ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
11

Article 23 of that regulation, in Section 7 of Chapter II, entitled ‘Prorogation of jurisdiction‘, provides in paragraphs (1) and (5): ‘1. If the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Member State, have agreed that a court or the courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall have jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise. Such an agreement conferring jurisdiction shall be either: (a) in writing or evidenced in writing, or (b) in a form which accords with practices which the parties have established between themselves, or (c) in international trade or commerce, in a form which accords with a usage of which the parties are or ought to have been aware and which in such trade or commerce is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade or commerce concerned. … 5. Agreements or provisions of a trust instrument conferring jurisdiction shall have no legal force if they are contrary to Articles 13, 17 or 21, or if the courts whose jurisdiction they purport to exclude have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 22.’
27

In those circumstances, the Tribunal Administrativo e Fiscal de Coimbra (Coimbra Administrative and Tax Court, Portugal) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Can Article 27(10) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004, or any other rule of law or general principle of the Union that the Court deems applicable, be interpreted as meaning that it precludes a national provision that establishes a charge to finance official controls related to food safety, to be paid by the owners of food or mixed retail outlets only, where that charge does not correspond to any specific official control that has been caused by, or that is for the benefit of, those chargeable persons? (2) Would the answer be different if, instead of a charge, a financial contribution was established in favour of a public body, to be collected from the same chargeable persons, intended to cover the costs of food quality controls, although with the sole aim of extending the responsibility for financing such controls to all operators in the food chain? (3) Does the exemption of certain economic operators from [TSAM], which is levied on certain food or mixed retail outlets only (namely large retail food undertakings) and which is intended to finance the costs of carrying out official controls in the area of food safety, animal protection and animal health, plant protection and plant health, constitute State aid incompatible with the internal market, in so far as it distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU or, at least, does that charge exemption constitute an integral part of a State aid that is subject to notification to the [European] Commission within the meaning of Article 108(3) of the TFEU? (4) Do the principles of EU law, notably the principles of equality, non-discrimination, competition (including the prohibition of reverse discrimination) and freedom to conduct business preclude a national provision that: (a) imposes the obligation to pay the charge on large retail food undertakings only? (b) excludes from the scope of the charge outlets or microenterprises with a sales area of less than 2000 m2 and which are not integrated in a group, or which do not belong to an undertaking that uses one or more ensigns and which has, at national level, a cumulative sales area of 6000 m2 or more?’
11

Regulation No 182/2011 provides in Article 3(1) to (4) and (7), entitled ‘Common provisions’: ‘1. The common provisions set out in this Article shall apply to all the procedures referred to in Articles 4 to 8. 2. The Commission shall be assisted by a committee composed of representatives of the Member States. The committee shall be chaired by a representative of the Commission. The chair shall not take part in the committee vote. 3. The chair shall submit to the committee the draft implementing act to be adopted by the Commission. Except in duly justified cases, the chair shall convene a meeting not less than 14 days from submission of the draft implementing act and of the draft agenda to the committee. The committee shall deliver its opinion on the draft implementing act within a time limit which the chair may lay down according to the urgency of the matter. Time limits shall be proportionate and shall afford committee members early and effective opportunities to examine the draft implementing act and express their views. 4. Until the committee delivers an opinion, any committee member may suggest amendments and the chair may present amended versions of the draft implementing act. The chair shall endeavour to find solutions which command the widest possible support within the committee. The chair shall inform the committee of the manner in which the discussions and suggestions for amendments have been taken into account, in particular as regards those suggestions which have been largely supported within the committee. … 7. Where applicable, the control mechanism shall include referral to an appeal committee. The appeal committee shall adopt its own rules of procedure by a simple majority of its component members, on a proposal from the Commission. Where the appeal committee is seised, it shall meet at the earliest 14 days, except in duly justified cases, and at the latest 6 weeks, after the date of referral. Without prejudice to paragraph 3, the appeal committee shall deliver its opinion within 2 months of the date of referral. A representative of the Commission shall chair the appeal committee. The chair shall set the date of the appeal committee meeting in close cooperation with the members of the committee, in order to enable Member States and the Commission to ensure an appropriate level of representation. By 1 April 2011, the Commission shall convene the first meeting of the appeal committee in order to adopt its rules of procedure.’
7

