ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
In order to analyse the functionality of a sign for the purposes of Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of Regulation No 40/94 on the Community trade mark, which concerns only signs which consist of the shape of the actual goods, the essential characteristics of a shape must be assessed in the light of the technical function of the actual goods concerned.

Thus, and since the sign at issue consists of the shape of actual goods and not of an abstract shape, the technical function of the actual goods at issue must be defined and must be taken into account when assessing the functionality of the essential characteristics of that sign.

While it is necessary, for the purpose of that analysis, to proceed on the basis of the shape at issue, as represented graphically, the analysis cannot be made without taking into consideration, where appropriate, the additional elements relating to the function of the actual goods at issue.

First, it follows from the case-law of the Court that, when examining the functional characteristics of a sign, the competent authority may carry out a detailed examination that takes into account material relevant to identifying appropriately the essential characteristics of a sign, in addition to the graphic representation and any descriptions filed at the time of application for registration.

Secondly, in each of the cases which gave rise to the Court’s judgments of 18 June 2002, Philips (C‑299/99, EU:C:2002:377), of 14 September 2010, Lego Juris v OHIM (C‑48/09 P, EU:C:2010:516), and of 6 March 2014, Pi-Design and Others v Yoshida Metal Industry (C‑337/12 P to C‑340/12 P, not published, EU:C:2014:129), the competent authorities would not have been able to analyse the shape concerned solely on the basis of its graphic representation without using additional information on the actual goods.

(see paras 46-50)
1.

Declares that, by failing to ensure secondary treatment or equivalent treatment for urban waste water from the agglomerations of Goyave, Bastelica, Morne-à-l’Eau, Aiguilles-Château-Ville Vieille, Borgo-Nord, Isola, Plombières-les-Bains, Saint-Céré, Vincey, Etueffont, Volx and Villeneuve, either for the entire amount of their discharges, in the case of agglomerations having a population equivalent of between 10000 and 15000, or for discharges into fresh water and estuaries, in the case of agglomerations having a population equivalent of between 2000 and 10000, the French Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 4(1) and (3) of Council Directive 91/271/EEC of 21 May 1991 concerning urban waste-water treatment, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1137/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008;
Article 4 of Directive 2003/59 on the initial qualification and periodic training of drivers of certain road vehicles for the carriage of goods or passengers must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation under which, before the driving activity in question may be carried out, periodic training of 35 hours duration has to be completed by persons who are exempted, under Article 4, from the requirement that drivers of certain road vehicles for the carriage of goods or passengers obtain an initial qualification.

Directive 2003/59 provides for a minimum level of harmonisation with regard to national provisions concerning the initial qualification and periodic training of drivers of certain road vehicles for the carriage of goods or passengers. Minimum harmonisation does not prevent the Member States from retaining or adopting more stringent measures, provided, however, that the latter are not liable seriously to compromise achievement of the result prescribed by the directive in question. No such danger is entailed by a condition which, for the issue of a driver’s certificate of professional competence (CPC), requires, in addition to the holding (as provided for by Directive 2003/59) of a driving licence for certain categories, participation in a prior course of periodic training of 35 hours duration. That condition contributes to ensuring the qualification of drivers and to improving road safety and the safety of drivers, objectives to which recitals 4 and 5 of Directive 2003/59 refer. Furthermore, an additional requirement of that kind cannot be regarded as going beyond what is necessary to attain those objectives. Moreover, it cannot be regarded as infringing the acquired rights of drivers, since (i) Directive 76/914 on the minimum level of training for some road transport drivers, which was repealed and replaced by Directive 2003/59, provided, in Article 1(3), that Member States should be able to require more extensive training than that provided for in the annex to Directive 76/914 in order for a person to obtain a CPC and (ii) the national legislation in question, even before the transposition of Directive 2003/59, provided that holding an appropriate driving licence was not sufficient for the purpose of driving the vehicles covered by the directive at issue and that the drivers of those vehicles were required to improve their driving skills by means of yearly training courses. Lastly, an additional requirement of that kind does not infringe Article 15 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

(see paras 39, 43, 45-47, 50-52, operative part)
Case C‑267/15

Gemeente Woerden

v

Staatssecretaris van Financiën

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden)

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Value added tax — Input tax — Deduction’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber), 22 June 2016

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Deduction of input tax — Origin and scope of the right of deduction — Taxable person having had a building constructed and having sold that building for a price less than the cost of constructing it — Entitlement to deduct all of the value added tax — Purchaser having granted the use of part of the building to a third party free of charge — No effect

(Council Directive 2006/112)

Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that, where a taxable person has had a building constructed and has sold that building for a price less than the cost of constructing it, that taxable person is entitled to deduct all of the value added tax paid in respect of the construction of that building, and not only a part of that tax in proportion to the parts of the building which its purchaser uses for economic activities. The fact that that purchaser allows the building at issue to be used without charge is of no importance in that regard.

