ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 283/22

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 29 May 2017 — Hellenic Republic v Leo Kuhn

(Case C-308/17)

(2017/C 283/30)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberster Gerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Defendant and appellant on a point of law: Hellenic Republic

Applicant and respondent in the appeal on a point of law: Leo Kuhn

Questions referred

Must Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (1) be interpreted as meaning that:

1. even in the case — as here — of the repeated contractual transfer of a claim, the place of performance within the meaning of that provision is determined by the first contractual agreement?

2. in the case of the assertion of a claim seeking compliance with the terms of a government bond such as that specifically issued by the Hellenic Republic in the present case, or seeking damages for non-fulfilment of that claim, the actual place of performance is established immediately upon the payment of interest from that government bond into an account of a person holding a domestic securities portfolio?

3. the fact that a legal place of performance within the meaning of Article 7(1)(a) of that regulation was established by the first contractual agreement precludes the assumption that the subsequent actual performance of a contract establishes a — further — place of performance within the meaning of that provision?

(1) Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1).
—

declare that, by failing to take all the necessary measures to establish a general system of protection for the ortolan bunting in Landes, the French Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 5 of Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds;
2.

If the Court of Justice’s answer is that Article 138(2)(b) of the VAT Directive applies to a situation such as that in the main proceedings (that is, the acquirer of the products is a taxable person registered for tax), must that provision be interpreted as meaning that, where the dispatch or transport of those products takes place in accordance with the relevant provisions of Council Directive 2008/118/EC (2) concerning the general arrangements for excise duty and repealing Directive 92/12/EEC (3) (‘the Excise Duty Directive’), a supply connected with a procedure under the Excise Duty Directive must be regarded as a supply entitled to exemption under that provision, even though the conditions for exemption under Article 138(1) of the VAT Directive are not otherwise satisfied, having regard to the assignment of the transport of goods to another transaction?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 309/26

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte d’appello di Roma (Italy) lodged on 1 June 2017 — Martina Sciotto v Fondazione Teatro dell’Opera di Roma

(Case C-331/17)

(2017/C 309/32)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte d’appello di Roma

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Martina Sciotto

Respondent: Fondazione Teatro dell’Opera di Roma

Question referred

Are the national rules (in particular under Article 3(6) of Decree-Law No 64 of 30 April 2010, converted into law, with amendments, by Law No 100 of 29 June 2010, in so far as they determine that ‘the provisions of Article 1(01) and (2) of Legislative Decree No 368 of 6 September 2008 shall not apply to the operatic and orchestral foundations’) incompatible with Clause 5 of the framework agreement on fixed-term work, concluded on 18 March 1999, which appears in the annex to Council Directive 1999/70/EC (1) of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP?

(1) OJ 1999 L 175, p. 43.
Does a national rule which prohibits only commercial operators of search engines and commercial service providers which edit content, but not other users, including commercial users, from making press products or parts thereof (excluding individual words and very short text excerpts) available to the public constitute, under Article 1(2) and (5) of Directive 98/34/EC (as amended by Directive 98/48/EC), (1) a rule which is not specifically aimed at the services defined in that point,

and, if that is not the case,
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 318/5

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 14 June 2017 — Jörg Scharnweber and Henning Kuhlmann v Société Air France SA

(Case C-366/17)

(2017/C 318/07)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Hamburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Jörg Scharnweber and Henning Kuhlmann

Defendant: Société Air France SA

The case was removed from the Register of the Court of Justice by order of the Court of 19 July 2017.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 318/9

Reference for a preliminary ruling from Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (United Kingdom) made on 17 July 2017 — Dermod Patrick O'Brien v Ministry of Justice (Formerly the Department for Constitutional Affairs)

(Case C-432/17)

(2017/C 318/14)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Supreme Court of the United Kingdom

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Dermod Patrick O'Brien

Defendant: Ministry of Justice (Formerly the Department for Constitutional Affairs)

Questions referred

Does Directive 97/81 (1), and in particular clause 4 of the Framework Agreement annexed thereto concerning the principle of nondiscrimination, require that periods of service prior to the deadline for transposing the Directive should be taken into account when calculating the amount of the retirement pension of a part-time worker, if they would be taken into account when calculating the pension of a comparable full-time worker?

