ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
A securities-based assets management service, namely where a taxable person for remuneration and on the basis of his own discretion takes decisions on the purchase and sale of securities and implements those decisions by buying and selling the securities, consists of two elements which are so closely linked that they form, objectively, a single economic supply.

Article 135(1)(f) or (g) of Council Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that securities-based asset management is not exempt from value added tax under that provision.

The transactions covered by the exemption provided for in Article 135(1)(g) of Directive 2006/112 are those which are specific to the business of undertakings for collective investment. In specific terms, what are involved are joint funds, in which many investments are pooled and spread over a range of securities which can be managed effectively in order to optimise results, and in which individual investments may be relatively modest. Such funds manage their investments in their own name and on their own behalf, while each investor owns a share of the fund but not the fund’s investments as such. By contrast, a securities-based assets management service concerns generally the assets of a single person, which must be of relatively high overall value in order to be dealt with profitably in such a way. The portfolio manager buys and sells investments in the name and on behalf of the client investor, who retains ownership of the individual securities throughout, and on termination of, the contract.

As regards the scope of Article 135(1)(f) of Directive 2006/112, transactions in shares and other securities are transactions on the market in marketable securities and trade in securities involves acts which alter the legal and financial situation as between the parties. The words ‘transactions in securities’ within the meaning of that provision refer, therefore, to transactions which are liable to create, alter or extinguish parties’ rights and obligations in respect of securities. A securities-based assets management service, by contrast, consists basically of two elements, namely, on the one hand, of a service of analysing and monitoring the assets of client investors, and, on the other hand, of a service of actually purchasing and selling securities. Services of analysing and monitoring assets do not necessarily involve transactions which are liable to create, alter or extinguish parties’ rights and obligations in respect of securities. Since that service may be taken into account for value added tax purposes only as a whole, it cannot be covered by Article 135(1)(f) of Directive 2006/112.

(see paras 31, 33, 34, 36-39, 43-46, operative part 2)
Article 185(2) of Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as not precluding national tax provisions which require, where a shortfall in the goods subject to value added tax has been established, that an adjustment be made to the deduction of that input tax at the time of acquisition of those goods, where the taxable person was the victim of a theft of those goods and the perpetrator has not been identified. Member States may provide for adjustments of input VAT deductions in any cases of theft of property giving rise to entitlement to value added tax deduction, irrespective of whether or not the circumstances surrounding the theft have been fully elucidated.

Member States, in exercising the power provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 185(2) of the Directive, are free to employ, in their domestic tax legislation, terms which are not identical to the enabling provision of the Directive, provided that those terms reflect the objective pursued by the latter. Since the concept of ‘theft’ generally comes within the scope of criminal law, the Member States may employ the terms they consider most appropriate in establishing the fiscal legislative framework intended to implement a European Union law provision governing value added tax adjustments. Therefore, and in so far as theft entails a ‘shortfall’ in the property concerned, with the result that it is not possible to use it for taxable output transactions, the national tax legislation which refers to a ‘shortfall [being] established’ as a ground for adjusting the input VAT deduction and its application by the competent authority must be regarded as a suitable implementation of the second subparagraph of Article 185(2) of the Directive.

(see paras 29, 32, 34, 35, 37, operative part)
The Court may of its own motion examine whether the conditions laid down in Article 258 TFEU for bringing an action for failure to fulfil obligations are satisfied.

In that regard, as follows in particular from Article 38(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, the application initiating proceedings must state the subject-matter of the dispute and a summary of the pleas in law and that statement must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the application. It is therefore necessary for the essential points of law and of fact on which a case is based to be indicated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself and for the heads of claim to be set out unambiguously so that the Court does not rule ultra petita or indeed fail to rule on an objection.

In respect of an action for failure to fulfil obligations, the absence of an indispensable element from the content of the application initiating proceedings, such as, where applicable, the period during which the Member State, according to the Commission’s assertions, has infringed European Union law, does not satisfy the requirements of coherence, clarity and precision. In those circumstances, the Commission may not merely allege that there is a current breach of obligations and that the Court’s decision must apply to the present and not the past, without however specifying the period referred to.

(see paras 42-44, 46, 47)
By scheduling, in the votes relating to the calendar of part-sessions for 2012 and 2013, in addition to the ten monthly plenary part-sessions which take place every month except August and October, two plenary part-sessions lasting two days each during the same week of October, the European parliament infringed Protocol No 6, annexed to the EU Treaty and to the TFEU, and Protocol No 3, annexed to the EAEC Treaty, concerning the location of the seats of the institutions and of certain bodies and departments of the European Union, pursuant to which the Parliament is required to hold 12 ordinary plenary part-sessions per year in Strasbourg.

In so far as, for the month of October of 2012 and 2013, the ordinary plenary part-sessions, which take place, in line with the Parliament’s general practice, over four days, are scheduled within the same week, those part-sessions do not satisfy the requirements under the protocols concerning the seats of the institutions. The actual time available for the part-sessions during October is reduced by more than half, with the result that the duration of those part-sessions is not equivalent to the other ordinary monthly part-sessions scheduled by the same votes.

