ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 17(1) of Regulation No 1013/2006 on shipments of waste, as amended by Regulation No 669/2008, must be interpreted as meaning that the shipment of waste, such as that referred to in Annex IV to that regulation, in the country of transit at a different border crossing point than that which is provided in the notification document and which the competent authorities consented to, must be considered to be an essential change made to the details and/or conditions of the shipment which received consent, so that the fact of not having informed the competent authorities of that change results in the shipment of waste being illegal because it was effected in a way which is not specified materially in the notification within the meaning of Article 2(35)(d) of that regulation. An interpretation to the contrary would deprive the procedures and control regimes established by Regulation No 1013/2006 of any practical effect.

Article 50(1) of Regulation No 1013/2006 on shipments of waste, as amended by Regulation No 669/2008, according to which the penalties applied by the Member States for infringement of the provisions of that regulation must be proportionate, must be interpreted as meaning that the imposition of a fine penalising the illegal shipment of waste, such as that referred to in Annex IV to that regulation, in the country of transit at a border crossing point which differs from that provided in the notification document which had been consented to by the competent authorities, of which the basic amount is the same as the fine imposed for a breach of the requirement to obtain consent and to give prior notification in writing, is to be considered to be proportionate only if the circumstances of the infringement make it possible to find that they involve equally serious infringements.

As the specific application of that principle of proportionality is a matter for the national court, which is required to determine whether the national measures are compatible with EU law, it is for that court to determine, by taking into account all the factual and legal circumstances of the case before it, and, in particular, the risks which may be created by that infringement in the field of the protection of the environment and human health, whether the amount of the penalty does not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objectives of ensuring a high level of protection of the environment and human health.

(see paras 54, 57, operative part 2)
Article 49 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding a Member State’s tax regime under which, in the event of transfer by a resident company to a non-resident company within the same group of a permanent establishment situated in another Member State, the losses previously deducted in respect of the establishment transferred are reincorporated into the taxable profit of the transferring company where, under a double taxation convention, the income of such a permanent establishment is exempt from tax in the Member State in which the company to which that establishment belonged has its seat.

However, where the transferring resident company demonstrates that the reincorporated losses are definitive losses for the purposes of the judgment in Marks & Spencer, C‑446/03, it is contrary to Article 49 TFEU to preclude the possibility for that company of deducting from its taxable profits in the Member State of its residence the losses incurred by a non-resident establishment.

(see paras 53, 58, operative part 1)
Article 1(1) of Directive 2001/23 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses must be interpreted as meaning that the scope of that directive covers a situation in which a public undertaking, responsible for the economic activity of handling intermodal transport units, entrusts, by a public service operating agreement, the performance of that activity to another undertaking, providing to the latter undertaking the necessary facilities and equipment, which it owns, and subsequently decides to terminate that agreement without taking over the employees of the latter undertaking, on the ground that it will henceforth perform that activity itself with its own staff.

In that respect, an interpretation of Article 1(1)(b) of Directive 2001/23 which exclude from the scope of that directive a situation in which the tangible assets essential to the performance of the activity in question have always been owned by the transferee would deprive that directive of part of its effectiveness.

In addition, the failure of the new contractor to take over, in terms of numbers and skills, an essential part of the staff which its predecessor employed to perform the same activity is not sufficient to preclude the existence of a transfer of an entity which retains its identity within the meaning of Directive 2001/23 in a sector where the activity is based essentially on equipment. Any other conclusion would run counter to the principal objective of Directive 2001/23, which is to ensure the continuity, even against the wishes of the transferee, of the employment contracts of the employees of the transferor.

(see paras 40, 41, 44, operative part)
The concept of ‘economic activity’ within the meaning of Article 1(5) of Regulation No 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport and related operations must be interpreted as covering an activity relating to the transport of stray dogs from one Member State to another by a charitable association in order to hand over those dogs to persons who have undertaken to adopt them after payment by those persons of a sum covering, in principle, the costs incurred for that purpose by that association.

