ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Appeal brought on 11 December 2020 by Colin Brown against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 5 October 2020 in Case T-18/19, Brown v Commission

(Case C-675/20 P)

(2021/C 98/07)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Colin Brown (represented by: I. Van Damme, advocaat)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission and Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under the appeal not to annul the contested decision (1);

— conclude, on the basis of the complete record before it, that the contested decision should be annulled and order that the appellant’s entitlement to the expatriation allowance and travel expenses should be restored with effect from 1 December 2017 and that the allowances which were not paid between 1 December 2017 and the date of re-establishment of the appellant’s entitlement be paid to the appellant with interest; and

— order the Commission to pay the costs incurred by the appellant before the Court and the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in interpreting Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations as to permit or require the removal of an official’s entitlement to an expatriation allowance on account of his obtaining the nationality of his place of employment, absent a change in the place of employment of the official.

Second plea in law, alleging that the application of Article 4(1)(b) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations to the appellant by the General Court in its judgment, and the Commission in the contested decision, gives rise to unjustified discrimination.

(1) Decision of 19 March 2018 of the Office for the Administration and Payment of Individual Entitlements withdrawing the appellant’s entitlement to the expatriation allowance and the payment of travel expenses with effect from 1 December 2017.
1.

Are products that are subject to excise duty transported pursuant to a suspension arrangement within the meaning of Article 4(c) of Council Directive 92/12/EEC (1) in a situation where a customs office of one Member State agreed to the movement of products under a duty-suspension arrangement from a tax warehouse to a registered trader established in another Member State, even though the conditions for the movement of those products under the duty-suspension arrangement were objectively not met, it having been established at a subsequent stage of the procedure that the registered trader had no knowledge of the movement of the products, due to fraud by third parties?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 23 November 2020 by Arkadiusz Kaminski against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 23 September 2020 in Case T-677/19, Polfarmex v EUIPO — Kaminski

(Case C-626/20 P)

(2021/C 128/10)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Arkadiusz Kaminski (represented by: E. Pijewska, M. Mazurek, W. Trybowski, radcowie prawni)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Polfarmex S.A

By order of 28 January 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Mr Arkadiusz Kaminski should bear his own costs.
(b)

If the answer to (a) is ‘yes’, is the fact that the claim which the injured party seeks to bring against the policy holder/insured arises out of the same facts as, and is being brought in the same action as the direct claim brought against the insurer sufficient to justify a conclusion that the injured party’s claim is a matter relating to insurance even though the cause of action between the injured party and the policy holder/insured is unrelated to insurance?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 22 August 2020 by XH against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 25 June 2020 in Case T-511/18, XH v Commission

(Case C-399/20 P)

(2021/C 217/22)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: XH (represented by: E. Auleytner, radca prawny)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 16 March 2021, the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) held that the appeal is dismissed as being, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded and that XH shall bear her own costs.
1.

Do Article 7 of Directive 2003/88 (1) and Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union preclude an interpretation of a rule of national law such as Paragraph 7(3) of the German Bundesurlaubsgesetz (Federal Law on leave) according to which the as yet unexercised entitlement to paid annual leave of a worker who became ill to an extent that rendered him or her unfit for work in the course of the leave year, but who could still have taken — at least some of — the leave in the leave year before the onset of his or her illness, lapses 15 months after the end of the leave year in the event of a continuing uninterrupted period of incapacity for work even if the employer has not actually enabled the worker to exercise his or her leave entitlement by duly informing him or her of the leave concerned and inviting him or her to take it?
1.

Do the principles of freedom of establishment, non-discrimination and safeguarding of competition laid down in Articles 49, 56 and 106 TFEU, and the precept of reasonableness implicit therein, preclude national legislation which, as a result of a national provision or act having the force of law, has the effect of extending existing licences and other collection rights, issued by means of invitations to tender or a regularisation procedure (without a tender), the normal deadline for which had already been set for June 2016?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Apelacyjny w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 11 September 2020 — A.K. v Skarb Państwa

(Case C-428/20)

(2021/C 278/34)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Apelacyjny w Warszawie

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: A.K.

Defendant: Skarb Państwa

Question referred

Under Article 2 of Directive 2005/14/EC of 11 May 2005 amending Council Directives 72/166/EEC, 84/5/EEC, 88/357/EEC and 90/232/EEC and Directive 2000/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, (1) is a Member State, which has established a transitional period within which to adapt minimum guarantees, under an obligation to increase guarantees to at least a half of the amounts provided for in Article 1(2) of Directive 84/5/EEC, as amended, within 30 months of the expiry of the time limit for implementing that directive:

— in respect of all motor insurance contracts in force after the expiry of those 30 months, including contracts concluded before 11 December 2009 but still in force after that date — in cases of damage occurring after 11 December 2009,

— or only in respect of new motor insurance contracts concluded after 11 December 2009?

