ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 1(4) of Directive 2001/84 on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art must be interpreted as not precluding the person by whom the resale royalty is payable, designated as such by national law, whether that is the seller or an art market professional involved in the transaction, from agreeing with any other person, including the buyer, that that other person will definitively bear, in whole or in part, the cost of the royalty, provided that a contractual arrangement of that kind does not affect the obligations and liability which the person by whom the royalty is payable has towards the author.

For the purpose of achieving the objective pursued by Directive 2001/84, which seeks, inter alia, to bring to an end distortions of competition on the art market, as that objective is circumscribed by recitals 13 and 15 to that directive, it is necessary that provision be made as to the person liable for payment of the royalty vis-à-vis the author and as to the rules for establishing the amount of the royalty. However, such provision is not necessary with regard to the question as to who, definitively, will bear the cost of the royalty. Admittedly, it cannot be excluded at the outset that the last-mentioned question may to some extent have a distorting effect on the functioning of the internal market. However, such an effect is, in any event, only indirect, since it arises as a result of contractual arrangements that are independent of the payment of the royalty to the author, for which the person by whom the royalty is payable remains liable.

(see paras 28-31, 33, operative part)
Directive 96/9 on the legal protection of databases must be interpreted as not being applicable to a database which is not protected either by copyright or by the sui generis right under that directive, so that Articles 6(1), 8 and 15 thereof do not preclude the author of such a database from laying down contractual limitations on its use by third parties, without prejudice to the applicable national law.

The fact that a database corresponds to the definition set out in Article 1(2) of Directive 96/9 does not justify the conclusion that it falls within the scope of the provisions of that directive governing copyright and/or the sui generis right if it fails to satisfy either the condition of application for protection by copyright laid down in Article 3(1) of that directive or the conditions of application for the protection by the sui generis right in Article 7(1) thereof. In that regard, it is clear from the purpose and structure of Directive 96/9 that Articles 6(1), 8 and 15 thereof, which establish mandatory rights for lawful users of databases, are not applicable to a database which is not protected either by copyright or by the sui generis right under that directive, so that it does not prevent the adoption of contractual clauses concerning the conditions of use of such a database.

(see paras 35, 39, 45, operative part)
The notion of ‘natural mineral water from one and the same spring’, contained in Article 8(2) of Directive 2009/54 on the exploitation and marketing of natural mineral waters must be interpreted as referring to a natural mineral water that is drawn from one or more natural or bore exits, and which originates in one and the same underground water table or in one and the same underground deposit, where, at all those natural or bore exits, that water has identical characteristics, pursuant to the criteria specified in Annex I to Directive 2009/54, that remain stable within the limits of natural fluctuation.

The notion of a ‘spring’ contained in Article 8(2) of Directive 2009/54 cannot be equated with either the notion of ‘underground water table or deposit’ or with the notion of an ‘exit’. Given that natural mineral waters are also defined on the basis of their composition, the characteristics of a natural mineral water play a decisive role in its identification.

In addition, given that (i) labels on natural mineral waters must indicate the place where the spring is exploited and the name of the spring, (ii) that name plays a decisive role in the identification of that water by consumers and (iii) the identification of a given natural mineral water is primarily based on its characteristics, it is necessarily those characteristics that essentially determine the identity of the spring that the water originates from.

That interpretation is, firstly, supported by the general scheme of Directive 2009/54, in particular Articles 4(1)(a) to (c), 6, 7(2)(a) and 12(a) and (b) thereof and, secondly, is the only interpretation capable of ensuring the attainment of the objectives pursued by Directive 2009/54, namely to protect the health of consumers, to prevent consumers from being misled and to ensure fair trading.

(see paras 29-31, 34-39, 45, operative part)
In matters relating to State aid, with the exception of cases in which a recovery decision has been annulled pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, the only defence available to a Member State in opposing an infringement action by the Commission under Article 108(2) TFEU is to plead that it was absolutely impossible for it to implement the decision of which it was an addressee.

In that connection, as regards the possible outbreak of social unrest, following the liquidation of an undertaking from which unlawful aid must be recovered, which might jeopardise public order, it is for the Member State to adopt all appropriate measures to guarantee the full scope and effect of EU law so as to ensure its proper implementation in the interests of all economic operators concerned, unless it can show that action on its part would have consequences for public order with which it could not cope by using the means at its disposal.