(see para. 42, operative part)
Articles 167, 168, 178, the first paragraph of Article 179, and Articles 180 and 182 of Council Directive 2006/112, on the common system of value added tax, must be interpreted as meaning that they do not preclude national legislation which provides for a limitation period for exercising the right to deduct, provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are observed, which it is for the national court to ascertain.

Articles 168, 178, 179, 193, 206, 242, 244, 250, 252 and 273 of Directive 2006/112, on the common system of value added tax, must be interpreted as meaning that they do not preclude national legislation which allows the tax authorities to refuse a taxable person the right to deduct value added tax (VAT) when it is established that that person has fraudulently failed to fulfil most of the formal obligations incumbent upon him in order to be able to benefit from that right.

In particular, the failure to file a VAT return, like to failure to keep accounting records, which would allow VAT to be applied and monitored by the tax authorities, and the failure to record the invoices issued and paid are liable to prevent the correct collection of the tax and, therefore, to compromise the proper functioning of the common system of VAT. Therefore, EU law does not prevent Member States from treating such infringements as amounting to tax evasion and from refusing to grant the right to deduct in such cases. In that regard, a refusal of the right to deduct in circumstances characterising the existence of tax evasion on the part of the taxable person seeking to benefit from that right cannot be considered contrary to the principle of fiscal neutrality, since that principle cannot legitimately be invoked by a taxable person who has intentionally participated in tax evasion and who has jeopardised the operation of the common system of VAT.

(see paras 56, 58, 59, operative part 2)
The provisions of Annex II to Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning medical devices, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1882/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 September 2003, read in the light of Article 11(1) and (10) and Article 16(6) of the directive, are to be interpreted as meaning that the notified body is not under a general obligation to carry out unannounced inspections, to examine devices and/or to examine the manufacturer’s business records. However, in the face of evidence indicating that a medical device may not comply with the requirements laid down in Directive 93/42, as amended by Regulation No 1882/2003, the notified body must take all the steps necessary to ensure that it fulfils its obligations under Article 16(6) of the directive and Sections 3.2, 3.3, 4.1 to 4.3 and 5.1 of Annex II to the directive.

Directive 93/42, as amended by Regulation No 1882/2003, is to be interpreted as meaning that, in the procedure relating to the EC declaration of conformity, the purpose of the notified body’s involvement is to protect the end users of medical devices. The conditions under which culpable failure by that body to fulfil its obligations under the directive in connection with that procedure may give rise to liability on its part vis-à-vis those end users are governed by national law, subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.

It should be noted, first of all, that the Court has previously stated that it does not necessarily follow from the fact that a directive imposes surveillance obligations on certain bodies or the fact that one of the objectives of the directive is to protect injured parties that the directive seeks to confer rights on such parties in the event that those bodies fail to fulfil their obligations, and that is the case especially if the directive does not contain any express rule granting such rights (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 October 2004, Paul and Others, C‑222/02, EU:C:2004:606, paragraphs 38 to 40). It should also be noted that, in the absence of any mention in Directive 93/42 of the manner in which the civil liability of notified bodies may be incurred, it cannot be maintained that the purpose of the directive is to govern the conditions under which the end users of medical devices may be able to obtain compensation for culpable failure by those bodies to fulfil their obligations.

(see paras 55, 56, operative part 2)
3.

