ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

Approximation of laws - Public procurement procedures in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors - Directive 93/38 - Complaint by a tenderer alleging that the conduct of the contracting entity infringes the directive and restricts competition and constitutes an obstacle to the free movement of goods - Examination by the Commission under the procedure applicable to failure by a Member State to fulfil its obligations - Permissibility - Failure to initiate the procedure under Regulation No 17 - Abuse of procedure - None - Distinct and independent character of the two procedures

(EC Treaty, Art. 169; Council Regulation No 17; Council Directive 93/38)

Summary

It is proper for the Commission to examine under the procedure established by Article 169 of the Treaty a complaint in which a tenderer for a procurement contract alleges that the conduct of the contracting entity constitutes an infringement of Directive 93/38 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, and serves to restrict competition and constitutes an obstacle to the free movement of goods. Recourse to that procedure is no less justified by the fact that the complaint related exclusively to conduct by the contracting entity and did not comprise any criticism of the relevant national legislation or the conduct of the government concerned since, in the application of the Community rules on public procurement, the acts of contracting entities must be imputed to the Member States to which those entities belong.

In so far as such a complaint does not contain any specific indication which would enable it to be characterized as a request submitted under Article 3(2)(b) of Regulation No 17, the Commission does not, therefore, commit any abuse of procedure by not examining it in the light of competition law.

Furthermore, and even supposing that the complainant did properly request the Commission to initiate the procedure under Regulation No 17, that procedure remains independent of the procedure for a finding that the conduct of a Member State infringes Community law and for termination of that conduct. The two procedures serve different purposes and are governed by different rules. The fact that the Commission decides not to initiate a procedure for a declaration of failure to fulfil obligations or decides to discontinue such a procedure, cannot therefore imply that it is prevented from finding that the conduct of the contracting entity at issue constitutes an infringement of the competition rules and ordering termination of the infringement. It follows that a decision to close the file, adopted in the context of a procedure for a declaration of failure to fulfil obligations, relates exclusively to that procedure and does not constitute an implied rejection of a complaint submitted under Regulation No 17, meaning that it does not affect the complainant's legal position in the context of a possible procedure in application of the competition rules.
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

Procedure - Application initiating proceedings - Procedural requirements - Identification of the subject-matter of the proceedings - Brief statement of the grounds relied on - Application seeking compensation for damage caused by a Community institution

(EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 19; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 44(1)(c))

Summary

Under Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 44(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, all applications must indicate the subject-matter of the proceedings and include a brief statement of the grounds relied on. The information given must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court of First Instance to decide the case, if appropriate without other information. In order to ensure legal certainty and the sound administration of justice, if an action is to be admissible the essential facts and law on which it is based must be apparent from the text of the application itself, even if only stated briefly, provided the statement is coherent and comprehensible.

In order to satisfy those requirements, an application seeking compensation for damage caused by a Community institution must state the evidence from which the conduct alleged against the institution can be identified, the reasons for which the applicant considers that there is a causal link between the conduct and the damage it claims to have suffered, and the nature and extent of that damage.

Although, in special circumstances, it is not essential to specify the exact extent of the damage in the application and to state the amount of compensation sought, the applicant must establish, or at least indicate, the existence of any such circumstances in the application.
Keywords



Keywords

Procedure - Division of jurisdiction between the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance - Action pending before the Court of First Instance, brought by a natural or legal person under Article 173, fourth paragraph, of the Treaty, concerning the implementation of the association of the overseas countries and territories - Request pending before the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the validity of the same measure - Proceedings before the Court of First Instance stayed in the interests of the proper administration of justice

(EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 47, third para.)
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Summary



Keywords

Actions for failure to act - Natural or legal persons - Failure in respect of which an action may be brought - Failure to send a reply to a person who has lodged a complaint alleging an infringement of the competition rules - None where the formal request was made prematurely

(EC Treaty, Art. 175)

Summary

An action for failure to act under Article 175 of the Treaty cannot be founded unless the institution has an obligation to act, so that the alleged failure to act is contrary to the Treaty.

When the Commission is seised of a complaint under Article 3 of Regulation No 17 alleging breach of Article 85 or Article 86 of the Treaty, it is obliged to examine carefully the evidence of fact and of law brought to its notice by the complainant in order to decide whether it must initiate the procedure for establishing the breach or reject the complaint or, finally, decide not to pursue the matter. The earliest moment at which the Commission may be under an obligation to take a decision on a complaint is thus when it has been able to examine all the considerations of fact and law brought to its notice by the complainant.

