ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Appeal brought on 26 January 2021 by Allergan Holdings France against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 18 November 2020 in Case T-664/19, Allergan Holdings France v EUIPO — Dermavita (JUVEDERM ULTRA)

(Case C-41/21 P)

(2021/C 228/17)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Allergan Holdings France (represented by: T. de Haan, avocat, and J. Day, Solicitor)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Dermavita Co. Ltd

By order of 29 April 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Allergan Holdings France should bear its own costs.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Saarbrücken (Germany) lodged on 23 March 2021 — Maxxus Group GmbH & Co. KG v Globus Holding GmbH & Co. KG

(Case C-183/21)

(2021/C 228/28)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Saarbrücken

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Maxxus Group GmbH & Co. KG

Defendant: Globus Holding GmbH & Co. KG

Question referred

Are Directive 2008/95/EC, (1) in particular in Article 12, and

Directive (EU) 2015/2436, (2) in particular in Articles 16, 17 and 19,

to be interpreted as meaning that the effet utile of those provisions prohibits an interpretation of national procedural law which

1. imposes on the applicant in civil proceedings for cancellation of a national registered trade mark on grounds of revocation for non-use a burden of raising and presenting an issue, as distinguished from the burden of proof; and

2. requires the applicant, in the context of that burden of raising and presenting an issue, a. to make, in such proceedings, substantiated submissions regarding the defendant’s non-use of the trade mark, to the extent that it is possible for the applicant to do so; and b. to carry out, for that purpose, its own research into the market, in a manner which is appropriate to the request for cancellation and to the specific nature of the trade mark concerned.

(1) Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (Codified version) (OJ 2008 L 299, p. 25).

(2) Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 2015 L 336, p. 1).
Does Article 6(1) of Directive 2008/98/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 preclude national legislation under which end-of-waste status is achieved only once waste or existing substances or the substances obtained from them are used directly as a substitute for raw materials or for products made from primary raw materials or they have been prepared for reuse?

If Question 1 is answered in the negative:
5.

Is the expression ‘which cannot be contained by any other reasonable means’, as used in Article 53 of the regulation, to be interpreted as giving equal importance, in the light of the wording of recital 8 of the regulation, on the one hand, to ensuring a high level of protection of both human and animal health and the environment and, on the other hand, to safeguarding the competitiveness of Community agriculture?
3.

Does the legal action whereby an applicant seeks a declaration that he or she is the owner of an asset in his or her possession in reliance on a double contract of sale, the first entered into by the original joint owner of that asset (the spouse of the defendant, who is also an original joint owner) with the person who sold the asset to the applicant, and the second between the latter two parties, come within the concept of matters relating to a contract within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the Brussels I Regulation? a. Is the answer different if the defendant relies on the fact that the first contract was not a contract of sale but a contract of deposit? b. If one of those situations comes within the concept of matters relating to a contract, which contract must be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the place of the obligation which serves as the basis of the claim?
A.

Is there an obligation to license suppliers on a priority basis? 1. Can an undertaking at a downstream stage in the economic process rely on the plea of abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU to dismiss a patent infringement action for a prohibitive injunction brought by the proprietor of a patent essential to a standard established by a standardisation body (‘SEP’) who has irrevocably undertaken to that body to grant a licence to any third party on FRAND terms, where the standard for which the patent at issue is essential, or parts thereof, are already implemented in an upstream product procured by the defendant in the patent infringement action, whose suppliers which are willing to obtain a licence are refused, by the patent proprietor, their own unrestricted licence for all types of use relevant under patent law on FRAND terms in respect of products implementing the standard? (a) Is this the case in particular if it is customary practice in the relevant industry of the final product distributor for the intellectual property right situation in respect of the patents used by the supplier part to be clarified by way of licensing through the suppliers? (b) Is there licensing priority for suppliers at every stage of the supply chain or only for the supplier immediately upstream of the distributor of the final product at the end of the value chain? Do customary trading practices also play a decisive role in that regard? 2. Does the prohibition of abuse under antitrust law require that the supplier be granted its own, unrestricted licence for all types of use relevant under patent law on FRAND terms for products implementing the standard in the sense that the end distributors (and, where relevant, the upstream customers) in turn no longer require their own, separate licence from the SEP holder in order to avoid patent infringement in the case of use of the supplier part concerned in accordance with its intended purpose? 3. If Question 1 is answered in the negative: Does Article 102 TFEU lay down specific qualitative, quantitative and/or other requirements for the criteria according to which the proprietor of a standard-essential patent decides the potential patent infringers at different levels of the same production and value chain against which it is to bring an action for a prohibitory injunction?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Administratif de Dijon (France) lodged on 31 March 2021 — Mr X v Préfet de Saône-et-Loire

