ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
If the Court of Justice answers the first question in the affirmative:

Is the first sentence of Article 27(2) of the SES to be interpreted as meaning that that provision also covers the legality of any act, based on the Convention or on the rules made under it, which is performed in relation to part-time teachers by the headteacher of a school in the exercise of his powers as specified by that Convention and which adversely affects such teachers?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 344/45

Appeal brought on 28 August 2013 by MOL Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyrt. against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 27 June 2013 in Case T-367/12: MOL Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyrt. v Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)

(Case C-468/13 P)

2013/C 344/77

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: MOL Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyrt. (represented by: K. Szamosi, avocat)

Other parties to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, SA

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— annul the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 27 June 2013 in Case T-367/12 and annul the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market No. R 2532/2011-2 of 30 May 2012 insofar as the appeal of the Intervener is dismissed and the rejection of the Intervener’s opposition is upheld; or alternatively

— refer the case back to the General Court for final judgment; and

— order the Defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings of the first instance and appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellant claims that

— The General Court’s findings regarding the inadmissibility of the Appellant’s arguments submitted before OHIM are on the one hand irrelevant, and, on the other hand, unjustified and incorrect; therefore the General Court infringed Article 44 of the Rules of Procedure and Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice.

— There was no need and no legal grounds for disregarding the evidence submitted by the Appellant in the proceedings before the General Court, and, therefore, the General Court infringed Article 65(2) of the Community Trade Mark Regulation (1) and Article 135 (4) of the Rules of Procedure when it considered the Appellant’s evidence to be inadmissible.

— The General Court infringed the Community Trade Mark Regulation when establishing the relevant public and its relevance in assessing the likelihood of confusion.

— The General Court infringed the Community Trade Mark Regulation and settled case-law when it found that the services in question are considered to be identical.

— The General Court did not make a clear and separate assessment of the aspects of visual, aural (phonetic) and conceptual similarity, and did not examine the relevant circumstances of the case in the light of this assessment, and therefore, the General Court infringed the Community Trade Mark Regulation.

— The General Court infringed the law when it found that the Board of Appeal was correct in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion between the Intervener’s earlier trademarks and the Appellant’s Community trade mark application.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark

OJ L 78, p.1
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 359/3

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 30 August 2013 — Heidemarie Retzlaff v easyJet Airline Co. Ltd

(Case C-476/13)

2013/C 359/04

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant and appellant on a point of law: Heidemarie Retzlaff

Defendant and respondent in the appeal on a point of law: easyJet Airline Co. Ltd

Questions referred

1. May a right to compensation granted under national law which is intended to reimburse additional travel costs incurred as a result of the cancellation of a booked flight be deducted from the compensation granted under Article 7 of the regulation (1) if the air carrier has fulfilled its obligations under Articles 8(1) and 9(1) of the regulation?

2. If deduction is possible: does this also apply to the costs of alternative transportation to the final destination of the flight?

3. In so far as deduction is possible: may the air carrier make the deduction in all cases or is it dependent on the extent to which it is permitted by national law or on the extent to which the court considers it equitable?

4. In so far as national law is determinant or the court is required to take a discretionary decision: is the payment of compensation under Article 7 of the regulation intended to redress only the inconvenience and loss of time suffered by passengers as a result of the cancellation, or is it intended also to redress material damage?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 377/6

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hof van Cassatie van België (Belgium) lodged on 3 October 2013 — Vlaams Gewest v Heidi Van Den Broeck

(Case C-525/13)

2013/C 377/12

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hof van Cassatie van België

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Vlaams Gewest

Respondent: Heidi Van Den Broeck

Question referred

Must the first paragraph of Article 33 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2419/2001 (1) of 11 December 2001 laying down detailed rules for applying the integrated administration and control system for certain Community aid schemes established by Council Regulation (EEC) No 3508/92 be interpreted as meaning that the refusal, for the calendar year in question, to grant ‘the aid to which the farmer would have been entitled pursuant to Article 31(2) … under the aid scheme concerned’, refers to the aid payable in implementation of ‘the aid scheme concerned’, as referred to in Article 1(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3508/92 (2) of 27 November 1992 establishing an integrated administration and control system for certain Community aid schemes, so that it is not only the aid for the ‘crop group concerned’ which must be refused, but the entire aid payable in implementation of one of the aid schemes referred to in that provision, of which the crop group concerned forms part?

