ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
2.

Having regard to the other provisions of EU law, is the principle of equivalence to be interpreted as conferring subjective rights on individuals against the Member State and as precluding the application of Austrian national rules under which the court must, before disposing of an application for an interlocutory injunction, as provided for in Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 89/665, as amended by Directive 2014/23, determine the type of contract award procedure and the (estimated) contract value as well as the total number of contested, separately contestable decisions from specific award procedures and also, if necessary, the lots from a specific award procedure, in order then to issue, if necessary, an order for regularisation via the presiding judge of the competent chamber of the court for the purpose of recovering fees and, in the event of non-payment of fees, to prescribe — before or no later than at the same time as rejecting an application for an interlocutory injunction due to failure to pay fees subsequently demanded — the procedural fees via the chamber of the court competent to deal with the application for review, failing which a loss of entitlement would ensue, when in (other types of) civil cases in Austria, such as, for example, in the case of actions seeking compensation or injunctions for infringements of competition law, non-payment of fees does not otherwise preclude the disposal of an application for an interlocutory injunction lodged in conjunction with an action, irrespective of the issue of the fees payable for judicial protection, whatever the amount, and, moreover, non-payment of flat-rate fees does not, in principle, preclude the disposal of an application for an interlocutory injunction lodged separately from an action in proceedings before the civil courts; and, by way of further comparison, in Austria, non-payment of appeal fees for bringing appeals against administrative decisions or for appeals or appeals on points of law against decisions of administrative courts to the Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court) or the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Supreme Administrative Court) does not lead to the dismissal of an appeal owing to non-payment of fees and, for example, does not lead to applications for the granting of suspensive effect being disposed of only by way of their rejection in such appeals or appeals on points of law?
2.

Second ground of appeal. Unlawful nature of the judgment in so far as it rejected the second plea in law. Infringement/misapplication of Article 317 TFEU, Article 172a(1) of Regulation No 2342/2002, (1) Article 31(3)(a) and (c) of Regulation No 1906/2006, (2) Articles II.5 and II.14 of the general conditions of the grant agreement. Failure to observe the principles of the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and fairness as set out in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 (3) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013. Error of assessment as regards the evidence in breach of Article 1315 of the Belgian Civil Code. The appellant challenges the judgment in so far as, by rejecting the second plea in law, the General Court concluded that the appellant did not demonstrate the eligibility of the direct and indirect personnel costs, either before OLAF and the Commission, or before the General Court. The appellant claims, on the contrary, that the General Court failed to take into account the fact that OLAF’s allegations were not related to the project at issue but to other funded projects, and thus it misapplied the principles of innocence and the burden of proof. In addition, the timesheets produced before the General Court should have been regarded as sufficient evidence, given the absence of other allegations and the confirmed conclusion of the project, to affirm the eligibility of the costs incurred and claimed from the Commission.
4.

If the third question is answered in the affirmative: (a) Is respect for the overall protection of temporary agency workers within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Directive 2008/104 ensured by statutory rules which, like the version of the Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz (Law on the supply of temporary workers) in force since 1 April 2017, provide for a minimum wage floor for temporary workers, for a maximum duration of assignment to the same user undertaking, for a time limit on the derogation from the principle of equal treatment with regard to pay, for the non-application of a collectively agreed arrangement derogating from the principle of equal treatment to temporary workers who, in the six months preceding the assignment to the user undertaking, left the employ of that user undertaking or an employer forming a group with that user undertaking within the meaning of Paragraph 18 of the Aktiengesetz (Law on public limited companies) and for an obligation of the user undertaking to grant temporary workers access to collective facilities or services (such as, in particular, childcare facilities, collective catering and transport) in principle under the same conditions as those applicable to permanent workers? (b) If that question is answered in the affirmative: Does this also apply if the relevant statutory rules, such as those in the version of the Law on the supply of temporary workers in force until 31 March 2017, do not provide for a time limit on derogations from the principle of equal treatment with regard to pay or a specific time frame for the requirement that the assignment may only be ‘temporary’?
1.

Is Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that an air carrier is not obliged to pay compensation in accordance with Article 7 of the regulation, if it arrives at the passenger’s final destination with a delay of 7 hours and 41 minutes, because the aircraft was damaged by a lightning strike during the first of two preceding flights; the technician from the air carrier’s contracted maintenance company who was called in after landing found only minor damage that did not affect the airworthiness of the aircraft (‘some minor findings’); the second preceding flight went ahead; however, during the course of a pre-flight check before the preceding flight, it emerged that the aircraft was not fit for further use for the time being; and the air carrier therefore used a replacement aircraft in place of the originally intended, damaged aircraft, which completed the flight with a departure delay of 7 hours and 40 minutes?
1.

