ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
12

In those circumstances, the Employment Tribunal, Leicester, decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Where: — a worker’s annual pay comprises … basic pay and commission payments made under a contractual right to commission; — the commission is paid by reference to sales made and contracts entered into by the employer in consequence of the worker’s work; — commission is paid in arrears and the amount of commission received in a given reference period fluctuates according to the value of sales achieved and contracts entered into and the time of such sales; — during periods of annual leave, the worker does not undertake any work that would entitle him to those commission payments and accordingly does not generate commission in respect of such periods; — during the pay period which includes a period of annual leave, the worker is entitled to basic pay and will continue to receive commission payments based on commission earned earlier; and — his average commission earnings over the course of the year will be lower than they would be if the worker had not taken leave, because, during the leave period, he will not have undertaken any work that would entitle him to commission payments, does Article 7 of [Council] Directive 93/104/EC [of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (OJ 1993 L 307, p. 18)], as amended by Directive 2003/88 …, require that Member States take measures to ensure that a worker is paid in respect of periods of annual leave by reference to the commission payments he would have earned during that period, had he not taken leave, as well as his basic pay? (2) What are the principles which inform the answer to Question 1? (3) If the answer to Question 1 is “Yes”, what principles (if any) are required to be adopted by Member States in calculating the sum that is payable to the worker by reference to the commission that the worker would or might have earned if he had not taken annual leave?’
3

Recitals 2 to 4 and 31 in the preamble to Directive 2004/38 read as follows: ‘(2) The free movement of persons constitutes one of the fundamental freedoms of the internal market, which comprises an area without internal frontiers, in which freedom is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the [EC] Treaty. (3) Union citizenship should be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States when they exercise their right of free movement and residence. It is therefore necessary to codify and review the existing Community instruments dealing separately with workers, self-employed persons, as well as students and other inactive persons in order to simplify and strengthen the right of free movement and residence of all Union citizens. (4) With a view to remedying this sector-by-sector, piecemeal approach to the right of free movement and residence and facilitating the exercise of this right, there needs to be a single legislative act to amend Council Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community [(OJ English Special Edition 1968(II), p. 475), as amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2434/92 of 27 July 1992 (OJ 1992 L 245, p. 1)], and to repeal the following acts: Council Directive 68/360/EEC of 15 October 1968 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the Community for workers of Member States and their families [(OJ Engish Special Edition 1968(II), p. 485)], Council Directive 73/148/EEC of 21 May 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the provision of services [(OJ 1973 L 172, p. 14)], Council Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence [(OJ 1990 L 180, p. 26)], Council Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity [(OJ 1990 L 180, p. 28)] and Council Directive 93/96/EEC of 29 October 1993 on the right of residence for students [(OJ 1993 L 317, p. 59)]. ... (31) This Directive respects the fundamental rights and freedoms and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In accordance with the prohibition of discrimination contained in the Charter, Member States should implement this Directive without discrimination between the beneficiaries of this Directive on grounds such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic characteristics, language, religion or beliefs, political or other opinion, membership of an ethnic minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation.’
24

Paragraph 46 of that Law, governing the European firearms pass, provides: ‘1. The European firearms pass is an authentic instrument which authorises its holder, on journeys to other Member States of the European Union, to carry the firearm entered on it and enough ammunition for the purpose that that firearm is to be used for, where the Member State of the European Union to which or through which he is travelling has given its agreement for him to carry that firearm to or through it. The form and contents of the European firearms pass are set out in a generally binding legal regulation, issued by the Ministry. 2. Holders of a European firearms pass may, without prior authorisation from a Member State of the European Union, on a journey through two or more Member States of the European Union, export a firearm within the meaning of Paragraph 6(1)(a) to (c), or an automatically reloading long firearm the magazine and chamber of which cannot hold more than three cartridges, and the corresponding ammunition, for the purposes of exercising a hunting right, or a firearm within the meaning of Paragraph 5(1)(a) to (f) and of Paragraph 6, and the corresponding ammunition, with a view to participating in a event including target shooting, provided that they are in possession of a European firearms pass listing such firearm or firearms and provided that they are able to substantiate the reasons for their journey. This derogation shall not apply to journeys to a Member State which prohibits the acquisition and possession of the firearm in question or which makes it subject to authorisation; in that case, an express statement to that effect shall be entered on the European firearms pass. 3. The European firearms pass is issued by a police department at the written request of a natural person who resides in [Slovakia], is the owner of a firearm listed in Paragraph 2 and is the holder of a group D or E firearms licence. A request for the issue of a European firearms pass must include the personal details of the requestor and the number and group of the firearms licence; two photographs are also to be included with the request pursuant to Paragraph 17(2)(a). …’
13

