ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
JUDGMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

(First Chamber)

11 December 2012

Case F‑97/11

Philippe Vienne

v

European Parliament

(Civil service — Emoluments — Family allowances — Household allowance — Cessation of entitlement to the household allowance — Dissolution of the marriage)

Application: Action brought under Article 270 TFEU, applicable to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to Article 106a thereof, whereby Mr Vienne requests the Tribunal to annul the decision whereby the European Parliament fixed at 1 March 2011 the date on which payment of the household allowance paid to the applicant ended.

Held: The action is dismissed. The applicant is to bear his own costs and is ordered to pay the costs incurred by the Parliament.

Summary

Officials — Remuneration — Family allowances — Household allowance — Date of the cessation of entitlement to the household allowance — Appraisal in the light of national law — Date of dissolution of the marriage

(Staff Regulations, Annex VII, Art. 16(3))

The need for uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that where a provision of EU law contains no express reference to the laws of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope, it must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, which must be sought in the light of the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the rules in question. However, it is also accepted that, even in the absence of such and express reference, the application of EU law may, where appropriate, involve making a reference to the laws of the Member States, in particular where the Courts of the European Union cannot identify in EU law or in the general principles of EU law the elements which would allow them to define the content and scope of EU law by an autonomous interpretation.

According to the law of the Member States of the European Union, entry into marriage gives rise, as between the spouses, to a number of reciprocal obligations, in particular of a financial nature, such as the obligation to provide succour, and the dissolution of the marriage brings those obligations to an end. In so far as the household allowance is intended to compensate for the additional burdens entailed by marriage, the dissolution of the marriage entails the cessation of the right of a married official to receive the household allowance which he received on account of his marriage.

Consequently, Article 16(3) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations must be interpreted as meaning that, where an official receives the household allowance on account of his marriage, the date on which the right to receive that allowance ceases corresponds to the date on which the marriage is dissolved.

(see paras 29-31)

See:

18 January 1984, 327/82 Ekro, para. 11

18 December 1992, T‑43/90 Díaz García v Parliament, para. 36; 11 June 1996, T‑147/95 Pavan v Parliament, para. 42; 22 February 2006, T‑342/04 Adam v Commission, para. 32

1 July 2010, F‑45/07 Mandt v Parliament, para. 62
The fact that the Appeals Committee established by the European Investment Bank in connection with appraisal of its staff is able to strike out any statement contained in an appraisal report on a staff member implies that that committee has power to reassess each of those statements on its merits before striking it out. This power, therefore, clearly extends beyond reviewing the legality of and setting aside the operative part of an act, in that it encompasses the possibility of reversing the grounds which supported the adoption of the operative part, whatever their place in the overall rationale of the act. This full power of review on the part of the Appeals Committee is confirmed by the power expressly given to it to modify the final assessment of merits relating to the overall appraisal of the performance of the person bringing the internal appeal. Alteration of the merit score of the individual concerned implies that the Committee carries out a detailed review of all of the assessments of merit contained in the report in issue, considering whether they involve any errors of assessment, fact or law, and also that it may, where appropriate, substitute itself for the evaluator and carry out a fresh assessment of those merits.

Ultimately, the Appeals Committee must exercise full review of the appraisal report before it, examining the validity of each of the assessments contained in the report, since its review is not limited to ascertaining whether there has been a manifest error of assessment.

(see paras 49-51)

Judgments of 27 April 2012 in De Nicola v EIB, T‑37/10 P, EU:T:2012:205, para. 41, and 16 September 2013 in De Nicola v EIB, T‑618/11 P, EU:T:2013:479
Only measures which give rise to binding legal effects capable of directly and immediately affecting the applicant’s interests by significantly altering his legal position constitute acts adversely affecting him. In the case of acts or decisions adopted by a procedure involving several stages, and particularly where they are the culmination of an internal procedure, it is in principle only those measures which definitively determine the position of the administration upon the conclusion of that procedure which are open to challenge and not intermediate measures whose purpose is to prepare the final decision. Acts preparatory to a decision do not adversely affect officials and an applicant may rely on defects in acts prior to the decision and closely linked to it only in the context of an action challenging the decision adopted at the end of the procedure.

Consequently, since the opinion of the Committee of Inquiry of the European Investment Bank is not an act which is open to challenge as such, claims seeking its annulment must be dismissed as inadmissible.

