ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
3.

If the answer to the second question is in the negative: must the requirement of transparency be interpreted as encompassing an obligation of the lawyer to indicate in the contract the cost of services the specific rates of which can be clearly defined and specified in advance, or must an indicative cost of the services (a preliminary budget for the legal services provided) also be specified, if it is impossible to predict the number (or duration) of specific actions, and the fee for them, when concluding the contract, and the possible risks leading to an increase or decrease in the cost be indicated? When assessing whether the contractual term regarding cost complies with the requirement of transparency, is it relevant whether information relating to the cost of legal services and the way in which it is calculated is provided to the consumer by any appropriate means or is laid down in the contract for legal services itself? Can a lack of information in pre-contractual relations be compensated for by providing information during the performance of the contract? Is the assessment of whether the contractual term complies with the requirement of transparency affected by the fact that the final cost of the legal services provided becomes clear only after their provision has come to an end? When assessing whether the contractual term regarding cost complies with the requirement of transparency, is it relevant that the contract does not stipulate the periodic provision of reports of the lawyer in respect of the services provided or the periodic presentation of bills to the consumer, which would allow the consumer to decide in good time on the refusal of legal services or a change of the contract price?
1.

Must Articles 45 and 48 TFEU, Article 4 TEU, Article 11 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union and Article 8 of Annex IIIa to the Conditions of Employment for Staff of the European Central Bank be interpreted as precluding a set of national rules or a national administrative practice which does not allow a worker who is a national of a Member State who has paid contributions to the national social security institution and who currently works for an EU institution, such as the ECB, to transfer to the pension scheme of that institution the pension contributions credited to the social security scheme of his or her own State?
1.

Are the rules laid down in Article 394(2) [of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil (Law on Civil Procedure)], pursuant to which an injured party is to bear a portion of the costs of the proceedings based on the amount of the sums wrongly paid as a surcharge which are returned to him after his claim for damages is upheld in part, where, as a premiss for a declaration, it is assumed that there is an infringement of competition law and that that infringement has a causal link to the harm suffered, which is indeed verified, quantified and awarded as a result of the proceedings, compatible with the right to full compensation of a person harmed by anti-competitive conduct, as referred to in Article 101 TFEU and in accordance with the case-law interpreting it?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main (Germany) lodged on 31 May 2021 — FH v SunExpress Günes Ekspres Havacilik A.S.

(Case C-337/21)

(2021/C 391/07)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Frankfurt am Main

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant and appellant: FH

Defendant and respondent: SunExpress Günes Ekspres Havacilik A.S.

Question referred

Is Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that, where flights with different air carriers are the subject of a single reservation made via an online agency, a right to compensation exists against the operating air carrier of the first leg of the journey where, although the delay in arrival of the flight of the first leg was less than 3 hours, this led to the connecting flight being missed and, as a result, the delay in arrival of the passenger at the final destination was in excess of 3 hours, and where the operating air carrier of the first leg was neither a party to the contract of carriage for the second leg nor aware that a connecting flight had been booked at the same time with a different air carrier?

By order of the President of the Court of Justice of 28 June 2021, the case was removed from the register of the Court.

(1) Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
3.

Does the absence of an effective remedy to challenge the validity of the appointment of judges in Poland, in circumstances where it is apparent that the appellants cannot at this point in time establish that the courts before which they will be tried will be composed of judges not validly appointed, amount to a breach of the essence of the right to a fair trial requiring the executing state to refuse the surrender of the appellants?
3.

