ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
20

Consequently, the Županijski Sud u Zagrebu (County Court, Zagreb) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Is Article 4(3) of Framework Decision [2002/584] to be interpreted as meaning that the decision not to prosecute for an offence on which [an EAW] is based or to halt proceedings relates only to the offence on which the [EAW] is based or is that provision to be understood as meaning that the cessation or discontinuation of proceedings must also concern the requested person as the suspect/accused in those proceedings? (2) May a Member State refuse, pursuant to Article 4(3) of Framework Decision [2002/584], to execute [an EAW] which has been issued when the judicial authority of the other Member State has decided either not to prosecute for the offence on which the [EAW] is based or to halt proceedings where the requested person had the status of a witness and not of a suspect/accused in the proceedings? (3) Does the decision to terminate an investigation in which the requested person did not have the status of a suspect but was interviewed as a witness constitute, for the other Member States, a ground not to act on the [EAW] which has been issued in accordance with Article 3(2) of Framework Decision [2002/584]? (4) What is the link between the mandatory ground for refusal of surrender laid down in Article 3(2) of the Framework Decision, where “the executing judicial authority is informed that the requested person has been finally judged by a Member State in respect of the same acts …”, and the optional ground for refusal of surrender laid down in Article 4(3) of the Framework Decision, where “a final judgment has been passed upon the requested person in a Member State, in respect of the same acts, which prevents further proceedings”? 5. Is Article 1(2) of Framework Decision [2002/584] to be interpreted as meaning that the executing Member State is required to adopt a decision on any [EAW] communicated to it, even where it has already taken a decision on a previous [EAW] issued by the other judicial authority against the same requested person in the same criminal proceedings and where the new [EAW] is issued because of a change in circumstances in the [Member] State issuing the [EAW] (decision to refer — initiation of criminal proceedings, stricter evidential criteria relating to the commission of the offence, new competent judicial authority/court)?’
36

In those circumstances, the Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa) (Tax Arbitration Tribunal (Centre for Administrative Arbitration)) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘Must Articles 44, 45, 132(1)(f), 167 [to] 169, 178, 179, [192a to 194] and 196 of [the VAT] Directive …, Articles 10 and 11 of Implementing Regulation No 282/2011 and the principle of neutrality be interpreted as precluding the Portuguese tax authorities from refusing the right to deduction of VAT by a branch of a German company, in circumstances where: – the German company obtained a tax identification number in Portugal to carry out an isolated act, namely “acquisition of shares”, corresponding to a non-resident entity without a fixed establishment; – subsequently, the branch of that German company was registered in Portugal and was assigned its own tax identification number, as a fixed establishment of that company; – later, the German company, using the first identification number, entered into a contract with another company to establish an [EIG] to carry out a works contract in Portugal; – subsequently, the branch, using its own tax identification number, entered into a subcontract with the EIG setting out the reciprocal services between the branch and the EIG and agreeing that the latter would invoice the subcontractors, in the agreed proportions, for the costs which it incurred; – the EIG indicated the branch’s tax identification number in the debit notes which it issued to invoice costs to that branch, and charged VAT; – the branch deducted the VAT charged in the debit notes; – the transactions of the EIG consist (by way of subcontracting) of the transactions of the branch and of the other company forming part of the EIG, those entities having invoiced to the EIG the entire revenue that the EIG invoiced to the developer?’
5

Article 19(1) and (2) of Regulation No 561/2006 reads as follows: ‘1. Member States shall lay down rules on penalties applicable and on infringements of this Regulation and Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. Those penalties shall be effective, proportionate, dissuasive and non-discriminatory. No infringement of this Regulation and Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 shall be subjected to more than one penalty or procedure. The Member States shall notify the Commission of these measures and the rules on penalties by the date specified in the second subparagraph of Article 29. The Commission shall inform Member States accordingly. 2. A Member State shall enable the competent authorities to impose a penalty on an undertaking and/or a driver for an infringement of this Regulation detected on its territory and for which a penalty has not already been imposed, even where that infringement has been committed on the territory of another Member State or of a third country. By way of exception, where an infringement is detected: – which was not committed on the territory of the Member State concerned, and – which has been committed by an undertaking which is established in, or a driver whose place of employment is, in another Member State or a third country, a Member State may, until 1 January 2009, instead of imposing a penalty, notify the facts of the infringement to the competent authority in the Member State or the third country where the undertaking is established or where the driver has his place of employment.’
11

