ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
B.

Interpretation of Article 18 of the Regulation This question need only be answered if Article 18 is capable of applying. 2) Where a passenger is re-routed in accordance with Article 18 does a new transport contract come into existence such that the right to compensation under Article 19 is to be determined in accordance with that new contract rather than the original transport contract? 3) a) If Article 18 is applicable then if a sailing is cancelled and there was no alternative service operating on that route (i.e. no direct service between those two ports) does providing an alternative sailing on any other route or routes available and chosen by the passenger including by ‘landbridge’ (e.g., travelling from Ireland to the UK by ferry and then driving, with the fuel costs reimbursed to the passenger by the ferry operator, to a UK port with a connection to France and travelling from there to France with the passenger choosing each of the sailings) amount to ‘re-routing to the final destination’ for the purposes of Article 18? If not, what criteria are to be employed in determining if a re-routing is ‘under comparable conditions’? b) If there is no alternative sailing on the cancelled route, such that the affected passenger cannot be accommodated on a direct sailing from the original port of embarkation to the final destination as set out in the transport contract, is the carrier required to pay any additional costs incurred by a re-routed passenger in travelling to and from the new port of embarkation and/or to and from the new port of destination?
1.

May the situation be treated as an emergency, as described in paragraph 45 of the judgment in Case C-173/09 (Elchinov), or does it constitute a case in which it is objectively impossible to seek the authorisation required under Article 20(1) and (2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, (1) which may justify a claim for full reimbursement of the expenses incurred in obtaining appropriate medical treatment (hospital treatment) in a Member State other than that in which the insured person resides, where the therapeutic treatment to which the latter consented was prescribed only by a doctor of a Member State other than the State in which the insured person resides, given that the diagnosis and the need to administer the treatment as a matter of urgency were confirmed by a doctor belonging to the health insurance scheme of the Member State of residence but who recommended a different therapeutic treatment from that to which the insured person consented, for reasons which may be deemed appropriate on the part of the latter, and which has at least the same degree of effectiveness but the advantage of not creating a disability?
2.

Must Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13 be interpreted as meaning that terms stipulating payments at fixed intervals allocated first to interest and providing for an extension of [the] term [of the contract] and for an increase in payments in order to pay the account balance, which may increase significantly as a result of exchange rate variations, cause a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract, in particular in that they expose the consumer to a disproportionate foreign exchange risk?
3.

In a situation such as that described in the case in the main proceedings, do Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1392/2001 (2) of 9 July 2001 and the EU concept of ‘priority category’ preclude a provision of a Member State, such as Article 2(3) of Decree-Law No 157/2004, adopted by the Republic of Italy, which lays down varying methods for refunding an additional levy that has been over-charged, drawing a distinction, in terms of timetables and methods of repayment, between producers that have relied upon due compliance with a national provision that has proved to be in conflict with EU law and producers who have not complied with such a provision?
4.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, must Article 101 TFEU and Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, (3) and the duty to ensure the effectiveness of EU laws, be interpreted as requiring an administrative authority such as the CNMC to impose fines and periodic penalty payments on those entities that behave in the way described?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia del País Vasco (Spain) lodged on 6 August 2019 — Confederación Nacional de Centros Especiales de Empleo (CONACEE) v Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa

(Case C-598/19)

(2019/C 363/15)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Superior de Justicia del País Vasco

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Confederación Nacional de Centros Especiales de Empleo (CONACEE)

Defendant: Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa

Question referred

Must Article 20 of Directive 2014/24/EU (1) on public procurement be interpreted as meaning that the scope ratione personae of the reservation laid down therein cannot be defined in terms which exclude from its scope undertakings or economic operators which satisfy the condition that at least 30 % of their employees must be persons with disabilities and which meet the aim or objective of the social and professional integration of those persons, by setting additional criteria related to the constitution, character and aims of those bodies, to their activities and investments, or to other matters

(1) Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement (OJ 2014 L 94, p.65)
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo (Spain) lodged on 2 July 2019 — Banco de Portugal, Fundo de Resolução, Novo Banco, S.A. v VR

(Case C-504/19)

(2019/C 363/10)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Supremo

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Banco de Portugal, Fundo de Resolução, Novo Banco, S.A.

