1.

The question of admissibility in both the present cases arises on two grounds: the first because the prescribed period for bringing proceedings was not observed and the second because there was no lawyer. I shall consider them in that order. Regarding the first ground it must be noted that the decisions of the Commission imposing penalties on the two companies for infraction of the ECSC rules regarding mandatory minimum prices were notified on 5 June 1978. Article 39 of the Statute of the Court (ECSC) provides that proceedings must be instituted within a month of notification. Having regard to Article 81 of the Rules of Procedure and Article 1 of Annex II thereto the time-limits were extended by 10 days and thus expired on 15 July 1978. The applications had to be lodged at the Registry before that date: Article 37 (3) of the Rules of Procedure provides ‘In the reckoning of time-limits for taking steps in proceedings, the only relevant date shall be that of lodgment at the Registry.’ The two original applications, however, sent from Brescia on 15 July 1978 arrived at the Court on 20 July. There was therefore no doubt that the time-limit provided by the said rule was not respected. What consequences follow from the applicant's conduct? They have stated that there is no provision in the Rules of Procedure relating to the consequences of defects in the application. I note however that the time-limits in question in the present cases are laid down in the Statute of the Court (ECSC), which clearly indicates in the last paragraph of Article 39, albeit by implication, that if the time-limits are not respected the rights of the party concerned lapse. Article 39 states ‘No right shall be prejudiced in consequence of the expiry of a time-limit if the party concerned proves the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or of force majeure.’ I think it is proper to infer from these words that, outside the two exceptions referred to, the expiry of the time-limits causes the right to bring the applications provided for in Articles 36 and 37 of the ECSC Treaty (to which the said Article 39 refers) to lapse. As to the Rules of Procedure it is worth stressing that there is a possibility of extending the time-limits only where they are ‘prescribed pursuant to these rules’ (Article 82) and it thus follows that there is no such possibility in the case of time-limits established by the Statute of the Court (this is logical since the rules are subordinate to the Statute). The applicants rely on force majeure for two reasons: that the application was sent from Italy within the period of 40 days and that the Community rule to the effect that the criterion is the date of lodging in the Registry is contrary to a general principle of Italian law. It is obvious that such considerations have nothing to do with force majeure. Even supposing that the first implies a reference to postal difficulties, it is not possible to see how a registered letter sent from Brescia on 15 July 1978 could arrive the same day in Luxembourg! The applicants are conscious of having infringed Article 37 (3) of the Rules of Procedure and seek to overcome this obstacle by citing an alleged general principle of Italian law to the effect that the date of dispatch of an application is the criterion as regards time-limits. It is, however, obvious that here only Community law applies.