Article 28 of that regulation states: ‘1. Member States shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he or she is subject to the procedure established by this Regulation. 2. When there is a significant risk of absconding, Member States may detain the person concerned in order to secure transfer procedures in accordance with this Regulation, on the basis of an individual assessment and only in so far as detention is proportional and other less coercive alternative measures cannot be applied effectively. 3. Detention shall be for as short a period as possible and shall be for no longer than the time reasonably necessary to fulfil the required administrative procedures with due diligence until the transfer under this Regulation is carried out. Where a person is detained pursuant to this Article, the period for submitting a take charge or take back request shall not exceed one month from the lodging of the application. The Member State carrying out the procedure in accordance with this Regulation shall ask for an urgent reply in such cases. Such reply shall be given within two weeks of receipt of the request. Failure to reply within the two-week period shall be tantamount to accepting the request and shall entail the obligation to take charge or take back the person, including the obligation to provide for proper arrangements for arrival. Where a person is detained pursuant to this Article, the transfer of that person from the requesting Member State to the Member State responsible shall be carried out as soon as practically possible, and at the latest within six weeks of the implicit or explicit acceptance of the request by another Member State to take charge or to take back the person concerned or of the moment when the appeal or review no longer has a suspensive effect in accordance with Article 27(3). When the requesting Member State fails to comply with the deadlines for submitting a take charge or take back request or where the transfer does not take place within the period of six weeks referred to in the third subparagraph, the person shall no longer be detained. Articles 21, 23, 24 and 29 shall continue to apply accordingly. 4. As regards the detention conditions and the guarantees applicable to persons detained, in order to secure the transfer procedures to the Member State responsible, Articles 9, 10 and 11 of [the Reception Directive] shall apply.’
21

In those circumstances, the Riigikohus (Supreme Court, Estonia) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Is Article 7(2) of [Regulation No 1215/2012] to be interpreted as meaning that a person who alleges that his rights have been infringed by the publication of incorrect information concerning him on the internet and by the failure to remove comments relating to him can bring an action for rectification of the incorrect information and removal of the harmful comments before the courts of any Member State in which the information on the internet is or was accessible, in respect of the harm sustained in that Member State? (2) Is Article 7(2) of [Regulation No 1215/2012] to be interpreted as meaning that a legal person which alleges that its rights have been infringed by the publication of incorrect information concerning it on the internet and by the failure to remove comments relating to that person can, in respect of the entire harm that it has sustained, bring proceedings for rectification of the information, for an injunction for removal of the comments and for damages for the pecuniary loss caused by publication of the incorrect information on the internet before the courts of the State in which that legal person has its centre of interests? (3) If the second question is answered in the affirmative: is Article 7(2) of [Regulation No 1215/2012] to be interpreted as meaning that: – it is to be assumed that a legal person has its centre of interests in the Member State in which it has its seat, and accordingly that the place where the harmful event occurred is in that Member State, or – in ascertaining a legal person’s centre of interests, and accordingly the place where the harmful event occurred, regard must be had to all of the circumstances, such as its seat and fixed place of business, the location of its customers and the way and means in which its transactions are concluded?’
26

In those circumstances, the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘Can Article 144 and Article 86(1) of [the VAT Directive] [corresponding to Article 14(1) and (2) and Article 11.B(3) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1)], taken together, be interpreted to mean that the only condition in order for connected services consisting of the “inbound” transport service — from airports to the place of destination within the territory of the Member State, with the “free-at-destination” clause — not to be liable to VAT is that their value is included in the taxable amount, regardless of whether or not the goods in question were in fact subject to customs duties, at the time of their importation; and is it therefore incompatible with those [EU law] provisions if the domestic rules laid down in [point 2 of] Article 9(1) and Article 69(1) of [Decree No 633/72] read together in the versions in force at the time of the material facts, provide that in every case, and therefore also in the case of imports that are not liable to VAT — as is the case here, since it concerns documents and goods of negligible value — there has to be compliance with the additional requirement that those imports must in fact be liable to VAT (and customs duty must in fact be paid) at the time of the importation of such goods, even, if need be, when account is taken of the ancillary nature of the transport services in relation to the main services (namely the importation) and of the rationale of simplification underlying both the main and the ancillary operations? ’
6

