ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
6

Under Article 15 of Directive 2008/115: ‘1. Unless other sufficient but less coercive measures can be applied effectively in a specific case, Member States may only keep in detention a third-country national who is the subject of return procedures in order to prepare the return and/or carry out the removal process, in particular when: (a) there is a risk of absconding or (b) the third-country national concerned avoids or hampers the preparation of return or the removal process. Any detention shall be for as short a period as possible and only maintained as long as removal arrangements are in progress and executed with due diligence. 2. Detention shall be ordered by administrative or judicial authorities. Detention shall be ordered in writing with reasons being given in fact and in law. When detention has been ordered by administrative authorities, Member States shall: (a) either provide for a speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of detention to be decided on as speedily as possible from the beginning of detention, (b) or grant the third-country national concerned the right to take proceedings by means of which the lawfulness of detention shall be subject to a speedy judicial review to be decided on as speedily as possible after the launch of the relevant proceedings. In such a case Member States shall immediately inform the third-country national concerned about the possibility of taking such proceedings. The third-country national concerned shall be released immediately if the detention is not lawful. 3. In every case, detention shall be reviewed at reasonable intervals of time either on application by the third-country national concerned or ex officio. In the case of prolonged detention periods, reviews shall be subject to the supervision of a judicial authority. 4. When it appears that a reasonable prospect of removal no longer exists for legal or other considerations or the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 no longer exist, detention ceases to be justified and the person concerned shall be released immediately. 5. Detention shall be maintained for as long a period as the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 are fulfilled and it is necessary to ensure successful removal. Each Member State shall set a limited period of detention, which may not exceed six months. 6. Member States may not extend the period referred to in paragraph 5 except for a limited period not exceeding a further 12 months in accordance with national law in cases where regardless of all their reasonable efforts the removal operation is likely to last longer owing to: (a) a lack of cooperation by the third-country national concerned, or (b) delays in obtaining the necessary documentation from third countries.’
18

In those circumstances, the Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘Must Article 1 of [Directive 1999/70], clause 1 of the [Framework Agreement], clause 4 of the [Framework Agreement] and the general principle of European Union law prohibiting discrimination based on the type of employment contract be construed as meaning that they preclude provisions of national law establishing rules for determining the length of the notice period for the termination of fixed-term employment contracts concluded for a period exceeding six months which are different (less favourable for workers employed on fixed-term contracts) from the rules determining the length of the notice period for the termination of employment contracts of indefinite duration; more specifically, do they preclude provisions of national law (Article 33 of the Law relating to the [Labour Code] which, irrespective of a worker’s length of service, establish a fixed two-week notice period for the termination of fixed-term contracts concluded for a period exceeding six months, whereas the length of the notice period for the termination of contracts of indefinite duration is dependent on the worker’s length of service and may range from two weeks to up to three months (Article 36(1) … of the Labour Code)?’
12

The Explanatory Note relating to General Rule 2(a) for the interpretation of the HS (‘the HSEN to General Rule 2(a)’), which rule is identical to General Rule 2(a) for the interpretation of the CN, reads as follows: ‘(I) The first part of Rule 2(a) extends the scope of any heading which refers to a particular article to cover not only the complete article but also that article incomplete or unfinished, provided that, as presented, it has the essential character of the complete or finished article. … Articles presented unassembled or disassembled (V) The second part of Rule 2(a) provides that complete or finished articles presented unassembled or disassembled are to be classified in the same heading as the assembled article. When goods are so presented, it is usually for reasons such as requirements or convenience of packing, handling or transport. (VI) This Rule also applies to incomplete or unfinished articles presented unassembled or disassembled provided that they are to be treated as complete or finished articles by virtue of the first part of this Rule. (VII) For the purposes of this Rule, “articles presented unassembled or disassembled” means articles the components of which are to be assembled either by means of fixing devices (screws, nuts, bolts, etc.) or by riveting or welding, for example, provided only assembly operations are involved. No account is to be taken in that regard of the complexity of the assembly method. However, the components shall not be subjected to any further working operation for completion into the finished state. Unassembled components of an article which are in excess of the number required for that article when complete are to be classified separately. (VIII) Cases covered by this Rule are cited in the General Explanatory Notes to Sections or Chapters (e.g., Section XVI, and Chapters 44, 86, 87 and 89). (IX) In view of the scope of the headings of Sections I to VI, this part of the Rule does not normally apply to goods of these Sections.’
26

