ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
8

Article 695 of the amended LEC, concerning the objection procedure against the enforcement of mortgages, provides: ‘1. In proceedings under this chapter, an objection to enforcement by the party against whom enforcement is sought may be admitted only if it is based on the following grounds: (1) extinction of the security or the secured obligation … (2) an error in determining the amount due … (3) in the case of enforcement against movable mortgaged property or property subject to a non-possessory pledge, the existence of another pledge, movable-property or immovable-property mortgage on, or seizure of, that property registered before the charge giving rise to the procedure, which must be proved by means of the corresponding certificate from the Registry. (4) the unfairness of a contractual term constituting the grounds for enforcement or that has determined the amount due. 2. If an objection is lodged under the preceding paragraph, the registrar shall stay enforcement and summon the parties to appear before the court which ordered the enforcement. There shall be at least fifteen days between the summons and the date of the hearing in question. At that hearing, the court shall hear the parties, admit the documents that are submitted and issue the decision that it considers reasonable within two days in the form of an order. 3. An order upholding the objection to enforcement on grounds 1 and 3 of paragraph 1 of the present article shall stay enforcement; an order upholding the objection to the enforcement on ground 2 shall determine the sum in respect of which enforcement is to continue. If ground 4 of paragraph 1 of the present article is upheld, enforcement shall be discontinued where it is based on the contractual term. In other cases, enforcement shall be continued without the application of the unfair term. 4. An appeal may lie against the order discontinuing enforcement or disapplying an unfair term or rejecting the opposition on the ground laid down in paragraph 1(4) of the present article. Save in those circumstances, no appeal shall lie against orders adjudicating upon the objection to enforcement referred to in the present article and the effects of those orders shall be confined exclusively to the enforcement proceedings in which they are made.’
2.

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 31-34)
Order of the Court (Second Chamber) of 20 January 2016 —

Skype v OHIM

(Case C‑382/15 P) ( 1 )

‛Appeal — Community trade mark — No need to adjudicate’

Community trade mark — Appeals procedure — No need to adjudicate — Appeal brought by the applicant for a Community trade mark against a judgment of the General Court upholding the decision of a Board of Appeal which refused the registration — Withdrawal of the opposition brought against the application for registration — End of the dispute (Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 149 and 190(1); Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 65) (see paras 11, 12)

Operative part

1. There is no need to rule on the appeal.

2. Skype Ultd is ordered to pay the costs of the present proceedings.

( 1 ) OJ C 354, 26.10.2015.
Order of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 24 November 2015 —

Sun Mark and Bulldog Energy Drink v Red Bull

(Case C‑206/15 P)

‛Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Community trade mark — Appeal brought by the ‘other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal’ who failed to lodge a response before the General Court — No status as intervener before the General Court — Appeal manifestly inadmissible’

Appeal — Admissibility — Appeal brought by a party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal which did not participate in the proceedings before the General Court — No status as intervener before the General Court — Appeal manifestly inadmissible (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 56, second para.; Rules of Procedure of the General Court (1991), Arts 134(1) and 135(1)) (see paras 29-31)

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the appeal.
Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 15 March 2016 —

Grupo Bimbo v OHIM

(Case C‑476/15 P)

‛Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Community trade mark — Three‑dimensional trade mark in the shape a Mexican tortilla — Refusal of registration — Absolute ground for refusal — No distinctive character — Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Article 7(1)(b) — Obligation to state reasons — Article 296 TFEU’

Appeals — Grounds — Inadequate or contradictory grounds — Scope of the obligation to state reasons (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 36 and 53, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 81) (see point 38)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.
Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 25 February 2016 — Aiudapds

(Case C‑520/15) ( 1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Article 53(2) — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Articles 47, second paragraph, and 54 — European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms — Article 6(1) — Extraordinary petition to the President of the Italian Republic — Opposition to the petition by a party to the dispute — Modification of that extraordinary petition into judicial proceedings — No implementation of EU law — Clear lack of jurisdiction of the Court’

1. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Limits — Request for an interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — National legislation not constituting a measure implementing EU law and not having any other connection with EU law — Clear lack of jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 6(1) TEU; Art. 267 TFEU; Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, Art. 51(1) and (2); Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 53(2)) (see paras 18-21, 23, operative part)

2. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Limits — Interpretation of provisions of international law binding on the Member States outside of the EU law framework — Not included (Art. 267 TFEU) (see para. 22)

Operative part

The European Court of Justice manifestly lacks jurisdiction to provide an answer to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State, Italy), by decision of 15 July 2015 (Case C‑520/15).

