ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Högsta domstolen (Sweden) lodged on 30 November 2018 — Föreningen Svenska Tonsättares Internationella Musikbyrå u.p.a. (Stim), Svenska artisters och musikers intresseorganisation ek. för. (SAMI) v Fleetmanager Sweden AB, Nordisk Biluthyrning AB

(Case C-753/18)

(2019/C 65/34)

Language of the case: Swedish

Referring court

Högsta domstolen

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: Föreningen Svenska Tonsättares Internationella Musikbyrå u.p.a. (Stim), Svenska artisters och musikers intresseorganisation ek. för. (SAMI)

Respondents: Fleetmanager Sweden AB, Nordisk Biluthyrning AB

Questions referred

1. Does the hiring out of cars which are equipped as standard with radio receivers mean that the person who hires the cars out is a user who makes a communication to the public within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 (1) and within the meaning of Article 8(2) of Directive 2006/115? (2)

2. What is the significance, if any, of the volume of the car hire activities and the duration of the hires?

(1) Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (OJ 2001 L 167, p. 10).

(2) Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 28).
1.

Are the competent social security authorities of one Member State (in this case the Caisse pour l’avenir des enfants (Children’s Future Fund), Luxembourg) required, pursuant to their Community obligations under Article 45 TFEU, Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (1) and Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, (2) in particular Article 4 thereof, to pay family benefits to a national of a second Member State when, under identical conditions for the grant of those benefits, those competent authorities recognise the entitlement of their own nationals and residents to family benefits, pursuant to a bilateral international convention concluded between the first Member State (Luxembourg) and the third country (Brazil)?
Appeal brought on 12 December 2018 by the European Union Intellectual Property Office against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 3 October 2018 in Case T-313/17, Wajos GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-783/18 P)

(2019/C 112/27)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Hanf, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— order Wajos GmbH to pay the costs incurred by EUIPO.

Pleas in law and main arguments

EUIPO submits that the judgment under appeal infringes Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009. (1) The Court applied an incorrect test in the assessment of the distinctiveness of the mark at issue, did not examine the relevant criteria and relied on incorrect assessment criteria.

The judgment under appeal also infringes Article 36 and the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, since it allows neither the appellant nor the Court of Justice to understand the grounds on which the General Court came to conclusion — which was decisive as regards the operative part of the judgment — that the form of the mark at issue had ‘an exceptional nature, in view of the customs of the sector’.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1).
2.

In any event, notwithstanding the foregoing, does the practice of the Spanish State of automatically applying the rule laid down in Article 7 of Royal Decree 240/2007, and refusing to grant a residence permit to a family member of an EU citizen where that EU citizen has never exercised freedom of movement, solely and exclusively on the ground that the EU citizen does not satisfy the conditions laid down in that provision, without having examined specifically and individually whether there exists a relationship of dependency between that EU citizen and the third-country national of such a nature that, for any reason and in the light of the circumstances, it would mean that were the third-country national refused a right of residence, the EU citizen could not be separated from the family member on which he is dependent and would have to leave the territory of the European Union, infringe Article 20 TFEU in the terms set out above? All of this is in the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, including, inter alia, the judgment of 8 May 2018, C-82/16, K.A. and Others v Belgische Staat. (1)
Appeal brought on 5 December 2018 by Wallapop, S.L. against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 3 October 2018 in Case T-186/17, Unipreus v EUIPO — Wallapop (wallapop)

(Case C-763/18 P)

(2019/C 131/25)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: Wallapop, S.L. (represented by: D. Sarmiento Ramírez-Escudero and N. Porxas Roig, lawyers)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office and Unipreus, S.L.

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal, for the reasons set out in the single ground of appeal, finding that the services at issue are not similar;

— order Unipreus to pay the costs incurred by Wallapop, both in the proceedings at first instance and in the present proceedings before the Court of Justice.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

Wallapop, S.L. is bringing an appeal against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 3 October 2018, delivered in Case T-186/17, (1) relating to opposition proceedings brought by the company Unipreus, S.L. in respect of Wallapop, S.L.‘s application for EU figurative mark No 13268941.

