ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 3(1) of Regulation No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings must be interpreted as meaning that the courts of the Member State within the territory of which insolvency proceedings have been opened have jurisdiction to hear and determine an action to set a transaction aside by virtue of insolvency that is brought against a person whose place of residence is not within the territory of a Member State.

Harmonisation, in the European Union, of the rules governing jurisdiction over actions to set a transaction aside by virtue of insolvency contributes to the attainment of the objectives pursued by that provision — which consist in the promotion of foreseeability as regards bankruptcy and liquidation jurisdiction and, therefore, of legal certainty — irrespective of whether the defendant’s place of residence is in a Member State or a third country.

The fact that the provisions of Regulation No 1346/2000 concerning recognition and enforcement of judgments delivered by the court which has opened the insolvency proceedings cannot bind third countries does not preclude the application of the rule governing jurisdiction which is laid down in Article 3(1) of the regulation. Moreover, even if, in a particular case, it is not possible to rely on the regulation itself for the recognition and enforcement of judgments, it is sometime possible to obtain under a bilateral convention the recognition and enforcement of a judgment delivered by the court with jurisdiction. Furthermore, even if such a judgment is not recognised and enforced, on the basis of a bilateral convention, by the State in which the defendant’s place of residence is located, it may be recognised and enforced by the other Member States under Article 25 of the regulation, in particular if part of the defendant’s assets are in the territory of one of those States.

(see paras 33, 37-39, operative part)
Article 3(2) of Directive 92/12 on the general arrangements for products subject to excise duty and on the holding, movement and monitoring of such products must be interpreted as precluding national legislation that establishes a tax on the retail sale of mineral oils, for such a tax cannot be regarded as pursuing a specific purpose within the meaning of that provision where that tax, intended to finance the exercise by the regional or local authorities concerned of their powers in the fields of health and the environment, is not itself directed at protecting health and the environment.

A specific purpose within the meaning of Article 3(2) of Directive 92/12 is a purpose other than a purely budgetary purpose. In addition, it has already been held that the reinforcement of the autonomy of a regional or local authority through the grant of a power to generate tax income constitutes a purely budgetary objective that cannot, on its own, constitute a specific purpose in the sense contemplated by Article 3(2) of Directive 92/12.

None the less, since every tax necessarily pursues a budgetary purpose, the mere fact that that tax is intended to achieve a budgetary objective cannot, in itself, suffice — if Article 3(2) of Directive 92/12 is not to be rendered meaningless — to preclude that tax from being regarded as having, in addition, a specific purpose within the meaning of that provision. In this connection, the predetermined allocation of the proceeds of that tax to the financing by regional authorities of powers transferred to them by the State in the fields of health and the environment can constitute a factor to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing the existence of a specific purpose. However, such an allocation, which is merely a matter of internal organisation of the budget of a Member State, cannot, in itself, constitute a sufficient condition in that regard, since any Member State may decide to lay down, irrespective of the purpose pursued, that the proceeds of a tax be allocated to financing particular expenditure.

In order to be regarded as pursuing a specific purpose within the meaning of Article 3(2) of Directive 92/12, a tax must itself be directed at protecting health and the environment. This would, in particular, be the case where the proceeds of that tax had to be used for the purpose of reducing the social and environmental costs specifically linked to the consumption of the mineral oils on which that tax is imposed, so that there is a direct link between the use of the revenue and the purpose of the tax in question.

(see paras 23, 25, 27-30, 36 operative part)
Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax and the principle of fiscal neutrality do not preclude, in a transaction subject to the reverse charge regime, the recipient of the services from being deprived of the right to deduct the value added tax which he paid when that tax was not due to the service supplier on the basis of an incorrectly drawn up invoice, even where the correction of that error is impossible because that supplier is insolvent.

