ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 22/17

Action brought on 14 November 2016 — European Commission v Czech Republic

(Case C-575/16)

(2017/C 022/23)

Language of the case: Czech

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: H. Støvlbæk and K. Walkerová, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Czech Republic

Form of order sought

— declare that, by laying down a condition of nationality for the exercise of the profession of notary, the Czech Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; and

— order the Czech Republic to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Commission considers that the condition of nationality laid down for the exercise of the profession of notary in the Czech legal system is discriminatory and constitutes a disproportionate restriction of the freedom of establishment. The Czech Republic has therefore failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

The Commission considers that the functions entrusted to notaries by the legislation of the Czech Republic are not by their nature linked to the exercise of public powers, so that the condition of nationality laid down for access to the profession of notary in the Czech legal system cannot be justified by the exception laid down in Article 51 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
1.

According to the reasoned opinion of 1 September 2014 which the Commission sent to the Greek authorities, by its approval of the fact that the filling stations held by the company Katastimata Aforologiton Eidon A.E. at the border posts located at Kipoi in Evros, at Kakavia and at Evzonoi make petroleum products available on which excise duty is not charged, Greece has failed to fulfil its obligations under Directive 2008/118 concerning the general arrangements for excise duty, as Greece does not consider that making those products available constitutes actual release for consumption. The direct supply of vehicles with fuel at those filling stations constitutes release for consumption and is subject to excise duty.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 30/19

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Commissione tributaria di Secondo Grado di Bolzano (Italia) lodged on 31 October 2016 — Agenzia delle Entrate — Direzione provinciale Ufficio controlli di Bolzano v Palais Kaiserkron Srl

(Case C-549/16)

(2017/C 030/23)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Commissione tributaria di Secondo Grado di Bolzano

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Agenzia delle Entrate — Direzione provinciale Ufficio controlli di Bolzano

Respondent: Palais Kaiserkron Srl

Question referred

Must Article 401 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (1) be interpreted as meaning that the value added tax and registration duty (payable on lease agreements for commercial property under Articles 40 and 5(1)(a-bis) of the first part of the schedule of charges of Presidential Decree No 131 of 26 April 1986) may be levied cumulatively, or rather as meaning that registration duty is in the nature of a turnover tax?

(1) OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.
1.

What criteria are to be applied in assessing whether the conduct or actions of an undertaking are covered by the prohibition in Article 7(1) of Council Regulation No 139/2004 (1) on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the prohibition of advance implementation), and does implementing action within the meaning of Article 7(1) presuppose that the action, wholly or in part, factually or legally, forms part of the actual change of control or merging of the continuing activities of the participating undertakings which — provided the quantitative thresholds are met — gives rise to the obligation of notification?
1.

Are mandate M/120 and harmonised standard EN 1090-1 (:2009+A1:2011) drawn up on the basis of that mandate to be interpreted as meaning that the products to be fixed into concrete before it sets (suspension system products used for fixing shell elements and brickwork supports to the building frame, and certain foundation bolts, fastening plates and standard steel parts, bracing systems, column shoes and wall shoes, and balcony connections) listed in points 1 to 4 of the decision of Tukes do not fall within their scope?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 53/25

Appeal brought on 21 December 2016 by Lysoform Dr. Hans Rosemann GmbH and Ecolab Deutschland GmbH against the order of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 12 October 2016 in Case T-669/15: Lysoform Dr. Hans Rosemann GmbH and Ecolab Deutschland GmbH v European Chemicals Agency

(Case C-663/16 P)

(2017/C 053/31)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Lysoform Dr. Hans Rosemann GmbH, Ecolab Deutschland GmbH (represented by: M. Grunchard, avocate, K. Van Maldegem, avocat, P. Sellar, Advocate)

Other party to the proceedings: European Chemicals Agency

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

— set aside the order of the General Court in Case T-669/15; and

— rule on admissibility and refer the case back to the General Court to rule on the merits of the case;

— in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court to rule on the admissibility of appellants’ application for annulment of the contested act; and, as appropriate, thereafter to rule on the merits of the case;

— order the defendant to pay all the costs of these proceedings (including the costs related to the objection to admissibility before the General Court).

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellants submit that the General Court misinterpreted and misapplied the law which led it to err in law in declaring the appellants’ application for annulment of the contested act inadmissible.

In particular, the appellants contend that the General Court committed a number of errors in its reasoning and in its interpretation of the legal framework as applicable to the appellants’ situation. That resulted in the General Court making the following errors in law:

— The General Court erred in its interpretation and application of article 130, paragraph 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, by entering into the substantive merits of the case;

— The General Court erred in its interpretation and application of article 130, paragraph 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, by failing to reserve its judgment on admissibility until it had heard a full exposition of the arguments on the substance of the case.

Furthermore, by declaring the appellants’ application inadmissible, the General Court infringed the appellants’ rights of defence, their right of access to justice and the duty to state reasons which pertain to fundamental rights of the individuals and thus reflect general principles of EU law.

For these reasons the appellants claim that the order of the General Court in Case T-669/15 should be set aside and the Court should rule on admissibility and refer the case back to the General Court to rule on the merits of the case.
1.

