving a matter of public policy which the Court must in any event examine of its own motion (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2016, SV Capital v EBA, C‑577/15 P, EU:C:2016:947, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited). The Court considers it appropriate to examine, in the first place, whether the Council was competent to adopt the contested acts.

The Council’s competence to adopt the contested acts

46 The applicant claims, in essence, that only the national regulatory authorities, in this instance Arcom, may intervene to impose sanctions on an audiovisual media outlet in respect of inappropriate editorial content.

47 The Council, supported by the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Estonia, the French Republic, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, the Commission and the High Representative, disputes the applicant’s arguments.

48 As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that Article 3(5) TEU provides as follows:

‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security … as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.’

49 As regards the contested decision, it should be observed that this is based on Article 29 TEU. That provision, inserted into Chapter 2 of Title V of the EU Treaty, on ‘Specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy’, confers on the Council the power to ‘adopt decisions which shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature’. In accordance with Article 23 TEU, the Union’s action on the international scene, pursuant to that chapter, is to be guided by the principles, pursue the objectives of, and be conducted in accordance with, the general provisions laid down in Chapter 1, including, according to Article 21(1) TEU, democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights, respect for human dignity, respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. Article 24(1) TEU states that ‘the Union’s competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security …’

50 According to the case-law, the combined effects of, on the one hand, Articles 21 and 23, Article 24(1) and Article 25 and the first subparagraph of Article 28(1) TEU and, on the other hand, Article 29 TEU, decisions which (i) come within the framework of the common foreign and security policy, as defined in Article 24(1) TEU, (ii) relate to ‘a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature’ and (iii) are not in the nature of ‘operational action’ within the meaning of Article 28 TEU constitute ‘approaches of the Union’ within the meaning of Article 29 TEU, namely actions entailing any operations, whether civil or military, led by one or more Member States, outside the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 41 and 46).

51 The concept of ‘approach of the Union’, within the meaning of Article 29 TEU, lends itself to a broad interpretation, so that, provided that the conditions set out in paragraph 50 above are met, not only acts programmatic in nature or mere declarations of intent, but also, in particular, decisions providing for measures capable of directly affecting the legal position of individuals may be adopted. That is, moreover, confirmed by the wording of the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU (judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraph 42).

52 In view of the broad scope of the aims and objectives of the common foreign and security policy, as expressed in Article 3(5) TEU and Article 21 TEU, and specific provisions relating to that policy, in particular Articles 23 and 24 TEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 March 2015, Ezz and Others v Council, C‑220/14 P, EU:C:2015:147, paragraph 46), the Council has a broad discretion in determining the persons and entities that are to be subject to the restrictive measures that the European Union adopts in the field of the common foreign and security policy (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 88). Thus, the Council cannot be criticised for having considered that, faced with the international crisis caused by the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine, suitable measures to respond to the serious threat to peace on the borders of the European Union and the violation of international law could include the temporary prohibition of the broadcasting of content of certain media outlets belonging, in particular, to the RT group of channels (‘the RT Group’), funded by the Russian State budget , on the ground that they supported that aggression by actions such as those referred to in recital 7 of the contested decision.

53 In fact, it follows from recital 8 of the contested decision that, in the Council’s assessment, such actions constituted a significant and direct threat to the EU’s public order and security, which justified its intervention within the framework of the competences which it exercises pursuant to Chapter 2 of Title V of the EU Treaty.

54 That intervention, as the Council made clear at the hearing, is therefore directly linked to the aims of the common foreign and security policy referred to in Article 21(2)(a) and (c) TEU, since it seeks, first, to safeguard the values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity of the European Union and, second, to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraphs 115 and 116).

55 As regards the objectives pursued by the Council, recitals 4 to 10 of the contested acts refer to the need to protect the Union and its Member States against disinformation and destabilisation campaigns conducted by the media outlets under the control of the leadership of the Russian Federation which threatened the Union’s public order and security, in a context marked by military aggression against Ukraine. Those objectives thus relate to public interests which aim to protect European society and form part of an overall strategy (see paragraphs 11, 12, 14, 17 and 19 above), which is designed to put an end, as quickly as possible, to the aggression suffered by Ukraine.

56 Since the propaganda and disinformation campaigns are capable of undermining the foundations of democratic societies and are an integral part of the arsenal of modern warfare, the restrictive measures at issue also form part of the pursuit by the European Union of the objectives assigned to it in Article 3(1) and (5) TEU.

57 By adopting the contested decision, the Council therefore exercised the competence attributed to the European Union by the Treaties under the provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy. That conclusion cannot be called in question by the fact, raised by the applicant, that according to French national legislation, the power to impose sanctions on a broadcaster in respect of inappropriate editorial content falls within the competence of Arcom. First, the competences of the European Union, including those relating to the common foreign and security policy, cannot be excluded by or predicated on the existence or exercise of powers attributed by national law to an administrative authority. Thus, the fact that a national administrative authority has competence to adopt sanctions does not preclude the competence conferred on the Council to adopt restrictive measures designed to prohibit, provisionally and reversibly, the broadcasting of the applicant’s content.

58 Second, it should be observed that the competence attributed to the national administrative authorities by domestic laws does not pursue the same objectives, is not based on the same premisses or the same values and cannot guarantee the same results as uniform and immediate intervention throughout the territory of the Union, such as that which can be achieved under the common foreign and security policy. It should also be noted that, in its operative part, the contested decision is addressed to operators that broadcast content of the applicant and of the other broadcasters listed in Annex IX, prohibiting them from broadcasting that content by any means, including cable, satellite and IP-TV (see paragraph 23 above). Inasmuch as such a prohibition applies irrespective of the Member State in which those operators are established and of the mode of broadcasting the applicant’s content, it follows that the result intended by the contested decision could not have been achieved via the national regulatory authorities, the competence of which is limited to the territory of the Member State to which each of them belongs.

59 Furthermore, although the applicant has not referred to the division of the Union’s internal competences, the adoption of a decision by the Council under Article 29 TEU cannot be called in question by the possibility for the Union to intervene, in the field of audiovisual services, on the basis of other categories of competences governed by the FEU Treaty, in particular the competences attributed to the Union for the regulation of the internal market, under Article 4(2) TFEU.

60 In that regard, it is sufficient to recall that, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 40 TEU, the implementation of the policies listed in Articles 3 to 6 TFEU is not to affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences under the common foreign and security policy.