Under the reverse charge regime, no value added tax payment takes place between the supplier and the recipient of the services, the recipient being liable, in respect of the transactions carried out, for the input value added tax, while being able, in principle, to deduct that tax so that no amount is payable to the tax authorities. In this regard, while the principle of fiscal neutrality requires deduction of input tax to be allowed if the substantive requirements are satisfied, even if the taxable person has failed to comply with some of the formal requirements, the recipient of the services should have paid the value added tax to the tax authorities in accordance with Article 199 of Directive 2006/112. Thus, besides the fact that the invoice at issue does not meet the formal requirements provided for by the national legislation, a substantive condition of the reverse charge regime has not been satisfied. That situation prevented the tax authorities from investigating the application of the reverse charge regime and led to a risk of a loss of tax revenue for the Member State concerned.

Thus, since the value added tax paid by the recipient to the supplier is not due and that payment is made in breach of a substantive requirement of that regime, the recipient of the services cannot claim the right to deduct that value added tax.

Further, the fact that the service supplier is insolvent cannot call into question the refusal to allow deduction of value added tax as a result of the service recipient’s failure to fulfil essential obligations for the application of the reverse charge regime. However, the service recipient which paid value added tax that was not due to the service supplier can request repayment of the value added tax from it in accordance with the national law.

(see paras 29, 35, 37, 38, 40-42, 44, operative part 1)
The obligation on the General Court, under Article 36 and the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, to state the reasons on which its judgments are based does not require the General Court to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments articulated by the parties to the case.

Where the General Court has examined the arguments put forward by the applicant in such a way that its reasoning is sufficient to enable the latter to ascertain the reasons on which the General Court has relied in giving judgment, the fact that there is only a brief explanation as to why certain of those arguments have been rejected cannot be regarded as an infringement of the obligation to state the reasons on which the judgment is based.

(see paras 31, 32)
Article 15 of Directive 2006/54 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which, on grounds relating to the public interest, excludes a woman on maternity leave from a vocational training course which forms an integral part of her employment and which is compulsory in order to be able to be appointed definitively to a post as a civil servant and in order to benefit from an improvement in her employment conditions, while guaranteeing her the right to participate in the next training course organised, the date of which is nevertheless uncertain.

The exclusion of a woman from the first training course and fact that she is subsequently prevented from participating in the examination at its end result in her losing a chance of benefitting, in the same way as her colleagues, from an improvement in working conditions and must therefore be regarded as constituting unfavourable treatment for the purposes of Article 15 of Directive 2006/54.

Even though, depending on the circumstances, national authorities have a certain degree of discretion when adopting measures which they consider to be necessary in order to guarantee public security in a Member State, they are nevertheless required, when they lay down measures which derogate from a fundamental right, such as the equal treatment of men and women which Directive 2006/54 seeks to ensure is implemented, to observe the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law.

It must be stated that the national legislation referred to above, which provides for automatic exclusion from a training course and renders it impossible to sit the examination organised at the end of that course, without account being taken, in particular, either of the stage of the course at which the absence for maternity leave takes place or of the training already received, and which merely grants the woman who has taken such leave the right to participate in a training course organised at a later, but uncertain, date, does not appear to comply with the principle of proportionality.

(see paras 33, 35, 36, 39, operative part 1)
Article 45 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that a woman who gives up work, or seeking work, because of the physical constraints of the late stages of pregnancy and the aftermath of childbirth, retains the status of ‘worker’, within the meaning of that article, provided she returns to work or finds another job within a reasonable period after the birth of her child.

In that regard, it does not follow either from Article 7 of Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the European Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, considered as a whole, or from the other provisions of that directive, that, in such circumstances, a citizen of the Union who does not fulfil the conditions laid down in that article is, therefore, systematically deprived of the status of ‘worker’, within the meaning of Article 45 TFEU.

The codification, sought by the directive, of the instruments of EU law existing prior to that directive, which expressly seeks to facilitate the exercise of the rights of Union citizens to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, cannot, by itself, limit the scope of the concept of worker within the meaning of the TFEU Treaty.

In order to determine whether the period that has elapsed between childbirth and starting work again may be regarded as reasonable, the national court concerned should take account of all the specific circumstances of the case in the main proceedings and the applicable national rules on the duration of maternity leave, in accordance with Article 8 of Council Directive 92/85 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding.

