ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
2.

Where an individual competent authority awards a public service contract directly to an internal operator in accordance with Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, is the joint exercise of control by that authority together with the other shareholders of the internal operator precluded if the power to intervene in public passenger transport in a given geographical area (Article 2(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007) is divided between the individual competent authority and a group of authorities which provides integrated public passenger transport services, for example where the power to award public service contracts to an internal operator remains with the individual competent authority but the responsibility for tariffs is transferred to a special purpose transport association to which, in addition to the individual authority, further authorities competent in their geographical areas belong?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 293/19

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 16 June 2017 — Ahmed Shajin v Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal

(Case C-369/17)

(2017/C 293/22)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Ahmed Shajin

Defendant: Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal

Question referred

Does it follow from the expression ‘that he or she has committed a serious crime’ used in Article 17(1)(b) of Directive 2011/95/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, that the penalty provided for a specific crime under the law of the particular Member State may constitute the sole criterion to determine whether the person claiming subsidiary protection may be excluded from it?

(1) OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 309/29

Appeal brought on 04/07/2017 by JYSK sp. z o.o. against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 04/05/2017 in Case T-403/15: JYSK sp. z o.o. v European Commission

(Case C-402/17 P)

(2017/C 309/38)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: JYSK sp. z o.o. (represented by: H. Sønderby Christensen, advokat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant submits that the judgment of the General Court declaring its action inadmissible on the ground that it is not directly and individually concerned by Commission decision C (2015) 3228 final of 11 May 2015 should be set aside on the ground that it violates the principle of effective judicial protection.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellant argues that indirect access to the Court of Justice via a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Polish courts does not provide the protection envisaged by article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The appellant maintains that it is directly and individually concerned by the aforementioned Commission decision.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 309/26

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Veneto (Italy) lodged on 8 June 2017 — Memoria Srl, Antonia Dall’Antonia v Comune di Padova

(Case C-342/17)

(2017/C 309/33)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Veneto

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Memoria Srl, Antonia Dall’Antonia

Defendant: Comune di Padova

Question referred

Must Articles 49 and 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union be interpreted as precluding the application of the following provisions of Article 52 of the Regulation on funeral services of the Municipality of Padua?

‘The recipient shall not in any circumstances be permitted to request a third party to keep the funeral urn. This prohibition shall apply even if the deceased expressly stated during his lifetime that such was his wish (third subparagraph).

It is obligatory to keep the urn solely at the home of the recipient (fourth subparagraph) …

In no circumstances may funeral urns be kept for profit and economic activities relating to, even non-exclusively, the keeping of funeral urns, for whatever purpose and for whatever period, shall therefore not be permitted. This prohibition shall apply even if the deceased expressly stated during his lifetime that such was his wish (tenth subparagraph).’
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 318/4

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 1 June 2017 — Gerhard Prenninger and Others

(Case C-329/17)

(2017/C 318/06)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Gerhard Prenninger, Karl Helmberger, Franziska Zimmer, Franz Scharinger, Norbert Pühringer, Agrargemeinschaft Pettenbach, Marktgemeinde Vorchdorf, Marktgemeinde Pettenbach, Gemeinde Steinbach am Ziehberg

Question referred

Must Directive 2011/92/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (the EIA Directive) be interpreted as meaning that the ‘clearance of a path’ for the purpose of the construction of a power supply system and for the duration of its lawful existence constitutes ‘deforestation for the purposes of conversion to another type of land use’ within the meaning of point 1(d) of Annex II to the EIA Directive?

(1) OJ 2012 L 26, p. 1.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 318/6

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 26 June 2017 — Società Immobiliare Al Bosco srl

(Case C-379/17)

(2017/C 318/09)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Società Immobiliare Al Bosco srl

Question referred

Is it compatible with Article 38(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (1) to apply a time limit which is laid down in the law of the State in which enforcement is sought, and on the basis of which an instrument may no longer be enforced after the expiry of a particular period, also to a functionally comparable instrument issued in another Member State and recognised and declared enforceable in the State in which enforcement is sought?

