ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
22

In those circumstances the Rechtbank Oost-Brabant ’s-Hertogenbosch decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) (a) Can the chemical substance [APAAN] be equated with [BMK]? In particular, the Rechtbank seeks clarification as to whether the Dutch term “bevatten”, the English term “containing” and the French term “contenant” should be interpreted as meaning that the substance BMK must, as such, already be present in the substance APAAN. (b) If Question 1(a) is answered in the negative: Must APAAN be regarded, or must it not be regarded, as [one of the] “stoffen … die zodanig zijn vermengd dat genoemde stoffen niet gemakkelijk met eenvoudige of economisch rendabele middelen kunnen worden gebruikt of geëxtraheerd”, “[a substance] that [is] compounded in such a way that [it] cannot be easily used or extracted by readily applicable or economically viable means” and “[une autre préparation] contenant des substances classifiées qui sont composées de manière telle que ces substances ne peuvent pas être facilement utilisées ni extraites par des moyens aisés à mettre en oeuvre ou économiquement viables”? It appears from Annex 3 that, in the view of the police, a relatively straightforward, perhaps even simple, conversion process is involved. (c) In answering Question 1(b), more particularly with regard to the use of “economisch rendabele middelen/economically viable means/[moyens] économiquement [viables]”, is it significant that in the conversion of APAAN to BMK — albeit by illegal means — very substantial amounts of money (can) apparently be made when the further processing of APAAN to BMK and/or amphetamine is successful and/or in the case of the (illegal) trade in the BMK obtained from APAAN? (2) The term “operator” is defined in Article 2(d) of Regulation No 273/2004 and in Article 2(f) of Regulation No 111/2005. In answering the following question, the Rechtbank requests that the Court of Justice proceed on the basis that what is under discussion here is a scheduled substance within the meaning of Article 2(a) or an equivalent substance within the terms of “Annex I: Scheduled substances within the meaning of Article 2(a)” of the Regulations. Should that term “operator” also be understood to refer to a natural person who, whether or not with (an)other legal person(s) and/or natural person(s), (intentionally) has a scheduled substance in his possession without a licence, without there being any further suspicious circumstances?’
9

Article 11 of Directive 2011/92 provides: ‘1. Member States shall ensure that, in accordance with the relevant national legal system, members of the public concerned: (a) having a sufficient interest, or alternatively; (b) maintaining the impairment of a right, where administrative procedural law of a Member State requires this as a precondition; have access to a review procedure before a court of law or another independent and impartial body established by law to challenge the substantive or procedural legality of decisions, acts or omissions subject to the public participation provisions of this Directive. 2. Member States shall determine at what stage the decisions, acts or omissions may be challenged. 3. What constitutes a sufficient interest and impairment of a right shall be determined by the Member States, consistently with the objective of giving the public concerned wide access to justice. To that end, the interest of any non-governmental organisation meeting the requirements referred to in Article 1(2) shall be deemed sufficient for the purpose of point (a) of paragraph 1 of this Article. Such organisations shall also be deemed to have rights capable of being impaired for the purpose of point (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article. 4. The provisions of this Article shall not exclude the possibility of a preliminary review procedure before an administrative authority and shall not affect the requirement of exhaustion of administrative review procedures prior to recourse to judicial review procedures, where such a requirement exists under national law. Any such procedure shall be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive. 5. In order to further the effectiveness of the provisions of this Article, Member States shall ensure that practical information is made available to the public on access to administrative and judicial review procedures.’
15

In that regard, the referring court observes that Article 2 of the Third Directive requires that compulsory motor insurance contracts cover, on the basis of a single premium, the entire territory of the European Union. That court therefore questions whether differentiation in the amount of the premium depending on the territory in which the vehicle is used is contrary to that article. While such differentiation has no effect on compensating the victims of a road traffic accident, as they are compensated regardless of the Member State in whose territory the accident takes place, it could disregard the interests of the party insured, whose protection would appear to constitute one of the objectives of Article 2 of the Third Directive. There would be a risk that the compulsory motor insurance contract would not cover the entire territory of the European Union, within the meaning of that article, if the insurer could, in the event that an accident took place in a Member State other than that provided for in the contract, have recourse to the party insured so as to recover part of the compensation paid to the victims. Last, according to the referring court, it should be determined whether differentiation in the amount of the premium depending on the territory in which the vehicle is used undermines the objective of free movement of goods and persons, pursued by the First and Third Directives, and the general principle of non-discrimination.
14

