The concept of ‘intentional non-compliance’ within the meaning of Article 67(1) of Regulation No 796/2004 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of cross-compliance, modulation and the integrated administration and control system provided for in Regulation No 1782/2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, and of Article 23 of Regulation No 1975/2006 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation No 1698/2005, as regards the implementation of control procedures as well as cross-compliance in respect of rural development support measures, must be interpreted as requiring an infringement of the rules on cross-compliance by a beneficiary of aid who seeks a state of non-compliance with those rules or who, without seeking such a state, accepts the possibility that it may occur. EU law does not preclude a national provision which gives a high probative value to the criterion of the existence of a long-established, settled policy, in so far as the beneficiary of aid has the possibility if appropriate of adducing evidence of the lack of intent in his conduct.

Article 67(1) of Regulation No 796/2004 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of cross-compliance, modulation and the integrated administration and control system provided for in Regulation No 1782/2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, and of Article 23 of Regulation No 1975/2006 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation No 1698/2005, as regards the implementation of control procedures as well as cross-compliance in respect of rural development support measures, must be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of an infringement of the requirements of cross-compliance by a third party who carries out work on the instructions of a beneficiary of aid, the beneficiary may be held responsible for the infringement if he acted intentionally or negligently as a result of the choice or the monitoring of the third party or the instructions given to him, independently of the intentional or negligent nature of the conduct of the third party.

That interpretation is consistent with the objective of penalties for infringement of the rules on cross-compliance which seek to incentivise farmers to observe the existing legislation in the various fields of cross-compliance. First, the requirement that there must be intentional or negligent conduct by a beneficiary of aid for him to be held responsible for acts or omissions of third parties enables the incentive effect of those penalties, referred to in recital 56 in the preamble to Regulation No 796/2004, to be maintained. Second such an interpretation enables abuse to be prevented, since the beneficiary of aid cannot exculpate himself by sub-contracting the agricultural work on his plot, nor diminish his liability by adducing evidence that the third party concerned, for example, acted negligently in order to exclude his liability for non-compliance committed intentionally.

(see paras 52, 53, operative part 2)