ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 347/21

Action brought on 21 August 2017 — European Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

(Case C-503/17)

(2017/C 347/28)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: F. Tomat, J. Tomkin, Agents)

Defendant: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by allowing the use of marked fuel for the purpose of fuelling private pleasure craft, the United Kingdom has breached its obligations under Directive 95/60/EC (1);

— order the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Commission considers that permitting the sale of marked fuel for propelling private pleasure craft is fundamentally incompatible with the Directive 95/60/EC (the ‘Fiscal Marking Directive’). The obligation to mark fuel that has been subject to a reduced rate of excise duty is intended specifically to ensure that those fuels are readily distinguishable from fuel in respect of which full duty has been paid. However, the effect of the national measure is that where marked fuel is found in a tank of a private pleasure craft that has been refuelled in the United Kingdom, it is not possible to determine by reference to the marking, whether or not the fuel used was subject to a full or discounted rate of excise duty.

(1) Council Directive 95/60/EC of 27 November 1995 on fiscal marking of gas oils and kerosene (OJ 1995, L 291, p. 46).
1.

For the purposes of applying Article 8(4) of Directive 2011/83/EU, (1) does the answer to the question whether a means of distance communication (in this instance, an advertising leaflet containing a mail order coupon) allows limited space or time to display information depend on whether (a) (in the abstract) the means of distance communication allows only limited space or time by its very nature or (b) (in the particular case) it offers limited space or time in the design selected for it by the trader?
2.

If Question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative: In the case of the award of scholarships referred to in Question 1, does the participation requirement relating to the passing of the First State Law Examination in Germany constitute indirect discrimination against an applicant within the meaning of Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/43/EC where the applicant, who is a Union citizen, has indeed acquired a comparable qualification in a State which does not belong to the European Union, without the choice of this place of qualification being related to the ethnic origin of the applicant, but, on account of his residence in national territory and fluent command of German, had, in the same way as a national, the possibility of taking the First State Law Examination after studying law in national territory? Is any difference made by the fact that the objective pursued by the scholarship programme is, without being linked to any discriminatory characteristics, to provide law graduates in Germany with knowledge of foreign legal systems, experience of being abroad and knowledge of languages by promoting a project for research and studies abroad?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 369/2

Appeal brought on 26 April 2017 by Natural Instinct Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 15 February 2017 in Case T-30/16: M. I. Industries v EUIPO — Natural Instinct

(Case C-218/17 P)

(2017/C 369/03)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Natural Instinct Ltd (represented by: C. Spintig, Rechtsanwalt, S. Pietzcker, Rechtsanwalt, B. Brandreth, Barrister)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, M. I. Industries, Inc.

By order of 7 September 2017 the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
1.

Is the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 (1) of 24 November 2015 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the Union Customs Code to be interpreted as meaning that this provision permits the customs authority to request the applicant to inform it of the tax identification numbers issued by the German Bundeszentralamt für Steuern (Federal Central Tax Office) for the purpose of income tax collection and the tax offices responsible for the income tax assessment of the members of the applicant’s supervisory board, its managing directors, heads of department, head of accounts, head of the customs department as well as those individuals responsible for customs matters and those dealing with customs matters employed by the applicant?
1.

In the light of the case-law laid down in Federutility, (1) is a measure setting a maximum price for cylinders of bottled liquefied gas, in so far as it is a measure for the protection of socially vulnerable users, compatible with that case-law or with the principle of proportionality where, separately or together, any of the following circumstances occur? — the measure is adopted as a general measure in relation to all consumers and for an indefinite period ‘while the conditions of competition on this market are not considered to be sufficient’, — the measure has already been in force for more than 28 years, — the measure may contribute to freezing the situation of limited competition by impeding the entry of new operators.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 374/23

Action brought on 15 September 2017 — European Commission v Kingdom of Belgium

(Case C-543/17)

(2017/C 374/32)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: J. Hottiaux, L. Nicolae and G. von Rintelen, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Kingdom of Belgium

