JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber)

28 April 2016 ( *1 )

‛Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures against Iran with the aim of preventing nuclear proliferation — Freezing of funds — Support to the Government of Iran — Research and technology development in military or military-related fields — Rights of the defence — Right to effective judicial protection — Error of law and error of assessment — Right to property — Proportionality — Misuse of powers — Claim for damages’

In Case T‑52/15,

Sharif University of Technology, established in Tehran (Iran), represented by M. Happold, Barrister,

applicant,

v

Council of the European Union, represented by V. Piessevaux and M. Bishop, acting as Agents,

defendant,

ACTION for, first, annulment of Council Decision 2014/776/CFSP of 7 November 2014 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ 2014 L 325, p. 19), in so far as it includes the applicant’s name on the list in Annex II to Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP of 26 July 2010 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Common Position 2007/140/CFSP (OJ 2010 L 195, p. 39), and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1202/2014 of 7 November 2014 implementing Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ 2014 L 325, p. 3), in so far as it includes the applicant’s name on the list in Annex IX to Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 (OJ 2012 L 88, p. 1) and, secondly, a claim for damages,

THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber),

composed of M. van der Woude (Rapporteur), President, I. Wiszniewska-Białecka and I. Ulloa Rubio, Judges,

Registrar: M. Junius, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure and further to the hearing on 3 December 2015,

gives the following

Judgment

Background to the dispute

1 The applicant, Sharif University of Technology, is an institution of higher education and research located in Tehran, Iran. Founded in 1966, it specialises in technology, engineering and the physical sciences.

2 The present case has been brought in connection with the restrictive measures introduced in order to apply pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran to end proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.

3 On 9 June 2010 the United Nations Security Council (‘the Security Council’) adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010) (‘UNSCR 1929’), which aimed to extend the scope of the restrictive measures imposed by UNSCR 1737 (2006), UNSCR 1747 (2007) and UNSCR 1803 (2008) and to introduce additional restrictive measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

4 On 17 June 2010, the European Council underlined its deepening concern about Iran’s nuclear programme and welcomed the adoption of UNSCR 1929. The European Council invited the Council of the European Union to adopt measures implementing those contained in UNSCR 1929 as well as accompanying measures, with a view to supporting the resolution of all outstanding concerns regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, through negotiation. Those measures were to focus on the areas of trade, the financial sector, the Iranian transport sector, key sectors in the oil and gas industry and additional designations, in particular for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (‘the IRGC’).

5 On 26 July 2010 the Council adopted Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Common Position 2007/140/CFSP (OJ 2010 L 195, p. 39), Annex II to which lists the persons and entities — other than those designated by the Security Council or by the Sanctions Committee created by UNSCR 1737 (2006) mentioned in Annex I — whose assets are to be frozen. Recital 22 of that decision refers to UNSCR 1929 and states that that resolution notes the potential connection between the revenues derived by Iran from its energy sector and the funding of its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.

6 On 23 January 2012 the Council adopted Decision 2012/35/CFSP amending Decision 2010/413 (OJ 2012 L 19, p. 22). Recital 8 of that decision reproduces, in essence, the content of recital 22 of Decision 2010/413 (see paragraph 5 above). Furthermore, according to recital 13 of Decision 2012/35, the restrictions on admission and the freezing of funds and economic resources should be applied to additional persons and entities providing support to the Government of Iran allowing it to pursue proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, in particular persons and entities providing financial, logistical or material support to the Government of Iran.

7 Article 1(7)(a)(ii) of Decision 2012/35 added the following provision to Article 20(1) of Decision 2010/413: ‘(c) other persons and entities not covered by Annex I that provide support to the Government of Iran, and persons and entities associated with them, as listed in Annex II.’

8 Consequently, under the FEU Treaty, on 23 March 2012 the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 (OJ 2012 L 88, p. 1). In order to implement Article 1(7)(a)(ii) of Decision 2012/35, Article 23(2) of that regulation provides for the freezing of funds of persons, entities and bodies listed in Annex IX thereto, identified as: ‘... (d) being other persons, entities or bodies that provide support, such as material, logistical or financial support, to the Government of Iran, and persons and entities associated with them; …’

9 On 15 October 2012 the Council adopted Decision 2012/635/CFSP amending Decision 2010/413 (OJ 2012 L 282 p. 58). According to recital 6 of Decision 2012/635, it is appropriate to review the prohibition on the sale, supply or transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of additional dual-use goods and technology listed in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (OJ 2009 L 134, p. 1), with a view to including items which might be relevant to industries controlled directly or indirectly by the IRGC or which might be relevant to Iran’s nuclear, military and ballistic missile programme, while taking into account the need to avoid unintended effects on the civilian population of Iran. Furthermore, recital 9 of Decision 2012/635 states that the sale, supply or transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of key naval equipment and technology for ship-building, maintenance or refit, should be prohibited. In addition, according to recital 16 of that decision, additional persons and entities should be included on the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures as set out in Annex II to Decision 2010/413, in particular Iranian State-owned entities engaged in the oil and gas sector, since they provide a substantial source of revenue for the Government of Iran.

10 Article 1(8)(a) of Decision 2012/635 amended Article 20(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413, which consequently provides that restrictive measures are to be imposed on: ‘(c) other persons and entities not covered by Annex I that provide support to the Government of Iran and entities owned or controlled by them or persons and entities associated with them, as listed in Annex II.’

11 On 21 December 2012, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 1263/2012 amending Regulation No 267/2012 (OJ 2012 L 356, p. 34). Article 1(11) of Regulation No 1263/2012 amended Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012, which thus provides for the freezing of funds of persons, entities and bodies listed in Annex IX, identified as: ‘(d) being other persons, entities or bodies that provide support, such as material, logistical or financial support, to the Government of Iran and entities owned or controlled by them, or persons and entities associated with them.’

12 The applicant’s name was included for the first time on the lists in Table I of Annex II to Decision 2010/413 by Decision 2012/829/CFSP of 21 December 2012 amending Decision 2010/413 (OJ 2012 L 356, p. 71), and the lists in Table I of Annex IX to Regulation No 267/2012 by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1264/2012 of 21 December 2012 implementing Regulation No 267/2012 (OJ 2012 L 356, p. 55).

