ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
13

The Gesetz über den Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die Integration von Ausländern im Bundesgebiet (Law on the residence, employment and integration of foreign nationals in the Federal territory) (BGBl. 2008 I, p. 162), in the version applicable at the material time in the main proceedings (‘the Aufenthaltsgesetz’), contains a Paragraph 11, entitled ‘Prohibition on entry and residence’, which is worded as follows: ‘1. A foreign national who has been placed under an order for expulsion, forcible return or removal may neither re-enter the territory of the Federal Republic nor reside there and cannot be issued with a residence permit even where the conditions of entitlement under this law are met (prohibition on entry and residence). 2. The duration of the prohibition on entry and residence shall be determined ex officio. It shall commence at the time of the foreign national’s departure. In the case of expulsion, the duration of the prohibition shall be determined at the same time as the expulsion order is made. In other cases, it shall be determined at the same time as the removal warning is issued and at the latest at the time of removal or forcible return. In order to avert a threat to public security and public policy, that period may be subject to a condition, in particular relating to the proven absence of criminal sanctions or drug use or trafficking. If that condition is not satisfied on expiry of the period, a longer period shall apply, which shall automatically be set at the same time as the period set under the fifth sentence. 3. The duration of the prohibition on entry and residence shall be determined by discretionary decision. It may exceed five years only if the foreign national has been expelled in consequence of a criminal conviction or if he or she represents a serious threat to public security and public policy. The duration of the prohibition shall in no case exceed ten years. …’
Article 15(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEG, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC must be interpreted as meaning that a decision to expel a Union citizen from the territory of the host Member State, adopted on the basis of that provision, on the ground that that Union citizen no longer enjoys a temporary right of residence in that territory under that directive, cannot be deemed to have been complied with in full merely because that Union citizen has physically left that territory within the period prescribed by that decision for his or her voluntary departure. In order to enjoy a new right of residence under Article 6(1) of that directive in the same territory, a Union citizen who has been the subject of such an expulsion decision must not only have physically left the territory of the host Member State, but must also have genuinely and effectively terminated his or her residence there, with the result that, upon his or her return to that territory, his or her residence cannot be regarded as constituting in fact a continuation of his or her previous residence in that territory. It is for the referring court to verify whether that is the case, having regard to all the specific circumstances characterising the particular situation of the Union citizen concerned. If it follows from such a verification that the Union citizen has not genuinely and effectively terminated his or her temporary residence in the territory of the host Member State, that Member State is not obliged to adopt a new expulsion decision on the basis of the same facts which gave rise to the expulsion decision already taken against that Union citizen, but may rely on that latter decision in order to oblige him or her to leave its territory.
16

The First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) (United Kingdom) upheld WR’s appeal against the contested assessment to excise duty and the fine. That tribunal held that, even though he knew that the goods at issue were subject to excise duty, WR was not a conspirator in relation to the attempt to smuggle those goods. Since he did not have access to the EMCS, he had no means of verifying whether the ARC stated on the CMR note had already been used. Moreover, nothing in the documents available to him was such as to give rise to doubts in that regard. Furthermore, WR was not the owner of the HGV and had no right to or personal interest in the goods at issue, his sole aim being to collect and deliver those goods, for a fee, in accordance with the instructions received. Only the persons who had organised the smuggling attempt had the de facto and legal right of control over the goods at issue at the time when they were seized. That tribunal also found that WR had informed the person who had instructed him to transport the goods at issue that they had been seized, that the identity of those behind the smuggling attempt had not been ascertained and that HMRC had not attempted to determine the identity of those persons or that of the owner of the HGV.
36

In the present case, it must be noted that the interpretation of Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations and its application in the context of damage to the European Union which has already given rise to compensation were argued before the General Court in the proceedings at first instance. The arguments relied on by DK, alleging a breach of the principle of equal treatment, are intended to challenge the General Court’s analysis of the first part of the first plea in the action brought before it. In the context of that analysis, the General Court, in paragraphs 38 to 41 of the judgment under appeal, focused on the fact that misconduct on the part of EU officials had to be treated differently depending on the extent of the damage caused, and at the same time held that the fact that that damage had already given rise, in whole or in part, to compensation is irrelevant for the purpose of determining the seriousness of the misconduct, for the purposes of that provision. Thus, those arguments are intended to challenge in detail the interpretation and application made by the General Court of that provision, in those paragraphs of the judgment under appeal, and do not constitute a new plea the introduction of which at the appeal stage would be prohibited (see, by analogy, judgments of 18 January 2007, PKK and KNK v Council, C‑229/05 P, EU:C:2007:32, paragraph 63, and of 19 December 2019, HK v Commission, C‑460/18 P, EU:C:2019:1119, paragraph 28).
6