61 It follows that the Union’s competences under the common foreign and security policy and under other provisions of the FEU Treaty coming within the third part of that Treaty, dealing with the Union’s policies and internal actions, are not mutually exclusive, but are complementary, each having its own scope, and aim to achieve different objectives (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 19 July 2012, Parliament v Council, C‑130/10, EU:C:2012:472, paragraph 66).

62 As regards the Council’s competence to adopt the contested regulation, it must be observed that, according to Article 215(2) TFEU, where a decision, adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the EU Treaty, so provides, the Council may adopt restrictive measures against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State entities (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 June 2016, CW v Council, T‑224/14, not published, EU:T:2016:375, paragraph 68).

63 In the present case, in so far as the Council could validly adopt the contested decision on the basis of Article 29 TEU, it follows that the adoption of the contested regulation on the basis of Article 215(2) TFEU was necessary, as is apparent from recital 12 of that regulation, to ensure its uniform application throughout the territory of the Union. In fact, since the restrictive measures at issue can be implemented only by imposing on economic operators a temporary prohibition on the broadcasting of the applicant’s audiovisual content, it is clear, as emphasised by certain interveners, that the uniform implementation of the temporary prohibition of the broadcasting of the applicant’s content throughout the territory of the European Union could be better achieved at EU level than at national level. In that regard, it should also be observed that, contrary to the applicant’s claim, the measures adopted by the Council in the present case cannot be considered to be a total interruption of economic and financial relations with a third country, pursuant to Article 215(1) TFEU, since, as has been stated above, the contested regulation was adopted on the basis of Article 215(2) TFEU.

64 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the complaint alleging that the Council lacks competence must be rejected as unfounded.

The first plea, alleging breach of the rights of the defence

65 The applicant takes issue with the Council for having adopted the contested acts in breach of the applicant’s rights of defence and of the adversarial principle inherent in those rights. First, respect for the rights of the defence, guaranteed by Articles 41 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), required that the Council hear the applicant before adopting those acts, or at least allow it to submit comments, after having had access to the case file. Second, respect for the right to effective judicial protection, guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter, required that the applicant be able to ascertain the grounds on which the Council proposed to base its decision to include the applicant’s name on the lists at issue before it adopted that decision.

66 In the applicant’s submission, the contested acts undeniably undermine its interests, in a serious and irreversible manner, giving rise to dramatic economic, financial and human consequences, since the applicant is no longer in a position to carry on its activity. It also claims that the contested acts cause serious harm to its reputation, since it is presented in those acts as a media outlet under the permanent and exclusive control of the Russian leadership, which discredits it in the exercise of its activity.

67 It is argued that, as it was given no prior individual notification of the restrictive measures at issue, the applicant was deprived of its rights. In addition, there was no official, or even informal, contact, by political or institutional representatives, be it at European or at national level, before the contested acts were adopted.

68 In the reply, the applicant claims, in essence, that the reasoning on which the contested acts are based is circular and tautological, and insufficient in the light of the requirements of the case-law of the Courts of the European Union. Moreover, in the defence, the Council merely paraphrases, or indeed re-transcribes, the recitals of those acts, while those acts, according to the applicant, do not demonstrate or justify the propaganda activity in which it is alleged to have taken part. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant was able to bring the present action, together with an application for interim measures, cannot prove that it was sufficiently informed by the grounds on which the temporary broadcasting ban at issue was based.

69 Furthermore, the applicant takes the view that the context of extreme urgency linked with the launch of the military aggression against Ukraine, on which the Council relies, is not in itself sufficient to justify the breach of its rights of defence and its right to effective judicial protection.

70 In the applicant’s submission, the general and absolute prohibition on broadcasting to which it is subject is purely symbolic and cannot be regarded as a reaction that would restore peace and stability on the European continent. Such a prohibition is in no way necessary to achieving the aim which it claims to pursue and has the attributes of a targeted restrictive measure that should have been taken with due regard for the applicant’s rights of defence. Nor does the fact that the applicant has the benefit of effective judicial review, before an impartial tribunal, compensate for the irregularity affecting the procedure for the adoption of the contested acts.

71 As regards, lastly, the arguments which the applicant could have put forward if it had been heard, or if it had been able to ascertain the grounds before the contested acts were adopted, the applicant claims that it would have been able to show, first, the balance which it had respected in the choice of participants and what was said in its media and, second, the veracity of the words used. Furthermore, the fact that it was never penalised by Arcom is tangible proof that the content broadcast did not constitute propaganda. In the light of those arguments, it submits that the procedure could have had a different outcome.

72 The Council, supported by the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Estonia, the French Republic, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, la Commission and the High Representative, disputes the applicant’s arguments.

73 Following the clarification provided in the reply, the first plea must be regarded as consisting, in essence, of two parts, alleging, first, inadequate statement of reasons justifying the adoption of the contested acts with respect to the applicant and, second, failure to have regard to the applicant’s right to be heard before the contested acts were adopted.

74 It is appropriate to examine, first of all, the second part of the first plea.

The second part, alleging, in essence, failure to have regard to the applicant’s right to be heard

75 The right to be heard in all proceedings, laid down in Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter, which is inherent in respect for the rights of the defence, guarantees every person the opportunity to make known his or her views effectively during an administrative procedure and before the adoption of a decision in relation to that person that is liable to affect his or her interests adversely (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 December 2014, Boudjlida, C‑249/13, EU:C:2014:2431, paragraphs 34 and 36, and of 18 June 2020, Commission v RQ, C‑831/18 P, EU:C:2020:481, paragraphs 65 and 67 and the case-law cited).

76 In proceedings relating to the adoption of the decision to list the name of an individual in the annex to an act imposing restrictive measures, respect for the rights of the defence requires that the competent EU authority disclose to the individual concerned the grounds and the evidence against that person on which that authority proposes to base its decision. When that disclosure takes place, the competent EU authority must ensure that that individual is placed in a position in which he or she may effectively make known his or her views on the grounds advanced against him or her (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 111 and 112).

77 Article 52(1) of the Charter nevertheless allows limitations on the exercise of the rights enshrined in the Charter, subject to the conditions that the limitation concerned respects the essence of the fundamental right in question and, subject to the principle of proportionality, that it is necessary and genuinely meets objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union (see judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 101 and the case-law cited). In that regard, the Court of Justice has held on a number of occasions that the rights of the defence might be subject to limitations or derogations, both in the sphere of the restrictive measures adopted in the context of the common foreign and security policy (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2011, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited) and in other spheres (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 June 2006, Dokter and Others, C‑28/05, EU:C:2006:408, paragraphs 75 and 76, and of 10 September 2013, G. and R., C‑383/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:533, paragraph 33).

