ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
The Combined Nomenclature set out in Annex I to Regulation No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, as amended by Regulation No 1214/2007, must be interpreted as meaning that a product such as the ‘video multiplexer’ must, subject to the national court’s assessment of all the facts before it, be classified in heading 8521 of that nomenclature.

It follows from the actual wording of Combined Nomenclature headings 8517, 8521, 8531 and 8543 and the relevant Explanatory Notes that the function of the product concerned is crucial for its classification in one of those headings.

In addition, Note 3 to Section XVI of the Combined Nomenclature, which headings 8517, 8521 and 8531 of that nomenclature come under, states that ‘machines designed for the purpose of performing two or more complementary or alternative functions are to be classified as if consisting only of that component or as being that machine which performs the principal function’.

In that respect, the ‘video multiplexer’, having regard to its objective characteristics and properties and its intended purpose, has a principal function of recording and reproducing video within a security and surveillance system. The other functions fulfilled by the video multiplexer, that is to say, the alarm and network functions, are merely ancillary functions intended to improve the functioning of the system in which the video multiplexer is incorporated.

Finally, the ‘video multiplexer’ cannot be regarded as a ‘part of a machine’ for the purposes of Note 2 to Section XVI of the Combined Nomenclature.

In that regard, in order to be able to classify an article as a ‘part’, it is not sufficient to show that, without that article, the machine is not able to function properly. It remains necessary to establish that the mechanical or electrical functioning of the machine in question is dependent upon that product.

Even though the ‘video multiplexer’ is part of a closed circuit video-surveillance system, the detection apparatuses used in that system may fulfil their function without a video multiplexer. In addition, the mechanical and electrical functioning of those apparatuses is not dependent on the ‘video multiplexer’ being present.

(see paras 47, 53, 55, 56, 62-65, 72, operative part)
State aid, as defined in the FEU Treaty, is a legal concept which must be interpreted on the basis of objective factors. For that reason, the EU Courts must in principle, having regard both to the specific features of the case before them and to the technical or complex nature of the Commission’s assessments, carry out a comprehensive review as to whether a measure falls within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU.

Judicial review is nevertheless limited with regard to whether a measure comes within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU, in a case where the appraisals by the Commission are technical or complex in nature.

In that regard, where, in order to determine whether a measure comes within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU, the Commission must apply the prudent private investor criterion in a market economy, as a rule, the application of that test requires the Commission to make a complex economic assessment.

Although the EU Court may not substitute its assessment for that of the Commission, it must establish, among other things, whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also ascertain whether that evidence contains all the relevant information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.

(see paras 87-89, 91)
Article 7(2) of Regulation No 492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which, with the aim of encouraging an increase in the proportion of residents with a higher education degree, makes the grant of financial aid for higher education studies to a non-resident student conditional on at least one of that student’s parents having worked in that Member State for a minimum and continuous period of five years at the time the application for financial aid is made, but which does not lay down such a condition in respect of a student residing in the territory of that Member State.

Such a distinction based on residence is liable to operate mainly to the detriment of nationals of other Member States, as non-residents are in the majority of cases foreign nationals, and therefore constitutes indirect discrimination on the ground of nationality which is permissible only if it is objectively justified. In this connection, the social objective of significantly increasing the proportion of residents with a higher education degree is an objective in the public interest acknowledged at the level of the European Union. In addition, the condition of a minimum and continuous period of work on the part of the frontier worker parent is appropriate and necessary in order to attain that objective. It seems legitimate that the State providing the aid would seek to ensure that the frontier worker does in fact have a link of integration with the society of that Member State, by requiring a sufficient attachment in order to combat the risk of ‘study grant forum shopping’. That condition is of such a kind as to establish such a connection on the part of those workers and a reasonable probability that the student will return to the Member State in question after completing his studies. However, that condition goes beyond what is necessary to attain the legitimate objective in so far as it does not permit the competent authorities to grant the aid where the parents, notwithstanding a few short breaks, have worked in the Member State in question for a significant period of time in the period preceding that application, even though such breaks are not liable to sever the connection between the applicant for financial aid and the Member State in question.