13 That listing was based on the following grounds: ‘Sharif University of Technology (SUT) is assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is providing support to Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of late 2011 SUT had provided laboratories for use by UN-designated Iranian nuclear entity Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) and EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA).’

14 By judgment of 3 July 2014 in Sharif University of Technology v Council (T‑181/13, EU:T:2014:607), the General Court annulled Decision 2012/829 and Regulation No 1264/2012 in so far as they concern the applicant.

15 By letter of 4 September 2014, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to re-list it on the basis of new grounds and invited it to submit its observations before 15 September 2014. In that letter, the Council expressed the view that the applicant provided support to the Government of Iran by means of cooperation agreements concluded with Iranian governmental organisations designated by the United Nations and the European Union. The Council enclosed with that letter the documents contained in its file on which that re-listing was based.

16 By letter of 15 September 2014, the applicant requested the Council to reconsider its decision.

17 On 7 November 2014 the Council adopted Decision 2014/776/CFSP amending Decision 2010/413 (OJ 2014 L 325 p. 19). By that decision, the applicant’s name was once again included in Table I of Annex II to Decision 2010/413 containing the list of ‘persons and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and persons and entities providing support to the Government of Iran’.

18 As a consequence, on the same day, the Council adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1202/2014 implementing Regulation No 267/2012 (OJ 2014 L 325, p. 3), which included once again the applicant’s name in Table I of Annex IX to Regulation No 267/2012, containing the list of ‘persons and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and persons and entities providing support to the Government of Iran’.

19 In Decision 2014/776 and Implementing Regulation No 1202/2014 (together ‘the contested acts’), the following reasons are given for inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists: ‘Sharif University of Technology (SUT) has a number of cooperation agreements with Iranian Government organisations which are designated by the UN and/or the EU and which operate in military or military-related fields, particularly in the field of ballistic missile production and procurement. This includes: an agreement with the EU-designated Aerospace Industries Organisation for inter alia the production of satellites; co-operating with the Iranian Ministry of Defence and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) on smart boat competitions; a broader agreement with the IRGC Air Force which covers developing and strengthening the University’s relations, organisational and strategic cooperation; SUT is part of a 6-university agreement which supports the Government of Iran through defence-related research; and SUT teaches graduate courses in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) engineering which were designed by the Ministry of Science among others. Taken together, these show a significant record of engagement with the Government of Iran in military or military-related fields that constitutes support to the Government of Iran.’

20 The Aerospace Industries Organisation (‘AIO’) is included on the lists for the following reasons: ‘AIO oversees Iran’s production of missiles, including Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group and Fajr Industrial Group, which were all designated under UNSCR 1737 (2006). The head of AIO and two other senior officials were also designated under UNSCR 1737 (2006).’

21 IRGC is included on the lists for the following reasons: ‘Responsible for Iran’s nuclear programme. Has operational control for Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Has undertaken procurement attempts to support Iran’s ballistic missiles and nuclear programmes.’

22 By letter of 10 November 2014, the Council informed the applicant of its decision to re-list it.

23 By letter of 2 February 2015, the applicant requested the Council to provide it with all the information and evidence on the basis of which it had decided to include the applicant’s name of the lists for a second time, and the identity of the Member State which had proposed its re-listing.

Procedure and forms of order sought

24 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 4 February 2015, the applicant brought the present action.

25 By document lodged at the Court Registry on 17 September 2015, the applicant submitted a request for a hearing, stating the reasons for which it wished to be heard, in accordance with the provisions of Article 106(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. The Council did not express a view as to whether there should be a hearing within the period prescribed. Acting on a proposal of the Judge-Rapporteur, the General Court (Seventh Chamber) granted the applicant’s request.

26 The applicant claims that the Court should: — annul the contested acts, in so far as they concern it; — order the Council to pay the applicant compensation to make good the damage to its reputation caused by the contested acts; — order the Council to pay the costs.

27 The Council contends that the Court should: — dismiss the action as unfounded; — order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law

1. The application for annulment

28 In support of its application for annulment, the applicant puts forward four pleas in law: the first alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection; the second alleging an error of law and manifest errors of assessment; the third alleging infringement of the right to property and the principle of proportionality; and the fourth alleging misuse of powers.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to effective judicial protection

29 In the first place, the applicant criticises the Council for failing to indicate, in its letter of 10 November 2014 (see paragraph 22 above), the date of adoption of the decision re-listing its name. In that context, it recalls that it submitted an application for review in its letter of 15 September 2014.

30 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the Council enclosed with its letter of 10 November 2014 referred to above, which was received by the applicant on 25 November 2014, a copy of the publication of the contested acts in the Official Journal of the European Union, which refers expressly, in the title of those acts, to their date of adoption, namely 7 November 2014.

31 In the second place, the applicant criticises the Council for failing to grant its request for access to the file made by letter of 2 February 2015. The Council did not provide the relevant internal documents, contrary to its practice in other cases relating to restrictive measures. Furthermore, there are some signs that suggest that the contested acts were adopted on the basis of information not contained in the documents provided by the Council’s letter of 4 September 2014. The applicant claims in that regard that those documents do not contain the slightest evidence substantiating one the reasons for listing referred to in the contested acts, namely it ‘teaches graduate courses in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) engineering which were designed by the Ministry of Science among others’.

32 Accordingly, the applicant maintains that, by not giving it full access to the file, including access to information concerning the identity of the Member State that proposed that its name be re-listed, the Council infringed the applicant’s rights of defence and its right to effective judicial protection.

33 It must be noted that the Council, by its letter of 4 September 2014, notifying the applicant of its intention to re-list the applicant’s name (see paragraph 15 above), sent the evidence and information available to it which served as the basis on which its decision to adopt the contested acts was made. In its defence, the Council submitted that, apart from that evidence, its file contained only the proposal and the revised proposal for re-listing the applicant’s name, which were presented by a Member State, and the note submitted by the General Secretariat of the Council to the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper) and the Council with a view to the adoption of the contested acts. By document lodged at the Court Registry on 4 September 2015, the Council produced those documents.

34 It follows from those documents, in which the identity of the Member State that proposed the re-listing and all the information not concerning the applicant were redacted, that they contain no additional relevant information as compared with the information provided to the applicant by letter of 4 September 2014 and the documents annexed to that letter.

