ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. Non-contractual liability - Scope - Acts of the Community institutions or acts of servants of the Community - Meaning - Whether instruments of primary Community law are covered - Not covered - Position where damage is attributable to the Single European Act

(EC Treaty, Arts 7a (now, after amendment, Art. 14 EC) and 215, second para. (now Art. 288, second para., EC))

2. Non-contractual liability - Breach by the Community institutions of a legal obligation to act - Demise of the profession of customs agent as a result of the Single European Act - Obligation of the institutions to act - None - Obligation of the Community to compensate members of the profession - None

(EC Treaty, Art. 215, second para. (now Art. 288, second para., EC))

Summary

1. As regards non-contractual liability on the part of the Community, the cause of the damage suffered by customs agents resulting from the abolition of customs and tax frontiers between Member States is not attributable to the Council or the Commission. The direct and determining cause of that damage is neither the adoption of measures of secondary legislation nor the absence of adequate compensation and support measures, but Article 13 of the Single Act, which inserted in the EEC Treaty an Article 8a which later became Article 7a (now, after amendment, Article 14 EC); this provides in particular that the internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers. The Single Act, which was adopted by the Member States, is not, therefore, attributable to the above institutions and consequently cannot give rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the Community.

( see para. 17 )

2. Omissions by the Community institutions can give rise to liability on the part of the Community only when the institutions have infringed a legal obligation to act under a provision of Community law. In respect of the demise of the profession of customs agent there is no such obligation under the Single Act itself or under any other provision of Community law, or under any general principle of law by virtue of which the Community would be obliged to compensate a person who has been subject to a measure expropriating his property or restricting his freedom to enjoy his right to property, since the Community cannot be obliged to make good damage caused by acts which cannot be imputed to it. It follows that the Community cannot be obliged to compensate members of that profession. However, the possibility cannot be excluded that an obligation to provide compensation might arise under the domestic law of the Member State on whose territory the intra-Community customs agent carried out his activities.

( see para. 18 )
29

By contrast, in the case of a probationary official entitled to the household allowance, the precarious nature of the engagement during the probationary period has the principal effect of making it reasonable for the whole of the household not to move to the official's new place of work definitively until after his appointment has been confirmed. It would be seriously disruptive of the social and economic lives of an official's family and dependants if, on one spouse's appointment on a probationary basis, the whole household were to be expected to move to the official's place of work, only then to face the possibility that, if the appointment is not confirmed at the end of the probationary period, they would have either to return to their place of origin - but not normally to the same residence - and try to reestablish the economic and social links that had earlier been broken, or to remain in the place of work to which the appointment had been made, with the difficulty of finding new employment and establishing social and educational links in an unfamiliar environment. By allowing the probationary official to maintain his previous residence, where the rest of his household remains pending the completion of his probationary period, but then expecting the official to remove his household shortly thereafter, the regulations ensure a fair balance between the legitimate needs of the probationary official and his household on the one hand and the needs of the Community institutions and of proper budgetary control and efficient administration on the other.
Order of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber, extended composition) of 25 May 1998. - Broome & Wellington v Commission of the European Communities. - Action for annulment - Notice of initiation of an an anti-dumping proceeding - Inadmissibility. - Case T-267/97.



European Court reports 1998 Page II-02191



Summary



Keywords

Actions for annulment - Actionable measures - Definition - Acts having binding legal effects - Commission decision initiating an anti-dumping proceeding - Preparatory act

(EC Treaty, Art. 173; Council Regulation No 384/96)

Summary

Measures whose legal effects are binding and are capable of affecting the applicants' interests by clearly altering their legal position constitute acts which may be the subject of an action for annulment under Article 173 of the Treaty. In the case of acts adopted by a procedure involving several stages, in principle only measures definitively laying down the position of the institution on the conclusion of the procedure constitute acts which may be contested, as opposed to intermediate measures intended to pave the way for the final decision, whose legality may only be challenged in an action brought against the final decision. Moreover, only measures immediately and irreversibly affecting the legal position of the undertakings concerned are of such a nature as to justify, before completion of the administrative procedure, the admissibility of an action for annulment.

