ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Appeal brought on 1 December 2021 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 22 September 2021 in Joined Cases T-639/14 RENV, Τ-352/15 and Τ-740/17, Dimosia Epicheirisi Ilektrismou ΑΕ (DEI) v European Commission, supported by Mytilinaios AE — Omilos Epicheiriseon

(Case C-739/21 P)

(2022/C 37/32)

Language of the case: Greek

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: Antonios Bouchagiar and Paul-John Loewenthal)

Other parties to the proceedings: Dimosia Epicheirisi Ilektrismou ΑΕ (DEI) (applicant at first instance),

Mytilinaios AE — Omilos Epicheiriseon (intervener at first instance)

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber, Extended Composition) of 22 September 2021 in Joined Cases T-639/14 RENV, T-352/15 and T-740/17, DEI v Commission;

— give final judgment on the action at first instance in Case T-740/17 and dismiss it (in the alternative, give final judgment rejecting the third and fourth pleas for annulment and the first and second parts of the fifth plea for annulment and refer Case T-740/17 back to the General Court as regards the remaining pleas for annulment), and at the same time declare that the action in Cases T-639/14 RENV and T-352/15 has become devoid of purpose and there is no longer any need to adjudicate; and

— order the respondent and applicant at first instance to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant raises a single ground of appeal:

According to the appellant, the General Court misinterpreted and misapplied Article 107(1) TFEU, because it considered that the Commission could not have ruled out the existence of an advantage on the basis of application of the market economy operator test in relation to DEI’s recourse to arbitration with Mytilinaios, but should have examined whether the tariff determined by the arbitration tribunal in fact reflected the market price, because the arbitration tribunal should supposedly have been treated in the same way as an ordinary State court.

Owing to that error of law, the General Court erred in finding that the Commission should have entertained doubts within the meaning of Article 4(4) of Regulation 2015/1589, (1) on the basis of which it should have opened a formal investigation procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU regarding the tariff fixed by the arbitration tribunal.

(1) Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 2015 L 248, p. 9).
The rejection of the first part of the first plea in law in the action for annulment:

The word ‘whistleblower’, used by the General Court, does not appear in the Staff Regulations and implies a negative and biased assessment.

In regarding it as essential that a connection is established between the contested appraisal procedure and the allegations made by the appellant before OLAF, the General Court erred in law and contradicted the guidance provided in Case T-689/16.

The General Court failed to have regard to the content of the documents before the Court and the scope of the protection attached to the status of informant and unlawfully reversed the burden of obligations and of proof.

The General Court also erred in law and ruled ultra petita by finding that the appellant had not requested the Secretary-General to take on the role of appeal assessor or requested the Reports Committee to meet.
—

Second, the General Court committed a manifest error of assessment when interpreting Article 9(4) of the basic regulation and by failing to address essential arguments, or to provide reasons. Under the General Court’s protection, the Commission exceeded by far the limits of the investigation period, by choosing 2008 as ‘the most recent representative year’ unaffected by the financial crisis. Relatedly, the Appellant argues that the Contested Judgment’s finding of injury is vitiated in that it is not the result of a balancing of both positive and negative relevant factors. In that context, the Appellant argued that a reduction of the Union industry’s costs of production should, among other factors, be also associated with the situation of the Union industry following the global financial crisis of 2012. However, the General Court refused to even consider whether the financial crisis would have also affected the injury chain.
Appeal brought on 2 August 2021 by Franz Schröder GmbH & Co. KG against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 2 June 2021 in Case T-854/19, Franz Schröder v EUIPO

(Case C-473/21 P)

(2022/C 64/10)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Franz Schröder GmbH & Co. KG (represented by: L. Pechan, N. Fangmann, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, RDS Design ApS

By order of 8 December 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Franz Schröder GmbH & Co. KG should bear its own costs.
Appeal brought on 16 December 2021 by the Federal Republic of Germany against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 6 October 2021 in Joined Cases T-233/19 and T-234/19, Infineon Technologies Dresden GmbH & Co. KG and Infineon Technologies AG v European Commission

(Case C-794/21 P)