( 1 ) OJ C 398, 30.11.2015.
1.

Actions for annulment — Natural or legal persons — Measures of direct and individual concern to them — Whether directly concerned — Criteria — Commission decision post-clearance entry of import duties in the accounts but not justifying the remission of those duties in a particular case — Application for remission of customs duties — Commission referring the national authorities to a decision concerning another importer — Action by importers subject to the national decision but not the Commission decision — Not directly concerned — Inadmissibility (Art. 263, fourth para., TFEU) (see paras 45-50, 62, 63)
6.

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 73, 75)
Order of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 30 June 2016 —

ERDF

(Case C‑669/15) ( 1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — No legal framework — Manifest inadmissibility — Article 53(2) and Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice’

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Admissibility — Reference giving no details of the relevant facts or legislation and not setting out the reasons for making that reference to the Court of Justice — Manifest inadmissibility (Art. 267 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 23; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 53(2) and 94) (see paras 12-22)

Operative part

The request for a preliminary ruling brought by the Cour d’appel de Versailles (France), by decision of 8 December 2015, is manifestly inadmissible.

( 1 ) OJ C 78, 29.2.2016.
The provisions of the TFEU on freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services are not applicable in a situation all the elements of which are confined within a single Member State. However, in certain circumstances, the purely internal nature of the situation concerned does not prevent the Court answering a question referred pursuant to Article 267 TFEU.

This could be the case, in particular, if national law were to require the national court to allow a national of the Member State of its jurisdiction to enjoy the same rights as those which a national of another Member State would derive from EU law in the same situation, or if the request for a preliminary ruling concerned provisions of EU law to which the national law of a Member State refers in order to determine the rules applicable to a purely internal situation within that State.

However, although the Court may, in such circumstances, give the requested interpretation, it is not for it to take such an initiative if it is not apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the referring court is actually under such an obligation.

(see paras 23, 26-28)
1)

Articles 49 TFEU and 56 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding a national provision, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which imposes on operators wishing to respond to a call for tenders for the grant of concessions in the field of betting and gambling the obligation to provide evidence of their economic and financial standing by means of statements issued by at least two banks, without allowing that standing to be proved also by other means, where such a provision is capable of satisfying the conditions of proportionality laid down by the case-law of the Court, this being a matter for the referring court to ascertain.
Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 7 July 2016 —

HIT Groep v Commission

(Case C‑514/15 P) ( 1 )

‛Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Competition — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — European prestressing steel market — Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 — Article 23(2) — Calculation of the amount of the fine — Upper limit of the fine — Total turnover in the ‘preceding business year’ — Reference to a business year other than the one preceding the adoption of the contested decision — Principle of proportionality’

Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Maximum amount — Calculation in relation to the turnover in the business year preceding the date the fine was imposed — Business year in which there was no turnover — Reference to another business year — Lawfulness — Breach of principle of proportionality — No such breach (Art. 101 TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2)) (see paras 25-31, 34, 35, 38, 46)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. Hit Groep BV shall pay the costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 398, 30.11.2015.
Order of the Court (First Chamber) of 26 September 2018 — Viasat Broadcasting UK v TV2 v Danmark

(Case C‑660/15 P-DEP)

(Taxation of costs)

1. Judicial proceedings—Costs—Taxation—Recoverable costs—Definition—Expenses necessarily incurred by the parties (Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 144(b)) (see paras 18-20)

2. Judicial proceedings—Costs—Taxation—Recoverable costs—Elements to be taken into consideration (Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 144(b)) (see paras 21-23, 32, 33, 36)

Operative part

The total amount of the costs to be reimbursed by Viasat Broadcasting Ltd to TV2/Danmark A/S is fixed at EUR 30000.
1.

