ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.

Must Articles 2, 4, 5, 27 and 29 of the Citizenship Directive 2004/38, (1) which implement Articles 20 and 21 TFEU, be interpreted as not precluding the regulations of a Member State (in the present case, deriving from Articles 18 and 22 of the Ministerieel Besluit van 30 juni 2020 houdende dringende maatregelen om de verspreiding van het coronavirus COVID-19 te beperken (Ministerial Decree of 30 June 2020 on urgent measures to limit the spread of the coronavirus COVID-19), as amended respectively by Articles 3 and 5 of the Ministerieel besluit van 10 juli 2020 (Ministerial Decree of 10 July 2020)) which by way of a general measure: — impose, in principle, on Belgian nationals and their family members as well as on Union citizens residing in Belgian territory and their family members an exit ban for non-essential travel from Belgium to countries within the EU and the Schengen Area that are coloured red in accordance with a colour code drawn up on the basis of epidemiological data; — impose on non-Belgian Union citizens and their family members (who may or may not have the right to reside in Belgian territory) entry restrictions (such as quarantines and tests) for non-essential travel from countries within the EU and the Schengen Area to Belgium which are coloured red in accordance with a colour code drawn up on the basis of epidemiological data?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Arbeitsgericht Ludwigshafen am Rhein (Germany) lodged on 17 March 2022 — TF v Sparkasse Südpfalz

(Case C-206/22)

(2022/C 237/45)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Arbeitsgericht Ludwigshafen am Rhein

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: TF

Defendant: Sparkasse Südpfalz

Question referred

Must Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC (1) and the right to an annual period of paid leave set out in Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as precluding national legislation or practice on the granting of annual leave to workers under which the obligation to grant an entitlement to leave is fulfilled even if the worker is affected by an unforeseeable event during an authorised period of leave, such as, in the present case, government-ordered quarantine, and is therefore prevented from exercising that entitlement in full?

(1) Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (OJ 2003 L 299, p. 9).
2.

The General Court erred in law by holding that the Appellant cannot withdraw one of its representative uses from its notification dossier. Pursuant to Regulations 1107/2009 and 844/2012, the freedom in choosing the representative uses at the beginning of the renewal process mirrors and necessarily entails the freedom of withdrawing them during such procedure. The General Court also erred in law by holding that European Food Safety Authority’s (EFSA) Administrative Guidance is applicable. The process for the renewal is one single process combining two interconnected phases. It is therefore irrelevant that the EFSA’s administrative guidance concerns the process starting with the ‘submission of an application and ends with the adoption and publication of the EFSA conclusions’, and that consequently, the withdrawal could only occur in the first phase before EFSA.
2.

In the light of recital 14 and Article 7(3) of Regulation No 261/2004, does the breakdown of that bus and the need to replace it on the journey to the final destination constitute an extraordinary circumstance which exempts the air carrier from the obligation to pay compensation to passengers where the bus arrives at the final destination much later than its scheduled or expected arrival time?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas (Lithuania) lodged on 3 March 2022 — A.G. v Lietuvos Respublikos generalinė prokuratūra

(Case C-162/22)

(2022/C 237/37)

Language of the case: Lithuanian

Referring court

Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: A.G.

Other party: Lietuvos Respublikos generalinė prokuratūra

Question referred

Must Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector, read in conjunction with Articles 7, 8, 11 and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as prohibiting the competent public authorities from using data retained by providers of electronic communications services which may provide information on the data of, and communications made by, a user of a means of electronic communications, in investigations into corruption-related misconduct in office, irrespective of whether access to those data has been granted, in the particular case, for the purposes of combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security?

(1) OJ 2002 L 201, p. 37.
1.

Irrespective of the provisions of national law according to which, under certain circumstances, foreign nationals can be allowed to stay on account of their state of health, and which where necessary protect them from an expulsion order, must Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2011/95/EU (1) be interpreted as meaning that where a sick Palestinian refugee, after actually availing himself of UNRWA protection or assistance, leaves the State or territory in the area of operations of that agency in which he had his habitual residence because he cannot have sufficient access there to the care and treatment required by his state of health and because that failure to provide care and treatment presents a genuine risk to his life or physical integrity, there is reason to consider that his personal safety is at serious risk and that he is in a situation in which it is impossible for UNRWA to guarantee that his living conditions will be commensurate with the mission entrusted to it?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Krajský soud v Brně (Czech Republic) lodged on 14 April 2022 — CD v Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky

(Case C-257/22)

(2022/C 266/17)

Language of the case: Czech

Referring court

Krajský soud v Brně

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: CD

Defendant: Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky

Question referred

Should Article 4(2) and (3) and Article 5 in fine of Directive 2008/115/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals in conjunction with Article 2, Article 4, and Article 19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as precluding the application, in assessing whether a return decision under Article 6 of Directive 2008/115/EC leads to a breach of the non-refoulement principle, of the concept of a safe country of origin under Articles 36 and 37 of Directive 2013/32/EU (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, in combination with the narrowed definition of the non-refoulement principle focused solely on the prohibition of ill treatment under Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms?

