ORDER OF THE COURT (Seventh Chamber)

1 December 2015 ( )

(Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Action for damages — Restrictive measures against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Zimbabwe — Removal of the person in question from the list of persons and entities concerned — Compensation for the damage allegedly suffered)

In Case C‑545/14 P,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 27 November 2014,

Aguy Clement Georgias, residing in Harare (Zimbabwe),

Trinity Engineering (Private) Ltd, established in Harare,

Georgiadis Trucking (Private) Ltd, established in Harare,

represented by H. Mercer, QC, and I. Quirk, Barrister,

appellants,

the other parties to the proceedings being:

Council of the European Union, represented by G. Étienne and B. Driessen, acting as Agents,

and

European Commission, represented by S. Bartelt and M. Konstantinidis, acting as Agents,

defendants at first instance,

THE COURT (Seventh Chamber),

composed of C. Toader, President of the Chamber, A. Rosas (Rapporteur) and A. Prechal, Judges,

Advocate General: M. Wathelet,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to give a decision by reasoned order, pursuant to Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice,

makes the following

Order

1 By their appeal, Mr Georgias, Trinity Engineering (Private) Ltd and Georgiadis Trucking (Private) Ltd seek to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 18 September 2014 in Georgias and Others v Council and Commission (T‑168/12, EU:T:2014:781) (‘the judgment under appeal’), by which that court dismissed their action seeking compensation for the damage they claim they suffered as a result of the adoption of Commission Regulation (EC) No 412/2007 of 16 April 2007 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 314/2004 concerning certain restrictive measures in respect of Zimbabwe (OJ 2007 L 101, p. 6).

Background to the dispute

2 Recitals 1 to 4 in the preamble to Council Common Position 2002/145/CFSP of 18 February 2002 concerning restrictive measures against Zimbabwe (OJ 2002 L 50, p. 1) are worded as follows:

‘(1) On 28 January 2002, the Council expressed its serious concern about the situation in Zimbabwe, in particular the recent escalation of violence and intimidation of political opponents and the harassment of the independent press. It noted that the Government of Zimbabwe has not taken effective measures to improve the situation as called for by the European Council in Laeken last December.

(2) The Council further expressed serious concern about recent legislation in Zimbabwe which, if enforced, would seriously infringe on the right to freedom of speech, assembly and association, mainly the Public Order and Security Act and the General Laws Amendment Act (both of which violate the norms and standards for free and fair elections as agreed by [Southern African Development Community (SADC)] Parliamentarians in March 2001) and the proposed legislation to regulate the media.

(3) Therefore, the [European Union] decided it will close the consultations conducted under Article 96 of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement and implement targeted sanctions if:

– the Government of Zimbabwe prevents the deployment of an EU election observation mission starting by 3 February 2002, or if it later prevents the mission from operating effectively, or

– the Government of Zimbabwe prevents the international media from having free access to cover the election, or

– there is a serious deterioration on the ground, in terms of a worsening of the human rights’ situation or attacks on the opposition, or

– the election is assessed as not being free and fair.

(4) The Council has assessed that the Government of Zimbabwe continues to engage in serious violations of human rights and of the freedom of opinion, of association and of peaceful assembly. Therefore, for as long as the violations occur, the Council deems it necessary to introduce restrictive measures against the Government of Zimbabwe and those who bear a wide responsibility for such violations.’

3 By Articles 3 and 4 of Common Position 2002/145, the Council imposed a travel ban within the territory of the European Union and a measure freezing the funds of the persons listed in the annex to that common position ‘who are engaged in activities that seriously undermine democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe’. Listed in that annex are, inter alia, the names of the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, the President of the Parliament, nine Ministers, Secretaries, Generals and a number of senior civil servants.

4 By Council Common Position 2002/600/CFSP of 22 July 2002 amending Common Position 2002/145 (OJ 2002 L 195, p. 1), approximately 50 further persons were added to the list of persons subject to restrictive measures. These were Ministers, Ministers of State, Secretaries, Deputy Ministers, Deputy Secretaries and the wife of the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe.

