ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
12.

Under Article 3 of Framework Decision 2008/675: ‘1. Each Member State shall ensure that in the course of criminal proceedings against a person, previous convictions handed down against the same person for different facts in other Member States, in respect of which information has been obtained under applicable instruments on mutual legal assistance or on the exchange of information extracted from criminal records, are taken into account to the extent previous national convictions are taken into account, and that equivalent legal effects are attached to them as to previous national convictions, in accordance with national law. 2. Paragraph 1 shall apply at the pre-trial stage, at the trial stage itself and at the time of execution of the conviction, in particular with regard to the applicable rules of procedure, including those relating to provisional detention, the definition of the offence, the type and level of the sentence, and the rules governing the execution of the decision. 3. The taking into account of previous convictions handed down in other Member States, as provided for in paragraph 1, shall not have the effect of interfering with, revoking or reviewing previous convictions or any decision relating to their execution by the Member State conducting the new proceedings. 4. In accordance with paragraph 3, paragraph 1 shall not apply to the extent that, had the previous conviction been a national conviction of the Member State conducting the new proceedings, the taking into account of the previous conviction would, according to the national law of that Member State, have had the effect of interfering with, revoking or reviewing the previous conviction or any decision relating to its execution. 5. If the offence for which the new proceedings being conducted was committed before the previous conviction had been handed down or fully executed, paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not have the effect of requiring Member States to apply their national rules on imposing sentences, where the application of those rules to foreign convictions would limit the judge in imposing a sentence in the new proceedings. However, the Member States shall ensure that in such cases their courts can otherwise take into account previous convictions handed down in other Member States.’
25.

The fact remains that most categories of products listed in Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/96 include, albeit in different proportions, both products that are or may be used as motor fuels or heating fuels and products that are not or cannot be used in this manner. Therefore, if the legislature had wanted to draw a precise distinction between energy products and other products on the basis of the criterion of the manner of use, it would have sufficed to include an appropriate general proviso in the definition of energy products. However, the legislature’s intention was apparently to distinguish between products which are not energy products at all if they are not used as motor fuels or heating fuels and products which remain energy products within the meaning of the directive, but are not subject to its provisions if and as long as they are not used in this manner. In my view, this prevents Article 2(4) of Directive 2003/96 from being interpreted as an inseparable element of the definition of energy products and precludes the conclusion that, whenever the directive refers to energy products, this concept does not cover products not used as motor fuels or heating fuels, even if they fall within the definition contained in Article 2(1) of the directive.
11.

Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 885/2006 ( 8 ) regulates the procedure that must be carried out before the Commission decides to exclude certain amounts: ‘1. When, as a result of any inquiry, the Commission considers that expenditure was not effected in compliance with Community rules, it shall communicate its findings to the Member State concerned and indicate the corrective measures needed to ensure future compliance with those rules. The communication shall make reference to this Article. The Member State shall reply within two months of receipt of the communication and the Commission may modify its position in consequence. In justified cases, the Commission may agree to extend the period for reply. After expiry of the period for reply, the Commission shall convene a bilateral meeting and both parties shall endeavour to come to an agreement as to the measures to be taken as well as to the evaluation of the gravity of the infringement and of the financial damage caused to the Community budget. 2. Within two months from the date of the reception of the minutes of the bilateral meeting referred to in the third subparagraph of paragraph 1, the Member State shall communicate any information requested during that meeting or any other information which it considers useful for the ongoing examination. In justified cases, the Commission may, upon reasoned request of the Member State, authorise an extension of the period referred to in the first subparagraph. The request shall be addressed to the Commission before the expiry of that period. After the expiry of the period referred to in the first subparagraph, the Commission shall formally communicate its conclusions to the Member State on the basis of the information received in the framework of the conformity clearance procedure. The communication shall evaluate the expenditure which the Commission envisages to exclude from Community financing under Article 31 of Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 and shall make reference to Article 16(1) of this Regulation. 3. The Member State shall inform the Commission of the corrective measures it has undertaken to ensure compliance with Community rules and the effective date of their implementation. The Commission, after having examined any report drawn up by the Conciliation Body in accordance with Chapter 3 of this Regulation, shall adopt, if necessary, one or more decisions under Article 31 of Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 in order to exclude from Community financing expenditure affected by the non-compliance with Community rules until the Member State has effectively implemented the corrective measures. …’
7.