(see paras 43-47, 57, 58, 69, 70, operative part)
National legislation providing that persons who are aged 35 or more may not be recruited to the police forces of an Autonomous Community of a Member State affects those workers’ recruitment conditions. Such legislation must therefore be regarded as laying down rules relating to access to employment in the public sector within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a) of Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, and consequently falls within the scope of that directive.

Article 2(2) of Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, read together with Article 4(1) of that directive, must be interpreted as not precluding legislation which provides that candidates for posts as police officers who are to perform all the operational duties incumbent on police officers must be under 35 years of age.

In that regard, that legislation introduces a difference of treatment based directly on age, as referred to in Articles 1 and 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78, read together. However, the possession of particular physical capacities is a characteristic relating to age, and the duties relating to protection of people and property, the arrest and guarding of offenders and preventive patrolling may require the use of physical force. The nature of those duties requires a particular level of physical capability in so far as physical inadequacies in the exercise of those duties may have significant consequences not only for the police officers themselves and third parties but also for the maintenance of public order. It follows that the possession of particular physical capacities in order to be able to perform the three essential duties of the police of the Autonomous Community of the Member State concerned, namely ensuring the protection of people and property, ensuring that each individual can freely exercise his or her rights and freedoms, and ensuring the safety of citizens, may be considered to be a genuine and determining occupational requirement, within the meaning of Article 4(1) of Directive 2000/78, for the pursuit of the profession at issue.

Further, such legislation may be regarded, first, as being appropriate to the objective of ensuring the operational capacity and proper functioning of the police service concerned and, second, as not going beyond what is necessary for the attainment of that objective. The inadequacies to be feared in the operation of the police service of the Autonomous Community concerned are such that it is not conceivable that, as part of a recruitment competition, the organisation of demanding, eliminatory physical tests might constitute a less restrictive alternative. That objective requires that, with a view to re-establishing a satisfactory age pyramid, the possession of particular physical capacities should be envisaged not statically, at the time of recruitment competition tests, but dynamically, taking into consideration the years of service that can be accomplished by a police officer after he or she has been recruited.

(see paras 30, 34-36, 47, 48, 50, operative part)
Article 56 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that a review of the proportionality of restrictive national legislation in the area of games of chance must be based not only on the objective of that legislation at the time of its adoption, but also on the effects of the legislation, assessed after its adoption.

It follows from the judgment of 30 April 2014 in Pfleger and Others, C‑390/12, that Article 56 TFEU precludes national legislation where that legislation does not genuinely meet the concern to reduce opportunities for gambling or to fight gambling-related crime in a consistent and systematic manner. The very use of the words ‘in a consistent and systematic manner’ means that the legislation concerned must meet the concern to reduce opportunities for gambling or to fight gambling-related crime not only at the time of its adoption, but also thereafter. Moreover, in an assessment of proportionality, it is for the national court to examine, amongst other things, the development of the commercial policies of authorised operators and the state, at the date of the facts, of criminal and fraudulent activities related to gambling. It must therefore be held that, in a review of proportionality, the approach taken by the national court must be dynamic rather than static in the sense that it must take account of the way in which circumstances have developed following the adoption of the legislation concerned.

(see paras 33-37, operative part)
Article 71(2) of Regulation No 817/2004 laying down detailed rules for the application of Regulation No 1257/1999 on support for rural development from the EAGGF, must, in the light of the objective of Regulation No 1257/1999, as amended by Regulation No 1783/2003, and of Regulation No 817/2004, in the light of the principle of proportionality and Articles 17 and 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as not precluding national legislation in accordance with which the beneficiary of aid granted in return for agri-environmental commitments covering several years is required to repay all of the aid already received, on the ground that he did not submit an annual application for payment of that aid for the last year of the five-year period of his commitments, where, first, that five-year period replaced an earlier period as a result of an increase in the area of his holding and, secondly, that beneficiary did not cease to fulfil his obligations relating to the use of the area declared prior to that increase. As a result of the substantial increase of the area of the holding concerned and of the beginning of a new five-year commitment period, the beneficiary is required, throughout that period, to respect all of the obligations resulting therefrom and that for the whole increased area over a period of five years. A failure to comply with those conditions results in the grant and maintenance of the benefit of aid being unjustified and devoid of legal basis, and that in its entirety.

