1.

The Italian Government and the Commission take the view that the sentence of Article 3 of Regulation No 1C76/72 referred to in the order making the reference does not mean that if at the time of completion of the customs formalities the levies are not collected the right to do so is forfeited, so as to preclude their subsequent collection. I am inclined to agree with that interpretation on the basis of the following considerations: (a) The term “payable” contained in the sentence to be interpreted is significant. Its general meaning is that since at the material time an obligation crystallizes and becomes enforceable, payment may be demanded from that moment. It would be quite exceptional, however, on the basis of that term to make the supposition that, unless the right to claim the levy is exercised when payment falls due, the right is forfeited. Such a possibility might be envisaged only if a rule embodying the aforesaid concept also contained unequivocal provisions to that effect or if it were clear from the meaning and purpose of the rule that that was the only consequence — the forfeiture of the right — which could be intended. In the present case, however, there can be no question of that, as we shall shortly see in detail. (b) Article 3 (1) of Regulation No 1076/72 clearly states that as a rule, that is to say when the levy is not determined by way ot an invitation to tender, the amount of the levy is determined by reference to the day on which the customs formalities are completed, in other words the day which is also the latest time at which it is payable. That undoubtedly militates against the view that the term “payable” is to be interpreted as involving forfeiture of rights and against the supposition that the time at which the customs debt crystallizes coincides with the time when it ceases to exist in the event of a failure to collect it. It is possible to state that not only is there no such rule in the legal system of any Member State but also that there can be no question of its being, as the plaintiff contends, in the interests of trade, which is swiftly transacted and for which simplicity and clarity are essential conditions. That is because, as far as the price is concerned, which is affected by the lew, normal trading arrangements are certainly not made at the time of completion of the customs formalities but considerably earlier. (c) In so far as the plaintiff for the purpose of its argument lays particular emphasis on the expression “at the Utest”, it must concede that the sentence in question refers not to the collection of the levies but only to the time at which they are payable. The Court has also heard that the use of the expression “at the latest” in relation to the usual case, in which payment falls due on the day by reference to which the amount of the levy is calculated, seems difficult tc understand, vet can be explained and makes sense if it is viewed against the background of the practice in certain Member States according to which the levy becomes pavable in a sense even earlier. That appears to be the case, as the Commission has shown in detail, in Belgium and in the Netherlands where for the purpose of the provision of securit) a standard assessment is raised in respect of the liability to duty when the expon licence is granted. In order to take that into account, it was laid down that the levy was to be payable at the latest at the time of completion of the customs formalities and therefore not only at that time. Viewed in those terms, the meaning of the rule is clear. It is not concerned with the extinguishment of the customs debt but rather with the fact that the Member States should not be allowed to postpone the levying of dutv beyond the period prescribed on the ground that completion of the customs formalities does not necessarily entail actual exportation of the goods, as is the case for example when they are placed under customs control. (d) Moreover, in that connection, it has quite rightly been pointed out that Community law does not regulate all the details involved in the levying of duty and that, in the absence of a comprehensive set of Community rules, it is supplemented by national law, in particular as far as the determination of the competent authorities and the detailed rules for collection are concerned. That was decided in Joined Cases 66, 127 and 128/79 ( 2 ) with reference to the Council Decision of 21 April 197C, which was also concerned with agricultural levies. In those circumstances and in view of the finding that the relevant national customs legislation does not provide for forfeiture but only for time-barring of rights, it can scarcely be assumed that the purpose of Regulation No IC76/72 was to provide for the forfeiture of the right in question and to ensure that as a rule such forfeiture should occur on the day on which the levy becomes payable. Moreover, that is borne out by the fact that such a rule is not even provided for by Council Regulation (EEC) No 1697/79 (Official Journal 1979, L 197, p. 1), which entered into force on 1 July 1980, applies also to levies (Article 1) and regulates the post-clearance recovery of import or export duties. Article 2 of that regulation provides that duties legally due but payment of which has not been demanded are to be recovered subsequently and that this may be done within a period of three years from the date of entry in the accounts of the amount in question or, where there is no entrv in the accounts, from the date on which the custom debt was incurred. Furthermore, Article 7 provides merely that, in cases where duties have not been collected as a result of an error by the competent authorities, no interest on overdue payments is to be charged on sums recovered post-clearance. Accordingly, it does not prevent duties from being collected subsequently. (e) Finally, two further arguments were put forward by the Commission which are significant and lend weight to the view which I have expressed. (i) The Commission points out that the regulation to be interpreted is a Commission regulation which merely lavs down detailed rules for the collection of levies introduced in accordance with the requirements established by the Council. If that is borne in mind, it can scarcely be assumed thai the Commission would have intended in adopting its implementing rules to provide tor the extinguishment of a customs debt, the creation of which was regarded as necessary by the Council as a result of serious economic and political considerations. Moreover. the Commission would have lacked the requisite powers. (ii) Secondly, the Commission rightly points out that in principle a customs debt can come into being only on the basis of objective factors and not on the basis of the knowledge possessed by the person liable to dun. The supposition that the failure to levy the duties as a result of an error on completion of customs formalities entails the extinguishment of the debt is clearly inconsistent with that principle. It would make the operation and implementation of a system of duties, and therefore the achievement of a specific objective of the Council's economic policy, conditional on the awareness, zeal and ability of national officials responsible for enforcement. There is. no evidence to suggest that such a state of affairs was intended and that consequently the risk of discrimination and lack of uniformity in the application of the legislation on levies had been accepted. (f) Accordingly, it is clear how the question submitted by the national court should be answered. However, it is equallv clear that the answer does not prejudge the question of what consequences may arise from the express assurance which the plaintiff claims to have received from the customs authorities that its exports would be free from duty, as a result of placing reliance upon which it now finds itself in difficulty. That problem cannot be resolved in proceedings for a preliminaryruling but only under national law.