ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 11 of Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which prohibits the court hearing mortgage enforcement proceedings from reviewing, of its own motion or at the request of the parties, the validity of the enforceable instrument in light of the existence of unfair commercial practices and, in any event, prohibits the court having jurisdiction to rule on the substance regarding the existence of those practices from adopting any interim measures, such as staying the mortgage enforcement proceedings.

Accordingly, solely on the basis of the provisions of that directive, a contractual term cannot be declared invalid even if it was agreed on between the parties to the contract on the basis of an unfair commercial practice. In those circumstances, the grant of interim measures, such as a stay of the mortgage enforcement proceedings, by the court hearing an action on the merits concerning the existence of such practices is not required by Directive 2005/29 in order to ensure the full effectiveness of the final decision of that court. In any event, that decision could not, solely on the basis of that directive, have consequences for the validity of the contract in question and, a fortiori, that of the enforceable instrument.

(see paras 43, 44, 51, operative part 1)
Article 49 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which prohibits, even despite the express wishes of the deceased, the recipient of a cinerary urn from entrusting its safekeeping to a third party, and requires him to store the urn in his home, unless it is entrusted to a municipal cemetery, and furthermore prohibits any activity carried out for profit relating, even non-exclusively, to the safekeeping of cinerary urns, on whatever basis and for whatever period.

In that regard, as regards, first, the justification based on the protection of public health, it admittedly follows from settled case-law of the Court that the protection of public health is one of the overriding reasons in the public interest recognised by EU law and that Member States have a wide margin of discretion in this area (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 June 2010, Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez, C‑570/07 and C‑571/07, EU:C:2010:300, paragraphs 44, 68 and 106). However, that objective cannot justify the restriction at issue in the main proceedings in so far as cremation ashes, unlike corpses, are biologically inert, since they have been sterilised by heat, and accordingly their safekeeping cannot amount to a constraint imposed by public health considerations.

As regards, second, the objective of protection of the respect owed to the memory of the deceased, this too is capable of amounting to an overriding reason in the public interest. Nevertheless, it must be noted that there are less stringent measures which make it possible to achieve that objective, such as, in particular, the obligation to ensure the safekeeping of cinerary urns in similar conditions to those of municipal cemeteries and, in the event of cessation of activities, the obligation to transfer those urns to a public cemetery or to return them to the relatives of the deceased.

(see paras 54, 55, 57, 59, 66, operative part)
By using, in Article 3(1)(c) of Directive 2008/95, the terms ‘the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin or the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of the goods or service’, the EU legislature made it clear, first, that those terms must all be regarded as characteristics of goods or services and, secondly, that that list is not exhaustive, since any other characteristics of goods or services may also be taken into account.

On that basis, the fact that the Union legislature chose to use the word ‘characteristic’ highlights the fact that the signs referred to in that provision are merely those which serve to designate a property, easily recognisable by the relevant class of persons, of the goods or the services in respect of which registration is sought.

Therefore, a sign can be refused registration on the basis of Article 3(1)(c) of Regulation No 2008/95 only if it is reasonable to believe that it will actually be recognised by the relevant class of persons as a description of one of those characteristics.