In those circumstances, the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per la Sicilia decided to stay proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Do the principles of freedom of establishment, non-discrimination and the preservation of competition under Article 49 et seq. TFEU preclude national legislation which does not allow a pharmacist, who is qualified and entered in the relevant professional register but does not own a pharmacy included on the “pianta organica”, also to offer for retail sale, in the para-pharmacy owned by that pharmacist, pharmaceutical products which are subject to a prescription in the form of a “ricetta bianca” — that is to say, pharmaceutical products the cost of which is borne, not by the Italian national health service, but wholly by the citizen — and which thereby also establishes in that sector a prohibition on the sale of certain categories of pharmaceutical products, as well as a quota in relation to the number of commercial outlets which may be established within the national territory? (2) Must Article 15 of the Charter be interpreted as meaning that the principle therein established also applies, without restriction, to the profession of pharmacist, and that the public-interest aspect of that profession does not justify the application of different arrangements to the proprietors of pharmacies and to the proprietors of para-pharmacies as regards the sale of the medicinal products referred to in Question 1 above? (3) Must Articles 102 TFEU and 106(1) TFEU be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position must apply without restriction to the profession of pharmacist, inasmuch as a pharmacist who owns a traditional pharmacy, and sells medicinal products under a contractual arrangement with the Italian national health service, benefits from the ban on the sale of Class C medicinal products by proprietors of para-pharmacies, without this being properly justified on the basis of the undeniably special features of the profession of pharmacist arising from the public interest in safeguarding public health?’
11

In those circumstances, expressing doubts as to the effect of the principle pro rata temporis in the case before it, the Oberster Gerichtshof decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. Is the principle of pro rata temporis under Clause 4.2 of the [Framework Agreement on part-time work] to be applied to a child allowance provided for in a collective agreement — such allowance being a social benefit provided by the employer in order to meet part of the parents’ expenses for the maintenance of the child in respect of whom the allowance is obtained — on the basis of the (appropriate) nature of that benefit? 2. If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative, Is Clause 4.1 of the [Framework Agreement on part-time work] to be interpreted as meaning that the disadvantage suffered by part-time workers, due to the reduction in their entitlement to dependent child allowance in proportion with their working time, is — having regard to the social partners’ wide discretion in the determination of a particular social and economic policy objective and of the measures capable of achieving it — objectively justified on the basis that a prohibition of a proportionate grant (a) makes part-time work in the form of parental part-time working and/or minor activity during a period of parental leave more difficult or impossible; and/or (b) leads to distortion of competition on account of the greater financial burden placed on employers who employ a larger number of part-time workers, and to a lesser willingness on the part of employers to take on part-time workers; and/or (c) leads to more favourable treatment of part-time workers who have additional part-time work and multiple entitlement to a benefit — such as a dependent child allowance — under a collective agreement; and/or (d) leads to more favourable treatment of part-time workers, because they have more free time than full-time workers and thus have better childcare options available to them? 3. If the answer to Question 1 and Question 2 is in the negative: Is Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights [of the European Union] to be interpreted as meaning that where, in a system of employment law in which substantial elements of minimum employment standards are established in accordance with the agreed social policy assessments of specially selected and qualified parties to a collective agreement, a point of detail in a collective agreement (albeit a point that breaches the EU law principle of non-discrimination) — in this case, the proportionate grant of child allowance in the case of part-time working — is invalid (according to national practice), the penalty of invalidity extends to all the provisions of the collective agreement relating to that area (in this case, child allowance)?’
Case C‑330/13

