OPINION OFMRWARNER —JOINED CASES 80AND81/77
41Astheseproceedings are,insofarasthepartiestothemainactionare
concerned, inthenatureofastepintheactionpending beforethenational
court,costsareamatterforthatcourt.
Onthosegrounds,
THECOURT,
inanswer tothequestions submitted toitbytheTribunal d'Instance,
Bourg-en-Bresse, byjudgments of30June1977,herebyrules:
Article 31(2)ofRegulation No816/70 insofarasitauthorizes
producer Member States toprescribe andlevy,inintra-Community
tradeintheproducts covered bytheorganization ofthemarket which
thatregulation setsup,charges havinganeffectequivalent tocustoms
duties, isincompatible withArticle 13,inparticular paragraph (2)
thereof, andwithArticles 38to46oftheTreaty andisconsequently
invalid.
Kutscher Sørensen Bosco Donner Mertens deWilmars
Pescatore Mackenzie Stuart O'Keeffe Touffait
Delivered inopencourtinLuxembourg on20April1978.
A.VanHoutte
RegistrarH.Kutscher
President
OPINION OFMRADVOCATE GENERAL WARNER
DELIVERED ON15MARCH 1978
MyLords,
In1975therewasanexceptional influx
ofItalian wineontotheFrench market.Itiscommon ground thatthatinflux
wasdue,atalleventsinthemain,first
tothefactthatin1973and1974the
weather hadbeensuchthatyieldshad
948

COMMISSIONNAIRES RÉUNIS νRECEVEUR DESDOUANES
beenhighbothinFrance andinItaly
andsecondly tosuccessive devaluations
oftheItalian lira.The French
Government hasalleged thatitwasdue
alsotoafailure onthepartofthe
Italian authorities toestablish and
operate satisfactorily theadministrative
mechanisms necessary for the
management ofthemarket inwineas
envisaged byCouncil Regulation (EEC)
No816/70of28April1970(Official
Journal L99of5March 1970)"laying
downadditional provisions forthe
common organization ofthemarket in
wine".
Withaviewtolimiting thatinflux,the
French Government, on11September
1975,instituted bydecree (Decree No
75/846) acharge ontablewinesand
winessuitable foryielding tablewines,
coming fromItaly, imported in
containers ofmorethantwolitres.The
charge wascalculated onthevolume
andthealcoholic strength ofthewines.
Itsamount wasfixedatFF1.13per
degree/hectolitre. Itiscommon ground
thatthecharge wasonehaving
equivalent effecttoacustoms duty.
Asthedecree itselfrecited, theFrench
Government relied, inintroducing the
charge, onArticle 31ofRegulation No
816/70. Paragraph 1ofthatArticlewas,
sofarasrelevant, expressed toprohibit
thelevying, intheinternal tradeofthe
Community, ofanycharge having
equivalent effecttoacustoms duty.In
factofcoursethatprovision wasotiose.
TheRegulation having beenadopted
aftertheendofthetransitional period,
theprohibition already existed bythe
directeffectofArticles 9and12ofthe
Treaty. Article 31(2)wasinthese
terms:
"Bywayofderogation fromthe
provisions ofparagraph 1,solongasall
theadministrative mechanisms necessary
forthemanagement ofthemarket in
winearenotinapplication —withthe
exception, until31December 1971,of
theviticultural landregister—producerMember States shallbeauthorized in
ordertoavoid disturbances ontheir
markets totakemeasures thatmaylimit
imports fromanother Member State.
These measures shallbecommunicated
totheCommission, which shalldecide
without delaywhether tomaintain,
amend orabolish suchmeasures."
Onthesamedayasitadopted the
decree the French Government
informed theCommission ofitbytelex.
On15September 1975,theCommission
wrote totheFrench Government
expressing theopinion thatitwasnot
entided torelyonArticle 31(2),
because thatprovision had,bythen,
ceased tobeoperative, the
administrative mechanisms necessary for
themanagement ofthemarket inwine
beinginapplication inallMember
States.Thatbeingso,theCommission
said,itwouldnotbeappropriate forit
totakeadecision ofthekindenvisaged
bythesecond subparagraph ofArticle
31(2)anditasked theFrench
Government torevoke itsdecree.
The French Government having
declined sotodo,theCommission
initiated proceedings against theFrench
Republic underArticle 169ofthe
Treatyandeventually brought anaction
inthisCourt against itunder that
Article, Case117/75. Beforethataction
cametoahearing, however, theFrench
Government (byDecree No76/287 of
31March 1976)repealed thedecreeof
11September 1975asfrom 1April
1976. Thereupon theaction was
discontinued.
ByCouncil Regulation (EEC) No
1160/76 of17May1976,aRegulation
which madenumerous amendments of
greater andlesserimportance toRegu­
lationNo816/70, Article 31(2)was
expressly repealed.
Therearenow,soweweretold,some
40actions pending invarious French
Courts inwhichimporters ofItalian
winesintoFrancewhowere,during the
949

OPINION OFMRWARNER —JOINED CASES 10AND81/77
periodwhenthedecreeof11September
1975wasinforce,required topaythe
charge thereby imposed, areseeking
fromtheFrench Customs restitution of
thesumspaidbytheminrespectofit.
Thepresent casescomebeforethis
Courtbywayofreferences forpre­
liminary rulings madebytheTribunal
d'Instance ofBourg-en-Bresse intwoof
thoseactions. Theyaretherefore inthe
natureoftestcases.
