ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Appeal brought on 18 September 2019 by the Federal Republic of Germany against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 9 July 2019 in Case T-53/18, Federal Republic of Germany v European Commission

(Case C-688/19 P)

(2019/C 372/30)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Federal Republic of Germany (represented by: J. Möller and R. Kanitz, acting as Agents, and by M. Winkelmüller, F. van Schewick and M. Kottmann, Rechtsanwälte)

Other party: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union delivered on 9 July 2019 in Case T-53/18, Germany v Commission;

— annul Commission Decision (EU) 2017/1995 of 6 November 2017 to maintain in the Official Journal of the European Union the reference of harmonised standard EN 13341:2005 + A1:2011 on ‘Static thermoplastic tanks for above-ground storage of domestic heating oils, kerosene and diesel fuels’ in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 305/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council; (1)

— annul Commission Decision (EU) 2017/1996 of 6 November 2017 to maintain in the Official Journal of the European Union the reference of harmonised standard EN 12285-2:2005 on ‘Workshop fabricated steel tanks’ in accordance with Regulation No 305/2011; (2)

— in the alternative to (2) and (3), respectively, refer the case back to the General Court;

— order the Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on two grounds:

First, the judgment under appeal infringes Article 18(2), in conjunction with Article 17(5), of Regulation No 305/2011. (3) The General Court disregarded the fact that those provisions both empowered and required the Commission to adopt one of the measures suggested by the Federal Republic of Germany.

Second, the judgment under appeal infringes Article 18(2), in conjunction with Article 3(1) and (2) and Article 17(3), of Regulation No 305/2011. The General Court disregarded the fact that those provisions required the Commission to examine whether the standards at issue jeopardise compliance with the basic requirements for construction works.

(1) OJ 2017 L 288, p. 36.

(2) OJ 2017 L 288, p. 39.

(3) Regulation (EU) No 305/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 laying down harmonised conditions for the marketing of construction products and repealing Council Directive 89/106/EEC (OJ 2011 L 88, p. 5).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 11 June 2019 by Kiku GmbH against the judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 11 April 2019 in Case T-765/17, Kiku GmbH v Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO)

(Case C-444/19 P)

(2019/C 363/08)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Kiku GmbH (represented by: G. Würtenberger and R. Kunze, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: Community Plant Variety Office, Sächsisches Landesamt für Umwelt, Landwirtschaft und Geologie

By order of 16 September 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) did not allow the appeal to proceed and ordered the appellant to pay its own costs.
2.

If the answer to the previous question is in the negative, does the right to compensation for passengers under Article 7 of Regulation [(EC) No] 261/2004 (1) exist where the flight is composed of more than one leg and, as a result of a short delay (less than three hours) on one leg, there is a long delay (more than three hours) on arrival at the final destination because of a missed connection? If the answer is in the affirmative, where the different legs are operated by different carriers, is the obligation to pay compensation under Article 7 of Regulation [(EC) No] 261/2004 incumbent on the operating carrier on whose leg there was a short delay (less than three hours) which, however, caused the missed connection and, therefore, a long delay (more than three hours) on arrival at the final destination?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha (Spain) lodged on 17 July 2019 — DX v Subdelegación del Gobierno en Toledo

(Case C-549/19)

(2019/C 372/14)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: DX

Defendant: Subdelegación del Gobierno en Toledo

Question referred

Is an interpretation such as that set out in judgments of the Spanish Supreme Court No 191/2019 of 19 February 2019, appeal in cassation 5607/2017 (ECLI:ES:TS:2019:580), and No 257/2019 of 27 February 2019, appeal in cassation 5809/2017 (ECLI:ES:TS:2019:663), according to which, through an interpretation of Directive 2001/40/EC, (1) it is possible to come to the conclusion that any third-country national holding a long-term residence permit who has committed an offence punishable by a sentence of at least one year in duration can and should be ‘automatically’ removed, that is to say, without needing to give any consideration to his personal, family, social or employment circumstances, compatible with Article 12 of Council [Directive] 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, (2) and with — inter alia — the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 7 December 2017 (Case C-636/16 (3)) and of 8 December 2011 (Case C-371/08 (4))?

