ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
6

Information concerning the limitation on the choice of language 2 to the three languages mentioned above is provided in the same place in each of the contested notices. In this respect, notice of open competition EPSO/AD/248/13 states: ‘In conformity with the judgment [of 27 November 2012 in Italy v Commission (C‑566/10 P, ECR, EU:C:2012:752)] the EU institutions are required to state the reasons for limiting the choice of the second language in this competition to a restricted number of EU official languages. Candidates are therefore informed that the second language options in the present competition have been defined in accordance with the interest of the service which requires that newly recruited colleagues are immediately operational and able to communicate efficiently in their daily work. Otherwise the effective functioning of the institutions would be severely impaired. On the basis of long-standing practice in the EU institutions as regards the languages used for internal communication, and taking into account the needs of the services regarding external communication and the handling of files, English, French and German remain the most widely used languages. Moreover, English, French and German are the second languages that are by far the most widely chosen by candidates in competitions where they are able to choose their second language. This confirms current educational and professional standards, whereby candidates for European Union posts can be deemed to master at least one of these languages. Therefore, in balancing the interests of the service and the needs and capacities of the candidates, and taking account of the particular field of this competition, it is legitimate to organise tests in these three languages in order to ensure that, whatever their first official language, all candidates master at least one of these three official languages at working level. Moreover, in the interests of equal treatment of all candidates, everyone, including those whose first official language is one of these three, is required to take the test in their second language, chosen from among these three. Assessing specific competencies in this way allows the institutions to evaluate the ability of candidates to be immediately effective in an environment that closely matches the reality they would face on the job. This is without prejudice to later language training so as to acquire a capacity to work in a third language in accordance with Article 45(2) of the Staff Regulations.’ The other two contested notices essentially contain the same information drafted, in some language versions, in slightly different terms.
39

The applicant claims that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment, in the contested decision, in concluding that, as a result of the element ‘mac’ in the contested mark, the relevant public could associate that trade mark with the ‘Mc’ family of trade marks, from the McDONALD’S trade mark. It considers, in that regard, that the case-law concerning the family of marks must be strictly interpreted, as it derogates from the general principle that any trade mark must be assessed globally. According to the applicant, the documents placed by the intervener on the case-file relating to the proceedings before EUIPO, namely menus from the intervener’s fast-food restaurants, an independent survey carried out in 1991 and in 1992 and the decisions of courts of the Member States, were insufficient to conclude that the prefix ‘mc’ was associated, on the part of the relevant public, with foodstuffs and beverages. Except for a document referring to the McDONALD’s trade mark, those documents all dated from 2010 and, therefore, after 13 October 2008, the date on which the application for registration of the contested trade mark was filed. Furthermore, it is claimed, the part of the independent survey carried out in 1991 reveals only that the persons surveyed would associate the prefix ‘mc’ with the McDONALD’S trade mark, while the part of that survey carried out in 1992, the results of which could have been distorted by a biased drafting of the question posed, only makes it possible to conclude that most of the persons surveyed knew that the prefix ‘mc’, combined with other words, was used in relation to fast-food or self-service restaurant services. According to the applicant, the Board of Appeal was not justified in suggesting that the conclusions of the independent survey continued to be relevant more than 16 years later, and that they were even more relevant. Lastly, the decisions of courts of the Member States examined by the Board of Appeal are not, it is claimed, convincing, since they are not binding on EUIPO and relate to specific situations. The applicant states that it is clear, by implication, from the case-law and from Part C, Section 2, Chapter 7, paragraph 2, p. 4 of the directives concerning proceedings before EUIPO (‘the EUIPO directives’) that the concept of a family of trade marks is not applicable in the present case, in so far as the element ‘mac’ in the contested trade mark is not identical to the element ‘mc’, common to the ‘Mc’ family of trade marks. The element ‘coffee’ in the contested trade mark and which refers to the name of a beverage, differentiates that trade mark from the intervener’s earlier trade marks combining the prefix ‘mc’ with the name of a menu item or a foodstuff, written principally in lower-case letters. The applicant relies on the fact that, within the European Union, the intervener does not sell beverages under a trade mark including the prefix ‘mc’. According to the applicant, the differences which exist between the contested trade mark and the intervener’s earlier trade marks are sufficiently significant to be perceived by the relevant public.
71