Since the act by which the Commission initiates anti-dumping proceedings is a purely preparatory act, it cannot be regarded as an actionable measure. It follows from the provisions of anti-dumping Regulation No 384/96 that the Commission is responsible for carrying out investigations and deciding, on the basis of those investigations, whether to terminate the proceedings or to continue them, either by adopting provisional measures or by proposing to the Council that it adopt definitive measures.

That conclusion cannot be called into question either by the fact that, before a particular complaint was submitted, the Commission's spokesman had stated that the Commission would immediately open a procedure if a new complaint were lodged - which is a matter which falls to be examined in connection with the substantive legality of the Notice of Initiation - or by any greater or lesser degree of certainty as regards the imposition of anti-dumping duties since, in law, the initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding does not necessarily result in such duties being imposed. Moreover, the Notice of Initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding does not have the legal effect of compelling the undertakings concerned to alter their commercial practices or to cooperate in the investigation.
Order of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) of 16 November 1998. - Nederlandse Antillen v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities. - Disjoinder - Suspension - Declining of jurisdiction. - Joined cases T-163/97 and T-179/97.



European Court reports 1998 Page II-04123



Keywords

Procedure - Division of jurisdiction between the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance - Action, pending before the Court of First Instance, brought by a natural or legal person under Article 173, fourth paragraph, and Article 178 of the Treaty, concerning the introduction, in the first case by the Commission and in the second by both the Commission and the Council, of safeguard measures in respect of imports - Another action, also pending before the Court of First Instance, brought by the same person under Article 173, fourth paragraph, of the Treaty, concerning the introduction of those measures by the Council - Joinder of the two cases - Action pending before the Court of Justice, brought by a Member State, for annulment of the Council measure - In the interests of the proper administration of justice that the Court of Justice should take into consideration the arguments of the natural or legal person - Disjoinder of the two cases pending before the Court of First Instance - Jurisdiction in the second case declined by the Court of First Instance - Proceedings before the Court of First Instance stayed in the first case

(EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 47, third para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 50)
Case T-100/98

Anthony Goldstein

v

Commission of the European Communities

‛Action for damages — Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law’

Order of the Court of First Instance (Fourth Chamber), 28 October 1998 II-4065

Summary of the Order

Non-contractual liability — Conditions — Publication by the Commission, for information purposes, of a fact-sheet concerning the recognition of diplomas and qualifications in medical practice — Fault on the part of the Commission — None

(EC Treaty, Art, 215, second para.)

There is manifestly no foundation in law in the case of an application brought by a national of a Member State holding general and specialist qualifications in medicine, gained in that State, seeking compensation for damage allegedly suffered as a result of the Commission's publication of a fact-sheet concerning the recognition of diplomas and qualifications for general and specialist medical practitioners which, in the view of the applicant, inadequately reflects the rules applicable to specialist medical practitioners in the aforementioned Member State.

No finding of fault can be made against the Commission where the fact-sheet contains, for persons who wish to obtain recognition of their diploma or qualifications, a general overview of the applicable Community law, a list of the Community and national legislative instruments in force and a Hst of useful addresses, accompanied by a disclaimer warning that such guidance as is given on Community law is for information purposes only.

Furthermore, inasmuch as the fact-sheet cannot, by reason of its nature and content, have any effect as regards the rules applicable to specialist medical practitioners trained and established in a particular Member State, the applicant is in no position to invoke any personal damage arising out of the information published by the Commission.
Keywords



Keywords

Procedure - Action rendered devoid of purpose - Death of the applicant and proceedings not continued by the successors - No need to adjudicate
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1 Procedure - Application initiating proceedings - Procedural requirements - Summary of the pleas in law relied upon - Incorporation of observations submitted in the course of the pre-litigation procedure - Whether admissible

(EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 19, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 44(1)(c))

2 Procedure - Application initiating proceedings - Summary of the pleas in law - Terminology - Whether obligatory to use the terms used in the Rules of Procedure - No such obligation

(EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 19, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 44(1)(c))

Summary

1 Under the first paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 44(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, all applications must indicate the subject-matter of the dispute and briefly state the grounds on which the application is based. Irrespective of any question of terminology, that statement must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the application, even without further information. In order to guarantee legal certainty and sound administration of justice it is necessary, for an action to be admissible, that the basic matters of law and fact relied on be indicated, at least in summary form, coherently and intelligibly in the application itself. Whilst the body of the application may be supported and supplemented on specific points by references to extracts from documents annexed thereto, a general reference to other documents, even those annexed to the application, cannot make up for the absence of the essential arguments in law which, in accordance with the abovementioned provisions, must appear in the application.

