ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
3.

If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, would a provision of constitutional status such as that set out in Article 103(7) and (8) of the Greek Constitution, as revised in 2001, absolutely prohibiting the public sector from converting fixed-term employment contracts, concluded when the above provision was applicable, to contracts of indefinite duration, constitute an excessive restriction upon the obligation to interpret national law in conformity with EU law, by making it impossible to apply a pre-existing equivalent and still applicable legal measure of national law within the meaning of clause 5(1) of the framework agreement, such as Article 8(3) of Law 2112/1920, and by preventing the possibility of successive fixed-term employment contracts used to cover the fixed and permanent needs of local authority cleaning departments from being re-classified as contracts of indefinite duration following a correct classification of the lawful relationship during court proceedings, even if they cover fixed and permanent needs?
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Netherlands) lodged on 20 December 2018 — JZ

(Case C-806/18)

(2019/C 122/09)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hoge Raad der Nederlanden

Party to the main proceedings

Applicant: JZ

Question referred

Is the criminalisation under national law which criminalises the stay of a third-country national in the territory of the Netherlands after an entry ban has been imposed on him pursuant to Article 66a(7) of the Vreemdelingenwet 2000 compatible with EU law, in particular with the finding of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the judgment of 26 July 2017, Ouhrami v Netherlands (C-225/16, EU:C:2017:590, paragraph 49) according to which the entry ban provided for in Article 11 of the Return Directive (1) produces its ‘effects’ only from the point in time the foreign national has returned to his country of origin or to another third country, when national law also holds that that foreign national has no lawful residence and moreover it is established that the steps of the return procedure set out in the Return Directive have been followed but the actual return has not taken place?

(1) Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98).
2.

If the first question is answered in the affirmative (and it is held that that directive is applicable to providers of fixed telephony and Internet services), do Articles 12 and 13 of Directive 2002/20/EC allow Member States to impose a charge or fee calculated exclusively by reference to the gross annual revenue earned by the company — the proprietor of the installed facilities — from the provision of fixed telephony and Internet services in the territory concerned?
Action brought on 8 October 2018 — European Commission v Republic of Slovenia

(Case C-631/18)

(2019/C 155/21)

Language of the case: Slovenian

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: T. Scharf, B. Rous Demiri, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Republic of Slovenia

Form of order sought

The Commission claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by having failed to adopt (all) the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of 7 April 2016 supplementing Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, or by having failed to notify the Commission that it has adopted such provisions, the Republic of Slovenia has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 14 of that directive; and

— order the Republic of Slovenia to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Under Article 14 of Directive (EU) 2017/593, the Member States were under an obligation to adopt and publish, by 3 July 2017 at the latest, the provisions necessary to comply with that directive and to communicate them forthwith to the Commission. As the Republic of Slovenia did not, within that deadline, communicate to the Commission the measures transposing that directive, the Commission has decided to bring an action before the Court of Justice.

The deadline for transposing the directive expired on 3 July 2017.
2.

If the answer to question 1 is in the affirmative, must Article 5 of Directive 2004/38, and paragraph 2 thereof, be interpreted in the same way where the person who is a family member of an EU citizen and is not a national of another Member State has acquired the right of permanent residence in the United Kingdom and that is the State which issued the permanent residence card to that person? In other words, does the holding of the permanent residence card provided for in Article 20 of that directive, issued by the United Kingdom, exempt the holder of that card from the requirement to obtain a visa, regardless of the fact that neither Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, to which Article 5(2) of Directive 2004/38 refers, nor Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) is applicable to that Member State?
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 8 December 2018 by Anikó Pint against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 9 October 2018 in Case T-634/17 Pint v Commission

(Case C-770/18 P)

(2019/C 238/04)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Anikó Pint (represented by: D. Lázár, Rechtsanwalt)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Hungary

The Court of Justice of the European Union (Tenth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as manifestly unfounded by order of 21 May 2019 and ordered the appellant to bear her own costs.
Appeal brought on 28 December 2018 by Mamas and Papas Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 23 October 2018 in Case T-672/17: Mamas and Papas v EUIPO

(Case C-825/18 P)

(2019/C 148/11)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Mamas and Papas Ltd (represented by: S. Malynicz QC, B. Whitehead, J. Dainty, Solicitors)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court in Case T-672/17, Mamas and Papas Ltd v EUIPO;

— give judgment on the issue of prior disclosure;

— refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union on the remaining pleas in law that were brought before the General Court but not resolved by that Court;

— order the Office and intervener to bear their own costs and pay those of the appellant.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First the General Court erred in law regarding the powers of the EUIPO to examine the facts under Article 63(1) CDR (1) in relation to disclosure of the prior design. Where prior disclosure is positively averred by the design holder, it is not open to the EUIPO to come to a different conclusion on that issue.

