ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.

On the true meaning of Article 1 of Directive 98/50/EC (1) and in order to establish whether or not there is a transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or business, is ‘economic entity’ to be understood as a completely self-sufficient production unit which is capable of operating to attain its economic object without in any way seeking (purchasing, borrowing, leasing and so forth) factors of production (raw materials, manpower, machinery, components of the finished product, support services, financial resources and so forth) from third parties? Or, on the contrary, does it suffice, in order to qualify as an ‘economic entity’, that the subject matter of the activity is distinct, that that subject matter is in fact able to constitute the object of an economic endeavour and that it is feasible to effectively organise the factors of production (raw materials, machinery and other equipment, manpower and support services) to attain the object in question, irrespective of whether or not the new operator of the activity also seeks outside factors of production, or fails to attain the object in a particular instance?
2.

If the operating air carrier is required to take reasonable measures to avoid long delays themselves, is Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, to be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of the carriage of passengers on a route consisting of two (or more) flights, the air carrier must, in order to avoid an obligation to pay compensation in accordance with Article 7 of that regulation, merely take reasonable measures aimed at avoiding a delay to the flight which it is due to operate and which is subject to possible delay, or that it must also take reasonable measures to avoid a long delay for the individual passenger at the final destination (for example, by examining the possibility of rebooking the passenger onto another flight)?
2.

If so, do the principle of neutrality and Article 90 of Directive 2006/112/EC preclude national legislation such as Article 78(11) of the Código do Imposto sobre o Valor Acrescentado, which is interpreted to the effect that the tax may not be adjusted, in the event of non-payment, where the purchaser of the goods or service, being a taxable person, was not notified of the cancellation of the tax within the time-limit for deducting the tax laid down in Article 98(2) of the Value Added Tax Code?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 94/2

Appeal brought on 21 September 2017 by Windfinder R & L Co. KG against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 20 July 2017 in Case T-395/16, Windfinder R & L Co. KG v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-553/17 P)

(2018/C 094/02)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Windfinder R & L Co. KG (represented by: B. Schneider, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 24 January 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Tenth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 83/9

Appeal brought on 17 August 2017 by Miguel Torres, SA against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 31 May 2017 in Case T-637/15: Alma-The Soul of Italian Wine v EUIPO — Miguel Torres

(Case C-499/17 P)

(2018/C 083/13)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Miguel Torres, SA (represented by: A. von Mühlendahl, Rechtsanwalt, J. Güell Serra, abogado)

Other parties to the proceedings: Alma-The Soul of Italian Wine LLLP, European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 14 December 2017 the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 104/11

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hannover (Germany) lodged on 9 June 2017 — Petra Dziatkowiak, Thomas Erich Heinz Dziatkowiak v TUIfly GmbH

(Case C-352/17)

(2018/C 104/12)

Language of the case: German

Referring Court

Amtsgericht Hannover

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Petra Dziatkowiak, Thomas Erich Heinz Dziatkowiak

Defendant: TUIfly GmbH

The case was removed from the Register of the Court of Justice by order of the Court of 24 November 2017.
—

is Article 107(1) TFEU to be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances such as those in the present case, the following support is, or is not, to be regarded as selective and/or capable of affecting trade between Member States: support granted to an undertaking which implements a project of strategic importance, such as ‘NordBalt’; support granted to undertakings which are entrusted with ensuring the security of electricity supply for a given period; support to compensate for the losses reflecting market conditions and actually sustained by persons, such as the developers of solar photovoltaic plants who are at issue, by reason of the State’s refusal to fulfil commitments entered into (by reason of national regulatory changes); support granted to undertakings (network operators) with the objective of compensating for actual losses sustained in their discharging of the obligation to purchase electricity at a fixed price from electricity producers providing PIS and to balance the electricity?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 112/9

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 30 November 2017 — Planet49 GmbH v Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände — Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e. V.

(Case C-673/17)

(2018/C 112/13)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Planet49 GmbH

Defendant: Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände — Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e. V.