Under Article 11 of that directive: ‘1. Member States shall ensure that adequate and effective means exist to combat unfair commercial practices in order to enforce compliance with the provisions of this Directive in the interest of consumers. Such means shall include legal provisions under which persons or organisations regarded under national law as having a legitimate interest in combating unfair commercial practices, including competitors, may: (a) take legal action against such unfair commercial practices; and/or (b) bring such unfair commercial practices before an administrative authority competent either to decide on complaints or to initiate appropriate legal proceedings. It shall be for each Member State to decide which of these facilities shall be available and whether to enable the courts or administrative authorities to require prior recourse to other established means of dealing with complaints, including those referred to in Article 10. These facilities shall be available regardless of whether the consumers affected are in the territory of the Member State where the trader is located or in another Member State. It shall be for each Member State to decide: (a) whether these legal facilities may be directed separately or jointly against a number of traders from the same economic sector; and (b) whether these legal facilities may be directed against a code owner where the relevant code promotes non-compliance with legal requirements. 2. Under the legal provisions referred to in paragraph 1, Member States shall confer upon the courts or administrative authorities powers enabling them, in cases where they deem such measures to be necessary taking into account all the interests involved and in particular the public interest: (a) to order the cessation of, or to institute appropriate legal proceedings for an order for the cessation of, unfair commercial practices; or (b) if the unfair commercial practice has not yet been carried out but is imminent, to order the prohibition of the practice, or to institute appropriate legal proceedings for an order for the prohibition of the practice, even without proof of actual loss or damage or of intention or negligence on the part of the trader. …’
16

In those circumstances, the Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Higher Administrative Court of Bavaria, Germany) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Must Article 2(8) of Directive [2014/40] be interpreted as meaning that only chewing tobacco products in the traditional sense constitute “products intended to be chewed”? (2) Must Article 2(8) of Directive [2014/40] be interpreted as meaning that “products intended to be chewed” are synonymous with “chewing tobacco” within the meaning of Article 2(6) of the directive? (3) Must the question of whether a tobacco product is “intended to be chewed” within the meaning of Article 2(8) of Directive [2014/40] be determined on the basis of an objective consideration of the product and not on the basis of the information supplied by the manufacturer or the actual use by consumers? (4) Must Article 2(8) of Directive [2014/40] be interpreted as meaning that, in order for a tobacco product to be intended to be chewed, that product must in terms of its consistency and firmness be objectively suitable for being chewed and chewing it must result in the ingredients in the product being released? (5) Must Article 2(8) of Directive [2014/40] be interpreted as meaning that, in order for a tobacco product to be intended “to be chewed”, it is additionally necessary, but also sufficient, for the repeated exertion of light pressure on the tobacco product using the teeth or tongue to cause more of the ingredients in the product to be released than if the product is simply kept in the mouth? (6) Or, in order for a tobacco product to be “intended to be chewed”, is it necessary that merely keeping the product in the mouth or sucking it does not cause ingredients to be released? (7) Can the suitability of a tobacco product “to be chewed”, within the meaning of Article 2(8) of Directive [2014/40], also be imparted by the method of dispensation outside the processed tobacco, such as a cellulose sachet?’
10

