ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Order of the Court (Second Chamber) of 3 December 2014 — ASPROD

(Case C‑313/14)

‛Directive 92/83/EEC — Harmonisation of the structures of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages — Article 27(1)(f) — Exemption from the harmonised excise duty — Confectionary — Obligation to obtain a decision from the tax administration fixing the maximum limits for use of those products’

Tax provisions — Harmonisation of laws — Excise duties — Directive 92/83 — Alcohol and alcoholic beverages — Exemptions from harmonised excise duty — Exoneration subject to the requirement of obtaining a separate decision from the competent tax administration determining the maximum limits for authorised use — Unlawful (Council Directive 92/83, Art. 27(1)(f)) (see para. 19, 22, 25-27, operative part)

Operative part

Article 27(1)(f) of Council Directive 92/83/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the harmonisation of the structures of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages must be interpreted as precluding national rules, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which make the application of the exemption from the harmonised excise duty provided for under that provision subject to the condition that the trader concerned must hold a decision from the tax administration fixing the maximum limits for use of the products exempted under that provision.

Order of the Court (Second Chamber) of 3 December 2014 — ASPROD

(Case C‑313/14)

‛Directive 92/83/EEC — Harmonisation of the structures of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages — Article 27(1)(f) — Exemption from the harmonised excise duty — Confectionary — Obligation to obtain a decision from the tax administration fixing the maximum limits for use of those products’

Tax provisions — Harmonisation of laws — Excise duties — Directive 92/83 — Alcohol and alcoholic beverages — Exemptions from harmonised excise duty — Exoneration subject to the requirement of obtaining a separate decision from the competent tax administration determining the maximum limits for authorised use — Unlawful (Council Directive 92/83, Art. 27(1)(f)) (see para. 19, 22, 25-27, operative part)

Operative part

Article 27(1)(f) of Council Directive 92/83/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the harmonisation of the structures of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages must be interpreted as precluding national rules, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which make the application of the exemption from the harmonised excise duty provided for under that provision subject to the condition that the trader concerned must hold a decision from the tax administration fixing the maximum limits for use of the products exempted under that provision.
Order of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 21 May 2015 —

Slovenská autobusová doprava Trnava

(Case C‑318/14) 1 ( 1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Articles 49 TFEU and 52 TFEU — Freedom of establishment — Regulation No 1370/2007 — Public transport by rail and by road — Bus transport on urban public transport lines — Carrier established in another Member State and operating through a branch — Requirement to obtain special authorisation — Discretionary power of the competent authority — Public service contract’

Freedom of establishment — Restrictions — Operation of an urban public transport service by road in the territory of a Member State — National legislation requiring only foreign carriers which have a branch office in that Member State to obtain special authorisation issued on a discretionary basis by the competent authorities — Unlawful — No justification (Art. 49 TFEU) (see paras 37-42, 44, 47, 48-50, 53, operative part)

Operative part

Article 49 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State requiring only foreign carriers which have a branch office in that Member State to obtain special authorisation issued on a discretionary basis by the competent authorities in order to operate an urban public transport service by road in the territory of that Member State alone.

( 1 ) OJ C 351, 6.10.14.

Order of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 21 May 2015 —

Slovenská autobusová doprava Trnava

(Case C‑318/14) 1 ( 1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Articles 49 TFEU and 52 TFEU — Freedom of establishment — Regulation No 1370/2007 — Public transport by rail and by road — Bus transport on urban public transport lines — Carrier established in another Member State and operating through a branch — Requirement to obtain special authorisation — Discretionary power of the competent authority — Public service contract’

Freedom of establishment — Restrictions — Operation of an urban public transport service by road in the territory of a Member State — National legislation requiring only foreign carriers which have a branch office in that Member State to obtain special authorisation issued on a discretionary basis by the competent authorities — Unlawful — No justification (Art. 49 TFEU) (see paras 37-42, 44, 47, 48-50, 53, operative part)

Operative part

Article 49 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State requiring only foreign carriers which have a branch office in that Member State to obtain special authorisation issued on a discretionary basis by the competent authorities in order to operate an urban public transport service by road in the territory of that Member State alone.