The second and third recitals of Directive 86/653 state: ‘Whereas the differences in national laws concerning commercial representation substantially affect the conditions of competition and the carrying-on of that activity within the [European Union] and are detrimental both to the protection available to commercial agents vis-à-vis their principals and to the security of commercial transactions; whereas moreover those differences are such as to inhibit substantially the conclusion and operation of commercial representation contracts where principal and commercial agent are established in different Member States; Whereas trade in goods between Member States should be carried on under conditions which are similar to those of a single market, and this necessitates approximation of the legal systems of the Member States to the extent required for the proper functioning of the common market; whereas in this regard the rules concerning conflict of laws do not, in the matter of commercial representation, remove the inconsistencies referred to above, nor would they even if they were made uniform, and accordingly the proposed harmonization is necessary notwithstanding the existence of those rules’.
11

According to Article 4 of the 2004 Implementing rules, entitled ‘Opening and conduct of administrative inquiries’: ‘1. An administrative inquiry shall be opened at the request of a Director-General or Head of Department, or on its own initiative, by the Director-General for Personnel and Administration in agreement with the Secretary-General. … 3. The decision to open an administrative inquiry shall designate the Director of IDOC or another official as responsible for the inquiry, define the purpose and scope of the inquiry and require the officials responsible for it to determine responsibilities on the basis of the particular facts and circumstances, and, if appropriate, the individual responsibility of the officials concerned [by the inquiry]. 4. As soon as an administrative inquiry suggests that an official may be personally involved in an affair, that official shall be kept informed provided that information does not hinder the inquiry. In any case, conclusions referring to an official by name may not be drawn at the end of the inquiry unless that official has had the opportunity to express an opinion on all the facts which relate to him or her. The conclusions shall record that opinion. … 5. IDOC shall submit a report on the inquiry to the Director-General for Personnel and Administration … That report shall set out the facts and circumstances in question; it shall establish whether the rules and procedures applicable to the situation were respected and shall determine any individual responsibility, having regard to aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Copies of all the relevant documents and records of interviews shall be attached to the report. 6. The Director-General for Personnel and Administration shall inform the official concerned of the conclusion of the inquiry together with the conclusions of the inquiry report and, on request, all documents directly linked to the allegations made, subject to the protection of the legitimate interests of third parties. 7. After receiving an inquiry report from OLAF, the Director-General for Personnel and Administration may, if appropriate, either ask OLAF to supplement the report or decide to open an administrative inquiry himself or immediately open a disciplinary procedure or indeed close the file without any disciplinary consequences.’
8

Ley 9/2017 de Contratos del Sector Público, por la que se transponen al ordenamiento jurídico español las Directivas del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo 2014/23/UE y 2014/24/UE, de 26 de febrero de 2014 (Law 9/2017 on Public Sector Procurement, which transposes Directives 2014/23/EU and 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 into Spanish law), of 8 November 2017 (BOE No 272, of 9 November 2017, p. 107714) (‘Law on public sector contracts’) transposes Directive 2014/24 into Spanish law. The Fourth Additional Provision of that law, entitled ‘Reserved contracts’, provides: ‘1. By decision of the Council of Ministers or of the competent body within the sphere of the autonomous communities and local authorities, minimum percentages shall be set for reservation of the right to participate in procurement procedures for the award of certain contracts or certain lots of those contracts to social initiative special employment centres and to work integration social enterprises, governed, respectively, by Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2013 por el que se aprueba el Texto Refundido de la Ley General de derechos de las personas con discapacidad y de su inclusión social [(Royal Legislative Decree 1/2013 approving the consolidated text of the General Law on the rights of persons with disabilities and their social inclusion) of 29 November 2013 (“Royal Legislative Decree 1/2013”)] and by Ley 44/2007 para la regulación del régimen de las empresas de inserción [(Law 44/2007 on work integration social enterprises)] of 13 December 2007, which satisfy the eligibility criteria laid down in that legislation to qualify as such, or establish a minimum percentage for reservation of the performance of those contracts in the context of sheltered employment programmes, provided that the proportion of disabled or socially excluded staff of special employment centres, work integration social enterprises and programmes is that stipulated in the legislation in question and, in any event, at least 30%. The decision of the Council of Ministers or of the competent body within the sphere of the autonomous communities and local authorities shall set out the minimum requirements for ensuring compliance with the provisions of the previous paragraph. … 2. The call for competition shall make reference to this Article. …’
97

