ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 20 July 2017 —

Diesel v EUIPO — Sprinter megacentros del deporte (Representation of a curved and angled line)

(Case T‑521/15)

(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for an EU figurative mark representing a curved and angled line — Earlier EU figurative mark representing a capital letter ‘D’ — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)

1. EU trade mark — Appeals procedure — Action before the EU judicature — Jurisdiction of the General Court — Re-evaluation of the facts in the light of evidence produced for the first time before it — Exclusion (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 65) (see para. 17)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Signs of which a trade mark may consist — Signs composed of a letter or combination of letters — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 4, 7 and 8(1)(b)) (see paras 21, 61, 62)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 23, 24, 58-60)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Figurative mark representing a curved and angled line and figurative mark representing a capital letter ‘D’ (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 27, 56, 67-70)

5. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Weighing elements of similarity or difference between the signs — Taking into account of the intrinsic characteristics of the signs or the conditions in which the goods or services are marketed — Clothing sector (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 57)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 18 June 2015 (Case R 3291/2014-2), relating to opposition proceedings between Diesel and Sprinter megacentros del deporte.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 18 June 2015 (Case R 3291/2014-2);

2. Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Diesel SpA;
Economic, social and territorial cohesion — Structural assistance — European Union funding — Regulations No 1260/1999, No 1083/2006 and No 1303/2013 — Financial corrections — Time-limit for adoption of the Commission decision — Scope — Temporal applicability

(European Parliament and Council Regulation No 1303/2013, Arts 145(6), and 154, second para.; Council Regulations No 1260/1999, Art. 39(3), and No 1083/2006, Arts 100(5), 105 and 108, second para.; Commission Regulation No 448/2001, Art. 5(3))

(see paras 59-64)
Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 11 July 2017 —

Lidl Stiftung v EUIPO (JEDE FLASCHE ZÄHLT!)

(Case T‑623/15)

(EU trade mark — Application for EU figurative mark JEDE FLASCHE ZÄHLT! — Mark consisting of an advertising slogan — Absolute ground for refusal — No distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Concept — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 15, 17, 38, 66, 75, 83)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Marks constituted of advertising slogans — Distinctive character — Application of specific criteria for assessment — Not permissible (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 16)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Figurative mark JEDE FLASCHE ZÄHLT! (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 19, 31, 39, 40, 53, 59, 69, 74, 86, 92, 105)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Lack of distinctiveness — Trade mark made up of several elements — Possible for the competent authority to examine each of the elements making up the trade mark — Need to take account of the overall perception of the combination by the relevant public (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 56)

5. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Assessment of the registrability of a sign — EU rules only taken into account — Earlier registration of the mark in certain Member States or third countries — Decisions not binding EU bodies (Council Regulation No 207/2009) (see para. 98)

6. EU trade mark — Decisions of the Office — Legality — EUIPO’s previous decision-making practice (Council Regulation No 207/2009) (see para. 103)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 7 September 2015 (Case R 479/2015-4), concerning an application for registration of the figurative sign JEDE FLASCHE ZÄHLT! as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 22 September 2017 — Nara Tekstil Sanayi Ve Ticaret v EUIPO — NBC Fourth Realty (NaraMaxx)

(Case T‑586/15)

(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for the EU figurative mark NaraMaxx — Earlier national word mark MAXX — Relative ground for refusal — No likelihood of confusion — No similarity between the signs — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)

1. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 14-16, 48)

2. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Degree of attention of the relevant public (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 17)

3. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Figurative mark NaraMaxx and word mark MAXX (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 18, 29-31, 39, 43, 46, 47, 51)

4. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Similarity of the marks concerned—Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 21, 22)

5. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Similarity of the marks concerned—Assessment of the distinctiveness of an element composing a trade mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 24)

6. EU trade mark—Appeals procedure—Action before the EU judicature—Legality of the decision of a Board of Appeal—Account taken, for the purposes of applying EU law, of national legislation, case-law or academic writing—Lawfulness (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 65) (see para. 28)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 27 July 2015 (Case R 1073/2014-4), relating to opposition proceedings between NBC Fourth Realty and Nara Tekstil Sanayi Ve Ticaret.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
EU trade mark–Observations of third parties and opposition–Examination of the opposition–Proof of use of the earlier mark–Genuine use–Meaning–Criteria for assessment

(Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 15(1) and 42(2) and (3); Commission Regulation No 2868/95, Art. 1, Rule 22(2))

(see paras 20, 35)
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 5 February 2018 –

Dôvera zdravotná poist'ovňa v Commission

(Case T‑216/15)

(State aid — Health insurance bodies — Capital increase, debt repayment, subsidies and Risk Equalisation Scheme — Decision finding no State aid — Concept of State aid — Concept of undertaking and economic activity — Principle of solidarity — State supervision — Activity that is economic in nature — Competition on quality — Presence of operators seeking to make a profit — Pursuit, use and distribution of profits — Error of law — Error of assessment)

1. State aid—Meaning—Legal nature—Interpretation on the basis of objective factors—Judicial review—Scope (Art. 107(1) TFEU) (see para. 40)

2. State aid—Meaning—Measures intended to grant financial advantages to State-owned health insurance bodies—Included—Condition—Economic nature of the activity of health insurance—Criteria for assessment—Ability of health insurance companies to make, use and distribute part of their profits—Existence of a certain amount of competition as to the quality and scope of services provided—Presence of operators seeking to make a profit (Art. 107(1) TFEU) (see paras 45-71)

Re:

Application pursuant to Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Commission Decision (EU) 2015/248 of 15 October 2014 on the measures SA.23008 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) granted by the Slovak Republic to Spoločná zdravotná poisťovňa, a.s. (SZP) and Všeobecná zdravotná poisťovňa, a.s. (VšZP) (OJ 2015 L 41, p. 25).

Operative part

The Court:

1. Annuls Commission Decision (EU) 2015/248 of 15 October 2014 on the measures SA.23008 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) implemented by the Slovak Republic for Spoločná zdravotná poisťovňa, a.s. (SZP) and Všeobecná zdravotná poisťovňa, a.s. (VšZP);

2. Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Dôvera zdravotná poist'ovňa, a.s. and by Union zdravotná poist’ovňa a.s.;
Agriculture — Common agricultural policy — EAGGF, EAGF and EAFRD financing — Support for rural development — Mechanism granting aid for early retirement — Regulation No 1257/1999 and Regulation No 1698/2005 — Conditions for granting — Exercise of an agricultural activity for commercial purposes before the surrender of the holding — Obligation to actually carry out the activity during the period prior to cessation

(Council Regulations No 1257/1999, Art. 11(1), first indent, and No 1698/2005, Art. 23(2)(b))

(see paras 66-69)
Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 20 June 2018 –

KV v Commission

(Case T‑104/15)

(Grant agreements concluded in the context of the Lifelong Learning Programme (2007-2013) — ‘Green Business is Smart Business’ and ‘LadybizIT: Woman entrepreneurship on the verge of ICT’ projects — Ineligible costs — Action for annulment — Lack of competence of the Commission)

1. Actions for annulment—Grounds—Lack of competence of the institution which adopted the contested measure—Ground involving a question of public policy (Art. 263 TFEU) (see para. 38)

2. EU agencies—Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA)—Appeals procedure—Decision declaring certain staff costs to be ineligible in the light of the grant agreements concluded in the context of the Lifelong Learning Programme—Possibility for the legality of that decision to be reviewed by the Commission—None—Lack of competence of the Commission (Council Regulation No 58/2003, Art. 22) (see paras 46-50)

3. Judicial proceedings—General Court seised under an arbitration clause—Capacity to be a defendant—Grant agreements concluded in the context of the Lifelong Learning Programme—Agreements concluded with the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA)—Action directed against the Commission—Inadmissibility (Art. 272 TFEU; Council Regulation No 58/2003) (see paras 51, 52)

Re:

Application based on Article 263 TFEU and seeking the annulment of Commission Implementing Decision C(2014) 9706 final of 16 December 2014, which dismissed as unfounded the appeal brought by the applicant against the decision of EACEA of 23 September 2014 declaring certain staff costs to be ineligible in the light of the grant agreements concluded on 30 September 2010 and 9 September 2011 between the applicant and EACEA for the implementation of the European projects ‘Green Business is Smart Business’ and ‘LadybizIT: Woman entrepreneurship on the Verge of ICT’.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Annuls Commission Implementing Decision C(2014) 9706 final of 16 December 2014;

