ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
45

In that regard, it must be recalled that the independence of the judges of the Member States is of fundamental importance for the EU legal order in various respects. It is informed, first, by the principle of the rule of law, which is one of the values on which, under Article 2 TEU, the Union is founded and which are common to the Member States, and by Article 19 TEU, which gives concrete expression to that value and entrusts shared responsibility for ensuring judicial review within the EU legal order to national courts or tribunals (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraph 32). Second, that independence is a necessary condition if individuals are to be guaranteed, within the scope of EU law, the fundamental right to an independent and impartial tribunal laid down in Article 47 of the Charter, which is of cardinal importance as a guarantee of the protection of all the rights that individuals derive from EU law (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgment of 26 March 2020, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, C‑542/18 RX‑II and C‑543/18 RX II, EU:C:2020:232, paragraphs 70 and 71 and the case-law cited). Last, that independence is essential to the proper working of the judicial cooperation system embodied by the preliminary ruling mechanism under Article 267 TFEU, in that that mechanism may be activated only by a body responsible for applying EU law, which satisfies, inter alia, that criterion of independence (see, in particular, judgment of 21 January 2020, Banco de Santander, C‑274/14, EU:C:2020:17, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).
24

In those circumstances, the Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo no 17 de Barcelona (Administrative Court No 17, Barcelona, Spain), the referring court in Case C‑503/19, decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Is an interpretation by the national courts, according to which the existence of any form of criminal record is sufficient grounds for refusing long-term resident status, compatible with Article 6(1) and Article 17 of Directive 2003/109? (2) In addition to the existence of a criminal record, must the national courts take account of other factors, such as the severity and length of the sentence, the threat that the applicant represents to society, the duration of the applicant’s prior legal residence and the links he or she has with the country, and carry out an assessment that takes all those elements into account? (3) Must Article 6(1) of the directive be interpreted as precluding a rule of national law that allows long-term resident status under Article 4 to be refused on grounds of public policy or public security without establishing the assessment criteria included in Article 6(1) and Article 17 [of Directive 2003/109]? (4) Must Article 6(1) and Article 17 of Directive 2003/109 be interpreted as meaning, in accordance with the case-law laid down by the Court of Justice that directives have vertical direct effect, that the national court may apply Article 6(1) and Article 17 thereof directly, and may do so in order to assess previous convictions, having regard to the gravity of the offence, the length of the sentence, and the threat represented by the applicant? (5) Must EU law, in particular the right to obtain long-term resident status and the principles of clarity, transparency and intelligibility, be interpreted as precluding an interpretation by the Spanish courts of Articles 147 to 149 of [the Regulation implementing Organic Law 4/2000] and Article 32 of [Organic Law 4/2000], according to which long-term resident status may be refused on grounds of public policy and public security, even though those provisions do not set out clearly and transparently that they are grounds for refusal? (6) Is a rule of national law and its interpretation by the courts [which has the result] that obtaining long-term resident status is more difficult whereas obtaining temporary residence is easier, compatible with the principle that Directive 2003/109, and Article 6(1) in particular, have direct effect?’
8