(see paras 38, 46, 57, operative part)
The first sentence of Article 33(2) of Council Regulation No 6/2002 on Community designs must be interpreted as meaning that the licensee may bring proceedings alleging infringement of a registered Community design which is the subject of the licence although that licence has not been entered in the register of Community designs.

An interpretation of Article 33(2) and (3) of Regulation No 6/2002 which is both literal and schematic gives support to the idea that it, as a whole, is intended to govern the enforceability of the legal acts referred to in Articles 28, 29 and 32 of the regulation in respect of third parties who have, or are likely to have, rights in the registered Community design.

Next, it should be noted that Title III of Regulation No 6/2002, which includes Article 33, is entitled ‘Community Designs as objects of property’. Accordingly, all of the articles in that section contain rules relating to the Community designs as objects of property. This is the case with regard to Articles 28, 29 and 32 of the regulation which relate to acts the purpose or effect of which is to create or transfer a right in respect of the design.

Finally, it should be noted that, in the first sentence of Article 32(3) of Regulation No 6/2002, the licensee’s right to bring proceedings for infringement of a Community design, without prejudice to the provisions of the licensing contract, is subject only to the consent of the proprietor of that design.

It must also be stated that, according to Article 32(5) of Regulation No 6/2002, the licence is entered in the register on request of one of the parties. However, that article, like Article 29 of the regulation, does not contain any provision analogous to that of Article 28(b) of the regulation, under which ‘as long as the transfer has not been entered in the register, the successor in title may not invoke the rights arising from the registration of the Community design’.

Moreover, Article 28(b) of Regulation No 6/2002 would serve no useful purpose if Article 33(2) of that regulation had to be interpreted as precluding reliance, vis-à-vis all third parties, on all of the legal acts referred to in Articles 28, 29 and 32 of the regulation unless they have been entered in the register.

With regard to the purpose of the rule laid down in the first sentence of Article 33(2) of Regulation No 6/2002, it must be held that the lack of effects, vis-à-vis third parties, of the legal acts referred to in Articles 28, 29 and 32 of that regulation which have not been entered in the register is intended to protect a person who has, or may have, rights in a Community design as an object of property. It follows that the first sentence of Article 33(2) does not apply to a situation such as that in the main proceedings, in which the licence holder complains that a third party, by infringing the design, infringes the rights conferred by the registered Community design.

(see paras 19-25, operative part 1)
Article 45 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which a person having the status of civil servant in a Member State who leaves his post voluntarily in order to be employed in another Member State loses his retirement pension rights under the retirement pension scheme for civil servants and is insured retrospectively under the general old-age insurance scheme, conferring entitlement to a retirement pension lower than the retirement pension that would result from those rights. Such legislation constitutes a restriction on freedom of movement for workers since, even if it also applies to civil servants of that Member State who resign in order to work in the private sector in the same Member State, it is liable to prevent or deter them from leaving their Member State of origin to take up employment in another Member State. That legislation thus directly affects the access of civil servants of the Member State concerned to the employment market in Member States other than that concerned and is thus such as to impede freedom of movement for workers

While EU primary law admittedly can offer no guarantee to an insured person that moving to a Member State other than his Member State of origin will be neutral in terms of social security, in particular where sickness benefits and old-age pensions are concerned, since, given the disparities between the Member States’ social security schemes and legislation, such a move may be to the advantage of the person concerned in terms of social protection, or not, depending on the circumstances, where the application of national legislation is less favourable the latter is consistent with EU law only to the extent that, in particular, it does not place the worker concerned at a disadvantage compared with those who pursue all their activities in the Member State where it applies and does not purely and simply result in the payment of social security contributions on which there is no return.

(see paras 24, 28, 41, operative part 1)
Case C‑365/15

Wortmann KG Internationale Schuhproduktionen

v

Hauptzollamt Bielefeld

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Finanzgericht Düsseldorf)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Customs Union and Common Customs Tariff — Reimbursement of import duties — Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 (Customs Code) — Article 241, first paragraph, first indent — Obligation of a Member State to provide for the payment of default interest even where no action has been brought before the national courts)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 18 January 2017

Own resources of the European Union — Repayment or remission of import or export duties — Sums paid in error by the individual in respect of import duties determined on the basis of an invalid anti-dumping regulation — Obligation to pay to the individual entitled to reimbursement the corresponding interest

(Council Regulation No 2913/92, Art. 241)

Where import duties, including anti-dumping duties, are reimbursed on the ground that they have been levied in breach of EU law, this being a matter for the referring court to determine, there is an obligation on Member States, arising from EU law, to pay to individuals with a right to reimbursement the corresponding interest which runs from the date of payment by those individuals of the duties reimbursed.

