ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.

Must Article 39 of Council Decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), in particular Article 39(3), be interpreted as imposing an obligation to prohibit the registration of objects for which an alert has been issued in the Schengen Information System notwithstanding the fact that the alert is no longer relevant (the vehicle has been located; the criminal procedure in the Member State where the vehicle was located has been discontinued in the absence of a criminal offence committed in that Member State; the State that entered the alert has been informed but fails to take action to remove the alert from the system)?
Action brought on 4 March 2021 — European Parliament v European Commission

(Case C-137/21)

(2021/C 148/16)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: European Parliament (represented by: P. López-Carceller, J. Rodrigues, S. Alonso de León, Agents)

Defendant: European Commission

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— establish that by not adopting the delegated act pursuant to Article 7(f) of Regulation 2018/1806 (1), the Commission infringed the Treaty;

— order European Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of its action, the applicant relies on a single plea in law, namely the infringement of the Treaties.

According to the Parliament, the Commission was under the obligation to adopt a delegated act, pursuant to Article 7(f) of Regulation 2018/1806.1 By resolution of 22 October 2020, the Parliament called on the Commission to adopt the act in question. Since the Commission did not adopt the delegated act by 22 December 2020, the Parliament has decided to bring an action for failure to act under Article 265 TFEU.

(1) Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement (OJ 2018, L 303, p. 39).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 22 February 2021 — Deutsche Lufthansa AG v BC

(Case C-106/21)

(2021/C 182/47)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Deutsche Lufthansa AG

Defendant: BC

Question referred

Does a strike by the air carrier’s own employees which is called by a trade union constitute an extraordinary circumstance within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004? (1)

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
2.

(a) Do the principle of freedom to provide services set out in Article 56 TFEU, and, if deemed applicable in the present case, the similar principles which may be inferred from Directives 2006/123/EC (2) and 2000/31/EC, (3) preclude a national measure that imposes, on property intermediaries operating in Italy — including, therefore, operators not established in Italy which provide their services online — obligations to collect information relating to the short-term rental agreements concluded through them and subsequent transmission of that information to the tax authority, for the purpose of the collection of direct taxes payable by users of the service? (b) Do the principle of the freedom to provide services under Article 56 TFEU, and, if deemed applicable in the present case, the similar principles which may be inferred from Directives 2006/123/EC and 2000/31/EC, preclude a national measure that imposes, on property intermediaries operating in Italy — including, therefore, operators not established in Italy which provide their services online — and involved at the payment stage of the short-term rental agreements entered into through them, the obligation to levy, for the purpose of collecting direct taxes payable by users of the service, a withholding tax on those payments, with subsequent payment to the Treasury? (c) May the principle of the freedom to provide services under Article 56 TFEU, and, if deemed applicable in the present case, the similar principles which may be inferred from Directives 2006/123/EC and 2000/31/EC — where the above questions are answered in the affirmative — however be limited in accordance with [EU] law by national measures such as those described above under (a) and (b), in view of the fact that the tax levy relating to direct taxes payable by service users is otherwise ineffective? (d) May the principle of the freedom to provide services referred to in Article 56 TFEU and, if deemed applicable in the present case, the similar principles which may be inferred from Directives 2006/123/EC and 2000/31/EC, be limited in accordance with [EU] law by a national measure that imposes, on property intermediaries not established in Italy, the obligation to appoint a tax representative required to comply, in the name and on behalf of the intermediary not established in Italy, with the national measures described above under (b), in view of the fact that the tax levy relating to direct taxes payable by users of the service is otherwise ineffective?
1.

For the purposes of determining whether there is an ‘earlier right’ of a third party as referred to in Article 6(2) of the repealed Directive 2008/95/EC (1) (a) is it sufficient that, prior to the filing of the trade mark, that third party had made use in the course of trade of a right which is recognised by the laws of the Member State in question; or (b) is there a requirement that that third party, on the basis of that earlier right, under the applicable national legislation, is entitled to prohibit the use of the trade mark by the trade mark holder?
3.

