Case C‑583/11 P

Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others

v

European Parliament and Council of the European Union

‛Appeal — Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 — Trade in seal products — Restrictions on importing and marketing such products — Action for annulment — Admissibility — Right of natural or legal persons to institute proceedings — Fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU — Concept of ‘regulatory act’ — Legislative act — Fundamental right to effective judicial protection’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 3 October 2013

Fundamental rights — Right to effective judicial protection — Review of legality of European Union acts — Procedures — Protection of that right by the Court of the European Union or by the national courts and tribunals according to the legal nature of the contested act — Possibility of using an action for annulation or a reference for a preliminary ruling on validity

It follows from the second paragraph of Article 256(1) TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal. An appeal which merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the General Court, including those based on facts expressly rejected by that court, does not satisfy the requirements to state reasons under those provisions. However, provided that an appellant challenges the interpretation or application of EU law by the General Court, the points of law examined at first instance may be argued again in the course of an appeal. Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the General Court, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose. (see paras 46, 47)

See the text of the judgment. (see para. 50)

The first paragraph of Article 263 TFEU identifies the European Union acts which may be the subject-matter of an action for annulment before the Courts of the European Union, namely (i) legislative acts and (ii) other binding acts intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, and the latter may be individual acts or acts of general application. As regards the right of natural and legal persons to institute proceedings, the subject-matter of the first two limbs of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU is any European Union act which produces binding legal effects. The concept of ‘act’ in those provisions therefore covers acts of general application, legislative or otherwise, and individual acts. The Treaty of Lisbon added to the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU a third limb which relaxed the conditions of admissibility of actions for annulment brought by natural and legal persons. Since the effect of that limb is that the admissibility of actions for annulment brought by natural and legal persons is not subject to the condition of individual concern, laid down by the second limb of that provision, it renders possible such legal actions against ‘regulatory acts’ which do not entail implementing measures and are of direct concern to the applicant. As regards the concept of ‘regulatory act’, it is apparent from the third limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU that its scope is more restricted than that of the concept of ‘acts’ used in the first and second limbs of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, in respect of the characterisation of the other types of measures which natural and legal persons may seek to have annulled. The former concept cannot refer to all acts of general application but relates to a more restricted category of such acts. To adopt an interpretation to the contrary would amount to nullifying the distinction made between the term ‘acts’ and ‘regulatory acts’ by the second and third limbs of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. Further, it is clear from the travaux préparatoires relating to Article III‑365(4) of the proposed treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe that while the alteration of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC was intended to extend the conditions of admissibility of actions for annulment in respect of natural and legal persons, the conditions of admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC relating to legislative acts were not however to be altered. Accordingly, the use of the term ‘regulatory act’ in the draft amendment of that provision made it possible to identify the category of acts which might thereafter be the subject of an action for annulment under conditions less stringent than previously, while maintaining a restrictive approach in relation to actions by individuals against legislative acts, for which the ‘of direct and individual concern’ condition remains applicable. In those circumstances, the purpose of the alteration to the right of natural and legal persons to institute legal proceedings, laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, was to enable those persons to bring, under less stringent conditions, actions for annulment of acts of general application other than legislative acts. (see paras 52, 54-60)

The content of the condition that the act of which annulment is sought under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU should be of individual concern was not altered by the Treaty of Lisbon. Accordingly, natural and legal persons satisfy the condition of individual concern only if the contested act affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them, or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons, and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the persons addressed. That being the case, the prohibition on the placing of seal products on the market, laid down in Regulation No 1007/2009 on trade in seal products, is worded in general terms and applies indiscriminately to any trader falling within its scope. (see paras 71-73)

A natural or legal person is entitled under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU to bring an action for annulment of an act which is not a decision addressed to that person or a regulatory act only if the person is not only directly concerned by such an act but also individually concerned by it. Accordingly, since the conditions that the act of which annulment is sought should be of direct concern and individual concern are cumulative, the consequence, if one of those conditions is not met by an applicant, is that an action brought by him for annulment of that act must be held to be inadmissible. (see paras 75, 76)

The General Court is not required to provide an account which follows exhaustively all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case. The reasoning of the General Court may be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why the measures in question were taken and provides the competent court with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review. The fact that the General Court does not explicitly refer to provisions relied on by the appellants, and does not explicitly deal with all the details of their arguments cannot be regarded as constituting a breach of the obligation to state reasons. The same is true where the General Court concludes that it cannot disregard the conditions relating to the institution of proceedings against a regulation which ‘are expressly laid down’ in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, even though it undertook a literal, historical and teleological interpretation of that provision. Where the General Court rules on the scope of the concept of ‘regulatory act’, provided for in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, by undertaking a classical interpretation using methods of interpretation recognised by EU law, to proceed in such a way does not alter the fact that that concept represents a condition of admissibility expressly laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, which actions for annulment brought by natural and legal persons must satisfy, and does not mean that the reasoning of the General Court is self-contradictory. (see paras 82-84)