ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 16 April 2015 – European Dynamics Belgium and Others v EMA

(Case C‑173/14 P) ( 1 )

‛Appeal — Public service contracts — Invitation to tender — Award criteria — Transparency — Objective assessment — Claim for damages’

Appeals — Grounds — Mistaken assessment of the facts — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 30, 31)

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the appeal.

2. Orders European Dynamics Belgium SA, European Dynamics Luxembourg SA, Evropaïki Dynamiki — Proigmena Systimata Tilepikoinonion Pliroforikis kai Tilematikis AE and European Dynamics UK Ltd to pay the costs.

( 1 ) JO C 184 du 16.6.2014.

Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 16 April 2015 – European Dynamics Belgium and Others v EMA

(Case C‑173/14 P) ( 1 )

‛Appeal — Public service contracts — Invitation to tender — Award criteria — Transparency — Objective assessment — Claim for damages’

Appeals — Grounds — Mistaken assessment of the facts — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 30, 31)

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the appeal.

2. Orders European Dynamics Belgium SA, European Dynamics Luxembourg SA, Evropaïki Dynamiki — Proigmena Systimata Tilepikoinonion Pliroforikis kai Tilematikis AE and European Dynamics UK Ltd to pay the costs.

( 1 ) JO C 184 du 16.6.2014.
Articles 9(1) and 73, point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 78 and point (c) of the first paragraph of Article 79 of Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that the amount of taxes which is paid to municipalities by the company holding the gas distribution concession in return for the use of publicly-owned property belonging to those municipalities and which is then passed on by that company to another company responsible for marketing the gas, then by that company on to the final consumers, must be included in the taxable amount for value added tax applicable to the supply of services effected by the first company to the second company under Article 73 of that directive.

It is not the land use taxes as such which are passed on to the company responsible for marketing the gas, but rather the price of using publicly-owned municipal property. Consequently, the amount of land use taxes constitutes part of the consideration received by the company holding the gas distribution concession from the company responsible for marketing the gas for its supply of services and therefore constitutes an ‘economic activity’ within the meaning of Article 9(1) of Directive 2006/112.

(see paras 33, 34, 38, operative part)
Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 11 June 2015 — Baby Dan

(Case C‑272/14) ( 1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Customs union and Common Customs Tariff — Combined Nomenclature — Tariff classification — Heading 7318 and 8302 — Article specially designed to mount child safety gates’

Customs union — Common Customs Tariff — Tariff headings — Article which allows a moveable child safety gate to be mounted to a wall or a door frame — Classification under heading 7318 of the Combined Nomenclature (Council Regulation No 2658/87, Annex I) (see paras 30, 34, 35, 40, operative part)

Operative part

The Combined Nomenclature listed in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, as amended, successively, by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1214/2007 of 20 September 2007, and by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1031/2008 of 19 September 2008, must be interpreted as meaning that an article, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which allows a moveable child safety gate to be mounted to a wall or a door frame, must be classified under heading 7318 of the Combined Nomenclature.

( 1 ) OJ C 253, 4.8.2014.

Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 11 June 2015 — Baby Dan

(Case C‑272/14) ( 1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Customs union and Common Customs Tariff — Combined Nomenclature — Tariff classification — Heading 7318 and 8302 — Article specially designed to mount child safety gates’

Customs union — Common Customs Tariff — Tariff headings — Article which allows a moveable child safety gate to be mounted to a wall or a door frame — Classification under heading 7318 of the Combined Nomenclature (Council Regulation No 2658/87, Annex I) (see paras 30, 34, 35, 40, operative part)

Operative part

The Combined Nomenclature listed in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, as amended, successively, by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1214/2007 of 20 September 2007, and by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1031/2008 of 19 September 2008, must be interpreted as meaning that an article, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which allows a moveable child safety gate to be mounted to a wall or a door frame, must be classified under heading 7318 of the Combined Nomenclature.

( 1 ) OJ C 253, 4.8.2014.
Article 13(2) of Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States must be interpreted as meaning that a third-country national, divorced from a Union citizen, whose marriage lasted for at least three years before the commencement of divorce proceedings, including at least one year in the host Member State, cannot retain a right of residence in that Member State on the basis of that provision where the commencement of the divorce proceedings is preceded by the departure from that Member State of the spouse who is a Union citizen.