Even on the assumption that, at the time when the formal request is made, the Commission is under an obligation to take a decision on a complaint under Article 3 of Regulation No 17, any such obligation is removed where the complainant submits - both with that formal request and subsequently - further material of such a kind as to influence the assessment by the Commission, which, by reason of that very submission of new material, cannot reasonably be in a position to take a decision.
ORDER OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Fifth Chamber)

27 June 2000

Case T-608/97

Onno Plug

v

Commission of the European Communities

‛Officials — Act adversely affecting an official — Confirmatory act — Inadmissibility’

Full text in French II-569

Application for:

annulment of the decision contained in the Commission's letter of 14 January 1997 and, in so far as necessary, the decision of 12 December 1997 rejecting the complaint of 16 April 1997.

Held:

The application is dismissed as inadmissible. The parties shall bear their own costs.

Summary

Officials — Actions — Act adversely affecting an official — Concept — Purely confirmatory act — Exclusion

(Staff Regulations, Arts 90(2) and 91(1))

Both an administrative complaint and the ensuing court proceedings must be directed against an ‘act adversely affecting’ the applicant within the meaning of Articles 90(2) and 91(1) of the Staff Regulations, the act adversely affecting the applicant being the act that directly and immediately affects the legal situation of the person concerned. A purely confirmatory measure, such as an act which contains no new factors as compared with a previous measure adversely affecting the applicant and which has not therefore replaced it, cannot be described as an act adversely affecting the applicant.

(see paras 22 and 23)

See: 23/80 Grasselli v Commission [1980] ECR 3709, para. 18; 204/85 Streghili v Court of Auditors [1987] ECR 389, para. 6; T-14/91 Weyrich v Commission [1991] ECR II-235, para. 35; T-82/92 Cortes Jiminez and Others v Commission [1994] ECRSC I-A-69 and II-237, para. 14; T-173/95 Biedermann and Others v Court of Auditors [1998] ECRSC I-A-273 and II-831, para. 39; T-130/96 Aquilino v Council [1998] ECRSC I-A-351 and II-1017, para. 34
Order of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) of 6 July 1998. - Anthony Goldstein v Commission of the European Communities. - Action for failure to act - Obligation to act - None - Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law. - Case T-286/97.



European Court reports 1998 Page II-02629



Summary



Keywords

Actions for failure to act - Natural or legal persons - Failure in respect of which an action may be brought - Failure to send a reply to a person who has lodged a complaint alleging an infringement of the competition rules - None where the formal request was made prematurely

(EC Treaty, Art. 175)

Summary

An action for failure to act under Article 175 of the Treaty cannot be founded unless the institution has an obligation to act, so that the alleged failure to act is contrary to the Treaty.

When the Commission is seised of a complaint under Article 3 of Regulation No 17 alleging breach of Article 85 or Article 86 of the Treaty, it is obliged to examine carefully the evidence of fact and of law brought to its notice by the complainant in order to decide whether it must initiate the procedure for establishing the breach or reject the complaint or, finally, decide not to pursue the matter. The earliest moment at which the Commission may be under an obligation to take a decision on a complaint is thus when it has been able to examine all the considerations of fact and law brought to its notice by the complainant.

Even on the assumption that, at the time when the formal request is made, the Commission is under an obligation to take a decision on a complaint under Article 3 of Regulation No 17, any such obligation is removed where the complainant submits - both with that formal request and subsequently - further material of such a kind as to influence the assessment by the Commission, which, by reason of that very submission of new material, cannot reasonably be in a position to take a decision.
Order of the Court of First Instance (Fourth Chamber, extended composition) of 4 May 1998. - Bureau européen des unions des consommateurs (BEUC) v Commission of the European Communities. - Antidumping procedure - Interested party - Refusal - Action for annulment - Confirmatory act - Time-limit - Inadmissibility. - Case T-84/97.



European Court reports 1998 Page II-00795



Summary



Keywords

1 Actions for annulment - Actionable measures - Concept - Measures producing binding legal effects - Letter from the Commission refusing an organisation for consumer protection access to non-confidential documents in an anti-dumping proceeding

(EC Treaty, Art. 173)

2 Actions for annulment - Action contesting a decision confirming a decision which was not contested in good time - Inadmissible - Meaning of a confirmatory decision

(EC Treaty, Art. 173)

Summary

1 Only measures with binding legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position are capable of being the subject-matter of an application for annulment.

