ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha (Spain) lodged on 19 September 2019 — XC v Subdelegación del Gobierno de Toledo

(Case C-690/19)

(2020/C 414/27)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: XC

Defendant: Subdelegación del Gobierno de Toledo

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 31 October 2019 — TN v WWK Lebensversicherung auf Gegenseitigkeit, VP

(Case C-803/19)

(2020/C 247/02)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberster Gerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: TN

Defendants: WWK Lebensversicherung auf Gegenseitigkeit, VP

Interested party: UO

By order of 28 May 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Eighth Chamber) rules as follows:

Article 35(1) in conjunction with Article 36(1) of Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002 concerning life assurance, and Article 185(1) in conjunction with Article 186(1) of Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II), must be interpreted as not precluding a national provision according to which, in the event of the policyholder’s withdrawal from the insurance contract, the tax on insurance premiums which is owed by the policyholder and collected by the insurer and paid to the State is excluded from those amounts which the insurer is required to repay to the policyholder — who must therefore claim a tax refund from the tax administration or possibly damages from the insurer — in so far as the procedural provisions laid down by the law applicable to the insurance contract with respect to the reclaiming of sums paid by way of insurance premium tax are not such as to call in question the effectiveness of the policyholder’s right of cancellation under EU law, which it is for the referring court to ascertain.
1.

Are Articles 2 and 46 of Directive 2004/18/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts to be interpreted as precluding national legislation — such as Paragraph 41(3) of the Riigihangete seadus (Estonian Law on public procurement; ‘the RHS’) — pursuant to which, if specific requirements for the activities to be carried out under a public contract are laid down by law, the contracting authority must specify in the tender notice which registrations or activity licences are required to qualify the tenderer, must require the tenderer to submit evidence of the activity licence or registration for the purpose of verifying compliance with the special statutory requirements in the tender notice, and must refuse the tenderer as unqualified if the latter does not possess the relevant activity licence or registration?
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Mercantil de Badajoz (Spain) lodged on 15 January 2020 — Asociación de Usuarios de Bancos, Cajas y Seguros de España (Adicae Consumidores Críticos y Responsables) v Caja Almendralejo Sociedad Cooperativa de Crédito

(Case C-15/20)

(2020/C 137/45)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de lo Mercantil No 1 de Badajoz

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Asociación de Usuarios de Bancos, Cajas y Seguros de España (Adicae Consumidores Críticos y Responsables)

Defendant: Caja Almendralejo Sociedad Cooperativa de Crédito

Questions referred

The questions referred for a preliminary ruling are identical to those in referred in Case C-224/19. (1)

(1) OJ 2019 C 246, p. 4.
Appeal brought on 14 February 2020 by Yieh United Steel Corp. against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 3 December 2019 in Case T-607/15, Yieh United Steel v Commission

(Case C-79/20 P)

(2020/C 103/23)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Yieh United Steel Corp. (represented by: D. Luff, avocat)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Eurofer, Association Européenne de l'Acier, AISBL

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— declare this appeal admissible and well founded;

— set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 3 December 2019 in case Yieh United Steel Corporation Ltd (Yusco) v Commission of the European Union, T-607/15;

— in accordance with Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, give final judgment, upholding Yusco’s claims before the General Court and, accordingly, annul the antidumping duty imposed on the appellant under Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1429 (1) of 26 August 2015 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of stainless steel cold-rolled flat products originating in the People's Republic of China and Taiwan (the ‘Contested Regulation’ or the ‘Definitive Duty Regulation’), in so far as it relates to the applicant;

— order the Commission and the interveners, in addition to paying their own costs, to bear all costs occasioned to the appellants in the course of the present proceedings and the proceedings before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellant submits that the contested judgment should be set aside on the three grounds of appeal summarized below.

Firstly, the General Court infringed Article 2(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2016/1036 (2) of 8 June 2016 (the ‘Basic Regulation’) by wrongly discarding the application of this provision.

Secondly, the General Court infringed Article 2(5) of the Basic Regulation by not adequately balancing the interests of the Commission in the context of its investigation and the appellant’s right to have its own records considered.

Thirdly, the General Court infringed Article 2(2) of the Basic Regulation by erroneously ruling that the rejection of a domestic sale under Article 2(2) of the Basic Regulation does not require seeking a specific intention or knowledge on the part of the vendor as to the final export of the products concerned.

(1) OJ 2015, L 224, p. 10.

(2) Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (OJ 2016, L 176, p. 21).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per la Puglia (Italy) lodged on 14 January 2020 — MC v U.T.G. — Prefettura di Foggia

(Case C-17/20)

(2020/C 161/31)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per la Puglia

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: MC

Defendant: U.T.G. — Prefettura di Foggia

Question referred

Are Articles 91, 92 and 93 of Decreto Legislativo 6 settembre 2011, n. 159 (Legislative Decree No 159 of 6 September 2011), in so far as they do not provide for the person in respect of whom the Administration intends to issue a prohibitory antimafia disclosure to make an internal appeal, compatible with the principle of an adversarial process, as reconstructed and recognised as a principle of EU law.
Do the phrases ‘new elements or findings’ that ‘have arisen or have been presented by the applicant’ in Article 40(2) and 40(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast) (1) (‘the Procedures Directive’) also cover circumstances that already existed before the previous asylum procedure was definitively concluded?

