ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 16 June 2016 —

Commission v Portugal

(Case C‑200/15) ( 1 )

‛Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Article 110 TFEU — Internal taxation — Discriminatory taxation — Second-hand motor vehicles imported from other Member States — Determination of their taxable value — Depreciation rate’

Tax provisions — Internal taxation — System for taxing imported second-hand vehicles — System which does not take account of the depreciation on the vehicles during their first year of use — System which does not take account of depreciation of more than 52% in the case of vehicles which have been used for more than five years — Incompatibility with Article 110 TFEU (Art. 110 TFEU) (see paras 29-31, 34, 36, 37, operative part 1)

Operative part

1. Declares that, in applying, in order to determine the taxable value of second-hand vehicles imported into Portugal from another Member State, a system for calculating the depreciation on the vehicles which does not take account of the depreciation on the vehicles during their first year of use or of depreciation of more than 52% in the case of vehicles which have been used for more than five years, the Portuguese Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 110 TFEU;

2. Orders the Portuguese Republic to pay the costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 205, 22.6.2015.
In order to assess the meaning of charges which are normally borne by the budget of an undertaking and, accordingly, assess the selective nature of a measure for the purpose of its classification as State aid, the additional costs which undertakings normally must bear by virtue of obligations imposed by law, regulation or agreement, inherent in the exercise of a regulated economic activity are, in essence, such charges. The fact that such obligations derive from the public authorities cannot therefore, by itself, have effects on the assessment of the nature of other measures by those same authorities, in order to determine whether they favour undertakings outside of normal market conditions.

The facts that those charges arise from measures of the public authorities in the exercise of their public powers or that the Member States are free to take on those costs have no effect on the categorisation of charges which the undertakings must normally bear.

Moreover, and in any event, the fact that there is no harmonisation on the financing of measures at issue has no bearing on the categorisation of an economic advantage which such financing is likely to constitute. Indeed, even in areas where the Member States have jurisdiction, they must comply with EU law and in particular the requirements of Articles 107 TFEU and 108 TFEU.

(see paras 35, 36, 38, 39)
Case C‑379/15

Association France Nature Environnement

v

Premier ministre

and

Ministre de l’Écologie, du Développement durable et de l'Énergie

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the

Conseil d’État (France))

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive 2001/42/EC — Assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment — National measure incompatible with EU law — Legal consequences — Power of the national court to maintain certain effects of that measure provisionally — Third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU — Obligation to make a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 28 July 2016

Environment — Assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment — Directive 2001/42 — Annulment by a national court of national provisions incompatible with the obligations arising from Directive 2001/42 — Possibility of maintaining the effects of the disputed provisions — Conditions (Art. 3, third para., TEU; Art. 191(1) and (2) TFEU; European Parliament and Council Directive 2001/42, Art. 6(3)) Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Reference to the Court — Issues of interpretation — Obligation to seek a preliminary ruling — Scope — Question regarding the possibility of maintaining in force national provisions held to be contrary to EU environmental law — Included — Conditions (Art. 267, third para., TFEU)
Article 15(2) and (8) of Regulation No 1260/2001 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector must be interpreted as not conferring on a sugar producer the right to be reimbursed for production levies paid on the quantities of sugar under A and B quotas which were still stored on 30 June 2006, as the production levy system was not renewed after that date by Regulation No 318/2006 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector.

Therefore, in the calculation of the exportable surplus for the 2001/2002 to 2005/2006 marketing years, the exclusion of quantities of sugar, isoglucose and inulin syrup stored at the end of the 2005/2006 marketing year is contrary to both Article 6(4) of Regulation No 314/2002 laying down detailed rules for the application of the quota system in the sugar sector as amended by Regulation No 1140/2003, which expressly provides that those stocks are to be taken into account, and Article 15(2)(a) of Regulation No 1260/2001, which also refers to the exportable and not the exported surplus, which necessarily includes, as is clear, in particular from recital 15 of the latter regulation, the quantities on the market in the relevant marketing year, and those held in stock. Moreover, the fact of continuing to refer to a ‘foreseeable’ overall loss, even after the adjustment provided for in Article 15(2) and (3) of Regulation No 1260/2001, so far as concerns the 2001/2002 to 2005/2006 marketing years, implies that the loss may not yet have been incurred in its entirety. In that regard, it does not appear that the Council committed a manifest error, a misuse of power or exceeded the limits of its discretionary power under Articles 40 to 43 TFEU by providing that, as regards the 2005/2006 marketing year in the context of the financing of the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector, the exportable surplus existing at the end of that year would be taken into consideration, which necessarily included the quantities of sugar held in stock at the end of that year.