Defendant: VR

Question referred

Is an interpretation of Article 3(2) of Directive 2001/24/EC (1) under which, in legal proceedings pending in other Member States, the courts must, without any further formalities, recognise the effects of a Decision by the competent administrative authority of the home Member State that is intended retrospectively to change the legal framework that existed at the time the proceedings were commenced and that renders ineffective any judgments that do not accord with the provisions of the new decision, compatible with the fundamental right to an effective remedy in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, the principle of the rule of law in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, and the general principle of legal certainty?

(1) Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions (OJ 2001 L 125, p. 15).
Appeal brought on 18 September 2019 by VodafoneZiggo Group BV against the order of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 9 July 2019 in Case T-660/18: VodafoneZiggo Group BV v Commission

(Case C-689/19 P)

(2019/C 372/31)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: VodafoneZiggo Group BV (represented by: W. Knibbeler, A.A.J. Pliego Selie, B.A. Verheijen, advocaten)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the order of the General Court of 9 July 2019 in Case T-660/18 (the Contested Order);

— refer the case back to the General Court for consideration;

— reserve the costs of the present proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First ground of appeal: errors of law in the General Court’s conclusion that decision C(2018) 5848 final of the European Commission (the Contested Decision) does not produce binding legal effects.

First limb of the first ground: the requirement for national regulatory authorities to ‘take utmost account of’ comments of the European Commission made pursuant to Article 7(3) of Directive 2002/21/EC (1) imposes a binding legal obligation upon those authorities.

Second limb of the first ground: comments made pursuant to Article 7(3) of Directive 2002/21/EC amount to an authorisation, because the European Commission is thereby choosing to conclude its investigation without using its right of veto.

Third limb of the first ground: the Contested Decision cannot be qualified as a preparatory act because the procedure the European Commission follows is separate and distinct from the national procedure.

Fourth limb of the first ground: the General Court, by deeming the Commission’s use of the word ‘decision’ to be ‘inappropriate’, exceeds its competence of judicial review.

Fifth limb of the first ground: the Contested Order suffers from a lack of reasoning in its statement that the subject matter of the Contested Decision would be ‘irrelevant’.

Second ground of appeal: errors of procedure by failing to address arguments capable of materially affecting the outcome of the case.

First limb of the second ground: regarding the argument that an opportunity for BEREC to comment was foreclosed.

Second limb of the second ground: regarding the argument that the foreclosure of an opportunity to be heard cannot be remedied by other, unrelated opportunities to be heard.

Third ground of appeal: errors of law in the General Court’s conclusion that the appellant’s fundamental rights would not be infringed. The appellant enjoys fundamental rights under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in light of which its arguments and admissibility must be interpreted. Moreover, the procedure for a preliminary ruling cannot prevent the infringement.

(1) Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) (OJ 2002, L 108, p. 33).
Appeal brought on 5 September 2019 by NeXovation, Inc. against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 19 June 2019 in Case T-353/15: NeXovation v Commission

(Case C-665/19 P)

(2019/C 372/25)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: NeXovation, Inc. (represented by: A. von Bergwelt, M. Nordmann, L. Hettstedt, Rechtsanwälte)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside points 3 and 4 of the operative part of the judgment under appeal, and annul Article 3(2) and the final indent of Article 1 of the Commission Decision (1) of 1 October 2014 on the State aid SA.31550 implemented by Germany for Nurburgring (with a corrigendum of 13 April 2015);

— in the alternative, set aside points 3 and 4 of the operative part of the judgment under appeal and refer the case back to the General Court;

— order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appeal is based on two grounds of appeal:

With respect to the first contested decision the General Court erred in applying Article 263(4) TFEU since the appellant was individually concerned. The General Court misjudged that the case does not reflect the typical scenario in which competition between several suppliers of goods is affected but between bidders, which request a certain good.

With respect to the second contested decision the General Court erred in applying Articles 107(1) and 296(2) TFEU as well as Articles 4(3) and 20(2) of the procedural Regulation No (EU) 659/1999 (2) and the principle of a diligent and impartial investigation.