(1) OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1.
3.

Must EU law — in particular, the right of establishment, the freedom to provide services and Directive 2014/23/EU, and the principles of non-discrimination, transparency, freedom of competition, proportionality and consistency too — be interpreted as precluding rules that impose a de facto choice between being awarded a new concession and continuing to exercise the freedom to provide various betting services on a cross-border basis, a choice of the kind that results from Article 30 of the model contract, the effect being that the decision to participate in the tender for the award of the new concession would involve abandoning the cross-border activity, even though the legality of that activity has on several occasions been recognised by the Court of Justice?
(4)

In any event, in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, is it contrary to Article 47(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and to the concept under EU law of an independent and impartial tribunal for a Giudice di Pace who has an interest in the case before him being resolved in favour of the applicant, who, as his sole form of employment, performs exactly the same judicial functions, to stand in the place of the tribunal established by law as having jurisdiction because of the refusal by the highest domestic judicial body — the Combined Chambers of the Court of Cassation — to grant effective protection for the rights claimed, thus obliging the tribunal established as competent by law to decline, when requested, jurisdiction for the purpose of recognising the right claimed, notwithstanding the fact that the right in question — like the right to paid leave at issue in the main proceedings — is enshrined in primary and secondary EU law in a situation in which ‘Community’ law is directly and vertically applicable to the Member State in question? In the event that the Court finds that there is infringement of Article 47(2) of the Charter, it is requested to indicate domestic remedies to avoid a situation in which infringement of a provision of primary EU law coincides with an absolute refusal under domestic law to protect fundamental rights ensured by EU law in the particular circumstances of the case.
1)

Is it a requirement of Article 11.3 (1) that the injured person's claim against the policy holder/insured involves a matter relating to insurance in the sense that it raises a question about the validity or effect of the policy?
1.

In accordance with Article 14 of Directive 1999/31/EC (‘the directive’), Member States were required to take measures in order that existing landfill sites — ie, ‘landfills which [had] been granted a permit, or which [were] already in operation at the time of transposition of [the] Directive’, that being 16 July 2001 (in Slovenia’s case 1 May 2004, the date of its accession to the EU) — were examined in the light of the requirements of the directive and, on the basis of such an evaluation, were closed down as soon as possible or were guaranteed to comply with the requirements of the directive within a transitional period of eight years, which expired on 16 July 2009. That deadline applied also to Slovenia, which, in that respect, was not given a transitional period under the Accession Treaty.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 347/23

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d’appel de Liège (Belgium) lodged on 23 August 2017 — Ministère public v Marin-Simion Sut

(Case C-514/17)

(2017/C 347/31)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour d’appel de Liège

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Ministère public

Defendant: Marin-Simion Sut

Question referred

Can Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584 (1) be interpreted as being inapplicable to acts for which a custodial sentence has been imposed by a court of an issuing Member State, when those same acts are punishable in the territory of the executing Member State only by a fine, which means, in accordance with the domestic law of the executing Member State, that the custodial sentence cannot be executed in the executing Member State, which would be to the detriment of the social rehabilitation of the person sentenced and of his family, social and other ties?

(1) 2002/584/JHA: Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States — Statements made by certain Member States on the adoption of the Framework Decision (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 374/18

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte d’Appello di Trento (Italy) lodged on 14 August 2017 — Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca — MIUR v Fabio Rossato, Conservatorio di Musica F.A. Bonporti

(Case C-494/17)

(2017/C 374/26)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte d’Appello di Trento

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca — MIUR

Cross-appellant: Fabio Rossato

Respondent: Conservatorio di Musica F.A. Bonporti

Question referred

Must clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC (1) of 28 June 1999, be interpreted as precluding the application of Article 1(95), (131) and (132) of Law No 107 of 2015 of the Italian State, which provides for the conversion of temporary teachers’ fixed-term contracts into contracts of indefinite duration with respect to the future, without retroactive effect and without compensation for damage, as measures that are proportionate, sufficiently effective and a sufficient deterrent to ensure that the measures laid down in the Framework Agreement are fully effective as regards breach of the agreement resulting from abusive repeated renewal of fixed-term contracts during the period prior to that in which the measures set out in the provisions in question are intended to have legal effect?