Lukoyl Neftohim Burgas AD

v

Nachalnik na Mitnicheski punkt Pristanishte Burgas Tsentar pri Mitnitsa Burgas

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administrativen sad Burgas)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Common Customs Tariff — Combined Nomenclature — Classification of goods — Goods described as ‘heavy oils, lubricating oils or other oils for undergoing a specific process’ — Headings 2707 and 2710 — Aromatic and non aromatic constituents — Relationship between the Combined Nomenclature and the Harmonised System’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber), 12 June 2014

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Identification of the relevant elements of EU law — Reformulation des questions (Art. 267 TFEU)

Customs union — Common Customs Tariff — Tariff headings — Heavy oils, lubricating oils and other oils for undergoing a specific process — Classification under subheadings 2707 or 2710 — Criterion — Content by weight of the aromatic constituents in relation to the non-aromatic constituents — Determination by the national court (Council Regulation No 2658/87, Annex I, Headings 2707 and 2710, as amended by Commission Regulation No 1006/2011)

Customs union — Common Customs Tariff — Tariff headings — Chapter 27 of the Combined Nomenclature — Petrol oil and oils obtained from bituminous minerals other than crude and similar products with predominately aromatic constituents — Concept of aromatic constituents wider than that of aromatic hydrocarbons (Council Regulation No 2658/87, Annex I, Chapter 27, as amended by Council Regulation No 1006/2011)

EU law — Interpretation — Texts in several languages — Uniform interpretation — Consideration of the wording, objectives and context of the national rules at issue
Case C‑204/13

Finanzamt Saarlouis

v

Heinz Malburg

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof)

‛Taxation — Value added tax — Origin and scope of the right of deduction — Dissolution of a partnership by a partner — Acquisition of a portion of the client base of that partnership — Contribution in kind to another partnership — Payment of input tax — Whether deduction possible’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber), 13 March 2014

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Deduction of input tax — Origin and scope of right of deduction — Acquisition by one of the partners of a portion of the client base of a partnership in order to make it available free of charge to a new partnership — Right to deduction — No such right — Principle of fiscal neutrality — Not applicable

(Council Directive 77/388, Arts 2(1), 4(1) and (2), and 17(2)(a))

Article 4(1) and (2) and Article 17(2)(a) of Sixth Directive 77/388 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes, as amended by Directive 95/7, must, having regard to the principle of value added tax neutrality, be interpreted as meaning that a partner in a partnership of tax advisors who acquires from that partnership a portion of its client base for the sole purpose of making that client base available directly and free of charge to a newly founded partnership of tax advisors, in which he is the principal partner, so that that partnership can use that client base in its business, without that client base however becoming part of the capital assets of the newly founded partnership, is not entitled to deduct input value added tax paid on the acquisition of the client base concerned.

That provision of the client base for the use of the new partnership is free of charge and therefore does not fall within the scope of Article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive, which refers only to supplies of goods and services provided for consideration, nor within the scope of Article 4(1) and (2) of the Sixth Directive, which refers to the exploitation of tangible or intangible property for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis.

Moreover, the principle of fiscal neutrality manifests itself through the deduction system which is meant to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of the value added tax payable or paid in the course of all his economic activities. The common system of value added tax consequently ensures that all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided that they are themselves subject to that tax, are taxed in a wholly neutral way. The principle of fiscal neutrality does not apply therefore to a situation of the provision of the client base for the use of a partnership free of charge is not a transaction falling within the scope of value added tax.

(see paras 36, 41, 42, 47, operative part)
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

Transport — Maritime transport — Freedom to provide services — Regulation No 4055/86 — Scope ratione personae — Company established in a State that is a party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, proprietor of a vessel flying the flag of a third country and providing maritime transport services between the States party to that agreement — Included — Conditions

(EEA Agreement; Council Regulation No 4055/86, Art. 1)

Summary

Article 1 of Regulation No 4055/86 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport between Member States and between Member States and third countries must be interpreted as meaning that a company established in a State that is a party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area and which is proprietor of a vessel flying the flag of a third country, by which maritime transport services are provided from or to a State that is a party to the EEA Agreement, may rely on the freedom to provide services, provided that it can, due to its operation of that vessel, be classed as a provider of those services and that the persons for whom the services are intended are established in States that are parties to the EEA Agreement other than that in which that company is established.

The application of Regulation No 4055/86 is in no way affected by the fact that the vessel carrying out the maritime transport at issue, and on which the workers in whose favour industrial action is taken are employed, flies the flag of a third country, nor by the fact that the crew members of the vessel are third country nationals.