Secondly, in any event, as regards its assessment of the evidence of prior disclosure the General Court distorted the evidence and incorrectly assessed the facts, and its decision contains a substantive inaccuracy in the findings attributable to the documents submitted to it which is clear from the case file.

(1) 11 Council Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community Designs (OJ 2002, L 3, p. 1).
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 21 December 2018 by Next design+produktion GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 18 October 2018 in Case T-533/17, Next design+produktion GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

(Case C-819/18 P)

(2019/C 280/19)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Next design+produktion GmbH (represented by: M. Hirsch, Rechtsanwalt, M. Metzner, Rechtsanwältin)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Nanu-Nana Joachim Hoepp GmbH & Co. KG

By order of 11 July 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Eighth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
Official Journal of the European Union

Appeal brought on 25 January 2019 by Banco Santander, S.A. and Santusa Holding, S.L against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 15 November 2018 in Case T-399/11 RENV Banco Santander and Santusa v Commission

(Case C-53/19 P)

(2019/C 112/38)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellants: Banco Santander, S.A. and Santusa Holding, S.L. (represented by: J. Buendía Sierra, E. Abad Valdenebro, R. Calvo Salinero and A. Lamadrid de Pablo, abogados)

Interveners in support of the applicants at first instance: Kingdom of Spain, Federal Republic of Germany, and Ireland

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellants submit that the Court should:

— Set aside the judgment of the General Court of 15 November 2018;

— Uphold the application for annulment and definitively annul the contested decision; and

— Order the European Commission to pay the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

On 15 November 2018, the General Court gave judgment in Case T-399/11 RENV, Banco Santander and Santusa v Commission, (1) against which this appeal is brought. The judgment dismissed the appellant’s action against the European Commission’s decision of 12 January 2011, (2) on ‘financial goodwill’ regulated by Article 12.5 of the Spanish Ley de Impuesto sobre Sociedades (Law on Corporation Tax).

In support of its appeal, the appellant relies on a single ground of appeal, alleging that, in the judgment under appeal, the General Court erred in law in its interpretation of Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in relation to the concept of ‘selectivity’.

In particular, it is submitted that the General Court erred:

— In determining the reference system at the first stage of the selectivity analysis;

— In determining the objective forming the basis for comparing the separate legal and factual situations at the second stage of the selectivity analysis;

— Consequently, the General Court also erred in the attribution of the burden of proof and the application of the principle of proportionality;

— In the alternative, in its examination relating to the supposed lack of proof of a causal link between the companies’ inability to merge abroad and the acquisition of holdings abroad; and

— In the alternative, in ruling out the severability of the measure according to the control percentage;

— In addition to maintaining a legally incorrect line of reasoning, the General Court substituted its own reasoning for that of the Commission’s decision in relation to a number of the abovementioned points, thus giving rise to further errors of law.

(1) Judgment of 15 November 2018, Banco Santander and Santusa v Commission (T-399/11 RENV, EU:T:2018:787).

(2) Commission Decision 2011/282/EU of 12 January 2011 on the tax amortisation of financial goodwill for foreign shareholding acquisitions C 45/07 (ex NN 51/07, ex CP 9/07) implemented by Spain (OJ 2011 L 135, p. 1).
2.3.

