ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 13(1) of Regulation No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 TFEU obliges the Commission, once any additional comments have been lodged by interested parties, or the reasonable period has expired, to close the preliminary examination stage by adopting a decision pursuant to Article 4(2), (3) or (4) of that regulation, that is to say, a decision stating that aid does not exist, raising no objections, or initiating the formal investigation procedure.

Although the Commission may withdraw a decision to take no further action on a complaint regarding alleged unlawful aid in order to remedy illegality affecting that decision, the adoption of a purely confirmatory decision cannot be regarded as being such a withdrawal.

An action against a confirmatory decision is inadmissible only if the confirmed decision has become final in relation to the person concerned because no action has been brought within the prescribed period. Otherwise, the person concerned is entitled to challenge either the confirmed decision, or the confirmatory decision, or both.

Moreover, to accept that, in such a situation, the adoption by the Commission of a new decision would mean a ruling that there was no need to adjudicate on the action for annulment brought against the initial decision would be to impede the effectiveness of the judicial review.

It would be sufficient for the Commission to decide to take no further action on a complaint lodged by an interested party and then, after that party brought an action, to reopen the preliminary examination stage and repeat those operations as many times as are necessary in order to avoid any judicial review of its actions.

The same is true, a fortiori, where the Commission, during the proceedings before the General Court concerning an action for annulment of a decision to take no further action on a complaint, asks that those proceedings be stayed to allow it to re-examine the case, then purely and simply confirms its initial decision.

It could be different only if the Commission withdrew a decision to take no further action on a complaint in order to remedy illegality affecting that decision, while stating the nature of the illegality vitiating that decision.

(see paras 29, 32, 35, 37-40)
Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that a recourse claim between jointly and severally liable debtors under a credit agreement constitutes a ‘matter relating to a contract’, as referred to in that provision.

The second indent of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that a credit agreement, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, between a credit institution and two jointly and severally liable debtors, must be classified as a ‘contract for the provision of services’ for the purposes of that provision.

According to the Court’s case-law, the concept of ‘services’, within the meaning of Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation No 44/2001, the wording of which is identical to that of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 1215/2012, implies, at the least, that the party who provides the service carries out a particular activity in return for remuneration (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 July 2016, Granarolo, C‑196/15, EU:C:2016:559, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

As the Advocate General has observed in point 40 of his Opinion, in a credit agreement between a credit institution and a borrower, the supply of services lies in the transfer of a sum of money by the credit institution to the borrower, in return for fees paid by the borrower, in principle, in the form of interest.

It must therefore be held that such a credit agreement must be classified as a ‘contract for the provision of services’, within the meaning of the second indent of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 1215/2012.

(see paras 35-38, operative part 2)
While in the exercise of the powers conferred on them the EU authorities have broad discretion in particular where they are called on to undertake complex assessments and evaluations, it must first be determined whether they are indeed acting within the limits of the powers given to them and, more particularly, in a case concerning a delegated power under Article 290 TFEU, it must be ascertained whether the EU authorities have exceeded the powers conferred on them by the enabling act, bearing in mind in particular that such a delegated power must in any event comply with the essential elements of the enabling act and come within the regulatory framework as defined by the basic legislative act.

The possibility of delegating powers provided for in Article 290 TFEU aims to enable the legislature to concentrate on the essential elements of a piece of legislation and on the non-essential elements in respect of which it finds it appropriate to legislate, while entrusting the Commission with the task of supplementing certain non-essential elements of the legislative act adopted or amending such elements within the framework of the power delegated to it. It follows that the essential rules on the matter in question must be laid down in the basic legislation and cannot be delegated. The essential elements of basic legislation are those which, in order to be adopted, require political choices falling within the responsibilities of the EU legislature. Identifying the elements of a matter which must be categorised as essential must be based on objective factors amenable to judicial review, and requires account to be taken of the characteristics and particular features of the field concerned.