Is Article 12(4) of Directive 2011/7 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that Member States may exclude from the scope of that directive a contractual practice relating to penalties for late payment which the parties engaged in on a consistent basis in respect of individual orders prior to 16 March 2013, even if the individual orders in respect of which the enforcement of penalties for late payment is sought were placed after that date?
3.

3.1 Must Article 4(1) of the framework directive, in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, be interpreted as conferring a right of appeal against a decision by a national regulatory authority on an undertaking only where the position of that undertaking in the market: (a) is directly and genuinely affected by the decision; or (b) is shown to be highly likely to be affected by the decision; or (c) may be directly or indirectly affected by the decision? 3.2 Is the fact that the undertaking submitted a bid in the auction procedure, that is to say, that it wished to take part in the procedure but was unable to do so because it did not satisfy the requirements, in itself proof of the effect referred to in question 3.1, or can the court legitimately require the undertaking also to furnish evidence to show that it is affected by the decision?
2.

May Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 and the principles of EU law therein be interpreted as meaning that they preclude the application of Article 191(2) of the Portuguese Código de Processo Civil (Code of Civil Procedure) to the present case, in so far as that provision states that a pleading of nullity of service must be lodged within a certain time limit (namely, the time limit laid down for lodging a defence)?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 24 February 2021 by Cinkciarz.pl sp. z o.o. against the judgment of the General Court delivered on 16 December 2020 in Case T-665/19, Cinkciarz.pl v EUIPO

(Case C-114/21 P)

(2021/C 368/03)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Appellant: Cinkciarz.pl sp. z o.o. (represented by: E. Skrzydło-Tefelska, radca prawny, K. Gajek, adwokat, and M. Żuk, radca prawny)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 22 June 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) did not allow the appeal to proceed.
2.

precluding, in the light of the principle of proportionality, the practice of a Member State’s competition authority of imposing a fine in relation to the turnover stated in the profit and loss account of the balance sheet for the previous financial year, which includes the sums re-invoiced to final customers in connection with services for the purchase of media space by an intermediary, rather than just the commissions on the work of the intermediary;
3.

Do Article 63 of the directive and the principle of proportionality preclude the exclusion from the [tendering] procedure of a tenderer who has not named an operator as a subcontractor for the purpose of demonstrating compliance with certain criteria relating to technical and professional capacity and the capacity to carry out the technical and professional activity arising from the provisions of special laws not set out in the procurement documents in the case where the tenderer in question has chosen a different contractual form of involving specialists in the contract, that is to say [a] contract for the supply/provision of services, or has submitted [a] declaration of willingness on their part? Does the right to determine its organisation and contractual relations within the group lie with the economic operator and is it possible also to involve certain providers/suppliers in the contract in the case where the provider is not one of the entities on whose capacity the tenderer intends to rely in order to demonstrate compliance with the relevant criteria?
1.

Under the first ground of appeal, EMA submits that the General Court committed a two-fold error, insofar as it failed to infer from the fact of the recent renewal of the marketing authorisation for a combination medicinal product that said renewal would have been undertaken against the evidence available at the time of the renewal and the regulatory standards applicable at the time of the renewal.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 16 July 2021 — Agenzia delle Entrate v Contship Italia SpA

(Case C-434/21)

(2021/C 422/06)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte suprema di cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Agenzia delle Entrate

Respondent: Contship Italia SpA

Question referred

Do Articles 18 (ex Article 12 TEC) and 49 (ex Article 43 TEC) TFEU preclude national legislation which, like Article 30(1)(5) of legge 23 dicembre 1994, n. 724 (Law No 724 of 23 December 1994), in the version applicable ratione temporis, prior to the amendments introduced by legge 27 dicembre 2006, n. 296 (Law No 296 of 27 December 2006), excludes from the measures to prevent tax avoidance by non-operational companies — based on minimum revenue and income thresholds relative to the value of specific corporate assets, which, if not met, is a sign that the company is non-operational and means that the taxable income must be determined by way of presumption — only companies and entities whose securities are traded on Italian regulated markets and not companies and entities whose securities are traded on foreign regulated markets, as well as the companies that control or are controlled by, even indirectly, those listed companies and entities?
1.