In that regard, it must, admittedly, be observed that Article 241, first sentence, of the Customs Code provides that repayment by the customs authorities of amounts of import duties or export duties or of credit interest or interest on arrears collected upon payment of such duties is not to give rise to the payment of interest by those authorities. However, that provision cannot, in itself, mean that, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, national legislation can legitimately provide that there is no need to pay interest on reimbursed import duties from the time of payment of those duties up to the time of their reimbursement. It follows both from the legislative history of Article 241 of the Customs Code and from the context of that provision that it does not apply in circumstances such as those in the case in the main proceedings.

In that regard, it must be observed that, according to the case-law of the Court, it is for the national authorities to draw the consequences, in their legal system, of the annulment or declaration of invalidity of a regulation imposing anti-dumping duties, which has the consequence that anti-dumping duties paid under the regulation concerned are not legally owed within the meaning of Article 236(1) of the Customs Code and must, in principle, be repaid by the customs authorities in accordance with that provision, provided that the conditions to which such repayment is subject, including that set out in Article 236(2) of that code, are satisfied (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 September 2007, Ikea Wholesale, C‑351/04, EU:C:2007:547, paragraph 67, and of 18 March 2010, Trubowest Handel and Makarov v Council and Commission, C‑419/08 P, EU:C:2010:147, paragraph 25).

(see paras 24-26, 34, 39, operative part)
Case C‑654/15

Länsförsäkringar AB

v

Matek A/S

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Högsta domstolen)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — EU trade mark — Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Article 9(1)(b) — Article 15(1) — Article 51(1)(a) — Extent of the exclusive right granted to the proprietor — Period of five years following registration)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 21 December 2016

EU trade mark — Effects of the EU trade mark — Rights conferred by a mark — Right to prohibit the use of a mark — Use of an identical or similar sign covering identical or similar goods or services — Extent of the exclusive right granted to the proprietor — Period of five years following registration

(Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 9(1)(b), 15(1) and 51(1)(a) and (2))

Article 9(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 on the EU trade mark, read in conjunction with Articles 15(1) and 51(1)(a) of that regulation, must be interpreted as meaning that, during the period of five years following registration of an EU trade mark, its proprietor may, if there is a likelihood of confusion, prevent third parties from using in the course of trade a sign identical or similar to his mark in respect of all goods and services identical or similar to those for which that mark has been registered without having to demonstrate genuine use of that mark in respect of those goods or services.

It is apparent from the wording and purpose of Article 15(1) and Article 51(1)(a) and (2) of Regulation No 207/2009 that, until the period of five years following registration of the EU trade mark has expired, the rights of the proprietor cannot be declared to be revoked in respect of either some or all of the goods or services for which the mark is registered. Those provisions thus confer on the proprietor a grace period for beginning genuine use of his mark, during which he may rely on the exclusive rights which the mark confers, pursuant to Article 9(1) of the regulation, in respect of all those goods and services, without having to demonstrate such use.

Therefore, in determining, under Article 9(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, whether the goods or services of the alleged infringer are identical or similar to the goods or services covered by the EU trade mark at issue, the extent of the exclusive right conferred by virtue of that provision should be assessed, during the period of five years following registration of the EU trade mark, by having regard to the goods and services as covered by the mark’s registration, and not in relation to the use that the proprietor has been able to make of the mark during that period.

(see paras 26, 27, 29, operative part)
Customs union—Common Customs Tariff—Tariff headings—Interpretation—Explanatory notes to the combined nomenclature—No binding force—Requirement that those notes comply with the provisions of the Combined Nomenclature

(Commission Regulation No 2658/87, Annex I, as amended by Commission Regulation No 1001/2013)
2.

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see para. 32)