The interests of a consumer protection organisation are prejudiced in a direct and immediate manner by a letter from the Commission informing it that it cannot be considered to be a party with an interest in the proceeding and, consequently, refusing it access to a non-confidential file.

In that context, the particular form in which acts and decisions are adopted is, in principle, immaterial so far as concerns the possibility of their being challenged by an action for annulment, and it is their substance which must be examined in order to determine whether they constitute measures within the meaning of Article 173. Where the decision in question contains a clear and definitive consideration of the request put to the Commission, the character of the decision cannot be called in question merely on the ground that the request was considered only by the Commission's staff.

2 An application for annulment brought against a decision which merely confirms an earlier decision which has not been challenged in good time is inadmissible. A decision is a mere confirmation of an earlier decision where it contains no new factors as compared with the earlier measure and is not preceded by any reexamination of the situation of the addressee of the earlier measure.
Order of the Court of First Instance (Fourth Chamber) of 23 October 1998. - Regione Puglia v Commission of the European Communities and Kingdom of Spain. - Agriculture - Regulation having general application - Action brought by a regional body - Inadmissibility. - Case T-609/97.



European Court reports 1998 Page II-04051



Summary



Keywords

Actions for annulment - Natural or legal persons - Measures of direct and individual concern to them - Regulation fixing the amount of production aid payable in advance to producers of olive oil - Action brought by a Member State regional body founding on the measure's impact on that region - Inadmissible

(EC Treaty, Art. 173, second and fourth paras; Commission Regulation No 1979/97)

Summary

A regional body of a Member State has no right of action against a regulation determining, in the context of the common organisation of the markets in oils and fats, the estimated production of olive oil and the amount of unit production aid that may be paid in advance for any given marketing year to producers established in the Community, claiming that the reduction brought about by the regulation in the amount of aid payable has significant socio-economic consequences for its region.

A regional body cannot rely on the second paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty since it is clear from the general scheme of the Treaty that the term `Member State', for the purposes of the provisions relating to proceedings before the Community courts, refers only to the government authorities of the Member States of the European Communities and cannot be extended to the governments of the regions, irrespective of the powers they may have.

Notwithstanding the fact that the body in question may possess the requisite legal personality to bring an action under the fourth paragraph of Article 173, since the regulation in question is not in the nature of a decision, the general interest that such an applicant may have - as the body responsible for the economic and social affairs within its jurisdiction - in obtaining a result that is favourable to the economic prosperity of the region, is not sufficient on its own to enable it to be regarded as individually concerned by the provisions of the regulation.
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Summary



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Applications for interim measures - Suspension of operation of a measure - Conditions for granting - Urgency - Serious and irreparable damage - Appraisal allowing for the Community institution's discretion - Financial damage

(EC Treaty, Art. 185; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2))

Summary

The urgency of an application for interim measures must be assessed in relation to the necessity for an interim order to prevent serious and irreparable damage to the party applying for those measures. It is for the party seeking suspension of the operation of a contested decision to prove that it cannot wait for the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering damage that would entail serious and irreparable consequences.

As regards the introduction, within the framework of the association arrangements for overseas countries and territories, of tariff quotas for the importation of certain agricultural products free of customs duties, the judge hearing an application for interim measures may not, save in a situation of manifest urgency, override the Council's assessment as to the choice of the most appropriate measure to prevent disruption of the Community market for the products concerned, without running the risk of encroaching upon the Council's discretion. It follows that the request cannot be granted unless the urgency of the measures sought appears undeniable.

Purely financial damage cannot, save in exceptional circumstances, be regarded as irreparable since it can be made good by pecuniary compensation. The existence of exceptional circumstances may be found where it appears that, without the interim measure sought, the party concerned could be placed in a situation liable to endanger its very existence or to alter its market share irreversibly.
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Summary



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1 Officials - Actions - Time-limits - Mandatory - Conditions relating to time-limits may be examined by the Court of its own motion

(Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91)

2 Procedure - Time-limits for bringing an action - Actions brought out of time - Application for legal aid - No effect on procedural time-limits

(EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 42, second para.)