35 Accordingly, first, it must be held that the applicant’s claims that the contested acts were adopted on the basis of information which was not contained in the documents sent to it by letter of 4 September 2014 (see paragraph 31 above) are unfounded.

36 Secondly, it must be noted that the identity of the Member State which made the proposal for inclusion on the lists, is, in itself, confidential, with the result that it cannot, on account of overriding considerations concerning the security of the European Union or its Member States or the conduct of their international relations, be communicated to the person concerned. The fact that that information was not disclosed to the applicant cannot, however, infringe its rights of defence or its right to effective judicial protection, in so far as it has no effect on the opportunity available to the applicant to submit its observations on the grounds for listing its name and the evidence on which those grounds are based.

37 It follows from the above that the first plea in law must be rejected.

Second plea in law, alleging an error of law and manifest errors of assessment

38 The applicant submits that the Council incorrectly interpreted the legal criterion relating to the provision of support to the Government of Iran set out in Article 20(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413 and Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012 (‘the contested criterion’) and on which the re-listing of its name in the contested acts is based. The applicant claims, essentially, that that criterion does not cover research and technology development in military or military-related fields relied on in the grounds for the inclusion of its name on the lists, in the absence of any connection between those activities and the nuclear proliferation programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, the applicant claims that the documents provided by the Council as evidence do not substantiate the grounds put forward for the listing of its name.

Interpretation of the contested criterion in respect of the activities in the military or military-related fields referred to in the grounds of the contested acts

39 In the first place, the applicant criticises the Council for having interpreted the contested criterion literally, thereby allowing it to include a vast group of persons, including Iranian taxpayers. In the applicant’s view, that criterion refers only to support allowing the Government of Iran to pursue proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, which implies that there is a causal link between the conduct constituting ‘support’ and the pursuit of such activities. The requirement of a causal link derives from recital 13 of Decision 2012/35, Article 215(1) TFEU and the judgment of 13 March 2012 in Tay Za v Council (C‑376/10 P, ECR, EU:C:2012:138, paragraphs 61 and 67).

40 According to the applicant, the case-law confirms that, first, the contested criterion refers only to the provision of support to the Government of Iran enabling it to pursue nuclear proliferation activities. Secondly, that material, logistical or financial support must have specific ‘quantitative or qualitative significance’. Thirdly, the aim of the contested criterion is to deprive the Government of Iran of its sources of revenue, in order to oblige it to end the development of its nuclear proliferation programme. The applicant also refers, inter alia, to the judgments of 16 July 2014 in National Iranian Oil Company v Council (T‑578/12, EU:T:2014:678, paragraphs 119 and 120), 25 March 2015 in Central Bank of Iran v Council (T‑563/12, ECR, EU:T:2015:187, paragraph 66) and 25 June 2015 in Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction v Council (T‑95/14, ECR (Extracts), EU:T:2015:433, paragraph 53).

41 In the second place, the applicant submits that its alleged collaboration with various ministries of the Government of Iran did not constitute support in the sense of the contested criterion, since the qualitative or quantitative significance of the activities in question was not sufficient to permit the assumption that it provided financial or logistical support to the Government of Iran encouraging the pursuit of nuclear proliferation activities.

42 In that respect, the applicant claims that it is a public university funded by the Iranian State. Accordingly, unlike the large financial institutions or undertakings active in the oil and gas sector, which were previously included on the lists on the basis of the contested criterion, the applicant does not provide financial resources to the Government of Iran which could be presumed to encourage the pursuit of the nuclear proliferation activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

43 In those circumstances, the applicant infers from the above that the Council must show that, on account of their qualitative significance, the activities which the Council claims it is engaged in enabled the Government of Iran to pursue its nuclear proliferation activities.

44 The Council disputes those arguments.

45 It is clear from the statement of reasons for the contested acts (see paragraph 19 above) that the Council re-listed the applicant on the ground that its ‘significant record of engagement with the Government of Iran in military or military-related fields’ constituted support to the Government of Iran, for the purposes of the contested criterion.

46 In order to establish the existence of such engagement, the Council relied, in the contested acts, on a number of factors: — the existence of cooperation agreements with Iranian Government organisations designated by the UN or the EU and operating in military or military-related fields, particularly in the field of ballistic missile production and procurement, namely: — an agreement with the AIO for the production of satellites; — cooperation with the Iranian Ministry of Defence and the IRGC on smart boat competitions; — a broader agreement with the IRGC Air Force which covers the developing and strengthening of their relations and organisational and strategic cooperation; — the applicant’s participation in a six-university agreement which supports the Government of Iran through defence-related research; — the fact that the applicant provides graduate courses in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) engineering which were designed by the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology.

47 The grounds of the contested acts, which are set out in paragraphs 45 and 46 above, clearly show that the Council criticises the applicant, in essence, for providing support to the Government of Iran in respect of military or military-related research and technology, inter alia through cooperation agreements with the AIO and the IRGC, which also appear on the lists and operate in those fields (see paragraphs 20 and 21 above).

48 It is therefore necessary to examine the applicant’s argument that research and technology development in military or military-related fields, in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence or State entities which are themselves listed, is not covered by the contested criterion where the Council fails to establish that those activities have sufficient quantitative or qualitative significance to allow for a finding that they encourage the pursuit of the proliferation-sensitive Iranian nuclear programme (see paragraph 41 above).

49 In the first place, contrary to the applicant’s claims (see paragraph 39 above), the contested criterion does not involve establishing a causal link between the conduct constituting the provision of support to the Government of Iran and the pursuit of nuclear proliferation activities.

50 It is true that, according to case-law, the contested criterion does not concern any form of support to the Government of Iran, but covers forms of support which, by their quantitative or qualitative significance, contribute to the pursuit of Iran’s nuclear activities. Interpreted, subject to review by the European Union Courts, by reference to the objective of applying pressure on the Government of Iran to end activities posing a risk of nuclear proliferation, the contested criterion thus objectively defines a limited category of persons and entities which may be subject to fund-freezing measures (judgment in National Iranian Oil Company v Council, cited in paragraph 40 above, EU:T:2014:678, paragraph 119).