Is Article 10(2) of Lei n.o 55/2012, de 6 de setembro (Law No 55/2012 of 6 September 2012), if interpreted as meaning that the fee for which it provides is to be used exclusively to finance the promotion and dissemination of Portuguese film and audiovisual works, liable to give rise to indirect discrimination against the provision of services between Member States as compared with the corresponding national provision of services, inasmuch as it makes the provision of services between Member States more difficult than the purely domestic provision of services within a Member State, thus infringing Article 56 TFEU?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Kúria (Hungary) lodged on 22 July 2021 — CIG Pannónia Életbiztosító Nyrt. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

(Case C-458/21)

(2021/C 471/25)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Kúria

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: CIG Pannónia Életbiztosító Nyrt.

Respondent: Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

Question referred

Must Article 132(1)(c) of [Council] Directive 2006/112/EC (1) [of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax] be interpreted as meaning that a service used by [an insurance company] is exempt from VAT where the purpose of the service is:

— to verify the accuracy of a diagnosis of a serious illness with which the insured has been diagnosed; and

— to seek the best medical care available to treat the insured; and

— where included in the cover offered by the insurance policy and at the request of the insured, to arrange provision of the medical care abroad?

(1) OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 23 September 2021 by Ryanair DAC, Laudamotion GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 14 July 2021 in Case T-677/20, Ryanair and Laudamotion v Commission (Austrian Airlines; Covid-19)

(Case C-591/21 P)

(2021/C 462/37)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Ryanair DAC, Laudamotion GmbH (represented by: V. Blanc, E. Vahida and F.-C. Laprévote, avocats, D. Pérez de Lamo and S. Rating, abogados, I.-G. Metaxas-Maranghidis, dikigoros)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Federal Republic of Germany, Republic of Austria, Austrian Airlines AG

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— declare in accordance with Articles 263 and 264 TFEU the Commission Decision C(2020) 4684 final of 6 July 2020 on State aid SA.57539 (2020/N) — Austria — COVID-19 — Aid to Austrian Airlines void;

— order the Commission to bear its own costs and pay those incurrent by Ryanair, and order the interveners at first instance and in this appeal (if any) to bear their own costs.

Alternatively:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration;

— reserve the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the appellants rely on seven pleas in law.

First plea in law: the General Court erred in law and manifestly distorted the facts in rejecting the appellants’ claim that the Commission failed to review a possible ‘spill-over’ of aid to or from Lufthansa.

Second plea in law: the General Court erred in law in rejecting the appellants’ claim that the Commission breached the requirement that aid granted under Article 107(2)(b) TFEU is not to make good the damage suffered by a single victim.

Third plea in law: the General Court erred in law in rejecting the appellants’ claim that the non-discrimination principle has been unjustifiably violated.

Fourth plea in law: the General Court erred in law and manifestly distorted the facts in rejecting the appellants’ claim on the infringement of the freedom of establishment and the free provision of services.

Fifth plea in law: the General Court erred in law and manifestly distorted the facts in the application of Article 107(2)(B) TFEU and the proportionality principle in relation to damage caused to Austrian Airlines by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Sixth plea in law: the General Court erred in law and manifestly distorted the facts regarding the failure to open a formal investigation procedure.

Seventh plea in law: the General Court erred in law and manifestly distorted the facts regarding the Commission’s failure to state reasons.
2.

Within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on combating late payment in commercial transactions, does a contract for the supply of goods that obliges the supplier to supply to the contracting authority, for a price agreed in that contract, a certain quantity of goods and at the same time grants the contracting authority the right to determine unilaterally the timing and volumes of the individual deliveries comprising execution of the subject of the contract, including the possibility of opting out from receiving some of the goods contracted for without suffering any negative consequences, and obliges the contracting authority to pay for each part delivery within a certain time limit calculated from receipt of that part delivery, constitute a single commercial transaction, or does each of those part deliveries, which are based on the contracting authority’s stated requirements, constitute a separate commercial transaction within the meaning of the directive, even though it does not constitute a separate contract under national law?
1.

Can the second purchaser of a good be refused the right of deduction in respect of the purchase because he or she should have known that the original seller had evaded value added tax (VAT) in the first sale, even though the first purchaser had known that the original seller had evaded VAT in the first sale?
3.

