ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.

(a) Does the operator of a shared hosting service via which files containing content protected by copyright are made publicly accessible by users without the consent of the rightholders carry out an act of communication within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC (1) if — the upload process takes place automatically and without being seen in advance or controlled by the operator, — in the conditions of use, the operator indicates that copyright-infringing content may not be posted, — it earns revenue through the operation of the service, — the service is used for lawful applications, but the operator is aware that a considerable amount of copyright-infringing content (over 9 500 works) is also available, — the operator does not offer a directory of the content or a search function, but the unlimited download links provided by it are posted by third parties on the internet in link collections that contain information regarding the content of the files and make it possible to search for specific content, — via the structure of the remuneration for downloads that are paid by it in accordance with demand, it creates an incentive to upload content protected by copyright that users could otherwise only obtain for a charge and — by providing the possibility to upload files anonymously, the probability of users not being held accountable for copyright infringements is increased? (b) Does this assessment change if copyright-infringing offerings are provided by the shared hosting service and account for 90 % to 96 % of the overall use?
1.

Does the provision of software by one public administrative authority to another public administrative authority, which is agreed in writing and linked to a cooperation agreement, constitute a ‘public contract’ within the meaning of Article 2.1(5) of Directive 2014/24/EU (1) or a contract within the meaning of Article 12(4) of that directive which — at least initially, subject to Article 12(4)(a) to (c) thereof — comes within the scope of the directive if, although the software recipient does not have to pay a price or reimbursement costs for the software, the cooperation agreement connected with the provision of the software provides that each cooperation partner — and therefore also the software recipient — is required to make available to the other partner, free of charge, any of its own further developments of the software that it may create — but is not obliged to create — in the future?
2.

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative, can the operating air carrier rely on extraordinary circumstances within the meaning of Article 5(3) if, following a technical follow-up by the aircraft manufacturer in relation to aircraft already in use, the part dealt with in that document is in fact treated as a so-called ‘on condition’ part, that is to say as a part that is used until it becomes defective, and the operating air carrier has prepared to replace the part in question by permanently stocking a spare part?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale ordinario di Roma (Italy) lodged on 12 December 2018 — Società Italiana degli Autori ed Editori (S.I.A.E.) v Soundreef Ltd

(Case C-781/18)

(2019/C 112/26)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale ordinario di Roma

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: S.I.A.E. — Società Italiana degli Autori ed Editori

Defendant: Soundreef Ltd

Question referred

Must Directive 2014/26/EU (1) be interpreted as precluding national legislation that reserves access to the copyright intermediation market, or in any event the granting of licences to users, solely to entities which can be classified, according to the definition in that directive, as collective management organisations, to the exclusion of those which can be classified as independent management entities incorporated in that Member State or in other Member States?

(1) Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market (OJ 2014 L 84, p. 72).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Kamenz (Germany) lodged on 24 December 2018 — MC v ND

(Case C-827/18)

(2019/C 103/12)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Kamenz

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: MC

Defendant: ND

Question referred

Is the disputed principal claim for EUR 535, based on a notarial purchase contract of 10 February 2016 for the purchase of a residential apartment located in Großröhrsdorf, falling under the jurisdiction of the Local Court, Kamenz, which, derived specifically from the transfer of possession and enjoyment to the applicant on 1 April 2016, in accordance with Paragraph 6 of the notarial contract, was still effected by means of the defendant’s tenant’s rental payment on 1 April 2016 in respect of the residential apartment […] to be regarded as proceedings within the meaning of Article 22 of the Lugano Convention, (1) which have as their object the payment in respect of a right in rem in immovable property or tenancies of immovable property, or is the international jurisdiction of a German court to be derived from another provision of the Lugano Convention, or [is] the international jurisdiction of the Swiss court which has jurisdiction in respect of the defendant’s domicile justified (Article 2(1) in conjunction with Article 5 No 1 of the Lugano Convention)?

(1) Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters of 30 October 2007 (‘Lugano II Convention’) (OJ 2009 L 147, p. 5).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 3 August 2018 by Prada SA against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 5 June 2018 in Case T-111/16: Prada v EUIPO

(Case C-510/18 P)

(2019/C 155/20)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Prada SA (represented by: C: Mazzi, G. Guglielmetti, P. Tammaro, avvocati)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, The Rich Prada International PT

By order of 14 February 2019 the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
1.

