ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 8 January 2021 — AX v Deutsche Lufthansa AG

(Case C-9/21)

(2021/C 88/27)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: AX

Respondent: Deutsche Lufthansa AG

Question referred

Does a strike by the air carrier’s own employees that is called by a trade union constitute an extraordinary circumstance within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004? (1)

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d’appel de Liège (Belgium) lodged on 28 January 2021 — Pharmacie populaire — La Sauvegarde SCRL v État belge

(Case C-52/21)

(2021/C 128/27)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour d’appel de Liège

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Pharmacie populaire — La Sauvegarde SCRL

Respondent: État belge

Question referred

Is Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to be interpreted as precluding legislation, or a national practice, under which companies established in one Member State which use services of companies established in another Member State are required, in order to avoid a corporation tax levy of 100 % or 50 % of the sums invoiced by the latter, to complete and submit to the tax authorities individual fee forms and summary statements relating to those expenses whereas, if they use the services of resident companies, they are under no such obligation in order to avoid that levy?
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Nejvyšší správní soud (Czech Republic) lodged on 27 January 2021 — FCC Česká republika, s.r.o.

(Case C-43/21)

(2021/C 110/27)

Language of the case: Czech

Referring court

Nejvyšší správní soud

Parties to the main proceedings

Complainant in the appeal proceedings in cassation: FCC Česká republika, s.r.o.

Defendants in the appeal proceedings in cassation: Městská část Praha-Ďáblice, Spolek pro Ďáblice

Other party to the proceedings: Ministerstvo životního prostředí

Question referred

Should Article 3(9) of Directive 2010/75/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) be interpreted such that a ‘substantial change’ of a plant includes an extension of the duration of waste disposal at a landfill without the maximum approved dimensions of the landfill or its total potential capacity changing at the same time?

(1) OJ 2010 L 334, p. 17.
2.

If that term cannot be defined, by what criteria are judges to look at evidence so that national courts may decide according to a settled list of factors who is or who is not a member of the household of an EU citizen for the purpose of freedom of movement?
Appeal brought on 4 February 2021 by Deza a.s. against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 16 December 2020 in Case T-638/18, Deza a.s. v Commission

(Case C-74/21 P)

(2021/C 128/36)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Deza a.s. (represented by: P. Sellar, advocaat, K. Van Maldegem, avocat, M. Grunchard, avocate)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Kingdom of Spain and European Chemicals Agency

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— refer the case back to the General Court for consideration; and

— reserve the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First plea in law, alleging that the General Court's finding that the appellant’s argument that the Commission committed a manifest error did not necessarily imply also the argument that the Commission had infringed the duty of act diligently, is wrong as a matter of law.

Second plea in law, alleging that the General Court was wrong as a matter of law to use an alleged lack of legal clarity of point 4.1.3.5.5 of Annex I to Regulation No 1272/2008 (1) as a ground for dismissing the legal argument that was actually being made by the appellant.

Third plea in law, alleging that the General Court could not rely on the finding that the legal framework was complex in order to excuse the Commission's failure to take into account the lack of CTPHT's (classified pitch, coal tar, high-temp) solubility. The General Court had actually held the opposite in earlier related proceedings (Case T-689/13 DEP, Bilbaina de Alquitranes SA and Others v European Commission). Without any explanation for holding the opposite, the General Court's reasoning is insufficient and contradictory.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the General Court wrongly applied the ordinary, due diligence test. By finding that the Commission acted as any other ordinary, duly diligent administrative authority would, it used an incorrect and inappropriate point of comparison to assess the due diligence and ordinariness of the Commission.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the General Court's statement of reasons is insufficient and contradictory insofar as that court found, without indicating any evidence and by only relying on the opinion of the Advocate General, that the Commission may have had difficulties in correcting its manifest error of assessment, thereby suggesting that Commission’s approach could be excused.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that the General Court was wrong in law to conclude that the Commission's error could be excused by reference to the precautionary principle because it is settled case law that the principle cannot be invoked during the classification of a substance.

(1) Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (OJ 2008, L 353, p. 1).
2.