The reference in that provision to, on the one hand, ‘the host Member State’, which is defined in Article 2(3) of Directive 2004/38 only by reference to the exercise of the Union citizen’s right of free movement and residence, and, on the other, ‘initiation of the divorce … proceedings’ necessarily implies that the right of residence of the Union citizen’s spouse who is a third-country national can be retained on the basis of Article 13(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38 only if the Member State in which that national resides is the ‘host Member State’ within the meaning of Article 2(3) of Directive 2004/38 on the date of commencement of the divorce proceedings. That is not the case, however, if, before the commencement of those proceedings, the Union citizen leaves the Member State in which his spouse resides for the purpose of settling in another Member State or a third country. In that event the third-country national’s derived right of residence based on Article 7(2) of Directive 2004/38 has come to an end with the departure of the Union citizen and can therefore no longer be retained on the basis of Article 13(2)(a) of that directive. Consequently, it is clear that the spouse who is a EU citizen of a third-country national must reside in the host Member State, in accordance with Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38, up to the date of commencement of the divorce proceedings for that third-country national to be able to claim the retention of his right of residence in that Member State on the basis of Article 13(2) of the directive.

(see paras 61, 62, 66, 70, operative part 1)
EU own resources — Regulation on the protection of the European Communities financial interests — Proceedings relating to irregularities — Limitation period — Applicability both to irregularities leading to the imposition of an administrative penalty and to irregularities which are the subject of an administrative measure

(Council Regulation No 2988/95, Arts 3(1) to (3), 4 and 5)
A national rule in relation to limitation periods for criminal offences which provides that the interruption of criminal proceedings concerning serious fraud in relation to value added tax has the effect of extending the limitation period by only a quarter of its initial duration is liable to have an adverse effect on fulfilment of the Member States’ obligations under Article 325(1) and (2) TFEU if that national rule prevents the imposition of effective and dissuasive penalties in a significant number of cases of serious fraud affecting the financial interests of the European Union, or provides for longer limitation periods in respect of cases of fraud affecting the financial interests of the Member State concerned than in respect of those affecting the financial interests of the European Union, which it is for the national court to verify. The national court must give full effect to Article 325(1) and (2) TFEU, if need be by disapplying the provisions of national law the effect of which would be to prevent the Member State concerned from fulfilling its obligations under Article 325(1) and (2) TFEU.

In relation to VAT, it follows from Directive 2006/112, read in conjunction with Article 4(3) TEU, that Member States are not only under a general obligation to take all legislative and administrative measures appropriate for ensuring collection of all the VAT due on their territory, but must also fight against tax evasion. Although the Member States have freedom to choose the applicable penalties — which may take the form of administrative penalties, criminal penalties or a combination of the two — in order to ensure that all VAT revenue is collected and, in so doing, that the financial interests of the European Union are protected in accordance with the provisions of Directive 2006/112 and Article 325 TFEU, criminal penalties may nevertheless be essential to combat certain serious cases of VAT evasion in an effective and dissuasive manner.

(see paras 36, 39, 58, operative part 1)
Article 1(2) of Directive 96/9 on the legal protection of databases must be interpreted as meaning that geographical information extracted from a topographic map by a third party so that that information may be used to produce and market another map retains, following its extraction, sufficient informative value to be classified as ‘independent materials’ of a ‘database’ within the meaning of that provision.

Classification as a ‘database’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 96/9 is dependent on the existence of a collection of ‘independent materials’, that is to say, materials which are separable from one another without their informative, literary, artistic, musical or other value being affected. The informative value of material from a collection is not affected if it has autonomous informative value after being extracted from the collection concerned. A decline in the informative value of material linked to its being extracted from the collection of which it forms a part does not necessarily rule out the possibility that that material may come within the definition of ‘independent materials’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 96/9, provided that that material retains autonomous informative value. The autonomous informative value of material which has been extracted from a collection must be assessed in the light of the value of the information not for a typical user of the collection concerned, but for each third party interested by the extracted material.

Therefore, information from a collection which is utilised for financial gain and in an autonomous manner constitutes ‘independent materials’ from a ‘database’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 96/9 since, once extracted, that information provides the customers of the company using that information with relevant information.