(see paras 18-20)
24

Under Paragraph 57 of the StGB, entitled ‘Suspension of execution of the remaining period of a fixed term custodial sentence’: ‘1. The court shall suspend the execution of the remainder of a fixed term custodial sentence and grant probation if (i) two-thirds of the imposed punishment, but not less than two months, have been served, (ii) this can be justified upon consideration of the security interests of the general public, and (iii) the convicted person consents. To be considered in making the decision shall be, in particular, the personality of the convicted person, his previous history, the circumstances of the act committed, the importance of the legal interest at stake in case of recidivism, the conduct of the convicted person while serving his sentence, his living conditions and the effects which can be expected as a result of the suspension. 2. After half of a fixed term custodial sentence has been served, but not less than six months, the court may suspend execution of the remainder and grant probation if (i) the convicted person is serving his custodial sentence and it does not exceed two years, or (ii) a comprehensive assessment of the act committed, the personality of the convicted person and his development while serving the sentence reveals that special circumstances exist, and the remaining requirements of subparagraph (1) have been fulfilled. 3. Paragraphs 56a to 56e shall apply mutatis mutandis; the term of probation, even if subsequently reduced, may not be less than the remainder of the sentence. Where the convicted person has served at least one year of his sentence before the remainder is suspended and probation granted, the court shall, as a rule, place him under the supervision and guidance of a probation officer for all or a part of the term of probation. 4. To the extent a custodial sentence has been completed by setting of detention periods, it shall qualify as having been served within the meaning of subparagraphs (1) to (3). 5. Paragraphs 56f and 56g shall apply mutatis mutandis. The court shall also revoke the suspension of execution of a sentence where (i) in the interval between the conviction and the suspension decision, the convicted person has committed an offence which the court was unable to take into consideration, for practical reasons, at the time when the suspension of execution was granted and which would have resulted in refusal of the suspension had it been taken into consideration and (ii) the judgment in which findings of fact as to the substance could be examined for the last time is classified as a criminal conviction. 6. The court may refrain from suspending execution of the remainder of a fixed term custodial sentence with probation if the convicted person makes insufficient or false statements concerning the whereabouts of objects which, as proceeds of a criminal offence, are subject to confiscation. …’
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Reference to the Court — Conformity of the decision to refer with the rules of national law governing the organisation of the courts and their procedure — Not a matter for the Court to determine

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Admissibility — Need to provide the Court with sufficient information on the factual and legislative context — Extent of the obligation in the sphere of competition

(Art. 267 TFEU; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 94)
9

Article 16(1) and (4) of the Hotărârea Guvernului nr. 621/2005 privind gestionarea ambalajelor și a deșeurilor de ambalaje (Governmental Decision No 621/2005 on the management of packaging and packaging waste) (Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I, No 639 of 20 July 2005; ‘Governmental Decision No 621/2005’), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings, provides: ‘(1) Economic operators which are Romanian legal persons shall be responsible for all the waste produced by the packaging which they place on the national market, as follows: (a) economic operators who place packaged products on the market shall be responsible for waste generated by primary, secondary and tertiary packaging used in the packaging of their products, with the exception of retail packaging used for packaging at the point of sale of the products which they place on the national market; (b) economic actors who over-package individually packed products for resale or for redistribution shall be responsible for the waste generated by the secondary and tertiary packaging which they place on the market; (c) economic operators who place retail packaging on the market shall be responsible for the waste resulting from such packaging. … (4) The economic operators referred to in paragraph 2 shall achieve at least the objectives set out in Annex 3 to the [Ordonanța de urgență a guvernului nr. 196/2005 privind Fondul pentru mediu (Government Emergency Order No 196/2005 on the Environmental Fund) (Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I, No 1193 of 30 December 2005)], approved with amendments and additions by [Legea nr.105/2006 (Law No 105/2006)], with its subsequent amendments and additions, applied to packaging waste resulting from packaging placed on the national market/recovered on a contractual basis and of which the traceability is ensured.’
5

The background to the dispute is set out as follows in the judgment under appeal: ‘1 The first applicant, Ms … Azoulay, has a child registered since September 2014 at the Athénée (Belgian primary and secondary school) Ganenou in Brussels (Belgium). The other three applicants, Mr … Boreham, Ms … Bouchard and Mr … Neville, have children registered at the International School Le Verseau in Bierges (Belgium). Until the school year 2014/2015, those of the applicants who already had children registered at those educational establishments before 2014 received reimbursement of those children’s education costs within the limits of the monthly maximum amount. 2 The International School Le Verseau is a non-faith school which is part of the Fédération des établissements libres subventionnés indépendants (Federation of Independent Subsidised Free Establishments) (FELSI) and is subsidised by the French Community. Lessons are provided in French and English from pre-school onwards by teachers who have one of those languages as their mother tongue. However, the school is not entirely funded by that subsidy. It has its own resources, provided, inter alia, by the non-profit association Les Amis du Verseau. 3 The Athénée Ganenou is a faith school which is subsidised by the French Community, whose official curriculum it applies in full, while adding several hours thereto per week to teach Hebrew, the history of Judaism, the Bible, and English from primary level onwards. The school is not entirely funded by that subsidy. It has its own resources, provided, inter alia, by the non-profit association Les Amis de Ganenou. 4 In October and November 2014, the applicants submitted requests for reimbursement of education costs which they had incurred in respect of their dependent children, accompanied by supporting documents provided by the schools concerned and identical to those which had been appended to their previous requests for reimbursement of such costs, which had been accepted. 5 On 24 April 2015, the applicants received notification that their requests for reimbursement of education costs had been definitively rejected … on the ground that the conditions set out in Article 3(1) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations … were not satisfied, because the two schools concerned were not schools which charge fees for the purposes of that provision, since the optional contributions made by the applicants to the non-profit associations concerned fall outside the framework of compulsory free education as provided for by Belgian legislation. 6 On 20 July 2015, each of the applicants submitted a complaint pursuant to Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations. By … decisions … of 17 and 19 November 2015, those complaints were rejected … However, the Secretary-General of the Parliament decided, “ex gratia and by way of exception”, to grant the applicants the education allowance for the year 2014/2015, but not to continue to grant it for future school years in respect of schooling at the International School Le Verseau or the Athénée Ganenou.’
45