As regards Directive 2010/30 on the indication by labelling and standard product information of the consumption of energy and other resources by energy-related products, it must be considered, in view of the general scheme of Directive 2010/30, that the requirement that the information supplied to consumers must reflect energy consumption while the machine is in use is an essential element of the directive. In that respect, the Commission was obliged, in order not to disregard an essential element of Directive 2010/30, to adopt in Delegated Regulation No 665/2013 supplementing Directive 2010/30 with regard to energy labelling of vacuum cleaners a method of calculation which makes it possible to measure the energy performance of vacuum cleaners in conditions as close as possible to actual conditions of use, requiring the vacuum cleaner’s receptacle to be filled to a certain level, having regard nevertheless to the requirements concerning the scientific validity of the results obtained and to the accuracy of the information supplied to consumers, as mentioned in particular in recital 5 and Article 5(b) of the directive.

(see paras 58-63, 68)
Case C‑218/16

Proceedings brought by Aleksandra Kubicka

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from the Sąd Okręgowy w Gorzowie Wielkopolskim)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Area of Freedom, Security and Justice — Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 — Succession and the European Certificate of Succession — Scope — Immovable property located in a Member State in which legacies ‘per vindicationem’ do not exist — Refusal to recognise the material effects of such a legacy)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 12 October 2017

Judicial cooperation in civil matters—Jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession—Regulation No 650/2012—Scope—Matters excluded—Nature of rights in rem—Scope—Methods of transfer of a right in rem—Not included (European Parliament and Council Directive No 650/2012, Art. 1(2)(k)) Judicial cooperation in civil matters—Jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession—Regulation No 650/2012—Scope—Matters excluded—Recording in a register of rights in immovable or movable property and its effects—Scope—Acquisition of ownership of an asset by legacy ‘by vindication’—Not included (European Parliament and Council Directive No 650/2012, Art. 1(2)(l)) Judicial cooperation in civil matters—Jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession—Regulation No 650/2012—Applicable law—Adaption of rights in rem—Scope—Methods of transfer of rights in rem—Not included (European Parliament and Council Directive No 650/2012, Art. 31) Judicial cooperation in civil matters—Jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession—Regulation No 650/2012—Scope—Material effects of a legacy by vindication concerning the right of ownership in immovable property located in a Member State that does not provide for legacies with direct material effect—Included (European Parliament and Council Directive No 650/2012, Arts 1(2)(k), (l) and 31)
Harmonisation of fiscal legislation—Common system of value added tax—Obligations of persons liable for the tax—Inclusion in the register of taxable persons for VAT—Taxable person of which a director was formerly connected with another person who had not complied with his tax obligations—National law requiring that taxable person to provide a guarantee—Measure seeking to ensure payment of the correct amount of VAT and to prevent fraud—Lawfulness—Condition—Observance of the principle of proportionality

(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 16; Council Directive 2006/112, Art. 273)
2.

European Union—Judicial review of the legality of the acts of the institutions—Restrictive measures taken having regard to the situation in Ukraine—Freezing of funds of persons involved in the misappropriation of public funds and of natural or legal persons, bodies or organisations associated with them—Ambit of the review—Assessment of whether the investigations relating to the person affected by the decision to freeze funds are well founded—Not included—Assessment, on the basis of the documents on which the decision is based, of whether the decision to freeze funds is well founded—Included (Council Decisions 2015/143/CFSP and 2015/364/CFSP; Council Regulations No 2015/138 and 2015/357) (see para. 72)
Case C‑308/16

Kozuba Premium Selection sp. z o.o.

v

Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w Warszawie

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Taxation — Common system of value added tax (VAT) — Directive 2006/112/EC — Article 12(1) and (2) — Article 135(1)(j) — Taxable transactions — Exemption for the supply of buildings — Concept of ‘first occupation’ — Concept of ‘conversion’)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 16 November 2017

Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Common system of value added tax — Exemptions — Transaction involving the supply of buildings or parts thereof, and of the land on which they stand — National law making the exemption for a first occupation conditional upon it arising in the context of a taxable transaction — Unlawful — National law making the exemption in cases of the upgrade of an existing building conditional upon not exceeding a fixed threshold of the initial value thereof — Lawfulness — Condition — Definition of the concept of ‘upgrade’ laid down in the national law identical to that of ‘conversion’ included in Directive 2006/112 — Verification a matter for the national court