( 1 ) OJ C 351, 6.10.14.
Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 5 February 2015 —

Jyoti Ceramic Industries v OHIM

(Case C‑420/14 P)

‛Appeals — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure — Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Figurative trade mark containing the word element ‘ZIECON’ — Opposition by the proprietor of the word mark CERCON — Likelihood of confusion — Regulation No (EC) No 207/2009 — Article 8(1)(b)’

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity of the marks concerned — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 25-27)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. Jyoti Ceramic Industries PVT. Ltd is ordered to bear its own costs.

Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 5 February 2015 —

Jyoti Ceramic Industries v OHIM

(Case C‑420/14 P)

‛Appeals — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure — Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Figurative trade mark containing the word element ‘ZIECON’ — Opposition by the proprietor of the word mark CERCON — Likelihood of confusion — Regulation No (EC) No 207/2009 — Article 8(1)(b)’

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity of the marks concerned — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 25-27)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.
Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 4 June 2015 —

Junited Autoglas Deutschland v OHIM

(Case C‑579/14 P)

‛Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Community word mark United Autoglas — Application for registration — Opposition proceedings — Earlier national figurative mark AUTOGLASS — Partial refusal to register — Appeal clearly inadmissible and clearly unfounded’

Appeals — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 25-28)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. Junited Autoglas Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG is ordered to pay the costs.

Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 4 June 2015 —

Junited Autoglas Deutschland v OHIM

(Case C‑579/14 P)

‛Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Community word mark United Autoglas — Application for registration — Opposition proceedings — Earlier national figurative mark AUTOGLASS — Partial refusal to register — Appeal clearly inadmissible and clearly unfounded’

Appeals — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 25-28)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 15 October 2015 — Naderhirn

(Case C‑581/14)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Principle of sincere cooperation — Article 267 TFEU — Obligation to comply with the instructions of a higher court’

EU law — Primacy — Conflicting provision of national law — Judgment of the Court of Justice finding such a conflict — No national laws on procedure in place to deal with cases pending before the national courts — Principle of sincere cooperation — Obligation to comply with the instructions of a higher court which are not in accordance with EU law — Unlawful (Art. 4(3) TEU; Art. 267 TFEU) (see paras 30, 31, 35-37, operative part)

Operative part

EU law must be interpreted as precluding a situation in national law which is characterised by, first, the lack of domestic legal provisions governing the manner in which a national court must take account of the fact that it follows from a judgment of the Court of Justice that a national provision must be held to be contrary to EU law when it is dealing with cases pending before it and, second, the existence of rules of domestic law which provide that the court in question is unconditionally bound by another national court’s interpretation of EU law, in so far as, on account of such a rule of domestic law, the national court is precluded from ensuring that the primacy of EU law is duly guaranteed by taking, in the context of its jurisdiction, all the necessary measures to that effect.
Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 6 September 2016 —

Lidl Stiftung v EUIPO

(Case C‑237/14 P) ( *1 )

‛Appeal — EU trade mark — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Appeal manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded’

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 181) (see para. 27)

Operative part:

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. Lidl Stiftung & Co. KG shall pay the costs.

( *1 ) OJ C 282, 25.8.2014.
Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 6 October 2015 —

Marpefa v OHIM

(Case C‑181/15 P)

‛Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Lodging a procedural document — Original bearing a handwritten signature — Period allowed for commencing proceedings — Delay — Appeal manifestly unfounded’

Judicial proceedings — Application initiating proceedings — Formal requirements — Handwritten signature of a lawyer — Substantive rule of strict application (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 19; Rules of Procedure of the General Court (1991), Art. 43) (see paras 17-24)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 16 July 2015 —

Striani and Others

(Case C‑299/15)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Insufficient information regarding the legal and factual context — Insufficient information regarding the reasons justifying the need for an answer to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling for the purposes of resolving a dispute in the main proceedings — Manifest inadmissibility’

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Admissibility — Reference giving no details of the relevant facts or legislation and not setting out the reasons for making that reference to the Court of Justice — Manifest inadmissibility (Art. 267 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 23; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 53(2) and (94) (see paras 19-38)

Operative part

The reference for a preliminary ruling from the tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles (Belgium), by decision of 29 May 2015, is manifestly inadmissible.

Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 16 July 2015 —

Striani and Others

(Case C‑299/15)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Insufficient information regarding the legal and factual context — Insufficient information regarding the reasons justifying the need for an answer to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling for the purposes of resolving a dispute in the main proceedings — Manifest inadmissibility’

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Admissibility — Reference giving no details of the relevant facts or legislation and not setting out the reasons for making that reference to the Court of Justice — Manifest inadmissibility (Art. 267 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 23; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 53(2) and (94) (see paras 19-38)

Operative part

The reference for a preliminary ruling from the tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles (Belgium), by decision of 29 May 2015, is manifestly inadmissible.
Order of the Court (Third Chamber) of 17 December 2015 —

Guja v Poland

(Case C‑352/15 P)

‛Appeal — Action for damages brought against a Member State — Manifest lack of jurisdiction of the General Court of the European Union’

Judicial proceedings — Action for annulment or for damages brought by a natural or legal person against a Member State — Manifest lack of jurisdiction of the General Court — Inadmissibility (Arts 256 TFEU, 263 TFEU, 268 TFEU and 340, third and fourth paras, TFEU) (see paras 9-11)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.
Order of the Court (First Chamber) of 29 October 2015 —

Voigt v President of the Parliament and Parliament

(Case C‑425/15)

‛Action for annulment — Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Article 54, second paragraph, of the Statute of the Court of Justice — Refusal to make available to the applicant, a member of the European Parliament, Parliament premises for the purposes of hosting a delegation comprising two Russian citizens, inter alia, for a press conference — Prohibition on the Russian citizens on the list of participants of the meeting from entering European Parliament premises — Manifest lack of jurisdiction — Referral back to the General Court of the European Union’

Judicial proceedings — Division of jurisdiction between the various courts of the European Union — Action for annulment brought by a member of the European Parliament against the refusal of his institution to make available to him Parliament premises for the purposes of hosting a delegation comprising Russian citizens and against the prohibition on those citizens from entering Parliament premises — Lack of jurisdiction of the Court — Referral back to the General Court (Art. 256(1), first para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 51 and 54, second para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 53(2)) (see paras 9-14)

Operative part

1. The Court of Justice manifestly lacks jurisdiction to hear the action for annulment brought by Udo Voigt on 31 July 2015 (Case C‑425/15).

2. Case C‑425/15 is referred back to the General Court of the European Union.
1.

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Questions the answer to which may be clearly deduced from the Court’s existing case-law — Application of Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure (Art. 267 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 99) (see paras 22, 23)
When assessing the urgency of an interim measure, the fact that the publication of information concerning customer names and descriptions of the products of undertakings pursued for infringement of EU competition law could infringe the principles of protection of legitimate expectations and of equal treatment cannot suffice, as such, to find that that information must be regarded as being covered by the obligation of professional secrecy and that, as a consequence, its disclosure would cause serious and irreparable damage to those undertakings. Such a fact, if established, would at most constitute the basis for requiring the Commission not to disclose such information.

While it is true that the publication of information is irreversible, however, in order to satisfy the conditions for granting interim measures and, in particular, the condition regarding urgency, the irreversible nature of the disclosure of such information must be likely to cause serious and irreparable damage to the applicants.

In that regard, whereas, in order to establish the existence of such damage it is not necessary for the occurrence of that damage to be demonstrated with absolute certainty, it being sufficient to show that damage is foreseeable with a sufficient degree of probability, the applicant is still required to prove the facts forming the basis of its claim that such serious and irreparable damage is likely.

Furthermore, whereas the disclosure of business secrets is, indeed, likely to cause damage consisting in the fact that, once the confidential information has been published, any subsequent annulment of the contested decision would not reverse the effects of the publication of that information, the same cannot be said regarding the disclosure of information that cannot be considered to be covered by professional secrecy. This is the case for information that is held not to constitute business secrets in a part of the judgment of the General Court that was not the subject of the appeal brought against that judgment. The part of the judgment concerning the information in question must be considered as definitive.