(1) Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC — Annex: Framework agreement on part-time work (OJ 1998, L 14, p. 9)
1.

Does an infringement of the rules on lis pendens contained in Article 19(2) and (3) of Regulation No 2201/2003 (1) affect only the determination of jurisdiction, with the consequent application of Article 24 of Regulation No 2201/2003 or, on the contrary, may it constitute a ground for withholding recognition, in the Member State whose court has been seised first, of a judicial ruling made in the Member State whose court has been seised at a later stage, in the light of procedural public policy, having regard to the fact that Article 24 of Regulation No 2201/2003 refers only to the rules determining jurisdiction contained in Articles 3 to 14 of that regulation and not to the subsequent Article 19 thereof?
If Question 1 is to be answered in the negative:

Is Article 7(14) to be interpreted as meaning that the transitional provision covers only the prohibition on the placing on the market of tobacco products with a characterising flavour under the first sentence of Article 7(1) of the directive or — also — the prohibition on the placing on the market of tobacco products containing flavourings in any of their components under the first sentence of Article 7(7) of the directive?
1.

Does the expression ‘the courts of a Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter’ which appears in Article 15 of the Brussels II Regulation (1) refer equally to courts hearing the case at first instance and to courts of appeal? It is important to know whether the case may be transferred, on the basis of that provision, to a court better placed to hear it if the court having jurisdiction and being asked to transfer the case to a better placed court is a court of appeal, while the better placed court is a court of first instance.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 357/3

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Poland) lodged on 13 July 2017 — Szef Krajowej Administracji Skarbowej v Polfarmex Spółka Akcyjna, established in Kutno

(Case C-421/17)

(2017/C 357/03)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Szef Krajowej Administracji Skarbowej

Respondent: Polfarmex Spółka Akcyjna, established in Kutno

Question referred

Does the transfer by a public limited company of immovable property to a shareholder in connection with the redemption of its shares constitute a transaction that is subject to value added tax in accordance with Article 2(1)(a) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax? (1)

(1) OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 347/12

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 31 July 2017 — SGI v Ministre de l’Action et des Comptes Publics

(Case C-459/17)

(2017/C 347/15)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: SGI

Respondent: Ministre de l’Action et des Comptes Publics

Question referred

Must the provisions of Article 17 of the Sixth VAT Directive of 17 May 1977, (1) which have, in essence, been reproduced in Article 168 of Directive [2006/112/EC] of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, (2) be interpreted as meaning that, in order to refuse a taxable person the right to deduct, from the value added tax that he is liable to pay by reason of his own transactions, tax levied on invoices corresponding to goods or services that the tax authorities establish have not actually been supplied to the taxable person, it is necessary, in all cases, to examine whether it has been established that that taxable person knew, or ought to have known, that the transaction was connected with value-added-tax fraud, regardless of whether that fraud was committed on the initiative of the issuer of the invoice, its recipient or a third party?

(1) Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1).

(2) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).
(4)

The General Court erred in finding that the Council had not infringed the right to good administration. First, the findings of the General Court on the Council’s obligation to maintain impartiality are vitiated by errors of law. Second, the General Court failed to have regard for the scope of the obligation to make a careful determination of the facts. In this context, an infringement of the appellant’s procedural rights is also evident. The General Court erred in finding that the Council had not committed a ‘manifest error of assessment’. First, the General Court failed to meet its obligation to carry out a review in relation to the contested legal acts in that it did not review the procedure which had led to the adoption of the contested legal acts. The General Court erred in law in finding that the Council could rely solely on a letter from the Ukraine. The General Court thereby disregarded the obligation to make additional enquiries. Furthermore, the General Court failed to have regard for the scope of the most recent case-law of the Court of Justice on restrictive measures. In addition, the General Court reasoned to a large extent in a purely political manner and demonstrates a failure to appreciate the importance of fundamental rights in a third country.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 374/15

