ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
11

Article 285 of the Código do Trabalho (Labour Code) provides: ‘1. In the event of transfer, by whatever means, of the ownership of an undertaking or business or a part of an undertaking or business that constitutes an economic unit, the rights and obligations of the employer under the employment contracts of the employees concerned shall be transferred to the purchaser, together with the liability to pay any fines imposed in respect of employment law infringements. 2. The transferor shall be jointly and severally liable, in respect of obligations falling due up to the date of the transfer, for the period of one year following that transfer. 3. The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall also apply to the transfer, assignment or resumption of control of the operation of an undertaking, business or economic unit and, in the event of assignment or resumption, the party carrying out that operation immediately before the assignment or resumption shall be jointly and severally liable. 4. The preceding paragraphs shall not apply to an employee who, before the transfer, has been transferred by the transferor to another business or economic unit, within the meaning of Article 194, while being retained in the transferor’s service, with the exception of matters concerning the liability of the transferor regarding payment of any fines imposed in respect of employment law infringements. 5. An organised grouping of resources which has the objective of pursuing an economic activity shall be considered to be an economic unit, whether that activity is central or ancillary. 6. A breach of the rules laid down in paragraph 1 of this Article, and of the first part of paragraph 3 thereof, shall constitute a very serious infringement.’
Council Directive 72/166/EEC of 24 April 1972 on the approximation of the laws of Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and to the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability, Second Council Directive 84/5/EEC of 30 December 1983 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, as amended by Directive 2005/14/EC of 11 May 2005, and Third Council Directive 90/232/EEC of 14 May 1990 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, must be interpreted as not precluding national provisions which allow exclusion of the right of a driver of a motor vehicle responsible, by his own fault, for a traffic accident as a result of which his spouse, a passenger in that vehicle, has died, to receive compensation for the material harm which he has suffered as a result of that death.
44

Accordingly, the answer to the first question is that Article 138(1) of the VAT Directive must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, a supply of goods by a taxable person established in a first Member State is not exempt from VAT under that provision where, prior to entering into that supply transaction, the person acquiring the goods, who is identified for VAT purposes in a second Member State, informs the supplier that the goods will be resold immediately to a taxable person established in a third Member State, before he takes them out of the first Member State and transports them to that third taxable person, provided that that second supply has in fact been carried out and the goods have then been transported from the first Member State to the Member State of the third taxable person. The fact that the first person acquiring the goods is identified for VAT purposes in a Member State other than that of the place of the first supply or that of the place of the final acquisition is not a criterion for classification of an intra-Community transaction or, in itself, evidence sufficient to show that a transaction is an intra-Community one.
6

Article 63(1) of Directive 2014/24 states as follows: ‘With regard to criteria relating to economic and financial standing as set out pursuant to Article 58(3), and to criteria relating to technical and professional ability as set out pursuant to Article 58(4), an economic operator may, where appropriate and for a particular contract, rely on the capacities of other entities, regardless of the legal nature of the links which it has with them. … Where an economic operator wants to rely on the capacities of other entities, it shall prove to the contracting authority that it will have at its disposal the resources necessary, for example, by producing a commitment by those entities to that effect. The contracting authority shall, in accordance with Articles 59, 60 and 61, verify whether the entities on whose capacity the economic operator intends to rely fulfil the relevant selection criteria and whether there are grounds for exclusion pursuant to Article 57. The contracting authority shall require that the economic operator replaces an entity which does not meet a relevant selection criterion, or in respect of which there are compulsory grounds for exclusion. The contracting authority may require or may be required by the Member State to require that the economic operator substitutes an entity in respect of which there are non-compulsory grounds for exclusion. Where an economic operator relies on the capacities of other entities with regard to criteria relating to economic and financial standing, the contracting authority may require that the economic operator and those entities be jointly liable for the execution of the contract. …’
32

