ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal Administrativo (Portugal) lodged on 14 September 2016 — Instituto de Financiamento da Agricultura e Pescas IP v Maxiflor — Promoção e Comercialização de Plantas, Importação e Exportação, Lda

(Case C-491/16)

(2016/C 441/13)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Supremo Tribunal Administrativo

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Instituto de Financiamento da Agricultura e Pescas IP

Defendant: Maxiflor — Promoção e Comercialização de Plantas, Importação e Exportação, Lda

Questions referred

1. Must the Operational Programme for Rural Development, (‘the AGRO Programme’) be considered a ‘multiannual programme’ within the meaning of Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 (1) of 21 June 1999 (repealed by Article 107 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 (2) of 11 July 2006, without prejudice to Article 105(1) thereof)?

2. Must the AGRO Programme be considered a ‘multiannual programme’ within the meaning of the second sentence of the second paragraph of Article 3(1) of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 (3) of 18 December 1995, according to which ‘in the case of multiannual programmes, the limitation period shall in any case run until the programme is definitively terminated’?

3. In the event that the AGRO Programme is considered a ‘multiannual programme’ within the meaning of the second sentence of the second paragraph of Article 3(1) of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95: — Is the limitation period for the administrative measures conducted pursuant to that programme subject to expiry after 4 years, as set out in Article 3(1)? — If the limitation period of 4 years ends before the termination of the programme, does this result in expiry, or — In view of the provision in the second sentence of the second paragraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95, is the dies ad quem of the limitation period extended, so that it coincides with the date when the ‘[multiannual] programme is definitively terminated’?

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds (OJ 1999 L 161, p. 1).

(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 (OJ 2006 L 210, p. 25).

(3) Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the European Communities financial interests (OJ 1995 L 312, p. 1).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 428/5

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 11 August 2016 — Roland Becker v Hainan Airlines Co. Ltd.

(Case C-447/16)

(2016/C 428/06)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Roland Becker

Defendant: Hainan Airlines Co. Ltd

Question referred

Where passengers are transported on two flights without any significant stopover at the connecting airports, is the place of departure of the first leg of the journey to be regarded as being the place where the services were provided under the second indent of Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, (1) even when the claim advanced in the application for compensation under Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (2) is based on a disruption to the second leg of the journey and the action is brought against the party to the contract of carriage, which, although it was the operating air carrier for the second flight, was not the operating air carrier for the first flight?

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1).

(2) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 475/10

Appeal brought on 27 May 2016 by Médis — Companhia portuguesa de seguros de saúde, SA against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 15 March 2016 in Case T-774/15: Médis v EUIPO — Médis

(Case C-313/16 P)

(2016/C 475/14)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Médis — Companhia portuguesa de seguros de saúde, SA (represented by: M. Martinho do Rosário, advogada)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

By order of 19 October 2016 the Court of Justice (Eight Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
2.

First of all, the appellant alleges infringement of the principle of fair procedure under Article 6(1) TEU, in conjunction with the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The General Court, it submits, failed to consider documents that were submitted in the context of the statement of claim. Those documents merely supplemented the present matters of fact or law. The General Court also did not justify the failure to examine those documents, but merely adopted formulaic wording from another judgment that does not apply to the present case.
2.

In particular, is Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/221 concerning the classification of certain goods in the Combined Nomenclature invalid in so far as it: unduly restricts the scope of subheading 8704-10; takes into account impermissible factors; is internally inconsistent; does not take proper account of the Explanatory Notes, CN headings and GIRs; and/or fails to take account of the relevant requirements identified by case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union in relation to CN heading 8704 10?
1.

