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As regards the first part of the present plea, the Commission contends that it did not apply the ‘mono-product’ ratios in a linear way by attributing to each undertaking a rate of reduction equal or proportionate to its ‘mono-product’ ratio, since no rule of EU law required it to do so. In taking into account the ‘mono-product’ ratio, the Commission also sought to maintain the link between the non-adjusted basic amounts, which reflected each undertaking’s participation in the cartel. Moreover, in order for the fine to be a deterrent, the reduction applied had to be the smallest possible which would allow the basic amount to be lowered below the ceiling of 10%. However, the adjustment of the basic amount of the applicants’ fine on the basis of a higher rate, proportionate to the difference between their ‘mono-product’ ratio and that of the other undertakings, would have had the effect of imposing on them a fine which did not have a sufficiently deterrent effect. Furthermore, the applicants benefited from a larger reduction than Bong and Hamelin, the adjusted basic amounts being EUR 11823500, EUR 13860000 and EUR 22607550, respectively. As regards Bong, the Commission states that, although a rate of reduction (88%) higher than Bong’s ‘mono-product’ ratio (80%) was applied to it, its adjusted basic amount (EUR 13860000) was, in absolute terms, higher than that of the applicants (EUR 11823500), notwithstanding the fact that the applicants’ value of sales and non-adjusted basic amount (EUR 143316000 and EUR 118235000) were higher than those of Bong (EUR 140000000 and EUR 115500000). As regards Hamelin, the Commission applied to it the lowest rate of reduction of all the undertakings (85%). Only GPV benefited from a higher rate of reduction than the applicants, due, on the one hand, to its higher, or even the highest, ‘mono-product’ ratio (93%) and, on the other hand, to the need to grant it a minimum rate of reduction of 98% to ensure that the adjusted basic amount would be less than the ceiling of 10% of its total turnover. However, the applicants’ situation was different, since their ‘mono-product’ ratio was 90% and the minimum rate of reduction required to bring their adjusted basic amount below the ceiling of 10% of their 2013 total turnover was 89.9% (88.9% with respect to the total turnover of 2015 and 86.2% with respect to that of 2016). Finally, taking into account the ‘mono-product’ ratio in a linear manner would have ascribed too much importance to it and would have had unfair consequences. For example, the adjusted basic amount of Mayer-Kuvert, whose ‘mono-product’ ratio was 76%, would have been higher (EUR 57769000 – 70% = EUR 13864560) than the applicants’ adjusted basic amount (EUR 118235000 – 90% = EUR 11823500), whereas the applicants’ non-adjusted basic amount was more than double that of Mayer-Kuvert (EUR 118235000 for the applicants compared with EUR 57769000 for Mayer-Kuvert). The Commission concludes from this that the rate of reduction applied to each undertaking follows from an overall assessment of several factors and not solely from the ‘mono-product’ ratio. The applicants, it argues, are in fact seeking to obtain the benefit of the rates of reduction applied to other undertakings and not to rectify any illegality. In any event, in view of their total turnover in 2015, the adjusted basic amount of their fine represents not 9.7% but 8.97% of that turnover.