Article 3 of that annex, entitled ‘Types of enterprise taken into consideration in calculating staff numbers and financial amounts’, is worded as follows: ‘1. An “autonomous enterprise” is any enterprise which is not classified as a partner enterprise within the meaning of paragraph 2 or as a linked enterprise within the meaning of paragraph 3. 2. “Partner enterprises” are all enterprises which are not classified as linked enterprises within the meaning of paragraph 3 and between which there is the following relationship: an enterprise (upstream enterprise) holds, either solely or jointly with one or more linked enterprises within the meaning of paragraph 3, 25% or more of the capital or voting rights of another enterprise (downstream enterprise). However, an enterprise may be ranked as autonomous, and thus as not having any partner enterprises, even if this 25% threshold is reached or exceeded by the following investors, provided that those investors are not linked, within the meaning of paragraph 3, either individually or jointly to the enterprise in question: … (b) universities or non-profit research centres; … (d) autonomous local authorities with an annual budget of less than EUR 10 million and less than 5000 inhabitants. 3. “Linked enterprises” are enterprises which have any of the following relationships with each other: (a) an enterprise has a majority of the shareholders’ or members’ voting rights in another enterprise; (b) an enterprise has the right to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory body of another enterprise; (c) an enterprise has the right to exercise a dominant influence over another enterprise pursuant to a contract entered into with that enterprise or to a provision in its memorandum or articles of association; (d) an enterprise, which is a shareholder in or member of another enterprise, controls alone, pursuant to an agreement with other shareholders in or members of that enterprise, a majority of shareholders’ or members’ voting rights in that enterprise. There is a presumption that no dominant influence exists if the investors listed in the second subparagraph of paragraph 2 are not involving themselves directly or indirectly in the management of the enterprise in question, without prejudice to their rights as shareholders. Enterprises having any of the relationships described in the first subparagraph through one or more other enterprises, or any one of the investors mentioned in paragraph 2, are also considered to be linked. Enterprises which have one or other of such relationships through a natural person or group of natural persons acting jointly are also considered linked enterprises if they engage in their activity or in part of their activity in the same relevant market or in adjacent markets. … 4. Except in the cases set out in paragraph 2, second subparagraph, an enterprise cannot be considered an SME if 25% or more of the capital or voting rights are directly or indirectly controlled, jointly or individually, by one or more public bodies. …’
9

Paragraph 18 of Book XI of the Social Code, in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (BGB1. I 2012, p. 2246) (‘the SGB XI’), provides: ‘1. Care and support insurance funds commission the medical service of health insurance schemes or other independent experts to determine whether care and support conditions are fulfilled and to assess the extent of that care and support. In the context of those examinations, the medical service or the experts appointed by the care and support insurance fund must establish, by examining the applicant, the difficulties encountered by that person in carrying out the tasks referred to in Paragraph 14(4) and the nature, extent and probable duration of the need for assistance, and must determine the existence of a serious limitation of the capacity to meet the needs of daily life … Moreover, it is also necessary to establish, as necessary, the measures which are appropriate, necessary and reasonable to eliminate, reduce or prevent an increase in the care and support needs, including services of medical re‑education and rehabilitation; in that regard, insured persons may claim against the competent institution for the performance of medical re-education and rehabilitation services … … 7. The tasks of the medical service are carried out by doctors, in close collaboration with nursing staff and other competent professionals. …’
7

Paragraph 2 of the lagen (1960:729) om upphovsrätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk (upphovsrättslagen) (Law 1960:729 on copyright in literary and artistic works; ‘the URL’) provides: ‘Subject to the limitations laid down in this law, copyright include the exclusive right to dispose of the work by reproducing it and by making it available to the public, whether in its original form or in modified form, in translation, in adaptation into another literary or artistic form or using another technique. Any direct or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction of a work, by any means and in any form, in whole or in part, shall be considered to be reproduction. The work is made available to the public in the following cases: 1. When the work is subject to a communication to the public. Communication to the public occurs when the work is made available to the public, by wire or wireless means, from a place other than that where the public can enjoy that work. It includes any communication carried out in such a way that members of the public may access the work from a place and at a time individually chosen by them. … 4. When a reproduction of the work is offered for sale, rental or on loan or otherwise distributed to the public. Any communication or performance of a work aimed at a large closed circle, in a professional context, shall be treated as a communication to the public or public performance.’
Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to contest the jurisdiction of a court to hear and determine an action brought for compensation under Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 and against an airline, a jurisdiction clause incorporated in a contract of carriage concluded between a passenger and that airline cannot be enforced by the airline against a collection agency to which the passenger has assigned the claim, unless, under the legislation of the Member State whose courts are designated in that clause, that collection agency is the successor to all the initial contracting party’s rights and obligations, which it is for the referring court to determine. Where appropriate, such a clause, incorporated, without having been subject to an individual negotiation, in a contract concluded between a consumer, that is to say, the air passenger, and a seller or supplier, that is to say, the airline, and which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the courts which have jurisdiction over the territory in which that airline is based, must be considered as being unfair within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts.
48

