ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.

Does Article 23(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, (1) read in conjunction with Article 23(5) thereof, require that, if a person in detention has not been surrendered within the time limits, the executing judicial authority referred to in Article 6(2) of the Framework Decision is to decide on a new surrender date and must determine whether a situation of force majeure exists and if the conditions required for detention are met, or is a procedure under which the court only examines those matters where the parties so request also compatible with the framework decision? If action on the part of the judicial authority is required in order for the time limit to be extended, does the lack of any such action necessarily mean that the time limits laid down in the framework decision have expired, in which case the person in detention must be released pursuant to Article 23(5) thereof?
Appeal brought on 14 December 2021 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 29 September 2021 in Joined Cases T-344/19 and T-356/19, Front Polisario v Council

(Case C-778/21 P)

(2022/C 119/29)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: A. Bouquet, F. Castillo de la Torre, A. Stobiecka-Kuik, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Front populaire pour la libération de la Saguia el-Hamra et du Rio de oro (Front Polisario), Council of the European Union, Kingdom of Spain, French Republic, Chambre des pêches maritimes de la Méditerranée, Chambre des pêches maritimes de l’Atlantique Nord, Chambre des pêches maritimes de l’Atlantique Centre, Chambre des pêches maritimes de l’Atlantique Sud

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside paragraphs 1 and 2 of the operative part of the judgment under appeal and consequently;

— dismiss the action brought at first instance by the Front Polisario, or, if the state of proceedings does not permit the Court of Justice to give final judgment in the matter, refer the case back to the General Court;

— order the Front Polisario to pay the costs of both sets of proceedings in their entirety.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

— First ground of appeal: errors in law based on the Front Polisario’s lack of capacity to be a party to legal proceedings.

— Second ground of appeal: errors in law based on the Front Polisario’s lack of direct concern.

— Third ground of appeal: errors in law based on the Front Polisario’s lack of individual concern.

— Fourth ground of appeal: errors in law regarding the scope of judicial review, the institutions’ margin of appreciation and the need to find that there had been a manifest error; regarding the consent of the people of Western Sahara not being a requirement; regarding the fact that the concept of consent adopted is too strict and theoretical, that the consultation that obtained the favourable opinion is considered insufficient and that the examination of the benefits is rejected; regarding the Front Polisario’s identification as the entity that would be responsible for giving such consent, given its limited status and representativeness.
1.

Must the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU be interpreted as meaning that, due to the fact that the independence of the courts has been undermined, citizens are not guaranteed the legal remedies necessary for effective judicial protection where, in a Member State of the European Union, it is permissible for judges to be seconded to a higher court for an indefinite period, with their consent, by decision of a governing body of the judiciary which is independent of the other public authorities, if conditions are laid down for a decision to terminate the secondment and provision is made for a legal remedy against that decision, but that remedy does not have suspensive effect while the proceedings are pending, and on the basis of what criteria should it be specifically assessed whether secondment for an indefinite period is permissible?
Action brought on 22 December 2021 — European Commission v Hungary

(Case C-823/21)

(2022/C 128/12)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: A. Azéma, L. Grønfeldt, A. Tokár and J. Tomkin, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Hungary

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by making access to the international protection procedure and the making of an application for international protection in respect of third-country nationals present in the Hungarian territory, including at its borders, subject to the requirement that they must first undergo a procedure at a Hungarian diplomatic representation in a third country, Hungary has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 6 of Directive 2013/32, (1) read in conjunction with Article 18 of the Charter.

— order Hungary to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Under the rules on the right of asylum introduced in Hungary by Act LVIII of 2020, which was adopted on a provisional basis but has subsequently been extended on several occasions, persons wishing to seek asylum in Hungary must, with few exceptions, first submit a letter of intent to the Hungarian Embassy in Belgrade or Kyiv, and can only access the international protection procedure after a positive response to that letter of intent and the issuance of an entry permit.

The Commission considers that that new asylum procedure is incompatible with Article 6 of Directive 2013/32 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, interpreted in the light of Article 18 of the Charter.

The right of ‘access to the procedure’, which is guaranteed by Article 6 of the directive, implies first and foremost the possibility for third-country nationals present in the territory of a Member State, including at its borders, to make an application for international protection.

However, it follows from the applicable provisions of Act LVIII of 2020 that, if third-country nationals present in Hungarian territory, including at its borders, express their willingness to avail themselves of international protection, the Hungarian authorities will not consider that declaration as the making of an application for international protection within the meaning of Directive 2013/32. The application will not be registered and the person will not be granted the rights to which the applicant is entitled. Instead, in order to submit his or her application, the person must leave the Hungarian territory, return to a third country and first undergo a procedure at the Hungarian embassy in that country.

(1) Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 10 November 2021 by Residencial Palladium, S.L. against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 1 September 2021 in Case T-566/20, Residencial Palladium v EUIPO — Palladium Gestión (Palladium Hotel Garden Beach)

(Case C-674/21 P)

(2022/C 148/12)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: Residencial Palladium, S.L. (represented by: D. Solana Giménez, abogado)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Palladium Gestión, S.L.