First, the legal basis for Regulation No 1/2005 is Article 37 EC (now Article 43 TFEU) and it therefore falls within internal market policy. In that context, the importation of goods or the provision of services for remuneration are to be regarded as ‘economic activities’ within the meaning of the Treaty. The decisive factor which enables an activity to be regarded as having an economic character, is the fact that the activity must not be provided for nothing. However, for an activity to be classified as economic, it is not necessary that it be carried out for profit. Therefore, an activity involving the frequent transport of a large number of dogs, by a charitable association in order to bring those animals to persons who adopt them on the basis of a contract providing, inter alia, for the payment of a sum of money to that association, is performed in connection with an economic activity, within the meaning of Article 1(5) of Regulation No 1/2005, even if that association does not seek to make a profit or make a profit.

Second, having regard to the objectives pursued by Regulation No 1/2005, the concept of economic activity cannot be interpreted restrictively. Limiting the scope of Regulation No 1/2005 to economic activities performed for profit risks jeopardising that regulation’s main objective, which is the protection of animals during transport.

(see paras 29-31, 33-35, operative part 1)
Where the Court rules, in proceedings under Article 267 EC, that an act of the European Union is invalid, its decision has the legal effect of requiring the institutions concerned to take the necessary measures to remedy that illegality, as the obligation laid down in Article 266 TFEU in the case of a judgment annulling a measure applies in such a situation by analogy to judgments of the Court declaring an act of the European Union to be invalid.

In order to fulfil that obligation, the institutions concerned are required to have regard not only to the operative part of the judgment of annulment or invalidity, but also to the grounds which led to the judgment and constitute its essential basis, in so far as they are necessary to determine the exact meaning of what is stated in the operative part. It is those grounds which, on the one hand, identify the precise provision held to be illegal and, on the other, indicate the specific reasons which underlie the finding of illegality contained in the operative part and which the institution concerned must take into account when replacing the measure annulled or declared invalid.

Nevertheless, it should be recalled that Article 266 TFEU requires the institutions which adopted the act annulled only to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment annulling it. Furthermore, the annulment of a Union act does not necessarily affect the preparatory acts thereof.

Consequently, except where the irregularity found rendered the entire procedure null and void, those institutions may, in order to adopt an act intended to replace a preceding act annulled or declared invalid, reopen the procedure at the stage at which that irregularity was committed.

It is not necessary that the option of reopening the procedure should be expressly provided for by the applicable legislation in order that the institutions which adopted an act annulled or declared invalid may avail themselves of it.

(see paras 48-52)
Rule 3(b) of the General Rules for the interpretation of the Combined Nomenclature in Annex I to Regulation No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, as amended by Regulation No 1214/2007, must be interpreted as meaning that goods which are presented for customs clearance in separate packages and are packed together only after that transaction may nevertheless be held to be ‘goods put up in sets for retail sale’, within the meaning of that rule and may, therefore, come under a single tariff heading, where it is established, having regard to other objective factors, which it is for the national court to assess, that the goods belong together as a unit and are intended to be presented as such in the retail trade.

In the first place, it is not apparent from the wording of Rule 3(b) of the General Rules or from the explanatory notes of the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System or the Guidelines on the classification in the Combined Nomenclature of goods put up in sets for retail sale, the latter laying down certain exceptions to the requirement that there must be a single package, that the concept of a ‘set’, within the meaning of that rule, necessarily presupposes, in every case, that the goods concerned are presented within the same package for the purposes of customs clearance.

In the second place, the concept of a ‘set’ within the meaning of that rule presupposes that the goods are closely linked, from the perspective of how they are marketed, such that they are not only presented together for customs clearance but are also normally supplied together, at the various marketing stages and in particular at the retail stage, as a unit in a single package in order to meet a particular need or to carry out a specific activity.

Thus, the goods being in a single package, at the time of their presentation to customs, does not constitute a condition sine qua non in order to consider that they belong together as a unit and hence constitute a ‘set’, within the meaning of Rule 3(b) of the General Rules, but merely evidence that allows the inference of such a finding.

