ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
11

Article 5 of Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 2008 L 299, p. 25 and corrigendum OJ 2009 L 11, p. 86), entitled ‘Rights conferred by a trade mark’, provides: ‘1. The registered trade mark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive rights therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade: (a) any sign which is identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical with those for which the trade mark is registered; (b) any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade mark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public; the likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association between the sign and the trade mark. 2. Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade any sign which is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, where the latter has a reputation in the Member State and where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark. 3. The following, inter alia, may be prohibited under paragraphs 1 and 2: (a) affixing the sign to the goods or to the packaging thereof; (b) offering the goods, or putting them on the market or stocking them for these purposes under that sign, or offering or supplying services thereunder; (c) importing or exporting the goods under the sign; (d) using the sign on business papers and in advertising. 4. Where, under the law of the Member State, the use of a sign under the conditions referred to in paragraph 1(b) or paragraph 2 could not be prohibited before the date of entry into force of the provisions necessary to comply with [First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1)] in the Member State concerned, the rights conferred by the trade mark may not be relied on to prevent the continued use of the sign. 5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall not affect provisions in any Member State relating to the protection against the use of a sign other than for the purposes of distinguishing goods or services, where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.’
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 21 October 2015 —

Kovozber

(Case C‑120/15) ( 1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Value added tax (VAT) — Directive 2006/112/EC — Article 183 — Refund of excess VAT — National legislation prescribing that default interest relating to the refund of excess VAT is to be calculated only as from ten days after completion of a tax inspection’

1. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Questions the answer to which may be clearly deduced from the Court’s existing case-law — Application of Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure (Art. 267 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 99) (cf. points 16, 17)

2. Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Deduction of input tax — Refund of excess — National legislation prescribing that default interest relating to the refund of excess VAT is to be calculated only as from ten days after completion of a tax inspection — Unlawful (Council Directive 2006/112, Art. 183, first para.) (see paras 19-29, 33, operative part)

3. EU law — Direct effect — National taxes incompatible with EU law — Repayment — Procedures — Application of national law — Limits — Respect for the principles of equivalence and effectiveness — Verification a matter for the national court (Council Directive 2006/112, Art. 183) (see paras 30, 32)

Operative part

The first paragraph of Article 183 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which prescribes that default interest relating to the refund of excess value added tax is to be calculated only as from ten days after completion of the tax inspection.

( 1 ) OJ C 213, 29.6.2015.
Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 8 September 2015 —

DTL Corporación v OHIM

(Case C‑62/15 P) ( 1 )

‛Appeal — Article 181 the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Community trade mark — Application for registration of the word mark Generia — Opposition by the proprietor of the earlier Community figurative mark Generalia generación renovable — Partial refusal to register — Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Article 8(1)(b) — Likelihood of confusion — Article 64(1) — Powers of the Board of Appeal — Article 75, second subparagraph — Right to be heard’

1. Appeal — Grounds — Challenge to the contested decision before the General Court and not the judgment it delivered — Inadmissibility (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see para. 34)

2. Community trade mark — Appeals procedure — Appeal against a decision of the Opposition Division of OHIM — Examination by the Board of Appeal — Scope (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 64(1)) (see para. 35)

3. Community trade mark — Procedural provisions — Decisions of the Office — Observance of the rights of the defence — Scope of the principle (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 75) (see para. 45)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. DTL Corporación, SL is ordered to bear its own costs.

( 1 ) OJO C 146, 4.5.2015.
2.

