ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 67(2) TFEU and Article 21 of Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), as amended by Regulation (EU) No 610/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, must be interpreted to the effect that they preclude legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which requires every coach transport undertaking providing a regular cross-border service within the Schengen area to the territory of that Member State to check the passports and residence permits of passengers before they cross an internal border in order to prevent the transport of third-country nationals not in possession of those travel documents to the national territory, and which allows, for the purposes of complying with that obligation to carry out checks, the police authorities to issue orders prohibiting such transport, accompanied by a threat of a recurring fine, against transport undertakings which have been found to have conveyed to that territory third-country nationals who were not in possession of the requisite travel documents. The fact that, in the present case, the checks at issue in the main proceedings are characterised by the particularly close connection which they have with the crossing of an internal border, inasmuch as that is specifically the event which triggers those checks, is particularly indicative of an ‘effect equivalent to border checks’ for the purposes of Article 21(a) of Regulation No 562/2006.

(see paras 68, 73, operative part)
Article 31(1) of Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, must be interpreted as meaning that an undertaking which offers the live streaming of television programmes online must not, based on that fact alone, be regarded as an undertaking which provides an electronic communications network used for the distribution of radio or television channels to the public.

It clearly follows from recital 5 of the Framework Directive that it is necessary to separate the regulation of transmission from the regulation of content, and that the common regulatory framework, of which the Universal Service Directive is part, does not cover the content of services delivered over electronic communications networks using electronic communications services (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 November 2013, UPC Nederland, C‑518/11, EU:C:2013:709, paragraph 38).

(see paras 20, 22, operative part 1)
Clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work, concluded on 18 March 1999, which is annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which allows an employer to terminate, at the end of the teaching period, the employment relationship of fixed-term teachers recruited as interim civil servants for one academic year, on the ground that the conditions of necessity and urgency attached to their recruitment have ceased to apply on that date, whereas the employment relationship of indefinite duration of teachers who are established civil servants is maintained.

Indeed, the fact that, at end of the teaching period, the employment relationship of teachers who are established civil servants is not terminated, or that this relationship is not suspended, is inherent in the very nature of the employment relationship of such workers. They will occupy a permanent post precisely because they are hired in the context of an employment relationship of indefinite duration.

As regards fixed-term employment relationships, such as those of the persons concerned, they are, by contrast, as follows from Clause 3(1) of the Framework Agreement, characterised by the fact that the employer and the worker agree, at the point those relationships begin, that they will end upon the occurrence of objectively determined conditions, such as the completion of a specific task, the occurrence of a specific event or a specific date being reached (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 June 2018, Grupo Norte Facility, C‑574/16, EU:C:2018:390, paragraph 57, and Montero Mateos, C‑677/16, EU:C:2018:393, paragraph 60).

In those circumstances, since, as was pointed out, in essence, in paragraphs 33 and 36 of this judgment, the Framework Agreement recognises, in principle, that it is legitimate to have recourse to both employment relationships of indefinite duration and fixed-term employment relationships and does not specify the conditions under which use may be made of such relationships, a difference in treatment, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which consists solely in the fact that a fixed-term employment relationship has come to an end at a given date, whereas an employment relationship of indefinite duration has not, cannot be penalised on the basis of that agreement.

(see paras 43, 44, 46, 54, operative part 1)
1.

