Articles 3 and 4 of Regulation No 320/2006 establishing a temporary scheme for the restructuring of the sugar industry in the Community and amending Regulation No 1290/2005 on the financing of the common agricultural policy and Article 4 of Regulation No 968/2006 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation No 320/2006 must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purposes of those articles, the concept of production facilities includes silos intended to store the aid beneficiary’s sugar, irrespective of whether they are also employed for other purposes. Silos used only to store sugar, produced under quota, from other producers or bought from those producers, or those silos used only for packing or packaging sugar for the purposes of marketing it are not included within that concept. It is for the national court to carry out such an assessment, on a case-by-case basis, in the light of the technical characteristics of the silos concerned or how they are actually used.

There exists no factor liable to affect the validity of Articles 3 and 4 of Regulation No 320/2006 establishing a temporary scheme for the restructuring of the sugar industry in the Community and amending Regulation No 1290/2005 on the financing of the common agricultural policy and Article 4 of Regulation No 968/2006 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation No 320/2006. Those regulations provide for restructuring aid in exchange for the dismantling of the production facilities concerned.

First, those regulations allows the producer to decide freely whether it would like to take advantage of the aid, choose the factory in relation to which it renounces the corresponding quota and, as the case may be, opt for either the full or only partial dismantling of the production facilities. The advantage potentially accruing to that producer depends accordingly, for the most part, on the choices made by that producer. From that perspective, the legislation at issue in the main proceedings is not disproportionate.

Second, on the one hand, in view of the objective of producers voluntarily renouncing the quota production assigned to a sugar factory, the situation of a sugar producer which chooses to renounce a quota assigned to a factory that contains a silo and the situation of a producer which must dismantle a factory that does not contain such a silo are entirely comparable where those producers renounce an identical number of tonnes of quota. On the other hand, the direct costs inherent to the dismantling of a silo represent only a small part of the overall costs of dismantling the production facilities. In those circumstances, it does not appear that the EU legislature — which enjoys a wide discretion where the common agricultural policy is concerned — has adopted, by not providing that the flat-rate amount of the aid granted per tonne of quota renounced should vary depending on whether or not the designated factory contained a silo, a measure which was manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective pursued, namely reducing the production of sugar for the purposes of re-establishing a balance on the internal market.

(see paras 45, 46, 50, 51, 53, operative part 2)