Thequestions referred totheCourtby
theTribunal d'Instance arethese:
"(1)DidArticle 31(2)ofCouncil Regu­
lationNo816/70 accord withthe
EECTreaty, havingregardtothe
factthatthatprovision authorized
measures contrary totherulesof
theTreaty onthefreemovement
ofgoodsapplicable after theendof
thetransitional period?
(2)Iftheanswer totheforegoing
question isintheaffirmative, were
theprovisions ofArticle 31(2)of
thesaidRegulation stillapplicable
on11September 1975,having
regardtothepossibility thatallthe
administrative mechanisms necess­
aryforthemanagement ofthe
marketinwinehadbeensetup?"
Asregards thefirstquestion, thereare
fourrivalcontentions.
ThePlaintiffs contend that,underthe
Treaty, theCouncil hadnopower,after
theendofthetransitional period, to
legislate insuchawayastoauthorize
Member States toimpose charges
having equivalent effecttocustoms
dutiesininternal Community trade.
Attheother extreme, theFrench
Government contends thatthewayin
whichagriculture isdealtwithinthe
Treaty, andinparticular theunique
provisions relating toitcontained in
TitleIIofPartTwooftheTreaty,must
betakentoindicate (having regardto
thoseobvious characteristics ofagri­
culture thatdistinguish itfromother
economic activities, such asitsvul­nerability tothevagaries ofthe
weather) thattheauthors oftheTreaty
intended ittobetreated asan
exceptional sector, andthattheCouncil
should, initscase,haveageneral power
toderogate fromtherulesthatwould
otherwise beapplicable under the
Treaty. TheFrenchGovernment draws
particular attention toArticle 38(2)of
theTreaty, underwhich"theruleslaid
down fortheestablishment ofthe
common market" aretoapplytoagri­
cultural products "save asotherwise
provided inArticles 39to46",andto
Article 39(2),whichprovides that"In
working outthecommon agricultural
policyandthespecial methods forits
application, account shallbetakenof
among otherthings "theparticular
natureofagricultural activity, which
resultsfromthesocialstructure ofagri­
culture andfromstructural andnatural
disparities between thevarious agri­
cultural regions".
TheCouncil andtheCommission
advance intermediate contentions,
thoughnotthesameone.
TheCouncil contends thatithas,when
instituting acommon organization of
themarket inanyagricultural product
orgroupofagricultural products, a
limited power toderogate fromthe
general rulesoftheTreaty, limited in
thatthepowerdoesnotpermitthe
Council togobeyond theadoption of
measures thatarebothancillary and
temporary ("mesures temporaires d'ac-
compagnement" wastheexpression
used).
TheCommission's contention ismore
restrictive. ItisthattheCouncil had
power, wheninstituting thecommon
organization ofamarket atorabout
theendofthetransitional period, to
prescribe transitional provisions
applicable untiltheendofthethen
current marketing year.Thus, the
Commission contends, Article 31(2)
couldonlyhavebeenvalidifithad
beenlimited tooperate until 1
950

COMMISSIONAIRES REUNIS vRECEVEUR DESDOUANES
September 1970,whichwasthedateof
thebeginning ofthenext"wine­
growing year"aftertheadoption of
Regulation No816/70.
Inargument, anumber ofJudgments of
thisCourtwerecitedassupporting this
orthatcontention. Ithinkitwillbe
convenient if,subjecttooneexception,
Idiscuss thoseJudgments intheir
chronological order.
Case 17/67 Neumann vHZA Hof[1967]
ECR441(Rec.1967,p.571)whichwas
cited onbehalf oftheFrench
Government andoftheCouncil, does
not,inmyopinion, lendsupport tothe
contention ofeither ofthem. The
question therewaswhether levieson
imports fromthirdcountries instituted
byCouncil Regulations establishing the
common organization ofamarket(that
inpoultry meat)werelawful.Itwas
arguedforanimporter thattheywere
notbecause theywereincompatible
withtheArticles oftheTreaty setting
uptheCommon Customs Tariff.The
Courtrejected thatargument. Itheld
thatsuchleviescamewithin Article 40
(3)oftheTreaty asbeing"measures
required toattainthe...regulation of
prices...andcommon machinery for
stabilising imports orexports". They
weretherefore withinthesavingclause
ofArticle 38(2).Thus,fortheprinciple
ofthatdecision tobeheldtoapply
here,itwouldbenecessary tobeableto
pointtoa.provision inArticles 39to46
which, eitherexpressly orbynecessary
implication, authorized theinstitution,
aspartofacommon organization ofa
market, ofcharges having aneffect
equivalent tocustoms dutiesintrade
between Member States.Icanseenone,
nordideither theFrench Government
ortheCouncil attempt topointtoany.
Certainly Article 40(3)cannot beheld
toconstitute suchaprovision, sinceit
goesontoprovide thatacommon
organization "shallexclude anydiscri­
mination between producers or
consumers withintheCommunity".Case82/71 the SAILcase[1972] 1
ECR119wasmuchreliedupon,not
leastbytheCommission, whichsawin
thatcasetheauthority foritscontention
thattheCouncil hadapowerofdero­
gation that was limited to
"overstepping" theendofthe
transitional periodfortherestofthe
thencurrent marketing year("un
depassement technique"). Aclose
reading oftheJudgment reveals,
however, thattheCourtconfined itself
theretoholding, asamatterofinterpret­
ationoftheCouncil Regulations auth­
orizing Italytemporarily toretain its
"milkcentre" system, thatthatauthoriz­
ationhadexpired attherelevant time.
TheCourt didnotdealwith the
question ofitsvalidity. Thecaseis
therefore, inmyopinion, ofno
relevance here.
