ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 14 of Directive 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which provides that the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the legal costs incurred by the successful party, which offers the courts responsible for making that order the possibility of taking into account features specific to the case before it, and provides for a flat-rate scheme for the reimbursement of costs for the assistance of a lawyer, subject to the condition that those rates ensure that the costs to be borne by the unsuccessful party are reasonable, which it is for the referring court to determine.

Taking account of recital 17 and Articles 3(1) and 14 of that directive, such legislation is capable of being justified, in particular if that legislation is intended to exclude the reimbursement of excessive costs due to unusually high fees agreed between the successful party and its lawyer or due to the provision, by the lawyer, of services that are not considered necessary in order to ensure the enforcement of the intellectual property rights concerned. By contrast, the requirement that the unsuccessful party must bear reasonable legal costs cannot justify legislation imposing a flat-rate significantly below the average rate actually charged for the services of a lawyer in that Member State. Such legislation would be incompatible with Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/48, which states that the procedures and remedies provided for by that directive must be dissuasive or compromises the principal aim pursued by Directive 2004/48, of ensuring a high level of protection of intellectual property rights in the internal market.

However, Article 14 of that directive precludes national legislation providing flat-rates which, owing to the maximum amounts that it contains being too low, do not ensure that, at the very least, that a significant and appropriate part of the reasonable costs incurred by the successful party are borne by the unsuccessful party. That question cannot be assessed independently of the costs that the successful party actually incurred in respect of the assistance of a lawyer, provided they are reasonable. If the requirement of proportionality does not imply that the unsuccessful party must necessarily reimburse the entirety of the costs incurred by the other party, it does however mean that the successful party should have the right to reimbursement of, at the very least, a significant and appropriate part of the reasonable costs actually incurred.

(see paras 25-27, 29, 32, operative part 1)
Article 1(2) of Regulation No 1924/2006 on nutrition and health claims made on foods, as amended by Regulation No 1047/2012, must be interpreted as meaning that nutrition or health claims made in a commercial communication on a food which is intended to be delivered as such to the final consumer, if that communication is addressed not to the final consumer, but exclusively to health professionals, falls within the scope of that regulation.

The concept of a commercial communication within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Regulation No 1924/2006 must be understood as covering, inter alia, a communication made in the form of advertising foods, designed to promote, directly or indirectly, those foods. Such a communication may also take the form of an advertising document which food business operators address to health professionals, containing nutritional or health claims within the meaning of that regulation, in order that those professionals recommend, if appropriate, that their patients purchase and/or consume that food. In that regard, Article 1(2) of Regulation No 1924/2006 does not include any details on the addressee of the commercial communication and makes no distinction according to whether that addressee is a final consumer or a health professional. It follows that it is the product itself, and not the communication of which it is the subject matter, which must necessarily be aimed at consumers. It cannot be ruled out that the health professionals themselves may be misled by nutrition or health claims which are false, deceptive, or even mendacious. Therefore, those health professionals risk forwarding, in all good faith, incorrect information on foods which are the subject of a commercial communication to final consumers with whom they have a relationship. Consequently, the application of Regulation No 1924/2006 to the nutrition or health claims made in a commercial communication addressed to professionals contributes, in the context of the internal market, to a high level of consumer protection.

(see paras 29-31, 44, 45, 47, 54, operative part)
Customs union — Common Customs Tariff — Tariff headings — Interpretation — Explanatory notes to the combined nomenclature — Obligation that these be consistent with the provisions of the combined nomenclature

EU law — Interpretation — Methods — Interpretation in the light of the international agreements concluded by the Union — Interpretation of Regulation No 2658/87 in the light of the Agreement on trade in information technology products

(Council Regulation No 2658/87, as amended by Regulations No 1549/2006 and No 1214/2007, Annex I)
Case C‑189/15

