4.

Before making a final judgment of the applicant's position, two objections put forward by the defendant must be considered. It referred in its defence to the fact that its aim was not to induce municipal transport undertakings to replace their entire fleet, but merely to provide an incentive to buy a limited number of prototypes: thus it sought to make clear the relatively limited economic scope of the measures. It also pointed out that Article 30 was not relevant because the measure in question related to aid. The Treaty provides for a special procedure in such cases and only an assessment in the light of Article 92 is relevant. (a) Since I have already made some reference to the first point, I can deal with it very quickly here. Having regard to the amount of money which Law No 308 made available (and which was intended to finance one-fifth of the purchase price of each vehicle), it certainly cannot be said that the measure is of no economic importance and it is certain that it would have a noticeable effect on intra-Community trade. It is also clear that according to the Court's case-law such considerations of quantity are irrelevant for the purposes of Article 30, and that that article also applies even when only a limited hindrance is likely to result (see judgment in Case 269/83). ( 6 ) (b) With regard to the second point, I do not wish to dwell further on the fact that, as the applicant has pointed out, the defendant's position is somewhat contradictory. At one point, it expressly emphasizes that the contested measure was not a subsidy likely to distort competition because all the transport undertakings concerned have a geographical monopoly, and it was also for that reason that no notice was given to the applicant and the procedure under Article 93 of the EEC Treaty was not initiated. It is certainly true that a subsidy which is accorded only to certain domestic undertakings cannot be regarded as a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction within the meaning of Article 30. That is abundantly clear from the judgment in Case 74/76. ( 7 ) With regard to the present case, it must be noted, on the one hand, that it appears very questionable whether the Italian measure is actually covered by Article 92. On the other hand, the applicant places particular emphasis on the significance of the fact that in the aforementioned judgment it was also emphasized that aspects of aid which are not necessary for the attainment of the object of the aid may be distinguished from the rest and may be regarded as infringing particular provisions of the Treaty, including Article 30 thereof. Inasmuch as the Italian measure provides for aid to municipal transport undertakings and encourages them to make use of energy-saving vehicles, it would appear that Article 92 is not applicable because the beneficiaries do not compete with one another, and thus the public subsidies provided for cannot give rise to any distortion of competition, which is the relevant factor in regard to Article 92. In so far as the purpose of the measure and, more particularly, of the nationality clause, may also be regarded as that of granting indirect aid to vehicle manufacturers, with a view to promoting research into and development of energy-saving vehicles, it is also questionable whether it is correct to speak of aid to producers within the meaning of Article 92. They do not receive any financial aid which would permit them to reduce their costs but rather, through the purchaser of the vehicle, who receives part of the purchase price from the State, they receive consideration for goods which they supply. It is thus difficult to speak of aid granted to the vehicle manufacturers. The measure is in fact one designed to direct demand towards particular products and that, as has been shown, is clearly covered by Article 30. That question does not require a thoroughgoing investigation since the applicant's argument based on the second basic principle mentioned in Case 74/76 ( 8 ) appears to be convincing in this case. If it were to be assumed that the measure concerned is in fact in the nature of aid, it would also be clear, in view of its purpose which relates to energy policy (promotion of the use of electric vehicles by the transport undertakings), that the contested clause is not essential for that purpose and that the same result could also be achieved by promoting the purchase of similar foreign vehicles. To that extent, it can therefore be said that the condition constitutes an unnecessary aspect of the aid which is undoubtedly contrary to other provisions of the Treaty, including Article 30. The same can also be said in regard to the measure's other objective, namely promotion of the development of domestic production of electric vehicles. In fact, it must be supposed that if the purpose of the measure was in any way to induce municipal transport undertakings to buy such vehicles, the mere possibility that the Italian undertakings in question might make such a purchase abroad, would be a sufficient incentive to produce vehicles of that kind without there being any need for discrimination of the kind involved in the measures contested here. From that point of view also it is thus difficult to deny that the measure is in the nature of a subsidy and it cannot therefore be argued that it may only be assessed with reference to Article 92 of the EEC Treaty.