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Recognition of a colour per se as having distinctive character — Acquisition through use (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 31)
Case C‑137/15

María Pilar Plaza Bravo

v

Servicio Público de Empleo Estatal Dirección Provincial de Álava

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de la Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Directive 79/7/EEC — Article 4(1) — Equal treatment of male and female workers — Part-time workers, primarily female — National legislation providing for a maximum amount of unemployment benefit — Legislation referring, for the purposes of the calculation of that amount, to the relationship between the working hours of the part-time employees concerned and the working hours of full-time employees’

Summary — Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber), 17 November 2015

Social policy — Equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security — Directive 79/7 — National legislation providing for a maximum amount of unemployment benefit — Legislation applying, to that amount, a reduction coefficient for part time work corresponding to the relationship between the working hours of part-time employees and the working hours of a comparable full-time employee — No discrimination — Whether such legislation is permissible

(Council Directive 79/7, Art. 4(1))

Article 4(1) of Directive 79/7 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security does not preclude a provision of national law under which, in order for the amount of the benefit for total unemployment to be received by an employee following the loss of her only part-time employment to be calculated, a reduction coefficient for part-time work that corresponds to the percentage represented by the part-time working hours in relation to the hours completed by a comparable worker employed full-time is applied to the maximum amount of unemployment benefit laid down by law.

Such a provision cannot be regarded as predominantly placing at a disadvantage a particular category of employees, in this case those working part-time and, in particular, women. It cannot therefore be regarded as being an indirectly discriminatory measure within the meaning of Article 4(1) of Directive 79/7.

(see paras 29, 30, operative part)
Order of the Court (Second Chamber) of 23 March 2016 — Overseas Financial and Oaktree Finance

(Case C‑319/15) ( 1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — No need to adjudicate’

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Case pending before the national court rendered devoid of purpose — No need to adjudicate (Art. 267 TFEU) (see paras 28-35, operative part)

Operative part

There is no need to adjudicate on the request for a preliminary ruling made by the Cour administrative d’appel de Paris (France) by decision of 22 June 2015.

( 1 ) OJ C 279, 24.8.2015.
1.

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 28-30, 37)
Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 14 April 2016 — Gabarel

(Case C‑555/15) ( 1 )

‛Request for a preliminary ruling — Value added tax (VAT) — Directive 2006/112/EC — Exemptions — Provision of medical care in the exercise of the medical and paramedical professions — Physiotherapy — Osteopathy’

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Exemptions — Exemption in respect of the provision of medical care in the exercise of the medical and paramedical professions — Discretion of the Member States to define the paramedical processions and the health care services provided by persons working in those professions — Limits — Exclusion of therapies specific to osteopathy carried out by a physiotherapist — Assessment by national courts — Criteria (Council Directive 2006/112, Art. 132(1)(c)) (see paras 25-47, operative part)

Operative part

Article 132(1)(c) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that a physiotherapist who, in the context of his professional health activity, uses, either indistinctly or complementarily, both therapies characteristic of physiotherapy and therapies characteristic of osteopathy must be exempt from value added tax not only with regard to the former therapies, but also with regard to the latter, where the exclusion of the therapies characteristic of osteopathy from the exercise of paramedical professions for the purposes of an exemption from value added tax exceeds the scope of the discretion granted to Member States by that provision.

( 1 ) OJ C 16, 18.1.2016.
Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 28 April 2016 — Pudāns

(Case C‑462/15) ( 1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Common Agricultural Policy — Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 — Direct support schemes — Article 29(1) — Obligation to make payments in full to the beneficiaries — Income tax’

1. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Questions the answer to which may be clearly deduced from the Court’s existing case-law — Application of Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure (Art. 267 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 99) (see paras 18, 19)

2. Agriculture — Common agricultural policy — Direct support schemes — Common rules — Payments made under those schemes — Obligation to make payments in full to the beneficiaries — National legislation making those payments subject to income tax — Whether admissible (Council Regulation No 73/2009, Recital 25 and Art. 29(1)) (see paras 25-31, operative part)

Operative part

Article 29(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which applies income tax to payments under the support schemes listed in Annex I to that regulation.

( 1 ) OJ C 381, 16.11.2015.
1.

