ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Brașov (Romania) lodged on 10 May 2021 — S. C. Techno-Gaz K.F.T. PAKS v U. A. T. Comuna Dalnic

(Case C-298/21)

(2021/C 329/11)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Brașov

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant– respondent: S. C. Techno-Gaz K.F.T. PAKS

Defendant — appellant: U. A. T. Comuna Dalnic

Question referred

Do the principle of the freedom to provide services under Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 25 of Directive 2004/18 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004, (1) and the principles of free and fair competition between economic operators and proportionality, which are specific to European Union law, preclude national legislation on public contracts, such as the Romanian rules laid down in Article 96(1) of [Hotărârea Guvernului (Government Decree)] No 925/2006, which provide that, where certain parts of a public contract are to be performed by one or more subcontractors, the contracts produced must be consistent with the tender and will form an integral part, in the annex, of the public contract, interpreted as meaning that the subcontracted services must be of the same value/price as that stipulated in the main contract for the services in question?

(1) Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114).
Misinterpretation and misapplication of Article 139(6)(a) of Regulation 1303/2013 read in conjunction with Article 137(1)(a) and (d) and (2), Article 131, Article 135(2) and Article 139(1), (2) and (7) of that regulation

Romania submits that the General Court made several errors of law as regards the distinction between the final application for interim payment and the acceptance of accounts, in unduly disregarding the role of that latter stage and taking the view that the co-financing rate applicable for calculating the amount chargeable is that in force at the time of submission of the final application for interim payment.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Višje sodišče v Mariboru (Slovenia) lodged on 30 June 2021 — FV v NOVA KREDITNA BANKA MARIBOR d.d.

(Case C-405/21)

(2021/C 349/30)

Language of the case: Slovene

Referring court

Višje sodišče v Mariboru

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: FV

Respondent: NOVA KREDITNA BANKA MARIBOR d.d.

Question referred

Is Article 3(1), read in conjunction with Articles 8 and 8a, of Council Directive 93/13/EEC (1) to be interpreted as not precluding national provisions which characterise the two conditions of ‘good faith’ and ‘a significant imbalance’ as alternatives (as separate, autonomous and independent conditions), such that, for the purposes of deciding whether a contractual term is unfair, it is sufficient if facts exist which establish that just one of those two conditions is fulfilled?

(1) Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).
Appeal brought on 21 May 2021 by Ryanair DAC against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 14 April 2021 in Case T-378/20, Ryanair v Commission (SAS, Denmark; Covid-19)

(Case C-321/21 P)

(2021/C 349/21)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Ryanair DAC (represented by: E. Vahida and F.-C. Laprévote, avocats, S. Rating, abogado, I.-G. Metaxas-Maranghidis, dikigoros, and V. Blanc, avocate)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Kingdom of Denmark, French Republic, SAS AB

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— declare in accordance with Articles 263 and 264 TFEU that Commission Decision C(2020) 2416 final of 15 April 2020 on State Aid SA.56795 (2020/N) — Denmark — Compensation for the damage caused by the COVID-19 outbreak to Scandinavian Airlines is void; and

— order the Commission to bear its own costs and pay those incurrent by Ryanair, and order the interveners at first instance and in this appeal (if any) to bear their own costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the appellant relies on six pleas in law.

First plea in law: the General Court erred in law in rejecting the appellant’s claim that the Commission breached the requirement that aid granted under Article 107(2)(b) TFEU is not to make good the damage suffered by a single victim.

Second plea in law: the General Court erred in law and committed a manifest distortion of the facts in the application of Article 107(2)(b) TFEU and the proportionality principle in relation to damage caused to SAS by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Third plea in law: the General Court erred in law in rejecting the appellant’s claim that the non-discrimination principle has been unjustifiably violated.

Fourth plea in law: the General Court erred in law and committed a manifest distortion of the facts in rejecting the appellant’s claim on the infringement of the freedom of establishment and the free provision of services.

Fifth plea in law: the General Court erred in law and committed a manifest distortion of the facts regarding the failure to open a formal investigation procedure.

