ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Since Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability, is not applicable ratione temporis to the dispute in the main proceedings, since Council Directive 72/166/EEC of 24 April 1972 on the approximation of the laws of Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and to the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability, as amended by Directive 2005/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005, Council Directive 84/5/EEC of 30 December 1983 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles as amended by Directive 2005/14, and Directive 2000/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 May 2000 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC are not applicable ratione materiae to the present dispute, and, therefore, since, in the absence of implementation of EU law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, neither is Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union applicable to the dispute, those directives and Article 47 of the Charter must be interpreted as not precluding, in the present case, the consequences arising from the case-law of the referring court to the effect that, for the purposes of the subrogated claim, the burden of proof relating to all of the elements establishing the civil liability of the defendants in the main proceedings for the accident which occurred on 20 July 2006 rests with the Lietuvos Respublikos transporto priemonių draudikų biuras (the Bureau of Motor Insurers of the Republic of Lithuania).

(see para. 45, operative part)
Environment—Urban waste-water treatment—Directive 91/271—Making the treatment of urban waste-water entering the collecting systems subject to secondary treatment—Requirements concerning discharges of urban waste-water from treatment plants—Non-compliance—Failure not such as to lead to an infringement of the surveillance requirements for such discharges

(Council Directive 91/271, Arts 4 and 15 and Annex I, points B and D)

(see paras 59, 63)
Case C‑580/15

Maria Eugenia Van der Weegen and Others

v

Belgische Staat

(Request for a preliminary ruling

from the rechtbank van eerste aanleg West-Vlaanderen, afdeling Brugge)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 56 TFEU — Article 36 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area — Tax legislation — Income tax — Tax exemption reserved to interest payments by banks complying with certain statutory conditions — Indirect discrimination — Banks established in Belgium and banks established in another Member State)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 8 June 2017

Freedom to provide services — Restrictions — Tax legislation — Measure applicable without distinction to all services — National legislation limiting a tax exemption to the income of savings deposits held with banking service providers complying with conditions specific to the national market alone — Not permissible

(Art. 56 TFEU; EEA Agreement, Art. 36)

Article 56 TFEU and Article 36 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area of 2 May 1992 must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides for a national tax exemption system, to the extent that that system, although applicable without distinction to income from savings deposits held with banking service providers established in Belgium or in another Member State of the European Economic Area, imposes conditions for access to the Belgian banking market on service providers established in other Member States, this being a matter for the referring court to verify.

In the present case, the legislation at issue in the main proceedings establishes a tax system which is applicable without distinction to the remuneration received from a savings deposit paid by banks established in Belgium and to that paid by banks established in another Member State.

However, even national legislation which applies without distinction to all services, irrespective of the place of establishment of the provider, is liable to constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide services in so far as it reserves an advantage solely to users of services which comply with certain conditions which are de facto specific to the national market and thus deny that advantage to users of other services which are essentially similar but do not comply with the specific conditions provided for in that legislation. Such legislation affects the situation of users of services as such and is thus liable to discourage them from using the services of certain providers, since the services offered by them do not comply with the conditions laid down in that legislation, thus directly affecting access to the market (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 May 1995, Alpine Investments, C‑384/93, EU:C:1995:126, paragraphs 26 to 28 and 35 to 38, and of 10 November 2011, Commission v Portugal, C‑212/09, EU:C:2011:717, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

(see paras 28, 29, 45, operative part)
The ‘global marketing authorisation’ referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 6(1) of Directive 2001/83 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use is accompanied only by a single regulatory data protection period which applies both to data relating to the original medicinal product and to data presented for its developments, such as additional strengths, pharmaceutical forms, administration routes, presentations, as well as variations and extensions. That period begins with the grant of the marketing authorisation (MA) for the original medicinal product.

In that respect, changes made by an MA proprietor to the strength and to the therapeutic indications of a medicinal product constitute ‘variations’ within the meaning of Regulation No 1085/2003 concerning the examination of variations to the terms of a marketing authorisation for medicinal products for human use and veterinary medicinal products falling within the scope of Regulation No 2309/93, that is to say developments of that medicinal product, referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 6(1) of Directive 2001/83, with the result that the grant of the MA for such developments does not give rise to an independent regulatory data protection period. In that context, the second subparagraph of Article 6(1) of Directive 2001/83 makes no distinction between the developments authorised through the granting of a separate MA and the developments of the initial medicinal product authorised through the variation of the terms of an initial MA. It follows that the concept of a ‘global marketing authorisation’, within the meaning of that provision, covers all subsequent developments of the original medicinal product, irrespective of their authorisation procedures, namely through the variation of the initial MA for that medicinal product or through the grant of a separate MA.

(see paras 65, 69, 71, 72)
As regards, first, the terms used, it should be noted that the term ‘programme’ is broad in scope and that the terms ‘programme’ and ‘project’ may be used interchangeably for the purposes of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95. Thus, the concept of a ‘multiannual programme’, within the meaning of the second sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95, is a transversal concept which can be found in all the fields covered by the policies of the European Union, in so far as the budgetary resources of the European Union are used.