Article 59 of the REACH Regulation, entitled ‘Identification of substances referred to in Article 57’, provides: ‘1. The procedure set out in paragraphs 2 to 10 of this Article shall apply for the purpose of identifying substances meeting the criteria referred to in Article 57 and establishing a candidate list for eventual inclusion in Annex XIV. … 2. The [European] Commission may ask the [ECHA] to prepare a dossier in accordance with relevant Sections of Annex XV for substances which in its opinion meet the criteria set out in Article 57. … 3. Any Member State may prepare a dossier in accordance with Annex XV for substances which in its opinion meet the criteria set out in Article 57 and forward it to the [ECHA]. … … 5. Within 60 days of circulation, the other Member States or the [ECHA] may comment on the identification of the substance in relation to the criteria in Article 57 in the dossier [forwarded] to the [ECHA]. 6. If the [ECHA] does not receive or make any comments, it shall include this substance on the list referred to in paragraph 1. … 7. When comments are made or received, the [ECHA] shall refer the dossier to the Member State Committee within 15 days of the end of the 60-day period referred to in paragraph 5. 8. If, within 30 days of the referral, the Member State Committee reaches a unanimous agreement on the identification, the [ECHA] shall include the substance in the list referred to in paragraph 1. … 9. If the Member State Committee fails to reach a unanimous agreement, the Commission shall prepare a draft proposal on the identification of the substance within three months of receipt of the opinion of the Member State Committee. A final decision on the identification of the substance shall be taken in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 133(3). 10. The [ECHA] shall publish and update the list referred to in paragraph 1 on its website without delay after a decision on inclusion of a substance has been taken.’
29.

It was in those circumstances that the Audiencia Provincial de Zaragoza (Provincial Court, Zaragoza) decided to stay the main proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Is national legislation compatible with the principle of effectiveness provided for in Article 6(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC, as that directive has been interpreted by the Court of Justice, where it may be inferred from that national legislation that, if a particular unfair term withstood an initial review conducted by a court of its own motion when making an enforcement order [negative review of the validity of the terms’ content], that review prevents the same court from subsequently assessing that term of its own motion where the factual and legal elements existed from the outset, even if that initial review did not express, in the operative part or in the grounds, any considerations on the validity of the terms? (2) Where factual and legal elements exist which determine the unfairness of a term in a consumer contract and the party against whom enforcement is sought fails to rely on that unfairness in the application objecting to enforcement laid down for that purpose by the Law, can that party, following the resolution of that application, make a further preliminary application aimed at determining whether one or more other terms is/are unfair when that party could have relied on those terms at the outset in the ordinary procedural step provided for in the Law? In short, is a time-barring effect created which prevents the consumer from raising again the issue of unfairness of another term in the same enforcement proceedings, and even in subsequent declaratory proceedings? (3) If the conclusion that the party is not entitled to make a second or subsequent application objecting to the enforcement proceedings, in order to allege the unfairness of a term which that party could have raised earlier because the necessary factual and legal elements had already been determined, is held to be compatible with Directive 93/13, can this serve as a basis for use as a means whereby the court, having been alerted to the unfairness of that term, is able to exercise its power of review of its own motion? (4) Once the sale at auction has been approved and the property awarded, possibly to the same creditor, and the ownership of the property provided as security, already realised, has even been transferred, is it compatible with EU law to apply an interpretation according to which (i) after the proceedings have concluded and the objective of such proceedings has been fulfilled, that is to say, the security has been realised, a debtor may make further applications for a declaration that an unfair term is invalid, entailing an effect on the enforcement proceedings or (ii) after the transfer has been completed, possibly in favour of the same creditor, and entered in the Land Registry, a court may of its own motion carry out a review which results in the entire enforcement proceedings being annulled or ultimately affects the amounts covered by the mortgage, potentially affecting the terms under which the bids were made?’
16.

The President of the Okresný súd Bratislava III (District Court, Bratislava III) is now contemplating the issuance of a European arrest warrant in respect of one of the accused persons. In those proceedings he has referred the following questions to the Court of Justice: ‘(1) Does the ne bis in idem principle preclude the issuance of a European arrest warrant within the meaning of Framework Decision 2002/584, and taking into account Article 50 of [the Charter], where the criminal case has been finally closed by a judicial decision to acquit or to discontinue the case, if those decisions have been adopted on the basis of an amnesty that has been revoked by the legislature after the decisions became final and the domestic legal order provides that revocation of such an amnesty entails annulment of decisions of public authorities, where they have been adopted and substantiated on the basis of amnesties or pardons, and the legal obstacles of criminal prosecutions that were based on an amnesty thus revoked have disappeared, without a specific judicial decision or judicial proceedings? (2) Does a provision of a national law that annuls directly – without a decision of a national court – the decision of a national court discontinuing criminal proceedings, which is, under national law, a final decision entailing acquittal and on the basis of which the criminal proceedings have been finally discontinued following the amnesty granted in accordance with a national law, comply with the right to a fair trial, guaranteed in Article 47 of [the Charter], and the right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence, guaranteed in Article 50 of [the Charter] and in Article 82 [TFEU]? (3) Does a provision of national law limiting review by the Constitutional Court of the Resolution of the Národná rada Slovenskej republiky (National Council of the Slovak Republic), which revoked an amnesty or individual pardons and was adopted under Article 86(i) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, merely to an assessment of the resolution’s constitutionality, without taking into account binding acts adopted by the European Union, in particular [the Charter], the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Treaty on European Union, comply with the principle of sincere cooperation within the meaning of Article 4(3) [TEU], Article 267 [TFEU] and Article 82 [TFEU], the right to a fair trial, guaranteed in Article 47 of [the Charter], and the right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence, guaranteed in Article 50 of [the Charter]?’
68.

