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As regards the criterion relating to the use of State resources, the Commission observes as follows: ‘(88) The Commission notes that the guarantees at issue in this case are not examined under State aid rules as to the amount of fee possibly foregone in light of the risk or exposure incurred by the guarantor (i.e. a private bank, not the State) but as to the risk for the State in case the guaranteed amount is lower than the actual costs of the environmental damage and in case the guaranteed company does not or cannot pay the full restoration costs. … (90) The financial guarantee by [the applicant] is provided in the form of a bank guarantee which is not [free for] the State. It can be used only for measures strictly defined by the law, in particular for financing the removal of waste, restoration of the site and other environmental measures in case [the applicant] does not fulfil its environmental obligations. The State does not acquire any interest on the funds of the guarantee or any other financial advantage which would be reduced in case of a lower amount of the guarantee. Further, the State has so far not been in a position where it would need to make any use of the guarantee for any of the above purposes. However, even if the reduced amount of the guarantee has so far not led to any actual effect on State resources, this fact alone does not exclude the existence of a potential effect on State resources due to increased risk for the State to be obliged to spend its resources in the future. (91) Indeed, the creation of a concrete risk of imposing an additional burden on the State in the future is sufficient for the purposes of fulfilling the notion of State aid, pursuant to Article 107(1) of the Treaty. The Court of Justice [of the European Union] has also held that the link to and effect on State resources of a State aid measure [need not] be direct for this criterion to be met. (92) The very purpose of such financial guarantees is to make sure that the mining companies have sufficient resources kept aside to cover future restoration costs whatever their financial situation in the (often rather distant) future might be. It is thus evident that in case the amount of the guarantee is significantly lower than expected restoration costs, there is at the least an increased risk that State resources might be affected in the future. This risk of potential costs to [the] public budget is clearly higher than in case the guaranteed amount would have been correctly set in line with the applicable legislation, taking due account of the expected restoration costs. If these resources are significantly lower than necessary, State resources would ultimately have to cover a greater part of these costs in case [the applicant] is for whatever reason not willing or able to do so. In addition, in case of [the applicant’s] inability to pay the restoration costs in the future, the alleged possibility for the Spanish authorities to seize assets of [the applicant] is unlikely to bring significant additional resources since the only Spanish assets of [the applicant] (and the whole ICL group) are its potash mining facilities. However, once the potash mines are closed the value of these assets is doubtful. (93) The fact that the State would be obliged to step in on its own account in case [the applicant] is not willing or able to take the necessary restoration measures with respect to its waste heaps is well established in the applicable legislation. (94) Firstly, pursuant to Article 102 of Law 39/2015, the State may take measures in lieu of the party legally responsible for taking such measures. Spain would have to (i) enjoin [the applicant] to take specifically defined measures; (ii) inform [the applicant] that the administration will otherwise take such measures itself, and at what cost; (iii) implement such measures; and (iv) attempt to recover the cost from [the applicant], which by definition will not be possible if Spain must execute [an] insufficient financial guarantee. While this decision is formally [optional], in the event of [the applicant] defaulting on its obligations to restore its facilities, Spain would have no option other than to pay upfront for such restoration, because Spain would otherwise not comply with its own obligations. (95) Secondly, as noted in recital 13, Spain may be in breach of its obligations under the Extractive Waste Directive and the Water Framework Directive. Therefore, should [the applicant] abandon its facilities after depleting the mineral resources and not restore such facilities, given the insufficient guarantee, the only way for Spain to meet its obligations under those Directives and eventually avoid daily penalty payments imposed by the Court of Justice [of the European Union] is to pay itself for the removal of the salt tips or an equally effective restoration. (96) Thirdly, under the provisions of the Spanish Law 27/2006 of 18 July 2006 the Spanish authorities can be compelled to comply with their obligations under the environmental legislation. Any non-governmental organisation that meets the criteria set out in Law 27/2006 may, in the event of an environmental infringement listed at Article 18(1) of Law 27/2006 (including e.g. infringements concerning the obligations in the area of water protection), take action in court to force the administration to comply with its environmental obligations. … (98) Finally, the Spanish authorities themselves indicate that according to Article 9 of [Catalan] Law 12/1981 in case the operator does not comply with its obligations, the [Generalitat de Catalunya] can forcefully execute these measures at the costs of the operator. They indicate that in practice the administration implements the relevant measures that are then financed from the financial guarantee or, in case the guarantee is not sufficient, from the sale of assets of the operator. Therefore, in case the financial guarantee is significantly lower than required, the public administration runs a risk that the assets of the operator are not sufficient to finance the relevant measures it executed. This confirms that … too low [a] financial guarantee increases the risk that the restoration measures taken by the administration will not be sufficiently covered by the assets of the operator (especially in case it does not have any other Spanish activities as in [the applicant’s case]) and would need to be paid from the public resources. (99) Therefore, a level of guarantees which is significantly lower than necessary as required by law is exposing the State to a concrete risk of additional burden on its resources. The increased risk of additional burden on the State is thus sufficiently concrete to constitute at least a potential impact on State resources due to an excessively low level of the financial guarantee.’