(see paras 40, 43, 46, 48, 56, 59)
Where such rules are aimed at granting compensation for the future, protecting younger workers and facilitating their reintegration into employment, whilst taking account of the need to achieve a fair distribution of limited financial resources in a social plan, it is possible to justify, by way of derogation from the general rule prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age, such differences in treatment in as much as the means employed are appropriate and necessary and do not go beyond what is required to achieve the objective pursued.

Articles 2(2) and 6(1) of Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation must be interpreted as not precluding rules of an occupational social security scheme under which, in the case of workers older than 54 years of age who are made redundant on operational grounds, a calculation is to be made of the compensation on the basis of the earliest possible date on which their pension will begin – unlike the standard method of calculation, which takes account in particular of the length of service – with the result that the compensation paid to those workers is lower than the compensation resulting from the application of that standard method, though still at least one half of the standard amount.

Article 2(2) of Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation must be interpreted as precluding rules of an occupational social security scheme under which, in the case of workers older than 54 years of age who are made redundant on operational grounds, the compensation to which they are entitled is calculated on the basis of the earliest possible date on which their pension will begin – unlike the standard formula, under which account is taken inter alia of the length of service – with the result that the compensation paid is lower than the standard formula compensation, although still at least one half thereof, and that alternative calculation method takes account of the possibility of receiving an early retirement pension on the ground of disability.

It is apparent that the scheme at issue, while pursuing legitimate objectives, omitted to take account both of the risks faced by severely disabled people and of the fact that those risks tend to become exacerbated as they approach retirement age. Severely disabled people have specific needs stemming both from the protection their condition requires and from the need to anticipate possible worsening of their condition. Regard must be had to the risk that disabled workers may throughout their lives have financial requirements arising from their disability which cannot be adjusted and/or that, with advancing age, those financial requirements may increase. Otherwise, in ultimately paying a severely disabled worker compensation on termination which is lower than the amount paid to a non-disabled worker, the measure at issue has an excessive adverse effect on the legitimate interests of severely disabled workers and goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the social policy objectives pursued.

(see paras 67-70, 72, operative part 2)
Case C-394/11

Valeri Hariev Belov

v

CHEZ Elektro Balgaria AD and Others

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia)

‛Request for a preliminary ruling — Article 267 TFEU — Concept of ‘national court’ — Lack of jurisdiction of the Court’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 31 January 2013

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Reference to the Court — National court or Tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU — Concept

(Art. 267 TFEU)

In order to establish whether a national body, entrusted by law with different categories of function, is to be regarded as a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, it is necessary to determine in what specific capacity it is acting within the particular legal context in which it seeks a ruling from the Court.

In that connection, such a body cannot be classified as a court or tribunal where, in the proceedings in which it makes a reference to the Court, it is found that those proceedings may be initiated by a party, but that they may also be brought of that body’s own motion, that the rules applicable and the results to which those proceedings are intended to lead are the same regardless as to whether they are instituted by an application or of that body’s own motion, or the fact that that body may join to the proceedings ‘of its own motion’ other persons than those designated by the applicant or that, where the decision of that body is challenged, it has the status of defendant and may revoke its decision.

(see paras 41, 43, 47-50)

Case C-394/11

Valeri Hariev Belov

v

CHEZ Elektro Balgaria AD and Others

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia)

‛Request for a preliminary ruling — Article 267 TFEU — Concept of ‘national court’ — Lack of jurisdiction of the Court’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 31 January 2013

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Reference to the Court — National court or Tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU — Concept

(Art. 267 TFEU)

In order to establish whether a national body, entrusted by law with different categories of function, is to be regarded as a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, it is necessary to determine in what specific capacity it is acting within the particular legal context in which it seeks a ruling from the Court.

In that connection, such a body cannot be classified as a court or tribunal where, in the proceedings in which it makes a reference to the Court, it is found that those proceedings may be initiated by a party, but that they may also be brought of that body’s own motion, that the rules applicable and the results to which those proceedings are intended to lead are the same regardless as to whether they are instituted by an application or of that body’s own motion, or the fact that that body may join to the proceedings ‘of its own motion’ other persons than those designated by the applicant or that, where the decision of that body is challenged, it has the status of defendant and may revoke its decision.

(see paras 41, 43, 47-50)
Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, under which contractual terms which reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions are not subject to the provisions of that directive, must be interpreted as meaning that that directive applies to provisions in general terms and conditions, incorporated into contracts concluded between a supplier and a consumer, which reproduce a rule of national law applicable to another category of contracts and are not subject to the national legislation concerned.

If it were permitted to exclude the application of Directive 93/13 to contractual terms merely because they reproduce national statutory or regulatory provisions that do not apply to the contract concluded by the parties, or refer to such provisions, that would call into question the system of consumer protection established by that directive.