Does Directive 2004/38/EC preclude a host Member State from limiting access to a social assistance payment benefit by a family member of a Union citizen worker who enjoys a derived right of residence on the basis of her dependency on that worker, on the grounds that payment of the benefit will result in the family member concerned becoming an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the State?
Appeal brought on 8 February 2021 by Likvidacijska masa iza Mesoprodukt d.o.o. and Gojko Čuljak against the order of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 28 January 2021 in Case T-603/20, Likvidacijska masa iza Mesoprodukt d.o.o. and Gojko Čuljak v European Commission

(Case C-171/21 P)

(2021/C 462/25)

Language of the case: Croatian

Parties

Appellants: Likvidacijska masa iza Mesoprodukt d.o.o. and Gojko Čuljak (represented by: I. Žalac, odvjetnik)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 1 September 2021, the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as manifestly unfounded, dismissed the application for legal aid lodged by Likvidacijska masa iza Mesoprodukt d.o.o. and Mr Gojko Čuljak, and ruled that Likvidacijska masa iza Mesoprodukt d.o.o. and Mr Čuljak are to bear their own costs.
1.

Is the rule laid down in the second part of the first sentence and in the second sentence of Article 177(3) of the Sudski poslovnik (Rules of Procedure of the Courts, Narodne novine, br. 37/14, 49/14, 8/15, 35/15, 123/15, 45/16, 29/17, 33/17, 34/17, 57/17, 101/18, 119/18, 81/19, 128/19, 39/20 and 47/20), which provides that ‘, a case before a court of second instance shall be deemed to be closed on the date on which the decision is sent from the court office, after the case has been returned by the Registration Service. The Registration Service shall be required to return the file to the court office as promptly as possible after receipt thereof. The decision shall then be notified within a further period of eight days’, to be considered compatible with Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Germany) lodged on 12 August 2021 — L. GmbH v Federal Republic of Germany

(Case C-495/21)

(2021/C 471/31)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesverwaltungsgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant on a point of law: L. GmbH

Respondent in the appeal on a point of law: Federal Republic of Germany

Questions referred

1. Can the principal intended action of a substance be pharmacological within the meaning of Article 1(2)(a) of Directive 93/42/EEC (1) even if it is not based on a receptor-mediated mode of action and the substance is not absorbed by the human body but remains on and reacts with the surface of, for example, the mucosa? On what criteria should a distinction be drawn between pharmacological and non-pharmacological means, in particular physico-chemical means, in such a case?

2. Can a product be regarded as a substance-based medical device within the meaning of Article 1(2)(a) of Directive 93/42/EEC if, according to current scientific knowledge, the mode of action of the product is open to debate and it is thus not possible to definitively determine whether the principal intended action is achieved by pharmacological or physico-chemical means?

3. In such a case, is the classification of the product as a medicinal product or as a medical device to be carried out on the basis of an overall assessment of its other properties and all other circumstances, or, in so far as it is intended to prevent, treat or alleviate diseases, is the product to be regarded as a medicinal product by presentation within the meaning of Article 1(2)(a) of Directive 2001/83/EC, (2) irrespective of whether or not a specific medicinal effect is being claimed?

4. Does the primacy of the regime governing medicinal products also apply in such a case in accordance with Article 2(2) of Directive 2001/83/EC?

(1) Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning medical devices (OJ 1993 L 169, p. 1), as last amended by Directive 2007/45/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007 (OJ 2007 L 247, p. 17).

(2) Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (OJ 2001 L 311, p. 67) in the version of Directive 2012/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 (OJ 2012 L 299, p. 1) which is applicable here.
3.

Is Article 2(2)(d) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC to be interpreted as meaning that, in order to be regarded as a dependant and thus to fall within the definition of ‘family member’ referred to in that provision, a direct relative in the ascending line [may] rely on a situation of real material dependence in the country of origin established by documents which, at the time of lodging the application for a residence card as a family member of a Union citizen, were, however, issued several years previously, on the ground that the departure from the country of origin and the lodging of the application for a residence card in the host Member State did not occur at the same time?
Appeal brought on 12 July 2021 by Sun Stars & Sons Pte Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 12 May 2021 in Case T-638/19, Sun Stars & Sons v EUIPO — Valvis Holding (AC AQUA AC)

(Case C-424/21 P)

(2022/C 11/16)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Sun Stars & Sons Pte Ltd (represented by: M. Maček, odvetnica)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Valvis Holding SA

By order of 11 November 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Sun Stars & Sons Pte Ltd should bear its own costs.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Cluj (Romania) lodged on 14 September 2021 — AA v Banca S

(Case C-566/21)

(2022/C 2/25)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Cluj

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant and defendant at first instance: S

Respondent and applicant at first instance: AA

Question referred

Does Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts, (1) as interpreted in the case-law of the Court of Justice, allow a term to be altered in such a way that the purely potestative right of the seller or supplier to convert the currency of the credit agreement in fact constitutes an obligation on the seller or supplier if that alteration is entirely to the benefit of the consumer and the mere removal of the unfair term from the agreement is of no benefit to him or her?