2. Dismisses the remainder of the action as inadmissible;

3. Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by KV;
Judicial proceedings — Absolute bar to proceeding — To be considered of the Court’s own motion — Compliance with the principle that the parties should be heard

(Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 129)

(see paras 28, 29)
Judicial proceedings — Application initiating proceedings — Formal requirements — Brief summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based — Abstract statement — Inadmissibility

(Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 76(d))

(see para. 196)
33

As regards the alleged failure to state reasons, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009, decisions of EUIPO must state the reasons on which they are based. That obligation to state reasons, which also derives from Article 296 TFEU, has been the subject of settled case-law according to which the statement of reasons must disclose in a clear and unequivocal manner the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable, first, the persons concerned to exercise effectively their right to request judicial review of the contested decision and, secondly, the Courts of the European Union to exercise their power to review the legality of the decision. It is not, however, necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law. The question whether the statement of reasons for a decision satisfies those requirements is a question to be assessed with reference not only to its wording but also to its context and the whole body of legal rules governing the matter in question (judgments of 29 February 1996 in Commission v Council, C‑122/94, EU:C:1996:68, paragraph 29, and of 28 January 2016 in Gugler France v OHIM — Gugler (GUGLER), T‑674/13, not published, EU:T:2016:44, paragraph 52). Likewise, the requirement to state reasons must be assessed according to the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure and the nature of the reasons given, which means that it is not always required that an express view be adopted on all the matters put forward or requested by the persons concerned (judgment of 30 March 2000 in VBA v Florimex and Others, C‑265/97 P, EU:C:2000:170, paragraph 93; see also, to that effect, judgments of 30 November 2000 in Industrie des poudres sphériques v Commission, T‑5/97, EU:T:2000:278, paragraph 199, and of 9 December 2010 in Tresplain Investments v OHIM — Hoo Hing (Golden Elephant Brand), T‑303/08, ECR, EU:T:2010:505, paragraph 46).
27

It must be observed that the second subparagraph of Article 15(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009 relates to a situation where a national or Union registered trade mark is used in trade in a form slightly different from the form in which registration was effected. The purpose of that provision, which avoids imposing strict conformity between the used form of the trade mark and the form in which the mark was registered, is to allow its proprietor, on the occasion of its commercial exploitation, to make variations in the sign, which, without altering its distinctive character, enable it to be better adapted to the marketing and promotion requirements of the goods or services concerned. In accordance with its purpose, the material scope of that provision must be regarded as limited to situations in which the sign actually used by the proprietor of a trade mark to identify the goods or services in respect of which the mark was registered constitutes the form in which that same mark is commercially exploited. In such situations, where the sign used in trade differs from the form in which it was registered only in insignificant respects, and the two signs can therefore be regarded as broadly equivalent, the abovementioned provision envisages that the obligation to use the trade mark which was registered may be fulfilled by furnishing proof of use of the sign which constitutes the form in which it is used in trade (judgments of 23 February 2006, Il Ponte Finanziaria v OHIM — Marine Enterprise Projects (BAINBRIDGE), T‑194/03, EU:T:2006:65, paragraph 50; 10 June 2010, ATLAS TRANSPORT, T‑482/08, not published, EU:T:2010:229, paragraph 30; and of 5 December 2013, Olive Line International v OHIM — Carapelli Firenze (Maestro de Oliva), T‑4/12, not published, EU:T:2013:628, paragraph 23; see also, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Specsavers International Healthcare and Others, C‑252/12, EU:C:2013:497, paragraph 29; see also, by analogy, judgment of 25 October 2012, Rintisch, C‑553/11, EU:C:2012:671, paragraphs 21 and 22).
16