5 Following a government reshuffle in Zimbabwe, that list was replaced by the list in the annex to Council Decision 2002/754/CFSP of 13 September 2004 implementing Common Position 2002/145 (OJ 2002 L 247, p. 56). That list included 79 persons, including 23 Ministers, 12 Deputy Ministers, 23 Secretaries or Deputy Secretaries and various other political figures and military officers.

6 By Council Common Position 2003/115/CFSP of 18 February 2003 amending and extending Common Position 2002/145 (OJ 2003 L 46, p. 30), Common Position 2002/145 was extended for a period of 12 months.

7 Following the adoption of each of the common positions and decisions referred to above, the Council adopted a regulation providing, inter alia, for the freezing of the funds of the persons on the list annexed to the regulation, which was drawn up in accordance with the lists annexed to those common positions and decisions.

8 Council Common Position 2004/161/CFSP of 19 February 2004 renewing restrictive measures against Zimbabwe (OJ 2004 L 50, p. 66) provided for the renewal of the restrictive measures introduced by Common Position 2002/145.

9 Recitals 2, 6 and 7 in the preamble to Common Position 2004/161 are worded as follows:

‘(2) By Common Position [2002/14] the Council also imposed a travel ban and a freezing of funds on the Government of Zimbabwe and persons who bear a wide responsibility for serious violations of human rights and of the freedom of opinion, of association and of peaceful assembly.

…

(6) In view of the continued deterioration in the human rights situation in Zimbabwe, the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union should be renewed for a further 12 months.

(7) The objective of these restrictive measures is to encourage the persons targeted to reject policies that lead to the suppression of human rights, of the freedom of expression and of good governance.’

10 Article 4(1) of Common Position 2004/161 provides as follows:

‘Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of the natural persons listed in the Annex, who are engaged in activities that seriously undermine democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe.’

11 Article 5(1) of Common Position 2004/161 is worded as follows:

‘All funds and economic resources belonging to individual members of the Government of Zimbabwe and to any natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them as listed in the Annex shall be frozen.’

12 Council Regulation (EC) No 314/2004 of 19 February 2004 concerning certain restrictive measures in respect of Zimbabwe (OJ 2004 L 55, p. 1) was adopted, as stated in recital 5 in the preamble thereto, in order to implement the restrictive measures laid down by Common Position 2004/161.

13 Recital 2 in the preamble to that regulation reads as follows:

‘The Council continues to consider that the Government of Zimbabwe is still engaging in serious violations of human rights. Therefore, for as long as the violations occur, the Council deems it necessary to maintain restrictive measures against the Government of Zimbabwe and those who bear prime responsibility for such violations.’

14 Article 6(1) of Regulation No 314/2004 provides as follows:

‘All funds and economic resources belonging to individual members of the Government of Zimbabwe and to any natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them as listed in Annex III shall be frozen.’

15 Mr Georgias is a Zimbabwean businessman. He is the owner and chief executive of Trinity Engineering (Private) Ltd. Georgiadis Trucking (Private) Ltd is a subsidiary of that company. Mr Georgias is also chief executive of Georgiadis Trucking (Private) Ltd.

16 On 29 November 2005, Mr Georgias was appointed a non-constituency Senator by the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe. On 6 February 2007, the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe appointed Mr Georgias Deputy Minister for Economic Planning and Development.

17 Council Decision 2007/235/CFSP of 16 April 2007 implementing Common Position 2004/161 (OJ 2007 L 101, p. 14) amended the annex to the latter to include, inter alia, the following entry as regards Mr Georgias: ‘Georgias, Aguy; [Deputy] Minister for Economic Development, born 22. 6. 1935’. The Commission adopted, on the same day, Regulation (EC) No 412/2007, which amended Annex III to Regulation No 314/2007. The annex thus amended includes, inter alia, an entry in relation to Mr Georgias which has the same wording as the original entry.