78 Furthermore, the question whether there is a breach of the rights of the defence must be examined in relation to the specific circumstances of each particular case, including the nature of the act at issue, the context of its adoption and the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited).

79 It should be observed at the outset that, in the context of this part of its plea, the applicant cites, in one passage of the application, Article 48 of the Charter, entitled ‘Presumption of innocence and right of defence’, but without raising any specific supporting arguments. In that regard, it should be noted that the applicant has failed to explain in what respect it might rely on Article 48(2) of the Charter or derive a different protection from the Charter than it could derive from the application of Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter, or greater protection than that protection. In those circumstances, it is not necessary to examine a claim alleging infringement of Article 48 of the Charter independently (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 September 2015, First Islamic Investment Bank v Council, T‑161/13, EU:T:2015:667, paragraph 68).

80 As regards respect for the right to be heard, it is apparent from the case-law that, in the case of the initial decision placing a person’s or an entity’s name on the list of persons and entities whose funds are frozen, the Council is not required to inform the person or entity concerned beforehand of the grounds on which it intends to rely in order to list that person or entity. So that its effectiveness may not be jeopardised, such a measure must be able to take advantage of a surprise effect and to apply immediately (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2011, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 61). Upon application to the Council, the person or entity concerned also has the right to make known his or her view on that evidence after the measure has been adopted (judgment of 20 February 2013, Melli Bank v Council, T‑492/10, EU:T:2013:80, paragraph 72).

81 Such a derogation from the fundamental right to be heard during a procedure preceding the adoption of restrictive measures is justified by the need to ensure that the freezing measures are effective and, in short, by overriding considerations to do with safety or the conduct of the international relations of the Union and of its Member States (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2011, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).

82 In the present case, in the first place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the Council ought to have notified it individually of the contested acts, since those acts provide for restrictive measures against the applicant, it must be noted that while the absence of individual communication of those acts may have an impact on the point at which time started to run for the purposes of bringing an action, this does not in itself justify the annulment of the contested acts. In that regard, the applicant has failed to put forward any arguments that would demonstrate that, in the present case, the failure to communicate those acts individually resulted in a breach of its rights that would justify the annulment of those acts in so far as they concern it (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2018, DenizBank v Council, T‑798/14, EU:T:2018:546, paragraph 92 and the case-law cited).

83 In the second place, as regards the Council’s failure to communicate the grounds and evidence supporting the adoption of the restrictive measures against the applicant before the restrictive measures at issue were adopted and the alleged breach of the applicant’s right to be heard, it should be observed that those measures consist in a temporary prohibition on broadcasting and not in the freezing of individual funds.

84 While a derogation from the fundamental right to respect for the right to be heard has been allowed by the case-law in the case of an initial decision to freeze funds, which must, by its very nature, be able to have a surprise effect and to apply immediately in order, in essence, not to jeopardise its effectiveness (see paragraph 80 above), there is nothing to preclude such a derogation from also being allowed where, in the light of the specific circumstances of a particular case, characterised by the need to intervene with the utmost urgency, the immediate implementation of a measure is essential in order to ensure its effectiveness in the light of the objectives which it pursues and in particular to ensure that it is not deprived of impact and effectiveness.

85 In the present case, it is necessary to ascertain whether, having regard to the requirements stemming from Article 3(1) and (5) TEU and Article 21(1) and (2)(a) and (c) TEU, relating, inter alia, to safeguarding the values of the European Union and its security and to preserving international peace and security in compliance with international law and, in particular, the principles of the United Nations Charter, the fact that the applicant was not informed in advance of the Council’s decision to prohibit it temporarily from any form of broadcasting of content constituted a breach of its right to be heard.

86 In that regard, on the one hand, first, it must be noted that the restrictive measures at issue were adopted in an extraordinary context of extreme urgency (see paragraphs 9 to 18 above), to which reference is made in recitals 10 and 11 of the contested acts, in which the Council also weighs up the different interests involved, taking into account, in particular, respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms recognised in the Charter. Second, in that context, the restrictive measures at issue are an integral part of a package of measures of unprecedented scope adopted by the Council between the last week of February, during which the first violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity took place on 21 February 2022, when the Russian President recognised the independence and sovereignty of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and ordered Russian armed forces to enter those areas (see paragraphs 10 to 12 above), and the beginning of March 2022. As the Council rightly emphasises, the rapid escalation of the situation and the gravity of the violations made any form of modulation of the restrictive measures designed to prevent the conflict from spreading difficult. In that context, the European Union therefore responded rapidly to a violation of obligations imposed erga omnes by international law in order to counter, using all the measures at its disposal that did not involve the use of force, the military aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation.

87 Furthermore, the adoption of the restrictive measures at issue immediately after the military aggression began, in order to ensure their full effectiveness, also met the requirement to put in place multiple forms of rapid response to that aggression, particularly in view of the fact, highlighted by the Council and the High Representative at the hearing, that at that time the aggression was perceived as likely to be short-lived. In that context, it should be observed that, as the Council claimed at the hearing, in view of that requirement, it would have been unable to give the applicant sufficient time to submit its observations before the contested acts were adopted without jeopardising the effectiveness of the restrictive measures at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 July 2020, Ocean Capital Administration and Others v Council, T‑332/15, not published, EU:T:2020:308, paragraph 191). Thus, in the context of the European Union’s overall strategy of responding in a rapid, united, graduated and coordinated manner, the requirements of urgency and effectiveness of all the restrictive measures adopted justified the limitation, on the basis of Article 52(1) of the Charter (see paragraph 77 above), of the application of Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter, inasmuch as they responded effectively to objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union, such as protecting the Union’s public order and security, as stated in recital 8 of the contested acts.

88 On the other hand, as the Council rightly emphasises, in a strategy of countering so-called ‘hybrid’ threats, already mentioned by the Council in its conclusions of 10 May 2021 (see recital 5 of the contested acts), the requirement to adopt restrictive measures against media outlets, such as the applicant, funded by the Russian State budget and directly or indirectly controlled by the leadership of that country, which is the aggressor country, in that they were considered to be at the root of a continuous and concerted activity of disinformation and manipulation of the facts, became, following the launch of the armed conflict, overriding and urgent, in order to preserve the integrity of democratic debate in European society.