If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Social n.o3 de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 9 March 2020 — YJ v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS)

(Case C-130/20)

(2020/C 201/24)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de lo Social n.o3 de Barcelona

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: YJ

Defendant: Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS)

Question referred

Can a provision like Article 60(4) of the General Law on Social Security (Ley General de la Seguridad Social), which excludes the maternity supplement for women who retire [early] voluntarily, as opposed to those who retire, also voluntarily, at the normal age provided for, or who retire early but on the basis of work performed throughout their working lives, by reason [of] disability, or because they ceased employment before taking retirement through no fault of their own, be considered to constitute direct discrimination for the purposes of Directive 79/7? (1)

(1) Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security OJ 1979 L 6, p. 24.
Is the third criterion established in the Court of Justice’s competition case-law on the applicability of the ‘ne bis in idem’ principle, namely that conduct must concern the same protected legal interest, applicable even where the competition authorities of two Member States are called upon to apply the same provisions of EU law (here: Article 101 TFEU), in addition to provisions of national law, in respect of the same facts and in relation to the same persons?

In the event that this question is answered in the affirmative:
2.

If the answer to the first question is that the insurer or policyholder (who offers such insurance, distributes the insurance product, or ‘sells’ unit-linked insurance) is obliged to communicate to the consumer information on the nature and the type specification and characteristics of the underlying instrument (a derivative or a structured financial instrument with a derivative embedded in it), are Article 185(3)(i) of Directive 2009/138/EC and Article 36(1) of Directive 2002/83/EC in conjunction with point 12 of Annex III(A) thereto to be interpreted as meaning that information on the nature and the type specification and characteristics of the underlying instrument (a derivative or a structured financial instrument with a derivative embedded in it) communicated to the insured consumer should contain the same information as that required by Article 19(3) of Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC (3) and Article 24(4) of Directive 2014/65/EU of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, (4) that is to say, comprehensive information on the derivatives and proposed investment strategies which should include appropriate guidance on and warnings of the risks associated with investments in those instruments or in respect of particular investment strategies, including, in particular, information on the methodology used by the insurer or calculation agent during the term of the insurance cover for pricing the underlying instrument and information on the risks associated with the derivative and its issuer, including on the change in the value of the derivative over time, the various factors determining those changes and the extent to which those factors affect the value?
3.

For the purposes of interpreting the requirements laid down in the General Data Protection Regulation, can there be considered to be a legitimate objective justifying the obligation, imposed by a request for information such as that at issue in this case, to provide all of the data requested in an undefined amount and for an undefined period of time, in the case where there is no prescribed expiry date for the fulfilment of that request for information?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Procura della Repubblica di Trento (Italy) lodged on 24 January 2020 — Criminal proceedings against XK

(Case C-66/20)

(2020/C 209/08)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Procura della Repubblica di Trento

Party to the main proceedings

XK

Other Party

Finanzamt Münster

Question referred

In so far as it provides that ‘any other competent authority as defined by the issuing State which, in the specific case, is acting in its capacity as an investigating authority in criminal proceedings with competence to order the gathering of evidence in accordance with national law’, may also be regarded as an issuing authority, but also provides that, in that case, ‘before it is transmitted to the executing authority the EIO shall be validated, after examination of its conformity with the conditions for issuing an EIO under this Directive, in particular the conditions set out in Article 6.1, by a judge, court, investigating judge or a public prosecutor in the issuing State’, is Article 2(1)(c)(ii) of Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters (1) to be interpreted as allowing a Member State to exempt an administrative authority from the obligation to have the EIO validated by defining it as a “judicial authority for the purposes of Article 2 of the Directive?

(1) OJ 2014 L 130, p. 1.
Action brought on 1 June 2020 — European Commission v Italian Republic

(Case C-227/20)

(2020/C 255/16)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: R. Trico and G. Gattinara, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Italian Republic

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by failing to adopt the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of Articles 4 and 7 of Regulation No 511/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on compliance measures for users from the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization in the Union, (1) by failing to adopt all the measures necessary to ensure that those rules are applied and that the penalties provided for are effective, proportionate and dissuasive, and by failing to notify the Commission of those rules on penalties by 11 June 2015, the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 11 of Regulation No 511/2014;

— order the Italian Republic to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Commission claims that the measures specifying penalties for infringement of Articles 4 and 7 of Regulation No 511/2014 have not yet been adopted by the Italian Republic, despite the fact that, first, those measures should have been laid down in the national legislation of the Member States since 11 June 2014 and, second, those measures should have been followed by the Member States implementing ‘all the measures necessary to ensure that they are applied’, as stated in the last sentence of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 511/2014.

Furthermore, the infringement of Article 11 of that regulation also concerns the Italian Republic’s failure to notify the Commission of the measures on penalties. In that regard, according to the final paragraph of Article 11 of Regulation No 511/2014, the Italian Republic was obliged to notify the Commission of the rules ‘referred to in paragraph 1’ of that provision, that is to say the ‘rules on penalties applicable to infringements of Articles 4 and 7’ by 11 June 2015.

