JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition)

29 September 2021 ( *1 )

(External relations – International agreements – Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement EC-Morocco – Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco – Implementation protocol to the Partnership Agreement – Exchange of Letters accompanying the Partnership Agreement – Conclusion decision – Regulation on the allocation of fishing opportunities among the Member States – Action for annulment – Admissibility – Capacity to bring legal proceedings – Direct concern – Individual concern – Territorial scope – Jurisdiction – The Court’s interpretation of international law – Principle of self-determination – Principle of the relative effect of treaties – Possibility of relying on those principles – Concept of consent – Implementation – Discretion – Limits – Maintenance of the effects of the contested decision)

In Joined Cases T‑344/19 and T‑356/19,

Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Front Polisario), represented by G. Devers, lawyer,

applicant,

v

Council of the European Union, represented by F. Naert, P. Plaza García and V. Piessevaux, acting as Agents,

defendant,

supported by

Kingdom of Spain, represented by S. Centeno Huerta, acting as Agent,

intervener in Cases T‑344/19 and T‑356/19

by

French Republic, represented by A.-L. Desjonquères, C. Mosser, J.-L. Carré and T. Stéhelin, acting as Agents,

intervener in Cases T‑344/19 and T‑356/19

by

European Commission, represented by F. Castillo de la Torre, A. Bouquet and A. Stobiecka-Kuik, acting as Agents,

intervener in Cases T‑344/19 and T‑356/19

and by

Chambre des pêches maritimes de la Méditerranée, established in Tangier (Morocco),

Chambre des pêches maritimes de l’Atlantique Nord, established in Casablanca (Morocco),

Chambre des pêches maritimes de l’Atlantique Centre, established in Agadir (Morocco),

Chambre des pêches maritimes de l’Atlantique Sud, established in Dakhla (Western Sahara),

represented by G. Forwood, N. Colin and A. Hublet, lawyers,

interveners in Case T‑344/19

APPLICATION, in Case T‑344/19, under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Council Decision (EU) 2019/441 of 4 March 2019 on the conclusion of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco, the Implementation Protocol thereto and the Exchange of Letters accompanying the Agreement (OJ 2019 L 77, p. 4), and, in Case T‑356/19, under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Council Regulation (EU) 2019/440 of 29 November 2018 on the allocation of fishing opportunities under the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Implementation Protocol thereto (OJ 2019 L 77, p. 1),

THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition),

composed of M.J. Costeira, President, D. Gratsias (Rapporteur), M. Kancheva, B. Berke and T. Perišin, Judges,

Registrar: M. Marescaux, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure and further to the hearing on 3 March 2021,

gives the following

Judgment

I. Background to the dispute

A. International context

1 The evolving international context relating to Western Sahara can be summarised as follows.

2 On 14 December 1960, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) adopted resolution 1514 (XV), entitled ‘Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples’, which states, inter alia, that ‘all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’, that ‘immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire’, and that ‘all States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations … on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity’.

3 Western Sahara is a territory in north-west Africa which was colonised by the Kingdom of Spain at the end of the nineteenth century and which, by the date of resolution 1514 (XV), had become a province of Spain . In 1963, it was included by the UN in the ‘preliminary list of territories to which the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples applies [General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)]’ as a non-self-governing territory administered by the Kingdom of Spain, within the meaning of Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations, signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945, and is still on the list of non-self-governing territories drawn up by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the basis of information communicated under Article 73(e) of that Charter.

4 On 20 December 1966, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 2229 (XXI) on the question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara, in which it ‘reaffirm[ed] the inalienable right of the peoples of … Spanish Sahara to self-determination in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)’ and called upon the Kingdom of Spain, in its capacity as administering power, ‘to determine at the earliest possible date … the procedures for the holding of a referendum under [UN] auspices with a view to enabling the indigenous population of the Territory to exercise freely its right to self-determination’.

5 On 24 October 1970, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 2625 (XXV), by which it approved the ‘Declaration on principles of international law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’, the text of which is annexed to that resolution. That declaration ‘solemnly proclaims’, inter alia, ‘the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’. As regards that principle, it states, inter alia, the following: ‘By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right to freely determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. … The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes for implementing the right of self-determination by that people. … The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing Territory has, under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from that of the territory of the State administering it; and such separate and distinct status under the Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or of the Non-Self-Governing Territory have exercised their right of self-determination in accordance with the Charter, and particularly its purposes and principles.’

6 The Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Front Polisario) is an organisation created in Western Sahara on 10 May 1973. In Article 1 of its constituting document, it defines itself as a ‘national liberation movement’, the members of which ‘fight for total independence and for the recovery of the sovereignty of the Saharawi people over the entire territory of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic’.

7 On 20 August 1974, the Kingdom of Spain informed the UN that it proposed to hold a referendum in Western Sahara under UN auspices.

8 On 13 December 1974, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 3292 (XXIX), by which it decided, in particular, to request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the following questions: ‘I. Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonisation by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)? If the answer to the first question is in the negative, II. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?’

9 On 16 October 1975, the ICJ delivered the Advisory Opinion (see Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12; ‘the Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara’). In paragraph 162 of that opinion, it took the following view: ‘The materials and information presented to the Court show the existence, at the time of Spanish colonisation, of legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara. They equally show the existence of rights, including some rights relating to the land, which constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity, as understood by the Court, and the territory of Western Sahara. On the other hand, the Court’s conclusion is that the materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV) [of the UN General Assembly] in the decolonisation of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory.’

10 In paragraph 163 of the Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, the ICJ stated, in particular: ‘[the Court takes the view], with regard to Question I, … that Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonisation by Spain was not a territory belonging to no-one (terra nullius); … with regard to Question II, … that there were legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco of the kinds indicated in paragraph 162 of this Opinion; [and] that there were legal ties between this territory and the Mauritanian entity of the kinds indicated in paragraph 162 of this Opinion’.

11 In a speech delivered on the day of the publication of the advisory opinion on Western Sahara, the King of Morocco stated that ‘the whole world [had] recognised that [Western] Sahara [was] in [the] possession’ of the Kingdom of Morocco and that it ‘[was] obliged to reclaim that territory peacefully’, calling, to that end, for the organisation of a march.

12 On 22 October 1975, the UN Security Council, before which the matter was brought by the Kingdom of Spain, adopted resolution 377 (1975), in which it ‘request[ed] the Secretary-General to enter into immediate consultations with the parties concerned and interested’ and ‘appeal[ed] to [those parties] to exercise restraint and moderation’. On 2 November 1975, it adopted resolution 379 (1975), in which it ‘urge[d] all the parties concerned and interested to avoid any unilateral or other action which might further escalate the tension in the area’ and ‘request[ed] the Secretary-General to continue and intensify his consultations’. On 6 November 1975, following the start of the march announced by the King of Morocco, which brought together 350000 people, and the crossing of the border between the Kingdom of Morocco and Western Sahara by them, it adopted resolution 380 (1975), in which it, in particular, ‘deplore[d] the holding of [that] march’ and ‘call[ed] upon [the Kingdom of] Morocco immediately to withdraw from the Territory of Western Sahara all the participants in [that] march’.

13 On 26 February 1976, the Kingdom of Spain informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations that, as from that date, it was terminating its presence in Western Sahara and considered itself relieved of any responsibility of an international nature concerning the administration of that territory. The list of non-self-governing territories referred to in paragraph 3 above refers, in respect of Western Sahara, to that statement, which is reproduced in the footnote to that list.

14 In the meantime, an armed conflict between the Kingdom of Morocco, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the Front Polisario broke out in that region. Part of the population of Western Sahara fled that conflict and found refuge in camps located on Algerian territory, close to the border with Western Sahara.

15 On 14 April 1976, the Kingdom of Morocco concluded a treaty with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania on the partition of the territory of Western Sahara and annexed the part of that territory that had been allocated to it by that treaty. On 10 August 1979, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania concluded a peace agreement with the Front Polisario, under which it renounced all territorial claims to Western Sahara. The Kingdom of Morocco took control of the territory evacuated by Mauritanian forces and proceeded to annex it.

16 On 21 November 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 34/37 on the question of Western Sahara, in which it ‘reaffirm[ed] the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the [UN] … and the objectives of [its] resolution 1514 (XV)’, ‘deeply deplore[d] the aggravation of the situation resulting from the continued occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco’, ‘urged Morocco to join the peace process and to terminate the occupation of the Territory of Western Sahara’ and ‘recommend[ed] to that end that the [Front Polisario], the representative of the people of Western Sahara, should participate fully in any search for a just, lasting and definitive political solution of the question of Western Sahara, in accordance with the resolutions and declarations of the [UN]’. That resolution was followed by resolution 35/19 of 11 November 1980, in paragraph 10 of which the UN General Assembly ‘urge[d] … Morocco and the [Front Polisario], representative of the people of Western Sahara, to enter into direct negotiations with a view to arriving at a definitive settlement of the question of Western Sahara’.

17 The conflict between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Front Polisario continued until, on 30 August 1988, the parties accepted, in principle, the proposals for settlement put forward, inter alia, by the UN Secretary-General and providing, in particular, for the proclamation of a ceasefire and the organisation of a referendum on self-determination under UN supervision.

