ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d’appel de Paris (France) lodged on 14 February 2022 — Eurelec Trading SCRL v Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances, Scabel SA, Groupement d’Achat des Centres Édouard Leclerc (GALEC), Association des Centres distributeurs Édouard Leclerc (ACDLEC)

(Case C-98/22)

(2022/C 198/36)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour d’appel de Paris

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Eurelec Trading SCRL

Respondents: Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances, Scabel SA, Groupement d’Achat des Centres Édouard Leclerc (GALEC), Association des Centres distributeurs Édouard Leclerc (ACDLEC)

Question referred

Are ‘civil and commercial’ matters, as defined in Article 1(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, (1) to be interpreted as including in the scope of that regulation an action — and the judicial decision rendered at the end of the proceedings — (i) brought by the French Minister for Economic Affairs and Finances pursuant to (former) Article L 442-6, I, 2o of the French Commercial Code against a Belgian company, (ii) seeking a declaration of the existence of restrictive practices, an order that they cease and an order that the alleged perpetrator of those practices pay a civil fine, (iii) on the basis of evidence obtained in the exercise of his specific powers of investigation?

(1) OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1.
1.

Must Article 5(1)(a) and Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (1) (Air Passenger Rights Regulation) be interpreted as meaning that a repatriation flight operated in the exercise of the State’s sovereign activity is also to be regarded as re-routing, under comparable transport conditions, to the final destination — as must be offered by the operating air carrier in the event of cancellation — where the operating air carrier cannot establish legal entitlement to transport the passenger but could register the passenger for that purpose and bear the costs and, by virtue of a contractual agreement with the State, ultimately operates the flight with the same aircraft and at the same flight times as scheduled for the flight originally cancelled?
2.

In an interpretation based on Article 4(c) of Directive 2004/48, must the term ‘direct interest in the defence of the copyright of the rightholders whom it represents’ be interpreted uniformly in all Member States as regards the right of a collective representation body within the meaning of Article 3(a) of Directive 2014/26/EU (2) to bring an action for copyright infringement in its own name where (i) it concerns uses of works in respect of which an organisation is entitled, as a contractual licensing organisation within the meaning of the Tekijänoikeuslaki (Law on copyright), to grant extended collective licences also allowing the licensee to use works by authors in that sector who have not authorised the organisation to manage their rights; (ii) it concerns uses of works in respect of which the authors have authorised the organisation to manage their rights by contract or by way of a mandate, without the copyrights having been assigned to the organisation?
2.

If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative, and a political view is thus sufficient to qualify as a political opinion, what weight must be given to the strength of that political view, thought or belief and to the importance to the foreign national of the activities stemming from it in the examination and assessment of an asylum application, that is to say, the examination of the reality of that applicant’s alleged fear of persecution?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Craiova (Romania) lodged on 28 January 2022 — NR v Parchetul de pe lângă Curtea de Apel Craiova

(Case C-58/22)

(2022/C 213/29)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Craiova

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: NR

Other party: Parchetul de pe lângă Curtea de Apel Craiova

Question referred

Is the ne bis in idem principle, as guaranteed by Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in conjunction with Romania’s obligations to address the benchmarks set out in the CVM decision (Commission Decision 2006/928), to be interpreted as meaning that a decision to take no further action, issued by the public prosecutor after obtaining essential evidence in the case, precludes another public prosecution from being brought against the same person, for the same acts, albeit with a different legal classification, since that decision is final — unless it is established that the circumstance on which the discontinuance was based does not exist, or new facts or circumstances have emerged which show that the circumstance on which the discontinuance was based no longer exists?
2.

