ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 8 June 2021 – Centraal Justitieel Incassobureau

(Case C‑699/20)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court – Judicial cooperation in criminal matters – Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA – Refusal to recognise a decision imposing a financial penalty – No pending litigation before the court that refused that request – Manifest inadmissibility)

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Jurisdiction of the Court – No pending litigation before the national court – Manifest inadmissibility – Similar disputes pending before the same court – Irrelevant

(Art. 267 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 53(2))

(see paras 14, 15, 18-20 and operative part)

Operative part

The request for a preliminary ruling made by the Sąd Rejonowy w Nysie, II Wydział Karny (District Court, Nysa, Criminal Division II, Poland), by decision of 19 November 2020, is manifestly inadmissible.
2.

Article 56 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude national legislation providing imperatively that, where prohibited lotteries are made available for commercial purposes: – the imposition of a minimum fine per unauthorised slot machine, without a ceiling on the total amount of the fines imposed, provided that the total amount of the fines imposed is not disproportionate to the economic advantage that the penalized infringements may provide; – the imposition of an alternative custodial sentence by unauthorised slot machine without a ceiling on the total duration of the alternative custodial sentences imposed, provided that the duration of the alternative custodial sentence actually imposed is not excessive in view of the seriousness of the infringements observed, and – a contribution to the costs of the proceedings amounting to 10% of the fines imposed, provided that that contribution is not excessive in relation to the real cost of such proceedings or does not infringe the right of access to the courts enshrined in the Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 22 October 2021 – O and Others

(Case C‑691/20) ( 1 )

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – EU law – Principles – Article 18 TFEU – Equal treatment – Discrimination on grounds of nationality – Prohibition – Article 49 TFEU – Freedom of establishment – Joint and several liability of companies which form part of a group for debts resulting from an employment contract entered into by one of those companies – Exclusion by the legislation of the Member State concerned of companies that have their seat in another Member State)

1. EU law – Principles – Equal treatment – Discrimination on grounds of nationality – Prohibition – Scope – Conditions Article 18 TFEU (see paras 18, 19)

2. Freedom of movement for persons – Freedom of establishment – Provisions of the Treaty – Implementation of Article 18 TFEU by Article 49 TFEU – National rules excluding the joint and several liability of a company with a controlling position over another company and established in a different Member State than the latter, for debts resulting from an employment contract concluded by the latter – Whether permissible (Arts 18 and 49 TFEU) (see paras 20, 22-25, operative part)

Operative part

The principle of non-discrimination, implemented by Article 49 TFEU, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation under which a company, established in a Member State other than that in which the company which it controls is established, cannot be held jointly and severally liable for that latter company’s debts resulting from an employment contract.

( 1 ) OJ C 110, 29.3.2021.
Order of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 23 April 2021 – Centre d’Enseignement Secondaire Saint-Vincent de Soignies

(Case C‑471/20) ( 1 )

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Article 53(2) and Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court – Social policy – Protection of the safety and health of workers – Organisation of working time – Directive 2003/88/EC – Maximum weekly working time – Reference period – Article 16 – Derogations – Articles 17 and 18 – Supervisor-teacher at a boarding school undertaking night duty – Compensatory rest conditions)

Social policy – Protection of the safety and health of workers – Directive 2003/88 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time – Maximum weekly working time – Derogation – Activity of a teacher at a boarding school, responsible for the supervision of boarders during the night – Conditions

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/88, Arts 17(2) and (3)(b))

(see paragraphs 32, 34-36, operative part)

Operative part

Article 17(3)(b) of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time must be interpreted as meaning that the work of a teacher at a boarding school, who is responsible for the supervision of boarders during the night, falls within the scope of that provision.

( 1 ) OJ C 9, 11.1.2021.
Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 25 March 2021 – Banco Santander

(Case C‑503/20)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Article 53(2) and Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Consumer protection – Consumer credit – Directives 87/102/EEC and 2008/48/EC – Scope – National legislation intended to combat usury – Freedom to provide services)

1. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Questions the answer to which may be clearly deduced from the Court’s existing case-law – Application of Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure (Art. 267 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 99) (see paras 22, 23)

2. Consumer protection – Credit agreements for consumers – Directives 87/102 and 2008/48 – Annual percentage rate of charge – National legislation, as interpreted in case-law, which places a limit on that rate in order to combat usury – Whether permissible – Condition – Compliance with the harmonised rules as regards, in particular, information obligations – To be determined by the national court (European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/48, Art. 30(1); Council Directive 87/102, Art. 15) (see paras 26, 27, 29-32 and operative part)

3. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Admissibility – Request providing no details of the factual and legislative context and not setting out the reasons for the reference to the Court of Justice – Manifest inadmissibility (Art. 267 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 23; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 53(2) and 94) (see paras 34-39)

4. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Admissibility – Need to provide the Court with sufficient information regarding the factual and legislative context – Scope of the obligation in the context of the fundamental freedoms – Question raised concerning a dispute confined within a single Member State – No indication as to the connecting factor making the requested interpretation necessary to resolve the dispute – Manifest inadmissibility (Art. 267 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 53(2) and 94) (see paras 41-43)