(Case C-206/21)

(2021/C 278/37)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal administratif de Dijon

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Mr X

Defendant: Préfet de Saône-et-Loire

Question referred

In requiring sickness insurance cover and sufficient resources not to become a burden on the social assistance system, do Articles 7(1)(b) and 8(4) of Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 (1) introduce indirect discrimination … to the detriment of persons who, due to their disability, are not in a position to work or who can work only in a limited capacity and who can therefore find themselves without sufficient resources to meet their needs without significant or even unreasonable reliance on the social assistance system of the host Member State where they reside?

(1) Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004 L 158, p. 77).
First ground of appeal: Objection of a procedural nature regarding the failure to reopen the oral part of the procedure

The appellant contends that new facts alleged by the applicant, which only became known to it after the end of the oral part of the procedure and which it could not have brought into the proceedings until that time, invalidated the arguments on which the contested decision is based in material respects, as that decision is based on facts that have not been confirmed by the findings of the national criminal investigation body.

Furthermore, the applicant’s request for the reopening of the oral part of the procedure because of hitherto unknown new facts, which are of legal importance to the outcome of the dispute in that they are capable of influencing it in the applicant’s favour, was rejected on the basis of an error of assessment.
1.

Must Articles 2 and 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union (‘the TEU’) and Article 6(1) to (3) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘the CFR’), be interpreted as meaning that: (a) where a court includes in its composition a person appointed to a judicial post in that court as a result of a procedure which does not provide for the participation of judicial self-government bodies, which bodies are appointed largely independently of the executive and the legislature, in a situation where, in the light of the constitutional acquis of the Member State, the participation of a judicial self-government body meeting those requirements in the judicial appointment procedure is necessary, that court is not a tribunal established by law within the meaning of European Union law, having regard to the institutional and structural context and given that: — there was a requirement for an assembly of judges to give an opinion on the candidate’s suitability for the judicial post, which requirement was deliberately disregarded contrary to national law and the position of that judicial self-government body; — the current Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (National Council of the Judiciary), which was elected contrary to Polish constitutional and statutory provisions, is not an independent body and no representatives of the judiciary were elected to it independently of the executive and the legislature, and therefore no motion for appointment to the post of judge was effectively lodged as required under national law; — the participants in the competition for appointment to the post had no right of appeal to a court within the meaning of Articles 2 and 19(1) TEU and Article 6(1) to (3) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. (b) where a court includes in its composition a person appointed to a judicial post in that court as a result of a procedure which is subject to arbitrary interference by the executive and omits the participation of judicial self-government bodies, which bodies are appointed largely independently of the executive and the legislature, or of another body ensuring an objective assessment of the candidate, in view of the fact that the participation of judicial self-government bodies or of another body independent of the executive and the legislature which ensures an objective assessment of the candidate in the judicial appointment procedure is, in the context of the European legal tradition which is rooted in the aforementioned provisions of the TEU and the CFR and which underpins a union of law such as the European Union, necessary to ensure that the national court guarantees the required level of effective judicial protection in cases governed by European Union law, and consequently that the principles of separation and balance of powers and of the rule of law are safeguarded, that court does not satisfy the requirements of an independent tribunal established by law;
3.