In the light of the principle of proportionality, must Article 44(2)(a) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1974/2006 of 15 December 2006 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) be interpreted as meaning that, where, during the period for which a commitment given as a condition for the grant of assistance runs, all or part of the holding of a beneficiary is transferred to another person, and that second beneficiary, although having honoured a significant part of the commitment concerned, ceases agricultural activities, and it is not feasible for a successor to take over the commitment, the second beneficiary of the commitment [more correctly: of the aid] must reimburse the aid which it has received (in relation to the period for which it was the beneficiary of the aid), or must it also reimburse the aid received by the first beneficiary thereof?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesverwaltungsgericht Niederösterreich (Austria) lodged on 3 March 2022 — RE v Bezirkshauptmannschaft Lilienfeld

(Case C-155/22)

(2022/C 222/21)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landesverwaltungsgericht Niederösterreich

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: RE

Respondent authority: Bezirkshauptmannschaft Lilienfeld

Other party to the proceedings: Arbeitsinspektorat NÖ Wald- und Mostviertel

Question referred

Is EU law to be interpreted as being compatible with a national provision that allows persons who are criminally liable for a transport undertaking to transfer their liability for very serious infringements of Community provisions on driving time and rest periods for drivers to a natural person by mutually acceptable agreement, if such transfer precludes the assessment of good repute within the meaning of Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009, (1) which is provided for under national law only when a punishment is being imposed on the persons transferring criminal liability?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing common rules concerning the conditions to be complied with to pursue the occupation of road transport operator and repealing Council Directive 96/26/EC (OJ 2009 L 300, p. 51).
Appeal brought on 9 March 2022 by Nemea Bank plc against the order of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 20 December 2021 in Case T-321/17, Niemelä and Others v ECB

(Case C-181/22 P)

(2022/C 237/39)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Nemea Bank plc (represented by: A. Meriläinen, asianajaja)

Other parties to the proceedings: Heikki Niemelä, Mika Lehto, Nemea plc, Nevestor SA, European Central Bank, European Commission

Form of order sought

The Appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the order under appeal;

— refer the case back to the General Court to be properly adjudicated, but to a different chamber with an entirely different composition of judges, given the bias and non-respect of the Appellant’s fundamental rights by the chamber having issued the said order, and

— order the ECB to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First ground of appeal: the General Court erred in law by erroneously assuming that there is no need to adjudicate in case T-321/17, erroneously failed to take into consideration that the purported effect ex tunc of the ECB decision of 30 June 2017 violated Art. 263 TFEU and erroneously assumed that the Appellant has no interest in the annulment of the ECB decision of license withdrawal of 23 March 2017.

Second ground of appeal: the General Court erred in law with respect to numerous infringements of essential procedural requirements.

Third ground of appeal: the General Court failed to take into consideration the violation of the Appellant’s rights pursuant to Art. 47 of the Charter prior to the commencement of the procedure and the continuing lack of an effective representation of the Appellant during the proceedings.

Fourth ground of appeal: the General Court failed to take into consideration the violation of the Appellant’s rights pursuant to Art. 41 of the Charter in deciding the application for damages to be inadmissible.

Fifth ground of appeal: the General Court erred in law by failing to take into consideration the Appellant’s rights provided by the Art. 340 TFEU when deciding that the application for damages is inadmissible.
1.

Does European Union law, and in particular Article 18 of the Treaty on European Union, Article 45 of the Treaty on European Union, Article 7(2) of EU Regulation 492/11, (1) Article 11(1)(d) of EU Directive 2003/109, (2) Article 29 of EU Directive 2011/95, (3) Article 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Articles 30 and 31 of the Social Charter of the Council of Europe, preclude national legislation such as that contained in Article 7(1) of Decree-Law No 4 of 28 January 2019, converted into law and amended by Law No 26 of 28 March 2019, read in conjunction with Article 7(2)(1)(a) thereof, in so far as it makes access to basic income subject to the condition relating to residence in Italy for at least ten years (the final two of which, as at the time the application is made and for the entire duration of the benefit, must be consecutive), thus affording treatment to Italian nationals, EU nationals with a right of residence or permanent residence, or non-EU long-term residents who have been resident for less than ten years or for ten years, the final two of which were not consecutive, which is less favourable than that accorded to the same categories who have been resident for ten years, the final two of which were consecutive? If the previous question (4) is answered in the affirmative:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 23 March 2022 — Research Consorzio Stabile Scarl, acting on its own account and as agent of the association of undertakings to be constituted (Research-Cisa) and Others v Invitalia — Agenzia Nazionale per l’Attrazione degli Investimenti e lo Sviluppo di Impresa and Others

(Case C-215/22)

