EN Official Journal of the European Union C 252/14

Appeal brought on 6 June 2011 by Densmore Ronald Dover against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 24.03.2011 in Case T-149/09: Densmore Ronald Dover v European Parliament

(Case C-278/11 P)

2011/C 252/28

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Densmore Ronald Dover (represented by: D. Vaughan QC, M. Lester, Barrister, R. Collard, Solicitor)

Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— issue an order that the contested parts of Judgment of the General Court in Case T-149/09 be overturned;

— annul the whole of the Contested Decision;

— issue an order that the Parliament pays the appellant's costs of this appeal and of the application for annulment in the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First, the General Court erred in holding that the Parliament complied with its duty to give proper reasons for seeking repayment of the sum of GBP 345 289,00 at paragraphs 24 and 25 of the Contested Decision. The appellant did not know, from paragraphs 24 to 25 of the Contested Decision or elsewhere, the reasons why he was being ordered to repay those sums, which would permit him to contest the validity of that reasoning before the Courts, or to enable the Courts properly to review those reasons.

Second, the General Court erred in holding that the Parliament was justified in reclaiming GBP 345 289,00 on the grounds that it had been paid ‘unduly’ under Article 14 of the PEAM rules since:

(a) The Parliament had not explained anywhere in the Contested Decision the reasons why it considered that the numerous documents submitted by the appellant did not prove that the items set out at paragraph 25 were used in accordance with the PEAM rules, nor the respects in which the Parliament considered them to have been wrongly claimed under Article 14 of the PEAM rules or to have been misused or used for improper purposes.

(b) In fact the appellant had explained each item listed at paragraph 25 of the Contested Decision, and had also explained that each item was incurred entirely and precisely in order to cover only the expenses arising from the employment or engagement of MP Holdings as service provider. The appellant had provided a large volume of documentary evidence in order to show that the allowances paid to MP Holdings were actually used for Article 14 purposes. What he provided has vastly exceeded the documents he has been required to keep and provide at all relevant times, in particular documents relating to the appellant’s first mandate. This evidence demonstrated that all expenses were incurred wholly and exclusively in providing parliamentary assistance services to the appellant. The Parliament was seeking to impose hugely onerous requirements on the appellant to provide documentation in order to justify each and every cost going right back to 1999. These were not requirements that existed at the time the expenses were incurred, and indeed have never been preconditions for reimbursement at all under Article 14 of the PEAM Rules.

Third, the General Court erred in finding that the Parliament’s impermissible reliance on an alleged ‘conflict of interest’ should not have resulted in the annulment of the Contested Decision as a whole. The General Court correctly held that the Parliament could not rely on an alleged conflict of interest to justify seeking repayment of parliamentary assistance allowance. Since the Parliament had relied expressly and principally on that reason to justify the whole of the Contested Decision, that finding should have resulted in the whole of the Contested Decision being annulled.