In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the question referred is that the VAT Directive must be interpreted as meaning that the letting of a building by a holding company to its subsidiary amounts to ‘involvement in the management’ of that subsidiary, which must be considered to be an economic activity, within the meaning of Article 9(1) of that directive, giving rise to the right to deduct the VAT on the expenditure incurred by the company for the purpose of acquiring shares in that subsidiary, where that supply of services is made on a continuing basis, is carried out for consideration and is taxed, meaning that the letting is not exempt, and there is a direct link between the service rendered by the supplier and the consideration received from the beneficiary. Expenditure connected with the acquisition of shareholdings in subsidiaries incurred by a holding company which involves itself in the subsidiaries’ management by letting them a building and which, on that basis, carries out an economic activity has to be regarded as belonging to its general expenditure and the VAT paid on that expenditure must, in principle, be capable of being deducted in full.
Articles 167, 168 and 184 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax and the principle of the neutrality of value added tax must be interpreted as not precluding a body governed by public law from being entitled to a right to adjustment of deductions of value added tax paid on immovable property acquired as capital goods in a situation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, where, at the time of the acquisition of those goods, first, they could, by their very nature, be used both for taxable activities and for non-taxable activities but were initially used for non-taxable activities, and second, that public body had not expressly stated its intention to use those goods for a taxable activity but had also not excluded the possibility that they might be used for such a purpose, so long as it follows from an assessment of all the factual circumstances, which it is for the referring court to carry out, that the condition laid down by Article 168 of Directive 2006/112, according to which the taxable person must have acted as a taxable person at the time when it made that acquisition, is satisfied.
3

Recitals 4, 5, 7, 21, 22 and 37 of Directive 2011/83 state: ‘(4) … The harmonisation of certain aspects of consumer distance and off-premises contracts is necessary for the promotion of a real consumer internal market striking the right balance between a high level of consumer protection and the competitiveness of enterprises, while ensuring respect for the principle of subsidiarity. (5) … [Full] harmonisation of consumer information and the right of withdrawal in distance and off-premises contracts will contribute to a high level of consumer protection and a better functioning of the … internal market. … (7) Full harmonisation of some key regulatory aspects should considerably increase legal certainty for both consumers and traders. … Furthermore consumers should enjoy a high common level of protection across the Union. … (21) An off-premises contract should be defined as a contract concluded with the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer, in a place which is not the business premises of the trader, for example at the consumer’s home or workplace. In an off-premises context, the consumer may be under potential psychological pressure or may be confronted with an element of surprise, irrespective of whether or not the consumer has solicited the trader’s visit. The definition of an off-premises contract should also include situations where the consumer is personally and individually addressed in an off-premises context but the contract is concluded immediately afterwards on the business premises of the trader or through a means of distance communication. … Purchases made during an excursion organised by the trader during which the products acquired are promoted and offered for sale should be considered as off-premises contracts. (22) Business premises should include premises in whatever form (such as shops, stalls or lorries) which serve as a permanent or usual place of business for the trader. Market stalls and fair stands should be treated as business premises if they fulfil this condition. Retail premises where the trader carries out his activity on a seasonal basis, for instance during the tourist season at a ski or beach resort, should be considered as business premises as the trader carries out his activity in those premises on a usual basis. Spaces accessible to the public, such as streets, shopping malls, beaches, sports facilities and public transport, which the trader uses on an exceptional basis for his business activities as well as private homes or workplaces should not be regarded as business premises. … … (37) … Concerning off-premises contracts, the consumer should have the right of withdrawal because of the potential surprise element and/or psychological pressure. Withdrawal from the contract should terminate the obligation of the contracting parties to perform the contract.’
3

