EN Official Journal of the European Union C 45/22

Appeal brought on 4 December 2013 by Total Marketing Services, successor in law to Total Raffinage Marketing, against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 13 September 2013 in Case T-566/08 Total Raffinage Marketing v Commission

(Case C-634/13 P)

2014/C 45/38

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Total Marketing Services, successor in law to Total Raffinage Marketing (represented by: A. Vandencasteele, C. Lemaire, S. Naudin, lawyers)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

— set aside the judgment appealed against on the ground that the General Court incorrectly excluded the cessation of Total Marketing Services’ (‘TMS’) participation in the infringement after 12 May 2004;

— set aside the judgment appealed against on the ground that the General Court incorrectly excluded any unjustified unequal treatment between TMS and Repsol concerning the duration of their participation in the infringement;

— set aside the judgment appealed against on the ground that the General Court incorrectly excluded the interruption of TMS’ participation in the infringement between 26 May 2000 and 27 June 2001;

— set aside the judgment appealed against on the ground that the General Court did not respond to the plea alleging failure to examine evidence of TMS’ competitive behavior on the market;

— rule definitively, in accordance with Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and, on that basis, annul the decision in so far as it concerns TMS and, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, reduce the fine imposed on TMS;

— should the Court not rule on the present case, reserve costs and refer the case back to the General Court for re-examination, in accordance with the Court’s ruling;

— lastly, order the Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings before the General Court and the Court of Justice, pursuant to Article [184] of the Rules of Procedure.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of its appeal, the appellant invokes four grounds.

In its first ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court infringed Article 101 TFEU, the rules on the adducing of evidence, the principles of the presumption of innocence and legal certainty and the obligation to state reasons by holding that the appellant participated in the infringement between 12 May 2004 and 28 April 2005 on the ground that it failed to show that it publicly distanced itself from the agreement during that period.

By its second ground of appeal, divided into two parts, the appellant considers that the General Court infringed, first, the principle of equal treatment and its obligation to state reasons and, secondly, that it distorted the documentary evidence relating to the invitations received by TMS and Repsol, in so far as the General Court excluded any exit by TMS from the agreement after the meeting of 11 to 12 May 2004, but approved the exit of Repsol after the meeting of 3 to 4 August 2004.

By its third ground of appeal, divided into two parts, the appellant claims that the General Court infringed Article 101 TFEU, the rules on the adducing of evidence, the principles of the presumption of innocence and legal certainty and the obligation to state reasons by holding that TMS did not interrupt its participation in the infringement between 26 May 2000 and 26 June 2001 on the ground that it had failed to show that it publicly distanced itself from the agreement during that period.

Finally, by its fourth ground of appeal, the appellant complains that the General Court infringed the principles of effective judicial protection, that penalties must be specific to the infringing party, and the obligation to state reasons in so far as the General Court rejected without examination the plea alleging failure to take account of evidence of TMS’ competitive behaviour.