A European Union citizen would be deterred from exercising her right to freedom of movement if, in the event that she was pregnant in the host State and gave up work as a result, if only for a short period, she risked losing her status as a worker in that State.

If, by virtue of the special protection for women in connection with maternity and particularly Article 16(3) of Directive 2004/38, an absence for an important event such as pregnancy or childbirth does not affect the continuity of the five years of residence in the host Member State required for the granting of the right of permanent residence, the physical constraints of the late stages of pregnancy and the immediate aftermath of childbirth, which require a woman to give up work temporarily, cannot, a fortiori, result in that woman losing her status as a worker.

(see paras 31, 32, 42, 44, 46, 47, operative part)
Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 19 December 2013 — Transnational Company ‘Kazchrome’ and ENRC Marketing v Council

(Case C‑10/12 P)

‛Appeal — Dumping — Regulation (EC) No 172/2008 — Imports of ferro-silicon originating in China, Egypt, Kazakhstan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Russia — Partial interim review — Regulation (EC) No 384/96 — Article 3(7) — Known factors — Injury to European Union industry — Causal link’

1. Common commercial policy — Protection against dumping — Damage — Discretion of the institutions — Establishment of a causal link — Obligations of the institutions — Taking into account of matters extraneous to the dumping — Impact of such factors on the establishment of a causal link — Burden of proof on the parties alleging that the regulation imposing an anti-dumping duty is unlawful (Council Regulation No 384/96, Art. 3(5), (6) and (7)) (see paras 20‑25, 28, 29, 39)

2. Appeals — Grounds — Mistaken assessment of the facts — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 256(1), second para. TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.) (see paras 40, 41)

3. Common commercial policy — Protection against dumping — Damage — Establishment of a causal link — Obligations of the institutions — Taking into account individually and collectively of the factors extraneous to the dumping — Need to carry out systematically a collective analysis of those factors — No such need (Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Art. 3.5; Council Regulation No 384/96, Art. 3(5), (6) and (7)) (see paras 51‑56)

4. Judicial proceedings — Costs — Order that the successful party bear its own costs — Absence of exceptional circumstances (Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 87(3)) (see paras 60, 61)

Re:

Appeal brought against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 25 October 2011 in Case T‑192/08 Transnational Company ‘Kazchrome’ and ENRC Marketing v Council, by which the General Court dismissed an action seeking partial annulment of Council Regulation (EC) No 172/2008 of 25 February 2008 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duties imposed on imports of ferro-silicon originating in the People’s Republic of China, Egypt, Kazakhstan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Russia (OJ 2008 L 55, p. 6).

Operative part:

The Court:

1. Dismisses the appeal;

2. Orders Transnational Company ‘Kazchrome’ AO and ENRC Marketing AG to pay the costs of the present proceedings;

3. Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs;
By making registration in its territory of new passenger vehicles having their steering equipment on the same side as the direction of the traffic dependent on the repositioning of the steering wheel to the other side, a Member State fails to fulfil its obligations under Article 2a of Directive 70/311 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the steering equipment for motor vehicles and their trailers and Article 4(3) of Directive 2007/46 establishing a framework for the approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles.

The steering equipment of vehicles is specifically covered by Directive 70/311, Article 2a of which requires the Member States not to prohibit, in particular, the registration of vehicles on grounds relating to their steering equipment if the latter satisfy the requirements of that directive. Indeed, Directives 2007/46 and 70/311 make reference to ‘hand of drive: … left/right’, which must be stated on the information document for the purpose of type-approval of a vehicle. Also, the indication must be made on the certificate of conformity, that the vehicle is ‘adapted’ to traffic on the right or on the left. However, those provisions may not cover fundamental elements of the construction of the vehicle, such as the position of the steering-wheel, but only other elements, such as the vehicles’ lighting and windscreen wiping devices or indirect vision systems. The adaptations that may be required may not relate to the repositioning of the driver’s seat, which would amount to a procedure having a significant impact on the design of the vehicle, contrary to the wording and purpose of Directive 70/311, but solely to procedures having a minimal impact.