18 On 27 June 1990, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 658 (1990), in which it ‘approve[d] the report of the [UN] Secretary-General … which contains the … settlement proposals [referred to in paragraph 17 above] as well as an outline of the plan [for their implementation]’ and ‘call[ed] upon the two parties to cooperate fully with the [UN] Secretary-General and the current Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity in their efforts aimed at an early settlement of the question of Western Sahara’. On 29 April 1991, the Security Council adopted resolution 690 (1991) establishing the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

19 On 6 December 1995, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 50/33, entitled ‘Activities of Foreign Economic and Other Interests Which Impede the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Territories under Colonial Domination’, in which, inter alia, it ‘reaffirm[ed] the inalienable right of the peoples of colonial and Non-Self-Governing Territories to self-determination and independence and to the enjoyment of the natural resources of their Territories, as well as their right to dispose of those resources in their best interests’, ‘affirm[ed] the value of foreign economic investment undertaken in collaboration with the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories and in accordance with their wishes in order to make a valid contribution to the socio-economic development of the Territories’, ‘reiterate[d] that the damaging exploitation and plundering of the marine and other natural resources of colonial and Non-Self-Governing Territories by foreign economic interests, in violation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, is a threat to the integrity and prosperity of those Territories’ and ‘invite[d] all Governments and organisations of the United Nations system to ensure that the permanent sovereignty of the peoples of colonial and Non-Self-Governing Territories over their natural resources is fully respected and safeguarded’.

20 To date, despite the exchanges and consultations organised under the auspices of the UN, the parties have not reached a settlement on the situation in Western Sahara. The Kingdom of Morocco controls the greater part of the territory of Western Sahara, while the Front Polisario controls the other part, the two areas being separated by a wall of sand built and guarded by the Moroccan army. A significant number of refugees from that territory still live in camps administered by the Front Polisario on Algerian territory.

B. The Association Agreement and the 2006 Fisheries Agreement

1. Association Agreement

21 The Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part, signed in Brussels on 26 February 1996, entered into force on 1 March 2000 (OJ 2000 L 70, p. 2; ‘the Association Agreement’).

22 Article 1(1) of the Association Agreement provides: ‘An association is hereby established between the Community and its Member States, of the one part, and Morocco, of the other part.’

23 Article 94 of the Association Agreement provides: ‘This Agreement shall apply, on the one hand, to the territories in which the Treaties establishing the European Community and the European Coal And Steel Community are applied and under the conditions laid down in those Treaties and, on the other hand to the territory of the Kingdom of Morocco.’

24 On 13 December 2010, in the context of the Association Agreement and pursuant to Article 16 thereof, the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco signed, in Brussels (Belgium), the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters concerning reciprocal liberalisation measures on agricultural products, processed agricultural products, fish and fishery products, the replacement of protocols 1, 2 and 3 and their annexes and amendments to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part (OJ 2012 L 241, p. 4; ‘the Liberalisation Agreement’). On 8 March 2012, the Council of the European Union adopted Decision 2012/497/EU on the conclusion of the Liberalisation Agreement (OJ 2012 L 241, p. 2).

2. 2006 Fisheries Agreement

25 On 22 May 2006, the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 764/2006 on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco (OJ 2006 L 141, p. 1). Article 1 of that regulation provides: ‘The Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco is hereby approved on behalf of the Community.’

26 As is clear from its preamble and Articles 1 and 3 thereof, the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco (‘the 2006 Fisheries Agreement’) was intended to intensify the working relationship established by the Community and the Kingdom of Morocco, in particular in the context of the Association Agreement, by establishing a partnership in the fisheries sector intended to promote responsible fishing in Moroccan fishing zones and to implement Morocco’s fisheries policy effectively. To that end, that agreement established, inter alia, rules on economic, financial, technical and scientific cooperation between the parties, the conditions of access of vessels flying a flag of the Member States to Moroccan fishing zones and the arrangements for monitoring fishing activities in those zones.

27 Article 11 of the 2006 Fisheries Agreement provided that it was to apply, as regards the Kingdom of Morocco, ‘to the territory of Morocco and to the waters under Moroccan jurisdiction’. Moreover, Article 2(a) of that agreement stated that the term ‘Moroccan fishing zone’ was to be understood, for the purposes of that agreement, the protocol which accompanied it and the annex thereto as meaning ‘the waters falling within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Morocco’.

28 In accordance with Article 17 thereof, the 2006 Fisheries Agreement entered into force on 28 February 2007 (OJ 2007 L 78, p. 31).

29 The protocol originally accompanying the 2006 Fisheries Agreement was replaced by another protocol, which was in turn succeeded, in 2013, by a new protocol, signed in Brussels on 18 November 2013, which was approved on behalf of the European Union by Council Decision 2013/785/EU of 16 December 2013 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the protocol between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco (OJ 2013 L 349, p. 1), and which entered into force on 15 July 2014 (OJ 2014 L 228, p. 1; ‘the 2013 Protocol’).

30 Under Article 1 of the 2013 Protocol, that protocol ‘help[ed] to meet the general objectives of the Association Agreement and aim[ed] to ensure the viability of fisheries resources from ecological, economic and social points of view’.

C. Disputes relating to the Association Agreement

1. Cases T‑512/12 and C‑104/16 P

31 By application lodged at the Court Registry on 19 November 2012 and registered under number T‑512/12, the applicant, the Front Polisario, brought an action for annulment of Decision 2012/497 (judgment of 21 December 2016, Council v Front Polisario, C‑104/16 P, EU:C:2016:973, paragraph 38; ‘the judgment in Council v Front Polisario’).

32 In support of its action in that case, the applicant had alleged, inter alia, a number of infringements by the Council of its obligations under international law, on the ground that it had approved, by Decision 2012/497, the application of the Liberalisation Agreement to the territory of Western Sahara (judgment in Council v Front Polisario, paragraph 44).

33 By judgment of 10 December 2015, Front Polisario v Council (T‑512/12, EU:T:2015:953), the Court annulled Decision 2012/497 in so far as it approved the application of the Liberalisation Agreement to Western Sahara, on the ground that the Council had failed to fulfil its obligation to examine all the elements of the case before the adoption of Decision 2012/497 by failing to ascertain whether the production of the products originating in that territory exported to the European Union was detrimental to the population of that territory and did not entail infringements of fundamental rights of the persons concerned (judgment in Council v Front Polisario, paragraphs 47 and 48).

34 On 19 February 2016, the Council brought an appeal against the judgment of 10 December 2015, Front Polisario v Council (T‑512/12, EU:T:2015:953).

35 By the judgment in Council v Front Polisario, ruling on the Council’s appeal, the Court of Justice set aside the judgment of 10 December 2015, Front Polisario v Council (T‑512/12, EU:T:2015:953), and dismissed the applicant’s action before the General Court as inadmissible.

36 In that regard, first, the Court of Justice upheld the second ground of appeal, alleging that the General Court erred in law in its analysis of the applicant’s standing and, more particularly, the complaint alleging that the General Court had erred in finding that the Liberalisation Agreement applied to Western Sahara (judgment in Council v Front Polisario, paragraph 126).

37 In the first place, the Court held that, in accordance with the principle of self-determination, which is applicable in relations between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco, Western Sahara, a non-self-governing territory within the meaning of Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations, enjoyed a status separate from and distinct from that of any State, including that of the Kingdom of Morocco. The Court concluded that the words ‘territory of the Kingdom of Morocco’ in Article 94 of the Association Agreement could not be interpreted in such a way that Western Sahara is included within the territorial scope of that agreement (judgment in Council v Front Polisario, paragraphs 86 to 93).

38 In the second place, the Court held that it was also necessary to take account of the customary rule codified in Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969 (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331; ‘the Vienna Convention’), according to which, unless a different intention appears from a treaty or is otherwise established, that treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory. It concluded that that customary rule also precluded Western Sahara from being regarded as falling within the scope of the Association Agreement. Nevertheless, it pointed out that it also followed from that customary rule that a treaty may, by way of derogation, bind a State in respect of another territory if such an intention is apparent from that treaty or is otherwise established (judgment in Council v Front Polisario, paragraphs 94 to 98).

39 In the third place, the Court considered that the general international-law principle of the relative effect of treaties must also be taken into consideration, since, as a ‘third party’ to the Association Agreement, for the purposes of that principle, the people of Western Sahara could be affected by the implementation of that agreement in the event that the territory of Western Sahara were to fall within its scope and that implementation must receive their consent. In the absence of any manifestation of such consent, the Court concluded that the finding that the territory of Western Sahara fell within the scope of the Association Agreement was contrary to the principle of the relative effect of treaties (judgment in Council v Front Polisario, paragraphs 100 to 107).