51 In the light of the purpose of the fund-freezing measures referred to in paragraph 50 above, it is unequivocally clear from the contested criterion that it is aimed in a targeted and selective manner at the relevant person’s or entity’s own activity, which, even if it has no actual direct or indirect connection with nuclear proliferation, is nevertheless capable of encouraging it by providing the Government of Iran with resources or facilities of, inter alia, a material, financial or logistic nature which allow it to pursue proliferation activities (see, to that effect, judgments in National Iranian Oil Company v Council, cited in paragraph 40 above, EU:T:2014:678, paragraph 120, and of 29 April 2015 in National Iranian Gas Company v Council, T‑9/13, EU:T:2015:236, paragraph 62).

52 However, contrary to the interpretation proposed by the applicant, it does not follow from the case-law set out in paragraphs 50 and 51 above that the concept of ‘support to the Government of Iran’ involves proof of a connection between that support and the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In that regard, the Council rightly states that the applicant is confusing, first, the criterion relating to the provision of support to the Government of Iran set out in Article 20(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413 and Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012, which is the only relevant criterion in the present case, and, secondly, the criterion relating to the provision of support ‘for … Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems’ set out in Article 20(1)(b) of that decision and Article 23(2)(a) of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment in National Iranian Oil Company v Council, cited in paragraph 40 above, EU:T:2014:678, paragraph 139). The application of the first criterion does not imply a certain degree of connection, even indirect connection, with Iran’s nuclear activities, required for the purposes of the application of the second criterion referred to above relating to the provision of support for Iran’s nuclear activities (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 November 2013 in Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, ECR, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 80, and in Central Bank of Iran v Council, cited in paragraph 40 above, EU:T:2015:187, paragraph 66).

53 As regards the contested criterion, it is apparent from recital 13 of Decision 2012/35 (see paragraph 6 above), which inserted that criterion into Article 20(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413, that the Council, considering that the provision of support to the Government of Iran was capable of encouraging the pursuit of proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, intended to expand the criteria for listing by extending the adoption of fund-freezing measures to persons and entities providing support to that government, without requiring a direct or indirect link between that support and such activities (see, to that effect, judgment in National Iranian Oil Company v Council, cited in paragraph 40 above, EU:T:2014:678, paragraph 118).

54 Thus, the existence of a connection between the provision of support to the Government of Iran and the pursuit of nuclear proliferation activities is expressly established by the applicable legislation. In that context, the contested criterion must be construed as being aimed at any support which, even though it has no direct or indirect connection with the development of nuclear proliferation, is nevertheless capable, as a result of its quantitative or qualitative significance, of encouraging such development, by providing the Government of Iran with resources or facilities of, inter alia, a material, financial or logistic nature. Accordingly, the Council is not required to establish that there is a connection between the conduct constituting support and the facilitation of nuclear proliferation activities, since such a connection is established by the general rules applicable (see, to that effect, judgments in National Iranian Oil Company v Council, cited in paragraph 40 above, EU:T:2014:678, paragraph 140; Central Bank of Iran v Council, cited in paragraph 40 above, EU:T:2015:187, paragraph 81, and National Iranian Gas Company v Council, cited in paragraph 51 above, EU:T:2015:236, paragraph 65).

55 Accordingly, it is necessary to reject the applicant’s claim that the interpretation of the contested criterion referred to in paragraphs 53 and 54 above is purely literal and leads to the inclusion on the lists of a vast group of persons (see paragraph 39 above). That interpretation of the contested criterion, in the light of its legal context, concerns a limited category of persons in a targeted manner (see paragraphs 50 and 51 above) and cannot cover the mere fact of discharging one’s legal obligations, including tax obligations (judgment in National Iranian Oil Company v Council, cited in paragraph 40 above, EU:T:2014:678, paragraph 121).

56 Article 215(1) TFEU and the judgment in Tay Za v Council, cited in paragraph 39 above (EU:C:2012:138), on which the applicant also relies, are irrelevant in the present case, in so far as Regulation No 267/2012, implemented by Implementing Regulation No 1202/2014, is based on Article 215(2) TFEU and in so far as the measures examined by the Court in that judgment were adopted on the basis of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC and form part of the entirely separate legal framework of restrictive measures against the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.

57 In the second place, it is also necessary to reject the applicant’s argument that, since the support which it is claimed it provides to the Government of Iran is not financial, unlike that provided by the financial institutions or undertakings operating in the oil and gas sector which were previously listed on the basis of the contested criterion, the Council must establish that the support provided encourages the pursuit of nuclear proliferation activities (see paragraphs 42 and 43 above).

58 It is true that in the judgments relied on by the applicant (see paragraph 40 above), relating, inter alia, to the oil and gas sector in Iran, the Court considered that the activity of State undertakings operating in that sector (judgment in National Iranian Oil Company v Council, cited in paragraph 40 above, EU:T:2014:678, paragraph 141) or of undertakings providing logistical support to the Government of Iran in that sector (see, to that effect, judgment in Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction v Council, cited in paragraph 40 above, EU:T:2015:433, paragraph 54) satisfied the contested criterion, highlighting, in essence, the fact that the applicable rules, in particular recital 22 of Decision 2010/413 (see paragraph 5 above), recital 8 of Decision 2012/35 (see paragraph 6 above) and recital 16 of Decision 2012/635 (see paragraph 9 above), had established a connection between the source of revenue that the Islamic Republic of Iran drew from that sector and the funding of proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.

59 However, the contested criterion cannot be interpreted as aiming solely to deprive the Government of Iran of its sources of revenue and thus to compel it to end its nuclear proliferation activities. That criterion refers to any support which, as a result of its quantitative or qualitative significance, is capable of encouraging the pursuit of those activities and that assessment must be made in the light of all relevant provisions of the applicable legislation (see paragraph 54 above). Recital 13 of Decision 2012/35 and Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012 indicate by way of example that support may be material, logistical or financial.

60 In the third place, it is therefore necessary to ascertain whether, in the context of the applicable legislation, research and technology development in military or military-related fields, which does not correspond to any of the three types of support — material, financial or logistical — referred to by way of example in that legislation (see paragraph 59 above), is capable of falling within the scope of the contested criterion.

61 In that regard, it must be noted that it follows from Decision 2010/413 and Regulation No 267/2012 that restrictive measures may be adopted in respect of persons or entities involved in procurement by the Islamic Republic of Iran, in military or military-related fields, of prohibited goods and technology or providing technical assistance in relation to such goods and technology. The connection between the latter and nuclear proliferation is established by the EU legislature in the general rules of the relevant provisions (see, by analogy, judgment in Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, cited in paragraph 52 above, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 76).