(1) OJ 2001 L 327, p. 11.

(2) OJ 1992 L 355, p. 1.
2.

(a) In determining whether making a bus lane on a public road available to Black Cabs but not minicabs, during the hours of operation of that bus lane, is selective for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU, what is the relevant objective by reference to which the question whether Black Cabs and minicabs are in a comparable legal and factual situation should be assessed? (b) If it can be shown that the relevant objective, for the purposes of question 2(a), is at least in part to create a safe and efficient transport system, and that there are safety and/or efficiency considerations that justify allowing Black Cabs to drive in bus lanes and that do not apply in the same way to minicabs, can it be said that the measure is not selective within the meaning of Article 107 (1) TFEU? (c) In answering question 2(b), is it necessary to consider whether the Member State relying on that justification has demonstrated, in addition, that the favourable treatment of Black Cabs by comparison with minicabs is proportionate and does not go beyond what is necessary?
3.

that the Commission has failed in its obligation to exercise due care and has disregarded Article 3(2) and (6) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (2) of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (OJ 2009 L 343, p. 51),
1.

Are the public procurement rules of European Union law — the third subparagraph of Article 1(1) of [Directive 89/665, as amended by] Directive 2007/66, (1) in which are laid down the principles of effectiveness and expeditiousness with regard to the defence of rights of tenderers which have been infringed, Article 2 of Directive 2004/18, (2) which lays down the principles of equal treatment of tenderers and of transparency, and Articles 44(1) and 53(1)(a) of Directive 2004/18, in which is set out the procedure governing the conclusion of a contract with the tenderer which has submitted the most economically advantageous tender — to be understood and interpreted together or separately (but without a limitation to the aforementioned provisions) as meaning that: (a) in the case where a tenderer has become aware of a possible significant connection (link) which another tenderer has with the contracting authority’s experts who evaluated the tenders, and (or) has become aware of the potentially exceptional position of that tenderer by reason of preparatory work previously performed in connection with the procurement procedure in dispute, and where, in regard to those circumstances, the contracting authority has not undertaken any actions, that information alone is sufficient to establish a claim that the review body should recognise as unlawful the actions of the contracting authority which failed to ensure transparency and objectivity in the procedures, the applicant, moreover, not being required to prove in concrete terms that the experts acted in a biased manner? (b) the review body, having established that the grounds for the applicant’s abovementioned claim are well founded, is not obliged, when ruling on the consequences which those grounds may have for the results of the tendering procedure, to have regard for the fact that the results of the evaluation of the tenders submitted by tenderers would essentially have been the same if there had not been any biased assessors among the experts who evaluated the tenders? (c) the tenderer becomes (finally) aware of the content of the criteria relating to the most economically advantageous tender, which were formulated in accordance with the qualitative parameters and set out in abstract terms in the tendering conditions (criteria such as completeness and compatibility with the needs of the contracting authority), in respect of which the tenderer was essentially able to submit a tender, only at the time when, in accordance with those criteria, the contracting authority evaluated the tenders submitted by tenderers and provided interested parties with comprehensive information concerning the grounds for the decisions taken, and only from that moment could the limitation period governing the review procedure laid down in national law be applied to that tenderer?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 24/16

Appeal brought on 27 November 2013 by Castel Frères SAS against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 13 September 2013 in Case T-320/10: Fürstlich Castell’sches Domänenamt Albrecht Fürst zu Castell-Castell v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

(Case C-622/13 P)

2014/C 24/29

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Castel Frères SAS (represented by: A. von Mühlendahl, H. Hartwig, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), Fürstlich Castell’sches Domänenamt Albrecht Fürst zu Castell-Castell

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— annul the Judgment of the General Court of 13 September 2013 in Case T-320/10,

— dismiss the application for annulment brought by Fürstlich Castell’sches Domänenamt Albrecht Fürst zu Castell-Castell against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 4 May 2010 in Case R 962/2009-2,

— order the Office and the Other Party to bear the costs of the proceedings before the General Court and this Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Appellant claims that the General Court committed legal error in rejecting the Appellant's claim that the application to the General Court should have been dismissed as inadmissible because of the ‘abus de droit’ committed by the Other Party. The Appellant's claim is based on a distortion of the evidence. The claim is also based on a misinterpretation of the role of the abuse of rights in proceedings before European Union institutions. The claim is also based on a failure to give reasons for the decision because the General Court failed to give any reasons for the dismissal of the Appellant's claim.