In those circumstances the Landgericht Dortmund decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. Is Article 6(1) of [Regulation No 44/2001] to be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of an action in which a defendant domiciled in the same State as the court and other defendants domiciled in other Member States … are together the subject of an application for disclosure and damages on account of a single and continuous infringement of Article 81 EC/Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement which has been established by the … Commission and committed in several Member States and in which the defendants have participated in different places and at different times, it is expedient to hear and determine those applications together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings? Is it significant in this regard if the action against the defendant domiciled in the same State as the court is withdrawn after having been served on all the defendants, before the expiry of the periods prescribed by the court for lodging a defence and before the start of the first hearing? 2. Is Article 5(3) of Regulation … No 44/2001 to be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of an action for disclosure and damages brought against defendants domiciled in a number of Member States … on account of a single and continuous infringement of Article 81 EC/Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement which has been established by the European Commission and committed in several Member States and in which the defendants have participated in different places and at different times, the harmful event occurred in relation to each defendant and in relation to all heads of damage claimed or the overall loss in those Member States in which cartel agreements were concluded and implemented? 3. In the case of actions for damages for infringement of the prohibition of agreements, decisions and concerted practices contained in Article 81 EC/Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, does the requirement of effective enforcement of the prohibition of agreements, decisions and concerted practices laid down in [EU] law allow account to be taken of arbitration and jurisdiction clauses contained in contracts for the supply of goods, where this has the effect of excluding the jurisdiction of a court with international jurisdiction under Article 5(3) and/or Article 6(1) of Regulation … No 44/2001 in relation to all the defendants and/or all or some of the claims brought?’
42

In the first place, as regards the assessment of whether there is a high risk of acquiring severe infectious diseases that can be transmitted by blood, account must be taken of the epidemiological situation in France, which has a very specific character, according to the French Government and the Commission, under reference to data supplied by the Institut de veille sanitaire français (French Institute for Public Health Surveillance). It is clear from those data that almost all HIV infections for the period from 2003 to 2008 were due to sexual relations, and that men who have had sexual relations with other men represent the population most affected, corresponding to 48% of new infections. In the same period, while the overall incidence of HIV infection has gone down, in particular as regards heterosexual relations, it has not diminished for men who have had sexual relations with other men. Furthermore, in the same period, they represented the population most affected by HIV infection, with an incidence rate of 1% per annum, which is 200 times greater than that for the heterosexual population in France.
34

As it was uncertain whether the Latvian legislation complies with Article 12 of Directive 2006/126 and with its objectives, as defined in recital 2 in the preamble thereto, namely to improve road safety and to facilitate the free movement of persons taking up residence in a Member State other than the State issuing the licence, the Administratīvā apgabaltiesa decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘Must Article 12 of Directive 2006/126, read in conjunction with the first sentence of recital 2 in the preamble thereto, be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which provides that the only means of proving that a person is normally resident in that State (Latvia) is the declared place of residence of that person? “Declared place of residence” must be understood as referring to the obligation of the person, in accordance with the national legislation, to be registered in a national register, in order to notify his accessibility at the declared place of residence for the purposes of his legal relations with the State and local authorities.’
4