However, the unlawfulness of the opinion of the Committee of Inquiry may be relied on in support of claims for annulment of the final decision adopted by the President of the EIB. It follows from the internal rules entitled ‘Policy on Dignity at Work’, adopted by the European Investment Bank and referred to in Article 3.6 of the EIB’s Staff Code of Conduct, that the opinion of the Committee of Inquiry is a substantive procedural requirement, and any factual or procedural irregularities committed in the drawing up of that opinion constitute a defect which renders the final decision of the President of the EIB adopted on the basis of that opinion unlawful.

(see paras 47-49)

Judgment of 11 November 2014 in De Nicola v EIB, F‑52/11, EU:F:2014:243, paras 144 and 145
27

Although it is thus not established, in the present case, that the contested decision was taken following a procedure carried out against the applicant, the fact remains that that decision adversely affects the situation of the latter, in so far as it deprives him of the possibility of continuing his employment with Frontex. The rights of the defence, as now enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter, which, according to the Courts of the European Union, is of general application (L v Parliament, T‑317/10 P, EU:T:2013:413, paragraph 81), include, while being more extensive, the procedural right provided for in paragraph 2(a) of that article, of every person to be heard, before any individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken (see, to that effect, France v People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 65; M., C‑277/11, EU:C:2012:744, paragraphs 81 to 83; and Commission v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 98 and 99). Consequently, it was for Frontex, under Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter, to allow the applicant to submit his observations to useful effect before adopting the contested decision. Frontex does not dispute the fact that it did not allow the applicant to be heard before the adoption of that decision.
JUDGMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

(Third Chamber)

18 March 2015

Tuula Rajala

v

Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)

‛Civil service — Officials — Reports procedure — Appraisal report — General assessment of performance — Consistency’

Application:

under Article 270 TFEU, in which Ms Rajala seeks the annulment of her appraisal report drawn up in respect of the period from 1 October 2011 to 31 December 2012 (‘the 2011/2012 appraisal report’ or ‘the contested report’) and an order that the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM or ‘the Office’) pay her a sum of at least EUR 500 by way of damages.

Held:

The action is dismissed. Ms Rajala is to bear half of her own costs. The Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) is to bear its own costs and is ordered to pay half of the costs incurred by Ms Rajala.

Summary

Officials — Reports procedure — Appraisal report — Reporting officers’ discretion — Judicial review — Limits — Manifest error of assessment — Concept

(Staff Regulations, Art. 43)

Assessors enjoy a very wide discretion when appraising the work of persons upon whom they must report. Consequently, review by the Courts of the European Union of the content of appraisal reports is limited to ensuring that the procedure is conducted in a regular manner, the facts are materially correct, and there is no manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers. Thus, it is not for the Civil Service Tribunal to review the merits of the administration’s assessment of the professional abilities of an official, where it involves complex value-judgments which by their very nature are not amenable to objective verification.

In that regard, an error may only be said to be manifest where it may easily be detected in the light of the criteria to which the legislature intended the exercise of decision-making powers to be subject.

Consequently, a complaint alleging a manifest error of assessment must be rejected if, in spite of the evidence put forward by the applicant, the contested assessment still appears to be plausible.

That is particularly so where the decision at issue is vitiated by errors of assessment which, taken together, are of only minor significance unlikely to have influenced the administration.

(see paras 41-44)

See:

Judgments in Adia Interim v Commission, T‑19/95, EU:T:1996:59, para. 49; AIUFFASS and AKT v Commission, T‑380/94, EU:T:1996:195, para. 59; BUPA and Others v Commission, T‑289/03, EU:T:2008:29, para. 221, and Belfass v Council, T‑495/04, EU:T:2008:160, para. 63

Judgments in Wenning v Europol, F‑114/07, EU:F:2009:130, para. 111 and the case-law cited therein; Faria v OHIM, F‑7/09, EU:F:2010:9, para. 44 and the case-law cited therein; AJ v Commission, F‑80/10, EU:F:2011:172, para. 36, and CW v Parliament, F‑48/13, EU:F:2014:186, paras 70, 72 and 73 and the case-law cited therein
JUDGMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

(Third Chamber)

15 December 2015

Christian Guittet

v

European Commission

‛Civil service — Former official — Social security — Payment of medical expenses — Management of the medical file by the Commission — Principle of sound administration and the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials — Non-contractual liability of the European Union’

Application

:

under Article 270 TFEU, applicable to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to Article 106a thereof, in which Mr Guittet essentially requests the Tribunal to order the European Commission to compensate him for the material and non-material harm which he claims to have suffered as a result, mainly, of its continual failure to have regard for his welfare and to observe the principle of sound administration, which it committed in the management of his medical file and the reimbursement of his medical expenses and those of his late wife, since his accident on 8 December 2003.

Held

:

The action is dismissed. Mr Guittet is to bear his own costs and to pay the costs incurred by the European Commission.

