Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. Appeals – Grounds of appeal – Mere repetition of the pleas and arguments submitted to the Court of First Instance – Inadmissibility – Challenge to the interpretation or application of Community law by the Court of First Instance – Admissible

(Art. 225 EC; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 112(1)(c))

2. Actions for annulment – Measures against which actions may be brought – Concept – Measures producing binding legal effects – Declaration of the President of the European Parliament taking note that a seat is vacant following the application of national provisions by the national authorities – Excluded

(Art. 230 EC; Act concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage, Art. 12(2))

Summary

1. Under Article 225 EC, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal. That requirement is not satisfied by an appeal which, without even including an argument specifically identifying the error of law allegedly vitiating the judgment under appeal, merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the Court of First Instance. However, provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of Community law by the Court of First Instance, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal. Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the Court of First Instance, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose.

(see paras 39-40)

2. In order to determine whether an act may be the subject of a challenge in an action for annulment under Article 230 EC what should be taken into account is the substance of the act in question and the intention of its author; since the form in which an act or decision is adopted is in principle irrelevant. It cannot therefore be excluded that a written communication, or even a mere oral statement, are subject to review by the Court under Article 230 EC.

However, the assessment of a declaration by the President of the Parliament in a plenary session that the seat of a member is vacant cannot be made in breach of the rules and procedures governing the election of members of Parliament. Since no uniform electoral procedure for the election of Members of that institution had been adopted at the material time, that procedure continued to be governed, pursuant to Article 7(2) of the 1976 Act concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage, by the provisions in force in each Member State. Where, under the legislative provisions of a Member State ineligibility brings the term of office as a Member of Parliament to an end, that institution will have had no choice but to take notice without delay of the declaration by the national authorities that the seat was vacant – a declaration which concerned a pre‑existing legal situation and resulted solely from a decision of those authorities.

It is clear from the wording of Article 12(2) of the 1976 Act, under which it was for the Parliament to ‘take note’ that a seat had fallen vacant pursuant to national provisions in force in a Member State, that the Parliament does not have any discretion in the matter. In that particular case, the role of the Parliament is not to declare that the seat is vacant but merely to take note that the seat is vacant, as already established by the national authorities, whereas in the other cases concerning, inter alia, the resignation or death of one of its members, that institution has a more active role to play since Parliament itself establishes that there is a vacancy and informs the Member State in question thereof. Furthermore, it was not for the Parliament – but for the competent national courts or the European Court of Human Rights as the case may be – to verify that the procedure laid down by the applicable national law or the fundamental rights of the person concerned were respected.

(see paras 46-50, 56)