The appeal is based on a single ground of appeal, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the European Union trade mark (2) (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark) and the case-law that interprets the assessment of similarity between services.

In particular, the ground of appeal is based on the General Court’s erroneous application of the criteria established in the case-law for determining the similarity in terms of application as between trade marks; in essence, the General Court disregarded the concept of marketing and the services that an online market ordinarily provides, according to the meaning attributed to it by legislation and case-law; that is to say, intermediary services rather than marketing or similar services.

The General Court’s incorrect assessment carries forward to the analysis in its judgment of the similarity of the services at issue, applying the criteria established in the case-law to that effect (such as nature, distribution channels, intended purpose and perception or competitiveness and complementarity between services).

(1) Judgment of 3 October 2018, Unipreus v EUIPO — Wallapop (wallapop) (T-186/17, not published, EU:T:2018:640).

(2) OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Germany) lodged on 14 November 2018 — WN v Land Niedersachsen

(Case C-710/18)

(2019/C 182/03)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesarbeitsgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: WN

Defendant: Land Niedersachsen

Question referred

Are Article 45(2) TFEU and Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union (1) to be interpreted as precluding a provision such as that in Paragraph 16(2) of the Tarifvertrag für den Öffentlichen Dienst der Länder (the Collective Agreement for the public sector of the Länder; ‘the TV-L’), pursuant to which the relevant professional experience acquired with the last previous employer has a privileged position in the case where an employee is allocated to the steps of a collective pay structure following re-employment as a result of that professional experience being fully acknowledged pursuant to the second sentence of Paragraph 16(2) of the TV-L, whereas only a maximum of three years of relevant professional experience acquired with other employers is taken into account pursuant to the third sentence of Paragraph 16(2) of the TV-L, if that privileged position is required under EU law by clause 4.4 of the framework agreement on fixed-term contracts concluded on 18 March 1999, which is contained in the annex to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP?

(1) OJ 2011 L 141, p. 1.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 7 November 2018 by Hungary Restaurant Company Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. (Hungary Restaurant Company Kft.) and Evolution Gaming Advisory Kft. against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) made on 12 October 2018 in Case T-416/18, Hungary Restaurant Company Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. (Hungary Restaurant Company Kft.) and Evolution Gaming Advisory Kft. v European Commission

(Case C-700/18 P)

(2019/C 164/02)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellants: Hungary Restaurant Company Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. (Hungary Restaurant Company Kft.), Evolution Gaming Advisory Kft. (represented by: P. Ruth, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 14 March 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Seventh Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellants to bear their own costs.
1.

Infringement of Article 19(3) of the Statute of the Court of Justice (in conjunction with Article 51(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court) The General Court infringed Article 19(3) of the Statute of the Court of Justice (in conjunction with Article 51(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court), since it misapplied the parties’ obligation laid down in that provision to be ‘represented by a lawyer’. The General Court overestimates the requirements of the lawyer’s independence. The wording and meaning of Article 19(3) of the Statute of the Court of Justice do not justify the General Court’s interpretation. The General Court’s interpretation also finds no basis in the case-law of the Court of Justice. It is not foreseeable and breaches the principle of legal certainty.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 21 December 2018 by OY against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 16 October 2018 in Case T-605/16: OY v Commission

(Case C-816/18 P)

(2019/C 255/21)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: OY (represented by: S. Rodrigues and N. Flandin, avocats)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 12 June 2019 the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
1.