Is it to be assumed that it is already known to the courts that ‘slot delays’ by air traffic management in international air transport are not circumstances that are out of the ordinary within the meaning of the case-law of the Court of Justice, but rather ordinary, usual and expected concomitants of air transport, or is it necessary in the dispute to take evidence in that regard by obtaining expert reports, whereby such evidence would be provided only if slot delays occur extremely rarely in international air transport and not on a regular basis?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Nejvyšší správní soud (Czech Republic) lodged on 18 February 2021 — HJ

(Case C-101/21)

(2021/C 148/11)

Language of the case: Czech

Referring court

Nejvyšší správní soud

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: HJ

Other party to the proceedings: Ministerstvo práce a sociálních věcí

Question referred

Does Article 2 of Directive 2008/94/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer, in conjunction with Article 12(a) and (c) thereof, preclude [the application of] national case-law according to which a CEO of a trading company is not deemed to be an ‘employee’ for the purpose of the satisfaction of pay claims pursuant to Directive 2008/94/EC, for the sole reason that the CEO as an employee is, at the same time, a member of the statutory body of the same trading company?

(1) OJ 2008 L 283, p. 36.
1.

Should Article 1(2) of Council Directive 87/357/EEC (1) of 25 June 1987 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning products which, appearing to be other than they are, endanger the health or safety of consumers be interpreted as defining the products referred to in paragraph 1 of that article as being those which, although not foodstuffs, possess a form, odour, colour, appearance, packaging, labelling, volume or size, such that it is likely that consumers, especially children, will confuse them with foodstuffs and in consequence place them in their mouths, or suck or ingest them, which could be dangerous as it is demonstrated by objective and substantiated data that this may cause, for example, suffocation, poisoning, or the perforation or obstruction of the digestive tract?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy (Poland) lodged on 2 February 2021 — Rigall Arteria Management Sp. z o.o. sp. k. v Bank Handlowy w Warszawie S.A.

(Case C-64/21)

(2021/C 182/41)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Najwyższy

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant in cassation: Rigall Arteria Management Sp. z o.o. sp. k.

Other party to the proceedings: Bank Handlowy w Warszawie S.A.

Question referred

In the light of the wording and purpose of Article 7(1)(b) of Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents, (1) must that provision be understood as conferring on a self-employed commercial agent an absolute right to commission on a contract concluded during the term of an agency contract with a third party whom he or she has previously acquired as a customer for transactions of the same kind, or may that entitlement be contractually excluded?

(1) OJ 1986 L 382, p. 17.
1.

Is Article 9(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the use of a sign identical with a trade mark in an advertisement displayed on a website is attributable to the website operator or to entities economically linked with it owing to the combination on that website of the operator’s or its economically linked entities’ own offers and those of third-party sellers, by the incorporation of those advertisements in the operator’s or its economically linked entities own commercial communication? Is such incorporation strengthened by the fact that: — the advertisements are presented uniformly on the website? — the operator’s own advertisements and those of economically linked entities and the advertisements of third-party sellers are displayed without distinction as to their origin, but clearly display the logo of the operator or of economically linked entities, in the advertising categories of third-party websites in the form of ‘pop-ups’? — the operator or economically linked entities offer a comprehensive service to third-party sellers, including providing assistance in preparing the advertisements and setting selling prices, stocking the goods and shipping them? — the website of the operator and economically linked entities is designed in such a way as to be presented in the form of shops and labels such as ‘best sellers’, ‘most sought after’ or ‘most popular’, without apparent distinction, at first sight, between the operator’s and economically linked entities’ own goods and third-party sellers’ goods?
5.

If the answer to the fourth question is in the affirmative, do the objectives referred to by the applicants, that is to say, making notarial practice uniform, filling a regulatory gap, protecting the interests of consumers, safeguarding the principles of equal treatment of consumers and proportionality, and protecting notaries against unjustified civil liability, constitute legitimate objectives when assessing those clarifications in accordance with the criteria set out in paragraph 97 of the judgment in Wouters?
1.