62 In particular, Article 1(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413 prohibits the supply, sale or transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of arms and related material of all types, including military vehicles and equipment. Moreover, by virtue of Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation No 267/2012, it is prohibited to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance relating to the goods and technology listed in the Common Military List of the European Union adopted by the Council on 17 March 2014 (OJ 2014 C 107, p. 1) (the ‘Common Military List’), or associated with the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of goods on that list to any Iranian person, entity or body or for use in Iran.

63 Thus, by providing for such a ban in so far as concerns certain military equipment, within the framework of Regulation No 267/2012, the legislature established a connection between procurement by the Islamic Republic of Iran of that type of equipment and pursuit by the Government of Iran of proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.

64 That interpretation is confirmed by UNSCR 1737 (2006) and UNSCR 1929, adopted on 23 December 2006 and 9 June 2010 respectively, and referred to in recitals 1 and 4 of Decision 2012/35 respectively. The general rules of the European Union providing for the adoption of restrictive measures must be interpreted in the light of the wording and purpose of the Security Council resolutions which they implement (judgments of 16 November 2011 in Bank Melli Iran v Council, C‑548/09 P, ECR, EU:C:2011:735, paragraph 104, and 25 April 2012 in Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft v Council, T‑509/10, ECR, EU:T:2012:201, paragraph 83). The abovementioned two resolutions refer to the adoption of suitable measures to constrain the Islamic Republic of Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes. In particular, satellites and UAVs, inter alia, feature on the lists of equipment and technology whose provision to the Islamic Republic of Iran is prohibited by those resolutions, lists to which UNSCR 1929 more specifically refers.

65 Accordingly, the provision of support to the Government of Iran in respect of research and technology development in military or military-related fields satisfies the contested criterion where it relates to equipment or technology on the Common Military List, the procurement of which by the Islamic Republic of Iran is prohibited (see paragraph 62 above).

66 It must be noted in that respect that the Common Military List concerns, inter alia, the following equipment: ‘ML 9 Vessels of war (surface or underwater), special naval equipment, accessories, components and other surface vessels, as follows: … a. Vessels and components, as follows: 1. Vessels (surface or underwater) specially designed or modified for military use, regardless of current state of repair or operating condition, and whether or not they contain weapon delivery systems or armour, and hulls or parts of hulls for such vessels, and components therefor specially designed for military use; … ML 10 “Aircraft”, “lighter-than-air vehicles”, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (“UAVs”), aero-engines and “aircraft” equipment, related equipment, and components, as follows, specially designed or modified for military use: … c. Unmanned aircraft and related equipment, as follows, and specially designed components therefor: 1. “UAVs”, Remotely Piloted Air Vehicles (RPVs), autonomous programmable vehicles and unmanned “lighter-than-air vehicles”; … ML 11 Electronic equipment, [satellite], as follows: … c. [satellite] specially designed or modified for military use, and “spacecraft” components specially designed for military use.’

67 It follows that the provision of support to the Government of Iran in so far as concerns, inter alia, the design, production or development of satellites, ships or UAVs which meet the specifications of the Common Military List satisfies the contested criterion, without the Council being required to demonstrate that the extent of that support encourages the pursuit of nuclear proliferation activities.

68 In the fourth place, it must however be stressed that, in any event, the question of whether conduct falls within the scope of the contested criterion must be examined in the light of the legal and factual context as a whole. Accordingly, where the Council is not able to establish that the activities in question relate to satellites or smart boats which in fact meet the specifications of the Common Military List, the fact that those activities are conducted in cooperation with the AIO, as regards the production of satellites, or with the Iranian Ministry of Defence and the IRGC in the context of the smart boat competition permits the view that, if the Council’s claims relating to that cooperation are sufficiently substantiated, the extent of the support thus provided to the Government of Iran is sufficient to satisfy the contested criterion.

69 The AIO, which, the contested acts indicate, is designated by the European Union ‘for inter alia the production of satellites’ is itself included on the lists on the ground that it ‘oversees Iran’s production of missiles’, including three industrial groups referred to in UNSCR 1737 (2006). The IRGC is included on the lists for the following reasons: ‘Responsible for Iran’s nuclear programme. Has operational control for Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Has undertaken procurement attempts to support Iran’s ballistic missiles and nuclear programmes.’

70 In those circumstances, the direct involvement of the AIO as regards the production of missiles and of the IRGC in Iran’s nuclear programme and in the operational control of Iran’s ballistic missile programme, which is not contested in the present case by the applicant, permits the assumption that the activities conducted in cooperation with those entities of the Government of Iran in relation to the production of satellites and the development of smart boats, are of clear benefit, in so far as concerns the pursuit of the proliferation-sensitive nuclear programme or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.

71 In the present case, it must be confirmed whether the Council’s claims relating to the exercise of such activities by the applicant are sufficiently substantiated.

Evidence relied on by the Council

72 The applicant maintains that the Council failed to establish that the activities mentioned in the documents it has produced, taken as a whole, show ‘a significant record of engagement with the Government of Iran in military or military-related fields’. In particular, the Council failed to specify which type of support the Government of Iran would have derived from the applicant’s cooperation with the AIO and the IRGC. The fact that the applicant may have cooperated with the government of its country, like other Iranian universities, is normal for any research institute in the field of science and technology in any country in the world.

73 Furthermore, the Council did not verify the accuracy of the information in the documents that the Council produced, which are, for the most part, merely translations by the Council of news reports, that is to say second-hand information. Moreover, the original versions of those documents were drafted in Farsi and some of those original texts were not provided by the Council.

74 According to the Council, the applicant’s cooperation, which is demonstrated by the documents produced, with, first, the Ministry of Defence, and secondly, the AIO and the IRGC, which are bodies controlled by the Iranian State and included on the lists because of their involvement in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s ballistic missile programme, constitutes support for the Government of Iran for the purpose of the contested criterion.