By order of 22 February 2022, the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) dismissed the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed and ordered Residencial Palladium, S.L. to bear its own costs.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 15 December 2021 by Wolfgang Kappes against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) delivered on 13 October 2021 in Case T-429/20, Sedus Stoll AG v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-784/21 P)

(2022/C 213/22)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Wolfgang Kappes (represented by: B. Schneiders, J. Schneiders, T. Pfeifer, N. Gottschalk, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: Sedus Stoll AG, European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 5 April 2022, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) did not allow the appeal to proceed and ordered the appellant to bear his own costs.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 10 December 2021 by NB against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 28 September 2021 in Case T-648/20, NB v Court of Justice of the European Union

(Case C-774/21 P)

(2022/C 198/24)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: NB (represented by: J.-N. Louis, avocat, N. Maes, avocate)

Other party to the proceedings: Court of Justice of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the order under appeal;

and, giving judgment itself,

— annul the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union not to appoint her to Grade AST10 for appointment/promotion/‘reclassification’ exercise 2014-2018;

— in any event, order the respondent to pay the costs at both instances.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of her appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court committed a manifest error of assessment in deciding that the action was inadmissible.

She also claims that the procedure put in place by the institution for the implementation of the 2014 reform of the Staff Regulations as regards appointment/promotion from Grade AST 9 to Grade AST10 is unlawful.
6)

Where insufficient evidence is before a protection decision maker as to the state of an applicant’s mental health but where some evidence of the possibility of an applicant suffering from such difficulties is present, is the international protection decision maker, in accordance with the duty of cooperation mentioned in Case C- 277/11 M.M. v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and Ors (paragraph 66), or otherwise, under a duty to make further enquiry, or any other duty, prior to arriving at a final decision?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 1 December 2021 by Collibra against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 22 September 2021 in Cases T-128/20 and T-129/20, Collibra v EUIPO — Dietrich (COLLIBRA and collibra)

(Case C-730/21 P)

(2022/C 222/14)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Collibra (represented by: A. Renck and A. Bothe, Rechtsanwälte, and by I. Junkar, abogada)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Hans Dietrich

By order of 23 March 2022, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Collibra should bear its own costs.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Graz (Austria) lodged on 6 January 2022 — Staatsanwaltschaft Graz v MS

(Case C-16/22)

(2022/C 138/20)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberlandesgericht Graz

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Staatsanwaltschaft Graz

Defendant: MS

Other party: Finanzamt für Steuerstrafsachen und Steuerfahndung Düsseldorf

Question referred

Must the first sentence of Article 1(1) and Article 2(c)(i) of Directive 2014/41/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters be interpreted as meaning that a German tax office for criminal tax matters and tax investigation which is empowered under national rules to exercise the rights and fulfil the obligations of the public prosecutor’s office in relation to certain offences is to be regarded as a ‘judicial authority’ and an ‘issuing authority’ within the meaning of those provisions of EU law?

(1) Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters (OJ 2014 L 130, p. 1).
Appeal brought on 7 February 2022 by Jean-François Jalkh against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 1 December 2021 in Case T-230/21 Jalkh v Parliament

(Case C-82/22 P)

(2022/C 138/24)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Jean-François Jalkh (represented by: F. Wagner, lawyer)

Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— annul the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 1 December 2021 in Case T-230/21, Jalkh v Parliament;

— annul the decision of the European Parliament P9_TA(2021)0092 of 25 March 2021 on the request for waiver of the immunity of the applicant [2020/2110 (IMM)];

— order the European Parliament to pay all costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of his appeal, the appellant relies on three grounds of appeal.

The first ground of appeal alleges a breach of the rule that ‘civil and administrative proceedings must await the outcome of criminal proceedings’. According to the appellant, the General Court committed a manifest error of assessment which led it to disregard legal provisions in force in the EU and the case-law of an EU country, which could and should have been taken into account in the appellant’s case, in order to suspend the procedure for the waiver of his immunity, having regard to the complaint against X seeking to join a civil action to proceedings lodged with the investigating magistrate in Brussels on 15 December 2020, on the ground of forgery and use of forged documents.

The second ground of appeal alleges a manifest error of assessment of EU law by failing to recognise the infringement by the European Parliament, via its JURI Committee, of Article 7 of Communication 0011/2019 of 19/11/2019.

According to the appellant, the General Court committed a manifest error of assessment of EU law and its general principles, such as the principle of equal treatment and the principle of sound administration, which was of particular relevance to the proceedings, as the appellant argued that the handwritten phrase ‘very attentive’ in addition to the typewritten greeting on the letter from the Minister for Justice of 16 June 2020 should be regarded as revealing an eagerness on the part of the French Government to use the judicial proceedings at issue in the political debate and as such constituting fumus persecutionnis.

The third ground of appeal alleges an infringement of Article 9 of the Protocol on Immunities. According to the appellant, the General Court acknowledged that the facts complained of, namely Jean-François Jalkh’s use of his parliamentary assistance budget, were covered by the immunity provided for in Article 9 of the Protocol, but confined itself to a general formula to dismiss the complaint without explaining its reasons.
1.