(1) Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).
5.

Can the real threat of an honour killing in the event that the person concerned is returned to the country of origin justify — if the other conditions for this are met — the granting of subsidiary protection under Article 15(a) of Directive 2011/95, read in conjunction with Article 2 of the ECHR (no one is to be deprived of his or her life intentionally), or is that threat to be classified as harm under Article 15(b) of Directive 2011/95, read in conjunction with Article 3 of the ECHR, as interpreted in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, in an overall assessment of the risk of further acts of gender-based violence; is it sufficient for the granting of such protection that the applicant has stated that he or she is subjectively unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of the country of origin?
3.

Is legislation which does not distinguish between an administrative offence (Article 127(1) of the Zakon za markite i geografskite oznacheniya (Law on trade marks and geographical indications; ‘the ZMGO’) currently in force and Article 81(1) of the ZMGO in force in 2016), the criminal offence under Article 172b(1) of the NK and, if the first question is answered in the negative, the criminal offence under Article 172b(2) of the NK compatible with the principle of legality of criminal offences, as enshrined in Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 27 October 2021 — Syndicat Uniclima v Ministre de l’Intérieur

(Case C-653/21)

(2022/C 37/21)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Syndicat Uniclima

Defendant: Ministre de l’Intérieur

Questions referred

1. Does the harmonisation required by Directive 2006/42/EC, (1) Directive 2014/35/EU (2) and Directive 2014/68/EU (3) permit Member States to lay down safety requirements for the equipment governed by those directives, and if so under what conditions and within what limits, where those requirements do not entail any modification of equipment that is, as attested by the affixing of the ‘CE marking’, in conformity with the requirements of those directives?

2. Does the harmonisation required by them permit Member States to lay down, solely for use of that equipment in premises open to the public and in the light of specific fire safety risks, safety requirements which may entail the modification of equipment that, as attested by the affixing of the ‘CE marking’, is nevertheless in conformity with the requirements of those directives?

3. If the preceding question is answered in the negative, can it be answered in the affirmative if the safety requirements in question apply only where that equipment uses flammable refrigerants as alternatives to fluorinated greenhouse gases, in accordance with the objectives set out in Regulation No 517/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on fluorinated greenhouse gases, (4) and, in addition, relate only to equipment which, although in conformity with the requirements of those directives, does not, having regard to the fire risk from the use of flammable refrigerants, offer the protection of being hermetically sealed?

(1) Directive 2006/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on machinery, and amending Directive 95/16/EC (OJ 2006 L 157, p. 24).

(2) Directive 2014/35/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of electrical equipment designed for use within certain voltage limits (OJ 2014 L 96, p. 357).

(3) Directive 2014/68/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of pressure equipment (OJ 2014 L 189, p. 164).

(4) Regulation (EU) No 517/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on fluorinated greenhouse gases and repealing Regulation (EC) No 842/2006 (OJ 2014 L 150, p. 195).
1.

Can the provisions on the free movement of goods in Title II of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or Article 110 TFEU preclude legislation of a Member State under which, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, the motor vehicle tax included in the value of a vehicle within the meaning of the Autoverolaki (1482/1994) (Law on motor vehicle tax [1482/1994]) is not refunded to the owner of the vehicle where he or she exports the vehicle for use on a permanent basis in another Member State, and is it relevant in that connection whether the vehicle was intended to be used on a permanent basis primarily in the territory of the Member State which levied the motor vehicle tax and whether it was actually used on a permanent basis primarily in that territory?
2.