(1) OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98.

(2) OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 13 May 2022 — KRI SpA, as the successor of SI.LO.NE. — Sistema logistico nord-est Srl v Agenzia delle dogane e dei monopoli

(Case C-323/22)

(2022/C 294/23)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte suprema di cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: KRI SpA, as the successor of SI.LO.NE. — Sistema logistico nord-est Srl

Respondent: Agenzia delle dogane e dei monopoli

Question referred

Must the first sentence of Article 14 of Council Directive 92/12/EEC of 25 February 1992 (1) be interpreted as meaning that in the event of irregular departure of the product subject to excise duty, the liability of the warehousekeeper guaranteeing payment of the duty is objective, with there being no possibility of exemption from that liability and from payment of the sums corresponding to the related financial penalties, even where that departure results from an unlawful act attributable — exclusively — to a third party, or can it be interpreted as meaning that the exemption from the tax and from the corresponding penalties is to be granted — as a fortuitous event or force majeure — to the guarantor warehousekeeper who not only has nothing whatsoever to do with the unlawful act of the third party but also had a legitimate and good faith expectation that the movement of the product under the duty suspension arrangement was regular?

(1) Council Directive 92/12/EEC of 25 February 1992 on the general arrangements for products subject to excise duty and on the holding, movement and monitoring of such products (OJ 1992 L 76, p. 1).
1.

Must Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29) (1) be construed as precluding an interpretation of national law which, in the case where a contract is no longer capable of continuing in existence following the elimination of abusive clauses, makes the start of the limitation period for the claims of the seller or supplier for restitution conditional on the occurrence of any of the following events: (a) the consumer making a claim or raising a plea against the seller or supplier on the grounds that contractual clauses are abusive, or a court, acting of its own motion, advising that contractual clauses may be declared abusive; or (b) the consumer stating that he or she has been given comprehensive information on the effects (legal consequences) of the contract being no longer capable of continuing in existence, including information on the possible claims of the seller or supplier for restitution and the extent of those claims; or (c) the consumer’s knowledge (awareness) of the effects (legal consequences) of the contract being no longer capable of continuing in existence being established during court proceedings, or the court advising the consumer of such consequences; or (d) the final court judgment resolving the dispute between the seller or supplier and the consumer being delivered?
2.

Must the provision of Article 107 TFEU be interpreted and applied in such a manner that, with regard to the status of ‘undertaking’ and in the application of the criteria for an ‘undertaking’, and having regard to the data collected in relation to the completed first stage of the administrative procedure for prior consent, the investment project as applied for and factually described of the beneficiary of unlawfully obtained State aid, which is to be realised on State-owned forest land acquired by means of a swap and which is a prerequisite for the initiation of a subsequent procedure concerning the removal from the forest stock of the land acquired for the purpose of the construction, must be taken into account as a legally relevant circumstance, irrespective of the fact that it has become objectively impossible for the investment project to be realised due to the moratorium imposed by parliament and the subsequently adopted statutory provision containing an express prohibition preventing a change of the designated use of the land acquired from the State and preventing construction on that land?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 10 March 2022 by Laboratorios Ern, SA against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 12 January 2022 in Case T-160/21, Laboratorios Ern v EUIPO — Malpricht (APIRETAL)

(Case C-187/22 P)

(2022/C 318/27)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Laboratorios Ern, SA (represented by: T. González Martínez and R. Guerras Mazón, abogados)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Ingrid Malpricht

By order of 11 July 2022, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Laboratorios Ern, SA should bear its own costs.
Appeal brought on 9 June 2022 by British Airways plc against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 30 March 2022 in Case T-341/17, British Airways v Commission

(Case C-378/22 P)

(2022/C 303/30)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: British Airways plc (represented by: A. Lyle-Smythe and R. O'Donoghue, advocaten, T. Sebastian, Barrister)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal in full, or in alternative, in part insofar as it rejects the appellant’s fourth plea and the second part of the appellant’s seventh plea;

— if the judgment under appeal is not set aside in full, set aside paragraph 4 of the operative part of the judgment insofar as it deals with the appellant’s fourth plea and the second part of the appellant’s seventh plea;

— annul the Commission Decision C(2017) 1742 final of 17 March 2017 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU, Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and Article 8 of the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport (Case AT.39258 — Airfreight) (the Decision) in whole or in part, specifically the first sentence of recital 1045 and recital 1046 in its entirety; and

— award the appellant the costs of the appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellant seeks to set aside, in whole or in part, the judgment under appeal. The judgment under appeal resolved the appellant’s application to annul, in whole or in part, the Decision.

In support of the action, the applicant relies on the three following pleas in law.