Environment — Waste — Directive 2006/21 — Obligation of the Member States to ensure the management of extractive waste — Scope — Waste management that does not endanger human health and which does not harm the environment — Obligation to achieve a result — Discretion of the Member States regarding the measures to be taken — Limits — Persistence of a non-compliant situation — Failure to fulfil obligations (European Parliament and Council Directive 2006/21, Art. 4) (see paras 79-81, 93-101)
The procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU is essential whenever the Commission has serious difficulties in determining whether aid is compatible with the internal market. Thus, the Commission may confine itself to the preliminary investigation under Article 108(3) TFEU when taking a decision in favour of aid only if it is able to satisfy itself, after an initial examination, that that aid is compatible with the internal market. If, by contrast, the initial examination leads the Commission to the opposite conclusion or even if it does not enable it to resolve all the difficulties involved in determining whether the aid is compatible with the internal market, the Commission is under a duty to carry out all the requisite consultations and for that purpose to initiate the procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU.

In that regard, in accordance with the objective of Article 108(3) TFEU and its duty of sound administration, the Commission may, amongst other things, engage in a dialogue with the notifying State or with third parties in an endeavour to overcome, during the preliminary procedure, any difficulties encountered. However, that power presupposes that the Commission may adjust its position in accordance with the results of the dialogue in which it engages, without that adjustment having to be interpreted, a priori, as establishing the existence of serious difficulties. Accordingly, the Commission may, after an initial examination, lawfully adopt, on the basis of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article [108 TFEU], a decision whereby, while finding that there is no State aid, it takes note of commitments entered into by the Member State. The fact that the Commission concluded, during the preliminary investigation and prior to negotiation of those commitments, that the measure at issue conferred an advantage on the beneficiary cannot therefore be regarded as serious difficulties requiring initiation of the formal investigation procedure.

(see para. 30, 35-37)
Case C‑568/15

Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs Frankfurt am Main eV

v

comtech GmbH

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Stuttgart)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Consumer protection — Directive 2011/83/EU — Article 21 — Communication by telephone — Operation of a telephone line by a trader to enable consumers to contact him in relation to a contract concluded — Prohibition on applying a rate higher than the basic rate — Concept of ‘basic rate’)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber), 2 March 2017

Consumer protection — Consumer contracts — Directive 2011/83 — Communication by telephone — Operation of a telephone line by a trader to enable consumers to contact him in relation to a contract concluded — The cost of a call to that telephone line — Concept of basic rate — Charges higher than the cost of a call to a landline or mobile telephone line — Not included — Whether the trader makes or does not make a profit through that telephone helpline — Irrelevant

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2011/83, Art. 21)

The concept of ‘basic rate’ referred to in Article 21 of Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, must be interpreted as meaning that call charges relating to a contract concluded with a trader to a telephone helpline operated by the trader may not exceed the cost of a call to a standard geographic landline or mobile telephone line. Provided that that limit is respected, the fact that the relevant trader makes or does not make a profit through that telephone helpline is irrelevant.

An interpretation of the concept of ‘basic rate’ to the effect that traders are permitted to charge rates higher than that of a standard call to a geographic landline or mobile telephone line would be liable to discourage consumers from using a telephone helpline in order to obtain information in relation to the contract concluded with the trader or from asserting their rights relating to, inter alia, a guarantee or withdrawal.

(see paras 29, 32, operative part)
Article 9 of the Protocol (No 36) on transitional provisions, annexed to the EU Treaty and the FEU Treaty, must be interpreted as meaning that a provision of an act duly adopted on the basis of the EU Treaty before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which lays down detailed rules for the adoption of measures implementing that act, continues to produce its legal effects until it is repealed, annulled or amended, and permits the adoption of implementing measures in accordance with the procedure that it defines. It follows that the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon does not, in itself, preclude the adoption of acts falling under the former ‘third pillar’, such as decisions adopted under the procedure defined in Article 25 of Decision 2008/615 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime. Consequently, the argument that such acts must necessarily be based on Article 82(1)(d) and Article 87(2)(a) TFEU cannot succeed.

By requiring that measures necessary to implement Decision 2008/615 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, at the level of the European Union be adopted by the Council by means of a unanimous decision, whilst Article 34(2)(c) EU provided that such measures had to be adopted by the Council acting by a qualified majority, Article 25(2) of that decision unlawfully lays down detailed rules for the adoption of measures that are more stringent in comparison with the procedure laid down for that purpose by the Treaties.

