ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Case C‑229/17

Evonik Degussa GmbH

v

Bundesrepublik Deutschland

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Berlin)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Environment — Scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the European Union — Free allocation — Directive 2003/87/EC — Article 10a — Annex I — Decision 2011/278/EU — Annex I, Part 2 — Determination of product benchmarks — Production of hydrogen — System boundaries of the product benchmark for hydrogen — Process element of separation of hydrogen in a rich gas stream which already contains hydrogen)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber), 17 May 2018

Environment — Atmospheric pollution — Directive 2003/87 — Scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading — Transitional regime for free allocation of quotas — Free allocation of emission allowances associated with the production of hydrogen — Activities included in the product benchmark for hydrogen — Included — Practice of isolation of hydrogen already contained in a gas mixture — Precluded

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/87, Art. 10a(1); Commission Decision 2011/278, Annex I)

Annex I, Part 2, to Commission Decision 2011/278/EU of 27 April 2011 determining transitional Union-wide rules for harmonised free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council must be interpreted as meaning that a process, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which does not produce hydrogen by chemical synthesis, but isolates only hydrogen already contained in a gas mixture, does not fall within the system boundaries of the product benchmark for hydrogen. It would be otherwise only if that process, first, were associated with ‘production of hydrogen’ within the meaning of Annex I to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, as amended by Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 and, second, have a technical connection with it.

(see para. 47, operative part)
Case C‑58/17

INEOS Köln GmbH

v

Bundesrepublik Deutschland

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Berlin)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Environment — Scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the European Union — Directive 2003/87/EC — Article 10a — Transitional rules for harmonised free allocation of emission allowances — Period 2013-2020 — Decision 2011/278/EU — Article 3(h) — Concept of ‘process emissions sub-installation’ — Emissions stemming from the combustion of incompletely oxidised carbon — Liquid waste — Excluded)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber), 18 January 2018

Environment — Atmospheric pollution — Directive 2003/87 — Scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading — Transitional regime for free allocation of quotas — Concept of ‘process emissions sub-installation’ — National legislation excluding from the concept emissions stemming from the combustion of incompletely oxidised carbon in a liquid state — Lawfulness

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/87, Art. 10a; Commission Decision 2011/278, Art. 3(h))

Article 3(h) of Commission Decision 2011/278/EU of 27 April 2011 determining transitional Union-wide rules for harmonised free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which excludes from the concept of ‘process emissions sub-installation’, within the meaning of that provision, greenhouse gas emissions stemming from the combustion of incompletely oxidised carbon in a liquid state.

As follows from the written observations submitted to the Court, waste gases stemming from industrial production cannot be stored, with the result that, if they are not burned, they leak freely into the atmosphere and, thus, necessarily emit into the atmosphere the greenhouse gases that they contain. It is common ground that the combustion of those waste gases results, generally, in a reduction of such greenhouse gases. By contrast, it is not disputed that liquid waste does not, for its part, generate greenhouse gases, or, if so, then only in negligible quantities. In those circumstances, while it is fully in compliance with the objectives pursued by Directive 2003/87 and Decision 2011/278 to take into account greenhouse gases generated by the combustion of waste gases containing incompletely oxidised carbon, since those emissions cannot be avoided and the combustion of those waste gases generally results in their reduction, it would, by contrast, go against those objectives to take into account greenhouse gases generated by the combustion of liquid waste containing incompletely oxidised carbon because this would result in an increase of those emissions, even though they are avoidable.

(see paras 46, 47, 49, 51 and operative part)
Article 17(1) of the Sixth Directive provides that the right to deduct arises at the time when the deductible tax becomes chargeable. This takes place, pursuant to Article 10(2) of that directive, when the goods are delivered or the services are performed.

It follows that, in the VAT system, the right to deduct is connected to the actual delivery of the goods or performance of the services at issue (see, by analogy, order of the President of the Court of 4 July 2013, Menidzherski biznes reshenia, C‑572/11, not published, EU:C:2013:456, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).

The good or bad faith of a taxable person seeking deduction of VAT has no bearing on the question whether there has been a delivery, for the purposes of Article 10(2) of the Sixth Directive. In accordance with the objective of that directive, which aims to establish a common system of VAT based, inter alia, on a uniform definition of taxable transactions, the concept of ‘supply of goods’ in Article 5(1) of that directive is objective in nature and must be interpreted without regard to the purpose or results of the transactions concerned and without it being necessary for the tax authorities to carry out inquiries to determine the intention of the taxable person or for them to take account of the intention of an economic operator other than that taxable person involved in the same chain of supply (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 November 2013, Dixons Retail, C‑494/12, EU:C:2013:758, paragraphs 19 and 21 and the case-law cited).

