ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Keywords

Subject of the case

Operative part



Keywords

Community trade mark — Observations of third parties and opposition — Examination of the opposition — Proof of use of the earlier mark — Genuine use — Concept — Interpretation having regard to the rationale of Article 42(2) and (3) of Regulation No 207/2009 (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 42(2) and (3)) (see para. 24)

2. Community trade mark — Observations of third parties and opposition — Examination of the opposition — Proof of use of the earlier mark — Genuine use — Concept — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 42(2) and (3)) (see paras 25-29)

3. Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Facts and evidence not produced in support of the opposition within the period prescribed for that purpose — Account taken — Discretion of the Board of Appeal (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 42(2), and 76(2); Commission Regulation No 2868/95, Art. 1, Rule 22(2)) (see paras 43, 45-49)

4. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 57, 58, 60, 77)

5. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Word marks TEEN VOGUE and VOGUE (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 62, 63, 76, 78)

Subject of the case

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 22 November 2011 (Case R 1763/2010‑4), concerning opposition proceedings between Mr Eduardo López Cabré and Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc.

Operative part

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., to pay the costs.
Keywords

Subject of the case

Operative part



Keywords

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Concept (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 11)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Assessment of distinctive character (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 12)

3. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Composite mark — Need to take account of the overall perception of the combination by the relevant public (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 20, 21)

4. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Figurative marks Fleet Data Services and Truck Data Services (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 22-26)

5. Community trade mark — Procedural provisions — Decisions of the Office — Observance of the rights of the defence — Scope of the principle (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 75) (see paras 31, 32)

Subject of the case

Re:

Two actions brought against two decisions of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 10 September 2012 (Case R 130/2012‑1 and Case R 4/2012‑1), concerning applications for registration, first, of the figurative sign Fleet Data Services and, secondly, the figurative sign Truck Data Services as Community trade marks.

Operative part

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the actions;

2. Orders Still GmbH to pay the costs.
Keywords

Subject of the case

Operative part



Keywords

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 19, 20)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Word marks JUNGBORN and BORN (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 22-24, 30, 35, 36)

3. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity of the marks concerned — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 25-27)

Subject of the case

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 9 July 2012 (Case R 936/2011-4) relating to opposition proceedings between Develey Holding GmbH & Co. Beteiligungs KG and Robert Klingel OHG.

Operative part

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Robert Klingel OHG to pay the costs.
Keywords

Subject of the case

Operative part



Keywords

Community trade mark — Procedural provisions — Statement of reasons for decisions — Article 75, first sentence, of Regulation No 207/2009 — Scope identical to that of Article 296 TFEU (Art. 296, second para., TFEU; Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 75, first sentence) (see paras 18, 19)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 28, 29, 50)

3. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Word marks METABOL and METABOL-MG (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 30, 41, 46-48, 51)

Subject of the case

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 19 July 2012 (Case R 1901/2011‑1), relating to opposition proceedings between Pentafarma-Sociedade Tecnico-Medicinal, SA and Ms Sofia Golam.

Operative part

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Ms Sofia Golam to pay the costs.
Concerning the intensity of judicial review, the Council has broad discretion as to what to take into consideration for the purpose of adopting economic and financial sanctions on the basis of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC, in accordance with a common position adopted on the basis of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). Since the courts of the European Union may not, in particular, substitute their assessment of the evidence, facts and circumstances justifying the adoption of such measures for that of the Council, the review carried out by the Court must, therefore, be restricted to checking that the rules governing procedure and the statement of reasons have been complied with, that the facts are materially accurate, and that there has been no manifest error of assessment of the facts or misuse of power. That limited review applies, especially, to the assessment of the considerations of appropriateness on which such decisions are based.

It is however necessary in that context also to take into consideration the case-law relating to the concept of a third country, for the purposes of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC, according to which that concept includes the leaders of such a country and the individuals and entities associated with those leaders or directly or indirectly controlled by them. It follows that, when exercising its broad discretion in the matter, the Council, where it intends to adopt, on the basis of those articles, restrictive measures against the leaders of such a country and individuals and entities associated with those leaders or controlled directly or indirectly by them, may, it is true, define more or less broadly the leaders and their associates who are to be subject to the measures to be adopted, but the Council may not extend the scope of those measures to persons or entities who do not fall into one or the other of the abovementioned categories.

Further, in a situation where the Council defines abstractly the criteria which may justify the listing of a person, or entity, in the list of persons or entities subject to restrictive measures adopted on the basis of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC, it is the task of the Court to determine, on the basis of the pleas in law raised by the person or entity concerned or, where necessary, raised of its own motion, whether the case in point corresponds to the abstract criteria defined by the Council. That review extends to the assessment of the facts and circumstances relied on as justifying the listing of the person or entity concerned on the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures, and to verifying the evidence and information on which that assessment is based. The Court must likewise ensure that the rights of the defence are observed and that the requirement of a statement of reasons is satisfied and also, where applicable, that the overriding considerations relied on exceptionally by the Council in order to justify disregarding those rights are well founded.