Since the rules regarding the manner in which the EU institutions arrive at their decisions are laid down in the Treaties and are not within the discretion of the Member States or of the institutions themselves, the Treaties alone may, in particular cases, empower an institution to amend a decision-making procedure established by the Treaties. Accordingly, to acknowledge that an institution can establish secondary legal bases for the adoption of legislative acts or implementing measures, whether for the purpose of strengthening or easing the detailed rules for the adoption of an act, would be tantamount to according that institution a legislative power which exceeds that provided for by the Treaties. In that regard, it follows from Article 34(2)(c) EU and from Article 39(1) EU that the Council, voting unanimously on the initiative of any Member State or of the Commission, may adopt legislative acts with any aim that is consistent with those of Title VI of the EU Treaty, with the exception, however, of the areas referred to in Article 34(2)(a) and (b) EU, and, voting by majority, may adopt the measures necessary for the implementation of those acts at EU level. Consequently, Article 25(2) of Decision 2008/615 must be interpreted as providing for the adoption, by the Council voting unanimously, of measures to implement that decision.

(see paras 47, 49, 69, 72)
Article 2(1) of Directive 2001/83 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, as amended by Directive 2011/62, must be interpreted as meaning that a medicinal product for human use which, under national legislation, does not require a marketing authorisation by reason of the proven frequency with which it is the subject of medical and dental prescriptions, the essential manufacturing steps for such products are carried out in a pharmacy as part of the normal pharmacy business producing in the course of one day up to 100 packages ready for dispensation and intended for supply under the existing pharmacy operating licence, cannot be regarded as having been prepared industrially or manufactured by a method involving an industrial process, within the meaning of that provision, and consequently does not come within the scope of that directive, subject to the findings of fact which it is for the referring court to make.

(see para. 41, operative part)
Article 1(1)(a) of Regulation No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that an action for annulment of marriage brought by a third party following the death of one of the spouses falls within the scope of Regulation No 2201/2003.

First, as regards the terms of that article, that provision states that marriage annulment, inter alia, is one of the matters which fall within the scope of that regulation, without making any distinction on the basis of the date on which such an action is brought in relation to the death of one of the spouses or the identity of the person entitled to bring such an action.

Secondly, such an interpretation is supported by the context of that provision. In that regard, Article 1(3) of that regulation provides an exhaustive list of matters excluded from the scope of the regulation. An action for annulment of marriage brought by a third party following the death of one of the spouses is not included in that list of excluded matters.

Thirdly, that interpretation is also borne out by the objective pursued by that regulation which contributes to the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is ensured. Excluding an action for annulment of marriage brought by a third party after the death of one of the spouses from the scope of Regulation No 2201/2003 would undermine the attainment of that objective, in so far as that exclusion would be liable to increase legal uncertainty as a result of there being no uniform regulatory framework in this area, especially since Regulation No 650/2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession does not cover matters relating to the status of natural persons or family relationships.

(see paras 27-30, 32-34, 37, operative part 1)
Joined Cases C‑680/15 and C‑681/15

Asklepios Kliniken Langen-Seligenstadt GmbH

v

Ivan Felja

and

Asklepios Dienstleistungsgesellschaft mbH

v

Vittoria Graf

(Requests for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesarbeitsgericht)

(References for a preliminary ruling — Transfer of undertakings — Safeguarding of employees’ rights — Directive 2001/23/EC — Article 3 — Contract of employment — Legislation of a Member State authorising the incorporation of clauses referring to collective labour agreements after the date of the transfer — Effects with regard to the transferee)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 27 April 2017

Social policy — Approximation of laws — Transfers of undertakings — Safeguarding of employees' rights — Directive 2001/23 — Rights and obligations within the meaning of Article 3 — Individual contract of employment referring to a collective agreement — National legislation authorising the conclusion of clauses collective labour agreements subsequent to the date of the transfer — Lawfulness — Condition — Obligation for the national law to provide for the possibility for the transferee to make adjustments both consensually and unilaterally

(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 16; Council Directive 2001/23, Art. 3)

Article 3 of Council Directive 2001/23/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses, and Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of a transfer of a business, the continued observance of the rights and obligations of the transferor arising from a contract of employment extends to the clause which the transferor and the worker agreed pursuant to the principle of freedom of contract, and pursuant to which their employment relationship is governed not only by the collective agreement in force on the date of the transfer but also by agreements subsequent to the transfer and which supplement it, amend it or replace it, if the national law provides for the possibility for the transferee to make adjustments both consensually and unilaterally.

(see para. 29, operative part)