ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 9(1) of Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that the operation of agricultural engineering works by a non-profit company which engages in such commercial activities only on an ancillary basis constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of that provision, notwithstanding the fact that those works have in large part been financed by State aid and that their operation gives rise only to revenue from modest fees, provided that that fee can be regarded as having a ‘continuing basis’ on account of the period of time during which it is to be charged.

Such an activity is to be regarded as falling within the concept of ‘economic activity’ if it is engaged in for the purposes of obtaining income on a continuing basis. Such income is to be found where the services provided or to be provided give or will give rise to remuneration as a result of the owners of the land concerned being charged an operating fee in relation to the engineering works for a predetermined period of eight years, with that period allowing the fee to be regarded as having a ‘continuing basis’.

As regards the fact that the taxable persons concerned could engage in that commercial activity only on an ancillary basis, first, it is clear from the second subparagraph of Article 9(1) of Directive 2006/112 that, for a finding that the exploitation of tangible or intangible property is carried out for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom, it is irrelevant whether or not that exploitation is intended to make a profit. Secondly, engaging in such an activity on an ancillary basis has no bearing on the economic nature of that activity provided that, on account of the period of time during which it is to be charged, the fee can be regarded as having a ‘continuing basis’. Lastly, the fact that the investments are largely financed by aids granted by the Member State and the European Union cannot have a bearing on whether or not such an activity is to be regarded as an economic activity, since the concept of ‘economic activity’ is objective in nature and applies not only without regard to the purpose or results of the transactions concerned but also without regard to the method of financing chosen by the operator concerned, which also holds true in relation to public subsidies.

(see paras 28, 30, 31, 33-35, 37, 38, 51, operative part 1)
Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time must be interpreted as precluding national legislation or a national practice under which a worker who is on convalescence leave, granted in accordance with national law, during the period of annual leave scheduled in the leave roster of the establishment where he is employed may be refused, at the end of his convalescence leave, the right to take his paid annual leave in a subsequent period, provided that the purpose of the right to convalescence leave is different from that of the right to annual leave, a matter which is for the national court to determine.

Whilst it is ultimately for the national court, which alone has jurisdiction to interpret national legislation, to decide whether the purpose of convalescence leave is different from that of paid annual leave defined in Article 7 of Directive 2003/88, as interpreted by the Court, the latter, which is called upon to provide the national court with a useful answer for the purpose of deciding the case brought before it, may provide it, for this purpose, with guidance based on all the material supplied by it, and in particular on the grounds of the order for reference.

The fact that national law states that convalescence leave is granted ‘in order to follow a course of treatment prescribed by a doctor’, that it is the panel doctor treating the teacher who decides on the ‘need to grant him convalescence leave for the purpose of the prescribed treatment’ and that, two weeks before the end of that leave, the teacher must go for an examination in order to check that there are no contraindications against his resuming work are such as to support the proposition that the convalescence leave has the objective of improving the state of health of the workers who are prescribed it and, unlike the paid annual leave laid down in Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88, is not intended to grant those workers a period of relaxation and leisure since they must follow a course of treatment prescribed by a doctor.

Should the referring court have to conclude that the objectives do differ, the national legislation must lay down an obligation on the employer to grant the worker concerned a different period of annual leave proposed by him which is compatible with any overriding reasons relating to the interests of the employer, without excluding in advance the possibility that that period may fall outside the reference period for the annual leave in question.

(see paras 28-30, 32, 34, operative part)
Article 175(1) of Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States are not required to apply the rounding-up rule laid down in that provision where the deductible proportion is calculated in accordance with one of the derogating methods set out in Article 173(2) of that directive.

Article 184 et seq. of Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States are required to apply the rounding-up rule laid down in Article 175(1) of that directive in the event of adjustment where, under their national legislation, the deductible proportion has been calculated in accordance with one of the methods set out in Article 173(2) of that directive or in the third subparagraph of Article 17(5) of Sixth Directive 77/388 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment, only where that rule was applied to determine the initial amount of the deduction or where the factor whose change makes the adjustment necessary consists of a new application of the calculation method set out in the second subparagraph of Article 173(1) of that directive or of the rounding-up rule.

