In that regard, where a decision rejecting a complaint does not contain a reconsideration of the situation of the person concerned by reference to new elements of law or of fact, but confirms the contested decision, it is indeed the legality of the initial act adversely affecting the person concerned that must be examined, taking into account the grounds given for the decision rejecting the complaint, those grounds being supposed to coincide with that act.

Since, under the system laid down in the Staff Regulations, the person concerned must submit a complaint against the decision which he is contesting and then appeal against the decision rejecting his complaint, an action is admissible whether it is directed against the initial decision alone, the decision rejecting the complaint or both, provided that the complaint and the appeal were lodged within the periods prescribed by Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations. However, in accordance with the principle of economy of procedure, the judicature may decide that it is not appropriate to rule specifically on the claims directed against the decision rejecting the complaint where it finds that those claims have no independent content and are, in reality, the same as those directed against the decision against which the complaint has been made. That may, in particular, be the case where it finds that the decision rejecting the complaint, in some cases because it is implied, is purely confirmatory of the decision which is the subject of the complaint and that, therefore, the annulment of the first decision would have no effect on the legal position of the person concerned distinct from that which follows from the annulment of the second.

The purpose of an action must exist at the time at which the action is brought, failing which it will be inadmissible, and must continue until the final decision, failing which there will be no need to adjudicate, which presupposes that the action must be liable, if successful, to procure an advantage to the party bringing it.

As regards an action by a former member of the contract staff against a decision of a Union agency to defer his medical cover on his engagement, as provided for in the first paragraph of Article 100 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants, the fact that the applicant’s contract was terminated in the course of the proceedings does not mean that that deferment of medical cover automatically ceased to apply. Even though it is true that the applicant’s contractual relationship with the agency was terminated at the end of the period of notice, the fact remains that he was subsequently entitled, for a certain period, to receive unemployment benefits and to membership of the Joint Sickness Insurance Scheme without paying contributions. During that period the deferment of medical cover would have had the effect of denying him the benefit of guarantees in respect of invalidity and death for the effects and consequences of the illness or disability on account of which medical cover was deferred. However, that fact does not mean that the action for annulment retained its purpose beyond the date on which the applicant’s membership of the Joint Sickness Insurance Scheme ended.

Moreover, that finding is not called into question by the fact that the staff member was subsequently recruited by another European agency which also deferred his medical cover. Since a judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal produces effects only in respect of the parties to a case, the annulment of the contested decision could not lead to the annulment of the decision to apply Article 100 of the Conditions of Employment to the staff member concerned following the medical examination preceding his engagement by another Union agency, since the applicant may obtain that annulment only by bringing an action to challenge the latter decision.

(see paras 33, 36-39, 44)

judgment in Mische v Parliament, F‑93/05, EU:F:2011:168, para. 27 and the case-law cited therein