Keywords

Summary



Keywords

1. Actions for damages – Limitation period – Starting point

(Arts 235 EC and 288, second para., EC; EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 43 (now Art. 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice); Council Regulations Nos 1078/77 and 857/84)

2. Actions for damages – Time-limits for bringing actions – Interruption

(Arts 230 EC and 232 EC; EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 43 (now Art. 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice); Council Regulations Nos 1078/77, 857/84 and 2187/93; Council and Commission Notice No 92/C 198/04)

3. Procedure – Time-limits for bringing actions – Claim barred by lapse of time

Summary

1. The limitation period laid down by Article 43 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice (now Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice) for actions in non-contractual liability against the Communities cannot begin to run until all the conditions governing the obligation to make good the damage are satisfied and, in particular, in cases where liability stems from a legislative measure, until the injurious effects of the measure have been produced. Those conditions are the existence of unlawful conduct on the part of the Community institutions, the fact of the damage alleged and the existence of a causal link between that conduct and the loss claimed.

In that regard, damage from a milk producer’s inability to use a reference quantity arises on the date when, following the expiry of his non‑marketing undertaking entered into pursuant to Regulation No 1078/77, the producer concerned would have been able to resume milk deliveries, without having to pay the additional levy, if he had not been refused allocation of a reference quantity. Therefore it is on that date that the conditions for an action for damages against the Community are satisfied.

(see paras 61-62)

2. In accordance with Article 43 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice (now Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice), the limitation period is interrupted if proceedings are instituted before the Community judicature or if, prior to such proceedings, an application is made to the relevant institution of the Communities. In the latter event, however, the interruption is effective only if the application is followed by the institution of proceedings within the period laid down in Article 230 EC or Article 232 EC, as the case may be.

The Council and Commission Notice on the subsequent adoption of Regulation No 2187/93 providing for an offer of compensation to the producers concerned, whereby the institutions undertook, vis-à-vis certain producers, to waive the right to plead limitation under Article 43 of the Statute until the time when the detailed practical rules for compensation of producers had been determined, does not have the effect of causing a new limitation period of five years to run from the date on which that self-limitation came to an end. Nonetheless, that waiver and the earlier correspondence which followed the prior claims for compensation have an effect on the calculation of the limitation period. In that regard, the suspension of the limitation period resulting from the institutions’ unilateral waiver of the right to plead limitation in that communication, and possibly also in earlier correspondence, retains its validity regardless of the point in time at which an applicant brought an action in damages before the Court.

In that regard, the benefit of the unconditional suspension of limitation brought about by the institutions’ unilateral waiver is not restricted solely to that group of milk producers who had not made an application for compensation within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 10(2) of Regulation No 2187/93. The presence or absence of such an application is relevant solely for the purposes of establishing the end date of the suspension of limitation brought about by that waiver, which varies according to whether or not such an application was made.

(see paras 67, 69, 71-73, 76)

3. In the context of Community case-law on the time-limits for bringing actions, the concept of excusable error must be strictly construed and can concern only exceptional circumstances in which, in particular, the conduct of the institutions concerned had been, either alone or to a decisive extent, such as to give rise to a pardonable confusion in the mind of a party acting in good faith and exercising all the diligence required of a normally experienced trader. In such circumstances, the administration may not rely on its own failure to observe the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations out of which the party’s error arose.

(see para. 93)