40 In the fourth place, finding that the Liberalisation Agreement had to be regarded as a treaty subordinate to the Association Agreement, the Court inferred that the Liberalisation Agreement could not be understood as applying to the territory of Western Sahara, with the result that there was no need to include therein a clause excluding that application. According to the Court, the practice of the Council and the European Commission after the conclusion of the Association Agreement could not call that analysis into question, since that amounted to taking the view that the European Union intended to implement the Association Agreement and the Liberalisation Agreement in a manner incompatible with the principles of self-determination and of the relative effect of treaties and therefore in a way that is incompatible with the principle that treaty obligations must be performed in good faith (judgment in Council v Front Polisario, paragraphs 110 to 125).

41 Secondly, the Court gave final judgment in the matter. In particular, the Court held that, since the Liberalisation Agreement had to be interpreted, in accordance with the relevant rules of international law applicable to relations between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco, as meaning that it did not apply to the territory of Western Sahara, the applicant had to be regarded, in any event, in the light of the arguments on which it relied, as not having standing to bring an action for annulment of Decision 2012/497, without it being necessary to examine the other pleas of inadmissibility raised by the Council and the Commission (paragraphs 128 to 134).

2. Case C‑266/16

42 By decision of 27 April 2016, the High Court of Justice (England & Wales), Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court) (United Kingdom), referred questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling on the validity of the 2006 Fisheries Agreement, as approved and implemented by Regulation No 764/2006, by Decision 2013/785 and by Council Regulation (EU) No 1270/2013 of 15 November 2013 on the allocation of fishing opportunities under the protocol between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco (OJ 2013 L 328, p. 40) (judgment of 27 February 2018, Western Sahara Campaign UK, C‑266/16, EU:C:2018:118, paragraph 1; ‘the judgment in Western Sahara Campaign UK’).

43 By its first question, the referring court sought, in essence, to ascertain whether the fact that the exploitation of the natural resources in the waters adjacent to the territory of Western Sahara was permitted by the 2006 Fisheries Agreement and the 2013 Protocol rendered invalid Regulation No 764/2006, Decision 2013/785 and Regulation No 1270/2013 in the light of Article 3(5) TEU. By its second question, that court sought, in essence, to ascertain whether a litigant that has standing to bring proceedings under national law, such as the applicant in the main proceedings, was entitled to challenge the validity of acts concluding and implementing that agreement and that protocol, on the ground that the European Union was in breach of international law (judgment in Western Sahara Campaign UK, paragraphs 41, 54 and 86).

44 In that regard, in the first place, in paragraph 59 of the judgment in Western Sahara Campaign UK, the Court stated that it was apparent from the first paragraph of the preamble to the 2006 Fisheries Agreement that that agreement was a manifestation of the mutual desire of the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco to intensify the close working relationship established between them, particularly in the context of the Association Agreement and that, as such, the 2006 Fisheries Agreement was one of a body of agreements framed by the Association Agreement. Given the existence of that body of agreements, the Court held that the concept of ‘territory of Morocco’, in Article 11 of the 2006 Fisheries Agreement, should be construed in the same way as the concept of ‘territory of the Kingdom of Morocco’, in Article 94 of the Association Agreement (judgment in Western Sahara Campaign UK, paragraph 61).

45 The Court pointed out, as it had noted in the judgment in Council v Front Polisario, that the concept of ‘territory of the Kingdom of Morocco’ had to be construed as referring to the geographical area over which the Kingdom of Morocco exercises the fullness of the powers granted to sovereign entities by international law, to the exclusion of any other territory, such as that of Western Sahara, and that the inclusion of that territory in the scope of the Association Agreement would be contrary to the principle of self-determination and the principle of the relative effect of treaties, which are applicable in relations between the European Union and Kingdom of Morocco. It concluded that the territory of Western Sahara was not covered by the concept of ‘territory of Morocco’ within the meaning of Article 11 of the 2006 Fisheries Agreement (judgment in Western Sahara Campaign UK, paragraphs 62 to 64).

46 In the second place, for the purposes of interpreting the expression ‘waters falling within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Morocco’, the Court noted that it followed from Article 2(1) and Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, concluded at Montego Bay on 10 December 1982 (‘the Convention on the Law of the Sea’), that the waters over which a coastal State was entitled to exercise sovereignty or jurisdiction were limited exclusively to the waters adjacent to its territory and forming part of its territorial sea or of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Consequently, and in view of the fact that the territory of Western Sahara was not part of the territory of the Kingdom of Morocco, the Court concluded that the waters adjacent to the territory of Western Sahara were not part of the Moroccan fishing zone referred to in Article 2(a) of the 2006 Fisheries Agreement (judgment in Western Sahara Campaign UK, paragraphs 65 to 69).

47 In the third place, the Court stated that, with respect to the ‘waters falling within the sovereignty … of the Kingdom of Morocco’, referred to in Article 2(a) of the 2006 Fisheries Agreement, it would be contrary to the principle of self-determination and the principle of the relative effect of treaties if it were agreed that the waters directly adjacent to the coast of the territory of Western Sahara were to be included within the scope of that agreement (judgment in Western Sahara Campaign UK, paragraph 71).

48 In the fourth place, as regards the expression ‘waters falling within the … jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Morocco’ in Article 2(a) of the 2006 Fisheries Agreement, the Court noted that the Council and the Commission considered, inter alia, that the Kingdom of Morocco could be regarded as a ‘de facto administrative power’ or as an occupying power of the territory of Western Sahara and that such a description could be of relevance in order to determine the scope of the 2006 Fisheries Agreement. The Court pointed out that, without there being any need even to examine whether any joint intention of the parties to the 2006 Fisheries Agreement to give that expression a special meaning, in order to take such circumstances into account, would have been compatible with the rules of international law that were binding on the European Union, the existence of such a joint intention could not, in any event, be identified in that case since the Kingdom of Morocco had categorically denied that it was an occupying power or an administrative power with respect to the territory of Western Sahara (judgment in Western Sahara Campaign UK, paragraph 72).

49 In the fifth place, as regards the territorial scope of the 2013 Protocol, the Court found that the expression ‘Moroccan fishing zone’ was used both in the 2006 Fisheries Agreement and in the 2013 Protocol to determine the territorial scope. It considered that that expression must be understood as referring to waters falling within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Morocco and that, consequently, it did not include the waters adjacent to the territory of Western Sahara (judgment in Western Sahara Campaign UK, paragraphs 75 to 79).

50 In the sixth place, the Court found that the geographical coordinates of the baselines and the fishing zone of the Kingdom of Morocco required by the provisions of the 2013 Protocol were notified only on 16 July 2014. Given that the 2013 Protocol entered into force on 15 July 2014, it inferred that those geographical coordinates did not form part of the text of that protocol, as agreed by the parties. In any event, according to the Court, even if those geographical coordinates had been notified prior to the entry into force of the 2013 Protocol, they could in no way have called into question the interpretation of the expression ‘Moroccan fishing zone’ which it adopted in paragraph 79 of its judgment, nor have extended the scope of that protocol so as to include the waters adjacent to the territory of Western Sahara (judgment in Western Sahara Campaign UK, paragraphs 80 to 82).

51 That being the case, the Court answered the first question referred for a preliminary ruling to the effect that, since neither the 2006 Fisheries Agreement nor the 2013 Protocol were applicable to the waters adjacent to the territory of Western Sahara, consideration of that question had revealed nothing capable of affecting the validity of acts approving the conclusion of those agreements in the light of Article 3(5) TEU. Given that answer to the first question, it considered that there was no need to answer the second question referred for a preliminary ruling (judgment in Western Sahara Campaign UK, paragraphs 85 and 87).

3. Orders in Cases T‑180/14, T‑275/18 and T‑376/18

52 By orders of 19 July 2018, Front Polisario v Council (T‑180/14, not published, EU:T:2018:496); of 30 November 2018, Front Polisario v Council (T‑275/18, not published, EU:T:2018:869); and of 8 February 2019, Front Polisario v Council (T‑376/18, not published, EU:T:2019:77), the Court dismissed as inadmissible the applicant’s actions against acts of the Council relating to the conclusion or amendment of various international agreements between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco.

53 In particular, in the first two orders cited in paragraph 52 above, the General Court relied on the judgments in Council v Front Polisario and Western Sahara Campaign UK in order to establish that the applicant lacked standing to bring proceedings, since the agreements at issue did not apply to Western Sahara or to the adjacent waters (orders of 19 July 2018, Front Polisario v Council, T‑180/14, not published, EU:T:2018:496, paragraphs 69 to 71, and of 30 November 2018, Front Polisario v Council, T‑275/18, not published, EU:T:2018:869, paragraphs 41 and 42).

54 In the third of the orders cited in paragraph 52 above, the Court held that, in accordance with Article 218(3) and (4) TFEU, the purpose of the Council Decision of 16 April 2018 authorising the opening of negotiations with the Kingdom of Morocco with a view to amending the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco and the conclusion of a protocol implementing that agreement was solely to designate the negotiator or the head of the negotiating team of the European Union and to issue instructions to those persons. It was therefore an act producing legal effects only in relations between the European Union and its Member States and between the EU institutions. The General Court concluded that that decision did not affect the applicant’s legal position and that it could not therefore be regarded as directly concerned by that decision (order of 8 February 2019, Front Polisario v Council, T‑376/18, not published, EU:T:2019:77, paragraphs 28 and 29).