Tothethree cases onmonetary
compensatory amounts decided bythe
Court on24October 1973,namely
Case5/73,thefirst Balkan case[1973]
2ECR1091,Case9/73 Schlüter v HZA
Lörrach, ibid.p.1135andCase10/73
Rewe-Zentral vHZA Kehl,ibid.p.
1175,Ihadoccasion toreferrecently in
Case29/77, thethird Roquette case
[1977] ECR1835.Itherepointed out
thatthose cases, andothers, were
authority forsaying that the
fundamental purpose ofthesystemof
m.c.a.'s wastoprevent changes in
exchange rates from immediately
affecting agricultural pricesintermsof
national currencies insuchawayasto
disturb thefunctioning ofthecommon
organizations ofmarkets. Suchdistur­
bances oftradecould beoftwokinds.
Thefirstkindwasdirectdisturbance of
intervention arrangements, suchashad
occurred inconsequence ofthedeva­
luation oftheFrench francin1969,
whenGerman traders bought cereals in
France forre-sale totheGerman
intervention agency ataprofit,anddid
soinsuchquantities astothreaten to
exhaust thatagency's storage capacity.
The second kindofdisturbance
951

OPINION OFMRWARNER —JOINED CASES 8CAND31/77
consisted inthediversion oftrade
between theCommunity andthird
countries, inparticular thediversion of
imports through Member Slateswith
devalued currencies insearch oflower
levies andthediversion ofexports
through Member Stateswithrevalued
currencies insearchofhigherrefunds.
Onecantherefore saythat,inthose
cases, theCourt recognized the
existence intheCouncil ofapowerto
institute asbetween Member States
charges having aneffectequivalent to
customs duties insofarasthatwas
essential toensure theproper
functioning ofcommon organizations
ofmarkets.
Case 153/73 Holtz & Willemsen v
Council and Commission [1974] 1ECR
675isinmyopinion themostpertinent
ofthecasesthatwerecited.Itwasan
actionfordamages underthesecond
paragraph ofArticle 215oftheTreaty,
inwhich aGerman oil-miller, relyingon
Article 7thereof andontheprohibition
ofdiscrimination inArticle 40(3),
challenged thevalidity ofaspecial
temporary subsidy instituted bythe
Council infavour ofItalian oil-millers
aspartofthecommon organization of
themarket inoilsandfats.TheCourt
upheld thevalidity ofthatsubsidy on
thenarrow ground that,atitsinitiation,
thecommon organization ofamarket
might contain gapsthedifficulties
caused bywhich theCouncil could
lessenbymeansofprovisional measures.
Itistobeobserved, first,thatthecase
wenttothevergeofthelaw,inasmuch
astheCourt recorded thatithadnot
foundtheexplanation givenbythe
Defendants "altogether satisfactory"
and, secondly, thattheCourt
considered thatthe"provisional nature"
ofthemeasure hadbeen"respected"
because theCouncil putanendtoit
afterthe1973/74 marketing year.
ThereasonwhyIthinkthatcasepar­
ticularly pertinent isthis.Atthetimeof
theadoption ofRegulation No816/70,theadministrative mechanisms necessary
forthemanagement ofthemarket in
wineexisted incertain Member States,
notably inFrance (which hadhaduntil
thenanational organization ofthat
market) buttheydidnotexistinother
Member States, notably Italy.The
Council wastherefore faced with a
choice.Itcouldeitherwaittobringthe
common organization ofthemarket
intoforce untilthose administrative
mechanisms hadbeenestablished inall
Member States;oritcouldbringthat
organization intoforceatonce,witha
provision affording asafeguard against
itsunduemalfunction solongasthose
mechanisms werenotoperative inall
Member States. Itchose thelatter
course. Thatthatwasthegenesis of
Article 31(2)maybeinferred inpan
fromparagraph 2ofthereasoned
opinion of29October 1975delivered
bytheCommission totheFrench
Government intheArticle 169
proceedings andinpanfromtheobser­
vationsoftheCouncil inthepresent
case.(Itappeared perhaps evenmore
clearly from theCommission's
application inCase117/75, butIwould
hesitate toreferYourLordships tothat
document asitdoesnot,strictly
speaking, formpanofthepapersinthe
present case).Thathaving beenthe
position, itseemstomethatthevalidity
ofArticle 31(2)atitsinception canbe
upheldontheprinciple ofthedecision
inthe Holtz &Willemsen case:atthe
outset, theorganization established by
Regulation No816/70 contained agap,
inasmuch asthenecessary mechanisms
foritsfunctioning didnotexistinsome
Member States, sothatitwasopento
theCouncil tolessenthedifficulties that
thatgapmight causebyprovisional
measures. Thatcomesfairlycloseto
accepting theCouncil's contention in
thepresent case,butitdoesnotgoall
thewaytodoingso.
There wasmuch discussion ofCase
48/74, the Charmasson case[1974] 2
ECR1383.Inmyopinion themain
952

COMMISSIONNAIRES RÉUNIS »RECEVEUR DESDOUANES
relevance ofthatcaseisthattheCourt
thereconsidered, notforthefirsttime,
theinterpretation thatoughttobegiven
toArticle 38(2)oftheTreaty. The
Courtheldthatitappeared fromthat
provision, "particularly ifconsidered in
conjunction withArticle42",thatagri­
cultural products were,intheabsence
ofanycontrary provision, "subject to
therulesrelating totheestablishment of
thecommon market". Article 42,Your
Lordships remember, isconcerned with
theapplication "toproduction ofand
tradeinagricultural products" ofthe
provisions oftheTreaty "relating to
rulesoncompetition". Itprovides that
those rulesshallapply tosuch
production andtrade"onlytothe
extentdetermined bytheCouncil". The
inference fromthatJudgment is,
therefore, again, that,before the
Council canbeheldtohaveadiscretion
toexclude thoserulesinanyparticular
respect, therehastobeshowntobe,
somewhere inArticles 39to46ofthe
Treaty, aprovision conferring that
discretion onit.Sothecaseisauthority
against theFrench Government's
contention.