Questions referred

1. a) Does it constitute a valid consent within the meaning of Article 5(3) and Article 2(f) of Directive 2002/58/EC (1) in conjunction with Article 2(h) of Directive 95/46/EC (2) if the storage of information, or access to information already stored in the user’s terminal equipment, is permitted by way of a pre-checked checkbox which the user must unselect to refuse his consent? b) For the purposes of the application of Article 5(3) and of Article 2(f) of Directive 2002/58/EC in conjunction with Article 2(h) of Directive 95/46/EC, does it make a difference whether the information stored or accessed constitutes personal data? c) In the circumstances referred to in Question 1 a), does a valid consent within the meaning of Article 6(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (3) exist?

2. What information does the service provider have to give within the scope of the provision of clear and comprehensive information to the user that has to be undertaken in accordance with Article 5(3) of Directive 2002/58/EC? Does this include the duration of the operation of the cookies and the question of whether third parties are given access to the cookies?

(1) Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) (OJ 2002 L 201, p. 37).

(2) Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ 1995 L 281, p. 31).

(3) Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ 2016 L 119, p. 1).
1.

Does the freedom of movement of capital under Article 63(1) TFEU in conjunction with Article 65 TFEU preclude legislation of a Member State under which a non-resident institution operating an occupational pension scheme whose essential structure is similar to a German pension fund does not receive any relief from tax on income from capital in respect of dividends received, whereas such dividend distributions to domestic pension funds do not result in any increase in their corporation tax liability, or only a comparatively small one, because the latter are able to reduce their taxable profit in a tax assessment procedure by deducting the amounts reserved to meet their pension payment obligations and to neutralise the tax on income from capital through a set-off, and also receive a refund in the event that the amount of corporation tax payable is less than the amount set-off?
Case C-684/17 P: Appeal brought on 6 December 2017 by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, Wise Dialog Bank SpA (Banca Widiba SpA) against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 26 September 2017 in Case T-83/16: Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena and Banca Widiba SpA v EUIPO

Appeal brought on 6 December 2017 by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, Wise Dialog Bank SpA (Banca Widiba SpA) against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 26 September 2017 in Case T-83/16: Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena and Banca Widiba SpA v EUIPO

(Case C-684/17 P)

Parties

Appellants: Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, Wise Dialog Bank SpA (Banca Widiba SpA) (represented by: L. Trevisan, D. Contini, avvocati)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 17 May 2018 the Court of Justice (Tenth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
2.

Must Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 be interpreted as meaning that a deed of certification of succession drawn up by a notary in accordance with a non-contentious application by all the parties to the certification proceedings, which produces the legal effects of a final court order declaring succession — such as a deed of certification of succession drawn up by a Polish notary — constitutes a decision within the meaning of that provision? and consequently: must the first sentence of Article 3(2) of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 be interpreted as meaning that the notary drawing up that kind of deed of certification of succession must be regarded as a court within the meaning of that provision?
Case C-394/17: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hannover (Germany) lodged on 30 June 2017 — Ines Ewen v TUIfly GmbH

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hannover (Germany) lodged on 30 June 2017 — Ines Ewen v TUIfly GmbH

(Case C-394/17)

Referring court

Amtsgericht Hannover

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Ines Ewen

Defendant: TUIfly GmbH

By decision of the Court of Justice of 17 May 2018 the case was removed from the Court’s register.
Case C-354/17: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hannover (Germany) lodged on 9 June 2017 — Birgit Förg v TUIfly GmbH

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hannover (Germany) lodged on 9 June 2017 — Birgit Förg v TUIfly GmbH

(Case C-354/17)

Referring court

Amtsgericht Hannover

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Birgit Förg

Defendant: TUIfly GmbH

By decision of the Court of Justice of 28 May 2018 the case was removed from the Court’s register.
By unilaterally refusing to fulfil its obligations under the arbitration award, while at the same time preventing Slovenia from fully exercising its sovereignty over certain parts of its territory under the Treaties, the Republic of Croatia is in breach of its duty of sincere cooperation with the European Union and with the Republic of Slovenia as laid down in Article 4(3) TEU. The Republic of Croatia’s conduct is jeopardising the attainment of the objectives of the European Union, namely peace-building and an ever closer union between nations, and the objectives of the Union rules relating to the territory of the Member States (first subparagraph of Article 4(3) TEU). In addition, the Republic of Croatia is making it impossible for the Republic of Slovenia to implement EU law throughout its mainland and marine territory and to act in accordance with that law, and in particular in compliance with the secondary Union rules relating to the territory of the Member States (first subparagraph of Article 4(3) TEU).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 112/25