Article 3 of the basic regulation, headed ‘Determination of injury’, provides in paragraphs 1 to 3, 5 and 6 as follows: ‘1. Pursuant to this Regulation, the term “injury” shall, unless otherwise specified, be taken to mean material injury to the [Union] industry, threat of material injury to the [Union] industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an industry and shall be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this Article. 2. A determination of injury shall be based on positive evidence and shall involve an objective examination of both: (a) the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the [Union] market for like products; and (b) the consequent impact of those imports on the [Union] industry. 3. With regard to the volume of the dumped imports, consideration shall be given to whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the [European Union]. With regard to the effect of the dumped imports on prices, consideration shall be given to whether there has been significant price undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like product of the [Union] industry, or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price increases, which would otherwise have occurred, to a significant degree. No one or more of these factors can necessarily give decisive guidance. ... 5. The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the [Union] industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including the fact that an industry is still in the process of recovering from the effects of past dumping or subsidisation, the magnitude of the actual margin of dumping, actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on investments, utilisation of capacity; factors affecting [Union] prices; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments. This list is not exhaustive, nor can any one or more of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance. 6. It must be demonstrated, from all the relevant evidence presented in relation to paragraph 2, that the dumped imports are causing injury within the meaning of this Regulation. Specifically, this shall entail a demonstration that the volume and/or price levels identified pursuant to paragraph 3 are responsible for an impact on the [Union] industry as provided for in paragraph 5, and that this impact exists to a degree which enables it to be classified as material.’
38

Thus, the referring court considers that the positions of the proprietor of an SEP and of the infringer ought not to make it possible for them to obtain excessively high royalties (a ‘hold-up’ situation) or excessively low royalties (a ‘reverse hold-up’ situation), respectively. For that reason, but also on the grounds of equality of treatment between the beneficiaries of licences for, and the infringers in relation to, a given product, the proprietor of the SEP ought to be able to bring an action for a prohibitory injunction. Indeed, the exercise of a statutory right cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse of a dominant position, for characterisation as such requires other criteria to be satisfied. For that reason, it is not satisfactory to adopt, as a criterion of such an abuse, the notion of the infringer’s ‘willingness to negotiate’, since this may give rise to numerous interpretations and provide the infringer with too wide a freedom of action. In any event, if such a notion is to be held to be relevant, certain qualitative and time requirements must be imposed in order to ensure that the applicant for the licence is acting in good faith. Accordingly, a properly formulated, acceptable, ‘unconditional’ request for a licence, containing all the provisions normally found in a licensing agreement, ought to be required to be submitted before the patent concerned is used. As regards, in particular, requests for a licence from operators which have already placed products using an SEP on the market, those operators must immediately comply with the obligations to render an account of use of that SEP and to pay the corresponding royalty. In addition, the referring court considers that an infringer ought, initially, to be able to provide security instead of paying the royalty directly to the proprietor of the SEP in question. The possibility of the applicant for a licence leaving the determination of a fair royalty amount to the proprietor must also be envisaged.
2.

European Union own resources — Post-clearance recovery of import or export duties — Conditions for non-entry of import duties in the accounts set out in Article 220(2)(b) of Regulation No 2913/92 — Error of the authorities which could not ‘reasonably have been detected by the person liable for payment’ — Criteria for assessment — Complexity of the tariff legislation (Council Regulation No 2913/92, Art. 220(2)(b)); Commission Regulations No 2125/95, Art. 10(1) and No 1864/2004, Art. 14(2) (see paras 55-67)
1.

Declares that, by having failed to adopt, within the period prescribed, all the measures necessary to recover from the beneficiaries of the State aid declared unlawful and incompatible with the internal market in Article 1 of Commission Decision 2009/402/EC of 28 January 2009 on the contingency plans in the fruit and vegetable sector implemented by France (C 29/05 (ex NN 57/05)) and by having failed to provide the European Commission, within the period prescribed, with the information listed in Article 4 of that decision, the French Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under the fourth paragraph of Article 288 TFEU and Articles 2 to 4 of that decision;
The award of contracts which, in view of their value, do not fall within the scope of Directive 2004/18 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, as amended by Regulation No 1251/2011, is none the less subject to the fundamental rules and the general principles of the FEU Treaty, in particular the principles of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality and of equal treatment and the consequent obligation of transparency, provided that those contracts have a certain cross-border interest in the light of certain objective criteria. Such criteria may be, in particular, that the contract in question is for a significant amount, in conjunction with the place where the work is to be carried out or the technical characteristics of the contract. The national court may, in its overall assessment of the existence of certain cross-border interest also take account of the existence of complaints brought by operators situated in other Member States, provided that it is determined that those complaints are real and not fictitious.