Sixth plea in law: the General Court erred in law and committed a manifest distortion of the facts regarding the failure to state reasons.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Svea hovrätt, Patent- och marknadsöverdomstolen (Sweden) lodged on 28 June 2021 — IRnova AB v FLIR Systems AB

(Case C-399/21)

(2021/C 368/08)

Language of the case: Swedish

Referring court

Svea hovrätt, Patent- och marknadsöverdomstolen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: IRnova AB

Defendant: FLIR Systems AB

Question referred

Is an action seeking a declaration of better entitlement to an invention, based on a claim of inventorship or co-inventorship according to national patent applications and patents registered in a non-Member State, covered by exclusive jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 24(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters?

(1) OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1.
2

If it is the case that those refunds refer to a cash refund, are the health crisis related to the COVID-19 epidemic and its effects on travel operators, which have suffered as a result of that crisis a fall in their turnover estimated at between 50 and 80 % and represent more than 7 % of France’s gross domestic product and, in the case of package tour operators, have 30 000 employees in France and a turnover of nearly EUR 11 billion, capable of justifying and, if so, under what conditions and subject to what limitations, a temporary derogation from the obligation for the organiser to refund to the traveller the full amount of any payments made for the package within a period of 14 days following the termination of the contract, laid down in Article 12(4) of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on package travel and linked travel arrangements?
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 5 March 2021 — Deutsche Lufthansa AG v AirHelp Germany GmbH

(Case C-142/21)

(2021/C 382/09)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Deutsche Lufthansa AG

Defendant: AirHelp Germany GmbH

The case was removed from the register of the Court of Justice by order of the President of the Court of 18 June 2021.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour du travail de Mons (Belgium) lodged on 21 June 2021 — Ville de Mons, Zone de secours Hainaut — Centre v RM

(Case C-377/21)

(2021/C 391/11)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour du travail de Mons

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants, defendants in the original proceedings: Ville de Mons, Zone de secours Hainaut — Centre

Respondent, applicant in the original proceedings: RM

Question referred

Is Clause 4 of the Framework Agreement implemented by Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC (1) to be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which, for the calculation of the salary of professional firefighters employed on a full-time basis, accredits, in respect of the length of service for financial purposes, the services provided on a part-time basis as a volunteer firefighter according to the volume of work, that is to say the duration of the services actually provided, in line with the principle of ‘pro rata temporis’, and not according to the period over which the services were provided?

(1) OJ 1998 L 14, p. 9.
2.

Must Article 13(1)(b)(i) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (2) of 29 April 2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, Articles (3)(1)(a) and 11(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009 (3) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing common rules concerning the conditions to be complied with to pursue the occupation of road transport operator and repealing Council Directive 96/26/EC and Article (4)(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1072/2009 (4) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 on common rules for access to the international road haulage market be interpreted as meaning that it necessarily follows from the fact that an undertaking which obtains a road transport authorisation in a Member State of the European Union pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009 and Regulation (EC) No 1072/2009 and which therefore must have an effective and stable establishment in that Member State, that it has been irrefutably demonstrated that its registered office is established in that Member State, as referred to in Article 13(1) of the aforementioned Regulation No 883/2004/EC, for the purposes of determining the applicable social security system and that the authorities of the Member State of employment are bound by that determination?
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 16 February 2021 — Deutsche Lufthansa AG v FT

(Case C-94/21)

(2021/C 422/02)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Deutsche Lufthansa AG

Defendant: FT

The case was removed from the Register of the Court of Justice by order of the President of the Court of 17 June 2021.
1.

Is Article 48(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which concerns the principle of the presumption of innocence, read in conjunction with Article 16(1) of Directive 2008/118/EC, (1) to be interpreted as precluding a legal situation, such as that at issue in the present case, in which an administrative measure suspending an authorisation to operate as a producer of alcohol may be adopted on the basis of mere presumptions which are the subject of an ongoing criminal investigation, without any final conviction in criminal proceedings having been handed down?
3.