75 In the present case, it is necessary to assess the probative value of the evidence relied on by the Council in support of each of the grounds for re-listing the applicant’s name set out in the contested acts (see paragraph 46 above), in order to ascertain whether, having regard to the content and scope of the contested criterion, which are set out in particular in paragraphs 54 and 67 to 70 above, those grounds are sufficiently substantiated to the requisite legal standard (see paragraphs 77 to 103 below). That examination will make it possible to establish whether, taken as a whole, those grounds therefore justify the re-listing of the applicant’s name (see paragraph 104 below).

76 As a preliminary point, it is necessary to reject the argument relied on by the applicant at the hearing to the effect that the documents put forward by the Council in support of the grounds for listing it in the contested acts were too old. As regards the development of satellites and smart boats, most of the documents relied on by the Council date from 2012 and show cooperation with no specific end date (MD 176/14 RELEX, MD 177/14 RELEX, MD 178/14 RELEX). Furthermore, document MD 179/14 RELEX, relating to a statement by the Commander of the IRGC Navy from the applicant’s website dates from January 2014. As regards the cooperation agreement between the applicant and the IRGC Air Force, it must be noted that document MD 180/14 RELEX was still on that site when the contested acts were adopted.

– Agreement with the AIO for the production of satellites

77 In support of its claims relating to the applicant’s agreement with the AIO for the production of satellites, the Council produced documents MD 176/14 RELEX and MD 177/14 RELEX from its file (see paragraph 15 above). Those documents consist of copies of web pages from a BBC reports archive, which are drafted in English and include the text of two reports of the press agency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA). As the applicant notes, the IRNA’s own reports were not produced. However, the applicant does not dispute the accuracy of the information in the BBC documents. The applicant submits, in essence, that that information does not justify its re-listing.

78 The first of those documents (MD 176/14 RELEX), dated 3 February 2012 and entitled ‘Iran to have greater achievements in space industry — defence minister’, reports on the announcement by the Iranian Minister for Defence of the launch by the AIO of a satellite designed and built by the applicant’s students, under the supervision of a member of the High Council of Space. In the same document, the director of the AIO states that it is a remote-testing satellite which films the earth with greater accuracy. Weighing 50 kg, that micro-satellite has different applications in various fields, such as meteorology, management of natural disasters and measuring temperature and air humidity.

79 The second document (MD 177/14 RELEX), dated 2 October 2012 and entitled ‘Iran to launch more satellites this year’, refers to the announcement by the director of the AIO of the launch of another satellite, equipped with solar panels, to be built by the applicant, whose mission will be to photograph the earth at an altitude of 250 to 370 km.

80 The applicant maintains that document MD 176/14 RELEX concerns a micro-satellite designed for peaceful purposes. Furthermore, it did not participate in the design and construction of the delivery system or the launching of that satellite or of the satellite referred to in document MD 177/14 RELEX. Those documents contain no evidence to substantiate the claim that the design and construction of the satellites to which they refer encourage the Government of Iran to pursue its nuclear proliferation activities.

81 It must be noted that documents MD 176/14 RELEX and MD 177/14 RELEX contain no evidence permitting the inference that the two satellites concerned were specially designed or modified for military use, for the purposes of the Common Military List (see paragraph 66 above). Furthermore, these documents do not refer to any agreement between the applicant and the AIO in respect of satellite production.

82 However, the fact that the launch of the first satellite by the AIO was announced by the Iranian Ministry of Defence (see paragraph 78 above) demonstrates the relevance of that satellite in military or military-related fields. Furthermore, that analysis is confirmed by the fact that the AIO, which is responsible for the launch of the satellites, is itself included on the lists on account of its involvement in missile production (see paragraph 70 above). In that context, the applicant’s claim that it was not involved in the design and production of the launch delivery systems is irrelevant, since the Council criticises the applicant only in respect of its activities relating to the design and production of satellites.

83 Accordingly, the applicant’s activities relating to the production of satellites may be regarded as the provision of support to the Government of Iran, for the purposes of the contested criterion.

– Cooperation with the Iranian Ministry of Defence and the IRGC concerning smart boat competitions

84 In order to demonstrate that the applicant is cooperating with the Iranian Ministry of Defence and the IRGC in the context of smart boat competitions, the Council produced, first, documents MD 178/14 RELEX and MD 179/14 RELEX, which are contained in its file (see paragraph 15 above), and, secondly, as an annex to the rejoinder, an article published on the website of the Iran Daily Brief newspaper, dated 30 January 2014.

85 Document MD 178/14 RELEX is a press article published by the Fars News Agency dated 12 May 2012. That article, which is entitled ‘Close cooperation between Sharif University and the Ministry of Defence/Navy issues neglected in Iran’, relates to an interview given by the head of the applicant’s Marine Engineering Group to that agency in which that senior official refers to an agreement concluded by a scientific committee of the applicant’s and the Defence Ministry’s Marine Industries Organisation in respect of smart boat competitions. Under the terms of that agreement, there is no financial or operational restriction on approved projects. The article states that that close cooperation between the applicant and the Ministry of Defence organisation had begun two years earlier.

86 Document MD 179/14 RELEX contains, inter alia, an article from the applicant’s website, dated 21 January 2014, entitled ‘Navy support for the winners of the smart boat competitions’. That article relates to a statement made by the Commander of the IRGC Navy at the opening ceremony of the third smart boat competition, who refers to the strategic importance of the technological development of that type of boat and to the cooperation of the IRGC Navy and Iranian research centres.

87 The applicant maintains that it is clear from document MD 178/14 RELEX that at the time of the interview to which it refers no project had been agreed. Moreover, that document does not contain any information concerning potential projects. In its reply, the applicant stated that it had organised only one smart boat competition. Document MD 179/14 RELEX, which does not mention the applicant, therefore refers to a competition that the applicant did not organise. Moreover, it does not follow from the statement of the IRGC naval commander that the boats in question were intended for military use. In any event, the Council did not explain why the applicant’s involvement in the design of boats, even those for military use, would encourage the pursuit by the Government of Iran of nuclear proliferation activities.

88 In the rejoinder, the Council maintained that the applicant’s claim that it did not organise the third smart boat competition is contradicted by an article published on the Iran Daily Brief website, which was submitted as an annex to the rejoinder.

89 That article, dated 30 January 2014, is entitled: ‘IRGCN commander: Organisation of Smart Combat Vessels established’. It indicates that, in his speech at the opening ceremony of the third Autonomous Surface Vehicles (ASV) competition, which took place at Sharif University of Technology, the Commander of the IRGC Navy stated that ‘a combat department of smart boats’ had been established by the IRGC.