(see paras 34, 35, 38)
Case C‑31/17

Cristal Union

v

Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France))

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive 2003/96/EC — Taxation of energy products and electricity — Article 14(1)(a) — Energy products used for the generation of electricity — Obligation to exempt — Article 15(1)(c) — Energy products used for combined heat and power generation — Option to exempt or reduce the level of taxation — Natural gas intended for use in the cogeneration of heat and electricity)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 7 March 2018

Tax provisions—Harmonisation of laws—Taxation of energy products and electricity—Directive 2003/96—Exemption of energy products used to produce or maintain the ability to produce electricity—Whether individuals may rely on the relevant provision before the national court (Council Directive 2003/96, Art. 14(1)(a)) Tax provisions—Harmonisation of laws—Taxation of energy products and electricity—Directive 2003/96—Exemption of energy products used to produce or maintain the ability to produce electricity—Obligation to exempt—Scope—Energy products used for combined heat and power generation—Included (Council Directive 2003/96, Arts 14(1)(a) and 15(1)(c))
Case C‑478/17

IQ

v

JP

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul Cluj)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility — Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 — Article 15 — Transfer to a court better placed to hear the case — Scope — Article 19 — Lis pendens)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 4 October 2018

Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility — Regulation No 2201/2003 — Jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility — Transfer to a court better placed to hear the case — Scope — Transfer to a court that already has jurisdiction as to the substance of the case — Precluded

(Council Regulation No 2201/2003, Art. 15)

Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as not applying in circumstances, such as those in the main proceedings, in which both courts seised have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter under Articles 12 and 8, respectively, of that regulation.

In that regard, it must be borne in mind that Article 15(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003 provides that the courts of a Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of a case may transfer that case, or a specific part thereof, to a court of another Member State with which the child has a particular connection, if they consider that that court is better placed to hear the case, and where the transfer is in the best interests of the child. It follows that Article 15(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003 allows the court that normally has jurisdiction to rule on matters of parental responsibility, whether under the general rule set out in Article 8(1) of that regulation or by prorogation of jurisdiction on the basis of Article 12 of that regulation, to transfer its jurisdiction, over all or over a specific part of the case before it, to a court that would not normally have jurisdiction in the matter but which, in the circumstances of the particular case, must be considered to be ‘better placed’ to hear that case. Therefore, the court of another Member State with which the child in question has a particular connection and which is best placed to hear the case, as referred to in Article 15(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003, cannot be the court that normally has jurisdiction as to the substance of the case on the basis of Article 8 or 12 of that regulation.

(see paras 30, 33, 39, 49, operative part)
Article 17(1)(b) of Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third‑country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State pursuant to which the applicant for subsidiary protection is deemed to have ‘committed a serious crime’ within the meaning of that provision, which may exclude him from that protection, on the basis of the sole criterion of the penalty provided for a specific crime under the law of that Member State. It is for the authority or competent national court ruling on the application for subsidiary protection to assess the seriousness of the crime at issue, by carrying out a full investigation into all the circumstances of the individual case concerned.

In that regard, it is important to note that, while the criterion of the penalty provided for under the criminal legislation of the Member State concerned is of particular importance when assessing the seriousness of the crime justifying exclusion from subsidiary protection pursuant to Article 17(1)(b) of Directive 2011/95, the competent authority of the Member State concerned may apply the ground for exclusion laid down by that provision only after undertaking, for each individual case, an assessment of the specific facts brought to its attention with a view to determining whether there are serious grounds for taking the view that the acts committed by the person in question, who otherwise satisfies the qualifying conditions for the status applied for, come within the scope of that particular ground for exclusion (see, by analogy, judgments of 9 November 2010, B and D, C‑57/09 and C‑101/09, EU:C:2010:661, paragraph 87, and of 31 January 2017, Lounani, C‑573/14, EU:C:2017:71, paragraph 72).

(see paras 55, 58, operative part)
Case C‑339/17

Verein für lauteren Wettbewerb eV

v

Princesport GmbH

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Textile fibre names and related labelling and marking requirements — Regulation (EU) No 1007/2011 — Articles 7 and 9 — Pure textile products — Multi-fibre textile products — Labelling or marking methods)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 5 July 2018

Approximation of laws—Textile fibre names and related labelling and marking requirements—Requirements for labelling and marking—Scope—Pure textile products—Requirement to indicate the name and percentage by weight of all the constituent fibres of the product—None

Approximation of laws—Textile fibre names and related labelling and marking requirements—Requirements for labelling and marking—Scope—Pure textile products—No requirement to use the terms ‘100%’, ‘pure’ or ‘all’—Failure to use those terms does not constitute an unfair or misleading commercial practice

Article 4 and the first subparagraph of Article 14(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1007/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2011 on textile fibre names and related labelling and marking of the fibre composition of textile products and repealing Council Directive 73/44/EEC and Directives 96/73/EC and 2008/121/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, read in conjunction with recital 10 of that regulation, must be interpreted to the effect that they impose a general labelling or marking obligation in order to give an indication of the fibre composition of all textile products, including those textile products defined in Article 7 of that regulation. (see para. 33, operative part 1)

Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1007/2011 must be interpreted to the effect that it does not impose a requirement to use, on the label or marking of a pure textile product, one of the three terms referred to in that provision, that is to say, ‘100%’, ‘pure’ or ‘all’. When those terms are used, they may be used jointly. Moreover, it does not appear from the file submitted to the Court that a practice such as that at issue in the main proceedings constitutes an unfair or misleading commercial practice prohibited by Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) (OJ 2005 L 149, p. 22). (see paras 42, 43, operative part 2)
Case C‑306/17

