ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 11(2) of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals must be interpreted as meaning that the starting point of the duration of an entry ban, as referred to in that provision, which in principle may not exceed five years, must be calculated from the date on which the person concerned actually left the territory of the Member States.

Consequently, although Article 6(6) of Directive 2008/115 opens the possibility for Member States to adopt a return decision and an entry ban at the same time, it is nevertheless clear from the general scheme of that directive that those two decisions are separate since a return decision results from the fact that the initial stay is unlawful whereas an entry ban applies to any possible subsequent stay by making it unlawful.

(see paras 50, 58, operative part)
Judicial proceedings—Oral part of the procedure—Reopening—Obligation to reopen the oral part of the procedure to allow parties to lodge observations on a new fact—No such obligation—Justification—Whether sufficient information to give a ruling

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 83)

(see paras 13-15)
Article 47(1)(a) and (4) of Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts must be interpreted as meaning that a contracting authority may exclude a tenderer from a tendering procedure on the ground that it does not fulfil the criterion regarding economic and financial standing laid down in the contract notice with respect to the provision of a statement given by a bank undertaking to grant credit in the amount specified in the contract notice and to guarantee that that amount will be available to the tenderer throughout the period of performance of the contract.

In this respect, it must be noted that a requirement to obtain a loan tied to performance of the contract is, objectively, a reasonable means of obtaining information on the economic ability of the tenderer to perform the contract successfully. As the European Commission noted, the grant of a loan is an appropriate means of establishing that the tenderer has at its disposal resources which it does not itself own and which are necessary for the performance of the contract (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 December 1999, Holst Italia, C‑176/98, EU:C:1999:593, paragraph 29). It is, however, for the referring court to confirm that the amount required in the contract notice is proportionate to the subject matter of the contract. In respect of the requirement, also laid down in the contract notice, regarding the grant of credit in a minimum amount of EUR 3000000‘for the period of performance of the contract (48 months)’, although, admittedly Article 47 of Directive 2004/18 does not expressly provide that the contracting authority may require a tenderer to have at its disposal the resources necessary for the performance of the contract throughout the duration of the performance of the contract, it must be noted, as the Advocate General observed in point 46 of his Opinion, that the contracting authority’s verification of the tenderer’s compliance with the economic and financial criteria in a tendering procedure is intended to provide that authority with the assurance that the successful tenderer will indeed be able to use whatever resources it relies on throughout the period covered by the contract (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 January 2016, Ostas celtnieks, C‑234/14, EU:C:2016:6, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited). Moreover, the continued availability of the amount required throughout the period of performance of the contract is a useful tool in assessing, in a tangible manner, the economic and financial standing of the tenderer with respect to its commitments. The proper performance of the contract is indeed intrinsically linked to whether the tenderer has the financial means for the execution of the contract.

(see paras 36-38, 41, operative part 1)
Agriculture—Common agricultural policy—Organic production and labelling of organic products—Regulation No 834/2007—Control system—Compulsory compliance of producers—Discretion of the Member States to grant an exemption—Restrictive interpretation

(Council Regulation No 834/2007, Arts 27 and 28(1) and (2))
As regards more specifically the circumstance of a victim of a motor vehicle accident being the insurance policy-holder and owner of the vehicle involved in that accident, it must be recalled that the Court has held that the aim of protecting victims pursued by the First, Second and Third Directives requires the legal position of the owner of the vehicle, present in the vehicle at the time of an accident as a passenger, to be the same as that of any other passenger who is a victim of that accident (judgment of 1 December 2011, Churchill Insurance Company Limited and Evans, C‑442/10, EU:C:2011:799, paragraph 30). By analogy, the Court must hold that the fact that a pedestrian who was knocked down in a motor vehicle accident was the insurance policy-holder and the owner of the vehicle that caused that accident does not permit the exclusion of that person from the concept of ‘third parties who have been victims’, within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the Second Directive and Article 1a of the Third Directive. As observed by the referring court and as correctly argued by the Commission, the fact that the owner of the vehicle concerned and insurance policy-holder was not within that vehicle at the time of the accident, but was a pedestrian who was knocked down by that vehicle cannot justify, having regard to the same objective of protection pursued by the First, Second and Third Directives, as described in paragraph 41 of the present judgment, a difference in treatment.

