ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
27

In those circumstances, the Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘1) Given that the Court, in its answer to Question 4 in the judgment of 12 December 2006, [Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, (C‑446/04, EU:C:2006:774)], determined that Articles 43 and 56 of the EC Treaty — now Articles 49 and 63 TFEU — precluded legislation of a Member State which allows resident companies distributing dividends to their shareholders which have their origin in foreign-sourced dividends received by them to elect to be taxed under a regime which permits them to recover advance corporation tax paid, but, first, obliges those companies to pay that advance corporation tax and subsequently to claim repayment and, secondly, does not provide a tax credit for their shareholders, whereas those shareholders would have received such a tax credit in the case of a distribution made by a resident company which had its origin in nationally sourced dividends, are any rights under EU law conferred on those shareholders themselves, whether under Article 63 TFEU or otherwise, in cases where they are the recipients of the dividends elected to be paid under that regime, in particular where a shareholder is resident in the same Member State as the company distributing the dividends? 2) If the shareholder referred to in Question 1 does not itself have rights under Article 63 TFEU, is it entitled to rely on any infringement of rights under Article 49 TFEU or Article 63 TFEU of the company distributing the dividend? 3) If the answer to Question 1 or Question 2 is that the shareholder has rights under or can rely on EU law, does EU law impose any requirements as to the remedy to be provided to the shareholder under domestic law? 4) Does it make any difference to the Court’s answer to the above questions that: a) the shareholder is not liable to income tax in the Member State on any dividends received, with the consequence that, in the case of a distribution made by a resident company outside the above regime, the tax credit to which the shareholder is entitled under domestic legislation may result in a payment of the tax credit to the shareholder by the Member State; b) the national court has decided that the infringement of EU law by the domestic legislation in question was not sufficiently serious so as to give rise to a liability of the Member State in damages in favour of the company distributing the dividends, under the principles established [in the judgment of 5 March 1996, Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame (C‑46/93 and C‑48/93, EU:C:1996:79)], or that c) in some cases, but not all, the company distributing the dividends under the above regime may have increased the amount of its distributions paid to all shareholders to provide a cash sum equivalent to that which would be achieved by an exempt shareholder from a payment of dividends outside the regime?’
39

Next, the Commission and the Parliament contend that, in the present case, the draft revised agreement, like the Lisbon Agreement, displays a specific link with international trade. It is true that the draft has no preamble expressly stating its aim. However, it is clear from an analysis of its provisions and its context that it has the aim and effect of providing, for the appellations of origin and geographical indications of each contracting party, a system of international registration which ensures their legal protection, on the territory of all the contracting parties, against the risk that they might be used in such a way as to undermine their integrity or their reputation and thus that the marketing abroad of the corresponding products might be prejudiced. In so doing, the draft revised agreement improves the protection of exports of those products from the European Union to third countries, protection which would otherwise depend on country-by-country registration and thus on variable legal guarantees. Consequently, a draft of that nature falls within the exclusive competence of the European Union in the field of the common commercial policy, even if the system of protection which it proposes to introduce is intended to be implemented by the authorities of the Member States, in accordance with Article 291(1) TFEU. Furthermore, the European Union has already concluded by itself, on the basis of Article 207 TFEU, a number of international agreements relating to the protection of appellations of origin and geographical indications, and the Council, which has not disputed the existence of that practice, has given no reasons to explain its departure from it in the present case.
Case C‑144/16

Município de Palmela

v

Autoridade de Segurança Alimentar e Económica (ASAE) —

Divisão de Gestão de Contraordenações

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from the Tribunal Judicial da Comarca de Setúbal)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Procedures for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services — Directives 83/189/EEC and 98/34/EC — Draft technical regulation — Notifying the European Commission — Obligations of Member States — Infringement — Consequences)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) 1 February 2017

Approximation of laws — Information procedure in the field of technical rules and regulations — Directive 83/189 — Information procedure in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services — Directive 98/34 — Technical regulation — Obligation on Member States to notify the Commission of all draft technical regulations — Breach of that obligation — Consequence — Rules not notified cannot be enforced against individuals — Scope

(European Parliament and Council Directive 98/34, as amended by Directive 98/48, Art. 8(1); Council Directive 83/189, Art. 8(1))