Istituto di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientifico (IRCCS) — Fondazione Santa Lucia

v

Cassa conguaglio per il settore elettrico and Others

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive 2003/96/EC — Taxation of energy products and electricity — Tax reductions — Substantive scope — Incentives in respect of the amounts covering general electricity charges — Article 17 — Energy-intensive businesses — Incentives granted to such businesses in the manufacturing sector alone — Lawfulness)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber), 18 January 2017

Tax provisions — Harmonisation of laws — Taxation of energy products and electricity — Directive 2003/96 — Tax reductions — Concept — Incentives granted under national law to energy-intensive businesses on the amounts covering general electricity charges — Included — Conditions — Verification by the national court — Incentives granted to such businesses in the manufacturing sector alone — Lawfulness

(Council Directive 2003/96, Art. 4(1))

Article 17(1) of Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘tax reductions’ covers the incentives granted, under national law, to energy-intensive businesses, as defined in that provision, in respect of amounts, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, covering general electricity charges, subject to verification by the referring court of the facts and the rules of national law on which this answer from the Court is based.

Article 17(1) of Directive 2003/96 must be interpreted as not precluding national rules which provide for tax reductions on the consumption of electricity in favour of energy-intensive businesses, within the meaning of that provision, in the manufacturing sector alone. In accordance with Article 17(1)(a) of Directive 2003/96, provided the minimum levels of taxation prescribed in that directive are respected on average for each business, Member States may apply tax reductions on the consumption of electricity in favour of energy-intensive businesses. That provision also defines the concept of ‘energy-intensive business’ and states, in the context of that definition, that Member States may apply more restrictive criteria, such as sales value, process and sector definitions. It follows therefrom that, for the purposes of that provision, the Member States remain free to restrict the benefit of tax reductions for energy-intensive businesses to those in one or more industrial sectors. Consequently, that provision does not preclude national rules, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which grant incentives in respect of the amounts covering general electricity charges to the manufacturing sector alone.

(see paras 44, 47-49, 52, operative part 1, 2)
Case C‑539/15

Daniel Bowman

v

Pensionsversicherungsanstalt

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Social policy — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Directive 2000/78/EC — Equal treatment in employment and occupation — Article 2(1) and (2) — Discrimination on grounds of age — Collective labour agreement — Extension of the period of advancement from the first to the second step in the salary scale — Indirect unequal treatment on grounds of age)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber), 21 December 2016

Social policy — Equal treatment in employment and occupation — Directive 2000/78 — Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age — Collective labour agreement laying down a longer period of advancement from the first to the second salary step than that which applies to advancements between subsequent steps — Lawfulness — Condition — Longer period applicable to any employee who benefits from account being taken of periods of school education for the purpose of his classification in the salary steps

(Council Directive 2000/78, Art. 2(1) and (2) )

Article 2(1) and (2) of Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation must be interpreted as not precluding a national collective labour agreement under which an employee, who benefits from account being taken of periods of school education for the purpose of his classification in the salary steps, is subject to a longer period of advancement between the first and second salary step, as long as that extension applies to every employee benefiting from the inclusion of those periods, including retroactively to those having already reached the next steps.

Such an agreement does not lead to a difference in treatment on grounds of age in respect of such an employee.

In addition, the classification of Administration employees in the salary steps depends in particular on completed periods of school education. Those periods of school education may be taken into account for the purposes of that classification, regardless of the age of the employee at the time of recruitment. Therefore, such a scheme is based on criterion which is neither inextricably nor indirectly linked to the age of employees.

Consequently, even if a young worker, newly recruited and with little experience, who asks for his periods of school education to be taken into account for classification in the salary steps, will, in practice, be subject to the extension in the period for advancement within the first step, it remains the case that an older worker benefiting from a substantial period of service with the Administration and making an identical request, will also and on the same grounds, potentially or retroactively, be subject to the same extension.

(see paras 23, 28, 30, 33, operative part)
An action for annulment is available against all measures adopted by the EU institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have binding legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position.