(2022/C 73/30)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Federal Republic of Germany (represented by: J. Möller and R. Kanitz, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Infineon Technologies Dresden GmbH & Co. KG, Infineon Technologies AG, European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal of the General Court of the European Union of 6 October 2021 in Joined Cases T-233/19 and T-234/19, in so far as it dismissed the actions as unfounded;

— annul the Commission’s Decision of 28 May 2018 on State aid SA.34045 (2013/c) (ex 2012/NN) implemented by Germany for baseload consumers under Paragraph 19 StromNEV C(2018) 3166 final, for the years 2012 and 2013 in accordance with Article 61(1) of the Statute of the Court of Justice;

— order the Commission to pay the costs before the General Court and the Court of Justice.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant relies on a single ground of appeal, in which it alleges an infringement of Article 107(1) TFEU. According to the appellant, the General Court erred in law in assuming that the scheme in Paragraph 19(2) of the German Stromnetzentgeltverordnung (StromNEV) (Regulation on electricity network charges) constitutes a State aid as provided for in Article 107(1) TFEU.

First, the General Court erred in law in finding, in the context of the assessment of the State nature of the network charges, that the existence of a mandatory charge on consumers or end users and the State control over the funds or over the administrators of those funds constituted two factors that were ‘part of an alternative’.

Secondly, the General Court erred in law in finding, in the context of the assessment whether there is a ‘mandatory charge on consumers or end users’ that the relationship between an electricity supplier and electricity end users was irrelevant. In addition, the General Court erred in law by taking into account the obligation to levy and not the legal obligation to pay network charges.

Thirdly, the General Court erred in law in holding, in the context of the assessment whether State control or State power to dispose of funds exists, that the exclusive use of the network charges collected did not rule out that the State could dispose of those funds.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 1 August 2021 by Rezon OOD against the judgment of the General Court delivered on 16 June 2021 in Case T-487/20, Rezon v EUIPO

(Case C-476/21 P)

(2022/C 84/27)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Parties

Appellant: Rezon OOD (represented by: M. Yordanova-Harizanova, advokat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 10 December 2021, the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) ordered as follows:

1. The appeal is not allowed to proceed.
3.

If the answer to Question [1] is in the affirmative and the answer to Question [2] is in the negative, must Article 18 of Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability, in conjunction with Article 3 thereof, be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which an insurance undertaking, to which the owner of a car damaged in motor vehicle traffic applied for payment of hypothetical costs which he/she has not incurred but would have had to incur if he/she had decided to restore the vehicle to its state before the accident, can: a. make that payment conditional on the injured party proving that he/she genuinely intends to have the vehicle repaired in a specific way, by a specific mechanic, at a specific price for parts and services, and to transfer the funds for that repair directly to that mechanic (or to the seller of the parts necessary for the repair), subject to reimbursement, if the purpose for which the funds were paid should not be fulfilled, and if not: b. make that payment conditional on the consumer undertaking to show, within an agreed period, that he/she has used the funds paid to repair the vehicle or to reimburse them to the insurance undertaking, and if not: c. after the payment of those funds and indication of the purpose of the payment (the manner in which they are used) and expiry of the necessary period during which the injured party was able to have the car repaired), require him/her to show that those funds have been spent on the repair or refunded — so as to rule out the possibility of the injured party enriching himself/herself as a result of the damage?
2.

Must Article 2(1) and (2) of Council Directive 2000/78/[E]C of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, together with Article 3(1)(c), in fine, of that directive, be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that laid down in Article 1(2) of Legea-cadru nr. 330 din 5 noiembrie 2009 privind salarizarea unitară a personalului plătit din fonduri publice (Framework Law No 330 of 5 November 2009 on the uniform remuneration of staff paid from the public purse), as interpreted by Decizia nr. 7/2019 (Decision No 7/2019) (published in Monitorul Oficial al României — Official Journal of Romania — No 343 of 6 May 2019), given by the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice, Romania), ruling on an appeal on a point of law, in circumstances in which the claimant did not have the legal possibility of requesting an increase in his or her employment allowance on entering the judiciary at a date after the entry into force of [Framework Law No 330/2009], a legislative act which expressly provided that remuneration rights are to be and remain exclusively as provided in [that] law, thus creating remuneration discrimination as compared with his or her colleagues, including on the basis of the criterion of age, which means in fact that only older judges, who were appointed before January 2010 (who benefited from court rulings in the period from 2006 to 2009, the operative parts of which were subject to interpretation in 2019 pursuant to Decision [No 7/2019 of the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice)]), received retroactive payment of remuneration rights (similar to those sought in the action which forms the subject matter of the present proceedings) during December 2019 and January 2020, in respect of the period from 2010 to 2015, even though during that period the claimant also acted as a prosecutor and performed the same work, under the same conditions and in the same institution?
Appeal brought on 14 December 2021 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 29 September 2021 in Case T-279/19, Front Polisario v Council