(1) Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (OJ 1999 L 175, p. 43).
1.

Is it compatible with Article 4 of Directive 2012/13/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings (‘Directive 2012/13/EU’), Article 8(2) of Directive 2012/13/EU, the right to liberty and security under Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the right of defence under Article 48(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the right to a fair trial under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union for the national authorities not to provide the detainee, throughout the period of detention, with the information referred to in Article 4(2) of Directive 2012/13/EU (in particular the right to access to the materials of the case), fully or completely, and not to permit the detainee to challenge that failure to provide information in accordance with Article 8(2) of Directive 2012/13/EU? If the reply to that question should be in the negative, does that infringement of the law of the European Union affect, at any stage in the criminal proceedings, the legality of the deprivation of personal liberty when the detainee has been placed in pre-trial detention, in addition to the continuation of such pre-trial detention, taking account of Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 5(1)(c) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms? For the purposes of answering the foregoing questions, is it relevant that the detainee has been charged with a serious crime, for which national legislation provides for imprisonment for a minimum term of 15 years?
1.

Failure of the General Court to characterise the facts correctly in law in regard to the existence of a special situation as contemplated in Article 239 of the Customs Code. (1) The Commission submits that the General Court alleged erroneous action on its part in so far as, on the one hand, it attributed powers to the Commission which the latter does not at all have or, on the other hand, required it to exercise powers which could no longer contribute to a clarification of the facts. There was, however, no erroneous action on the part of the Commission, with the result that there was no special situation as contemplated in Article 239 of the Customs Code.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 402/11

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundespatentgericht (Germany) lodged on 5 September 2017 — LN

(Case C-527/17)

(2017/C 402/13)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundespatentgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: LN

Defendant: Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt

Question referred

Must Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products (1) be interpreted as meaning that, for the purposes of that regulation, an authorisation under Directive 93/42/EEC (2) for a combined medical device and medicinal product within the meaning of Article 1(4) of Directive 93/42/EEC is to be treated as a valid marketing authorisation under Directive 2001/83/EC (3), where, as part of the authorisation procedure laid down in Annex I, Section 7.4, first paragraph, to Directive 93/42/EEC, the quality, safety and usefulness of the medicinal product component has been verified by the medicinal products authority of a Member State in accordance with Directive 2001/83/EC?

(1) OJ L 152, p. 1.

(2) Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning medical devices (OJ 1993 L 169, p. 1).

(3) Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (OJ 2001 L 311, p. 67).
3.

Does the current version of Decision (EU) 2015/774 of the European Central Bank of 4 March 2015, referred to in 1 above, infringe Article 119 and Article 127(1) and (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Articles 17 to 24 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank because it exceeds the monetary policy mandate of the European Central Bank laid down in those provisions and for that reason encroaches upon the competence of the Member States? Is the mandate of the European Central Bank exceeded in particular as a result of the fact that a) on the basis of the volume of the PSPP, which amounted to EUR 1 534,8 billion on 12 May 2017, the Decision referred to in 1 above materially influences the refinancing terms of the Member States? b) in view of the improvement in the refinancing terms of the Member States referred to in (a) above and their effect on the commercial banks, the Decision referred to in 1 above has not only indirect economic policy consequences but its objectively ascertainable effects suggest that an economic policy aim of the programme is at least of equal priority as the monetary policy aim? c) on account of its powerful economic policy effects, the Decision referred to in 1 above infringes the principle of proportionality? d) in the absence of a specific statement of reasons during the period of more than two years of implementation, it is not possible to examine whether the Decision referred to in 1 above is still necessary and proportionate?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 424/19

Appeal brought on 30 August 2017 by L’Oréal against the order of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 26 June 2017 in Case T-183/16 L’Oréal v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

(Case C-525/17 P)

(2017/C 424/28)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: L’Oréal (represented by: T. de Haan, P. Péters, lawyers)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Guinot

Form of order sought

— set aside the order of the General Court of the European Union of 26 June 2017 in Case T-183/16, EU:T:2017:449;

— refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union; and

— reserve the costs; in the alternative, order EUIPO to bear the appellant’s costs in relation both to the appeal and to the proceedings at first instance.

