2.

Since therefore. the contested decision is unassailable on formal grounds, it remains to be considered whether the refusal is not affected by errors of substantive law. In that connection, the applicant's main submission is that it does not follow from the conditions for eligibility that, as the defendant subsequently contended, it was possible to admit only those candidates to the competition who were able to provide evidence of theoretical training in records or library work, or both. Rather, the conditions for eligibility set out at points II.1.B.2 and II.1.C.1 are couched in such general terms that, subject to fulfilment of the other requirements, it would have been necessary to admit every candidate who was able to produce evidence of ability relevant to the field of records or librarianship, or both. In any event, in her view, the opinions of her superiors attesting her ability to perform the tasks described should have been deemed to constitute such evidence. Against that, the defendant points to the wide discretion enjoyed by the Selection Board in establishing the requirements for admission to the tests. It has been shown in practice, however, that the requirements laid down are fulfilled only by those candidates who also possess a theoretical knowledge of the subjects in question. Accordingly, the decision was taken to demand proof of theoretical training of whatever kind from candidates seeking admission to the competition. Such a requirement was apparent simply from a careful reading of the wording of the notice of competition and also, in particular, from the scheme according to which the individual conditions for admission were set out. In the first place, with regard to the Commission's arguments, it must in principle be accepted that, as the Court of Justice too has emphasized in its judgment in Case 90/74 Deboeck, ( 4 ) the appointing authority enjoys a wide discretion in determining the indications of ability required for the new posts to be created and hence also in establishing, having regard to those criteria and in the interests of the service, the requirements for admission to the tests. Accordingly, it cannot be the task of this Court, so long as the limits of that discretion are not overstepped, to usurp the role of the appointing authority. Furthermore, it must also be accepted that, as the Court of Justice has made clear in Case 178/78 Szemerey, ( 5 ) in principle there is nothing to prevent requirements for certain posts or certain groups of posts set out in the notice of competition from exceeding the minimum requirements laid down in Article 5 of the Staff Regulations for the categories concerned, irrespective of whether a vacant post is to be filled or a reserve for posts in a specific category is to be constituted. Hence there is no objection in principle to the requirement of evidence of theoretical knowledge for the performance of executive duties in Category B. Such a requirement must however be clearly discernible to candidates. That is already apparent from the consideration that, as the Court has consistently held, the work of the Selection Board consists initially in comparing the statements of qualification submitted by the candidates against the requirements set out in the notice of competition. Such a comparison must be carried out on the basis of objective factors, known to all the candidates. ( 6 ) Therefore the Court has also laid down, in its judgment in Case 255/78 Anselme, ( 7 ) strict requirements concerning the conditions set out in a notice of competition. According to that judgment, the basic function accorded to the notice of competition by the Staff Regulations “is precisely to give those interested the most accurate information possible about the conditions of eligibility for the post to enable them to judge whether they should apply for it” with the result that it is sufficient if the candidate would have been able to discover those conditions from a careful reading of the notice. Accordingly, since the case turns on the interpretation of points II.1.B.2 and II.1.C.1 — “Certificate or other acceptable statement of qualification as a records clerk and/or library assistant” — it is necessary to examine whether a candidate would have been able to discover from a careful reading of the notice in question that evidence of having undergone theoretical training in the subjects specified was required. In this regard I am unable to agree with the defendant's view to the effect that it is possible to infer from the wording itself that evidence of theoretical training is required. The fact that the above requirement diverges from that stated at point II.1.A.2, in which mention is made of a diploma, indicates, according to the Commission, merely that no training with final diploma or certificate is required under subheadings B and C, but that in such a case a certificate of participation in a theoretical course is sufficient. However, such an interpretation could at most, if at all, be given to the concept “certificate” — “certificat” in the French version and “Zeugnis” in the German version — but is unquestionably untenable as regards the alternative requirement which is intended to qualify the first-mentioned concept. In the French version, the alternative qualification is referred to as an “attestation”, in the English text “other acceptable statement of qualification” whilst in the Dutch text as it stands the qualification required is merely a “bewijs of getuigschrift”. If we proceed on the basis of the German and English versions of the latter requirement, which strike me as being the most specific in meaning, the only inference to be drawn from them is that the evidence of special aptitude in the field of records and library work is required. Those requirements as they are worded are however satisfied by the assessment of the applicant made by her superiors and submitted by the applicant. Even on the assumption that evidence of special theoretical knowledge is also required, that certainly does not mean that such knowledge may be acquired solely by attending courses of instruction at particular educational establishments and not by a candidate's own efforts. Also militating against the defendant's contention is the fact that a systematic interpretation of the notice of competition does not produce any other result. In particular, it does not necessarily follow that, because under heading A, in addition to general educational requirements, a completed specialized training of a theoretical nature is called for, this is also the case as regards headings B and C. Heading A differs fundamentally from the others inasmuch as apart from advanced secondary education with a final diploma or certificate, no special experience is required. Accordingly, the requirement of additional special training of a theoretical nature serves a purpose in this case. However, the case might be different if, as in headings B and C, relevant experience were required. In such circumstances and in particular in view of the different wording used, a statement of qualification as a “records clerk” or “library assistant” or both, might conceivably take the form of an appropriate certificate issued by the candidate's superiors. Moreover, such a certificate providing information on a candidate's particular abilities is not to be confused with evidence of specific experience, as required by points II.1.B.3 and II.1.C.2. Such evidence may be furnished if the candidate shows that he worked in the specific field in question during the requisite period, but without thereby providing a statement of qualification. It is already apparent from those considerations that the requirement set out at points II.1.B.2 and II.1.C.1 of the notice of competition, which is not concerned with special theoretical training, may not be interpreted in a way which conforms with the defendant's opinion. This, moreover, is supported by the fact that 39 other candidates who were not admitted apparently also understood the condition laid down in a sense different from that attributed to it by the defendant. Any other interpretation would, on the other hand, be tantamount to reading into the said requirements a number of things not expressly mentioned in them, with the result that the Selection Board's discretion would be virtually unlimited. Finally, and especially having regard to the particular circumstances of this case, the exclusion of the applicant from the internal competition by way of tests would not be in conformity with the meaning and purpose of the notice of competition, namely to constitute a reserve of qualified persons. In that regard, I share the opinion expressed by Mr Mulfinger in his letter of 29 September 1980 to the effect that it would be an absurd result if the applicant, who, as is attested in the letter, has performed the duties of an official in Category B for several years in the fields in question to the complete satisfaction of her superiors, were not admitted to a competition for a Category B post, whereas the mere submission of a certificate of participation in a theoretical course of instruction of whatever kind entitled a candidate to take part in the competition on condition that the other requirements were fulfilled. In that connection, it is necessary to bear in mind in particular that the purpose of the competition, which is based on tests as specified in the notice, is precisely to assess a candidate's knowledge in the field of “records/library work”. Therefore, a test of the applicant's theoretical knowledge might still have been conducted within the framework of that competition. Since therefore, on the basis of a reasonable assessment, point II.1.B.2 of Internal Competition No COM/B/4/80 cannot from any point of view be interpreted as laying down a requirement that candidates must possess a qualification relating to theoretical training in “records” or “library work”, or both, the Selection Board's decision not to admit the applicant to the competition on the ground that she did not fulfil that requirement was based on criteria other than those specified in the notice of competition and thereby infringed the first paragraph of Article 5 of Annex III to the Staff Regulations according to which all the applicants who meet the requirements set out in the notice of competition must be included in the list of candidates. In view of that conclusion, it is no longer necessary to consider the other submissions put forward by the applicant.