(see paras 48, 52, 53)
Under Article 9(1) of that regulation, Member States enjoy a margin of discretion concerning the choice of penalties which they adopt in order to ensure compliance with the obligation to declare laid down in Article 3 of that regulation, provided that a breach of that obligation can be penalised in a simple, effective and efficient way, and without the competent authorities necessarily having to take account of other circumstances, such as intention or recidivism.

The requirement that the penalties introduced by the Member States under Article 9 of Regulation No 1889/2005 on controls of cash entering or leaving the Community must be proportionate does not mean the competent authorities must take account of the specific individual circumstances of each case.

Article 9(1) of Regulation No 1889/2005 on controls of cash entering or leaving the Community must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, which, in order to penalise a failure to comply with the obligation to declare laid down in Article 3 of that regulation, imposes payment of an administrative fine, the amount of which corresponds to 60% of the amount of undeclared cash, where that sum is more than EUR 50000.

Such a fine goes beyond what is necessary in order to ensure compliance with that obligation and the fulfilment of the objectives pursued by that regulation.

In that regard, the penalty provided for in Article 9 of Regulation No 1889/2005 does not seek to penalise possible fraudulent or unlawful activities, but solely a breach of that obligation.

In that context, it should be noted that, as stated in recitals 3 and 15 in the preamble to that regulation, the latter seeks to ensure more effective control of movements of cash entering or leaving the European Union, in order to prevent the introduction of the proceeds of unlawful activities in the financial system, whilst respecting the principles recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

Moreover, Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1889/2005 provides for the possibility to detain, by administrative decision in accordance with the conditions laid down under national legislation, cash which has not been declared in accordance with Article 3 of that regulation, in order, inter alia, to allow the competent authorities to carry out the necessary controls and checks relating to the provenance of that cash, its intended use and destination. Therefore, a penalty which consists of a fine of a lower amount, together with a measure to detain cash that has not been declared in accordance with Article 3 thereof, is capable of attaining the objectives pursued by that regulation without going beyond what is necessary for that purpose.

(see paras 30-33, 35, operative part)
The concept of a ‘fixed-term worker’, within the meaning of clause 3(1) of the framework agreement on fixed-term work, concluded on 18 March 1999, which is set out in the Annex to Directive 1999/70 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must be interpreted as applying to a worker included in the non-permanent staff under national law.

Directive 1999/70 and the framework agreement are applicable to all workers providing remunerated services in the context of a fixed-term employment relationship linking them to their employer. The mere fact that a worker may be classified as ‘non-permanent’ under national law or that his employment contract has certain particular features, such as its temporary nature, the fact that appointment or termination is not subject to any restrictions and the fact that the worker is supposed to carry out duties entailing trust and special advice, is irrelevant in that regard. Otherwise, if Member States were permitted to remove at will certain categories of persons from the protection offered by Directive 1999/70 and the framework agreement, the effectiveness of those EU instruments would be in jeopardy, as would their uniform application in the Member States.

(see 33, 34, 37, operative part 1)
Article 24 of Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States and Article 4 of Regulation No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems, as amended by Regulation No 1244/2010, must be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State under which nationals of other Member States who are in a situation such as that referred to in Article 14(4)(b) of that directive are excluded from entitlement to certain ‘special non-contributory cash benefits’ within the meaning of Article 70(2) of Regulation No 883/2004, which also constitute ‘social assistance’ within the meaning of Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38, although those benefits are granted to nationals of the Member State concerned who are in the same situation.

It follows from the express reference in Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 to Article 14(4)(b) thereof that the host Member State may refuse to grant any social assistance to a Union citizen whose right of residence is based solely on that latter provision.

Although Directive 2004/38 requires a Member State to take account of the individual situation of the person concerned before it adopts an expulsion measure or finds that the residence of that person is placing an unreasonable burden on its social assistance system, no such individual assessment is necessary in the case of an EU citizen who has entered the territory of the host Member State in order to seek employment there, given that Directive 2004/38, establishing a gradual system as regards the retention of the status of ‘worker’ which seeks to safeguard the right of residence and access to social assistance, itself takes into consideration various factors characterising the individual situation of each applicant for social assistance and, in particular, the duration of the exercise of any economic activity.

