ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
13

Article 30 of Directive 2001/14, entitled ‘Regulatory body’, provides: ‘1. Without prejudice to Article 21(6), Member States shall establish a regulatory body. This body, which can be the Ministry responsible for transport matters or any other body, shall be independent in its organisation, funding decisions, legal structure and decision-making from any infrastructure manager, charging body, allocation body or applicant. It shall furthermore be functionally independent from any competent authority involved in the award of a public service contract. The body shall function according to the principles outlined in this Article whereby appeal and regulatory functions may be attributed to separate bodies. 2. An applicant shall have a right to appeal to the regulatory body if it believes that it has been unfairly treated, discriminated against or is in any other way aggrieved, and in particular against decisions adopted by the infrastructure manager or where appropriate the railway undertaking concerning: … (d) the charging scheme; (e) level or structure of infrastructure fees which it is, or may be, required to pay; … 3. The regulatory body shall ensure that charges set by the infrastructure manager comply with Chapter II and are non-discriminatory. Negotiation between applicants and an infrastructure manager concerning the level of infrastructure charges shall only be permitted if these are carried out under the supervision of the regulatory body. The regulatory body shall intervene if negotiations are likely to contravene the requirements of this Directive. 4. The regulatory body shall have the power to request relevant information from the infrastructure manager, applicants and any third party involved within the Member State concerned, which must be supplied without undue delay. 5. The regulatory body shall be required to decide on any complaints and take action to remedy the situation within a maximum period of two months from receipt of all information. Notwithstanding paragraph (6), a decision of the regulatory body shall be binding on all parties covered by that decision. In the event of an appeal against a refusal to grant infrastructure capacity, or against the terms of an offer of capacity, the regulatory body shall either confirm that no modification of the infrastructure manager’s decision is required, or it shall require modification of that decision in accordance with directions specified by the regulatory body. 6. Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that decisions taken by the regulatory body are subject to judicial review.’
31

In those circumstances, the cour d’appel de Paris (Court of Appeal, Paris, France) decided to stay proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) (a) Is the first subparagraph of Article 1(1) of [Directive 2003/6] in conjunction with Article 1(1) of [Directive 2003/124] to be interpreted as meaning that information relating to the forthcoming publication of a press article reporting a market rumour about an issuer of financial instruments can satisfy the requirement of precision laid down in those articles for classification as inside information? (b) Does the fact that the press article, whose forthcoming publication constitutes the information at issue, mentions – as a market rumour – the price of a public takeover bid affect the assessment of the precise nature of the information at issue? (c) Are the reputation of the journalist who authored the article and of the media outlet which published it and the genuinely significant (“ex post”) effect of that publication on the price of the securities to which the published article relates relevant factors for the purposes of assessing the precise nature of the information at issue? (2) [If] the information … at issue can satisfy the necessary requirement of precision: (a) Is Article 21 of [Regulation No 596/2014] to be interpreted as meaning that the disclosure by a journalist, to one of his or her usual sources [of information], of information relating to the forthcoming publication of an article authored by him or her reporting a market rumour is made “for the purpose of journalism”? (b) Is the answer to that question dependent on, inter alia, whether or not the journalist was informed of the market rumour by that source or whether or not the disclosure of the information on the forthcoming publication of the article was expedient in order to obtain clarifications from that source with regard to the credibility of the rumour? (3) … Are Articles 10 and 21 of [Regulation No 596/2014] to be interpreted as meaning that, even where inside information is disclosed by a journalist “for the purpose of journalism” within the meaning of Article 21 [thereof], the lawful or unlawful nature of the disclosure requires an assessment of whether the disclosure was made “in the normal exercise of … [the] profession [of journalist]” for the purposes of Article 10? (4) … Is Article 10 of [Regulation No 596/2014] to be interpreted as meaning that, in order for it to occur in the normal exercise of the profession of journalist, the disclosure of inside information must be strictly necessary for the exercise of that profession and must comply with the principle of proportionality?’
34

