ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 112/18

Action brought on 21 December 2017 — European Commission v Republic of Poland

(Case C-715/17)

(2018/C 112/24)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: A. Stobiecka-Kuik and G. Wils, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Republic of Poland

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by failing to indicate at regular intervals, and at least every three months, the appropriate number of applicants who can be relocated swiftly to its territory starting from 16 March 2016, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 5(2) of Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 and under Article 5(2) of Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601, and has consequently failed to fulfil its other relocation obligations as set out in Article 5(4) to (11) of both of the aforementioned Council decisions;

— order the Republic of Poland to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

A provisional emergency relocation scheme was established in two Council decisions adopted in September 2015, namely Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 (1) and Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601, (2) pursuant to which the Member States undertook to relocate from Italy and Greece persons requiring international protection.

Those Council decisions place the Member States under an obligation to offer relocation places every three months with a view to ensuring a swift and orderly relocation procedure. Although almost all the other Member States have taken steps to fulfil their obligations in this matter, including relocation, Poland has not carried out any relocation, nor has it proposed any appropriate relocation place since December 2015.

On 16 June 2017 the Commission initiated a Treaty-infringement procedure against Poland.

Having considered the response of that Member State to be unsatisfactory, the Commission decided to proceed to the next stage of the Treaty-infringement procedure by sending the Republic of Poland a reasoned opinion on 26 July 2017.

Having also deemed the response to the reasoned opinion to be unsatisfactory, the European Commission has decided to bring proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union against the Republic of Poland in relation to the latter’s non-performance of its legal relocation obligations.

(1) Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece (OJ 2015 L 239, p. 146).

(2) Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece (OJ 2015 L 248, p. 80).
3.

If, on the basis of the answers to the first two questions, the heat produced in the installation at issue is eligible for an allocation: Does the CO2 released into the atmosphere as part of the conditioning of natural gas (in the form of sour gas) in the ‘Claus process’, whereby the CO2 inherent in natural gas is separated from the gas mixture, constitute an emission which, for the purposes of the first sentence of Article 3(h) of Commission Decision 2011/278/EU, occurs as a result of the process referred to in Article 3(h)(v)? a) For the purposes of the first sentence of Article 3(h) of Commission Decision 2011/278/EU, can CO2 emissions occur ‘as a result of’ a process in which the CO2 inherent in the raw material is physically separated from the gas mixture and released into the atmosphere, even though that process as such does not give rise to additional carbon dioxide, or does that provision make it mandatory for the CO2 released into the atmosphere to occur for the first time as a result of that process? b) Is a carbon-containing raw material ‘used’ within the meaning of Article 3(h)(v) of Commission Decision 2011/278/EU where, in the ‘Claus process’, the naturally-occurring gas is used to produce sulphur and, in the course of that procedure, the carbon dioxide inherent in the natural gas is released into the atmosphere, even though the carbon dioxide inherent in the natural gas is not part of the chemical reaction taking place in that process, or does the term ‘use’ make it mandatory for the carbon to be part of, or indeed essential to, the chemical reaction taking place?
Case C-656/17 P: Appeal brought on 24 November 2017 by Berliner Stadtwerke GmbH against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) made on 20 September 2017 in Case T-402/16, Berliner Stadtwerke GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office

Appeal brought on 24 November 2017 by Berliner Stadtwerke GmbH against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) made on 20 September 2017 in Case T-402/16, Berliner Stadtwerke GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-656/17 P)

Parties

Appellant: Berliner Stadtwerke GmbH (represented by: O. Spieker and A. Schönfleisch, Rechtsanwälte)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 31 May 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Tenth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 142/19

Appeal brought on 5 September 2017 by Isabel Martín Osete against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 29 June 2017 in Case T-427/16: Martín Osete / EUIPO

(Case C-529/17 P)

(2018/C 142/26)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Isabel Martín Osete (represented by: V. Wellens, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 22 February 2018 the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.
Case C-311/17: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hannover (Germany) lodged on 29 May 2017 — Jeannine Wieczarkowiecz v TUIfly GmbH

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hannover (Germany) lodged on 29 May 2017 — Jeannine Wieczarkowiecz v TUIfly GmbH