89 It should be observed, as the Council, the High Representative and other interveners have, that the intense media coverage during the first days of the military aggression against Ukraine, as is apparent from the various items of evidence, drawn from public sources, placed on the case file by the Council, took place at a critical time when the actions of a media outlet, such as the applicant, were liable to have a significant harmful effect on public opinion, also giving rise to a potential threat to the Union’s public order and security.

90 In that regard, account should also be taken of the fact that the audiovisual media, which may, in particular, suggest, by the way in which they present the information, how their audience should assess it, have a much more immediate and powerful effect than the print media, since they are able to convey through images messages which the print media are not able to impart (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 5 April 2022, NIT S.R.L. v. Republic of Moldova, CE:ECHR:2022:0405JUD002847012, §§ 181 and 182 and the case-law cited).

91 Thus, in the very particular circumstances of the present case, set out in paragraphs 86 to 90 above, the Council rightly decided, on a proposal from the High Representative and the Commission, to intervene with the utmost rapidity, from the first days of the outbreak of war, to avoid the risk of the effectiveness of the restrictive measures at issue being seriously jeopardised or indeed, in essence, nullified, by prohibiting, in particular, the broadcasting of content of, inter alia, the applicant, with the aim of temporarily suspending the activity of such a vehicle for propaganda, in support of the military aggression against Ukraine, on the territory of the European Union.

92 In the light of all of the foregoing, having regard to the quite exceptional context in which the contested acts were adopted, namely that of the outbreak of a war at the borders of the Union, the objective which they pursue and the effectiveness of the restrictive measures which they lay down, it must be concluded that the EU authorities were not required to hear the applicant before initially placing its name on the lists at issue and, consequently, that there was no breach of the applicant’s right to be heard.

93 In any event, according to settled case-law, a breach of the rights of the defence, in particular of the right to be heard, does not result in the annulment of the act in question unless, had it not been for that irregularity, even if proven, the outcome of the administrative procedure that preceded the adoption of the act might have been different, which it is for the person relying on such a breach to demonstrate (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 September 2013, G. and R., C‑383/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:533, paragraph 38; of 25 June 2020, Vnesheconombank v Council, C‑731/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:500, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited, and of 13 September 2018, Sberbank of Russia v Council, T‑732/14, EU:T:2018:541, paragraph 125 and the case-law cited).

94 The Courts of the EU must – where an irregularity affecting the right to be heard is alleged to have occurred – assess whether, in the light of the factual and legal circumstances of the case, the outcome of the procedure at issue could have been different (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 September 2013, G. and R., C‑383/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:533, paragraph 40, and of 12 February 2020, Kibelisa Ngambasai v Council, T‑169/18, not published, EU:T:2020:58, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited).

95 In the present case, it should be observed that the grounds on which the Council relied in order to impose the restrictive measures at issue, which are set out in the recitals of the contested acts, consist essentially in the fact that the applicant is a media outlet funded by the budget of the Russian Federation and under the permanent control of the Russian leadership. In addition, the Council considered that the applicant, along with the other entities the names of which appeared in the annexes to the contested acts, engaged in propaganda actions in support, in particular, of the military aggression against Ukraine. In support of those grounds, the Council has placed on the case file, as annexes to its defence, several items of evidence relating both to the permanent control of the applicant and to its propaganda activity.

96 It must be pointed out that the evidence in question consists of television programmes broadcast by the applicant and articles published on its website, which were broadcast to the public, in particular during the period around the launch of the war and the days immediately afterwards. In the light of that evidence, the Council rightly considered that the content broadcast by the applicant entailed an activity of support for the military aggression against Ukraine (see paragraphs 172 to 188 below). Accordingly, it must be held that, even if the applicant had been given a hearing, its observations would not have altered the fact that those broadcasts had taken place, that those articles had been published and, in short, that that content had been broadcast to the public within the European Union.

97 Furthermore, in the reply and, at the hearing, in answer to a question put by the Court, the applicant claimed that the arguments and evidence which it would have been able to put forward if it had been heard or if it had been aware of the grounds before the contested acts were adopted were the same as those relied on in its written pleadings and were intended to demonstrate the balance which it observed in the choice of participants and in the words relayed in its media and, moreover, the veracity of the words used. However, as the Council emphasises in the rejoinder, although the evidence on which the applicant relies shows the existence of sequences which present other viewpoints on the situation in Ukraine, those sequences are not capable of showing that, overall, the applicant’s media coverage of the aggression maintained a balance in so far as concerns the choice of participants, content, images and views communicated in those sequences (see paragraphs 189 and 190 below).

98 Lastly, the fact that the applicant has never been the subject of sanctions imposed by Arcom is irrelevant and, in any event, is not capable of showing that the programmes contained in the videos placed on the case file by the Council did not constitute propaganda actions in support of the military aggression against Ukraine.

99 It follows that, having regard to the circumstances of the present case and all the evidence adduced by the applicant and the Council, no argument relied upon by the applicant can show that the outcome of the procedure could have been different if the applicant had been heard before the measures at issue were adopted or if the grounds relating to the application of those measures had been disclosed to it beforehand.

100 In the light of all of the foregoing, the second part of the first plea, alleging, in essence, breach of the rights of the defence, must be rejected.

The first part, alleging inadequacy of the statement of reasons on which the contested acts are based with respect to the applicant

101 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, in the context of this part of the plea, the applicant merely relies on the right to effective judicial protection, but without putting forward any specific supporting arguments. In that regard, there is no need to examine independently a complaint alleging breach of the right to effective judicial protection (see paragraph 79 above).

102 As regards the alleged inadequacy of the statement of reasons on which the contested acts are based, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, the purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which an act adversely affecting an applicant is based, which is a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence, is, first, to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the act is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested before the Courts of the European Union and, second, to enable those Courts to review the legality of that act (see judgment of 14 April 2021, Al-Tarazi v Council, T‑260/19, not published, EU:T:2021:187, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

103 It should also be borne in mind that the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU and by Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter must be appropriate to the nature of the act at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in receiving explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 17 September 2020, Rosneft and Others v Council, C‑732/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:727, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).

104 Thus, first, the reasons given for a decision adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that decision was adopted in circumstances known to the party concerned which enable him or her to understand the scope of the measure concerning him or her (see judgment of 17 September 2020, Rosneft and Others v Council, C‑732/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:727, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited). Second, the degree of precision of the statement of the reasons for a measure must be weighed against practical realities and the time and technical facilities available for taking the measure (see judgment of 13 September 2018, Sberbank of Russia v Council, T‑732/14, EU:T:2018:541, paragraph 93 and the case-law cited).