Declares that Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations: – under Article 3(1) and (2) of Council Directive 91/271/EEC of 21 May 1991 concerning urban waste water treatment, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1137/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008, and section A and footnote 1 of Annex I thereto by not ensuring that the waters collected in a combined urban waste water and rainwater system are retained and conducted for treatment in compliance with the requirements of that directive, as amended, so far as concerns the agglomerations of Athlone, Cork City, Enniscorthy apart from the townland of Killagoley, Fermoy, Mallow, Midleton, Ringaskiddy and Roscommon Town; – under Article 4(1) and/or (3) of Directive 91/271 as amended by Regulation No 1137/2008, read in conjunction with Article 10 thereof and section B of Annex I thereto, by not putting in place secondary or equivalent treatment so far as concerns the agglomerations of Arklow, Athlone, Ballybofey/Stranorlar, Cobh, Cork City, Enfield, Enniscorthy, Fermoy, Killybegs, Mallow, Midleton, Passage/Monkstown, Rathcormac, Ringaskiddy, Ringsend, Roscommon Town, Shannon Town, Tubbercurry and Youghal; – under Article 5(2) and (3) of Directive 91/271 as amended by Regulation No 1137/2008, read in conjunction with Article 10 thereof and section B of Annex I thereto, by not ensuring that urban waste water entering collecting systems from the agglomerations of Athlone, Cork City, Dundalk, Enniscorthy apart from the townland of Killagoley, Fermoy, Killarney, Killybegs, Longford, Mallow, Midleton, Navan, Nenagh, Portarlington, Ringsend, Roscrea and Tralee be, before discharge into sensitive areas, made subject to treatment more stringent than that described in Article 4 of that directive, as amended, and in accordance with the requirements of section B of Annex I thereto; and – under Article 12 of Directive 91/271, as amended by Regulation No 1137/2008, by not ensuring that the disposal of waste water from urban waste water treatment plants of the agglomerations of Arklow and Castlebridge is subject to prior regulations and/or specific authorisation.
Article 4(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society must be interpreted as meaning that the storage by a retailer of goods bearing a motif protected by copyright on the territory of the Member State where the goods are stored may constitute an infringement of the exclusive distribution right, as defined by that provision, when that retailer offers for sale, without the authorisation of the copyright holder, goods identical to those which he is storing, provided that the stored goods are actually intended for sale on the territory of the Member State in which that motif is protected. The distance between the place of storage and the place of sale cannot, on its own, be a decisive element in determining whether the stored goods are intended for sale on the territory of that Member State.

(see para. 40, operative part)
10

Paragraph 49 of the Gesetz über den Schutz von Marken und sonstigen Kennzeichen (Law on the protection of trade marks and other distinctive signs) of 25 October 1994 (BGBl. 1994 I, p. 3082, ‘the Markengesetz’), entitled ‘Revocation of the rights of the proprietor’, provides in paragraph 1: ‘On an application, the mark shall be removed from the register, on the ground that it has been revoked, if it has not been used, within the meaning of Paragraph 26, for an uninterrupted period of five years after the date of its registration. The revocation of the rights of the proprietor of a mark may not, however, be invoked if, after that period and before the application for cancellation has been filed, use of the mark, within the meaning of Paragraph 26, has been started or resumed. The commencement or resumption of use within a period of three months preceding the filing of the application for cancellation which began after a continuous period of five years of non-use shall, however, be disregarded where preparations for the commencement or resumption occur only after the proprietor of the mark becomes aware that the application for cancellation may be filed. Where the application for cancellation under Paragraph 53(1) is filed with the Patent Office, the application to the Patent Office shall be the determining date for calculating the three-month period referred to in the third sentence, if the cancellation action under Paragraph 55(1) has been made within three months of notification of the communication referred to in Paragraph 53(4).’
57

Consequently, the answer to be given to the referring court is that Article 49 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding, in principle, national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, pursuant to which the resident companies in a group are permitted to deduct, from their group profits, the losses sustained by a resident permanent establishment of a non-resident subsidiary of that group only in the case where the rules applicable in the Member State in which that subsidiary has its registered office do not permit those losses to be deducted from the latter’s profits, when the application of that legislation is combined with that of a convention preventing double taxation allowing, in the latter Member State, the deduction from the income tax payable by the subsidiary of a sum corresponding to the income tax paid, in the Member State on the territory of which that permanent establishment is situated, in respect of the latter’s activity. However, Article 49 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding such legislation in the case where the effect of its application is to deprive that group of any effective possibility of deducting those losses from the group’s overall profits, where it is not possible to set off those losses against that subsidiary’s profits in the Member State on the territory of which that subsidiary is established, these being matters for the referring court to verify.
3

