ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Social n.o 41 de Madrid (Spain) lodged on 20 November 2019 — JL v Fondo de Garantía Salarial (Fogasa)

(Case C-841/19)

(2020/C 45/23)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de lo Social n.o 41 de Madrid

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: JL

Defendant: Fondo de Garantía Salarial (Fogasa)

Question referred

The question referred is whether Article 4(1) of Directive 79/7/EEC (1) and Article 2(1) of Directive 2006/54/EC (2)of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 should be interpreted as precluding a legislative provision of a Member State ¼ such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which, as regards the amount which FOGASA (3) is liable to pay a part-time worker, the worker’s base wages, which are reduced due to the part-time nature of the employment, are reduced again when calculating FOGASA’s liability under Article 33 of the Workers’ Statute, because the part-time factor is applied for a second time, as compared with a comparable full-time worker, in so far as that provision disadvantages female workers as compared with male workers.

(1) Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security (OJ 1979, L 6, p. 24).

(2) Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (OJ 2006 L 204, p. 23).

(3) Fondo de Garantía Salarial (Wages Guarantee Fund).
1.

Must the second subparagraph of Article 19(1), Article 2, Article 4(3) and Article 6(3) of the Treaty on the European Union, in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning that a person who has been appointed to the position of judge in flagrant breach of the laws of a Member State applicable to judicial appointments — which breach included, in particular, the appointment of that person to the position of judge as a result of the designation of a body which does not guarantee independence from the executive and legislative authorities and impartiality, with the systematic exclusion from judicial review of the lawfulness of the nomination procedure, and also the appointment of that person to the position of judge despite a prior appeal to the competent national court (the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Supreme Administrative Court, Poland)) against the resolution of a national body (the Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (National Council of the Judiciary, Poland)), which included a motion for the appointment of that person to the position of judge, notwithstanding the fact that the implementation of that resolution had been stayed in accordance with national law and that proceedings before the competent national court (Supreme Administrative Court) had not been concluded before the delivery of the appointment letter — is not an independent judge within the meaning of EU law, — and consequently is a court whose composition includes persons appointed under the conditions set out above not an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law within the meaning of EU law?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Krajský soud v Brně (Czech Republic) lodged on 4 December 2019 — Tesco Stores ČR a.s. v Ministerstvo zemědělství

(Case C-881/19)

(2020/C 68/36)

Language of the case: Czech

Referring court

Krajský soud v Brně

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Tesco Stores ČR a.s.

Defendant: Ministerstvo zemědělství

Question referred

Should the rule set out in point 2(a) of part E of Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and (EC) No 1925/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Commission Directive 87/250/EEC, Council Directive 90/496/EEC, Commission Directive 1999/10/EC, Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Commission Directives 2002/67/EC and 2008/5/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No 608/2004 be interpreted such that, with respect to a food intended for an end consumer in the Czech Republic, a compound ingredient listed in point 2(c) of part A of Annex I to Directive 2000/36/EC (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 June 2000 relating to cocoa and chocolate products intended for human consumption, as amended, may only be listed among the ingredients of the product without a precise specification of its composition if that compound ingredient is labelled precisely in line with the Czech language version of Annex I to Directive 2000/36/EC?

(1) OJ 2011 L 304, p. 18.

(2) OJ 2000 L 197, p. 19.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Judecătoria Sectorului 2 București (Romania) lodged on 1 October 2019 — IO v Impuls Leasing România IFN SA

(Case C-725/19)

(2020/C 54/17)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Judecătoria Sectorului 2 București

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: IO

Defendant: Impuls Leasing România IFN SA

Question referred

Taking into account the principle of effectiveness, is Directive 93/13/EEC (1) to be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as the Romanian legislation in force concerning the conditions under which an objection to enforcement is admissible, namely Article 713(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Law No 310/2018, pursuant to which, in the context of an objection to enforcement, the examination, at the request of the consumer or by the court acting of its own motion, of whether the terms of a leasing contract that constitutes the enforceable instrument are unfair is precluded because it is possible to bring a common law action in which a contract concluded between a ‘consumer’ and a ‘seller or supplier’ may be examined in order to determine whether it contains unfair terms within the meaning of that directive?

