ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
21

Article 78-2 of Code of Criminal Procedure provides: ‘Senior law-enforcement officers and, upon their orders and under their responsibility, the law-enforcement officers and assistant law-enforcement officers referred to in Articles 20 and 21-1 may ask any person to prove his identity by any means, where one or more plausible reasons exist for suspecting that: – the person has committed or attempted to commit an offence; – or the person is preparing to commit a crime or other offence; – or the person is likely to provide information useful for the investigation in the event of a crime or other offence; – or the person has breached the obligations or prohibitions to which he is subject in the context of judicial supervision, house arrest with electronic surveillance, a sentence or a measure followed by the judge responsible for the execution of sentences; – or the person is the subject of inquiries ordered by a judicial authority. On the public prosecutor’s written recommendations for the purposes of the investigation and prosecution of offences specified by him, the identity of any person may also be checked, in accordance with the same rules, in the places and for a period of time determined by the public prosecutor. The fact that the identity check uncovers offences other than those referred to in the public prosecutor’s recommendations shall not constitute a ground for invalidating related proceedings. The identity of any person, regardless of his conduct, may also be checked pursuant to the rules set out in the first paragraph to prevent a breach of public order, in particular, an offence against the safety of persons or property. In an area between the land border of France with the States party to the [CISA] and a line drawn 20 kilometres inside that border, and in the publicly accessible areas of ports, airports and railway or bus stations open to international traffic and designated by order, for the prevention and investigation of cross-border crime, the identity of any person may also be checked, in accordance with the rules provided for in the first paragraph, in order to ascertain whether the obligations laid down by law to hold, carry and produce papers and documents are fulfilled. … Where there is a section of motorway starting in the area referred to in the first sentence of this paragraph and the first motorway tollbooth is situated beyond the 20-kilometre line, the identity check may also take place up to that first tollbooth on parking areas and on the site of that tollbooth and the adjoining parking areas. The tollbooths concerned by this provision shall be designated by order. The fact that the identity check uncovers an offence other than the non-observance of the aforementioned obligations shall not constitute a ground for invalidating related proceedings. For the purposes of this paragraph, checks related to the obligations laid down by law to hold, carry and produce papers and documents may only be carried out in any given location for a period not exceeding six consecutive hours and may not consist in systematic checks on persons present in or moving within the areas or places referred to in this paragraph. …’
28

However, in the specific situation at issue in the main proceedings, the requirements set out in Articles 168 and 203 of the VAT Directive apply jointly to the same trader. The same quantities of electricity were fictitiously resold at the same price between companies of the same group in a circular manner, in such a way that those companies sold and re-purchased those quantities at the same price. In this way, each trader was both the issuer of an invoice indicating VAT payable and the recipient of another invoice, relating to the purchase of the same amount of electricity at the same price and indicating the same amount of VAT. As the issuer of an invoice and in application of the rule set out in Article 203 of the VAT Directive, EN.SA. was thus liable to pay to the Treasury the amount of VAT indicated on that invoice. By contrast, in view of the fictitious nature of the transactions in question, that company was not permitted, in accordance with the requirement resulting from Article 168 of that directive, to deduct the tax in the same amount as that indicated on the invoice which it received relating to the re-purchase of the electricity.
39

As a preliminary point, it should be pointed out that the animal by-products at issue in the main proceedings are culinary waste from the Netherlands, intended to be further processed in Germany for use in a biogas plant. In accordance with Article 2(2)(g)(iii) of Regulation No 1069/2009, those by-products fall within the scope of that regulation. They constitute, under Article 10(p) of that regulation, category 3 materials, being specified that, as is apparent from recital 29 and an overall reading of that regulation, the animal by-products falling within that category are considered to be the least hazardous. Moreover, it may be inferred from the order for reference that the animal by-products at issue in the main proceedings also constitute waste within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Regulation No 1013/2006 — which refers to the definition given in Article 1(1)(a) of Directive 2006/12, now Article 3(1) of Directive 2008/98 — which, if covered by the scope of that regulation, would fall within the categories of waste subject to the prior notification and consent procedure provided for in Article 3(1) of that regulation and not those referred to in Article 3(2) of that regulation for which solely a prior information procedure is required. In that regard, it is still necessary to note that, except in respect of the categories of waste referred to in the latter provision, which are not relevant in the present case, Regulation No 1013/2006 makes the shipments of waste from one Member State to another Member State subject to requirements, as a general rule, which are more stringent than Regulation No 1069/2009, as the Advocate General stated in point 65 of his opinion.
8