In that regard, Article 3 of Regulation No 1059/2003 on the establishment of a common classification of territorial units for statistics lays down, in the version applicable at the time of the facts of the case, the following: ‘1. Existing administrative units within the Member States shall constitute the first criterion used for the definition of territorial units. To this end, “administrative unit” shall mean a geographical area with an administrative authority that has the power to take administrative or policy decisions for that area within the legal and institutional framework of the Member State. 2. In order to establish the relevant NUTS level in which a given class of administrative units in a Member State is to be classified, the average size of this class of administrative units in the Member State shall lie within the following population thresholds: … If the population of a whole Member State is below the minimum threshold for a given NUTS level, the whole Member State shall be one NUTS territorial unit for this level. 3. For the purpose of this Regulation, the population of a territorial unit shall consist of those persons who have their usual place of residence in this area. 4. The existing administrative units used for the NUTS classification are laid down in Annex II. Measures designed to amend non-essential elements of this Regulation and adapting Annex II shall be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 7(2). 5. If for a given level of NUTS no administrative units of a suitable scale exist in a Member State, in accordance with the criteria referred to in paragraph 2, this NUTS level shall be constituted by aggregating an appropriate number of existing smaller contiguous administrative units. This aggregation shall take into consideration such relevant criteria as geographical, socio-economic, historical, cultural or environmental circumstances. The resulting aggregated units shall hereinafter be referred to as “non-administrative units”. The size of the non-administrative units in a Member State for a given NUTS level shall lie within the population thresholds referred to in paragraph 2. Some non-administrative units may, however, deviate from those thresholds because of particular geographical, socio-economic, historical, cultural or environmental circumstances, especially in the islands and the outermost regions. Those measures, designed to amend non-essential elements of this Regulation, by supplementing it, shall be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 7(2).’
62

As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, in its observations on the future conduct of the proceedings in Case T‑719/13 RENV, the Commission disputes that Bankia and others and Aluminios Cortizo are entitled to file written observations or to have status as interveners in the proceedings referred back to the General Court, on several grounds. First of all, such entitlement would be contrary to the wording of Article 217(1) of the Rules of Procedure. Next, it would amount in practice to allowing intervention, in first-instance proceedings, of parties that cannot be given leave to intervene because they have brought actions that are still pending. Further, according to the Commission, the present situation can be distinguished from that which gave rise to the judgment of 23 March 1993, Gill v Commission (T‑43/89, EU:T:1993:24), in which the General Court gave a party which had intervened only in the appeal proceedings leave to intervene at the stage of the proceedings referred back to the General Court, because the Court of Justice had not ruled on its costs. The Commission observes that, in the present case, the Court of Justice did rule on the costs of Bankia and others and Aluminios Cortizo in the judgment on appeal. Lastly, the Commission contends that the present case may be distinguished from a situation in which a party lodges an application for leave to intervene but the General Court rules on the case without making a decision on that application. In those circumstances, following any referral of the case back to the General Court, the Commission is of the view that the applications for leave to intervene remain in force and that it is for the General Court to rule on them (see, to that effect, order of 2 September 2014, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v Commission, T‑203/10 RENV, not published, EU:T:2014:792, paragraph 47).
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 28 April 2015 — Volkswagen v OHIM (EXTRA)

(Case T‑216/14)

‛Community trade mark — Application for Community word mark EXTRA — Mark comprised of an advertising slogan — Absolute ground for refusal — Lack of distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

1. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Concept — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 13-15)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Marks constituted of advertising slogans — Distinctive character — Application of specific criteria for assessment — Not permissible (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 16-19)

3. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Word mark EXTRA (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 20-28)

4. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Sign without descriptive character — Fact not necessarily implying the distinctive character of the sign (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b) and (c)) (see para. 26)

5. Community trade mark — Decisions of the Office — Principle of equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — OHIM’s previous decision-making practice — Principle of legality — Need for a strict and complete examination in each particular case (see paras 30-32)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 6 February 2014 (Case R 1788/2013-1) relating to the application for registration of the word sign EXTRA as a Community trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 21 January 2015 — Grundig Multimedia v OHIM (Pianissimo)

(Case T‑11/14)

‛Community trade mark — Application for Community word mark Pianissimo — Mark consisting of an advertising slogan — Absolute ground for refusal — Absence of distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Equal treatment’

1. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Concept — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 15, 16, 27)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Marks constituted of advertising slogans — Distinctive character — Application of specific criteria for assessment — Inadmissibility (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 17, 18)

3. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Marks constituted of advertising slogans — Slogan with a fantasy character (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 19)

4. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Marks constituted of advertising slogans — Flattering promotional formula (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 20)

5. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Word mark Pianissimo (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 22-26, 30)

6. Community trade mark — Decisions of the Office — Principle of equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — OHIM’s previous decision-making practice — Principle of legality — Need for a strict and complete examination in each particular case (Council Regulation No 207/2009) (see paras 37-39)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 5 November 2013 (Case R 441/2013-4), confirming rejection of the application for registration of the word sign Pianissimo as a Community trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 19 May 2015 —

Swatch v OHIM — Panavision Europe (SWATCHBALL)

(Case T‑71/14)

‛Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for Community word mark SWATCHBALL — Community word and figurative marks and international word and figurative marks SWATCH and swatch — Relative ground for refusal — Damage to reputation — Article 8(5) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

1. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark enjoying a reputation — Protection of well-known earlier mark extended to dissimilar goods or services — Conditions — Link between the marks — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(5)) (see paras 17-21)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark enjoying a reputation — Protection of well-known earlier mark extended to dissimilar goods or services — Conditions — Link between the marks — Word mark SWATCHBALL — Word and figurative marks SWATCH and swatch (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(5)) (see paras 23-25, 32, 33, 36)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 11 November 2013 (Case R 470/2012-2), relating to opposition proceedings between Swatch AG and Panavision Europe Ltd.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Keywords