In those circumstances, the College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven (Administrative Court of Appeal for Trade and Industry, Netherlands) decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Are Articles 5(4) and 8(2) of [Regulation No 1/2005], read in conjunction with the provisions regarding the journey log in Annex II to that regulation, to be interpreted as meaning that they impose an obligation on the organiser of the transport and/or on the keeper of the animals, when transporting animals to a third country, to keep the journey log up to the place of destination in that third country? (2) Are Articles 5 and 7 of [Regulation No 817/2010], read in conjunction with Article 4 of that regulation, to be interpreted as meaning that the export refunds must be recovered if the journey log was not kept up to the place of destination in the third country, for the reason that the transporter discharged the obligation laid down in point 7 of Annex II to Regulation No 1/2005 to give the journey log to the official veterinarian at the exit point? (3) Are Articles 5 and 7 of Regulation No 817/2010, read in conjunction with Article 4 of that regulation, to be interpreted as meaning that the export refunds must be recovered if the exporter is unable to prove compliance with the provisions of Regulation No 1/2005, in a situation where the veterinarian, in the context of the checks which he is required to carry out in the third country pursuant to Article 3(1) of Regulation No 817/2010, is unable to verify whether or not the route plan data (the journey log) are satisfactory, that is to say, whether or not they are in compliance with the provisions of Regulation No 1/2005 (and is consequently also unable to declare that the outcome of those checks is satisfactory), inasmuch as the transporter has given the journey log to the official veterinarian at the exit point?’
23

In those circumstances, the Tribunal da Relação de Guimarães (Court of Appeal, Guimarães) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Does the obligation, laid down in Article 3(1) of [the First Directive], to have insurance … apply to the use of vehicles, in any place, be it public or private, solely in cases in which the vehicles are moving, or also in cases in which they are stationary but with the engine running? (2) Does the aforementioned concept of use of vehicles, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of [the First Directive], encompass an agricultural tractor, which was stationary on a flat mud track on a farm and was being used, as was usual, in the performance of agricultural work (herbicide spraying in a vineyard), with the engine running to drive the pump in the drum containing the herbicide, and which, in those circumstances, as the result of a landslip caused by the combination of the following factors: – the weight of the tractor, – the vibration produced by the tractor’s engine and by the spraying device mounted on the back of the tractor, – heavy rain, fell downwards hitting four workers who were carrying out the same task on the lower terraces, causing the death of a worker who was supporting the hose that was being used for spraying? (3) If questions 1 and 2 are answered in the affirmative, does this interpretation of the concept of “use of vehicles” in Article 3(1) of [the First Directive] preclude a rule of national law (Article 4(4) of [Decreto-Lei No 291/2007 que aprova o regime do sistema do seguro obrigatório de responsabilidade civil automóvel (Decree-Law No 291/2007 concerning the system of compulsory motor vehicle insurance against civil liability) of 21 August 2007 (“Decree-Law No 291/2007”)]) which excludes the obligation to have insurance laid down in Article 3(1) [of that directive] in cases in which vehicles are used for purely agricultural or industrial purposes?’
9

As regards statutory health insurance cover by the public health insurance funds, Paragraph 2 of the Fünftes Buch Sozialgesetzbuch (Fifth book of the social code) in the version of 22 December 2010 (BGBl. 2010 I, p. 2309) (‘the SGB V’) provides: ‘1. The health insurance funds make available the services covered in Chapter III to the persons whom they insure in compliance with the principle of good administration (Paragraph 12), to the extent that those insured persons are not themselves liable for those supplies The particular treatment methods, medicines and medicinal remedies are not excluded. The quality and efficacy of the services must meet generally accepted standards of medical knowledge and take into account medical advances. 2. The insured persons shall receive supplies in the form of supplies in kind or in service, without prejudice to the derogations laid down in this Book V or Book IX. Upon request, the services may also be provided in the form of a participation in a “Multi-branch personal budget” according to the combined provisions of Paragraph 17(2) to (4) of Book IX, the regulation on the budget and Paragraph 159 of Book IX. The provision of supplies in kind and in services is the object of contracts that the health insurance funds conclude with service providers under the provisions of Chapter IV.’
12