Action brought on 29 January 2018 — European Commission v Republic of Austria

(Case C-51/18)

(2018/C 112/32)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: N. Gossement and B.-R. Killmann, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Republic of Austria

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

1. declare that, by imposing value added tax on the royalty paid to an author of an original work of art on the basis of the resale right, the Republic of Austria has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 2 of the VAT Directive;

2. order the Republic of Austria to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on the following arguments:

Austria levies value added tax on the royalties paid to the author of an original artistic work upon its resale, within the framework of the resale right which was introduced in Austria in the transposition of Directive 2001/84/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art. In doing so, Austria has infringed Article 2 of the VAT Directive.

In the context of the resale right, there is no relationship based on an exchange of services between the author and the party which is liable to pay. The share of proceeds to be returned to the author on the basis of the resale right results from the law and is created in such a way that the seller, or whoever else takes part in the resale, is required to pay a royalty to the author, without the author having to perform any sort of service in that respect. The author’s service has already been provided in that respect before the resale, in that the author brought his original work onto the market in the first place.

The royalty from the resale right which is to be paid to the author does therefore not represent consideration for any of the services performed by the author, but rather the royalty depends entirely on the price paid in the resale, the amount of which cannot be influenced by the author. The author is entitled to the royalty without having to, or even being able to, undertake any service, either by action or by inaction. Consequently, the royalty from the resale right cannot be regarded as consideration for a supply of goods or services within the meaning of Article 2 of the VAT Directive.

(1) Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art (OJ 2001 L 272, p. 32).
3.

If the answer to question 2 is in the affirmative, according to what principles is the wording ‘signs which consist exclusively of the shape (or another characteristic) which gives substantial value to the goods’ in Article 7(1)(e)(iii) of the Trade Marks Regulation to be interpreted, in a situation where the registration covers a wide range of classes of goods and goods and the sign may be affixed in different ways to the goods? Is the assessment to be made in accordance with more objective/general criteria, for example with the starting point of how the mark appears and how it is possible to affix it to different goods, that is to say without regard to the manner in which the trade mark proprietor may de facto have affixed or may intend to affix the sign to various goods?
(1)

Must Clause 4 of the framework agreement on fixed-term work contained in the Annex to Directive 1999/70 (1) be interpreted as precluding national legislation which, in respect of the same set of facts (the termination of a contract for services (contrata) between the employer and a third-party undertaking at the latter’s instigation), provides for a lower level of compensation for (i) termination of a fixed-term contract (contrato) for a specific task or service with a term of the same duration as that of the contract between the employer and the third-party undertaking than it does for (ii) termination of the permanent contracts of comparable workers under a collective redundancy that is justified on production-related grounds pertaining to the employer and arises from the termination of the contract between the employer and the third-party undertaking?
2.

Are Articles 18, 21 and 165 TFEU to be interpreted as meaning that an association of a Member State impermissibly discriminates against amateur athletes who do not have the nationality of the Member State by allowing them to participate in national championships but only letting them start ‘outside classification’ or ‘without classification’ and not letting them participate in the finals of races and contests?
1.

In the interpretation of Article 157(1), first subparagraph of Directive 2009/138/EEC, (1) read in conjunction with Article 13(13) and (14) thereof, is the Member State entitled to levy tax on insurance premiums considered as being the State in which the company (a legal person) which has taken out the insurance policy is established or the State in which the company which is the subject of the company acquisition is established, where an insurance company with its registered office in Great Britain, which does not have a place of business in Finland offers insurance covering risks relating to a company acquisition — to a company which does not have a place of business in Finland, which, in the company acquisition, acts as the purchaser, and the target company is established in Finland; — a company established in Finland which, in the company acquisition, acts as the buyer, where the target company of that acquisition is not established in Finland; — a company which has no place of business in Finland which, in the company acquisition, acts as the seller where the target company of that acquisition is established in Finland; — a company established in Finland, which in the company acquisition acts as the seller where the target company of that acquisition is not established in Finland.
1.