90 It follows from that article, first, that, in the absence of any other explanation from the applicant, the third smart boat competition concerned boats likely to be used for military purposes. Secondly, the fact that the opening ceremony of that competition was held on the applicant’s premises suggests that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it was involved in its organisation.

91 The abovementioned article of 30 January 2014 therefore constitutes supplementary evidence corroborating the evidence contained in documents MD 178/14 RELEX and MD 179/14 RELEX relating to the applicant’s cooperation with the Ministry of Defence and the IRGC in the context of smart boat competitions (see paragraphs 85 and 86 above). It contains no new factual evidence in support of the applicant’s listing and merely substantiates the claims already made by the Council in its letter of 4 September 2014 (see paragraph 15 above) and addresses the arguments raised by the applicant during the proceedings before the Court. It may therefore be taken into consideration, even though it was not included in the Council’s file, without any infringement of the applicant’s rights of defence and right to an effective remedy.

92 It follows that the Council has established to the requisite legal standard that the applicant’s activity concerning smart boat competitions satisfied the contested criterion.

– Agreement between the applicant and the IRGC Air Force

93 The Council submitted the text of an ‘Agreement to Assign Space in Sharif’s Technology House’ between the applicant’s Research and Technology Department and the IRGC Aerospace Force — represented by the head of the SAK Research Institute of the Aerospace Force (‘the Research Institute’) — contained in its file under reference MD 180/14 RELEX.

94 The applicant maintains that this is a mere letter of intent, which was not signed. Furthermore, that letter sets out only general heads of cooperation and would have to be followed by specific operational agreements.

95 The Council submits that document MD 180/14 RELEX comes from the applicant’s website. It maintains that, even if the agreement was not signed by the parties, it reveals, in any event, a real intent to develop a certain level of cooperation between the applicant and the Research Institute.

96 In that regard, it must be noted that, according to document MD 180/14 RELEX, the agreement was planned for a period running from the date of signing to 20 March 2013, with the possibility of extension, depending on the level of activity, by agreement between the parties. Furthermore, the text of the agreement was still on the applicant’s website when the contested acts were adopted, on 7 November 2014. Those facts permit the assumption that the applicant had connections with the IRGC Air Force with a view to scientific and technological cooperation.

97 It is true, as the applicant notes, that that agreement does not refer expressly to activities in military or military-related fields. However, the provisions of the agreement show the decisive influence of the Research Institute and, accordingly, of the IRGC on the applicant’s relationships with industry and on the choice and follow-up of its research projects. It is clear from that agreement that, in general, it aims to develop and organise relations between the applicant and industry and seeks to fulfil the requirements of the industry with the applicant’s existing resources. The Research Institute undertakes, inter alia, to conclude a contract with the applicant to implement research projects required by industry, in particular the proposals submitted by that institute (paragraph 5.1 of the agreement). That institute defines specific areas of interest to companies and presents them to the applicant with a view to concluding a contract (paragraph 5.11 of the agreement). For its part, the applicant undertakes, inter alia, to submit periodic reports on the results of its industry-related research (paragraph 6.1 of the agreement) and to provide industry-related university resources (paragraph 6.4 of the agreement).

98 The matters referred to above do not make it possible to establish, in themselves, that the applicant provides support to the Government of Iran in respect of equipment on the Common Military List (see paragraph 67 above). However, it must be stressed that the abovementioned agreement with the IRGC Air Force provided for close and systematic cooperation between the applicant and the Research Institute in respect of the applicant’s research activities, according to the requirements of Iranian industry. That agreement therefore applies to all industrial fields, including military and related fields referred to in the grounds for listing the applicant. In the light of the IRGC’s involvement in the nuclear programme and operational control of Iran’s ballistic missile programme (see paragraph 70 above) and in several key sectors of the economy, the agreement confirms that the support thus provided by the applicant to the Government of Iran falls, on account of its extent, within the scope of the contested criterion (see paragraph 68 above).

– Agreement between the applicant and six other universities concerning defence-related research

99 In order to establish the existence of an agreement between the applicant and six other universities to provide the Government of Iran with defence-related research, the Council relied on document MD 181/14 RELEX, which is contained in its file and includes a compilation of information from websites of Iranian press agencies, in particular the IRNA, in respect of military developments in Iran from 15 June to 11 July 2012.

100 That document shows that an IRNA article of 23 June 2012 indicates that a cooperation agreement was signed by the applicant and six other universities concerning education, joint research and the establishment of centres of excellence. The Minister for Science, Research and Technology highlighted, in that regard, the universities’ role in ‘neutralising the enemies’ plots and plans targeted at the country’s university community’. He announced that the Ministry would provide financial support for research and activities in defence-related matters.

101 However, contrary to the Council’s claims, that agreement cannot constitute evidence of the support provided by the applicant to the Government of Iran, for the purposes of the contested criterion. It is a cooperation agreement between universities, which refers in general to the usual teaching and research activities normally carried out by universities. In that context, the general statements made by the Minister for Science, Research and Technology contained in document MD 181/14 RELEX are not sufficient for it to be presumed, in the absence of any specific information concerning the content of that agreement, that it relates more particularly to research and technological development activities in the field of defence or related fields and that accordingly the agreement contributes to the provision of support to the Government of Iran.

– University courses in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) design

102 The applicant rightly notes that the documents produced by the Council contain no proof that it teaches courses designed by the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology in UAV design.

103 Accordingly, since that ground for the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists is not substantiated, it cannot serve to justify the adoption of the contested acts.

– Conclusion

104 It follows from all the foregoing that the grounds for inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists relating to its activity, first, in the field of satellites and, secondly, in the field of smart boats, are sufficiently substantiated, as was found in paragraphs 83 and 92 above. Furthermore, the agreement between the applicant and the IRGC confirms the applicant’s commitment to the Government of Iran in military or military-related fields (see paragraph 98 above). All of those reasons therefore justify the inclusion of the applicant’s name, in the contested acts, on the basis of the contested criterion.

105 Consequently, the second plea in law must be rejected.

Third plea in law, alleging breach of the right to property and of the principle of proportionality

106 The applicant submits, first of all, that, since there is no justification for its re-listing, the contested acts infringe the right to property and are contrary to the principle of proportionality.

