ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
1.

Does it follow from EU law, in particular from Article 4(3) TEU, the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU and Article 260(1) TFEU, that, in the context of ongoing court proceedings between private persons, Article 15(1), (2)(g) and (3) of Directive 2006/123/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market (‘the Services Directive’) has direct effect in such a way that the national provisions contrary to that directive that are contained in Paragraph 4 of the German Verordnung über die Honorare für Architekten- und Ingenieurleistungen (Decree on fees for services provided by architects and engineers) of 1996, as amended in 2002 (‘the 2002 HOAI’), pursuant to which the minimum rates for planning and supervision services provided by architects and engineers laid down in that official scale of fees are mandatory — save in certain exceptional cases — and any fee agreement in contracts with architects or engineers which falls short of the minimum rates is invalid, are no longer to be applied, even in the case of claims arising from an architect’s contract concluded in 2004, that is to say, prior to the adoption of the Services Directive?
1.

In the light of Article 36 TFEU, does Article 34 TFEU preclude an interpretation of Paragraph 5(1) of the Law on audiovisual programmes which requires that audiovisual programme media be classified in accordance with the Law on audiovisual programmes, and age rating labels based on that classification be added to the product information, already at the time when the audiovisual programme media are made available for sale in an online store, even though the audiovisual programme media have been classified and labelled in another Member State but have not yet been delivered to Finland? Is it relevant to the assessment of the question that the Law on audiovisual programmes contains no provision on exceptions to classification and labelling on the ground that it has been ascertained that a purchaser of the audiovisual programme media is of full age and that, in the case of audiovisual programme media offered in an online store, the abovementioned requirement of reclassification and relabelling applies only where the programme is offered by entities or traders registered or established in Finland or by a person who is a Finnish national or is habitually resident in Finland, or if the decision to offer the programme was taken in Finland?
2.

If it is the latter, in the case where an EU trade mark or a national trade mark is owned by several individuals, would it be consistent with the principles of EU law for it to be impossible for one of the joint proprietors of the mark, after the mark has been assigned to a third party by unanimous decision, free of charge and for an indefinite period, unilaterally to withdraw from that decision or, alternatively, would it, on the contrary, be consistent with the principles of EU law if the joint proprietor were not bound in perpetuity by the original intent, such that he or she could retract, with the resulting effect on the act of assignment?
1.

Does Article 5(2) of Directive 2008/7/EC (1) preclude national legislation, such as item 17(3)(4) of the Código do Imposto do Selo (Stamp Duty Code), under which stamp duty is levied on fees which banks charge open-ended securities investment fund management companies for gaining new subscriptions for units, that is, for obtaining new inflows of capital for the investment funds in the form of new subscriptions for units issued by the funds?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzgericht (Austria) lodged on 20 October 2021 — Climate Corporation Emissions Trading GmbH v Finanzamt Österreich

(Case C-641/21)

(2022/C 51/27)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesfinanzgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Climate Corporation Emissions Trading GmbH

Respondent authority: Finanzamt Österreich

Question referred

Is Directive 2006/112/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/8/EC, (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the national authorities and courts must regard the place of supply of a service, which, under the written law, is formally located in the other Member State, in which the recipient of the supply is established, as being within the national territory if the domestic taxable person supplying the service should have known that, in supplying it, he or she was participating in value added tax evasion committed in the context of a chain of supplies?

(1) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1), as amended by Council Directive 2008/8/EC of 12 February 2008 amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards the place of supply of services (OJ 2008 L 44, p. 11).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 19 August 2021 by DI against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 9 June 2021 in Case T-514/19, DI v BCE

(Case C-513/21 P)

(2022/C 37/10)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: DI (represented by: L. Levi, avocate)

Other party to the proceedings: European Central Bank

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— by consequence grant the appellant’s requests: — the annulment of the decision of the Executive Board of the ECB dated 7 May 2019 imposing the disciplinary dismissal without notice; — the annulment of the decision of the Executive Board of the ECB dated 25 June 2019 refusing to reopen the disciplinary proceedings further to the closure of criminal proceedings; — in any case, the compensation of the moral prejudice suffered by the appellant evaluated ex aequo et bono at 20 000,00 Euros; — the reimbursement of all the costs.

— order the ECB to pay all the costs of both the appeal and of the first instance.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The judgement under appeal erred in law in rejecting the first plea alleging lack of competence of the author of the contested measures.

