ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 10 December 2015 —

Fútbol Club Barcelona v OHIM (Representation of the outline of a crest)

(Case T‑615/14)

‛Community trade mark — Application for a figurative Community trade mark representing the outline of a crest — Absolute grounds for refusal — No distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — No distinctive character acquired through use — Article 7(3) of Regulation No 207/2009’

1. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Assessment of distinctive character — Criteria (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 23-27, 36)

2. Community trade mark — Procedural provisions — Examination of the facts of the Office’s own motion — Scope — No obligation to prove matters within common knowledge (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 76(1)) (see paras 29-31)

3. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Figurative mark representing the outline of a crest (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 32-35, 39, 60, 65)

4. Community trade mark — Decisions of the Office — Principle of equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — OHIM’s previous decision-making practice (see para. 38)

5. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Exception — Distinctive character acquired through use — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b) to (d), and (3)) (see paras 46-54)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 23 May 2014 (Case R 2500/2013-1) concerning an application for registration as a Community trade mark of a figurative sign representing the outline of a crest.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
In the absence of any provision to the contrary contained either in a regulation or a directive applicable to recruitment competitions or in the notice of competition, the requirement of possession of a university diploma on which admission to an open competition depends is necessarily to be construed in the light of the definition of such a diploma given in the legislation of the Member State in which the candidate completed the studies on which he relies. The university diploma which a candidate must possess in order to take part in an open competition must be fully recognised under the legislation of the Member State in which it was awarded.

Such references to the legislation of the Member State in which the diploma was awarded, in the absence of a contrary provision, ensure equal treatment in competition procedures which may be entered by candidates whose university studies have taken place in different countries and at institutions whose systems of teaching also differ greatly as regards their organisation, structure, methods and content. This makes it possible to assess in an equal manner those who, having obtained a diploma the actual value of which is certified by the official nature afforded it by the State, are essentially in the same situation both from the point of view of the facts and from the legal point of view. Furthermore, such references guarantee the persons concerned the highest level of certainty, enabling them to know in advance and with sufficient assurance whether their university diploma will or will not be regarded as valid for admission to the European civil service.

(see paras 26-28, 33)

Judgment of 13 July 1989 in Jaenicke Cendoya v Commission, 108/88, ECR, EU:C:1989:325, para. 17

Judgment of 9 December 1999 in Alonso Morales v Commission, T‑299/97, ECR-SC, EU:T:1999:314, para. 60
Judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) of 28 January 2016 —

Arbuzov v Council

(Case T‑434/14)

‛Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures adopted in view of the situation in Ukraine — Freezing of funds — List of persons, entities and bodies covered by the freezing of funds and economic resources — Inclusion of the applicant’s name — Proof that inclusion on the list is justified’

1. Actions for annulment — Natural or legal persons — Measures of direct and individual concern to them — Restrictive measures taken having regard to the situation in Ukraine — Decision reviewing the list of persons, groups or entities concerned and supplementing the list without repealing the earlier decision — Action brought by a person mentioned in the decision carrying out the said review but not in the earlier decision — Admissibility (Art. 263, fourth and sixth paras, TFEU; Council Decision 2014/119/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2014/216/CFSP) (see paras 23-25)

2. European Union — Judicial review of the legality of the acts of the institutions — Restrictive measures taken having regard to the situation in Ukraine — Ambit of the review — Proof the measure well-founded — Obligation on the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the grounds held against the persons or entities concerned well-founded (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47; Council Decision 2014/119/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2014/216/CFSP) (see paras 31, 33-45)

3. Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures taken having regard to the situation in Ukraine — Decision to freeze funds — Restriction of the right to property — Conditions — No restriction laid down by law — Infringement of the right to property (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 52(1); Council Decision 2014/119/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2014/216/CFSP) (see paras 32, 42, 45, 46)

Re:

APPLICATION for annulment of Council Decision 2014/119/CFSP of 5 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 66, p. 26) and of Council Implementing Decision 2014/216/CFSP of 14 April 2014 implementing Decision 2014/119 (OJ 2014 L 111, p. 91), in so far as the applicant’s name was included on the list of persons, entities and bodies covered by those restrictive measures.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Annuls Council Decision 2014/119/CFSP of 5 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine, as amended by Council Implementing Decision 2014/216/CFSP of 14 April 2014 implementing Decision 2014/119 in so far as it applies to Mr Sergej Arbuzov;
Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 18 February 2016 — Harrys Pubar and Harry’s New York Bar v OHIM — Harry’s New York Bar and Harrys Pubar (HARRY’S NEW YORK BAR)

(Joined Cases T‑84/14 and T‑97/14)

‛Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for the Community word mark HARRY’S NEW YORK BAR — Earlier national figurative mark PUB CASINO Harrys RESTAURANG — Partial refusal of registration — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

1. Judicial proceedings — Application initiating proceedings — Formal requirements — Identification of the subject-matter of the dispute — Brief summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 21, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the General Court (1991), Art. 44(1)(c)) (see para. 27)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 47-49, 51, 52, 103, 104)

3. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity between the goods or services in question — Complementary nature of the goods or services (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 61, 62)

4. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity of the marks concerned — Criteria for assessment — Composite mark (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 76, 77, 84, 85)

5. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Word mark HARRY’S NEW YORK BAR and figurative mark PUB CASINO Harrys RESTAURANG (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 92-101, 108, 110)

Re:

Two actions brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 14 November 2013 (joined Cases R 1038/2012-1 and R 1045/2012-1), relating to opposition proceedings between Harrys Pubar AB and Harry’s New York Bar SA.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Annuls, in Case T‑84/14 points 1 of the operative part of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) of 14 November 2013 (joined Cases R 1038/2012-1 and R 1045/2012-1), relating to opposition proceedings between Harrys Pubar AB and Harry’s New York Bar SA;

2. Dismisses, in Case T‑97/14, the action brought by Harry’s New York Bar;
Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 26 February 2016 —

provima Warenhandels v OHIM — Renfro (HOT SOX)

(Case T‑543/14)

‛Community trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — International registration designating the European Community — Word mark HOT SOX — Absolute grounds for refusal — Lack of distinctive character — Distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

1. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Assessment of the descriptive nature of a sign — Criteria (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c); Art. 52(1)(a); Art. 158) (see paras 16-18, 20, 40)

2. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications capable of designating the characteristics of a product or service — Word mark composed of several elements — Taking into account the overall perception of the mark by the relevant public — Linguistic knowledge of the public (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 19, 52)

3. Community trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Absolute grounds for invalidity — Registration contrary to Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 — Word mark HOT SOX (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 21, 37, 47, 49, 55)

4. Community trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Absolute grounds for invalidity — Registration contrary to Article 7 — Relevant date for the examination of an absolute ground for nullity — Date of lodging the application for registration (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 52(1)(a)) (see para. 44)

5. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Assessment of the registrability of a sign — EU rules only taken into account — Earlier registration of the mark in certain Member States or third countries — Decisions not binding EU bodies (Council Regulation No 207/2009) (see para. 50)

6. Community trade mark — Decisions of the Office — Principle of equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — OHIM’s previous decision-making practice — Principle of legality (see para. 54)

7. Community trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark — Absolute grounds for refusal — Marks devoid of any distinctive character — Concept — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 60, 61)

8. Community trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Absolute grounds for invalidity — Registration contrary to Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 — Word mark HOT SOX (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see paras 63-66)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 13 May 2014 (Case R 1859/2013-2), concerning invalidity proceedings between provima Warenhandels GmbH and Renfro Corp.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 7 April 2016 —

Industrias Tomás Morcillo v EUIPO — Aucar Trailer (Polycart A Whole Cart Full of Benefits)

(Case T‑613/14)

‛EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for European Union figurative mark Polycart A Whole Cart Full of Benefits — Earlier European Union figurative mark POLICAR — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009’

1. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Similarity between the goods or services in question — Criteria for assessment (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 16, 22, 27)

2. EU trade mark — Definition and acquisition of the EU trade mark — Relative grounds for refusal — Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services — Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark — Figurative marks Polycart A Whole Cart Full of Benefits and POLICAR (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 36-38)

Re:

ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the EUIPO of 7 May 2014 (Case R 1735/2012-1), relating to opposition proceedings between Aucar Trailer, SL and Industrias Tomás Morcillo, SL.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
6.

Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures against Iran — Freezing of funds of persons, entities or bodies engaged in or supporting nuclear proliferation — Restriction of the right to property and the free exercise of an economic activity — No breach of principle of proportionality (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts 17 and 52(1); Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Council Regulation No 267/2012) (see paras 98-101)
The fact that a product is described as being a finished product does not mean it may not be used in industry as an ingredient, raw material or component in the manufacture of another product. A finished product means a product which is ready to be marketed. The description can therefore be applied to products marketed to industry. Moreover, even if that description is used in a narrower sense, to distinguish manufactured goods from unprocessed raw materials, a manufactured product may constitute an ingredient, raw material or component of another manufactured product.

(see para. 51)
Judgment of the General Court (Appeal Chamber) of 26 January 2017 — Commission v Verile and Gjergji

(Case T‑104/14 P-INTP)

(Proceedings — Interpretation of a judgment)

Judicial proceedings—Costs—Applicable rules—Each party ordered to pay its own costs on appeal—Costs linked to the dispute at first instance—Inclusion

(Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 211(3))

(see paras 10, 11)

Re:

Request for interpretation of the judgment of 13 October 2015, Commission v Verile and Gjergji (T‑104/14 P, EU:T:2015:776).

Operative part

1. Paragraph 3 of the operative part of the judgment of 13 October 2015, Commission v Verile and Gjergji (T‑104/14), must be interpreted as covering both the costs relating to the appeal proceedings and those relating to the proceedings at first instance.

2. Mr Marco Veril and Ms Anduela Gjergji, on the one hand, and the European Commission, on the other, are each ordered to bear their own costs relating to the proceedings for interpretation.
In order to assess whether texts intended to establish binding rules may form the subject-matter of an action under Article 263 TFEU, it is necessary to examine their content. In the absence of specific or new obligations being established, the mere publication of a communication is not sufficient to conclude that that communication constitutes a measure capable of producing binding legal effects.

As regards the General Rules applicable to open competitions published in the Official Journal of the European Union by the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO), including the General Guidelines of the College of the Heads of Administration on the use of languages in EPSO competitions, it is clear from the actual wording of those texts that, in publishing them, EPSO has not definitively decided on the language rules for all competitions which it is responsible for organising. The General Rules and the General Guidelines expressly reserve the choice of the language rules for each competition to the competition notice which will be adopted when the procedure to which it refers is opened. Therefore, the texts at issue cannot be regarded as creating specific or new obligations.

Moreover, and in any event, even if the General Rules and the General Guidelines include a series of assessments according to which the choice of the second language of the competitions organised by EPSO and the language of communication between EPSO and the candidates is to be limited to German, English and French, those assessments cannot be interpreted as establishing language rules applicable to all competitions organised by EPSO, given that no provision has conferred on EPSO or the College of the Heads of Administration the power to establish such rules of general application or to adopt, in that regard, basic rules which a competition notice may avoid only in exceptional cases. In that regard, EPSO is not precluded, for the purposes of ensuring equal treatment and legal certainty, from adopting and publishing measures such as the General Rules and the General Guidelines setting out how it intends to make use, in certain circumstances, of the discretion which those provisions confer on it. Nevertheless, EPSO is bound by those texts only insofar as they do not depart from the rules of general application governing its powers and provided that, in adopting those texts, it does not give up the power conferred on it in the assessment of the needs of the institutions and bodies of the European Union, including their linguistic needs, when organising the various competitions.

