ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
26

In those circumstances, the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme Administrative Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. In circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, is Article 19(1) of [the Audiovisual Media Services Directive] to be interpreted as precluding an interpretation of national legal provisions to the effect that screen splitting is not regarded as a break-bumper that keeps the audiovisual programme distinct from television advertising, where one part of the screen is reserved for the programme’s closing credits and the other part to a list presenting the upcoming programmes on a broadcaster’s channel and no acoustic or optical signal expressly announcing the start of an advertising break is broadcast either on the split screen or thereafter? 2. Taking into account the fact that [the Audiovisual Media Services Directive] is in the nature of a minimum standard, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings is Article 23(2) of that directive to be interpreted as meaning that it is not compatible with that provision to classify sponsor idents broadcast in the context of programmes other than the sponsored programmes as “advertising spots” within the meaning of Article 23(1) of the directive which must be included in the maximum permissible advertising time? 3. Taking into account the fact that [the Audiovisual Media Services Directive] is in the nature of a minimum standard, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings is the term “advertising spots” in Article 23(1) of that directive in conjunction with the description of the maximum permissible advertising time (“the proportion … within a given clock hour shall not exceed 20%”) to be interpreted as meaning that it is not compatible with that provision to count the “black seconds” between individual advertising spots and at the end of an advertising break as advertising time?’
30

That court takes the view that the mechanism for substituting a medicinal product laid down in Paragraph 129 of the SGB V does not give such a competitive advantage in the case of accession to a rebate contract scheme within the meaning of Paragraph 130a(8) of the SGB V. The situation is different where such a rebate contract is concluded in a procedure for the award of a public contract. In that situation, the exclusivity from which the successful tenderer benefits has the consequence that that tenderer enjoys a special competitive position, the award of the contract having a decisive effect on competition. By contrast, where such contracts are concluded with all interested operators, the substitution of a medicinal product takes place on the basis of a choice made not by the contracting authority but by the pharmacist or the patient depending on the sale conditions proposed by the operators who have acceded to the rebate contract scheme. Accordingly, it is possible that some of the contracting operators may see their product sold only rarely. It is the same if, as in the present case, a single operator has contracted. In granting the right to contract at any moment to any interested operator, the contracting authority refrains from exercising an influence on the competitive situation, which depends not on the possibility of substituting the contracting operator’s medicinal products but on the decision taken by each operator who is potentially interested in participating or not in the rebate contract scheme.
8

Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004 L 158, p. 77, and corrigenda at OJ 2004 L 229, p. 35, OJ 2005 L 30, p. 27, and OJ 2005 L 197, p. 34) provides in Article 7, headed ‘Right of residence for more than three months’: ‘1. All Union citizens shall have the right of residence on the territory of another Member State for a period of longer than three months if they: (a) are workers or self-employed persons in the host Member State; or (b) have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their period of residence and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State; or (c) — are enrolled at a private or public establishment, accredited or financed by the host Member State on the basis of its legislation or administrative practice, for the principal purpose of following a course of study, including vocational training; and — have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State and assure the relevant national authority, by means of a declaration or by such equivalent means as they may choose, that they have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their period of residence; or (d) are family members accompanying or joining a Union citizen who satisfies the conditions referred to in points (a), (b) or (c). ... 3. For the purposes of paragraph 1(a), a Union citizen who is no longer a worker or self-employed person shall retain the status of worker or self-employed person in the following circumstances: (a) he/she is temporarily unable to work as the result of an illness or accident; (b) he/she is in duly recorded involuntary unemployment after having been employed for more than one year and has registered as a job-seeker with the relevant employment office; (c) he/she is in duly recorded involuntary unemployment after completing a fixed-term employment contract of less than a year or after having become involuntarily unemployed during the first twelve months and has registered as a job-seeker with the relevant employment office. In this case, the status of worker shall be retained for no less than six months; (d) he/she embarks on vocational training. Unless he/she is involuntarily unemployed, the retention of the status of worker shall require the training to be related to the previous employment. ...’
46

