15.

As Advocate General Reischl pointed out in his Opinion in the Balkan-Import-Export case, the question at issue there concerned the application of a principle of ‘Objective’ rather than ‘subjective’ equity. He explained the difference between the two principles as follows (at p. 1192): ‘In German law such a discretionary exemption from taxation imposed by the State may be granted on several grounds. First, it may be granted on grounds of natural justice of a subjective nature [“persönliche Billigkeits-gründe”], such as, for example, personal living circumstances or financial difficulty. Secondly, it may be based on grounds of natural justice which are said to be objective in nature [“sogenannte sachbezogene Bil-ligkeitsgründe”]. Such grounds exist, first ... where it may be concluded from the will of the legislature that if the question to be settled had been dealt with expressly, it would have been settled along the lines of the measure of natural justice envisaged. The aim is to arrive at a just solution in specific cases and unusual situations which were not foreseeable by the legislature. Secondly, so-called objective grounds of natural justice cover cases in which a failure to observe the proper procedure or the expiry of a time-limit for bringing an action give rise to the imposition of a sum owed by way of tax which is materially unjustified.’ Advocate General Reischl then went on to observe that: ‘In making its application the plaintiff relied solely on objective grounds of natural justice. ... [It] is clear from the facts that the question may be confined to the problem of the grant of exemption on objective grounds of natural justice, in particular, in cases where the imposition of the charge is alleged to conflict with the aim of the law and is contrary to the intention of the legislature. In the present case, therefore, it is unnecessary to discuss the question whether an exemption may be granted on grounds of a subjective nature or by reason of the effects of provisions of a formal and procedural nature.’ (see pp. 1192-3) The Court held that the plaintiff could not be released from the obligation to pay monetary compensatory amounts for reasons which related to the economic justification for the charge in question: see paragraph 5 of the judgment, final sentence. It is clear, in fact, that to permit remission on such a ground would be equivalent to altering the circumstances in which the charge could be imposed, and would accordingly be inconsistent with the rules laid down by the Community regulation. Similarly, the Court has held that a national rule of equity cannot be applied so as to modify the application of a regulation imposing a Community import levy: see Case 18/72 Granaria [1972] ECR 1163 at p. 1171. The Court has also stated that no general principle of objective equity is included in the general principles of Community law: see Case 299/84 Neumann v BALM [1985] ECR 3663, at paragraphs 23 to 25 and 33 of the judgment, and Case C-174/89 Hoche [1990] ECR I-2681, at paragraph 31 of the judgment. On the other hand, where the claim for remission relates to sums paid in excess of the amount due under the Community provisions, and in the absence of relevant provisions of Community law governing remission in such a case, national law providing for remission on equitable grounds may be applied: see Case 113/81 Reichelt v Hauptzollamt Berlin-Süd [1982] ECR 1957, at paragraphs 7 to 10 of the judgment.