It must be concluded that the General Rules and the General Guidelines must be interpreted as constituting, at most, communications, which set out criteria by which EPSO intends to choose the language rules for the competitions which it is responsible for organising.

(see paras 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 57, 58)
Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 6 July 2017 —

France v Commission

(Case T‑74/14)

(State aid — Aid measures implemented by France in favour of SNCM — Restructuring aid and measures taken in the context of a privatisation plan — Private investor in a market economy test — Decision declaring the aid unlawful and incompatible with the internal market — Re-opening of the formal investigation procedure — Obligation to state reasons)

1. Actions for annulment—Judgment annulling a measure—Scope—Commission decision finding aid incompatible with the internal market and ordering its recovery—Annulment for error of law and manifest errors of assessment—New analysis required by the judgment annulling a measure able to be carried out by the Commission without starting the investigation of the case afresh—Right to be heard having been respected at the time of the adoption of the contested decision—Adoption of a new decision without reopening the formal investigation procedure—Lawfulness (Arts 108(2) TFEU and 266 TFEU; Council Regulation No 659/1999) (see paras 44-60)

2. Acts of the institutions—Statement of reasons—Obligation—Scope—Commission decision on State aid (Art. 296 TFEU) (see paras 68-74)

Re:

APPLICATION under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Commission Decision C(2013) 7066 final of 20 November 2013, concerning State aid SA.16237 (C 58/2002) (ex N 118/2002) implemented by France in favour of SNCM.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;
Competition — Administrative procedure — Commission decision finding an infringement — Burden of proving the infringement and its duration on the Commission — Means of proof — Reliance on a body of evidence — Degree of evidential value necessary as regards items of evidence viewed in isolation — Permissibility of an overall assessment of a body of evidence — Compliance with the principle of the presumption of innocence

(Art. 101(1) TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 48)

(see paras 62-68, 116-122, 143-145)
As regards a ground approach instrument which uses a radio signal to increase the landing accuracy of an aircraft approaching a landing runway, that instrument, even if it were mandatory and though it contributes, like other systems, to the safety of landings, plays no part either in the control and supervision of airspace, or in the performance of any other public policy remit which might be exercised at an airport. It contributes to the delivery of the services offered by a civil airport in a competitive context to airlines within the framework of its general activity, which is an economic activity. The absence of such equipment has the result only that, in certain meteorological conditions, the airlines using an airport will cancel their flights or redirect them to other airports possessing such equipment. Accordingly, an airport which is not equipped with such equipment is in a less favourable competitive position than an airport which has installed such equipment, but that finding does not allow that equipment to escape being classified as an activity of an economic nature.

(see paras 97, 99, 100, 102, 103)
Competition — Administrative procedure — Principle of sound administration — Requirement of impartiality — Scope — Public statements made by Members of the Commission during the administrative procedure — Breach of the principle of good administration and of the presumption of innocence — None

(Art. 101(1) TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts 41 and 48(1))

(see paras 54-62)
Competition — Administrative procedure — Commission decision finding an infringement — Burden of proving the infringement and its duration on the Commission — Extent of the burden of proof — Proof of the beginning of the infringement — Compliance with the principle of the presumption of innocence

(Art. 101(1) TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 48)

(see paras 167, 175, 196-204)
Action for annulment — Natural or legal persons — Measures of direct and individual concern to them — Whether directly concerned — Criteria — Restrictive measures taken having regard to the situation in Ukraine — Acts prohibiting all EU operators from certain types of financial transactions with entities established outside the EU which are more than 50% owned by an entity included in the list of entities covered by restrictive measures –Action brought by an entity more than 50% owned by an entity included in those lists — Admissibility

(Art. 263, 4th para. TFEU; Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP, Art. 1(2)(a), (b) and (c) and Annex III; Council Regulation No 833/2014, Arts 5(2)(a), (b) and (c), 11(1)(a) and Annex VI)

(see paras 65-68, 70, 71)