ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
3

Recitals 4, 5, 7 and 39 of Directive 2011/83 are worded as follows: ‘(4) In accordance with Article 26(2) TFEU, the internal market is to comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods and services and freedom of establishment are ensured. The harmonisation of certain aspects of consumer distance and off-premises contracts is necessary for the promotion of a real consumer internal market striking the right balance between a high level of consumer protection and the competitiveness of enterprises, while ensuring respect for the principle of subsidiarity. (5) … [T]he full harmonisation of consumer information and the right of withdrawal in distance and off-premises contracts will contribute to a high level of consumer protection and a better functioning of the business-to-consumer internal market. … (7) Full harmonisation of some key regulatory aspects should considerably increase legal certainty for both consumers and traders. Both consumers and traders should be able to rely on a single regulatory framework based on clearly defined legal concepts regulating certain aspects of business-to-consumer contracts across the Union. The effect of such harmonisation should be to eliminate the barriers stemming from the fragmentation of the rules and to complete the internal market in this area. Those barriers can only be eliminated by establishing uniform rules at Union level. Furthermore consumers should enjoy a high common level of protection across the Union. … (39) It is important to ensure for distance contracts concluded through websites that the consumer is able to fully read and understand the main elements of the contract before placing his order. To that end, provision should be made in this Directive for those elements to be displayed in the close vicinity of the confirmation requested for placing the order. It is also important to ensure that, in such situations, the consumer is able to determine the moment at which he assumes the obligation to pay the trader. Therefore, the consumer’s attention should specifically be drawn, through an unambiguous formulation, to the fact that placing the order entails the obligation to pay the trader.’
17

In those circumstances, the Tallinna Halduskohus (Administrative Court, Tallinn) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Must the … microbiological criterion [requiring a zero tolerance limit] set out in Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2073/2005 and point 1.2 … in Chapter 1 of Annex I thereto be interpreted, having regard to that regulation, the protection of public health and the objectives pursued by [that regulation and by] Regulation No 178/2002 …, as meaning that in the case where the food business operator has been unable to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the competent authority that ready-to-eat foods able to support the growth of Listeria monocytogenes, other than those intended for infants and for special medical purposes, will not exceed the limit of 100 cfu/g during their shelf-life, the microbiological criterion … then also applies in any event to products placed on the market during their shelf-life? (2) If the answer to the first question is in the negative, must the second microbiological criterion [requiring a zero tolerance limit] be interpreted, in the light of the objective of protecting public health and the objectives pursued by Regulation No 2073/2005, and by [Regulation] No 178/2002 …, as meaning that, irrespective of whether the food business operator is able to demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the competent authority that the food will not exceed the limit of 100 cfu/g during the shelf-life, two alternative microbiological criteria then apply to that food, namely: first, the criterion ‘zero tolerance limit’ while the food is under the control of the food business operator, and second, the criterion “100 cfu/g” after the food has left the control of the food business operator?’
12

Article 5 of that directive, entitled ‘Rights conferred by a trade mark’, states: ‘1. The registered trade mark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive rights therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade: (a) any sign which is identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical with those for which the trade mark is registered; (b) any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade mark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public; the likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association between the sign and the trade mark. 2. Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade any sign which is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, where the latter has a reputation in the Member State and where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark. 3. The following, inter alia, may be prohibited under paragraphs 1 and 2: (a) affixing the sign to the goods or to the packaging thereof; (b) offering the goods, or putting them on the market or stocking them for these purposes under that sign, or offering or supplying services thereunder; (c) importing or exporting the goods under the sign; (d) using the sign on business papers and in advertising. … 5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall not affect provisions in any Member State relating to the protection against the use of a sign other than for the purposes of distinguishing goods or services, where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.’
36

As to the first condition, even assuming that the deduction that is sought by the purchaser of immovable property of the input VAT paid by him or her when taking over that property may be classified as a tax advantage, that advantage cannot be regarded as contrary to the objectives of the VAT Directive. As the Advocate General has stated in points 40 to 44 of her Opinion, that is what is revealed by Article 199(1)(g) of the VAT Directive, which permits the Member States, in the case of the supply of immovable property sold by a judgment debtor in a compulsory sale procedure, to have recourse to the reverse charge mechanism and to transfer the VAT burden to the taxable person to whom the taxable supply is made. Whilst the Republic of Lithuania chose not to have recourse to that mechanism, the very existence of the option provided for by that provision shows that the EU legislature did not regard deduction of the VAT paid by the purchaser of immovable property in a compulsory sale procedure as contrary to the objectives of the VAT Directive.
13