In those circumstances, the reproduction in the body of the application of the full text of observations submitted by the applicant in the course of the pre-litigation procedure, coupled with the express statement that they form the basis of the action, cannot be equated with mere reference to or reproduction of an annex.

2 The statement of pleas in the application need not match the terms and the order used in the Rules of Procedure and, whilst they may be expressed in terms of substance rather than legal classification, it may be sufficient if the application sets them out with sufficient clarity.
Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 14 August 1998. - Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v Commission of the European Communities. - Association arrangements for overseas countries and territories - Decisions 91/482/EEC and 97/803/EC - Regulation (EC) No 2553/97 - Proceedings for interim relief - Intervention - Urgency - None. - Case T-44/98 R.



European Court reports 1998 Page II-03079



Summary



Keywords

Applications for interim measures - Suspension of operation of a measure - Conditions for granting - Urgency - Serious and irreparable damage - Appraisal allowing for the Community institution's discretion - Financial damage

(EC Treaty, Art. 185; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2))

Summary

The urgency of an application for interim measures must be assessed in relation to the necessity for an interim order to prevent serious and irreparable damage to the party applying for those measures. It is for the party seeking suspension of the operation of a contested decision to prove that it cannot wait for the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering damage that would entail serious and irreparable consequences.

In view of the fact that the Council, in adopting Decision 97/803 introducing, within the framework of the association arrangements for overseas countries and territories, tariff quotas for the importation of certain agricultural products free of customs duties, exercised its discretion with regard to the choice of the most appropriate measure for preventing disruption of the Community market for the products at issue and in order to ensure that the judge hearing an application for interim relief does not interfere with that discretion in granting suspension of the operation of the contested decision, the applicant's request can be granted only if the urgency of the measures sought appears undeniable.

Purely financial damage cannot, save in exceptional circumstances, be regarded as irreparable since it can be made good by pecuniary compensation. The existence of exceptional circumstances may be found where it appears that, without the interim measure sought, the party concerned would be exposed to a situation liable to endanger its very existence or to alter its market share irreversibly.
ORDER OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (First Chamber)

29 April 2002

Case T-70/98

Wolfgang Hilden

v

Commission of the European Communities

‛Officials — Request for review of classification in grade — Action — New fact — Reasonable period — Inadmissibility’

Full text in French II-265

Application for:

annulment of the Commission's decision of 8 January 1998 rejecting the applicant's request for a review of his classification in grade.

Held:

The application is dismissed as inadmissible. The parties are to bear their own costs.

Summary

Officials — Actions — Prior complaint through official channels — Time-limits — Matter of public policy — Expiry — Reopening — Condition — New fact — To be put forward within a reasonable period

(Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91)

An action brought by an official before the Court of First Instance must be held to be inadmissible if the pre-litigation procedure has not followed its proper course. In that respect, the time-limits prescribed in Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations, being designed to ensure legal certainty, are a matter of public policy and are binding on the parties and the Court. An official cannot therefore revive for himself a right of appeal against a decision which has become definitive upon the expiry of the abovementioned time-limits by submitting a request to the appointing authority under Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations. However, the existence of a new and substantive fact may justify the submission of a request for the reexamination of such a decision. In order to be able to put forward such a fact effectively, it is for the official to submit his request through official channels within a reasonable period. Whether such a period is reasonable must be determined when it has ended, that is to say, on the day when the request is submitted.

(see paras 38-39, 41, 43)

See: 231/84 Valentini v Commission [1985] ECR 3027, para. 14; T-34/91 Whitehead v Commission [1992] ECR II-1723, para. 18; T-495/93 Carrer and Others v Court of Justice [1994] ECRSC I-A-201 and II-651, para. 20; T-112/94 Moat v Commission [1995] ECRSC I-A-37 and II-135, para. 25; T-202/97 Koopman v Commission [1998] ECRSC I-A-163 and II-511, para. 24; T-42/97 Lebedef v Commission [1998] ECRSC I-A-371 and II-1071, para. 25; T-192/99 Dunnett and Others v EIB [2001] ECR II-813, para. 52
Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 21 July 1999. - DSR-Senator Lines GmbH v Commission of the European Communities. - Competition - Payment of a fine - Bank guarantee - Proceedings for interim relief - Suspension of operation of a measure - Urgency - None. - Case T-191/98 R.