(1) Commission Decision (EU) 2016/151 of 1 October 2014 on the State aid SA.31550 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN) implemented by Germany for Nürburgring (notified under document C(2014) 3634) (OJ 2016, L 34, p. 1).

(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ 1999, L 83, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 16 July 2019 — YX v Eurowings GmbH

(Case C-542/19)

(2019/C 383/45)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Hamburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: YX

Defendant: Eurowings GmbH

Question referred

Is the total flight distance to be used as a basis for calculating the entitlement to compensation under Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1) also in the case where the arrival of a passenger at the final destination is delayed by three hours or more solely as a result of a delay/cancellation of the connecting flight, but the feeder flight was on time, the two flights were operated by different air carriers and the flights were booked together?

(1) OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (Romania) lodged on 15 July 2019 — CY and Asociația ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’ v Inspecția Judiciară, Consiliul Superior al Magistraturii and Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție

(Case C-547/19)

(2019/C 372/13)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: CY and Asociația ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’

Defendants: Inspecția Judiciară, Consiliul Superior al Magistraturii and Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție

Question referred

Must Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, Article 19(1) thereof and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as precluding the intervention of a constitutional court (a body which is not, under national law, a judicial institution) as regards the way in which a supreme court has interpreted and applied infra-constitutional legislation in the activity of establishing panels hearing cases?
5.

Having regard to the fact that the discrimination at issue in these proceedings concerns a difference in the taxation of dividend income distributed by resident collective investment undertakings to their shareholders or unitholders, when it comes to assessing whether the taxation of the income is comparable, is it lawful to take account of other taxes, levies or charges payable in respect of the investments made by collective investment undertakings? In particular, in order to analyse whether the situations are comparable, is it lawful and permissible to take account of the impact of taxes on assets or costs, or of other types of tax, rather than limiting the examination strictly to the tax on the income of collective investment undertakings, including any specific taxes?
(b)

offers its customers plans that include only fitness services and plans that include nutrition services in addition to fitness services, for the purposes of Article 2(1)(c) of Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006, (1) must the human health activity, and the nutrition service in particular, be regarded as ancillary to the fitness and physical well-being activity, with the effect that the ancillary supply must be given the same tax treatment as the principal supply, or, on the contrary, must the human health activity, and the nutrition service in particular, be regarded as independent of and distinct from the fitness and physical well-being activity, with the effect that the tax treatment established for each of those activities will apply to that activity?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 10 April 2019 by Apple Inc. against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 31 January 2019 in Case T-215/17: Pear Technologies v EUIPO - Apple (PEAR)

(Case C-295/19 P)

(2019/C 406/12)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Apple Inc. (represented by: G. Tritton and J. Muir Wood, Barristers, instructed by J. Olsen and P. Andreottola, Solicitors)

Other parties to the proceedings: Pear Technologies Ltd, European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 1 October 2019 the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) held that the appeal is dismissed as being manifestly unfounded and that Apple Inc. shall bear its own costs.
Action brought on 9 October 2019 — European Parliament v Council of the European Union

(Case C-743/19)

(2019/C 399/41)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: European Parliament (represented by: L. Visaggio, I. Anagnostopoulou, and C. Biz, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— annul Decision (EU) 2019/1199 of 13 June 2019; (1)

— order Council of the European Union to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By its first plea in law, the Parliament claims that the author of the contested decision, be it the Council or all the Member States, does not have the power to determine the location of the seat of the European Labour Authority (ELA). The Parliament is of the opinion that:

Article 341 TFEU does not constitute an appropriate legal basis to determine the seat of bodies of the European Union such as decentralised agencies. In the present case, ELA was established by the EU legislature by Regulation (EU) 2019/1149, (2) adopted on the basis of Articles 46 and 48 TFUE by means of the ordinary legislative procedure. The Parliament considers that Article 341 TFEU cannot withdraw from the scope of competence of the EU legislature, which established ELA, the power to decide on the location of its seat, by attributing it instead to the Member States, and that therefore that provision cannot validily serve as the legal basis for the contested decision.