18 On 25 May 2007, Mr Georgias arrived at Heathrow Airport (United Kingdom) with a view to visiting family living in that Member State and then, on the following day, to taking a flight to New York (United States). He was refused leave to enter the United Kingdom or transit through United Kingdom airports on his way to New York. He was compelled to spend the night detained in Heathrow Airport and to take a return flight to Harare (Zimbabwe) the following day.

19 Council Decision 2007/455/CFSP of 25 June 2007 implementing Common Position 2004/161 (OJ 2007 L 172, p. 89) again amended the annex to that common position. The following sentence was added to the entry relating to Mr Georgias set out in paragraph 17 above:

‘Member of the Government and as such engaged in activities that seriously undermine democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law’.

20 Commission Regulation (EC) No 777/2007 of 2 July 2007 amending Regulation No 314/2004 (OJ 2007 L 173, p. 3) amended Annex III to Regulation No 314/2004 once more. Mr Georgias remained listed with, now, an entry worded in the same terms as those set out in the preceding paragraph.

21 Council Decision 2011/101/CFSP of 15 February 2011 concerning restrictive measures against Zimbabwe (OJ 2011 L 42, p. 6) repealed Common Position 2004/161. That decision laid down, against the persons who were listed in the annex thereto, restrictive measures comparable to those laid down by Common Position 2004/161. However, Mr Georgias was not listed in that annex. Commission Regulation (EU) No 174/2011 of 23 February 2011 amending Regulation No 314/2004 (OJ 2011 L 49, p. 23), which was adopted subsequently, replaced Annex III to the latter regulation with a new annex in which Mr Georgias was again not listed.

The judgment under appeal

22 Mr Georgias and the two companies owned by him brought an action for damages before the General Court seeking compensation for the damage caused to Mr Georgias as a result of his detention at Heathrow Airport, namely reimbursement in respect of, first, the medical costs incurred by him as a result of the deterioration in his state of health due to the ‘personal stress’ caused by the restrictive measures adopted against him and, second, the legal fees incurred by him, as well as compensation for the business losses suffered by the two companies because of the alleged ‘extraterritorial effects’ of Regulation No 314/2004, which led some of their business partners no longer to trade with them.

23 With regard to the damage arising from Mr Georgias’ detention at Heathrow Airport, the General Court considered that the immediate cause of the damage claimed was a decision of the competent United Kingdom authorities, which was taken in the exercise of those authorities’ sovereign powers, namely powers relating to controlling the entry of citizens of third countries to the territory of that Member State. Accordingly, only between that decision and the damage claimed by Mr Georgias can there be said to be a definite and direct causal nexus. It follows that, even if it is the measure freezing Mr Georgias’ assets which led the United Kingdom authorities to adopt that decision, the damage allegedly suffered is not a sufficiently direct consequence of that measure.

24 As regards the other heads of damage, the applicants put forward four pleas in law in support of their claim before the General Court, namely: (i) manifest error of assessment; (ii) insufficient statement of reasons in the contested regulations; (iii) misuse of powers; and (iv) breach of the rights of defence. The General Court rejected each of those pleas and dismissed the action.

Forms of order sought by the parties

25 The appellants claim that the Court should:

– set aside the judgment of the General Court in its entirety;

– grant the relief sought by the appellants in the proceedings before the General Court, namely that:

– the European Union, the Commission and/or the Council should make good the damage caused to the appellants by paying them compensation, such compensation to be determined by the General Court;

– if, and to the extent that the Court finds it necessary, there shall be an inquiry into the amount of damages suffered by the appellants, such inquiry to be supervised by the General Court; and

– the Council and/or the Commission shall pay the appellants’ costs;

– in the alternative, the case be referred back to the General Court; and

– in any event, the Council and the Commission be ordered to pay the appellants’ costs.

26 The Council contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the appeal as unfounded; and

– order the appellants to pay the costs.

27 The Commission contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the fourth ground of appeal as inadmissible;

– dismiss the first three grounds of the appeal as manifestly unfounded; and

– order the appellants to pay the costs.