The judgement under appeal erred in law in rejecting the second plea alleging infringement of Article 8.3.2 of the Staff Rules and of the principle of legal certainty.

The judgement under appeal erred in law in rejecting the seventh plea alleging infringement of the right to the presumption of innocence and Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

The judgement under appeal erred in law in rejecting the fourth plea alleging infringement of Article 8.3.7 of the Staff Rules and infringement of the principle of impartiality as enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter.

The judgement under appeal erred in law in rejecting the sixth plea alleging manifest errors of assessment.
3.

Irrespective of the answers to the second question, is a club-points-based timeshare contract to be treated as a contract for the acquisition of rights in rem in immovable property or association-type rights in personam? — If it is considered that rights in rem are acquired, for the purposes of determining the law applicable, which of Article 4(c) and 6(1) of Regulation No 593/2008 is applicable by way priority, including in the event that the consumer chooses the law of a State other than that of his or her State of habitual residence as the applicable law? — If it is considered that rights in personam are acquired, are those rights to be treated as a tenancy of immovable property, for the purposes of Article 4(c), or as a provision of services, for the purposes of Article 4(b)? Further, and in any event, is Article 6(1) applicable by way of priority in so far as the contract is with a consumer and/or user, including where the consumer chooses the law of a State other than that of his or her State of habitual residence as the applicable law?
1.

Must Articles 4, 7 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Articles 5, [6(6)] and 13 of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, (1) read in the light of the judgment [of 19 June 2018, Gnandi (C-181/16, EU:C:2018:465)], be interpreted as meaning that a court hearing an appeal against a return decision adopted pursuant to a decision refusing to grant international protection, when assessing the legality of the return decision, may take account of changes in circumstances that may have a significant bearing on the assessment of the situation under Article 5 cited above, only where those changes occurred prior to the disposal of the international protection proceedings by the Council for asylum and immigration proceedings?
Appeal brought on 23 June 2021 by Asolo LTD and WeMO Brands BV against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 28 April 2021 in Case T-509/19, Asolo v EUIPO

(Case C-387/21 P)

(2022/C 64/09)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Asolo LTD and WeMO Brands BV (represented by: W. Pors, advocaat, N. Dorenbosch, advocaat)

Other party: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 13 December 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Asolo LTD and WeMo Brands BV should bear their own costs.
Appeal brought on 16 December 2021 by WEPA Hygieneprodukte GmbH and WEPA Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG, the latter formerly Wepa Leuna GmbH and Wepa Papierfabrik Sachsen GmbH, against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 6 October 2021 in Case T-238/19, Wepa Hygieneprodukte GmbH and Others v European Commission

(Case C-795/21 P)

(2022/C 73/31)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellants: WEPA Hygieneprodukte GmbH, WEPA Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG, the latter formerly Wepa Leuna GmbH and Wepa Papierfabrik Sachsen GmbH (represented by: H. Janssen, A. Vallone, Rechtsanwälte, D. Salm, Rechtsanwältin)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Federal Republic of Germany

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

1. set aside in full the judgment under appeal of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 6 October 2021 in Case T-238/19;

2. annul the Commission’s Decision of 28 May 2018 in the case ‘State aid SA.34045 (2013/c) (ex 2012/NN) implemented by Germany for baseload consumers under Paragraph 19 of StromNEV’;

3. in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court;

4. order the Commission to pay the costs of both sets of proceedings.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

By their first ground of appeal, the appellants claim that the General Court distorted facts and misconstrued the meaning and scope of national law, in so far as it based its decision on the following: first that the Bundesnetzagentur (Federal Network Agency) had set the amount of the surcharge under Paragraph 19(2) of the German Stromnetzentgeltverordnung (StromNEV) (Federal Regulation on electricity network charges) in a binding manner; secondly that the Federal Network Agency had issued very detailed requirements; and, thirdly that the loss of revenues of the network operators had been fully covered by that surcharge. The appellants therefore claim that relevant facts for the General Court which should have demonstrated State control over the funds collected by the surcharge did not exist at all.