If the answer to Question 2 above is in the negative, should Article 27 of [that regulation], read in conjunction with recitals 18 and 19 and Article 4 thereof, be interpreted as meaning that, where it has been determined that there has been a failure to fulfil the obligations laid down in Article 4 [of that regulation], an effective remedy requires that the court verify the significance of that failure to fulfil obligations in the light of the circumstances alleged by the applicant and permits confirmation of the transfer decision in all cases where there are no grounds for adopting a transfer decision with different content?
1.

Must the principle of the neutrality of value added tax, as well as recital 30 and Articles 63, 167, 168, 178 to 180, 182 and 273 of the VAT Directive, (1) be interpreted as meaning that they preclude the last sentence of Article 137(3) of az általános forgalmi adóról szóló 2007. évi CXXVII. törvény (Law CXXVII of 2007 on Value Added Tax), in the version in force between 1 January 2015 and 31 December 2017, whereby, ‘even in the case where the tax authority revokes the taxable person’s tax identification number without having suspended it, the taxable person shall lose his or her right to deduct tax on the date on which the decision revoking that number becomes final’, and Article 137 thereof, in the version in force between 1 January 2018 and 26 November 2020, whereby, ‘if the national tax and customs authority revokes the taxable person’s tax identification number, the taxable person shall lose the right to deduct tax on the date on which the decision revoking that number becomes final’?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Bucureşti (Romania) lodged on 3 March 2021 — Direcţia Generală Regională a Finanţelor Publice Bucureşti — Administraţia Sector 1 a Finanţelor Publice v VB, Direcţia Generalā Regională a Finanţelor Publice Bucureşti — Serviciul Soluţionare Contestaţii 1

(Case C-146/21)

(2021/C 228/24)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Bucureşti

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Direcţia Generală Regională a Finanţelor Publice Bucureşti — Administraţia Sector 1 a Finanţelor Publice

Respondents: VB, Direcţia Generalā Regională a Finanţelor Publice Bucureşti — Serviciul Soluţionare Contestaţii 1

Question referred

In circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, do Directive 2006/112/EC (1) and the principle of neutrality preclude national legislation or a tax practice in accordance with which the reverse charge mechanism (simplification measures), which is mandatory for the sale of standing timber, is not applicable to a person who has been the subject of an inspection and who has been registered for VAT purposes following that inspection, on the grounds that the person subject to the inspection had neither applied for nor obtained registration for VAT purposes either before the transactions were carried out or by the date on which the upper limit [for exemption] was exceeded?

(1) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).
3.

If the response to the first question is in the affirmative, do the requirements of the establishment of a single national regulatory body for the railway sector, pursuant to Article 55(1) of Directive 2012/34; of the functions of a regulatory body pursuant to Article 56(2), (6), (11), and (12) thereof; and of cooperation of regulatory bodies pursuant to Article 57(2) thereof, admit the possibility that the decisions of a regulatory body on the merits of the case can be substituted by judgments of individual courts of general jurisdiction, which are not bound by the regulatory body’s findings of fact?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 18 January 2021 by Dermavita Co. Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 18 November 2020 in Case T-643/19, Dermavita v EUIPO — Allergan Holdings France (JUVEDERM ULTRA)

(Case C-26/21 P)

(2021/C 242/03)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Dermavita Co. Ltd (represented by: D. Todorov, advokat)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Allergan Holdings France SAS

By order of 4 May 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Dermavita Co. Ltd should bear its own costs.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 3 May 2021 by European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 24 February 2021 in Case T-161/18, Braesch and Others v Commission

(Case C-284/21 P)

(2021/C 252/24)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: A. Bouchagiar and K. Blanck, Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Anthony Braesch, Trinity Investments DAC, Bybrook Capital Master Fund LP, Bybrook Capital Hazelton Master Fund LP, Bybrook Capital Badminton Fund LP

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— rule itself on the application at first instance and reject the application as inadmissible; and

— order the other parties to the proceedings to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellant submits a single ground of appeal.

According to the appellant, the General Court breached Article 108(2) TFEU and Article 1(h) of the State Aid Procedural Regulation (1) by erroneously qualifying the applicants at first instance as ‘parties concerned’ or ‘interested parties’.