105 In addition, it has been made clear in the case-law that the statement of reasons for an act of the Council which imposed a restrictive measure had not only to identify the legal basis for that measure but also the actual and specific reasons why the Council considered, in the exercise of its discretion, that such a measure had to be adopted in respect of the person concerned (see judgment of 13 September 2018, Sberbank of Russia v Council, T‑732/14, EU:T:2018:541, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited).

106 In the present case, first, it should be borne in mind that the restrictive measures at issue relate to the content broadcast by certain audiovisual media outlets that are dependent on the Russian Federation – which include the applicant – and therefore form part of a context known to the applicant (see paragraphs 9 to 20 above).

107 In addition, as the Council rightly emphasises, first, recital 4 of the contested acts refers to the European Council’s conclusions of 24 February 2022 (see paragraph 14 above), whereby it condemned in the strongest possible terms the Russian Federation’s ‘unprovoked and unjustified … aggression’ against Ukraine, called for the urgent preparation and adoption of a further individual and economic sanctions package and demanded, in particular, that the Russian Federation immediately stop its disinformation campaign. Second, recital 5 of the contested acts refers to the Council’s conclusions of 10 May 2021 whereby the Council underlined the need to further strengthen the Union’s and Member States’ resilience as well as their ability to counter hybrid threats, including disinformation, and, inter alia, foreign interference and influence operations.

108 In addition, recitals 6 to 9 of the contested acts state the reasons for the designation of the legal persons, entities and bodies on the lists at issue. More specifically, recital 7 refers to the continuous and concerted propaganda actions of the Russian Federation targeted at, in particular, civil society in the Union in order to justify and support its aggression against Ukraine. Recitals 8 and 9 of the contested acts state that the media outlets subject to the measure temporarily prohibiting the broadcasting activities are those through which those propaganda activities have been channelled and which are under the permanent direct or indirect control of the leadership of the Russian Federation. Lastly, the latter recitals also set out the reasons underlying the adoption of the restrictive measures at issue, namely the fact that such actions constitute a significant and direct threat to the Union’s public order and security and that those media outlets are essential and instrumental in bringing forward and supporting the aggression against Ukraine and in destabilising neighbouring countries.

109 It follows from the wording of those recitals, especially in the context, known to the applicant, in which the contested acts were adopted, that the grounds stated are not general and abstract statements but grounds which relate directly to the applicant and its activities, which set out in a sufficiently precise manner the reasons why the restrictive measures at issue were adopted with regard to it.

110 Second, it should be borne in mind that the operative part of the contested acts, as set out in paragraphs 23 to 26 above, provide that it is to be prohibited for EU operators to broadcast, or to enable, facilitate or otherwise contribute to broadcast, any content by the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex IX to the contested decision and Annex XV to the contested regulation, including through transmission or distribution by any means such as cable, satellite, IP-TV, internet service providers, internet video-sharing platforms or applications, whether new or pre-installed. It must be stated that the aforementioned annexes to the contested acts contain no specific statement of reasons concerning each of the entities listed therein, the broadcasting of whose content is temporarily prohibited.

111 It must be held, however, that the ‘actual and specific reasons’ why the Council considered, in the exercise of its discretion, that the restrictive measures at issue had to be adopted with respect to the applicant, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 105 above, correspond in the present case to the criteria set out in recitals 6 to 9 of the contested acts.

112 The applicant was in fact mentioned solely because it satisfied the actual and specific reasons set out in recitals 6 to 9 of the contested acts, namely that it was a media outlet under the permanent direct or indirect control of the leadership of the Russian Federation, which engaged in propaganda actions the aim of which was, in particular, to justify and support the Russian Federation’s military aggression against Ukraine.

113 That statement of reasons is comprehensible and sufficiently precise, having regard to the specific context and the particularly serious and urgent conditions in which the contested acts were adopted, as to allow the applicant to know the reasons that led the Council to consider that the inclusion of its name on the lists at issue was justified in the light of the legal criteria applicable in the present case and to challenge the legality of its listing before the Courts of the European Union and to allow those Courts to exercise their power of review.

114 In those circumstances, the applicant was able properly to ascertain the actual and specific reasons that justified the adoption of the contested acts and therefore has no basis for claiming that the statement of reasons is inadequate in that regard.

115 The part of the first plea alleging inadequacy of the statement of reasons justifying the adoption of the contested acts with respect to the applicant must therefore be rejected as unfounded, and the first plea must therefore be rejected in its entirety.

The second plea, alleging infringement of freedom of expression and information

116 The applicant claims that the contested acts disregard the freedom of expression and information guaranteed by Article 11 of the Charter, which corresponds to Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’).

117 The applicant observes that, according to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECtHR’), freedom of expression and information is one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the fundamental conditions of progress and development for all, so that interference by the State would not be necessary in such a society if it had the effect of deterring the press from contributing to an open discussion of issues of public interest. In the applicant’s submission, it also follows from the case-law of the ECtHR that, in the field of audiovisual broadcasting, the State is required to guarantee access by the public, via television and radio, to a variety of opinions and comments that reflect, in particular, the diversity of public opinion in the country and also to ensure that journalists and other audiovisual media professionals are protected against obstacles to the communication of that information and those comments. Thus, the public authorities should refrain from restricting information media, whatever they may be. Like the ECHR, the Charter is opposed as a matter of principle to any prohibition of publication and broadcasting.

118 In its reply, in the first place, the applicant claims that the restrictive measures at issue are not appropriate for the pursuit of the twofold general interest objective on which the Council relies, namely (i) the objective of countering a hybrid threat from the Russian Federation and (ii) an objective of preserving peace and strengthening international security. In that regard, the applicant claims that it has committed no act that would justify the imposition of the restrictive measures at issue and that those measures represent only a ‘political gesture’.

119 In the second place, the applicant maintains that the measure to which it is subject constitutes an excessive restriction of freedom of expression and information. First, the very essence of that freedom is undermined in so far as the general and absolute temporary prohibition of broadcasting makes an information service inaccessible throughout the territory of the European Union. Second, such a prohibition is not proportionate, as the censorship of an information service does not constitute an effective means of achieving the objectives pursued by the contested acts.