Article 16 of amended Regulation No 726/2004 provides: ‘1. After a[n MA] has been granted in accordance with this Regulation, the [MA] holder shall, in respect of the methods of manufacture and control provided for in points (d) and (h) of Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/83/EC, take account of scientific and technical progress and introduce any changes that may be required to enable the medicinal product to be manufactured and checked by means of generally accepted scientific methods. He shall apply for approval of corresponding variations in accordance with this Regulation. 2. The [MA] holder shall forthwith provide the [EMA], the Commission and the Member States with any new information which might entail the amendment of the particulars or documents referred to in Article 8(3), Article 10, 10a, 10b and 11, or Article 32(5) of Directive 2001/83/EC, in Annex I thereto, or in Article 9(4) of this Regulation. In particular, the [MA] holder shall forthwith inform the [EMA] and the Commission of any prohibition or restriction imposed by the competent authorities of any country in which the medicinal product is marketed and of any other new information which might influence the evaluation of the benefits and risks of the medicinal product concerned. The information shall include both positive and negative results of clinical trials or other studies in all indications and populations, whether or not included in the [MA], as well as data on the use of the medicinal product where such use is outside the terms of the [MA]. 3. The [MA] holder shall ensure that the product information is kept up to date with the current scientific knowledge including the conclusions of the assessment and recommendations made public by means of the European medicines web-portal established in accordance with Article 26. 3a. In order to be able to continuously assess the risk-benefit balance, the [EMA] may at any time ask the [MA] holder to forward data demonstrating that the risk-benefit balance remains favourable. The [MA] holder shall answer fully and promptly any such request. The [EMA] may at any time ask the [MA] holder to submit a copy of the pharmacovigilance system master file. The [MA] holder shall submit the copy at the latest seven days after receipt of the request. 4. The Commission shall, after consulting the [EMA], adopt appropriate provisions for the examination of variations to [MAs] in the form of a regulation. Those measures, designed to amend non-essential elements of this Regulation by supplementing it, shall be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 87(2a).’
14

According to the findings made by the referring court, the relevant facts for the purposes of the present proceedings are as follows: – despite being the proprietor of the parallel trade marks in only some Member States of the EEA, Schweppes International has promoted a global image of the Schweppes trade mark; – Coca-Cola, which is the proprietor of the parallel trade marks registered in the other Member States of the EEA, has contributed to maintaining that global trade mark image; – that global image is a cause of confusion for the relevant public in Spain as regards the commercial origin of ‘Schweppes’ goods; – Schweppes International is responsible for the European website that deals specifically with the Schweppes trade mark (www.schweppes.eu), which not only provides general information about goods bearing that trade mark, but also contains links to various local websites, in particular the United Kingdom website managed by Coca-Cola; – Schweppes International, which holds no rights in the Schweppes trade mark in the United Kingdom (where the mark is owned by Coca-Cola), refers on its website to the British origins of that mark; – Schweppes and Schweppes International use the image of ‘Schweppes’ goods originating in the United Kingdom in their advertising; – Schweppes International engages, in the United Kingdom, in activities promoting ‘Schweppes’ goods to customers and informing customers about those goods on social networks; – the presentation of ‘Schweppes’ goods marketed by Schweppes International is very similar — and in some Member States, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, identical — to that of ‘Schweppes’ goods originating in the United Kingdom; – Schweppes International, whose registered office is in the United Kingdom, and Coca-Cola coexist peacefully in the United Kingdom; – following the assignment, which took place in 1999, of a proportion of the parallel trade marks to Coca-Cola, the two proprietors of the parallel trade marks in the EEA have, in their respective territories, applied for the registration of new, identical or similar Schweppes trade marks in respect of the same goods (such as, for example, the trade mark SCHWEPPES ZERO); – even though Schweppes International is the proprietor of the parallel trade marks in the Netherlands, the trade mark is exploited in that country (that is to say, the product is prepared, bottled and marketed) by Coca-Cola in its capacity as licensee; – Schweppes International is not opposed to ‘Schweppes’ goods originating in the United Kingdom being marketed online in various Member States of the EEA in which it is the proprietor of the parallel trade marks, such as Germany and France; furthermore, ‘Schweppes’ goods are sold via websites throughout the EEA, with no distinction as to their origin; – Coca-Cola has made no opposition, on the basis of the rights which it holds in the parallel trade marks, to Schweppes International’s application for registration of a Community design containing the word element ‘Schweppes’.
A new, four-wheel drive utility vehicle with a compression-ignition internal combustion piston engine (diesel) of a cylinder capacity of 720 cm3, with a net weight including fluids) of approximately 630 kg, an unbraked towing capacity of 750 kg and with dimensions of approximately 300 x 160 cm. The vehicle has an open cabin with two seats (including the driver) fitted with a full roll-over protection frame, a cargo bed constructed of a strong steel frame with a sturdy flat-bed tipping body, with a manual tipper and of a capacity of 0,4 m3or, approximately, 400 kg. It has a high ground clearance (27 cm) and a wheel base of 198 cm. It is equipped with off-road earth moving tyres, wet-type disc brakes, a coupling device and a front hitch. The vehicle has a limited speed of 25 km/h, and a high brake capacity. The vehicle is designed for off-road use, particularly in very rough terrain. The vehicle is presented to be used for a range of functions, for example, pushing, hauling trailers, moving animals, transporting plants, boxes, water and equipment, carrying munitions and transporting feed for animals.

