Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. Own resources of the European Communities – Repayment or remission of import duties

(Council Regulation No 1430/79, Arts 1(2)(a) and (b), and 13; Commission Regulation No 2670/81, Art. 3)

2. Appeals – Pleas in law – Plea submitted for the first time at the appeal stage

Summary

1. Article 13(1) of Regulation No 1430/79 on the repayment or remission of import or export duties, according to which import duties may be repaid or remitted in special situations which result from circumstances in which no deception or obvious negligence may be attributed to the person concerned, cannot be the basis for remission or repayment of a charge due under Article 3 of Regulation No 2670/81 laying down detailed implementing rules in respect of sugar production in excess of the quota.

Such a charge is levied not because a quantity of C sugar has crossed the external frontiers of the Community, but, on the contrary, because that quantity has not been exported outside the Community or because the conditions and time-limits laid down by Regulation No 2670/81 were not complied with when it was exported. Such a charge falls to be levied where there is an absence of proof, on the date determined for that purpose, of the export of a quantity of C sugar within the prescribed period. Therefore, such a charge does not come within any of the three categories listed in Article 1(2)(a) and (b) of Regulation No 1430/79.

Nor is there anything to indicate that the Community legislature intended to place producers of C sugar disposed of on the internal market on an equal footing with sugar importers.

First, levies on imports of sugar from non-member countries and the charge due under Article 3 of Regulation No 2670/81 for C sugar disposed of on the internal market do not pursue the same objectives.

Second, it does not follow either from the third recital of Regulation No 2645/70 on the provisions applicable to sugar produced in excess of the maximum quota or from the third recital of Regulation No 2670/81, which replaced it – both of which are essentially in the same terms – that the Community legislature intended that importers of sugar from non-member countries and producers of C sugar disposed of on the internal market be placed on an equal footing. It is apparent from those recitals and from Article 3 of Regulation No 2670/81 that the reference to sugar imported from non-member countries is limited to the method of calculating the charge laid down in that article.

Third, it is not possible to discern from the wording of Regulation No 1785/81 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector any intention on the part of the Community legislature to grant C sugar disposed of on the internal market the status of a product imported from a non-member country and to treat a producer of C sugar in the same way as an importer of sugar, since that article merely states that C sugar may not be disposed of on the internal market.

Fourth, and finally, the fact that both import duties and the charge due under Article 3 of Regulation No 2670/81 form part of the Community’s own resources does not demonstrate that importers of sugar from non-member countries and producers of C sugar are in similar situations. The Community’s own resources are made up of receipts of a very diverse nature which come under systems which are equally diverse.

(see paras 39, 41, 43, 63-65, 101-102)

2. To allow a party to put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea in law which it has not raised before the Court of First Instance would be to allow it to bring before the Court, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a case of wider ambit than that which came before the Court of First Instance. In an appeal the Court’s jurisdiction is confined to review of the findings of law on the pleas argued before the Court of First Instance.

A plea which alleges that the Court of First Instance contravened the principle of equal treatment between the appellant and a given category of economic operators is therefore inadmissible where that party, whilst raising a plea at first instance alleging infringement of the principle of equality, was challenging only the difference in treatment which it suffered in relation to another category of economic operators.

(see paras 95-97)