D. The contested decision and the agreement at issue

55 Following the judgment in Western Sahara Campaign UK, the Council, by decision of 16 April 2018, authorised the Commission to enter into negotiations with the Kingdom of Morocco with a view to amending the 2006 Fisheries Agreement and, in particular, to include within the scope of that agreement the waters adjacent to the territory of Western Sahara.

56 On 24 July 2018, following those negotiations, a new Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco, a new protocol for the implementation of that agreement, including the annex thereto and the appendices thereto, and the Exchange of Letters accompanying the agreement at issue were initialled.

57 On 14 January 2019, the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco signed, in Brussels, the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco (‘the Fisheries Agreement’), the implementation protocol thereto (‘the implementation protocol’) and the Exchange of Letters accompanying that agreement (‘the Exchange of Letters’) (together ‘the agreement at issue’).

58 On 4 March 2019, the Council adopted Decision (EU) 2019/441 on the conclusion of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco, the implementation protocol thereto and the Exchange of Letters accompanying the agreement (OJ 2019 L 77, p. 4; ‘the contested decision’). The first paragraph of Article 1 of that decision provides: ‘The … Fisheries … Agreement, the Implementation Protocol … and the Exchange of Letters … are hereby approved on behalf of the Union’.

59 In accordance with Article 17 of the Fisheries Agreement, that agreement, the implementation protocol and the exchange of letters entered into force on 18 July 2019 (OJ 2019 L 195, p. 1).

60 In recitals 3 to 5 and 7 to 12 of the contested decision, the Council states: ‘(3) In its judgment in Case C‑266/16 in reply to a request for a preliminary ruling on the validity and interpretation of the Agreement and of the Implementation Protocol thereto, the Court held that neither the Agreement nor the Implementation Protocol thereto apply to the waters adjacent to the territory of Western Sahara. (4) The Union does not prejudice the outcome of the political process on the final status of Western Sahara taking place under the auspices of the United Nations, and it has constantly reaffirmed its commitment to the settlement of the dispute in Western Sahara, which is currently listed by the United Nations as a non-self-governing territory and administered principally by the Kingdom of Morocco. It fully supports the efforts made by the United Nations Secretary-General and his personal envoy to assist the parties in achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution which will allow the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara as part of arrangements consistent with the purposes and principles set out in the Charter of the United Nations and enshrined in United Nations Security Council resolutions …. (5) It should be possible for Union fleets to continue the fishing activities they had pursued since the entry into force of the Agreement, and the scope of application of the Agreement should be defined so as to include the waters adjacent to the territory of Western Sahara. Furthermore, the continuation of the fisheries partnership is essential in order for that territory to continue to benefit from the sectoral support provided under the Agreement, in compliance with Union and international law, including human rights, and for the benefit of the people concerned. … (7) The objective of the Fisheries Agreement is to enable the Union and the Kingdom of Morocco to work together more closely on promoting a sustainable fisheries policy and sound exploitation of fishery resources in the fishing zone defined in the Fisheries Agreement and supporting the Kingdom of Morocco’s efforts to develop the fisheries sector and a blue economy. It thereby contributes to achieving the objectives of the Union under Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union. (8) The Commission assessed the potential impact of the Fisheries Agreement on sustainable development, in particular as regards the benefits for the people concerned and the exploitation of the natural resources of the territories concerned. (9) In line with that evaluation, it is assessed that the Fisheries Agreement should be highly beneficial to the people concerned owing to the positive socioeconomic impact on those people, particularly in terms of employment and investment, and to its impact on the development of the fisheries sector and fish processing sector. (10) Equally, it is assessed that the Fisheries Agreement represents the best guarantee for the sustainable exploitation of the natural resources of the waters adjacent to Western Sahara, since the fishing activities comply with the best scientific advice and recommendations in that area and are subject to appropriate monitoring and control measures. (11) In view of the considerations set out in the Court of Justice’s judgment, the Commission, together with the European External Action Service, took all reasonable and feasible measures in the current context to properly involve the people concerned in order to ascertain their consent. Extensive consultations were carried out in Western Sahara and in the Kingdom of Morocco, and the socioeconomic and political actors who participated in the consultations were clearly in favour of concluding the Fisheries Agreement. However, the Polisario Front and some other parties did not accept to take part in the consultation process. (12) Those who did not accept to participate in the process rejected the application of the Fisheries Agreement and of the Implementation Protocol thereto to the waters adjacent to Western Sahara, because they felt essentially that those acts would affirm the Kingdom of Morocco’s position on the territory of Western Sahara. However, there is nothing in the terms of the Fisheries Agreement or of the Implementation Protocol thereto which implies that it would recognise the Kingdom of Morocco’s sovereignty or sovereign rights over Western Sahara and the adjacent waters. The Union will also continue to step up its efforts in support of the process, initiated and pursued under the auspices of the United Nations, of peacefully resolving the dispute.’

61 Under Article 1(h) of the Fisheries Agreement, for the purposes of that agreement, ‘fishing zone’ must be understood as meaning ‘the waters of the Eastern Central Atlantic Ocean between the parallels 35°47’18” north and 20°46’13” north, including the adjacent waters [to] Western Sahara, covering all management areas’. It is also stated that ‘this definition shall not affect any negotiations on the delimitation of the sea areas of coastal States bordering the fishing zone or the rights of third countries in general’.

62 Article 6(1) of the Fisheries Agreement provides: ‘With a view to guaranteeing a regulatory framework for sustainable fishing, Union vessels operating in the fishing zone shall comply with the Moroccan laws and regulations governing fishing activities in that zone, unless otherwise provided for in this Agreement …’

63 Article 12(1) to (4) of the Fisheries Agreement provides: ‘1. The financial contribution is defined in the Protocol. 2. The financial contribution referred to in paragraph 1 shall include: (a) financial compensation granted by the Union for access by Union vessels to the fishing zone; (b) fees to be paid by the owners of the Union vessels; (c) sectoral support granted by the Union towards the implementation of a sustainable fisheries policy and ocean governance, subject to annual and multiannual programming. 3. The financial contribution granted by the Union shall be paid each year in accordance with the Protocol. 4. The Parties shall consider the fair geographical and social distribution of the socioeconomic benefits arising from this Agreement, in particular in terms of infrastructure, basic social services, the setting-up of businesses, vocational training, and of programmes aimed at developing and modernising the fisheries sector, to ensure that this distribution benefits the relevant populations in a way that is proportionate to the fishing activities.’

64 Article 13(1) of the Fisheries Agreement provides: ‘A Joint Committee shall be set up, made up of representatives of the [p]arties. It shall be responsible for monitoring the application of this Agreement and may amend the Protocol.’

65 Article 14 of the Fisheries Agreement provides: ‘This Agreement shall apply to the territories subject, on the one hand, to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and on the other hand, to the laws and regulations referred to in Article 6(1) of this Agreement’.

66 Article 16 of the Fisheries Agreement provides: ‘The [implementation] Protocol and the Exchange of Letters … shall form an integral part of the Agreement …’

67 Article 6(1) and (2) of the implementation protocol provides: ‘1. The financial compensation referred to in point (a) of Article 12(2) of the Fisheries Agreement and the fees referred to in point (b) of Article 12(2) of the Fisheries Agreement shall be subject to a fair geographical and social distribution of the socioeconomic benefits to ensure that the compensation benefits the relevant populations, in accordance with Article 12(4) of the Agreement. 2. No later than three months after the date of application of this Protocol, the authorities of the Kingdom of Morocco shall present a method ensuring the geographical and social distribution referred to in paragraph 1 and a distribution key for the allocated amounts, which shall be examined by the Joint Committee.’

68 Article 7(1) and (2) of the implementation protocol provides: ‘1. The sectoral support referred to in point (c) of Article 12(2) of the Fisheries Agreement shall contribute to developing and implementing sectoral policy as part of the national development strategy for the fisheries sector. 2. No later than three months after the date of application of this Protocol, the Joint Committee shall agree on a multiannual sectoral programme and detailed implementing rules comprising, in particular: (a) annual and multiannual guidelines for the use of the amount granted as sectoral support in accordance with Article 12(4) of the Fisheries Agreement; …’

69 Fishing datasheets No 3 to No 6 in Appendix 2 to the implementation protocol refer, as the southern limit of the corresponding management zone, to parallel 20°46’13’’. Fishing datasheet No 6, concerning industrial pelagic or semi-pelagic trawling and purse seining, refers to vessels with cold stores (trawlers and seiners) landing at Dakhla port.

70 The second paragraph of the Exchange of Letters states: ‘Following negotiations, the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco have agreed as follows: 1. With regard to Western Sahara, the Parties reaffirm their support for the United Nations process and the Secretary-General’s efforts to achieve a final political solution in accordance with the principles and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and on the basis of Security Council resolutions. 2. The Fisheries Agreement is concluded without prejudice to the Parties’ respective positions: – for the European Union, references in the Fisheries Agreement to Moroccan laws and regulations are without prejudice to its position concerning the status of the non-self-governing territory of Western Sahara, whose adjacent waters are part of the fishing zone defined in point (h) of Article 1 of the Fisheries Agreement, and its right to self-determination, – for the Kingdom of Morocco, the Sahara region is an integral part of the national territory over which it exercises full sovereignty in the same manner as for the rest of the national territory. Morocco considers that any solution to this regional dispute should be based on its autonomy initiative.’

