4.

Let me say immediately, however, that EITO's arguments in its written observations do not strike me as persuasive. First of all, I would mention the argument that the actual wording of Article 5(a) must make it possible for a name to consist of no more than a description of the object of the undertaking. EITO notes that that provision, while stipulating that the words ‘European Economic Interest Grouping’ or the initials ‘EEIG’ must precede or follow the name of the grouping, then adds ‘unless those words or initials already form part of the name’. In its view, the only explanation for that clause is that it is intended to allow an objective name: indeed, EITO maintains that a business name consisting of the names of the members could not contain the initials in question. But I cannot see any grounds for that argument. The national court itself, in the order for reference, pointed out that the national legislation governing business names definitely allows partnerships to add ‘EEIG’ not only before (e. g. ‘EEIG Musterman & Co., Financial Consultants’) or after (e. g. ‘Musterman & Co., Financial Consultants, EEIG’) the name of the grouping, but also within the name itself (e. g. ‘Financial Consultants EEIG Musterman & Co.’, or ‘Musterman & Co. EEIG of Financial Consultants’). ( 4 ) Nor is it possible to agree with EITO's argument that, in order to guarantee equal treatment for the members, the requirement of a personal name for the grouping must entail inclusion of the names of all the members in the business name. In EITO's view, that solution would in any case be impracticable for large groupings; the result in such situations would be to discourage undertakings from setting up EEIGs, thus undermining cooperation between them and running counter to one of the objectives pursued by the Regulation. To my mind, however, EITO's fears are unfounded: the requirement of a personal name subsists, in German law and in other legal orders, in relation to various forms of association, yet it has not prevented those legal forms from developing and growing in importance as essential instruments of cooperation in economic life. Next, EITO refers to the Commission's document concerning EEIGs, in which the Commission adopted a position clearly in favour of allowing EEIGs to be given names descriptive of their object. ( 5 ) In that regard I cannot, however, accept that that document is of the slightest relevance for the purposes of the question before us. In the first place, the document begins by saying that it is intended for the internal use of the Commission and does not represent the institution's official view; a view which, moreover, could clearly not be decisive for the purposes of interpreting a provision of secondary legislation. In any event, the Commission itself, while seeming in that document to acknowledge the possibility of invented names, nevertheless recognizes in a general fashion that the members of an EEIG must ‘comply with the legal restrictions existing at national level which limit free choice of a name’. ( 6 ) I must add one last consideration concerning the observation, again by EITO, that about 80% of EEIGs are formed with names of an objective nature; and so if they were required to adopt a different name this would create differences under the laws of the various Member States and discourage the establishment of EEIGs in Germany. Here, I shall merely say that the consequences envisaged by EITO seem to me frankly to be exaggerated. It may be possible that national legislation on business names plays a part in the choice of a country as the seat of an EEIG; I do not, however, believe that it is a decisive factor. If anything, the point is to discover whether or not the regulation permits national legislatures to apply rules governing the names of EEIGs, and if so within what limits. And to my mind, for the reasons I shall now set out, the answer to the question must be that it does.