By contrast, under Article 5(1)(c) of Regulation No 817/2010, it is for the authority competent for the payment of export refunds to decide whether the applicable provisions of Regulation No 1/2005 have or have not been satisfied in the context of the transport concerned since the decision in that regard must be taken on the basis of the documents listed in Article 4(2) of Regulation No 817/2010 and/or all other elements at its disposal concerning compliance with that regulation. Article 4(2) makes reference to, in relation to the part of the transport carried out within the territory of the European Union, the document constituting evidence of exit from that territory as completed by the official veterinarian at the exit point in accordance with Article 2(3) or (4) of that regulation. In addition, among other elements that the authority has at its disposal is the official veterinarian’s report, referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 2(2) of the same regulation. Drafted in accordance with the model set out in Annex I to the same regulation, that report contains the precise indications and observations which, where applicable, allow the authority competent for the payment of the refund to know in detail the reasons why the official veterinarian at the exit point considered the results of the checks carried out in relation to all or some of the animals transported to be unsatisfactory and entered that assessment on the document constituting evidence of exit from the customs territory of the European Union, as provided for by Article 2(4).
8

Article 7 of Directive 2005/29, headed ‘Misleading omissions’, provides: ‘1. A commercial practice shall be regarded as misleading if, in its factual context, taking account of all its features and circumstances and the limitations of the communication medium, it omits material information that the average consumer needs, according to the context, to take an informed transactional decision and thereby causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise. 2. It shall also be regarded as a misleading omission when, taking account of the matters described in paragraph 1, a trader hides or provides in an unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely manner such material information as referred to in that paragraph or fails to identify the commercial intent of the commercial practice if not already apparent from the context, and where, in either case, this causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise. 3. Where the medium used to communicate the commercial practice imposes limitations of space or time, these limitations and any measures taken by the trader to make the information available to consumers by other means shall be taken into account in deciding whether information has been omitted. 4. In the case of an invitation to purchase, the following information shall be regarded as material, if not already apparent from the context: (a) the main characteristics of the product, to an extent appropriate to the medium and the product, (b) the geographical address and the identity of the trader, such as his trading name and, where applicable, the geographical address and the identity of the trader on whose behalf he is acting; (c) the price inclusive of taxes, or where the nature of the product means that the price cannot reasonably be calculated in advance, the manner in which the price is calculated, as well as, where appropriate, all additional freight, delivery or postal charges or, where these charges cannot reasonably be calculated in advance, the fact that such additional charges may be payable; (d) the arrangements for payment, delivery, performance and the complaint handling policy, if they depart from the requirements of professional diligence; (e) for products and transactions involving a right of withdrawal or cancellation, the existence of such a right. 5. Information requirements established by Community law in relation to commercial communication including advertising or marketing, a non-exhaustive list of which is contained in Annex II, shall be regarded as material.’
Article 24 of Regulation No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation No 1347/2000, prohibits any review of the jurisdiction of the court of the Member State of origin, and even provides expressly that Article 23(a) of the regulation cannot be used to carry out such a review. Admittedly, Article 24 of Regulation No 2201/2003 refers only to Articles 3 to 14, not to Article 15 of the regulation. However, Article 15 of Regulation No 2201/2003, which is in Chapter II of the regulation, entitled ‘Jurisdiction’, supplements the rules of jurisdiction in Articles 8 to 14 of that chapter by introducing a means of cooperation by which a court of a Member State which has jurisdiction to hear the case under one of those rules may, by way of exception, transfer it to a court of another Member State which is better placed to hear the case. It follows that an alleged breach of Article 15 of that regulation by a court of a Member State does not allow a court of another Member State to review the jurisdiction of that court, despite the fact that the prohibition in Article 24 of the regulation does not refer expressly to Article 15.

(see paras 42-45)
Article 27(4)(a) and Annex VI, points (1) and (2), of Regulation No 882/2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules must be interpreted as precluding Member States, when they prescribe the fees charged to food sector establishments, from including the costs in connection with the compulsory basic training of official auxiliaries.