120 The applicant submits, furthermore, that the restrictive measures at issue are not accompanied by any clear and objective time limit, as the lifting of the measures is subject to a random, indeed arbitrary, assessment by the Council. The expiry of the temporary prohibition on broadcasting, set at 31 July 2022, is highlighted, in a purely artificial manner, solely for the needs of the defence, since it can be extended.

121 In addition, the applicant takes issue with the Council, first, for not having substantiated the allegations, made in the contested acts, that the applicant engages in propaganda and, second, for having based the restrictive measures at issue on its mode of funding, which has not changed since 2017. In the applicant’s submission, the propaganda actions in which it is alleged to have engaged and the justification for its supposed ability to pursue a part of its activity are wholly unsubstantiated.

122 In the first place, the applicant maintains that it has never sought to conceal the way in which it is funded, which, moreover, is not punishable in itself and has always been public. Furthermore, it would be rash to draw any conclusion whatsoever about the editorial work of a media outlet from the sole fact that it receives State funding, as is, for example, the case of France 24.

123 In the second place, as regards the allegations relating strictly to propaganda, the applicant claims that it is independent of the Russian State and that it has complete control of its editorial policy. It observes, moreover, that it has never been the subject of sanctions, whether by the CSA or by Arcom, since it was authorised to broadcast its content, and that its agreement with Arcom was renewed without difficulty in 2020. The content broadcast by the applicant cannot therefore, for that sole reason, be regarded as reprehensible in the light to the obligations incumbent on the applicant.

124 Moreover, it is argued that the Council cannot confuse the applicant’s media coverage and information processing with those of other channels of the RT Group, which are separate from the applicant, which have been the subject of decisions adopted by certain national regulatory authorities and, in particular, by the regulatory authority of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

125 Lastly, as regards the evidence adduced by the Council concerning the alleged activity of disinformation or manipulation of information in which the applicant is engaged, the latter maintains in its reply that the Council has failed to show that it was an organ of Russian State influence and of propaganda for the latter. The work of a French researcher, on whom the Council relied on a number of occasions and who, moreover, is the subject of defamation proceedings, does not justify a prohibition measure such as that at issue. The same applies to the report of the Secretary of State of the United States, adduced by the Council, which does not refer to any specific conduct on the applicant’s part.

126 In the applicant’s submission, the truncated evidence adduced by the Council does not demonstrate how the applicant dealt with Russian military operations on Ukrainian territory. Relying on certain items of evidence submitted by the Council, the applicant produced a document responding to those various items. It maintains that a close examination of the evidence annexed to the reply and added to the case file is sufficient to be convinced of the specious nature of the arguments put forward by the Council, which attempts to justify the contested acts ex post facto. The applicant maintains that it dealt with different opinions concerning the conflict in Ukraine, which on many occasions was described as military aggression undermining peace in Europe and not solely as defensive and preventive action on the part of the Russian Federation. Likewise, the applicant’s journalists took care to contradict the claims of certain participants and to ensure balance between the views expressed. Furthermore, conveying the view of the Russian Federation is not as such reprehensible, unless the view is taken that only the majority opinion can be broadcast.

127 The applicant argues, in addition, that it is incorrect to assert, in order to justify the proportionality of the prohibition at issue, that such measures do not prevent the applicant and its staff from performing, within the European Union, activities other than broadcasting, such as research and interviews. That is confirmed, in particular, by the recent refusal by the Commission de la carte d’identité des journalistes professionnels (Professional Journalists’ Press Card Commission (CCIJP), France) to accredit the applicant’s journalists. Pursuant to that prohibition, all professional journalists working for the applicant are therefore prevented from effectively working as journalists. Similarly, suppliers now refuse to continue their contractual relationships with the applicant. Thus, the temporary prohibition on broadcasting amounts to preventing the applicant’s entire activity, in particular its ability to be broadcast to the French public, and is not proportionate.

128 In the applicant’s submission, whatever the editorial policy of a media outlet, or its audience, ultimately a general and absolute prohibition on broadcasting constitutes a genuine act of censorship and cannot be regarded as either necessary or proportionate in order to achieve effectively the objectives on which the Council relies.

129 Lastly, the applicant disputes the reversible nature of the measure at issue. As it is impossible for it to exercise its activity, the applicant is inevitably at risk of being placed in liquidation.

130 The Council, supported by the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Estonia, the French Republic, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, the Commission and the High Representative, disputes the applicant’s arguments.

The principles of case-law applicable to freedom of expression

131 It must be recalled that respect for fundamental rights is required of all actions of the European Union, including those in the area of the common foreign and security policy, as is apparent from the provisions, read together, set out in Articles 21 and 23 TEU (see judgment of 27 September 2018, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑288/15, EU:T:2018:619, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited). Since freedom of expression is guaranteed by Article 11 of the Charter, which corresponds to Article 10 ECHR, it must be ascertained whether that right is respected by the contested acts.

132 Under Article 11(1) of the Charter, everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. Article 11(2) of the Charter provides that the freedom and pluralism of the media are to be respected. As is apparent from the Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 17) and in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, the rights guaranteed in Article 11 thereof have the same meaning and scope as those guaranteed in Article 10 ECHR (judgment of 26 April 2022, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑401/19, EU:C:2022:297, paragraph 44; see also judgment of 14 July 2021, Cabello Rondón v Council, T‑248/18, EU:T:2021:450, paragraph 101 and the case-law cited).

133 The ECtHR has already held that freedom of expression constituted one of the essential freedoms of a democratic society and that no distinction was made in Article 10 ECHR according to the nature of the aim pursued or the role which natural or legal persons had played in the exercise of that freedom (ECtHR, 28 September 1999, Öztürk v. Türkiye, CE:ECHR:1999:0928JUD002247993, § 49). Subject to Article 10(2) ECHR, that freedom is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb, in accordance with the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic society’ (ECtHR, 7 December 1976, Handyside v. United Kingdom, CE:ECHR:1976:1207JUD000549372, § 49; see also ECtHR, 5 April 2022, NIT S.R.L. v. Republic of Moldova, CE:ECHR:2022:0405JUD002847012, § 177 and the case-law cited).

134 In that regard, the ECtHR has also held that tolerance and respect for the equal dignity of all human beings constituted the basis of a democratic and pluralist society. It follows, in principle, that it may be deemed necessary, in democratic societies, to penalise or indeed to prevent all forms of expression that propagate, encourage, promote or justify hatred based on intolerance, the use of and apology for violence, provided that it is ensured that the ‘formalities’, ‘conditions’, ‘restrictions’ or ‘penalties’ imposed are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 6 July 2006, Erbakan v. Türkiye, CE:ECHR:2006:0706JUD005940500, § 56 and the case-law cited, and 23 June 2022, Rouillan v. France, CE:ECHR:2022:0623JUD002800019, § 66).