Article 3 of Regulation No 800/2008, entitled ‘Conditions for exemption’, featuring in Chapter I of that regulation, itself entitled ‘Common Provisions’, provides: ‘1. Aid schemes fulfilling all the conditions of Chapter I of this Regulation, as well as the relevant provisions of Chapter II of this Regulation, shall be compatible with the [internal] market within the meaning of Article [107(3) TFEU] and shall be exempt from the notification requirement of Article [108(3) TFEU] provided that any individual aid awarded under such a scheme fulfils all the conditions of this Regulation, and the scheme contains an express reference to this Regulation, by citing its title and publication reference in the Official Journal of the European Union. 2. Individual aid granted under a scheme referred to in paragraph 1 shall be compatible with the [internal] market within the meaning of Article [107(3) TFEU] and shall be exempt from the notification requirement of Article [108(3) TFEU] provided that the aid fulfils all the conditions of Chapter I of this Regulation, as well as the relevant provisions of Chapter II of this Regulation, and that the individual aid measure contains an express reference to the relevant provisions of this Regulation, by citing the relevant provisions, the title of this Regulation and its publication reference in the Official Journal of the European Union. 3. Ad hoc aid fulfilling all the conditions of Chapter I of this Regulation, as well as the relevant provisions of Chapter II of this Regulation, shall be compatible with the [internal] market within the meaning of Article [107(3) TFEU] and shall be exempt from the notification requirement of Article [108(3) TFEU] provided that the aid contains an express reference to the relevant provisions of this Regulation, by citing the relevant provisions, the title of this Regulation and its publication reference in the Official Journal of the European Union.’
4

Article 15 of that directive states: ‘1. Member States shall examine whether, under their legal system, any of the requirements listed in paragraph 2 are imposed and shall ensure that any such requirements are compatible with the conditions laid down in paragraph 3. Member States shall adapt their laws, regulations or administrative provisions so as to make them compatible with those conditions. 2. Member States shall examine whether their legal system makes access to a service activity or the exercise of it subject to compliance with any of the following non-discriminatory requirements: … (g) fixed minimum and/or maximum tariffs with which the provider must comply; … 3. Member States shall verify that the requirements referred to in paragraph 2 satisfy the following conditions: (a) non-discrimination: requirements must be neither directly nor indirectly discriminatory according to nationality nor, with regard to companies, according to the location of the registered office; (b) necessity: requirements must be justified by an overriding reason relating to the public interest; (c) proportionality: requirements must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective pursued; they must not go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective and it must not be possible to replace those requirements with other, less restrictive measures which attain the same result. … 5. In the mutual evaluation report provided for in Article 39(1), Member States shall specify the following: (a) the requirements that they intend to maintain and the reasons why they consider that those requirements comply with the conditions set out in paragraph 3; (b) the requirements which have been abolished or made less stringent. 6. From 28 December 2006 Member States shall not introduce any new requirement of a kind listed in paragraph 2, unless that requirement satisfies the conditions laid down in paragraph 3. …’
39

Fourthly, the Commission maintains that there is no need, in the present case, to balance a reciprocally binding relationship, since, under a concession, where the concessionaire is remunerated by operating the infrastructure and assumes the risk associated with the operation, maintaining the contractual balance would remove that risk completely and alter the subject matter of the concession contract. Moreover, as regards the possible justification for the lack of a competitive tendering procedure at the time when the 2009 single agreement was concluded by the ‘need to guarantee contractual balance’, the Commission claims that the judgment of 14 July 2016, Promoimpresa and Others (C‑458/14 and C‑67/15, EU:C:2016:558), relied on by the Italian Republic, is not relevant to the present case, since it concerns whether it is possible to subject to principles deriving from the TFEU concessions which, until the entry into force of Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 1), were not covered by any directive, whereas Directive 2004/18 was in force at the time the 2009 single agreement was concluded. Referring to the judgment of 4 June 2009, Commission v Greece (C‑250/07, EU:C:2009:338, paragraph 38), the Commission argues that Directive 2004/18 does not contain derogations from the principle of equal treatment based on an alleged need to ‘guarantee contractual balance’, but that it lays down other exceptions to that principle, which must be interpreted strictly. Further, the Commission asserts that it is apparent from the judgment of 14 November 2013, Belgacom (C‑221/12, EU:C:2013:736, paragraph 40) that the principle of legal certainty cannot be relied on in order to justify an extension to an agreement which is contrary to the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination and the obligation of transparency deriving therefrom.
Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 29 July 2019 — EMA v Shire Pharmaceuticals Ireland