Are Article 20 TFEU and Articles 5 and 13 of Directive 2008/115, in conjunction with Articles 20 and 47 of the Charter, and recital 22 of Directive 2008/115, which states that the obligation to take into account the best interests of the child should be a primary consideration, and recital 24 of that directive, which requires that the fundamental rights and principles enshrined in the Charter must be guaranteed, to be interpreted as meaning that, where, in the event that the national court declares, on the basis of a ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union, that the law of the Member State or the practices of the immigration authorities based on that law are contrary to EU law, that court may, when examining the legal basis of the entry and residence ban, take into account, as an acquired right of the applicant in the present case, the fact that, under the rules of the a szabad mozgás és tartózkodás jogával rendelkező személyek beutazásáról és tartózkodásáról szóló 2007. évi I. törvény (Law I of 2007 on the entry and residence of persons having the right of free movement and residence; ‘Law I of 2007’), the applicant had achieved what was necessary for the purposes of application of Article 42 of that Law, namely more than 10 years’ legal residence in Hungary, or, when reviewing the grounds for the issue of the entry and residence ban, must that court base the consideration taken of family and personal circumstances directly on Article 5 of Directive 2008/115 in the absence of provisions in that respect in the a harmadik országbeli állampolgárok beutazásáról és tartózkodásáról szóló 2007. évi II. törvény (Law II of 2007 on the entry and residence of third-country nationals; ‘Law II of 2007’)?
Appeal brought on 7 May 2021 by EM against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 3 March 2021 in Case T-599/19 EM v Parliament

(Case C-299/21 P)

(2021/C 431/03)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: EM (represented by: M. Casado García-Hirschfeld, avocate)

Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The appellant submits that the Court of Justice should:

— set aside the judgment of 3 March 2021, EM v Parliament (T-599/19);

— order the Parliament to pay the entirety of the costs, including those incurred before the General Court.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

By the first plea in law raised before the General Court, the appellant relied on infringement of Articles 1 and 31 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as Article 12 and Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations, breach of the duty to provide assistance, and abuse of power. The General Court ruled on the first plea, divided into three parts, in paragraphs 42 to 131 of the judgment under appeal.

By the second plea in law raised before the General Court, the appellant relied on infringement of the principle of sound administration and of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials, as well as a manifest error of assessment. The General Court ruled on this plea in paragraphs 142 to 159 of the judgment under appeal.

In support of his appeal, the appellant relies on a single ground of appeal, alleging distortion of the facts, and manifest errors of assessment resulting in a statement of reasons that is insufficient and legally imprecise. The General Court therefore ruled infra petita. In the context of the appeal, the appellant contests, in particular, paragraphs 51 to 57, 66 to 69, 100 to 103, 109, 126 to131, 145 to 146, 148 to 149 and 170 to 171 of the judgment under appeal.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 12 May 2021 by Graanhandel P. van Schelven BV against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 24 March 2021 in Case T-306/19, Graanhandel P. van Schelven v Commission

(Case C-309/21 P)

(2021/C 462/27)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Graanhandel P. van Schelven BV (represented by: C. Almeida, advocaat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

By order of 28 September 2021, the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) held that the appeal is dismissed as manifestly unfounded and that Graanhandel P. van Schelven BV shall bear its own costs.
II.

Must Article 73(1) of the Directive be interpreted as meaning that: II.I. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 71 or to duly notified reasonable suspicion of fraud, is a mere notification that a payment transaction was not authorised, without any supporting evidence, sufficient to give rise to an obligation (on the part of the payment service provider) to provide a refund (to the payer)? II.II. If the answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, is it possible to exclude the rule that a mere notification by the payer is sufficient by disapplying the rules on the burden of proof contained in Article 72 of the Directive by agreement between the parties (payer and service provider), as permitted by Article 61(1) of the Directive? II.III. If the answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, is the payment service provider under an obligation to reimburse the payer immediately only if the latter demonstrates that the transaction was not authorised in a situation where, following the exclusion of the application of Article 72 of the Directive, the applicable legislative or contractual rules require the payer to provide such evidence?
3.

Are Articles 167, 168(a) and 178(a) of the VAT Directive, in the light of the principles of proportionality and reasonableness, to be interpreted as meaning that even if the tax authority considers, based on the specific circumstances of the case, that the taxable person should have been more diligent, that person cannot be required to verify facts which the tax authority was only able to discover after an inspection lasting approximately five years which necessitated numerous additional checks using instruments of public law, such that the protection of taxable persons’ trade secrets was not an impediment to the checks? In the event that greater diligence is required, is it sufficient proof of due diligence that the taxable person’s scrutiny extends to matters beyond those indicated in the Mahagében judgment in relation to possible trading partners, such that the taxable person has internal supply rules for the purpose of conducting checks on those trading partners, does not accept cash payments, includes clauses concerning the possible risks in the contracts it concludes, and also examines other matters during the transaction?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 13 August 2021 by Joshua David Silver, Leona Catherine Bashow, Charles Nicholas Hilary Marquand, JY, JZ, Anthony Styles Clayton, Gillian Margaret Clayton against the order of the General Court (Tenth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 8 June 2021 in Case T-252/20, Silver and Others v Council

