ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
In that regard, the categories to which point 7 of Annex I to Directive 94/19 refers, in order to determine the deposits or depositors excluded from the guarantee, must be defined in functional terms. Consequently, the exclusion of the deposit-guarantee applies to persons who carry out functions which can be considered, having regard to national law and to the commercial practice of the Member State, as being covered by the concepts referred to in that point of that annex, irrespective of the actual title of the functions accordingly carried out, which is for the national court to determine. Moreover, since the categories laid down in Annex I to Directive 94/19 constitute an exception to the general rule in Article 3 of that directive, they must be interpreted strictly.

The deposits excluded under point 7 of Annex I to Directive 94/19 on deposit-guarantee schemes, as amended by Directive 2009/14, are listed exhaustively in that provision, so that the Member States cannot provide, in their national law, for other categories of depositors who are not covered, in terms of the functions carried out, by the concepts listed in that point, in order for the exclusion from the deposit-guarantee to be applied to them.

Point 7 of Annex I to Directive 94/19 on deposit-guarantee schemes, as amended by Directive 2009/14, must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States may exclude from the guarantee laid down by that directive, as a manager, persons who, because of the function exercised within the credit institution, have, irrespective of the title of that function, a level of information and expertise which enables them to assess the actual financial situation and the risks associated with the activity of the credit institution.

The optional exclusion of the depositors listed in point 7 of Annex I to Directive 94/19 is based on the assumption that those persons have, in principle, a level of expertise and information relating to the credit institution to which they entrust their deposits which most depositors do not have. It is for the national court to determine whether, in the circumstances, the person concerned possesses that information and expertise and is in a situation to enable him to assess the actual financial situation and the risks associated with the activity of the credit institution. To that end, the national court will have to take into consideration all the relevant circumstances of the case and, in particular, the description of the position held by the person concerned, the activities which he actually carried out and the legal and factual relationships between him and the bank’s administrative board. In that context, whether the person concerned is responsible for all of the bank’s activity or only a specific part of it is only one of the elements to be taken into account in that determination.

(see paras 33, 37, 38, operative part 2)
In accordance with the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is required, where a question of EU law is raised before it, to comply with its obligation to bring the matter before the Court of Justice, unless it has established that the question raised is irrelevant or that the provision of EU law in question has already been interpreted by the Court or that the correct application of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt.

Neither Regulation No 297/95 on fees payable to the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, as amended by Regulation No 273/2012, nor Regulation No 1234/2008 concerning the examination of variations to the terms of marketing authorisations for medicinal products for human use and veterinary medicinal products, as amended by Regulation No 712/2012, requires a competent national authority to demand, in respect of the change of address of a marketing authorisation holder, payment of as many fees as there are marketing authorisations requiring variation, and nor do those regulations prohibit such an authority from demanding such payment.

Regulation No 297/95 does not impose any obligation on national authorities responsible for issuing marketing authorisations for medicinal products. As regards Regulation No 1234/2008, it does not contain any provision governing the amount of fees that may be charged by competent national authorities for processing groupings of Type IA minor variations, such as variations of purely administrative nature that are related to the identity and contact details of the marketing authorisation holder. The question whether those national authorities may demand payment of as many fees as there are marketing authorisations requiring variation, notwithstanding the fact that the applications for variation are grouped together, falls to be determined, in the absence of any legislative provisions adopted by the European Union, by national law.