This interpretation of the GDPR leads to a situation whereby a subscriber may communicate the withdrawal of his or her consent (here a request not to include contact details in directories) to any entity that includes those details in directories, or to any entity (including the telecommunications operator), that communicates such contact details to others for that same purpose. The entity that the subscriber chooses to approach becomes responsible for passing on his or her request for erasure to other controllers to the extent required to ensure that the data are not processed unlawfully. Such an interpretation is in line with the obligation that Article 12(2) of the GDPR imposes on controllers to facilitate the exercise by data subjects of their rights under Articles 15 to 22 of the GDPR. It also reflects the requirement in the last sentence of Article 7(3) of the GDPR that it shall be as easy to withdraw, as to give, consent to the processing of personal data. Since a provider of directories may rely on consent given by a subscriber to process data for that purpose to another provider, it follows that, in order to withdraw consent, it must be possible for a subscriber to contact any one of the providers of directories or the telecommunications operator with a view to his or her contact details being withdrawn from directories published by all of those who rely upon his or her single instance of consent.
Order of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 21 September 2015 —

Shotef v Commission

(Case C‑1/15 SA) ( 1 )

‛Application for leave to serve a garnishee order on the European Union’

Privileges and Immunities of the European Union — Application for leave to serve a garnishee order on an institution of the European Union — Need for the Court’s authorisation — Scope of the Court’s jurisdiction — Coercive measures affecting the financing of common policies or the implementation of action plans — Risk of interference with the functioning of the Union (Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union, Art. 1) (see paras 12-16)

Operative part

1. The application is rejected.

2. The hotel chain La Frontière, Shotef SPRL, is ordered to pay the costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 73, 2.3.2015.
Keywords



Keywords

PROCEDURE - THIRD-PARTY PROCEEDINGS - CONDITIONS OF ADMISSIBILITY - PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS OF THE THIRD PARTY

( STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EEC , ART . 39 ; RULES OF PROCEDURE , ART . 97 ( 1 ))
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. AMENDMENT OF THE ECSC TREATY WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 95 - MODIFICATION OF THE POWERS CONFERRED UPON THE HIGH AUTHORITY BY ARTICLE 65 (2) - LIMITS

2. AMENDMENT OF THE ECSC TREATY WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 95 - SYSTEM OF PRELIMINARY CONTROL PROVIDED FOR BY ARTICLE 65 (2) (C) - REPLACEMENT BY A SYSTEM OF SUBSEQUENT CHECKS - CONFERRING OF A NEW POWER - INADMISSIBILITY

3. AMENDMENT OF THE ECSC TREATY WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 95 - ARTICLE 65 AS AN IMPLEMENTING PROVISION OF ARTICLE 4 (D) - DEROGATION BY AMENDMENT FROM THE LIMITS PRESCRIBED BY ARTICLE 65 (2) (C) - INADMISSIBLE INFRINGEMENT OF A BASIC PROVISIO

Summary

1. IN PRINCIPLE, ARTICLE 95 DOES NOT PREVENT THE RULES RELATING TO THE POWERS CONFERRED BY ARTICLE 65 UPON THE HIGH AUTHORITY FROM BEING ADAPTED BY MEANS OF AN AMENDMENT OF ARTICLE 65 (2) WITH A VIEW TO GIVING THE HIGH AUTHORITY POWER TO AUTHORIZE EITHER AGREEMENTS OF A DIFFERENT NATURE BUT HAVING THE SAME OBJECTIVES AS THOSE PROVIDED FOR IN THE PRESENT PARAGRAPH OR AGREEMENTS OF THE SAME NATURE AS BUT HAVING A DIFFERENT OBJECTIVE FROM THOSE PROVIDED FOR IN THE PARAGRAPH PRESENTLY IN FORCE OR, FINALLY, AGREEMENTS DIFFERING BOTH IN NATURE AND OBJECTIVE.

