1.

A constant theme of the Court of Justice's case-law, beginning with Case 9/70 (Franz Grad v Finanzamt Traunstein, Judgment of 6 October 1970; [1970] ECR 825), has been the recognition that even decisions and directives which are in principle addressed only to States can produce direct effects in the legal relationship between Member States and individuals if the following requirements are met: the obligation imposed on Member States by the decision must be clear and unambiguous, it must not be dependent on any condition and in particular it must not leave the addressee any margin of discretion as to the manner of its implementation. If these criteria are met, a decision directly obliges the authorities and courts of the Member States to protect the interests of individuals affected by a breach thereof. Thus the Court has emphasized on several occasions that ‘particularly in cases where, for example, the Community authorities by means of a decision have imposed an obligation on a Member State or on all the Member States to act in a certain way, the effectiveness (“l'effet utile”) of such a measure would be weakened if the nationals of that State could not invoke it in the courts and the national courts could not take it into consideration as part of Community law’ (Case 9/70, Franz Grad v Finanzamt Traunstein, Judgment of 6 October 1970; [1970] ECR at p. 837). If we now consider Article 1 of Commission Decision No 66/474 in the light of these principles, it is clear from the wording that the Italian Republic is obliged to abolish the protective measures notified to the Commission on 23 July 1966. It would be possible, pursuing a purely formal argument, to contend that this wording does not unambiguously refer also to protective measures in that field which are not notified. However, since frozen beef and veal for processing under customs supervision were expressly excluded from the protective measure in the notification to the Commission, the Commission had to assume that the levies on goods of that description continued to be suspended, and so it did not need to order the abolition of the supplementary levies on them. Moreover it is clear from the preamble to the decision that the Commission did not consider the requirements of Article 16 (1) of Regulation No 14/64 to have been satisfied and so regarded protective measures for all products covered by Regulation No 14/64 as unnecessary. Therefore a correct interpretation of the decision can only lead to the conclusion that all protective measures which were adopted in respect of products subject to the market organization for beef and veal had to be removed. It must also be ascertained whether the decision left the Italian Government any margin of discretion in its implementation. The Italian Government submits that such a margin may be inferred from the fact that on the very day on which the Commission took its decision, a Council decision was taken on a proposal of the Commission, authorizing the Italian Republic to increase the levies on the goods in question. The Italian Government argues that, even though the last-mentioned decision was taken in reliance on a different provision of Regulation No 14/64, it none the less recognized the necessity of a price increase and thereby confirmed that the protective measure taken by Italy was necessary and justified. Reading the two provisions together and bearing in mind that no time-limit was stated for the abolition, it is possible, in the Italian Government's view, to conclude that the intention was to allow the Italian Republic to determine for itself the methods and the appropriate time for adapting the decision to its own legal order. To that the Commission objects that there is no connexion between its decision, based on Article 16 of Regulation No 14/64, and the Council's decision, based on Article 18 of the same regulation: the two decisions are subject to different conditions and have different effects. It is true, says the Commission, that at that time it had been necessary to take note of certain anomalies in the market; however, they would not have justified protective measures under Article 16 of Regulation No 14/64, since provision had been made for such measures only for extreme cases. For market anomalies of the type described, the appropriate instrument, in the Commission's view, was provided by Article 18 of Regulation No 14/64, since the Member State could be authorized to deal with the anomalies within a stated period and by specified methods. The decision ordering the abolition of the protective measures constituted in this respect, says the Commission, nothing more than a repetition of the prohibition, contained in Article 12 (2) of Regulation No 14/64, of the imposition of charges equivalent in effect to customs duties and was therefore capable of producing direct effects. I share the Commission's opinion that even though the two legal instruments were adopted on the same day, they are subject to different conditions, pursue different aims, provide for different methods and produce different effects. The protective measures taken under Article 16 constitute independent acts of the Member States, partially suspending the market organization for beef and veal and capable of review, as regards their compatibility with Community law, only by means of a procedure operating ex post facto. They are permissible only if the market in beef and veal suffers, or is threatened with, serious disturbances liable to endanger the objectives laid down in Article 39 of the Treaty. In contrast the procedure under Article 18 of Regulation No 14/64 does not suspend the market organization even partially; it simply modifies it. Accordingly the conditions under which the Council may act are not as strict as those of Article 16. Any measures may be adopted to take account of special circumstances in the beef and veal market. If Member States are authorized to act by virtue of Article 16, they may make use of that authorization — which is based on a political and economic appraisal undertaken by the Community institutions, the Commission and the Council — only within the prescribed limits. But Articles 5 and 12 of Regulation No 14/64 show us that the Community institutions intended essentially to retain the regulation of the levies in their own hands. It was therefore logical that the Commission should first demand the removal of the protective measures and at the same time propose to the Council a decision under Article 18 as a less severe method. The two instruments should, for the reasons given, be considered separately, with the result that the question of precedence does not arise. Consequently Council Decision No 66/455, which allows the Italian Republic a margin of discretion as to the manner of its application, cannot change anything in the unequivocal decision of the Commission, which merely imposes a negative obligation on the addressee and so does not allow any margin of discretion. Lastly, the fact that the Commission decision does not prescribe any period within which the protective measure must be removed is not such as to cast doubt on the unequivocal nature of the order. In this respect the decision must be considered in conjunction with the fourth subparagraph of Article 16 (2) of Regulation No 14/64 which provides that it shall come into force immediately. It may be inferred from this that, if the Commission had wanted to depart from the general principle, it would have had to state such an intention expressly. The obligation imposed by Article 1 of Commission Decision No 66/474 is therefore unconditional, sufficiently clear and unequivocal and allows the Italian Republic no margin of discretion as to the manner of its execution. So the provision is capable of producing direct effects in the legal relationships between the Member State to which it is addressed and individuals and of creating for the latter the right to rely on it before national courts. The supremacy of Community law has the effect that in this respect national law which conflicts with it may not be applied.