The General Court’s analysis of the second plea in law The General Court does not consider that the disputed tweet of Mylene Troszczynski constitutes the expression of an opinion in the performance of parliamentary duties on the ground that it relates to a specific event, deemed to have taken place in France, which cannot be regarded as constituting the taking of a general position on current topical issues or issues dealt with by the Parliament, which are conditions required in order for an opinion to be protected under the Protocol. The General Court errs manifestly in its assessment, since: — each Member of Parliament is an elected representative in his country, he represents his electors and must maintain a link with them during his mandate, inter alia by making reference to facts that interest or concern them, — principle No 2 of Notice to Members 11/2003 does not make such a distinction, — the wearing of full veils in public places concerns the electorate of France and of all European countries and such an external manifestation of adherence to Islam is a subject of general interest that relates to public life and the rights of women, — the General Court ought to have applied the principles of the Patriciello judgment.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 25 January 2019 by World Duty Free Group, S.A., formerly Autogrill España, S.A., against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 15 November 2018 in Case T-219/10 RENV, World Duty Free Group v Commission

(Case C-51/19 P)

(2019/C 112/36)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: World Duty Free Group, S.A., formerly Autogrill España S.A. (represented by: J. Buendía Sierra, E. Abad Valdenebro, R. Calvo Salinero and A. Lamadrid de Pablo, abogados)

Interveners in support of the applicant at first instance: Kingdom of Spain, Federal Republic of Germany, and Ireland

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant submits that the Court should:

— Set aside the judgment of the General Court of 15 November 2018;

— Uphold the application for annulment and definitively annul the contested decision; and

— Order the European Commission to pay the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

On 15 November 2018, the General Court gave judgment in Case T-219/10 RENV, World Duty free Group, S.A. v European Commission, (1) against which this appeal is brought. The judgment dismissed the appellant’s action against the European Commission’s decision of 28 October 2009, (2) on ‘financial goodwill’ regulated by Article 12.5 of the Spanish Ley de Impuesto sobre Sociedades (Law on Corporation Tax).

In support of its appeal, the appellant relies on a single ground of appeal, alleging that, in the judgment under appeal, the General Court erred in law in its interpretation of Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in relation to the concept of ‘selectivity’.

In particular, it is submitted that the General Court erred:

— In determining the reference system at the first stage of the selectivity analysis;

— In determining the objective forming the basis for comparing the separate legal and factual situations at the second stage of the selectivity analysis;

— Consequently, the General Court also erred in the attribution of the burden of proof and the application of the principle of proportionality;

— In the alternative, in its examination relating to the supposed lack of proof of a causal link between the companies’ inability to merge abroad and the acquisition of holdings abroad; and

— In the alternative, in ruling out the severability of the measure according to the control percentage;

— In addition to maintaining a legally incorrect line of reasoning, the General Court substituted its own reasoning for that of the Commission’s decision in relation to a number of the abovementioned points, thus giving rise to further errors of law.

(1) Judgment of 15 November 2018, World Duty Free Group v Commission (T-219/10 RENV, EU:T:2018:784).

(2) Commission Decision 2011/5/EC of 28 October 2009 on the tax amortisation of financial goodwill for foreign shareholding acquisitions C 45/07 (ex NN 51/07, ex CP 9/07) implemented by Spain (OJ 2011 L 7, p. 48).
1.

Do Articles 2 and 273 of Council Directive 2006/112 of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, (1) Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 325 TFEU, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which enables the following combination of events to take place: — the payment of criminal damages, imposed during the pre-trial investigation phase on the basis of something other than a tax claim; — the subsequent conducting of a tax inspection, in parallel with the criminal proceedings in which the accused taxpayer has been brought to trial to respond to a charge of tax evasion, which imposes on that taxpayer ancillary tax liabilities for both the period and the amount already made available to the State authorities during the pre-trial investigation phase, while the decision regarding the administrative complaint lodged against the administrative and tax measures issued at the time of the inspection has been stayed pending the final decision in the criminal proceedings; — the closing of the criminal proceedings at first instance with the accused being sentenced, inter alia, jointly to pay the entirety of the amount imposed during the pre-trial investigation phase as being owed by all the accused parties, although only a part of that amount, which has already been paid by the taxpayer concerned, has been ascribed to that taxpayer; and to what extent are all of those events, taken together, excessive with regard to that same taxpayer?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo (Spain) lodged on 24 January 2019 — Repsol Petróleo, S.A. v Administración del Estado

(Case C-44/19)

(2019/C 155/27)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Supremo

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Repsol Petróleo, S.A.