A reading of Articles 184 and 185(1) of Directive 2006/112 in conjunction with on another reveals that, on the one hand, where an adjustment proves to be necessary because of the change in one of the factors used to determine the amount to be deducted, the amount of that adjustment must be calculated in such a way that the final amount to be deducted corresponds to that to which the taxable person would have been entitled if that change had been initially taken into account. On the other hand, the calculation of that amount entails taking into account the same factors as those initially taken into consideration, with the exception of the factor that has been changed.

(see paras 47, 50, 51, operative part 2)
Agriculture—Common agricultural policy—EAFRD financing—Grant of aid and premiums—Obligation on Member States to organise an effective system of administrative controls and on-the-spot checks—Scope

(Commission Regulation No 796/2004, Art. 35, and No 1975/2006, Arts 10(2), 14(2) and 15(2))

(see paras 58, 60, 61, 68, 69, 73)
Article 71 of Regulation No 1698/2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation under which expenditure is eligible for an EAFRD contribution to the co-financing of an operation selected by the Managing Authority of the rural development programme in question or under its responsibility only where it is incurred after the adoption of the decision granting such support.

Under Article 71(3) of Regulation No 1698/2005, the rules on eligibility of expenditure are, as a general rule, to be set at national level, subject to the special conditions laid down in that regulation for certain rural development measures. It follows that, in so far as that provision confers on the Member States the power in principle to set the rules on eligibility of expenditure, the Member States are justified in laying down a condition of eligibility as regards expenditure, inter alia linked to that expenditure being incurred after the approval of the application for support. Furthermore, since the objective of Regulation No 1698/2005 is, as set out in recital 5 thereof, to support rural development, a condition limiting the eligibility of expenditure relating to a co-financed operation only to expenditure incurred after the decision granting support is consistent with that objective since it ensures a more efficient allocation of EAFRD funds.

(see paras 37, 39, 41, 45, operative part 1)
The first indent of Article 202(3) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1791/2006 of 20 November 2006, must be interpreted as meaning that a legal person of which an employee, who is not its statutory representative, is responsible for the unlawful introduction of goods in the customs territory of the European Union, may be regarded as the debtor of the customs debt resulting from that introduction, where that employee introduced the goods at issue while carrying out the assignment entrusted to him by his employer and while fulfilling the instructions given, to that end, by another of the employer’s employees, empowered to give such instructions in the performance of his own duties, and who thus acted within the scope of his remit, in the name and on behalf of his employer.

(see para. 34, operative part 1)
By setting out the reasons why it took the view that the appellant was able to pay the amount of the fine imposed on it for infringement of the EU competition rules, the General Court is, without committing an error of law, entitled to respond to the complaint made to it alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment by finding that the financial situations of other undertakings fined for the same infringement are different and that it is in having regard to those differences, and not in the light of the manner in which those undertakings participated in the infringement, that the Commission had been of the opinion that it was appropriate to reduce the amount of the fine at issue in part, calculated to take account of each of the undertakings’ inability to pay.

The obligation on the General Court to state reasons is satisfied where, in the context of the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, the amount of the fine imposed on an undertaking for infringement of the competition rules, firstly, taking into account its participation in a single infringement, secondly, setting out the actual facts of that undertaking’s situation which it considered relevant concerning, in particular, the seriousness and duration of its participation in that infringement, thirdly, in determining the amount of the fine, taking account also of the need to ensure that it was a sufficient deterrent and of the principle of proportionality and, finally, not regarding itself as being bound by either the Commission’s calculations or its guidelines, it carried out its own assessment of the amount of the fine by taking account of all the facts of the case, even if it did not specify the calculation method which it used nor, in particular, state the weighting it gave to each of the relevant facts of which it took account in that regard. It is only inasmuch as the Court of Justice considers that the level of the penalty is not merely inappropriate, but also excessive to the point of being disproportionate, that it would have to find that the General Court erred in law, on account of the inappropriateness of the amount of a fine.

