ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.

Does Directive 2006/112/EC, (1) together with the principles of fiscal neutrality and proportionality, preclude, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, an administrative practice and/or an interpretation of the provisions of national legislation precluding the assessment and recognition of the right to reimbursement of VAT resulting from adjustments in respect of transactions carried out during a period, preceding the most recent inspection period, which has already been the subject of a tax inspection and in which the tax authorities did not find any anomalies that were such as to alter the taxable amount for VAT, notwithstanding the fact that those provisions may be interpreted as meaning that the tax authorities may review a period which has previously been the subject of a tax inspection in the light of additional data and information obtained subsequently as a result of cooperation between State authorities and institutions?
iv.

the language of the national provisions is such that it does not permit of an interpretation conforming to the requirements of EU law, then, in litigation between private parties and a private insurance company concerning a motor accident involving a serious injury to a passenger in 1999 who was not travelling in a fixed seat, where, by consent of the parties, the national Court joined the private insurance company and the State as defendants is the national court when disapplying the relevant provisions of national law also obliged to disapply the exclusion clause contained in the motor insurance policy or otherwise preclude an insurer from relying on the exclusion clause which was in force at the time so that the injured victim could then have recovered directly as against the insurance company on foot of that policy? Alternatively, would such a result amount in substance to a form of horizontal direct effect of a Directive against a private party in a manner prohibited by EU law?
2.

If Question 1 should be answered in the affirmative: — Must Article 8(1) and (5) of Directive 95/46 be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition so imposed on the operator of a search engine of processing data covered by those provisions, subject to the exceptions laid down by that directive, would require the operator to grant as a matter of course the requests for ‘de-referencing’ in relation to links to web pages concerning such data? — From that perspective, how must the exceptions laid down in Article 8(2)(a) and (e) of Directive 95/46 be interpreted, when they apply to the operator of a search engine, in the light of its specific responsibilities, powers and capabilities? In particular, may such an operator refuse a request for ‘de-referencing’, if it establishes that the links at issue lead to content which, although comprising data falling within the categories listed in Article 8(1), is also covered by the exceptions laid down by Article 8(2)(a) and (e) of the directive? — Similarly, when the links subject to the request for ‘de-referencing’ lead to processing of personal data carried out solely for journalistic purposes or for those of artistic or literary expression, on which basis, in accordance with Article 9 of Directive 95/46, data within the categories mentioned in Article 8(1) and (5) of the directive may be collected and processed, must the provisions of Directive 95/46 be interpreted as allowing the operator of a search engine, on that ground, to refuse a request for ‘de-referencing’?
2

In the alternative, in the event that Question (a) on interpretation is to be answered in the negative: which steps are required to ensure that there is respect for the principles of equal treatment and impartiality, of open competition and sound administration, and for other tenderers’ rights of defence and right to be heard?
1.

By its first ground of appeal, the appellant submits that it had standing to bring an action for annulment before the General Court of the European Union (‘the General Court’) against Regulation 2016/278 (1), since that regulation satisfies the requirements set out in paragraph 4 of Article 263 TFEU. As the Court knows, those requirements are: (i) that the contested act is of direct and individual concern or (ii) that the contested act is a regulatory act which is of direct concern and does not entail implementing measures. In relation to the requirement that the contested act must be of direct and individual concern, the appellant submits that the General Court in no way disputed that it was directly concerned. In addition, IPM is individually concerned by the contested act since the regulation in question affects each and every importer that included TARIC nomenclature or codes in its Single Administrative Documents (SADs) in relation to the goods subject to the anti-dumping duties, between 2009 (when Regulation 91/2009 entered into force) and 2016 (when Regulation 2016/278 entered into force) inclusive. In that manner, those importers formed a ‘limited class of economic operators’, since the limitation of the effects of the derogation from the antidumping duties affected them in a concrete and specific way. Furthermore, as regards the requirement that the contested act must be a regulatory act which is of direct concern and does not entail implementing measures, the appellant’s arguments seek to prove that Regulation 2016/278 does not entail implementing measures. Thus the collection of duties to which the General Court refers as implementing measures of the regulation are not actually implementing measures, since the only duties collected from the appellant in that respect derived from the provisions of Regulation 91/2009 (2), and in no case from the provisions of the contested regulation (Regulation 2016/278). This is demonstrated by that fact that the duties collected from IPM by the Spanish tax authorities were imposed before the entry into force of the contested regulation. Thus, the contested Article 2 is an autonomous provision that does require any subsequent measure in order to produce legal effects as from the date of its entry into force, since it merely repeals certain anti-dumping duties in the light of their incompatibility with the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT treaty. Moreover, the regulation imposes an obligation not to act, since it orders the Spanish State not to issue any measure collecting anti-dumping duties, with the result that it precludes the issue of any tax measure capable of being challenged under national law, and bringing an action for annulment is therefore the only way in which IPM may challenge Article 2 of Regulation 2016/278. For all the foregoing reasons, the appellant submits that there is no doubt that IPM is entitled under Article 263 TFEU to bring an action for annulment against Article 2 of Regulation 2016/278, since that regulation, by virtue of its nature and content, does not entail any implementing measures.
2.

