5.

It is time to pass to a consideration of the objections relating to the substance of the case. It is necessary to bear in mind in this respect that counsel for the applicant in answer to a question put by the Court clarified his claims in a document dated 8 May 1980. According to that document the applicant is seeking the partial annulment of the periodic report made by the second reporting officer on 2 March 1979 in three respects which I shall shortly specify. To clarify the limits within which this Court must remain in considering objections to periodic reports on officials may I cite the established case-law to the effect that “although it is true that these reports are made up of assessments which it is difficult for a court to review, this fact does not prevent their adoption from being vitiated for irregularity of form and procedure or patent error and misuse of discretionary power — defects capable of making them unlawful” (see in particular the judgment of 25 November 1976 in Case 122/75 Küster v Parliament [1976] ECR 1685 at paragraph 9 of the decision; and the judgment of 12 May 1977 in Case 31/76 Hehrant (née Macevičius) v Parliament [1977] ECR 883 to the same effect). That does not mean, as Mr Advocate General Mayras pertinently pointed out in his opinion on 27 March 1980 in Case 24/79, that the Court must substitute its own assessment for that of the administrative authority, but only that it is for the Court to review the ways and means which may have led to such an assessment. Let us now consider in detail each of the three objections made by Mr Grassi to the periodic report on him. (a) In the first place the applicant seeks the deletion of the phrase which attributes to him “a limited number of unrevised translations”. Those words are to be found in the first part of the report in Section II. In that respect he maintains that only once, on a mission to Florence from 20 to 22 November 1975, did he do translations in the period covered by the report in question. Moreover details of that kind are of little importance in the context of a periodic report and reveal an intention to belittle the applicant's capacity and duties. This alleged defect cannot be regarded as a patent error of fact. Undoubtedly Mr Grassi also did the work of translator on the occasion of the mission to Florence. That is enough, it seems to me, to rule out an error of fact. Nor can mention of doing the work of translator be regarded as a misuse of powers. No evidence has been adduced that the administration has put it in the report for reasons other than are normal for so doing. Further it has emerged from uncontested statements by the Council's representative that in the description of the duties of all the revisers in the periodic reports for 1975 to 1977 there is mention of the work of translator. That means that mention of the work of translator cannot have amounted to discrimination against the applicant and further confirms the weakness of the argument to the effect that reference to such (limited) duties represented a misuse of powers on the part of the administration. A different view might prevail with regard to the usefulness of the reference with which we are concerned for the purpose of assessing the ability and efficiency of an official. But the question seems to me to be covered by the discretion of the administration, for whose special assessment the Court cannot substitute its own. Further even from the objective point of view it is difficult to say whether the reference in question represents an unjustified underestimation of the applicant or rather proper recognition of the work done outside his specific duties. (b) In the second place the applicant seeks the deletion of the observation “acceptable” in reference to his working relations with his superiors and colleagues in the second part in Section ĪII (2). He maintains that the reasons on which that observation was based should have been stated since it represents an adverse assessment of the official. Let me say first of all that according to the case-law of the Court periodic reports do not come within the category of decisions relating to specific individuals in respect of which Article 25 of the Staff Regulations provides that the grounds shall be stated, but are “governed by the special provisions” adopted to implement Article 43 of the Staff Regulations (cf. the already cited judgment of 25 November 1976 in Case 122/75 at paragraphs 21 to 26 of the decision). As regards the Council the sole criteria applicable are those contained in the Guide to Staff Reports to which I have referred. That document, which contains internal provisions implementing the Decision of 18 October 1977, is confined to laying down in the first part at Section E (I) (4) (b) (p. 16) that “‘outstanding’ and ‘has shortcomings’ must be accompanied by an explanation ...”