Is Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union (1) to be interpreted as meaning that a provision of national law limiting the obligation of national local authorities (districts) regarding school transport to the residents of the wider constituent state (Land) has an indirectly discriminatory effect, even if it is established, on the basis of the factual circumstances, that the residence requirement quite predominantly excludes residents of the rest of the territory of the Member State from the benefit? If Question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative:
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 29 November 2018 by Volkswagen AG against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 19 September 2018 in Case T-623/16, Volkswagen AG v EUIPO

(Case C-744/18 P)

(2019/C 238/03)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Volkswagen AG (represented by: F. Thiering and L. Steidle, Rechtsanwälte)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

By order of 21 May 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Seventh Chamber) dismissed the appeal as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 13 June 2018 by Mauro Bettani against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 24 April 2018 in Case T-80/18, Bettani v Commission

(Case C-392/18 P)

(2019/C 148/07)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: Mauro Bettani (represented by: Mauro Bettani, avvocato)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 7 March 2019, the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered Mr Mauro Bettani to bear his own costs.
Official Journal of the European Union

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Obvodní soud pro Prahu 5 (Czech Republic) lodged on 5 November 2018 — HJ v II

(Case C-680/18)

(2019/C 280/17)

Language of the case: Czech

Referring court

Obvodní soud pro Prahu 5

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: HJ

Defendant: II

By order of 11 April 2019, the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) held that the request for a preliminary ruling was inadmissible.
Appeal brought on 25 January 2019 by Axa Mediterranean Holding, S.A. against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 15 November 2018 in Case T-405/11 Axa Mediterranean v Commission

(Case C-54/19 P)

(2019/C 112/39)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: Axa Mediterranean Holding, S.A. (represented by: J. Buendía Sierra, E. Abad Valdenebro, R. Calvo Salinero and A. Lamadrid de Pablo, abogados)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant submits that the Court should:

— Set aside the judgment of the General Court of 15 November 2018;

— Uphold the application for annulment and definitively annul the contested decision; and

— Order the European Commission to pay the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

On 15 November 2018, the General Court gave judgment in Case T-405/11, Axa Mediterranean Holding, S.A. v European Commission, (1) against which this appeal is brought. The judgment dismissed the appellant’s action against the European Commission’s decision of 12 January 2011, (2) on ‘financial goodwill’ regulated by Article 12.5 of the Spanish Ley de Impuesto sobre Sociedades (Law on Corporation Tax).

In support of its appeal, the appellant relies on a single ground of appeal, alleging that, in the judgment under appeal, the General Court erred in law in its interpretation of Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in relation to the concept of ‘selectivity’.

In particular, it is submitted that the General Court erred:

— In determining the reference system at the first stage of the selectivity analysis;

— In determining the objective forming the basis for comparing the separate legal and factual situations at the second stage of the selectivity analysis;

— Consequently, the General Court also erred in the attribution of the burden of proof and the application of the principle of proportionality;

— In the alternative, in its examination relating to the supposed lack of proof of a causal link between the companies’ inability to merge abroad and the acquisition of holdings abroad; and

— In the alternative, in ruling out the severability of the measure according to the control percentage;

— In addition to maintaining a legally incorrect line of reasoning, the General Court substituted its own reasoning for that of the Commission’s decision in relation to a number of the abovementioned points, thus giving rise to further errors of law.

(1) Judgment of 15 November 2018, Axa Mediterranean v Commission (T-405/11, not published, EU:T:2018:780).