Recitals 3, 7, 9 and 11 of the EIA Directive are worded as follows: ‘(3) The principles of the assessment of environmental effects should be harmonised, in particular with reference to the projects which should be subject to assessment, the main obligations of the developers and the content of the assessment. The Member States may lay down stricter rules to protect the environment. … (7) Development consent for public and private projects which are likely to have significant effects on the environment should be granted only after an assessment of the likely significant environmental effects of those projects has been carried out. That assessment should be conducted on the basis of the appropriate information supplied by the developer, which may be supplemented by the authorities and by the public likely to be concerned by the project in question. … (9) Projects of other types may not have significant effects on the environment in every case and those projects should be assessed where the Member States consider that they are likely to have significant effects on the environment. … (11) When setting such thresholds or criteria or examining projects on a case-by-case basis, for the purpose of determining which projects should be subject to assessment on the basis of their significant environmental effects, Member States should take account of the relevant selection criteria set out in this Directive. In accordance with the subsidiarity principle, the Member States are in the best position to apply those criteria in specific instances.’
52

First of all, it must be found that the arguments by which the appellants dispute the findings of fact by the General Court are inadmissible in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 32 above, on the ground that the appellants have not claimed that there has been a distortion of the facts or evidence examined by the General Court. That is true of the arguments disputing the assessment, in paragraph 47 of the judgment under appeal, of the purpose of the measures taken by the entities referred to in the complaint. The arguments relating to the scope of the national authorities’ and courts’ discretion, their alleged lack of jurisdiction and the fact that the inspections had not initially revealed any irregularity are also inadmissible. Lastly, the arguments calling in question the assessment, in paragraphs 59 and 64 of the judgment under appeal, of the geographical scope of the alleged infringement are inadmissible. In those circumstances, it is also unnecessary to adjudicate on the admissibility of the documents produced by the appellants in annex to the reply in order to illustrate the scope — and in particular the territorial scope — of the conduct of which the entities referred to in the complaint are accused.
18

Article 20 of the Zakon o mednarodni zaščiti (Law on International Protection) (Uradni list RS No 16/17, ‘the ZMZ-1’) provides: ‘(1) In Slovenia, “international protection” shall refer to refugee status and subsidiary protection status. (2) The status of refugee shall be granted to a citizen of a third country who, entertaining a well-founded fear of being persecuted on account of his belonging to a particular race or ethnic group or to a particular religion, or because of his citizenship, his membership of a particular social group or his political opinions, has left the country of which he is a citizen and cannot or, because of that fear, does not wish to avail himself of the protection offered by that country, or to a stateless person who is no longer in the country of his habitual residence and, because of a well-founded fear, cannot or does not wish to return to that country, provided that there are no grounds of exclusion of the kind provided for in Article 31(1) of this Law. (3) The status of subsidiary protection shall be granted to a citizen of a third country or a stateless person who does not satisfy the requirements for the grant of refugee status, if there are substantial grounds for believing that the person concerned would run a real risk of suffering severe harm if he should return to his country of origin or to the country of his last habitual residence, as provided by Article 28 of this Law, and there are no grounds of exclusion of the kind referred to in Article 31(2) of this Law.’
21

In those circumstances, the Bundesfinanzhof (Federal Finance Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Account being taken of the task of tax collector for the tax authority that falls to the taxable person, must Article 63 of [the VAT Directive] be interpreted restrictively as meaning that the amount receivable in respect of the supply of goods or services (a) is due or (b) is at least unconditionally owed? (2) If the answer to the first question is in the negative: is the taxable person obliged to pre-finance the VAT owed in respect of the supply of goods or services for a period of two years if he is not able to receive (part of) the remuneration for the goods or services supplied by him until two years after the taxable event has occurred? (3) If the answer to the second question is in the affirmative: account being taken of the powers conferred on them under Article 90(2) of [the VAT Directive], are the Member States entitled to assume, for the purposes of the tax period in which VAT first becomes chargeable, that there has been an adjustment as provided for in Article 90(1) of that directive in the case where the taxable person is not able to obtain the amount receivable, because it is not due, until two years after the taxable event has occurred?’
24