The Appellant further claims that the General Court violated Article 7 (1) (c) CTMR (1) in that it applied erroneous legal criteria in determining that the Appellant's mark was improperly registered.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark

OJ L 78, p. 1
1.

Is Article 27(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 (1) of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1) to be interpreted as meaning that the court other than the court first seised, which has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Article 22 of Regulation 44/2001, must nevertheless stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised, which does not have exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Article 22 of Regulation No 44/2001, is definitively established?
—

Declare that, by not adopting the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Article 2(a), (b), (d), (f), (g), (h) and (n); Article 3(4)(a) and (b); Article 5; Article 13(1)(e) and the second and third subparagraphs of Article 13(6); Article 14(2), (3), (4) and (5); the second sentence of Article 16(1), the first subparagraph of Article 16(3), the second sentence of Article 16(4), Article 16(6), (7) and (8); Article 17(1)(c) in relation to biofuels, Article 17(2) in relation to bioliquids, Article 17(3)(b)(i) in relation to other Member States and third countries, Article 17(3)(a), Article 17(3)(b)(ii), Article 17(3)(c), Article 17(4)(a) to (c) and Article 17(8); Article 18(1) in relation to bioliquids; and Article 19(1) and (3) in respect of bioliquids of Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (1), and with Annexes II, III, IV and V to that directive, either in the whole of the federal territory or in some parts thereof, or by not informing the Commission of such provisions, the Republic of Austria has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 27(1) of that directive;
First, the General Court infringed Article 23(3) of Regulation No 1/2003 (1), the principle of certainty, the principle of equal treatment and the principle of proportionality in interpreting Article 23(2), second sentence, of Regulation No 1/2003 as a ceiling, thereby finding that the Commission did not erroneously determine the amount of the fine and putting itself in a position in which it was not able to reduce the fine as appropriate.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 45/17

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Obvodní soud pro Prahu 1 (Czech Republic) lodged on 29 October 2013 — Hoštická a.s. and Others v Ministerstvo zemědělství

(Case C-561/13)

2014/C 45/32

Language of the case: Czech

Referring court

Obvodní soud pro Prahu 1

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Hoštická a.s., Jaroslav Haškovec, Zemědělské družstvo Senice na Hané

Defendant: Ministerstvo zemědělství

Questions referred

1. Is Article 126 of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 (1) to be interpreted such that the separate sugar payment is a decoupled payment?

2. Is Article 126(1) of Council Regulation No 73/2009 to be interpreted such that ‘the criteria adopted by the relevant Member States in 2006 and 2007’ include the representative period chosen by the Member State at that time on the basis of Article 143ba(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003, (2) as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 319/2006? (3)

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 (OJ 2009 L 30, p. 16).

(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 of 29 September 2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers and amending Regulations (EEC) No 2019/93, (EC) No 1452/2001, (EC) No 1453/2001, (EC) No 1454/2001, (EC) No 1868/94, (EC) No 1251/1999, (EC) No 1254/1999, (EC) No 1673/2000, (EEC) No 2358/71 and (EC) No 2529/2001 (OJ 2003 L 270, p. 1).

(3) Council Regulation (EC) No 319/2006 of 20 February 2006 amending Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers (OJ 2006 L 58, p. 32).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 39/8

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Kammarrätten i Sundsvall (Sweden) lodged on 25 November 2013 — OKG AB v Skatteverket

(Case C-606/13)

2014/C 39/14

Language of the case: Swedish

Referring court

Kammarrätten i Sundsvall

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: OKG AB

Defendant: Skatteverket

Questions referred

1. Article 4(2) of the Energy Taxation Directive (1) states that ‘level of taxation’ is the total charge levied in respect of all indirect taxes (except VAT) calculated directly or indirectly on the quantity of electricity at the time of release for consumption. Under Article 21(5) of that directive, electricity is to be subject to taxation and the tax liability is to become applicable at the time of supply by the distributor or redistributor. Do these articles preclude a tax levied on the thermal power of nuclear reactors?