Does the national court infringe Article 4 [of Directive 2016/343], read together with Article 3 [thereof], as interpreted in the judgment [of 19 September 2018, Milev (C-310/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:732)], if it justifies its decision on the extension of the pre-trial detention in accordance with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights relating to Article 5(1)(c) of the Convention and clearly identifies the existence of evidence in support of the charge which, by nature ‘would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned might have committed an offence’, and Article 5(4) of the Convention, in particular, by giving a decision on the objections of the accused person’s defence counsel on the legality of the pre-trial detention which is effective and based on the facts?
Appeal brought on 22 February 2019 by the Comune di Milano against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-167/13 Comune di Milano v European Commission

(Case C-160/19P)

(2019/C 131/39)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: Comune di Milano (represented by: A. Mandarano, E. Barbagiovanni, S. Grassani, lawyers)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

— Set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018 in Case T-167/13, Comune di Milano v Commission;

— annul Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1225 of 19 December 2012 regarding injections of capital by SEA SpA into SEA Handling SpA (Case SA.21420 (C 14/10) (ex NN 25/10));

— order the Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings, including those relating to the proceedings for interim measures in Case T-167/13 R.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By the judgment under appeal, the General Court dismissed the action for annulment brought by the Comune di Milano against the aforementioned decision.

In support of its appeal, the Comune di Milano relies on four grounds of appeal, which all relate to infringement by the General Court of Article 107 TFEU and the absence, in the present case, of measures which may be classified as State aid.

By its first ground, the Comune di Milano, first, disputes that the alleged State aid measures made use of ‘state resources’ and, second, complains that the imputability ‘test’ developed by the General Court is incompatible with the principles established in Community case-law.

By its second ground of appeal, the Comune di Milano claims that the General Court infringed the principles concerning evidence of imputability, both from the perspective of unequal treatment as regards evidence and lack of evidence over an extended period of time.

By its third ground of appeal, the Comune di Milano alleges distortion of the facts and evidence by the General Court in the assessment of the evidence relied on by the Commission in support of its claim that the measures in question were imputable to the Comune di Milano.

By its fourth ground of appeal, the Comune di Milano disputes, on various grounds, all the assessments made by the General Court relating to the application, by the Commission, of the private investor in a market economy test (known as the Market Economy Investor Principle ‘MEIP’) and the findings set out in the judgment in that regard.
3.

If Question 2 is answered in the negative (and there are no concerns in principle against a reference to provisions of national law): Does Article 10(2)(p) of Directive 2008/48/EC preclude an interpretation to the effect that withdrawal information is ‘clear’ and ‘concise’ if the reference to a provision of national law — in the present case, Paragraph 492(2) of the BGB in the version valid from 30 July 2010 up to 12 June 2014 — and the further reference — in the present case, to Article 247, Paragraphs 3 to 13, of the EGBGB in the version valid from 4 August 2011 up to 12 June 2014 — necessarily means that the consumer has to carry out a process of legal inference beyond simply reading the provisions — for instance, as to whether the loan was granted to him under conditions customary for contracts secured by mortgage and the interim financing thereof or whether linked agreements exist, so that he can gain clarity as to what mandatory information must be provided in order for the period of withdrawal to start to run in the case of his loan agreement?
1.

Must a commercial agreement between a provider of internet access services and an end user under which the service provider charges the end user a zero-cost tariff for certain applications (that is to say, the traffic generated by a given application is not taken into account for the purposes of data usage and does not slow down once the contracted data volume has been used), and under which that provider engages in discrimination which is confined to the terms of the commercial agreement concluded with the end consumer and is directed only against the end user party to that agreement and not against any end user not a party to it, be interpreted in the light of Article 3(2) of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 laying down measures concerning open internet access and amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services and Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 on roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union (‘the Regulation’)?
Appeal brought on 30 January 2019 by Suzanne Saleh Thabet, Gamal Mohamed Hosni Elsayed Mubarak, Alaa Mohamed Hosni Elsayed Mubarak, Heidy Mahmoud Magdy Hussein Rasekh, Khadiga Mahmoud El Gammal against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 22 November 2018 in Joined Cases T-274/16 and T-275/16: Saleh Thabet and Others v Council

(Case C-72/19 P)

(2019/C 155/30)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Suzanne Saleh Thabet, Gamal Mohamed Hosni Elsayed Mubarak, Alaa Mohamed Hosni Elsayed Mubarak, Heidy Mahmoud Magdy Hussein Rasekh, Khadiga Mahmoud El Gammal (represented by: D. Anderson QC, B. Kennelly QC, J. Pobjoy, Barrister, G. Martin, C. Enderby Smith, F. Holmey, Solicitors)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

— set aside the decision under appeal;

— itself give final judgment in this case, annulling the contested acts in so far as they concern the appellants;

— in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for judgment, in line with the legal assessment of the Court of Justice; and

— order the Council to pay the appellants’ costs of the proceedings before the Court of Justice and the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the Council was not required to verify that the Egyptian authorities had respected the appellants’ fundamental EU rights.