Respondent: Administración del Estado

Question referred

Must Article 21(3) of Directive 2003/96 (1) be interpreted as meaning that it permits the self-consumption of energy products within the curtilage of the producer to be made subject to the excise duty on mineral oils in the proportion in which non-energy products are obtained?

Or, on the contrary, does the purpose of that provision, which is to exclude from taxation the use of energy products that is deemed necessary for obtaining final energy products, preclude the taxation of that self-consumption in so far as it results in the production of other non-energy products, even when such production is residual and occurs inevitably as a result of the production process itself?

(1) Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (OJ 2003 L 283, p. 51).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Poznaniu (Poland) lodged on 15 January 2019 — Corporis Sp. z o.o., established in Bielsko-Biała v Gefion Insurance A/S, established in Copenhagen

(Case C-25/19)

(2019/C 164/12)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Okręgowy w Poznaniu

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Corporis Sp. z o.o., established in Bielsko-Biała

Defendant: Gefion Insurance A/S, established in Copenhagen

Question referred

Should Article 152(1) and (2), in conjunction with Article 151, of Directive 2009/138/EC (1) and recital 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 (2) be interpreted as meaning that the representation of a non-life insurance undertaking by an appointed representative includes the receipt of a document which initiates court proceedings for damages in respect of a road traffic accident?

(1) Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) (OJ 2009 L 335, p. 1).

(2) Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents), and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 (OJ 2007 L 324, p. 79).
1.

For the purposes of Article 2(h) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, (1) what conditions must be fulfilled in order for an indication of wishes to be regarded as specific and informed?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 28 February 2019 by Teva UK Ltd, Teva Pharmaceuticals Europe BV, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-679/14: Teva UK Ltd and Others v Commission

(Case C-198/19 P)

(2019/C 164/32)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Teva UK Ltd, Teva Pharmaceuticals Europe BV, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd (represented by: D. Tayar, avocat, A. Richard, avocate)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Generic medicines Association AISBL (EGA), European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

— accept the appeal and declare the action admissible;

— set aside the judgment of the General Court of 12 December 2018 in case T-679/14;

— refer the case back to the General Court for a new decision to be taken, unless the Court considers that it is sufficiently well informed to annul Commission Decision COMP/AT.39612 (1)‘Perindopril (Servier)’ of 9 July 2014insofar as it finds that Teva UK limited, Teva Pharmaceuticals Europe B.V. and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited infringed Article 101 of the TFEU and cancel the fine imposed Teva UK limited, Teva Pharmaceuticals Europe B.V. and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, and

— order the Commission to pay the costs of these proceedings, including the costs incurred by the appellants before this Court and before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellants put forward three pleas in law to support their request:

1. The General Court erred in law in the standard applied to assess whether Teva was a potential competitor to Servier.

2. The General Court erred in law in finding that the agreement was restrictive of competition by object under Article 101(1) TFEU.

3. The General Court erred in law in its application of Article 101(3) TFEU.

(1) Summary of Commission Decision of 9 July 2014 relating to a proceeding under Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Case AT.39612 — Perindopril (Servier)) (notified under document C(2014) 4955) (JO 2016 C 393, p. 7).
1.

Are Articles 13b and 31a of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 (1) of 15 March 2011 laying down implementing measures for Directive 2006/112/EC (2) on the common system of value added tax, as amended by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1042/2013 (3) of 7 October 2013 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 as regards the place of supply of services, to be interpreted as meaning that computing centre services of the type at issue in the main proceedings, with which a trader provides its customers with equipment cabinets in a computing centre for holding customers’ servers together with ancillary services, are to be regarded as the leasing or letting of immovable property?