(1) Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).
2.

If the first question elicits an affirmative answer, should the power of the Prime Minister in the process of the appointment of members of the judiciary in Malta be considered to be in conformity with Article 19(1) TEU and with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, considered as well in the light of Article 96A of the Constitution, which entered into effect in 2016?
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Potenza (Italy) lodged on 26 July 2019 — OM v Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca and Others

(Case C-569/19)

(2020/C 87/02)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale di Potenza

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: OM

Defendants: Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, and Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri

By order of 7 November 2019, the Court (Ninth Chamber) declared the request for a preliminary ruling lodged by the Tribunale di Potenza manifestly inadmissible.
Is there a rule with direct effect under EU law that grants a taxpayer to whom the tax office, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, has not refunded a turnover tax credit in good time entitlement to interest for late payment, with the result that he can claim that entitlement before the tax office or before the administrative courts, even though national law does not provide for such a rule on interest?

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative:
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 25 November 2019 by Confédération nationale du Crédit Mutuel against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 24 September 2019 in Case T-13/18, Crédit mutuel Arkéa v EUIPO — Confédération nationale du Crédit mutuel (Crédit Mutuel)

(Case C-867/19 P)

(2020/C 95/13)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Confédération nationale du Crédit Mutuel (represented by B. Moreau-Margotin, M. Merli, C. Thomas-Raquin, M. Le Guerer, avocats)

Other parties to the proceedings: Crédit Mutuel Arkéa and European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

By order of 13 February 2020, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) ruled that the appeal should not be allowed to proceed.
(D)

If the answers to the earlier questions support the extension of subsidiaries’ liability to cover acts of the parent company, would a provision of national law such as Article 71(2) of the Ley de Defensa de la Competencia (Law on the Protection of Competition), which provides only for liability incurred by the subsidiary to be extended to the parent company, and then only where the parent company exercises control over the subsidiary, be compatible with that Community doctrine?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 11 November 2019 by ruwido austria GmbH against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 11 September 2019 in Case T-649/18 ruwido austria GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-823/19 P)

(2020/C 103/12)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: ruwido austria GmbH (represented by: A. Ginzburg, lawyer)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 13 February 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) did not allow the appeal to proceed and ordered the appellant to pay its own costs.
Appeal brought on 23 August 2019 by Sigrid Dickmanns against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 11 June 2019 in Case T-538/18, Sigrid Dickmanns v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-631/19 P)

(2020/C 95/08)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Sigrid Dickmanns (represented by: H. Tettenborn, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

By order of 5 February 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Sixth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered the unsuccessful party to bear its own costs.
Appeal brought on 29 November 2019 by Camelia Manéa against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 12 September 2019 in Case T-225/18 Manéa v CdT

(Case C-892/19 P)

(2020/C 161/24)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Camelia Manéa (represented by: M.-A. Lucas, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: Centre de traduction des organes de l'Union européenne (CdT)

Form of order sought

— Set aside the judgment of 12 September 2019 (T-225/18);

— Rule again on the action and grant the appellant the relief sought at first instance;

— Order the CdT to pay the costs of both sets of proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of her appeal the appellant relies on seven grounds of appeal:

The first ground of appeal, relating to paragraphs 36 to 38 of the judgment under appeal, alleges distortion of the factual and legal basis of the first plea in law of the application.

The second ground of appeal, relating to paragraph 43 of the judgment under appeal, alleges a breach of the rules of evidence, a substantially incorrect assessment based on an incomplete examination of the file, a distortion of the evidence, and a distortion of a document in the case file.

The third ground of appeal, relating to paragraph 44 of the judgment under appeal, alleges contradictory reasoning, a distortion or substantially inaccurate assessment of the decision of 10 June 2016 arising from an incomplete examination of the case file, and breach of the duty to restore the previous situation taking account of legality.