. In those circumstances it Qoes not seem to me that in this case “an explanation” was essential as a matter of form since the contested classification (“acceptable”) was not one of those mentioned above. Therefore the alleged lack of a statement of reasons seems to me not to be relevant either in relation to Article 25 of the Staff Regulations or in relation to the special provisions contained in the Guide. It is nevertheless proper to observe that in the report in question the classification “acceptable” is confined to the relations with superiors and colleagues and is accompanied by a brief comment and the citation of certain incidents which, in the opinion of the administration, justified it. I mean to refer to the clause: “He is, however, so rigid ...” which figures in the report under the heading “Continuation of Part III” and with which I shall deal briefly. In any event there is no defect of form or procedure in the classification “acceptable”. It appears in fact to have been used in accordance with the criteria laid down in the Guide. In the same way it is out of the question to speak of misuse of powers since there is no evidence that the authority inserted that classification for any purpose other than that for which the document is prescribed. Finally, there is no patent error of fact in the classification “acceptable”, since it is an appraisal and thus an act which expresses the discretionary assessment of the administration. (c) Thirdly the applicant seeks the deletion of a phrase in Part 3, Section III of the report. That contains assessments of the applicant's conduct in the service relating mainly to his personality. Mr Grassi is alleged to be excessively “rigid” and his conduct is said to have had a negative effect on the atmosphere in the Italian Division. In particular the reporting officer writes of him “He is, however, so rigid in his attitudes that his relations with his superiors and colleagues of his own grade are much less satisfactory” than those he has with those junior to him (that is, the translators). Further on there is mention of two unpleasant incidents of which details are given (an altercation with a group of revisers in December 1975 and his written comments on his two superiors in March 1977 on the occasion of a mission to Fiji). The main objection the applicant has against that part of the periodic report is, according in particular to the arguments put forward at the hearing, that no reasons are given. In this connexion I think I ought to stress that the Staff Regulations do not make a statement of reasons in the periodic report mandatory. Against that Counsel for Mr Grassi contends that reasons are necessary when the assessments contained in a report are particularly adverse. I have however already pointed out that the Guide to Staff Reports requires explanatory comments only in respect of extreme assessments expressed according to the prescribed summary formula and not in the case of assessments in the descriptive part of the report which clearly includes those with which we are at present concerned. It seems fitting for me to add that in fact the whole sentence with which we are concerned constitutes to some extent a statement of reasons for the assessment of “acceptable” used in reference to the relationships with superiors and colleagues in another part of the report. I must further point out that the assessments contained in the sentence in question are justified by means of the reference to the two specific incidents which I mentioned above. It follows that the objection that no reasons are given must be held to be without foundation not only from the formal point of view but also as a matter of fact. Counsel for the applicant makes observations likewise in relation to the use which the report seems to make of the two incidents in 1975 and 1977. Such incidents, he maintains, show the correctness of Mr Grassi's conduct in the service and cannot therefore be used to support negative or particularly adverse assessments. The critical attitude adopted in 1975 by the applicant towards the head of the Italian Division, Mr Tommaso Valerio, was due to the fact that Mr Grassi did not approve of the way in which the translators were chosen for missions abroad. In 1977 the disagreement was renewed, prompted by the appointment of a particular official to a mission outside Europe, because of the way the missions were organized and in a general way the methods by which the division was directed (cf. the dossiers numbered 16 and 17 annexed to the application dated 20 June 1979). I do not think that the Court can follow the applicant's lawyer in investigating those incidents or undertake to establish who was responsible. If it did so the Court would be substituting its own discretion for the administration's assessment of the officials' conduct in the service, whereas, as is well-known, that kind of assessment does not fall within its jurisdiction. The Court, in my opinion, must confine itself to observing that the incidents referred to in the report in fact took place and thus to find that the administration supported its assessment with a statement of specific facts. That seems to me sufficient to rule out not only the defect of lack of statement of reasons (which moreover it is not possible to see even in the abstract) but also that of patent error. As for the misuse of powers, once again I observe that reference to the two incidents does not appear to have been made by the administration for purposes other than those proper to Article 43. Moreover the applicant himself speaks only generally or misuse of powers and in fact confines himself to denying his own responsibility for those incidents. He does not succeed in showing that the administration mentioned them in the report for improper purposes. Finally, as regards the form and procedure I would observe that reference to specific incidents to supplement assessments is a correct application of the criteria which, according to the principles in the relevant Guide, must be followed in drawing up periodic reports.