Appeal — Grounds — Mere repetition of the pleas and arguments put forward before the General Court — Error of law relied on not identified — Manifest inadmissibility (Art. 256(1), second para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 168(1)(d) and 169(2)) (see paras 40, 41, 47, 68)
26

As to whether a natural person who agrees to secure the contractual obligations owed by a commercial company to a banking institution under a credit agreement can be regarded as a ‘consumer’ within the meaning of Article 2(b) of Directive 93/13, it should be observed that while a contract providing security or a contract of guarantee can be described, with regard to its purpose, as a contract which is ancillary to the principal contract which gives rise to the debt it secures (see, in the context of Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises (OJ 1985 L 372, p. 31) judgment in Dietzinger, C‑45/96, EU:C:1998:111, paragraph 18), from the point of view of the contracting parties it presents itself as a distinct contract, as it is concluded between persons other than the parties to the principal contract. It is therefore as parties to the contract providing security or contract of guarantee that the capacity in which those parties acted must be assessed.
1.

Paragraph 3 of the order of 14 April 2016 in Best-Lock (Europe) v EUIPO (C‑452/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:270) shall be rectified as follows: ‘The background to the dispute was set out in paragraphs 1 to 7 of the judgment under appeal as follows: “1 On 18 April 2000, [Lego Juris] obtained registration of a Community trade mark with EUIPO, pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1), as amended [replaced by Regulation No 207/2009]. 2 The mark in respect of which registration was obtained under No 50450 is the three-dimensional trade mark reproduced below: 3 The goods in respect of which registration was obtained are, inter alia, in Class 28 of the Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and correspond to the following description: “Games and playthings; decorations for Christmas trees”. 4 On 17 October 2011, [Best-Lock] filed an application seeking a declaration of invalidity of the contested trade mark in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above on the basis of Article 52(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Article 7(1)(e)(i) and (ii) of that regulation. 5 On 28 June 2013, the Cancellation Division rejected the application for a declaration of invalidity. 6 On 27 August 2013, [Best-Lock] filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO, pursuant to Articles 58 to 64 of Regulation No 207/2009, against the Cancellation Division’s decision. 7 By [the decision at issue], the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO dismissed that appeal. …”’
14

Article 11a of the Law on consumer credit, as amended, inserted by Article 3 of that amending law, headed ‘Variable rate of interest’, provides: ‘(1) If variable rates of interest are agreed, the creditor must: (a) define parameters that are clear and known to consumers for adopting decisions regarding changes to those rates; (b) set out qualitatively and quantitatively the causal link between fluctuations in the parameters referred to in point (a) and their impact on the variable interest rates; and, (c) fix the periods to which the adoption of the decision to change the variable interest rates apply (what the base period is and what the reference period is). (2) The parameter referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be one of following variables: Euribor, LIBOR, NRR (national reference rate), treasury bond yield or average interest rate on deposits by private individuals in a given currency. The variable rate is fixed by adding a fixed margin to the agreed parameter which banks are prohibited from exceeding during the repayment period and which must be agreed at the same time as the parameter. (3) The interest rate fluctuations within a reference period may not be greater, or less in the case of a fall, than the fluctuation of the parameter referred to in paragraph 1 expressed in percentage points. (4) If the lender offers variable interest rates, it must clearly and unequivocally communicate to the consumer the elements referred to in paragraph 1 before the loan agreement is concluded. Additionally, it must warn the consumer of all the risks attached to the variability and set out, clearly and unequivocally, in the contract the variable elements on the basis of which the interest rate is calculated. (5) In respect of all ongoing credit agreements concluded up to the date of the entry into force of the present law without the parameter having been fixed or the causal link established, the creditor must, in accordance with this article, define the parameter by one of the following variables: — a reference interest rate (Euribor, LIBOR) or — the NRR or — the rate of the Finance Ministry treasury bond yield or — the average interest rate on deposits by private individuals in a given currency; it must also state the fixed part of the interest rate and the frequency at which interest rates are changed. ... ...’
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling—Jurisdiction of the Court—Limits—Request for an interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union—Legal situation falling outside the scope of EU law—Clear lack of jurisdiction of the Court

(Art. 6(1) TEU; Art. 267 TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 51; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 53(2))

(see paras 14-21, operative part)
Appeals—Grounds—Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence—Inadmissibility—Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence—Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see para. 4)
Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 20 July 2016 –