Under Article 15 of Regulation No 2201/2003, entitled ‘Transfer to a court better placed to hear the case’: ‘1. By way of exception, the courts of a Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter may, if they consider that a court of another Member State, with which the child has a particular connection, would be better placed to hear the case, or a specific part thereof, and where this is in the best interests of the child: (a) stay the case or the part thereof in question and invite the parties to introduce a request before the court of that other Member State in accordance with paragraph 4; or (b) request a court of another Member State to assume jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 5. 2. Paragraph 1 shall apply: (a) upon application from a party; or (b) of the court’s own motion; or (c) upon application from a court of another Member State with which the child has a particular connection, in accordance with paragraph 3. A transfer made of the court’s own motion or by application of a court of another Member State must be accepted by at least one of the parties. 3. The child shall be considered to have a particular connection to a Member State as mentioned in paragraph 1, if that Member State: (a) has become the habitual residence of the child after the court referred to in paragraph 1 was seised; or (b) is the former habitual residence of the child; or (c) is the place of the child’s nationality; or (d) is the habitual residence of a holder of parental responsibility; or (e) is the place where property of the child is located and the case concerns measures for the protection of the child relating to the administration, conservation or disposal of this property. 4. The court of the Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter shall set a time limit by which the courts of that other Member State shall be seised in accordance with paragraph 1. If the courts are not seised by that time, the court which has been seised shall continue to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 8 to 14. 5. The courts of that other Member State may, where due to the specific circumstances of the case, this is in the best interests of the child, accept jurisdiction within six weeks of their seisure in accordance with paragraph 1(a) or 1(b). In this case, the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction. Otherwise, the court first seised shall continue to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 8 to 14. 6. The courts shall cooperate for the purposes of this Article, either directly or through the central authorities designated pursuant to Article 53.’
6

Article 1 of Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning medical devices (OJ 1993 L 169, p. 1), as amended by Directive 2007/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007 (OJ 2007 L 247, p. 21) (‘Directive 93/42’), provides: ‘1. This Directive shall apply to medical devices and their accessories. For the purposes of this Directive, accessories shall be treated as medical devices in their own right. Both medical devices and accessories shall hereinafter be termed devices. 2. For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions shall apply: (a) “medical device” means any instrument, apparatus, appliance, software, material or other article, whether used alone or in combination, including the software intended by its manufacturer to be used specifically for diagnostic and/or therapeutic purposes and necessary for its proper application, intended by the manufacturer to be used for human beings for the purpose of: – diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, treatment or alleviation of disease, … and which does not achieve its principal intended action in or on the human body by pharmacological, immunological or metabolic means, but which may be assisted in its function by such means; … 3. Where a device is intended to administer a medicinal product within the meaning of Article 1 of Directive [2001/83], that device shall be governed by this Directive, without prejudice to the provisions of Directive [2001/83] with regard to the medicinal product. If, however, such a device is placed on the market in such a way that the device and the medicinal product form a single integral product which is intended exclusively for use in the given combination and which is not reusable, that single product shall be governed by Directive [2001/83]. The relevant essential requirements of Annex I to this Directive shall apply as far as safety and performance-related device features are concerned. 4. Where a device incorporates, as an integral part, a substance which, if used separately, may be considered to be a medicinal product within the meaning of Article 1 of Directive [2001/83] and which is liable to act upon the body with action ancillary to that of the device, that device shall be assessed and authorized in accordance with this Directive.’ … 5. This Directive shall not apply to: … (c) medicinal products covered by Directive [2001/83]. In deciding whether a product falls under that Directive or this Directive, particular account shall be taken of the principal mode of action of the product; …’
13