Article 128 of Regulation 2017/1001, entitled ‘Counterclaims’, provides: ‘1. A counterclaim for revocation or for a declaration of invalidity may only be based on the grounds for revocation or invalidity mentioned in this Regulation. 2. An EU trade mark court shall reject a counterclaim for revocation or for a declaration of invalidity if a decision taken by [EUIPO] relating to the same subject matter and cause of action and involving the same parties has already become final. … 4. The EU trade mark court with which a counterclaim for revocation or for a declaration of invalidity of the EU trade mark has been filed shall not proceed with the examination of the counterclaim, until either the interested party or the court has informed [EUIPO] of the date on which the counterclaim was filed. [EUIPO] shall record that information in the Register. If an application for revocation or for a declaration of invalidity of the EU trade mark had already been filed before [EUIPO] before the counterclaim was filed, the court shall be informed thereof by [EUIPO] and stay the proceedings in accordance with Article 132(1) until the decision on the application is final or the application is withdrawn. … 6. Where an EU trade mark court has given a judgment which has become final on a counterclaim for revocation or for a declaration of invalidity of an EU trade mark, a copy of the judgment shall be sent to [EUIPO] without delay, either by the court or by any of the parties to the national proceedings. [EUIPO] or any other interested party may request information about such transmission. [EUIPO] shall mention the judgment in the Register and shall take the necessary measures to comply with its operative part. 7. The EU trade mark court hearing a counterclaim for revocation or for a declaration of invalidity may stay the proceedings on application by the proprietor of the EU trade mark and after hearing the other parties and may request the defendant to submit an application for revocation or for a declaration of invalidity to [EUIPO] within a time limit which it shall determine. If the application is not made within the time limit, the proceedings shall continue; the counterclaim shall be deemed withdrawn. Article 132(3) shall apply.’
9

Annex IV to the Universal Service Directive, entitled ‘Calculating the net cost, if any, of universal service obligations and establishing any recovery or sharing mechanism in accordance with Articles 12 and 13’, includes a Part A, itself entitled ‘Calculation of net cost’, which provides: ‘Universal service obligations refer to those obligations placed upon an undertaking by a Member State which concern the provision of a network and service throughout a specified geographical area, including, where required, averaged prices in that geographical area for the provision of that service or provision of specific tariff options for consumers with low incomes or with special social needs. National regulatory authorities are to consider all means to ensure appropriate incentives for undertakings (designated or not) to provide universal service obligations cost efficiently. In undertaking a calculation exercise, the net cost of universal service obligations is to be calculated as the difference between the net cost for a designated undertaking of operating with the universal service obligations and operating without the universal service obligations. … Due attention is to be given to correctly assessing the costs that any designated undertaking would have chosen to avoid had there been no universal service obligation. The net cost calculation should assess the benefits, including intangible benefits, to the universal service operator. The calculation is to be based upon the costs attributable to: (i) elements of the identified services which can only be provided at a loss or provided under cost conditions falling outside normal commercial standards. This category may include service elements such as access to emergency telephone services, provision of certain public pay telephones, provision of certain services or equipment for disabled people, etc.; (ii) specific end-users or groups of end-users who, taking into account the cost of providing the specified network and service, the revenue generated and any geographical averaging of prices imposed by the Member State, can only be served at a loss or under cost conditions falling outside normal commercial standards. This category includes those end-users or groups of end-users which would not be served by a commercial operator which did not have an obligation to provide universal service. The calculation of the net cost of specific aspects of universal service obligations is to be made separately and so as to avoid the double counting of any direct or indirect benefits and costs. The overall net cost of universal service obligations to any undertaking is to be calculated as the sum of the net costs arising from the specific components of universal service obligations, taking account of any intangible benefits. The responsibility for verifying the net cost lies with the national regulatory authority.’
35