In those circumstances, the Juzgado de Primera Instancia No4 de Palma de Mallorca decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. Must [Directive 93/13] and the principles of EU law on consumer protection and a balance in the parties’ contractual rights and obligations be interpreted as meaning that they preclude Spanish legislation on mortgages which, although it provides that the mortgagee may request an increase of the security where the valuation of a mortgaged property decreases by 20%, does not provide, in the context of mortgage enforcement proceedings, that the consumer/debtor/party against whom enforcement is sought may request, following a valuation involving the parties concerned, revision of the sum at which the property was valued, at least for the purposes stipulated in Article 671 of the LEC, where that valuation has increased by an equal or higher percentage during the period between the creation of the mortgage and the enforcement thereof? 2 Must [Directive 93/13] and the principles of EU law concerning consumer protection and a balance in the parties’ contractual rights and obligations, be interpreted as meaning that they preclude the Spanish procedural rules on mortgage enforcement which provide that the creditor seeking enforcement may be awarded the mortgaged property at 50% (now 60%) of the sum at which the property was valued, which entails an unjustified penalty for the consumer/debtor/party against whom enforcement is sought equivalent to 50% (now 40%) of that valuation? 3 Must [Directive 93/13] and the principles of EU law concerning consumer protection and a balance in the parties’ contractual rights and obligations, be interpreted as meaning that there is abuse of rights and unjust enrichment where, after being awarded the mortgaged property at 50% (now 60%) of the sum at which the property was valued, the creditor/party seeking enforcement applies for enforcement in respect of the outstanding amount in order to make up the total amount of the debt, despite the fact that the sum at which the property awarded was valued and/or the actual value of the property awarded is higher than the total amount owed, even though such action is permitted under national procedural law? 4. Must [Directive 93/13] and the principles of EU law concerning consumer protection and a balance in the parties’ contractual rights and obligations, be interpreted as meaning that, upon the award of the mortgaged property with a valuation and/or actual value which is higher than the total amount of the mortgage loan, Article 570 LEC is applicable and supplants Articles 579 and 671 LEC, and that, accordingly, the creditor seeking enforcement must be considered to have been repaid in full?’
8

Article 10 of that directive, entitled ‘Delegated acts’, provides in paragraphs 1 to 3: ‘1. The Commission shall lay down details relating to the label and the fiche by means of delegated acts in accordance with Articles 11 to 13, relating to each type of product in accordance with this Article. Where a product meets the criteria listed in paragraph 2, it shall be covered by a delegated act in accordance with paragraph 4. Provisions in delegated acts regarding information provided on the label and in the fiche on the consumption of energy and other essential resources during use shall enable end-users to make better informed purchasing decisions and shall enable market surveillance authorities to verify whether products comply with the information provided. Where a delegated act lays down provisions with respect to both energy efficiency and consumption of essential resources of a product, the design and content of the label shall emphasise the energy efficiency of the product. 2. The criteria referred to in paragraph 1 are the following: (a) according to most recently available figures and considering the quantities placed on the Union market, the products shall have a significant potential for saving energy and, where relevant, other essential resources; (b) products with equivalent functionality available on the market shall have a wide disparity in the relevant performance levels; (c) the Commission shall take into account relevant Union legislation and self-regulation, such as voluntary agreements, which are expected to achieve the policy objectives more quickly or at lesser expense than mandatory requirements. 3. In preparing a draft delegated act, the Commission shall: ... (d) set implementing date(s), any staged or transitional measures or periods, taking into account in particular possible impacts on SMEs or on specific product groups manufactured primarily by SMEs.’
29

Under Article 96 of the Customs Code, since the principal is required, amongst other things, to present the goods once again, intact, at the customs office at the place of destination — the transit document under cover of which carriage of goods under the Community external transit system is effected undeniably plays an essential role in the proper functioning of that system. Thus a removal of those goods, even if only temporary, is likely to undermine the very objectives of that system where, contrary to the requirements of Article 37 of the Customs Code, it prevents any possible requisition of those goods by the customs service. Such removal also complicates the identification both of the goods which are subject to the transit procedure and of the customs regime applicable to them (see, by analogy, Case C‑222/01 British American Tobacco EU:C:2004:250, paragraph 52).
20