Does the principle of the free movement of pyrotechnic articles, as laid down in Article 6(1) of Directive 2007/23/EC (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 May 2007 on the placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles (now Article 4(1) of Directive 2013/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of pyrotechnic articles), read in conjunction, if necessary, with Article 10 of Directive 2006/123/EC (3) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, preclude national legislation which makes the storage of directive-compliant pyrotechnic articles associated with the retail trade subject to the twofold requirement of possessing (i) an authorisation granted pursuant to the legislation governing the manufacture, storage, holding, sale, transport and use of explosives, and (ii) an authorisation granted under the legislation on environmental authorisations for nuisance-causing structures, when both authorisation regimes essentially have the same objective (the preventive assessment of safety risks), and one of those two authorisation regimes (in this case, that relating to explosives) sets a (very) low maximum threshold for the storage of party fireworks (in the amount of 50 kg of pyrotechnic composition (that is, the active substance))?
1.

Should Article 8(1) and (2), in conjunction with Article 3(1), of Directive 2001/29/EC (1) be interpreted as meaning that ‘effective and dissuasive sanctions for infringements of the right to make works available to the public’ are still provided for even when the owner of an Internet connection used for copyright infringements through file-sharing is excluded from liability to pay damages if the owner of that Internet connection can name at least one family member who, besides him or her, might have had access to that Internet connection, without providing further details, established through appropriate investigations, as to when and how the Internet was used by that family member?
1.

Must Article 13 of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98; ‘the Return Directive’), read in conjunction with Articles 4, 18, 19(2) and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning that under EU law, if national law makes provision to that effect, in proceedings challenging a decision which includes a return decision within the meaning of Article 3(4) of Directive 2008/115/EC, the legal remedy of an appeal has automatic suspensory effect where the third-country national claims that enforcement of the return decision would result in a serious risk of infringement of the principle of non-refoulement? In other words, in such a case, should the expulsion of the third-country national concerned be suspended during the period for lodging an appeal, or, if an appeal has been lodged, until a decision has been delivered on that appeal, without the third-country national concerned being required to submit a separate request to that effect?
1.

The illegality of the notice of competition, of the corrigendum, and of the Assessment Centre fundamental principles The appellant considers that the competition notice is unlawful insofar as it does not provide an objective justification either as regards the limitation of the choice of second language (German, English or French) in the light of the interest of the service or as regards the proportionality of that limitation with regard to the real needs of the service. Secondly, the appellant claims the illegality, lack of validity and of scientific foundation of the Assessment Centre fundamental principles governing EPSO open competitions as there is no support, evidence, or verification of the fundamental practices used at EPSO based on the following principles: (i) ‘past behavior is the best predictor of future performance’, (ii) ‘assessment centers, simulating real-life working situations, are the best predictor of real-life performance’. Thirdly, the appellant claims the illegality of a corrigendum published in competition EPSO/AD/248/13.
3.

Error of law in that General Court, in the judgment under appeal, held that the decision at issue was well founded (paragraph 67 of the judgment under appeal) even though the decision at issue refers, as an integral part of its statement of reasons, first, to the Commission Decision [ARES (2014) 710158] of 13 March 2014 rejecting the appellant’s participation in the eDIGIREGION project (paragraphs 57 and 60 to 62 of the judgment under appeal), and, secondly, to the final audit reports 11-INFS-025 and 11-BA119-016 (paragraphs 63 and 64 of the judgment under appeal), whereas both the Commission Decision of 13 March 2014 [ARES (2014) 710158] and the final audit reports 11-INFS-025 and 11-BA119-016 were the subject of actions for annulment.
1.