Has the EU legislature provided for the possibility, in Articles 70, 71 and 72 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1122/2009 (1) of 30 November 2009 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 as regards cross-compliance, modulation and the integrated administration and control system, under the direct support schemes for farmers provided for that regulation, as well as for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards cross-compliance under the support scheme provided for the wine sector, — in situations such as that in the main proceedings, in which there are multiple instances of non-compliance within the same area of cross-compliance — of aggregating the reductions of aid for repeated and unrepeated instances of negligent non-compliance with cross-compliance requirements, on the one hand, and for instances of intentional non-compliance with cross-compliance conditions, on the other?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 70/10

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation (France) lodged on 12 December 2016 — Tünkers France, Tünkers Maschinenbau GmbH v Expert France

(Case C-641/16)

(2017/C 070/15)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour de cassation

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Tünkers France, Tünkers Maschinenbau GmbH

Defendant: Expert France

Question referred

Must Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings (1) be interpreted as meaning that the court which opened insolvency proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction over an action seeking to establish liability by which the assignee of part of a business acquired in the course of those insolvency proceedings is accused of misrepresenting itself as the exclusive distributor or the goods manufactured by the debtor?

(1) OJ 2000 L 160, p. 1.
2.

If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative, are the rights of Union citizens to move and reside freely in the territory of another Member State, laid down in Articles 20 and 21 TFEU, restricted in a situation in which the grant abroad of a benefit such as personal assistance in accordance with the Disability Services Law is not separately provided for and the conditions for grant of the benefit are interpreted in such a way that personal assistance is not granted in another Member State in which the person completes a three-year course of higher education studies leading to a degree? — Is it relevant, in assessing the matter, that a benefit such as personal assistance may be granted in Finland in a municipality other than the person’s home municipality, for example when the person is studying in another municipality in Finland? — Must relevance be attached, in assessing the matter with respect to EU law, to the rights derived from Article 19 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Disabled Persons?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 86/10

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākā tiesa (Latvia) lodged on 19 December 2016 — DW v Valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas aģentūra

(Case C-651/16)

(2017/C 086/13)

Language of the case: Latvian

Referring court

Augstākā tiesa

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: DW

Defendant: Valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas aģentūra, Rīga.

Question referred

Must Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 45(1) and (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State such as that at issue in the main proceedings that, for the purposes of determining the amount of a maternity benefit, does not exclude from the 12-month period which is to be used in determining the average contribution basis the months in which the person worked in an EU institution and was covered by the joint insurance scheme of the European Communities, but that, on the grounds that, during that period, the person was not insured in Latvia, equates her income with the average contribution basis in the State, which may substantially reduce the amount of the maternity benefit granted in comparison with the possible amount of the benefit that the person could have received if, during the period under consideration for the purposes of the calculation, she had not worked for an EU institution but had been employed in Latvia?
1.

Is Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC to be interpreted as precluding measures of a Member State in respect of waters under its sovereignty or jurisdiction which are necessary in order to comply with the obligations of a Member State under Article 6 of Council Directive 92/43/EEC 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, (2) which have effects on the fishing vessels of other Member States, and by which professional sea fishing by means of fishing equipment that touches the seabed, as well as gillnets (‘trammel and gillnets’), is comprehensively prohibited in Natura 2000 sites? In particular: (a) Is Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC to be interpreted as meaning that the fishing techniques listed in the first question referred fall within the concept of ‘conservation measures’? (b) Is Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC to be interpreted as meaning that fishing vessels of another Member State which sail under the flag of the Federal Republic of Germany also fall within the concept of ‘fishing vessels of other Member States’? (c) Is Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC to be interpreted as meaning that such measures adopted by a Member State which merely promote the objectives listed in that Union legislation also fall within the concept of ‘meet[ing] the objectives of the relevant Union legislation’?
1.

Does Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (Directive 2003/88/EC) (1) or Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) preclude national legislation, such as Paragraph 7 of the Bundesurlaubsgesetz (Federal law on leave, ‘the BUrlG’), under which, as one of the methods of exercising the right to annual leave, an employee must apply for such leave with an indication of his preferred dates so that the leave entitlement does not lapse at the end of the relevant period without compensation and under which an employer is not required, unilaterally and with binding effect for the employee, to specify when that leave be taken by the employee within the relevant period?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 121/10

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 19 December 2016 — Hitachi Rail Italy Investments Srl v Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (Consob)

(Case C-655/16)

(2017/C 121/14)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Hitachi Rail Italy Investments Srl

Defendant: Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (Consob)

Question referred

Is the proper application of the second subparagraph of Article 5(4) of Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids, (1) in the light of the general principles laid down in Article 3(1) thereof, and in the light of the proper application of the general principles of European law relating to legal certainty, protection of legitimate expectations, proportionality, reasonableness, transparency and non-discrimination, prevented by a provision of national law such as Article 106(3)(d)(2) of Legislative Decree No 58 of 24 February 1998 (consolidating all provisions in the field of financial intermediation within the meaning of Articles 8 and 21 of Law No 52 of 6 February 1996), as subsequently amended, and Article 47 octies of the Decision of the Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa — Consob No 11971 of 14 May 1999 (Order implementing Legislative Decree No 58 of 24 February 1998 laying down rules applicable to offerees), as subsequently amended, in so far as those provisions authorise Consob to increase the takeover bid as referred to in Article 106 where the condition that ‘there has been collusion between the offeror or the persons acting in concert with it and one or more sellers’ is fulfilled, without identifying the specific actions which constitute such a situation, and thus without determining clearly the conditions and criteria under which Consob is authorised to adjust upwards the price of the takeover bid?