In those circumstances, the Curtea de Apel Timișoara (Court of Appeal, Timișoara) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Does [EU] law applicable to financial support relating to the agricultural year 2014 – in particular [Regulation No 73/2009] and Regulation No 1122/2009 – preclude the introduction, through national legislation, of an obligation to provide proof of the right to use an area of land for the purpose of obtaining financial support relating to the area schemes? (2) In so far as the abovementioned [EU] law does not preclude the national legislation referred to in Question 1, does [EU] law (including the principle of proportionality) preclude – in the particular case where the right to exploit the agricultural area has been justified by the beneficiary by submitting a concession contract for an area of pastureland (under which the applicant acquired the right to exploit the pastureland at his own risk and for his benefit, in return for a fixed sum) – national legislation which imposes, for such a concession contract to be valid, the condition that the future concessionaire must be only a [breeder] or owner of animals? (3) Does the activity of a beneficiary under an area scheme who – after concluding a concession contract for pastureland for the purpose of obtaining the right to exploit that area and obtaining rights to aid in the agricultural year 2014 – subsequently concludes a cooperation contract with [animal breeders] by which he permits use, free of charge, of the land granted for the purposes of grazing animals, and the beneficiary retains the right to use the land but undertakes not to hinder grazing and to clean up the pastureland, fall within the definition of agricultural activity set out in Article 2 of Regulation No 73/2009? (4) Does [EU] law preclude an interpretation of a national legal provision, such as Article 431(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure – on the status of res judicata of a final judicial decision – to the effect that a final judicial decision finding a payment application ineligible on the ground of failure to comply with national law as regards the requirement relating to the lawfulness of the right to exploit/use the land in respect of which an area scheme has been applied for in the agricultural year 2014 (in a dispute in which annulment of the decision imposing multiannual penalties has been sought), and which prevents analysis of the conformity of that national requirement with [EU] law applicable in the agricultural year 2014 in a new dispute in which the lawfulness of the measure recovering the sums unduly paid to the applicant is examined, in respect of the same agricultural year 2014, and the measure is based on the same facts and the same national legislation which were analysed in the earlier final judicial decision?’
17

In those circumstances the hof van beroep Antwerpen (Court of Appeal, Antwerp) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘Must Clause 4.1 of the [framework agreement on fixed-term work] and Clause 4.1 of the [framework agreement on part-time work] be interpreted as precluding a university, on the basis of national legislation (Article 91 of the Decree concerning universities) under which independent academic staff with full-time positions are appointed on a permanent basis, and staff with part-time positions may either be appointed, or employed on a temporary basis for renewable periods of a maximum of six years, from being permitted to: (a) employ a professor, using the justification of “freedom of policy”, over a period of twenty years on the basis of some twenty consecutive, short-term and part-time employment contracts and statutory appointments of between one and three years, without any limit on the total number of renewals, while other colleagues with similar duties were appointed on a permanent and full-time basis? (b) stipulate in its staff regulations only a general minimum limit of an appointment percentage at 50 percent in order to be eligible for a permanent appointment, but not lay down a single criterion on the basis of which the part-time staff appointed at 50 percent or greater can be appointed on a permanent or temporary basis? (c) award appointment percentages to a part-time professor, using the justification of unlimited “freedom of policy”, without laying down objective criteria, and without applying any objective workload measurement? (d) deny a temporary and part-time professor, when his employment is not renewed, using the justification of the university’s “freedom of policy”, the right to invoke the allegedly abusive nature of the past employment conditions, because he had, so to speak, always accepted those conditions by carrying out the allocated work, with the result that he forfeits the protection afforded by European Union law?’
85