Pleas in law and main arguments

According to the appellant, the General Court distorted the facts and arguments which it had made before it and infringed Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009. (1)

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ L 78, p. 1).
1.

Is the exemption under Article 138 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax ( 1 ) for an intra-Community transfer from a Member State to be refused where the taxable person carrying out that transfer in another Member State does declare in the other Member State the intra-Community acquisition linked to the intra-Community transfer, but commits tax evasion in connection with a subsequent taxable transaction with the goods concerned in the other Member State by wrongfully declaring an exempt intra-Community supply from that other Member State?
4.

In any event, in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, is it contrary to the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and to the EU-law concept of an independent and impartial tribunal for a Giudice di Pace, having an abstract interest in the case being resolved in favour of the applicant, who, as her sole form of employment, performs the same judicial functions, to stand in the place of the Italian courts with jurisdiction to hear employment disputes in general, or disputes of the ordinary magistrates, as a result of a refusal by the court of last instance (the Combined Chambers of the Court of Cassation) to grant protection for the rights claimed and protected by EU law, thus obliging the court naturally having jurisdiction (the Tribunale del lavoro (Labour Court) or the Tribunale amministrativo regionale (T.A.R.) (Regional Administrative Court)) to decline jurisdiction, when requested, despite the fact that that right — payment for annual leave, as sought in the action — is founded in EU law, which is binding and takes precedence within the legal order of the Italian State? In the event that the Court of Justice should find that there is an infringement of Article 47 of the Charter, what domestic remedies are available in order to avoid a situation in which infringement of a provision of primary EU law also involves an absolute refusal under domestic law to protect fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law in the particular circumstances of the case?
3.

If the answer to the second question is in the affirmative: account being taken of the powers conferred on them under Article 90(2) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, are the Member States entitled to assume, for the purposes of the tax period in which VAT first becomes chargeable, that there has been an adjustment as provided for in Article 90(1) of that directive in the case where the taxable person is not able to obtain the amount receivable, because it is not due, until two years after the taxable event has occurred?
1.

Must the first sentence of Article 7(1) of Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 on common rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of quality of service, (1) in conjunction with Article 8 thereof, be interpreted as meaning that rules of national procedural law, such as those laid down in Article 165(2) of the Law establishing the Code of Civil Procedure (Ustawa Kodeks postępowania cywilnego) of 17 November 1964 (consolidated text: Dziennik Ustaw of 2016, item 1822, as amended; hereinafter: ‘the KPC’), under which only the posting of a procedural document at a national post office of the designated operator, that is to say, the operator required to provide a universal postal service, is equivalent to lodgement of that document with the court, and the possibility of according such effect to the posting of a procedural document at the post office of another postal operator which provides a universal service, but is not a designated operator, is excluded, constitute a special right?
1.

Can the requested Member State — and the Member State responsible in accordance with the criteria set out in Chapter III of the Dublin III Regulation (1) — effectively accept the take back request under Article 23(1) of the Dublin III Regulation even though the time limit for replying specified in Article 25(1) of that regulation has already passed and the requested Member State had previously refused the take back request within the time limit and also negatively replied within the time limit to the request for re-examination based on Article 5(2) of the Implementing Regulation? (2) If the first question is to be answered in the negative: As a consequence of the refusal, communicated within the prescribed period, of the take back request by the Member State responsible in accordance with the criteria set out in Chapter III of the Dublin III Regulation, must the requesting Member State in which the new application was lodged examine that application in order to ensure that the application is examined by a Member State in accordance with Article 3(1) of the Dublin III Regulation?