ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 8 September 2021 –

Naturgy Energy Group v Commission

(Case T‑328/18)

(State aid – Environmental incentive adopted by Spain in favour of coal-fired power plants – Decision to initiate the procedure laid down by Article 108(2) TFEU – Obligation to state reasons – Manifest error of assessment – Selective nature)

1. State aid – Examination by the Commission – Decision to initiate the procedure laid down by Article 108(2) TFEU – Obligation to state reasons – Scope – Decision to enable interested parties to participate effectively in the formal investigation procedure – Brief statement of reasons relating to the selective nature of the national measure in question – Whether permissible (Arts 107(1), 108(2) and 296(2) TFEU; Council Regulation 2015/1589, Arts 6(1) and 9(2)) (see paras 59-63, 66-80)

2. State aid – Definition – Selective nature of the measure – Environmental incentive adopted by Spain in favour of coal-fired power plants – Appropriate criterion for establishing the selectivity of the measure (Art. 107(1) TFEU) (see paras 96, 97)

3. State aid – Examination by the Commission – Decision to initiate the procedure laid down by Article 108(2) TFEU – Judicial review – Limits – Manifest error of assessment (Arts 107(1) and 108(2) TFEU) (see paras 98, 99, 115, 116, 126, 130)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Commission Decision C(2017) 7733 final of 27 November 2017, concerning State Aid SA.47912 (2017/NN) – Environmental incentive adopted by Spain in favour of coal-fired power plants, initiating the formal investigation procedure laid down by Article 108(2) TFEU.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Naturgy Energy Group, SA to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;
EU institutions – Right of public access to documents – Decision 2004/258 of the European Central Bank (ECB) – Exceptions to the right of access to documents – Overriding public interest justifying the disclosure of documents – Definition – Subjective interest of the person concerned in defending himself – Not included

(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 41(2); European Central Bank Decision 2004/258, as amended by Decisions 2011/342 and 2015/529, Art. 6(1))

(see paras 94, 102, 104-106, 130)
30

Admittedly, in its judgment of 21 June 2007, Commission v Hosman-Chevalier (C‑424/05 P, EU:C:2007:367, paragraphs 42 and 43), cited by the applicant, the Court of Justice referred to the privileges, immunities and the special status from which the party concerned benefited, in finding that she had a specific tie linking her to another State which hindered her integration in the country of employment. However, the question at issue in that case was whether the applicant, who worked at the Länder Liaison Office of the Republic of Austria, had worked for that State and therefore had a tie to it. In that judgment, the Court of Justice deduced such a tie from a number of factors. The first of those factors was that the staff of a permanent representation must be considered to be working for the Member State concerned and, consequently, to be in a situation of expatriation, since they are part of the structures of that representation. The second factor was that, although the person concerned worked at the Länder Liaison Office, she was a member of staff of the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Austria and was subject to the supervisory authority of the Austrian ambassador, so that she had to be regarded as having worked for the Austrian State. Lastly, the third factor was that her status was the same as that of other officials posted to that representation (judgment of 21 June 2007, Commission v Hosman-Chevalier, C‑424/05 P, EU:C:2007:367, paragraphs 41 and 42). Thus, the special status referred to by the Court of Justice in paragraph 43 of that judgment cannot be understood as deriving solely from the privileges and immunities from which the person concerned had benefited. On the contrary, the Court of Justice placed more emphasis on the fact that she had worked for the Republic of Austria in its Permanent Representation.
85