(Case C-311/17)

Referring court

Amtsgericht Hannover

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Jeannine Wieczarkowiecz

Defendant: TUIfly GmbH

By decision of the Court of Justice of 8 May 2018 the case was removed from the Court’s register.
Case C-403/17: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hannover (Germany) lodged on 4 July 2017 — Petra Nünemann v TUIfly GmbH

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hannover (Germany) lodged on 4 July 2017 — Petra Nünemann v TUIfly GmbH

(Case C-403/17)

Referring court

Amtsgericht Hannover

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Petra Nünemann

Defendant: TUIfly GmbH

By decision of the Court of Justice of 17 May 2018 the case was removed from the Court’s register.
—

Alfamicro submits that both the analysis and the context of the Commission’s letter of 28 October 2014 show that that letter constitutes a decision-making, administrative act, that is to say, an administrative decision. The terms in which it is drafted, the fact that it is based on an audit of the Court of Auditors, the fact that the Commission extrapolated the conclusions of the audit to all other agreements to which the appellant is a party and the adjustments made by the Commission all point to this being an administrative decision. The judgment of the General Court, which reflects the Court’s opinion that the action brought should be classified as a declarative action and not an action challenging an administrative decision, seriously limits the appellant’s rights of defence. In addition, Alfamicro submits that the General Court seriously infringed the principle of the equality of the parties and the principle of contractual balance.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 112/24

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 24 January 2018 — Compagnie d’entreprises CFE SA v Région de Bruxelles-Capitale

(Case C-43/18)

(2018/C 112/31)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Compagnie d’entreprises CFE SA

Defendant: Région de Bruxelles-Capitale

Questions referred

Does an order by which a Member State body designates a special area of conservation, under Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, (1) and which contains conservation objectives and general preventive measures having regulatory force, constitute a plan or programme within the meaning of Directive 2001/42/EC on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment? (2)

More particularly, does such an order fall within Article 3(4), as a plan or programme which sets the framework for future development consent of projects, with the result that the Member States must determine whether it is likely to have significant effects on the environment, in compliance with Article 3(5)?

Must Article 3(2)(b) of Directive 2001/42/EC on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment be interpreted as meaning that the designation order in question is exempt from the application of Article 3(4) of that directive?

(1) OJ 1992 L 206, p. 7.

(2) OJ 2001 L 197, p. 30.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 104/22

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 17 January 2018 — Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Deutsche Bahn AG

(Case C-28/18)

(2018/C 104/28)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberster Gerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Verein für Konsumenteninformation

Defendant: Deutsche Bahn AG

Question referred

Must Article 9(2) of Regulation (EU) No 260/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 establishing technical and business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro and amending Regulation (EC) No 924/2009 (the SEPA Regulation) (1) be interpreted to mean that the payee is prohibited from making payment under the SEPA direct debit scheme dependent on the payer’s place of residence being in the Member State in which the payee also has his establishment (residence), if payment in a different way, for example with a credit card, is also allowed?

(1) OJ 2012 L 94, p. 22.
2.

Do the European rules on the rights of defence, due process and effective substantive operation of the protection afforded, in particular, by Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article (1) and (2) of Directive 89/665/CEE, preclude a provision of national law, such as Article 120(2-bis) of the Codice del Processo amministrativo (Italian Code of Administrative Procedure), which prevents an economic operator from claiming, upon conclusion of the procedure, even by cross-appeal, that the decision to admit other operators is unlawful, in particular the one awarded the contract or the applicant in the main action, if they had not previously challenged the decision to admit in the manner set out in the preceding question?
4.