E. The contested regulation

71 On 29 November 2018, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2019/440 on the allocation of fishing opportunities under the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco and the implementation protocol thereto (OJ 2019 L 77, p. 1; ‘the contested regulation’). In accordance with Article 2 thereof, that regulation entered into force on the day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union, which took place on the same date as the publication of the contested decision, namely 20 March 2019.

72 Article 1(1) of the contested regulation allocates the fishing opportunities established under the implementation protocol as follows: Fishing category Type of vessel Member State Licences or quota Small-scale fishing in the north, pelagic species Seiners < 150 gross tonnage (GT) Spain 22 Small-scale fishing in the north Bottom longliners < 40 GT Spain 25 Portugal 7 Bottom longliners ≥ 40 GT < 150 GT Portugal 3 Small-scale fishing in the south Pole-lines < 150 GT per vessel Total ≤ 800 GT Spain 10 Demersal fishing Bottom longliners ≤ 150 GT Spain 7 Portugal 4 Trawlers ≤ 750 GT Total ≤ 3 000 GT Spain 5 Italy 0 Tuna fishing Pole-and-line vessels Spain 23 France 4 Industrial fishing for pelagic species 85 000 tonnes (t) in the first year 90 000 t in the second year 100 000 t in the third year and in the fourth year Distribution of vessels authorised to fish: 10 vessels ≥ 3 000 GT and < 7 765 GT 4 vessels ≥ 150 and < 3 000 GT 4 vessels < 150 GT Year 1: 85 000 t Germany 6 871.2 t Lithuania 21 986.3 t Latvia 12 367.5 t Netherlands 26 102.4 t Ireland 3 099.3 t Poland 4 807.8 t United Kingdom 4 807.8 t Spain 496.2 t Portugal 1 652.2 t France 2 809.3 t Year 2: 90 000 t Germany 7 275.4 t Lithuania 23 279.6 t Latvia 13, 095.0 t Netherlands 27 637.9 t Ireland 3 281.6 t Poland 5 090.6 t United Kingdom 5 090.6 t Spain 525.4 t Portugal 1 749.4 t France 2 974.5 t Years 3 and 4: 100 000 t Germany 8 083.8 t Lithuania 25 866.3 t Latvia 14 550.0 t Netherlands 30 708.8 t Ireland 3 646.3 t Poland 5 656.3 t United Kingdom 5 656.3 t Spain 583.8 t Portugal 1 943.8 t France 3 305.0 t

II. Procedure and forms of order sought

73 By applications lodged at the Court Registry on 10 and 12 June 2019, the applicant brought the present actions, registered under number T‑344/19 and number T‑356/19 respectively.

74 The Council lodged its defences on 19 (Case T‑344/19) and 20 September 2019 (Case T‑356/19) respectively.

75 By decision of 16 October 2019, following a change in the composition of the Chambers, pursuant to Article 27(5) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the Judge-Rapporteur was assigned to the Ninth Chamber of the General Court, to which the present cases were consequently allocated.

76 On 8 November 2019, the applicant lodged its reply in Case T‑344/19. It did not lodge a reply within the prescribed time limit in Case T‑356/19.

77 By decisions of 13 November 2019, the President of the Ninth Chamber of the General Court granted the applications for leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the Council in both cases lodged by the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic and the Commission.

78 By order of 10 December 2019, Front Polisario v Council (T‑344/19, not published, EU:T:2019:862), the President of the Ninth Chamber granted the application for leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the Council lodged in Case T‑344/19 by the Moroccan sea fisheries chambers, namely the Chambre des pêches maritimes de la Méditerranée, the Chambre des pêches maritimes de l’Atlantique Nord, the Chambre des pêches maritimes de l’Atlantique Centre and the Chambre des pêches maritimes de l’Atlantique Sud (together; ‘the CPMMs’).

79 On 8 January 2020, the Commission lodged its statements in intervention. The Kingdom of Spain and the French Republic lodged theirs on 9 January 2020.

80 On 9 January 2020, the Council lodged its rejoinder in Case T‑344/19.

81 On 4 March 2020, the CPMMs lodged their statement in intervention in Case T‑344/19.

82 On 9 March 2020, the applicant submitted its observations, first, on the statements in intervention of the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic and the Commission in Case T‑344/19 and, secondly, on those of the Kingdom of Spain and the French Republic in Case T‑356/19. On 20 June 2020, it submitted its observations on the statement in intervention of the CPMMs in Case T‑344/19.

83 No request for a hearing was filed within the prescribed time limit in Case T‑356/19. On 22 September 2020, the applicant requested that a hearing be organised in Case T‑344/19.

84 On 23 November 2020, on a proposal from the Ninth Chamber, the General Court decided, pursuant to Article 28 of the Rules of Procedure, to refer the cases to a chamber sitting in extended composition.

85 On 9 December 2020, on the basis of Article 106(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the General Court decided to open the oral part of the procedure. In addition, it invited the parties to comment on the joinder of the cases for the purposes of the oral part of the procedure and the final decision.

86 By two measures of organisation of procedure in Case T‑344/19 of 18 December 2020, the Court, first, put questions for written answer to the parties and asked the applicant, the Council and the Commission to provide additional information and, secondly, requested that the parties clarify, at the hearing, their position on particular questions of principle relevant to the dispute in that case.

87 On 25 January 2021, the applicant, the Council and the Commission submitted their written answers to the General Court’s questions and provided the requested information. The main parties submitted their observations on the joinder on 25 January 2021.

88 By decision of 28 January 2021, the President of the Ninth Chamber of the General Court joined the cases for the purposes of the oral part of the procedure and the final decision.

89 On 25 February 2021, on the basis of Article 85(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the applicant submitted new offers of evidence. The Commission submitted its observations on those offers on 12 March 2021, while the Council and the CPMMs submitted theirs on 15 March 2021.

90 The hearing was held on 3 March 2021. At the hearing, the Court asked the Kingdom of Spain and the Commission to provide particular elements of factual clarification in writing.

91 On 9 March 2021, the Commission submitted a request that the General Court, on the basis of the second paragraph of Article 264 TFEU, maintain the effects of the contested decision, in the event of its annulment, until a later date or, in the event of an appeal, until the Court of Justice’s decision on that appeal.

92 The Kingdom of Spain and the Commission replied, on 10 and 12 March 2021 respectively, to the General Court’s requests for factual clarification. For its part, the applicant voluntarily submitted new evidence in response to that request on 12 March 2021. The Kingdom of Spain and the Commission submitted observations on that evidence on 25 March 2021, while the Council and the CPMMs submitted their observations in that regard on 29 March and 2 April 2021 respectively. In addition, the Kingdom of Spain and the Council submitted, on 25 and 29 March 2021 respectively, observations on the Commission’s request referred to in paragraph 91 above, while the applicant and the French Republic submitted their own observations on that request on 2 April 2021. The oral part of the procedure was closed on 9 April 2021 and the cases entered the deliberation stage.

93 Following the death of Judge Berke on 1 August 2021, the three judges whose signature this judgment bears continued the deliberations, in accordance with Articles 22 and 24(1) of the Rules of Procedure.

94 The applicant claims that the Court should: – in Case T‑344/19, annul the contested decision; – in Case T‑356/19, in the event that the Court should find that the contested regulation constitutes an intermediate measure preventing it from being directly concerned by the contested decision, annul that regulation; – order the Council and the interveners to pay the costs.

95 The Council contends that the Court should: – dismiss the actions; – order the applicant to pay the costs.

96 The Kingdom of Spain submits that the Court should: – dismiss the actions; – make a decision as to costs.

97 The French Republic submits that the Court should dismiss the actions.

98 The Commission states that it supports the form of order sought by the Council. In addition, in Case T‑344/19, it asks the General Court to maintain the effects of the contested decision, in the event of its annulment, until a later date or, in the event of an appeal, until the Court of Justice’s decision on that appeal.

99 In Case T‑344/19, the CPMMs submit that the Court should: – dismiss the action; – order the applicant to pay the costs.

III. Law

A. The action in case T‑344/19

100 By its action in Case T‑344/19, the applicant, who states that it acts ‘on behalf of the Sahrawi people’, seeks the annulment of the contested decision on the ground, in essence, that, by approving the agreement at issue without the consent of that people, the Council infringed the obligations incumbent on the European Union in its relations with the Kingdom of Morocco under EU and international law. The applicant claims that that agreement applies to Western Sahara and the adjacent waters, provides for the exploitation of its natural resources by EU fishing vessels and promotes the policy of annexing that territory by that third State. In particular, the applicant submits that the conclusion of that agreement is not consistent with the case-law of the Court in the judgments in Council v Front Polisario and Western Sahara Campaign UK, which excluded such territorial scope.