In those circumstances a supplier could easily avoid review of the unfairness of terms not individually negotiated with a consumer by drafting the terms in his contracts in the same way as those laid down by national legislation for certain categories of contracts. All the rights and obligations created by a contract drawn up in that way would not necessarily correspond to the balance the national legislature intended to establish for the contracts governed by its legislation on the point.

(see paras 25, 30, 31, 39, operative part 1)
As regards Council measures imposing restrictive measures on persons and entities in Côte d’Ivoire, which were published in the Official Journal of the European Union and must also, pursuant to Article 7(3) of Decision 2010/656 renewing the restrictive measures against Côte d’Ivoire, as amended by Decision 2010/801, and Article 11a(3) of Regulation No 560/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, as amended by Regulation No 25/2011, be communicated to the persons and entities concerned, either directly if their addresses are known, or, if not, through the publication of a notice in the Official Journal, the period for the bringing of an action for annulment under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU runs, for each of those persons and entities, from the date of the communication which they must receive.

Since those measures, which at the same time resemble both measures of general application and also a bundle of individual decisions, were adopted on the basis of provisions relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, it is the individual nature of those measures which, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU and the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, permits access to the Courts of the European Union. Having regard to those particular features and the consequent rules relating to publication and communication, the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU would not be applied consistently if, when applied to persons and entities concerned, the starting point for the calculation of the period for bringing an action for annulment was, for those persons, fixed as the date of publication of the measure at issue and not as the date when that measure was communicated to them. The purpose of that communication is precisely to ensure that persons to whom the measures are addressed are able to defend their rights in the best possible conditions and to decide, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in their applying to the Courts of the European Union.

Further, given that the notices published in the Official Journal for the attention of the persons and entities concerned are capable of enabling them to identify the legal remedies available to them in order to challenge their designation in the lists and the date when the period for bringing proceedings expires, the persons and entities concerned should not be able to defer the starting point of the period for bringing proceedings by relying on the fact that there was no direct communication or that they actually became aware of the decision at a later date. If such a possibility were, in the absence of force majeure, open to the applicants, it would jeopardise the very objective of a time-limit for bringing proceedings, which is to protect legal certainty by ensuring that European Union measures which produce legal effects may not indefinitely be called into question

(see paras 55-59, 62)
Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as meaning that, subject to contractual terms which reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions set out by national law, which is a matter for the national court to ascertain, it applies to a residential tenancy agreement concluded between a landlord acting for purposes relating to his trade, business or profession and a tenant acting for purposes which do not relate to his trade, business or profession.

The system of protection implemented by Directive 93/13 is particularly important in the case of a residential tenancy agreement concluded between, on the one hand, an individual acting on a non-commercial basis and, on the other hand, a real estate professional. The consequences of the inequality existing between the parties are aggravated by the fact that, from an economic perspective, such a contract relates to an essential need of the consumer, namely to obtain lodging, and involves sums which most frequently, for the tenant, represent one of the most significant items in his budget, while, from a legal perspective, this is a contract which, as a general rule, is covered by complex national rules about which individuals are often poorly informed.

(see paras 32, 34, operative part 1)
When adopting protection measures with regard to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies under Regulation No 999/2001 laying down rules for the prevention, control and eradication of certain transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, according to Article 24a of that regulation, which was inserted by Regulation No 1923/2006, the decisions to be adopted in accordance with one of the procedures referred to in Article 24 of Regulation No 999/2001 are to be based on an appropriate assessment of the possible risks for human and animal health and shall, taking into account existing scientific evidence, maintain, or if scientifically justified increase, the level of protection of human and animal health ensured in the Union.

In that regard, even though the recitals of the preamble to Regulation No 1923/2006 do not contain any explanation as to the purpose of the proposal concerned, it is clear from those travaux préparatoires that Article 24a of Regulation No 999/2001 was envisaged as a guarantee aimed at preventing measures which lower the level of protection of human and animal health in the European Union from being adopted under the comitology procedure. It does not, however, follow that Article 24a of Regulation No 999/2001 excludes any relaxation of the earlier preventive measures. First of all, Article 24a of Regulation No 999/2001 does not lay down as a yardstick the fact that the comparison must be carried out with respect to the level of protection resulting from the earlier preventive measures adopted in the same field, but refers in general to the level of health assured in the Union. Second, it follows from both Article 7(2) of Regulation No 178/2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety and the Court’s case-law that the provisional risk management measures, which are adopted in the context of scientific uncertainty, must be re-examined within a reasonable amount of time in order to ensure that they are proportionate and no more restrictive of trade than is required to achieve the high level of health protection chosen by the Union.

Therefore, the level of protection of human health is tightly correlated to the level of risk deemed acceptable for society, which depends, in turn, on the scientific knowledge available at a given moment. It cannot be ruled out that, in the light of scientific progress, the same level of protection may be ensured by less restrictive measures.

(see paras 131-136)