In their second ground of appeal the appellants put forward that the General Court misinterpreted the conditions for the existence of aid granted through State resources, within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. First, the General Court failed to recognise the fact that the surcharge under Paragraph 19(2) StromNEV did not constitute a charge, a ‘compulsory charge’ or a ‘parafiscal charge’ (first part of the second ground of appeal). Second, the General Court misinterpreted the fact that the exemption for baseload consumers under the second sentence of Paragraph 19(2) StromNEV and the surcharge under Paragraph 19(2) StromNEV were not aid granted from State resources (second part of the second ground of appeal). If, however, as is the case, the surcharge does not constitute a charge, the prerequisite of Article 107(1) TFEU is not satisfied, which is also the view of the General Court. In addition, even if were to constitute charge, the prerequisite of Article 107(1) TFEU would not be satisfied, as the surcharge is not aid granted by the State or from State resources.
1.

In the assessment as to whether the asylum status previously granted to a refugee by the competent authority can be revoked on the ground set out in Article 14(4)(b) of Directive 2011/95/EU, (1) must the competent authority carry out a weighing up of interests in such a way that revocation requires that the public interests in forced return must outweigh the refugee’s interests in the continuation of the protection afforded by the State of refuge, whereby the reprehensibility of a crime and the potential danger to society must be weighed against the foreign national’s interests in protection — including with regard to the extent and nature of the measures with which he or she is threatened?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administratīvā rajona tiesa (Latvia) lodged on 13 December 2021 — AAS BTA Baltic Insurance Company v Iepirkumu uzraudzības birojs, Tieslietu ministrija

(Case C-769/21)

(2022/C 84/38)

Language of the case: Latvian

Referring court

Administratīvā rajona tiesa

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: AAS BTA Baltic Insurance Company

Defendants: Iepirkumu uzraudzības birojs, Tieslietu ministrija

Question referred

Is national legislation which requires the contracting authority to terminate a procurement procedure in a situation where the originally selected tenderer, which declined to enter into the procurement contract with the contracting authority, must be considered to constitute a single market participant with the next tenderer, whose tender meets the contracting authority’s needs and requirements, compatible with the principles of procurement defined in Article 18(1) of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, (1) in particular with the requirement for Member States to treat economic operators equally and without discrimination, and with the principle of proportionality?

(1) OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65.
2.

If, in accordance with Article 6(2) of Decision ECB/2010/14, the minimum standards referred to therein are applicable only to manufacturers of banknote handling machines (but not to cash handlers), should Article 6(2) of Decision ECB/2010/14, read in conjunction with Article 3(5) thereof, be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law according to which the obligation to comply with those minimum standards does apply to a cash handler?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof (Germany) lodged on 25 November 2021 — A v Finanzamt X

(Case C-713/21)

(2022/C 119/25)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesfinanzhof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: A

Defendant: Finanzamt X

Questions referred

In relation to the meaning of Article 2(1)(c) of Directive 2006/112/EC, (1) as interpreted in the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 10 November 2016, Baštová: (2)

Does the owner of a competition horse training stable provide the horse owner with a single supply, consisting in the stabling and training of horses and the participation of horses in competitions, for consideration even where the horse owner remunerates that supply by assigning half of the claim to prize money to which he or she is entitled in the event of successful participation in a competition?

(1) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).

(2) C 432/15 (EU:C:2016:855).
Are natural and legal persons who are involved in the placing on the market of scheduled substances in such a way that that involvement constitutes an offence punishable under Article 2(1)(d) of Framework Decision 2004/757 (1) to be regarded as ‘operators’ for the purposes of Article 2(d) of Regulation No 273/2004? (2)

If the answer to this first question is in the affirmative:
1.

Must the provisions of EU law concerning VAT be interpreted as allowing the application of a provision of national law — such as Article 6(1) of the ustawa o podatku od towarów i usług (Law on the tax on goods and services) of 11 March 2004 (Dz. U. of 2021, item 685; ‘the Law on VAT’) — which excludes taxation of a supply of an organised part of an undertaking without making the application of that exclusion subject to the condition referred to in Article 19 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax …, (1) that is to say, legal succession between the seller and the purchaser?
Appeal brought on 24 May 2021 by Roberto Alejandro Macías Chávez, José María Castillejo Oriol and Fernando Presencia against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 27 April 2021 in Case T-719/20 Macías Chávez and Others v Spain and Parliament

(Case C-322/21 P)

(2022/C 165/29)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellants: Roberto Alejandro Macías Chávez, José María Castillejo Oriol and Fernando Presencia (represented by: J. Jover Padró, abogado)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Parliament and Kingdom of Spain

By order of 1 February 2022, the Court of Justice (Tenth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as being, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded, and ordered appellants to bear their own costs.
2.