(1) Council Directive 2001/40/EC of 28 May 2001 on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third country nationals (OJ 2001 L 149, p. 34).

(2) OJ 2004 L 16, p. 44.

(3) Judgment of 7 December 2017, López Pastuzano (C-636/16, EU:C:2017:949).

(4) Judgment of 8 December 2011, Ziebell (C-371/08, EU:C:2011:809).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD) (Portugal) lodged on 23 August 2019 — PAGE Internacional Lda. v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

(Case C-630/19)

(2019/C 383/55)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: PAGE Internacional Lda.

Defendant: Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

Question referred

Must Article 168(a) and Article 176 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (1) of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax and the principles of VAT neutrality and of proportionality be interpreted as meaning that the Portuguese legislature is entitled, under Article 21(1)(d) and 21(2)(d) of the Código do Imposto sobre o Valor Acrescentado (Value Added Tax Code), as approved by Decree No 394-B/84 of 26 December 1984, to limit the deductibility of the input VAT on expenditure on food to 50 %, even where the taxable person demonstrates that all that expenditure has been fully applied to the carrying on of its taxed economic activity?

(1) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).
1.

Are Paragraphs 6(1) and 27(1) of the EG-Fahrzeuggenehmigungsverordnung (EC Vehicle Approval Regulation; EG-FGV) (1) and/or Articles 18(1) and 26(1) of Directive 2007/46/EC (2) to be interpreted as meaning that the manufacturer is in breach of its obligation to issue a valid certificate pursuant to Paragraph 6(1) of the EG-FGV (and/or of its obligation to deliver a certificate of conformity pursuant to Article 18(1) of Directive 2007/46/EC), if it has installed in the vehicle an impermissible defeat device within the meaning of Articles 5(2) and 3.10 of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 (3), and that the placing of such a vehicle on the market is in breach of the prohibition on placing a vehicle on the market without a valid certificate of conformity pursuant to Paragraph 27(1) of the EG-FGV (and/or of the prohibition of sale without a valid certificate of conformity pursuant to Article 26(1) of Directive 2007/46/EC)? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative: 1a. Are Paragraphs 6 and 27 of the EG-FGV and/or Articles 18(1), 26(1) and 46 of Directive 2007/46/EC also aimed at protecting the end customer and — in the case of resale on the second-hand market — in particular the subsequent car buyer, including in relation to his freedom of disposal and his assets? Does a car buyer’s acquisition of a used vehicle that has been placed on the market without a valid certificate of conformity come within the area of the risks for the prevention of which these standards were adopted?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Central Administrativo Norte (Portugal) lodged on 30 August 2019 — RESOPRE — Sociedade Revendedora de Aparelhos de Precisão SA v Município de Peso da Régua

(Case C-643/19)

(2019/C 399/31)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Tribunal Central Administrativo Norte

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: RESOPRE — Sociedade Revendedora de Aparelhos de Precisão SA

Defendant: Município de Peso da Régua,

Other parties to the proceedings: DATAREDE — Sistemas de Dados e Comunicações, SA, Alexandre Barbosa Borgesm, SA, Fernando L. Gaspar — Sinalização e Equipamentos Rodoviários, SA

Question referred

In a pre-contractual public procurement procedure relating to a concession for the exploitation of plots of land to install and operate [parking meters] and control compliance with the provisions laid down in the municipal regulation on short-stay paid parking zones in force in the municipality, does EU law (in particular, Articles 56(1) and 60(4) of Directive 2014/24/[EU] (1) and the principle of competition) allow the instructions for tenderers to establish that tenderers must submit the software and equipment (the parking meter) to be supplied, in order to demonstrate both that the tenderer complies with the terms and conditions in the contract documents and the characteristics of the tenders, and to establish an award criterion related to the ‘technical and functional suitability of the solution’ factor, to be assessed on the basis of that demonstration (see paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Instructions for Tenderers)?

(1) Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65).
1.