The fees may be intended to cover only the costs which the Member States actually incur in performing controls in food establishments and their purpose is not to impose the cost of the initial training of those staff members on undertakings in the relevant sector. Therefore, Annex VI to Regulation No 882/2004, to which Article 27 of that regulation refers, must be interpreted as referring exclusively to the salaries and costs of persons who are actually involved in performing the official controls. Furthermore, it should be recalled that those controls are normally carried out by the official veterinarians who may be assisted only by official auxiliaries or, in certain cases, by the slaughterhouse staff. It is not apparent from any provision of Regulation No 854/2004, laying down specific rules for the organisation of official controls on products of animal origin intended for human consumption, that persons who follow the compulsory basic training for official auxiliaries may, during that training, participate in the performance of official controls.

(see paras 39-42, operative part)
Article 20(2) of Directive 2008/118 concerning the general arrangements for excise duty and repealing Directive 92/12 must be interpreted as meaning that the movement of excise goods under a duty suspension arrangement ends, for the purpose of that provision, when the consignee of those goods has found, on unloading in full from the means of transport carrying the goods in question, that there were shortages of the goods in comparison with the amount which should have been delivered to him.

The wording of Article 20(2) of Directive 2008/118 refers to the goods themselves and not at all the means of transport by which they have been carried. It is therefore the actual receipt of the goods, as such, by their consignee which must be taken into account in order to determine the time of their delivery and not the mere transport to the consignee of their content, whatever that may be.

Article 20(2) of that directive forms part of Chapter IV thereof, entitled ‘Movement of excise goods under suspension of excise duty’. That chapter includes the provisions of Article 19(2)(c) of that directive, in accordance with which the consignee must consent to any check enabling the competent authorities of the Member State of destination to satisfy themselves that the goods in question have actually been received. The EU legislature thus intended to make the actual receipt of the goods the element determining the conditions under which the movement of those goods under a duty suspension arrangement must be assessed at the time of their delivery. There is no other provision of that chapter which calls for a different interpretation.

Furthermore, the provisions of Article 20(2) of Directive 2008/118, by stating when the movement of excise goods under a duty suspension arrangement ends, seeks to define the time at which those goods are deemed to have been released for consumption and to determine, in consequence, the point at which duty on those goods becomes chargeable.

Moreover, since excise duty is a tax on consumption, as stated in recital 9 of Directive 2008/118, based on the amount of goods offered for consumption, the point at which the duty becomes chargeable must be fixed in such a manner that the amount of goods concerned can be measured precisely.

(see paras 29-32, 35, operative part 1)
Case C‑662/15

Lohmann & Rauscher International GmbH & Co. KG

v

BIOS Medical Services GmbH

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Approximation of laws — Directive 93/42/EEC — Medical devices — Class I device (sterile wound dressings) which has been the subject of a conformity assessment procedure by the manufacturer — Parallel imports — Addition to the labelling of information relating to the importer — Supplementary conformity assessment procedure)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber), 24 November 2016

Approximation of laws — Medical devices — Directive 93/42 — Parallel imports — Addition to the labelling of information relating to the importer — No obligation on the importer to carry out a supplementary conformity assessment of those medical devices

(Council Directive 93/42, Arts 1(2)(f), 8(1), 10, 11 and 14b)

Article 1(2)(f) and Article 11 of Directive 93/42 concerning medical devices, as amended by Directive 2007/47, must be interpreted as not requiring a parallel importer of a medical device, which bears a CE marking and which has been subjected to a conformity assessment within the meaning of that provision, to carry out a further assessment designed to certify the conformity of the information allowing its identification which that parallel importer adds to the labelling of that device with a view to that device being placed on the market of the Member State of importation.