Must Article 23(3) of the Dublin Regulation (1) be interpreted as meaning that Italy has become responsible for examining the application for international protection lodged by the applicant in that country on 23 October 2014, despite the fact that the Netherlands were the Member State primarily responsible on the basis of the applications for international protection, within the meaning of Article 2(d) of the Dublin Regulation, previously lodged in that country, the last of which was still under examination in the Netherlands at that time, because the Administrative Law Division of the Raad van State had not yet delivered judgment in the appeal brought by the applicant against the ruling [AWB 14/13866] of the Rechtbank [Den Haag, sitting in Middelburg] of 7 July 2014 …?
A.

With respect to that part of the judgment under appeal which is concerned with the first plea in law relating to the 10 % financial correction in relation to area aid for pastures (paragraphs 23-106 of the judgment under appeal) three grounds of appeal are relied on. The first ground of appeal is based on the misinterpretation and misapplication of the provision of Article 2 of Commission Regulation (ΕC) No 796/2004 of 21 April 2004 on the definition of pasture, on the misinterpretation and misapplication of the provisions of Article 296 TFEU and on the insufficient and erroneous statement of reasons in the judgment under appeal. The second ground of appeal is based on the misinterpretation and misapplication of the provisions of Article 296 TFEU, and an insufficient statement of reasons, with respect to the ruling in the judgment under appeal, whereby the claims of the Hellenic Republic in relation to the lawfulness of the statement of reasons in the Commission decision were rejected. Further, by means of the third ground of appeal it is claimed that the judgment under appeal infringed the principle of proportionality in conjunction with misinterpretation and misapplication of the provisions of Article 296 TFEU and an insufficient statement of reasons.
5.

Is Article 1(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA to be interpreted as meaning that the executing State is required to adopt a decision on any European arrest warrant communicated to it, even where it has already taken a decision on a previous European arrest warrant issued by the other judicial authority against the same requested person in the same criminal proceedings and where the new European arrest warrant is issued because of a change in circumstances in the State issuing the European arrest warrant (decision to refer — initiation of criminal proceedings, stricter evidential criteria relating to the commission of the offence, new competent judicial authority/court)?
(2)

If the answer to Question 1 is that the concept of production does not include the process of increasing the relative share of H2 hydrogen in a gas mixture, the following further question must be asked: Must the wording ‘relevant process elements directly or indirectly linked to the production of hydrogen and the separation of hydrogen and carbon monoxide’ be interpreted as meaning that only both elements together (‘and’) are covered by the system boundaries of the product benchmark for hydrogen described in Annex I, Part 2, to Commission Decision 2011/278/EU of 27 April 2011, or can the process element ‘separation of hydrogen and carbon monoxide’ also operate in isolation within the system boundaries as an independent process element in its own right?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 277/20

Appeal brought on 17 February 2017 by CBA Spielapparate- und Restaurantbetriebs GmbH against the order of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 19 December 2016 in Case T-655/16 CBA Spielapparate- und Restaurantbetriebs GmbH v Court of Justice of the European Union

(Case C-87/17 P)

(2017/C 277/29)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: CBA Spielapparate- und Restaurantbetriebs GmbH (represented by: A. Schuster, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: Court of Justice of the European Union

By order of 5 July 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Tenth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 269/2

Appeal brought on 16 January 2017 by Neonart svetlobni in reklamni napisi Krevh d.o.o. against the order of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 14 November 2016 in Case T-221/16: Neonart svetlobni in reklamni napisi Krevh v EUIPO (NEONART)

(Case C-22/17 P)

(2017/C 269/02)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Neonart svetlobni in reklamni napisi Krevh d.o.o. (represented by: J. Marn, Non avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

By order of 11 May 2017 the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
—

declare that the Republic of Croatia has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 42(1) of Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014, L 60, p. 34), by failing to adopt, by 21 March 2016, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with that Directive or, in any event, by failing to communicate those measures to the Commission;
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 277/24