101 Without formally raising a plea of inadmissibility, the Council, supported by the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Commission and the CPMMs, raises, primarily, two pleas of inadmissibility with the present action, alleging, first, that the applicant lacks capacity to bring proceedings before the EU Courts and, secondly, that it lacks standing to bring proceedings against the contested decision. In particular, in the context of those pleas of inadmissibility, the Council, supported by the French Republic, the Commission and the CPMMs, calls into question the extent and exclusivity of the role claimed by the applicant with regard to the people of Western Sahara. Moreover, the CPMMs, for their part, call into question the validity of the power of attorney which the applicant conferred on its lawyer. In the alternative, the Council, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Commission and the CPMMs claim that the applicant’s arguments as to the substance should be rejected. In particular, the Council, supported by the Kingdom of Spain and the French Republic, submits, in essence, that, by approving the Fisheries Agreement, it complied with the case-law of the Court. For their part, the Commission and the CPMMs, while endorsing that line of argument, consider, in any event, that that case-law is not relevant to the examination of the action, in particular because it relates, as regards the agreements concluded by the European Union with the Kingdom of Morocco, to their interpretation and not their validity. Furthermore, the Council, the French Republic, the Commission and the CPMMs consider that the principles of international law on which the applicant bases its arguments cannot be relied upon.

102 As a preliminary point, first, it should be noted that the present action seeks the annulment of the contested decision, in so far as it concluded the Fisheries Agreement, the implementation protocol and the Exchange of Letters, those two instruments forming an integral part of that Fisheries Agreement, in accordance with Article 16 thereof.

103 Secondly, by judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council (T‑279/19), the Court is adjudicating on an action brought by the applicant seeking annulment of Council Decision (EU) 2019/217 of 28 January 2019 on the conclusion of the agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco on the amendment of Protocols 1 and 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part (OJ 2019 L 34, p. 1). As is clear from the grounds of that judgment, in Case T‑279/19, the pleas in law and pleas of inadmissibility raised by the Council, who is the defendant and supported, inter alia, by the French Republic and the Commission, are largely based on the same legal bases and the same arguments as the pleas in law and pleas of inadmissibility raised in the present case. Consequently, the Court will examine them, where necessary, in the light of the findings in that judgment.

1. The admissibility of certain annexes to the reply

104 In the rejoinder, the Council disputes, on the basis of Article 85 of the Rules of Procedure, the admissibility of Annexes C.1 to C.3, C.5, C.6, C.8, C.9, C.12, C.14, C.15, C.17, C.21, C.22, C.24 to C.40 and C.42 to C.53 on the ground that the late submission of that evidence is not justified. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, under Article 85(2) of the Rules of Procedure, in reply or rejoinder a main party may produce or offer further evidence in support of his arguments, provided that the delay in the submission of such evidence is justified. However, those provisions must be read in the light of Article 92(7) of those rules, which expressly provides that evidence may be submitted in rebuttal and previous evidence may be amplified. Consequently, as is clear from settled case-law, evidence in rebuttal and the amplification of the offers of evidence submitted in response to evidence in rebuttal from the opposite party are not covered by the time-bar laid down in the abovementioned Article 85(2) (see the judgment of 18 September 2017, Uganda Commercial Impex v Council, T‑107/15 and T‑347/15, not published, EU:T:2017:628, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).

105 In the present case, it is sufficient to note that, as is apparent from the parts of the reply which refer to it, the evidence contained in the annexes contested by the Council enables a response to the arguments by which the latter, in the defence, claims, first, the validity of the consultations conducted by the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) with a view to obtaining the consent of the people of Western Sahara and, secondly, the applicant’s lack of capacity to be a party to legal proceedings and lack of standing to bring proceedings. Therefore, the time-bar laid down in Article 85(2) of the Rules of Procedure does not apply to that evidence, which is therefore admissible. It follows that the Council’s plea of inadmissibility with regard to that evidence must be dismissed.

2. Admissibility of the action

106 Before examining the Council’s pleas of inadmissibility and the doubts expressed by the CPMMs, it must be observed that the subject matter of the present action raises other issues of admissibility, on which it is for the Court to rule of its own motion. Those issues relate, first, to the premiss on which the applicant bases its standing to bring an action, namely that the territorial scope of the agreement at issue includes Western Sahara and its adjacent waters and, secondly, to the scope of the claims for annulment of the contested decision.

(a) The territorial scope of the agreement at issue

107 It is clear from the pleas and arguments put forward in the application that the present action is based on the premiss that the agreement at issue applies to Western Sahara and the adjacent waters. In particular, as regards the admissibility of the action, the applicant relies on the alleged fact that, as the representative of the people of Western Sahara, it is directly and individually concerned by the contested decision by reason of that agreement’s territorial application.

108 It is therefore necessary to ascertain, as a preliminary point, whether the premiss on which the applicant bases its standing to bring an action with regard to the contested decision is correct.

109 In that regard, in the first place, it should be noted that, according to the wording of Article 1(h) of the Fisheries Agreement, the fishing zone, for the purposes of that agreement, concerns the ‘waters of the Eastern Central Atlantic Ocean between the parallels 35°47’18” north and 20°46’13” north, including the adjacent waters [to] Western Sahara’, without prejudice to the rights of third States, in particular coastal States bordering that fishing zone (see paragraph 61 above).

110 Moreover, as pointed out in paragraph 69 above, fishing datasheets No 3 to No 6, which appear in Appendix 2 to the implementation protocol, refer, as the southern limit of the management zone covered by those datasheets, to parallel 20°46’13’’ and fishing datasheet No 6 refers to vessels landing at Dakhla port, which is in Western Sahara.

111 It follows from the wording of those provisions that the geographical coordinates referred to therein include both the waters falling within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Morocco and the waters adjacent to Western Sahara, as is illustrated, moreover, by the charts reproduced in point 66 of the Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Western Sahara Campaign UK (C‑266/16, EU:C:2018:1), as well as by points 66 to 69 of that Opinion. In a written reply to a question put to it by the Court, the Commission confirmed that the delimitation of the fishing zones on those charts corresponded, in essence, to the limits of the management areas set out in the fishing datasheets referred to in paragraph 110 above.

112 In the second place, it must be observed that Article 12 of the Fisheries Agreement, first, provides that a ‘financial contribution’ is to be paid, including, inter alia, under paragraph 2 of that article, ‘sectoral support granted by the Union’ and, secondly, requires the parties to that agreement, under paragraph 4 thereof, to examine ‘the fair geographical and social distribution of the socioeconomic benefits arising from [that] Agreement’‘to ensure that this distribution benefits the relevant populations in a way that is proportionate to the fishing activities’ (see paragraph 63 above).

113 The provisions referred to in paragraph 112 above are laid down, in particular, in Articles 6 and 7 of the implementation protocol. Article 6(2) of that protocol provides, inter alia, that the authorities of the Kingdom of Morocco are to present a method ensuring the geographical and social distribution of the socioeconomic advantages in question and a distribution key for the allocated amounts, which is to be examined by the Joint Committee established by Article 13 of the Fisheries Agreement. In addition, Article 7(2) of the protocol provides that no later than three months after the date of application of that protocol, that Joint Committee is to agree on a multiannual sectoral programme and detailed implementing rules.

114 In the third place, under Article 14 of the Fisheries Agreement, entitled ‘Area of application’, the Fisheries Agreement applies to the territories subject, first, to the EU Treaty and the FEU Treaty and, secondly, ‘to the laws and regulations referred to in Article 6(1) [of that] Agreement’, that is to say, according to the wording of that article, the Moroccan laws and regulations applicable to fishing activities (see paragraphs 62 and 65 above).

115 In the fourth place, point 1 of the second paragraph of the Exchange of Letters states that, ‘with regard to Western Sahara’, the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco ‘reaffirm their support for the United Nations process’. Point 2 of the second paragraph of the Exchange of Letters states that ‘the Fisheries Agreement is concluded without prejudice [to their] respective positions’, ‘for the … Union, … concerning the status of the non-self-governing territory of Western Sahara’ and, ‘for the Kingdom of Morocco, [concerning] the Sahara region [as] an integral part of the national territory over which it exercises full sovereignty’ (see paragraph 70 above).

116 In the fifth place, it is expressly stated in recitals 3 and 5 of the contested decision (see paragraph 60 above) that, following the delivery of the judgment in Western Sahara Campaign UK, by which ‘the Court held that neither the [2006 Fisheries Agreement] nor the [2013] Protocol [were applicable] to the waters adjacent to the territory of Western Sahara’, the conclusion of the agreement at issue is intended to enable ‘Union fleets’ to ‘to continue the fishing activities they had pursued’, to ‘include [in the scope of the Agreement]’ those waters and to permit, by the ‘continuation of the fisheries partnership’, ‘that territory’ to ‘continue to benefit from the sectoral support provided under the Agreement, in compliance with Union and international law, including human rights, and for the benefit of the people concerned’.