It should be borne in mind that, in the procedure laid down in Article 267 TFEU for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the referring court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, even if, formally, the question referred for a preliminary ruling relates directly to the interpretation of Article 9 of Directive 92/12, that does not prevent this Court from providing the referring court with all the elements of interpretation of EU law that may be of assistance in adjudicating the case pending before it, whether or not the national court has referred to them in the wording of its questions. It is, in that regard, for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the order for reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation in relation to the subject-matter of the dispute (see Worten, C‑342/12, EU:C:2013:355, paragraphs 30 and 31).
20

The national court nevertheless expresses doubts concerning that interpretation of the Bundesfinanzhof and wonders whether the term ‘manufacturer’ in Article 24(2) of Directive 2003/96 must be given this restrictive interpretation or whether it would be preferable to adopt a broad interpretation whereby that term would also cover coachbuilders and dealers. It considers that the latter interpretation could be justified by the aim of Article 24(2) of the directive, as resulting from the 19th recital in the preamble to Directive 94/74. It observes in this regard that that recital relates to Article 8a of Directive 92/81 which has been replaced by Article 24 of Directive 2003/96 and which the Court interpreted broadly in its judgment in Meiland Azewijn (C‑292/02, EU:C:2004:499). On the other hand, according to the national court, the restrictive interpretation adopted by the Bundesfinanzhof is based on the judgment in Schoonbroodt (EU:C:1998:586) which related to Regulation No 918/83, a measure which, as the Court held in Meiland Azewijn (EU:C:2004:499), pursued, however, an objective different from that underlying the provisions relating to excise duty that are relevant in the main proceedings. The national court notes, furthermore, that a broad interpretation of the term might also be justified in the light of the actual conditions of lorry production, in which a number of undertakings participate in order to be able to equip the vehicles in accordance with the technical and/or economic requirements specific to each of them.
19

Hearing the case on appeal, the Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas (Supreme Court of Lithuania) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. Where an action is brought by an insolvency administrator, acting in the interests of all the creditors of the undertaking and seeking to restore the undertaking’s solvency and to increase the amount of the assets of the insolvent undertaking so that as many creditors’ claims as possible may be satisfied — whilst it should be noted that the same effects are also sought, for instance, by an insolvency administrator’s actions to set transactions aside (actio Pauliana), which have been recognised as closely connected with the insolvency proceedings — and given the fact that in the case at issue payment of a sum owed is claimed under the [CMR] and the Lithuanian Civil Code (general provisions of civil law) for the international carriage of goods that was performed, is that action to be considered to be connected closely (by direct link) with the applicant’s insolvency proceedings, must jurisdiction to hear it be determined in accordance with the rules of Regulation No 1346/2000 and does it fall within the exception to the application of Regulation No 44/2001? 2. In the event that the first question is answered in the affirmative, the Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas requests the Court to explain whether, where the obligation at issue (the defendant’s obligation, based on the improper performance of its contractual obligations, to pay the sum owed and default interest to the insolvent applicant for the international carriage of goods) has arisen prior to the opening of insolvency proceedings in respect of the applicant, Article 44(3)(a) of Regulation No 1346/2000 must be relied upon and this regulation is inapplicable because jurisdiction over the case is established in accordance with Article 31 of the [CMR] as provisions of a specialised convention? 3. In the event that the first question is answered in the negative and the dispute under consideration falls within the scope of Regulation No 44/2001, the Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas requests the Court to explain whether, in the present instance, inasmuch as Article 31(1) of the CMR ... and Article 2(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 do not conflict with each other, it should be considered that, upon placing the relations at issue within the scope of the [CMR] (the specialised convention), the legal rules in Article 31 of the [CMR] are to be applied when establishing which State’s courts have jurisdiction over the action under consideration, if the legal rules in Article 31(1) of the [CMR] do not run counter to the fundamental objectives of Regulation No 44/2001, do not lead to results which are less favourable for achieving sound operation of the internal market and are sufficiently clear and precise?’
7

Paragraph 4 of the Law of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia on compliance with collective agreements, social norms and fair competition in the award of public contracts (Gesetz über die Sicherung von Tariftreue und Sozialstandards sowie fairen Wettbewerb bei der Vergabe öffentlicher Aufträge), of 10 January 2012 (‘the TVgG-NRW’) provides: ‘(1) Public service contracts, the performance of which comes within the scope of application of the Law on the posting of workers, … (2) Public contracts … in the field of public transportation of passengers by road and rail … (3) Public service contracts which are not covered by Paragraph 4(1) and (2) may be awarded only to undertakings which, at the time of the submission of the tender, have agreed in writing, by means of a declaration made to the contracting authority, to pay their staff …, for the performance of the service, a minimum hourly wage of at least EUR 8.62. The undertakings shall, in their declarations, state the nature of the commitment adopted by their undertaking in the context of the collective agreement and the minimum hourly wage which will be paid to the staff engaged for the performance of the services. The amount of the minimum hourly wage may be adapted in accordance with Paragraph 21, by means of a regulation adopted by the Ministry of Labour.’
30