(see paras 32, 37, 40, 41, operative part 1)
Case C‑326/14

Verein für Konsumenteninformation

v

A1 Telekom Austria AG

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive 2002/22/EC — Electronic communications networks and services — Users’ rights — Right of subscribers to terminate their contract without penalty — Changes to charges under terms of the contract — Increase in charges in line with increase in the consumer price index’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 26 November 2015

Approximation of laws — Electronic communications networks and services — Universal service and users’ rights — Directive 2002/22 — Right of subscribers to terminate their contract without penalty in the event of modifications to it — Concept of modification — Adjustment to charges — Not included — Conditions

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2002/22, as amended by Directive 2009/136, Art. 20(2))

Article 20(2) of Directive 2002/22 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive), as amended by Directive 2009/136, must be interpreted as meaning that a change in charges for the provision of electronic communications networks or services, resulting from the operation of a price adjustment clause contained in the standard terms and conditions applied by an undertaking providing such services, where that term provides that such a change is to apply in accordance with changes in an objective consumer price index compiled by a public institution, does not constitute a modification to the contractual conditions within the meaning of that provision, which grants the subscriber the right to withdraw from the contract without penalty.

The EU legislature recognised that undertakings providing electronic communications services may have a legitimate interest in being able to adjust the prices and charges for their services. In that regard, price adjustments provided for in the contract, in so far as they are based on a clear, comprehensive and easily accessible price index, resulting from State decisions and mechanisms, cannot place end-users in a contractual situation any different from that which arises from a contract in which the term at issue is provided for in the standard terms and conditions of that contract. Consequently, the operation of such a change in charges cannot be characterised as a modification to the contractual conditions, within the meaning of Article 20(2) of Directive 2002/22.

(see paras 25, 27-29, operative part)
In that context, it is for the Member States to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for damages in public procurement matters. However, the fact remains that those detailed procedural rules must be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and must not make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness).

Article 1(1) and (3) of Directive 89/655 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts, as amended by Directive 2007/66, requires the Member States to take the measures necessary to ensure that decisions taken by the contracting authorities which are incompatible with EU law may be reviewed effectively and, in particular, as rapidly as possible and ensure wide availability of reviews with respect to any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular contract and who has been or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement.

EU law, in particular the principle of effectiveness, precludes national legislation which makes bringing an action for damages in respect of the infringement of a rule of public procurement law subject to a prior finding that the public procurement procedure for the contract in question was unlawful because of the lack of prior publication of a contract notice, where the action for a declaration of unlawfulness is subject to a six-month limitation period which starts to run on the day after the date of the award of the public contract in question, irrespective of whether or not the applicant in that action was in a position to know of the unlawfulness affecting the decision of the awarding authority.

Making the admissibility of actions for damages subject to a prior finding that the public procurement procedure for the contract in question was unlawful because of the lack of prior publication of a contract notice, where the action for a declaration of unlawfulness is subject to a six-month limitation period, irrespective of whether or not the person harmed knew that there had been an infringement of a rule of law, is likely to render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of the right to bring an action for damages. Where there has been no prior publication of a contract notice, such a limitation period of six months is likely not to enable a person harmed to gather the necessary information with a view to a possible action, thus preventing that action from being brought.

(see paras 41, 42, 46, operative part)
6.

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see para. 101)
Article 4 of Directive 91/271 concerning urban waste water treatment, as amended by Regulation No 1137/2008, requires Member States to ensure that, within the periods specified in that article, the agglomerations concerned subject urban waste water entering collecting systems provided to agglomerations in accordance with Article 3 of that directive to appropriate treatment and that such discharges satisfy the requirements of Annex I.B to the directive. That obligation does not mean that the collection of samples, provided for in Annex I.D to Directive 91/271, must span a full year in order for it to be established that the systems concerned are in compliance with the requirements of Annex I.B to the directive. Where a Member State is able to submit a sample meeting the requirements set out in Annex I.B to Directive 91/271, the obligations arising under Article 4 of that directive must be deemed to be satisfied.

Moreover, in order to meet the objective of protecting the environment from the adverse effects of waste water discharges, as specified in Article 1 of Directive 91/271, the obligation in Article 4 thereof — according to which discharges of urban waste waters must be subject to treatment satisfying the requirements of Annex I.B — is secured over time through the monitoring of discharges from treatment plants, as provided for in the first indent of Article 15(1) of the directive, which makes express reference to Annex I.D thereto.

