ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Case C-419/10

Wolfgang Hofmann

v

Freistaat Bayern

(Reference for a preliminary rulingfrom the Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof)

‛Directive 2006/126/EC — Mutual recognition of driving licences — Refusal by a Member State to recognise, in favour of a person whose driving licence was withdrawn on its territory, the validity of a driving licence issued by another Member State’

Summary of the Judgment

Transport — Road transport — Driving licences — Directive 2006/126 — Mutual recognition of driving licences — Withdrawal of driving licence in the Member State, coupled with a temporary prohibition of obtaining a new licence — Licence issued in another Member State after the end of the period of temporary prohibition

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2006/126, Arts 2(1) and 11(4))

Articles 2(1) and 11(4), second subparagraph, of Directive 2006/126 on driving licences must be interpreted as precluding a Member State from refusing, outside any period of prohibition of applying for a new driving licence imposed on the holder of a driving licence issued by another Member State and when the condition of normal residence in the territory of the latter has been observed, to recognise the validity of that driving licence, when that holder has been subject, in the territory of the first Member State, to a measure withdrawing a previous driving licence.

(see para. 91, operative part)

Case C-419/10

Wolfgang Hofmann

v

Freistaat Bayern

(Reference for a preliminary rulingfrom the Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof)

‛Directive 2006/126/EC — Mutual recognition of driving licences — Refusal by a Member State to recognise, in favour of a person whose driving licence was withdrawn on its territory, the validity of a driving licence issued by another Member State’

Summary of the Judgment

Transport — Road transport — Driving licences — Directive 2006/126 — Mutual recognition of driving licences — Withdrawal of driving licence in the Member State, coupled with a temporary prohibition of obtaining a new licence — Licence issued in another Member State after the end of the period of temporary prohibition

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2006/126, Arts 2(1) and 11(4))

Articles 2(1) and 11(4), second subparagraph, of Directive 2006/126 on driving licences must be interpreted as precluding a Member State from refusing, outside any period of prohibition of applying for a new driving licence imposed on the holder of a driving licence issued by another Member State and when the condition of normal residence in the territory of the latter has been observed, to recognise the validity of that driving licence, when that holder has been subject, in the territory of the first Member State, to a measure withdrawing a previous driving licence.

(see para. 91, operative part)
Keywords

Summary



Keywords

Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters — Regulation No 44/2001 — Temporal scope — Member State acceding to the European Union in 2004 — Recognition and enforcement of judgments — Grounds for refusing enforcement — Request for enforcement in the Member State addressed of a judgment delivered in another Member State before the entry into force of the regulation in the Member State addressed — Definition of ‘entry into force’ for the purpose of Article 66(2) of the regulation — Necessary that, at the time the judgment for which recognition is sought was delivered, the regulation should already have entered into force both in the Member State of origin and in the Member State addressed — Regulation applicable only in the period following the two entries into force

(Council Regulation No 44/2001, Art. 66(2))

Summary

Article 66(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that, for that regulation to be applicable for the purpose of the recognition and enforcement of a judgment, it is necessary that at the time of delivery of that judgment the regulation was in force both in the Member State of origin and in the Member State addressed.

The application of the simplified rules of recognition and enforcement laid down by Regulation No 44/2001, which protect the claimant especially by enabling him to obtain the swift, certain and effective enforcement of the judgment delivered in his favour in the Member State of origin, is justified only to the extent that the judgment to be recognised or enforced was delivered in accordance with the rules of jurisdiction in that regulation, which protect the interests of the defendant, particularly by providing that he may not, in principle, be sued in the courts of a Member State other than that in which he is domiciled.

By contrast, if the defendant is domiciled in a State which was not yet a Member of the European Union either at the date the action was brought or at the date the judgment was delivered, and is therefore regarded as domiciled in a third State for the purposes of the applicability of Regulation No 44/2001, the balance of interests between the parties is no longer ensured. Furthermore, Regulation No 44/2001 contains certain mechanisms which protect the defendant’s rights during the original proceedings in the State of origin, but they apply only if the defendant is domiciled in a Member State of the Union. It thus follows both from the history and from the scheme and purpose of Article 66 of Regulation No 44/2001 that the concept of ‘entry into force’ in that provision must be understood as the date from which that regulation applies in both the Member States concerned.