If Question 2 is answered in the affirmative: Can the ‘name of the product’ also consist of two components, one of which is a generic name or term protected under trade mark law which is not related to the individual food and is supplemented, for each of the individual products, by an additional element (as the second part of the name of the product) which specifies the food in question?
3.

What evidence can the applicant use in support of his arguments that Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation precludes his transfer, and what standard of proof should be applied? In the light of the references to the Union acquis in the recitals of the Dublin Regulation, does the transferring Member State have a duty of cooperation or verification, or, in the event of serious and systemic infringements of fundamental rights with respect to third-country nationals, is it necessary to obtain individual guarantees from the Member State responsible that the applicant’s fundamental rights will (indeed) be respected after the transfer? Is the answer to this question different if the applicant lacks evidence in so far as he is unable to support his consistent and detailed statements with documents, when he cannot be expected to do so, given the nature of the statements?
2.

Is it appropriate to apply the test set out in the judgment in Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice) and affirmed in the judgment in Openbaar Ministerie (Independence of the issuing judicial authority) where the requested person seeking to challenge his surrender cannot meet that test by reason of the fact that it is not possible at that point in time to establish the composition of the courts before which he will be tried by reason of the manner in which cases are randomly allocated?
Appeal brought on 12 August 2021 by Birkenstock IP GmbH and Birkenstock Sales GmbH against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) made on 2 June 2021 in Case T-365/20, Birkenstock Sales GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-498/21 P)

(2022/C 24/17)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellants: Birkenstock IP GmbH, Birkenstock Sales GmbH (represented by: N. Weber and D. Leisner, Rechtsanwälte)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 22 November 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) did not allow the appeal to proceed and ordered the appellants to bear their own costs.
Appeal brought on 29 July 2021 by König Ludwig International GmbH & Co. KG against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 31 May 2021 in Case T-332/20, König Ludwig International v EUIPO

(Case C-465/21 P)

(2022/C 11/19)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: König Ludwig International GmbH & Co. KG (represented by: O. Spuhler, Rechtsanwalt, J. Stock, Rechtsanwältin)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 12 November 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that König Ludwig International GmbH & Co. KG should bear its own costs.
Appeal brought on 17 September 2021 by Marie-Christine Arnautu against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 14 July 2021 in Case T-740/20, Arnautu v Parliament

(Case C-573/21 P)

(2022/C 24/21)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Marie-Christine Arnautu (represented by: F. Wagner, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 14 July 2021 in Case T-740/20, Arnautu v Parliament;

— declare the plea of illegality admissible and rule that Article 33(1) and (2) of the Implementing Measures for the Statute for Members (‘IMSM’) are unlawful;

— find that there is no legal basis for the Secretary-General’s decision of 21 September 2020 and annul that decision;

in the main proceedings:

— find that Marie-Christine Arnautu has adduced evidence of the work of her assistant in accordance with Article 33(1) and (2) of the IMSM and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union;

consequently,

— annul the decision of the Secretary-General of the European Parliament of 21 September 2020, taken pursuant to Article 68 of Decision 2009/C 159/01 of the Bureau of the European Parliament of 19 May and 9 July 2008‘concerning implementing measures for the Statute for Members of the European Parliament’ as amended, finding a debt on the part of the appellant amounting to EUR 87 203,46 in respect of amounts wrongly paid in connection with the parliamentary assistance allowance and giving reasons for its recovery;

— annul debit note No 7000001577 informing the appellant that a debt on the part of the appellant had been found following the decision of Secretary-General of 21 September 2021, recovery of the sums wrongly paid as parliamentary assistance allowance, application of Article 68 of the IMS and Articles 98 to 101 of the Financial Regulation;

— order the European Parliament to pay all the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellant puts forward a plea in law entitled ‘INFRINGEMENT OF EU LAW BY THE GENERAL COURT — ERROR IN LAW AND ERROR IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE FACTS — MANIFEST ERROR OF ASSESSMENT’, which she sub-divides into two chapters, the first relating to the plea of illegality raised at first instance and the General Court’s analysis of the first plea, and the second relating to the merits and the General Court’s analysis of the third plea.

In the first chapter, the appellant raises a plea of illegality and claims that Article 33(1) and (2) and Article 68(1) and (2) of the IMSM do not respect the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations. The arguments put forward by the appellant in the second chapter concern the General Court’s assessment of the concept of ‘tasks necessary for, and directly related to, the exercise of the Members’ mandate.’