The General Court disregarded the fact that the designation ‘Neuschwanstein’ is an indication of geographical origin. It states in paragraph 27 of the judgment — in itself contradictorily — that Neuschwanstein Castle is admittedly ‘geographically locatable’ but is not a ‘geographical location’, because the principal function of the location is the preservation of cultural heritage and not the manufacturing or marketing of souvenirs or services. The ‘principal function’ of a geographical location does not, however, play any role in the absolute ground for refusal of the indication of geographical origin. Neuschwanstein Castle is clearly and immutably locatable and is, contrary to the General Court’s view, distinguishable from an ordinary museum that is determined by the exhibits displayed therein, which — unlike Neuschwanstein Castle — may also be relocated. The relevant public will not take up the analytical assessment, set out in the judgment under appeal, of the name as meaning ‘the new stone of the swan’, but will associate the fantasy name exclusively with the world-famous castle. Consequently, the judgment under appeal is also at variance with the requirements laid down by the Court of Justice in its Chiemsee judgment, (2) since the relevant public will associate goods bearing the designation ‘Neuschwanstein’ with Neuschwanstein Castle as a world renowned tourist centre. That location is therefore undoubtedly liable to have an impact on consumers’ choices and preferences by reason of its positive connotations. Thus, the sign, as an indication of geographical origin, lacks the capacity to be protected. There is a general interest in keeping the names of famous tourist sights, at least for typical souvenirs that are marketed and purchased in order to remind visitors of the sight concerned, free from monopolisation through trade-mark protection. An analysis of the goods and services in respect of which registration was sought in terms of their suitability as souvenirs was, however, not undertaken in the judgment under appeal. This was, however, necessary, in particular because registration of the mark at issue was sought for headings that also include typical souvenirs. The fact that in this case the Freistaat Bayern is the applicant in no way alters those principles, as the General Court stressed in its Monaco judgment, (3) since the same principles apply to a State qua applicant for registration of a trade mark as to other market participants.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 22/3

Appeal brought on 26 September 2016 by Francisco Javier Rosa Rodríguez against the order of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) made on 20 July 2016 in Case T-358/16 Rosa Rodríguez v Consejería de Educación de la Junta de Andalucía

(Case C-509/16 P)

(2017/C 022/05)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: Francisco Javier Rosa Rodríguez (represented by: J. Velasco Velasco, abogado)

Other party to the proceedings: Consejería de Educación de la Junta de Andalucía

By order of 8 December 2016, the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered Mr Rosa Rodríguez to bear his own costs.
1.

Does Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, interpreted in the light of Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the European Convention on Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the relevant case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and national law, preclude the possibility of conducting administrative proceedings in respect of an act (unlawful conduct consisting in market manipulation) for which the same person has been convicted by a decision that has the force or res judicata?
1.

First, the General Court applied the wrong legal test when assessing whether the Council had evidence to decide that domestic raw materials prices contained in the records of the relevant Argentinian exporters were sufficiently distorted to justify disregarding them and having recourse to the methodology provided by Article 2(5) of the Basic Regulation (1), second paragraph. In doing so, the General Court has imposed too high a burden of proof on the Institution.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 38/17

Appeal brought on 25 November 2016 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 15 September 2016 in Case T-220/13, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission

(Case C-623/16 P)

(2017/C 038/22)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: P. Stancanelli, D. Grespan, F. Tomat, acting as agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori Srl, Italian Republic

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal to the extent that it declares the proceedings at first instance admissible for the purpose of the final limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU;

— declare the action at first instance inadmissible for the purpose of the second and last limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and consequently dismiss it in its entirety;

— order Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori to pay the costs incurred by the Commission in the proceedings before the General Court and in the present proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By a single plea in law, divided into three parts, the Commission claims that the last limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU was misinterpreted and misapplied, in that the General Court ruled that the applicant’s action at first instance was admissible on the basis of that provision. In particular, the General Court erred in law by finding that the contested act amounted to a regulatory act which was of direct concern to the applicant at first instance and did not entail implementing measures in respect of the applicant itself.
1.