Recitals 3, 4, 9, 10, 23 and 31 of Directive 2001/29 state: ‘(3) The proposed harmonisation will help to implement the four freedoms of the internal market and relates to compliance with the fundamental principles of law and especially of property, including intellectual property, and freedom of expression and the public interest. (4) A harmonised legal framework on copyright and related rights, through increased legal certainty and while providing for a high level of protection of intellectual property, will foster substantial investment in creativity and innovation, including network infrastructure, and lead in turn to growth and increased competitiveness of European industry, both in the area of content provision and information technology and more generally across a wide range of industrial and cultural sectors. This will safeguard employment and encourage new job creation. … (9) Any harmonisation of copyright and related rights must take as a basis a high level of protection, since such rights are crucial to intellectual creation. Their protection helps to ensure the maintenance and development of creativity in the interests of authors, performers, producers, consumers, culture, industry and the public at large. Intellectual property has therefore been recognised as an integral part of property. (10) If authors or performers are to continue their creative and artistic work, they have to receive an appropriate reward for the use of their work, as must producers in order to be able to finance this work. The investment required to produce products such as phonograms, films or multimedia products, and services such as “on-demand” services, is considerable. Adequate legal protection of intellectual property rights is necessary in order to guarantee the availability of such a reward and provide the opportunity for satisfactory returns on this investment. … (23) This Directive should harmonise further the author’s right of communication to the public. This right should be understood in a broad sense covering all communication to the public not present at the place where the communication originates. This right should cover any such transmission or retransmission of a work to the public by wire or wireless means, including broadcasting. This right should not cover any other acts. … (31) A fair balance of rights and interests between the different categories of rightholders, as well as between the different categories of rightholders and users of protected subject matter must be safeguarded. …’
7

Recitals 3, 4, 8, 9, 12, 23, 24, 33 and 39 of Directive 2011/95 are worded as follows: ‘(3) The European Council at its special meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999 agreed to work towards establishing a Common European Asylum System, based on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention … (4) The Geneva Convention … [provides] the cornerstone of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees. … (8) In the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, adopted on 15 and 16 October 2008, the European Council noted that considerable disparities remain between one Member State and another concerning the grant of protection and the forms that protection takes and called for new initiatives to complete the establishment of a Common European Asylum System, provided for in the Hague Programme [adopted by the European Council on 4 November 2004 setting the objectives to be implemented in the area of freedom, security and justice in the period 2005-2010], and thus to offer a higher degree of protection. (9) In the Stockholm Programme [adopted in 2010], the European Council reiterated its commitment to the objective of establishing a common area of protection and solidarity, based on a common asylum procedure and a uniform status, in accordance with Article 78 [TFEU], for those granted international protection, by 2012 at the latest. … (12) The main objective of this Directive is, on the one hand, to ensure that Member States apply common criteria for the identification of persons genuinely in need of international protection, and, on the other hand, to ensure that a minimum level of benefits is available for those persons in all Member States. … (23) Standards for the definition and content of refugee status should be laid down to guide the competent national bodies of Member States in the application of the Geneva Convention. (24) It is necessary to introduce common criteria for recognising applicants for asylum as refugees within the meaning of Article 1 of the Geneva Convention. … (33) Standards for the definition and content of subsidiary protection status should also be laid down. Subsidiary protection should be complementary and additional to the refugee protection enshrined in the Geneva Convention. … (39) While responding to the call of the Stockholm Programme for the establishment of a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and with the exception of derogations which are necessary and objectively justified, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status should be granted the same rights and benefits as those enjoyed by refugees under this Directive, and should be subject to the same conditions of eligibility.’