Summary

Actions brought by officials — Actions for compensation — Application for annulment of a pre-litigation decision rejecting a request for compensation — Application not independent of the claims for compensation (Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91) Officials — Non-contractual liability of the institutions — Damage — Assessment — Criteria (Staff Regulations, Art. 90(1))
JUDGMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

(Second Chamber)

24 September 2015

Roderich Weissenfels

v

European Parliament

‛Civil service — Officials — Action for compensation — Non-contractual liability of the European Union — Content of an email sent by the administration to a retired official — Impugnment of the applicant’s honour — None — Communication by agents representing the institution of the applicant’s personal data to his lawyer in proceedings before the General Court — Infringement of Regulation No 45/2001 — False factual assertions’

Application:

under Article 270 TFEU, applicable to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to Article 106a thereof, in which Mr Weissenfels seeks annulment of the European Parliament’s decision of 5 March 2014 rejecting his claim for compensation for the non-material harm which he claims to have suffered due to, first, assertions contained in an email sent to him by Parliament’s administration and, second, the communication of certain documents containing his personal data to his lawyer.

Held:

The action is dismissed. Mr Weissenfels is to bear his own costs and is ordered to pay those incurred by the European Parliament.

Summary

Actions brought by officials — Jurisdiction of the Courts of the European Union — Limits — Application of national law — Not included (Art. 270 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Annex I, Art. 1) Officials — Non-contractual liability of the institutions — Conditions — Unlawfulness — Concept — Communication by agents representing an institution of an official’s personal data to his lawyer in judicial proceedings — Not included (Art. 340, second para., TFEU)
50

The 2011 and 2012 reports, it is claimed, focus only on the tasks required to hold a post in function group AST, for which the applicant was actually recruited. However, the tasks that she performed in the course of the first three years of ESMA’s existence, it is claimed, went far beyond the scope of the description of her post. During the first fifteen months following the establishment of ESMA she was, it is alleged, the only member of staff responsible for human resources and she took on duties corresponding to a post in the administrators’ function group; after the restructuring of the human resources department in 2013, she continued to bear an abnormal workload, given the lack of staff, of which her immediate superiors were fully aware. However, no reference was made to those circumstances in the 2011 and 2012 reports, which indicated that the applicant’s performance was lower than expected due to a lack of efficiency, organisational skills and prioritisation. In that regard it suffices to note, according to the applicant, that it would have been impossible to handle, during the first fifteen months of ESMA’s existence, the multiple tasks that were assigned to her if she had not set priorities or had not been efficient and organised. The applicant emphasises that her workload, undertaken during that period with the help of a part-time secretary and a trainee, was, by the middle of 2012, divided between five members of staff and four trainees.
The time limits for lodging a complaint and bringing an action, which are mandatory and not at the discretion of the parties or the court, are intended to safeguard within the EU institutions the legal certainty which is essential for their successful operation, by preventing EU measures which involve legal effects from being called in question indefinitely.

To accept that, in response to a request for review lodged subsequently by the official concerned, the latter may receive retrospective payment of allowances previously denied him is likely to give rise to considerable legal uncertainty, with the risk of the institutions accumulating debts with regard to their officials, without the institutions being in a position to limit that risk.

Moreover, a judgment cannot be regarded as a substantial new fact which would justify the re-opening of the time limits for lodging a complaint or bringing an action against an administrative decision that has become final, since the official concerned was not a party to that judgment or directly concerned by the measure annulled by that judgment.

(see paras 27, 29)

Judgment of 21 February 1974 in Kortner and Others v Council and Others, 15/73 to 33/73, 52/73, 53/73, 57/73 to 109/73, 116/73, 117/73, 123/73, 132/73 and 135/73 to 137/73, EU:C:1974:16, paras 36 and 39

Judgment of 5 March 2008 in Combescot v Commission, T‑414/06 P, EU:T:2008:58, para. 43 and the case-law cited therein

Judgment of , 13 April 2011 in Sukup v CommissionF‑73/09, EU:F:2011:40, para. 62, and order of 13 February 2014 in Probst v Commission, F‑75/13, EU:F:2014:20, para. 23
JUDGMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL (First Chamber)

21 July 2016

António Gaspar Pinto Ferreira

v

European Commission

‛Civil service — Officials — Disciplinary penalty — Article 9(2) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations — Amount withheld from pension — External activity undertaken without permission — No advance request for permission made’

Application:

under Article 270 TFEU, applicable to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to Article 106a thereof, by which Mr Pinto Ferreira seeks annulment of the decision of the European Commission, of 16 December 2014, imposing, as a disciplinary measure under Article 9(2) of Annex IX of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’), the withholding of an amount of 185 EUR per month from his retirement pension, for a period of 12 months, with effect from the date when he began to receive that pension, namely 1 November 2015.