If Question 2 is answered in the affirmative, is it permissible for the provision in question to continue to regulate, during the period between its adoption and its amendment, legal relationships in respect of an unlimited group of persons who have not brought actions for damages on account of that provision, or for the assessment of the compatibility of the national rule with the EU law provision in respect of the period prior to the amendment not to have been carried out in relation to those persons?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Kleve (Germany) lodged on 14 May 2021 — AB and Others v Ryanair DAC

(Case C-307/21)

(2021/C 310/14)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Kleve

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: AB and Others

Respondent: Ryanair DAC

Question referred

Are Article 5(1)(c) and Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the operating air carrier must pay compensation in the event of a flight cancellation of which the passenger was not informed at least two weeks prior to the scheduled time of departure, even though the air carrier sent that information in good time before the expiry of two weeks to the only email address communicated to it in the course of the booking, without, however, being aware that the booking had been made via an agent or its internet platform and that the email address communicated by the booking platform could be used at most to contact the agent, and not the passenger directly?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Østre Landsret (Denmark) lodged on 28 May 2021 — A1 and A2 v I

(Case C-352/21)

(2021/C 320/32)

Language of the case: Danish

Referring court

Østre Landsret

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: A1 and A2

Respondents: I

Question referred

Must Article 15(5) of the Brussels I Regulation, (1) in conjunction with Article 16(5) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that hull insurance for pleasure craft that are not used for commercial purposes falls within the exception laid down in Article 16(5) of that regulation, and is, therefore, an insurance contract which contains a choice of court agreement departing from the rule laid down in Article 11 of that regulation valid under Article 15(5) of that regulation?

(1) Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de Primera Instancia No 2 de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (Spain) lodged on 6 April 2021 — Zulima v Servicios prescriptor y medios de pagos E.F.C. S.A.U.

(Case C-215/21)

(2021/C 320/16)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Zulima

Defendant: Servicios prescriptor y medios de pagos E.F.C. S.A.U.

Question referred

Where a consumer raises a complaint against an unfair term under Directive 93/13/EC (1) and an out-of-court offer to settle is made, Article 22 of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil (Law of Civil Procedure) has the effect of compelling the consumer to bear the costs of the proceedings without regard to the seller’s or supplier’s prior conduct in having failed to heed the letters of formal notice [issued to him]. Do those Spanish rules of procedure constitute a significant obstacle capable of dissuading a consumer from exercising the right to effective judicial review of the potentially unfair nature of a contractual term contrary to the principle of effectiveness and Article[s] 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13?

(1) Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 4 June 2021 — Criminal proceedings against HYA and Others

(Case C-348/21)

(2021/C 338/14)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad

Parties to the main proceedings

HYA and Others

Question referred

Is a national law which provides that the right of an accused person to be present in proceedings is safeguarded and the public prosecutor’s office properly discharges its obligation to prove the guilt of the accused person compatible with Articles 8(1) and 6(1) of Directive 2016/343, (1) read in conjunction with recitals 33 and 34 thereof, and the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter if the testimony given at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings by witnesses who cannot be examined for objective reasons is introduced at the trial stage of the criminal proceedings, whereby those witnesses were examined solely by the prosecution and without the participation of the defence, but before a judge, and the prosecution could have provided the defence with the opportunity to participate in that examination at the pre-trial stage, but did not do so?

(1) Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ 2016 L 65, p. 1).
2.

