ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 3(3) of Directive 92/12 on the general arrangements for products subject to excise duty and on the holding, movement and monitoring of such products and Article 1(3) of Directive 2008/118 concerning the general arrangements for excise duty and repealing Directive 92/12 must be interpreted as not precluding products which do not fall within the scope of those directives, such as lubricating oils used for purposes other than as motor fuels or as heating fuels, from being made subject to a tax governed by rules identical to those relating to the harmonised excise duty arrangements set out in those directives, where the imposition of such a tax on those products does not, in trade between Member States, give rise to formalities connected with the crossing of frontiers.

In that regard, the requirements relating to the domestic duty suspension arrangement applicable to those products, which apply both to the products imported from another Member State and to those acquired on the domestic market, cannot be regarded as formalities connected with the crossing of a frontier.

Moreover, the obligations relating to the duty-paid excise procedure — namely a declaration of the planned intra-Community purchase and guaranteeing payment of the excise duty, in so far as they must be met before the products in question cross the border, where the guarantee of payment of the excise is connected with the event giving rise to the excise duty and where those formalities correspond to the requirements with which the persons liable for excise duty must comply in accordance with the first paragraph, point (a), of Article 34(2) of Directive 2008/118 — cannot be regarded as formalities connected with the crossing of frontiers. Similarly, the obligations of submitting a simplified declaration, calculating the excise duty and paying it within 10 days from when the tax obligation arose, and of maintaining records of intra-Community acquisitions of excise goods — which aim to ensure payment of the excise duty due — cannot be regarded as formalities connected with the crossing of frontiers.

(see paras 38, 39-43, 52, operative part)
Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as meaning that ‘main subject-matter of the contract’ and ‘adequacy of the price and remuneration, on the one hand, as against the services or goods supplie[d] in exchange, on the other’ do not, in principle, cover the types of terms in the credit agreements concluded between a professional and consumers which, on one hand, allow, under certain conditions, the lender unilaterally to alter the interest rate and, on the other hand, provide for a ‘risk charge’ applied by it. However, it is for the referring court to verify that classification of those contractual terms, having regard to the nature, general scheme and stipulations of the agreements concerned and the legal and factual context of which they form part.

Contractual terms falling within the notion of the ‘main subject-matter of the contract’, within the meaning of Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13, must be understood as being those that lay down the essential obligations of the contract and, as such, characterise it. By contrast, terms ancillary to those that define the very essence of the contractual relationship cannot fall within the notion of the ‘main subject-matter of the contract’. It also follows from the wording of Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13 that the second category of terms which cannot be examined as regards unfairness is limited in scope, for that exclusion concerns only the adequacy of the price or remuneration as against the services or goods supplied in exchange, that exclusion being explained by the fact that no legal scale or criterion exists that can provide a framework for, and guide, such a review.

Accordingly, terms relating to the consideration due by the consumer to the lender or having an impact on the actual price to be paid to the latter by the consumer thus do not, in principle, fall within the second category of terms, except as regards the question whether the amount of consideration or the price as stipulated in the contract are adequate as compared with the service provided in exchange by the lender

(see paras 54-56, 78, operative part)
A Member State which applies a rate of value added tax of 3% to the supply of digital or electronic books fails to fulfil its obligations under Articles 96 to 99, 110 and 114 of Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax, as amended by Directive 2010/88, read in conjunction with Annexes II and III to that directive and Regulation No 282/2011 laying down implementing measures for Directive 2006/112.

It is clear from the terms of point 6 of Annex III to Directive 2006/112 that the reduced rate of value added tax is applicable to a transaction consisting of the supply of a book on a physical medium. Admittedly, in order to be able to read an electronic book, physical support, such as a computer, is required. However such a support is not included in the supply of electronic books. In addition, it is clear from the second subparagraph of Article 98(2) of that directive, the EU legislature decided to exclude any possibility of a reduced rate of value added tax being applied to electronically supplied services. The supply of electronic books is such a service, given that it cannot be regarded as a supply of goods within the meaning of Article 14(1) of that directive, since electronic books cannot qualify as tangible property. Likewise, the supply of electronic books clearly meets the definition of electronically supplied services set out in Article 7(1) of Regulation No 282/2011. Moreover, such a supply is not covered by point 9 to Annex III of directive 2006/112, which relates to the supply of services by writers, composers and performing artists, or of the royalties due to them.