(Case C‑359/18 P) ( 1 )

(Appeal — Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 — Orphan medicinal products — Article 5 — Application for designation of a medicinal product as an ‘orphan medicinal product’ — Validation — Existence of a prior marketing authorisation (MA) for the same medicinal product)

Approximation of laws — Uniform legislation — Medicinal products for human use — Orphan medicinal products — Procedure for designating a medicinal product as an orphan medicinal product — Existence of a prior marketing authorisation for the same medicinal product — Sponsor seeking orphan designation for a second medicinal product in respect of the same therapeutic indication — Obligation to establish that the second medicinal product is of significant benefit to patients in relation to the first medicinal product

(European Parliament and Council Regulation No 141/2000, Arts 3(1) and 5(2)

(see para. 31)

Operative part

The Court:

1. Dismisses the appeal;

2. Orders the European Medicines Agency (EMA) to bear its own costs and to pay the costs incurred by Shire Pharmaceuticals Ireland Ltd;

3. Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs.

( 1 ) OJ C 294, 20.8.2018.
4.

Appeal — Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted — Ground of appeal alleging distortion of the clear sense of the evidence — Need to indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted and show the errors of appraisal which led to that distortion (Art. 256(1), second para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 168(1)(d)) (see paras 82, 83)
Appeal — Pleas in law/Grounds — Incorrect assessment of the facts and evidence — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted — Failure to observe the rules of evidence — Question of law amenable to judicial review on appeal

(Art. 256(1), second para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)

(see paras 28, 31, 37, 73-75)
Acts of the institutions – Statement of reasons – Obligation – Scope – Restrictive measures taken having regard to the situation in Ukraine – Export restrictions and restrictions on access to the EU capital markets – Obligation to identify in the statement of reasons the specific and concrete elements justifying the said measure – Decision falling within a context known to the person concerned, enabling him to understand the scope of the measure taken against him – Whether summary statement of reasons sufficient

(Art. 296 TFEU; Council Decision 2014/512/ CFSP, as amended by Decision (CFSP) 2016/2315, Art. 1(2) and Annex III; Council Regulation No 833/2014, as amended by Regulation No 1290/2014, Art. 5(2)(a), (b) and (c) and Annex VI)

(see paras 76-78, 80-83)
4

Under Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation, entitled ‘General rule’: ‘1. Unless otherwise provided for in this Regulation, the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur. 2. However, where the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining damage both have their habitual residence in the same country at the time when the damage occurs, the law of that country shall apply. 3. Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply. A manifestly closer connection with another country might be based in particular on a pre-existing relationship between the parties, such as a contract, that is closely connected with the tort/delict in question.’
13

Paragraph 66 of that law reads as follows: ‘(1) For the purposes of the present law, the exportation of goods shall be understood to mean the exit of the goods from the territory of the European Union to the territory of a third country, provided that the goods have been placed under the export customs procedure … (2) The supply by the taxpayer of goods which are dispatched or transported from the Czech Republic to a third country (a) by the seller or a person authorised by him … … shall be exempt from tax on the exportation of goods to a third country. … (4) In the supply of goods to a third country, the date on which the transaction shall be deemed to take place is the date on which the goods exit the territory of the European Union, confirmed by the customs office. The taxpayer shall prove the supply of the goods to the territory of a third country by means of a tax document in accordance with Paragraph 33a(a). … (6) Where the exit of the goods from European Union territory is not confirmed by the customs office in the tax document, the taxpayer may prove the exit of the goods by other means of evidence.’
13