In those circumstances, no factors have been disclosed capable of affecting the validity of Regulation No 1360/2013 fixing the production levies in the sugar sector for the 2001/2002, 2002/2003, 2003/2004, 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 marketing years, the coefficient required for calculating the additional levy for the 2001/2002 and 2004/2005 marketing years and the amount to be paid by sugar manufacturers to beet sellers in respect of the difference between the maximum levy and the levy to be charged for the 2002/2003, 2003/2004 and 2005/2006 marketing years.

(see paras 44, 45, 52, 54, 56, operative part 1 and 2)
The concept of ‘proceedings to challenge a judgment’ referred to in Article 34(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as also including applications for relief when the period for bringing an ordinary challenge has expired.

Article 34(2) of that regulation does not mean that the defendant is required to take additional steps going beyond normal diligence in the defence of his rights, such as steps to inform himself of the contents of a judgment delivered in another Member State. Regarding, more specifically, an application for relief, it aims to ensure proper respect for the rights of the defence of defendants who have failed to enter an appearance. In that context, in so far as the defendant, without any fault on his part, did not have knowledge of the document concerned in sufficient time to bring a challenge, has disclosed a prima facie defence to the action on the merits, and has filed his application for relief within a reasonable time, in other words, in so far as the conditions set out in Article 19(4) of Regulation No 1393/2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents), and repealing Regulation No 1348/2000 are met, the submission of an application for relief cannot be regarded as an additional step going beyond normal diligence in the defence of the rights of a defendant who has failed to enter an appearance.

If that defendant has not made use of his right to apply for relief when it was possible for him to do so, the conditions set out in Article 19(4) of Regulation No 1393/2007 having been met, recognition of a judgment in default given against him cannot be refused on the basis of Article 34(2) of Regulation No 44/2001.

By contrast, a judgment in default should not be recognised if the defendant who has failed to enter an appearance, without any fault on his part, has submitted an application for relief which has subsequently been dismissed, even though the conditions set out in Article 19(4) of Regulation No 1393/2007 were met.

(see paras 40, 42-47, 49, operative part 1)
Article 3(1)(a) of Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation and Article 14(1)(a) of Directive 2006/54 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, must be interpreted as meaning that a situation in which a person who in making an application for a post does not seek to obtain that post but only seeks the formal status of applicant with the sole purpose of seeking compensation does not fall within the definition of ‘access to employment, to self-employment or to occupation’, within the meaning of those provisions, and may, if the requisite conditions under EU law are met, be considered to be an abuse of rights.

According to the actual wording of the titles of those directives, they concern employment and occupation.

However, a person making an application for a post in the aforementioned circumstances clearly is not seeking to obtain the post for which he formally applies. That person cannot, therefore, rely on the protection offered by Directives 2000/78 and 2006/54. A contrary interpretation would be incompatible with the objective pursued by those directives, which is to ensure equal treatment ‘in employment and occupation’ to all persons by offering them effective protection against certain forms of discrimination, in particular concerning ‘access to employment’.

Furthermore, such a person cannot, in those circumstances, be regarded as a ‘victim’ within the meaning of Article 17 of Directive 2000/78 and Article 25 of Directive 2006/54 or a ‘person injured’ having sustained ‘loss’ or ‘damage’, within the meaning of Article 18 of Directive 2006/54.