Irrespective of the answers to Questions 1 to 3: Does EU law, in particular the freedom to provide services (Article 56 and 57 TFEU), preclude a provision of national law which also mandatorily requires undertakings which post workers to the territory of another Member State for the purpose of providing a service to comply with terms and conditions of employment within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Directive and to comply with accompanying obligations (such as, in particular, the obligation to provide a notification regarding the cross-border posting of workers to a public authority in the host Member State and the obligation to retain documents relating to the level of remuneration and to the social security registration of these workers) in situations in which (firstly) the workers posted across borders form part of the mobile staff of a railway undertaking that is active on a cross-border basis or of an undertaking which provides services typical for a railway undertaking (provision of food and drink to passengers, on-board service) on that undertaking’s trains which cross the borders of the Member States, and in which (secondly) the posting is based either on no service contract at all or at least on no service contract between the undertaking making the posting and the recipient of the services which is active in another Member State, because the posting undertaking’s obligation to provide services to the recipient of the services which is active in another Member State is established by way of subcontracts (a subcontracting chain), and in which (thirdly) the posted worker is not in an employment relationship with the undertaking making the posting but rather is in an employment relationship with a third-party undertaking which has hired out its workers to the undertaking making the posting back in the Member State in which the posting undertaking is established?
3.

Does the principle of proportionality prevent the State from taking no notice of the fact that the company, following the tax inspection, obtained a decision permitting ‘unfinished fuel oil’ to be treated in the same way as ‘fuel oil’ and, at the time of investigation of the complaint of the taxpayer/company, prevent the excise duty initially calculated for ‘gas oil’ from being maintained?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 142/37

Appeal brought on 23 February 2018 by River Kwai International Food Industry Co. Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 14 December 2017 in Case T-460/14: Association européenne des transformateurs de maïs doux (AETMD) v Council of the European Union

(Case C-144/18 P)

(2018/C 142/49)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: River Kwai International Food Industry Co. Ltd (represented by: F. Graafsma and J. Cornelis, advocaten)

Other parties to the proceedings: Association européenne des transformateurs de maïs doux (AETMD), Council of the European Union, European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the Judgment of the General Court of 14 December 2017 in Case T-460/14, Association européenne des transformateurs de maïs doux (AETMD) v Council of the European Union; and

— order the Applicant to pay the Appellant’s costs of this appeal as well as those of the proceedings before the General Court in Case T-460/14.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellant submits that the General Court’s findings are vitiated by several errors of law and by a distortion of the facts and the evidence before it. The appellant therefore submits that the contested judgment should be set aside.

The appellant relies on three grounds of appeal.

First, the contested judgment’s failure to address the appellant’s objections to the admissibility of the original application — including with respect to the fourth plea — infringed the appellant’s rights of defense before the General Court. The contested judgment ignored the appellant’s inadmissibility claims without providing a reason/motivation as to why it was not necessary to address the appellant’s objections.

Second, by classifying the issue of the allocation of costs as one related to the determination of the normal value and hence the dumping margin calculation, and not as one related to the existence of a lasting change in circumstances, the contested judgment has distorted the evidence. None of the submissions made by the applicant during the administrative proceeding link the issue of the allocation of costs to the calculation of the dumping margin.

Finally, the contested judgment violates Article 10 of the basic Regulation (1) as well as the general principle of non-retroactivity as the appellant’s antidumping duty is effectively retroactively increased from 3,6 % to 12,8 %.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (OJ 2009, L 343, p. 51).
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 152/13

Action brought on 1 February 2018 — European Commission v Republic of Slovenia

(Case C-69/18)

(2018/C 152/14)

Language of the case: Slovenian

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: H. Støvelbæk, G. von Rintelen and M. Žebre)

Defendant: Republic of Slovenia

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that, by failing to adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2014/56/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts (OJ 2014 L 158, p. 196), or in any event, by failing to communicate those provisions to the Commission, the Republic of Slovenia has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 2 of that directive;

— order the Republic of Slovenia to pay a penalty payment, under Article 260(3) TFEU, in the sum of EUR 7 986,60 per day, as from the day of delivery of the Court’s judgment in the present case;

— order Republic of Slovenia to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In accordance with Article 2 of Directive 2014/56/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts, the Republic of Slovenia should have adopted and communicated the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with that directive by 17 June 2016. Since the Republic of Slovenia did not notify the Commission, before the expiry of that deadline, that it has transposed all the provisions of that directive, the Commission decided to refer the case to the Court.