If Question 1 is answered in the negative, are Articles 6(1) and 22 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 to be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which the use of a probability value — in casu, in relation to a natural person’s ability and willingness to pay, in the case where information about claims against that person is taken into account — regarding specific future behaviour of a natural person for the purpose of deciding on the establishment, implementation or termination of a contractual relationship with that person (scoring) is permissible only if certain further conditions, which are set out in more detail in the grounds of the request for a preliminary ruling, are met?
Appeal brought on 2 August 2021 by Franz Schröder GmbH & Co. KG against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 2 June 2021 in Case T-856/19, Franz Schröder v EUIPO

(Case C-475/21 P)

(2022/C 64/12)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Franz Schröder GmbH & Co. KG (represented by: L. Pechan, N. Fangmann, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, RDS Design ApS

By order of 8 December 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Franz Schröder GmbH & Co. KG should bear its own costs.
2.

Must Article 129(3) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark be interpreted as meaning that the provision in question, which concerns ‘the rules of procedure governing the same type of action relating to a national trade mark’, refers to the national rules of procedure which would be applicable to specific proceedings concerning infringement of an EU trade mark (and to proceedings resulting from a statement of counterclaim seeking a declaration of invalidity), or does it refer generally to the national rules of procedure present in the legal order of a Member State, this being relevant in cases where, on account of the date on which the specific proceedings concerning infringement of an EU trade mark were initiated, the rules of procedure governing a counterclaim for a declaration of invalidity of a trade mark relating to national trade marks were not present in the legal order of a given Member State?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg (Luxembourg) lodged on 1 December 2021 — GV v Caisse nationale d’assurance pension

(Case C-731/21)

(2022/C 73/20)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour de cassation du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant in cassation: GV

Respondent in cassation: Caisse nationale d’assurance pension

Question referred

Does European Union law, in particular Articles 18, 45 and 48 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union, (1) preclude provisions of the law of a Member State, such as Article 195 of the Luxembourg Social Security Code and Articles 3, 4 and 4-1 of the amended Law of 9 July 2004 on the legal effects of certain partnerships, which make the grant, to the surviving partner of a partnership properly entered into and registered in the Member State of origin, of a survivor’s pension, due as a result of the exercise by the deceased partner of a professional activity in the host Member State, subject to the condition that the partnership was recorded in a register kept by that State for the purposes of verifying compliance with the substantive conditions required by the law of that Member State in order to recognise a partnership and ensure its effectiveness vis-à-vis third parties, whereas the grant of a survivor’s pension to the surviving partner of a partnership entered into in the host Member State is subject to the sole condition that the partnership has been properly entered into and registered there?

(1) OJ 2011 L 141, p. 1.
Appeal brought on 26 August 2021 by Republic of Cyprus against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 16 June 2021 in Case T-281/19, Cyprus v EUIPO

(Case C-538/21 P)

(2022/C 84/28)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Republic of Cyprus (represented by: S. Malynicz, BL, S. Baran, Barrister, V. Marsland, Solicitor)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 21 December 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that the Republic of Cyprus should bear its own costs.
5.

Can joint control of data in accordance with Article 4(7) and Article 26(1) of the GDPR be interpreted exclusively as involving deliberately coordinated actions in respect of the determination of the purpose and means of data processing, or can that concept also be interpreted as meaning that joint control also covers situations in which there is no clear ‘arrangement’ in respect of the purpose and means of data processing and/or actions are not coordinated between the entities? Are the circumstance relating to the stage in the creation of the means of personal data processing (IT application) at which personal data were processed and the purpose of the creation of the application legally significant for the interpretation of the concept of joint control of data? Can an ‘arrangement’ between joint controllers be understood exclusively as a clear and defined establishment of terms governing the joint control of data?
Should Article 8(1) read in conjunction with Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (1) be understood to refer to a measure to protect intellectual property rights only when the rightholder’s intellectual property right has been confirmed in these or other proceedings?

– if Question 1 is answered in the negative