(see paras 41, 44, 45)
Article 22(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as not applying to proceedings to determine whether a person was correctly registered as the proprietor of a trade mark.

Proceedings in which there is no dispute regarding the registration of the trade mark as such or its validity are covered neither by the words ‘proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of … trade marks’ in Article 22(4) of Regulation No 44/2001, nor the objective underlying that provision. In that regard, the Court points out that the question of the individual estate to which an intellectual property right belongs is not, generally, closely linked in fact and law to the place where that right has been registered.

(see paras 37, 43, operative part)
The principle of equal treatment requires tenderers for a public contract to be afforded equality of opportunity when formulating their bids, which therefore implies that the bids of all tenderers must be subject to the same conditions. With regard to the different treatment of tenders linked to the issue of identifying abnormally low tenders, Article 139(1) of Regulation No 2342/2002 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, means that the contracting authority is under a duty, first, to identify suspect tenders, secondly to allow the tenderers concerned to demonstrate their genuineness by asking them to provide the details which it considers appropriate, thirdly to assess the merits of the explanations provided by the persons concerned and, fourthly to take a decision as to whether to admit or reject those tenders. It is only on condition that the reliability of a tender is, a priori, doubtful that the obligations arising out of that provision are imposed on the contracting authority, including that of verifying in detail the seriousness of the prices offered using the reference economic parameters.

Therefore, since the evaluation committee identifies a tenderer’s bid as being, prima facie, abnormally low, and considers that the bid of another tenderer does not, a priori, present any abnormality, it may, without infringing the principle of equal treatment between tenderers, initiate the adversarial procedure provided for in Article 139(1) of Regulation No 2342/2002 against the first tenderer and verify in detail its prices using the reference economic parameters without applying the same treatment to the second. That conclusion is not called into question by the argument that the price of a tender does not, in itself, lead to the conclusion that that tender is abnormally low. In the absence of a definition of the notion of an ‘abnormally low tender’ or of rules making it possible to identify such a tender under Article 139(1) or Article 146(4) of Regulation No 2342/2002, it falls to the contracting authority to determine the method used to identify abnormally low tenders, provided that that method is objective and non-discriminatory. In that regard, nothing prevents the contracting authority from comparing tenders with the estimated budget in the tender specifications and from identifying one of them as being, prima facie, abnormally low where the amount of that tender is considerably lower than the estimated budget.

(see paras 47, 49-55, 57)
Article 12 of Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which, as interpreted by some of the courts of that Member State, does not provide for the application of the requirements of protection against the expulsion of a third-country national who is a long-term resident to all administrative expulsion decisions, regardless of the legal nature of that measure or of the detailed rules governing it.

It should be noted that, according to the case-law of the Court, the principal purpose of Directive 2003/109 is the integration of third-country nationals who are settled on a long-term basis in the Member States (judgments of 26 April 2012, Commission v Netherlands, C‑508/10, EU:C:2012:243, paragraph 66, and of 2 September 2015, CGIL and INCA, C‑309/14, EU:C:2015:523, paragraph 21).

Furthermore, Article 12(3) of that directive states that, before taking a decision to expel a third-country national who is a long-term resident, Member States are to have regard to the duration of residence in their territory, the age of the person concerned, the consequences for the person concerned and family members and links with the country of residence or absence of links with the country of origin. It is therefore irrelevant whether such a measure has been delivered in the form of an administrative penalty or whether it is the result of a criminal conviction.

Moreover, the Court has already pointed out in its judgment of 8 December 2011, Ziebell (C‑371/08, EU:C:2011:809, paragraphs 82 and 83) that the adoption of such a measure may not be ordered automatically following a criminal conviction, but rather requires a case-by-case assessment which must, in particular, have regard to the elements mentioned in Article 12(3) of Directive 2003/109. Consequently, a decision to expel may not be adopted against a third-country national who is a long-term resident for the sole reason that he or she has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than one year in duration.