That is not so in the case of the Eurogroup statement of 25 March 2013 concerning, in particular, the restructuring of the banking sector in Cyprus. The Commission and the European Central Bank were, in accordance with Article 13(3) of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), entrusted by the ESM’s Board of Governors with the task of negotiating with the authorities of a Member State a macro-economic adjustment programme to be set out in the form of a memorandum of understanding. In that regard, the role of the Commission and the Bank as defined by Article 1 of Protocol No 14 on the Eurogroup cannot be wider than the role accorded to those institutions by the ESM Treaty. Whilst the ESM Treaty entrusts to the Commission and the Bank certain tasks relating to the attainment of the objectives of that Treaty, first, the duties conferred on the Commission and the Bank within the ESM Treaty do not entail the exercise of any power to make decisions of their own and, secondly, the activities pursued by those two institutions within the ESM Treaty commit the ESM alone.

Furthermore, the fact that the Commission and the Bank participate in the meetings of the Eurogroup does not alter the nature of the latter’s statements and cannot result in the statement at issue being considered to be the expression of a decision-making power of those two EU institutions. Nor is there anything in that Eurogroup statement reflecting a decision of the Commission and the Bank to create a legal obligation on the Member State concerned to implement the measures which it contains. That statement, of a purely informative nature, is intended to inform the general public of the existence of a political agreement between the Eurogroup and the authorities of the Member State concerned reflecting a common intention to pursue the negotiations in accordance with the statement’s terms.

(see paras 51-53, 57-59)
However, the situation underlying the question referred for a preliminary ruling concerns two applications based on EU law, namely an application for refugee status and an application for subsidiary protection status.

Observance of the principle of equivalence requires that a national rule be applied without distinction to procedures based on EU law and those based on national law.

In a reference for a preliminary ruling relating to the question whether the principle of equivalence must be interpreted as precluding a national procedural rule which requires an application for subsidiary protection status to be made within a period of 15 working days of notification, by the competent authority, that the applicant whose asylum application has been rejected may make an application for subsidiary protection, invoking the principle of equivalence is irrelevant.

The principle of effectiveness must be interpreted as precluding a national procedural rule which requires an application for subsidiary protection status to be made within a period of 15 working days of notification, by the competent authority, that an applicant whose asylum application has been rejected may make an application for subsidiary protection.

Under the principle of effectiveness, such a national procedural rule must ensure that persons applying for subsidiary protection are actually in a position to avail themselves of the rights conferred on them by Directive 2004/83 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted. In that regard, the procedure for examining applications for subsidiary protection is of particular importance inasmuch as it enables applicants for international protection to safeguard their most basic rights by the grant of such protection.

In that context, taking account of the difficulties such applicants may face because of, inter alia, the difficult human and material situation in which they may find themselves, such a time limit is particularly short and does not ensure, in practice, that all those applicants are afforded a genuine opportunity to submit an application for subsidiary protection and, where appropriate, to be granted subsidiary protection status. Therefore, such a time limit cannot reasonably be justified for the purposes of ensuring the proper conduct of the procedure for examining an application for that status.

Accordingly, the national procedural rule at issue is capable of compromising the ability of applicants for subsidiary protection actually to avail themselves of the rights conferred on them by Directive 2004/83.

(see paras 39, 45, 46, 48, 49, operative part)
Under Article 65(2) of Regulation No 207/2009 on the European Union trade mark, the General Court may annul or alter a decision of a Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office only ‘on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaty, of [that] Regulation or of any rule of law relating to their application or misuse of power’. It follows that the General Court may annul or alter a decision against which an action has been brought only if, at the date on which that decision was adopted, it was vitiated by one of those grounds for annulment or alteration. The General Court may not, however, annul or alter that decision on grounds which come into existence subsequent to its adoption.

