Case C‑535/14 P

Vadzim Ipatau

v

Council of the European Union

‛Appeal — Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures taken against the Republic of Belarus — Admissibility — Time-limit for bringing proceedings — Legal aid — Suspensory effect — Effective judicial protection — Rights of the defence — Principle of proportionality’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 18 June 2015

European Union — Judicial review of the legality of the acts of the institutions — Restrictive measures against Belarus — Freezing of funds of certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Belarus — Scope of the review

Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures against Belarus — Freezing of funds — Rights of the defence — Disclosure of incriminating evidence — Subsequent decision maintaining the applicant’s name in the list of persons subject to those measures — No new grounds — No infringement of the right to be heard — (Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP; Council Regulation No 1017/2012)

Judicial proceedings — Time-limit for bringing proceedings — Application for legal aid — Suspension of the time-limit for bringing proceedings — Conditions — Reference in the application for legal aid to the act that ought to be the subject of the action

See the text of the decision. (see para. 14)

The period prescribed for the bringing of an action against an act is not suspended under Article 96(4) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court by the filing of an application for legal aid unless that act is referred to in that application as an act that ought to be the subject of the proposed action. (see paras 15, 18)

In the context of the adoption of a decision to maintain the name of a person or an entity in a list of persons or entities subject to restrictive measures adopted against the Republic of Belarus, the Council must respect the right of that person or entity to be heard beforehand where that institution is including in that decision new evidence against that person or entity, namely evidence which was not included in the initial listing decision. However, where there has been no substantial change to the grounds for continuing to include a person in the list of persons subject to those restrictive measures and where it is clear that that person had already submitted observations to the Council and was therefore aware that that right was always available to him, a fortiori during regular reviews of the restrictive measures adopted against the Republic of Belarus with a view to the possible extension of those measures, it cannot be concluded that there has been an infringement of that person’s rights of defence. (see paras 26-28)

The duty to state reasons established by Article 296 TFEU is an essential procedural requirement which must be distinguished from the question whether the reasoning is well founded, which is concerned with the substantive legality of the measure at issue. The reasoning of a decision consists in a formal statement of the grounds on which that decision is based. If those grounds are vitiated by errors, the latter will vitiate the substantive legality of the decision, but not the statement of reasons in it, which may be adequate even though it sets out reasons which are incorrect. It follows that objections and arguments intended to establish that a measure is not well founded are irrelevant in the context of a ground of appeal alleging an inadequate statement of reasons or a lack of such a statement. (see para. 37)

See the text of the decision. (see para. 42)