(see paras 31, 35, 36, 44, operative part)
It follows from Article 10(2) of Regulation No 1975/2006 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation No 1698/2005, as regards the implementation of control procedures as well as cross-compliance in respect of rural development support measures that the Member States are required to organise on-the-spot checks in order to verify that the aid beneficiaries in question fulfil the conditions for granting support provided for by the EU rules and by the national legislation to which those rural development support measures are subject. Article 14(2) of that regulation requires Member States to carry out on-the-spot checks covering all the commitments and obligations of a beneficiary, including those arising under national law, which can be checked at the time of the visit.

However, Regulation No 1975/2006 does not lay down detailed rules for the checks which the Member States are required to carry out in order to verify that the eligibility criteria for rural development support measures are complied with.

Nonetheless, Article 15(2) of Regulation No 1975/2006 states that they are to be carried out in accordance with Articles 29, 30 and 32 of Regulation No 796/2004, laying down detailed rules for the implementation of cross-compliance, modulation and the integrated administration and control system provided for in Regulation No 1782/2003, which relate only to on-the-spot checks of single applications with regard to area-related aid schemes.

Accordingly, Article 35 of Regulation No 796/2004, concerning on-the-spot checks on livestock measures, cannot, as such, apply to on-the-spot checks for area-related measures such as the Compensatory Allowances for Natural Handicaps.

Even if the EU rules on the granting of aid and premiums do not expressly require Member States to introduce specific supervisory measures and inspection procedures, nevertheless, such an obligation may follow, in some cases implicitly, from the fact that under the rules in question it is for the Member States to organise an effective system of inspection and supervision.

(see paras 62, 63, 65-67, 70, 71)
The concept of ‘agreement conferring jurisdiction’ referred to in Article 23(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted not as a simple reference to the national law of one or other of the States concerned but as an independent concept. Having regard to the procedural purpose of that provision, which aims to establish uniform rules of international jurisdiction, a jurisdiction clause is governed by that provision, which lays down the conditions as to form which such clauses must meet, so as to ensure legal certainty and to ensure that the parties have given their consent.

The court hearing an application concerning the validity of a jurisdiction clause has the duty of examining, in limine litis, whether that clause was in fact the subject of consensus between the parties, which must be clearly and precisely demonstrated. The requirements as to form imposed by Article 23(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters ensure, in that regard, that consensus between the parties is in fact established. That provision must be interpreted as meaning that a jurisdiction clause which, first, is set out in the client’s general terms and conditions, referred to in the instruments witnessing the contracts between those parties and forwarded upon their conclusion, and, secondly, designates as courts with jurisdiction those of a city of a Member State, meets the requirements of that provision relating to the consent of the parties and to the precision of the content of such a clause.

Following the common practice in the course of trade, a jurisdiction clause set out in the general conditions is lawful where the text of the contract signed by both parties itself contains an express reference to general conditions which include a jurisdiction clause. With regard to the precision of the content of such a clause, in relation to determining a court or courts of a Member State to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise between the parties, it is sufficient that the clause state the objective factors on the basis of which the parties have agreed to choose a court or the courts to which they wish to submit disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them. Those factors, which must be sufficiently precise to enable the court seised to ascertain whether it has jurisdiction, may, where appropriate, be determined by the particular circumstances of the case.

(see paras 37, 39, 43, 44, 49, operative part)
As regards the meaning of ‘religion’ in Article 1 of that directive, it should be noted that the directive does not include a definition of that term.

Nevertheless, the EU legislature referred, in recital 1 of Directive 2000/78, to fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’), which provides, in Article 9, that everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, a right which includes, in particular, freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

In the same recital, the EU legislature also referred to the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of EU law. Among the rights resulting from those common traditions, which have been reaffirmed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), is the right to freedom of conscience and religion enshrined in Article 10(1) of the Charter. In accordance with that provision, that right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. As is apparent from the explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 17), the right guaranteed in Article 10(1) of the Charter corresponds to the right guaranteed in Article 9 of the ECHR and, in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, has the same meaning and scope.

In so far as the ECHR and, subsequently, the Charter use the term ‘religion’ in a broad sense, in that they include in it the freedom of persons to manifest their religion, the EU legislature must be considered to have intended to take the same approach when adopting Directive 2000/78, and therefore the concept of ‘religion’ in Article 1 of that directive should be interpreted as covering both the forum internum, that is the fact of having a belief, and the forum externum, that is the manifestation of religious faith in public.

