3.

In addition the applicants are unable to rely on the EEC Treaty since it appears that the requirement laid down in the second paragraph of Artcile 173 of the EEC Treaty that if a person wishes to challenge a decision addressed to another person that decision must be of direct and individual concern to the former, is not satisfied in this case. (a) With regard to the criterion of “direct... concern” it was rightly pointed out in the Opinion delivered by the Advocate General in Case 25/62 ([1963]) ECR 95 at pp. 114 and 115) ( 3 ) that it does not relate to the strength of the interest but must be understood in relation to the system of the Treaty and the structure of the Community order, in which the cooperation of the Member States is required in realizing specific aims. (aa) That does not mean, as has already been made clear in the Court's case-law, that a decision is to be regarded as not being of direct concern to a person challenging a Community provision addressed to another person merely because the provision in question still requires national measures for its implementation. It is certainly not the case, where the national authorities have no discretion but must simply execute the Community decision. (That was the attitude adopted in Joined Cases 41 to 44,70 ( 4 ) in relation to decisions regarding the grant of import licences in the context of protective measures; in Case 92/78 ( 5 ), which concerned a decision fixing minimum selling prices in the context of an invitation for tenders for the sale of beef which was of concern to all tenderers; and in Case 113/77 ( 6 ), which related to. a decision concerning the collection of amounts secured by way of provisional duty in the context of antidumping proceedings). It is not even the case where a Member State is granted an express authorization if it relates, as was the position in Case 62/70 ( 7 ) concerning goods excluded from Community treatment, to applications for import licences already made, which the appropriate authorities have made it clear would be rejected as soon as they had been granted the community authorization. (bb) Nevertheless it must not be overlooked that the facts of this case are completely different and that therefore the aforementioned case-law cannot be applied to them but instead their similarity to the situations in Case 123/77 ( 8 ) and in Joined Cases 103 to 109/78 ( 9 ) must be considered. (As the Court is aware, the former case concerned a restriction on imports into Italy of motor cycles originating in Japan which was to be in force for one year; the latter case concerned the authorization granted to the French Republic to reduce the basic sugar quota for undertakings established in its overseas departments.) Even on the premise that there was no doubt that the Luxembourg Government would make use of the power to grant aids to the steel industry and that the recipient undertakings would satisfy the statutory requirements (closure of factories) because they were interested in receiving the aids and were forced to comply on economic grounds, nevertheless the fact remains first that according to the contested decision the list of the factories to be closed was to be handed in only by the end of January 1984 (a period of grace of which the Luxembourg Government made full use, as has been seen) and secondly that according to Article 2 (1) of the contested decision the “justification for the aids” by means of capacity reduction might “also be contributed by other undertakings”. That was not only of theoretical significance, as is shown in this case, in which Arbed made such a contribution for the benefit of a Belgian undertaking. Therefore, at the time at which the decision was adopted, it was by no means certain which factories would be closed. (After all, as the Commission has shown, two other hot-rolled wide-strip mills in other municipalities might have been chosen.) In fact in this case another plant which was under consideration for closure was reprieved because it was subsequently shown to be viable. Accordingly, it is not possible to argue that the municipalities in whose territory the factories which could be closed are situated were directly concerned by the Commission's decision (that was in fact so only after the adoption of a subsequent management decision). It cannot even be accepted that the said requirement was satisfied for a municipality in which plant was actually closed because in that respect, since the Court is concerned with the question of the admissibility of legal proceedings, the date of adoption of the contested decision must surely be decisive (or at least the situation at the period within which the proceedings must be instituted) and it is not sufficient for a decision on the manner in which a decision concerns an applicant to be given only in the course of legal proceedings or even at the time judgment is given in those proceedings. (b) There is also justifiable doubt whether the decision is of individual concern to the municipalities, although I need not consider the question in detail in view of my preceding comments. The criteria for determining that question have been clear since the Court's judgment in Case 25/62 ( 10 ) (to which reference was, for example, made as recently as in the Court's judgment in Case 231/82 ( 11 ) the important question is whether a decision addressed to a person other than the persons claiming to be individually concerned “affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them, or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons, and by virtue of these factors distingiushes them individually just as in the case of the person addressed”. (aa) That was accepted for example in the Court's judgment in Case 88/76 ( 12 ) in respect of traders holding export licences issued before a certain date with advance fixing of a refund in relation to a provision excluding the right to cancel such licences (because they were differentiated from all other persons by reasons of actual circumstances and distinguished individually just as in the case of the person addressed). It was not applied in Joined Cases 239 and 275/82 ( 13 ) in respect of importers affected by antidumping duties because the decision was not intended to apply to them (since their special position was not taken into account) unlike the exporters and producers in the nonmember country in question. (bb) It must not be forgotten that the basic assumption in this case is that the applicant municipalities are affected only indirectly by the contested decision. However, in such a case, characterized by the effects of the decision on the economic and financial sitution, there is, in addition, a wide circle of other persons affected by the decision such as employees, who lose their employment as a result of the capacity reductions, customers and suppliers of the factories to be closed and businessmen in municipalities in which the workers affected by the closure reside. If the circumstances are examined in that way it is in fact difficult to regard the Commission's decision as being of individual concern to the applicant municipalities in a manner comparable to that of an addressee. (c) I should like to add, finally, that it is not possible to come to a contrary conclusion by reason of the fact that it appears that, according to Luxembourg law, it is not possible to challenge directly the aforementioned Luxembourg legislation which was passed in respect of the Commission's decision. It is not possible to accept the argument that Article 173 of the EEC Treaty should be given a wide interpretation, taking account of the European Convention on Human Rights and general principles of law, in order to provide a complete system of legal protection. It must be admitted that there are judgments of the Court which, in connection with decisions as to admissibility of actions under Article 173 of the EEC Treaty, refer to the possibility of instituting proceedings under national law in respect of national provisions which are linked to a community measure (which was approximately the position in the aforementioned Cases 123/77, 239 and 275/82 and 231/82 ( 14 )). It is certainly not possible to deduce from that, however, (and in that respect it must be recalled too that in C^se 113/77 ( 15 ) reference to the right to bring an action under national law was rejected as irrelevant) and access to the Court of Justice depends essentially on the extent to which rights of action exist or are wanting under national law. Article 173 of the EEC Treaty is a provision of Community law without any express connection with national law; it must therefore be interpreted by reference to Community law alone, that is to say without reference to the nature of legal protection under national law. If it is true therefore that the applicant municipalities have no right of action under Luxembourg law in relation to the closure of factories in their territory (it might be that to consider the aforementioned statute alone, in respect of which implementing measures must presumably still be adopted, is to examine the position from too narrow a point of view), it would be more appropriate to object to the fact that legal protection under Luxembourg law is too restrictive than to draw any conclusions with regard to the interpretation of Community law.