Paragraph 39e of the EStG, headed ‘Procedure for the establishment and use of the individual electronic data for the calculation of the wage tax to be deducted at source’: ‘(1) The Federal Central Tax Office shall establish, for every wage-earning employee, generally in automated form, the tax bracket, and, and as regards children to be taken into account with respect to tax brackets I to IV, the amount of child relief … as individual data for the calculation of the wage tax to be deducted at source (Paragraph 39(4), first sentence, points 1 and 2) … Where the tax authority establishes, in accordance with Paragraph 39, individual data for the calculation of the wage tax to be deducted at source, it shall transmit that data to the Federal Central Tax Office so that the data will be available for automated retrieval by the employer … (2) In order to make available to employers the individual data for the calculation of the wage tax to be deducted at source, which is automatically retrievable, the Federal Central Tax Office shall store the individual data for the calculation of the wage tax to be deducted at source, accessible by identification number, and, for each taxpayer, the following data, in addition to the data mentioned in Paragraph 139b(3) of the [AO]: 1. affiliation de jure to a tax-collecting religious community, and the date of joining and withdrawal, 2. registered marital status, and the date of creation or dissolution of that marital status and, in the case of married persons, identification number of the spouse, 3. children, with reference to their identification number … … (4) When commencing employment, for the purpose of retrieving individual data for the calculation of the wage tax to be deducted at source, a wage-earning employee shall inform each of his employers 1. of his identification number and date of birth … … At the start of the employment relationship, the employer shall retrieve the individual electronic data for the calculation of the wage tax to be deducted at source for the employee from the Federal Central Tax Office via remote data transmission and shall incorporate that data in the employee’s wage records.’
48

In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the second question is that Article 308 of the VAT Directive must be interpreted as meaning that the margin of the travel agent, and, consequently, its taxable amount, corresponds to the difference between the total amount, exclusive of VAT, to be paid by the traveller and the actual input cost incurred by the travel agent in respect of supplies of goods and services provided by other taxable persons, in so far as those transactions are for the direct benefit of the traveller. When the amount of the payment on account corresponds to the total price of the tourist service or to a significant part of that price, and the travel agent has not yet incurred any actual cost, or has incurred only a limited part of the individual total cost of that service, or even when the individual actual cost of the trip incurred by the travel agent cannot be determined at the time when the payment on account is made, the profit margin can be determined on the basis of an estimate of the total actual cost which it will ultimately have to incur. For the purpose of such an estimate, the travel agent must take into account, where relevant, the costs which it has already actually incurred at the time of receipt of the payment on account. For the purpose of the calculation of the margin, the estimated total actual cost is deducted from the total price of the trip and the taxable amount for VAT to be paid at the time of receipt of the payment on account is obtained by multiplying the amount of that payment on account by the percentage corresponding to the part of the total cost of the trip that the estimated profit margin, thus determined, represents.
7

Under Article 27 of Directive 2012/34, entitled ‘Network statement’, which reproduces, in essence, the provisions of Article 3 of Directive 2001/14, as amended by Directive 2007/58: ‘1. The infrastructure manager shall, after consultation with the interested parties, develop and publish a network statement which shall be obtainable against payment of a fee which shall not exceed the cost of publication of that statement. The network statement shall be published in at least two official languages of the Union. The content of the network statement shall be made available free of charge in electronic format on the web portal of the infrastructure manager and accessible through a common web portal. That web portal shall be set up by the infrastructure managers in the framework of their cooperation in accordance with Articles 37 and 40. 2. The network statement shall set out the nature of the infrastructure which is available to railway undertakings, and contain information setting out the conditions for access to the relevant railway infrastructure. The network statement shall also contain information setting out the conditions for access to service facilities connected to the network of the infrastructure manager and for supply of services in these facilities or indicate a website where such information is made available free of charge in electronic format. The content of the network statement is laid down in Annex IV. 3. The network statement shall be kept up to date and amended as necessary. 4. The network statement shall be published no less than four months in advance of the deadline for requests for infrastructure capacity.’