That interpretation cannot be undermined by the principle of fiscal neutrality, since that principle cannot extend the scope of reduced rates of value added tax in the absence of clear wording to that effect. Point 6 of Annex III to Directive 2006/112 is not a provision which, unequivocally, extends the scope of reduced rates of value added tax to the supply of electronic books. On the contrary such a supply is not covered by that provision.

(see paras 35, 36, 40-43, 50, 51, 61,71, operative part)
A Member State fails to fulfil its obligations under Article 49 TFEU and Article 31 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area by adopting and maintaining in force a tax scheme which makes the benefit of the deferral of taxation of the capital gains realised on the sale of a capital asset forming part of the assets of a permanent establishment of the taxable person located within national territory subject to the condition that those capital gains are reinvested in the acquisition of replacement assets forming part of the assets of a permanent establishment of the taxable person located within that territory.

Such a difference in treatment with regard to the deferral of taxation of capital gains is liable to give rise to a cash-flow disadvantage for the taxable person wishing to reinvest those capital gains in order to acquire replacement assets intended for a permanent establishment located within the territory of another Member State. That difference in treatment is at the very least liable to make reinvestment effected outside national territory less attractive than reinvestment effected within that territory, without being explained by an objective difference in situation.

Although taxation of the capital gains at the time of reinvestment of those gains, for the purpose of acquiring replacement assets outside the national territory, may be justified on grounds related to the need to preserve the division of the powers of taxation between the Member States, such national legislation, which has the effect of providing, in all cases, for the immediate recovery of tax on those capital gains at the time of their reinvestment outside the national territory, goes, by reason of the existence of measures which are less restrictive of the freedom of establishment than an immediate recovery of tax, beyond what is necessary to attain the objective related to the need to preserve the division of powers of taxation between the Member States.

The taxable person should be given the choice between, on the one hand, the immediate payment of that tax and, on the other, the deferred payment of that tax, together, where relevant, with interest in accordance with the applicable national legislation.

In so far as a direct link is not established between the tax advantage concerned and the offsetting of that advantage by a particular tax levy, such a restriction cannot be justified by the need to guarantee the coherence of the national tax system.

(see paras 58-60, 67, 72, 74, 83, operative part)
There is nothing in the wording of Article 1(1)(a) of Directive 98/59 to suggest that a different meaning is to be given to the terms ‘establishment’ or ‘establishments’ in the same subparagraph of that provision. The fact that the legislature offers Member States a choice between the alternative and substantially equivalent options set out in Article 1(1)(a)(i) and (a)(ii) of Directive 98/59 indicates that the term ‘establishment’ cannot have a completely different meaning depending on which option the Member State concerned chooses and such a major difference would be contrary to the need, emphasised in recital 7 in the preamble to Directive 98/59, to promote the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies. The term ‘establishment’, which is not defined in Directive 98/59, is a term of EU law and cannot be defined by reference to the laws of the Member States. It must, on that basis, be interpreted in an autonomous and uniform manner in the EU legal order.

The term ‘establishment’ in Article 1(1)(a)(ii) of Directive 98/59 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies must be interpreted in the same way as the term in Article 1(1)(a)(i) of that directive.

Article 1(1)(a)(ii) of Directive 98/59 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation that lays down an obligation to inform and consult workers in the event of the dismissal, within a period of 90 days, of at least 20 workers from a particular establishment of an undertaking, and not where the aggregate number of dismissals across all of the establishments or across some of the establishments of an undertaking over the same period reaches or exceeds the threshold of 20 workers.

The Court has already held that where an undertaking comprises several entities meeting the criteria set out in the judgment in Rockfon (C‑449/13) and the judgment in Athinaïki Chartopoiïa (C‑270/05), it is the entity to which the workers made redundant are assigned to carry out their duties that constitutes the ‘establishment’ for the purposes of Article 1(1)(a) of Directive 98/59.

Interpreting the term ‘establishment’ as meaning all of the establishments of an undertaking would, first, be contrary to the objective of ensuring comparable protection for workers’ rights in all Member States and, secondly, entail very different costs for the undertakings that have to satisfy the information and consultation obligations under Articles 2 to 4 of that directive in accordance with the choice of the Member State concerned, which would also go against the EU legislature’s objective of rendering comparable the burden of those costs in all Member States.