(2022/C 244/21)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Research Consorzio Stabile Scarl, acting on its own account and as agent of the association of undertakings to be constituted (Research-Cisa); C.I.S.A. SpA, acting on its own account and as agent of the association of undertakings to be constituted (Research-Cisa); Debar Costruzioni SpA, acting on its own account and as agent of the association to be constituted with Consorzio Stabile COM Scarl, C.N. Costruzioni Generali SpA and Edil.Co. Srl; Invitalia — Agenzia Nazionale per l’Attrazione degli Investimenti e lo Sviluppo di Impresa

Defendants: Invitalia — Agenzia Nazionale per l’Attrazione degli Investimenti e lo Sviluppo di Impresa; Debar Costruzioni SpA, acting on its own account and as agent of the association to be constituted with Consorzio Stabile COM Scarl, C.N. Costruzioni Generali SpA and Edil.Co. Srl; Consorzio Stabile Scarl, acting on its own account and as agent of the association of undertakings to be constituted (Research-Cisa); C.I.S.A. SpA, acting on its own account and as agent of the association to be constituted (Research-Cisa)

Question referred

Do Articles 63 and 71 of Directive 2014/24 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014, (1) together with the principles of freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services laid down in Articles 49 and 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (FEU Treaty), preclude an interpretation of national Italian law on necessary subcontracting under which a tenderer which does not have the mandatory qualification in one or more secondary sub-categories cannot satisfy the non-fulfilled requirement by having recourse to several subcontracting undertakings or by aggregating the amounts for which those undertakings are qualified?

(1) Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65).
1.

Are Articles 167, 168(a) and 178(a) of the VAT Directive (1) to be interpreted as meaning that, if the tax authority finds, in respect of any member of a supply chain, that there has been an infringement of special legislation concerning the services provided under a contract concluded with the taxpayer or under agreements concluded between the members of the chain, or an infringement of any other legislation, such an infringement is sufficient in itself, as an objective circumstance, to establish the existence of tax evasion, even where the activities of the members of the chain are lawful in all respects, or does the tax authority also have to specify in that case what the tax evasion consists of, and by which members of the chain and by means of what action it has been committed? In that context, if such a breach is found, is it necessary for the tax authority to examine the causal link between the breach of the regulatory obligations governing the economic activity and the taxpayer’s right of deduction, so that it is only if such a link is established that it can refuse the taxpayer his or her right to deduct VAT?
Reference for a preliminary ruling from High Court (Ireland) made on 16 May 2022 — Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v Minister for Agriculture, Food and the Marine, Ireland and the Attorney General

(Case C-330/22)

(2022/C 284/22)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

High Court (Ireland)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Friends of the Irish Environment CLG

Respondents: The Minister for Agriculture, Food and the Marine, Ireland and the Attorney General

Questions referred

1) In circumstances where the 2020 Regulation (1) has been superseded and/or the national implementing measures have expired, is the within reference necessary to be referred?

2) Is Annex IA of Council Regulation 2020/123/EU invalid, having regard to the aims and objectives of Regulation (EU) 1380/2013 (2) (the ‘CFP Regulation’), and specifically Article 2(1) and 2(2) of the CFP Regulation including the objective of the second sentence of Article 2(2) and the principles of good governance set out in Articles 3(c) and (d) of the CFP Regulation (including the extent to which it applies to stocks for which a pre-cautionary approach is required), when read in conjunction with Articles 9, 10, 15 and 16 of the CFP Regulation and the Recitals thereto and Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 10 of Regulation 2019/472 (3) of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a multi-annual plan for stocks fished in the Western Waters (‘the Western Waters Regulation’), insofar as the total allowable catches (‘TACs’) set by the 2020 Regulation do not follow zero-catch advice for maximum sustainable yield (‘MSY’) issued by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (‘ICES’) for certain species?

(1) Council Regulation 2020/123/EU of 27 January 2020 fixing for 2020 the fishing opportunities for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks, applicable in Union waters and, for Union fishing vessels, in certain non-Union waters (OJ 2020, L 25, p. 1).

(2) Regulation 1380/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC (OJ 2013, L 354, p. 22).

(3) OJ 2019, L 83, p. 1
2.