(1) OJ 2005 L 149, p. 14.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main (Germany) lodged on 13 January 2021 — JW, HD, XS v LOT Polish Airlines

(Case C-20/21)

(2021/C 98/12)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Frankfurt am Main

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: JW, HD, XS

Defendant: LOT Polish Airlines

Question referred

Must Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (1) be interpreted as meaning that the place of performance, within the meaning of that provision, in respect of a flight consisting of a confirmed single booking for the entire journey and divided into two or more legs, can also be the place of arrival of the first leg of the journey where transport on those legs of the journey is performed by two separate air carriers and the claim for compensation brought on the basis of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (2) arises from the delay of the first leg of the journey and is brought against the operating air carrier of that first leg?

(1) OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1.

(2) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 8 January 2021 — Deutsche Lufthansa AG v IY and TP

(Case C-11/21)

(2021/C 88/29)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Deutsche Lufthansa AG

Respondents: IY, TP

Question referred

Does a strike by the air carrier’s own employees that is called by a trade union constitute an extraordinary circumstance within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004? (1)

(1) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
(a)

Are Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 21 of Protocol No 4 to be interpreted as prohibiting a national central bank that is a member of the European System of Central Banks from incurring liability to pay compensation from its own resources to former holders of financial instruments that have been cancelled by decision of the central bank in the exercise of its own statutory power to adopt extraordinary measures in the public interest in order to avert threats to the stability of the financial system, in the event that it transpires in the course of subsequent legal proceedings that, in the context of the cancellation of financial instruments, there was a failure to observe the principle that no holder of a financial instrument should, as a result of an extraordinary measure, be placed in a worse position than he would have been in had the measure not been adopted, where, in that context, the national central bank is liable (i) for loss that was foreseeable from the facts and circumstances obtaining at the time of the central bank’s decision and of which the bank was aware or ought to have been aware, and (ii) for loss resulting from the conduct of individuals who acted in the exercise of such powers of the central bank and on instructions from it where, in that context, having regard to the facts and circumstances of which they were aware or ought to have been aware in accordance with the powers conferred, those individuals did not act with the diligence of a prudent expert?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 18 January 2021 — Istituto nazionale per l’assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavoro (INAIL), Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) v Ryanair DAC

(Case C-33/21)

(2021/C 110/26)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte suprema di cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: Istituto nazionale per l’assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavoro (INAIL), Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS)

Respondent: Ryanair DAC

Question referred

Can the concept of a person ‘employed principally in the territory of the Member State in which he resides’ contained in Article 14(2)(a)(ii) [of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71, (1) as amended] be interpreted in the same way as that which (concerning judicial cooperation in civil matters, jurisdiction and individual contracts of employment (Regulation (EC) No 44/2001) (2)) Article 19(2)(a) [of the latter Regulation] defines as the ‘place where the employee habitually carries out his work’, including in the aviation and airline crew sector (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91), (3) as expressed in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union referred to in the grounds?

(1) Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community (OJ 1971 L 149, p. 2).

(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1).

(3) Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 of 16 December 1991 on the harmonization of technical requirements and administrative procedures in the field of civil aviation (OJ 1991 L 373, p. 4).
Appeal brought on 2 February 2021 by SGL Carbon SE against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 16 December 2020 in Case T-639/18, SGL Carbon SE v Commission

(Case C-65/21 P)

(2021/C 128/32)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: SGL Carbon SE (represented by: P. Sellar, advocaat, K. Van Maldegem, avocat, M. Grunchard, avocate)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Kingdom of Spain and European Chemicals Agency

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment under appeal;

— refer the case back to the General Court for consideration; and

— reserve the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First plea in law, alleging that the General Court’s finding that the appellant’s argument that the Commission committed a manifest error did not necessarily imply also the argument that the Commission had infringed the duty of act diligently is wrong as a matter of law.

Second plea in law, alleging that the General Court was wrong as a matter of law to use an alleged lack of legal clarity of point 4.1.3.5.5 of Annex I to Regulation No 1272/2008 (1) as a ground for dismissing the legal argument that was actually being made by the appellant.

Third plea in law, alleging that the General Court could not rely on the finding that the legal framework was complex in order to excuse the Commission's failure to take into account the lack of CTPHT's (classified pitch, coal tar, high-temp) solubility. The General Court had actually held the opposite in earlier related proceedings (Case T-689/13 DEP, Bilbaina de Alquitranes SA and Others v European Commission). Without any explanation for holding the opposite, the General Court's reasoning is insufficient and contradictory.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the General Court wrongly applied the ordinary, due diligence test. By finding that the Commission acted as any other ordinary, duly diligent administrative authority would, it used an incorrect and inappropriate point of comparison to assess the due diligence and ordinariness of the Commission.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the General Court's statement of reasons is insufficient and contradictory insofar as that court found, without indicating any evidence and by only relying on the opinion of the Advocate General, that the Commission may have had difficulties in correcting its manifest error of assessment, thereby suggesting that Commission's approach could be excused.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that the General Court was wrong in law to conclude that the Commission's error could be excused by reference to the precautionary principle because it is settled case law that the principle cannot be invoked during the classification of a substance.

(1) Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (OJ 2008, L 353, p. 1).
1.