The appeal

28 Under Article 181 of its Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the Court may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part.

29 That provision should be applied in the present case.

The first three grounds of appeal

30 By the first three grounds of appeal, which it is appropriate to examine together, the appellants take issue with the General Court’s interpretation of the legislation at issue and the conclusion drawn by the General Court from that interpretation, namely that it was possible for Mr Georgias to be listed in Annex III to Regulation No 314/2004 on the sole basis of his status as Member of the Government, without there being any need to prove that his activities had seriously undermined democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe.

31 By their first ground of appeal, the appellants submit that the General Court was incorrect not to take account of Article 4 of Common Position 2004/161, which states that the persons listed in the annex thereto were also engaged in activities that seriously undermine democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe. By their second ground of appeal, the appellants maintain that the General Court erred in its interpretation of Article 5(1) of Common Position 2004/161 and, as a result, misapplied Regulation No 314/2004. By their third ground of appeal, the appellants claim that, at paragraph 58 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court misinterpreted the addition of the words ‘as such’ to Senator Georgias’ listing in Annex III to that regulation, by taking the view that the addition was a ‘mere clarification’ of the fact that status as member of the government was sufficient justification in itself for the person concerned to be included in the list in that annex.

32 The appellants essentially claim that Article 6(1) of Regulation No 314/2004 — which provides that funds belonging to individual members of the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe and to any natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them are to be frozen — must be interpreted not only in the light of Article 5(1) of Common Position 2004/161, which provides for the freezing of such funds in accordance with the same general criteria, but also in the light of Article 4(1) of Common Position 2004/161, under which Member States are to take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of the natural persons listed in the annex to that common position, who are engaged in activities that seriously undermine democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe. In the appellants’ submission, the persons and entities concerned, who are on a single list, should satisfy the criteria laid down by the various relevant provisions and, in particular, fulfil the requirement that they have undermined democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe.

33 In that regard, it should be noted that that argument is based on the assumption that the general criteria for inclusion on the lists at issue require, with regard to Members of the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe, not only that their status be established by specific evidence but also the fact that they have undermined democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe. However, that assumption is at odds with the wording of Regulation No 314/2004 and the interpretation of that regulation in the light of not only Common Position 2004/161 but also of the historical context in which the provisions were adopted by the European Union, Regulation No 314/2004 being one such provision.

34 Both Article 5(1) of Common Position 2004/161 and Article 6(1) of Regulation No 314/2004 provide that funds belonging to individual members of the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe and to any natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them are to be frozen. The terms of those provisions are clear and there is nothing to indicate that they are to be interpreted as meaning that, as regards the members of that government, not only must their status be established by specific evidence but also the fact that they have seriously undermined democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe.

35 On the contrary, the grounds for the restrictive measures adopted against the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe are clear from the common positions and decisions taken under the common foreign and security policy since 2002. It is apparent in particular from recital 4 in the preamble to Common Position 2002/145 that the Council had established that that government continued to engage in serious violations of human rights and of the freedom of opinion, of association and of peaceful assembly and that, as a consequence, for as long as the violations occurred, it was necessary to impose restrictive measures on that government and those who bore a wide responsibility for such violations.

36 In recital 6 in the preamble to Common Position 2004/161, the Council stated that, in view of the continued deterioration in the human rights situation in Zimbabwe, the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union should be renewed and, in recital 7 thereto, that the objective of those restrictive measures was to encourage the persons targeted to reject policies that led to the suppression of human rights, of the freedom of expression and of good governance.

37 Recital 2 in the preamble to Regulation No 314/2004 states that the Council continued to consider that the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe was still engaging in serious violations of human rights. Therefore, for as long as the violations occurred, the Council deemed it necessary to maintain restrictive measures against that government and those who bore prime responsibility for such violations.

38 An examination of the lists of persons who were subject to those restrictive measures shows that those lists are composed of political figures or persons holding positions such as President, Vice President, Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary, Provincial Governor, Army Officer or Police Commissioner.