(Case C-779/21 P)

(2022/C 119/30)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: A. Bouquet, F. Castillo de la Torre, F. Clotuche-Duvieusart, B. Eggers, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Front populaire pour la libération de la Saguia el-Hamra et du Rio de oro (Front Polisario), Council of the European Union, French Republic, Confédération marocaine de l’agriculture et du développement rural (Comader)

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal and consequently;

— dismiss the action brought at first instance by the Front Polisario, or, if the state of proceedings does not permit the Court of Justice to give final judgment in the matter, refer the case back to the General Court;

— order the Front Polisario to pay the costs of both sets of proceedings in their entirety.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

— First ground of appeal: errors in law based on the Front Polisario’s lack of capacity to be a party to legal proceedings.

— Second ground of appeal: errors in law based on the Front Polisario’s lack of direct concern.

— Third ground of appeal: errors in law based on the Front Polisario’s lack of individual concern.

— Fourth ground of appeal: errors in law regarding the scope of judicial review, the institutions’ margin of appreciation and the need to find that there had been a manifest error; regarding the consent of the people of Western Sahara not being a requirement; regarding the fact that the concept of consent adopted is too strict and theoretical, that the consultation that obtained the favourable opinion is considered insufficient and that the examination of the benefits is rejected; regarding the Front Polisario’s identification as the entity that would be responsible for giving such consent, given its limited status and representativeness.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 15 March 2021 by Sergio Spadafora against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 10 February 2021 in Case T-130/19, Spadafora v Commission

(Case C-169/21 P)

(2022/C 119/21)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: Sergio Spadafora (represented by: G. Belotti, avvocato)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, CC

By order of 25 January 2022, the Court (Ninth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as manifestly inadmissible in part and manifestly unfounded in part and ordered Mr Sergio Spadafora to bear his own costs.
3.

In the case of healthcare workers on whom the law of the Member State in question has imposed compulsory vaccination, can vaccines approved by the Commission conditionally within the meaning of Regulation No 507/2006 be used for the purposes of compulsory vaccination, without any procedure for precautionary purposes, or may those healthcare workers oppose inoculation, in view of the conditionality of the authorisation, at least until the deciding health authority has ruled out, in the circumstances concerned and with reasonable certainty, that, on the one hand, there are no contraindications to that effect and, on the other, that the benefits to be gained from them outweigh those gained from other medicinal products currently available? In that case, must the deciding health authority act in accordance with Article 41 of the Nice Charter?
—

By its first ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the judgment under appeal infringes Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), on the basis that: (i) it is not possible to request access to the documents sought in Case T-628/17; and (ii) the judgment under appeal prevents that party from exercising its right to an effective remedy and increases the inequality of arms between the parties. In any event, that restriction of Article 47 of the Charter is not justifiable under Article 52(1) of the Charter.
2.

Does Article 3 of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society preclude national legislation which establishes a rebuttable presumption of communication to the public on the basis of the existence of sound systems, where those sound systems are required by other provisions of law governing the carrier’s activity?
iv.