(see paras 23, 26-29, operative part)
Case C‑347/16

Balgarska energiyna borsa AD (BEB)

v

Komisia za energiyno i vodno regulirane (KEVR)

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administrativen sad Sofia-grad)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Articles 101 and 102 TFEU — Directive 2009/72/EC — Articles 9, 10, 13 and 14 — Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 — Article 3 — Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 — Article 2(3) — Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 — Article 1(3) — Certification and designation of an independent transmission system operator — Limitation of the number of holders of electricity transmission licences in national territory)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 26 October 2017

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling—Admissibility—Limits—Clearly irrelevant questions and hypothetical questions put in a context not permitting a useful answer—Need to provide the Court with sufficient information on the factual and legislative context (Art. 267 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 23; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 94) Approximation of laws—Measures of approximation—Common rules for the internal market in electricity—Directive 2009/72—Operation of the transmission system—Certification and designation of an operator—National legislation limiting the number of holders of electricity transmission licences for a Member State—Lawfulness (European Parliament and Council Directive 2009/72, Arts 9, 10, 13 and 14; European Parliament and Council Regulations No 714/2009, Art. 3, and No 1227/2011, recital 3 and Art. 2(3); Commission Regulation No 2015/1222, Art 1(3)) Competition—EU rules—Obligations of the Member States—Legislation intended to reinforce the effects of pre-existing agreements, decisions and concerted practices—Concept (Art. 4(3) TEU; Arts 101 and 102 TFEU) Competition—Public undertakings and undertakings enjoying special or exclusive rights granted by the Member States—Creation of a dominant position—Not incompatible in itself with Article 102 TFEU (Arts 102 TFEU and 106(1) TFEU)
Article 3(3) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, is to be interpreted as meaning that the judicial authority of the executing Member State must refuse to surrender only those minors who are the subject of a European arrest warrant and who, under the law of the executing Member State, have not yet reached the age at which they are regarded as criminally responsible for the acts on which the warrant issued against them is based.

It should be noted in that regard that Article 3(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584 requires the executing judicial authority to refuse to execute a European arrest warrant if the person who is the subject of the warrant may not, owing to his age, be held ‘criminally responsible for the acts on which the arrest warrant is based under the law of the executing State’. It is therefore apparent from the wording of Article 3(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584 that the ground for non-execution laid down in that provision does not cover minors in general but refers only to those who have not reached the age required, under the law of the executing Member State, to be regarded as criminally responsible for the acts on which the warrant issued against them is based.

(see paras 28, 29, 38, operative part 1)
Case C‑102/16

Vaditrans BVBA

v

Belgische Staat

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State (Belgium))

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Road transport — Driver’s rest periods — Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 — Article 8(6) and (8) — Whether it is possible to take daily rest periods and reduced weekly rest periods away from base and in a vehicle — Exclusion of regular weekly rest periods)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber), 20 December 2017

Transport — Road transport — Social provisions — Weekly rest — Taking of weekly rest period in a vehicle — Precluded — Infringement of the principle of legality in criminal proceedings — No such infringement

(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 49(1); European Parliament and Council Regulation No 561/2006, Art. 8(6))

Article 8(6) and (8) of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport and amending Council Regulations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EC) No 2135/98 and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 must be interpreted as meaning that a driver may not take the regular weekly rest periods referred to in Article 8(6) in his vehicle.

Consideration of the second question referred has disclosed nothing to affect the validity of Regulation No 561/2006, having regard to the principle of legality in criminal proceedings, enshrined in Article 49(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

(see operative part 1, 2)
Articles 16 and 18 of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the [European Union] trade mark must be interpreted as not precluding the application to an EU trade mark of a national provision, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which a person harmed, by the trade mark registration which was applied for in fraud of his rights or in breach of a legal or contractual obligation, is entitled to claim ownership of that trade mark, provided that the situation concerned does not fall within those covered by Article 18 of that regulation.

(see para. 38, operative part)
Article 185(1) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted to the effect that the reduction of a debtor’s obligations resulting from the final approval of an arrangement with creditors constitutes a change in the factors used to determine the amount to be deducted, for the purposes of that provision.

The first subparagraph of Article 185(2) of Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted to the effect that the reduction of a debtor’s obligations resulting from the final approval of an arrangement with creditors does not constitute a case of a transaction remaining totally or partially unpaid that does not give rise to an adjustment of the initial deduction, where that reduction is definitive, although that is a matter for the referring court to determine.

The second subparagraph of Article 185(2) of Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted to the effect that, in order to implement the option provided for in that provision, a Member State is not required to make express provision for an obligation to adjust the deductions in the case of transactions remaining totally or partially unpaid.