107 Next, the applicant criticises the Council for failing to take account of the fact that it is not a commercial undertaking, but a university. Therefore, the inclusion of its name on the lists affects not only its own rights, but also those of its teaching staff and its students. That listing is also disproportionate because it undermines the rights of the applicant’s scientific staff, the right to education enshrined in Article 2 of Protocol No 1 to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, Article 14 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as well as the freedom of expression and information enshrined in Article 10 of that convention and in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

108 Finally, the applicant claims that the contested acts had a negative effect on its research and teaching activities, in particular, in so far as, since the initial listing, publishers have ceased to publish articles by Iranian authors and cancelled contracts with the applicant for the publication of five English-language books. The applicant also ceased to receive scientific reviews, publications and catalogues published in Europe, is no longer able to procure research and laboratory materials in EU Member States, no longer has access to certain internet research sites and its members are no longer granted visas to go to EU Member States.

109 It is settled case-law that the principle of proportionality is one of the general principles of European Union law and requires that measures implemented through provisions of European Union law be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them (see judgment of 13 September 2013 in Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, ECR, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 98 and the case-law cited).

110 In the present case, it should be noted that the fact that the contested acts affect not only the applicant’s right to property but also its research and teaching activities, not to mention the other rights referred to in paragraph 107 above, does not justify the view that those acts are disproportionate. In so far as, through its research and development activities referred to in the contested acts, the applicant provided support to the Government of Iran prohibited by the applicable rules, as established in paragraph 104 above, the Council was entitled to take the view, without exceeding the limits of its discretion, that the re-listing of the applicant constituted an appropriate and necessary measure for the purposes of combating nuclear proliferation.

111 It follows that the third plea in law must be rejected.

Fourth plea in law, alleging misuse of powers

112 First, the applicant submits that the fact that the documents produced by the Council do not support the grounds put forward for its re-listing shows that the Council actually based its decision on grounds other than those set out in the initial decision to list it, which was annulled by the judgment in Sharif University of Technology v Council, cited in paragraph 14 above (EU:T:2014:607).

113 That argument merely reiterates, in support of the present plea in law, the argument already relied on by the applicant in the first plea, to the effect that the Council failed to notify it of certain information contained in its file on which the contested acts relied. That argument must, accordingly, be rejected on the grounds set out in paragraphs 33 to 35 above, to which reference should be made.

114 Secondly, the applicant alleges that, of the three universities included on the lists, it is the only one whose inclusion is based on the contested criterion. The two other universities were included on the basis of the criterion of involvement in Iran’s nuclear programme. In that context, the applicant takes the view that the fact that the other five universities which are, with the applicant, parties to the six-university agreement providing support to the Government of Iran through defence-related research mentioned in one of the grounds of the contested acts were not listed shows that the applicant’s re-listing is in fact based on another ground.

115 In that regard, it must be noted that the claim concerning the listing on other grounds of the two other universities, which is referred to in paragraph 114 above, is irrelevant in the present case. Moreover, the fact that the five other universities which are parties to the agreement referred to in one of the grounds for the applicant’s re-listing were not subject to restrictive measures on the basis of the contested criterion cannot constitute evidence of misuse of powers.

116 It is clear from the statement of reasons for the contested acts that the applicant’s participation in that agreement is only one of five grounds for its re-listing. Three other grounds listed in the contested acts relate, respectively, to cooperation agreements with Iranian Government organisations relating to the production of satellites, the organisation of smart boat competitions and strategic and organisational cooperation with the IRGC (see paragraph 46 above). As was held in paragraph 104 above, those three other grounds, viewed as a whole, justify the applicant’s re-listing, while the ground relating to the abovementioned agreement between six universities in respect of defence-related research was considered to be unsubstantiated (see paragraph 101 above).

117 For all those reasons, the fourth plea in law must be rejected.

118 It follows that the application for annulment of the contested acts must be rejected.

2. The claim for damages

119 The applicant claims that its unjustified re-listing has caused damage to its reputation. The annulment of that re-listing could not be sufficient to compensate it for that damage.

120 In accordance with settled case-law, in order for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability under the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU for unlawful conduct by its institutions, a number of conditions must be satisfied: the institution’s conduct must be unlawful, actual damage must have been suffered and there must be a causal link between the conduct complained of and the damage pleaded (see judgments of 9 September 2008 in FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission, C‑120/06 P and C‑121/06 P, ECR, EU:C:2008:476, paragraph 106 and the case-law cited, and 25 November 2014 in Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, T‑384/11, ECR, EU:T:2014:986, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

121 The cumulative nature of those three conditions governing the establishment of non-contractual liability means that, if one of them is not satisfied, the action for damages must be dismissed in its entirety, and there is no need to examine the other conditions (judgments of 8 May 2003 in T. Port v Commission, C‑122/01 P, ECR, EU:C:2003:259, paragraph 30, and Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, cited in paragraph 120 above, EU:T:2014:986, paragraph 48).

122 Since the condition relating to the unlawfulness of the listing of the applicant has not been satisfied in the present case, as noted in paragraph 118 above, the applicant’s claim for damages must be rejected and, accordingly, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

123 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

124 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful in all of its pleas in law and the Council has applied for costs, the applicant must be ordered to pay all the costs.

On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber) hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Sharif University of Technology to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union.

Van der Woude Wiszniewska-Białecka Ulloa Rubio Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 28 April 2016. [Signatures]

Table of contents

Background to the dispute Procedure and forms of order sought Law 1. The application for annulment First plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to effective judicial protection Second plea in law, alleging an error of law and manifest errors of assessment Interpretation of the contested criterion in respect of the activities in the military or military-related fields referred to in the grounds of the contested acts Evidence relied on by the Council – Agreement with the AIO for the production of satellites – Cooperation with the Iranian Ministry of Defence and the IRGC concerning smart boat competitions – Agreement between the applicant and the IRGC Air Force – Agreement between the applicant and six other universities concerning defence-related research – University courses in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) design – Conclusion Third plea in law, alleging breach of the right to property and of the principle of proportionality Fourth plea in law, alleging misuse of powers 2. The claim for damages Costs

( *1 ) Language of the case: English.