ButitwasrelieduponbythePlaintiffs
andbytheCommission asauthority for
theviewthat,aftertheendofthe
transitional period, therewasnopower
atall,evenforaCommunity
Institution, toderogate inanywayfrom
thegeneral rulesoftheTreaty except
thoserelating tocompetition andexcept
(pertheCommission) totheextentof
the"dépassement technique" towhichI
havereferred. That,inmyopinion, goes
toofar.AsIventured topointoutin
Case29/75 Kaufhof vCommission
[1976]ECRatp.450,itmustbeborne
inmindthattheeventsgivingrisetothe
Charmasson casehadoccurred during
thetransitional period andthatthe
actualquestion withwhichtheCourt
wasthereconcerned (sofarasrelevent
here)wasastotheextenttowhichthe
existence inaMember State,during
thatperiod, ofanational organizationofthemarketforaparticular product
precluded theapplication inthatState
ofArticle 33oftheTreaty, which
provided fortheprogressive abolition
duringthatperiodofimport quotas as
between Member States.Indealing with
thatquestion theCourt adverted to
whatwastobetheposition afterthe
endofthetransitional period. But,asto
that,apartfrommaking thegeneral
observations ontheinterpretation of
Article 38(2)thatIhavementioned, the
Coun saidnomorethanthataMember
Statewouldnotthenbeentitled torely
onthe defactoabsence ofacommon
organization ofthemarket ina
particular product asjustifying itin
maintaining restrictions onimports from
other Member States under itsown
marketorganization.
Inowdepartslightly fromthechro­
nological orderoftheauthorities soas
todealtogether withCase46/76
Bauhuis vNetherlands [1977] ECR5
and Case 89/76 Commission v
Netherlands [1977]ECR1355.Withall
respecttothosewhocitedthemitseems
tomemanifest thatthosecasesarenot
inpoint.Theywereconcerned with
charges imposed tomeetthecostof
inspections provided for,inthefirst
case, byCouncil Directive No
64/432/EEC(Official Journal L121of
29.July1964)"onanimal health
problems affecting intra-Community
tradeinbovine animals andswine" and,
inthesecond case,bytheInternational
PlantProtection Convention. AsIhad
occasion tomention recently inCase
70/77 Simmenthal vAmministrazione
delle Finanze (inwhichtheCoun has
notyetdelivered judgment) what
underlay thedecision oftheCounin
eachofthosecaseswasthat,ineachof
them, thesystem ofinspections in
question hadasitsobjectandeffectto
facilitate tradebetween theStates to
whichitapplied. Thatbeingso,itcould
notbeheldthatcharges imposed to
meetthecostofsuchinspections hadan
effectequivalent tocustoms duties.
953

OPINION OFMRWARNER —JOINED CASES 80AND81/77
Here, ontheotherhand,itis,and
always hasbeen,common ground that
thecharge imposed bytheFrench
Government purportedly inpursuance
ofArticle 31(2)ofRegulation No
816/70 wasonehaving aneffect
equivalent toacustoms duty.Indeed
Article 31(2)related onlytosuch
charges.
Lastlywewerereferred toCase68/76
Commission vFrance[1977]ECR515,
inparagraph 21oftheJudgment in
whichtheCourt,afterreferring tothe
termsofArticle 38(1)and(2)ofthe
Treaty, said:
"Accordingly, following theendofthe
transitional period, theprovisions of
Articles 39to46cannot bereliedupon
injustification ofaunilateral derogation
fromtherequirements ofArticle 34of
theTreaty, eveninrespectofanagri­
cultural product forwhichnocommon
organization ofthemarket hasyetbeen
established."
Itwassubmitted onbehalf ofthe
French Government andoftheCouncil
thatitcouldbeinferred, fromtheuse
thereoftheword"unilateral", thatthe
Courtwould nothaveregarded as
unlawful asimilarderogation madein
pursuance ofameasure adopted bythe
Community. Inmyopinion, however,
theonlyinference thatitissafetodraw
isthattheCourt wasnotthere
concerned topronounce onanything
otherthanunilateral derogations. Of
greater moment, tomymind,inthat
case,istheconclusion ofMrAdvocate
General Capotorti that"While...itis
truethatthecommon organizations of
themarket giverisetointervention on
theagricultural market bypublicauth­
orities toanextentwhichwould notbe
permissible intheindustrial field,those
organizations stillhavetoabidebythe
fundamental principle ofthefreedom of
tradethroughout theCommunity" (see
[1977]ECRatp.539).
BeforeIsumupwhatappears tometo
betheeffectofthoseauthorities, Ishould Ithinkmention thattheFrench
Government referred tofourinstances
where, itsaid,theCouncil hadenacted
provisions derogating fromthegeneral
ruleofthefreemovement ofgoods
within theCommunity, thesuggestion
being, soIunderstood, that,sincethe
Council hadenacted thoseprovisions, it
musthavehadpowertodoso.Thefirst
instance wasthatofthesubsidy that
wasinquestion inthe Holtz6
Willemsen case.Theotherthree(in
relation towhich nodecision ofthe
Coun was cited) were drawn
respectively fromthecommon organiz­
ation ofthemarket infruitand
vegetables, fromthatofthesugar
market, andfromthelegislation on
fisheries. TheCommission submitted
that,infact,innoneofthosethree
instances wastheretrulyaderogation
fromtheruleastothefreemovement
ofgoods.Idonotpropose toenterinto
thequestion whether therewasorwas
not.Tomyminditcannot assistthe
Courtindetermining whatis,onthe
trueinterpretation oftheTreaty, the
scopeoftheCouncil's powers, toknow
whatinfacttheCouncil regarded as
beingwithin itspowers inparticular
instances.