(Case C-499/21 P)

(2021/C 490/17)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Joshua David Silver, Leona Catherine Bashow, Charles Nicholas Hilary Marquand, JY, JZ, Anthony Styles Clayton, Gillian Margaret Clayton (represented by: P. Tridimas, Δικηγόρος, A. von Westernhagen, D. Harrison, Solicitors)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The Applicants claim that the Court should:

— quash the order under appeal;

— declare the application in Case T-252/20 admissible;

— grant the orders sought by the applicants in the proceedings before the General Court;

— order the Council to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Appellants consider that the General Court erred in law by finding that:

a) the Appellants lack individual concern;

b) Council Decision (EU) 2020/135 (1) on the conclusion of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community is not a regulatory act.

The Appellants argue that they have individual concern on the ground that:

a) they are members of a closed group whose membership is fixed and cannot be added to after the entry into force of the contested decision;

b) the contested decision deprives them of their Union citizenship status and the rights attached thereto. Given the character of citizenship as the fundamental status of EU nationals, those are specific and exclusive acquired rights which are indefeasible and which cannot be abrogated upon the withdrawal of the United Kingdom.

The Appellants also argue that the contested decision is a regulatory act on the ground that:

a) According to the case law all acts of general application which are not legislative acts are regulatory acts;

b) The fact that the contested decision gives effect to the Withdrawal Agreement which ranks higher than acts adopted by the EU institutions is not material;

c) The argument that the Withdrawal Agreement may be regarded as being the equivalent externally to a legislative act internally is erroneous;

d) The argument that the contested decision benefits from high democratic legitimation is incorrect.

(1) Council Decision (EU) 2020/135 of 30 January 2020 (OJ 2020, L 29, p. 1).
2.

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative and the data subject does not have a right of access to the information referred to in that question on the basis of Article 15(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation because it does not constitute ‘personal data’ of the data subject within the meaning of point 1 of Article 4 of the General Data Protection Regulation, it remains necessary in the present case to consider the information in respect of which the data subject does have a right of access in accordance with Article 15(1)[(a) to (h)]: a. How is the purpose of processing within the meaning of Article 15(1)(a) to be interpreted in relation to the scope of the data subject’s right of access, that is to say, can the purpose of the processing give rise to a right of access to the user log data collected by the controller, such as information concerning personal data of the processors and the time and the purpose of the processing of the personal data? b. In that context, can the persons who processed J.M.’s customer data be regarded, under certain criteria, as recipients of the personal data within the meaning of Article 15(1)(c) of the General Data Protection Regulation, in respect of whom the data subject would be entitled to obtain information?
1.

Is it contrary to Article 1(1) of Directive 84/5/EEC for the notion of ‘personal injuries’ to be interpreted as meaning that such injury exists in the case of psychological pain and suffering caused to a child by the death of a parent as a result of a road traffic accident only where that pain and suffering has resulted in pathological damage to the child’s health?
3.

If the answer to Question 2 is in the negative: Is national legislation under which an application for asylum is inadmissible in the event of a subsequent application and which makes no distinction in that respect between refugee status and subsidiary protection status compatible with Article 33(2)[(d)] of Directive 2013/32/EU?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD) (Portugal) lodged on 26 July 2021 — The Navigator Company, S.A., Navigator Pulp Figueira, S.A. v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

(Case C-459/21)

(2022/C 11/18)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: The Navigator Company, S.A., Navigator Pulp Figueira, S.A.

Defendant: Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

Question referred

Does the principle of equivalence preclude national VAT legislation, such as that laid down in Article 21(1) of the Código do Imposto sobre o Valor Acrescentado (Value Added Tax Code) (CIVA), maintained under the standstill clause, which excludes entirely, or in the proportion of 50 % of input VAT, the right to deduct VAT on motor vehicle expenses, travel and accommodation expenses and entertainment expenses, these being, in the context of corporation tax, fully deductible as expenses (without prejudice to ex post verification and subject to certain conditions), or, in the context of autonomous taxation, effectively deductible in a proportion greater than 50 %?