ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
25

In those circumstances, the Verwaltungsgericht Köln (Administrative Court, Cologne, Germany) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Is a national authority, when classifying a cosmetic product as a “medicinal product by function”, within the meaning of Article 1(2)(b) of [Directive 2001/83] and, in so doing, examining all the characteristics of that product, entitled to base the necessary scientific assessment of the pharmacological properties of that product and the risks associated with it on a “structural analogy”, in a case where the active substance used has only recently been developed, is comparable in its structure to pharmacological active substances which are already known and studied, but no comprehensive pharmacological, toxicological or clinical studies of the new substance in relation to its effects and its dosage, which are necessary only if [Directive 2001/83] is applicable, have been submitted by the applicant? (2) Is Article 1(2)(b) of [Directive 2001/83] to be interpreted as meaning that a product which is placed on the market as a cosmetic and which significantly modifies physiological functions by producing a pharmacological effect is to be regarded as a medicinal product by function only in the case where it has a specific positive health-promoting effect? Is it sufficient in this regard even that the product has on a person’s appearance a predominantly positive effect which, by increasing self-esteem or well-being, is of indirect benefit to health? (3) Or is that product also a medicinal product by function in the case where its positive effect is confined to an improvement in a person’s appearance, without being of direct or indirect benefit to health, but where it does not have properties that are exclusively harmful to health and is not therefore comparable to a narcotic?’
Appeal – Grounds – Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence – Inadmissibility – Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence – Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted – Plea alleging distortion of the facts – Need to indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted and show the errors of appraisal which led to that distortion

(Art. 256(1), 2nd subpara., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58(1))

(see paras 31-33)
2

The background to the dispute is set out in paragraphs 1 to 4 of the order under appeal as follows: ‘1 By letter of 30 January 2020, the [appellant] […], a member of the Senát Parlamentu České republiky (Senate of the Czech Republic), asked the European Commission to adopt binding and dissuasive measures designed to prevent or deal with the alleged conflict of interests of Mr Andrej Babiš, the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, in particular, first, by preventing the Members of the College of Commissioners, particularly its President, from meeting [Mr Babiš], and discussing with him questions connected with the Multiannual Financial Framework of the European Union for 2021-2027 and with the EU budget in general and, second, by adopting measures intended to put an end to the direct payments of agricultural aid from the EU budget in favour of certain companies over which Mr Babiš exercises control and of which he is the effective proprietor (‘the call to act’), on the ground of an alleged conflict of interests of that representative of the Czech Republic, which arises from his personal and family interests in the Agrofert group and the Synbiol group, both active in particular in the agri-food sector. 2 In its reply of 25 March 2020, the Commission, while noting that the call to act addressed to it corresponded, to a large extent, to that already addressed to the European Council and which was the subject of the action for failure to act, pending before the General Court on that date, in Case T‑715/19 Wagenknecht v European Council, explained that it had already taken the necessary and proportionate measures in order to protect the EU budget. The Commission referred, first, to the fact that no payments under the European Structural and Investment Funds had been made to the beneficiaries potentially affected by the alleged conflict of interest and, second, to the decision of 28 November 2019 suspending payments under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). In that context, the Commission stated that the latter decision had been challenged before the Court in Case T‑76/20, Czech Republic v Commission. Thus, because of that case, pending at the time and having subsequently been removed from the Register of the General Court following its withdrawal by the [appellant] (order of 25 August 2020, Czech Republic v Commission, T‑76/20, not published, EU:T:2020:379), the Commission had decided to refrain from making any further observations. 3 By email of 30 March 2020, the [appellant] again contacted the Commission, reiterating the questions which he had posed in the call to act, on the ground that, in his view, the Commission had not adopted a position on them in its reply of 25 March 2020. In the same email, the [appellant] posed additional questions, while acknowledging that those questions went beyond the scope of the call to act. 4 By letter of 23 April 2020, the Commission, taking note of the [appellant’s] email of 30 March 2020, replied that it had nothing to add to the previous correspondence.’
8