(2) Commission Decision 2011/282/EU of 12 January 2011 on the tax amortisation of financial goodwill for foreign shareholding acquisitions C 45/07 (ex NN 51/07, ex CP 9/07) implemented by Spain (OJ 2011 L 135, p. 1).
Appeal brought on 24 January 2019 by the Mouvement pour une Europe des nations et des libertés against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 27 November 2018 in Case T-829/16, Mouvement pour une Europe des nations et des libertés v Parliament

(Case C-60/19 P)

(2019/C 93/47)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Mouvement pour une Europe des nations et des libertés (represented by: A. Varaut, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— annul the decision of the European Parliament of 12 September 2016 declaring certain expenditure ineligible for the purposes of a grant for the 2015 financial year;

— order the Parliament to pay the full costs, and

— make an order as to the amount to be awarded to the appellant in relation to the costs of the proceedings.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The Mouvement pour une Europe des nations et des libertés (MENL) edited a poster relating to the migration crisis and the Schengen agreement featuring its logo, together with those, in a much smaller size, of the Front National and the Vlaams Belang.

The Parliament declared ineligible the expenditure relating to that poster, considering that it constituted an unfair advantage for a national political party.

By the judgment under appeal, the General Court dismissed the MENL’s action for annulment of that decision.

The MENL seeks to have the judgment under appeal set aside because of the following errors of law:

— The facts of the case have been distorted, since, further to its finding that the Bureau of the Parliament was not aware of the MENL’s defence submissions, the General Court nonetheless found that the latter had been able to defend itself because its defence submissions had been forwarded to an assistant of one of the members of the Bureau;

— Article 41 of the Charter, Article 16 of the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour and Article 8 of the decision of the Bureau of the Parliament of 29 March 2004 laying down the procedures for implementing Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding (1) were infringed, in that the General Court found that the decision-making work of the Parliament’s services can replace a decision of the Bureau of the Parliament;

— The General Court erred in rejecting the plea of illegality of Article 7 of Regulation No 2004/2003, raised pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, by ruling that the content of the prohibition on indirect funding is an indeterminate legal notion while acknowledging that it applied that notion;

— The General Court misapplied Article 7 of Regulation No 2004/2003 in finding that the presence of the logo of a political party, whatever its size, on a poster of a European political party constituted, as such, illegal direct funding of that party.

(1) OJ 2003 L 297, p. 1.
Appeal brought on 29 January 2019 by the Kingdom of Spain against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 15 November 2018 in Case T-219/10 RENV World Duty Free Group v Commission

(Case C-64/19 P)

(2019/C 112/42)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: Kingdom of Spain (represented by: M. A. Sampol Pucurull, acting as Agent)

Other parties to the proceedings: World Duty Free Group, S.A., previously Autogrill España, SA, and European Commission

Interveners in support of the applicant at first instance: Federal Republic of Germany, and Ireland

Form of order sought

The appellant submits that the Court should:

— Uphold the present appeal and set aside the judgment of the General Court of 15 November 2018, in Case T-219/10 RENV World Duty Free Group, S.A. v European Commission; (1)

— Annul Article 1(1) of the contested decision in so far as Commission Decision 2011/5/EC of 28 October 2009 on the tax amortisation of financial goodwill for foreign shareholding acquisitions C 45/07 (ex NN 51/07, ex CP 9/07) implemented by Spain (2) considers that the tax measure at issue constitutes State aid; and

— Order the European Commission to pay the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appeal is founded on a single ground of appeal which ought to lead to the setting aside of the judgment under appeal. Spain submits that the General Court erred in law, for the purposes of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, in its erroneous interpretation of Article 107(1) of the Treaty (TFEU) and, in particular, the concept of the selectivity of State aid contained in that article. The single ground of appeal can be divided into four parts:

— In the first place, Spain submits that the General Court erred in determining the reference system for the tax measure, which does not coincide with that contained in the contested decision;

— In the second place, Spain submits that the General Court erred in law by failing to find that the tax treatment of financial goodwill constitutes a general measure or an independent or specific framework;

— In the third place, Spain maintains that the General Court also erred in law in incorrectly defining the objective of the reference framework and in incorrectly conducting the comparison required by the judgment given on appeal in World Duty Free; (3)

— In the fourth place, the error committed in identifying a constituent element of the reference framework entails an error of law in the attribution of the burden of proof.

(1) Judgment of 15 November 2018, World Duty Free Group v Commission (T-219/10 RENV, EU:T:2018:784).

(2) OJ 2011 L 7, p. 48.