By its action, the Commission asks the Court to order the Republic of Slovenia to pay a penalty of EUR 7 986,60 per day. In calculating that amount, the Commission took into consideration the seriousness and the duration of the infringement of EU law, as well as the deterrent effect in relation to the ability of the Member State concerned, namely the Republic of Slovenia, to pay.

The deadline for transposition of the directive expired on 17 June 2013.
(a)

Must Article 7 of Decision No 2/76 (1) and Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 1 be interpreted as not precluding a national rule providing for the general processing and storage of the biometric data of third-country nationals, including Turkish nationals, in a filing system within the meaning of Article 2(a) and (b) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ 1995 L 281[, p. 31]) on the ground that that national rule does not go further than is necessary to achieve the legitimate objective, pursued by that rule, of preventing and combating identity fraud and document fraud?
—

make an appropriate order as to the sum to be awarded to the appellant as compensation for the non-material harm that she has suffered as a result of the unfounded accusations made before the enquiry was finalised, the harm to her reputation, and the very significant disruption to her personal and political life occasioned by the contested decision;
1.

Is Note 2(a) to Chapter 90 of the Combined Nomenclature, (1) read in conjunction with General Rules Nos 1 and 6 for the interpretation of the CN, to be interpreted as meaning that ‘parts and accessories, which are goods included in any of the headings of this chapter or of Chapter 84, 85 or 91’, refers to goods in the four-digit headings in those chapters, or is the Note to be interpreted as also referring to the related subheading notes (the first six digits) in Chapters 84, 85, 90 and 91?
1.

Must the definition of an electronic communications service laid down in Article 2(c) of Directive 2002/21/EC of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, (1) as amended, be understood to mean that a voice-over IP service, made available via software, terminated on a public switched telephone network, to a fixed or mobile number covered by an (E.164) national numbering plan must be regarded as an electronic communications service, notwithstanding the fact that the internet service by means of which a user accesses that voice-over IP service already itself constitutes an electronic communications service, but where the provider of the software makes available that service for remuneration and enters into agreements with telecommunications service providers duly authorised to send and terminate calls to the public switched telephone network which allow the termination of calls to a fixed or mobile number covered by a national numbering plan?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 182/13

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo (Spain) lodged on 9 March 2018 — Oro Efectivo S.L. v Diputación Foral de Bizkaia

(Case C-185/18)

(2018/C 182/16)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Supremo

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Oro Efectivo S.L.

Defendant: Diputación Foral de Bizkaia

Question referred

Does Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, (1) the principle of tax neutrality arising from that directive, and the case-law of the Court of Justice interpreting the directive preclude a national rule of law under which a Member State may require payment of an indirect tax other than VAT from a business person or professional in respect of the purchase of movable property (specifically, gold, silver or jewellery) from a private individual where:

1. the purchased object is going to be processed and subsequently sold on in the course of that business person’s economic activities;

2. transactions subject to VAT will occur when the purchased property is reintroduced into the course of trade; and

3. in such transactions the applicable legislation in that same Member State does not permit the business person or professional to deduct the amount paid by way of that tax in respect of the initial purchase?

(1) OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.
4)

Do the ‘polluter pays’ principle in Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the principles of equality and non-discrimination in Articles 20 and 21 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and Articles 3 and 5 of Directive 2005/89/EC, (2) insofar as they seek to ensure ‘the proper functioning of the internal market for electricity’ and call on Member States to ensure ‘that any measures adopted in accordance with this Directive are non-discriminatory and do not place an unreasonable burden on the market actors’, preclude a provision in national legislation that requires all electricity companies (other than generators of hydroelectricity, which is classified as renewable energy) to fund the tariff deficit, but which imposes a particularly heavy tax burden on nuclear generators, which are required to contribute more than other actors in the energy market, some of which are more polluting, but that do not have to pay these charges, the reasons given being grounds of environmental protection in view of the risks and uncertainties inherent in nuclear activities, without specifying the costs involved or stipulating that the revenue raised is to be used for environmental protection purposes, when the cost of waste management and storage is already covered by other levies, and nuclear generation companies assume civil liability, distorting the free competition required by the liberalised internal market by favouring other electricity generators that do not have to pay environmental taxes even when their sources of production are more highly polluting?