Judgment of the Court of 7 March 1995. - ISAE/VP (Instituto Social de Apoio ao Emprego e à Valorização Profissional) and Interdata (Centro de Processamento de Dados Ldª) v Commission of the European Communities. - Application for revision - Manifest inadmissibility. - Case C-130/91 REV.



European Court reports 1995 Page I-00407



Summary

Parties

Grounds

Decision on costs

Operative part



Keywords

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Procedure ° Revision of a judgment ° Conditions of admissibility of application ° New fact ° Fact known at the time when judgment was delivered ° Inadmissible

(Statute of the Court of Justice of the EEC, Art. 41)

Summary

It follows from the first paragraph of Article 41 of the EEC Statute of the Court of Justice that revision is not an appeal procedure but an exceptional review procedure that allows the authority of res judicata attaching to a final judgment to be called in question on the basis of the findings of fact relied upon by the court. Revision presupposes the discovery of elements of a factual nature which existed prior to the judgment and which were unknown at that time to the court which delivered it as well as to the party applying for revision and which, had the court been able to take them into consideration, could have led it to a different determination of the proceedings.

Consequently, an application for revision unsupported by any new fact which existed prior to the judgment in question is inadmissible.

Parties

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In Case C-130/91 REV II,

ISAE/VP (Instituto Social de Apoio ao Emprego e à Valorização Profissional), a company governed by Portuguese law and established in Lisbon,

and

Interdata (Centro de Processamento de Dados Limidada), a company governed by Portuguese law and established in Lisbon,

represented by Agostinho Amado Rodrigues, of the Lisbon Bar, of 50 Plaça do Campo Pequeno, Esq. 2, 1000 Lisbon,

applicants,

v

Commission of the European Communities, represented by Ana Maria Alves Vieira, of its Legal Service, acting as Agent, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the office of Carlos Gómez de la Cruz, of its Legal Service, Wagner Centre, Kirchberg,

defendant,

APPLICATION for revision of the order of the Court of Justice of 14 January 1992 in Case C-130/91 ISAE/VP and Interdata v Commission [1992] ECR I-69,

THE COURT,

composed of: G.C. Rodríguez Iglesias, President, C.N Kakouris, D.A.O. Edward, J.-P. Puissochet and G. Hirsch (Presidents of Chambers), G.F. Mancini, F.A. Schockweiler, J.C. Moitinho de Almeida, P.J.G. Kapteyn, C. Gulmann, J.L. Murray (Rapporteur), P. Jann, H. Ragnemalm, L. Sevón and M. Wathelet, Judges,

Advocate General: P. Léger,

Registrar: R. Grass,

after hearing the Advocate General,

gives the following

Judgment

Grounds

1 By application lodged at the Court Registry on 15 May 1995, the companies ISAE/VP (Instituto Social de Apoio ao Emprego e à Valorização Profissional) and Interdata (Centro de Processamento de Dados Limidada) applied, pursuant to Article 41 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EC (`the Statute'), for the revision of the order of the Court of 14 January 1992 in Case C-130/91 ISAE/VP and Interdata v Commission [1992] ECR I-69, and also for legal aid.

2 In that order, the Court dismissed as inadmissible the application for the annulment of a Commission decision alleged to have been adopted on a date unknown and to have refused payment of contributions from the European Social Fund which had previously been approved in respect of applications for assistance Nos 87.0730/P1, 88.0705/P1 and 88.0706/P1.

3 According to the applicants, the Commission refused to pay the contributions on the grounds that it had reason to suspect illegality. The European Social Fund Department in Lisbon (`DAFSE') laid a complaint with the prosecuting authorities based on the facts underlying the present case and accordingly suspended all payment of contributions until those proceedings are completed. In support of their application for revision, the applicants refer to an opinion dated 20 November 1993 given by two professors of law at the University of Coimbra concerning the prosecution of another undertaking in the Portuguese courts. According to that opinion, the conduct of the Commission and DAFSE in deferring the payment of the sums at issue until the proceedings before the national court are completed is unlawful. The applicants consider that the opinion is a new fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor which was unknown when the Court made its order. They therefore ask the Court to revise the order of 14 January 1992 and in consequence to order payment of the contributions in question.

4 The Commission considers that the application for revision is inadmissible since the document and the facts relied on by the applicants are not facts which are new or unknown to the Court and to the party claiming the revision within the meaning of Article 41 of the Statute. A legal opinion dating from 1993 concerning a case wholly unrelated to the present case cannot be classed as a new fact. The Commission also considers that it is clear from the application for revision that it has never taken a decision with regard to the requests for payment of the balance in connection with the matters at issue.

5 In assessing the admissibility of the present application, it should be recalled that, according to the first paragraph of Article 41 of the Statute: `An application for revision of a judgment may be made to the Court only on discovery of a fact which is of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, and which, when the judgment was given, was unknown to the Court and to the party claiming the revision.'

6 It follows that revision is not an appeal procedure but an exceptional review procedure that allows the authority of res judicata attaching to a final judgment to be called in question on the basis of the findings of fact relied upon by the court. Revision presupposes the discovery of elements of a factual nature which existed prior to the judgment and which were unknown at that time to the court which delivered it as well as to the party applying for revision and which, had the court been able to take them into consideration, could have led it to a different determination of the proceedings (see, most recently, the order of 25 February 1992 in Case C-185/90 P-REV Gill v Commission [1992] ECR I-993, paragraph 12, and the judgment in Case C-130/91 REV ISAE/VP and Interdata v Commission [1995] ECR I-407, paragraph 6).

7 The opinion lodged with the Court does not constitute a new fact which existed prior to the judgment and is of such a nature as to be a decisive factor within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 41 of the Statute.

8 Consequently, the application for revision of the aforesaid order of the Court of 14 January 1992 must, pursuant to Article 100(1) of the Rules of Procedure, be held to be inadmissible.

9 Since the application for revision is inadmissible, there is no need to give a decision on the application for legal aid made by the applicants.

Decision on costs

Costs

10 Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs. Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to pay the costs.

Operative part

On those grounds,

THE COURT

hereby:

1. Dismisses the application for revision as inadmissible;

2. Orders the applicants to pay the costs.