ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Giustizia Amministrativa per la Regione Siciliana (Italy) lodged on 27 November 2020 — Caruter s.r.l. v S.R.R. Messina Provincia S.c.P.A., Comune di Basicò, Comune di Falcone, Comune di Fondachelli Fantina, Comune di Gioiosa Marea, Comune di Librizzi, Comune di Mazzarrà Sant’Andrea, Comune di Montagnareale, Comune di Oliveri, Comune di Piraino, Comune di San Piero Patti, Regione Siciliana — Urega — Ufficio regionale espletamento gare d’appalti lavori pubblici Messina, Regione Siciliana — Assessorato regionale delle infrastrutture e della mobilità

(Case C-642/20)

(2021/C 79/25)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Giustizia Amministrativa per la Regione Siciliana

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Caruter s.r.l.

Defendants: S.R.R. Messina Provincia S.c.P.A., Comune di Basicò, Comune di Falcone, Comune di Fondachelli Fantina, Comune di Gioiosa Marea, Comune di Librizzi, Comune di Mazzarrà Sant’Andrea, Comune di Montagnareale, Comune di Oliveri, Comune di Piraino, Comune di San Piero Patti, Regione Siciliana — Urega — Ufficio regionale espletamento gare d’appalti lavori pubblici Messina, Regione Siciliana — Assessorato regionale delle infrastrutture e della mobilità

Question referred

Does Article 63 of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014, (1) concerning reliance on the capacities of other entities, in conjunction with the principles of freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services enshrined in Articles 49 and 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), preclude the application of the Italian national rules relating to ‘criteria for selection and the supplementing or amending of tendering documentation’ laid down in the penultimate sentence of Article 83(8) of the Public Procurement Code established by Legislative Decree No 50 of 18 April 2016, according to which where recourse is had to reliance on the capacities of other entities (referred to in Article 89 of the Public Procurement Code established by Legislative Decree No 50 of 18 April 2016), the agent must in any event fulfil the majority of the requirements and provide the majority of the services?

(1) Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65).
Appeal brought on 24 August 2020 by Leinfelder Uhren München GmbH & Co. KG against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) delivered on 10 June 2020 in Case T-577/19, Leinfelder Uhren München v EUIPO

(Case C-401/20 P)

(2021/C 72/13)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Leinfelder Uhren München GmbH & Co. KG (represented by: S. Lüft, Rechtsanwalt)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Thomas Schafft

By order of 19 January 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) did not allow the appeal to proceed and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
1.

Are Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, (1) read in conjunction with subparagraphs (e) and (f) of paragraph 1 of the annex to that directive, and Article 15(2) and (3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights [of the European Union] to be interpreted as meaning that terms are contrary to the requirement of good faith and are to the disadvantage of the consumer if they substantially increase the consumer’s costs under a credit agreement in the event that the consumer does not transfer his or her salary to [an account with] the lending bank each month, taking into account that, under the terms of the agreement, that consumer is obliged to create a pledge on his or her claim to salary, irrespective of how and in which country he or she receives that salary?
1.

Is Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive (1) intended to provide protection only in the exceptional situation where the degree of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict reaches such a high level that there are substantial grounds for believing that a civilian, returned to the relevant country or, as the case may be, to the relevant region, would, solely on account of his presence on the territory of that country or region, face a real risk of being subject to the threat referred to in that provision? And does that exceptional situation fall under the ‘most extreme cases of general violence’ referred to in the judgment in N.A. v. United Kingdom? (2) If the first part of the first question is answered in the negative:
1.

Must the concept of ‘cable retransmission’, as provided for in Article 1(3) of Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993, (1) be interpreted as meaning that it covers, in addition to the simultaneous transmission by one broadcasting organisation of a broadcast by another broadcasting organisation, the distribution to the public, on a simultaneous basis and entirely by cable, of a primary broadcast of television or radio programmes intended for reception by the public (whether or not the person performing that distribution to the public is a broadcasting organisation)?
1.