(see paras 52, 72-74)
2.

Community trade mark — Duration, renewal, modification and division of the mark — Renewal of the mark — Time-limits — Lodging of an application for partial renewal and payment of the related charges during the initial period — Complement of the application during the grace period — Not included (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 47(3)) (see paras 37-41)
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 27 February 2015 — LS Fashion v OHIM — Gestión de Activos Isorana (L’Wren Scott)

(Case T‑41/12)

‛Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for Community word mark L’Wren Scott — Earlier national word mark LOREN SCOTT — Relative ground for refusal — Genuine use of the mark — Article 42(2) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — No likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009’

1. Community trade mark — Observations of third parties and opposition — Examination of the opposition — Proof of use of the earlier mark — Genuine use — Concept (Council Regulation No 207/2009, tenth recital and Art. 42(2) and (3); Commission Regulation No 2868/95, Rule 22(3)) (see paras 18-24, 46)

2. Community trade mark — Observations of third parties and opposition — Examination of the opposition — Proof of use of the earlier mark — Genuine use — Concept — Determination of a quantitative threshold of minimum use — Not included (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 42(2)) (see para. 25)

3. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 50-53)

4. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Word marks L’Wren Scott and LOREN SCOTT (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 57-79)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 24 November 2011 (Case R 1584/2009-4) concerning opposition proceedings between Gestión de Activos Isorana, SL, and LS Fashion, LLC.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the application;
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 21 April 2015 —

Louis Vuitton Malletier v OHIM — Nanu-Nana (Representation of a grey chequerboard pattern)

(Case T‑360/12)

‛Community trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — Community figurative mark representing a grey chequerboard pattern — Absolute ground for refusal — No distinctive character — No distinctive character acquired through use — Article 7(1)(b) and Article 7(3) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Article 52(1) and (2) of Regulation No 207/2009’

1. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Three-dimensional trade marks consisting of the shape of the product itself — Distinctive character — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 20-23)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Figurative mark consisting of the two-dimensional representation of a product — Distinctive character — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 24, 25)

3. Community trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Absolute grounds for invalidity — Registration contrary to Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 — Exception — Distinctive character acquired through use — Figurative mark representing a grey chequerboard pattern (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 7(1)(d), and 52(2)) (see paras 35-45, 104, 120)

4. Community trade mark — Decisions of the Office — Principle of equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — OHIM’s previous decision-making practice — Principle of legality (see paras 47-51)

5. Community trade mark — Procedural provisions — Examination of the facts of the Office’s own motion — Invalidity proceedings concerning absolute grounds for refusal — Examination restricted to the submissions of the parties (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 7(1), 52, 55, 57(1), and 76(1)) (see paras 58-62)

6. Community trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Absolute grounds for invalidity — Registration contrary to Article 7(1)(b) to (d) of Regulation No 207/2009 — Exception — Distinctive character acquired through use — Conditions (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 7(1)(b) to (d), and (3), 52(2), and 165(1) and (4)) (see paras 79-82)

7. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Exception — Distinctive character acquired through use — Trade mark devoid of distinctive character throughout the EU — Acquisition by use also throughout the EU (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 1(2), and 7(3)) (see paras 84, 85, 91-93)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 16 May 2012 (Case R 1854/2011-1), relating to invalidity proceedings between Nanu-Nana Handelsgesellschaft mbH für Geschenkartikel & Co. KG and Louis Vuitton Malletier.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
8.

In the context of a procedure for refund of anti-dumping duties, the review as to whether the anti-dumping duties were passed on to customers of a related importer, provided for under Article 11(10) of the basic regulation, is a stage in the calculation of the export price constructed on the basis of Article 2(9) of that regulation. In step with the result obtained at the conclusion of that review, the anti-dumping duties are to be deducted from the constructed export price and, accordingly, will have a direct impact on the amount of that constructed export price, in that it will necessarily be less than if the anti-dumping duties had not been deducted. Moreover, the lower the export price, the greater will be the difference with the normal value and the higher will be the revised dumping margin. Article 11(10) of the basic regulation therefore contributes to the construction of the export price and, indirectly, to the calculation of the revised dumping margin. In that context, the Commission must be consistent in the methods it uses for the purposes of the application of Article 2(9) and (11) and Article 11(10) of the basic anti-dumping regulation. In that regard, where the Commission verifies whether anti-dumping duties have been passed on to the resale prices to the first independent buyer in the Union in accordance with a PCN-by-PCN method of analysis, it commits a manifest error of assessment by refusing non-deduction of the anti-dumping duties from the export prices of the PCNs for which the anti-dumping duties had nevertheless been reflected in the resale prices and the subsequent selling prices in the Union. By proceeding in that way, the Commission does not draw all the consequences of the PCN-by-PCN method which it had itself decided to apply, in that it deducts all of the anti-dumping duties paid from the export price constructed pursuant to Article 2(9) of the basic anti-dumping regulation, thereby artificially reducing the single weighted average export price per PCN. Moreover, Article 11(10) of the basic regulation does not require the Commission systematically to deduct all the anti-dumping duties paid in a case in which examination by way of a PCN-by-PCN method as to whether the anti-dumping duties were passed on has not made it possible to conclude that the anti-dumping duties were passed on for all PCNs, but only for some of them. (see paras 140-147, 150)
63

