2.

However is it possible that the regulation in question infringes the legitimate expectations of exporters who were entitled to assume that from 1 July 1976 the cancellation of export licences would be possible and who, in reliance thereon, have made certain arrangements? In agreement with the Commission it may immediately be doubted whether such a submission has any place at all in the context of proceedings for annulment of a measure of extensive scope. The applicant has not given further evidence, for example by making reference to any similar general legal principle. It merely relied on the fact that similar arguments have repeatedly been raised in proceedings concerning the liability of public bodies or their servants. However it is evident that no direct comparison can be made between proceedings concerning on the one hand financial compensation payable to an individual who has suffered loss or, on the other, the revocation of a sovereign act with effect erga omnes which might thus affect the interests of third parties and so raises questions of legal certainty. For that reason in cases such as the present concerning measures of general application there is strong support for requiring at least that reference should not merely be made to the subjective position of the applicant but that stress should be placed on evidence that the expectation of the economic sector concerned in general has been disregarded. As there is no such evidence in the present case it appears quite admissible not to examine in any further detail the argument relating to the breach of legitimate expectation. If this objection is not upheld one must at least accept the Commission's view that a legitimate expectation cannot categorically exclude any change in the law. In this respect various considerations must be taken into account before it can be concluded that a legal provision must be annulled for failure to take account of the abovementioned principle. Thus it is important to examine what interests are involved on the part of the economic sectors concerned and whether there exists a stable or weak position of confidence. It is further important whether there exist substantial public interests which tell in favour of an amendment of the law. Finally it is also relevant whether the amendment of the law was implemented in a way which took sufficient account of the legitimate interests. The following assessment may be made in the present case with regard to the abovementioned points of view: — Doubts may be felt from the outset whether, in accordance with the fundamental principles of the law relating to refunds, protection is merited if, as apparently occurred in the present case, arrangements are made which consist solely of an exchange of licences in order to obtain increased profit. In fact this is scarcely compatible with the meaning and purpose of the rules relating to refunds which seek to make certain marketing operations possible in accordance with the conditions of the world market. — In view of what I have already stated it should further be assumed that with regard to rules whereby the economic position after 1 July 1976 was to be relevant for the exercise of the right of cancellation it was only with circumspection that the economic circles concerned could make arrangements at an earlier date. In addition it is important that any possibly existing confidence in the unaltered retention of the legal situation was already substantially shaken from very early on. This had already happened at the end of April 1976 when in the Management Committee for Sugar reference was made to the intention to introduce in the near future an amendment to Regulation No 557/76 and the chairman of the Committee therefore asked that the business circles concerned should be informed of this intention. The intended development became more obvious from the adoption of the abovementioned Council Regulation No 1451/76 of 22 June 1976. Even though it merely refers to empowering the Commission it was clear to those with experience that use would be made of this right immediately, particularly where the market in sugar was concerned. Moreover it was clear that the right of cancellation would disappear with the introduction of compensation. In my opinion this is obvious not only from the text of the provision which was added to Article 5 (2) of Regulation No 557/76 by Regulation No 1451/76. This is also evidenced by the preamble to Regulation No 1451/76 which refers to the risk of disturbance which would result if the right of cancellation were widely exercised; it is thus self-evident that such a risk could only be obviated by abolishing the right of cancellation but certainly not by creating a right to choose between cancellation and compensation. I take the view that such factors must be given a weight similar to proposals of the Commission for the adoption of a regulation which were recognized as being of significance with regard to the reliance on the protection of legitimate expectation in the judgment in Cases 95 to 98/74, 15 and 100/75 (Union Nationale des Coopératives Agricoles de Céréales and Others v Commission and Council of the European Communities, Judgment of 10 December 1975, [1975] ECR 1615). — With regard to the existence of substantial public interest on the other hand to support alteration of the law, in my view this arises from the fear that wide use might be made of the right of cancellation, a fear which at the time of the preparation of the regulation at the end of April and beginning of May 1976 was based on the development of the world market prices and the related sharp rise in refunds for sugar exports. The quantity involved becomes apparent if it is remembered that at the end of April 1976 there were unused export licences for 60000 tonnes of sugar in the Netherlands and in the Federal Republic of Germany alone. It would be erroneous to rely on hindsight and only to have regard to the applications for cancellation which were in fact submitted on 1 July 1976 as it may certainly be assumed that the prior warning of the intention to alter the law had its effect on the conduct of the exporters. — The extent of the anticipated cancellations referred to above could certainly be regarded as a substantial disruptive factor for the sugar balance whether it was assumed that corresponding amounts would remain on the internal market and would thus involve storage expenses and influence the future export policy or that they would in part be exported on the basis of new licences, that is to say, with increased refunds, thereby causing an increased financial burden on the Community budget. This conclusion is not altered by the applicant's reference to the fact that there is a tolerance limit of 5 % for exports in any case which over the whole year — the invitations to tender in the 1975/76 marketing year ran to over 1000000 tonnes — would entail uncertainty of approximately the same order of magnitude as that resulting from the cancellation of the export licences involved in the present proceedings. There is certainly a substantial difference according to whether such uncertainty is spread out over the whole marketing year or whether it is concentrated on the end of the marketing year and the particularly difficult period of the transition to the following marketing year. Further, the assessment of the Commission is not open to criticism on the ground that it had the opportunity, by means of its refunds policy, of avoiding the risk of the extensive cancellation of export licences. Indeed the formulation of the refund policy cannot be expected to be as effective as the abolition of the possibility of cancellation quite apart from the fact that any sudden alteration in the export policy at the end of the marketing year and relating to a relative short period of time would scarcely appear justifiable. — Lastly with regard to a final important element in this respect it is significant that the amendment of the law did not solely concern the abolition of the right of cancellation. As we know this was linked to the introduction of compensation which corresponded to the difference between the monetary compensatory amounts before and after 1 July 1976. This could be regarded as sufficient for the interests of the exporters as it had the effect of getting over disadvantages for which in principle Council Regulation No 557/76 solely provided a guarantee. In fact it was ensured that any person who complied fully with the system, by making arrangements only after 1 July 1976, could effect exports on the basis of the licences issued originally without any disadvantage. — In addition on 27 July 1976 the Commission took a further step in that by means of Regulation No 1811/76 it extended the validity of the licences concerned until 30 September. As no complaints by other exporters have come to light this apparently at least had the effect of enabling any difficulties to be overcome for persons who had already made other arrangements and no longer wanted to make use of the licences which they had originally obtained. On the assumption that the argument of the infringement of legitimate expectation may be relied on at all in an action for annulment the only possible conclusion is that in the present case such an allegation is not justified as not all the necessary preconditions are satisfied. Therefore the alternative arguments raised by the applicant are not sufficient for the annulment of the contested Commission regulation.