In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions referred is that the principles of EU law relating to the rights of persons to obtain the repayment of sums of money the payment of which has been imposed on them by a Member State in breach of EU law and the payment of interest on those sums of money must be interpreted: – first, as meaning that they apply where the sums of money in question correspond, on the one hand, to export refunds which were granted late to a person, after having been refused in breach of EU law, and, on the other hand, to a financial penalty which was imposed on that person as a result of that breach; – second, as meaning that they apply where it follows from a decision of the Court or a decision of a national court that the payment of export refunds, a financial penalty, anti-dumping duties or import duties has, as the case may be, been refused or imposed by a national authority on the basis either of an incorrect interpretation of EU law or of an incorrect application of that law, and – third, as precluding national legislation which provides that, where the payment of export refunds, a financial penalty, anti-dumping duties or import duties has, as the case may be, been refused or imposed in breach of EU law, the payment of interest may be made only in respect of the period from the date on which the legal proceedings seeking the payment or repayment of the sum of money in question were brought to the date of the decision given by the court having jurisdiction, to the exclusion of the earlier period. On the other hand, those principles do not, in themselves, preclude such legislation from providing that that payment is to be due only if such proceedings have been brought, provided that this does not have the effect of making the exercise of the rights which persons derive from EU law excessively difficult.
(114)

Certain categories of services continue by their very nature to have a limited cross-border dimension, namely such services that are known as services to the person, such as certain social, health and educational services. Those services are provided within a particular context that varies widely amongst Member States, due to different cultural traditions. A specific regime should therefore be established for public contracts for those services, with a higher threshold than that which applies to other services. Services to the person with values below that threshold will typically not be of interest to providers from other Member States, unless there are concrete indications to the contrary, such as Union financing for cross-border projects. Contracts for services to the person above that threshold should be subject to Union-wide transparency. Given the importance of the cultural context and the sensitivity of these services, Member States should be given wide discretion to organise the choice of the service providers in the way they consider most appropriate. The rules of this Directive take account of that imperative, imposing only the observance of basic principles of transparency and equal treatment and making sure that contracting authorities are able to apply specific quality criteria for the choice of service providers, such as the criteria set out in the voluntary European Quality Framework for Social Services, published by the Social Protection Committee. When determining the procedures to be used for the award of contracts for services to the person, Member States should take Article 14 TFEU and Protocol No 26 into account. In so doing, Member States should also pursue the objectives of simplification and of alleviating the administrative burden for contracting authorities and economic operators; it should be clarified that so doing might also entail relying on rules applicable to service contracts not subject to the specific regime. Member States and public authorities remain free to provide those services themselves or to organise social services in a way that does not entail the conclusion of public contracts, for example through the mere financing of such services or by granting licences or authorisations to all economic operators meeting the conditions established beforehand by the contracting authority, without any limits or quotas, provided that such a system ensures sufficient advertising and complies with the principles of transparency and non-discrimination.’
43

If the amounts to be repaid cannot be determined in the light of various hypothetical operations which could have been implemented by the undertakings if they had not opted for the type of operation coupled with the aid, the beneficiaries of an aid scheme may, at the recovery stage, rely on the deductions and reliefs provided for by domestic law if it is established, having regard to the operations actually carried out, that they were in fact entitled to benefit from them. Re-establishing the status quo ante merely enables account to be taken, at the stage of recovery of the aid by the national authorities, of tax treatment which may be more favourable than the ordinary treatment which, in the absence of unlawful aid and in accordance with domestic rules which are compatible with EU law, would have been granted on the basis of the operation actually carried out (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 December 2005, Unicredito Italiano, C‑148/04, EU:C:2005:774, paragraphs 114 to 119).
13