Whether art. 6(3) of directive 92/43/EEC (2) is to be interpreted as meaning that, in the application of the principle that in order to determine whether it is necessary to carry out, subsequently, an appropriate assessment of the implications, for a site concerned, of a plan or project, it is not appropriate, at the screening stage, to take account of the measures intended to avoid or reduce the harmful effects of the plan or project on that site, the competent authority of a member state is entitled to take account of features of the plan or project involving the removal of contaminants that may have the effect of reducing harmful effects on the European site solely on the grounds that those features are not intended as mitigation measures even if they have that effect, and that they would have been incorporated in the design as standard features irrespective of any effect on the European site concerned.
Appeal brought on 28 December 2021 by Fachverband Spielhallen eV and LM against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 22 October 2021 in Case T-510/20, Fachverband Spielhallen eV and LM v European Commission

(Case C-831/21 P)

(2022/C 198/26)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellants: Fachverband Spielhallen eV, LM (represented by: A. Bartosch and R. Schmidt, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Federal Republic of Germany

Form of order sought

The appellants claims that the Court should:

— set aside the order of the General Court of the European Union in Case T-510/20;

— refer the case back to the General Court;

— reserve the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellants raise a single ground of appeal, alleging infringement of Article 107(1) TFEU.

The General Court dismissed the action in Case T-510/20 solely on the ground that the measure at issue was not capable of conferring an economic advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU. However, according to established EU case-law on tax matters, the criteria of advantage and selectivity must always be examined together. A finding of selectivity invariably presupposes the definition of a normal tax system. Without the definition of such a normal tax system, it is therefore impossible to determine whether there was an economic advantage. However, the General Court failed to examine the normal tax system and was therefore not entitled to conclude that the measure at issue did not confer an economic advantage. As a result, the contested decision is vitiated by a serious error of law.
3.

If such an interpretation is incompatible with Articles 6(1) and 7(1), do those articles preclude an interpretation according to which the starting point of the limitation period is the date of the judgments of the Court of Justice holding that an action for restitution may be subject to a limitation period (essentially, the judgment of 9 July 2020, Raiffeisen Bank SA, Joined Cases C-698/10 and 699/18, and the judgment of 16 July 2020, Caixabank SA, Joined Cases C-224/19 and C-259/19, which confirmed the former)?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 10 December 2021 by St. Hippolyt Holding GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) delivered on 20 October 2021 in Case T-351/20, St. Hippolyt v EUIPO — Raisioaqua

(Case C-761/21 P)

(2022/C 237/29)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: St. Hippolyt Holding GmbH (represented by: M. Gail, Rechtsanwalt)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Raisioaqua Oy

By order of 31 March 2022, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that St. Hippolyt Holding GmbH should bear its own costs.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale ordinario di Roma (Italy) lodged on 5 January 2022 — Liberi editori e autori (LEA) v Jamendo SA

(Case C-10/22)

(2022/C 119/36)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale ordinario di Roma

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Liberi editori e autori (LEA)

Defendant: Jamendo SA

Question referred

Must Directive 2014/26/EU (1) be interpreted as precluding national legislation that reserves access to the copyright intermediation market, or in any event the granting of licences to users, solely to entities which can be classified, according to the definition in that directive, as collective management organisations, to the exclusion of those which can be classified as independent management entities incorporated in that Member State or in other Member States?

(1) Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market (OJ 2014 L 84, p. 72).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Austria) lodged on 26 January 2022 — BF v Versicherungsanstalt öffentlich Bediensteter, Eisenbahnen und Bergbau

(Case C-52/22)

(2022/C 158/08)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesverwaltungsgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: BF

Respondent authority: Versicherungsanstalt öffentlich Bediensteter, Eisenbahnen und Bergbau

Question referred

Are Article 2(1) and 2(2)(a) and Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78/EC (1) and the principles of legal certainty, maintenance of established rights and effectiveness of EU law to be interpreted as precluding national legislation — such as that at issue in the main proceedings — under which the first adjustment of the retirement pension of the group of civil servants who became entitled to a retirement pension (‘total pension’ under the Pensionsgesetz 1965 (‘the 1965 Law on pensions’)) as from 1 December 2021 at the latest is to be made with effect only from 1 January of the second calendar year following the commencement of entitlement to the retirement pension, whereas the first adjustment of the retirement pension of the group of civil servants who became or will become entitled to a retirement pension (‘total pension’ under the 1965 Law on pensions) as from 1 January 2022 is to be made with effect already from 1 January of the first calendar year following the commencement of entitlement to the retirement pension?

(1) Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16).