(see paras 39, 40, 45)
In order to identify the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising from a tort or delict, Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) adopts the law of the country in which the ‘damage’ occurs, irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred, and irrespective of the country or countries in which the ‘indirect consequences’ of that event occur. The damage which must be taken into account in order to determine the place where the damage occurred is the direct damage, as is clear from recital 16 of that regulation. In the event of physical injuries caused to a person or the damage caused to goods, the EU legislature stated, in recital 17 of the Rome II Regulation, that the county of the place where the direct damage occurs is the country of the place where the injuries were suffered or the goods were damaged. It follows that, where it is possible to identify the occurrence of direct damage, which is usually the case with a road traffic accident, the place where the direct damage occurred is the relevant connecting factor for the determination of the applicable law, regardless of the indirect consequences of that accident.

Furthermore, the application of the law of the place where the direct damage was suffered contributes to the objective set out in recital 16 of the Rome II Regulation, seeking to ensure the foreseeability of the applicable law, while avoiding the risk that the tort or delict is broken up in to several elements, each subject to a different law according to the places or the persons other than the direct victim who sustain damage.

(see paras 23-25, 29)
Article 17(1) and (2) of Framework Decision 2008/909 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299, must be interpreted as precluding a national rule being interpreted in such a way that it permits the executing State to grant to the sentenced person a reduction in sentence by reason of work he carried out during the period of his detention in the issuing State, although no such reduction in sentence was granted by the competent authorities of the issuing State, in accordance with the law of the issuing State.

Before the recognition of the judgment passing sentence by the executing State and the transfer of the sentenced person to the executing State, it falls to the issuing State to determine the reductions in sentence that pertain to the period of detention served on its territory. The issuing State alone is competent to grant a reduction in sentence for work carried out before the transfer and, where appropriate, to inform the executing State of that reduction in the certificate referred to in Article 4 of Framework Decision 2008/909. Consequently, the executing State cannot, retroactively, substitute its law on the enforcement of sentences and, in particular, its rules on reductions in sentence, for the law of the issuing State with respect to that part of the sentence which has already been served by the person concerned on the territory of the issuing State. An interpretation to the contrary would be likely to undermine the objectives pursued by Framework Decision 2008/909, those objectives including respect for the principle of mutual recognition, which constitutes, as stated in recital 1 of Framework Decision 2008/909, read in the light of Article 82(1) TFEU, the ‘cornerstone’ of judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the European Union.

(see paras 44, 46, 51, operative part 1)
2.

Acts of the institutions — Statement of reasons — Obligation — Scope — Assessment of the duty to state reasons by reference to the circumstances of the case — No need to specify all the relevant factual and legal elements (Art. 296 TFEU) (see para. 17)
In that respect, the General Court’s review of the evidence on which the EU institutions based their findings does not constitute a new assessment of the facts replacing that made by the institutions. That review does not encroach on the broad discretion of the institutions in the field of commercial policy, but is restricted to showing whether that evidence was able to support the conclusions reached by the institutions.

In the sphere of the common commercial policy and, most particularly, in the realm of measures to protect trade, the EU institutions enjoy a broad discretion by reason of the complexity of the economic, political and legal situations which they have to examine. Judicial review of such an appraisal must thus be limited to verifying that the relevant procedural rules have been complied with, that the facts on which the choice is based have been accurately stated and that there has not been a manifest error of assessment of those facts or a misuse of powers.

Although it follows from Article 6(1) of anti-dumping Regulation No 384/96 that, as a rule, post-investigation period data are not to be taken into account for the purpose of the investigation of the dumping and the injury, nevertheless, the EU legislature did not intend to exclude entirely the consideration of such data.