(1) OJ 2014 L 150, p. 59.
1.

Must EU law, in particular Article 17 of the [Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union] and Directive 2014/59/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council, and in particular Articles 36, 73 and 74 of that directive, be interpreted as precluding national legislation such as that set out above, which was applied through a resolution action consisting in the formation of a bridge bank and the separation of assets, and which, in partially transposing that directive before the deadline for transposition: (a) did not provide for a fair, prudent and realistic valuation of the assets and liabilities of the credit institution under resolution to be carried out before the resolution action was adopted; (b) did not provide for potential compensation based on the valuation referred to in point (a) to be paid to the institution under resolution or, where appropriate, to the holders of shares or other titles of ownership and which, instead, merely provided for any remaining proceeds from the sale of the bridge bank to be returned to the original credit institution or its insolvency estate; (c) did not establish that the shareholders of the institution under resolution were entitled to receive an amount not less than the amount it is calculated they would have received if the institution under resolution had been completely wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, and established such a safeguard mechanism only for creditors whose claims had not been transferred; and (d) did not provide for a separate valuation from that referred to in point (a) to be carried out in order to determine whether shareholders and creditors would have received more favourable treatment if the credit institution under resolution had entered into normal insolvency proceedings?
2.

Is an air carrier to be regarded as an operating air carrier within the meaning of Article 2(b) of Regulation No 261/2004 in relation to a passenger if, despite the fact that that passenger has a contract with a tour operator which has promised him carriage on a particular flight, individualised by points of departure and destination, times of departure and arrival and flight number, the tour operator has not, however, reserved a seat for the passenger and has therefore not established a contractual relationship with the air carrier in respect of that flight?
2.

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: (a) Does an entitlement to residence under the first sentence of Article 9 of Decision No 1/80 require that the parents of the Turkish children benefiting from that provision have already acquired rights under Article 6(1) or Article 7 of Decision No 1/80? (b) If Question 2(a) is answered in the negative: Is legal employment within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 9 of Decision No 1/80 to be interpreted in the same way as in Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80? (c) If Question 2(a) is answered in the negative: Can an entitlement to residence in respect of Turkish children under the first sentence of Article 9 of Decision No 1/80 already arise after one of the parents has been in legal employment in the host Member State for a period of (only) three months? (d) If Question 2(a) is answered in the negative: Does the right of residence of Turkish children also entail, without the need to fulfil further conditions, a right of residence for one or both parents with custody?
4.

Does [EU] law preclude an interpretation of a national legal provision, such as Article 431(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure — on the status of res judicata of a final judicial decision — to the effect that a final judicial decision finding a payment application ineligible on the ground of failure to comply with national law as regards the requirement relating to the lawfulness of the right to exploit/use the land in respect of which an area scheme has been applied for in the agricultural year 2014 (in a dispute in which annulment of the decision imposing multiannual penalties has been sought), and which prevents analysis of the conformity of that national requirement with [EU] law applicable in the agricultural year 2014 in a new dispute in which the lawfulness of the measure recovering the sums unduly paid to the applicant is examined, in respect of the same agricultural year 2014, and the measure is based on the same facts and the same national legislation which were analysed in the earlier final judicial decision?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Korneuburg (Austria) lodged on 15 June 2020 — Airhelp Limited v Laudamotion GmbH

(Case C-263/20)

(2020/C 279/50)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landesgericht Korneuburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Airhelp Limited

Defendant: Laudamotion GmbH

Questions referred

1. Are Article 5(1)(c) and Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the passenger has a right to compensation where the original time of departure of 14.40 is brought forward to 8.25 on the same day?

2. Is Article 5(1)(c)(i) to (iii) of Regulation No 261/2004 to be interpreted as meaning that examination as to whether the passenger is informed of the cancellation is to be conducted solely in accordance with that provision and precludes the application of national law on the receipt of declarations which was enacted in transposition of Directive 2000/31/EC (2) and includes a provision whereby declarations are deemed to be received?

3. Are Article 5(1)(c)(i) to (iii) of Regulation No 261/2004 and Article 11 of Directive 2000/31 to be interpreted as meaning that, where a passenger reserved a flight via a booking platform and provided his telephone number and email address, but the booking platform forwarded to the air carrier the telephone number and an email address that was generated automatically by the booking platform, delivery to the automatically generated email address of the notification that the flight has been brought forward is to be regarded as information or delivery of notification that the flight has been brought forward, even where the booking platform does not forward, or delays forwarding, the air carrier’s notification to the passenger?

(1) Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).

(2) Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’) (OJ 2000 L 178, p. 1).
2.

Is a quantitative restriction which makes the possibility of ordering and dispensing to a patient a medicinal product which does not have a marketing authorisation in one Member State but does have such an authorisation in another [Member State of the EEA] conditional on the existence of a medical prescription and a declaration from the pharmaceutical authority, including where the medicinal product is registered in the other Member State as a medicinal product not subject to medical prescription, justified in the interests of protection of the health and life of humans, as referred to in Article 36 TFEU?