135 It is clear from the wording of Article 10 ECHR itself that the right to freedom of expression is not an absolute prerogative and may therefore be subject to limitations. In that regard, a number of principles may be identified in the case-law of the ECtHR, according to which, first, the most careful scrutiny is called for when the measures taken or sanctions imposed by the authorities are capable of discouraging the participation of the press in debates on matters of legitimate public interest and, second, that provision does not, however, guarantee a wholly unrestricted freedom of expression even with respect to press coverage of matters of serious public concern (see ECtHR, 5 April 2022, NIT S.R.L. v. Republic of Moldova, CE:ECHR:2022:0405JUD002847012, §§ 178 and 179 and the case-law cited).

136 The protection of the right of the media and, more particularly, of journalists to impart information on issues of general interest is subject to the proviso that they are acting in good faith and on an accurate factual basis and provide ‘reliable and precise’ information in accordance with the ethics of journalism, or in other words, in accordance with the tenets of responsible journalism (see ECtHR, 5 April 2022, NIT S.R.L. v. Republic of Moldova, CE:ECHR:2022:0405JUD002847012, § 180 and the case-law cited).

137 These considerations play a particularly important role nowadays, given the influence wielded by the media in contemporary society: not only do they inform, they can also suggest, by the way in which they present the information, how it is to be assessed. In a world in which the individual is confronted with vast quantities of information circulated via traditional and electronic media and involving an ever-growing number of players, monitoring compliance with journalistic ethics takes on added importance (see ECtHR, 5 April 2022, NIT S.R.L. v. Republic of Moldova, CE:ECHR:2022:0405JUD002847012, § 181 and the case-law cited).

138 Where the ‘duties and responsibilities’ which the exercise of freedom of expression entails are concerned, the potential impact of the medium of expression involved is an important factor in assessing the proportionality of the interference. In this context, account must be taken of the fact that the audiovisual media have a more immediate and powerful effect than the print media. The former have means of conveying through images messages which the print media are not able to impart (see paragraph 90 above). The function of television and radio as familiar sources of entertainment in the intimacy of the listener’s or viewer’s home further reinforces their impact (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 5 April 2022, NIT S.R.L. v. Republic of Moldova, CE:ECHR:2022:0405JUD002847012, § 182 and the case-law cited).

139 In accordance with that case-law, in principle, unlike expression on matters of public interest, which is entitled to strong protection, expression that promotes or justifies violence, hatred, xenophobia or another form of intolerance cannot normally claim protection (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 8 July 1999, Sürek v. Türkiye (No. 1), CE:ECHR:1999:0708JUD002668295, §§ 61 and 62, and 15 October 2015, Perinçek v. Switzerland, CE:ECHR:2015:1015JUD002751008, §§ 197 and 230).

140 According to the ECtHR, in order to determine whether the statements taken as a whole may be seen as a justification of violence, it is necessary to pay attention to the words used, the manner in which the statements were made and the context in which they were broadcast (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 6 July 2010, Gözel and Özer v. Türkiye, CE:ECHR:2010:0706JUD004345304, paragraph 52, and 15 October 2015, Perinçek v. Switzerland, CE:ECHR:2015:1015JUD002751008, §§ 205 and 206).

141 It is in the light of all of those principles and considerations that the Court must examine the present plea.

The existence of a restriction on freedom of expression

142 As a preliminary point, it should be observed that, as is apparent from recitals 7 and 8 of the contested acts, the applicant was temporarily prohibited from broadcasting content as a media outlet under the permanent direct or indirect control of the leadership of the Russian Federation, for having engaged in propaganda actions justifying and supporting the Russian Federation’s military aggression against Ukraine.

143 That temporary prohibition on broadcasting constitutes an interference with the applicant’s exercise of its right to freedom of expression within the meaning of Article 11(1) of the Charter, as is apparent, moreover, from recitals 10 and 11 of the contested acts.

144 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, as has been stated in paragraph 135 above, the right to freedom of expression on which the applicant relies, as protected by Article 11 of the Charter, may be subject to limitations, under the conditions laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter, according to which, first, ‘any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by [the Charter] must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’ and, second, ‘subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’.

145 Thus, in order to comply with EU law, an interference with freedom of expression must satisfy four conditions. First, the limitation in question must be ‘provided for by law’, in the sense that the EU institution adopting measures liable to restrict a natural or legal person’s freedom of expression must have a legal basis for its actions. Second, the limitation in question must respect the essence of freedom of expression. Third, it must effectively meet an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union. Fourth, the limitation in question must be proportionate (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraphs 69 and 84 and the case-law cited, and of 13 September 2018, VTB Bank v Council, T‑734/14, not published, EU:T:2018:542, paragraph 140 and the case-law cited).

146 Those conditions correspond, in essence, to those provided for by the case-law of the ECtHR, according to which, in order to be justified under Article 10(2) ECHR, an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression must be ‘prescribed by law’, pursue one or more legitimate aims and be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ to achieve them (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 7 June 2012, Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy, CE:ECHR:2012:0607JUD003843309, § 135).

147 It follows that the Council was allowed to adopt restrictive measures capable of restricting the applicant’s freedom of expression, provided that those limitations comply with the conditions, set out above, all of which must be satisfied in order for that freedom to be legitimately restricted (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).

148 It must therefore be ascertained whether the restrictive measures at issue are provided for by law, comply with the essence of freedom of expression, pursue an objective of general interest and are not disproportionate, although, in its written pleadings the applicant focused its argument on the last of those conditions.

The condition that any restriction on freedom of expression must be provided for by law

149 As to whether the restrictive measures at issue were provided for by law, it must be noted that those measures are set out in acts of general application and have clear legal bases in EU law, namely Article 29 TEU, in the case of the contested decision, and Article 215 TFEU, in the case of the contested regulation (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited, and of 14 July 2021, Cabello Rondón v Council, T‑248/18, EU:T:2021:450, paragraph 121). Those Treaty provisions are sufficiently foreseeable for the persons concerned as regards their purpose in serving as legal bases for the adoption of restrictive measures liable adversely to affect or limit freedom of expression (see paragraphs 49 to 52 and 62 above).