Article 8(1) of Directive 83/189/EEC of the Council of 28 March 1983 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations, as amended by the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, and Article 8(1) of Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services, as amended by Directive 98/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 1998, must be interpreted as meaning that the penalty of unenforceability of a technical regulation which has not been notified, such as Article 16(1) and (2) of the Regulamento que estabelece as condições de segurança a observar na localização, implantação, conceção e organização funcional dos espaços de jogo e recreio, respetivamente, equipamento e superfícies de impacto (Regulation on the mandatory safety requirements regarding the localisation, implementation, design and functional organisation of play and recreation areas and their equipment and impact surfaces), annexed to Decreto-Lei No 379/97 (Decree-Law No 379/97), of 27 December 1997, as amended by Decreto-Lei No 119/2009 (Decree-Law No 119/2009), of 19 May 2009, applies only to that technical regulation and not to the entire legislative text in which it is contained.

(see para. 38, operative part)
Case C‑453/16 PPU

Proceedings relating to the execution of a European arrest warrant issued against Halil Ibrahim Özçelik

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the rechtbank Amsterdam)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Urgent preliminary ruling procedure — Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters — European arrest warrant — Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA — Article 8(1)(c) — Concept of ‘arrest warrant’ — Autonomous concept of EU law — National arrest warrant issued by a police service and confirmed by a public prosecutor for the purpose of criminal proceedings)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 10 November 2016

Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters — Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States — Concept of ‘judicial decision’ within the meaning of Article 8(1)(c) of the Framework Decision — Confirmation, by the public prosecutor’s office of a Member State, of a national arrest warrant issued previously by a police service in connection with criminal proceedings — Included

(Council Framework Decision 2002/584, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299, Art. 8(1)(c))

Article 8(1)(c) of the Framework Decision 2002/584 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299, must be interpreted as meaning that a confirmation by the public prosecutor’s office, of a national arrest warrant issued previously by a police service in connection with criminal proceedings constitutes a ‘judicial decision’, within the meaning of that provision.

Since the public prosecutor’s office constitutes a Member State authority responsible for administering criminal justice, the confirmation of the national arrest warrant by that office provides the executing judicial authority with an assurance that the European arrest warrant is based on a decision that had undergone judicial approval such confirmation, therefore, justifies the high level of confidence between Member State.

(see paras 34, 36-38, operative part)
Article 220(2)(b) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code as amended by Regulation (EC) No 2700/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2000 must be interpreted as meaning that an importer may not rely on a legitimate expectation, in accordance with that provision, in order to object to a post-clearance incurring of liability for import duties, submitting that he acted in good faith, unless three cumulative conditions are met. It is necessary, first of all, that those duties were not levied as a result of an error on the part of the competent authorities themselves, secondly, that that error was such that it could not reasonably have been detected by a person liable for payment acting in good faith and, finally, that that person complied with all the provisions laid down by the legislation in force as regards his customs declaration. Such a legitimate expectation is lacking, in particular, where, although there are clear reasons for doubting the accuracy of a Form A certificate of origin, an importer failed to obtain, using his best efforts, information concerning the circumstances of the issue of that certificate in order to verify whether those doubts were well founded. Such an obligation does not however mean that an importer is required, in general, to systematically verify the circumstances of the issue, by the customs authorities of the exporting country, of a Form A certificate of origin. It is for the referring court to determine, taking into account all of the specific facts of the dispute in the main proceedings, whether those three conditions are met in this case.

(see para. 43, operative part 1)
Case C‑97/16

José María Pérez Retamero

v

TNT Express Worldwide Spain S.L. and Others

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from the Juzgado de lo Social no 3 de Barcelona)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Social policy — Directive 2002/15/EC — Protection of the safety and health of workers — Organisation of working time — Road transport — Mobile worker — Self-employed driver — Concept — Inadmissibility)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber), 2 March 2017

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Limits — Request for interpretation of provisions of EU law manifestly inapplicable to the dispute in the main proceedings — Inapplicability of Directive 2002/15 in proceedings relating to an action challenging a dismissal — Inadmissibility

(Art. 267 TFEU; European Parliament and Council Directive 2002/15, Arts 1 and 3)

The request for a preliminary ruling made by the Juzgado de lo Social No 3 de Barcelona (Labour Court, Barcelona, Spain) is inadmissible.