A project, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, consisting in the creation of a waste management system in a specific region and the implementation of which was envisaged over several years and financed by resources of the European Union, falls within the concept of a ‘multiannual programme’ within the meaning of the second sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests.

Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95 must be interpreted as meaning that the limitation period for an irregularity committed in the context of a ‘multiannual programme’, such as the project at issue in the main proceedings, runs from the date on which the irregularity in question was committed, in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95; if the irregularity is ‘continuous or repeated’, the limitation period runs from the day on which the irregularity ceases, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95.

In addition, a ‘multiannual programme’ is regarded as ‘definitively terminated’, within the meaning of the second sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95, on the end date provided for in respect of that programme, in accordance with the rules which govern it. In particular, a multiannual programme governed by Council Regulation (EC) No 1164/94 of 16 May 1994 establishing a Cohesion Fund, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1264/1999 of 21 June 1999, Council Regulation (EC) No 1265/1999 of 21 June 1999 and the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, must be regarded as being ‘definitively terminated’, within the meaning of that provision, on the date indicated in the European Commission decision approving that project as the deadline for completion of the work and for the making of the payments of the eligible expenditure related thereto, without prejudice to any extension, by a new decision of the Commission to that effect.

(see para. 70, operative part 2)
As regards, in the first place, the scope of the judgment in IP Translator, C‑307/10, it should be recalled that, in paragraph 61 of that judgment, the Court held that, in order to comply with the requirements of clarity and precision, an applicant for a trade mark who uses all of the general indications of a particular class heading of the Nice Classification to identify the goods or services for which protection of the trade mark is sought must specify whether his application for registration is intended to cover all the goods or services included in the alphabetical list of the particular class concerned or only some of those goods or services. If the application concerns only some of those goods or services, the applicant is required to specify which of the goods or services in that class are intended to be covered.

The Court indicated, in paragraphs 29 and 30 of the judgment of 16 February 2017, Brandconcern C‑577/14 P, that the IP Translator judgment provided clarifications only on the requirements relating to new EU trade mark registration applications, and thus does not concern trade marks that were already registered at the date of that latter judgment’s delivery. The Court thus inferred, in paragraph 31 of the judgment in Brandconcern, that it therefore could not be considered that the Court, by the IP Translator judgment, had sought to question the validity of the approach set out in Communication No 4/03 as regards trade marks registered before the delivery of that latter judgment

Communication No 2/12 of the President of the European Union Intellectual Property Office cannot call into question that case-law and thus lead to the scope of protection of trade marks registered before the delivery of the IP Translator judgment for goods or services designated by the general indications of the class headings of the Nice Agreement being limited solely to the goods or services mentioned in the alphabetical list of that class and to that protection being denied, in accordance with Communication No 4/03, to all the goods and services within that class.

The scope of the protection afforded by trade marks that have been registered may not be altered on the basis of a non-binding communication which has no function other than to provide clarification for applicants as to the practices of EUIPO

(see paras 37-40)
Article 325(1) TFEU must be interpreted as precluding national legislation that establishes a procedure for the termination of criminal proceedings, such as that provided for in Articles 368 and 369 of the Nakazatelno protsesualen kodeks (Code of Criminal Procedure), in so far as that legislation is applicable in proceedings initiated with respect to cases of serious fraud or other serious illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the European Union in customs matters. It is for the national courts to give full effect to Article 325(1) TFEU, by disapplying that legislation, where necessary, while also ensuring respect for the fundamental rights of the persons accused.

Article 6(3) of Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings must be interpreted as not precluding the disclosure of detailed information on the charges to the defence after the lodging before the court of the indictment that initiates the trial stage of proceedings, but before the court begins to examine the merits of the charges and before the commencement of any hearing of argument by the court, and after the commencement of that hearing but before the stage of deliberation, where the information thus disclosed is the subject of subsequent amendments, provided that all necessary measures are taken by the court in order to ensure respect for the rights of the defence and the fairness of the proceedings.

Article 7(3) of that directive must be interpreted as meaning that it is for the national court to be satisfied that the defence has been granted a genuine opportunity to have access to the case materials, such access being possible, in some cases, after the lodging before the court of the indictment that initiates the trial stage of the proceedings, but before that court begins to examine the merits of the charges and before the commencement of any hearing of argument by that court, and after the commencement of that hearing but before the stage of deliberation where new evidence is placed in the file in the course of proceedings, provided that all necessary measures are taken by the court in order to ensure respect for the rights of the defence and the fairness of the proceedings.

(see paras 99, 100, operative part 2)
In order to permit the competent authorities to resort to the derogations laid down in Article 9 of Directive 2009/147 on the conservation of wild birds only in a manner which complies with EU law, the national legislative and regulatory framework must be designed in such a way that the application of the derogating provisions set out there is consonant with the principle of legal certainty. Accordingly, the applicable national legislation must specify the criteria for the derogation clearly and precisely and require the authorities responsible for their application to take them into account. In respect of exceptional arrangements, which must be interpreted strictly and impose on the authority taking the decision the burden of proving that those conditions exist for each derogation, the Member States are required to ensure that all action affecting the protected species is authorised only on the basis of decisions containing a clear and sufficient statement of reasons which refers to the reasons, conditions and requirements laid down in Article 9(1) and (2) of that directive.