IT IS HOWEVER ESSENTIAL THAT THE AMENDED WORDING SHOULD STATE THE NATURE OF THE AGREEMENTS WHICH MAY BE AUTHORIZED AND DEFINE CLEARLY THE AIM OF SUCH AGREEMENTS BECAUSE OTHERWISE IT WOULD CONSTITUTE NOT THE ADAPTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF A POWER ALREADY CONFERRED UPON THE HIGH AUTHORITY WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE DEROGATIONS ALLOWED BY ARTICLE 65 (2) BUT THE GRANT OF A POWER WITHOUT DEFINED LIMITS AND THUS OF SUCH A VAST AND INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF ITS EXISTING POWERS AS TO AMOUNT TO AN ALTERATION NOT ONLY IN THE EXTENT BUT IN THE NATURE OF THOSE POWERS, IN OTHER WORDS, TO A NEW POWER.

2. SINCE ARTICLE 65 (2) (C) PROVIDES FOR A SYSTEM OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION WITH REGARD TO THE AUTHORIZATION OF SPECIALIZATION AGREEMENTS OR JOINT-BUYING OR JOINT-SELLING AGREEMENTS THIS SYSTEM CANNOT BE REPLACED IN THE COURSE OF AN AMENDMENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 95 BY A SYSTEM OF CHECKING THE FACTS AND OF SUBSEQUENT DIRECT INTERVENTION. SUCH AN AMENDMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A MERE ADAPTATION OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY'S POWERS BUT THE GRANT OF A NEW POWER.

3. THE DEROGATING PROVISION OF ARTICLE 65 (2) LAYS DOWN AN OBJECTIVE CRITERION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE AGREEMENT CONCERNS " A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE PRODUCTS IN QUESTION WITHIN THE COMMON MARKET ". THIS CRITERION MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO ASSESS THE CASES IN WHICH AN AGREEMENT IS IN ANY CASE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE PROHIBITION LAID DOWN BY ARTICLE 4 (D) AND BY ARTICLE 65 (1 ), SINCE ARTICLE 4 (D) CONSTITUTES A PRINCIPLE OF STRICT APPLICATION THE IMPLEMENTING PROVISIONS OF WHICH ARE CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 65.

IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES TO MAKE PROVISION, BY AN AMENDMENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 95, FOR DEROGATION FROM THE LIMITS PRESCRIBED IN ARTICLE 65 (2) (C) CONSTITUTES AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAID DOWN BY ARTICLE 4 (D )
Case C-17/11 RX

Commission v Petrilli

‛Review’

Decision of the Court (special Chamber provided for in Article 123b of the Rules of Procedure), 8 February 2011

Summary of the Judgment

Review — Finding that the unity or consistency of Community law has been affected — Criteria for assessment

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 62; Rules of Procedure of the Court, Art. 123b)

It is not for the Court of Justice, in the context of the review procedure, to rule on the merits of the General Court’s development of its own case-law when the latter is acting in its appellate capacity.

The fact that the Court of Justice has not yet ruled on a point of law is not, in itself, sufficient to justify a review pursuant to Article 62 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, in so far as it is now solely for the Civil Service Tribunal and the General Court to develop the case-law in matters relating to the civil service, the Court of Justice having jurisdiction only to prevent the decisions of the General Court affecting the unity or consistency of European Union law.

(see para. 4)
(Action for annulment – Action for failure to act – Article 104 EC – Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 – Stability and Growth Pact – Excessive budget deficits – Council decisions not to adopt measures recommended by the Commission pursuant to Article 104(8) and (9) EC – Conclusions of the Council holding the excessive budget deficit procedure in abeyance)
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 63/18

Application for interpretation of judgment of 17 May 1990, Barber (C-262/88), lodged on 26 May 2010 by Manuel Enrique Peinado Guitart

(Case C-262/88 INT)

2011/C 63/35

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Manuel Enrique Peinado Guitart

By order of 17 December 2010, the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) declared the application for interpretation inadmissible.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 22/32

Action brought on 21 November 2007 — Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium

(Case C-510/07)

(2008/C 22/58)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: G. Rozet and B. Schima, Agents)

Defendant: Kingdom of Belgium

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by failing to adopt all such laws, regulations or administrative provisions as may be appropriate to maintain within the Community at all times the level of stocks of petroleum products in the second category of petroleum products listed in Article 2, the Kingdom of Belgium has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 1(1) of Council Directive 68/414/EEC of 20 December 1968 imposing an obligation on Member States of the EEC to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products (1);

— order the Kingdom of Belgium to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By its action, the Commission complains that the defendant has frequently not complied with the obligation to stock petroleum products under Directive 68/414/EEC, as amended and then codified by Council Directive 2006/67/EC of 24 July 2006 (2), as regards the products in the second category under that directive, namely gas oil, diesel oil, kerosene and jet-fuel of the kerosene type. The Commission points out, particularly, in that regard, that a sometimes considerable discrepancy exists between the figures relating to internal consumption of the products in question provided by the defendant in its monthly returns and the data available to the Commission via Eurostat.

(1) OJ English Special Edition, Series I, Chapter 1968 II, p. 586.

(2) OJ 2006 L 217, p. 8.