The Parliament submits, in essence, that, in so far as the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States have no power to determine the location of the seat of the bodies of the Union, the decision of 20 November 2017 cannot be given any binding effect, capable of limiting the EU legislature’s discretion to intervene. To accept the contrary would amount to legitimising the existence of a decision-making process unrelated to the institutional architecture conceived by the Treaties, which does not confer on the Member States competence to determine the seat of the institutions or bodies of the Union, in particular its agencies. Nor can such a reservation of competence be inferred from Article 341 TFEU, which refers exclusively to the ‘institutions of the Union’ laid down by Article 13(1) TEU. In view of the fact, moreover, that the institutions of the Union cannot voluntarily relinquish the exercise of the powers conferred on them by the Treaties, the Commission could not, for its part, act in its proposal for a regulation without reserving the choice made by the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States in the decision of 20 November 2017, without itself carrying out a discretionary assessment, just as the co-legislators could not give a legally binding assurance that they would adopt such a proposal. It follows that the agreements successively concluded between the Member States concerning, first of all, the selection rules adopted on 22 June 2017 and, subsequently, the choice of the city of Amsterdam as the new seat of the EMA under the decision of 20 November 2017, constitute acts of purely political cooperation which cannot limit the powers of the institutions of the Union.
1.

Action for annulment – Natural or legal persons – Regulatory acts – Acts not entailing implementing measures and concerning the applicant directly – Concept of direct concern – Criteria – Act likely to have an influence on the material situation of the applicant – Criterion not conclusive (Art. 263, para. 4, TFEU) (see paras 19-26)
1.

Agriculture – EAFRD financing – Grant of aid and premiums – Obligation of Member States to organise an effective system of administrative controls and on-the-spot checks – Scope – Administrative checks ensuring effective verification of all the eligibility criteria of an application for support, including the quality of the applicants (Commission Regulation No 65/2011, Arts 4 and 24) (see paras 75, 76)
1.

Actions brought by officials – Prior administrative complaint – Time limits – Mandatory – Time-barred – Re-opening by a request within the meaning of Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations – Not included (Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91) (see paras 42-45)
36

That said, it is also apparent from the order for reference that the loan agreement at issue in the main proceedings contains a term which requires the consumer concerned, in the event of the early termination of the term of that agreement, to pay to the seller or supplier, inter alia, both default interest and ordinary interest for the period from the time at which the loan was declared immediately due and payable until the capital borrowed has actually been repaid. According to Prima banka Slovensko, such an accumulation of interest was authorised by the Court in the judgment in Banco Santander and Escobedo Cortés. According to that party to the main proceedings, in that judgment the Court defined the purpose of ordinary interest as being consideration for the use of the funds until they were repaid. The consumer uses those funds, with the result that he or she should, on that basis, also have to pay ordinary interest. In those circumstances, the referring court has doubts as to whether the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, which does not permit the accumulation of default interest and ordinary interest, is compatible with that judgment.
5

Article 27 of that directive, entitled ‘Network statement’, provides: ‘1. The infrastructure manager shall, after consultation with the interested parties, develop and publish a network statement which shall be obtainable against payment of a fee which shall not exceed the cost of publication of that statement. The network statement shall be published in at least two official languages of the [European] Union. The content of the network statement shall be made available free of charge in electronic format on the web portal of the infrastructure manager and accessible through a common web portal. That web portal shall be set up by the infrastructure managers in the framework of their cooperation in accordance with Articles 37 and 40. 2. The network statement shall set out the nature of the infrastructure which is available to railway undertakings, and contain information setting out the conditions for access to the relevant railway infrastructure. The network statement shall also contain information setting out the conditions for access to service facilities connected to the network of the infrastructure manager and for supply of services in these facilities or indicate a website where such information is made available free of charge in electronic format. The content of the network statement is laid down in Annex IV. 3. The network statement shall be kept up to date and amended as necessary. 4. The network statement shall be published no less than four months in advance of the deadline for requests for infrastructure capacity.’
15