It is true that, according to established case-law, the principle of fiscal neutrality, which was intended by the EU legislature to reflect, in matters relating to VAT, the general principle of equal treatment (judgment of 29 October 2009, NCC Construction Danmark, C‑174/08, EU:C:2009:669, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited), precludes in particular treating similar goods and supplies of services, which are thus in competition with each other, differently for VAT purposes (judgment of 14 December 2017, Avon Cosmetics, C‑305/16, EU:C:2017:970, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited). Furthermore, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court that that principle must be interpreted as meaning that a difference in treatment for the purposes of VAT of two deliveries of goods or two supplies of services which are identical or similar from the point of view of the consumer and meet the same needs of the consumer is sufficient to establish an infringement of that principle (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 November 2011, Rank Group, C‑259/10 and C‑260/10, EU:C:2011:719, paragraph 36). However, it must be pointed out that the line of argument advanced by the German Government is based on a comparison of supplies of goods to two clearly distinct groups of consumers and that the fact that those groups are potentially treated differently is merely the consequence of the choice made by the persons belonging to those groups to own or not to own a dwelling in a building under co-ownership.
8

Under Article 183a of that code: ‘§ 1. Workers should be treated equally with respect to the establishment and termination of an employment relationship, employment conditions and promotion conditions, as well as access to training in order to improve professional qualifications, in particular regardless of gender, age, disability, race, religion, nationality, political beliefs, trade union membership, ethnic origin, creed, sexual orientation, and regardless of whether they are employed for a fixed term or for an indefinite term or on a full-time or part-time basis. § 2. Equal treatment in employment means that there shall be no direct or indirect discrimination whatsoever on any of the grounds referred to in § 1. § 3. Direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where a worker, on one or more of the grounds referred to in § 1, is, has been or would be treated less favourably than other workers in a comparable situation. § 4. Indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or action places or would place all or a considerable number of workers belonging to a particular group distinguished on one or more of the grounds referred to in § 1 at a disproportionate disadvantage, or at a particular disadvantage, in relation to the establishment and termination of an employment relationship, employment conditions, promotion conditions as well as access to training in order to improve professional qualifications, unless that provision, criterion or action is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. …’
13

Paragraph 3a of the UStG governs the determining of the place of performance of other services, stating that: ‘(1) Subject to Paragraph 3a(2) to (8) and Paragraphs 3b, 3e and 3f, another service shall be deemed to have been performed at the place where the trader operates his business. … (2) Subject to Paragraph 3a(3) to (8) and Paragraphs 3b, 3e and 3f, another service which is performed for the benefit of a trader for the purposes of that trader’s business shall be deemed to have been performed at the place from which that trader operates his business. [If that] service is performed for the benefit of a trader’s permanent establishment however, the place of the permanent establishment shall be decisive in that regard. The first and second sentences shall apply mutatis mutandis in the case of another service performed for the benefit of a legal person carrying on exclusively non-entrepreneurial activities to whom an identification number has been assigned for the purposes of turnover tax and in the case of another service performed for the benefit of a legal person carrying on both economic and non-economic activities; this shall not apply to other services which are exclusively intended for the private use of staff or of a shareholder. (3) By way of derogation from Paragraph 3a(1) and (2)[, with effect from 30 June 2013]: … 2. The short-term letting of a means of transport shall be deemed to have been performed at the place where that means of transport is actually made available to the recipient. For the purposes of the first sentence, letting shall be deemed to be short-term if it takes place for an uninterrupted period of not more than (a) 90 days, for vessels, (b) 30 days, for other means of transport. The leasing of a means of transport which cannot be regarded as short-term letting within the meaning of the second sentence, performed for the benefit of a customer who is neither a trader for whose business the service is acquired nor a legal person carrying on a non-economic activity to whom an identification number has been assigned for the purposes of turnover tax, shall be deemed to have been performed at the place where the recipient has his or her residence or its registered office. ...’
3

Article 63(1) of Directive 2016/680 provides: ‘1. Member States shall adopt and publish, by 6 May 2018, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive. They shall forthwith notify to the Commission the text of those provisions. They shall apply those provisions from 6 May 2018. When Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made. 2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, a Member State may provide, exceptionally, where it involves disproportionate effort, for automated processing systems set up before 6 May 2016 to be brought into conformity with Article 25(1) by 6 May 2023. 3. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, a Member State may, in exceptional circumstances, bring an automated processing system as referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article into conformity with Article 25(1) within a specified period after the period referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, if it would otherwise cause serious difficulties for the operation of that particular automated processing system. The Member State concerned shall notify the Commission of the grounds for those serious difficulties and the grounds for the specified period within which it shall bring that particular automated processing system into conformity with Article 25(1). The specified period shall in any event not be later than 6 May 2026. 4. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive.’
20