117 Consequently, first, it follows expressly from the provisions of the agreement at issue as a whole and from the recitals of the contested decision that the purpose of that agreement, confirmed by the intention of the parties thereto, is to allow the European Union’s fishing fleets to carry out their fishing activities in an area which includes both the waters falling within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Morocco and the waters adjacent to Western Sahara. Secondly, it also follows that that agreement applies both on the territory of the Kingdom of Morocco and on that of Western Sahara, at least the part of that territory controlled by that third State, to which, under Article 6(1) of the Fisheries Agreement, Moroccan ‘laws and regulations’ ‘shall apply’. In particular, the same is true of its provisions concerning financial compensation, which include sectoral support from which the ‘people’ of that territory are likely to benefit in proportion to the fishing activities in the adjacent waters.

118 That analysis is not called into question by the Court’s interpretation of the scope, first, of the Association Agreement and the Liberalisation Agreement in paragraphs 86 to 126 of the judgment in Council v Front Polisario and, secondly, of the 2006 Fisheries Agreement and the 2013 Protocol in paragraphs 59 to 82 of the judgment in Western Sahara Campaign UK (see paragraphs 36 to 40 and 44 to 51 above).

119 It follows from paragraphs 86 to 126 of the judgment in Council v Front Polisario and paragraphs 59 to 82 of the judgment in Western Sahara Campaign UK that an agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco concluded within the framework of the whole convention that is the Association Agreement cannot be interpreted as implicitly including, within its territorial scope as defined in Article 94 of that agreement, the territory of Western Sahara (see, to that effect, judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, paragraph 187). Moreover, it follows from paragraphs 73 and 79 of the judgment inWestern Sahara Campaign UK that a fisheries agreement between those two parties and its implementation protocol concluded in that context, which refer to the ‘Moroccan fishing zone’, defined as referring to the waters falling within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Morocco, cannot be interpreted as including in that Moroccan fishing zone the waters adjacent to Western Sahara.

120 By contrast, in the judgments in Council v Front Polisario and Western Sahara Campaign UK, the Court did not rule on the conclusions to be drawn from a provision in an agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco expressly providing that its scope extends to the territory of Western Sahara and the adjacent waters. In particular, as the Commission and the French Republic point out, the Court did not rule out, in principle, the possible validity of such an explicit inclusion of that territory and of those waters within that scope (see, to that effect, judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, paragraphs 187 and 188).

121 Moreover, the requirement arising, in particular, from Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, that the provisions of a treaty must be interpreted in the light of any rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties, cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of such provisions which runs counter to their wording, where the meaning of those provisions is clear and it is also established that that meaning corresponds to the interpretation which the parties to the treaty had intended to give to them. Aside from the fact that the implementation of that requirement must be consistent with the principle laid down in Article 31(1) of that convention, according to which a treaty is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose, that implementation cannot have the consequence of altering the substance of the rights and obligations to which the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco mutually consented in the context of the agreement at issue (see, to that effect, judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, paragraphs 190 to 192).

122 Since the purpose of the agreement at issue is, in particular, to provide a legal framework for the inclusion of the waters adjacent to Western Sahara in the fishing zone authorised for EU vessels and, consequently, for the application to the territory of Western Sahara of the financial contribution granted by the European Union in proportion to the activities of those vessels, it must necessarily be concluded that, by that agreement, the parties intended to derogate from Article 94 of the Association Agreement in so far as the territorial scope of the legal regime applicable to those activities and that contribution is concerned. That article limits, as regards the Kingdom of Morocco, the scope of the Association Agreement to the territory of the latter (see, to that effect, judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, paragraph 189).

123 The premiss on which the applicant bases its standing to bring proceedings with regard to the contested decision, namely that the contested decision approves an agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco which expressly applies to the territory of Western Sahara and the adjacent waters, is therefore correct.

(b) Scope of the claims for annulment

124 The Court notes that, in the present action, the applicant disputes, by its pleas and arguments, the legality of the contested decision solely on the ground that it approves the application of the agreement at issue to the territory of Western Sahara and the adjacent waters, which the applicant confirmed, in essence, at the hearing in response to a question from the Court on that subject. Thus, by those pleas and arguments, the applicant does not seek to challenge the lawfulness of the application of those instruments to the territory of the Kingdom of Morocco or to the waters falling within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of that third State; that application is therefore not called into question in the present dispute.

125 However, it is clear from the wording of the application, in particular its introduction and conclusion, that, in the form of order sought, the applicant seeks the annulment of the contested decision, without expressly limiting the scope of that annulment to the approval, by that decision, of the application of the agreement at issue to Western Sahara and the adjacent waters.

126 When questioned at the hearing on the scope of the form of order sought, the applicant stated that its action sought, primarily, the annulment of the contested decision in so far as it approved the application of the agreement at issue to Western Sahara and the adjacent waters and, in the alternative, if the Court were to find that that territorial application was not severable from that agreement as a whole, the annulment of the contested decision in its entirety.

127 In that regard, it must be observed that, according to settled case-law, the partial annulment of an EU act is possible only if the elements whose annulment is sought may be severed from the remainder of the act. In that regard, it has been repeatedly held that the requirement of severability is not satisfied in the case where the partial annulment of an act would have the effect of altering its substance. Consequently, review of whether elements of an EU act are severable requires consideration of the scope of those elements in order to assess whether their annulment would alter the spirit and substance of the act (see judgment of 9 November 2017, SolarWorld v Council, C‑204/16 P, EU:C:2017:838, paragraphs 36 and 37 and the case-law cited).

128 As is apparent from paragraphs 109 to 117 above, by the contested decision, the Council, on behalf of the European Union, expressed the consent of the latter to an agreement with the Kingdom of Morocco, the provisions of which apply without distinction, first, to the territory of that third country and to the waters under its sovereignty or jurisdiction and, secondly, to Western Sahara and the adjacent waters. In particular, it must be observed that, although the Fisheries Agreement expressly includes the latter waters in the fishing zone, its definition and the management areas referred to in the fishing datasheets set out in Appendix 2 to the implementation protocol do not imply a delimitation of fishing activities according to whether they take place in those waters or in Moroccan waters. Similarly, the provisions of that agreement and of the implementation protocol relating to the financial contribution, in particular sectoral support, do not differentiate between the part of that contribution paid for activities located in Moroccan territory and the part paid for activities located in the abovementioned non-self-governing territory.

129 Consequently, it must be inferred that the consent given, on behalf of the European Union, by the contested decision to the agreement at issue applying to Western Sahara and the adjacent waters is not severable from the consent given, by that decision, to that agreement as a whole. Thus, annulment of that decision only in so far as it approved the application of that agreement to that non-self-governing territory and to those waters would alter the spirit and substance of that act.

130 Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the applicant is not entitled, in principle, to alter the original subject matter of the application by substituting the forms of order sought in the application with forms of order sought for the first time at the hearing (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 27 January 2000, Mulder and Others v Council and Commission, C‑104/89 and C‑37/90, EU:C:2000:38, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited, and of 21 April 2005, Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, T‑28/03, EU:T:2005:139, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited). In the present case, it must be observed that only the head of claim which it put forward at the hearing in the alternative, seeking annulment of the contested decision in its entirety, corresponds to the wording of the form of order sought in the application.

131 Therefore, the applicant’s principal head of claim, at the hearing, seeking partial annulment of the contested decision in so far as it approves the application of the agreement at issue to Western Sahara and the adjacent waters must be rejected as inadmissible. It is therefore necessary to examine only the form of order sought by the applicant, as set out in the application and reiterated, in the alternative, at the hearing, that seeks annulment of the contested decision in its entirety.

(c) The Council’s first plea of inadmissibility, alleging the applicant’s lack of capacity to bring legal proceedings

132 In support of the first plea of inadmissibility, the Council submits that the applicant is not a legal person, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, with the capacity to bring legal proceedings before the EU Courts. In the first place, it submits that the applicant does not have legal personality under the domestic law of a Member State. In the second place, it states that the applicant is not a subject of international law. In the third place, it submits that the applicant does not satisfy the criteria laid down by the EU Courts for the purpose of recognising the capacity to bring legal proceedings of an entity that does not have legal personality and, in particular, the condition that the entity in question must be treated by the European Union as a distinct person endowed with rights and obligations.

133 The French Republic, the Commission and the CPMMs essentially put forward the same arguments as the Council. The CPMMs further submit that the applicant does not have the necessary independence to act as a responsible entity in legal relations, in the light of its relations with the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which is not recognised by the UN or the European Union.

134 In support of its capacity to bring legal proceedings, the applicant claims that it is a national liberation movement, deriving its rights and obligations directly from international law by reason of the separate and distinct status of Western Sahara and the right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people. That status is confirmed, in particular, by its capacity to conclude agreements and by its recognition as the sole representative of that people by the UN General Assembly. As a subject of international law, it satisfies, a fortiori, the criteria laid down by the case-law for determining whether an entity without legal personality may be regarded as a legal person within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

135 As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first and second paragraphs of that article, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures.

136 Next, according to the case-law, although the concept of legal person in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU implies, in principle, the existence of legal personality, which must be determined in the light of the national law under which the legal person in question was constituted, it does not necessarily coincide with those specific to the different legal orders of the Member States. Thus, the case-law has already recognised the capacity of entities to bring legal proceedings before the EU Courts irrespective of whether they are constituted as a legal person under national law (see judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, paragraph 83 and the case-law cited).