Éva Nothartová

v

Sámson József Boldizsár

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tatabányai Törvényszék)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Area of freedom, security and justice — Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 — Jurisdiction — Special jurisdiction — Article 8(3) — Counterclaim arising or not arising from the same contract or facts on which the original claim was based)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber), 31 May 2018

Judicial cooperation in civil matters—Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters—Regulation No 1215/2012—Special jurisdiction—Counterclaim within the meaning of Article 8(3)—Non-exclusive jurisdiction (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 1215/2012, Art. 8(3)) Judicial cooperation in civil matters—Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters—Regulation No 1215/2012—Special jurisdiction—Counterclaim within the meaning of Article 8(3)—Counterclaim based on the same facts as the original claim—Counterclaim for compensation in respect of restrictions on intellectual creations that are the subject of the original application, the latter being founded on a claim alleging infringement of the applicant’s personality rights—Included—Condition (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 1215/2012, Art. 8(3))
Case C‑445/17

Agenzia delle Dogane e dei Monopoli

v

Pilato SpA

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Commissione Tributaria Regionale del Lazio)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Common Customs Tariff — Combined Nomenclature — Tariff classification — Headings 8703, 8704 and 8705 — Hearses)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber), 25 July 2018

Customs union — Common Customs Tariff — Tariff headings — Hearses — Classification under heading 8703 of the combined nomenclature

(Council Regulation No 2658/87, as amended by Regulation No 927/2012, Annex I)

The Combined Nomenclature in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, as amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 927/2012 of 9 October 2012, must be interpreted as meaning that hearses such as those at issue in the case in the main proceedings must be classified under heading 8703 of that combined nomenclature.

(see para. 41, operative part)
Article 93(1), Article 94 and Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008 must be interpreted as not precluding a Member State from requiring, as a standard for good agricultural and environmental conditions referred to in that Annex II, the preservation, on an agricultural area, of cairns marked by stones, the removal of which breaches such a requirement and, consequently, the reduction of payments owed to the farmer concerned.

As was provided for in Annex IV to Regulation No 1782/2003, the GAEC 7 standard, included in Annex II to Regulation No 1306/2013 and whose main topic is entitled ‘Landscape, minimum level of maintenance’, includes the retention of landscape features amongst the requirements and standards to be complied with in that regard. Among the landscape features referred to in Annex II to that regulation are hedges, ponds, ditches, trees in line, in group or isolated, field margins and terraces. Since the concept of ‘landscape features’ is not defined by Regulation No 1306/2013, it is necessary to interpret it, as was noted by the Advocate General in point 26 of her Opinion, taking into account its usual meaning and the context in which it is generally used (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2009, Horvath, C‑428/07, EU:C:2009:458, paragraph 34).

In that regard, it should be noted that a restrictive interpretation of the concept of ‘landscape features’, which, in particular, would exclude features resulting from human intervention — would be inconsistent with the discretion which Member States enjoy, in accordance with Article 94 of that regulation, in order to define the minimum requirements relating to good agricultural and environmental conditions (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2009, Horvath, C‑428/07, EU:C:2009:458, paragraph 37). In that regard, the Court has held that landscape features are physical elements of the environment and that the requirements relating to the retention of those features must contribute to their preservation as such (judgment of 16 July 2009, Horvath, C‑428/07, EU:C:2009:458, paragraph 41). The conservation of cairns marked by stones contributes to the safeguard of the cultural and historical heritage of Member States as physical elements of the environment.

(voir points 41, 43-47, operative part 1)
Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters — Regulation No 44/2001 — Scope — Matters excluded — Bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings — Definition — Actions deriving directly from insolvency proceedings and closely connected therewith — Whether Regulation No 1346/2000 is applicable

(Council Regulations No 1346/2000 and No 44/2001, Art. 1(2)(b))
3.

EU trade mark — Surrender, revocation and invalidity — Causes of revocation — Absence of genuine use of a trade mark — Use of the mark in a form differing by elements not altering the distinctive character of the mark — Three-dimensional mark made up of the form of an oven (Council Regulation No 207/2009, Art. 15(1)(a)) (see paras 44, 45, 47, 48)
Both Article 1(3) of Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts, as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007, and Article 1(3) of Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, as amended by Directive 2007/66, must be interpreted as meaning that they do not preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which does not allow economic operators to bring an action against the decisions of a contracting authority relating to a tendering procedure in which they have decided not to participate on the ground that the legislation applicable to that procedure made the award to them of the contract concerned very unlikely.

However, it is for the competent national court to make a detailed assessment, taking account of all the relevant information characterising the context of the case brought before it, as to whether the application of that legislation in practice is liable to affect the right of the economic operators concerned to the right to effective judicial protection.

(see para. 58, operative part)
Appeal — Grounds — Plea submitted for the first time in the context of the appeal — Inadmissibility

(Art. 256(1), second para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see para. 31)