In the context of an activity such as private security services at industrial facilities, in which the new provider has taken over only one of the four employees that had formed part of the economic unit (and did not therefore take over the majority) and there is no factual basis for concluding that the employee in question possessed specific skills and knowledge such as to support the assertion that, in terms of skills, an essential part of the staff has been transferred to the new provider and no intangible assets have been transferred, may it be concluded that there is no transfer of an economic entity, even in the case where the customer continues to make certain equipment (alarms, closed-circuit television, computer) available to the new service provider, given, on the one hand, the relatively low economic value of the investment which that equipment represents in the operation as a whole, and, on the other hand, the fact that it would not have been sensible, from an economic point of view (judgment of 27 February 2020, Grafe and Pohle, C-298/18, paragraph 32), (3) to require the customer to replace it?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 2 December 2021 by Henry Cotton's Brand Management Co. Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 22 September 2021 in Case T-173/20, Henry Cotton's Brand Management v EUIPO — Industries Sportswear

(Case C-744/21 P)

(2022/C 198/23)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Henry Cotton's Brand Management Co. Ltd (represented by: A. von Mühlendahl, C. Eckhartt, P. Böhner, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Industries Sportswear Co. Srl

By order of 31/03/2022, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Henry Cotton's Brand Management Co. Ltd should bear its own costs.
Appeal brought on 23 March 2021 by OH against the order of the General Court delivered on 9 December 2020 in Case T-704/20 AJ, OH v European Court of Human Rights

(Case C-692/21 P)

(2022/C 326/03)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Appellant: OH

Other party to the proceedings: European Court of Human Rights

By order of 17 May 2022, the Court of Justice (Tenth Chamber) held that the appeal brought by OH is dismissed due to a manifest lack of jurisdiction of the Court and that OH is to bear her own costs.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Visoki trgovački sud Republike Hrvatske (Croatia) lodged on 7 October 2021 — Financijska agencija v MINERAL-SEKULINE d.o.o.

(Case C-622/21)

(2022/C 222/11)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Visoki trgovački sud Republike Hrvatske

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Financijska agencija

Respondent MINERAL-SEKULINE d.o.o.

Question referred

Can the rule laid down in the second part of the first sentence and in the second sentence of Article 177(3) of the Sudski poslovnik (Rules of Procedure of the Courts), which provides that ‘a case before a court of second instance shall be deemed to be closed on the date on which the decision is sent from the court office, after the case has been returned by the Registration Service. The Registration Service shall be required to return the file to the court office as promptly as possible after receipt thereof. The decision shall then be notified within a further period of eight days’ be considered compatible with Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter?
2.

Are the provisions of EU law contained in Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 — and in particular in Article 37(1) and (4), governing the powers of the regulatory authorities, and in Annex I — to be interpreted as including, within the scope of any compensation and the refund arrangements which apply to customers in the electricity market if contracted service quality levels are not met by the market operator, the reimbursement of moneys paid by such customers that are expressly governed by a contractual term in an agreement that has been signed and accepted and bear no relationship to service quality itself but are stipulated as covering the economic operator’s own administrative management costs?
2.

Must Articles 1, 2, 9(1) and 18 of Directive 94/62/EC, as supplemented by the provisions of points 1, 2 and 3 of Annex II to the directive, be interpreted as precluding the adoption of a national rule prohibiting the marketing of single-use shopping bags made of non-biodegradable materials, which otherwise comply with the requirements laid down in Directive 94/62/EC, or may the additional technical rules laid down by national law be justified by the aim of ensuring a higher level of environmental protection, considering, if need be, the specific problems regarding waste collection in the Member State and the need for that State to implement the EU obligations laid down in that related context?
2.

Does the principle that penalties must be effective, deriving from Article 23 of Directive 2008/48/EC, in the light of the principles of legal certainty and of States’ procedural autonomy and the principle that the subject matter of an action is delimited by the parties, preclude a situation whereby a court may not declare a credit agreement null and void after raising of its own motion a provision of national law, resulting from Article 14 of that directive, where the consumer has not applied for or at least acquiesced in such annulment?
1.

Is it contrary to the right to effective judicial protection and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to require that, before instituting legal proceedings, the consumer must first have issued an out-of-court demand for payment in order for the declaration as to the invalidity of a particular general condition of contract on grounds of unfairness to give rise to all of the compensatory effects (including the costs of the legal proceedings) associated with such invalidity, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts? (1)