Consequently, the position of the driver’s seat, an integral part of the steering equipment of a vehicle, comes within the harmonisation established by Directives 2007/46 and 70/311, so that the Member States may not require, for reasons of safety, with a view to the registration of a new vehicle in their territory, the driver’s seat of that vehicle to be moved to the side opposite the direction of the traffic.

(see paras 44, 48, 50, 52, operative part)
Sixth Directive 77/388 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes, as amended by Directive 91/680, must be interpreted as not precluding a national provision which makes the acquisition of the majority of the capital of a company, the assets of which essentially comprise immovable property, subject to an indirect tax other than value added tax.

The Court has already ruled on the compatibility of that legislation with Article 33(1) of the Sixth Directive in the case which gave rise to the order of 27 November 2008 in Case C‑151/08 Renta. In that regard, the Court found in that order that a tax with characteristics such as those of the tax on capital transfers differs from value added tax in such a way that it cannot be characterised as a turnover tax within the meaning of Article 33(1) of the Sixth Directive.

Moreover, since EU law permits concurrent systems of taxation, it thus allows such a tax to be levied even where the charging of such a tax on a transaction which is already subject to value added tax may result in the double taxation of that transaction.

(see paras 28, 29, 31, operative part)
An action for failure to fulfil obligations is inadmissible if, after expiry of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, the alleged infringement does not continue to produce effects. That is not the case, and the action is, accordingly, admissible, where the infringement alleged by the Commission resides in the fact that the Data Protection Supervisor was prevented from serving his full term and it is common ground that the term of office had not expired by the date specified in the reasoned opinion.

A Member State which prematurely brings to an end the term served by the supervisory authority for the protection of personal data, has failed to fulfil its obligations under Directive 95/46 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.

The supervisory authorities responsible for supervising the processing of personal data must enjoy an independence allowing them to perform their duties free from external influence in whatever form, whether direct or indirect, which may have an effect on their decisions and which could call into question the performance by those authorities of their task of striking a fair balance between the protection of the right to private life and the free movement of personal data.

However, operational independence is not sufficient in itself to protect supervisory authorities from all external influence. In that regard, the mere risk that the State scrutinising authorities could exercise a political influence over the decisions of the supervisory authorities is enough to hinder the latter in the independent performance of their tasks. If it were permissible for every Member State to compel a supervisory authority to vacate office before serving its full term, in contravention of the rules and safeguards established in that regard by the legislation applicable, the threat of such premature termination to which that authority would be exposed throughout its term of office could lead it to enter into a form of prior compliance with the political authority, which is incompatible with the requirement of independence. Moreover, in such a situation, the supervisory authority cannot be regarded as being able, in all circumstances, to operate above all suspicion of partiality.

(see paras 51-55, 62, operative part 1)
Keywords

Operative part



Keywords

Appeals

—

Appeal deemed founded

—

Judgment to be given on the substance by the appeal court

—

Condition

—

State of the proceedings not permitting final judgment to be given

—

Referral of the case back to the General Court (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 61, first para.) (see paras 18, 19

)

Operative part

Operative part

The Court:

1. Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union in DEI v Commission , T‑421/09, EU:T:2012:450;

2. Refers the case back to the General Court of the European Union;

3. Reserves the costs.
1.

declares that, by applying different tax treatment to donations and successions between beneficiaries and donees resident in Spain and those not resident in Spain, between bequeathers resident in Spain and those not resident in Spain, and between donations and similar transfers of immovable property situated within and outside of Spain, the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 63 TFEU and Article 40 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area of 2 May 1992;
Article 2(4)(b) of Directive 2003/96 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity, as amended by Directive 2004/74, must be interpreted as meaning that the fact of using, firstly, coal as a heating fuel in the sugar production process and, secondly, carbon dioxide generated by the combustion of that energy product to produce chemical fertilizers does not constitute ‘dual use’ of that energy product within the meaning of that provision.

However, the fact of using, firstly, coal as a heating fuel in the sugar production process and, secondly, carbon dioxide generated by the combustion of that energy product for the purposes of the same production process does constitute such ‘dual use’ if it is established that the sugar production process cannot be completed without using the carbon dioxide generated by the combustion of the coal.

(see para. 28, operative part 1)