Article 1a of the Zakon o dostopu do informacij javnega značaja (Law on access to public information; ‘ZDIJZ’) provides: ‘(1) The present law governs also the procedure enabling anyone to have free access to information of public importance held by commercial companies and other private law entities which are under the dominant influence, whether directly or indirectly, individually or jointly, of the Republic of Slovenia, autonomous local territorial entities or other public law entities (“undertakings under the dominant influence of public law entities”) and to reuse that information. (2) There shall be deemed to be dominant influence within the meaning of the preceding paragraph where the Republic of Slovenia, autonomous local territorial entities or other public law entities, individually or collectively: – are able to exercise a dominant influence on the basis of a majority shareholding in the subscribed capital, or possess, in relation to a commercial company, the right to control the majority of or the power to appoint more than half of the members of the administrative organ or supervisory body, directly or indirectly through other commercial companies or other private law entities; … (3) A bank which benefits from measures taken pursuant to the law governing the measures taken by the Republic of Slovenia to strengthen the stability of banks shall also be deemed to be under a dominant influence within the meaning of paragraph 1 of this Article. (4) An undertaking shall also be considered subject to the obligation laid down in paragraph 1 of this Article for a period of five years after the dominant influence as referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article has come to an end, in the case of information of public importance that dates from the period during which that undertaking was under a dominant influence. (5) An undertaking under the dominant influence of public law entities shall be subject to the obligation to provide access to information of public importance within the meaning of Article 4a of this Law, which originates at any time during which that undertaking was under the dominant influence of a public law entity. (6) In addition to the objective set out in Article 2(1), the present Law shall also have the objective of enhancing transparency, and the responsible management of public funds and the finances of undertakings under the dominant influence of public law entities.’
22

In those circumstances, the Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa) (Tax Arbitration Tribunal (Centre for Administrative Arbitration)) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Must Articles 2(1)(c), 64(1), 66(a) and 73 of Directive 2006/112/EC be interpreted as meaning that a telecommunications operator (television, internet, mobile network and fixed network) is liable for value added tax as a result of charging its customers –– in a case of termination, for reasons attributable to the customer, of a contract containing an obligation to be bound by the contract for a defined term (tie-in period) before the end of that period –– a pre-determined amount, corresponding to the basic monthly amount payable by the customer under the contract, multiplied by the number of monthly payments that are still to be made before the end of the tie-in period, the operator having, at the time when that amount is invoiced and independently of its actual payment, already ceased to provide the services, where: (a) the contractual purpose of the amount invoiced is to deter the customer from disregarding the tie-in period which he has undertaken to observe and to make good the damage sustained by the operator as a result of the failure to complete the tie-in period –– in particular, on account of loss of the profit the operator would have obtained if the contract had continued until the end of the period, as well as on account of the agreement to charge lower tariffs, the supply of equipment or other offers, free of charge or at discounted prices, and the costs of advertising and of acquiring customers; (b) contracts negotiated with a tie-in period entail higher remuneration for the commercial intermediaries who obtained them than contracts obtained by them without a tie-in period and that remuneration is calculated, in each case (that is, as regards contracts with or without a tie-in), on the basis of the amount set for monthly payments in the contracts obtained; (c) the amount invoiced may be classified, under national law, as a penalty clause. (2) Is the answer to the first question liable to change in the event that one or more of the situations described in points (a), (b) and (c) of that question does not apply?’
69

In the present case, the Spanish Government refers to the difference that characterises the context in which the grounds for termination of fixed-term contracts set out in Article 49(1)(c) of the Workers’ Statute, such as the expiry of a temporary replacement contract, arise, by comparison with the context in which payment of compensation is provided for in the event of dismissal on one of the grounds set out in Article 52 of that statute, such as economic or technical grounds or grounds relating to the organisation or to production with the employer, when the number of posts abolished is below that required in order for the cancellation of the employment contracts to be classified as ‘collective dismissal’. In order to explain the difference in treatment at issue in the main proceedings, the Spanish Government emphasises, in essence, that in the former situation the severance of the employment relationship occurs on the occasion of an event that could be foreseen by the worker at the time when the fixed-term employment contract was concluded, which indeed corresponds with the situation at issue in the main proceedings, where the temporary replacement contract was cancelled by the effect of the reinstatement of the replaced worker. In the latter situation, on the other hand, payment of the compensation provided for in Article 53(1)(b) of the Workers’ Statute would be motivated by the desire to compensate for the worker’s legitimate expectations regarding the continuation of the employment relationship being disappointed as a result of his dismissal on one of the grounds set out in Article 52 of that statute.