(see paras 33-38, 40-42)
3.

Appeals — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 34, 48, 58)
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 10 November 2016 — Brouillard v Court of Justice of the European Union

(Case C‑590/15 P) ( 1 )

(Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Public service contracts — Negotiated tender procedure for the conclusion of framework contracts for the translation of legal texts — Exclusion of a proposed subcontractor — Professional competence — Requirement of full legal training — Recognition of diplomas)

1. Appeals—Grounds—Plea submitted for the first time in the context of the appeal—Inadmissibility (Art. 256(1), second para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see para.18)

2. Appeals—Grounds—Specific criticism of a point of the General Court’s reasoning necessary (Art. 256(1), second para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 168) (see para. 23)

3. European Union public contracts—Conclusion of a contract following a call for tenders—Criteria for selecting candidates—Criterion requiring a full legal education for providing legal translation services at the Court of Justice—Obligation for the contracting authority to compare, in accordance with Directive 2005/36, the qualifications claimed by a tenderer with those required in the contract notice—No such obligation (Arts 45 TFEU and 49 TFEU; European Parliament and Council Directive 2005/36, Title III) (see paras30, 31)

4. Appeal—Grounds—Review by the Court of the assessment of the rules of national law relied on by a party—Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1), second para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see para.44)

5. European Union public contracts—Conclusion of a contract following a call for tenders—Discretion of the institutions—Judicial review—Limits (see para. 63)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. Alain Laurent Brouillard is ordered to pay the costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 48, 8.2.2016.
Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 22 June 2016 — Matratzen Concord v EUIPO

(Case C‑295/15 P) ( 1 )

‛Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — EU trade mark — EU word mark ARKTIS — Application for revocation — Genuine use of the mark — Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Article 51(1)(a) — Form of use of the mark — Proof of use of the mark — Consent of the proprietor — Partial rejection of the application for revocation’

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see para. 28)

Operative part

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. Matratzen Concord GmbH is ordered to pay the costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 302, 14.9.2015.
2.

Appeal — Grounds — Mistaken assessment of the facts — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of Justice of the assessment of the facts put before the General Court — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 36, 37)
4.

EU trade mark — Observations of third parties and opposition — Examination of the opposition — Facts and evidence not produced in support of the opposition within the period prescribed for that purpose — Continuation of the procedure for examining the opposition — Transmitting observations from the opponent to the applicant — Error of law — Effect limited to the lawfulness of the procedure before EUIPO (Commission Regulation No 2868/95, Art. 1, Rules 19 and 20(1) and (2)) (see paras 69-73)
3.

The effects of the declaration of invalidity of Article 4 of, and Annex II to, Decision 2013/448 shall be limited in time in such a way, first, that that declaration shall take effect only at the end of a period of ten months from the date of delivery of the judgment of 28 April 2016, Borealis Polyolefine and Others (C‑191/14, C‑192/14, C–295/14, C–389/14 and C–391/14 to C–393/14, EU:C:2016:311), in order to allow the European Commission to proceed with the adoption of the necessary measures and, secondly, that the measures adopted up to that point on the basis of the provisions declared invalid cannot be brought into question.
2.

Nestlé Unternehmungen Deutschland GmbH and Lotte Co. Ltd are ordered to pay their own costs.
Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 27 October 2016 – Uber Belgium

(Case C-526/15) ( 1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Inadmissibility — Transportation of persons by motor vehicles — Private drivers using a smart phone application to connect them to people wishing to travel within urban areas — Requirement to hold an operating permit’

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Admissibility — Questions referred without sufficient information on the factual and legislative context — Manifest inadmissibility (Art. 267 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 23; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Arts 53(2) and 94) (see paras 17-30, 32, operative part)

Operative part

The request for a preliminary ruling from the Nederlandstalige rechtbank van koophandel Brussel (Flemish-language Commercial Court, Brussels, Belgium), by decision of 23 September 2015, is manifestly inadmissible.

( 1 ) OJ C 429, 21.12.2015.