(see paras 27-29, 33, operative part)
The words ‘with complete independence’ in the second subparagraph of Article 28(1) of Directive 95/46 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as meaning that the supervisory authorities for the protection of personal data must enjoy an independence which allows them to perform their duties free from external influence. In that regard, the fact that such an authority has functional independence in so far as its members are independent and are not bound by instructions of any kind in the performance of their duties is not by itself sufficient to protect that supervisory authority from all external influence. The independence required under the second subparagraph of Article 28(1) of Directive 95/46 is intended to preclude not only direct influence, in the form of instructions, but also any indirect influence which is liable to have an effect on the supervisory authority’s decisions. Moreover, in the light of the role assumed by the supervisory authorities as guardians of the right to privacy, the second subparagraph of Article 28(1) requires that their decisions, and therefore the authorities themselves, remain above all suspicion of partiality.

Consequently, a Member State fails to fulfil its obligations under the second subparagraph of Article 28(1) of Directive 95/46 by failing to take all of the measures necessary to ensure that the national legislation meets the requirement of independence with regard to the supervisory authority, more specifically by laying down a regulatory framework under which

– its managing member is a federal official subject to supervision,

– its office is integrated with the departments of the Federal Chancellery, and

– the Federal Chancellor has an unconditional right to information covering all aspects of the work of the authority.

(see paras 41-43, 52, 66, operative part)
Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 22 November 2012 — Commission v Germany

(Case C‑600/10)

‛Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Free movement of capital — Taxation of dividends and interest paid to pension funds and pension insurance schemes — Treatment of dividends and interest paid to non-resident institutions — Deduction of operating costs directly linked to the receipt of income in the form of dividends and interest — Burden of proof’

Actions for failure to fulfil obligations — Proof of failure — Burden of proof on Commission — Complaint alleging incompatibility with the rules on the free movement of capital of national legal provisions on the taxation of dividends and interest paid to non-resident pension funds — No plausible example showing the existence of disadvantageous tax treatment of those funds — Action based on presumptions — Rejection (Arts 63 TFEU and 258 TFEU) (see paras 13-26)

Re:

Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Infringement of Article 63 TFEU and of Article 40 of the EEA Agreement — National legal provisions on the taxation of dividends and interest paid to pension funds and pension insurance schemes, granting certain fiscal advantages only in respect of dividends and interest paid to resident institutions.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Federal Republic of Germany;

3. Orders the French Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to bear their own costs.

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 22 November 2012 — Commission v Germany

(Case C‑600/10)

‛Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Free movement of capital — Taxation of dividends and interest paid to pension funds and pension insurance schemes — Treatment of dividends and interest paid to non-resident institutions — Deduction of operating costs directly linked to the receipt of income in the form of dividends and interest — Burden of proof’

Actions for failure to fulfil obligations — Proof of failure — Burden of proof on Commission — Complaint alleging incompatibility with the rules on the free movement of capital of national legal provisions on the taxation of dividends and interest paid to non-resident pension funds — No plausible example showing the existence of disadvantageous tax treatment of those funds — Action based on presumptions — Rejection (Arts 63 TFEU and 258 TFEU) (see paras 13-26)

Re:

Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Infringement of Article 63 TFEU and of Article 40 of the EEA Agreement — National legal provisions on the taxation of dividends and interest paid to pension funds and pension insurance schemes, granting certain fiscal advantages only in respect of dividends and interest paid to resident institutions.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Federal Republic of Germany;
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 13 January 2011 – Media-Saturn-Holding v OHIM

(Case C-92/10 P)

Appeal – Community trade mark – Absolute ground for refusal – Lack of distinctive character – Mark consisting of an advertising slogan and composed of elements individually devoid of any distinctive character – Figurative sign ‘BEST BUY’

1. Appeals – Grounds – Mistaken assessment of the facts – Inadmissibility – Review by the Court of Justice of the assessment of the facts put before the Court of First Instance – Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256 TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see para. 27)

2. Appeals – Grounds – Plea submitted for the first time in the context of the appeal – Inadmissibility (see para. 39)

Re:

Appeal brought against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 15 December 2009 in Case T-476/08 Media-Saturn v OHIM (BEST BUY) by which that court dismissed the action against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM, of 28 August 2008, dismissing the appeal against the examiner’s decision which refused the registration of the figurative sign ‘BEST BUY’ as a Community trade mark for goods and services in Classes 1, 2, 5 to 12, 14 to 17, 20 to 22, 27, 28, 35, 37, 38 and 40 to 42 – distinctive character of a mark consisting of an advertising slogan and composed of elements individually devoid of any distinctive character.