Form of order sought

— Declare that, by failing, by 1 January 2016 at the latest, to adopt all the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2014/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on measures to reduce the cost of deploying high-speed electronic communications networks (OJ 2014 L 155, p. 1) or, in any event, by failing to communicate those provisions to the Commission, the Kingdom of Belgium has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 13 of that directive;

— Order the Kingdom of Belgium to pay, in accordance with Article 260(3) TFEU, a fine in the sum of EUR 54 639,36 per diem from the date of delivery of the judgment in this action for failure to fulfil the obligation of communicating the measures transposing Directive 2014/61;

— Order the Kingdom of Belgium to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By virtue of Article 13 of Directive 2014/61, the Member States were required to adopt the national transposing measures by 1 January 2016 at the latest. The Commission is of the view that the Kingdom of Belgium failed to fulfil its obligations under that provision.

In its action, the Commission proposes that a daily fine of EUR 54 639,36 be imposed on the Kingdom of Belgium.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 402/16

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Østre Landsret (Denmark) lodged on 22 September 2017 — 2M-Locatel A/S v Skatteministeriet

(Case C-555/17)

(2017/C 402/19)

Language of the case: Danish

Referring court

Østre Landsret

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: 2M-Locatel A/S

Defendant: Skatteministeriet

Question referred

Is the Combined Nomenclature in the Common Customs Tariff, as set out in Annex 1 to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1549/2006 of 17 October 2006 (1) (2)

(i) the subdivision ‘---Video tuners’ of heading 8528,

(ii) subheading 8528 71 13 and

(iii) subheading 8528 71 90

to be interpreted as meaning that a product matching the product description in subheading 8528 71 13 and capable of receiving, decoding and processing Live TV television signals transmitted via internet technology, but not capable of receiving, decoding and processing Live TV television signals transmitted via antenna, cable TV or satellite, is to be classified under subheading 8528 71 13, subheading 8528 71 90 or under a third subheading?

(1) OJ 2006 L 301, p. 1. amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87

(2) OJ 1987 L 256, p. 1. on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff,
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 382/34

Action brought on 25 September 2017 — European Commission v Kingdom of Belgium

(Case C-564/17)

(2017/C 382/42)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: C. Cattabriga, G. von Rintelen and R. Troosters, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Kingdom of Belgium

Form of order sought

— find that, by failing to adopt, no later than 25 December 2013, all the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State, (1) and in any event by failing to communicate those provisions to the Commission, the Kingdom of Belgium has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 16(1) of the directive;

— order the Kingdom of Belgium to pay, pursuant to Article 260(3) TFEU, a penalty payment of EUR 70 828,80 per day, from the date on which judgment is delivered in the present case, for failure to comply with the obligation to give notification of the measures transposing Directive 2011/98/EU;

— order Kingdom of Belgium to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Member States were required, under the first subparagraph of Article 16(1) of Directive 2011/98/EU, to adopt the national measures required to transpose the obligations under the directive no later than 25 December 2013. As Belgium has failed to confirm that it has adopted all the measures necessary to fully transpose the directive, the Commission has decided to bring the present action before the Court of Justice.

In its application, the Commission proposes that the Kingdom of Belgium be ordered to pay a penalty payment of EUR 70 828,80 per day. The amount of the penalty payment has been calculated taking into account the seriousness and duration of the infringement and as well as the deterrent effect in the light of the Member State’s ability to pay.

(1) OJ 2011 L 343, p. 1.
Case C-390/17 P: Appeal brought on 28 June 2017 by Irit Azoulay, Andrew Boreham, Mirja Bouchard and Darren Neville against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 28 April 2017 in Case T-580/16, Azoulay and Others v European Parliament

Appeal brought on 28 June 2017 by Irit Azoulay, Andrew Boreham, Mirja Bouchard and Darren Neville against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 28 April 2017 in Case T-580/16, Azoulay and Others v European Parliament

(Case C-390/17 P)

Parties

Appellants: Irit Azoulay, Andrew Boreham, Mirja Bouchard and Darren Neville (represented by: M. Casado García-Hirschfeld, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— grant the form of order sought at first instance by the present appellants in the action brought in Case T-580/16;

— order the respondent to pay all of the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellants are of the opinion that the judgment under appeal is vitiated by several errors of law and a distortion of the facts.