First ground of appeal: the General Court erred in law and/or fact by finding that the decision at issue had an effect on the amount of the pension alone, not on the right to a pension and the stage at which it arose, incorrectly finding that that decision was in line with the general principles of the European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The appellants claim that the judgment under appeal is unlawful because (i) it confused the right to a pension with the right to the amount of the pension, excluding the application of the principle that the right to a pension cannot be changed, although that principle was in fact applicable, (ii) it incorrectly failed to find that the action taken relating to the appellants’ life annuities resulted, not in a mere reduction of the amount, but in a total reform of the system which affected retroactively and permanently the stage at which the right to the life annuities — which had already been distributed and acquired for years and had definitively become part of the assets of the persons concerned — arose, and (iii) it incorrectly failed to find that the Parliament did not carry out any review of the conformity of the acts at issue with EU law and that no reasoning whatsoever was provided in that respect.
—

order the Republic of Bulgaria to pay the Commission a daily lump sum of EUR 3 156, from the date of delivery of the judgment of 5 April 2017, Commission v Bulgaria (C-488/15, EU:C:2017:267), until the date of delivery of the judgment in the present case, or, should non-compliance end earlier, until 31 December of the last year of that non-compliance; in any event, that amount should be no less than the minimum lump sum of EUR 653 000;
4.

Do the principle of equal and non-discriminatory treatment of economic operators and the principle of transparency set out in Article 18(1) of Directive 2014/24/EU permit Article 21(1) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 2(1) of Directive 2016/943 to be interpreted in such a manner that economic operators competing for a public contract may reserve as trade secrets documents required for the purpose of examining the compliance of their tender with the requirements of the contracting authority contained in the tender specifications (including the description of the subject matter of the contract) or for the purpose of evaluating the tender under the tender evaluation criteria, particularly where those documents relate to the fulfilment of the requirements of the contracting authority laid down in the tender specifications, in applicable laws or in other documents which are generally available or accessible to interested parties, and in particular where that evaluation does not take place according to objectively comparable schemes and mathematically or physically measurable and comparable indicators, but rather according to an individual assessment by the contracting authority? Consequently, are Article 21(1) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 2(1) of Directive 2016/943 to be interpreted as meaning that a declaration made by an economic operator in the context of its tender that it will perform the subject matter of the contract in accordance with the contracting authority's requirements included in the tender specifications, compliance with which is monitored and assessed by the contracting authority, can be regarded as a trade secret of the economic operator in question, even though it is for the economic operator to choose the methods intended to achieve the result required by the contracting authority (the subject matter of the contract)?
Appeal brought on 2 April 2021 by European Investment Bank against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 27 January 2021 in Case T-9/19, ClientEarth v EIB

(Case C-212/21 P)

(2021/C 217/39)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: European Investment Bank (EIB) (represented by: T. Gilliams, G. Faedo and K. Carr, Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: ClientEarth, European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— declare the appeal admissible and well founded;

— set aside in its entirety the judgment under appeal as set out in its operative part;

— if the Court considers that the state of the proceedings so permits, dismiss the action at first instance;

— order ClientEarth to pay the costs of both parties incurred as a result of both the appeal proceedings and those of the proceedings at first instance.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellant relies on three grounds of appeal.

First, the judgment under appeal erroneously declares as inadmissible the EIB’s defence concerning its independence in the sphere of its financial operations. The General Court failed to consider EU primary law provisions underpinning the EIB’s defence, misapplied the duty to state reasons, and distorted the EIB’s reply to ClientEarth’s request for internal review based on Article 10 of the Aarhus Regulation (1). As a result, the General Court erroneously interpreted the definition of ‘administrative act’ in accordance with Article 2(1)(g) of the Aarhus Regulation.

Second, the judgment under appeal erroneously held that the resolution adopted by the Board of Directors of the EIB on 12 April 2018, which approved a proposal to finance a project for the construction of a biomass power generation plant in Curtis (Spain), constitutes an administrative act having ‘legally binding and external effect’ within the meaning of Article 2(1)(g) of the Aarhus Regulation. The General Court infringed the principle of the primacy of EU primary law over EU secondary law and over international agreements, disregarded Articles 271(c) and 263(4) TFEU, and wrongly applied Article 263 TFEU.