Is Article 1 of Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, (1) and also Clauses Nos 1 and 4 of that framework agreement, to be interpreted as precluding provisions of national law obliging employers to state in writing the reasons for a decision giving notice of termination of an employment contract only in relation to employment contracts of indefinite duration, and consequently subjecting to judicial review the well-foundedness of the reasons for the notice of termination of contracts of indefinite duration, without at the same time imposing such an obligation on employers (that is to say, an obligation to state the reasons justifying the notice of termination) in relation to fixed-term employment contracts (as a result of which only the issue of the compliance of the notice of termination with the provisions on termination of contracts is subject to judicial review)?
2.

Is national legislation compatible with EU law — Article 49 TFEU and Articles 76 and 77 of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 (as read with Article 74 and Annex XIV thereof) — when, with regard to the provision of health and social services of general interest, it enables public procurement legislation to be avoided through the use of public-private agreements that supplement or replace direct provision, not because such agreements are a more appropriate way to provide these services but because they are a means to achieve specific social policy objectives which affect the way in which the service is provided or which the service provider must satisfy in order to be selected, even if the principles of advertising, competition and transparency continue to apply?
Appeal brought on 23 October 2020 by FL Brüterei M-V GmbH against the order of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) made on 20 August 2020 in Case T-755/18, FL Brüterei M-V GmbH and Others v European Commission

(Case C-540/20 P)

(2021/C 471/19)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: FL Brüterei M-V GmbH (represented by: H. Schmidt, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: Erdegut GmbH, Ökofarm Groß Markow GmbH, European Commission

By order of 24 September 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Sixth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 10 September 2020 by Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções, Lda. and Others against the order of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 8 July 2020 in Case T-90/20 REC, Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções and Others v ECB and Banco do Portugal

(Case C-450/20 P)

(2021/C 252/05)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Parties

Appellants: Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções, Lda., Paulo Eduardo Matos Gomes de Azevedo, Julião Maria Gomes de Azevedo, Isabel Maria Matos Gomes de Azevedo (represented by: M. Ribeiro, advogado)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Central Bank, Banco do Portugal

By order of 5 May 2021, the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) dismissed the appeal as manifestly inadmissible.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 8 January 2021 — Deutsche Lufthansa AG v TZ

(Case C-10/21)

(2021/C 88/28)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Deutsche Lufthansa AG

Respondent: TZ

Question referred

Does a strike by the air carrier’s own employees that is called by a trade union constitute an extraordinary circumstance within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004? (1)

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
1.

Does national legislation which, as applied by the Walloon Region, makes the use without any re-registration requirement of a foreign vehicle provided to a manager (or freelancer) who is resident in Belgium by an undertaking (with or without legal personality) established in an EU Member State other than Belgium contingent upon that manager (or freelancer) carrying in the vehicle an attestation of the undertaking (with or without legal personality) or evidence of engagement (that is, an attestation within the meaning of Article 3(2), point 6, of the Royal Decree of 20 July 2001), conflict with the relevant provisions of EU law, in particular Article 49 (freedom of establishment) and Article 56 (freedom to provide services) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)?
1.

Is Article 88(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation — GDPR) to be interpreted as meaning that, in order to be a more specific rule for ensuring the protection of the rights and freedoms in respect of the processing of employees’ personal data in the employment context within the meaning of Article 88(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, a provision must meet the requirements imposed on such rules by Article 88(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679?
4.

Is the means chosen by the Member State — the imposition on a specific credit institution of a prohibition on entering into business relationships with persons who are not nationals of a specific Member State (the Republic of Latvia) and a requirement to terminate any such existing relationships — appropriate to achieve the objective established in Article 1 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, and does it therefore constitute an exception provided for in Article 65(1)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union?
Action brought on 3 February 2021 — European Commission v Hellenic Republic

(Case C-70/21)

(2021/C 128/34)

Language of the case: Greek

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: M. Konstantinidis and N. Noll-Ehlers, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Hellenic Republic

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court of Justice should

— declare that: — by systematically and consistently exceeding the limit values for PM10 concentrations as regards the daily limit value since 2005 in the EL0004 conurbation of Thessaloniki, the Hellenic Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under the combined provisions of Article 13 of and Annex XI to Directive 2008/50/EC; (1) — by failing to adopt, from 11 June 2010, appropriate measures to ensure compliance with the limit values for PM10 concentrations in the EL0004 conurbation of Thessaloniki, the Hellenic Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 23(1) of Directive 2008/50/EC (in conjunction with Section A of Annex XV to that directive), and in particular the obligation, laid down in the second subparagraph of Article 23(1) of that directive, to take the appropriate measures to ensure that the duration of the exceedance of limit values is as short as possible;