The General Court erred in law and distorted the facts by rejecting an autonomous and uniform interpretation of the concept of education costs within the EU legal order and by making that concept dependent on the meaning attributed to it in the various education systems of the countries of residence of an official, irrespective of the nature of the costs and the interests of the children.

According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it follows, both from the uniform application of EU law and from the principle of equality, that the terms of a provision of EU law that makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, which must take into account the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (judgment of 15 October 2015, Axa Belgium, C–494/14, EU:C:2015:692).

In addition, the General Court’s finding in paragraph 47 of the judgment under appeal is incoherent and misconstrues the case-law concerning the rule of correspondence between the prior administrative complaint and the action.

The appellants also submit that the General Court did not comply with its obligation to state reasons by failing to rule on the infringement of the principle of equal treatment and of Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which had nonetheless been put forward before it.

Consequently, according to the appellants, by examining their three separate heads of claims in a manner that was overly perfunctory, the General Court arrived at findings that are substantiated neither in law nor in fact.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 402/18

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Amsterdam (Netherlands) lodged on 28 September 2017 — Openbaar Ministerie v Samet Ardic

(Case C-571/17)

(2017/C 402/22)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank Amsterdam

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Openbaar Ministerie

Defendant: Samet Ardic

Question referred

If the requested person has been found guilty in final proceedings conducted in his presence and has had imposed on him a custodial sentence, the execution of which has been suspended subject to certain conditions, do subsequent proceedings in which the court, in the absence of the requested person, orders that suspension to be revoked on the ground of non-compliance with conditions and evasion of the supervision and guidance of a probation officer constitute a ‘trial resulting in the decision’ as referred to in Article 4a of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA (1)?

(1) Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 424/24

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State (Netherlands) lodged on 4 October 2017 — Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie v H.

(Case C-582/17)

(2017/C 424/35)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Raad van State

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie

Defendant: H.

Question referred

Must Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person … be interpreted as meaning that only the Member State in which the application for international protection was first lodged can determine the Member State responsible, with the result that a foreign national has a legal remedy only in that Member State, under Article 27 of the Dublin Regulation, against the incorrect application of one of the criteria for determining responsibility set out in Chapter III of that Regulation, including Article 9?

(1) OJ 2013 L 180, p. 31; ‘the Dublin Regulation’.
2.

If extraordinary circumstances that already occurred on the previous day can also justify the cancellation or long delay of a flight on the following day, is Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004 to be interpreted as meaning that an air carrier is required, as part of the reasonable measures which it must take in order to avoid extraordinary circumstances, to make adequate provision for such contingencies in advance and, in any event, also adequately provide replacement aircraft at its home base?
1.

Must account be taken, in the assessment of whether a loss in a subsidiary in another Member State is definitive within the meaning given in, inter alia, the case of A, and the parent company may thus deduct the loss on the basis of Article 49 TFEU, of the fact that, under the rules of the subsidiary’s State, there are restrictions on the possibility for parties other than the party itself which made the loss to deduct the loss?
4.