Paragraph 62 of the Einkommensteuergesetz (Law on Income Tax), in the version published on 8 October 2009 (BGBl. 2009 I, p. 3366), as amended by the Gesetz gegen illegale Beschäftigung und Sozialleistungsmissbrauch (Law against illegal work and abuse of social benefits, BGBl. 2019 I, p. 1066), and entered into force on 18 July 2019 (‘the EStG’), reads as follows: ‘(1) 1The following persons shall be entitled to family benefits in respect of children within the meaning of Paragraph 63 of the present law: 1. persons whose permanent residence or habitual residence is within the national territory, … 2To be able to claim family benefits under sentence 1, the person entitled must be identified by means of the identification number allocated to him or her … 3The subsequent allocation of an identification number shall have retroactive effect to the months during which the conditions referred to in sentence 1 are met. (1a) 1If a national of another Member State of the Union or a State to which the Agreement on the European Economic Area applies establishes his or her permanent residence or habitual residence within the national territory, he or she shall not be entitled to claim family benefits for the first three months following establishment of that permanent residence or habitual residence. 2This rule shall not apply if that national proves that he or she is in receipt of national income in accordance with points 1 to 4 of sentence 1 of Paragraph 2(1), with the exception of income referred to in point 2 of sentence 1 of Paragraph 19(1). 3Following expiry of the period referred to in sentence 1, that individual shall be entitled to claim family benefits, unless the conditions laid down in Paragraph 2(2) or (3) of the [Gesetz über die allgemeine Freizügigkeit von Unionsbürgern (Law on freedom of movement of Union citizens)] are not met or only the conditions laid down in point 1a of Paragraph 2(2) of the Law on freedom of movement of Union citizens are met without any of the other conditions laid down in Paragraph 2(2) of that law having been met previously. 4The examination to determine whether the eligibility conditions for family benefits are met in accordance with the second sentence shall be at the sole discretion of the Family Allowances Fund … 5Where, in such a case, the Family Allowances Fund rejects an application for family benefits, it must notify its decision to the competent immigration authority. 6Where the applicant has used falsified or altered documents or deception to suggest that he or she is eligible to claim family benefits, the Family Allowances Fund shall immediately advise the competent immigration authority.’
Appeal – Grounds – Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence – Inadmissibility – Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence – Possible only where the facts or evidence have been distorted – Requirement that the distortion be obvious from the documents in the file – Ground alleging a divergence of interpretation of a document – Inadmissibility

(Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see paras 37, 38, 50, 55, 56, 61)
1.

Article 6(1)(m) of Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council must be interpreted as meaning that, as regards the manufacturer’s commercial guarantee, the information requirement imposed on the trader by that provision does not arise from the mere fact that that guarantee exists, but only where the consumer has a legitimate interest in obtaining information concerning that guarantee in order to decide whether to enter into a contractual relationship with the trader. Such a legitimate interest is established, inter alia, where the trader makes the manufacturer’s commercial guarantee a central or decisive element of its offer. In order to determine whether the guarantee constitutes a central or decisive element of the offer, account must be taken of the content and general layout of the offer with regard to the goods concerned, the importance of referring to the manufacturer’s commercial guarantee for sales or advertising purposes, the space occupied by that reference in the offer, the likelihood of mistake or confusion which that reference might trigger in the mind of the average consumer – who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect with respect to the different rights which he or she may exercise under a guarantee or to the real identity of the guarantor – whether or not there might be explanations relating to other guarantees covering the goods, and any other element capable of establishing an objective need to protect the consumer.
4

Article 14 of that regulation, headed ‘Food safety requirements’, reads: ‘1. Food shall not be placed on the market if it is unsafe. 2. Food shall be deemed to be unsafe if it is considered to be: (a) injurious to health; (b) unfit for human consumption. 3. In determining whether any food is unsafe, regard shall be had: (a) to the normal conditions of use of the food by the consumer and at each stage of production, processing and distribution, and (b) to the information provided to the consumer, including information on the label, or other information generally available to the consumer concerning the avoidance of specific adverse health effects from a particular food or category of foods. 4. In determining whether any food is injurious to health, regard shall be had: (a) not only to the probable immediate and/or short-term and/or long-term effects of that food on the health of a person consuming it, but also on subsequent generations; (b) to the probable cumulative toxic effects; (c) to the particular health sensitivities of a specific category of consumers where the food is intended for that category of consumers. 5. In determining whether any food is unfit for human consumption, regard shall be had to whether the food is unacceptable for human consumption according to its intended use, for reasons of contamination, whether by extraneous matter or otherwise, or through putrefaction, deterioration or decay. … 7. Food that complies with specific Community provisions governing food safety shall be deemed to be safe in so far as the aspects covered by the specific Community provisions are concerned. 8. Conformity of a food with specific provisions applicable to that food shall not bar the competent authorities from taking appropriate measures to impose restrictions on it being placed on the market or to require its withdrawal from the market where there are reasons to suspect that, despite such conformity, the food is unsafe. …’