150 As regards the requirement of foreseeability, the ECtHR has repeatedly held that a norm cannot be regarded as a ‘law’ within the meaning of Article 10(2) ECHR unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable a person to regulate his or her conduct. That person must be able – if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. Those consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty. A law which confers a discretion is thus not in itself inconsistent with the requirement of foreseeability, provided that the scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise are indicated with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference (see ECtHR, 5 April 2022, NIT S.R.L. v. Republic of Moldova, CE:ECHR:2022:0405JUD002847012, § 159 and the case-law cited).

151 In the present case, having regard to the foregoing and also to the broad discretion which the Council enjoys when adopting restrictive measures (see paragraph 52 above), it was foreseeable that, in view of the important role played by the media, in particular the audiovisual media, in modern society, the large-scale media support for the military aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation, provided during television and internet broadcasts by a media outlet entirely funded by the Russian State budget, could be targeted by restrictive measures consisting in the prohibition of the broadcasting of propaganda activities in support of such aggression (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 76).

152 In those circumstances, it must be held that the condition that the limitations of freedom of expression must be provided for by law is satisfied in the present case.

Compliance with the essence of freedom of expression

153 It is necessary to ascertain whether the nature or scope of the temporary prohibition on the broadcasting of the applicant’s content constitutes an interference with the essence of freedom of expression.

154 In the present case, it must be emphasised that the restrictive measures at issue are temporary and reversible. It follows from Article 9 of Decision 2014/512, as amended, that that decision is to apply until 31 July 2022 and is to be kept under constant review (see paragraph 28 above). The maintenance of the restrictive measures at issue after 31 July 2022 will require the adoption by the Council of a new decision and a new regulation.

155 Contrary to the applicant’s assertion, it follows from the wording of the last part of recital 10 of the contested acts, read and interpreted in the light of the requirement to limit, as far as possible, the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression, that the maintenance of the restrictive measures at issue after 31 July 2022 is conditional on two cumulative criteria. Those measures could be maintained, first, until the aggression against Ukraine is put to an end and, second, until the Russian Federation, and its associated media outlets, cease to conduct propaganda actions against the Union and its Member States. As the two criteria are cumulative, if one of them ceased to be satisfied, there would be no further need to maintain the measures at issue. The applicant cannot therefore claim that the measures are intended to apply without a time limit defined in advance by the Council.

156 In addition, it should be observed that the contested acts do not prevent every activity inherent in freedom of information and expression. As stated in recital 11 of the contested acts, the temporary prohibition on broadcasting imposed on the applicant does not prevent it from carrying out other activities in the European Union than broadcasting, such as research and interviews. It may therefore be affirmed, as the Council contends, that the applicant and its journalists remain authorised to pursue certain activities linked to freedom of information and expression and that, in principle, that prohibition is not liable to impede the applicant’s exercise of other, potentially revenue-generating, activities.

157 Furthermore, it should be noted, as the Council does, that the contested acts do not prohibit the applicant from broadcasting its content outside the European Union, including in French-speaking countries, so that the restrictive measures at issue do not interfere with its right to exercise its freedom of expression outside the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 123 and the case-law cited). In short, the applicant has been prevented neither from producing programmes and editorial content nor from selling them to entities not affected by the measures at issue, including TV Novosti and the other RT Group media outlets established in third countries, which would then be able to broadcast that content outside the European Union.

158 In addition, as regards the argument based on the CCIJP’s decision to refuse any new application for a press card submitted by journalists working for the applicant, it should be observed that that refusal is the direct consequence of a unilateral decision of that commission, the adoption of which is not a consequence of the contested acts, and which, moreover, is the subject matter of an action currently pending before the French courts having jurisdiction. The applicant is therefore wrong to maintain that the fact that its journalists are unable to practise their profession on French territory is the consequence of the adoption of the contested acts.

159 For those reasons, it must held that the nature and scope of the temporary prohibition at issue comply with the essence of freedom of expression and do not undermine that freedom as such.

The pursuit of an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union

160 As regards the condition relating to the pursuit of an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union, it should be observed, as the Council does, that, as is clear from recitals 1 to 10 of the contested acts, the Council seeks, by the restrictive measures at issue, to pursue a twofold objective.

161 First, as stated in recitals 6 to 8 of the contested acts, the Council seeks to protect the Union’s public order and security, under threat from the systematic international propaganda campaign put in place by the Russian Federation, channelled through media outlets under the permanent direct or indirect control of its leadership, in order to destabilise neighbouring countries, the Union and its Member States and to support military aggression against Ukraine, which corresponds to one of the objectives of the common foreign and security policy. The adoption of restrictive measures against media outlets having such a propaganda action as their mission satisfies the objective set out in Article 21(2)(a) TEU, namely to safeguard the Union’s values, fundamental interests, security and integrity.

162 Furthermore, as has already been observed in paragraph 56 above, since the propaganda and disinformation campaigns are capable of undermining the foundations of democratic societies and are an integral part of the arsenal of modern warfare, the restrictive measures at issue also form part of the pursuit by the European Union of the objectives, including the peaceful objectives, assigned to it in Article 3(1) and (5) TEU.

163 Second, as the Council emphasises, the restrictive measures at issue form part of the objectives pursued by the overall strategy of responding in a rapid, united, graduated and coordinated manner, implemented by the Union, through the adoption of a series of restrictive measures (see paragraphs 12, 17 and 19 above), with the ultimate aim of exerting maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and to the military aggression against Ukraine. From that perspective, the restrictive measures at issue are consistent with the objective, referred to in Article 21(2)(c) TEU, of preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 81).

164 It should be observed that, as certain interveners have submitted, the restrictive measures at issue may be understood as being the response, with the peaceful means at the Union’s disposal and with a view to achieving the objectives laid down in Article 3(5) TEU, of a subject of international law faced with aggression in breach of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and, consequently, a violation of the erga omnes obligations imposed by international law.

165 The existence of such a violation, moreover, was confirmed by the resolution of 2 March 2022, entitled ‘Aggression against Ukraine’ (A/ES-11/L.1), of the United Nations General Assembly. In that resolution, inter alia, the United Nations General Assembly, referring to its resolution 377 A(V) of 3 November 1950, entitled ‘Uniting for peace’, and taking into account that the lack of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council had prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, deplored in the strongest terms the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and demanded that the Russian Federation immediately cease its use of force against Ukraine and immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders. It also recalled the obligation of all States under Article 2 of the United Nations Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and to settle their internationa