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Amsterdam (Netherlands) lodged on 18 May 2017 — Openbaar Ministerie v Tadas Tupikas

(Case C-270/17)

(2017/C 277/34)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank Amsterdam

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Openbaar Ministerie

Defendant: Tadas Tupikas

Question referred

Are appeal proceedings

— in which there has been an examination of the merits and

— which resulted in the passing of a (new) sentence on the person concerned and/or the confirmation of the sentence handed down at first instance,

— where the EAW [European Arrest Warrant] concerns the execution of that sentence,

the ‘trial resulting in the decision’ as referred to in Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA? (1)

(1) Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 293/12

Appeal brought on 3 May 2017 by Vatseva against the order of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 7 April 2017 in Case T-920/16: Vatseva v European Court of Human Rights

(Case C-231/17 P)

(2017/C 293/16)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Vatseva (represented by: K. Mladenova, advokat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Court of Human Rights

By order of 6 July 2017 the Court of Justice (Eight Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
c)

appropriate national courts would have a jurisdiction to make any appropriate order disapplying national legislation which was required to ensure compliance with the measure of European law in question, would have jurisdiction to entertain cases in which such a remedy was necessary, would have jurisdiction in such cases to provide any remedy mandated by Union law and where the remedy provided in the courts has been assessed, in accordance with the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, as complying with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness,
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 300/10

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy w Siemianowicach Śląskich (Poland) lodged on 6 April 2017 — Profi Credit Polska S.A., established in Bielsko-Biała v Mariusz Wawrzosek

(Case C-176/17)

(2017/C 300/13)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy w Siemianowicach Śląskich

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Profi Credit Polska S.A., established in Bielsko-Biała

Defendant: Mariusz Wawrzosek

Question referred

Must the provisions of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, (1) in particular Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) thereof, and the provisions of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, (2) in particular Article 17(1) and Article 22(1) thereof, be construed as precluding the assertion of a claim, established by means of a duly completed bill of exchange, by a seller or supplier (the creditor) against a consumer (the debtor) in the course of an order for payment procedure pursuant to Article 485(2) et seq. of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure (Kodeks postępowania cywilnego), in conjunction with Article 41 of the Law on consumer credit (Ustawa o kredycie konsumenckim) of 12 May 2011, under which the national court may examine the effectiveness of the claim arising from the bill of exchange exclusively from the point of view of compliance with the formal requirements applicable to the bill of exchange, without examining the relationship underlying it?

(1) OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29.

(2) OJ 2008 L 133, p. 66.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 293/21

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Förvaltningsrätten i Malmö, migrationsdomstolen (Sweden) lodged on 6 July 2017 — A v Migrationsverket

(Case C-404/17)

(2017/C 293/26)

Language of the case: Swedish

Referring court

Förvaltningsrätten i Malmö, migrationsdomstolen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: A

Defendant: Migrationsverket

Question referred

Is an application in which the applicant’s information is deemed to be reliable and so is taken as the basis for the assessment, but insufficient to form the basis of a need for international protection on the ground that the country-of-origin information suggests that there is acceptable protection, to be regarded as clearly unfounded under Article 31(8) of the recast Asylum Procedure Directive? (1)

(1) Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 309/28

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas (Lithuania) lodged on 29 June 2017 — UAB ‘EVP International’ v Lietuvos bankas

(Case C-389/17)

(2017/C 309/36)

Language of the case: Lithuanian

Referring court

Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: UAB ‘EVP International’

Other party: Lietuvos bankas

Questions referred

Is Article 5(2), read in conjunction with Article 6(1)(a), of Directive 2009/110/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions, amending Directives 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC to be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances such as those in the present case, the following are to be regarded as payment services that are (not) linked to the issuance of electronic money:

(a) a payment transaction whereby, at the request (instruction) of the electronic money holder to the electronic money institution (the issuer), the electronic money (redeemable funds) redeemed at par value is transferred to a third-party bank account;

(b) a payment transaction whereby, on the instruction of the seller, the buyer (payer) of goods and/or services pays for the goods and/or services by making a transfer/payment of funds to an electronic money institution (issuer of electronic money), which, upon receipt of the funds, issues electronic money, at par value of the funds received, for the benefit of the seller (electronic money holder)?

(1) Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions, Directives 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC (OJ 2009 L 267, p. 7).