Case T‑422/10

(publication by extracts)

Trafilerie Meridionali SpA

v

European Commission

‛Competition — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — European market for prestressing steel — Price-fixing, market-sharing and exchange of commercially sensitive information — Decision finding an infringement of Article 101 TFEU — Single and continuous infringement — Proportionality — Principle that the penalty must fit the offence — Unlimited jurisdiction’

Summary — Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber), 15 July 2015

Competition — Fines — Amount — Discretion of the Commission — Judicial review — Unlimited jurisdiction of the EU judicature — Scope — Reduction of the amount of a fine imposed in breach of the principle of proportionality — Account taken of the principle that the penalty must fit the offender

Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Adjustment of the basic amount — Contributory capacity — No obligation to take account of the deficit situation of the undertaking concerned — Actual capacity of the undertaking to pay in a particular social and economic context — To be taken into consideration — Conditions — Account taken of the principles of proportionality and equal treatment

Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Method of calculation laid down by the guidelines drawn up by the Commission — Penalty made to fit the particular infringement at various stages of the determination of the amount — Obligation to take account of all relevant circumstances — Judicial review

Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Participation in meetings having an anti-competitive object — Circumstances from which, where the undertaking concerned has not distanced itself from the decisions adopted, it may be concluded that it participated in the ensuing cartel — Burden of proving participation in meetings on the Commission — No proof of the participation of an undertaking in meetings held during a certain part of the total duration of a single infringement — Consequences

Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Prohibition — Infringements — Agreements and concerted practices constituting a single infringement — Imputation of responsibility to an undertaking for the whole of the infringement notwithstanding its limited role — Lawfulness — Account taken when assessing the gravity of the infringement and determining the amount of the fine

Competition — Administrative procedure — Commission decision finding an infringement — Burden of proving the infringement and its duration on the Commission — Extent of the burden of proof — Degree of precision required of the evidence used by the Commission — Body of evidence — Judicial review — Scope — Decision leaving a doubt in the mind of the court — Compliance with the principle of the presumption of innocence

See the text of the decision. (see paras 88-90)

See the text of the decision. (see paras 91-96)

In order to prove to the requisite standard that an undertaking participated in a cartel, it is sufficient for the Commission to establish that the undertaking concerned participated in meetings at which anti-competitive agreements were concluded, without manifestly opposing them. Where participation in such meetings has been established, it is for that undertaking to put forward indicia to establish that its participation in those meetings was without any anti-competitive intention by demonstrating that it had indicated to its competitors that it was participating in those meetings in a spirit that was different from theirs. In that regard, the requirement of a distancing where the undertaking concerned participates in a meeting assumes, in order to apply, that the Commission shows that the undertaking concerned participated in meetings at which anti-competitive agreements were concluded, without manifestly opposing them, in order to prove to the requisite standard that the undertaking participated in the cartel. Thus, in the case of an undertaking which participated in a cartel for several years, where it is not demonstrated to the requisite legal standard that that undertaking participated, directly or indirectly, in meetings over a period of about nine months, so that other cartel members had no firm idea about its conduct on the market during that period, the Commission cannot consider that the said undertaking participated in anti-competitive practices during the said period. (see paras 97, 295-297)

In the matter of penalties imposed for infringement of competition law in relation to cartels, after having established the existence of a single infringement and identified its participants, the Commission is required, in order to impose fines, to examine the relative gravity of the participation of each of them in that infringement. That is apparent in particular from the Guidelines for the calculation of fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, which provide for differential treatment in respect of the starting amount (specific starting amount) and for account to be taken of aggravating and mitigating circumstances allowing the amount of the fine to be adjusted, notably by reference to the active or passive role of the undertakings concerned in the implementation of the infringement. In any event, an undertaking can never be fined an amount which is calculated to reflect its participation in a collusion for which it is not held liable. Likewise, an undertaking can be penalised only for acts imputed to it individually. The penalties must be individualised in the sense that they must relate to the individual conduct and specific characteristics of the undertakings concerned. It is even more necessary to make the penalty fit the offence where there has been a complex infringement constituted by a series of agreements and concerted practices between undertakings with conflicting commercial interests over a very long period and where the participation in the cartel of one of those undertakings has numerous special characteristics by comparison with those of the main players brought together within the cartel. In that regard, an undertaking whose liability is established in relation to several branches of a cartel contributes more to the effectiveness and the seriousness of the cartel than an offender involved in only one branch of it. Thus, the first undertaking commits a more serious infringement than the second. Participation of an undertaking in only the internal aspect of a cartel is inherently less serious than that of an undertaking that participated not only in the internal aspect but also in its external aspect. (see paras 99-103, 148, 314)

See the text of the decision. (see paras 115, 132, 133, 135, 144, 175, 194)

The list of mitigating circumstances in point 29 of the 2006 Guidelines is not exhaustive, as is clear from the fact that that list is introduced by the expression ‘such as’. (see para. 313)

See the text of the decision. (see paras 315-329)

In the matter of penalties imposed for infringement of the competition rules on cartels, in accordance with the second indent of point 29 of the 2006 Guidelines, the Commission may reduce the basic amount of the fine to take account of a mitigating circumstance where the undertaking provides evidence that the infringement has been committed as a result of negligence. In that regard, the participation of an undertaking cannot be the outcome of negligence, but is the result of a deliberate act on its part, where information provided by other cartel members shows that the said undertaking wished to join them. Similarly, the fact that it is a small family undertaking, which sells only in the domestic market and does not export, the small size of its market share, the fact that it does not have an in-house legal department or its alleged ignorance of the principles governing competition law, or again the particular features of its participation, do not constitute circumstances capable of showing that it was not acting deliberately when it joined, then left, then re-joined a cartel. (see paras 335-337)

See the text of the decision. (see paras 356-365, 373-376, 383, 392)

See the text of the decision. (see paras 366-371)