(Council Directive 2006/112, Arts 12(1) and (2) and 135(1)(j))

Articles 12(1)(a) and 135(1)(j) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as precluding a national law, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which makes the VAT exemption on the supply of buildings subject to the condition that the first occupation thereof arises in the context of a taxable transaction. The same provisions must be interpreted as not precluding such a national law from making that exemption subject to the condition, in the case of the ‘upgrade’ of an existing building, that the costs incurred have not exceeded 30% of the initial value thereof, provided that that concept of ‘upgrade’ is interpreted in the same way as that of ‘conversion’ in Article 12(2) of Directive 2006/112, namely as meaning that the building concerned must have been subject to substantial modifications intended to modify the use or alter considerably the conditions of occupation.

(see para. 59, operative part)
Article 99(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 on the European Union trade mark must be interpreted as meaning that an action for infringement brought before an EU trade mark court in accordance with Article 96(a) of that regulation may not be dismissed on the basis of an absolute ground for invalidity, such as that provided for in Article 52(1)(b) of that regulation, without that court having upheld the counterclaim for a declaration of invalidity brought by the defendant in that infringement action, pursuant to Article 100(1) of the regulation, and based on the same ground for invalidity.

In that context, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, in the absence of EU rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law, the Member States having nonetheless responsibility for ensuring that those rights are effectively protected in each case (see, to that effect, judgments of 30 September 2003, Köbler, C‑224/01, EU:C:2003:513, paragraph 47, and of 27 June 2013, Agrokonsulting, C‑93/12, EU:C:2013:432, paragraph 35).

In this respect, in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU, the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual’s rights under EU law must be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and must not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (judgments of 16 December 1976, Rewe-Zentralfinanz and Rewe-Zentral, 33/76, EU:C:1976:188, paragraph 5; of 14 December 1995, Peterbroeck, C‑312/93, EU:C:1995:437, paragraph 12; and of 27 June 2013, Agrokonsulting, C‑93/12, EU:C:2013:432, paragraph 36).

It follows from the Court’s case-law that the requirements stemming from the principles of equivalence and effectiveness apply, in particular, to the definition of the procedural rules governing actions based on EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 June 2013, Agrokonsulting, C‑93/12, EU:C:2013:432, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

(see paras 40-42)
Article 2(1)(c) of Council Directive 75/363/EEC of 16 June 1975 concerning the coordination of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in respect of activities of doctors, as amended by Council Directive 82/76/EEC of 26 January 1982, as well as Article 24(1)(c) of Council Directive 93/16/EEC of 5 April 1993 to facilitate the free movement of doctors and the mutual recognition of their diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications must be interpreted as not precluding the legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in accordance with which the disbursement of a national bursary intended to fund training given in another Member State, leading to qualification as a specialist doctor, is conditional upon the recipient doctor practising his profession in that first Member State for a period of five years over a ten-year period following completion of the specialisation or, failing that, upon his repayment of up to 70% of the amount of the bursary received, together with interest.

Articles 45 and 49 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding the legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in accordance with which the disbursement of a national bursary intended to fund training given in another Member State, leading to qualification as a specialist doctor, is conditional upon the recipient doctor practising his profession in that first Member State for a period of five years over a ten-year period following completion of the specialisation or, failing that, upon his repayment of up to 70% of the amount of the bursary received, together with interest, unless the measures laid down by that legislation do not actually contribute to the pursuit of the objectives of protection of public health and of the financial equilibrium of the social security system and go beyond what is necessary in that regard, which is a matter for the referring court to assess.