(see paras 17, 22, 24, 27-29, operative part)
Regulation No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that the approval of an agreement for the sharing-out of an estate concluded by a guardian ad litem on behalf of minor children constitutes a measure relating to the exercise of parental responsibility, within the meaning of Article 1(1)(b) thereof and thus falls within the scope of the latter, and not a measure relating to succession, within the meaning of Article 1(3)(f) of that regulation, which is excluded from its scope.

Legal capacity and the associated representation issues must be assessed in accordance with their own criteria and are not to be regarded as preliminary issues dependent on the legal acts in question. Therefore, the appointment of a guardian for the minor children and the review of the exercise of his activity are so closely connected that it would not be appropriate to apply different jurisdictional rules, which would vary according to the subject matter of the relevant legal act.

Therefore, the fact that the approval of such an agreement for the sharing-out of an estate by the court dealing with guardianship matters has been requested in succession proceedings cannot be regarded as decisive as to whether that measure should be classified as falling within the law on succession. The need to obtain approval from the court dealing with guardianship matters is a direct consequence of the status and capacity of minor children and constitutes a protective measure for the child relating to the administration, conservation or disposal of the child’s property in the exercise of parental responsibility within the meaning of Article 1(1)(b) and 2(e) of Regulation No 2201/2003.

(see paras 30, 31, 38, operative part)
Article 18 of Directive 2006/54 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation must be interpreted as meaning that, in order for the loss and damage sustained as a result of discrimination on grounds of sex to be the subject of genuine and effective compensation or reparation in a way which is dissuasive and proportionate, that article requires Member States which choose the financial form of compensation to introduce in their national legal systems, in accordance with detailed arrangements which they determine, measures providing for payment to the person injured of compensation which covers in full the loss and damage sustained.

First, it already follows from Article 6 of Directive 76/207 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, both in its original version and as amended, and from the case-law of the Court, that the genuine deterrent effect sought by that article does not involve awarding, to the person injured as a result of such discrimination, punitive damages which go beyond full compensation for the loss and damage actually sustained and which constitute a punitive measure. Second, there has been no substantive change in EU law which might lead to an interpretation of Article 18 of Directive 2006/54 differing, in that regard, from that of Article 6 of Directive 76/207.

(see paras 34, 36, 45, operative part)
Case C‑375/14

Criminal proceedings

against

Rosanna Laezza

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Frosinone)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Articles 49 TFEU and 56 TFEU — Freedom of establishment — Freedom to provide services — Betting and gaming — Judgment of the Court of Justice which declared the national rules on licences for the collection of bets incompatible with EU law — Reorganisation of the system by way of a new call for tenders — Free-of-charge transfer of the rights to use tangible and intangible assets owned by licensees and which constitute their network for the management and collection of bets — Restriction — Overriding reasons in the public interest — Proportionality’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 28 January 2016

Freedom to provide services — Freedom of establishment — Restrictions — Betting and gaming — National law requiring the licensee to transfer, free of charge, on the cessation of business as a result of the expiry of the final term of the licence the rights to use tangible and intangible assets which he owns and which constitute his network for the management and collection of bets — Not permissible — Justification — Combatting crime — Proportionality — Verification by the national court

(Arts 49 TFEU and 56 TFEU)

Articles 49 TFEU and 56 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding a restrictive national provision which requires a licensee to transfer, free of charge, on the cessation of business as a result of the expiry of the final term of the licence, the rights to use tangible and intangible assets which he owns and which constitute his network for the management and collection of bets, in so far as that restriction goes beyond what is necessary to attain the objective actually pursued by that provision, which is for the referring court to verify.

Such a national provision may render the exercise of that activity less attractive. The risk that an undertaking may have to transfer, without financial consideration, the rights to use the assets in its possession may prevent it from obtaining a return on its investment. In that connection, although that provision may be justified as it pursues an objective of combating criminality linked to betting and gaming, which is an overriding reason in the public interest capable of justifying a restriction on fundamental freedoms, it is for the national court to ascertain whether the restriction concerned satisfies the principle of proportionality.