Under Article 4 of the directive: ‘1. On the basis of the criteria set out in Annex III (Stage 1) and relevant scientific information, each Member State shall propose a list of sites indicating which natural habitat types in Annex I and which species in Annex II that are native to its territory the sites host. … Where appropriate, Member States shall propose adaptation of the list in the light of the results of the surveillance referred to in Article 11. … 2. On the basis of the criteria set out in Annex III (Stage 2) and in the framework both of each of the nine biogeographical regions referred to in Article 1(c)(iii) and of the whole of the territory referred to in Article 2(1), the Commission shall establish, in agreement with each Member State, a draft list of sites of Community importance drawn from the Member States’ lists identifying those which host one or more priority natural habitat types or priority species. … The list of sites selected as sites of Community importance, identifying those which host one or more priority natural habitat types or priority species, shall be adopted by the Commission in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 21. … 4. Once a site of Community importance has been adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in paragraph 2, the Member State concerned shall designate that site as [an SAC] as soon as possible and within six years at most, establishing priorities in the light of the importance of the sites for the maintenance or restoration, at a favourable conservation status, of a natural habitat type in Annex I or a species in Annex II and for the coherence of Natura 2000, and in the light of the threats of degradation or destruction to which those sites are exposed. …’
6

Article 46 of Regulation No 1408/71, headed ‘Award of benefits’, provides as follows: ‘1. Where the conditions required by the legislation of a Member State for entitlement to benefits have been satisfied without having to apply Article 45 or Article 40(3), the following rules shall apply: (a) the competent institution shall calculate the amount of the benefit that would be due: (i) on the one hand, only under the provisions of the legislation which it administers; (ii) on the other hand, pursuant to paragraph 2; … 2. Where the conditions required by the legislation of a Member State for entitlement to benefits are satisfied only after application of Article 45 and/or Article 40(3), the following rules shall apply: (a) the competent institution shall calculate the theoretical amount of the benefit to which the person concerned could lay claim provided all periods of insurance and/or of residence, which have been completed under the legislation of the Member States to which the employed person or self-employed person was subject, have been completed in the State in question under the legislation which it administers on the date of the award of the benefit. If, under this legislation, the amount of the benefit is independent of the duration of the periods completed, the amount shall be regarded as being the theoretical amount referred to in this paragraph; (b) the competent institution shall subsequently determine the actual amount of the benefit on the basis of the theoretical amount referred to in the preceding paragraph in accordance with the ratio of the duration of the periods of insurance or of residence completed before the materialisation of the risk under the legislation which it administers to the total duration of the periods of insurance and of residence completed before the materialisation of the risk under the legislation of all the Member States concerned. 3. The person concerned shall be entitled to the highest amount calculated in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 from the competent institution of each Member State without prejudice to any application of the provisions concerning reduction, suspension or withdrawal provided for by the legislation under which this benefit is due. Where that is the case, the comparison to be carried out shall relate to the amounts determined after the application of the said provisions. …’
12

Article 39 of the ustawa Prawo telekomunikacyjne (Law on telecommunications) of 16 July 2004 (Dz. U. No 171, heading 1800), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the Law on telecommunications’), provides: ‘1. Under the conditions referred to in Article 24(2)(a), the President of the OEC may, by way of a decision, impose on operators with significant market power an obligation to: (1) calculate the justified costs of the service for accessing the telecommunications network (by setting out the detailed arrangements for the calculation of the costs) that it must apply on the basis of the provisions of the regulation referred to in Article 51, in accordance with the description of the calculation of the costs carried out by the President of the OEC, (2) apply access fees the amount of which includes the recovery of the justified costs of the operator. 2. An operator on which an obligation as referred to in paragraph 1 is imposed shall provide the President of the OEC, on request, with justification of the amount of the fees on the basis of the justified costs. … 4. In the event that: … (3) the body responsible for carrying out the audit referred to in Article 53(5) delivers a negative opinion or a qualified opinion, (4) a discrepancy is identified between the amount of the fees set by the operator and that of the fees set by the President of the OEC, in accordance with paragraph 3, the President of the OEC shall set the amount of the fees for accessing the telecommunications network or the maximum or minimum levels thereof, applying the methods referred to in paragraph 3(2). The abovementioned fees shall by set by separate decision … 5. The President of the OEC shall set the fees for accessing the telecommunications network in a way that promotes efficiency and sustainable competition and ensures maximum benefits for end-users, while taking into account the recovery of the justified costs.’
18