Inmyopinion theeffectoftheauth­
oritiesmaybesummarized asfollows.
Thereisnoauthority thatsupports the
French Governement's contention, and
someauthority against it.Thisisnot
surprising sinceitisacontention that
fliesinthefaceofArticle 38(2)ofthe
Treaty. Thesaving clause isforthat
whichis"provided inArticles 39to46",
notforwhatever maybeprovided by
theCouncil. Iwould therefore reject
thatcontention.
Thereisauthority inconsistent withthe
otherextreme contention, thatofthe
Plaintiffs, notably inthem.c.a. cases
andinthe Holz &Willemsen case.I
wouldacordingly rejectthatcontention
too.
954

COMMISSIONNAIRES RÉUNIS vRECEVEUR DESDOUANES
There isnoauthority thatsupports the
contention oftheCommission; andthe
m.c.a.and Holz &Willemsen casesare
inconsistent withittoo.Moreover that
contention, whichrestsneither onany
express provision oftheTreatynoron
anyknown ruleofinterpretation,
whould produce anarbitrary result.SoI
wouldrejectitalso.
There isauthority tosupport the
contention oftheCouncil, butnotin
thewide terms inwhich itwas
formulated. Inordertojustify the
inclusion bytheCouncil, inany
legislation relating tothecommon
organization ofagricultural markets, of
aprovision derogating fromthegeneral
rulesoftheTreaty, incircumstances not
expressly provided foranywhere in
Articles 39to46,itmustbeshownnot
onlythatthatprovision isauxiliary and
temporaly, butalsothat,inviewofa
particular factual situation, the
provision isnecessary, andgoesno
further thanisnecessary, toafford a
safeguard against themalfunctioning of
suchorganization. Thatistheeffectof
them.c.a.and Holtz &Willemsen cases,
anditmustberightbecause thepower
fortheCouncil toderogate fromthe
rulesoftheTreaty insuchcircum­
stances beinganimplied power, implied
inArticle 43oftheTreaty,itcannot be
wider thanisnecessary forthe
attainment oftheobjectives forwhich
theexpress powers contained inthat
Article areconferred (consider para.I
(3)ofthereasoning oftheCourtinits
Opinion givenon26April1977under
Article 228(1)oftheTreaty inthe
matter ofthe draft 'Agreement
establishing aEuropean laying-up fund
forinland waterway vessels'[1977]ECR,
atp.755).
Ishould add—although perhaps this
goeswithout saying—that,evenwhere
itisshownthataprovision derogating
fromthegeneral rulesoftheTreaty is
necessary asatemporary safeguard
against themalfunctioning ofthe
common organization ofamarket, thepoweroftheCouncil toenactsucha
provision doesnot,inmyopinion,
include power todelegate anywide
discretion toMember States. The
operation oftheprovision mustremain
under thecontrol oftheCommunity
itself.
Forthereasons Ihavealready stated,I
amoftheopinion that,atthetime
when Regulation No816/70 was
adopted, asituation existed which
warranted theinclusion inthatRegu­
lationofArticle 31(2).Moreover the
second subparagraph ofthatprovision
wasdesigned toensure thatits
operation remained underthecontrolof
theCommission. Iamaccordingly of
theopinion that,atitsinception, Article
31(2)wasvalid, andthatYour
Lordships should soruleinanswer to
thefirstquestion referred totheCourt
bytheTribunal d'Instance of
Bourg-en-Bresse.
Iturntothesecondquestion.
AstothattheFrench Government
submits firstthatArticle 31(2)must
haveremained inforceinSeptember
1975because itwasnotrepealed until
May1976.TheFrench Government
argues that,sincethatprovision was
contained inaCouncil Regulation, its
applicability couldbebrought toanend
onlybyanactoftheCouncil. In
support ofthatviewtheFrench
Government referstothefactthatthe
minutes oftheMeeting oftheCouncil
heldon27and28April1970,when
Regulation No816/70 wasadopted,
contained adeclaration totheeffect
that"theCommission would consider,
atthebeginning ofthenextwine­
growing year,whether, ineachMember
State,allthemechanisms necessary for
themanagement ofthemarket inwine,
within theframework ofthecommon
organization ofthatmarket, hadbeen
established insuchawaythattheirdue
functioning could beensured; and
would report itsfindings tothe
Council". TheFrench Government also
955

OPINION OFMRWARNER —JOINED CASES 80AND81/77
reliesontheviewsexpressed bycertain
members oftheCouncil atsubsequent
meetings ofit.
Inmyopinion thatsubmission shouldbe
rejected. ByitsowntermsArticle 31(2)
waslimitedtooperate only"solongas
alltheadministrative mechanisms
necessary forthemanagement ofthe
market inwinearenotinapplication".