European Court reports 1999 Page II-02531



Summary



Keywords

1 Applications for interim measures - Suspension of operation of a measure - Interim relief - Conditions for granting - Prima facie case - Urgency - Cumulative requirements - Balancing of all the interests at stake

(EC Treaty, Arts 185 and 186 (now Arts 242 EC and 243 EC); Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2))

2 Applications for interim measures - Suspension of operation of a measure - Suspension of operation of the obligation to lodge a bank guarantee as a condition for postponing the immediate recovery of a fine - Conditions for granting - Exceptional circumstances - Situation of the group to which the undertaking belongs to be taken into account

(EC Treaty, Arts 185 and 186 (now Arts 242 EC and 243 EC); Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2))

Summary

1 Article 104(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance provides that applications for interim measures must state the circumstances giving rise to urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the measures applied for. Those requirements are cumulative, so that an application for suspension of operation must be dismissed if one of them is not met. Where necessary, the court hearing an application for interim relief also balances the interests at stake.

2 An application for suspension of operation of a measure, the object of which is to obtain dispensation from the obligation to provide a bank guarantee as a condition for a fine not being recovered immediately, may be granted only in exceptional circumstances.

In order to assess the applicant's ability to provide a bank guarantee without jeopardising its existence, account should also be taken of the group of undertakings to which it belongs directly or indirectly, particularly with regard to the possibility of providing the security which the banks might require.
Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 15 December 1999. - Cho Yang Shipping Co. Ltd v Commission of the European Communities. - Competition - Payment of a fine - Bank guarantee - Proceedings for interim relief - Urgency - Interim measures. - Case T-191/98 R II.



European Court reports 1999 Page II-03909



Summary



Keywords

1 Applications for interim measures - Suspension of operation of a measure - Interim measures - Conditions for granting - Urgency - Imminent risk of serious and irreparable damage - Meaning

(Arts 242 EC and 243 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2))

2 Applications for interim measures - Suspension of operation of a measure - Suspension of operation of the obligation to provide a bank guarantee as a condition for postponing recovery of a fine for infringement of the competition rules - Necessary to balance the various interests at stake

(Art. 242 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2))

Summary

1 In order for the condition for granting the suspension of operation of a measure or interim relief requiring the existence of a risk that the applicant will suffer serious and irreparable damage, it is not necessary to establish with absolute certainty that the harm is imminent. It is sufficient that the harm in question, particularly when it depends on the occurrence of a number of factors, should be foreseeable with a sufficient degree of probability.

2 When hearing an application for suspension of operation of the obligation under which an undertaking must provide the Commission with a bank guarantee in order for the recovery of a fine for infringement of the competition rules to be postponed, the Court must balance the various interests at play, in particular the Commission's interest in being able to recover the fine should the main action be dismissed and, more generally, the public interest in maintaining the deterrent effect of fines imposed by the Commission.
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

Actions for annulment - Natural or legal persons - Measures of direct and individual concern to them - Regulation laying down the conditions governing the provision of information generated by computerised reservation systems - Action by vendors of computerised reservation systems - Inadmissible

(Art. 230 EC, fourth para.; Council Regulation No 2299/89, Art. 2, as amended by Regulation No 3089/93, and Art. 6(1)(b)(v), as amended by Regulation No 323/1999)

Summary

$$The fact that it is possible to determine more or less precisely the number or even the identity of the persons to whom a measure applies by no means implies that it must be regarded as being of individual concern to them within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC as long as it is established that such application takes effect by virtue of an objective legal or factual situation defined by the measure in question.

The vendors of computerised reservation systems have not established that they are individually concerned by Article 6(1)(b)(v) of Regulation No 2299/89 on a code of conduct for computerised reservation systems, inserted by Regulation No 323/1999, which lays down the conditions under which a system vendor may provide information, statistics etc., generated by such a system. That provision is of concern to them in their objective capacity as system vendor, in the same way as any other system vendor, within the meaning of Article 2 of Regulation No 2299/89, as amended by Regulation No 3089/93.

( see paras 47, 50, 55 )