In that regard, the Court has made it clear that Member States, when exercising an option under the VAT Directive, may choose the legislative technique which they regard as the most appropriate (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 June 2009, SALIX Grundstücks-Vermietungsgesellschaft, C‑102/08, EU:C:2009:345, paragraph 56, and of 4 October 2012, PIGI, C‑550/11, EU:C:2012:614, paragraph 33). Thus, they may, for example, simply incorporate into national legislation the formula used in that directive or an equivalent expression, or set out exhaustively in a list the situations in which, by derogation from Article 185(1) of that directive, there is no need to adjust the initial deductions.

The fact that there is no mention of transactions remaining totally or partially unpaid in such a list may be regarded as the result of the exercise by the Member State of the power of derogation granted to it under the second subparagraph of Article 185(2) of the VAT Directive (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 May 2014, Almos Agrárkülkereskedelmi, C‑337/13, EU:C:2014:328, paragraph 24).

(see paras 50, 51, 54, operative part 3)
The General Court did not err in law in holding, in its assessment of the admissibility of an action seeking annulment of Article 3 of Implementing Regulation No 1238/2013 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties and collecting definitively the provisional duties imposed on imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (i.e. cells) originating in or consigned from the People’s Republic of China, that that article was not severable from the remaining provisions of that regulation.

Since the partial annulment of an EU act is possible only if the elements whose annulment is sought may be severed from the remainder of the act, the requirement of severability is not satisfied in the case where the partial annulment of an act would have the effect of altering its substance.

In that regard, it follows from the provisions of Articles 1 and 3 of Implementing Regulation No 1238/2013 that the latter article establishes, by means of the undertaking relating to minimum import prices, an exemption from payment of anti-dumping duties imposed under Article 1 thereof, up to a certain level of annual imports. The EU legislature, when adopting that regulation, put in place trade defence measures constituting a set or a ‘package’. That regulation imposes two separate and complementary measures which seek to achieve a common goal, namely the removal of the injurious effect on the Union industry of Chinese dumping relating to the products at issue, while safeguarding the interests of that industry.

Since Implementing Regulation No 1238/2013 is based on the possibility of applying those two separate measures alternatively, the Chinese exporting producers can rely on the undertaking relating to minimum import prices accepted by the Commission, within the meaning of Article 3 of that regulation, and thus avoid an ad valorem anti-dumping duty, such as that laid down by Article 1 of that regulation, from being imposed on their products. The annulment of Article 3 of that regulation would remove such a possibility and eliminate the alternative which the EU legislature wished to offer to Chinese exporting producers when adopting the regulation at issue. Taking account of the differences in the economic consequences of those two types of trade defence measures, such an annulment would therefore affect the very substance of the regulation at issue.

The application of the undertaking relating to minimum import prices concerned the vast majority of cases with effect from the adoption of Implementing Regulation No 1238/2013. That undertaking therefore appears to be intended to apply primarily in the context of the imports from China concerned by that implementing regulation. Accordingly, the annulment of that undertaking would necessarily affect the substance of the regulation.

(see paras 36, 40, 44, 50, 53, 55)
Article 7(1) of Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks, read in the light of Article 36 TFEU, must be interpreted as precluding the proprietor of a national trade mark from opposing the import of identical goods bearing the same mark originating in another Member State in which that mark, which initially belonged to that proprietor, is now owned by a third party which has acquired the rights thereto by assignment, when, following that assignment,

– the proprietor, either acting alone or maintaining its coordinated trade mark strategy with that third party, has actively and deliberately continued to promote the appearance or image of a single global trade mark, thereby generating or increasing confusion on the part of the public concerned as to the commercial origin of goods bearing that mark,

or

– there exist economic links between the proprietor and that third party, inasmuch as they coordinate their commercial policies or reach an agreement in order to exercise joint control over the use of the trade mark, so that it is possible for them to determine, directly or indirectly, the goods to which the trade mark is affixed and to control the quality of those goods.

By that conduct, which results in the proprietor’s trade mark no longer independently fulfilling its essential function within its own territorial field of application, the proprietor has himself compromised or distorted that function. Consequently, he may not rely on the necessity of protecting that function in order to oppose the import of identical goods bearing the same mark originating in another Member State where that mark is now owned by that third party.

(see paras 40, 55, operative part)