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the appeal;
1.

Declares that, by failing to take the necessary measures to ensure that the competent authorities see to it, by means of permits issued in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of Directive 2008/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control (codified version) or, as appropriate, by reconsidering and, where necessary, by updating the conditions, that all existing installations within the meaning of Article 2(4) of that directive operate in accordance with the requirements of Articles 3, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14(a) and (b) and 15(2) of that directive, the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under the directive;
1.

Declares that, by exceeding the limit values for concentrations of PMlO in ambient air from 2005 to 2007 in zones SW 2 and SW 4 and in 2005 and 2006 in zone SW 5, the Kingdom of Sweden has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 5(1) of Council Directive 1999/30/EC of 22 April 1999 relating to limit values for sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and oxides of nitrogen, particulate matter and lead in ambient air;
15

Article 13 of Law No 17/2001 provides: ‘(1) The date of filing of an application shall be the date on which the competent body, as defined in Article 11, receives the documents containing the information specified in Article 12(1). (2) The date of filing of applications filed at a post office shall be the time at which that office receives the documents containing the information specified in Article 12(1), provided that those documents are filed in an unsealed envelope, by registered post and with acknowledgment of receipt, addressed to the body competent to receive the application. The post office shall record the day, hour and minute of the filing of the application. (3) If any of the bodies or administrative units referred to in the preceding paragraphs fails to record, at the time the application is received, the hour of its filing, the application shall be assigned the final hour of the day. If the minute has not been recorded, the application shall be assigned the final minute of the hour. If neither the hour nor the minute of filing has been recorded, the application shall be assigned the final hour and minute of the day in question.’
16

The Oberster Gerichtshof (Austrian Supreme Court), seised of an appeal on a point of law, asks in the present case under what conditions the advertising by use of the Austrian trade mark Wintersteiger on a website operating under a country-specific top-level domain ‘.de’ may confer jurisdiction on the Austrian courts under Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 to hear an action for an injunction against use of an Austrian trade mark. In those circumstances the Oberster Gerichtshof decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) In the case of an alleged infringement by a person established in another Member State of a trade mark granted in the State of the court seised through the use of a keyword (AdWord) identical to that trade mark in an internet search engine which offers its services under various country-specific top-level domains, is the phrase ‘place where the harmful event occurred or may occur’ in Article 5(3) of [Regulation No 44/2001] to be interpreted as meaning that: (a) jurisdiction is established only if the keyword is used on the search engine website the top-level domain of which is that of the State of the court seised; (b) jurisdiction is established only if the search engine website on which the keyword is used can be accessed in the State of the court seised; (c) jurisdiction is dependent on the satisfaction of other requirements additional to the accessibility of the website? (2) If [question 1(c)] is answered in the affirmative: Which criteria are to be used to determine whether jurisdiction under Article 5(3) of [Regulation No 44/2001] is established where a trade mark granted in the State of the court seised is used as an AdWord on a search engine website with a country-specific top-level domain different from that of the State of the court seised?’
6

Article 42, entitled ‘Procedure for assessment of tenders’, of Law No 25/2006 on public procurement, in the version that the national court considers to be applicable to the main proceedings, provides: ‘1. Tenders shall be assessed by a committee in camera. The committee shall assess the tenders having regard to compliance with the requirements of the contracting authority or contracting entity concerning the object of the contract and shall exclude tenders which fail to meet those requirements specified in the contract notice or in the notice used as a means of calling for competition and in the tender specifications. … In the evaluation of tenders with a variant, Article 37(3) shall be applied. 2. The committee may ask tenderers in writing to explain their tenders. However, it may not seek or accept a proposal from a tenderer to make a change that would give the tender an advantage. 3. Where a tender contains an abnormally low price, the committee shall ask the tenderer in writing to explain its price proposal. The request must be designed to obtain details of the basic characteristic parameters of the tender which the committee considers important and which apply in particular to: (a) the economics of the construction methods, manufacturing processes or the services provided; (b) the technical solution or particularly favourable conditions available to the tenderer for the delivery of supplies, performance of construction works, provision of service; (c) the special nature of the supplies, the construction works or the services proposed by the tenderer; (d) compliance with the laws relating to the protection of employment and labour conditions in force in the place of the supplies, construction works or services, (e) whether the tenderer may be granted State aid. (4) The committee shall take into consideration the clarification of a tender or of an abnormally low price and the evidence provided by a tenderer. The committee shall exclude a tender in the case where: (a) the tenderer has failed to submit a written explanation within three working days from the date of receipt of a request for clarification, unless the committee has fixed a longer period, or (b) the clarification submitted fails to comply with the requirement under paragraphs (2) or (3). … (7) The committee shall assess tenders which have not been excluded pursuant to the criteria specified in the contract notice or in the notice used as a means of calling for competition or in the tender specifications, and on the basis of the rules of their application, as specified in the tender documents, which are non-discriminatory and support fair competition. …’
3