(see paras 27-30)
1.

Actions for annulment — Interest in bringing proceedings — Action brought against an act imposing restrictive measures on the applicant — Repeal of the contested act in the course of the proceedings — Declaration that no need to adjudicate — Not permissible — Applicant maintaining an interest in obtaining recognition that the contested act unlawful (Art. 263 TFEU; Council Decisions 2013/661/CFSP and 2015/1863/CFSP; Council Regulations No 267/2012 and No 2015/1862) (see para. 12)
By document lodged on 20 December 2016, W applied, on the basis of Article 83 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, for the oral procedure to be reopened and a question to be referred by the Court of Justice to the European Court of Human Rights for a preliminary ruling. Concerning, in the first place, the application for a reference to the European Court of Human Rights, it should be pointed out that the Court has no power under Article 83 of the Rules of Procedure or under any other provision in those rules to make such a reference.

Article 8 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, and Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, must be interpreted as meaning that, in a case such as that in the main proceedings, the courts of the Member State which made a decision that has become final concerning parental responsibility and maintenance obligations with regard to a minor child no longer have jurisdiction to decide on an application for variation of the provisions ordered in that decision, inasmuch as the habitual residence of the child is in another Member State. It is the courts of the Member State of habitual residence that have jurisdiction to decide on that application.

As is apparent from recital 12 of Regulation No 2201/2003, that regulation was drawn up with the objective of meeting the best interests of the child and, to that end, it favours the criterion of proximity. Article 8 of Regulation No 2201/2003 gives expression to that objective by establishing a general jurisdiction in favour of the courts of the Member State in which the child is habitually resident. According to Article 8(1), the jurisdiction of a court must be established ‘at the time the court is seised’, that is to say, at the time when the document instituting the proceedings is lodged with the court, in accordance with Article 16 of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 October 2014, E., C‑436/13, EU:C:2014:2246, paragraph 38). Furthermore, as the Advocate General noted at point 45 of his Opinion, referring to paragraph 40 of the judgment of 1 October 2014, E. (C‑436/13, EU:C:2014:2246), that jurisdiction must be determined and established in each specific case, where a court is seised of proceedings, which implies that it does not continue after proceedings have been brought to a close.

(see paras 51-54, 70, operative part)
Article 15(1) of Directive 2011/64, on the structure and rates of excise duty applied to manufactured tobacco, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which prohibits retailers from selling tobacco products at a unit price lower than the price indicated by the manufacturer or importer on the revenue stamp affixed to those products, in so far as that price has been freely determined by the manufacturer or importer.

The first subparagraph of Article 15(1) of Directive 2011/64 is designed to ensure that the application of the rules relating to the excise duty on tobacco products does not harm the imperative needs of competition which imply, as is clear from recital 10 of that directive, a system of prices, formed freely by the producers or importers, for all groups of manufactured tobacco. Consequently, since the national legislation is not intended to govern the setting of the price indicated by the producer or importer on the revenue stamp and does not concern in any other manner the application of the excise duty on tobacco products, it is not encompassed by the situation referred to in Article 15(1) of Directive 2011/64. That article does not, therefore, preclude such legislation.

(see paras 26, 28, 29, 31, operative part 1)
It is necessary to declare inadmissible a request for a preliminary ruling concerning a procedure for the award of a public works contract whose value is below the threshold laid down by Directive 2004/18 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, as amended by Regulation No 1251/2011, since the national court has submitted no evidence providing the Court with information concerning certain cross-border interest. In that regard, a conclusion that there is certain cross-border interest cannot be inferred hypothetically from certain factors which, considered in the abstract, could constitute evidence to that effect, but must be the positive outcome of a specific assessment of the circumstances of the contract at issue. More particularly, the national court may not merely submit to the Court of Justice evidence showing that certain cross-border interest cannot be ruled out but must, on the contrary provide information capable of proving that it exists.

(see paras 22, 23, 27, operative part)