Appeal — Grounds — Grounds which are manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded — Dismissal at any point, by reasoned order, without an oral procedure (Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 181) (see para. 21)
Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 4 May 2016 —

Pannonhalmi Főapátság v Parliament

(Case C‑607/15 P)

‛Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Actions for annulment — Petition made to the European Parliament — Ownership of a castle in Rusovce (Slovak Republic) — Questions not falling within the scope of activity of the European Union — Decision to take no further action regarding the petition — Statement of reasons’

1. Acts of the institutions — Statement of reasons — Obligation — Scope — Decision by Committee on Petitions of the Parliament to take no further action — Whether a summary statement of reasons is sufficient (Arts 227 TFEU and 296 TFEU; Internal Rules of the European Parliament, Art. 201(8)) (see paras 13-15)

2. Judicial proceedings — Decision taken by way of reasoned order — Possibility of ruling without an oral procedure — Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law (Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 126) (see paras 18-22)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.
1.

Appeal — Grounds — Breach of the prohibition on ruling ultra petita — Presentation of a summary of the arguments of the Board of Appeal preceding the description of the errors of assessment which the Board of Appeal is alleged to have made — Absence (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 21; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 44(1) (see para. 29)
1.

Appeal — Grounds — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1), second para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 26, 40, 41)
Judicial proceedings—Costs—Taxation—Recoverable costs—Elements to be taken into consideration—Fees payable by the parties to their own lawyers—Determination of the fees which may be recovered from the party ordered to pay the costs

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 144(b))

(see paras 22)
1.

State aid — Planned aid — Absence of notification — Determination of the date of award of aid likely to vary depending on the nature of the aid at issue — Aid granted by means of conventions containing an unconditional commitment — Date of award corresponding to that of the signature of the convention (Art. 108(3) TFEU) (see paras 29, 30)
7

By its appeal, the Works Council criticises the General Court for misinterpreting the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice. The appeal comprises four grounds, alleging: — an error of law committed by the General Court by holding, in paragraph 13 of the order under appeal, that the collective interest of the employees of SNCM, which the Works Council represents, is not in itself of such a nature as to form the basis for a direct and existing interest of that council in the result of the case referred to that Court, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice; — an error of law committed by the General Court in holding, in paragraph 14 of the order under appeal, that the fact that the Works Council might possibly be regarded as an interested party within the meaning of Article 108(2) TFEU was not sufficient for it to establish a direct and existing interest in the result of the case pending before the General Court within the meaning of the abovementioned second paragraph of Article 40; — errors of assessment committed by the General Court, in that it held, in paragraph 15 of the order under appeal, first, that the Works Council had produced no specific evidence such as to show that the case pending before the General Court is of particular importance for the legislative initiatives in progress or that it displayed difficulties on matters of principle liable to affect its interests in particular and, second, that the Works Council had not demonstrated that the judicial reorganisation procedure in progress at national level would be suspended in the event of annulment of the contested decision, and — an error of assessment committed by the General Court in taking the view, in paragraphs 16 to 18 of the order under appeal, that the interest of the Works Council in the result of the case pending before it was not distinct from that of SNCM even though it had separate civil and legal personality, albeit linked to that undertaking, its own significant assets and budget with obligations and contracts in the course of performance directly affected by the judicial reorganisation procedure in the context of which it enjoyed, under French law, the right to be heard.
80

As regards the increased risk of being found liable in actions for damages, the Commission states, first, that financial damage can only exceptionally be deemed to be irreparable, given that it can be remedied by monetary compensation. In particular, that would be the case if, were the interim measure requested not granted, the applicant was placed in a position which might jeopardise its very existence or irremediably alter its market share. Yet, in its application, the applicant has not even claimed that the envisaged publication would jeopardise its very existence or cause it to irretrievably lose its share of the market. Second, the Commission considers that, contrary to what is claimed by the applicant, the order of the Vice-President of the Court in Commission v Pilkington Group (C‑278/13 P(R), EU:C:2013:558) is not relevant to the establishment of the alleged impossibility of adequately defining and quantifying the financial damage that the applicant would suffer due to actions for damages. In that order it was held that it was impossible to identify the number and status of all the persons who acquired knowledge of the information published and thus assess the actual impact which publication of that information might have on the commercial and financial interests of the undertaking concerned, taking into consideration, inter alia, the fact that the information at issue in the case which gave rise to that order constituted commercially sensitive information and therefore business secrets stricto sensu. In contrast, according to the Commission, the financial damage alleged by the applicant in this case is linked solely to actions for damages or cross claims subsequent to an infringement of the competition rules. Consequently, given that it is not impossible to determine the circle of persons who could, as victims of the cartel, bring actions for damages against the applicant, the damage suffered by the applicant is capable of being adequately defined and quantified. In any event, the alleged financial damage is no more than largely hypothetical, since it is impossible to predict the impact that any use of the information at issue would have in civil actions, pending or potential, against the applicant.
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 15 November 2016 —