Should Articles [55(1)], 56 to 58 and 60 to 66 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, read in conjunction with Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning that a supervisory authority which, pursuant to national law adopted in implementation of Article [58(5)] of that regulation, has the power to commence legal proceedings before a court in its Member State against infringements of that regulation cannot exercise that power in connection with cross-border processing if it is not the lead supervisory authority for that cross-border processing?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 13 March 2019 by ETI Gıda Sanayi ve Ticaret AȘ against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 17 January 2019 in Case T-368/18, ETI Gıda Sanayi ve Ticaret AȘ v EUIPO — Grupo Bimbo (ETI Bumbo)

(Case C-228/19 P)

(2019/C 406/10)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: ETI Gıda Sanayi ve Ticaret AȘ (represented by: D. Cañadas Arcas, P. Merino Baylos, D. Gómez Sánchez and N. Martínez de las Rivas Malagón, abogados)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office and Grupo Bimbo, SAB de CV

By order of 24 September 2019, the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered ETI Gıda Sanayi ve Ticaret AȘ to pay its own costs.
1.

Whether, under Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, (1) in particular Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of the directive, the following ruling is compliant with EU law in order to ensure protection for consumers and users and compliance with the relevant case-law: the ruling by the Supreme Court in judgments 44 to 49 of 23 January 2019, which establishes the unambiguous criterion that a term in a consumer mortgage loan agreement that has not been negotiated and that stipulates that all the costs of arranging the mortgage are to be borne by the borrower is unfair, and which apportions the various expenses that are involved in the unfair term found to be void between the bank that imposed the term and the borrower, in order to limit repayments of amounts wrongly paid under national legislation. And whether, under Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, in particular Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of the directive, in order to ensure protection for consumers and users and compliance with the relevant case-law, it is compliant with EU law for the Supreme Court to adopt an inclusive interpretation of a term that is void for unfairness if the term can be severed and its effects abolished without affecting the continued existence of the mortgage loan agreement.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākā tiesa (Senāts) (Latvia) lodged on 7 October 2019 — ZS Plaukti v Lauku atbalsta dienests

(Case C-736/19)

(2019/C 413/38)

Language of the case: Latvian

Referring court

Augstākā tiesa (Senāts)

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant on a point of law: ZS ‘Plaukti’

Other party in the appeal on a point of law: Lauku atbalsta dienests

Questions referred

1. Does the third subparagraph of Article 16(5) of Commission Regulation (EU) No 65/2011 of 27 January 2011 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, (1) as regards the implementation of control procedures as well as cross-compliance in respect of rural development support measures apply to a situation in which the applicant has failed to comply with the requirements relating to mowing the area for which the maintenance of pasture biodiversity payments were claimed (a requirement which goes beyond the mandatory minimum requirements under Article 39(3) of Regulation No 1698/2005 (2)) but where no change in the crop group has been found?

2. Can both the penalty established in the third subparagraph of Article 16(5) of Commission Regulation (EU) No 65/2011 of 27 January 2011 and the penalty laid down in Article 18(1)(a) of Regulation No 65/2011 be imposed simultaneously for a single infringement?

3. Do Articles 4 and 6 of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 (3) of 19 January 2009, in conjunction with Article 39(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 preclude national legislation according to which the same requirement can simultaneously be a mandatory minimum requirement and impose requirements greater than the minimum mandatory requirements (requirement for an agri-environment payment)?

(1) OJ 2011 L 25, p. 8.

(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (OJ 2005 L 277, p. 1).

(3) Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 (OJ 2009 L 30, p. 16).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Milano (Italy) lodged on 13 September 2019 — SPV Project 1503 Srl, Dobank SpA v YB

(Case C-693/19)

(2019/C 432/28)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale di Milano

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: SPV Project 1503 Srl, Dobank SpA

Defendant: YB

Question referred

Under what conditions, if any, do Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 93/13/EEC (1) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union preclude a national law, such as the one referred to, which prevents the enforcement court from performing a review of the content of a judicial enforceable instrument that has become final and, where a consumer has expressed his or her desire to rely on the unfairness of a term contained in the contract in respect of which the enforceable instrument was issued, precludes the same court from overriding the effects of the implicit force of res judicata?

(1) Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 15 October 2019 — T.H.C. v Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides

(Case C-755/19)

(2019/C 423/36)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: T.H.C.