(see paras 35, 36, 38, 45, operative part)
Case C‑448/14

Davitas GmbH

v

Stadt Aschaffenburg

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from the Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Novel foods and novel food ingredients — Regulation (EC) No 258/97 — Article 1(2)(c) — Concept of foods and food ingredients with a new primary molecular structure)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 9 November 2016

EU law—Interpretation—Taking account of the context and usual meaning of the terms Approximation of laws—Novel foods and novel food ingredients—Placing on the market—Regulation No 258/97—Scope—Foods and food ingredients with a new primary molecular structure—Definition (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 258/97, as amended by Regulation No 596/2009, Art. 1(2)(c))
Article 7 of Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law which requires a court, before which an individual action has been brought by a consumer seeking a declaration that a contractual term binding him to a seller or supplier is unfair, automatically to suspend such an action pending a final judgment concerning an ongoing collective action brought by a consumer association on the basis of Article 7(2) of Directive 93/13 seeking to prevent the continued use, in contracts of the same type, of terms similar to those at issue in that individual action, without the relevance of such a suspension from the point of view of the protection of the consumer who brought the individual action before the court being able to be taken into consideration and without that consumer being able to decide to dissociate himself from the collective action.

Individual and collective actions have, in the context of Directive 93/13, different purposes and legal effects, with the result that the procedural relationship between the respective conduct of each can correspond only to procedural requirements relating, in particular, to the sound administration of justice and to the need to avoid incompatible judicial decisions, without, however, the interaction of those different actions leading to a weakening of consumer protection, as provided for by Directive 93/13. In that context, the need to ensure consistency between judicial decisions cannot justify a lack of effectiveness consisting of the forfeit, on the part of the consumer, of the rights which he would be recognised as having in an individual action following its suspension pending a final judgment concluding the collective action, therefore the difference in nature between judicial control exercised in the context of a collective action and that exercised in the context of an individual action should, in principle, prevent the risk of incompatible judicial decisions. Similarly, as regard the need to avoid overburdening the courts, the effective exercise of subjective rights conferred by Directive 93/13 on consumers cannot be called into question by considerations connected to the organisation of a Member State’s judicial system.

(see paras 30, 35, 40-43, operative part)
Regarding the amount and the form of the lump sum payment to be imposed on a Member State for failure to comply with a judgment of the Court establishing a failure to comply with Directive 91/271 concerning urban waste-water treatment, it should be borne in mind, concerning the seriousness of the infringement, that that directive is intended to protect the environment. A lack or shortage of urban waste water treatment plants is likely to harm the environment and must be regarded as particularly serious. It is also necessary to regard as an aggravating circumstance the fact that the Member State concerned maintains that it will not be in a position to comply in full with the judgment in question until almost 20 years after the date on which the obligation to ensure that the secondary treatment of the urban waste water in question complied with EU law should have been fulfilled. In addition to its particularly lengthy character, that infringement, in the light of the objective mentioned above, is also a matter of indisputable gravity. However, the extent of the harm to the environment is dependent, to a large extent, on the number of agglomerations covered by the infringement complained of. Moreover, it is necessary to regard that infringement as being more serious for the purposes of calculating the lump sum payment than for the purposes of determining the penalty payment.

(see paras 71, 74, 75, 97)
3.

The principle of effectiveness must be interpreted as precluding a system of repayment of sums owed under EU law and the amount of which has been established by enforceable judicial decisions, such as the system at issue in the main proceedings, which provides for the repayment of such sums by instalments over five years and which makes the execution of such decisions contingent on the availability of funds received in respect of another tax, without the individual having the right to compel public authorities to fulfil their obligations if they do not do so voluntarily.
Article 76(2) of Regulation No 207/2009 on the European Union trade mark, which constitutes the legal basis for Rule 50 of Regulation No 2868/95 implementing Regulation No 40/94, as amended by Commission Regulation No 1041/2005, provides that the European Union Intellectual Property Office may disregard facts or evidence which are not submitted in due time by the parties concerned.

In that connection, when evidence is produced within the time limit set by EUIPO, the production of supplementary evidence remains possible.

Article 76(2) of Regulation No 207/2009 must be interpreted in the same way in relation to proof of the existence, validity and scope of protection of a trade mark, since that provision contains a rule which applies horizontally within the scheme of that regulation, inasmuch as it applies irrespective of the nature of the proceedings concerned. It follows that Rule 50 of the Implementing Regulation cannot be interpreted as extending the discretion of the Boards of Appeal to new evidence.

(see paras 25-27)
Article 107 TFEU and Article 4(3) TEU, read together with Article 4(2) of Decision 2009/287 on State aid awarded by Poland as part of Power Purchase Agreements and the State aid which Poland is planning to award concerning compensation for the voluntary termination of Power Purchase Agreements must be interpreted as precluding, must be interpreted as precluding, where the Commission has assessed a State aid scheme in the light of the Communication relating to the methodology for analysing State aid linked to stranded costs, and classified it as being compatible with the internal market before its implementation, national authorities and courts from reviewing in turn, at the time the State aid in question is implemented, whether it is consistent with the principles set out in that methodology.