Moreover, since the individual assessment concerns an overall appraisal of the burden which the grant of a specific benefit would place on the national system of social assistance as a whole, the assistance awarded to a single applicant can scarcely be described as an ‘unreasonable burden’ for a Member State, within the meaning of Article 14(1) of Directive 2004/38. However, while an individual claim might not place the Member State concerned under an unreasonable burden, the accumulation of all the individual claims which would be submitted to it would be bound to do so.

(see paras 58-60, 62, 63, operative part)
6.

Actions for failure to fulfil obligations — Judgment of the Court establishing the failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations — Breach of the obligation to comply with the judgment — Failure to comply with the obligation to recover unlawful aid — Defences — Recipients in difficulty or bankrupt — No effect — Obligation to use all the legal means available, including liquidation of the beneficiary — Burden on the issuing Member State to prove that diligence was exercised in recovering the aid granted unlawfully (Art. 260(2) TFEU) (see paras 60, 61)
Annex IIB to Directive 1999/13 on the limitation of emissions of volatile organic compounds due to the use of organic solvents in certain activities and installations must be interpreted as meaning that the time extension provided for in point (i) of the first paragraph of Annex IIB(2) to that directive may be given to the operator of an ‘installation’ within the meaning of Article 2(1) of that directive, for the implementation of his plan to reduce emissions of volatile organic compounds, where substitutes containing little or no solvent are still under development, even though, for that installation, a constant solid content of product can be assumed and used to define the reference point for emission reductions.

The possibility of giving a time extension to an operator necessarily implies that all the periods referred to in that directive, including that expiring on 31 October 2007 in respect of existing installations, can be extended. A different interpretation would mean that point (i) of the first paragraph of Annex IIB(2) to that directive would no longer be prescriptive and would reduce that provision to a mere explanation of how the period in question was to be calculated.

Moreover, while it is true that, in accordance with the second paragraph of Annex IIB(2) to Directive 1999/13, the standard scheme is to operate for installations for which a constant solid content of product can be assumed and used to define the reference point for emission reductions, that scheme does not, however, constitute a special rule precluding a time extension from being given to the operators of such installations. The possibility of giving a time extension in respect of all types of installations regardless of the reduction scheme adopted is borne out moreover by the ratio legis underpinning the provisions of Directive 1999/13 which relate to the time extension and to the installations which have a constant solid content of product. First, that time extension is an expression of the principle of proportionality. Second, as is apparent from recital 8 in the preamble to Directive 1999/13, the extension is based on the consideration that emissions of organic compounds can be avoided or reduced by less harmful substitutes which are or which will become available in the coming years. In that regard, the objective pursued by introducing the criterion relating to the presence of a constant solid content of product is unconnected to the ratio legis which underpins the provisions of Directive 1999/13 relating to the possibility of granting a time extension where substitutes containing little or no solvent are still under development.

Finally, since a different interpretation of Annex IIB to Directive 1999/13 cannot be clearly inferred from the wording of that annex, such an interpretation would run counter to the principle of legal certainty, which requires that EU rules enable those concerned to know precisely the extent of the obligations which are imposed on them and that those persons must be able to ascertain unequivocally what their obligations are and take steps accordingly.

(see paras 50, 53, 55-58, 61, 62, 64, operative part 1)
The importance of the principle of res judicata is reflected both in the legal order of the European Union and in national legal systems. In order to ensure both stability of the law and legal relations and the sound administration of justice, it is important that decisions of courts or tribunals which have become definitive after all rights of appeal have been exhausted or after expiry of the time-limits provided for in that connection can no longer be called into question. Therefore, EU law does not require a national court to disapply domestic rules of procedure conferring finality on a judgment, even if to do so would make it possible to remedy a domestic situation which is incompatible with EU law. Nevertheless, if the applicable domestic rules of procedure provide the possibility, under certain conditions, for a national court to go back on a decision having the authority of res judicata in order to render the situation compatible with national law, that possibility must prevail if those conditions are met, in accordance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, so that the situation at issue is brought back into line with EU law.

EU law, in particular the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, must be interpreted as not precluding a situation where there is no possibility for a national court to revise a final decision of a court or tribunal made in the course of civil proceedings when that decision is found to be incompatible with an interpretation of EU law upheld by the Court of Justice after the date on which that decision became final, even though such a possibility does exist as regards final decisions of a court or tribunal incompatible with EU law made in the course of administrative proceedings.