It should be noted that, in the context of this plea in law, the question arises as to the relationship between the procedure for the amendment of the harmonised classification and labelling of 8‑hydroxyquinoline (see paragraphs 11 to 14 above), on the one hand, and the procedure for the amendment of the conditions of approval of 8‑hydroxyquinoline (see paragraphs 15 to 25 above), on the other. As stated in those paragraphs, 8‑hydroxyquinoline, the active substance approved under Implementing Regulation No 993/2011, also underwent a procedure for harmonised classification and labelling under Regulation No 1272/2008 which resulted in the adoption of Regulation 2017/776 (see paragraph 12 above), under which 8‑hydroxyquinoline was classified, inter alia, as toxic in respect of reproduction category 1B. On 20 January 2017, the applicant requested the competent Spanish authority to propose to ECHA the amendment of the harmonised classification and labelling of 8‑hydroxyquinoline, stating that the studies referred to in paragraph 13 above had been prepared. That procedure was closed by a letter from the competent Spanish authority of 28 September 2017, in which that authority explained to the applicant the reasons why it had found that the evidence from the studies in question was not sufficient to call into question the harmonised classification and labelling in force and why it therefore did not justify a new proposal in the matter (see paragraph 14 above). By the present plea in law, the applicant claims that, by failing to take account of those studies in the context of the procedure for the amendment of the conditions of approval of 8‑hydroxyquinoline, the Commission infringed its right to be heard and the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.
12

Article 7 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations provides: ‘Basic monthly salaries of officials recruited before 1 May 2004 shall be determined in accordance with the following rules: 1. The renaming of grades pursuant to Article 2(1) of this Annex shall not lead to any changes in the basic monthly salary paid to each official. 2. For each official, a multiplication factor shall be calculated at 1 May 2004. This multiplication factor shall be equal to the ratio between the basic monthly salary paid to an official before 1 May 2004 and the applicable amount defined in Article 2(2) of this Annex. The basic monthly salary paid to the official on 1 May 2004 shall be equal to the product of the applicable amount and the multiplication factor. The multiplication factor shall be applied in order to determine the official’s basic monthly salary following advancement in step or update of remunerations. … 5. Without prejudice to paragraph 3, for each official, the first promotion after 1 May 2004 shall, depending on the category occupied before 1 May 2004 and the step occupied at the time the promotion takes effect, lead to an increase in basic monthly salary … 6. A new multiplication factor shall be determined upon this first promotion. That multiplication factor shall be equal to the ratio between the new basic salaries resulting from the application of paragraph 5 and the applicable amount in Article 2(2) of this Annex. Subject to paragraph 7, this multiplication factor shall be applied to the salary after advancement in step and adaptation of remunerations. …’
81

They also maintain that the statement of reasons for the contested decision, which fits on a single page, is very brief and is vitiated by ‘legal inaccuracies’ and ‘material shortcomings’ which cannot be reconciled with the excessively long duration of the procedure and which demonstrate that the Commission undertook a superficial examination. They criticise the Commission for having failed to examine the objective of increasing the predictability of the level of financial support provided to the umbrella associations, pursued by the Land of Lower Saxony as a result of the gradual removal of the link between the support of the charitable sector and lottery resources which took place between 1997 (or 2004) and 2015, even though the first applicant quoted passages from the explanatory memorandum for the various laws at issue. In addition, it did not decide on the question of whether the upward trend in the amounts of the support between 1956 and 2015 respected the 20% threshold laid down by Article 4(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 of 21 April 2004 implementing Regulation 2015/1589 (OJ 2004 L 140, p. 1), as amended by Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/2282 of 27 November 2015 (OJ 2015 L 325, p. 1), according to which an increase in the original budget of an existing aid scheme by up to 20% is not to be considered an alteration to existing aid. Moreover, it did not decide on the implications of the separation of the support into a fixed part and a variable part, linked to changes in the tax on gambling. Finally, the applicants emphasise that the Commission did not adopt a position on the statements of the Niedersächsischer Landesrechnungshof (Court of Auditors, Land of Lower Saxony, Germany) which it had in its possession and from which, according to the applicants, it is clear that the financial support constitutes new aid. They also criticise the absence of an exposition or definitions of what constitutes a substantial alteration to aid.
Judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) of 12 December 2019 –

Baustoffwerke Gebhart & Söhne v EUIPO (BIOTON)

(Case T‑255/19)

(EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark BIOTON — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 — No distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001)

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Meaning (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 13)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Assessment of the descriptive nature of a sign — Criteria (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 14, 15, 26)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Word mark BIOTON (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 17-23, 25, 28)

4. EU trade mark — Decisions of the Office — Legality — EUIPO’s previous decision-making practice (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001) (see para. 27)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 20 February 2019 (Case R 1887/2018-4), relating to an application for registration of the word sign BOITON as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
2.

EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Refusal to register where there is a relative ground for refusal, even if limited to part of the Union (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 25)
EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Examination of the grounds for refusal having regard to each of the products or services covered by the application for registration — Obligation to state reasons for the refusal to register — Scope

(European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(c) and Art. 94(1), first sentence)

(see paras 19-21)
Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 5 February 2020 –

Pierre Balmain v EUIPO (Representation of a lion’s head encircled by rings forming a chain)

(Case T‑331/19)

(EU trade mark — Application for an EU figurative mark representing a lion’s head encircled by rings forming a chain — Absolute ground for refusal — No distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of distinctive character — Definition — Criteria for assessment (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 17-19)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of distinctive character — Assessment of distinctive character — Criteria (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 20)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of distinctive character — Three-dimensional mark constituted by the shape of the product — Distinctive character — Criteria for assessment (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 21-24)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of distinctive character — Figurative mark consisting of the two-dimensional representation of a product — Distinctive character — Criteria for assessment (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 25)

5. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of distinctive character — Assessment of distinctive character — Criteria — Perception of the trade mark by the relevant public — Attention level of the public (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 30, 31)

6. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of distinctive character — Figurative mark representing a lion’s head encircled by rings forming a chain (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 33, 38, 40, 44, 56-58)

7. EU trade mark — Decisions of the Office — Principle of equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — EUIPO's previous decision-making practice — Principle of legality — Need for a strict and complete examination in each particular case (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001) (see paras 52-55)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 21 March 2019 (Case R 1223/2018-5), concerning an application for registration of a figurative sign representing a lion’s head encircled by rings forming a chain as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 29 April 2020 –

Bergslagernas Järnvaru v EUIPO — Scheppach Fabrikation von Holzbearbeitungsmaschinen (Wood-splitting tool)

(Case T‑73/19)

(Community design — Invalidity proceedings — Registered Community design representing a wood-splitting tool — Earlier national design — Ground for invalidity — No individual character — No different overall impression — Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 — Infringement of the rights of the defence — Article 62 of Regulation No 6/2002)

1. Community designs — Procedural provisions — Decisions of the Office — Observance of the rights of the defence — Scope of the principle (Council Regulation No 6/2002, Art. 62) (see paras 15, 21)

2. Community designs — Grounds for invalidity — No individual character — Design not giving the informed user a different overall impression from that produced by the earlier design — Global assessment of all the elements of the earlier design (Council Regulation No 6/2002, Arts 6(1) and 25(1)(b)) (see paras 24, 38, 39, 41, 42, 52, 69)

3. Community designs — Grounds for invalidity — No individual character — Design not giving the informed user a different overall impression from that produced by the earlier design — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 6/2002, Arts 6(1) and 25(1)(b)) (see para. 25)

4. Community designs — Grounds for invalidity — No individual character — Design not giving the informed user a different overall impression from that produced by the earlier design — Informed user — Definition (Council Regulation No 6/2002, Arts 6(1) and 25(1)(b)) (see paras 26, 58, 64, 70, 75)

5. Community designs — Grounds for invalidity — No individual character — Design not giving the informed user a different overall impression from that produced by the earlier design — Representation of a tool for cutting wood (Council Regulation No 6/2002, Arts 6(1) and 25(1)(b)) (see paras 27, 28, 40, 43, 46, 53-56, 63, 65, 71-74, 77)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Third Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 23 November 2018 (Case R 1455/2018-3), relating to invalidity proceedings between Scheppach Fabrikation von Holzbearbeitungsmaschinen and Bergslagernas Järnvaru.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
EU trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Examination of the application — Proof of use of the earlier mark — Genuine use — Definition — Criteria for assessment