As regards fraud, according to settled case-law, a taxable person is to be refused the right to deduct not only where fraud is committed by the taxable person him or herself, but also where it is established that that taxable person, to whom goods or services which served as the basis on which to substantiate the right to deduct were supplied, knew or ought to have known that, through the purchase of those goods or services, he or she was participating in a transaction connected to VAT fraud. Indeed such a taxable person must, for the purposes of Directive 2006/112, be regarded as a participant in such fraud, whether or not he or she profits from the resale of the goods or the use of the services in the context of the taxable transactions subsequently carried out by him or her, since that taxable person, in such a situation, aids the perpetrators of that fraud and becomes their accomplice (see order of 14 April 2021, Finanzamt Wilmersdorf, C‑108/20, EU:C:2021:266, paragraphs 22 and 23, and judgment of 11 November 2021, Ferimet, C‑281/20, EU:C:2021:910, paragraphs 46 and 47 and the case-law cited).
28

In those circumstances the Østre Landsret (High Court of Eastern Denmark) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Does the standstill clause in Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 preclude the introduction and application of a national rule which, as a condition for the reunification of spouses, requires – unless there are particularly compelling reasons in a specific case – that a language test in the host Member State’s official language be successfully taken by the spouse/cohabitant who, as a Turkish worker in the EU Member State concerned, is covered by the Association Agreement and by Decision No 1/80, in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, in which the Turkish worker has acquired the right of permanent residence in the EU Member State concerned under the rules previously in force, which did not require that a test in the language of the Member State concerned be successfully taken as a precondition for the acquisition of that right? (2) Does the specific prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 10(1) of Decision No 1/80 cover a national rule which, as a condition for the reunification of spouses, requires – unless there are particularly compelling reasons in a specific case – that a language test in the host Member State’s official language be successfully taken by the spouse/cohabitant who, as a Turkish worker in the EU Member State concerned, is covered by the Association Agreement and by Decision No 1/80, in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, in which the Turkish worker has acquired the right of permanent residence in the EU Member State concerned under the rules previously in force, which did not require that a test in the language of the Member State concerned be successfully taken as a precondition for the acquisition of that right? (3) If the answer to [the second question] is in the negative, does the general prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 9 of the Association Agreement then preclude a national rule, such as that mentioned, in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, in which the Turkish worker has acquired the right of permanent residence in the EU Member State concerned under the rules previously in force, which did not require that a language test in the official language of the host Member State be successfully taken as a precondition for the acquisition of that right, when such a requirement is not imposed on nationals of the Nordic Member State concerned (in this case, Denmark) and of the other Nordic countries, or on others who are nationals of an EU country (and is thus not imposed on EU/EEA nationals)? (4) If the answer to [the third question] is in the affirmative, can the general prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 9 of the Association Agreement be relied on directly before national courts?’
Order of the President of the Court of 1 October 1960. - Rudolf Pieter Marie Fiddelaar v Commission of the European Economic Community. - Case 44-59 R.



European Court reports

French edition Page 01119

Dutch edition Page 01161

German edition Page 01159

Italian edition Page 01087

English special edition Page 00555



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Operative part



Parties

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IN CASE 44/59

RUDOLF PIETER MARIE FIDDELAAR, RESIDING AT WOLUWE-SAINT-PIERRE ( BRUSSELS ),

REPRESENTED AND ASSISTED BY MARCEL SLUSNY, ADVOCATE AT THE COUR D'APPEL, BRUSSELS, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE CHAMBERS OF EMILE POOS, 9 RUE DE NASSAU, APPLICANT,

V

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY,

REPRESENTED AND ASSISTED BY ITS LEGAL ADVISER, PAUL LEVEUX, ACTING AS AGENT, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE OFFICE OF MR MANZANARES, SECRETARY OF THE JOINT LEGAL SERVICE OF THE EUROPEAN EXECUTIVES, 2 PLACE DE METZ, DEFENDANT,

Grounds

THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THE APPLICANT IS IN A VERY SERIOUS FINANCIAL POSITION AND THERE SEEMS TO BE A CORRESPONDING NEED FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE;

IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 15 JULY 1960 IN CASES 43/59, 45/59 AND 48/59, THE COURT ORDERED THE DEFENDANT TO PAY TO THE APPLICANTS DAMAGES OF FB 60 000 ON GROUNDS WHICH, AS THE DEFENDANT EXPRESSLY ACCEPTS, ARE AT LEAST AS VALID IN THE CASE OF THE APPLIANT, WITH THE RESULT THAT THE LATTER CAN REASONABLY EXPECT TO RECEIVE COMPARABLE DAMAGES .