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State (Netherlands) lodged on 10 August 2017 — K v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie

(Case C-484/17)

(2017/C 374/21)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Raad van State

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: K

Respondent: Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie

Question referred

Should Article 15(1) and (4) of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification (OJ 2003 L 251[, p. 12]) be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which an application for an autonomous residence permit on the part of a foreign national who has resided lawfully for more than five years on the territory of a Member State for family-reunification purposes may be rejected because of non-compliance with conditions relating to integration laid down in national law?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 392/11

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Krajowa Izba Odwoławcza (Poland) lodged on 24 January 2017 — Saferoad Grawil sp. z o.o., Saferoad Kabex sp. z o.o. v Generalna Dyrekcja Dróg Krajowych i Autostrad Oddział w Poznaniu

(Case C-35/17)

(2017/C 392/15)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Krajowa Izba Odwoławcza

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: Saferoad Grawil sp. z o.o., Saferoad Kabex sp. z o.o.

Respondent: Generalna Dyrekcja Dróg Krajowych i Autostrad Oddział w Poznaniu

Interveners: Przedsiębiorstwo Budownictwa Drogowego S.A., Zakład Bezpieczeństwa Ruchu Drogowego (Zaberd) S.A.

By order of 13 July 2017, the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) ruled that Article 2 of Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, (1) the principle of equal treatment and the obligation of transparency must be interpreted as precluding the exclusion of an economic operator from a public tendering procedure as a result of non-compliance, on the part of that operator, with an obligation which does not follow expressly from the documents relating to that procedure.

(1) OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 382/33

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 22 August 2017 — Administrative penalty proceedings against Josef Baumgartner

(Case C-513/17)

(2017/C 382/40)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Josef Baumgartner

Other parties: Bundesamt für Güterverkehr, Staatsanwaltschaft Köln

Question referred

Is the first sentence of Article 19(2) of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that a penalty imposed on an undertaking or a manager of an undertaking pursuant to Paragraphs 30, 9 and 130 of the Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten (German Law on administrative offences, ‘OWiG’) for an administrative offence committed at the seat of the undertaking may be imposed only by the Member State in whose territory the undertaking has its seat? Or are other Member States also authorised to impose a penalty for the administrative offence when that offence has been detected on their territory?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport and amending Council Regulations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EC) No 2135/98 and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 (OJ 2006 L 102, p. 1).
Case C-594/17: Action brought on 13 October 2017 — European Commission v Republic of Slovenia

Action brought on 13 October 2017 — European Commission v Republic of Slovenia

(Case C-594/17)

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: L. Flynn, G. von Rintelen and M. Žebre)

Defendant: Republic of Slovenia

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare that the Republic of Slovenia has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 15(1) of Council Directive 2001/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States (OJ 2011 L 306, p. 41), by failing to adopt, by 31 December 2013, all the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with that directive, or in any event by failing to communicate those provisions to the Commission;

— order the Republic of Slovenia to pay, on the basis of Article 260(3) TFEU, a penalty of EUR 7099,20 per day from the date of delivery of judgment in the present case;

— order the Republic of Slovenia to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In accordance with Article 15(1) of Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, the Republic of Slovenia should have adopted and made public, by 31 December 2013, all the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with that directive. Since the Republic of Slovenia did not confirm to the Commission, before expiry of that time limit, that all the provisions of the directive cited above had been transposed, the Commission decided to bring an action before the Court.

By its action, the Commission claims that the Court should order the Republic of Slovenia to pay a penalty of EUR 7099,20 per day. In calculating that amount, the Commission took into consideration the seriousness and the duration of the breach of EU law as well as the deterrent effect in relation to the ability of the Member State concerned, namely the Republic of Slovenia, to pay.
1.