The EU institutions are therefore entitled, in certain circumstances, to take post-investigation period data into consideration. That is particularly so in investigations intended, not to find an injury, but to determine whether there is a threat of injury which, by its very nature, requires a prospective analysis. The existence of a threat of injury, like that of an injury, must be established as at the date of the adoption of the anti-dumping measure. In addition, Article 3(9) of the basic regulation requires that the finding of a threat of material injury is to be based on facts and not merely allegation, conjecture or remote possibility and that the change in circumstances which would create a situation in which the dumping would cause injury must be clearly foreseen and imminent. In those circumstances, the post-investigation period data may be used to confirm or invalidate the forecasts in the provisional regulation and allows, in the former case, the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping measure.

However, such use of those post-investigation period data cannot escape review by the EU judicature. Although that review must not encroach on the broad discretion of the institutions in the realm of trade defence measures, the General Court does not go beyond the limits of that review by examining whether the evidence on which those institutions based their findings support the conclusions that they reached.

(see paras 70-74)
Article 11A(1)(b) of Sixth Directive 77/388 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes, as amended by Directive 95/7, must be interpreted as meaning that the value of a right in rem granting its holder a right of use over immovable property and the cost of completing the office building built on the land in question may be included in the taxable amount of a supply, within the meaning of Article 5(7)(a) of that directive, as amended, where the taxable person has already paid value added tax (VAT) on that value and that cost, but also deducted VAT immediately and in full.

Although the option of treating certain applications as supplies made for consideration cannot be used in order to charge VAT on the value of goods on which the taxable person has already, in the context of an earlier tax period, paid VAT, nevertheless, where VAT paid on the elements of the cost price of those goods has subsequently been deducted, the taxation resulting from such a treatment does not lead to repeated taxation of the same value. Only where the VAT on such elements remains chargeable to the taxable person because he has not deducted them are those elements not to be included in the taxable amount on the basis of Article 5(7)(a) of the Sixth Directive.

(see paras 41, 43, 46, operative part 1)
Article 1(2)(a) of Directive 2004/18 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts must be interpreted as meaning that a contract scheme through which a public entity intends to acquire goods on the market by contracting throughout the period of validity of that scheme with any economic operator who undertakes to provide the goods concerned in accordance with predetermined conditions, without choosing between the interested operators, and allows them to accede to that scheme throughout its validity, does not constitute a public contract within the meaning of that directive.

Where a public entity seeks to conclude supply contracts with all the economic operators wishing to supply the goods concerned in accordance with the conditions specified by that entity, the fact that the contracting authority does not designate an economic operator to whom contractual exclusivity is to be awarded means that there is no need to control, through the detailed rules of Directive 2004/18, the action of that contracting authority so as to prevent it from awarding a contract in favour of national operators. It is therefore apparent that the choice of a tender and, thus, of a successful tenderer, is intrinsically linked to the regulation of public contracts by that directive and, consequently, to the concept of ‘public contract’ within the meaning of Article 1(2)(a) of that directive.

(see paras 37, 38, 42, operative part 1)
A Member State fails to fulfil its obligations under Article 12(2) of Directive 2004/80/EC relating to compensation to crime victims by failing to adopt all the measures necessary to guarantee the existence, in cross-border situations, of a compensation scheme for victims of all violent intentional crimes committed on its territory.

That provision is intended to guarantee to Union citizens the right to fair and appropriate compensation for the injuries they suffer on the territory of the Member State in which they find themselves in exercising their right to free movement, by requiring each Member State to introduce a compensation scheme for victims of any violent intentional crime committed on its territory.

As regards the determination of the intentional and violent nature of a crime, although the Member States have, in principle, the competence to define the scope of that concept in their domestic law, that competence does not, however, permit them to limit the scope of the compensation scheme for victims to only certain violent intentional crimes, lest it render redundant Article 12(2) of Directive 2004/80.

Moreover, although the system of cooperation established by Directive 2004/80 solely concerns access to compensation in cross-border situations, it does not however exclude that Article 12(2) of that directive requires each Member State, for the purposes of securing the objective pursued by it in such situations, to adopt a national scheme guaranteeing compensation for victims of any violent intentional crime on its territory.

(see paras 45, 46, 49, 52, operative part 1)