EVEN IF IN THE MAIN ACTION THE COURT ANNULLED THE DISCHARGE OF THE APPLICANT, IN WHICH CASE THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION OF ORDERING THE DEFENDANT TO PAY DAMAGES, THE COMMISSION WOULD BE OBLIGED TO PAY TO THE APPLICANT EMOLUMENTS WHICH HE WOULD NORMALLY HAVE RECEIVED AND THE TOTAL OF HIS EMOLUMENTS WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY IN EXCESS OF THE SUM FB 60 000 .

IT HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT THE PRESENT FINANCIAL POSITION OF THE APPLICANT REQUIRES PAYMENT OF THE WHOLE OF THE DAMAGES CLAIMED AND THE PRESIENT REGARDS DAMAGES OF FB 60 000 AS ENOUGH TO COVER THE APPLICANT'S IMMEDIATE NEEDS .

P . 557

IN CONSEQUENCE, THE PRESIDENT UPHOLDS THE APPLICATION TO THE EXTENT OF FB 60 000 .

THERE HAS NOT BEEN ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT ANY REQUEST THAT THE APPLICANT SHOULD LODGE ANY SECURITY OR PROVIDE A GUARANTOR AND, SUBJECT TO THE RESERVATIONS INDICATED ABOVE, IT IS NOT OPPOSED TO THE GRANT OF THE APPLICATION;

Operative part

1 . THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SHALL MAKE TO THE APPLICANT AN INTERIM PAYMENT OF FB 60 000;

2 . COSTS ARE RESERVED .
Order of the President of the Court of 30 January 1959. - Mannesmann AG and others v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. - Case 2-59 R - Joined cases 4-59 to 13-59.



European Court reports

French edition Page 00345

Dutch edition Page 00353

German edition Page 00351

Italian edition Page 00335

English special edition Page 00162



Parties

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Operative part



Parties

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IN CASE 2/59

1 . NIEDERRHEINISCHE HUTTE AG, DUISBURG,

2 . PHOENIX-RHEINROHR AG, VEREINIGTE HUTTEN - UND ROHRENWERKE, DUSSELDORF,

3 . GUSSTAHLWERKE GELSENKIRCHEN AG, GELSENKIRCHEN,

4 . RUHRSTAHL AG, WITTEN,

5 . GUSSTAHLWERKE WITTEN AG, WITTEN,

6 . MANNESMANN AG, DUSSELDORF, ON BEHALF OF THE COMPANIES MANNESMANN HUTTENWERKE AG AND HAHNSCHE WERKE AG, RECONSTRUCTED IN THE NAME OF THE APPLICANT ABOVE AND STRUCK OFF THE TRADE REGISTER,

7 . BOCHUMER VEREIN FUR GUSSTAHLFABRIKATION AG, BOCHUM,

8 . AUGUST THYSSEN-HUTTE AG, DUISBURG-HAMBORN,

9 . STAHLWERKE BOCHUM AG, BOCHUM,

10 . HUTTENWERKE OBERHAUSEN AG, OBERHAUSEN, APPLICANTS, REPRESENTED BY WERNER VON SIMSON,

V

HIGH AUTHORITY OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, LUXEMBOURG, DEFENDANT, REPRESENTED BY ITS LEGAL ADVISER, FRANS VAN HOUTEN, ACTING AS AGENT,

Grounds

P . 163

THE APPLICANTS RELY UPON ARTICLE 63 ( 1 ) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY AND STRESS 'THE DANGER WHICH EXISTS OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY'S BEGINNING ENFORCEMENT BEFORE THE UNDERTAKINGS REFERRED TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO COMPLETE THE PREPARATION OF THEIR APPLICATION AND THUS ACQUIRE THE RIGHT TO BRING AN ACTION BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE '.