According to Article 7 of that directive: ‘1. Excise duty shall become chargeable at the time, and in the Member State, of release for consumption. 2. For the purposes of this Directive, “release for consumption” shall mean any of the following: (a) the departure of excise goods, including irregular departure, from a duty suspension arrangement; … 4. The total destruction or irretrievable loss of excise goods under a duty suspension arrangement, as a result of the actual nature of the goods, of unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure, or as a consequence of authorisation by the competent authorities of the Member State, shall not be considered a release for consumption. For the purpose of this Directive, goods shall be considered totally destroyed or irretrievably lost when they are rendered unusable as excise goods. The total destruction or irretrievable loss of the excise goods in question shall be proven to the satisfaction of the competent authorities of the Member State where the total destruction or irretrievable loss occurred or, when it is not possible to determine where the loss occurred, where it was detected. 5. Each Member State shall lay down its own rules and conditions under which the losses referred to in paragraph 4 are determined.’
15

Article 15 of the Wet houdende vervanging van de bestaande omzetbelasting door een omzetbelasting volgens het stelsel van heffing over de toegevoegde waarde (Law providing for replacement of the existing turnover tax by a turnover tax according to the system of collection of value added tax), of 28 June 1968 (Stb. 1968, No 329), in the version applicable at the material time in the main proceedings (‘the Law on turnover tax’), provides: ‘1. The tax … deductible by the trader shall be: (a) the tax which, for the period covered by the return, other traders have charged him by means of an invoice issued in accordance with the applicable rules, in respect of supplies of goods and services which they have made to him; … in so far as the trader uses the goods and services for the purposes of taxed transactions. … 4. Deduction of the tax shall be made in accordance with the intended use of the goods and services at the time the tax is invoiced to the trader or at the time the tax becomes chargeable. If it appears, at the time the trader starts to use the goods or services, that he is deducting the applicable tax to an extent which is higher or lower than that to which the use of the goods or services in question entitles him, the excess tax deducted shall be chargeable from that time. The tax which becomes chargeable shall be paid in accordance with Article 14. The amount of tax which could have been deducted and was not deducted shall be refunded to him on request.’
3

The 12th and 16th recitals of Directive 93/13 are worded as follows: ‘Whereas, … as they now stand, national laws allow only partial harmonisation to be envisaged; whereas, in particular, only contractual terms which have not been individually negotiated are covered by this Directive; whereas Member States should have the option, with due regard for the Treaty, to afford consumers a higher level of protection through national provisions that are more stringent than those of this Directive; … Whereas the assessment, according to the general criteria chosen, of the unfair character of terms, in particular in sale or supply activities of a public nature providing collective services which take account of solidarity among users, must be supplemented by a means of making an overall evaluation of the different interests involved; whereas this constitutes the requirement of good faith; whereas, in making an assessment of good faith, particular regard shall be had to the strength of the bargaining positions of the parties, whether the consumer had an inducement to agree to the term and whether the goods or services were sold or supplied to the special order of the consumer; whereas the requirement of good faith may be satisfied by the seller or supplier where he deals fairly and equitably with the other party whose legitimate interests he has to take into account’.
32

In the third place, however, it must be noted that, as regards the third and fourth questions, it may be observed that, in so far as the decision contested by the applicant in the main proceedings is a decision rejecting his application for international protection, the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings does not appear to require, as such, the interpretation of Article 45(1)(a) of Directive 2013/32, which is the subject of those questions. That provision applies to situations in which the competent authority intends to withdraw international protection from a person to whom it has already been granted. Thus, only the interpretation of Article 11(1) of that directive, which applies to decisions on applications for international protection and which is also referred to in the third and fourth questions, appears to be relevant to the resolution of the main proceedings. Moreover, the referring court does not provide any explanation as to how the interpretation of Article 45(1)(a) of that directive is necessary to enable it to decide the present case. It follows that the third and fourth questions are inadmissible in so far as they concern the interpretation of Article 45(1)(a) of Directive 2013/32.
Order of the President of the Court of 20 May 1959. - Italian Republic v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. - Case 21-59 R.



European Court reports

French edition Page 00717

Dutch edition Page 00739

German edition Page 00737

Italian edition Page 00691

English special edition Page 00351



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IN CASE 21/59 R

GOVERNMENT OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC, REPRESENTED BY PROFESSOR RICCARDO MONACO, HEAD OF THE LEGAL DEPARTMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ACTING AS AGENT, ASSISTED BY PIETRO PERONACI, SOSTITUTO AVVOCATO GENERALE DELLO STATO, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE ITALIAN EMBASSY, APPLICANT,

V

HIGH AUTHORITY OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, REPRESENTED BY ITS LEGAL ADVISER, GIULIO PASETTI, ACTING AS AGENT, ASSISTED BY MARIO BERRI, LEGAL ADVISER TO THE HIGH AUTHORITY, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT ITS OFFICES, 2 PLACE DE METZ, DEFENDANT,