(see paras 42, 44, operative part)
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

Border controls, asylum and immigration — Immigration policy — Right to family reunification — Directive 2003/86 — National law requiring the sponsor and his/her spouse to have reached the age of 21 by the date on which the application for family reunification is lodged — Lawfulness

(Council Directive 2003/86, Art. 4(5))

Summary

Article 4(5) of Directive 2003/86 on the right to family reunification must be interpreted as meaning that that provision does not preclude a rule of national law requiring that spouses and registered partners must have reached the age of 21 by the date when the application seeking to be considered family members entitled to reunification is lodged.

The minimum age fixed by the Member States by virtue of Article 4(5) of Directive 2003/86 ultimately corresponds with the age at which, according to the Member State concerned, a person is presumed to have acquired sufficient maturity not only to refuse to enter into a forced marriage but also to choose voluntarily to move to a different country with his or her spouse, in order to lead a family life with him or her there and to become integrated there.

A measure requiring the sponsor and his or her spouse to have attained the prescribed minimum age by the date when the application is lodged does not prevent the exercise of the right to family reunification nor render it excessively difficult.

Furthermore, taking the date when the application for family reunification is lodged as the point by reference to which it must be determined whether the minimum age condition is satisfied is consistent with the principles of equal treatment and legal certainty.

(see paras 15-17, 19, operative part)
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Limits — Jurisdiction of the national court — Establishing and assessing the facts of the dispute — Need for a preliminary ruling and relevance of the questions raised — Assessment by the national court

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Identification of the relevant aspects of EU law — Reformulation of the questions

Social security — Migrant workers — Family benefits — Legislation applicable — Whether a Member State has competence on the sole ground that the person applying for family benefits is registered as being permanently resident in that Member State — Not permissible — A Member State lacks competence where there is no specific and particularly close connecting factors between the situation at issue and the territory of that Member State

(Council Regulation No 1408/71, as amended by Regulation No 592/2008, Art. 13)
Keywords

Operative part



Keywords

Appeals — Grounds — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1), second para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 28, 29)

2. Appeals — Grounds — Specific criticism of a point of the General Court’s reasoning necessary (Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 169(2)) (see paras 45, 55)

3. Appeals — Grounds — Inadequate statement of reasons — Reliance by the General Court on implied reasoning — Lawfulness — Conditions (see para. 58)

Operative part

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the appeal;

2. Orders the Hellenic Republic to pay the costs.
Environment — International trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora — Species listed in Annex B to Regulation No 338/97 — Introduction in the European Union — Import permit — Non-compliance with the conditions for issuance laid down in Regulation No 338/97 — Invalidity of the permit restricted to the specimens actually affected by that non-compliance — Validity of the permit for the specimens fulfilling the conditions — Seizure and possible confiscation restricted to those specimens actually affected by the ground of invalidity

(Council Regulation No 338/97, Arts 4(2) and 6, 11(2)(a) and (b), and Annex B)

Article 11(2)(a) and (b) of Regulation No 338/97 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein must be interpreted as meaning that an import permit which does not comply with the conditions laid down in that regulation must be considered void only in respect of the specimens actually affected by the ground of invalidity of that import permit, those specimens then being the only ones which may be seized and possibly confiscated by the competent authority of the Member State where they are situated.

Although that regulation allows for the issuance of a single permit to import into the Union for a number of specimens of different species listed in Annex B to that regulation, the issuance of such a permit is not the outcome of an overall assessment of all of the specimens forming part of the cargo in question, but of an individual, in-depth examination of the situation of each of the specimens concerned. Therefore, the fact that an import permit is void in respect of the specimens of animals not meeting the conditions for issuance laid down in Article 4(2) and (6) of that regulation does not cast doubt on the validity of the permit in respect of those specimens which do fulfil those conditions.

This interpretation of Article 11(2)(a) and (b) of Regulation No 338/97 does not undermine the achievement of the objectives pursued by that regulation, namely that of ensuring the fullest possible protection for species of wild fauna and flora through controls on trade in such species, in compliance with the objectives, principles and provisions of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.

(see paras 25, 29, 31, 34, 35, 41, operative part)