On that basis, the General Court erroneously concluded that the applicants at first instance had standing to bring proceedings under the fourth limb of Article 263 TFEU against the Commission’s Decision C(2017) 4690 final of 4 July 2017 on State Aid SA.47677 (2017/N) authorising compatible state aid by Italy in favour of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena.

(1) Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 2015, L 248, p. 9).
4.

If, in the light of the answer to the third question, it is possible to interpret the grounds of refusal in Article 13(b) of the 1980 Hague Convention as meaning that there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation, must Article 11(4) of the Brussels II bis Regulation, in conjunction with the concept of the child’s best interests, referred to in Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in that regulation, be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation in which neither the child nor the mother has a currently valid residence document in the child’s State of residence, and in which therefore have neither the right to enter nor the right to remain in that State, the child’s State of residence must make adequate arrangements to secure that the child and his or her mother can lawfully remain [Or. 14] in the Member State in question? If the child’s State of residence has such an obligation, must the principle of mutual trust between Member States be interpreted as meaning that the State which returns the child may, in accordance with that principle, presume that the child’s State of residence will fulfil those obligations, or do the child’s interests make it necessary to obtain from the authorities of the State of residence details of the specific measures that have been or will be taken for the child’s protection, so that the Member State which surrenders the child may assess, in particular, the adequacy of those measures in the light of the child’s interests?
3.

If the answer to Question 2 is in the negative, does the general prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 9 of the Association Agreement then preclude a national rule, such as that mentioned, in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, in which the Turkish worker has acquired the right of permanent residence in the EU Member State concerned under the rules previously in force, which did not require that a language test in the official language of the host Member State be successfully taken as a precondition for the acquisition of that right, when such a requirement is not imposed on nationals of the Nordic Member State concerned (in this case, Denmark) and of the other Nordic countries, or on others who are nationals of an EU country (and is thus not imposed on EU/EEA nationals)?
Does this also include the interest of an individual purchaser of a vehicle in not purchasing a vehicle which does not comply with the requirements of EU law, and in particular in not purchasing a vehicle equipped with a prohibited defeat device within the meaning of Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007?

Irrespective of the answers to Questions 1 and 2:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Finland) lodged on 7 May 2021 — A

(Case C-296/21)

(2021/C 289/42)

Language of the case: Finnish

Referring court

Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: A

Defendants: Helsingin poliisilaitos and Poliisihallitus

Questions referred

In the case of transfers of deactivated firearms within the Union, taking into account the provisions of Council Directive 91/477/EEC of 18 June 1991 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008, and the provisions of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2403 (2) of 15 December 2015 establishing common guidelines on deactivation standards and techniques for ensuring that deactivated firearms are rendered irreversibly inoperable, in particular Article 3(1) of that regulation:

(a) can a verifying entity which has been confirmed by a national authority and has issued a deactivation certificate be regarded as an entity within the meaning of the Weapons Directive and Articles 3 and 7 of the Deactivation Regulation even though it is not included in the list published by the Commission pursuant to Article 3(3), where various authorities of that Member State have notified the transferor of the weapons that the verifying entity, operating in the legal form of a limited liability company (GmbH), which issued the certificate is authorised to do so under that regulation; and

(b) can a verifying entity designated by a Member State for the purposes of the deactivation of weapons also be validated by means of other evidence obtained from a national authority instead of by means of inclusion in the list published on the Commission’s website within the meaning of Article 3(3) of the regulation, such that a deactivation certificate issued by that verifying entity meets the requirements laid down in that regulation to the effect that a Member State must recognise a deactivation certificate issued in another Member State in accordance with Article 7(2) of the regulation?

(1) Directive 2008/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons (OJ 2008 L 179, p. 5).

(2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2403 of 15 December 2015 establishing common guidelines on deactivation standards and techniques for ensuring that deactivated firearms are rendered irreversibly inoperable (OJ 2015 L 333, p. 62).
1.