Third, the judgment under appeal erroneously held that the resolution of 12 April 2018 of the EIB Board of Directors constituted an administrative act ‘adopted under environmental law’ within the meaning of Article 2(1)(g) of the Aarhus Regulation. The General Court erroneously interpreted the definition in Article 2(1)(f) of the Aarhus Regulation, failed to identify the correct legal basis for the resolution at issue, and inconsistently interpreted the Aarhus Regulation in light of the Aarhus Convention.

(1) Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (OJ 2006, L 264, p. 13).
—

Fourth ground of appeal, alleging that the General Court infringed Article 232 TFEU since it did not take account of the power of the Parliament to organise freely the way in which it operates, as provided in the internal rules on the procedure relating to harassment involving Members of the European Parliament and in the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, in particular in Articles 166 and 167, applicable at the material time, on the imposition of penalties (paragraphs 12, 13, 63, 66, 129 and 132 of the judgment under appeal).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 18 January 2021 by Tinnus Enterprises LLC against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) delivered on 18 November 2020 in Case T-574/19, Tinnus Enterprises v EUIPO

(Case C-29/21 P)

(2021/C 252/09)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Tinnus Enterprises LLC (represented by: A. Odle and R. Palijama, advocaten)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 5 May 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Tinnus Enterprises LLC should bear its own costs.
2.

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative, does the General Data Protection Regulation mean that regard must also be had to the interests of the data subjects when a decision on disclosure must be made which involves the processing of personal data? In such circumstances, does EU law establish any requirements concerning how, in detail, that decision should be made?
1.

Does the concept of producer within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Product Liability Directive (1) presuppose that a person who puts his name, trade mark or other distinguishing feature on the product, or who has allowed them to be put on the product, also presents himself as the producer of the product in some other manner?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul Ilfov (Romania) lodged on 26 March 2021 — SR v EW

(Case C-196/21)

(2021/C 263/08)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Tribunalul Ilfov

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant-applicant: SR

Appellant-defendant: EW

Interveners: FB, CX, IK

Question referred

Where a court decides to summon interveners in civil proceedings, is the ‘applicant’, within the meaning of Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007, (1) the court in the Member State which decides to summon the interveners or the litigant in the proceedings pending before that court?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents), and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 (OJ 2007 L 324, p. 79).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d’appel de Bruxelles (Belgium) lodged on 10 May 2021 — Allianz Benelux SA v État belge, SPF Finances

(Case C-295/21)

(2021/C 289/41)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour d’appel de Bruxelles

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Allianz Benelux SA

Respondent: État belge, SPF Finances

Question referred

Is Article 4(1) of Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, (1) whether or not read in conjunction with the provisions of Directives 78/855/EEC (Third Directive) (2) and 82/891/EEC (Sixth Directive) (3) on company law, to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that the distributed benefits covered by the Directive are included in the basis of assessment of the company receiving the dividends before 95 % of their total is deducted from that basis and, as the case may be, carried forward to subsequent tax years but which, in the absence of a specific provision stating, in the case of an operation involving the reorganisation of companies, that the deductions thus carried forward in the hand of the transferring company are transferred in full to the receiving company, has the effect that the profits covered are indirectly taxed at the time of that operation on account of the application of a provision which limits the transfer of those deductions in proportion to the share represented by the net tax assets before the operation involving the absorbed parts of the transferring company in the total, once again before the operation, of the net tax assets of the absorbing company and of the net tax value of the absorbed parts?

(1) OJ 1990 L 225, p. 6.

(2) Third Council Directive 78/855/EEC of 9 October 1978 based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty concerning mergers of public limited liability companies (OJ 1978 L 295, p. 36).

(3) Sixth Council Directive 82/891/EEC of 17 December 1982 based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty, concerning the division of public limited liability companies (OJ 1982 L 378, p. 47).