Where the spouse of an EU citizen who has exercised free movement rights under Article 6 of Directive 2004/38/EC (1) has been refused a right of residence under Article 7 on the basis that the EU citizen in question was not, or was no longer, exercising EU Treaty Rights in the host Member State concerned, and where it is proposed that the spouse should be expelled from that Member State, must that expulsion be pursuant to and in compliance with the provisions of the Directive, or does it fall within the competence of the national law of the Member State?
1.

Is the concept of habitual residence of the child, within the meaning of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003 (1), to be interpreted as meaning that such habitual residence corresponds to the place where the child has demonstrated some degree of integration into the social and family environment, irrespective of the fact that a ruling has been made in another Member State, after the child moved with his father to the territory of the State, where the minor has integrated into that social and family environment? If that is the case, should Article 13 of Regulation No 2201/2003, which determines jurisdiction based on the child’s presence, be applied?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 161/42

Appeal brought on 23 February 2018 by Crédit mutuel Arkéa against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2017 in Case T-52/16, Crédit mutuel Arkéa v European Central Bank

(Case C-153/18 P)

(2018/C 161/47)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Crédit mutuel Arkéa (represented by: H. Savoie, avocat)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Central Bank, European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— Set aside the judgment of 13 December 2017 (T-52/16) by which the General Court dismissed Crédit mutuel Arkéa’s application seeking annulment of the decision of the European Central Bank of 4 December 2015 (ECB/SSM/2015 — 9695000CG7B84NLR5984/40) setting the prudential requirements applicable to Groupe Crédit mutual.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of its appeal, the appellant relies on two grounds, alleging that:

— the General Court erred in law when it held that Article 2(21)(c) of the SSM Framework Regulation allowed the ECB to exercise prudential supervision on a consolidated basis in respect of institutions affiliated to a central body despite the fact that that body does not have credit institution status;

— the General Court erred in its legal characterisation of the facts when it held that Crédit mutuel is a supervised group since it meets the criteria set out in Article 10(1) of Regulation No 575/2013. (1)

(1) Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 1).
1.

May Article 6(1) of Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (1) be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may levy on telecommunications operators an annual financial contribution such as that provided for in Article 5 of Ley 8/2009, de 28 de agosto, de financiación de la Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española (Law 8/2009 of 28 August on the funding of Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española), for the purpose of contributing to the funding of Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española, in view of the positive impact on the telecommunications sector resulting from the new rules governing the television and audiovisual sector and, in particular, from the increase in fixed and mobile broadband services and from the fact that Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española no longer broadcasts advertisements or paid or conditional-access content, taking the following circumstances into account: — that new legislation did not provide justification, nor was it confirmed in the relevant tax year, that such a positive, direct or indirect, impact existed for those undertakings; — that contribution is set at 0,9 % of the gross operating revenue invoiced in the relevant tax year and is not calculated on the basis of the revenue obtained from the provision of audiovisual services and advertising, the increase in that revenue or the profits generated by the activity. Furthermore, that contribution constitutes a levy provided for in Article 5 of Law 8/2009, as originally worded, and may not be justified in relation to the audiovisual service concerned, that article being the basis for the refusal, in the decision contested in the present administrative action, to grant the applicant’s requests for a refund of the payments made but not due and the rectification of the self-assessments?
2.

Without prejudice to Question 1, are delays in processing or otherwise deciding on an application for a visa pursuant to Article 5(2) arising from the necessity to ensure in particular by way of background checks that the application is not fraudulent or an abuse of rights, including that the marriage amounts to a marriage of convenience, whether by virtue of Article 35 of the 2004 Directive or otherwise and thus not a breach of Article 5(2)?