Article 12 of Directive 91/477 provides: ‘1. If the procedure provided for in Article 11 is not employed, the possession of a firearm during a journey through two or more Member States shall not be permitted unless the person concerned has obtained the authorisation of each of those Member States. Member States may grant such authorisation for one or more journeys for a maximum period of one year, subject to renewal. Such authorisations shall be entered on the [pass], which the traveller must produce whenever so required by the authorities of the Member States. 2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, hunters, in respect of categories C and D, and marksmen, in respect of categories B, C and D, may, without prior authorisation, be in possession of one or more firearms during a journey through two or more Member States with a view to engaging in their activities, provided that they are in possession of a [pass] listing such firearm or firearms and provided that they are able to substantiate the reasons for their journey, in particular by producing an invitation or other proof of their hunting or target shooting activities in the Member State of destination. Member States may not make acceptance of a [pass] conditional upon the payment of any fee or charge. However, this derogation shall not apply to journeys to a Member State which prohibits the acquisition and possession of the firearm in question or which, pursuant to Article 8(3), makes it subject to authorisation; in that case, an express statement to that effect shall be entered on the [pass]. ...’
10

On the initiative of the referring court which raised the question of the constitutionality of Article 1(79) of Law No 220/2010, the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court, Italy), by its judgment No 56/2015 of 31 March 2015 ruled that the principle of protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty are values protected by the Italian constitution, but not in absolute terms from which there can be no derogation. As regards public-service concessions, that court held that the possibility of public intervention leading to alteration of the original requirements must be considered inherent in the contractual concession relationship from the start, which is all the more likely to be the case in a field as sensitive as that of public gaming, which calls for the specific, ongoing attention of the national legislature. Therefore, neither those values nor the freedom to conduct a business have been infringed. Furthermore, the constraints imposed by the provisions at issue, in the present case, constitute a minimum measure for restoration of the principle of equal treatment of operators, fully justified by the situation of the existing concession holder, who enjoys an advantage in so far as he has not had to take part in the new selection procedure. In addition, the provisions in question are thus neither manifestly inconsistent with the objectives laid down by the national legislature, nor disproportionate to the content and nature of the contractual concession relationship, nor do they entail unacceptable additional charges. Finally, the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court) held that the supposed loss of all or part of the capital invested is at worst merely an indirect consequence of the management constraints imposed by the contested provisions and lies, as such, outside the sphere of protection of the right to be compensated.
21

In those circumstances the Bundesfinanzgericht (Federal Finance Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) In circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, – in which a taxable person X1 has at its disposal goods stored in Member State A and has sold those goods to a taxable person X2, and X2 has expressed to X1 its intention to transport the goods to Member State B, and X2 has presented to X1 its VAT identification number issued by Member State B, – and X2 has sold those goods on to a taxable person X3 and X2 has agreed with X3 that X3 will arrange or carry out the transport of the goods from Member State A to Member State B and X3 has arranged or carried out the transport of the goods from Member State A to Member State B and X3 was already entitled to dispose of the goods as owner in Member State A, – and X2 has not, however, informed X1 that he has already sold on the goods before they leave Member State A, – and X1 also could not know that X2 would not be arranging or carrying out the transport of the goods from Member State A to Member State B, is EU law to be interpreted as meaning that the place of supply from X1 to X2 is determined in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 32 of the VAT Directive and that the supply from X1 to X2 is thus the intra-Community (the so-called “active”) supply? (2) If Question 1 must be answered in the negative, is EU law then to be interpreted as meaning that X3 may nevertheless deduct as input VAT an amount of VAT of Member State B invoiced to it by X2, provided that X3 uses the goods purchased for purposes of its transactions taxed in Member State B and no wrongful exercise of the right of deduction of input VAT can be imputed to X3? (3) If Question 1 must be answered in the affirmative and X1 subsequently learns that X3 has arranged the transport and was already entitled to dispose of the goods as owner in Member State A, is EU law then to be interpreted as meaning that the supply from X1 to X2 retrospectively loses its status as the intra-Community supply (that it is thus to be viewed retrospectively as a so-called “passive” supply?’