Does the principle of effectiveness preclude national legislation (Article 14(4) of Legislative Decree No 504/1995) that does not allow a final consumer to seek reimbursement of undue tax directly from the State, but grants him or her only the option of bringing a civil action for recovery against the taxable person, who alone is entitled to obtain reimbursement from the tax authority, where the sole ground for the unlawfulness of the tax — namely the fact that it is contrary to a [Union] directive — can be relied on only in the relationship between the person liable to pay and the tax authority, but not in the relationship between the person liable to pay and the final consumer, thus effectively preventing the application of the reimbursement or, in order to ensure compliance with that principle, should the final consumer be recognised as having direct standing in such a case to bring an action against the Treasury, as a case where it is impossible or excessively difficult to obtain from the supplier a refund of the tax unduly paid?
Appeal brought on 13 June 2022 by Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 30 March 2022 in Case T-325/17, Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij v Commission

(Case C-385/22 P)

(2022/C 303/36)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV (represented by: R. Wesseling and F. Brouwer, advocaten)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal insofar as it holds that the Commission has jurisdiction to apply Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 EEA Agreement to inbound airfreight services on EEA-third country routes; and

— annul, the entire Commission Decision C(2017) 1742 final of 17 March 2017 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU, Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and Article 8 of the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport (Case AT.39258 — Airfreight) (the Decision); or

— in the alternative, partly annul the Decision insofar as it finds that the appellant infringed Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 EEA Agreement with regard to inbound airfreight services on EEA-third country routes; and

— in any event, order the Commission to pay all the costs, including those incurred by the appellant before the Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the appellant relies on the following plea in law.

The General Court erred in law and infringed its duty to state reasons by concluding that the inbound freight services fall within the scope of Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 EEA Agreement.

First part: The General Court infringed its duty to state reasons, erred in law and violated Article 101 TFEU in concluding that inbound freight services sorted relevant effects in the EEA.

Second part: The General Court infringed its duty to state reasons, erred in law and violated Article 101 TFEU in concluding that inbound freight services sorted probable effects in the EEA.

Third part: The General Court erred in law by relying on arguments and evidence not advanced by the Commission.

Fourth part: The General Court erred in law and violated Article 101 TFEU by concluding that the single and continuous infringement can extend the Commission’s jurisdiction over conduct outside the EEA.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 18 February 2022 by Republic of Cyprus against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 8 December 2021 in Case T-593/19, Cyprus v EUIPO — Fontana Food (GRILLOUMI BURGER)

(Case C-120/22 P)

(2022/C 294/16)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Republic of Cyprus (represented by: V. Marsland, Solicitor, and C. Milbradt, Rechtsanwältin)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Fontana Food AB

By order of 15 June 2022, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Republic of Cyprus should bear its own costs.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 17 June 2022 by SAS Cargo Group A/S, Scandinavian Airlines System Denmark-Norway-Sweden, SAS AB against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 30 March 2022 in Case T-324/17, SAS Cargo Group e.a. v Commission

(Case C-403/22 P)

(2022/C 303/39)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: SAS Cargo Group A/S, Scandinavian Airlines System Denmark-Norway-Sweden, SAS AB (represented by: B. Creve and M. Kofmann, advokater, and J. Killick and G. Forwood, avocats)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal insofar as it dismissed the appellants’ action for annulment;

— annul in whole or in part the Commission Decision C(2017) 1742 final of 17 March 2017 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU, Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and Article 8 of the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport (Case AT.39258 — Airfreight) insofar as it relates to the appellants;

— cancel or substantially reduce the fine imposed;

— in the alternative, refer the matter back to the General Court for determination in accordance with the judgment of the Court of Justice; and

— order the Commission to pay the costs of the appeal and the proceedings before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the appellants rely on five grounds of appeal.

First ground of appeal, alleging errors of law regarding infringement of the rights of defence and right of access to file by failing to give access to inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.

Second ground of appeal, alleging errors of law regarding the right to be heard with regard to the qualified effects test and inbound routes.

Third ground of appeal, alleging errors of law regarding the application of the qualified effects test.

Fourth ground of appeal, alleging errors of law regarding the single and continuous infringement.

Fifth ground of appeal, alleging errors of law regarding the General Court’s exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction to determine the fine.