Must Article 6(1) of the Unfair Terms Directive (1) — having regard also to the national legislation requiring legal representation — be interpreted as meaning that it is necessary to examine each of the clauses of a contract individually in the light of whether it may be regarded as unfair, irrespective of whether an examination of all the terms of the contract is actually necessary in order to rule on the claim made in the action?
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 424/23

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Netherlands) lodged on 27 September 2017 — Staatssecretaris van Financiën, L.W. Geelen

(Case C-568/17)

(2017/C 424/33)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hoge Raad der Nederlanden

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Staatssecretaris van Financiën

Defendant: L.W. Geelen

Questions referred

1 (a) Should the first indent of Article 9(2)(c) of the Sixth Directive, (1) or Article 52(a) of the VAT Directive of 2006 (2) (version to 1 January 2010), respectively, be interpreted as also covering the provision, in return for payment, of live interactive erotic webcam sessions? (b) If question 1(a) is answered in the affirmative, should the phrase ‘the place where those services are physically carried out’ in Article 9(2)(c) of the Sixth Directive or ‘the place where the services are physically carried out’ in the introductory sentence of Article 52 of the VAT Directive of 2006, respectively, then be interpreted as meaning that the decisive factor is the place where the models perform in front of the webcamera or the place where the visitors view the images, or could even some other place be envisaged?

2. Should the twelfth indent of Article 9(2)(e) of the Sixth Directive or Article 56(1)(k) of the VAT Directive of 2006 (version to 1 January 2010), read in conjunction with Article 11 of the VAT Regulation of 2005, (3) be interpreted as meaning that the provision, in return for payment, of live interactive erotic webcam sessions can be deemed to be an ‘electronically supplied service’?

3. If both question 1(a) and question 2 are answered in the affirmative, and the designation of the place of the service according to the relevant provisions of the directives concerned results in a different outcome, how should the place of the service then be determined?

(1) Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1).

(2) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).

(3) Council Regulation (EC) No 1777/2005 of 17 October 2005 laying down implementing measures for Directive 77/388/EEC on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2005 L 288, p. 1).
1)

In the light of the case-law laid down in [the judgment of 20 April 2010, Federutility, C-265/08], is a measure setting a maximum price for cylinders of bottled liquefied gas, in so far as it is a measure for the protection of socially vulnerable users, compatible with that case-law or with the principle of proportionality where, separately or together, any of the following circumstances occur? — the measure is adopted as a general measure in relation to all consumers and for an indefinite period ‘while the conditions of competition on this market are not considered to be sufficient’, — the measure has already been in force for more than 28 years, — the measure may contribute to freezing the situation of limited competition by impeding the entry of new operators.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 5/17

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main (Germany) lodged on 18 August 2017 — Thomas Krauss v TUIfly GmbH

(Case C-500/17)

(2018/C 005/23)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Frankfurt am Main

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Thomas Krauss

Defendant: TUIfly GmbH

By order of 28 September 2017, the Court removed the case from its Register.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 437/15

Appeal brought on 18 August 2017 by Groupe Léa Nature against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 8 June 2017 in Case T-341/13 RENV: Groupe Léa Nature v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-505/17 P)

(2017/C 437/18)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Groupe Léa Nature (represented by: E. Baud, avocat)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Debonair Trading Internacional Lda

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment rendered by the General Court on June 8, 2017;

— refer the case back to the General Court; and

— order Debonair to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on two pleas in law.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) EUMTR, based on a violation of the settled case-law pertaining to the assessment of the likelihood of confusion between the marks.

In support of this plea the appellant claims that the General Court did not:

— apply the relevant criteria required to determine the relevant public;

— assess correctly the similarities between the signs;

— properly apply the relevant requirements susceptible to assess the acquisition of a distinctive character through use; and

— validly proceed with an analysis of the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(5) EUMTR, based on a violation of the settled case-law rendered in relation to uses detrimental to the repute of an earlier mark.

In support of this plea, the appellant claims that the General Court did not:

— apply all the criteria required to establish the reputation of an earlier mark;

— assess correctly the similarities between the signs;

— proceed with a valid analysis of the existence of a link that the relevant public may make between the marks; and