Subject of the case

Operative part



Keywords

Actions for annulment — Judgment annulling a measure — Effects — Partial annulment of a regulation and of a decision entering a certain entity on the list of persons and entities covered by restrictive measures against Iran — Retroactive effect — Annulment involving the annulment of a decision and a regulation entering a person and an entity on the same list on the basis of the said annulled measures (Art. 264 TFEU; Council Decision 2013/661/CFSP; Council Regulation No 1154/2013) (see paras 40-56)

2. Actions for annulment — Judgment annulling a measure — Effects — Limitation by the Court — Restrictive measures against Iran — Partial annulment at two different times of two acts comprising identical restrictive measures — Maintenance of the effects of the first of those acts until the taking effect of annulment of the second — None — Conduct of the Council not showing a risk of the effectiveness of the said restrictive measures being seriously and irreversibly affected (Art. 264 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 60; Council Decision 2013/661/CFSP; Council Regulation No 1154/2013) (see paras 58-67)

Subject of the case

Re:

APPLICATION for annulment of Council Decision 2013/661/CFSP of 15 November 2013 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ 2013 306, p. 18) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1154/2013 of 15 November 2013 implementing Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ 2013 L 306, p. 3) in so far as they relate to the applicants.

Operative part

Operative part

The Court:

1. Annuls Council Decision 2013/661/CFSP of 15 November 2013 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran in so far as it listed HTTS Hanseatic Trade Trust & Shipping GmbH and Mr Naser Bateni in Annex II to Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP of 26 July 2010 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Common Position 2007/140/CFSP;

2. Annuls Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1264/2012 of 21 December 2012 implementing Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran in so far as it listed HTTS Hanseatic Trade Trust & Shipping GmbH and Mr Bateni in Annex IX to Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010;

3. Orders the Council of the European Union to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by HTTS Hanseatic Trade Trust & Shipping GmbH and Mr Bateni.
Under Article 8(4) of Regulation No 207/2009, the sign at issue must be used as a distinctive element in that it must serve to identify an economic activity engaged in by its proprietor.

However, that cannot mean that the function of the use of a sign, under Article 8(4) of Regulation No 207/2009, should be exclusively that of identifying the commercial origin of the goods or services at issue.

Article 8(4) of Regulation No 207/2009 covers non-registered trade marks and any ‘other sign’ used in the course of trade. In that context, and in the absence of any indication to the contrary, the function of the use of the sign at issue may, in the light of the nature of that sign, lie not only in the identification by the relevant public of the commercial origin of the goods concerned, but also, inter alia, in the identification of their geographical origin and the special qualities inherent in them or of the characteristics on which their reputation is based. The sign at issue, in the light of its nature, may thus be classified as a distinctive element if it serves to identify the goods or services of one undertaking in relation to those of another undertaking, but also, inter alia, if it serves to identify certain goods or services in relation to other similar goods or services. A different approach would effectively exclude signs which are used by a number of traders or which are used in association with trade marks from the benefit of Article 8(4) of Regulation No 207/2009, even though that provision does not provide for such an exclusion.

(see paras 27-29)
Keywords

Subject of the case

Operative part



Keywords

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Assessment of distinctive character — Criteria (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 40-45, 51, 52)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Figurative mark representing a green octagonal frame (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 47, 48, 59, 60)

3. Community trade mark — Decisions of the Office — Principle of equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — OHIM’s previous decision-making practice (see paras 61-65)

Subject of the case

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 9 January 2014 (Case R 1276/2013-1) concerning an application for registration of a figurative sign representing a green octagonal frame as a Community trade mark.

Operative part

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Mr Carsten Bopp to pay the costs.
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 6 October 2015 —

Monster Energy v OHIM — Balaguer (icexpresso + energy coffee)

(Case T‑61/14)

‛Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for the figurative Community trade mark icexpresso + energy coffee — Earlier Community word marks X-PRESSO MONSTER, HAMMER M X-PRESSO MONSTER ESPRESSO + ENERGY and MIDNIGHT M X-PRESSO MONSTER ESPRESSO + ENERGY — Relative ground for refusal — No likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

1. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 25, 26, 32, 72, 76)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity of the marks concerned — Visual similarity between a figurative mark and a word mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 31)

3. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity of the marks concerned — Criteria for assessment — Composite mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 33, 34, 37, 45, 55, 62)

4. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Figurative mark icexpresso + energy coffee and word marks X-PRESSO MONSTER, HAMMER M X-PRESSO MONSTER ESPRESSO + ENERGY and MIDNIGHT M X-PRESSO MONSTER ESPRESSO + ENERGY (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 50, 58, 68, 70, 77, 78)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 15 November 2013 (Case R 821/2013-2), relating to opposition proceedings between Monster Energy Company and Mr Luis Yus Balaguer.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;