Subject of the case

BY AN APPLICATION LODGED AT THE COURT REGISTRY ON 4 APRIL 1959, THE APPLICANT REQUESTED THE ANNULMENT OF DECISION NO 18/59 OF 18 FEBRUARY 1959 ON THE PUBLICATION OR NOTIFICATION TO THE HIGH AUTHORITY OF THE SCALES, RATES AND ALL OTHER TARIFF RULES OF EVERY KIND APPLIED TO THE CARRIAGE BY ROAD OF COAL AND STEEL WITHIN THE COMMUNITY FOR HIRE OR REWARD .

Grounds

ARTICLE 88 OF THE ECSC TREATY, ON WHICH THE DECISION CONTESTED BY THE APPLICANT IN THE MAIN ACTION IS BASED, GIVES THE HIGH AUTHORITY ONLY THE POWER TO FIND THAT A STATE HAS FAILED TO FULFIL AN OBLIGATION UNDER THE TREATY AND TO SET A TIME-LIMIT FOR THE FULFILMENT OF ITS OBLIGATION . UNDER THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF THAT ARTICLE THE HIGH AUTHORITY CANNOT ADOPT SANCTIONS AGAINST THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FOR ANY NON-FULFILMENT OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNTIL ITS ACTION HAS BEEN DISMISSED BY THE COURT HAVING JURISDICTION .

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 39 OF THE TREATY ON THE SUSPENSION OF APPLICATION CANNOT APPLY IN THE PRESENT CASE; IT APPEARS FROM THE TERMS OF THE PROVISION ITSELF THAT IT IS AIMED ONLY AT THE SUSPENSION OF MEASURES OF APPLICATION INITIATED BY THE HIGH AUTHORITY OR WHERE APPROPRIATE THIRD PARTIES AND TAKEN AGAINST THE PERSON CONCERNED .

THE APPLICANT HAS ALSO CLAIMED THAT SHOULD THE MAIN ACTION BE DISMISSED THE HIGH AUTHORITY COULD ADOPT SANCTIONS AGAINST IT WITH RETROACTIVE EFFECT AND THAT FOR THIS REASON THE CLAIM IS JUSTIFIED .

THIS FEAR HOWEVER DOES NOT APPEAR WELL FOUNDED SINCE THE MEASURES PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 88 CANNOT BE RETROACTIVE BY REASON OF THEIR NATURE .

AS A RESULT THE APPLICATION FOR SUSPENSION OF OPERATION MUST BE DISMISSED .

Operative part

1 . THE APPLICATION IS DISMISSED;

2 . THE COSTS ARE RESERVED .
Order of the President of the Court of 24 September 1963. - Société rhénane d'exploitation et de manutention "Sorema" v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. - Case 67/63 R.



European Court reports

French edition Page 00341

Dutch edition Page 00363

German edition Page 00373

Italian edition Page 00343

English special edition Page 00174



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IN CASE 67/63 R

SOCIETE RHENANE D' EXPLOITATION ET DE MANUTENTION ' SOREMA ', A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE IN STRASBOURG AT 11 RUE FISCHART, REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGERS, AND BY R . GARNON OF THE STRASBOURG BAR, 8 RUE DU MARCHE, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE OFFICES OF NICHOLAS WENNMACHER, HUISSIER, 17 BOULEVARD ROYAL,

APPLICANT,

V

HIGH AUTHORITY OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, REPRESENTED BY ITS LEGAL ADVISERS, MESSRS . MATTHIES AND OLIVIER, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT ITS REGISTERED OFFICE, 2 PLACE DE METZ,

DEFENDANT,

Subject of the case

APPLICATION FOR SUSPENSION OF OPERATION OF DECISION NO 8/63 OF 30 APRIL 1963 OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY, CONTESTED IN THE APPLICATION IN THE MAIN ACTION .

Grounds

IT APPEARS FROM THE RECORD THAT THE ASSOCIATES OF THE OBERRHEINISCHE KOHLENUNION, BETTAG, PUTON & CO ., PASSED THE FOLLOWING RESOLUTION IN WRITING :

' DIE SOREMA SCHEIDET GEMAESS ENTSCHEIDUNG DER HOHEN BEHOERDE NR 8/63 VOM 30 APRIL 1963 ZUM 30 JUNI 1963 AUS DER OBERRHEINISCHEN KOHLENUNION BETTAG, PUTON & CO ., AUS .