The first ground is divided into four parts. In the first part, the Commission submits that the General Court erred in of law in the interpretation of the legal nature of the ‘General Provisions’ applicable to general competitions (OJ 2014 C 60 A/1), since, according to the Commission, those provisions laid down specific new obligations in respect of the conduct of the competition procedure, obligations that the contested competition notices did not reflect. By the second part of the first ground, the Commission maintains that the General Court erred in law in interpreting Article 7(1) of Annex III to the Staff Regulations, in so far as it found that EPSO does not have the regulatory power to lay down general and abstract rules in respect of the language regime of the competitions which it organises. According to the Commission, EPSO has such a power. In that regard, the Commission also alleges breach of the obligation to state reasons, in so far as, at the end in paragraph 57 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court contradicts itself, by stating that EPSO still has the power to assess the needs, including linguistic needs, of the individual institutions when organising various competitions. By the third part of the first ground, the Commission contends that the General Court was wrong to consider that those provisions were simply measures laying down the criteria for the choice of the second language in competition procedures organised by EPSO, since those provisions established, on the contrary, with binding effect, the criteria justify that choice. Lastly, by the fourth part of the first ground, the Commission submits that the General Court misinterpreted the nature and content of the contested notices in finding that, in respect of the language regime, the notices constituted sources of new specific obligations, thereby also acting in breach of its duty to state reasons when rejecting the plea of inadmissibility submitted by the Commission; in that regard, according to the Commission, the contested notices merely confirmed what is stated in the General Provisions.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 38/17

Appeal brought on 25 November 2016 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 15 September 2016 in Case T-219/13, Ferracci v Commission

(Case C-624/16 P)

(2017/C 038/23)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: P. Stancanelli, D. Grespan, F. Tomat, acting as agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Pietro Ferracci, Italian Republic

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal to the extent that it declares the proceedings at first instance admissible for the purpose of the final limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU;

— declare the action at first instance inadmissible under the second and last limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and consequently dismiss it in its entirety;

— order Mr Ferracci to pay the costs incurred by the Commission in the proceedings before the General Court and in the present proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By a single plea in law, divided into three parts, the Commission claims that the last limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU was misinterpreted and misapplied in that the General Court ruled that the action of the applicant at first instance was admissible on the basis of that provision. In particular, the General Court erred in law by finding that the contested act amounted to a regulatory act which was of direct concern to the applicant at first instance and did not entail implementing measures in respect of the applicant himself.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 70/11

Action brought on 23 December 2016 — European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany

(Case C-668/16)

(2017/C 070/18)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: C. Hermes, A.C. Becker, D. Kukovec, Agents)

Defendant: Federal Republic of Germany

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that: — by failing to take the measures necessary to restore the conformity of vehicles of types 246, 176 and 117 with their approved types (Articles 12 and 30 of the Framework Directive); — by failing to take the measures necessary to implement penalties (Article 46, in conjunction with Articles 5 and 18, of the Framework Directive); and — by upholding on 17 May 2013 an application by Daimler AG for extension of the existing vehicle type 245G to vehicles for which a different type-approval had been granted previously, to which the new requirements of the MAC Directive are applicable, and thereby circumventing the MAC Directive; the Federal Republic of Germany has failed to fulfil its obligations under Directive 2006/40/EC (1) (MAC Directive) and Directive 2007/46/EC (2) (Framework Directive),

— order the Federal Republic of Germany to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Under Article 12 of and Annex X to the Framework Directive, Member States are required, in the event of non-conformity of production, to take the measures necessary to ensure that production vehicles conform to the approved type. Under Article 30 of the Framework Directive, the necessary measures are also to be taken to restore conformity where new vehicles deviate from approved types. The production and completed new vehicles of some of Daimler AG’s vehicle types have deviated from their approved type with regard to the use of a certain refrigerant. The German authorities did not take the measures necessary to restore conformity, contrary to Articles 12 and 30 of the Framework Directive.

Furthermore, the German authorities infringed Article 46 of the Framework Directive insofar as they imposed no penalties in respect of Daimler AG’s infringements of Article 5(1) and Article 18 of the Framework Directive.