Second plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the Council was not required to verify that the judicial proceedings and investigations involving the appellants concern acts that are such as to undermine the rule of law in Egypt.

Third plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the Council had not made a manifest error of assessment in relying on Case No. 10427 (Al Watany Bank Allegations).

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the Council had not made a manifest error of assessment in relying on Case No. 8897 (Private Villa Refurbishment Case).

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the Council had not made a manifest error of assessment in relying on Case No. 756 (Al-Ahram Establishment Gifts Allegation) and Case No. 53 (Dar El Tahrir Gifts Allegation)

Sixth plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the Council had not made a manifest error of assessment in relying on Case No. 144 (Money Laundering Allegation).
2.

If not, does an application opposing enforcement made pursuant to Paragraph 767 ZPO against a foreign maintenance order constitute proceedings concerned with the enforcement of judgments within the meaning of Article 24(5) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters? (2)
Appeal brought on 21 February 2019 by Deutsche Telekom AG against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-827/14, Deutsche Telekom AG v European Commission

(Case C-152/19 P)

(2019/C 164/26)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Deutsche Telekom AG (represented by: D. Schroeder and K. Apel, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Slovanet, a.s.

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018 in Case T-827/14 in so far as it dismisses the action;

— annul, in whole or in part, Commission Decision C(2014) 7465 final of 15 October 2014 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 TFEU and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39523 — Slovak Telekom) as corrected by Commission Decisions C(2014) 10119 final and C(2015) 2484 final of 16 December 2014 and 17 April 2015 in so far as it relates to the appellant or, in the alternative, annul or further reduce the fines imposed on the appellant;

— in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration;

— order the Commission to pay all the costs arising from the present proceedings and the proceedings before the General Court.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant relies on four grounds in support of its appeal.

First, the General Court incorrectly interpreted the legal principle according to which it is necessary, for a refusal of access, that the access sought is indispensable for activity on a downstream market and, consequently, failed to apply that principle and thereby incorrectly applied it.

Secondly, the General Court misinterpreted and misapplied the legal principle that the conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to the parent company only where the parent company has actually exercised a decisive influence.

Thirdly, the General Court failed to apply and thereby incorrectly applied the legal principle that the conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to the parent company only where the subsidiary has carried out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by its parent company.

Fourthly, the General Court incorrectly applied the legal principle that the right to be heard must be respected in administrative proceedings.
2.

In particular, do Articles 10 and 14 of Directive 1999/31, which provide that Member States must take ‘measures to ensure that all of the costs involved in the setting up and operation of a landfill site, including as far as possible the cost of the financial security or its equivalent referred to in Article 8(a)(iv), and the estimated costs of the closure and after-care of the site for a period of at least 30 years shall be covered by the price to be charged by the operator for the disposal of any type of waste in that site’ and ‘measures in order that landfills which have been granted a permit, or which are already in operation at the time of transposition of [that directive], may. continue to operate’ respectively, preclude the interpretation upheld by the appeal court, according to which Articles 15 and 17 of Legislative Decree 36/2003 apply to pre-existing landfill sites which already have permission to operate, where the measures implementing those obligations, in particular in relation to those landfill sites, are limited in Article 17 of that legislative decree to the provision of a transitional period and do not include any measure seeking to limit the financial impact of the extension on the ‘permit holder’?
3.

If Question 2 is to be answered in the negative and an obligation of recognition does exist: May a Member State refuse to recognise the exchanged driving licence document in any event if the Member State in the territory of which the question of recognition of the driving licence document arises can establish, on the basis of ‘indisputable information’, that the material entitlement to drive no longer existed at the time when the driving licence document was exchanged?
—

the General Court erred in law in the finding that it has jurisdiction to rule on the heads of claim submitted by the applicant, as it (i) did not assess if the factors forming the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction were met and it (ii) erroneously interpreted the principle of equal treatment.