Where a person purchases medical devices in a Member State, after they have been placed on the market in the European Union by their manufacturer, in order then to resell them in another Member State under the manufacturer’s name, without altering their packaging or their original presentation other than by affixing a label designating that person as responsible for placing the devices on the market and indicating its contact details and a code intended to identify those devices, that person cannot be considered to have repackaged or placed those devices on the market ‘under its own name’. In such circumstances, the parallel importer of medical devices, as it is not marketing those devices under its own name, cannot be regarded as coming within the scope of Article 1(2)(f) of Directive 93/42. Consequently, that importer cannot be required to cause the devices in question to undergo a further conformity assessment procedure under Article 11 of that directive.

In addition, the combination of the procedures for safeguarding, vigilance and health surveillance, such as laid down in Articles 8(1), 10 and 14b of Directive 93/42, thus ensures protection for the health and safety of persons, while at the same time limiting the adverse effects on the free movement of goods which would be entailed by the application of national measures requiring the importer to carry out an assessment as to the conformity of the alterations which it makes to the labelling of a medical device already bearing a CE marking.

(see paras 32, 33, 38, 39, operative part)
The concept of ‘seller’, for the purposes of Article 1(2)(c) of Directive 1999/44 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees, must be interpreted as covering also a trader acting as intermediary on behalf of a private individual who has not duly informed the consumer of the fact that the owner of the goods sold is a private individual, which it is for the referring court to determine, taking into account all the circumstances of the case. The above interpretation does not depend on whether the intermediary is remunerated for acting as intermediary.

Article 1(2)(c) of Directive 1999/44 limits the circle of persons against whom consumers may take action in order to enforce their rights under that directive. Consequently, it is essential that consumers are aware of the identity of the seller, and in particular whether he is acting as a private individual or as a trader, so that they are able to benefit from the protection conferred on them by the directive.

Therefore, in circumstances in which the consumer can easily be misled in the light of the conditions in which the sale is carried out, it is necessary to afford the latter enhanced protection. Therefore, the seller’s liability, in accordance with Directive 1999/44, must be capable of being imposed on an intermediary who, by addressing the consumer, creates a likelihood of confusion in the mind of the latter, leading him to believe in its capacity as owner of the goods sold.

Moreover, it is for the competent national court to assess whether a trader may be regarded as the ‘seller’, for the purposes of Article 1(2)(c) of Directive 1999/44, where he fails to duly inform the consumer that he was not the owner of the goods in question. The degree of participation and the amount of effort employed by the intermediary in the sale, the circumstances in which the goods were presented to the consumer and the latter’s behaviour may, in particular, be relevant in that regard in order to determine whether the consumer could have understood that the intermediary was acting on behalf of a private individual.

(see paras 37, 41, 44, 45, operative part)
Article 4 of Directive 2000/26 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles and amending Directives 73/239 and 88/357 (Fourth motor insurance Directive), as amended by Directive 2005/14, must be interpreted as not requiring Member States to provide that the claims representative appointed pursuant to that article may itself be sued, instead of the insurance undertaking which it represents, in the national court before which an action for damages was brought by an injured party falling within the scope of Article 1 of Directive 2000/26, as amended by Directive 2005/14.

It admittedly follows from those considerations that the Union legislature intended that, without being able to call into question observance of the rules of private international law, representation of insurance undertakings under Article 4(5) of Directive 2000/26 includes the duty to allow injured parties validly to bring proceedings before national courts for compensation for damage. In that context, the claims representative’s sufficient powers must include the authority to accept service of judicial documents. On the other hand, it is apparent neither from the drafting history nor from the recitals in the preamble to Directive 2000/26 that the intention of the EU legislature was to extend those powers to allow injured parties to bring proceedings against that undertaking’s representative, in order to seek compensation from the insurance undertaking of the responsible party, before the national court of their place of residence.

(see paras 33, 35, 39, operative part)
Agriculture—Common organisation of the markets—Fruit and vegetables—Producers’ organisations—Repayment of financial assistance granted by the Member State—Commission placing ceiling on the amounts repaid—Lawfulness

(Council Regulation No 1234/2007, Art. 103 sexies; Commission Regulation No 1580/2007, Arts 94(1) and 97(1))

(see paras 55-58)