(3) Judgment of 21 December 2016, Commission v World Duty Free Group and Others (C-20/15 P and C-21/16 P, EU:C:2016:981).
2.

Is Article 31(1) of Directive 2002/22/EC (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC (3) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, to be interpreted as precluding Member States from imposing a ‘must carry’ obligation (to broadcast a television channel over satellite networks owned by third parties and to provide access for end-users to that broadcast) on economic operators, such as the applicant, which (1) broadcast a television channel protected by a conditional access system over satellite networks owned by third parties, to that end receiving signals of television programmes (channels) broadcast at that time, converting them, encrypting them and transmitting them to an artificial Earth satellite from which they are uninterruptedly transmitted back to Earth, and (2) offer television channel packages to customers, to that end providing access to that protected television broadcast (or part thereof) by conditional access devices in return for remuneration?
Appeal brought on 6 February 2019 by the European External Action Service against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 27 November 2018 in Case T-315/17, Hebberecht v EEAS

(Case C-93/19P)

(2019/C 155/33)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: European External Action Service (represented by: S. Marquardt and R. Spac, Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: Chantal Hebberecht

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court of 27 November 2018 in Case T-315/17;

— dismiss the action at first instance as unfounded;

— order the other party to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

According to the EEAS, the General Court erred in law in basing its judgment on an infringement of Article 1d(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials and in considering that that provision contains a principle directly applicable to individual decisions adopted by the institution pursuant to those regulations (paragraphs 93 and 94 of the judgment under appeal).

In addition, even if Article 1d(2) of the Staff Regulations were to impose a directly applicable obligation, that provision could not apply in the present case, given the nature of the decision at issue, which concerned only the applicant in her capacity as Head of Delegation, and which was not suitable for the application of the principle of gender equality.
1.

Bearing in mind that the defendant neither participated in the conclusion of the agreements with the other co-owners nor consented to that which was agreed, must Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 be interpreted as meaning that the defendant’s obligation — which is established by law but which, as regards the amount, final date for payment and other details, is determined by common agreement by the owners who represent more than half of the shares in the joint ownership of the building — must be regarded as a contractual obligation?
1.

Must Article 1(2) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 (1) be interpreted as precluding the application of the provisions of the directive in regard to the examination of the fairness of individual contractual terms concerning non-interest credit costs, in the case where the legislative provisions in force in a Member State impose an upper limit on those costs by providing that non-interest credit costs arising from a consumer credit agreement are not payable in excess of the maximum non-interest credit costs calculated in the manner prescribed by law or the total amount of the credit?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel București (Romania) lodged on 11 February 2019 — Krakvet sp. z o.o. sp.k. v Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice București, Administrația Fiscală pentru Contribuabili Nerezidenți

(Case C-108/19)

(2019/C 172/13)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel București

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Krakvet sp. z o.o. sp.k.

Respondents: Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice București, Administrația Fiscală pentru Contribuabili Nerezidenți

Question referred

In the context of the sale of goods through an online retail outlet, is Article 33 of Directive 2006/112 (1) to be interpreted as not applying in the situation where the customer directly enters into a contract with the carrier for the transport of the goods from the Member State of the supplier to his own Member State, in accordance with the dispatching options offered by the supplier, and the goods are not transported on behalf of the supplier?

(1) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Gerechtshof te Amsterdam (Netherlands) lodged on 27 February 2019 — Rensen Shipbuilding BV, other party: Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Douane

(Case C-192/19)

(2019/C 164/29)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Gerechtshof te Amsterdam

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Rensen Shipbuilding BV

Other party: Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Douane

Question referred

Additional note 1 to Chapter 89 of the Combined Nomenclature provides that (inter alia) the CN subheadings 89012010 and 89019010, entitled ‘Seagoing’, are to be taken to apply only to vessels that are designed as seagoing. What should be understood by the term ‘seagoing’ in this context?
2.

If such derogation from the right to reduce the taxable amount for VAT purposes is permissible, must there nevertheless be a right to reduce the taxable amount for VAT purposes on the ground of non-payment where the taxable person is able to demonstrate that, even if he had lodged a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings, it would not have been satisfied, or is able to demonstrate that there were reasonable grounds for not lodging a claim?