In view of those considerations, and insofar as the actual date of revocation of the earlier mark which formed the basis for the opposition to the registration of the mark applied for is subsequent to the decision of the Board of Appeal on the opposition, the General Court is not required, during its review of the lawfulness of that decision, to take into account the EUIPO decision revoking that earlier mark.

(see paras 27, 30)
Case C‑544/15

Sahar Fahimian

v

Bundesrepublik Deutschland

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from the Verwaltungsgericht Berlin)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Area of freedom, security and justice — Directive 2004/114/EC — Article 6(1)(d) — Conditions of admission of third country nationals — Refusal of admission — Concept of ‘threat to public security’ — Margin of discretion)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 4 April 2017

Border controls, asylum and immigration — Immigration policy — Admission of third country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service — Directive 2004/114 — General conditions of admission — No threat to public policy, public security or public health — Margin of discretion of the competent national authorities — Refusal of admission to a third country national holding a degree from a university which is the subject of EU restrictive measures — Lawfulness — Conditions — Judicial review of the refusal — Conditions

(Council Directive 2004/114, Art. 6)

Article 6(1)(d) of Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service must be interpreted as meaning that the competent national authorities, where a third country national has applied to them for a visa for study purposes, have a wide discretion in ascertaining, in the light of all the relevant elements of the situation of that national, whether he represents a threat, if only potential, to public security. That assessment may thus take into account not only the personal conduct of the applicant but also other elements relating, in particular, to his professional career.

That provision must also be interpreted as not precluding the competent national authorities from refusing to admit to the territory of the Member State concerned, for study purposes, a third country national who holds a degree from a university which is the subject of EU restrictive measures because of its large scale involvement with the Iranian Government in military or related fields, and who plans to carry out research in that Member State in a field that is sensitive for public security, if the elements available to those authorities give reason to fear that the knowledge acquired by that person during his research may subsequently be used for purposes contrary to public security. It is for the national court hearing an action brought against the decision of the competent national authorities to refuse to grant the visa sought to ascertain whether that decision is based on sufficient grounds and a sufficiently solid factual basis.

(see paras 40, 50, operative part)
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1249/2011 of 29 November 2011 concerning the classification of certain goods in the Combined Nomenclature must be interpreted as meaning that it does not apply by analogy to products with the characteristics of the three camera models in the GoPro Hero 3 Black Edition range at issue in Case C‑435/15.

Those cameras are not identical to ‘pocket sized video recorders’ covered by that regulation, since, as the referring court notes, those products differ, inter alia, in respect of their capacity to take photographs and by the fact that they do not have a digital zoom, loudspeaker or a built-in internal memory.

As the cameras at issue in Case C‑435/15 are not sufficiently similar to the products which are classified under Implementing Regulation No 1249/2011, that regulation does not apply to them.

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 876/2014 of 8 August 2014 concerning the classification of certain goods in the Combined Nomenclature must be interpreted as meaning that it is applicable by analogy to products with the characteristics of the three camera models in the GoPro Hero 3 Black Edition range at issue in that case, but that it is invalid.

In the present case, Implementing Regulation No 876/2014 classifies, under subheading 8525 80 99 of the CN, ‘action cameras’, without requiring that those cameras may be used independently to record external video signals, that is to say, without relying on external materials or software with which they were not originally equipped. Such an independent recording capacity is a prerequisite for the classification of goods under tariff subheading 8525 80 99 of the CN. Failing that, the products must be classified not under subheading 8525 80 99 but rather under subheading 8525 80 91 of the CN (judgment of 5 March 2015, Vario Tek, C‑178/14, not published, EU:C:2015:152, point 32).

It follows that Implementing Regulation No 876/2014, in so far as it classifies ‘action cameras’ under subheading 8525 80 99 of the CN without specifying that they must, for the purpose of that classification, be capable of recording independently from external video signals, is incompatible with the scope of that subheading.

(see paras 36, 42, 43, 50, 51, 53, operative part 1 and 2)