8704 21 91
6

According to Article 87(5) to (7) and (9) of the Law on Tax Administration: ‘5. Tax amounts overpaid by the taxpayer that remain after setting off such amounts against arrears in payments shall be refunded at the request of the taxpayer. … 6. The tax authority shall have the right to verify, in accordance with the procedure and within the time limits laid down in this law, whether or not the taxpayer’s request for a refund of the tax overpayment is substantiated. 7. ... The tax authority shall refund the tax overpayment to the taxpayer as follows: (1) the tax overpayment shall be refunded within 30 days from the date of receipt of a written request to refund the tax overpayment. If the tax authority requests further documents from the taxpayer, the time limit of 30 days shall be calculated from the date of receipt of those documents. … The time limits referred to in this paragraph shall not apply in the cases referred to in subparagraph 2 of this paragraph; (2) in cases where a tax investigation is conducted with respect to refunding a tax overpayment or where issues related to the refunding of a tax overpayment constitute an integral part of the investigation carried out by the tax authority in respect of the taxpayer, the tax overpayment shall be refunded not later than within 20 days after the tax authority’s decision, wherein the tax and (or) related amounts are calculated anew and the taxpayer is instructed to pay them, (or a certificate where no violations have been established) is communicated to the taxpayer. … 9. If the tax authority fails to refund the tax overpayment within the time limit laid down in paragraph 7 of this article, it shall calculate interest thereon for the benefit of the taxpayer until the tax overpayment is refunded. The amount of such interest shall be equal to the amount of default interest for late payment of tax.’
32

In those circumstances, the Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky (Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Must Directive 2008/9 and the right to a tax refund be interpreted to the effect that the cumulative satisfaction of two conditions is required to exercise the right to a VAT refund, namely: (a) the supply of the goods or services and (b) the inclusion of VAT on the invoice by the supplier? In other words, is it possible for a taxable person who has not been charged VAT on an invoice to claim a tax refund? (2) Is it in accordance with the principle of proportionality or VAT fiscal neutrality for the time limit for the tax refund to be calculated from a point at which not all the substantive law conditions required to exercise the right to a tax refund were satisfied? (3) Are Articles 167 and 178(a) of [Directive 2006/112], in the light of the principle of fiscal neutrality, to be interpreted to the effect that, in circumstances such as those of the present case, and assuming that the other substantive law and procedural law conditions required to claim a right to a tax deduction are satisfied, they preclude an approach by the tax authorities which refuses the taxable person the right, claimed within the time limit under Directive 2008/9, to be refunded VAT which was charged to it by the supplier on the invoice and [collected] by the supplier before the expiry of the limitation period for relying upon the right under national law? (4) Did the Slovak tax authorities, in the light of the principle of neutrality and the principle of proportionality, which are the fundamental principles of the common system of VAT, exceed the limits of what was necessary for achieving the objective defined by the VAT Directive when they refused the taxable person the right to a refund of the deducted tax on the ground that the limitation period laid down by national law for claiming a tax refund had expired, even though the taxable person could not exercise its right to a tax refund within that period and even though the tax was correctly collected and the risk of tax evasion or non-payment of the tax had been completely excluded? (5) May the principles of legal certainty, legitimate expectations and the right to good administration under Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as precluding an interpretation of the national legislation under which, for the purposes of observance of the time limit for claiming a tax refund, the time of the decision of the administrative authority on the tax refund is decisive, and not the time at which the tax refund is claimed by the taxable person?’