16

In those circumstances, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Does Decision … 2015/774 … as amended by … Decision … 2016/702 … or the method of its implementation, infringe Article 123(1) TFEU? Does it infringe Article 123(1) TFEU in particular if in the course of the public sector asset purchase programme (PSPP), (a) details of the purchases are communicated in a way that creates de facto certainty on the markets that the Eurosystem will purchase part of the bonds to be issued by the Member States? (b) even after the event no details are given about compliance with minimum periods between the issue of a debt instrument on the primary market and its purchase on the secondary market, with the result that a review by the courts is not possible in that regard? (c) all bonds purchased are not resold but held until maturity and thus withdrawn from the market? (d) the Eurosystem purchases marketable debt instruments with a negative yield at maturity? (2) Does the Decision referred to in [the first question] then infringe Article 123 TFEU in any event if, in view of changes in conditions on the financial markets, in particular as a result of a shortage of bonds available for purchase, its continued implementation requires a continual loosening of the originally agreed purchase rules and [if] the restrictions laid down in the case-law of the Court of Justice for a bond purchase programme, such as the PSPP, lose their effect? (3) Does the current version of Decision … 2015/774 … infringe Article 119 and Article 127(1) and (2) TFEU and Articles 17 to 24 of the Protocol on the [ESCB and the ECB] because it exceeds the monetary policy mandate of the ECB laid down in those provisions and for that reason encroaches upon the competence of the Member States? Is the mandate of the ECB exceeded in particular as a result of the fact that: (a) on the basis of the volume of the PSPP, which amounted to EUR 1 534.8 billion on 12 May 2017, the Decision referred to in [the first question] materially influences the refinancing terms of the Member States? (b) in view of the improvement in the refinancing terms of the Member States referred to in (a) above and their effect on the commercial banks, the Decision referred to in [the first question] has not only indirect economic policy consequences but its objectively ascertainable effects suggest that an economic policy aim of the programme is at least of equal priority as the monetary policy aim? (c) on account of its powerful economic policy effects, the Decision referred to in [the first question] infringes the principle of proportionality? (d) in the absence of a specific statement of reasons during the period of more than two years of implementation, it is not possible to examine whether the Decision referred to in [the first question] is still necessary and proportionate? (4) Does the Decision referred to in [the first question] infringe Article 119 and Article 127(1) and (2) TFEU and Articles 17 to 24 of the Protocol on the [ESCB and the ECB] in any event because its volume and implementation period of more than two years and the resulting economic policy effects give grounds for a different view of the need for and proportionality of the PSPP and consequently, from a certain point in time, it exceeds the monetary policy mandate of the [ECB]? (5) Does the unlimited sharing of risks between the national central banks of the Eurosystem that may be provided for under the Decision referred to in [the first question], in the event of the non-repayment of bonds of the central governments and of equivalent issuers, infringe Article 123 and Article 125 TFEU and Article 4(2) TEU, if as a result it may be necessary for national central banks to be recapitalised using budget funds?’