Lastly, the German authorities circumvented the MAC Directive in an impermissible way by extending an earlier vehicle type to the abovementioned vehicle types.

(1) Directive 2006/40/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 relating to emissions from air conditioning systems in motor vehicles and amending Council Directive 70/156/EEC, OJ 2006 L 161, p. 12.

(2) Directive 2007/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007 establishing a framework for the approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles, OJ 2007 L 263, p. 1.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 53/20

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles (Belgium) lodged on 26 September 2016 — Karim Boudjellal v Rauwers Contrôle SA

(Case C-508/16)

(2017/C 053/25)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Karim Boudjellal

Defendant: Rauwers Contrôle SA

By order of 11 January 2017, the Court (Seventh Chamber) declared that it had no jurisdiction to answer the questions put to it by the Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles (Belgium).
1.

First ground of appeal: infringement of Articles 31 and 32 of Directive 2001/83/EC It is submitted in this connection that the disputed implementing decision is based on a procedure which was initiated and conducted in a procedurally unlawful manner. The appellants first of all contend that, contrary to the first sentence of Article 31(1) of Directive 2001/83/EC, (1) the procedure was initiated not before, but only after the application for renewed authorisation of the medicinal product had been rejected. In the absence of up-to-date reports on safety concerns, there was also no particular EU interest at issue. Moreover, the appointment of a member of the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (‘the CHMP’) as chief reporter from the Member State in which national proceedings had been initiated constitutes an infringement of the right under Article 41(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to have one’s affairs handled fairly and impartially. There is, in any event, objective and subjective partiality if, at the time when proceedings are initiated, proceedings are still pending between the Member State which provides the chief reporter and the holder of the marketing authorisation concerning the refusal to renew the authorisation for a medicinal product. Lastly, the appellants invoke an infringement of the right to a fair hearing, since in the proceedings before the CHMP the first appellant was not given an opportunity to comment on the intended content of the modification to the marketing authorisation.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 95/2

Appeal brought on 4 July 2016 by L'Oréal SA against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 28 April 2016 in Case T-144/15: L'Oréal v EUIPO — THERALAB (VICHY LABORATOIRES V IDÉALIA)

(Case C-371/16 P)

(2017/C 095/03)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: L'Oréal SA (represented by: J. P. Mioludo, advogado)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

By order of 8 December 2016 the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
5.

Does Article 4 of Directive 2011/95, in conjunction with recital 36 thereof and Article 31(1) of Directive 2013/32, permit national case-law in a Member State which: (a) obliges the responsible authority to assess the applications for international protection lodged by members of one and the same family in a joint procedure, in cases where those applications are based on the same facts, specifically the assertion that only one of the family members is a refugee; (b) obliges the responsible authority to suspend the proceedings relating to applications for international protection lodged by family members who do not personally meet the conditions for such protection until such time as the proceedings relating to the application lodged by the family member on the ground that the person concerned is a refugee within the meaning of Article 1(A) of the Geneva Convention on Refugees are concluded; and is that case-law also permissible in the light of considerations relating to the best interests of the child, maintenance of family unity and respect for the right to private and family life and the right to remain in the Member State pending the assessment of the application, more specifically in the light of Articles 7, 18 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, recitals 12 and 60 and Article 9 of Directive 2013/32, recitals 16, 18 and 36 and Article 23 of Directive 2011/95 and recitals 9, 11 and 35 and Articles 6 and 12 of Directive 2013/33/EU (3) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 112/14

Appeal brought on 22 September 2016 by Monster Energy Company against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 14 July 2016 in Case T-429/15: Monster Energy v EUIPO — MAD CATZ INTERACTIVE (MAD CATZ)

(Case C-501/16 P)

(2017/C 112/20)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Monster Energy Company (represented by: P. Brownlow, Solicitor)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

By order of 16 February 2017 the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.