(see para. 47)
104

It follows from all the foregoing that the answer to the questions referred is that Article 1(3), Article 5 and Article 6(1) of the Framework Decision must be interpreted as meaning that where there is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated evidence with respect to detention conditions in the issuing Member State that demonstrates that there are deficiencies, which may be systemic or generalised, or which may affect certain groups of people, or which may affect certain places of detention, the executing judicial authority must determine, specifically and precisely, whether there are substantial grounds to believe that the individual concerned by a European arrest warrant, issued for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence, will be exposed, because of the conditions for his detention in the issuing Member State, to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter, in the event of his surrender to that Member State. To that end, the executing judicial authority must request that supplementary information be provided by the issuing judicial authority, which, after seeking, if necessary, the assistance of the central authority or one of the central authorities of the issuing Member State, under Article 7 of the Framework Decision, must send that information within the time limit specified in the request. The executing judicial authority must postpone its decision on the surrender of the individual concerned until it obtains the supplementary information that allows it to discount the existence of such a risk. If the existence of that risk cannot be discounted within a reasonable time, the executing judicial authority must decide whether the surrender procedure should be brought to an end.
7

Article 11 of Framework Decision 2009/315, entitled ‘Format and other ways of organising and facilitating exchanges of information on convictions’, provides: ‘1. When transmitting information in accordance with Article 4(2) and (3), the central authority of the convicting Member State shall transmit the following information: (a) information that shall always be transmitted … (obligatory information): (i) information on the convicted person (full name, date of birth, place of birth … gender, nationality and — if applicable — previous name(s)); (ii) information on the nature of the conviction (date of conviction, name of the court, date on which the decision became final); (iii) information on the offence giving rise to the conviction (date of the offence … name or legal classification of the offence as well as reference to the applicable legal provisions); and (iv) information on the contents of the conviction (notably the sentence as well as any supplementary penalties, security measures and subsequent decisions modifying the enforcement of the sentence); (b) information that shall be transmitted if entered in the criminal record (optional information): (i) the convicted person’s parents’ names; (ii) the reference number of the conviction; (iii) the place of the offence; and (iv) disqualifications arising from the conviction; (c) information that shall be transmitted, if available to the central authority (additional information): (i) the convicted person’s identity number …; (ii) fingerprints, which have been taken from that person; and (iii) if applicable, pseudonym and/or alias name(s). In addition, the central authority may transmit any other information concerning convictions entered in the criminal record. 2. The central authority of the Member State of the person’s nationality shall store all information of the types listed in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1, which it has received in accordance with Article 5(1) for the purpose of retransmission in accordance with Article 7. For the same purpose it may store the information of the types listed in point (c) of the first subparagraph and in the second subparagraph of paragraph 1. 3. … Once the time limit set out in paragraph 7 of this Article has elapsed, central authorities of Member States shall transmit such information electronically using a standardised format. 4. The format referred to in paragraph 3 and any other means of organising and facilitating exchanges of information on convictions between central authorities of Member States shall be set up by the Council … Other such means include: (a) defining all means by which understanding and automatically translating transmitted information may be facilitated; …’
28

The minority opinion within the referring court, by contrast, is that the authorised warehousekeeper can be held jointly and severally liable only for payment of the excise duties, but not for the payment of sums corresponding to the financial penalties imposed on the perpetrators of smuggling offences. According to this opinion, it follows neither from the Greek legislation nor from Directive 92/12 that the authorised warehousekeeper is presumed in law to be the owner of the goods which it holds, which depart from its tax warehouse and are dispatched to a third country under an excise duty suspension arrangement, until they arrive at their proper destination or until they leave the territory of the European Union. Nor does it follow from that legislation or from that directive that, until the departure of the goods from that suspension arrangement, the natural persons involved, in whichever capacity, in the movement of those goods are presumed in law to act as agents or representatives of the authorised warehousekeeper. Thus, the increased liability advocated by the majority opinion within the referring court is not required to ensure the effective application of Directive 92/12 and comes up against various principles of EU law. First, it clashes with the principle of legal certainty, in particular with the principle of clarity and foreseeability of restrictions on the freedom to conduct a business and with the property rights of the authorised warehousekeeper. Second, it is at variance with the principle of proportionality, in so far as it would be manifestly excessive to impose on the authorised warehousekeeper the obligation to pay administrative fines, which, the law provides, amount to at least double the charges due, irrespective of their amount, for offences resulting from intentional criminal conduct on the part of third parties which has none of the characteristics referred to in Article 108 in the Customs Code and over which that warehousekeeper, who has demonstrated the appropriate diligence, cannot have any control.