In those circumstances, the Krajský súd v Prešove decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Are [Directive 93/13] and [Directive 2005/29], in the light of Article 38 of [the Charter], to be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State, such as Paragraph 151j(1) of the Civil Code, in conjunction with other provisions of the legislation applicable in the present case, which enables a creditor to recover sums on the basis of unfair contract terms by enforcing a charge against a consumer’s immovable property without any assessment of the contract terms by a court and despite there being a dispute as to whether the contract term at issue is unfair? (2) Does the European Union legislation referred to [in question 1] preclude the application of a national rule, such as Paragraph 151j(1) of the Civil Code, in conjunction with other provisions of the legislation applicable in the present case, which enables a creditor to recover sums on the basis of unfair contract terms by enforcing a charge against a consumer’s immovable property without any assessment of the contract terms by a court and despite there being a dispute as to whether the contract term at issue is unfair? (3) Must the judgment of the Court of Justice [in Simmenthal, EU:C:1978:49] be interpreted as precluding, in the interests of meeting the objectives of the directives [referred to in question 1] and in the light of Article 38 of the [Charter], the national court from applying domestic provisions, such as Paragraph 151j(1) of the Civil Code, in conjunction with other provisions of the legislation applicable in the present case, which enable a creditor to recover sums on the basis of unfair contract terms by enforcing a charge against a consumer’s immovable property without any assessment of the contract terms by a court and also, despite there being a dispute, to circumvent review by a court of its own motion of the contract terms? (4) Is Article 4 of [Directive 93/13] to be interpreted as meaning that a term in a contract concluded by a consumer without representation by a lawyer which enables a creditor to enforce a charge by extra-judicial means and without any review by a court, is a circumvention of the important principle of EU law that contract terms are to be reviewed by courts of their own motion and, for that reason, is unfair, even where the wording of such a contract term is based on a national provision?’
3

Article 7 of Regulation No 2371/2002, entitled ‘Commission emergency measures’, states: ‘1. If there is evidence of a serious threat to the conservation of living aquatic resources, or to the marine eco-system resulting from fishing activities and requiring immediate action, the Commission, at the substantiated request of a Member State or on its own initiative, may decide on emergency measures which shall last not more than six months. The Commission may take a new decision to extend the emergency measures for no more than six months. 2. The Member State shall communicate the request simultaneously to the Commission, to the other Member States and to the Regional Advisory Councils concerned. The other Member States may submit their written comments to the Commission within five working days of receipt of the request. The Commission shall take a decision within 15 working days of receipt of the request referred to in paragraph 1. 3. The emergency measures shall have immediate effect. They shall be notified to the Member States concerned, and published in the Official Journal. 4. The Member States concerned may refer the Commission decision to the Council within 10 working days of receipt of the notification. 5. The Council, acting by qualified majority, may take a different decision within one month of the date of receipt of the referral.’
10

Under Paragraph 84(1) and (2) of the AMG: ‘1. If, as a result of having been administered a medicinal product intended for human use, a person dies or the body or health of a person is adversely affected to a substantial degree, the pharmaceutical undertaking which placed the medicinal product on the market under the present Law shall be required to compensate the injured party for the resulting damage, where the product at issue has been supplied to the consumer under the present Law and is subject to compulsory marketing authorisation or has been exempted by regulation from that requirement. Liability to provide compensation shall apply only where: (1) when used as intended, the medicinal product has harmful effects in excess of what is considered acceptable in the light of current medical knowledge; or (2) the damage has occurred as a result of labelling, or specialist information or instructions for use which do not reflect current medical knowledge. 2. If, in the circumstances of an individual case, the medicinal product administered is capable of causing the damage, a presumption shall arise to the effect that the damage was caused by that medicinal product. In each case, the question whether the medicinal product is capable of causing the damage shall be determined in the light of the product’s composition and the dosage administered, the intended manner and duration of use, the relationship in time between the dose administered and the damage, the nature of the damage and the state of health of the person adversely affected at the time when the product was administered and all other circumstances which, in the individual case, suggest that the product did, or did not, cause the damage. …’