Must Article 17(1) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 (1) be interpreted, in accordance with Articles 19 and 47 of the [Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union] and Article 27 of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, as meaning that the court of the Member State, hearing an appeal against the decision of the Dublin Unit, may establish the responsibility of the Member State which would have to carry out the transfer under Article 18(1)(d), if it determines the existence, in the Member State responsible, of a risk of infringement of the principle of non-refoulement by returning the applicant to his country of origin, where the applicant’s life would be in danger and where he would be at risk of inhuman and degrading treatment?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 2 April 2021 by Ryanair DAC against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 17 February 2021 in Case T-259/20, Ryanair v Commission

(Case C-210/21 P)

(2021/C 297/19)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Ryanair DAC (represented by: E. Vahida and F. C. Laprévote, avocats, S. Rating, abogado, I.-G. Metaxas-Maranghidis, dikigoros, and V. Blanc, avocate)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, French Republic

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— declare in accordance with Articles 263 and 264 TFEU that Commission Decision C(2020) 2097 final of 31 March 2020 on State Aid SA.56765 (2020/N) — France — Covid-19 — Deferral of the payment of airline taxes in favour of public air transport undertakings is void; and

— order the Commission to bear its own costs and pay those incurrent by Ryanair, and order the interveners at first instance and in this appeal (if any) to bear their own costs;

alternatively:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— refer back the case to the General Court for reconsideration; and

— reserve the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the appellant relies on five pleas in law.

First, the General Court infringed EU law in rejecting the appellant’s claim that the non-discrimination principle has been unjustifiably violated.

Second, the General Court made an error in law and distorted the facts regarding the appellant’s claim on free movement of services.

Third, the General Court erred in law in its determination of the proportionality of the aid to the quantum of the damage under Article 107(2)(b) TFEU.

Fourth, the General Court made an error in law and distorted the facts regarding the Commission’s failure to state reasons.

Fifth, the General Court made an error in law and distorted the facts regarding the Commission’s failure to open a formal investigation procedure.
Appeal brought on 28 January 2021 by Topcart GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 18 November 2020 in Case T-378/19, Topcart GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-49/21 P)

(2021/C 297/16)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Topcart GmbH (represented by: M. Hoffmann, Rechtsanwalt)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Carl International

By order of 12 May 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) did not allow the appeal to proceed and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
2.

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: Do Articles 54 and 55 of the CISA and Articles 50 and 52 of the Charter preclude an interpretation by the German courts of the declaration made by the Federal Republic of Germany when ratifying the CISA in relation to Paragraph 129 of the Strafgesetzbuch (German Criminal Code, Federal Law Gazette 1994, II 631) that the declaration also covers criminal organisations, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which engage exclusively in financial crime and do not, in addition, pursue any political, ideological, religious or world-view objectives and also do not seek to gain influence by dishonest means over politics, the media, the public administration, the judiciary or the economy?
Appeal brought on 24 June 2021 by the European Central Bank against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 14 April 2021 in Case T-504/19, Crédit Lyonnais v ECB

(Case C-389/21 P)

(2021/C 320/34)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: European Central Bank (represented by: C. Zilioli, R. Ugena, M. Ioannidis and F. Bonnard, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: Crédit Lyonnais

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— order Crédit Lyonnais to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The European Central Bank (‘ECB’) submits that the judgment under appeal should be set aside, because the General Court:

— exceeded the limits of judicial review by substituting its own assessment of complex economic factors for that of the ECB, in breach of the standard established by EU courts on the matter;

— breached its duty to state reasons by not allowing the ECB to understand in what way its assessment of the dual guarantee by the State, issued in the context of the regulated savings, could be flawed;

— distorted the evidence that had been submitted to it in the course of the proceedings by a manifestly incorrect reading, both of the decision contested at first instance (decision ECB-SSM-2019-FRCAG-39 of 3 May 2019), and of the methodology applied by the ECB and against which the request for exemption submitted by Crédit Lyonnais had been examined;

— infringed Article 4(1)(94) of Regulation 575/2013 (1) by adding to the definition of the risk of excessive leverage the criteria that are not there, and Article 429(14) thereof, concerning the exemption of certain exposures from the calculation of the leverage ratio, thus depriving the ECB of the discretion granted to it by virtue of that article.

(1) Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 1), as amended by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/62 of 10 October 2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the leverage ratio (OJ 2015 L 11, p. 37).