Indeed, haditnotbeenforthat
limitation, Article 31(2)would, Ithink,
having regard tothereasons that
warranted itsinclusion inRegulation
No816/70, havebeenvoidasbeingin
excessofwhatitlaywithinthepower
oftheCouncil toenact.Thedifficulty
arisesfromthefactthattheRegulation
didnotspecify bywhom andinwhat
manner itshould beascertained when
thecondition subsequent expressed in
thelimitation wassatisfied. Itcannot,
however, bededuced fromthatthat
suchascertainment should beamatter
fortheCouncil. Having regardtothe
termsof,respectively, Articles 145an
155oftheTreaty, itisnottothe
Council, buttotheCommission, that
pertains thefunction ofensuring that
measures taken bytheInstitutions
pursuant totheTreatyareapplied.
Thereareanumber ofreasons whythe
declaration contained intheCouncil's
Minutes cannot havehadtheeffect
suggested bytheFrench Government.
First,andmostobviously, such a
declaration isnotanacthaving
legislative forceand,evenifitwere,it
couldnotaltertheprovisions ofthe
Treaty astotherespective functions of
theCouncil andoftheCommission. It
wassubmitted onbehalfoftheFrench
Government thatthedeclaration might
beinvoked, under theheading of
"travaux préparatoires", asanaidtothe
interpretation ofRegulation No816/70.
Butnoamount ofsuchaidwould
enable onetointerpret theRegulation
inawayinconsistent withtheTreaty.
Moreover, whatever maybethevaluein
general of"travaux préparatoires" in
theinterpretation ofCouncil Regu­lations —and,asYourLordships
know,Idoubtiftheycanhaveany—
theycertainly cannot beinvoked when
unpublished. (Iwould referinthat
connexion towhatIsaidinCase28/76
MilacvHZA Freiburg [1976]ECRat
p.1664andinCase109/76 Blottner v
Nieuwe Algemene Bedrijfsvereniging
[1977] ECR,atp.1154).Itwasalso
submitted onbehalf oftheFrench
Government (atthehearing) thatthe
declaration mightbeheldtohavehad
legaleffectbyvirtueoftheprinciple in
Case 81/72 Commission vCouncil
[1973] 1ECR,575.Butthatprinciple is
onlythatadeclaration oftheCouncil
may,incertain circumstances, giverise
tolegitimate expectations whichthelaw
willprotect.Itisdifficult toseethatthe
declaration hereinquestion canhave
givenrisetoanylegitimate expectation
onanyone's part.Atalleventthe
French Government didnotmention
any.Lastly,thetermsofthedeclaration
werenarrow inscope.Theycalledupon
theCommission togiveconsideration to
amatter thatitwould havebeenits
dutytoconsider anyway andto"report
itsfindings totheCouncil". Nothing
wassaidaboutthepurpose ofthat
report. Itcould wellhavebeen
envisaged asbeingforinformation only.
Furthermore, thedeclaration called
upon theCommission togive
consideration tothatmatteronlyonce,
i.e.atthebeginning ofthenextwine­
growing year.Nothing wassaidasto
whatwastohappeniftheCommission
found(asindeed, intheevents,itdid)
that,atthattime,theadministrative
mechanisms inquestion hadnotbeen
fullyestablished inallMember States.
Thusthequestion remains when, in
fact,alltheadministrative mechanisms
necessary forthemanagement ofthe
market inwine came tobe"in
application". Iftheywereinapplication
beforeMay1976,therepealthenof
Article 31(2)wasmerely the
elimination ofstatutory deadwood—a
familiar enough process.
956

COMMISSIONNAIRES RÉUNIS vRECEVEUR DESDOUANES
Itwassubmitted onbehalf ofthe
French Government thatthatquestion
wasnotofakindthatitwaswithin the
jurisdiction ofthisCourttoresolve in
proceedings underArticle 177ofthe
Treaty. Wewerereferred totwo
Judgments one,dated29April1977,of
theTribunal d'Instance ofMarseille and
theother,dated29June1977,ofthe
Tribunal d'Instance ofSète,intwo
othersofthe40orsocasesthatIhave
mentioned, inwhich those Courts
(unlike theTribunal d'Instance of
Bourg-en-Bresse) tookthatview,and
ordered experts' reports onthequestion
whether those administrative
mechanisms hadbeensetupinItalyby
11September 1975.
There againIhavecometothe
conclusion thatthesubmission ofthe
French Government mustberejected,
withtheconsequence thattheJudgment
oftheTribunal d'Instance ofMarseille
andthatoftheTribunal d'Instance of
Seteweremistaken.
IfIamrightinthinking that,byvirtue
ofArticle 155oftheTreaty, itlay,in
thefirstinstance, withtheCommission,
andwiththeCommission alone, to
determine when those administrative
mechanisms hadbeensetupandwere
functioning, itcouldnotalteranyone's
rightswhether ornotinfactthe
Commission tookanyformal decision
onthematter.IftheCommission issued
suchadecision, itwould beopento
challenge bytheCouncil orbyany
Member StateunderArticle 173ofthe
Treaty. Alternatively itsvalidity would
beopentoreviewunderArticle 177,on
areference fromanyCourtorTribunal
inanyMember State.Ineithercaseit
would beforthisCourt todecide,
according totheevidence, whether the
decision oftheCommission was
sustainable. AsIpointed outinCases
51,86&96/75 EMI v CBS [1976]ECR
atp.854,itisopentothisCourt,ona
reference underArticle 177astothe
validity ofanyactofaCommunity
Institution, toadmitevidence onany
issueoffactaffecting suchvalidity.Theomission oftheCommission to
issueanysuchdecision (atallevents
before 15September 1975)could, in
theory, beattributed toanyoneofthree
reasons. (Isay"atalleventsbefore 15
September 1975", because the
Commission's letterofthatdatetothe
French Government mightberegarded
asembodying suchadecision). Thefirst
possible reason would bethatthe
Commission overlooked itsobligations
undertheTreaty. Thesecondwould be
thattheCommission didnotconsider
itselfobliged totakeanyformal
decision untilapractical situation arose
inwhichitbecame necessary todoso.