First plea, that the General Court erred in law by substituting its own reasoning for that of the Commission and failed to identify any qualified effects on competition in the EU/EEA. This plea has two parts. First, that the Commission’s cursory reasoning was plainly inadequate and the General Court erred by impermissibly substituting its own detailed reasoning in place of that reasoning. Second, that the Commission’s substituted reasoning is in any event insufficient as it fails to identify a relevant and sufficient effect on competition in the EU/EEA.

Second plea, that the General Court erred in law in arriving at its conclusions on price effects in downstream goods markets located in the EU/EEA. The General Court distorted the evidence before it, improperly placed the burden of proof on the appellant to disprove material factual propositions and exceeded its competence by substituting its own reasoning for altogether different reasoning of the Commission.

Third plea, that the General Court erred in law and misconstrued the Decision mentioned above by relying on certain aspects of a single and continuous infringement, which had effects within the EU/EEA to establish jurisdiction over distinct foreign conduct, which was not shown to have generated qualified effects within EU/EEA territory.
1.

Where a parent company brings an action for damages in respect of the anti-competitive conduct of another company in order to obtain compensation for the damage suffered as a result of that conduct solely by its subsidiaries, does the registered office of the parent company determine the forum of jurisdiction, as the place where the harmful event occurred for the purposes of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (‘the Brussels Ia Regulation’)? (1)
9.

In the event that Directive 2006/123 is held, in the abstract, to be self-executing, can such immediate applicability be regarded as pertaining even in a legislative context such as that in Italy, in which Article 49 of the Codice della navigazione (Shipping Code) (which provides that, on the expiry of a concession, ‘all immovable property shall become the property of the State, without any compensation or reimbursement being due’) operates, and is such a consequence of the self-executing nature or immediate applicability of that directive (particularly with reference to duly authorised masonry structures and concessions over State-owned property that are functionally linked to a tourist business such as a hotel or holiday resort) consistent with the protection of fundamental rights, such as the right to property, which are accorded special protection under EU law and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights?
2.

Must EU law, in particular Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1821 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, be interpreted as meaning that a product is to be considered ‘unfit for human consumption’ when: (a) the use of that product in the food industry is entirely ruled out or impossible, that is to say, that product cannot be used or processed in the food industry or serve as the basis for manufacturing a product which can be consumed by humans; or (b) that product cannot be consumed by humans in its imported state but, once that product has been used or processed in the food industry, it may serve as the basis for manufacturing a product which can be consumed by humans?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Pécsi Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 14 June 2022 — Tüke Busz Közösségi Közlekedési Zrt. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

(Case C-391/22)

(2022/C 326/15)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Pécsi Törvényszék

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Tüke Busz Közösségi Közlekedési Zrt.

Defendant: Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

Question referred

Are the decision adopted in this case by the Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal (National Tax and Customs Authority) and the practice followed by that authority, whereby ‘regular passenger transport does not include the mileage necessary for the maintenance of regular passenger transport vehicles or for refuelling’, compatible with the provisions of Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity? (1)

(1) OJ 2003 L 283, p. 51.
Appeal brought on 14 July 2022 by OC against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 4 May 2022 in Case T-384/20, OC v Commission

(Case C-479/22 P)

(2022/C 340/32)

Language of the case: Greek

Parties

Appellant: OC (represented by: I. Ktenidis, dikigoros)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

Appeal seeking to have set aside the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) of 4 May 2022 in Case T-384/20, OC v European Commission (ECLI:EU:T:2022:273)

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside in its entirety the judgment under appeal;

— give a final judgment in the dispute;

— order the Commission to pay the costs of the appeal proceedings and of the proceedings before the General Court.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant raises the following three grounds:

1. First ground: Incorrect interpretation of Article 3(1) of Regulation 2018/1725 (1) regarding, first, the concept of ‘identifiable’ physical person and, second, the concept of means that are reasonably likely to be used to identify a natural person, as well as distortion of the clear sense of the evidence relating to the identification of the appellant by a specific person.

2. Second ground: Incorrect interpretation of Article 9(1) of Regulation No 883/2013 (2) and of Article 48(1) of the Charter, read in conjunction with Article 6(2) of the ECHR, regarding the scope of the presumption of innocence.

3. Third ground: Distortion of the clear sense of the evidence relating to the breach of the right to good administration under Article 41 of the Charter.

(1) Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (Text with EEA relevance), OJ 2018 L 295, p. 39.

(2) Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999, OJ 2013 L 248, p. 1.
3.

What evidence can the applicant use in support of his arguments that Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation precludes his transfer, and what standard of proof should be applied? In the light of the references to the Union acquis in the recitals of the Dublin Regulation, does the transferring Member State have a duty of cooperation or verification, or, in the event of serious and systematic infringements of fundamental rights with respect to third-country nationals, is it necessary to obtain individual guarantees from the Member State responsible that the applicant’s fundamental rights will (indeed) be respected after the transfer? Is the answer to this question different if the applicant lacks evidence in so far as he is unable to support his consistent and detailed statements with documents, when he cannot be expected to do so, given the nature of the statements?