Operative part

Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit, as amended by Council Directive 90/88/EEC of 22 February 1990, and Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, as interpreted in national case-law, which places a limit on the annual percentage rate of charge that may be placed on the consumer under a consumer credit agreement in order to combat usury, provided that that legislation does not contravene the rules harmonised by those directives as regards, in particular, information obligations.
Order of the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) of 4 May 2021 – Dermavita v EUIPO

(Case C‑26/21 P)

(Appeal – EU trade mark – Determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Article 170b of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Request failing to demonstrate that an issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Refusal to allow the appeal to proceed)

1. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Burden of proof (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 170b) (see para. 11)

2. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Request that an appeal be allowed to proceed – Formal requirements – Scope (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a and 170b) (see paras 12-14)

3. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Request that the appeal be allowed to proceed failing to demonstrate that the issue is significant – Appeal not allowed to proceed (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a and 170b) (see paras 15-18, 21, 23, 24)

4. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Inadequate or contradictory grounds – Request that the appeal be allowed to proceed failing to demonstrate that the issue is significant – Appeal not allowed to proceed (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 170b) (see paras 19, 20)

5. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Issue that has not been examined by the Court – Request that the appeal be allowed to proceed failing to demonstrate that the issue is significant – Appeal not allowed to proceed (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a and 170b) (see para. 22)

Operative part

1. The appeal is not allowed to proceed.
Order of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 1 July 2021 – Ministerul Public

(Case C‑244/21)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Article 49 – Principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties – National case-law prohibiting the application of new more lenient criminal legislation where it requires a new assessment of a legal characterisation that already has the force of res judicata – No implementation of EU law – Clear lack of jurisdiction of the Court )

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Jurisdiction of the Court – Limits – Request for an interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Subject matter of the national dispute not having any connection with EU law – Clear lack of jurisdiction of the Court

(Art. 6(1) TEU; Art. 267 TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 51(1) and (2); Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 53(2))

(see paras 25, 27-30, operative part)

Operative part

The Court of Justice of the European Union clearly has no jurisdiction to rule on the question referred by the Tribunalul Giurgiu (Giurgiu Regional Court, Romania), by decision of 9 April 2021.
Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Burden of proof

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 170b)

(see para. 13)
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Admissibility – Request not explaining why reference to the Court is necessary – Manifest inadmissibility

(Art. 267 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 23; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 53 (2) and 94 (c))

(see paras 33, 34, 37, 40, 43-48 and operative part)
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Jurisdiction of the Court – Limits – Purely internal situation – No reference to EU law in the legislation applicable – Manifest lack of jurisdiction

(Art. 267 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 53(2))

(see paras 16-20, operative part)
2.

Appeal – Grounds – Mistaken assessment of the facts and evidence – Inadmissibility – Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence – Possible only where the facts or evidence have been distorted – Ground of appeal alleging distortion of the clear sense of the evidence – Need to indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted and show the errors of appraisal which led to that distortion (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 168(1)(d)) (see paras 14, 15)
Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 19 May 2022 – Frontera Capital

(Case C‑722/21)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Article 267 TFEU – Notary – Meaning of a ‘court or tribunal’ – Criteria – No dispute before the referring body – Manifest inadmissibility)

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling – Reference to the Court – National court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 267 TFEU – Meaning – To be determined on the basis of criteria relating to the body’s constitution and function – Notario del Ilustre Colegio Notarial de Andalucía (notary belonging to the Association of Notaries of Andalusia, Spain) issuing European payment orders in cross-border cases – No judicial function – Not included

(Art. 267 TFEU)

(see paras 11-16)

Operative part

The request for a preliminary ruling made by a notario del Ilustre Colegio Notarial de Andalucía (notary belonging to the Association of Notaries of Andalusia, Spain) by decision of 25 November 2021 is manifestly inadmissible.
Order of the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) of 5 April 2022 – Kappes v Sedus Stoll and EUIPO

(Case C‑784/21 P)

(Appeal – EU trade mark – Determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Article 170 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Request failing to demonstrate that an issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Appeal not allowed to proceed)

1. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Burden of proof (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b) (see para. 14)

2. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Request that an appeal be allowed to proceed – Formal requirements – Scope (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b) (see paras 15-17)

3. Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Incompatibility with the case-law of the Court – Request that the appeal be allowed to proceed failing to demonstrate that the issue is significant – Appeal not allowed to proceed (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a (1) and 170b) (see paras 18, 19)

Operative part

1. The appeal is not allowed to proceed.
ORDER OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COURT

23 March 2022 ( *1 )

(Rectification order)

In Case C‑649/21 P(I)-REC,

APPEAL under the second paragraph of Article 57 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 25 October 2021,

Fastweb SpA, established in Milan (Italy), represented by E. Cerchi, M. Merola and F. Caliento, avvocati,

appellant,

the other parties to the proceedings being:

Iliad Italia SpA, established in Milan, represented by D. Fosselard and D. Waelbroeck, avocats,

applicant at first instance,

European Commission, represented by G. Conte, J. Szczodrowski and C. Sjödin, acting as Agents,

defendant at first instance,

THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COURT,

after hearing the Advocate General,

makes the following

Order

1 On 22 February 2022, the Vice-President of the Court made the order, Fastweb v Commission(C‑649/21 P(I), EU:C:2022:171).