39 It is clear from both recital 7 in the preamble to Common Position 2004/161 and recital 2 in the preamble to Regulation No 314/2004 that the Council’s objective was to adopt restrictive measures targeted at members of the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe and other persons holding key positions who were likely to influence the policy of that State and thereby exert pressure on those persons to reject policies that undermine human rights, freedom of expression and good governance.

40 Article 5(1) of Common Position 2004/161 and Article 6(1) of Regulation No 314/2004 must therefore be interpreted as meaning that the natural persons associated with members of the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe are precisely those who, according to Article 4 of that common position, are referred to in the annex thereto as also being engaged, in the same way as the members of that government, in activities that seriously undermine democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe.

41 As the General Court observed in paragraph 51 of the judgment under appeal, Regulation No 314/2004 was adopted on the base of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC. Article 60(1) EC provides that ‘[i]f, in the cases envisaged in Article 301 [EC], action by the Community is deemed necessary, the Council may, in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 301 [EC], take the necessary urgent measures on the movement of capital and on payments as regards the third countries concerned’. For its part, Article 301 EC provides that ‘[w]here it is provided, in a common position or in a joint action adopted according to the provisions of the Treaty [EU, in the version prior to the Treaty of Lisbon] relating to the common foreign and security policy, for an action by the Community to interrupt or to reduce, in part or completely, economic relations with one or more third countries, the Council shall take the necessary urgent measures’.

42 According to the Court’s case-law, having regard to the wording of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC, in particular the expressions ‘as regards the third countries concerned’ and ‘with one or more third countries’ used there, those provisions concern the adoption of measures vis-à-vis third countries, since that concept may include the rulers of such countries and also individuals and entities associated with or controlled, directly or indirectly, by them (judgments in Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 166, and Tay Za v Council, C‑376/10 P, EU:C:2012:138, paragraph 53).

43 However, the question raised by the first three grounds of appeal does not relate to whether the Council was entitled to include on the lists at issue persons who were not Members of the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe but who held key positions within that State unless it could be shown, by means of sufficient evidence, that those persons had personally undermined democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe.

44 Indeed, Mr Georgias takes issue with the General Court in this appeal for endorsing the Council’s decision not to apply the criteria laid down in Articles 4 and 5 of Common Position 2004/161 cumulatively for the purpose of justifying the listing of a person in Annex III to Regulation No 314/2004.

45 It is not disputed that Mr Georgias was a Member of the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe. In that capacity, he was a leading member of a third country to whom restrictive measures based on Article 60 EC and 301 EC could be applied, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 42 above.

46 As indicated in paragraphs 39 and 40 above, the Council’s objective was to adopt restrictive measures targeted at Members of the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe and other persons associated with those members performing important functions on the ground that, by carrying out those functions, those persons contributed to the undermining of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe.

47 It follows from all the foregoing that the General Court did not err in law in finding, in paragraph 57 of the judgment under appeal, that the Council intended to freeze the assets of Members of the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe on the sole basis of their status as members of that government, and, in paragraph 58 of that judgment, that the phrase ‘as such’ is a mere clarification.

48 Consequently, the first three grounds of appeal must be rejected as manifestly unfounded.

The fourth ground of appeal

49 By their fourth ground of appeal, the appellants maintain that the General Court erred in law in finding that Mr Georgias had not explained what arguments and evidence he would have relied on and how that evidence would have lead to his removal from the annex in question earlier if he had been given the opportunity to be heard. By that ground of appeal, Mr Georgias takes issue with paragraph 108 of the judgment under appeal.

50 Mr Georgias argued before the General Court that there had been a breach of his rights of defence, since Common Position 2004/161 provided for constant and regular review of the maintenance of sanctions against him. First, he was not informed of the reasons and relevant evidence which justified renewal of the restrictive measures imposed on him; second, he was not given an opportunity to request a review of those measures; and, third, there was no evidence that a review of his situation had in fact taken place.