In circumstances in which: (1) companies A and B both form part of a group of companies; (2) defendant X performs, de facto, the role of CEO of that group of companies (as Mr Bosworth did for the Arcadia Group of companies: Statement of Facts and Issues, paragraph 14); X is employed by one group company, company A (and so is an employee of company A) (as Mr Bosworth was from time to time in circumstances set out in the Statement of Facts and Issues, paragraph 15); and is not, as a matter of domestic law, employed by company B; (3) company A brings claims against X, and those claims fall within Articles 18-21; and (4) the other group company, company B, also bring claims against X in respect of like conduct to that which forms the basis of company A’s claims against X; what is the correct test for determining whether company B’s claim falls within Section 5? In particular: (1) Does the answer depend on whether there was, as between X and company B, an ‘individual contract of employment’ within the meaning of Section 5 and, if so, what is the correct test for determining whether there was such a contract? (2) Is company B to be treated as the ‘employer’ of X for the purposes of Section 5 to Title II of the Convention, and/or do company B’s claims against X (in paragraph 4(4) above) fall within Articles 18-21 in the same way that company A’s claims against X fall within Articles 18-21? In particular: (a) Does company B’s claim fall within article 18 only if the obligation on which it is actually based is an obligation in the contract of employment between company B and X? (b) Alternatively, does the claim fall within article 18 if the conduct complained of in the claim would have constituted a breach of an obligation in the contract of employment between company A and X? (3) If neither of the foregoing is the correct test, what is the correct test?
(1)

Must the requirement that contracts be drafted in plain, intelligible language, laid down in Articles 4(2) and 5 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC (1) of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (‘the Directive’), be interpreted as meaning that, in a loan contract concluded with a consumer, that requirement is satisfied by a contractual term not individually negotiated that specifies the exact amount of the charges, commissions and other costs (collectively ‘charges’) to be borne by the consumer, their method of calculation and the time when they have to be paid but does not, however, stipulate in return what specific services are covered by those charges, or must that requirement instead be interpreted as meaning that the contract also has to indicate what those specific services are? In the latter case, is it sufficient that the content of the service provided may be inferred from the description of the charge?
—

declare that, by failing to adopt by 1 January 2016 at the latest the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply fully with Directive 2014/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on measures to reduce the cost of deploying high-speed electronic communications networks, (1) or in any event by failing to inform the Commission of those measures, the Slovak Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 13 of that directive;
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 32/13

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça (Portugal) lodged on 18 October 2017 — J. Portugal Ramos Vinhos SA v Adega Cooperativa de Borba CRL

(Case C-629/17)

(2018/C 032/20)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Supremo Tribunal de Justiça

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: J. Portugal Ramos Vinhos SA

Defendant: Adega Cooperativa de Borba CRL

Question referred

In relation to the wording in Article [3](1)(c) of Directive 2008/95/EC, (1)‘indications which may serve, in trade, to designate other characteristics of the goods or service’, when used in the assessment of the permissibility of the registration of signs or indications intended to be adopted in order to designate wine products, must that wording be interpreted to the effect that it covers, in the verbal expressions adopted as a mark, including a protected geographical name as a designation of origin of wine, a reference to the word ‘adega’ [winery] — in the sense of a term currently used to identify the facilities and sites where the production process for such goods takes place — in the verbal expression adopted as a mark, in situations where that word (adega) is one of the various verbal elements which make up the corporate name of the legal entity seeking to register the mark?

(1) Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (Codified version) (OJ 2008 L 299, p. 25).
2.

Must recital 8 and Article 3(1) and (2) of Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services be interpreted as prohibiting receiving Member States, after they have established that material referred to in Article 6 of that directive was published, transmitted for distribution and distributed in a television programme re-broadcast and/or distributed via the Internet from a Member State of the European Union, from taking, without the conditions set out in Article 3(2) of that directive having been fulfilled, a decision such as that provided for in Article 33(11) and 33(12)(1) of the Lithuanian Law on the provision of information to the public, that is to say, a decision imposing an obligation on re-broadcasters operating in the territory of the receiving Member State and other persons providing services relating to distribution of television programmes via the Internet to determine, on a provisional basis, that the television programme may be re-broadcast and/or distributed via the Internet only in television programme packages that are available for an additional fee?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42/2

Appeal brought on 30 June 2017 by Double ‘W’ Enterprises Ltd against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 15 May 2017 in Case T-899/16: Double ‘W’ Enterprises Ltd v Kingdom of Spain

(Case C-401/17 P)

(2018/C 042/02)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Double ‘W’ Enterprises Ltd (represented by: A. Rubio Crespo, abogado)

Other party to the proceedings: Kingdom of Spain

By order of 14 December 2017 the Court of Justice (Tenth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.