(see para. 51, operative part 2)
Article 14(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community, in the version amended and updated by Council Regulation (EC) No 118/97 of 2 December 1996, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 631/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004, and Article 11(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 of 21 March 1972 laying down rules for the application of Regulation No 1408/71, as amended and updated by Regulation No 118/97, must be interpreted as meaning that, when an institution of a Member State to which workers have been posted makes an application to the institution that issued E 101 certificates for the review and withdrawal of those certificates in the light of evidence, collected in the course of a judicial investigation, which supports the conclusion that those certificates were fraudulently obtained or relied on, and the issuing institution fails to take that evidence into consideration for the purpose of reviewing the grounds for the issue of those certificates, a national court may, in the context of proceedings brought against persons suspected of having used posted workers ostensibly covered by such certificates, disregard those certificates if, on the basis of that evidence and with due regard to the safeguards inherent in the right to a fair trial which must be granted to those persons, it finds the existence of such fraud.

The application of EU legislation cannot be extended to cover transactions carried out for the purpose of fraudulently or wrongfully obtaining advantages provided for by EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 July 2007, Kofoed, C‑321/05, EU:C:2007:408, paragraph 38, and of 22 November 2017, Cussens and Others, C‑251/16, EU:C:2017:881, paragraph 27).

In particular, findings of fraud are to be based on a consistent body of evidence that satisfies both an objective and a subjective factor.

The objective factor consists in the fact that the conditions for obtaining and relying on an E 101 certificate, laid down in Title II of Regulation No 1408/71 and referred to in paragraph 34 of the present judgment, are not met.

The subjective factor corresponds to the intention of the parties concerned to evade or circumvent the conditions for the issue of that certificate, with a view to obtaining the advantage attached to it.

The fraudulent procurement of an E 101 certificate may thus result from a deliberate action, such as the misrepresentation of the real situation of the posted worker or of the undertaking posting that worker, or from a deliberate omission, such as the concealment of relevant information, with the intention of evading the conditions governing the application of Article 14(1)(a) of Regulation No 1408/71.

(see paras 49-53, 61, operative part)
4.

Competition—Fines—Amount—Determination—Determination of the basic amount—Determination of the value of sales—Sales carried out in direct or indirect relation to the infringement—Cartel in the international air freight forwarding services sector—Cartel regarding freight forwarding services as a package of services—Account taken of the value of sales made in the provision of freight forwarding services as a package of services—Lawfulness (Art. 101 TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2) and (3); Commission Communication 2006/C 210/02, point 13) (see paras 60-62)
Article 3(b) of Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products is to be interpreted as meaning that an end of procedure notice issued by the reference Member State in accordance with Article 28(4) of Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, as amended, as regards pharmacovigilance, by Directive 2010/84/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 December 2010, before the expiry of the basic patent, as defined in Article 1(c) of Regulation No 469/2009, may not be treated as equivalent to a marketing authorisation within the meaning of Article 3(b) of that regulation, with the result that a supplementary protection certificate may not be obtained on the basis of such a notice.

(see para. 46, operative part 1)
Case C‑255/16

Criminal proceedings against

v

Bent Falbert and Others

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Københavns byret)

(References for a preliminary ruling — Information procedure in the field of technical rules and regulations — National legislation clarifying or introducing a prohibition on unauthorised offering of gaming, lotteries and betting and introducing a prohibition on unauthorised offering of advertising for gaming, lotteries and betting)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 20 December 2017

Approximation of laws — Information procedure in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services — Directive 98/34 — Technical regulation — Definition — National provision providing for criminal sanctions where a person offers gaming, lotteries or betting without authorisation — Not included — National provision providing for criminal sanctions in the case of advertising for unlicensed gaming, lotteries or betting — Included

(European Parliament and Council Directive 98/34, as amended by Directive 98/48, Arts 1 and 8(1))

Article 1 of Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services, as amended by Directive 98/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 1998, must be interpreted as meaning that a national provision such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides for criminal sanctions where an unauthorised offer is made of gaming, lotteries or betting on the national territory, does not constitute a technical regulation within the meaning of that provision, subject to the notification obligation under Article 8(1) of that directive.

However, a national provision such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides for sanctions in the event of advertising for unauthorised gaming, lotteries or betting, does constitute a technical regulation within the meaning of that provision, subject to the notification obligation under Article 8(1) of that directive, as it is clear from the travaux préparatoires for that provision of national law that its object and purpose was to extend a pre-existing prohibition on advertising to cover online gaming services, which it is for the national court to determine.

(see para. 37, operative part)