(see paras 23, 32, 34, 37, 44, operative part)
Article 17(2) of Directive 86/653 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which provides that a commercial agent is entitled, on termination of the agency contract, both to an indemnity for customers limited to a maximum of one year’s remuneration and, if that indemnity does not cover all of the loss actually incurred, to the award of additional damages, provided that such legislation does not result in the agent being compensated twice for the loss of commission following termination of the contract.

It follows from the same wording in Article 17(2)(c) of Directive 86/653 and from its contextual interpretation that damages may be granted to commercial agents in addition to the indemnity for customers and that they are not subject to the conditions laid down in Article 17(2)(a) of the directive or to the maximum limit laid down in Article 17(2)(b) of that directive. In that regard, given that the directive does not give any clear guidance as to the circumstances in which a commercial agent may claim damages, it is for the Member States, in the exercise of their discretion, to determine those circumstances and the procedural rules. However, the discretion which Member States may exercise when implementing Article 17(2)(c) of the directive is circumscribed by the requirement to choose one of the two compensation schemes laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3 of that article, respectively, without being able to aggregate them. Consequently, the award of damages may not result in double recovery by combining the indemnity for customers with the compensation for loss resulting, in particular, from the loss of commission following termination of the contract.

(see paras 30, 32, 34, 35, operative part 1)
Since market-sharing agreements constitute particularly serious breaches of the competition rules, the analysis of the economic and legal context of which those practices form part may be limited to what is strictly necessary in order to establish the existence of a restriction of competition by object.

Within the context of EU competition law, an undertaking’s participation in a meeting having an anticompetitive object creates a presumption of the illegality of its participation, which that undertaking must rebut through evidence of public distancing, which must be perceived as such by the other parties to the cartel.

In that context, the concept of public distancing reflects a factual situation, the existence of which is found by the General Court, on a case-by-case basis, taking account of a number of coincidences and indicia submitted to it and accordingly an overall assessment of all the relevant evidence and indicia. Provided that that evidence has been properly obtained and that the general principles of law and the rules of procedure in relation to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have been observed, it is for the General Court alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced before it. Save where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, that assessment does not therefore constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the Court of Justice.

(see paras 63, 71)
As regards the statement of reasons for a decision requesting information under Article 18(3) of Regulation No 1/2003, that provision defines the essential elements thereof. That obligation to state specific reasons constitutes a fundamental requirement designed not merely to show that the request for information is justified but also to enable the undertakings concerned to assess the scope of their duty to cooperate whilst at the same time safeguarding their rights of defence.

With respect to the obligation to state the ‘purpose of the request’, this relates to the Commission’s obligation to indicate the subject of its investigation in its request, and therefore to identify the alleged infringement of competition rules. In that regard, the Commission is not required to communicate to the addressee of a decision requesting information all the information at its disposal concerning the presumed infringements, or to make a precise legal analysis of those infringements, providing it clearly indicates the suspicions which it intends to investigate. Since the necessity of the information must be judged in relation to the purpose stated in the request for information, that purpose must be indicated with sufficient precision, otherwise it will be impossible to determine whether the information is necessary and the Court will be prevented from exercising judicial review.

In that regard, it is true that a request for information is an investigative measure that is generally used as part of the investigation phase preceding the notification of the statement of objections and that the sole purpose of the preliminary investigation procedure is to enable the Commission to obtain the information and documentation necessary to check the actual existence and scope of a specific factual and legal situation. Furthermore, although the Court has held, with respect to inspection decisions, that, even though the Commission is obliged to indicate as precisely as possible what is being sought and the matters to which the investigation must relate, it is, on the other hand, not essential, in a decision ordering an inspection, to define precisely the relevant market, to set out the exact legal nature of the presumed infringements or to indicate the period during which those infringements were allegedly committed, the Court justified that finding by the fact that inspections take place at the beginning of an investigation, at a time when precise information is not yet available to the Commission. However, an excessively succinct, vague and generic — and in some respects, ambiguous — statement of reasons does not fulfil the requirements of the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 18(3) of Regulation No 1/2003 in order to justify a request for information where such a request is made more than two years after the first inspections, and even though the Commission had already sent a number of requests for information to undertakings suspected of involvement in an infringement and several months after the decision to initiate proceedings.

(see paras 17, 19-21, 24, 37-39)