— order the Hellenic Republic to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By its first plea in law, the Commission submits that Directive 2008/50/EC on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe requires that Member States limit the exposure of citizens to small particles known as particulate matter (PM10). The Commission claims that since 2005, when compliance with daily and annual limit values for PM10 became mandatory (pursuant, initially, to Article 5(1) of Directive 1999/30/EC then to Article 13 of Directive 2008/50/EC), the Hellenic Republic, on the basis of its annual air quality reports, has failed consistently to ensure consistent compliance with daily limit values in the EL0004 conurbation of Thessaloniki.

By its second plea in law, the Commission claims that the second subparagraph of Article 23(1) of Directive 2008/50/EC imposes a clear and urgent obligation on Member States in the event that limit values are exceeded to adopt air quality plans setting out appropriate measures to ensure that the duration of any exceedance is as short as possible. The Commission submits that the Hellenic Republic failed to draw up an appropriate air quality plan in respect of the EL0004 conurbation of Thessaloniki, in breach of the obligation laid down in Article 23(1) of Directive 2008/50/EC.

(1) Directive 2008/50/ΕC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe (OJ 2008 L 152, p. 1).
1.

The margin of discretion which is granted to the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) in assessing substances for identification as substances of very high concern under Article 57(f) of Regulation (EC) 1907/2006 (1) (the REACH Regulation) cannot be interpreted so as to allow the ECHA complete and unchallengeable free rein to make manifest errors in the selection and assessment of ‘scientific evidence’ under that Article 57(f). However, the General Court has accepted this by ruling that there can only be a finding of manifest error of assessment if the ECHA completely and wrongly disregarded a reliable scientific study and if the inclusion of that study would have altered the overall assessment of the evidence in such a way that the final decision would have been implausible. The General Court further accepted that the results of unreliable scientific studies could be relied upon by the ECHA and that their poor reliability does not preclude their being taken into account. The General Court has gone even further in accepting the reliance on unreliable and inconclusive scientific studies where their results support the ECHA ’s targeted hypothesis about the alleged hazardous property of the substance. In doing so, the General Court erred in law and breached the principle of scientific excellence.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Lennestadt (Germany) lodged on 19 January 2021 — Nemzeti Útdíjfizetési Szolgáltató Zrt., National Toll Payment Services PLC v NW

(Case C-30/21)

(2021/C 148/08)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Lennestadt

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Nemzeti Útdíjfizetési Szolgáltató Zrt., National Toll Payment Services PLC

Defendant: NW

Question referred

Is Article 1(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters to be interpreted as meaning that judicial proceedings brought by a State-owned company against a natural person domiciled in another Member State, for the purposes of recovering a debt, which is punitive in nature, for the unauthorised use of a toll road, come within the scope of that regulation?

(1) Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Łodzi (Poland) lodged on 15 January 2021 — TM v EJ

(Case C-28/21)

(2021/C 182/39)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Okręgowy w Łodzi

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: TM

Defendant: EJ

Question referred

Must the phrase ‘each Member State shall take all appropriate measures’ in Article 3 of Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability (1) in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability (OJ 2009 L 263, p. 11) be interpreted as meaning that, under the legislation of the Member States, insurance undertakings should be made fully liable under insurance against civil liability, including for such consequences as lost profits on the part of the victim?

(1) OJ 2009 L 263, p. 11.
—

Third ground of appeal: the General Court overlooks the fact that the criteria applied by the Court in C-622/16 P — C-624/16 P confirm that the requirement of direct concern is met in the present case. The appellant claims thus that Danske Slagtermestre properly stated that (i) the activities are similar, (ii) its members are active in the same market for goods and services as the company supported by the aid, and (iii) its members are active in the same geographical market as the company supported by the aid. In the present case its members’ activities are not merely similar but are identical to the activity of the beneficiary of the aid.
2.