Must Article 2(1) and (2) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, together with Article 3(1)(c), in fine, of that directive, be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that laid down in Article 1(2) of Legea-cadru nr. 330 din 5 noiembrie 2009 privind salarizarea unitară a personalului plătit din fonduri publice (Framework Law No 330 of 5 November 2009 on the uniform remuneration of staff paid from the public purse), as interpreted by Decision No 7/2019 (published in Monitorul Oficial al României — Official Journal of Romania — No 343 of 6 May 2019), given by the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice, Romania), ruling on an appeal on a point of law, in circumstances in which the claimants did not have the legal possibility of requesting an increase in their employment allowance on entering the judiciary at a date after the entry into force of [Framework Law No 330/2009], a legislative act which expressly provided that remuneration rights are to be and remain exclusively as provided in [that] law, thus creating remuneration discrimination as compared with their colleagues, including on the basis of the criterion of age, which means in fact that only older judges, who were appointed before January 2010 (who benefited from court rulings in the period from 2006 to 2009, the operative parts of which were subject to interpretation in 2019 pursuant to Decision [No 7/2019 of the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice)]), received retroactive payment of remuneration rights (similar to those sought in the action which forms the subject matter of the present proceedings) during December 2019 and January 2020, in respect of the period from 2010 to 2015, even though during that period the claimants also acted as judges and performed the same work, under the same conditions and in the same institution?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy (Poland) lodged on 7 June 2021 — Procter & Gamble International Operations SA v Perfumesco.pl sp. z o.o., sp. k.

(Case C-355/21)

(2021/C 357/10)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Najwyższy

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Procter & Gamble International Operations SA

Defendant: Perfumesco.pl sp. z o.o., sp. k.

Question referred

Must Article 10 of Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (1) be interpreted as precluding the interpretation of a provision of national law to the effect that a protection measure in the form of destruction of goods relates only to goods illegally manufactured or illegally marked, and cannot be applied to goods illegally put on the market in the territory of the European Economic Area which cannot be found to have been illegally manufactured or illegally marked?

(1) Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (OJ 2004 L 157, p. 45, Special edition in Polish: Chapter 17 Volume 002 P. 32 — 39).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht München (Germany) lodged on 15 June 2021 — DOMUS-SOFTWARE-AG v Marc Braschoß Immobilien GmbH

(Case C-370/21)

(2021/C 349/27)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht München

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: DOMUS-SOFTWARE-AG

Respondent: Marc Braschoß Immobilien GmbH

Question referred

Is Article 6(1) and (2) of Directive 2011/7/EU, (1) read in conjunction with Article 3 of Directive 2011/7/EU, to be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of periodic claims for payment arising from a single contractual relationship, there is an entitlement to payment of a fixed sum of at least EUR 40 for each individual claim for payment?

(1) Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on combating late payment in commercial transactions (recast) (OJ 2011 L 48, p. 1).
1.

Must Article 27(3)(g) and (4) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, (1) read in the light of the right to effective judicial protection, be interpreted as meaning that: — a surrendered person must be able to exercise his or her right to be heard in relation to a request for an extension of the offences in the issuing Member State when a judicial authority of that Member State grants him or her a hearing relating to the possible renunciation of the entitlement to the speciality rule as referred to in Article 27(3)(f) of the Framework Decision, or — must that person be able to exercise his or her right to be heard in the Member State which previously surrendered him or her to the executing judicial authority in the proceedings relating to the request for consent to extend the offences?
—

infringe the rights in respect of correspondence and private life guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in that it does not exclude, in principle, lawyers assessing their client’s legal situation from the scope of intermediaries who must supply the tax authorities with the information necessary for reporting a cross-border tax arrangement or who must notify another intermediary of that obligation?
2.

Is the fact that, in this type of summary procedure, any consideration of the unfairness of terms by the courts, whether of their own motion or on the application of a party, takes place in the context of an application for review of the decision of a non-judicial body such as the Registrar, and that the courts must in principle restrict their consideration solely to the subject matter of the decision and may not examine any evidence other than the documentary evidence already submitted by the parties, compliant with Directive 93/13 and the principle of the effectiveness of the directive, in conjunction with the right to an effective remedy in Article 47 of the Charter?