51 At paragraph 106 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court referred to the established case-law of the Court of Justice to the effect that, in the context of an action for annulment, before an infringement of the rights of the defence can result in the annulment of the act at issue, it must be demonstrated that, had it not been for that irregularity, the outcome of the procedure might have been different (judgment in Belgium v Commission, C‑142/87, EU:C:1990:125, paragraph 48, and order in Kish Glass v Commission, C‑241/00 P, EU:C:2001:556, paragraph 36).

52 The General Court observed, at paragraph 107 of the judgment under appeal, that, in a case in which the applicant seeks, by means of an action for damages, compensation for the damage which he claims to have suffered because of the adoption of an act or the extension of its validity, in breach of his rights of defence, and where that party has not brought an action for annulment of the act concerned, the claim of an alleged breach of his rights of defence is not by itself sufficient to establish that his action for damages is well founded. It is also necessary to explain, according to the General Court, what arguments and evidence the person concerned would have relied on if his rights of defence had been respected and to demonstrate, where appropriate, that such arguments and evidence might have led in his case to a different result — in other words, in this case and as regards Mr Georgias, to the restrictive measure at issue, the freezing of his assets, not being renewed.

53 The General Court found, in paragraph 108 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘in this case, the applicants have not met that requirement’ and that ‘[t]hey do not explain, in their written pleadings, what arguments and evidence [Mr Georgias] would have relied on if he had been heard before each annual renewal of the validity of Common Position 2004/161 and how such arguments and evidence would have led in his case to a different result, namely the removal, on a date earlier than 15 February 2011, of his name from the list of persons subject to a freezing of their assets’.

54 By their fourth ground of appeal, the appellants maintain that, when restrictive measures are due for renewal, the Council is required to grant the person concerned the opportunity properly to make known his views. In the submission of the appellants, the case-law cited in paragraph 106 of the judgment under appeal requires ‘an exercise in speculation’ where the Council has failed in its fundamental obligation to abide by the rights of defence, so that Mr Georgias is not required to prove that he would have been removed from the lists.

55 It should, however, be noted that the case-law cited by the General Court in paragraph 106 of the judgment under appeal is established case-law of the Court of Justice (see, inter alia, the judgment in Kamino International Logistics and Datema Hellmann Worldwide Logistics, C‑129/13 and C‑130/13, EU:C:2014:2041, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited) and that the General Court did not err in law in referring to that case-law.

56 The appellants also argue that the submissions made before the General Court establish that the inclusion of Mr Georgias on the list at issue was unlawful and that he had proven that, if he had been given the opportunity to put forward his arguments, he would have been removed from the list because, when he approached the Council for that purpose, he was immediately removed from the list.

57 It must be noted in that regard that the fact that it may be established that the inclusion on that list was unlawful does not prove that the requirements laid down by the case-law cited in paragraphs 51 and 55 above are met.

58 With regard to the letter sent to the Council by Mr Georgias and the circumstances of his removal from the list at issue, it should be recalled that the General Court addressed that question in paragraphs 115 et seq. of the judgment under appeal. However, Mr Georgias does not take issue with that part of that judgment and simply repeats the argument he put forward at first instance. It follows that, on this point, his argument is inadmissible.

59 It follows from the foregoing considerations that the fourth ground of appeal is in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded.

60 Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed.

Costs

61 Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, applicable to the procedure on appeal by virtue of Article 184 of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings.

62 Under Article 138(1) of those rules, which apply to the procedure on appeal by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party must be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

63 Since the Council and the Commission have applied for costs to be awarded against Mr Georgias, Trinity Engineering (Private) Ltd and Georgiadis Trucking (Private) Ltd and the latter have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered, in addition to bearing their own costs, to pay the costs incurred by the Council and the Commission.

On those grounds, the Court (Seventh Chamber) hereby orders:

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. Mr Aguy Clement Georgias, Trinity Engineering (Private) Ltd and Georgiadis Trucking (Private) Ltd are ordered to bear their own costs and to pay the costs incurred by the Council of the European Union and by the European Commission.

[Signatures]