2 That order contains a clerical error which it is appropriate for the Court to rectify of its own motion, in accordance with Article 154(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, which applies to the procedure on appeal under Article 190(1) of those rules.

On those grounds, the Vice-President of the Court hereby orders:

1. In the introductory part of the order of 22 February 2022, Fastweb v Commission(C‑649/21 P(I), EU:C:2022:171), the term ‘THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COURT’ shall be inserted after the names of the parties.

2. The original of this order shall be annexed to the original of the rectified order. A note of this order shall be made in the margin of the original of the rectified order.

Luxembourg, 23 March 2022. A. Calot Escobar Registrar L. Bay Larsen Vice-president

( *1 ) Language of the case: English.
Appeal – Scheme for prior determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Burden of proof

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58a; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 170a(1) and 170b)

(see para. 14)
2.

Appeal – Grounds – Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence – Inadmissibility – Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence – Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted – Plea alleging distortion of the facts – Need to indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted and show the errors of appraisal which led to that distortion (Art. 256 TFUE; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 168(1)(d)) (see para. 11)
OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL LAGRANGE

DELIVERED ON 25 OCTOBER 19562

Mr President,

Members of the Court,

In its judgment of 16 July 1956 the Court accepted that Decision No 22/55 — which concerns the fixing of prices and is, in my opinion, the only one at issue in this case — was general in nature not only — as I had myself accepted — as regards the three collieries considered individually, but even as regards the Fédération des Charbonnages de Belgique, and it concluded logically therefrom that against that general decision the applicant may only plead misuse of powers affecting it.

The whole debate appears to me to have borne solely upon the question whether or not the contested decision was contrary to the terms of Article 26 (2) (a) of the Convention in that — and this was the only point which the discussion could and had to concern — it fixed prices below the level of estimated production costs at the end of the transitional period. That entire discussion was in the nature of a reply to the operative part of the Court's interim judgment, and the applicants maintained that the prices fixed by the contested decisions were lower than the estimated production costs and that the High Authority had therefore infringed the provisions of Article 26 when it adopted that decision. We were told that four times and then a fifth time by Counsel for the applicant in his summing-up.

In those circumstances I do not see — and I say it quite frankly — I do not see the relevance of that discussion to the possibility of a misuse of powers affecting the applicants. It is of course conceivable that a thorough examination of that question from a purely factual and legal point of view might reveal certain factors which could demonstrate the existence of a misuse of powers or, at least, constitute prima facie evidence of it. Let me confess, however, that on that point the hearings which have taken place appear to me to have demonstrated, on the contrary, that the study of the estimated costs for 1958 was undertaken jointly by the parties with all requisite seriousness and even in mutual agreement, at least until October 1956. For myself, I do not see in the extremely serious and thorough but purely legal and technical discussion which has taken place the least indication of the existence of a misuse of powers by the High Authority affecting the applicants.

For that reason I believe that I need not deal with all the questions which have been discussed in such depth today and I can only adhere to my earlier opinion.
2.

You review only — the regularity of the procedure which has led to the assessment of the merits of the official; — the material accuracy of the facts on which the administration has based this assessment and the ‘compatibility’ between facts and assessment (Prakash cited above); — and finally any error of law or misuse of power. In this case, no defect in the report procedure is claimed to exist and although an allegation of misuse of power was initially made, the applicant's counsel, realizing that it would have been impossible to substantiate such an allegation, expressly withdrew it the other day in court. Therefore the only matters remaining for discussion are the material accuracy of the facts and any error of law. As regards the first matter, the applicant, by invoking quite impressive testimony and by offering to prove his case before the Court, tries to show that he is a far better man than those who reported on him thought him to be. But none of this testimony proves that the authorities entrusted with the task of drawing up the report based their judgment on incorrect facts or that they committed an obvious error. But even if this assessment goes too far, which one is tempted to think when reading certain documents in the file, the judge of the legality of the act cannot take account of this factor since to do so would transform his review into a review of a matter of expediency, which is clearly out of the question. There remains therefore error of law. I considered the question for a few moments. In fact, I asked myself whether the report should not relate solely to the official's future and whether it could legally, as it did here, make a judgment on his ability to perform the duties of the post corresponding to his career bracket, a post to which he has been properly appointed. But I do not think that this line of thought can be followed for two reasons: 1. Assessment of the aptitude of an official for the post which he occupies is very difficult to dissociate from assessment of his aptitude for a higher post. 2. Article 43 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the Communities merely stipulates that the report must cover ‘the ability, efficiency and conduct in the service of each official’ and consequently does not prohibit, the authority entrusted with the task of drawing up the report, from pronouncing on future prospects and equally does not require it to do so. Therefore in my opinion there appears to be no error of law. These are the reasons which lead me, morally with a certain regret but legally with not much doubt, to propose that you dismiss Mr Marcato's application. Perhaps, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, you could relieve him of the costs which he would normally have to bear on the dismissal of his application.