It is therefore apparent from settled case-law that a reference by a national court can be rejected if, inter alia, it is obvious that EU law cannot be applied, either directly or indirectly, to the circumstances of the case (judgment of 7 July 2011, Agafiţei and Others, C‑310/10, EU:C:2011:467, paragraph 28).

In that regard, it must be noted, first, that it follows from Article 1 of Directive 2002/15 that its purpose is to lay down minimum requirements on the organisation of working time, in order to improve the health and safety protection of persons performing mobile road transport activities, to improve road safety and to align conditions of competition. Secondly, in accordance with Article 3 of Directive 2002/15, the definitions provided for therein are established ‘[f]or the purposes of this Directive’. Therefore, the interpretation of the concepts of ‘mobile worker’ and ‘self-employed driver’, defined in Article 3(d) and (e) of that directive, cannot go beyond the scope of that directive.

It must be noted that the dispute in the main proceedings, which pertains to an action challenging a dismissal, relates not to a question about the organisation of working time, but to whether the person concerned must be classified as a ‘mobile worker’ and therefore as an employed person for the purposes of the application of national labour legislation and, more particularly, legislation on dismissals.

Therefore, it must be concluded that a dispute such as that in the main proceedings does not come within the scope of Directive 2002/15 and that the concepts in Article 3(d) and (e) of that directive, consequently, cannot apply to that dispute.

(see paras 23, 25-28, 30, operative part)
Case C‑436/16

Georgios Leventis

and

Nikolaos Vafeias

v

Malcon Navigation Co. Ltd

and

Brave Bulk Transport Ltd

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Areios Pagos)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters — Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 — Article 23 — Jurisdiction clause — Jurisdiction clause in a contract between two companies — Action for damages — Joint and several liability of representatives of one of those companies for tortious acts — Ability of the representatives to rely upon that clause)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber), 28 June 2017

Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters — Regulation No 44/2001 — Prorogation of jurisdiction — Agreement conferring jurisdiction — Jurisdiction clause in a contract between two companies — Clause that cannot be relied upon by representatives of one of those companies to dispute the jurisdiction of a court over an action for damages which aims to render them liable

(Council Regulation No 44/2001, Art. 23(1))

Article 23(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that a jurisdiction clause in a contract between two companies cannot be relied upon by the representatives of one of them to dispute the jurisdiction of a court over an action for damages which aims to render them jointly and severally liable for supposedly tortious acts carried out in the performance of their duties.

Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation clearly indicates that its scope is limited to cases in which the parties have ‘agreed’ on a court. The Court has thus stated that the court before which the matter is brought has the duty of examining, in limine litis, whether the jurisdiction clause was in fact the subject of consensus between the parties, which must be clearly and precisely demonstrated, the purpose of the requirements as to form imposed by Article 23(1) of the Brussels I Regulation being, in that regard, to ensure that consensus between the parties is in fact established (judgment of 7 July 2016, Hőszig, C‑222/15, EU:C:2016:525, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). Thus, a jurisdiction clause in a contract may, in principle, produce effects only in the relations between the parties who have given their agreement to the conclusion of that contract (judgment of 21 May 2015, CDC Hydrogen Peroxide, C‑352/13, EU:C:2015:335, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).

(see paras 33-35, 43, operative part)
Appeal—Grounds—Plea submitted for the first time in the context of the appeal—Inadmissibility—Plea seeking solely to contest the merits of the judgment under appeal—Plea arising from the judgment under appeal itself—Admissibility

(Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58)

(see para. 53)
Appeal—Grounds—Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence—Inadmissibility—Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence—Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted—Ground of appeal alleging distortion of the clear sense of the evidence—Need to indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted and show the errors of appraisal which led to that distortion

(Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 168(1)(d))

(see paras 36, 38)
Case C‑288/16

‘L.Č.’ IK

v

Valsts ieņēmumu dienests

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākā tiesa)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive 2006/112/EC — Value added tax (VAT) — Article 146(1)(e) — Exemptions on exportation — Supply of services directly connected with the exportation or the importation of goods — Meaning)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 29 June 2017

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Exemptions — Exemptions on exportation — Supply of services directly connected with the exportation or the importation of goods — Meaning — Services consisting in the transport of goods to a third country which are not supplied directly to the consignor or the consignee of those goods — Not included

(Council Directive 2006/112, Art. 146(1)(e))

Article 146(1)(e) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that the exemption laid down in that provision does not apply to a supply of services, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, relating to a transaction consisting in the transport of goods to a third country, where those services are not provided directly to the consignor or the consignee of those goods.