DER KAPITALANTEIL DER SOREMA IN HOEHE VOM DM 900 000 - ( EINGEZAHLT DIE HAELFTE ) WIRD VON DEN UEBRIGEN GESELLSCHAFTEN IM VERHAELTNIS IHRER GROSSHAENDLERANTEILE UEBERNOMMEN . EIN GROSSHAENDLERANTEIL DES KAPITALANTEILS DER SOREMA ( 110 ANTEILE ) BETRAEGT DM8 181.82 ( DAVON IST DIE HAELFTE = DM4 090.91 JE ANTEIL EINZUZAHLEN ); '

' ( IN ACCORDANCE WITH DECISION NO 8/63 OF 30 APRIL 1963, SOREMA SHALL LEAVE THE OBERRHEINISCHE KOHLENUNION ON 30 JUNE 1963;

SOREMA'S SHARE OF CAPITAL AMOUNTING TO DM900 000 ( ONE HALF PAID UP ) SHALL BE TAKEN OVER BY THE REMAINING COMPANIES IN PROPORTION TO THEIR SHARES AS WHOLESALE MERCHANTS . ONE WHOLESALE MERCHANT'S SHARE OF SOREMA'S SHARE OF CAPITAL ( 110 SHARES ) AMOUNTS TO DM8 181.82 ( WHEREOF ONE HALF = DM4090.91 IS PAYABLE PER SHARE ); '

THIS RESOLUTION CONSTITUTES IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISION NO 8/63 OF 30 APRIL 1963 OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY .

THE APPLICANT, WHO HAD RECEIVED NOTICE OF THE INTENTION TO PASS THE ABOVE QUOTED RESOLUTION BY LETTER OF 10 JULY 1963 FROM THE OKU DID NOT LODGE ITS APPLICATION FOR SUSPENSION AT THE COURT REGISTRY UNTIL 9 AUGUST 1963 .

THE REQUEST IS THEREFORE OUT OF TIME .

THE REQUEST FOR SUSPENSION HAVING FAILED AB INITIO IN ITS PURPOSE, IT MUST BE DECLARED INADMISSIBLE .

Operative part

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

HEREBY ORDERS :

1 . THE APPLICATION IS INADMISSIBLE;

2 . THE COSTS ARE RESERVED .
Order of the President of the Court of 29 May 1964. - Benoît Suss v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. - Case 17/64 R.



European Court reports

French edition Page 01201

Dutch edition Page 01263

German edition Page 01315

Italian edition Page 01185

English special edition Page 00617



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IN CASE 17/64

BENOIT SUSS, AN OFFICIAL OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, REPRESENTED BY ALEX BONN, ADVOCATE OF THE LUXEMBOURG BAR, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE CHAMBERS OF HIS SAID COUNSEL, 22 COTE-D'EICH . APPLICANT,

V

HIGH AUTHORITY OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, REPRESENTED BY ITS LEGAL ADVISER, PIERRE LAMOUREUX, APPOINTED AS AGENT TO THIS INTENT, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT ITS OFFICES, 2 PLACE DE METZ, DEFENDANT,

Subject of the case

APPLICATION FOR SUSPENSION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISIONS CONTESTED IN THE ORIGINAL CASE, AND OF ANY PROCEDURE SUBSEQUENT TO THE NOTICE OF THE DISPUTED COMPETITION .

Grounds

WHEREAS THE APPLICANT HAS BASED HIS CLAIM FOR SUSPENSION OF EXECUTION ON THE ARGUMENT THAT, IN APPOINTING A THIRD PARTY TO THE POST IN QUESTION DURING THE PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO HIS APPLICATION AGAINST THE NOTICE OF COMPETITION NUMBERED HA/B/2/AP ( SIC ), THERE IS A RISK OF CREATING A SITUATION WHICH CAN BE RECTIFIED ONLY WITH DIFFICULTY;

WHEREAS THE APPLICANT CLAIMED IN THE ORIGINAL CASE THAT THE COURT SHOULD RULE THAT ANY ANNULMENT SHOULD EMBRACE ANY PROCEDURE SUBSEQUENTLY FOLLOWED BY THE DEFENDANT TO FILL THE VACANT POST IN DISPUTE;