Stanleybet Malta and Stoppani

(Case C‑141/16) ( *1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services — Single tax on betting and pools — Making subject to taxation national intermediaries which transmit game data on behalf of operators established in another Member State — Absence of sufficient information concerning the factual and regulatory background to the dispute in the main proceedings and the reasons justifying the need for an answer to the question referred for a preliminary ruling — Manifest inadmissibility)’

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Admissibility — Reference giving no details of the relevant facts or legislation and not setting out the reasons for making that reference to the Court of Justice — Manifest inadmissibility (Art. 267 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 23; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 53(2) and 94) (see paras 6, 7, 10)

Operative part

The request for a preliminary ruling from the Commissione tributaria regionale di Milano (Regional Tax Court, Milan, Italy), by decision of 29 September 2015, is manifestly inadmissible.

( *1 ) OJ C 191, 30.5.2016.
Article 101 TFEU, read in conjunction with Article 4(3) TEU, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation pursuant to which the price of road haulage services for hire or reward may not be lower than minimum operating costs fixed by a national administration in a case where those minimum costs are fixed by that national administration after the trade associations most representative of hauliers and customers have been heard. In doing so, the Member State has not divested its own rules of the character of legislation by delegating to private economic operators responsibility for taking decisions affecting the economic sphere. Similarly, there is nothing in such legislation to suggest the existence of an agreement, decision or concerted practice between undertakings, within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU, that has been required or encouraged by public authorities, or the effects of which have been reinforced by them.

(see paras 22, 23, 25, 28, operative part)
Article 2(l) of Regulation No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights must be interpreted as meaning that a flight in respect of which the places of departure and arrival accorded with the planned schedule but during which an unscheduled stopover took place cannot be regarded as cancelled.

In that regard, first, it is common ground that the objective of Regulation No 261/2004, as is clear from recitals 1, 2 and 4 thereof, is to ensure a high level of protection for passengers and consumers, by strengthening their rights in a number of situations involving serious trouble and inconvenience, and also redressing those situations in a standardised and immediate manner.

The fact that a flight gave rise to an unscheduled stopover is not at all a situation involving in itself, for the passengers, serious trouble or inconvenience such as that arising from a denied boarding, a cancellation or a lengthy delay, compensation for which is provided for by Regulation No 261/2004, as interpreted by the Court.

Such serious trouble and inconvenience would only arise if the stopover means that the aircraft making the flight at issue reaches its final destination with a delay equal to or in excess of three hours compared with the scheduled time of arrival, a situation which, in principle, gives rise to the passenger’s right to compensation laid down in Article 5(1)(c) and Article 7 of Regulation No 261/2004, as interpreted by the Court.

Second, if a flight that arrives at its planned final destination after an unscheduled stopover were equated to a cancellation that would recognise the right of compensation to a passenger who, owing to the unscheduled stopover, suffered a delay in arriving of less than three hours, whilst a passenger who suffered the identical delay for a different reason would not have a right to the compensation provided for by Article 5(1)(c) and Article 7 of Regulation No 261/2004, as interpreted by the Court and, therefore, would be contrary to the principal of equal treatment.

(see paras 22-25, 27, operative part)
Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 4 May 2017 — Svobodová

(Case C‑653/16) ( 1 )

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Factual and regulatory background to the dispute in the main proceedings — Absence of sufficient information — Manifest inadmissibility — Article 53(2) and Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court)

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling—Admissibility—Reference giving no details of the relevant facts or legislation and not setting out the reasons for making that reference to the Court of Justice—Manifest inadmissibility

(Art. 267 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 23; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 53(2) and 94)

(see paras 18-22, 28, 29, operative part)

Operative part

The request for a preliminary ruling made by the Nejvyšší soud (Supreme Court, Czech Republic), by decision of 2 December 2016, is manifestly inadmissible.

( 1 ) OJ C 78, 13.3.2017.
Appeal—Grounds—Grounds which are manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded—Dismissal at any point, by reasoned order, without an oral procedure

(Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 181)

(see paras 3)
Appeal—Grounds—Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence—Inadmissibility—Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence—Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see paras 49, 50)