Summary

1 The conditions governing the admissibility of an action, as laid down in Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations, in particular those relating to the time-limit for bringing an action, are a matter of public policy and the Community judicature may, therefore, examine them of its own motion.

2 Since the strict application of Community rules on procedural time-limits serves the requirement of legal certainty and the need to avoid any discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice, there can be no derogation from the application of those rules unless there is a quite exceptional case of unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure as required by the second paragraph of Article 42 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice.

It cannot therefore be accepted that the making of an application for legal aid, in itself and independently of the circumstances of the case, has the effect of extending or suspending the period prescribed for bringing the action.
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Summary



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Actions for annulment - Natural or legal persons - Measures of direct and individual concern to them - Regulation concerning the classification of certain goods in the Combined Nomenclature - Action brought by a producer of lactic ferments - Inadmissible

(EC Treaty, Art. 173, fourth para.; Commission Regulation No 1160/98)

Summary

An action is inadmissible when brought by a producer of lactic ferments for annulment of Regulation No 1160/98, which classifies the products used in the production of those ferments under heading 0404 90 21 of the Combined Nomenclature.

That Regulation is a measure of general application, which applies to an objectively determined situation and entails legal effects for categories of persons regarded generally and in the abstract, in particular the importers of those products. Even though it is capable of affecting the applicant's situation, it would do so only by reason of the applicant's objective attribute as an economic operator importing products referred to in the Regulation, in the same way as any economic operator pursuing the same activity in the European Community.

In that connection it is irrelevant that the applicant is the leading Italian producer of lactic ferments. Such a circumstance is not sufficient to distinguish the applicant from all other operators with respect to the contested Regulation, which is intended to determine generally the customs tariff classification of the products in question by reason of their importation from non-member countries into all Member States without distinction.
Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 12 August 1998. - Maria Paola Sabbatucci v European Parliament. - Application for interim measures - Amicable settlement - Binding nature - Mandatory removal from the register - Conditions. - Case T-42/98 R.



European Court reports 1998 Page II-03043

Page IA-00459

Page II-01353



Summary



Keywords

Procedure - Amicable settlement in connection with an application for interim relief - Binding nature - Correct implementation - Automatic removal from the register

Summary

Since an amicable settlement agreed by the parties before a judge hearing an application for interim measures is legally binding, it must be enforced by him.

Where, on expiry of the time-limit specified in the minutes of the hearing in proceedings on an application for interim measures, within which the parties are required to inform the court of the results of the implementation of an amicable settlement, the judge finds that although the settlement was correctly implemented the applicant does not honour the undertaking given to withdraw his application for interim measures in such a situation, the judge must of his own motion order that application to be removed from the register.
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Summary



Keywords

1. Procedure - Introduction of new pleas in law in the course of the proceedings - Conditions - Amplification of an existing plea - Limits

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 48(2), first subpara.)

2. Acts of the institutions - Statement of reasons - Obligation - Scope - ECSC decision

(ECSC Treaty, Art. 15, first para.)

3. Procedure - Introduction of new pleas in law in the course of the proceedings - Inadequate statement of reasons - Plea which may be put forward at any stage in the proceedings

Summary

1. A plea in law which may be regarded as amplifying a plea previously put forward, directly or by implication, in the application initiating proceedings, and is closely connected with that plea is admissible. On the other hand, no new plea in law may be introduced in the course of proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or of fact which come to light in the course of the procedure, as the first subparagraph of Article 48(2) of the Rules of Procedure provides. In this respect, the fact that a plea is based on certain matters referred to in support of another plea is not sufficient for it to be regarded as amplifying that plea. Finally, a judgment which has merely confirmed the law which was known to the applicant, in principle, when it brought its action cannot be regarded as a new matter enabling the introduction of a new plea in law.

( see paras 24, 34, 36 )

2. The first paragraph of Article 15 of the ECSC Treaty provides that the decisions of the Commission are to state the reasons on which they are based. The statement of reasons must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure so as to defend their rights and to enable the Community judicature to carry out its review. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, however, inasmuch as it must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question.

( see para. 44 )

3. Pleas alleging that a statement of reasons is lacking or inadequate constitute a matter of public interest and may be put forward by the parties at any stage in the proceedings. The applicant cannot therefore be barred from criticising an inadequate statement of reasons solely on the ground that it did not rely on that argument in its application.

( see para. 46 )