Must Article 7(1) of Directive 2013/32/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, read in conjunction with Article 4(1) of Directive 2011/95/EU (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13. December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, be interpreted as precluding rules of national law, such as those applicable in the present case, which, in the event of a declaration of martial law, a state of emergency or also a declaration of an emergency due to a mass influx of foreigners, do not in principle allow a foreigner who has entered and remains unlawfully in the territory of a Member State to lodge an application for international protection?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Essen (Germany) lodged on 10 February 2022 — DC v HJ

(Case C-97/22)

(2022/C 165/42)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Essen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: DC

Defendant: HJ

Question referred

Must Article 14(5) of Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) be interpreted as meaning that, in the event that the customer withdraws his or her declaration of intention to conclude an off-premises construction contract only after the trader has already (fully) performed his or her services, it also precludes any entitlement to compensation or compensation for value on the part of the trader where the conditions of entitlement to compensation or compensation for value under the rules governing the legal consequences of withdrawal are not met, but the customer’s assets have been enhanced as a result of the trader’s construction work, that is to say, he or she has been enriched?

(1) OJ 2011 L 304, p. 64.
—

declare that, by failing to adopt, by 4 October 2016 at the latest, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Article 8(7), Article 9 and Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union (1) or, in any event, by not communicating those provisions to the Commission, Luxembourg has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 12 of that directive;
3.

Where a monotherapy, drug A, in this case ezetimibe, is granted an SPC, or any combination therapy is first granted an SPC for drugs A and B as a combination therapy, which are part of the claims in the patent, though only drug A is itself novel and thus patented, with other drugs being already known or in the public domain; is the grant of an SPC limited to the first marketing of either that monotherapy of drug A or that first combination therapy granted an SPC, A+B, so that, following that first grant, there cannot be a second or third grant of an SPC for the monotherapy or any combination therapy apart from that first combination granted an SPC?
2.

If question 1 is answered in the affirmative, must general interpretative rule 2(a) then be interpreted as also applying to the separate components of a satellite receiver which are declared for release for free circulation by the same declarant in its own name and on its own behalf, on the same day and at the same customs post as that at which the other components for that satellite receiver are placed under the external Community transit procedure, when the components, at the time when the declarations are made, are the property of two associated undertakings and all the components together are intended, after being put into free circulation, to be assembled into a complete satellite receiver?
3.

If the answer to the second question is in the affirmative: must the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) and Article 5(1) to (3) of the Treaty on European Union, read in conjunction with Articles 47 and 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, be interpreted as requiring a court of a Member State to set aside a final court decision whenever it is established that such a seconded judge participated in the examination of the case, and that the court which included the judge in question was not independent and impartial, by means of a legal remedy the purpose of which is to set aside final decisions, such as an extraordinary appeal, or does the determination of the effects of such an infringement come within the procedural autonomy of the Member State?
3.

Is a pre-trial investigation discontinued in respect of an accused person who was not questioned in his capacity as a person under judicial investigation in connection with a criminal offence relating to the co-accused persons, but in respect of whom measures of investigation were carried out in his capacity as an accused person, and in relation to whom the discontinuance of the pre-trial investigation was based on investigative information provided following a request for legal cooperation, as well as on the provision of bank account information and on the questioning of the co-accused persons in their capacity as persons under judicial investigation, compatible with the ne bis in idem principle laid down in Article 50 of the [Charter] and in Article 54 of the [CISA], and can such a pre-trial investigation be regarded as being sufficiently thorough and exhaustive?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 10 January 2022 by Sanford LP against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 10 November 2021 in Case T-443/20, Sanford v EUIPO — Avery Zweckform (Labels)

(Case C-19/22 P)

(2022/C 207/15)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Sanford LP (represented by: J. Zecher, Rechtsanwalt)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Avery Zweckform GmbH

By order of 6 April 2022, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Sanford LP should bear its own costs.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 28 February 2022 — LACD GmbH v BB Sport GmbH & Co. KG

(Case C-133/22)

(2022/C 222/19)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: LACD GmbH

Defendant: BB Sport GmbH & Co. KG

Questions referred

1. Can any other requirements not related to conformity set out in the guarantee statement within the meaning of Article 2, point 14, of Directive 2011/83/EU (1) and any other requirements not related to conformity within the meaning of Article 2, point 12, of Directive (EU) 2019/771 (2) apply where circumstances specific to the consumer, in particular his or her subjective attitude towards the item purchased (in this case, the consumer’s personal satisfaction with the item purchased), have a bearing on the guarantor’s obligation, without it being necessary that those personal circumstances relate to the condition or features of the item purchased?

2. If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: Must it be possible to establish the absence of requirements based on the circumstances specific to the consumer (in this case, the consumer’s satisfaction with the goods purchased) in the light of objective circumstances?

(1) Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2011 L 304, p. 64).

(2) Directive (EU) 2019/771 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the sale of goods, amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive 2009/22/EC, and repealing Directive 1999/44/EC (OJ 2019 L 136, p. 28), as corrected (OJ 2019 L 305, p. 66).