(European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Arts 18(1)(a) and 58(1)(a); Commission Regulation 2018/625, Art. 10(3) and (4))

(see paras 23-25, 30-33, 74)
EU trade mark – Surrender, revocation and invalidity – Absolute grounds for invalidity – Marks devoid of distinctive character – Three-dimensional trade marks consisting of the shape of the product itself – Distinctive character – Criteria for assessment

(European Parliament and Council Regulation No 2017/1001, Arts 7(1)(b) and 59(1)(a))

(see para. 17)
4.

EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity of the marks concerned — Assessment of the distinctive character of an element of which a trade mark is composed (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 42)
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 8 July 2020 –

Essential Export v EUIPO – Shenzhen Liouyi International Trading (TOTU)

(Case T‑633/19)

(EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for a figurative EU trade mark allegedly containing the word element ‘TOTU’ and coloured red and black – Earlier EU trade marks TOTTO – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

1. EU trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services – Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark – Criteria for assessment (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 8(1)(b); Commission Regulation No 2868/95, Art. 1, Rule 3(3)) (see paras 29, 30, 38)

2. EU trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services – Similarity of the marks concerned – Criteria for assessment (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 31, 33, 34)

3. EU trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services – Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark – Figurative mark allegedly containing the word element ‘TOTU’ and the colours red and black – Figurative marks TOTTO (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 35, 39-43)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 22 July 2019 (Case R 362/2019-2), relating to opposition proceedings between Essential Export and Shenzhen Liouyi International Trading.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 23 September 2020 –

Veronese Design Company v EUIPO – Veronese (VERONESE)

(Case T‑608/19)

(EU trade mark – Invalidity proceedings – EU figurative mark VERONESE – Earlier EU word mark VERONESE – Relative ground for refusal – No likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) and Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

EU trade mark – Surrender, revocation and invalidity – Relative grounds for invalidity – Existence of an identical or similar earlier mark registered for identical or similar goods or services – Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark – Figurative mark VERONESE and word mark VERONESE

(European Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, Arts 8(1)(b) and 60(1)(a))

(see paras 56, 79-82, 91-95)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 18 June 2019 (Case R 2434/2018-5), relating to invalidity proceedings between Veronese and Veronese Design Company.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Annuls the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 18 June 2019 (Case R 2434/2018-5), relating to invalidity proceedings between Veronese SAS and Veronese Design Company Ltd;

2. Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Veronese Design Company;
Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 23 September 2020 –

FF v Commission

(Case T‑654/19)

(Non-contractual liability – Manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products – Directive 2014/40/EU – Use of a photograph in a library of warnings with pictures to be used for tobacco products – Directive 2014/109/EU – Sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law conferring rights on individuals)

1. Non-contractual liability – Conditions – Unlawfulness – Injury – Causal link – One of the conditions not satisfied – Claim for compensation dismissed in its entirety (Art. 340, second para. TFEU) (see paras 18, 19)

2. Non-contractual liability – Conditions – Unlawfulness – Sufficiently serious breach of EU law – Use of a photograph in a library of picture warnings to be used for tobacco products – No sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law conferring rights on individuals – EU not liable (Art. 340, second para. TFEU; European Parliament and Council Directive 2014/40, Annex II; Commission Directive 2014/109) (see paras 20-27)

Re:

Application based on Article 268 TFEU seeking compensation in respect of the harm allegedly suffered by the applicant because of the unauthorised use of a photograph that he regards as representing him.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
EU trade mark – Procedural provisions – Statement of reasons for decisions – First sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation No 2017/1001 – Scope identical to that of Article 296 TFEU

(Art. 296 TFEU; European Parliament and Council Regulation No 2017/1001, Art. 94(1), first sentence)

(see para. 130)