The third would bethat the
Commission wasnotsatisfied untilMay
1976thattherequisite administrative
mechanisms wereinapplication. We
know,fromwhatwehavebeentoldon
behalfoftheCommission itself,thatthe
lastwasnotthecase.Therefore the
reason musthavebeenoneofthefirst
two.Neither ofthemcouldoperate so
astoresultinatransfer oftheultimate
jurisdiction ontheessential question
fromthisCourt tothenational Courts
ofMember States. Asitwasputon
behalfoftheCommission inthecourse
ofargument, although wearehere
concerned withtheduration ofthe
validity ofaprovision ofCommunity
legislation, ratherthanwiththequestion
ofitsvalidity fromtheoutset, the
question isstilloneaboutitsvalidity. It
isnotaquestion astotheapplication of
Community lawtothecircumstances of
aparticular case,which,inthecontext
ofArticle 177,would beamatter
exclusively forthenational Courts. In
saying thatIdonot,ofcourse,
overlook thataninferior Court ina
Member Statehasadiscretion todecide
itself,without reference tothisCourt, a
question concerning thevalidity ofa
provision ofCommunity Regulation.
But,onanyappeal against itsdecision
toaCourtagainst whosedecisions there
isnojudicial remedy undernational
law,areference tothisCourt there
957

OPINION OFMRWARNER —JOINED CASES ISAND 81/77
mustbe.Ultimate jurisdiction onsucha
question thuslieswiththisCourt.
SoIturntotheevidence.
IntheArticle 169proceedings (Case
117/75) theFrench Government madea
numberofallegations totheeffectthat,
bySeptember 1975,themechanisms
necessary forthemanagement ofthe
market inwinehadstillnotbeenfully
setupinItaly,oratalleventswerenot
functioning thereproperly. TheCourt
asked theFrench Government whether
itproposed toputinanyevidence to
substantiate those allegations. In
response tothatinvitation theFrench
Government putinabundle of
documents consisting inpartof
dispatches fromtheFrench Embassy in
Rome, inpartofcuttings fromItalian
newspapers andinpartofextracts from
the"Gazzetta Ufficiale dellaRepublica
Italiana". Initswritten observations in
thepresent cases theFrench
Government repeated muchthesame
allegations, againwithout preferring
anyevidence. TheCourtinviteditto
saywhether itwould agreetothat
bundleofdocuments beingtransferred
fromthefileinCase117/75 tothefile
inthepresent cases.Tothatcoursethe
French Government assented. Itdidnot
however relyonthosedocuments in
argument. Having perused them,Ihave
cometotheconclusion thattheyareof
negligible evidentiary value.
Therestoftheevidence consists of
documents putinbytheCommission
andbytheCouncil
Ofthosethefirstthatisrelevant isthe
reportmadebytheCommission tothe
Council pursuant tothedeclaration
contained intheminutes ofthemeeting
oftheCouncil of27and28April1970.
Thatreportwasdated27July1971.Its
conclusions wereexpressed inthe
following terms:
"—Lesinstruments nécessaires àla
gestion dumarché viti-vinicole
semblent, pourlaplusgrande
partie, êtremisenplaceparles
Étatsmembres.—Lesdates àpartirdesquelles les
instruments nécessaires ontétémis
enplace different d'un État
membre àl'autre. Pourdesraisons
d'ordre administratif ilaété
relativement plusfaciledeprocéder
àunemiseenplacerapidedeces
instruments dans certain Etats
membres qui,avantl'entrée en
vigueur de('organisation commune
dumarché viti-vinicole possédaient
déjà,danslecadrenational, les
instruments correspondants."
Inotherwords theCommission could
notfind,atthatdate, thatthe
mechanisms inquestion hadbeenfully
established inallMember States, andin
particular couldnotfindthattheyhad
beensoestablished inItaly.
The Commission's report was
successively considered bytheCouncil's
Working PartyonWineandbyits
Special Committee onAgriculture. The
former's report isdated 14February
1972,thelatter's 23February 1972.
Bothconcluded, inthelightoffurther
information thathadbeen received
since thedateoftheCommission's
report, thatthemechanisms necessary
forthemanagement ofthemarket in
wine hadbeen established inthe
Member Statesby31December 1971.
Itwasargued onbehalfoftheFrench
Government thatthosereports shoujd
beignored because theWorking Party
onWineandtheSpecial Committee on
Agriculture weresimply non-statutory
bodies setupbytheCouncil toassistit
initstasks,sothattheyhadnopower
tobindtheirmaster, theCouncil itself.
If,however, Iamrightinthinking that
thecompetence oftheCouncil didnot
extend toadjudicating upon the
question whether thecondition sub­
sequent contained inArticle 31(2)of
Regulation No816/70 hadbeen
satisfied atanyparticular time,that
argument isbeside thepoint. The
relevance ofthosereports isthat,having
beenmadebyspecialized bodies (I
958

COMMISSIONNAIRES RÉUNIS vRECEVEUR DESDOUANES
hesitate tousetheword"expert") on
which alltheMember States andthe
Commission wererepresented, they
constitute evidence and,Iwouldthink,
strong evidence, thatinfactthat
condition wassatisfied whentheysaidit
was.There isnosuggestion thatthe
reportswereotherthanunanimous.
TheFrench Government alsorefersto
whathappened attwosubsequent
meetings oftheCouncil.