The English language version of the explanatory note reads as follows: ‘Beer is an alcoholic beverage obtained by fermenting a liquor (wort) prepared from malted cereals (most commonly barley or wheat), water and (usually) hops. Certain quantities of non-malted cereals (e.g., maize (corn) or rice) may also be used for the preparation of the liquor (wort). The addition of hops imparts a bitter and aromatic flavour and improves the keeping qualities. Cherries or other flavouring substances are sometimes added during fermentation. Sugar (particularly glucose), colouring matter, carbon dioxide and other substances may also be added. According to the fermenting process employed, the products may be bottom fermentation beer, obtained at a low temperature with bottom yeasts, or top fermentation beer, obtained at a higher temperature with top yeasts. Beer may be pale or dark, sweet or bitter, mild or strong. It may be put up in barrels, bottles or in airtight tins and may be marketed as ale, stout, etc. This heading also covers concentrated beer prepared by vacuum-condensing beer of low alcoholic strength (but with a high content of malt extract) to between one fifth and one sixth of its original volume. The heading does not cover: (a) Certain beverages which, although they are sometimes described as beers, do not contain alcohol (e.g., beverages prepared from water and caramelised sugar) (heading 22.02). (b) Beverages called non-alcoholic beer consisting of beer made from malt, the alcoholic strength of which by volume has been reduced to 0.5% vol or less (heading 22.02). (c) Medicaments of heading 30.03 or 30.04.’
21

First, the referring court states that it would be logical to consider that taxable persons covered by that special scheme for small enterprises would be required to pay VAT only once the amounts provided for in Article 287 of the VAT Directive were exceeded. It points out that, under Lithuanian law, it is possible for a built property to be supplied without the right of ownership over the plot of land on which the building stands being transferred and that, in the case in point, the two items of immovable property were identified separately in the contract, each with its own sale price. Furthermore, according to that court, not allowing Ms Jarmuškienė to be exempt from VAT in respect of one of the items of property that were the subject of the transaction in question would result in unfair treatment as compared to another taxable person who had achieved the same end, but through two separate transactions, and would only exceed the annual limit by reason of subsequent transactions. It further states that the judgment of 8 June 2000, Breitsohl (C‑400/98, EU:C:2000:304), cannot in its view be transposed to the present case.
29

However, it is apparent from the file before the Court, first, that MSC, the account holder in question in the main proceedings, holds an overnight deposit account, and therefore a payment account within the meaning of Article 4(14) of Directive 2007/64, with BCP Bank. As the referring court states and as is apparent from recital 24 of that directive, the existence of such an account implies that a framework contract, such as the ones referred to in Title III, Chapter 3 of that directive, was concluded between those two parties. Secondly, the account holder disputes that it is possible for the national provision transposing Article 58 of that directive to be pleaded against it, not because there is no contractual relationship between it and that bank, but because there is no authorisation for the direct debits at issue, whether under such a framework contract or as single payment transactions such as those referred to in Title III, Chapter 2 of that directive.
6

Article 3 of the directive, entitled ‘Rights of the consumer’, reads as follows: ‘1. The seller shall be liable to the consumer for any lack of conformity which exists at the time the goods were delivered. 2. In the case of a lack of conformity, the consumer shall be entitled to have the goods brought into conformity free of charge by repair or replacement, in accordance with paragraph 3, or to have an appropriate reduction made in the price or the contract rescinded with regard to those goods, in accordance with paragraphs 5 and 6. 3. In the first place, the consumer may require the seller to repair the goods or he may require the seller to replace them, in either case free of charge, unless this is impossible or disproportionate. A remedy shall be deemed to be disproportionate if it imposes costs on the seller which, in comparison with the alternative remedy, are unreasonable, taking into account: – the value the goods would have if there were no lack of conformity, – the significance of the lack of conformity, and – whether the alternative remedy could be completed without significant inconvenience to the consumer. Any repair or replacement shall be completed within a reasonable time and without any significant inconvenience to the consumer, taking account of the nature of the goods and the purpose for which the consumer required the goods. 4. The terms “free of charge” in paragraphs 2 and 3 refer to the necessary costs incurred to bring the goods into conformity, particularly the cost of postage, labour and materials. 5. The consumer may require an appropriate reduction of the price or have the contract rescinded: – if the consumer is entitled to neither repair nor replacement, or – if the seller has not completed the remedy within a reasonable time, or – if the seller has not completed the remedy without significant inconvenience to the consumer. 6. The consumer is not entitled to have the contract rescinded if the lack of conformity is minor.’