(see para. 27, operative part)
Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, in particular, subparagraph (k) of the second subparagraph of Article 2 and subparagraph (e) of the second subparagraph of Article 13(1) thereof, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the cases in the main proceedings, which provides for the application of a levy on wind turbines designed to produce electricity.

It is true that the increase in the use of renewable energy sources for the production of electricity constitutes one of the important components of the package of measures needed in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, which are amongst the main causes of climate change that the European Union and its Member States have pledged to combat, and to comply, in particular, with the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Such an increase is also designed to protect the health and life of humans, animals and plants, which are among the public interest grounds listed in Article 36 TFEU.

However, even assuming that it were accepted that that levy, notwithstanding its regional scope and the fact that it relates to a single renewable energy source, is capable of meaning that the Member State concerned does not comply with the mandatory national overall target set out in Part A of Annex I to Directive 2009/28, the result would be, at most, an infringement, by that Member State, of its obligations under that directive, without, thereby, the imposition of such a levy being regarded in itself as contrary to that directive, since the Member States have, as pointed out in paragraph 32 above, discretion to attain that objective, provided that they observe the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the TFEU.

(see paras 38, 40, 41, operative part 1)
Case C‑151/16

‘Vakarų Baltijos laivų statykla’ UAB

v

Valstybinė mokesčių inspekcija prie Lietuvos Respublikos finansų ministerijos

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from the Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive 2003/96/EC — Taxation of energy products and electricity — Article 14(1)(c) — Exemption of energy products used as fuel for the purpose of navigation within European Union waters and to produce electricity on board a craft — Fuel used by a ship to sail from the place where it was built to the port of another Member State for the purpose of taking on its first commercial cargo)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 13 July 2017

Tax provisions—Harmonisation of laws—Taxation of energy products and electricity—Exemption of energy products supplied for use as fuel for the purpose of navigation within European Union waters and to produce electricity on board a craft—Scope—Fuel used by a ship to sail, without cargo, from one port of a Member State to a port of another Member State for the purpose of taking on cargo to be transported to a port of a third Member State—Included (Council Directive 2003/96, Art. 14(1)(c)) Tax provisions—Harmonisation of laws—Taxation of energy products and electricity—Exemption of energy products supplied for use as fuel for the purpose of navigation within European Union waters and to produce electricity on board a craft—National legislation excluding the application of the exemption where the formal requirements are not met notwithstanding compliance with the substantive requirements—Not permissible (Council Directive 2003/96, Art. 14(1)(c))
Case C‑164/16

Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs

v

Mercedes-Benz Financial Services UK Ltd

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from the Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division))

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Value added tax (VAT) — Directive 2006/112/EC — Article 14(2)(b) — Supply of goods — Motor vehicles — Finance lease with an option to purchase)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 4 October 2017

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Taxable transactions — Supply of goods — Motor vehicles — Leasing agreement — Ownership passing in the normal course of events at the latest upon payment of the final instalment — Meaning — Leasing contract with an option to purchase — Included — Condition — Exercise of the option to purchase appearing to be the only economically rational choice for the lessee — Verification a matter for the national court

(Council Directive 2006/112, Art. 14(2)(b))

The words ‘contract for hire which provides that in the normal course of events ownership is to pass at the latest upon payment of the final instalment’, used in Article 14(2)(b) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, must be interpreted as applying to a leasing contract with an option to purchase if it can be inferred from the financial terms of the contract that exercising the option appears to be the only economically rational choice that the lessee will be able to make at the appropriate time if the contract is performed for its full term, which it is for the national court to ascertain.

(see para. 43, operative part)