Article 23 of the CONI Statute provides: ‘1. In accordance with Legislative Decree No 242, as subsequently amended and supplemented, in addition to the activities the public nature of which is expressly provided for by law, the only national sports federation activities to have a public dimension shall be those which concern the following: the admission and membership of sports societies, associations, and individuals; revocation on any ground; the amendment of admission or membership decisions; scrutiny as to the proper running of professional sports competitions and championships; the use of public subsidies; the prevention and punishment of doping; high-level activities connected with preparations for the Olympics; the training of coaches; and the use and management of public sports facilities. 1 bis. In pursuing the activities of a public nature to which paragraph 1 refers, national sports federations shall comply with the guidelines and controls applied by the CONI and operate in accordance with the principles of impartiality and transparency. The public nature of an activity shall not change the ordinary rules of private law to which the individual acts and related individual legal situations are subject. 1 ter. The National Board shall establish the criteria and procedures for ensuring that decisions taken by federations comply with the CONI’s programmes in so far as concerns the competitiveness of national teams, the safeguarding of the national sports heritage and its specific identity and the need to ensure effective internal management. 2. The National Board, acting on the basis of the criteria and procedures laid down by the National Council, shall approve national sports federation budgets and establish the financial contributions payable to them, determining, where appropriate, the purpose for which those contributions are to be used, with particular attention being paid to the promotion of youth sport, preparation for the Olympic Games and high-level sporting activities. 3. The National Board shall oversee the proper functioning of national sports federations. In the event of proven serious management irregularities or serious infringements of sports law by the governing bodies, in cases of the proven inability of those bodies to function, or where the proper launch and conduct of sports competitions cannot be ensured, the National Board shall propose that the National Council appoint an administrator.’
61

It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the answer to the questions referred is that Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/88 must be interpreted as meaning that a period of stand-by time according to a stand-by system, during which a worker must be able to reach the town boundary of his or her workplace within a 20 minute response time, in uniform with the service vehicle made available to him or her by his or her employer, using traffic regulations privileges and rights of priority attached to that vehicle, constitutes, in its entirety, ‘working time’, within the meaning of that provision, solely if it follows from an overall assessment of all the circumstances of the case, in particular the consequences of such a response time and, where appropriate, the average frequency of interventions during that period, that the constraints imposed on that worker during that period are of such a nature as to constrain objectively and very significantly the ability that he or she has to freely manage, during the same period, the time during which his or her professional services are not required and to devote that time to his or her own interests.
11

The preamble to Ley 15/2012 de medidas fiscales para la sostenibilidad energética (Law 15/2012 on fiscal measures for sustainable energy) of 27 December 2012 (BOE No 312 of 28 December 2012, p. 88081), states: ‘1. The objective of this law is to adapt our tax system to more efficient and environmentally friendly use and sustainable development … … This law is based principally on Article 45 of the Constitution … Thus, one of the axes of this tax reform is to internalise the environmental costs resulting from electricity production … This law must serve as a stimulus to improve our levels of energy efficiency while at the same time ensuring better management of natural resources and continuing to enhance the new model of sustainable development, both from an economic and social point of view, as well as from an environmental point of view. … To that end, this law introduces three new taxes: the [IVPEE] … II. To that effect and also with the aim of encouraging a balanced budget, Title I of this law introduces a direct and substantive tax on the value of electricity production, which is levied on the activities of production and incorporation of electricity into the Spanish electricity system. That tax is levied on the economic capacity of electricity producers whose installations, first, account for significant investments in the electricity transmission and distribution networks in order to be able to switch the energy which they supply to those networks and, secondly, give rise themselves or because of the very existence and development of those systems, to undeniable effects on the environment, while generating significant costs which are necessary in order to maintain the guarantee of supply. The tax applies to the production of all electricity generating installations.’