2. Does a tax on thermal power constitute an excise duty which is levied directly or indirectly on the consumption of such goods (excise goods) as are referred to in Article 1(1) of the Excise Duty Directive? (2)

(1) Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (OJ 2003 L 283, p. 51).

(2) Council Directive 2008/118/EC of 16 December 2008 concerning the general arrangements for excise duty and repealing Directive 92/12/EEC (OJ 2009 L 9, p. 12).
—

to take account of working periods as a contract employee in the service of a European Union institution, established in that Member State, in particular where, both before and after the period of employment as a contract employee, work was performed as an employed person in accordance with the legislation of that Member State;
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Finanzgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 12 December 2013 — Verder LabTec GmbH & Co. KG v Finanzamt Hilden

(Case C-657/13)

(2014/C 71/13)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Finanzgericht Düsseldorf

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Verder LabTec GmbH & Co. KG

Defendant: Finanzamt Hilden

Question referred

Is it consistent with the freedom of establishment under Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union if, upon the transfer of an asset from a domestic to a foreign permanent establishment of the same undertaking, a national rule stipulates that there is a withdrawal for non-business purposes, with the result that the disclosure of hidden reserves leads to a profit upon the withdrawal, and another national rule provides the possibility of distributing that profit equally over five or ten financial years?
2.

Second ground of appeal , alleging error of law in the application of the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and breach of the principles of equal treatment and proportionality, of the principle that reasons must be stated and of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations in the application of the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. (2)
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 78/2

Action brought on 4 December 2013 — European Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

(Case C-640/13)

2014/C 78/04

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: R. Lyal, W. Roels, Agents)

Defendant: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that by retroactively curtailing the right of taxpayers to recover tax which was levied contrary to Union law, the United Kingdom has failed to comply with its obligations under Article 4(3) TEU;

— order United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to pay the costs.

The national legislation in issue

Section 107 of the Finance Act 2007 retroactively deprives taxpayers of the right to recover unlawfully charged tax.

The main argument

In the absence of any provision of EU law on the matter, it is for the national law of each Member State to determine the procedural conditions governing actions to vindicate the rights enjoyed by citizens under EU law. However, that procedural autonomy is subject to observance of the principles of effectiveness and equivalence and to other generally applicable principles of law, such as legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations. Section 107 of the Finance Act 2007 fails to observe those principles and is thus incompatible with Article 4(3) TEU.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Gliwicach (Poland) lodged on 2 December 2013 — Adarco Invest sp. z o.o established in Petrosani (Romania), Polish branch in Tarnowskie Góry

(Case C-629/13)

(2014/C 71/10)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Okręgowy w Gliwicach

Party to the main proceedings

Appellant: Adarco Invest sp. z o.o established in Petrosani (Romania), Polish branch in Tarnowskie Góry

Question referred

Do Articles 49 and 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 1 of the Eleventh Council Directive concerning disclosure requirements in respect of branches opened in a Member State by certain types of company governed by the law of another State (1) preclude refusal in a Member State to remove from the Krajowy Rejestr Sądowy (commercial register) a branch of a company established in another Member State in so far as that branch has not been wound up in accordance with the procedure laid down for winding up a domestic limited liability company, whereas such a procedure does not have to be carried out to remove a branch of a domestic company from the register? In the case of domestic companies, branches are entered only in the registration of the domestic company and that company is obliged to submit a consolidated financial statement covering the parent company and its branches, whilst branches of foreign companies are registered in the Krajowy Rejestr Sądowy (commercial register) and submit to the register only a financial statement for the branch.

(1) OJ 1989 L 395, p. 36.
1.

Is Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to be interpreted as preventing a provision of national law from maintaining a ban — which, moreover, is indefinite and disproportionate — on allowing persons who were convicted before the entry into force of a more lenient criminal law, namely, Law No 94-89 of 1 February 1994, to receive a lighter penalty?
2.

If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: In what circumstances are transmitter/receiver modules of the type described in more detail in the grounds, which have an individual function within the meaning of heading 8543, to be regarded as parts of machines or apparatus in heading 8543?