Article 236 of the Customs Code provides: ‘1. Import duties or export duties shall be repaid in so far as it is established that when they were paid the amount of such duties was not legally owed or that the amount has been entered in the accounts contrary to Article 220 (2). Import duties or export duties shall be remitted in so far as it is established that when they were entered in the accounts the amount of such duties was not legally owed or that the amount has been entered in the accounts contrary to Article 220(2). No repayment or remission shall be granted when the facts which led to the payment or entry in the accounts of an amount which was not legally owed are the result of deliberate action by the person concerned. 2. Import duties or export duties shall be repaid or remitted upon submission of an application to the appropriate customs office within a period of three years from the date on which the amount of those duties was communicated to the debtor. That period shall be extended if the person concerned provides evidence that he was prevented from submitting his application within the said period as a result of unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure. Where the customs authorities themselves discover within this period that one or other of the situations described in the first and second subparagraphs of paragraph 1 exists, they shall repay or remit on their own initiative.’
12

Paragraph 56 of Book VI of the German Social Security Code (Sozialgesetzbuch) (‘SGB VI’), entitled ‘Child-raising periods’, provides: ‘(1) A child-raising period shall be the period spent raising a child during the first three years of its life. A period spent raising a child shall be credited to one of the parents of the child (Paragraph 56(1), first sentence, point 3, and Paragraph 56(3), points 2 and 3, of the SGB I) if: 1. the period spent raising the child is to be attributed to that parent; 2. the child-raising took place in the Federal Republic of Germany or can be treated as having taken place there; and 3. that parent is not barred from being credited with that period. … (3) Raising shall be deemed to have taken place in the Federal Republic of Germany where the child-raising parent has habitually resided there with the child. A period of child-raising shall be treated as child-raising in the Federal Republic of Germany where the child-raising parent has habitually resided abroad with his or her child and during the period devoted to child-raising or immediately before the birth of the child has completed periods of compulsory contribution by virtue of an activity carried on there as an employed or self-employed person. Where spouses or partners are resident abroad together, the same shall also apply where the spouse or partner of the child-raising parent paid such compulsory contributions or did not do so only because he or she was one of the persons referred to in Paragraph 5(1) and (4) or was exempt from compulsory insurance. …’
6

The wealth tax uses a capping mechanism, described in Article 885Va of the CGI. That article is worded as follows: ‘Wealth tax owed by a taxpayer resident for tax purposes in France shall be reduced by the difference between, on the one hand, the total amount of that tax and of the tax due in France and overseas on income and proceeds arising in the previous year, calculated before the offsetting of tax credits and deductions of tax other than by way of discharge, and, on the other hand, 85% of the total amount of income net of business expenses arising in the previous year after deduction only of the category-based tax losses which may be offset under Article 156, as well as income exempt from income tax generated in the same year in France or outside France and proceeds liable to a withholding tax in discharge of tax liability. That reduction may not exceed a sum equal to 50% of the amount of contribution resulting from the application of Article 885V or, if greater, the amount of tax corresponding to taxable assets equal to the upper limit of the third band in the scale laid down in Article 885U. Capital gains shall be determined without taking into account the thresholds, reductions and rebates provided for in this Code. For the purposes of applying the first paragraph, where income tax has been charged on income accruing to persons whose assets are not included in the basis of assessment of the wealth tax owed by the person liable, it shall be reduced by the value of that income accruing to those persons as a percentage of their total income.’