2.

The main question in the case is whether the Parliament was right to claim subrogation in respect of the compensation which the applicant received from the insurers for the other party to the accident. Since Regulation No 912/78 entered into force, this assumption of rights has been governed by Article 73 (4) of the Staff Regulations which reads as follows: “Within the limits of the obligations devolving upon them under Articles 72, 73 and 75, the Communities shall automatically assume the rights of redress of the official or of those entitled under him against the third party responsible for an accident involving the death or injury of an official or a person covered by his insurance.” Previously, this matter was covered by Article 8 of the Rules, which provided: “The benefits and allowances, and also the reimbursement of medical expenses provided for in these Rules shall be paid to an official or to those entitled under him only on condition that they subrogate the Communities to their rights and proceedings against any responsible third party up to the amount of such benefits, allowances and reimbursement.” It is plain from the wording and from the purpose of the Rules (the avoidance of a duplication of benefits for the same injury) that the assignment of rights of redress covers only benefits akin to those paid by the employer of the injured party on account of the accident in question pursuant to Article 73 of the Staff Regulations and its implementing Rules. According to the applicant the benefits concerned in the present case are not of this nature. She claims that the compensation paid by the insurers of the other parry to the accident on the basis of an expert's repon called for in the context of proceedings before a Luxembourg tribunal is compensation for nonmaterial damage in the broadest sense of the term and not — as in the case of the allowance in respect of invalidity under Article 73 of the Staff Regulations — for impairment of eamine capacity. In suppon of her point of view she also refers to a “note d'information” of 18 February 1980 issued by the Head of the Directorate-General for Administration of the Parliament. That note makes clear, in regard to the question of subrogation in the case of accident that an injured official may directly bring a claim for indemnity against a responsible third pany inasmuch as specific material damage, such as damage to clothing or to a motorcar or damages for pain and suffering and nonmaterial damage are concerned. The Parliament's view, on the other hand, is that where compensation is paid by the insurers of the other party to the accident or an allowance is granted by the Parliament, in both cases the sums in question relate merely to the adverse effect on bodily health. Accordingly the Parliament rightly deducted the compensation when paying the allowance. (a) No contribution to the solution of this problem is to be. gained from the Parliament's reference to the definition of “accident” contained in Article 2 of the Rules which is worded as follows: “An accident means any occurrence or external factor of a sudden, violent or abnormal nature adversely affecting an official's bodily or menul health.” As I have already pointed out in my opinion in Case 152/77, in relation to an analogous argument, this provision only gives a definition of the concept of “accident” and in so doing naturally focuses on the adverse effect on bodily or mental health but without giving any reason why the benefit payable under Article 73 is provided ([1979] ECR 2850). Reliance on this definition thus cannot constitute proof that allowances granted as the result of accidents are paid only in respect of the adverse effect on bodily health. (b) The first point of importance for the purposes of this case is how, in the light of the matters which have come to our knowledge, the compensationgranted in the proceedings before the Luxembourg court is to be classified. It is of course obvious that in this connection Luxembourg law is a decisive factor. According to that law, if I understand it correctly, there is invalidity where there is a “perte ou une entrave dans les moyens d'action” (“loss or limitation of the possibilities of activity”) and invalidity is assessed according to the degree of reduction of capacity for work. On the other hand loss of income is irrelevant (Thiry, “Actions et Recours des Assurances Sociales devant des Juridictions Répressives”, p. 114). On the basis of that legal situation and because there are no “functional sequelae properly so called” the expert expressly stated that there could be no question of a partial permanent invalidity. The fact that none the lessane considered the sum of BFR 50000 to be appropriate compensation for “temporary traumatic consequences and minor long-term sequelae” (slight occipital neuralgia and scars sensitive to the weather and sligthly disfiguring, in the patellar region of her left knee), this can only be, so the applicant thinks, compensation for nonmaterial damage in the wider sense. (c) If, on the other hand, it is asked how the allowance granted by the Parliament must be classified, then, after all that has emerged in the course of the proceedings, the only matter which falls for consideration is that of subrogation under Article 8 of the Rules. An important factor in this regard is that in his declaration covering the consequences of the accident, the medical officer bluntly states: “L'invalidité est de 6%” (“the state of invalidity is 6o/o”). Even the Parliament's representative could only state, in answer to a question put to him by the Court in the course of the oral procedure, that an invalidity allowance had been granted. Similarly, nothing in the letter of 16 January 1980 from the Head of the Social Affairs Division which gives the result of the examination and mentions a “partial permanent invalidity of 6%” indicates that the resulting sum could have been determined by analogous application of the rates laid down in the invalidity scale referred to in Article 12 of the Rules, that is to say, on the basis of Article 14 of the Rules. We must therefore proceed on the basis that the allowance paid by the Parliament was granted in respect of an — albeit slight — reduction of earning capacity, that is to say, that the allowance was for material and not for nonmaterial damage. (d) The conclusion to be drawn from this is clear and compelling. Since the Parliament was unable to show that the requirements for subrogation — the similarity between the allowance paid by the Parliament and the compensation paid by the insurers of the other party to the accident in the context of the proceedings before the Luxembourg court — existed, it wrongly deducted the compensation. The contested decision must therefore be annulled and it must be declared that the applicant is entitled to receive from the Parliament the payment of the full amount of compensation in the sum of BFR 292582.