27.

More important, in my view, is the question whether this interpretation can be reconciled with the special conditions laid down by the IOAW for the grant of benefits. As wc have seen, Article 26 of the IOAW in principle requires the recipient and his spouse to seek employment. It is clear that Mrs Acciardi is unlikely to be able to fulfil in the Netherlands the obligations placed upon her by this provision. In its written observations the Commission stated that these difficulties could be resolved by applying the principles developed in the Bronzino ( 20 ) and Gatto ( 21 ) cases, which revolved around the question whether a migrant worker living in Germany was entitled to child allowance for unemployed children aged between 16 and 20 years even if they lived abroad. The German Government claimed that the provisions of German law restricting the payment of benefit to children living in Germany was objectively justified. The German authorities are able to arrange training or jobs only if the young person is registered with the careers advisory service or employment office in Germany. If it were seen that the German authorities had to pay child allowance in such cases, the employment agencies in other Member States would have no particular reason rapidly to find work for the person concerned ahead of others. ( 22 ) The Court ruled that it was sufficient if the child was registered with the employment office of the Member State in which he resided. ( 23 ) It rejected the German Government's argument that this made it impossible for the German authorities to relieve themselves of the obligation to pay benefits by offering employment to the child. It nevertheless remarked that this argument ‘may be relevant with regard to unemployment benefits’. ( 24 ) I share the Commission's view that in the present case it is sufficient for Mrs Acciardi to register with the employment services in Italy. The slight reservations which might arise in this connection from the passage in the Bronzino judgment I have just quoted would not be appropriate in the present case for the following reasons. Firstly, if a spouse living abroad is taken into account, this means that the spouse's income will also be taken into account when calculating the benefits under the IOAW. It is quite possible that this method of calculation will be less advantageous to the unemployed worker living in the Netherlands than the method currently applied. ( 25 ) Moreover, the conditions stated in Article 26(1) for the unemployed worker apply only to a very limited extent. According to Article 26(2) of the IOAW, the spouse has the obligations listed in the first paragraph only if his or her reintegration into working life can ‘reasonably’ be expected on the basis of a recent employment record; if the spouse's last employed activity dates back more than two years, these obligations do not apply. By contrast with the situation in the Bronzino and Gatto cases, in the present case there are ways in which the Netherlands authorities can relieve themselves of the obligation to pay benefits other than by offering employment to the spouse: as we have seen, it is sufficient if the unemployed worker himself is found a job with an adequate income.