Concerning the principle of equivalence, that principle requires equal treatment of claims based on a breach of national law and of similar claims based on a breach of EU law, not equivalence of national procedural rules applicable to different types of proceedings such as civil proceedings on the one hand and administrative proceedings on the other. Furthermore, that principle is not relevant to a situation which concerns two types of actions, both of which are based on a breach of EU law.

Concerning the principle of effectiveness, that principle must be analysed by reference to the role of the rules concerned in the proceedings as a whole, the way in which the proceedings are conducted and the special features of those rules, before the various national bodies. For those purposes, account must be taken, where appropriate, of the principles which form the basis of the national judicial system concerned, such as protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of proceedings. EU law does not require a judicial body automatically to go back on a judgment having the authority of res judicata in order to take into account the interpretation of a relevant provision of EU law adopted by the Court after delivery of that judgment.

(see paras 34, 36-39, 41, operative part)
Article 335 TFEU, although restricted to Member States on its wording, is the expression of a general principle that the European Union has legal capacity and is to be represented, to that end, by the Commission. It follows that Article 335 TFEU provides a basis for the Commission to represent the European Union before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.

In that respect, by submitting to that court, on behalf of the European Union, a written statement the content of which had not been approved by the Council, the Commission did not disregard the Council’s powers under Article 218(9) TFEU and the second sentence of Article 16(1) TEU.

In the first place, the reference in Article 218(9) TFEU to the positions to be adopted on the European Union’s behalf ‘in’ a body set up by an international agreement and called upon to adopt acts having legal effects means that the application of that provision concerns the positions to be adopted on behalf of the European Union in the context of its participation, through its institutions or, as the case may be, through its Member States acting jointly in its interests, in the adoption of such acts within the international body concerned. The European Union is invited to express, as a party, a position ‘before’ an international court, and not ‘in’ it.

In the second place, a written statement which consists in suggesting answers to the questions raised in a case, by setting out the manner in which the European Union envisaged the interpretation and application of certain provisions of international and EU law relevant to fishing, is not intended to formulate a policy in that respect, for the purpose of the second sentence of Article 16(1) TEU, but to present to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea a set of legal observations aimed at enabling that court to give, if appropriate, an informed advisory opinion on the questions put to it. In that respect, considerations in the statement relating to that court’s jurisdiction to give the requested advisory opinion and the admissibility of the questions put to it are, like the observations submitted on the substance of the case in question, characteristic of participation in proceedings before a court. They cannot, in those circumstances, be regarded as policy making, within the meaning of Article 16(1) TEU.

(see paras 58, 59, 62, 63, 70-73)
Article 23 of Regulation No 1122/2009 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation No 73/2009 as regards cross-compliance, modulation and the integrated administration and control system, under the direct support schemes for farmers provided for by that regulation, as well as for the implementation of Regulation No 1234/2007 as regards cross-compliance under the support scheme provided for the wine sector, read in conjunction with Regulation No 1698/2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, as amended by Regulation No 473/2009, and Regulation No 1975/2006 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation No 1698/2005, as regards the implementation of control procedures as well as cross-compliance in respect of rural development support measures, as amended by Regulation No 484/2009, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation from requiring that the applicant for agri-environmental aid supply to the paying authority, at the same time as its aid application, a certificate in relation to the rare plant species which gives the applicant the right to payment of that aid, on the condition that that legislation permits the operators concerned to comply under reasonable conditions with the requirements of that legislation, a matter which it is for the referring court to determine.

Such national legislation falls within the discretion conferred on the Member States pursuant to Articles 5, 10 and 11 of Regulation No 1975/2006 and furthers the objective of those provisions which is to ensure the effectiveness of the controls. However, the measures taken by Member States within their discretion cannot adversely affect the practical effect of the provisions of Regulations Nos 1698/2005, 1975/2006 and 1122/2009 and the general principles of EU law, in particular, the principles of proportionality and legal certainty. In that regard, it is for the national court to determine whether the detailed rules for the entry into force of the national legislation allowed the operators concerned to comply under reasonable conditions with the requirements of that legislation and, in particular, allowed the applicants for aid to request, obtain and submit the certificate at issue within the time limit set by that national legislation. Furthermore, it is for that court to determine whether the requirement of a certificate for rare plant species is not new and whether the legislation does not lay down a mandatory time limit for requesting the certificate from the competent authorities and, where appropriate, take those factors into account during its determination.

(see paras 41, 42, 49-51, operative part 1)