Held:

The decision of 16 December 2014, by which the appointing authority of the European Commission imposed on Mr Pinto Ferreira the penalty provided for in Article 9(2) of Annex IX of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, is annulled. The European Commission is to bear its own costs and is ordered to bear the costs incurred by Mr Pinto Ferreira.

Summary

Officials — Disciplinary measures — Penalty — Imposition on an official in active service of a disciplinary penalty laid down for officials in receipt of a retirement pension or invalidity allowance only — Unlawfulness (Staff Regulations, Annex IX, Art. 9(1) and (2)) Officials — Staff Regulations — Extension by analogy of the benefit of a provision of the Staff Regulations — Precluded
ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE FIRST CHAMBER OF THE

CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

4 September 2008

Case F-54/05

Fernanda Ehrhardt

v

European Parliament

(Amicable settlement at the initiative of the Tribunal – Removal from the register)

Application: brought under Articles 236 EC and 152 EA, in which Mrs Ehrhardt seeks, in particular, annulment of the Parliament’s decision rejecting her claim for restitution of the financial and/or other value of 207 hours 30 minutes which were deducted from her leave, her salary and her pension.

Held: Case F‑54/05 Ehrhardt v Parliament is removed from the register of the Tribunal. Each party is to bear its own costs.

Summary

Officials – Actions – Amicable settlement of the dispute before the Civil Service Tribunal – Removal from the register

(Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal, Arts 69 and 74)
ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE FIRST CHAMBER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

27 February 2007

Case F-78/05

Georgios Rounis

v

Commission of the European Communities

(Amicable settlement – Removal from the register)

Application: brought under Articles 236 EC and 152 EA, in which Mr Rounis seeks, first, annulment of the Commission’s decision of 20 April 2005 rejecting his complaint, submitted on 16 December 2004, against the Commission’s decision of 21 September 2004 refusing to allow him to transfer part of his salary to the United Kingdom intended to pay the university fees for his daughter for the period from November 2003 to October 2004, and annulment of that decision of 21 September 2004, and, secondly, compensation for the material and non-material damage which he claims to have suffered as a result of those decisions.

Held: Case F‑78/05 Rounis v Commission is removed from the register. The Commission is ordered to bear its own costs and to pay EUR 10 000 towards Mr Rounis’ costs.

Summary

Officials – Actions – Amicable settlement of the dispute before the Civil Service Tribunal – Removal from the register

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 98, first para.; Council Decision 2004/752, Art. 3(4))
Staff case summary



Staff case summary

Summary

Procedure – Allocation of jurisdiction among the various Community Courts

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Annex I, Art. 8(3); Staff Regulations of Officials, Art. 72)

Where the Civil Service Tribunal is seised of a case against the refusal to grant an official the 100% reimbursement of medical expenses to which he claims he is entitled on account of the mental illness from which he claims he is suffering, it is required, under the second paragraph of Article 8(3) of Annex I to the Statute of the Court of Justice, to decline jurisdiction in favour of the Court of First Instance where there are other cases pending before the Court of First Instance between the same parties, founded on the same legal basis and also concerning the right to 100% reimbursement of medical expenses. Those various cases constitute a single dispute and it is consistent with the sound administration of justice, which the provisions of Article 8(3) of Annex I to the Statute of the Court of Justice seek to ensure, to confer on one court only the power to determine the whole of that dispute.

(see paras 8-16)
Staff case summary



Staff case summary

Summary

Officials – Actions – Prior administrative complaint – Same subject-matter and legal basis

(Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91)

Under Article 91(2) of the Staff Regulations, an appeal is admissible only if the appointing authority has previously had a complaint submitted to it pursuant to Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations against the act adversely affecting the official concerned within the period of three months provided for in that article.

An appeal by an official against a decision of the administration fixing his pension rights is inadmissible where the prior complaint was lodged against a subsequent decision of the administration rejecting his application to contribute retroactively to the Community pension scheme. The appeal, in so far as it is directed against the first decision, was not preceded by a prior complaint with the same subject-matter and thus does not satisfy the requirement laid down in Article 91(2) of the Staff Regulations. Furthermore, even if the complaint, in so far as it relates to the administration’s calculation of the applicant’s pension rights, may be regarded as also calling into question the legality of the first decision and can therefore be deemed to have been lodged against that decision secondarily, it should have been submitted within the period laid down in the Staff Regulations.

(see paras 18, 22-24)