HOWEVER, ARTICLE 63 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COURT PROVIDES THAT 'NO INTERIM APPLICATION FOR A SUSPENSION OF ENFORCEMENT REFERRED TO IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 39 OF THE TREATY CAN BE MADE UNLESS THE DECISION OR RECOMMENDATION OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY HAS BEEN CONTESTED IN AN EARLIER OR AT LEAST CONCOMITANT MAIN ACTION '.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING THE APPLICATION MUST BE INADMISSIBLE, BECAUSE THE APPLICANTS HAVE NOT CONTESTED THE DECISIONS IN AN EARLIER OR AT LEAST CONCOMITANT MAIN ACTION .

IT SHOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED WHETHER THE APPLICATION IS ADMISSIBLE UNDER ARTICLE 64 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COURT, WHICH PROVIDES THAT :

P . 164

'AN APPLICATION FOR THE SUSPENSION OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF A DECISION OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY WHICH IMPOSES A PECUNIARY OBLIGATION CAN BE MADE WHEN THERE IS REASON TO FEAR THAT ENFORCEMENT WILL TAKE PLACE .'

HOWEVER, IT HAS NOT EVEN BEEN PROVED THAT THE PROCEDURE NECESSARY FOR ENFORCEMENT HAS BEEN INITIATED, SO THAT IT CANNOT BE ACCEPTED THAT THE FEAR OF SUCH MEASURES WAS JUSTIFIED . ASSUMING THAT THE APPLICATION IS BASED ON ARTICLE 64 IT IS THEREFORE ALSO INADMISSIBLE .

ARTICLE 60 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COURT PROVIDES THAT THE UNSUCCESSFUL PARTY SHALL BE ORDERED TO PAY THE COSTS .

Operative part

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE

HEREBY :

1 . REJECTS THE APPLICATION AS BEING INADMISSIBLE;

2 . ORDERS THE APPLICANTS TO BEAR THE COSTS .
Order of the President of the Court of 1 July 1963. - Acciaierie Ferriere Pietra Oddino v Haute Autorité de la CECA. - Case 60-63 R.



European Court reports

French edition Page 00037

Dutch edition Page 00036

German edition Page 00042

Italian edition Page 00034

English special edition Page 00027



Parties

Subject of the case

Grounds

Operative part



Parties

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IN CASE 60/63 R

ACCIAIERIE FERRIERE PIETRA ODDINO, AN UNDERTAKING IN THE PERSONAL NAME OF PIETRA ODDINO, AT VIA DALMAZIA 5, BRESCIA, REPRESENTED AND ASSISTED BY ODOARDO VALSARIATI, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE CHAMBERS OF CAMILLE WAGNER, 31 RUE DES ROSES,

APPLICANT,

V

HIGH AUTHORITY OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, REPRESENTED BY ITS LEGAL ADVISER, DR ITALO TELCHINI, ITS AGENT APPOINTED FOR THAT PURPOSE, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT ITS OFFICES, 2 PLACE DE METZ,

DEFENDANT,

Subject of the case

APPLICATION FOR THE SUSPENSION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES DISPUTED IN THE MAIN APPLICATION .

Grounds

WHEREAS, THE PLEADINGS AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS BEING SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR, IT IS APPROPRIATE TO DECIDE UPON THE APPLICATION WITHOUT SUMMONING THE PARTIES TO APPEAR;

WHEREAS DECISION NO 7/63, WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THE REQUEST FOR SUSPENSION, IS OF A GENERAL NATURE AND IS NOT CAPABLE OF IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION;

WHEREAS THE DEFENDANT DISPUTES THAT THE LETTERS OF 8 APRIL AND 10 MAY 1963 CONSTITUTE DECISIONS CAPABLE OF IMPLEMENTATION;

WHEREAS, WHATEVER THE NATURE OF THE LETTERS REFERRED TO, IT APPEARS CLEARLY FROM THE DEFENDANT'S REPLY THAT THE HIGH AUTHORITY HAS NO INTENTION OF PROCEEDING TO RECOVER THE DISPUTED AMOUNTS BY WAY OF AN ENFORCEABLE DECISION;

AND WHEREAS CONSEQUENTLY THE CONDITIONS OF URGENCY OF SUCH A NATURE AS TO JUSTIFY AN ORDER FOR SUSPENSION ARE ABSENT;

Operative part

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

HEREBY ORDERS :

1 . THE APPLICATION IS DISMISSED;

2 . THE COSTS ARE RESERVED .