By the second plea in law, raised in the alternative in the event that the Court were to find that Article 341 TFEU provides an appropriate legal basis for the contested decision, the Parliament seeks to claim that that decision is vitiated by an absolute failure to state reasons. The Parliament considers that, as a legal act of the European Union, the constested decision is subject to the obligation to state reasons laid down in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFUE, which was not fulfilled in any way, since it utterly fails to specify the reasons why the city of Bratislava was chosen to host the seat of ELA.

(1) Decision (EU) 2019/1199 taken by common accord between the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of 13 June 2019 on the location of the seat of the European Labour Authority (OJ 2019 L 189, p. 68).

(2) Regulation (EU) 2019/1149 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 establishing a European Labour Authority, amending Regulations (EC) No 883/2004, (EU) No 492/2011, and (EU) 2016/589 and repealing Decision (EU) 2016/344 (OJ 2019 L 186, p. 21).
1.

If it is shown that a term allowing the creditor to unilaterally change the interest rate on a loan agreement concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer is unfair, can the national court assume that the interest rate payable under the agreement is fixed (despite any provision to the contrary in the initial agreement) in the amount set as at the date the loan was granted?
1.

Is point (e) of the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) of Directive 2003/4/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC (the Environmental Information Directive) to be interpreted as meaning that the term ‘internal communications’ covers all communications which do not leave the internal sphere of an authority which is required to provide information?
2.

Bearing in mind that Poland is now a Member State of the European Union which is bound by the Hague Protocol, are maintenance decisions made by a Court in Poland in 1999 and 2003, that is, prior to Poland becoming a member state of the European Union, now capable of being registered and enforced in another EU Member State pursuant to any part of EC Regulation 4/2009 (the Maintenance Regulation),and in particular: (a) pursuant to Article 75(3) and Article 56 of the Maintenance regulation; (b) pursuant to Article 75(2) and Section 2 of Chapter IV of the Maintenance regulation; (c) pursuant to Article 75(2)(a) and Section 3 of Chapter IV of the Maintenance regulation; (d) pursuant to any other Articles of the Regulation?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 3 September 2019 — Criminal proceedings in respect of IR

(Case C-649/19)

(2019/C 413/30)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad

Party to the main proceedings

IR

Questions referred

Do the rights of an accused person under Article 4 (in particular the right under Article 4(3)), Article 6(2) and Article 7(1) of Directive 2012/13 (1) apply to an accused person who has been arrested on the basis of a European arrest warrant?

If the first question is answered in the affirmative: is Article 8 of Framework Decision 2002/584 to be interpreted as meaning that it allows the content of a European arrest warrant to be amended with regard to the form specified in the annex, in particular the insertion of new text into that form, in relation to the rights of the requested person against the judicial authorities of the issuing Member State to challenge the validity of the national arrest warrant and of the European arrest warrant?

If the second question is answered in the negative: is it compatible with recital 12 and Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584, Articles 4, 6(2) and 7(1) of Directive 2012/13/ЕU and Articles 6 and 47 of the Charter if a European arrest warrant is issued in strict compliance with the form set out in the annex (that is to say without informing the requested person about his rights against the issuing judicial authority) and the issuing judicial authority informs him about the rights to which he is entitled and sends him the relevant documents immediately after that authority becomes aware of the arrest?

If there are no other legal means for safeguarding the rights of a person arrested on the basis of a European arrest warrant under Article 4 of Directive 2012/13/ЕU, in particular the right under Article 4(3), Article 6(2) and Article 7(1) of Directive 2012/13/ЕU, is Framework Decision 2002/584 valid?

(1) Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings (OJ 2012 L 142, p. 1).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 29 July 2019 by KID-Systeme GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 16 May 2019 in Case T-354/18: KID-Systeme v EUIPO

(Case C-577/19 P)

(2019/C 432/22)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: KID-Systeme GmbH (represented by: R. Kunze, G. Würtenberger, Rechtsanwälte, T. Wittmann, Rechtsanwältin)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 10 October 2019 the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal is not allowed to proceed and that KID-Systeme GmbH shall bear its own costs.