WHEREAS, MOREOVER IT IS STILL OPEN TO THE APPLICANT TO MAKE A FRESH APPLICATION AGAINST THE APPOINTMENT OF ANOTHER PERSON IN THE MEANTIME ON THE BASIS OF THE SAME GROUNDS OF COMPLAINT AS IN THE PRESENT APPLICATION;

WHEREAS, CONSEQUENTLY, THE DECISIONS FORMING THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE APPLICATION IN THE ORIGINAL CASE DO NOT APPEAR SUCH AS IRREPARABLY, OR EVEN SERIOUSLY TO PREJUDICE THE APPLICANT'S INTERESTS;

WHEREAS, THEREFORE, THE APPLICATION FOR SUSPENSION MUST BE DISMISSED;

Operative part

1 . THE APPLICATION IS DISMISSED;

2 . THE COSTS ARE RESERVED .
Order of the President of the Court of 12 February 1965. - Ferriera Ernesto Preo e Figli v High Authority of the ECSC. - Case 2-65 R.



European Court reports

French edition Page 00334

Dutch edition Page 00387

German edition Page 00580

Italian edition Page 00259

English special edition Page 00231



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IN CASE 2/65 R

FERRIERA ERNESTO PREO E FIGLI, SOCIETA IN NOME COLLETTIVO, HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE IN VENEZIA-MARGHERA, REPRESENTED AND ASSISTED BY RAOUL LEVIS OF THE VENICE BAR AND OF THE CORTE DI CASSAZIONE, ROME, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE CHAMBERS OF CAMILLE WAGNER, 31 RUE DES ROSES,

APPLICANT,

V

HIGH AUTHORITY OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, REPRESENTED BY ITS LEGAL ADVISER, ITALO TELCHINI, ACTING AS AGENT, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT ITS OFFICES, 2 PLACE DE METZ,

DEFENDANT,

Subject of the case

APPLICATION FOR THE SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF TWO INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY CONCERNING THE CONTRIBUTIONS DUE BY THE APPLICANT UNDERTAKING UNDER THE SCHEME FOR THE EQUALIZATION OF IMPORTED FERROUS SCRAP .

Grounds

WHEREAS THE APPLICANT UNDERTAKING, BY APPLICATION LODGED AT THE COURT REGISTRY ON 15 JANUARY 1965, SOUGHT THE ANNULMENT OF TWO DECISIONS OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY OF 13 NOVEMBER 1964, THE FIRST OF WHICH FIXES THE TONNAGE OF THE APPLICANT'S FERROUS SCRAP CHARGEABLE FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1 OCTOBER 1956 TO 30 NOVEMBER 1958 AND THE SECOND OF WHICH, ON THE BASIS OF THIS FIGURE, REQUIRES IT TO PAY THE SUM OF 55 700 153 LIRE BY WAY OF EQUALIZATION CONTRIBUTIONS;

WHEREAS BY A SEPARATE DOCUMENT, LODGED AT THE REGISTRY ON 25 JANUARY 1965, THE APPLICANT REQUESTED THE COURT, BEFORE GIVING A RULING ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CASE, TO ORDER THE SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF THE TWO DECISIONS CONTESTED IN THE MAIN ACTION;

WHEREAS BY A DOCUMENT LODGED ON 29 JANUARY 1965, THE DEFENDANT CONTENDED THAT THE PRESENT APPLICATION SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS INADMISSIBLE OR, IN ANY EVENT, AS UNFOUNDED, AND THAT THE DECISION ON COSTS SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR THE FINAL JUDGMENT .

WHEREAS PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 83(2 ) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE AN APPLICATION FOR SUSPENSION SHALL STATE ' THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE DISPUTE, THE CIRCUMSTANCES GIVING RISE TO URGENCY AND THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL GROUNDS ESTABLISHING A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR THE INTERIM MEASURES ' APPLIED FOR;

WHEREAS THE APPLICATION FOR SUSPENSION IN THIS CASE DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THESE REQUIREMENTS;

WHEREAS IT STATES NO CIRCUMSTANCE OF SUCH A NATURE AS TO PROVE A CASE OF URGENCY NOR DOES IT PUT FORWARD ANY GROUNDS CAPABLE OF ESTABLISHING A CASE FOR GRANTING THE SUSPENSION REQUESTED;

WHEREAS THE APPLICATION IS THEREFORE INADMISSIBLE;

Operative part

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

HEREBY ORDERS :

1 . THE APPLICATION IS DISMISSED;

2 . THE COSTS ARE RESERVED .