Case T‑456/10

Timab Industries

and

Cie financière et de participations Roullier (CFPR)

v

European Commission

‛Competition — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — European market for animal feed phosphates — Decision finding an infringement of Article 101 TFEU — Allocation of sales quotas, coordination of prices and conditions of sale and exchange of commercially sensitive information — Applicant’s withdrawal from the settlement procedure — Fines — Obligation to state reasons — Gravity and duration of the infringement — Cooperation — Failure to apply the likely range of fines indicated during the settlement procedure’

Summary — Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber, Extended Composition), 20 May 2015

Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Criteria — Non-imposition or reduction of the fine in return for the cooperation of the undertaking concerned — Conditions — Discretion of the Commission — Burden of proof

Competition — Administrative procedure — Commission decision finding an infringement — Use as evidence of statements of other undertakings which participated in the infringement — Lawfulness — Probative value of voluntary depositions made by the main participants in a cartel with a view to benefiting from the Leniency Notice

Competition — Administrative procedure — Settlement procedure — Indication of a range of fines — Withdrawal of and undertaking from the settlement procedure — Commission not applying that range of fines in the final decision — Lawfulness

Competition — Administrative procedure — Statement of objections — Provisional nature — No obligation on the Commission to explain in the final decision the differences between the latter and its provisional assessments

Competition — Administrative procedure — Statement of objections — Necessary content — Observance of the rights of the defence — Indication of the main factual and legal elements likely to entail a fine — Sufficient indication having regard to the right to be heard on the determination of the amount of the fine

Competition — Fines — Amount — Reduction in fine in exchange for cooperation — Need for the undertaking to cooperate in the administrative procedure concerning the infringement in question — Assessment of the quality and usefulness of the information provided

Competition — Administrative procedure — Settlement procedure — Procedure not involving all the participants in a cartel — Withdrawal of an undertaking from the settlement procedure — Commission adopting two decisions with different addressees following two distinct procedures — Applicability of the guidelines for the calculation of fines — Duty to comply with the principle of equal treatment

In cartel matters, where a settlement does not involve all the participants in an infringement, as for example where an undertaking withdraws from the settlement procedure, the Commission adopts, on the one hand, following a simplified procedure (the settlement procedure), a decision addressed to the participants in the infringement who have decided to enter into a settlement and reflecting the commitment of each of them and, on the other hand, according to the standard procedure, a decision addressed to participants in the infringement who have decided not to enter into a settlement. However, even in such a hybrid case, involving the adoption of two decisions with different addressees and following two separate procedures, at issue are participants in one and the same cartel, so that the principle of equal treatment must be observed. That principle requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified. It follows that the settlement procedure is an alternative to the — adversarial — standard administrative procedure, distinct from it, and presenting certain special features, such as an advance statement of objections and the notification of a likely range of fines. However, the guidelines for the calculation of the fines to be imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 remain fully applicable in that context. That means that, in determining the amount of the fine, there cannot be any discrimination between the participants in the same cartel with respect to the information and calculation methods which are not affected by the specific features of the settlement procedure, such as a 10% reduction in the event that a settlement is entered into. (see paras 71-74)

A reduction in the amount of the fine on grounds of cooperation during the administrative procedure is justified only if the conduct of the undertaking in question enabled the Commission to establish the existence of an infringement more easily, and, where relevant, to bring it to an end. Where an application for immunity under the leniency notice relates to a different cartel from that which the Commission is dealing with and which moreover is time-barred, there is no added value and the Commission is under no obligation to reward such cooperation, since it does not facilitate the investigation. That reasoning also holds with respect to cooperation ‘outside the leniency programme’. (see paras 92, 93)

See the text of the decision. (see para. 98)

See the text of the decision. (see para. 99)

In competition matters, a range of fines is an instrument solely and specifically related to the settlement procedure. Article 10a(2) of Regulation No 773/2004, relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, expressly permits the Commission services to inform the participants in settlement discussions of an estimate of the fine to be imposed upon them, in the light of the method contained in the Guidelines on the calculation of fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, the provisions of the Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Regulation No 1/2003 in cartel cases and of the leniency notice, where applicable. If the undertaking does not put forward a proposal for a settlement, the procedure leading to the final decision is governed by the general provisions of Regulation No 773/2004, instead of those governing the settlement procedure. The situation is, therefore, that of a ‘tabula rasa’, in which the liabilities are yet to be determined. It follows that the range notified during the settlement procedure is irrelevant, since it is an instrument specific to that procedure. It would therefore be illogical, and even inappropriate, that the Commission be required to apply, or to refer to, a range of fines falling within the scope of another procedure now abandoned. Moreover, to indicate a range of fines at the statement of objections stage, of a range of fines would be contrary to the purely preparatory nature of such a measure and would deprive the Commission of the possibility of imposing a fine adapted to new circumstances existing at the time of the adoption of the decision, and this in spite of its obligation to take account of new arguments or evidence brought to its attention during the standard administrative procedure, which may have an impact on the determination of the amount of the fine to be imposed. Following the same logic, when the Commission resorts to the settlement procedure, subsequently abandoned, for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of disputes, it is under no more onerous obligation to state reasons than when it adopts a decision under the standard procedure. (see paras 100, 101, 104-107)

The prevailing principle under EU law is that evidence may be freely adduced and that the only relevant criterion for the purpose of assessing the evidence adduced relates to its credibility. No provision or any general principle of EU law prohibits the Commission from relying, as against an undertaking, on statements made by other undertakings. Statements made in the context of an application for immunity under the leniency notice have a probative value that is not insignificant. That reasoning may be applied with respect to statements that may be used against the applicant for leniency itself. Nevertheless, if the undertaking which made an application for leniency under the leniency notice alters its statement or subsequently gives a different interpretation thereof, it will be difficult for the Commission, and then for the Court, in the absence of other evidence, to take account of that statement as a result of the decrease in its probative value. In that case, the Commission is not necessarily expected to use the undertaking’s first statements against it. (see para. 115)

See the text of the decision. (see paras 132, 133)

See the text of the decision. (see paras 154, 155)

See the text of the decision. (see para. 161)

See the text of the decision. (see paras 177, 178, 184)