Indeed, the assessment of the compatibility of whether aid measures or a State aid regime with the internal market falls within the exclusive competence of the Commission, subject to review by the Courts of the European Union, national courts having to refrain from taking decisions which conflict with a decision of the Commission, even if it is provisional.

That being the case, to allow national courts, in the context of the implementation of a State aid scheme, to review the compatibility of such a scheme, which a Commission Decision has already established compatible with the internal, would amount in essence to giving those courts the power to substitute their own assessment for that of the Commission.

Furthermore, to accept that national courts may undertake such an assessment would in fact have the consequence that those courts would exceed the limits of their own jurisdiction aimed at ensuring compliance with EU law on State aid and would be in breach of their duty of sincere cooperation with the institutions of the European Union on State aid. Indeed, it is conceivable that the assessment undertaken by the national court in question would lead it to take a decision that runs counter to the decision, which is final, made by the Commission.

Nevertheless, if a national court entertains doubts regarding the interpretation of a decision of the Commission which classified a specific measure as State aid, that court may seek clarification from that institution or, depending on the circumstances, may or must, in accordance with the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU, refer a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Article 107 TFEU.

(see paras 32-34, 36, 37, 40, 41, operative part 1)
3

Recitals 3, 4, 9, 10, 13 to 15, 18 and 25 in the preamble to Directive 2001/84 are worded as follows : ‘(3) The resale right is intended to ensure that authors of graphic and plastic works of art share in the economic success of their original works of art. … (4) The resale right forms an integral part of copyright and is an essential prerogative for authors. The imposition of such a right in all Member States meets the need for providing creators with an adequate and standard level of protection. … (9) The resale right is currently provided for by the domestic legislation of a majority of Member States. Such laws, where they exist, display certain differences, notably as regards the works covered, those entitled to receive royalties, the rate applied, the transactions subject to payment of a royalty, and the basis on which these are calculated. …This right is therefore a factor which contributes to the creation of distortions of competition as well as displacement of sales within the Community. (10) Such disparities with regard to the existence of the resale right and its application by the Member States have a direct negative impact on the proper functioning of the internal market in works of art as provided for by Article 14 of the Treaty. In such a situation Article 95 of the Treaty constitutes the appropriate legal basis. … (13) Existing differences between laws should be eliminated where they have a distorting effect on the functioning of the internal market, and the emergence of any new differences of that kind should be prevented. There is no need to eliminate, or prevent the emergence of, differences which cannot be expected to affect the functioning of the internal market. (14) ... The existence of differences between national provisions on the resale right creates distortions of competition and displacement of sales within the Community and leads to unequal treatment between artists depending on where their works are sold. ... (15) In view of the scale of divergences between national provisions it is therefore necessary to adopt harmonising measures to deal with disparities between the laws of the Member States in areas where such disparities are liable to create or maintain distorted conditions of competition. It is not however necessary to harmonise every provision of the Member States' laws on the resale right and, in order to leave as much scope for national decision as possible, it is sufficient to limit the harmonisation exercise to those domestic provisions that have the most direct impact on the functioning of the internal market. ... (18) The scope of the resale right should be extended to all acts of resale, with the exception of those effected directly between persons acting in their private capacity without the participation of an art market professional. ... ... (25) The person by whom the royalty is payable should, in principle, be the seller. Member States should be given the option to provide for derogations from this principle in respect of liability for payment. The seller is the person or undertaking on whose behalf the sale is concluded.’
32

In that regard, it must be held that it is clear from the wording of Articles 128 and 129 of Regulation No 918/83, read in conjunction with Article 131, first, that an importer may be entitled to the relief from import duties provided for in Article 60 of that regulation only if it can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the competent authorities that the imported goods are actually intended for the establishments provided for by that article and for the use which is a precondition for that relief from import duties, and, secondly, that only the competent authorities of the Member State in the territory of which the goods are to be assigned to that use may grant such relief. By contrast, it is by no means apparent from the provisions of that article that the importer should itself be able to ensure the use which is a precondition for the grant of the relief in question.