It follows that the definition in Article 1(1)(a)(i) and (a)(ii) of Directive 98/59 requires that account be taken of the dismissals effected in each establishment considered separately.

(see paras 33, 42, 44, 49, 53, operative part)
Article 13(B)(a) of Sixth Directive 77/388 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes, as amended by Directive 91/680, must be interpreted as meaning that the supply of services whereby an economic operator which is independent of a second-hand motor-vehicle dealer provides, in return for payment of a lump sum, a warranty covering mechanical breakdowns which may affect certain parts of that vehicle constitutes an exempt insurance transaction within the meaning of that provision.

Irrespective of whether a contract is concluded between the purchaser of the second-hand vehicle and an economic operator independent of the dealer selling that vehicle, that dealer acting merely as an intermediary, whether it is the dealer which concludes the contract in its own name but on behalf of the purchaser, or, finally, whether the dealer transfers to the purchaser the rights arising from the contract which the dealer concluded in its own name and on its own behalf with the independent economic operator, the concept of ‘insurance transactions’, within the meaning of Article 13(B)(a) of the Sixth Directive, is broad enough to cover each of those situations.

Furthermore, categorisation of a service as an ‘insurance transaction’ within the meaning of Article 13(B)(a) of the Sixth Directive cannot depend on the manner in which the insurer manages the level of the risk which it undertakes to cover and calculates the exact amount of the premium. In this regard, the essence of an ‘insurance transaction’, within the meaning of Article 13(B)(a) of the Sixth Directive, lies in the fact that the insured person is exempted from the risk of bearing financial loss, which is uncertain, but potentially significant, by the premium, payment of which for that person is certain but limited.

Finally, the provision of such a supply and the sale of the second-hand vehicle must, in principle, be considered to be distinct and independent supplies, to be treated separately from the point of view of VAT. It is for the referring court to determine whether the sale of a second-hand vehicle and the warranty provided by an independent economic operator to the dealer selling that second-hand vehicle covering mechanical breakdowns which may affect certain parts of that vehicle are so interconnected that they must be regarded as constituting a single transaction or whether, on the contrary, they are independent transactions.

(see paras 38, 41, 42, 58, operative part)
A benefit may be regarded as a social security benefit in so far as it is granted, without any individual and discretionary assessment of personal needs, to recipients on the basis of a legally defined position and relates to one of the risks expressly listed in Article 3(1) of that regulation.

The distinction between benefits excluded from the scope of Regulation No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems and those which fall within it is based not on whether a benefit is classified as a social security benefit by national legislation, but essentially on the constituent elements of each particular benefit, in particular its purpose and the conditions under which it is granted.

The retirement benefits referred to in Article 3(1)(d) of Regulation No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems are characterised essentially by the fact that their purpose is to ensure means of subsistence for those persons who, on reaching a certain age, cease working and are under no obligation to make themselves available to the employment services.

A Christmas bonus which is not paid exclusively to recipients of an old-age pension, an early old-age pension or a military and police retirement pension, but which is also paid to a group of beneficiaries that includes recipients of other types of pension, in particular, an invalidity pension, a social pension, a widow/widower’s pension or an orphan’s pension, and the purpose of which does not depend only on the type of pension it is intended to supplement cannot be classified as an old-age benefit within the meaning of that provision.

That is the case, in particular, where the financial supplement, paid in the form of a Christmas bonus and the grant of which is not dependent on an individual and discretionary assessment of the claimant’s personal needs by the competent authorities, is intended to alleviate the difficult social situation of recipients on low incomes in a period during which they may personally experience the economic and social burden of their low income, which also derives from the fact that recipients of several legal pensions will receive only one Christmas bonus if the total amount of the pensions does not exceed the threshold laid down.