In that regard, first of all, in addition to the fact that, unlike the restructuring of SeaFrance, the restructuring of the SNCB’s freight activities was not carried out as part of rescuing a firm in difficulty but as part of a vast industrial and commercial plan for restructuring the sector, it should be noted that there was a significant difference in the relevant regulatory framework. The restructuring of the SNCB’s freight activities was subject to the Community guidelines on State aid for railway undertakings (OJ 2008 C 184, p. 13). Those guidelines constitute a specific regulatory framework for the rail transport industry, derogating from the guidelines on restructuring aid, inter alia as regards the level of the aid recipient’s own contribution. Paragraph 82 of those guidelines provides that the Commission may accept lower own contributions than those provided for in the guidelines on aid for restructuring. It is on that basis that the Commission accepted the SNCB’s freight subsidiary’s own contribution of between 15% and 25% of financing needs for the restructuring (see recitals 246 to 249 in the preamble to the SNCB-freight decision). Next, although the Commission agreed in the SNCB-freight decision that part of the SNCB’s freight subsidiary’s own contribution should be made up of a loan granted by the SNCB under market conditions, it is clear from recital 113 in the preamble to that decision that, in order to meet the financing needs for the restructuring, that subsidiary was also to obtain from a credit establishment an external credit line in the amount of EUR 50 million. Thus, unlike SeaFrance’s restructuring plan, the restructuring plan for the SNCB’s freight activities provided for intervention by players outside the SNCB group. Lastly, the amount of the loan which the SNCB planned to grant to its freight subsidiary represented a relatively small part of the own contribution. In fact, that loan was EUR 25 million and the total amount of the freight subsidiary’s own contribution was EUR 135 million for a total restructuring cost in the order of EUR 490 million (see recital 248 in the preamble to the SNCB-freight decision). On the other hand, according to SeaFrance’s modified restructuring plan, the loan of EUR 99.7 million represented between 85% and 95% of SeaFrance’s own contribution to the financing of its restructuring, given that the total amount of that contribution was EUR [confidential] million, with a total restructuring cost of EUR [confidential] million (see recitals 35 and 150 in the preamble to the contested decision).
59

It is important moreover to note that, as is clear from Article 8(2) of Decision 2011/695, the Hearing Officer must specify, in his decision, the date after which the information at issue ruled not to be confidential will be disclosed, that date not to be more than one week after notification. It follows from that provision that the intervention of the Hearing Officer consists in applying the rules which protect undertakings by reason of the confidentiality of the information concerned. The publication by DG Competition of information covered by the obligation of professional secrecy definitively nullifies the specific protection granted to that kind of information. The intervention of the Hearing Officer serves therefore to add a phase of supplementary review by a body independent of DG Competition. That body is, in addition, obliged to defer the date when its decision takes effect, thereby giving the undertaking concerned the opportunity to bring a case before the judge responsible for hearing applications for interim relief in order to have the decision suspended when the relevant conditions are met. Consequently, a distinction must be made between the application of legal rules relating to the confidentiality of the information as such, on the one hand, and the legal rules relied on with the objective of obtaining confidential treatment of the information irrespective of whether that information is inherently confidential, on the other. In that regard, as contended by the Commission, even if the publication of an item of information not covered by the obligation of professional secrecy might constitute an infringement of a rule falling within the second of the two abovementioned categories, that does not render the protection conferred by the rules relating to professional secrecy illusory. Such an infringement, if it were to be established, can give rise to adequate remedies, such as damages, if the conditions governing non‑contractual liability of the Union are met. Accordingly, an analysis of the substance of the arguments relating to that category of rules is outside the objectives pursued by the terms of reference conferred on a hearing officer under Article 8 of Decision 2011/695 (judgment of 28 January 2015 in Evonik Degussa v Commission, T‑341/12, ECR, EU:T:2015:51, paragraph 43), and consequently the findings in recitals 14, 17 and 19 are not vitiated by illegality.
Keywords

Subject of the case

Operative part



Keywords

Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Assessment of distinctive character — Criteria — Positional mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 13-17, 25)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Representation of a three-dimensional stylised flower affixed to the collar of the garment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 19-37)

Subject of the case

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 13 December 2012 (Case R 2578/2011-1), concerning an application for registration as a Community trade mark of a sign consisting in the affixing of a flower to a collar.

Operative part

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Lardini Srl to pay the costs.