(a) Since the Netherlands has failed to specify in national law when the reflection period guaranteed in Article 6(1) of Directive 2004/81/EC (1) commences, must that provision be interpreted as meaning that the reflection period commences by operation of law when the third-country national notifies (communicates) the trafficking in human beings to the Netherlands authorities? (b) Since the Netherlands has failed to specify in national law the duration of the reflection period guaranteed in Article 6(1) of Directive 2004/81/EC, must that provision be interpreted as meaning that the reflection period ends by operation of law once the trafficking in human beings has been reported or the third-country national concerned indicates that he no longer wishes to report such trafficking?
1.

Error in the application of the law by the General Court, in so far as it found that the Council correctly applied the presumption that the appellant was a prominent businessman operating in Syria, given that that presumption has no legal basis and is disproportionate in relation to the legal objective pursued.
2.

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: Does it constitute abuse of rights in the sense of the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, if a managing holding is involved as an ‘intermediary’ in obtaining services for subsidiaries in such a way that it obtains services itself for which the subsidiaries would have no entitlement to deduction if services were obtained directly, contributes these services to the subsidiaries in return for participation in its profit, and then claims full deduction on the basis of the inputs on the grounds of its position as a managing holding; or can acting as an intermediary in this way be justified on grounds that fall outside the scope of tax law, even though full deduction is in itself in conflict with the system and would result in a competitive advantage for holding structures over single-tier companies?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Germany) lodged on 26 February 2021 — LB v TO

(Case C-120/21)

(2021/C 182/53)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesarbeitsgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant on a point of law: LB

Respondent in the appeal on a point of law: TO

Question referred

Do Article 7 of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (1) and Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union preclude the application of national legislation such as Paragraph 194(1), in conjunction with Paragraph 195, of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code; ‘the BGB’), under which the entitlement to paid annual leave is subject to a standard limitation period of three years, which starts to run at the end of the leave year under the conditions set out in Paragraph 199(1) of the BGB, if the employer has not actually enabled a worker to exercise his or her leave entitlement by accordingly informing him or her of the leave and inviting him or her to take that leave?

(1) OJ 2003 L 299, p. 9.
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Administratif (Luxembourg) lodged on 5 March 2021 — A, B and C, legally represented by his parents v Ministre de l’Immigration et de l’Asile

(Case C-153/21)

(2021/C 189/15)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal Administratif

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: A, B and C, legally represented by his parents

Defendant: Ministre de l’Immigration et de l’Asile

Question referred

Can Article 33(2)(a) of Directive 2013/32/EU on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, (1) read in conjunction with Article 23 of Directive 2011/95/EU on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, (2) and with Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as permitting a declaration of inadmissibility in respect of an application for international protection made by the parents of a minor, in the name and on behalf of that minor, in a Member State (in this case Luxembourg) other than that which has previously granted international protection to the parents, brothers and sisters of the child, but not to the child himself (in this case Greece), on the ground that the authorities of the country which granted international protection to the parents, brothers and sisters, prior to their departure from that country and prior to the birth of the child, have guaranteed that, on arrival of the child and return of the other family members, the child will be granted a residence permit and will have the same benefits available to him as are granted to beneficiaries of international protection, though without stating that he will be granted international protection in his own right?

(1) OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60.

(2) OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9.
1.

Must Article 9(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (1) be interpreted as meaning that the use of a sign identical with a trade mark in an advertisement displayed on a website is, in principle, attributable to its operator if, in the perception of a reasonably well informed and reasonably observant internet user, that operator has played an active part in the preparation of that advertisement or if that advertisement may be perceived by such an internet user as forming part of that operator’s own commercial communication? Will such perception be influenced: — by the fact that that operator is a well-known distributor of a wide range of goods, including goods in the category of those featured in the advertisement; or — by the fact that the advertisement thus displayed presents a heading in which the service mark of that operator is reproduced, that mark being well known as a distributor’s trade mark; or — furthermore, by the fact that, as well as displaying that advertisement, that operator offers services traditionally offered by distributors of goods in the same category as that to which the goods featured in the advertisement belong?
3.

If Question 2 is answered in the affirmative, must EU law, in particular the principle of the primacy of EU law and the requirement of its effectiveness, be interpreted as precluding the application of a provision of national law which provides for a time-bar, such as Paragraph 34, second subparagraph, of the SFL, if the consequence of such application is that a party to an appeal may not raise the objection that there is no valid arbitration agreement on the ground that the arbitration clause in or the proposal in accordance with Article 26 ECT is invalid or not applicable as it runs counter to EU law?
1.

Must Article 58(4) of Directive 2014/24/EU (1) be interpreted as meaning that the requirements imposed by the selection criteria on the professional ability of the staff of economic operators in respect of a specialised contract in the construction sector may be stricter than the minimum requirements for training and professional qualifications laid down by the specific national law (Article 163a(4) of the ZUT) without being a priori restrictive of competition, and, more specifically, does the prescribed condition of ‘proportionality’ of the participation requirements imposed in relation to the subject matter of the contract a) require the national court to carry out an assessment of proportionality on the basis of the evidence gathered and the specific parameters of the contract, even in cases where the national law defines a large number of professionals who are in principle qualified to carry out the activities under the contract, or b) permit judicial review to be limited only to an examination of whether the participation requirements are too restrictive in relation to those provided for in principle in the specific national law?