Keywords

Summary



Keywords

++++

1 . CARTELS - PRICES - POWER TO FIX PRICES AND POWER TO DETERMINE PRICES - PERMISSIBILITY OF THIS DISTINCTION - CONCEPTS

( ECSC TREATY, ARTICLE 65 )

2 . COMMON MARKET FOR COAL AND STEEL - SYSTEM OF COMPETITION - IMPERFECT COMPETITION - CONDITIONAL ADMISSIBILITY

( ECSC TREATY, SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 2, ARTICLE 65 ( 2 ), ARTICLE 66 ( 2 ))

3 . CARTELS - AUTHORIZATION BY THE HIGH AUTHORITY - LIMITS - CONTROL OF MARKETING - CONCEPT

( ECSC TREATY, ARTICLE 65 ( 2 ) ( C ))

4 . CARTELS - AUTHORIZATION BY THE HIGH AUTHORITY - LIMITS - POWER TO DETERMINE PRICES WITHIN THE SCHEME OF THE TREATY - CONDITIONAL ADMISSIBILITY

( ECSC TREATY, ARTICLE 65 ( 2 ) ( C ))

5 . CARTELS - AUTHORIZATION BY THE HIGH AUTHORITY - LIMITS - POWER APPLICABLE TO A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF CERTAIN PRODUCTS WITHIN THE COMMON MARKET - CONCEPT

( ECSC TREATY, ARTICLES 2, 3, 4, 5, 65 ( 2 ) ( C ) )

Summary

1 . IN VIEW OF THE DIFFERENCE OF WORDING BETWEEN PARAGRAPHS ( 1 ) AND ( 2 ) OF ARTICLE 65 OF THE ECSC TREATY A BASIC DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE POWER TO FIX PRICES AND THE POWER TO DETERMINE PRICES IS PERMISSIBLE .

FOR THE UNDERTAKING WHICH EXERCISES IT, THE POWER TO FIX PRICES REPRESENTS AN OBJECTIVE FACT ARISING OUT OF AN EASILY ASCERTAINABLE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE .

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE POWER TO DETERMINE PRICES RESIDES IN THE POWER, GIVEN TO THE UNDERTAKING ENTITLED TO EXERCISE IT, TO ESTABLISH PRICES AT A LEVEL APPRECIABLY DIFFERENT FROM THAT AT WHICH THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE UNAIDED EFFECT OF COMPETITION . THUS A POWER TO DETERMINE PRICES CAN BE SAID TO EXIST ONLY WHEN IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT THE ACTUAL PRICES ARE, OR MAY BE, DIFFERENT FROM WHAT THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY POWER TO FIX PRICES .

2 . IT FOLLOWS FROM THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 65 ( 2 ) AND 66 ( 2 ) OF THE ECSC TREATY THAT THE TREATY IS NOT OPPOSED TO THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OR TO THE CREATION OF LARGE PRODUCTION OR SALES UNITS, SUCH AS ARE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE COAL AND STEEL MARKET, ON CONDITION THAT THE RESULTING SYSTEM OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION SERVES THE OBJECTIVES OF THE TREATY AND, IN PARTICULAR, THAT IT SAFEGUARDS WITHIN THAT MARKET THE MEASURE OF COMPETITION ESSENTIAL FOR THE OBSERVANCE OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 2 .

3 . A CARTEL WHICH HAS THE ABILITY TO REGULATE THE MARKETING OF A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF A GIVEN PRODUCT WITHIN THE COMMON MARKET EXERCISES A POWER OF CONTROL OVER MARKETING WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 65 ( 2 ) ( C ) OF THE ECSC TREATY .

4 . BY PERMITTING THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE AND CREATION OF LARGE PRODUCTION AND SALES UNITS WITHIN THE COMMON MARKET FOR COAL AND STEEL, THE ECSC TREATY GRANTS THOSE WHO TAKE PART IN THIS MARKET A MEASURE OF POWER TO DETERMINE PRICES, WHICH IS, HOWEVER, LIMITED BY PROVISIONS SUCH AS THOSE OF ARTICLE 65 ( 2 ) ( C ) WHICH ARE INTENDED TO SAFEGUARD A NECESSARY MINIMUM OF COMPETITION .

5 . A POWER TO DETERMINE PRICES OR TO CONTROL MARKETING APPLIES TO A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF CERTAIN PRODUCTS WITHIN THE COMMON MARKET WHEN THE FULL EXTENT OF THE EFFECTS WHICH IT PRODUCES IS NOT OF SECONDARY OR MINOR IMPORTANCE, BUT IS SUCH AS TO JEOPARDIZE, WITHIN THE SAID MARKET, THE MEASURE OF COMPETITION INTENDED BY THE TREATY OR THE EXECUTION OF THE TASKS WHICH ARTICLES 2, 3, 4 AND 5 ASSIGN TO THE COMMUNITY .