Paragraph 5 of the emberi felhasználásra kerülő gyógyszerek egyedi rendelésének és felhasználásának engedélyezéséről szóló 448/2017. Korm. Rendelet (Government Regulation 448/2017 on authorisation of the prescription and individual use of medicinal products for human use) of 27 December 2017, in force since 1 January 2018, is worded as follows: ‘1. In accordance with Paragraph 25(2) of the Law on medicinal products, medical practitioners may prescribe medicinal products which are not authorised to be placed on the market in Hungary but which are authorised to be placed on the market in another Member State of the EEA, or in a State which has the same legal status as that held by Member States of the EEA pursuant to an international treaty concluded with the European Community or the EEA …, only if, before prescribing those medicinal products, they lodge a notification with the Institute and they obtain a declaration from that Institute concerning the following matters: (a) whether the medicinal product which the medical practitioner wishes to prescribe has a marketing authorisation in a Member State of the EEA or in a State party to an EEA treaty identified by the medical practitioner, in relation to the pharmaceutical indications given by that practitioner, (b) whether the competent authority has withdrawn the marketing authorisation for the medicinal product which the medical practitioner wishes to prescribe or suspended its distribution, and (c) whether, in the medical practitioner’s opinion and based on information provided by the medical practitioner, there is an interest relating to patient care to which particular regard must be had, as defined in Paragraph 1(23) of the Law on medicinal products. 2. Medical practitioners shall request that the declaration referred to in subparagraph 1 be issued on the data sheet included in Annexes 3 to 5 to Ministerial Regulation 44/2004. The Institute shall notify the medical practitioner who is prescribing the medicinal product of its opinion on the matters set out in subparagraph 1 within eight working days of receipt of the data sheet. 3. Where the Institute issues a declaration according to which the conditions set out in subparagraph 1 are satisfied, the medical practitioner shall give the patient – in the case of a prescription-only medicine – a copy of the declaration from that Institute together with the prescription. 4. Where the Institute issues a declaration according to which, in its opinion, there is no interest relating to patient care to which particular regard must be had, as defined in Paragraph 1(23) of the Law on medicinal products, the medical practitioner shall give the patient – if the practitioner considers that it is necessary to prescribe the medicinal product and it is a prescription-only medicine – a copy of the declaration from that Institute together with the prescription and shall provide the patient with information concerning the contents of the declaration and its possible consequences.’
8

Article 2 of that directive was worded as follows: ‘1. This Directive shall apply to payment services provided within the [European Union]. However, with the exception of Article 73, Titles III and IV shall apply only where both the payer’s payment service provider and the payee’s payment service provider are, or the sole payment service provider in the payment transaction is, located in the [European Union]. 2. Titles III and IV shall apply to payment services made in euro or the currency of a Member State outside the euro area. 3. Member States may waive the application of all or part of the provisions of this Directive to the institutions referred to in Article 2 of Directive 2006/48/EC [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (OJ 2006 L 177, p. 1)] with the exception of those referred to in the first and second indents of that article.’
10

Eurowings contends, for its part, that the flight was cancelled due to extraordinary circumstances. It argues that the strike notice of 14 October 2019 concerned only Lufthansa and that it was only on 18 October 2019 that that notice was extended to its subsidiaries, including Eurowings. Furthermore, the strike was originally supposed to take place from 5.00 to 11.00. It was only on the day of the strike that that period was extended, spontaneously and without notice from the trade union, until midnight. Eurowings was not informed of this until 5.30 on the same day, which is why the emergency plan which it had drawn up to manage the originally scheduled strike period was of no use. In addition, by using subcharters on the day of the flight which CS should have taken, it was ultimately forced to cancel only 158 flights out of a total of 712 affected flights. Eurowings thus took all the measures in its power in order to reduce the negative effects of the collective action on all the flights usually scheduled for that day. Lastly, Lufthansa gave way to the demands on 18 October 2019 and announced a 2% pay rise. The warning strike at Lufthansa had thus been cancelled, whereas the strike at Eurowings had gone ahead, even though there were no longer any grounds for it. The strike was not therefore inherent in the normal exercise of an air carrier’s activity, nor was it within Eurowings’ control, as the extension of the strike to other companies and its prolongation constituted unavoidable extraordinary circumstances for that company.