Respondent: Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides

Question referred

Must Article 46 of Directive 2013/32/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (1) (recast), according to which applicants must have the right to an effective remedy against ‘a decision taken on their application for international protection’, and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as precluding a national rule of procedure, such as Article 39/57, paragraph 1, subparagraph 2, point 3o, second sentence, of the loi du 15 décembre 1980 sur l’accès au territoire, le séjour, l’établissement et l’éloignement des étrangers (Law of 15 December 1980 on entry to the territory, residence, establishment and removal of foreign nationals), read in conjunction with Article 57/6, paragraph 3, subparagraph 1, point 5o, and Article 57/6/2, paragraph 1, of the same law, which fixes at five ‘calendar’ days, from the notification of the administrative decision, the time limit for bringing an action against a decision that a subsequent application for international protection by a third country national, where the ‘foreign national is located, at the time of his application, in a specific place referred to in Articles 74/8 and 74/9 [of the same Law], or is put at the disposal of the government’?

(1) OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60.
Appeal brought on 29 July 2019 by Intercept Pharma Ltd, Intercept Pharmaceuticals, Inc. against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 28 June 2019 in Case T-377/18: Intercept Pharma and Intercept Pharmaceuticals v EMA

(Case C-576/19 P)

(2019/C 432/21)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Intercept Pharma Ltd, Intercept Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (represented by: L. Tsang, J. Mulryne, E. Amos, Solicitors, F. Campbell, Barrister)

Other party to the proceedings: European Medicines Agency

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

— set aside the decision of the General Court delivered on 28 June 2019;

— annul the decision communicated by the respondent to the appellants on 15 May 2018 to release the Periodic Benefit Risk Evaluation Report, and

— order the respondent to pay the appellants’ legal and other costs and expenses in relation to this matter, both at first instance and on appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellants rely on two pleas in law.

1. First plea in law, that the General Court erred in concluding that the ‘protection of court proceedings’ indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation 1049/2001 (1) is only relevant where documents were drawn up in the context of specific court proceedings or where they contain legal positions that are the subject of such proceedings. This put an impermissible restriction and limitation onto the wording of Article 4(2) that is not contained in the Regulation.

2. Second plea in law, that the General Court erred in concluding that the ‘commercial interests’ indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation 1049/2001 can only apply where specific elements of the document are identified as undermining the commercial interests of the relevant party, and cannot apply simply on the basis that the disclosure of a document as a whole would harm the commercial interests of its creator. This view prevented the General Court from recognising the error in law and assessment made by the respondent by refusing to consider the context of the request for disclosure in this case.

(1) Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001, L 145, p. 43).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 10 April 2019 by Etnia Dreams, S.L. against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 13 February 2019 in Case T-823/17, Etnia Dreams v EUIPO — Poisson (Etnik)

(Case C-296/19 P)

(2019/C 432/16)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: Etnia Dreams, S.L. (represented by: P. Gago Comes, abogado)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 6 November 2019, the Court of Justice (Tenth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered Etnia Dreams, S.L. to bear its own costs.
Appeal brought on 30 July 2019 by Belén Bernaldo de Quirós against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 5 June 2019 in Case T-273/18 Bernaldo de Quirós v Commission

(Case C-583/19 P)

(2020/C 19/08)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Belén Bernaldo de Quirós (represented by: M. Casado García-Hirschfeld, avocate)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

— Annul the judgment of 5 June 2019, Bernaldo de Quirós v Commission (T-273/18);

— Uphold the forms of order sought at first instance;

— Order the Commission to pay all of the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on a single ground of appeal, alleging a distortion of the facts, a manifest error of assessment and an imprecise reasoning in law.

In the context of the second plea in law submitted before the General Court, the appellant relied on the infringement of the principle of the rights of the defence within the framework of Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations. The General Court ruled on that plea in paragraphs 81 to 94 of the judgment under appeal.

The appellant argues that the General Court’s findings are substantially incorrect. She submits that the judgment under appeal is vitiated by an error in law and a manifest error of assessment in that, first, the internal rules cannot justify non-compliance with a statutory provision and, secondly, the general implementing provisions in question do not provide the delegation of powers of the appointing authority, Lastly, the interpretation of the provisions of Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations and Article 4(4) of the general implementing provisions resulted in an imprecise reasoning in law.