(see para. 52, 55, 57, 60, 61)
26

In those circumstances, the Juzgado de lo Social No 2 de Terrassa (Labour Court No 2, Terrassa) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Are Articles 1, 2(f), 3(1), 4(2)(a), 4(3), 5(3), 6, 7 and 8(1) and 8(2) of [Law 10/2012] contrary to Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in that they do not, firstly, permit a national court to adjust judicial fees or to assess reasons of proportionality (relating to the basis for charging the fees on the part of the State or to their amount as constituting an obstacle to obtaining an effective remedy) for the purposes of exemption; secondly, have regard to the principle of effectiveness in the application of provisions of Union law; or, thirdly, assess the importance of the proceedings to the parties in the light of the circumstances when payment of judicial fees is a prerequisite to obtaining leave to proceed with the appeal lodged? (2) Are Articles 1, 2(f), 3(1), 4(2)(a), 4(3), 5(3), 6, 7 and 8(1) and 8(2) of [Law 10/2012] contrary to Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in that the latter applies to special procedures, as in the case of an employment court or tribunal, in which Union law is commonly applied as a fundamental aspect of balanced economic and social development in the [European Union]? (3) In connection with the foregoing questions, is it open to a court such as the referring court to refrain from applying legislation such as the legislation at issue which does not permit a national court, firstly, to adjust judicial fees or to assess reasons of proportionality (relating to the basis for charging the fees on the part of the State or to their amount as constituting an obstacle to obtaining an effective remedy) for the purposes of exemption; secondly, to have regard to the principle of effectiveness in the application of provisions of Union law; or, thirdly, assess the importance of the proceedings to the parties in the light of the circumstances when payment of judicial fees is a prerequisite to obtaining leave to proceed with the appeal in ‘suplicación’ lodged?’
14

Article 20 of Royal Decree 898/1985 on university teaching staff (Real Decreto 898/1985 sobre el régimen del profesorado universitario) of 30 April 1985 (BOE No 146 of 19 June 1985, p. 18927), in the version applicable at the material time, provides: ‘Article 20: Associate lecturers 1. Under the conditions laid down in their constitutions and in compliance with budget forecasts, universities may engage, on a temporary, full‑time or part‑time basis, associate lecturers from among specialists with renowned competence who normally carry out their professional activity outside the university. 2. For the purposes of the previous paragraph, normal exercise of a professional activity shall mean the exercise otherwise than in a university of any paid professional activity which is made possible by the diploma held by the interested person for a minimum period of three years in the course of the five years preceding his employment as an associate lecturer by a university. Notwithstanding the provisions of the previous paragraph, and under the conditions laid down in their constitution where appropriate, universities may recruit persons of recognised competence. … 9. The constitutions of the universities shall fix the maximum duration of those contracts, their renewable or non-renewable nature, the conditions under which successive renewals may take place if at all, and the maximum number of renewals. … 10. Compliance with the expiry date set in the contract shall imply its automatic termination without the need for prior termination, unless the parties agreed at the outset upon the renewal of the contract for a period permitted by the constitution or for a shorter period. 11. The termination of the contracts of associate lecturers on expiry of the agreed period shall not give right to any compensation, unless otherwise provided in the constitution. … 15. The contracts of associate lecturers shall terminate not only under the conditions referred to in paragraph 10 of this article, but also when the lecturer engaged reaches the age of retirement, and for any other reason provided for in the constitution which does not amount to an abuse of law.’
8

Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 49 of Directive 2004/17, which is entitled ‘Information to applicants for qualification, candidates and tenderers’, provides: ‘1. Contracting entities shall as soon as possible inform the economic operators involved of decisions reached concerning the conclusion of a framework agreement, the award of the contract, or admission to a dynamic purchasing system, including the grounds for any decision not to conclude a framework agreement or award a contract for which there has been a call for competition or to recommence the procedure, or not to implement a dynamic purchasing system; this information shall be provided in writing if the contracting entities are requested to do so. 2. On request from the party concerned, contracting entities shall, as soon as possible, inform: — any unsuccessful candidate of the reasons for the rejection of his application, — any unsuccessful tenderer of the reasons for the rejection of his tender, including, for the cases referred to in Article 34(4) and (5), the reasons for their decision of non-equivalence or their decision that the works, supplies or services do not meet the performance or functional requirements, — any tenderer who has made an admissible tender of the characteristics and relative advantages of the tender selected, as well as the name of the successful tenderer or the parties to the framework agreement. The time taken to do so may under no circumstances exceed 15 days from receipt of the written enquiry. However, contracting entities may decide that certain information on the contract award or the conclusion of the framework agreement or on admission to a dynamic purchasing system, referred to in the paragraph 1, is to be withheld where release of such information would impede law enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial interests of a particular economic operator, public or private, including the interests of the economic operator to whom the contract has been awarded, or might prejudice fair competition between economic operators.’