4.

The fact that that is the real meaning of the Horváth judgment is confirmed by the rules referred to in it and by the manner in which they are interpreted. Paragraph 13 of the decision refers to Article 18 of the EEC Treaty, that is to say to the rule which is at the beginning of the section devoted to the “Setting up of the Common Customs Tariff”, in which “the Member States declare their readiness to contribute to the development of international trade and the lowering of barriers to trade by entering into agreements designed, on a basis of reciprocity and mutual advantage, to reduce customs duties below the general level of which they could avail themselves as a result of the establishment of a customs union between them”. In that respect the Court observes: “Since Article 18 of the EEC Treaty indicates that the setting up of the Common Customs Tariff is seen as a contribution to the develppment of international trade and the lowering of barriers to trade, it cannot relate to the importation of narcotics which are intended for unlawful use and are withdrawn from circulation as soon as they are discovered.” To the same effect, reference might also be made — as was indeed made by the representative of the Commission during the oral procedure — to Article 29 of the EEC Treaty which mentions, among the general criteria by which the Commission should be guided in carrying out its tasks in connection with the Common Customs Tariff, a number of factors which are certainly incompatible with the application of the tariff to drugs intended for unlawful purposes: the “need to promote trade between Member States and third countries” (subparagraph (a)); the “developments in conditions of competition within the Community” (subparagraph (b)); the “requirements of the Community as regards the supply of raw materials and semi-finished goods” (subparagraph (c)); and the “need to avoid serious disturbances in the economies of the Member States and to ensure rational development of production and an expansion of consumption within the Community” (subparagraph (d)). The Horvath judgment also referred to Regulation No 803/68 of the Council on the valuation of goods for customs purposes, noting that the provisions thereof “are based on the assumption that the imported goods are capable of being put on the market and absorbed into commercial circulation” (paragraph 12 of the decision). It seems to me that this is the most significant passage of the decision. For my part, I would point out that the sixth recital in the preamble to Regulation No 803/68 confirms the view that its provisions apply only to goods which may be put on the market. It is in fact stated in that recital that uniform determination of the value for customs purposes must serve inter alia to prevent “any deflection of trade and activities and any distortion of competition which might arise from differences between national provisions”; and it seems to me that it is incontestable that that purpose cannot be achieved in the case of goods which, like drugs, may not be imported or traded in (with the exception of course of “trade which is strictly controlled and limited to authorized use for pharmaceutical and medical purposes”, see paragraph 10 of the decision, infine). Finally, the Court referred to Articles 10 and 11 of Council Regulation No 1430/79 of 2 July 1979 on the repayment or remission of import or export duties. Although not applicable to the present cases ratione temporis, that regulation nevertheless provides useful criteria for the interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to customs tariffs. According to those articles, “import duties must be repaid or remitted where goods subject to payment of such duties are destroyed under the supervision of the competent authorities” (paragraph 14 of the decision); it may be inferred therefrom that the existence of the liability to pay duties is connected with the possibility of the goods' being placed in circulation. In the same context, reference may also be made to Article- 2 of Council Directive 797623/EEC of -25 June 1979 on the harmonization of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action relating to customs debt; as was observed by the Finanzgericht Düsseldorf, a customs debt arises by virtue of that provision when goods are cleared through customs in the normal way (see paragraph (a)) and in a number of cases, listed exhaustively, of infringement of specific customs rules (see paragraphs (b) to (f)), but it does not provide that a customs debt arises in the case of goods whose importation is absolutely forbidden, as in the case of drugs not intended for pharmaceutical use.