(see paras 53-56)
While the Member States are obliged, in the case of a self-diagnosis device, to require the information needed for the safe use of that device to be translated into their official languages, they cannot go so far as to require the importer of such a device, that bears a CE marking and that has undergone conformity assessment by a notified body, to submit that device to a notified body for an assessment of the conformity of alterations caused by that translation requirement.

Article 9 of Directive 98/79 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices must be interpreted as meaning that it does not require a parallel importer of a device for self-diagnosis for measuring blood sugar that bears a CE marking and that was the subject of a conformity assessment by a notified body to undertake a further assessment in order to certify the conformity of the labelling of that device and the instructions for its use as a result of their translation into the official language of the Member State of importation.

The obligation to undertake a conformity assessment laid down in Article 9 of Directive 98/79 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices is imposed solely on a manufacturer. As defined in Article 1(2)(f) of that directive, that concept means the person who places a device on the market under his own name. When a person purchases in a Member State in vitro diagnostic devices after they have been placed on the EU market by their manufacturer in order thereafter to re-sell them in another Member State, but makes no alteration to their original packaging or presentation other than to attach a label and instructions for use written in the official language(s) of the Member State of importation, that person cannot be regarded as having repackaged that device or having placed it on the market ‘under his own name’.

That being the case, the parallel importer of devices intended for self-diagnosis, unless he markets those devices under his own name, cannot be regarded as a ‘manufacturer’, within the meaning of Article 1(2)(f) of Directive 98/79. Consequently, that importer cannot be required to submit the devices concerned for a further conformity assessment procedure under Article 9 of that directive in order to certify the conformity of the alterations made to the labelling of that device and the instructions for its use as a result of their translation into the official language of the Member State of importation.

(see paras 43, 44)
A commercial practice consisting of the sale of a computer equipped with pre-installed software without any option for the consumer to purchase the same model of computer not equipped with pre-installed software does not in itself constitute an unfair commercial practice within the meaning of Article 5(2) of Directive 2005/29 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Directive 84/450, Directives 97/7, 98/27 and 2002/65 and Regulation No 2006/2004, unless such a practice is contrary to the requirements of professional diligence and materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer with regard to the product, a matter which is for the national court to determine by taking account of the specific circumstances of the case.

In that regard, in the context of the overall assessment of the respect for the requirements of professional diligence, it is for the national court to take into account circumstances such as whether the consumer was correctly informed, whether the combined offer met the expectations of a significant proportion of consumers and whether it was possible for the consumer to accept all the elements of that offer or to cancel the sale. Those circumstances are likely to satisfy the requirements of honest market practices or of the principle of good faith in the field of the manufacturing of computer equipment for the general public, the trader thereby demonstrating care towards the consumer.

Furthermore, it is for the referring court to determine whether, during such a sale of a computer equipped with pre-installed software without any option for the consumer to purchase the same model of computer not equipped with pre-installed software, the ability of that consumer to make an informed transactional decision was appreciably impaired, when a consumer has been duly informed, prior to the purchase, that the model of computer that is the subject matter of the sale was not marketed without pre-installed software and that he was therefore, in principle, free to choose another model of computer, or another brand, with similar technical specifications, sold without software or used with different software.

(see paras 37, 41, 42, operative part 1)
In order to determine whether an act may be the subject of an action for annulment, importance must be given to the substance of that act, the form in which an act or decision is adopted being in principle irrelevant to the right to challenge such acts. Only measures the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position may be the subject of an action for annulment. Thus, an action for annulment is, in principle, only available against a measure by which the institution concerned definitively determines its position upon the conclusion of an administrative procedure. On the other hand, intermediate measures whose purpose is to prepare for the definitive decision, or measures which are mere confirmation of an earlier measure or purely implementing measures, cannot be treated as acts open to challenge, in that such acts are not intended to produce autonomous binding legal effects compared with those of the act of the EU institution which is prepared, confirmed or enforced.