The fourth ground of appeal, relating to paragraph 55 of the judgment under appeal, alleges distortion of the grounds of the decision of 29 May 2017.

The fifth ground of appeal, relating to paragraph 56 of the judgment under appeal, alleges distortion of the plea in law contained in the application concerning the failure to comply with the duty to state reasons.

The sixth ground of appeal alleges a contraction in the reasoning in paragraphs 81 and 83 of the judgment under appeal.

The seventh ground of appeal, relating to paragraph 84 of the judgment under appeal, alleges a distortion of the arguments, a substantially inaccurate assessment arising from an incomplete examination of the case file and the inadequacy of the General Court’s response to the appellant’s arguments.
1.

Does the confiscation of illegally obtained assets constitute a punitive measure for the purposes of Directive 2014/42/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union or a measure under civil law if: A) the objective of the confiscation of assets as declared by national law is general prevention, that is to say the prevention of the possibility of obtaining and disposing of assets illegally, whereby confiscation is not conditional on the commission of a crime or other offence or on a direct or indirect connection between the offence and the assets obtained; B) the confiscation threatens not an individual asset, but (i) the total assets of the person under inquiry, (ii) property rights of third persons (natural and legal) acquired by the person under inquiry, whether for consideration or not, and (iii) property rights of the contracting partners of the person under inquiry and of the third parties; (C) the only condition for confiscation is the introduction of an irrebuttable presumption of the unlawfulness of all the assets for which no legal origin has been identified (without a previously established definition of ‘legal/illegal origin’); (D) in the absence of proof of the origin of the acquisition of assets by the person under inquiry, the law governing the lawfulness of the acquired assets is revised with retroactive effect for a period of ten years for all the persons concerned (person under inquiry, third parties and their contracting partners in the past), whereby at the time of acquisition of the specific property right there was no statutory obligation to provide such proof?
1.

Are Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union, Article 325(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 58 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, (1) [and] Article 4 of Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law, (2) [which was] adopted on the basis of Article 83(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [and which replaced the Convention] on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests of 26 July 1995, to be interpreted as precluding the adoption of a decision by a body outside the judiciary — the Curtea Constituțională a României (Constitutional Court of Romania) — which requires corruption cases decided within a specified period and currently at the appeal stage to be referred back to the court of first instance for re-examination on the ground that there has been a failure to establish, at the level of the supreme court, panels hearing cases specialising in that field, although it recognises the specialisation of the judges of which those panels were composed?
1.

Does a national court have jurisdiction to determine a claim for damages under Article 85 EEC/Article 81 EC where the conduct complained of involved the provision of international maritime services exclusively between non-EEC/EC ports in the period prior to 1 May 2004 and the national court was not a relevant authority in a Member State for the purposes of Article 88 EEC/Article 84 EC?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Østre Landsret (Denmark) lodged on 12 February 2020 — Anklagemyndigheden v VAS Shipping ApS

(Case C-71/20)

(2020/C 137/51)

Language of the case: Danish

Referring court

Østre Landsret

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Anklagemyndigheden

Defendant: VAS Shipping ApS

Question referred

Does Article 49 TFEU preclude legislation of a Member State which requires third-country crew members on a vessel flagged in a Member State and owned by a shipowner who is a national of another EU Member State to have a work permit, unless the vessel enters ports of the Member State on at most 25 occasions calculated continuously over the last year?
1.

Does a strike by airline pilots who are employed by an air carrier and who are needed to carry out a flight constitute an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004, (1) when the strike is not implemented in connection with a measure decided upon or announced by the air carrier but of which notice is given and which is lawfully initiated by workers’ organisations as industrial action intended to induce the air carrier to increase wages, provide benefits or amend employment conditions in order to meet the organisations’ demands?
Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal (Ireland) made on 13 February 2020 — K. M. v Director of Public Prosecutions

(Case C-77/20)

(2020/C 137/53)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Court of Appeal

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: K. M.

Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions

Question referred

In the context of the implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy and of the provisions of Article 32 of Council Regulation (EC) No 850/1998 (1), and in the context of a criminal prosecution taken to enforce the provisions thereof, is a provision of National law which provides on conviction on indictment, in addition to a fine, for the mandatory forfeiture of all fish and all fishing gear found on board the boat to which the offence relates, compatible with the provisions of Council Regulation (EC) 1224/2009 (2), and specifically Articles 89 and 90 thereof, and the principle of proportionality under the treaties of the European Union and Article 49(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights?

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 850/98 of 30 March 1998 for the conservation of fishery resources through technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms (OJ 1998, L 125, p. 1).

(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 of 20 November 2009 establishing a Community control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy, amending Regulations (EC) No 847/96, (EC) No 2371/2002, (EC) No 811/2004, (EC) No 768/2005, (EC) No 2115/2005, (EC) No 2166/2005, (EC) No 388/2006, (EC) No 509/2007, (EC) No 676/2007, (EC) No 1098/2007, (EC) No 1300/2008, (EC) No 1342/2008 and repealing Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1627/94 and (EC) No 1966/2006 (OJ 2009, L 343, p. 1).
3.

If it does not — which means a duplication of proceedings — does not Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which enshrines the principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties, interpreted in the light of the rights and freedoms in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights relating thereto, require that that duplication of criminal proceedings and administrative proceedings of a criminal nature for a single act (cold calling) be limited to the most serious cases and, in that case, that the criteria for determining gravity be defined in advance?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Högsta domstolen (Sweden) lodged on 27 February 2020 — Republic of Poland v PL Holdings Sàrl

(Case C-109/20)

(2020/C 161/52)

Language of the case: Swedish

Referring court

Högsta domstolen

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant and cross-respondent: Republic of Poland

Appellant and cross-respondent: PL Holdings Sàrl

Question referred

Do Articles 267 and 344 TFEU, as interpreted in Achmea, (1) mean that an arbitration agreement is invalid if it has been concluded between a Member State and an investor — where an investment agreement contains an arbitration clause that is invalid as a result of the fact that the contract was concluded between two Member States — [despite the fact that] the Member State, after arbitration proceedings were commenced by the investor, refrains, by the free will of the State, from raising objections as to jurisdiction?

(1) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 6 March 2018 (Case C-284/16, Achmea, EU:C:2018:158).
Action brought on 16 March 2020 — European Commission v Republic of Poland

(Case C-139/20)

(2020/C 201/25)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: M. Siekierzyńska and A. Armenia, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Republic of Poland

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by implementing a law which grants an exemption from excise duty for energy products used by energy-intensive businesses covered by the EU Emissions Trading System, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 17(1)(b) and Article 17(4) of Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity; (1)

— order the Republic of Poland to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Republic of Poland has introduced into its national legislation an exemption from excise duty for energy products used by energy-intensive businesses covered by the EU Emissions Trading System (‘the EU ETS’).

In the Commission’s view, this constitutes a failure to fulfil obligations under Article 17(1)(b) and Article 17(4) of Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity. According to those provisions, exemption from or reduction of the level of taxation applied to energy products used by energy-intensive businesses is possible only where agreements are concluded with undertakings or associations of undertakings, or where tradable permit schemes or equivalent arrangements are implemented, as far as they lead to the achievement of environmental protection objectives or to improvements in energy efficiency. The EU ETS cannot, in the Commission’s view, be regarded as a ‘tradable permit [scheme]’ for the purposes of those provisions.

(1) OJ 2003 L 283, p. 51.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzgericht (Austria) lodged on 4 February 2020 — K v Finanzamt Linz

(Case C-58/20)

(2020/C 191/10)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesfinanzgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: K

Respondent authority: Finanzamt Linz

Question referred

Must Article 135(1)(g) of Directive 2006/112/EC (1) be interpreted as meaning that the term ‘management of special investment funds’ also covers the tax-related responsibilities entrusted by the management company to a third party, consisting of ensuring that the income received by unit-holders from investment funds is taxed in accordance with the law?

(1) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).