3.

The principal argument or the Riva undertaking is that its debt is time-barred (this argument is moreover the only one which is still put forward in the reply and also the only one examined at the oral hearing). While admitting that the general decisions of the High Authority on the equalization of scrap make no such provisions, it considers that it is however possible to infer from national legal systems a general principle which is also applicable to the matter under consideration. In its opinion, the period of limitation necessarily began to run when the debt relating to the equalization contributions arose, in other words at the time when the scrap was used or, at the latest, at the end of each accounting period, and all other circumstances, such as for example the time when the High Authority had precise knowledge of all the data for calculating the equalization contribution, are irrelevant in this case. As regards the relevant period of limitation, the applicant considers it natural to think of applying by analogy other periods prescribed by Community law. In this connexion, it cites in particular general Decision No 5/65 of 17 March 1965 (OJ English Special Edition 1965-1966, p. 38) on the barring by time of claims in respect of general levies applied by the High Authority, which prescribes a period of limitation of three years, on the ground that the equalization contribution applicable to the consumption of scrap is calculated and levied in a very similar manner to the ECSC general levies. In its opinion, at the very least, the longest limitation period under Community law must be applied, namely that prescribed by Article 40 on the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the ECSC, which is a period of five years. The applicant considers the application of the same period is justified not only by a concern for ‘legal symmetry’ (freeing the administration from its responsibility means also freeing, within the same period, the individual from his obligations towards the administration), but is also justified by general Decision No 14/64 of 8 July 1964 (Official Journal, English Special Edition 1963-1964, p. 162) according to which undertakings only have to keep their business books and accounting documents for five years. The applicant considers that it may infer from this that the High Authority (now the Commission) is not entitled to enforce claims based on facts to which documents which may have been destroyed relate, in particular because these documents may also have contained evidence in favour of the undertakings concerned. The applicant maintains that it must therefore be admitted that the debts which arose in 1957 and in 1958 were time-barred whatever the circumstances, well before the High Authority enacted the decisions which are at present the subject of dispute. Examining this argument, I am forced to declare first of all that Community law has no special provisions on the period of limitation for claims relating to the equalization of scrap. Since such provisions exist in respect of the general levies imposed by the ECSC, as I have shown, I might be tempted to conclude that the Community legislature deliberately left out a period of limitation in respect of the equalization of scrap. However, I am not entirely convinced that this attitude was dictated by the particular characteristics of equalization, although it must be admitted that these claims are not in favour of the equalization scheme or of the bodies administering that scheme, but claims in favour of undertakings and that if some of them do not pay, the result is clearly an increase in the charge to be borne by other undertakings which duly discharge their obligations, which is incompatible with the fundamental principle of equality of treatment. The complete exclusion of the period of limitation for the equalization of scrap would in fact disregard entirely the principle of legal certainty and the possibility of ensuring compensation for undertakings which have correctly fulfilled their obligations to contribute through administrative proceedings brought against the bodies administering the equalization scheme where the latter have negligently allowed claims to become time-barred (these proceedings moreover enable the injustice inherent in the double levying of contributions, which I have already spoken of above, to be remedied). I therefore understand without any doubt, and this facilitates my examination, the reasons why case-law has already clearly accepted the principle of limitation of actions with regard to the equalization of scrap. I will simply recall in this connexion your judgment in Case 111/63 to which the two parties in these proceedings have referred. I find it difficult to accept that this principle has in the meantime been defeated by the judgment in Case 45/69, also cited, in which the Court rejected the submission relating to the period of limitation because of the absence of express provisions on that matter. In fact, this more recent judgment clearly concerns a completely different matter: the period of limitation for infringements of competition law in respect of which, moreover, analogies cannot be drawn from any other field of Community law. As judgment 111/63 accepted the principle of limitation of actions in the field of the equalization of scrap it only remains for me to determine the beginning of the period of limitation and to estimate its length. The first question will not delay me long since, here too, there is already an established line of case-law. As you know, the judgment in Case 111/63, cited above, has established expressly that ‘the limitation period can only run from the date when the accounts are finally closed’ (cf. [1965] ECR at p. 693). Although the applicant has protested formally against this opinion, I consider it however difficult to agree with its arguments because of the particular characteristics of the equalization of scrap (the obligation for undertakings to cooperate, lengthy examination of complex questions, etc.). I can therefore state that the period of limitation in respect of debts relating to contributions began to run at the earliest on 15 December 1965, for it was only at that date that general Decision No 19/65 on the final determination of rates of contribution and the drawing-up of final accounts in respect of the equalization of scrap (Official Journal 1965, p. 3290) came into force. It may however appear more difficult to determine the length of the period of limitation in particular where one tries to do so by referring to the various regulations on this matter existing in the Member States. However, it is not necessary to proceed in this manner since the question may be resolved by analogy with other rules of Community law which facilitates considerably the solution of the problem. Having said that, I clearly do not propose to have recourse to general Decision No 14/64 of the High Authority upon which the applicant relied. In fact, this decision clearly concerns another matter (that of ensuring the observance of price regulations laid down in the ECSC Treaty) and where it provides for this purpose that the undertaking's documents must be kept only for a certain period, its aim is only to exclude the application of the punitive sanctions provided by the ECSC Treaty. I cannot therefore accept that it is of general application, which would mean that after a certain time undertakings could set up against Community authorities their right to destroy documents, whatever their nature, and, in addition, that facts to which these documents refer must be regarded as no longer having any importance in relation to Community law. It seems to me to be appropriate, on the other hand, to consider applying by analogy Decision No 5/65 (cf. Official Journal, English Special Edition 1965-1966, p. 38), in other words the period of limitation relating to general levies in force in the ECSC even though there exist, here too, essential differences in relation to the aim pursued. One must clearly not lose sight of the fact that this decision provides not only a period of limitation of three years for normal cases, where accurate declarations are made, but that it also recognizes a period of six years where declarations are incomplete or inaccurate, whether intentionally or through negligence. I believe it is precisely this latter period which must be applied in this case, since, as I already stated when I set out the facts of the case, it is clear that the applicant made an incomplete declaration of the scrap which it consumed during the whole period of its production under the scrap equalization scheme, in other words, during the period from March 1957 to November 1958. If the period of limitation is made to run from the date indicated above, the necessary conclusion is that in any case no claims could have been time-barred before the entry into force of the contested decisions. The conclusion would moreover be the same if the period of limitation of five years provided for by Article 40 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the ECSC were adopted, in other words, the period of limitation applicable in actions against the administration. This is a period of limitation in relation to which the case-law of this Court has established that, in its proper sphere of application, it begins to run only from the closure of final accounts (cf. Joined Cases Nos 46 and 47/59, judgment of 14 December 1962, Meroni and Co. and Others v High Authority, [1962] ECR 411). Even on this hypothesis it is clearly not possible to conclude that the period of limitation expired before the contested decisions were enacted and notified to their addressee. I can therefore state that the applicant cannot succeed either by pleading the expiry of the limitation period without needing to deal in detail with other problems arising in this field (such as interruption).