ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 14 September 2016 —

Trajektna luka Split v Commission

(Case T‑57/15)

‛State aid — Port services — Alleged aid to the public ferry operator of Jadrolinija — Setting of fees by the Croatian authorities for port services in the Port of Split in respect of domestic traffic at an allegedly lower level than that of the fees applied in other Croatian ports and those applied for international traffic — Private operator holding an allegedly exclusive concession for the operation of the passenger terminal at the Port of Split — Decision finding no State aid — Definition of aid — State resources’

1. State aid — Concept — Aid from State resources — Public authorities fixing tariffs for certain port services provided by a private operator holding a concession — Tariffs paid directly by users of the port services — Sums transferred directly and exclusively between private companies — Exclusion (Art. 107(1) TFEU) (see paras 23-30, 34, 36, 49, 50)

2. State aid — Concept — Assessment having regard to Article 107(1) TFEU — Taking into account previous practice — Exclusion (Art. 107(1) TFEU) (see para. 40)

3. State aid — Examination by the Commission — Preliminary review and main review — Compatibility of aid with the internal market — Difficulties of assessment — Commission’s duty to initiate the main review procedure — Serious difficulties — Concept — Objective nature — Burden of proof — No circumstances enabling the existence of such difficulties to be determined (Arts 107(1) TFEU, and 108(2) and (3) TFEU; Regulation No 659/1999, Arts 4(4), and 13(1)) (see paras 59-70, 73, 74)

4. State aid — Examination of complaints — Obligations of the Commission — Statement of reasons — Scope (Arts 108(2) and (3) TFEU, and 296 TFEU) (see paras 76, 79, 80, 82)

5. Actions for annulment — Grounds — Lack of or inadequate statement of reasons — Distinct from pleas and arguments challenging the foundation of a decision (Arts 263 TFEU and 296 TFEU) (see paras 77, 81)

Re:

APPLICATION pursuant to Article 263 TFEU for the annulment of Commission Decision C(2013) 7285 final of 15 October 2014 on State Aid SA.37265 (2014/NN) — Croatia — Alleged aid to Jadrolinija.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) of 29 September 2016 — Bach Flower Remedies v EUIPO — Durapharma (RESCUE)

(Case T‑337/15)

‛EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU word mark RESCUE — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — No distinctive character acquired through use — Article 7(1)(c) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Article 52(2) of Regulation No 207/2009’

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Concept (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 16, 17)

2. EU trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Absolute grounds for invalidity — Registration contrary to Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 — Word mark RESCUE (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 20-42, 47)

3. EU trade mark — Decisions of the Office — Principle of equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — EUIPO’s previous decision-making practice — Principle of legality — Need for a strict and complete examination in each particular case (see paras 44, 45)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Trade marks which are devoid of distinctive character, descriptive or commonplace — Exception — Distinctive character acquired through use — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(3)) (see paras 54, 55)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 26 March 2015 (Case R 2551/2013-1), relating to invalidity proceedings between Durapharma and Bach Flower Remedies.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) of 19 January 2017 — Stock Polska v EUIPO — Lass & Steffen (LUBELSKA)

(Case T‑701/15)

(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU figurative mark LUBELSKA — Earlier national word mark Lubeca — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Level of attention of the public — Similarity of the signs — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)

1. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 13-15)

2. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Degree of attention of the relevant public (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 21)

3. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark—Figurative mark LUBELSKA and word mark Lubeca (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 26, 35, 44, 45)

4. EU trade mark—Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark—Relative grounds for refusal—Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services—Similarity of the marks concerned—Criteria for assessment—Composite mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 28-30)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 24 September 2015 (Case R 1788/2014-5), relating to opposition proceedings between Lass & Steffen Wein- und Spirituosen-Import and Stock Polska.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 1 March 2017 —

Universiteit Antwerpen v REA

(Case T‑208/15)

(Arbitration clause — Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007-2013) — Marie Curie actions — Early-stage researchers — Call for proposals FP7-People-ITN-2008 — Grant agreements — Eligible costs — Recovery of sums paid — Concept of hosting researchers — Proportionality)

1. Judicial proceedings—General Court seised under an arbitration clause—Contract subject to national law—Applicability of national substantive law—Inapplicability of national rules on jurisdiction (Art. 272 TFEU) (see paras 52-55)

2. Judicial proceedings—General Court seised under an arbitration clause—Contracts concluded under a specific research, technological development and demonstration programme—Objectives (Art. 272 TFEU) (see para. 65)

3. Judicial proceedings—General Court seised under an arbitration clause—Contracts concluded under a specific research, technological development and demonstration programme—Concept of hosting researchers (Art. 272 TFEU) (see paras 81-85, 93, 104, 116)

Re:

ACTION under Article 272 TFEU seeking, first of all, a declaration that Grant Agreements No 238214 ‘C7’ (Cerebellar-Cortical Control: Cells, Circuits, Computation, and Clinic) and No 238686 ‘Cerebnet’ (Timing and plasticity in the olivo-cerebellar system), which were entered into in the context of call for proposals FP7-People-ITN-2008, cannot be interpreted as imposing an obligation on the beneficiaries to provide training to early-stage researchers exclusively on their own premises and, as a consequence, confirmation that the REA cannot reject as ineligible part of the costs relating to the training of three early-stage researchers outside the applicant’s premises; and, secondly, an order that the REA is to pay all the costs related to the training of those early-stage researchers, as claimed by the applicant, together with interest from the date on which the payments were due under the agreements.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Orders the Research Executive Agency (REA) to pay Universiteit Antwerpen the sum of EUR 45526.73, corresponding to payment of some of the eligible costs under the ‘Cerebnet’ Agreement No 238686 entered into under the Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007-2013), together with contractual interest from the date from which that amount was due under that agreement;

2. Dismisses the action as to the remainder;
Judicial proceedings—Decision taken by way of reasoned order—Challenge—Conditions—Obligation to challenge the assessment by the Civil Service Tribunal of those conditions

(Rules of Procedure of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal, Art. 81)

(see paras 171, 192)
Judicial proceedings — Application initiating proceedings — Formal requirements — Identification of the subject-matter of the dispute — Brief summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 21, first para., and 53, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 76(d))

(see para. 23)
It follows from Article 263(1) TFEU and from Article 275(2) TFEU, that, while the EU judicature has jurisdiction to review the legality of the acts of the EU institutions and, in particular, the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council, it has no such jurisdiction to review the international agreement on which such EU measures are based. In that regard, it must be emphasised that the review of lawfulness thus to be ensured by the EU Courts applies to the Union act intended to give effect to the international agreement at issue, and not to the latter as such. With more particular regard to a Union act which is intended to give effect to a Security Council resolution, it is not, therefore, for the EU Courts to review the lawfulness of such a resolution adopted by an international body, or the enquiry underlying it.

In proceedings relating to the adoption of the decision to list or maintain the listing of the name of an individual, where, beforehand, under the relevant Security Council resolutions, the Sanctions Committee has decided to list the name of that person on its own list, respect for the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection requires that the competent Union authority disclose to the individual concerned the evidence against that person available to that authority and relied on as the basis of its decision, that is to say, at the very least, the summary of reasons provided by the Sanctions Committee, so that that individual is in a position to defend his rights in the best possible conditions and to decide, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in bringing an action before the EU Courts. When that disclosure takes place, the competent Union authority must ensure that that individual is placed in a position in which he may effectively make known his views on the grounds advanced against him. However, in the context of an initial listing, contrary to the position in respect of the procedure for maintaining the name of a person on the list, compliance with that dual procedural obligation does not have to precede the adoption of the decision.

Moreover, the Council must take its decision ‘on the basis of the statement of reasons provided by the Sanctions Committee’. There is no provision for that committee automatically to make available to the competent European Union authority, for the purposes of the adoption by that committee of its decision, any material other than that statement of reasons. It follows that the Council is not bound, when implementing the Security Council resolution, to verify ‘the accuracy of the facts and circumstances’ underlying the listing measure. It is when comments are made by the individual concerned on the summary of reasons that the competent European Union authority is under an obligation to examine, carefully and impartially, whether the alleged reasons are well founded, in the light of those comments and any exculpatory evidence provided with those comments.

(see paras 79-81, 86-88)
Judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) of 6 April 2017 —

Alkarim for Trade and Industry v Council

(Case T‑35/15)

(Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures taken against Syria — Freezing of funds — Manifest error of assessment)

1. European Union—Judicial review of the legality of the acts of the institutions—Restrictive measures against Syria—Ambit of the review—Proof the measure well-founded—Obligation on the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the grounds held against the persons or entities concerned well-founded (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47; Council Regulations No 36/2012 and No 1105/2014; Council Decisions 2013/255/CFSP and 2014/730/CFSP) (see paras 36-39)

2. Common foreign and security policy—Restrictive measures against Syria—Freezing of funds and economic resources—Annulment action by a person benefiting from the policies of the Syrian regime covered by a fund-freezing decision—Burden of proof—Decision based on a series of indicators—Lawfulness—Conditions (Council Regulations No 36/2012 and No 1105/2014; Council Decisions 2013/255/CFSP and 2014/730/CFSP) (see para. 40)

3. Actions for annulment—Judgment annulling a measure—Effects—Partial annulment of a regulation and a decision concerning the adoption of restrictive measures against Syria—Annulment of regulation to take effect only as from the date of expiry of the period for bringing an appeal or from the date of dismissal of the appeal—Time-limit not applying to the date on which annulment of the decision takes effect (Arts 264, second para., TFEU and 280 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 56, first para., and 60, second para.; Council Regulations No 36/2012 and No 1105/2014; Council Decisions 2013/255/CFSP and 2014/730/CFSP) (see paras 62-66)

Re:

APPLICATION pursuant to Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Council Implementing Decision 2014/730/CFSP of 20 October 2014 implementing Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria (OJ 2014 L 301, p. 36), and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1105/2014 of 20 October 2014 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (OJ 2014 L 301, p. 7), in so far as the name of the applicant has been included in the list of the persons and bodies to which the restrictive measures apply.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Annuls Council Implementing Decision 2014/730/CFSP of 20 October 2014 implementing Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria, and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1105/2014 of 20 October 2014 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria in so far as they concern Alkarim for Trade and Industry LLC;
EU trade mark—Surrender, revocation and invalidity—Causes of revocation—Absence of genuine use of a trade mark—Use of the mark in a form differing by elements not altering the distinctive character of the mark—Subject-matter and scope of Article 15(1), second subpara., (a), of Regulation No 207/2009

(Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 15(1), second subpara., (a), and 51(1)(a))

(see paras 23-25)
EU trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Absolute grounds for invalidity — Registration contrary to Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 — Exception — Distinctive character acquired through use — Criteria for assessment

(Council Regulation No 207/2009, Arts 7(1)(b), and (3), and 52(2))

(see para. 83)
A measure merely confirming an initial decision does not affect the interested party’s situation and, accordingly, does not constitute a measure against which an action for annulment could be brought. An action for the annulment of a measure which merely confirms a previous decision that has become final is inadmissible. A measure is regarded as merely confirmatory of a previous decision if it contains no new factor as compared with the previous measure and was not preceded by a re-examination of the circumstances of the person to whom that measure was addressed.

Where there is a contract between the applicant and one of the EU institutions, an action may be brought before the European Union judicative on the basis of Article 263 TFEU only where the contested measure aims to produce binding legal effects falling outside of the contractual relationship between the parties and which involve the exercise of the prerogatives of a public authority conferred on the contracting institution acting in its capacity as an administrative authority.

A decision enforceable within the meaning of Article 299 TFEU constitutes a challengeable act pursuant to Article 263 TFEU when that decision, in the absence of any contrary indication in the FEU Treaty, is among those referred to in Article 288 TFEU. The merits of such an enforceable decision can be disputed only before the court hearing the proceedings for annulment, on the basis of Article 263 TFEU. That is also the case, in particular, when an enforceable decision was adopted for the purposes of recovering a debt stemming from a contract concluded by an institution. Even if a contract of that type expressly allows such decisions to be issued, their legal nature remains defined not by the contract or the national law applicable to it but by Article 299 TFEU.

(see paras 88, 90, 91)
Judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) of 21 June 2017 —

City Train v EUIPO (CityTrain)

(Case T‑699/15)

(EU trade mark — Application for EU figurative mark CityTrain — Procedural time limit — Unforeseeable circumstances — Absolute grounds for refusal — Descriptive character — Lack of distinctiveness — Article 7(1)(b) and (c) and (2) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)

1. Judicial proceedings — Time-limit for instituting proceedings — Claim barred by lapse of time — Unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure — Concept — Postal delay (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 45, second para.) (see paras 12, 15)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Concept (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 24, 26)

3. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Assessment of the descriptive nature of a sign — Criteria (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see para. 25)

4. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Figurative mark CityTrain (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 28-31)

5. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Assessment of the registrability of a sign — EU rules only taken into account — Earlier registration of the mark in certain Member States or third countries — Decisions not binding EU bodies (Council Regulation No 207/2009) (see para. 32)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 9 September 2015 (Case R 843/2015-4) concerning an application for registration of figurative sign CityTrain as an EU trade mark.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that, under Article 13(1) of the basic antidumping regulation No 1225/2009, anti-dumping duties imposed pursuant to that regulation may be extended to imports from third countries of like products, slightly modified or not, or parts thereof, when circumvention of the measures in force is taking place. Article 13(2) of that regulation provides that an assembly operation is to be considered to circumvent the measures in force where the conditions set out in subparagraphs (a) to (c) are satisfied. More particularly, it follows from Article 13(2)(a) and (b) of that regulation that an assembly operation is to be deemed to constitute circumvention where parts having a value of 60% or more of the total value of the parts of the assembled product are from the country subject to measures.

In that context, Article 13(2) of the basic regulation must be interpreted as meaning that an assembly operation in the Community or in a non-member country is to be regarded as circumventing the measures in force where, as well as satisfying the other conditions referred to in that provision, the parts constituting 60% or more of the total value of the parts of the assembled product are from countries subject to the measures, unless the trader concerned provides the Community institutions with proof that those parts originated in another country. Such proof may be provided in different situations, and not just in the case of a transhipment.

It follows that, as a general rule, although it is sufficient to refer simply to where the parts used for assembling the final product are ‘from’ for the purposes of applying Article 13(2)(b) of the basic regulation, it may be necessary, in case of doubt, to verify whether the parts ‘from’ a third country in actual fact originate in another country. It follows that the term ‘are from’, for the purposes of Article 13(2)(a) of the basic regulation, must be understood as referring to the imports concerned and, therefore, the export country.

As regards determining whether the parts from a third country, in fact, originate from another country, such as the country subject to measures, the Commission cannot apply Article 13(2)(b) of the basic regulation ‘by analogy’ in order to determine the origin of those parts. Article 13(2)(b) does not constitute a rule of origin and the criteria laid down by that article are substantially different from those relating to the rules of origin.

(see paras 77, 78, 81-84, 87, 112, 114)