The letters by which the Commission demands the payment of default interest by the parent companies with regard to a fine, imposed on their subsidiary, but for which those companies are jointly and severally liable, must be regarded as producing binding legal effects of such a nature as to affect the interests of the parent companies, by bringing about a distinct change in their legal position, where the original amount of the fine was paid in full by the subsidiary and, therefore, the commission was no longer entitled to claim the payment of default interest from the parent companies. Therefore, the General Court has not committed an error of law by treating such letters as challengeable acts within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU.

(see paras 35-37, 40, 45, 48, 49)
In a situation such as that in the main proceedings, Articles 1(1) and 2(1)(a) and (b) of Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts, as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which a decision allowing a tenderer to participate in a procurement procedure — a decision allegedly adopted in breach of EU public procurement law or the national legislation transposing it — is not classed among the preparatory acts of a contracting authority which may be subject to an independent judicial review.

As the Court has already held, although Directive 89/665 has not formally laid down the time from which the possibility of review, as provided for in Article 1(1), must be open, the objective of that directive, as referred to in the preceding paragraph, does not authorise Member States to make the exercise of the right to apply for review conditional on the fact that the public procurement procedure in question has formally reached a particular stage (see, to that effect, judgment of11 January 2005, Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau (C‑26/03, EU:C:2005:5, paragraph 38). As regards, more specifically, a decision such as that at issue in the main proceedings allowing a tenderer to participate in a public procurement procedure, the fact that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings requires, in all cases, a tenderer to wait for a decision awarding the contract in question before it may apply for a review of a decision allowing another tenderer to participate in that procurement procedure infringes the provisions of Directive 89/665.

(see paras 31, 34, 37, operative part 1)
It follows from Article 1 (‘Principles’) of Anti-Dumping Basic Regulation No 1225/2009 that the anti-dumping investigation concerns a specific product called ‘the product under consideration’, defined by the EU institutions at the time the investigation is initiated. That definition of ‘the product under consideration’, however, does not prevent the EU institutions from subdividing the product into individual product types or models or from relying, for the purposes of calculating the dumping margin, on model-by-model or type-by-type comparisons between the normal value and the export price.

By contrast, in the light of its wording, objective and context, Article 2(11) of the Basic Regulation cannot be interpreted as allowing export transactions to the European Union relating to certain types of the product under consideration to be excluded from the calculation of the dumping margin. On the contrary, it follows from that provision that the EU institutions are required to take into account all those transactions for the purposes of that calculation.

It follows that, in the absence of ‘comparable prices’, where a fair comparison cannot be made between the normal value and the export price of certain types of the product under consideration covered by the dumping investigation, the EU institutions may either decide to exclude that product type from the definition of ‘the product under consideration’ or, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the Basic Regulation, construe the normal value for that product type so as to take into consideration export transactions of that same product type for the purposes of calculating the dumping margin.

(see paras 56, 59, 61, 67, 70)
Article 288 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that it does not, in itself, preclude the possibility that provisions of a directive that are capable of having direct effect may be relied on against a body that does not display all the characteristics listed in paragraph 20 of the judgment of 12 July 1990, Foster and Others (C‑188/89, EU:C:1990:313), read together with those mentioned in paragraph 18 of that judgment.

Paragraph 20 of that judgment must be read in the light of paragraph 18 of the same judgment, where the Court stated that such provisions can be relied on by an individual against organisations or bodies which are subject to the authority or control of the State or have special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable to relations between individuals. Accordingly, as stated, in essence, by the Advocate General in points 53 and 77 of her Opinion, the conditions that the organisation concerned must, respectively, be subject to the authority or control of the State, and must possess special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable to relations between individuals cannot be conjunctive (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 December 1997, Kampelmann and Others, C‑253/96 to C‑258/96, EU:C:1997:585, paragraphs 46 and 47, and of 7 September 2006, Vassallo, C‑180/04, EU:C:2006:518, paragraph 26).

(see paras 27-29, operative part 1)