MIP-TS

(Case C‑222/16) ( 1 )

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Commercial policy — Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 — Article 13 — Circumvention — Implementing Regulation (EU) No 791/2011 — Open mesh fabrics of glass fibres originating in the People’s Republic of China — Anti-dumping duties — Implementing Regulations (EU) No 437/2012 and (EU) No 21/2013 — Consignment from Thailand — Extension of anti-dumping duties — Temporal scope — Community Customs Code — Post-clearance recovery of import duties)

1. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling—Questions identical to those already ruled on in the case-law—Application of Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure (Art. 267 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 99) (see paras 27-30)

2. Common commercial policy—Protection against dumping—Circumvention—Extension to the anti-dumping duty—Scope ratione temporis—Retroactive application of the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed on imports released for free circulation in the Union prior to the entry into force of the regulation initiating an investigation concerning the circumvention and making the imports at issue subject to registration—Limit—Inaccuracy of the certificates of origin revealed following a verification carried out after the event (Council Regulations No 1225/2009, Arts 10(1), 13(1) and (3), and 14(5), and No 791/2011, Art. 1(1); Commission Regulation No 437/2012) (see paras 33-37, operative part

Operative part

Article 1(1) of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 791/2011 of 3 August 2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain open mesh fabrics of glass fibres originating in the People’s Republic of China must be interpreted as meaning that the definitive anti-dumping duty established by that provision is applicable to imports of open mesh fabrics of glass fibres, referred to in that provision, declared as having originated in Thailand and carried out prior to the entry into force of Regulation (EU) No 437/2012 of 23 May 2012 initiating an investigation concerning the possible circumvention of anti-dumping measures imposed by Implementing Regulation No 791/2011, and making those exports subject to registration, such as the imports at issue in the main proceedings, where it is established that those open mesh fabrics of glass fibres in fact originate in the People’s Republic of China.

( 1 ) OJ C 243, 4.7.2016.
Appeals—Grounds—Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence—Inadmissibility—Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence—Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see para. 6)
2.

Judicial proceedings — Intervention — Persons having an interest — Dispute concerning the validity of a decision concerning State aid — Application for leave to intervene made by an association representing the sector concerned — Association having been recognised as an interested party in the administrative procedure — No relevance (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 40, second para.; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 143(2); Council Regulation No 659/1999, Art. 1(h); Commission Decision 2015/1300) (see para. 15)
4.

Appeals — Grounds — Review by the Court of Justice of the assessment of the facts put before the General Court — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 5, 6)
Order of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 22 September 2016 —

Gaki v Commission

(Case C‑130/16 P)

‛Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure — Action for annulment — Action brought against the refusal of the European Commission to initiate the procedure for failure to fulfil obligations — Application for an injunction to be imposed on an institution of the European Union — Claim for compensation’

1. Actions for annulment — Jurisdiction of the EU judicature — Claim seeking that an injunction be imposed on an institution — Not permissible (Art. 263 TFEU) (see para. 14)

2. Actions for failure to act — Natural or legal persons — Actionable omissions — Failure to initiate the procedure for failure to fulfil obligations — Inadmissibility (Arts 263, fourth para., TFEU and 265, third para., TFEU) (see paras 17-19)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.