On 20 August 2015, in accordance with Paragraph 59(d) of Resolution 2127 (2013), the Sanctions Committee published on the UN website a ‘narrative summary of reasons for the listing for individuals and entities included in the sanctions list’ (‘the summary of the Sanction Committee’s reasons’), including those relating to the applicants. The summary of the Sanction Committee’s reasons is worded as follows: ‘Reasons for listing: On 20 August 2015, pursuant to [paragraph 12(d)] of Resolution 2196 (2015), [Badica and Kardiam] were included on the list of persons and entities ‘providing support for armed groups or criminal networks through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources, including diamonds, gold, wildlife as well as wildlife products in or from the [Central African Republic]’. Additional information: [Badica and Kardiam] provided support for armed groups in the Central African Republic, namely former Séléka and anti-Balaka forces, through the illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources, in particular diamonds and gold. In 2014, [Badica] continued to purchase diamonds from Bria and Sam-Ouandja (Haute Kotto province) in the east of the Central African Republic, where former Séléka forces impose taxes on aircraft transporting diamonds and receive security payments from diamond collectors. Several of [Badica]’s supplying collectors in Bria and Sam-Ouandja are closely associated with former Séléka commanders. In May 2014, Belgian authorities seized two diamond parcels sent to [Badica’s] office in Antwerp, which is registered in Belgium under the name of K[ardiam]. According to the experts, there is a high probability that the diamonds seized are of Central African origin since they display characteristics typical of Sam-Ouandja and Bria, as well as Nola (Sangha Mbaéré province), in the south-west of the country. Traders who were purchasing diamonds illegally trafficked from Central African Republic to foreign markets, in particular from the western part of the country, were operating in Cameroon on behalf of [Badica]. In May 2014, B[adica] also exported gold produced in Yaloké (Ombella-Mpoko), where artisanal gold mines fell under control of Séléka until the beginning of February 2014, before falling into the hands of anti-Balaka groups.’
42

The contested decision reads as follows: ‘Article 1 The payment of the compensation awarded by the arbitral tribunal … by [the arbitral] award … to the single economic unit comprising Viorel Micula, Ioan Micula, … European Food, … Starmill, … Multipack, European Drinks, Rieni Drinks, Scandic Distilleries, Transilvania General Import-Export and West Leasing constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) [TFEU] which is incompatible with the internal market. Article 2 1. Romania shall not pay out any incompatible aid referred to in Article 1 and shall recover any incompatible aid referred to in Article 1 which has already been paid out to any one of the entities constituting the single economic unit benefiting from that aid in partial implementation or execution of the [arbitral] award … as well as any aid paid out to any one of the entities constituting the single economic unit benefiting from that aid in further implementation of the [arbitral] award … that the Commission has not been made aware of or that is paid out after the date of this Decision. 2. Viorel Micula, Ioan Micula, … European Food, … Starmill, … Multipack, European Drinks, Rieni Drinks, Scandic Distilleries, Transilvania General Import-Export and West Leasing shall be jointly liable to repay the State aid received by any one of them. 3. The sums to be recovered are those resulting from the implementation or execution of the [arbitral] award … (principal and interest). 4. The sums to be recovered shall bear interest from the date on which they were put at the disposal of the beneficiaries until their actual recovery. 5. Romania shall provide the exact dates on which the aid provided by the state was put at the disposal of the respective beneficiaries. 6. The interest shall be calculated on a compound basis in accordance with Chapter V of Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004. 7. Romania shall ensure that no further payments of the aid referred to in Article 1 shall be effected with effect from the date of adoption of this Decision. Article 3 1. Recovery of the aid referred to in Article 1 shall be immediate and effective. 2. Romania shall ensure that this Decision is implemented within four months following the date of notification of this Decision. Article 4 1. Within two months following notification of this Decision, Romania shall submit the following information: (a) the total amount of aid received by each entity mentioned in Article 1 of this Decision; (b) a detailed description of the measures already taken and planned to comply with this Decision; (c) documents demonstrating that the beneficiaries have been ordered to repay the aid. 2. Romania shall keep the Commission informed of the progress of the national measures taken to implement this Decision until recovery of the aid referred to in Article 1 has been completed. It shall immediately submit, on simple request by the Commission, information on the measures already taken and planned to comply with this Decision. It shall also provide detailed information concerning the amounts of aid and recovery interest already recovered from the beneficiaries. Article 5 This Decision is addressed to Romania.’