Ofthosemeetings thefirstwasthat
heldon29and30May1972,whenthe
reports oftheCommission andofthe
Special Committee onAgriculture were
considered. Theminutes ofthatmeeting
arebefore theCourt. Formally, the
Council confined itselftotakingnoteof
thereportoftheCommission. During
thecourseofthediscussion, however,
theFrenchMinister ofAgriculture had
saidthathecouldnotbelieve thatall
themechanisms inquestion werein
application, because dailyexperience
showed thatdifficulties werestillbeing
encountered onthewinemarket. Itwas
"politically" impossible forhimto
acceptthattheCouncil should declare
Article 31(2)spent.Inanswer toa
question from thePresident, he
confirmed thatwhathemeantwasthat,
whilst those mechanisms hadbeen
established, theywerenotfunctioning
adequately. TheMember ofthe
Commission present stated thatthe
provisions ofRegulation No816/70
hadbeenapplied. Whether those
provisions needed modification or
improvement wasanother matter.
Thesecond meeting oftheCouncil
referred tobytheFrench Government
wasthatheldon9September 1975,that
isjustbefore theadoption bythat
Government ofthedecree herein
question. Theminutes ofthatmeeting
tooarebefore theCourt.Atthestartof
themeeting theFrenchMinister ofAgri­
culture drew attention tothe
disturbance caused intheFrench wine
marketbythedepreciation oftheItalianlira.Hesuggested there-introduction of
m.c.a.'s. Thatsuggestion washowever
rejected. TheFrench delegation then
putforward thesuggestion thatArticle
31(2)should beinvoked onthefooting
thattheCouncil hadsofarfailedto
agreeonthemeasures necessary to
improve thecommon organization of
themarket inwine,although ithad,by
aResolution of21April1975(Official
Journal C90of23April 1975)
committed itselftodoing soby1
August 1975.TheFrench Government
reliesstrongly onthefactthat,notonly
anumber ofother Members ofthe
Council butalsotheresponsible
Member oftheCommission (Mr
Lardinois), whowaspresent, accepted
thatsuchasolution mightbepossible. It
isfairtosayhowever thattheyaccepted
itonlyreluctantly andasoneelement in
apossible "political package", the
feasibility ofwhichwould needtobe
examined bytheCommission, there
beingdoubtsaboutitspracticability and
about itslegality. Intheevents the
solution wasrejected, because other
Members oftheCouncil wereopposed
toitonbothpolitical andlegalgrounds.
Itis,incidentally, noteworthy thata
number ofthemexpressed, asIhave
done,theviewthatitwasforthe
Commission tosaywhenthecondition
subsequent inArticle 31(2)hadbeen
satisfied.
Inmyopinion onecannot deduce from
theproceedings atthosetwomeetings
oftheCouncil that,inSeptember 1975,
thecondition subsequent inArticle 31
(2)hadstillnotbeensatisfied. Onemay
deduce fromthem,andfrommuchelse
inthedocuments placed before the
CourtbytheCommission andbythe
Council, thatthecommon organization
ofthemarket asestablished byRegu­
lation No816/70 wasinneedof
improvement. Itwasindeed improved,
later,byRegulation No1160/76. But
Article 31(2)cannot, inmyopinion, be
interpreted asmeaning thattherightof
aMember Statetotakemeasures there-
959

OPINION OFMRWARNER —JOINED CASES 8CAND81/77
under wastoremain exerciseable, not
onlysolong asthemechanisms
necessary togiveeffecttoRegulation
No816/70 itself were notin
application, butalsosolongasitmight
appearthattheprovisions ofthatRegu­
lationwereimperfect.
There isoneotherpieceofevidence to
whichIshould refer.
On15September 1975,MrLardinois
heldapressconference inBrussels at
which heexpounded theconsidered
viewoftheCommission. Inthecourse
ofdoingso,heoutlined themeasures
thattheCommission itselfhadtakento
alleviate thesituation onthewine
market. Oneofthemwasthedispatch
totheItalian Government ofaletter
askingittoaccelerate thepayment of
sumsduetoproducers andtraders
underthecommon organization ofthat
market (e.g.refunds, storage aids,
distillation premia, etc.).Hesaidthat
such payments, though normally
effected inMember States withintwo
months, tookclosertoayeartoeffect
inItaly,andthatthathadanadverse
effectonthemarket. This,insomemeasure, supports theviewofthe
French Government thatsomeofthe
relevant administrative mechanisms
werenotfunctioning properly inItaly.
Administrative inefficiency ishowever, I
apprehend, albeitregrettable, moreor
lessendemic inallourcountries. Often
itcauses hardship, sometimes grave
hardship. Theremedies against itvary
fromcountry tocountry. There are
ombudsmen, therearecourts, there is
thepressandthereareparliamentary
questions. AttheCommunity levelwe
relyparticularly onArticle 169ofthe
Treaty. Butonecannot, Ithink,hold
thatatemporary provision inaCouncil
Regulation establishing acommon
organization ofthemarket inanagri­
cultural product, derogating, inorderto
meetaparticular factualsituation, from
thegeneral rulesoftheTreaty, suchas
was,ifIamright,Article 31(2)of
Regulation No816/70, may be
regarded asstillcapable ofbeing
invoked, fiveyearsaftertheentryinto
forceofthatRegulation, simply in
ordertoafford aremedy against
administrative inefficiency.
Iamtherefore oftheopinion thatYourLordships should, inanswertothe
secondquestion referred totheCourtbytheTribunal d'Instance ofBourg-
en-Bresse, rulethattheprovisions ofArticle 31(2)ofRegulation
No816/70hadceasedtobeapplicable before 11September 1975.
960