(1) OJ 2004 L 142, p. 12.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 104/33

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Cluj (Romania) lodged on 10 January 2017 — Maria Dicu v Ministerul Justiției, Consiliul Superior al Magistraturi, Curtea de Apel Suceava, Tribunalul Botoșani

(Case C-12/17)

(2017/C 104/48)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Cluj

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Maria Dicu

Defendants: Ministerul Justiției, Consiliul Superior al Magistraturi, Curtea de Apel Suceava, Tribunalul Botoșani

Question referred

Must Article 7 of Directive 2003/88/EC (1) be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law which, in determining the duration of a worker’s annual leave, does not consider the period of parental leave for a child under two a period of service completed?

(1) Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (OJ 2003 L 299, p. 9).
2.

Is Article 21(3) of Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity to be interpreted as meaning that the Member States may restrict the scope of the exemption so as to cover only consumption of an energy product used in the production of an equivalent energy product (i.e. an energy product which, like the energy product consumed, is also subject to tax)?’
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 112/18

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Aue, Zweigstelle Stollberg (Germany) lodged on 10 January 2017 — Thomas Hübner v LVM Lebensversicherungs AG

(Case C-11/17)

(2017/C 112/26)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Aue, Zweigstelle Stollberg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Thomas Hübner

Defendant: LVM Lebensversicherungs AG

Questions referred

1. Must Point A of Annex II of Council Directive 92/96/EEC (1) of 10 November 1992 [read in conjunction with] the third subparagraph of Article 15(1) [of Directive 90/619/EEC] (2) be interpreted as meaning that a consumer is entitled to cancel a life assurance or pension insurance policy at any time during the entire payment period thereof, if he has paid into the policy for several years on the basis of the contract, unaware of his right of cancellation in relation to that contract owing to the failure of the life assurance or pension insurance undertaking to give proper notice thereof?

2. Does a provision of national law, under which, on grounds of good faith, a consumer’s right of cancellation is considered to be forfeit where a policy holder who was unaware of his right to cancel a contract continues to make payments under that contract until the time when he becomes aware of that right, comply with the above directive?

(1) Council Directive 92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance and amending Directives 79/267/EEC and 90/619/EEC (third life assurance Directive) (OJ 1992 L 360, p. 1).

(2) Council Directive 90/619/EEC of 8 November 1990 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance, laying down provisions to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide services and amending Directive 79/267/EEC (OJ 1990 L 330, p. 50).
1.

Error of law in relation to the interpretation of Article 1 of the contested decision, before its amendment, and in relation to the principles of sound administration and legal certainty, in that the General Court considered that that article also referred to the provision of equipment and that it did not entail any new obligation for the Kingdom of Spain.
2.

If the answer to the first question should be in the affirmative, if the legislation adopted by the Member State in order to transpose the Directive provides, in accordance with Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/23/EC, that after the date of the transfer the transferor and the transferee are to be jointly and severally liable for obligations, including those relating to wages, which arose before the date of the transfer as a result of employment contracts existing on the date of the transfer, is an interpretation to the effect that joint and several liability for prior obligations does not apply when the majority of the workforce were taken on by the new contractor as a result of the requirements of the collective agreement for the sector, and the wording of that agreement excludes joint and several liability for obligations preceding the transfer, compatible with that article of the Directive?
1.

Is the second subparagraph of Article 4(2) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC (1) of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (Directive 2000/78/EC) to be interpreted as meaning that the church can determine with binding effect that an organisation such as the defendant in the present proceedings, where employees in managerial positions are required to act in good faith and with loyalty, shall differentiate between employees who belong to the church and those who belong to another church or to none at all?
1.

Are provisions of European Union secondary legislation (in particular, for example, Article 64 or 65(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (1)) applicable to the levying by the authorities of interest pursuant to a Member State’s legal provisions under which a credit institution, on exceeding the limit for large exposures under Article 395(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, (2) is to have interest of 2 per cent of the excess over the limit for large exposures, calculated on an annual basis, levied on it for 30 days?
6.

Is Article 143(1)(d) of the VAT Directive to be interpreted as prohibiting an administrative practice of Member States under which the assumption that (i) the right of disposal was not transferred to a specific contractual partner and (ii) that the taxpayer knew or could have known about possible VAT fraud committed by the contractual partner is based on the fact that the undertaking communicated with the contractual partners by electronic means of communication and that it was established when the investigation was carried out by a tax authority that the contractual partners did not operate at the addresses specified and did not declare the VAT on the transactions with the taxable person?