137 In particular, that was the case where, first, the entity in question had sufficient representative character with regard to the persons whose rights, derived from EU law, it sought to defend and the independence and responsibility necessary to act in the context of legal relationships governed by EU law and, secondly, had been recognised by the institutions as an interlocutor in negotiations relating to those rights (see judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, paragraph 84 and the case-law cited).

138 That has also been the case where the EU institutions have treated that entity as a distinct subject with its own rights and obligations. Consistency and justice require recognition of the capacity of such an entity to be a party to legal proceedings to challenge measures restricting its rights or decisions unfavourable to it on the part of the institutions (see judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, paragraph 85 and the case-law cited).

139 It must be added, in contexts which are different from those of the judgments referred to in paragraphs 137 and 138 above, that the case-law does not preclude an entity from being recognised as having capacity to bring legal proceedings before the EU Courts, irrespective of its legal personality under national law, in particular where such recognition is necessary to meet the requirements of effective judicial protection, since a restrictive interpretation of the concept of ‘legal person’ must be ruled out (see judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, paragraph 86 and the case-law cited).

140 Finally, it is also apparent from the case-law that subjects of public international law, such as non-member States, are legal persons within the meaning of EU law (see judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited).

141 In the present case, as in the case which gave rise to the judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council (T‑279/19), while the parties agree on the fact that the applicant does not have legal personality under national law, they disagree as to whether the applicant has legal personality under public international law, and in particular on the impact of the applicant’s role in the self-determination process of Western Sahara on that personality and whether or not its representativeness is limited in respect of the people of that territory (judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, paragraphs 88 and 89).

142 It is therefore necessary to ascertain, in the light of the case-law on the concept of legal person referred to in paragraphs 136 to 140 above, whether the applicant’s role and representativeness are capable of conferring on it the capacity to bring legal proceedings before the EU Courts (judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, paragraph 90).

143 In that regard, in the first place, it must be recalled that, in paragraph 89 of the judgment in Council v Front Polisario, on which the applicant relies in the present action, the Court of Justice stated that the customary principle of self-determination formed part of the rules of international law applicable to relations between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco, which the Court of Justice was obliged to take into account. More specifically, in paragraph 105 of that judgment, the Court recalled that the ICJ noted, in its advisory opinion on Western Sahara, that the population of that territory enjoyed the right to self-determination under general international law, as set out in paragraphs 90 and 91 of that judgment. Moreover, it stated that, for its part, the UN General Assembly had, in paragraph 7 of resolution 34/37 on the question of Western Sahara, recommended that the applicant, ‘the representative of the people of Western Sahara, should participate fully in any search for a just, lasting and definitive political solution of the question of Western Sahara’.

144 It is thus apparent from those considerations that international law confers on the people of Western Sahara a right to self-determination, which the EU Courts must take into account, and that, on the basis of that right, the applicant, as the representative of that people, was recognised by the UN General Assembly as having the right to participate ‘fully’ in the search for a political solution to the question of the definitive status of that territory. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that that right was confirmed by resolution 35/19 (see paragraph 16 above) and that the applicant took part in the negotiations under the aegis of the UN, to which the Kingdom of Morocco and it have been parties since 1988 (see paragraphs 17, 18 and 20 above) (judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, paragraph 92).

145 In the context of the present plea of inadmissibility, the Council, the French Republic, the Commission and the CPMMs do not dispute the exercise, by the applicant, of its right to participate in the self-determination process of Western Sahara, as the representative of the people of that territory, a status recognised by the UN bodies (see, to that effect, judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, paragraph 93).

146 Moreover, as the applicant submits, it is subject to a certain number of commitments under international law as the representative of the people of Western Sahara, in particular under the peace agreement concluded with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania (see paragraph 15 above), agreements it has reached with the Kingdom of Morocco on particular matters relating to the application of the proposals for a regulation of the United Nations Secretary-General and of the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and of the Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 on the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), signed on 8 June 1977, to which it acceded on 23 June 2015 (see, to that effect, judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, paragraph 94).

147 Moreover, the Council, the French Republic, the Commission and the CPMMs do not dispute that, as the applicant claims, it participates in the work on the question of Western Sahara of the Special Committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, established by the United Nations General Assembly, and in the joint work of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), established within the United Nations Economic and Social Committee, and the Specialised Technical Committee on finance, monetary affairs, economic planning and integration (see, to that effect, judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, paragraph 95).

148 The applicant is therefore recognised internationally as a representative of the people of Western Sahara, even if, as the Council, the French Republic, the Commission and the CPMMs maintain, that recognition is within the limited framework of the self-determination process of that territory. In addition, its participation in that process implies that it has the necessary autonomy and responsibility to act in that context, which is confirmed, moreover, by its constituting document attached to the file. The fact that, as the Council, the French Republic, the Commission and the CPMMs submit, the applicant’s rights and obligations are not equivalent to those of States or international organisations, a fact which, moreover, is not disputed, is not decisive in that regard (see, to that effect, judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, paragraphs 96 and 97).

149 In the second place, the applicant rightly claims that the institutions took note of its role and representativeness. First, in paragraph 105 of the judgment in Council v Front Polisario, the Court itself took note of the recognition by the UN General Assembly of that representativeness (see paragraph 143 above). Secondly, the applicant provides evidence indicating that it regularly communicates with the Commission on matters concerning the situation of Western Sahara. Moreover, in the context of the consultations referred to in recital 11 of the contested decision (see paragraph 60 above), the EEAS proposed an exchange of views with the applicant concerning the agreement at issue, as is apparent from the Commission’s assessment report on the benefits for the population of Western Sahara of the Sustainable Fisheries Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco and its implementation protocol and on the consultation of that population, by the Commission, accompanying the proposal for a Council Decision of 8 October 2018 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco, the implementation protocol thereto and the Exchange of Letters accompanying the agreement (SWD(2018) 433 final; ‘the report of 8 October 2018’). The applicant is therefore justified in claiming that it is regarded as a legitimate interlocutor by the EU institutions on matters likely to concern that territory, including in order to express its position on the conclusion of the agreement at issue (see, to that effect, judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, paragraph 98).

150 In the third place, it must be recalled that, in paragraph 106 of the judgment in Council v Front Polisario, the Court held that, in the light of the information set out in paragraph 105 of that judgment (see paragraph 143 above), the people of Western Sahara had to be regarded as a ‘third party’ within the meaning of the principle of the relative effect of treaties, who, as such, could be affected by the implementation of the Association Agreement in the event that the territory of Western Sahara falls within the scope of that agreement, meaning that that implementation had, in any event, to receive its consent (judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, paragraph 99).

151 Moreover, in paragraphs 63 and 64 of the judgment in Western Sahara Campaign UK, the Court took into account the considerations in the judgment in Council v Front Polisario, in particular those in paragraphs 105 and 106 thereof, to conclude that the scope of the 2006 Fisheries Agreement could not be interpreted as including the territory of Western Sahara without infringing the principle of self-determination and the principle of the relative effect of treaties. Similarly, in paragraphs 69 to 73 of that judgment, taking into consideration the provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Court inferred from that conclusion that it would be contrary to those principles to hold that the waters adjacent to that non-self-governing territory fall within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Morocco for the purposes of that fisheries agreement.

152 By the present action, the applicant seeks to defend the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination, on the ground, in essence, that the contested decision fails to respect that right in that it approves the conclusion of an agreement with the Kingdom of Morocco which applies to that territory and to the adjacent waters, without its consent, contrary to the ruling of the Court of Justice (see paragraph 100 above). Consequently, it must be held that, in that particular situation, the requirements of effective judicial protection mean that, in any event, the applicant’s capacity to bring an action before the General Court in order to defend that right must be recognised (see, to that effect, judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, paragraph 100).

153 In the light of all those circumstances, the applicant must be classified as a legal person, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, having the capacity to be a party to legal proceedings before the EU Courts for the purposes of bringing the present action, without prejudice to its obligation to demonstrate that that action satisfies the other conditions of admissibility and, in particular, that it has standing to bring proceedings (see, to that effect, judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, paragraph 101).

154 The arguments of the Council, the French Republic, the Commission and the CPMMs do not call that conclusion into question.

155 First, the alleged circumstances relating to the fact that the applicant is not the sole representative of the people of Western Sahara and that its representativeness is limited to the self-determination process are not, in any event, decisive in the light of the facts recalled in paragraphs 143 to 149 above. The same is true of the fact that the UN bodies did not expressly define it as a national liberation movement and did not confer on it observer status and of the argument that its legal personality is, at most, ‘functional’ or ‘transitional’ (see, to that effect, judgment delivered today, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, paragraph 103).

156 Secondly, as regards the CPMMs’ argument alleging that the applicant is not independent of the SADR, in view of the fact that the applicant is a party to the self-determination process as an autonomous political organisation and not as a representative of the SADR and that, in any event, the text cited by the CPMMs in support of their argument recognises that independence, that argument must be rejected (s