Mandatory information required under Article 10(2) of Directive 2008/48 (a) Is Article 10(2)(p) of Directive 2008/48 to be interpreted as meaning that the amount of interest payable per day, which must be specified in the credit agreement, must be calculated from the contractual borrowing rate specified in the agreement? (b) Article 10(2)(r) of Directive 2008/48: (aa) Is that provision to be interpreted as meaning that the information in the credit agreement concerning the compensation payable in the event of early repayment of the loan must be sufficiently precise to enable the consumer to calculate at least approximately the compensation payable in the event of early termination? (should the previous question be answered in the affirmative) (bb) Do Article 10(2)(r) and the second sentence of Article 14(1) of Directive 2008/48 preclude national legislation pursuant to which, in the case of incomplete information within the meaning of Article 10(2)(r) of that directive, the period for withdrawal nevertheless commences on conclusion of the agreement and only the creditor’s right to compensation for early repayment of the credit is lost? (c) Is Article 10(2)(l) of Directive 2008/48 to be interpreted as meaning that the interest rate applicable in the case of late payments as applicable at the time of the conclusion of the credit agreement must be specified as an absolute number or, at the very least, that the current reference interest rate (in this case, the base rate in accordance with Paragraph 247 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code, ‘the BGB’)), from which the interest rate applicable in the case of late payments is obtained by adding a premium (in this case, a premium of five percentage points in accordance with Paragraph 288(1), second sentence, of the BGB), must be specified as an absolute number, and must the consumer be informed of the reference interest rate (base rate) and the variability of that rate? (d) Is Article 10(2)(t) of Directive 2008/48 to be interpreted as meaning that the essential formal requirements for a complaint and/or redress in the out-of-court complaint and/or redress procedure must be specified in the text of the credit agreement? If at least one of the above Questions 2(a) to 2(d) is answered in the affirmative: (e) Is Article 14(1), second sentence, point (b), of Directive 2008/48 to be interpreted as meaning that the period of withdrawal does not begin until the information required under Article 10(2) of Directive 2008/48 has been provided fully and correctly? If not: (f) What are the relevant criteria for determining whether the period of withdrawal is to begin in spite of the fact that that information is incomplete or incorrect? If the above Question 1(a) and/or at least one of Questions 2(a) to 2(d) is answered in the affirmative:
2.

If the answer to that question is in the negative, must Article 8(3)(d) of the Reception Directive II be construed as meaning that, in the circumstances set out above, detention is permissible only on the basis of predetermined objective criteria and of a prior finding that the applicant for international protection has already had the opportunity to lodge an application for international protection, so that it can be concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that that application was made merely in order to delay or frustrate the enforcement of a return decision?
2.

In the event that the first question is answered in the affirmative, must Articles 2(4) and 4(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584 be interpreted as meaning that the courts in the executing State may refuse to execute a European arrest warrant issued for the enforcement of a sentence where they find that the judicial authorities in the issuing State imposed that sentence on the person concerned for the commission of a single offence covering various acts and where only some of those acts constitute a criminal offence in the executing State? Does a distinction need to be made depending on whether or not the trial court in the issuing State considered those various acts to be divisible or indivisible?
1.

Did the aid authorised by Commission Decision SA.32113 (2010/N) of 25 July 2012 to cover 80 % of the costs of the construction of mini-hydroelectric power plants for the generation of electrical energy for own consumption from renewable energy sources for the benefit of mountain huts and hostels in high alpine areas, for which connection to the electricity grid is not feasible without disproportionate effort in technical and financial terms, expire on 31 December 2016?
2.

If Question 1 is answered in the negative: Is the information requirement under Article 6(1)(m) of Directive 2011/83 triggered by the mere mention of a manufacturer’s guarantee in the trader’s offering or is it triggered only if the mention of such a guarantee is readily apparent to the consumer? Is there also an information requirement if it is readily apparent to the consumer that the trader provides access to only the manufacturer’s information concerning the guarantee?
2.

Are Articles 4 and 5 of Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA and Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to be interpreted as permitting legislation of a Member State under which, in proceedings such as those in the main proceedings, the national court may impose a penalty on a legal person by fixing the amount of that penalty at the amount of the proceeds which would have been obtained from a specific criminal offence the commission of which has not yet been established because it is the subject of parallel criminal proceedings which have not been definitively concluded?