Article 23(8) of Directive 2004/18 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, as amended by Regulation No 1251/2011, is not applicable to a public contract with a value below the threshold for application laid down by that directive. In the context of a public contract not subject to that directive but which has certain cross-border interest, which it is for the national court to ascertain, the fundamental rules and general principles of the FEU Treaty, in particular the principles of equal treatment and of non-discrimination and the consequent obligation of transparency, must be interpreted as meaning that the contracting authority cannot reject a tender which satisfies the requirements of the contract notice on grounds which are not set out in that notice.

Since the obligation of transparency is in particular intended to preclude any risk of arbitrariness on the part of the contracting authority, that objective would not be achieved if the contracting authority were able to disregard the conditions it had itself imposed. Accordingly, it is prohibited from amending the award criteria during the award procedure. The principles of equal treatment and of non-discrimination and the obligation of transparency have the same effect in that respect with regard to the technical specifications.

The contracting authority cannot, therefore, after publication of a contract notice, amend the technical specification in respect of an element of the contract in breach of the principles of equal treatment and of non-discrimination and the obligation of transparency. It is irrelevant, in that regard, whether or not the element to which that specification refers is still in production or available on the market.

(see paras 26, 27, 29, 30, operative part)
Article 16(3) of Directive 2003/87 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Directive 96/61, as amended by Directive 2004/101, must be interpreted as not applying to an operator who surrenders a number of greenhouse gas emission allowances equal to the emissions for the preceding year as reported and verified in accordance with Article 15 of that directive, where it is established, following an additional verification carried out by the competent national authority after the expiry of the time-limit for surrender, that those emissions were understated, so that the number of allowances surrendered is insufficient. It is for the Member States to determine the penalties which may be imposed in such a situation, in accordance with Article 16(1) of Directive 2003/87.

In that regard, in the first place, the overall structure of Directive 2003/87 is based on the strict accounting of the issue, holding, transfer and cancellation of greenhouse gas emission allowances. The obligation on operators to surrender by 30 April of the current year, in order to have them cancelled, a number of greenhouse gas emission allowances equal to their emissions during the preceding calendar year, stated as a mandatory element of the greenhouse gas emissions permit by Article 6(2)(e) of that directive, and worded unambiguously in Article 12(3) thereof, that obligation is the only one to which that directive itself attaches, under Article 16(3) thereof, a specific penalty, whereas the penalty for any other conduct contrary to its provisions is, under Article 16(1) thereof, left to the discretion of the Member States.

In the second place, the verification of emissions reports is an essential condition for the surrender of allowances. Since Directive 2003/87 does not provide for other control mechanisms and does not make the surrender of allowances subject to any condition other than the emissions report being found to be satisfactory, the lump-sum penalty provided for in Article 16(3) of that directive must be imposed on operators who do not comply with that obligation, either because they do not surrender any allowances, or because the number of allowances surrendered is less than the emissions stated in the emissions report. Thus, although that directive does not preclude the competent authorities of the Member States from carrying out additional controls or verifications, it cannot be interpreted as requiring a penalty to be automatically imposed for breach of an obligation which it does not clearly specify.

Finally, that interpretation is also necessary having regard to the principle of proportionality. The automatic application of the lump-sum penalty provided for in Article 16(3) of Directive 2003/87 is disproportionate since, subject to the qualification of acting in good faith, an operator cannot foresee the result of such additional monitoring with sufficient certainty.

(see paras 28-30, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 41, 43, 45, operative part)
1.

Appeal — Grounds — Plea submitted for the first time in the context of the appeal — Inadmissibility — Arguments constituting merely an amplification of a plea set out in the application — Admissibility (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see para. 24)