ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to establish whether the fact of posting, on a website, hyperlinks to protected works, which are freely available on another website without the consent of the copyright holder, constitutes a ‘communication to the public’ within the meaning of that provision, it is to be determined whether those links are provided without the pursuit of financial gain by a person who did not know or could not reasonably have known the illegal nature of the publication of those works on that other website or whether, on the contrary, those links are provided for such a purpose, a situation in which that knowledge must be presumed.

The concept of ‘communication to the public’ requires an individual assessment. For the purposes of that assessment, it is accordingly necessary, when the posting of a hyperlink to a work freely available on another website is carried out by a person who, in so doing, does not pursue a profit, to take account of the fact that that person does not know and cannot reasonably know that that work had been published on the internet without the consent of the copyright holder. Indeed, such a person does not intervene, as a general rule, in full knowledge of the consequences of his conduct in order to give customers access to a work illegally posted on the internet. In contrast, where it is established that such a person knew or ought to have known that the hyperlink he posted provides access to a work illegally placed on the internet, the provision of that link constitutes a ‘communication to the public’ within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29. The same applies in the event that that link allows users to circumvent the restrictions taken by the site where the protected work is posted in order to restrict the public’s access to its own subscribers.

Furthermore, when the posting of hyperlinks is carried out for profit, it can be expected that the person who posted such a link carries out the necessary checks to ensure that the work concerned is not illegally published on the website to which those hyperlinks lead, so that it must be presumed that that posting has occurred with the full knowledge of the protected nature of that work and the possible lack of consent to publication on the internet by the copyright holder. In such circumstances, and in so far as that rebuttable presumption is not rebutted, the act of posting a hyperlink to a work which was illegally placed on the internet constitutes a ‘communication to the public’ within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29.

(see paras 33, 47-51, 55, operative part)
The Court of Justice of the European Union does not have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of Article 21(2) of Regulation No 469/2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products, as amended by the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Croatia and the adjustments to the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community.

Point (b) of the first paragraph of Article 267 TFEU confers jurisdiction on the Court to give preliminary rulings concerning both the interpretation of the acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union and the validity of those acts. That is not in the case as regards adjustments set out in an annex to an Act of Accession which are to be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State and which do not constitute an act of an institution, but are provisions of primary law which may not be suspended, amended or repealed otherwise than by means of the procedures laid down for the revision of the original Treaties. In that regard, Article 20(2) of Regulation No 1768/92 concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products was inserted into that regulation by the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded. Regulation No 469/2009 consolidated Regulation No 1768/92, so that Article 20(2) of Regulation No 1768/92 became Article 21(2) of Regulation No 469/2009.

(see paras 26, 27, 29, 30, 33, operative part 1)
The provisions of Directive 2006/112, as amended by Directive 2010/45, and the principles of fiscal neutrality, effectiveness and proportionality must be interpreted to the effect that, in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, they do not preclude the purchaser of an item of property from being deprived of the right to deduct the value added tax which he paid to the seller when that tax was not due, on the basis of an invoice drawn up in accordance with the rules of the ordinary value added tax regime, where the relevant transaction came under the reverse charge mechanism, and the seller paid that tax to the Treasury. However, to the extent that reimbursement of the unduly invoiced value added tax by the seller to the purchaser becomes impossible or excessively difficult, in particular in the case of the insolvency of the seller, those principles require that the purchaser be able to address his application for reimbursement to the tax authority directly.

Given that, in principle, it falls to the Member States to determine the conditions in which improperly invoiced VAT may be adjusted, the Court has accepted that a system in which, first, the seller of the property who has paid the VAT to the tax authority in error may seek to be reimbursed and, secondly, the purchaser of that property may bring a civil law action against that seller for recovery of the sums paid but not due, observes the principles of neutrality and effectiveness. Such a system enables the purchaser who bore the tax invoiced in error to obtain reimbursement of the sums unduly paid (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 March 2007, Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken, C‑35/05, EU:C:2007:167, paragraphs 38 and 39 and the case-law cited).

However, if reimbursement of the VAT becomes impossible or excessively difficult, in particular in the case of the insolvency of the seller, the principle of effectiveness may require that the purchaser of the property concerned be able to address his application for reimbursement to the tax authority directly. Thus, the Member States must provide for the instruments and the detailed procedural rules necessary to enable the purchaser to recover the unduly invoiced tax in order to respect the principle of effectiveness (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 March 2007, Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken, C‑35/05, EU:C:2007:167, paragraph 41).

(see paragraphs 51, 53, 57, operative part 2)
Directive 2003/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 on type-approval of agricultural or forestry tractors, their trailers and interchangeable towed machinery, together with their systems, components and separate technical units and repealing Directive 74/150/EEC, as amended by Commission Directive 2014/44/EU of 18 March 2014, must be interpreted as meaning that the first placing on the market and the registration in a Member State of used or second-hand tractors imported from a third country are subject to compliance with the technical requirements laid down by that directive.

The EU type-approval procedure, as provided for by the EU legislature, is thus based on the principle of mutual recognition of the monitoring carried out by the approval authorities of the various Member States of compliance with the requirements set out in Directive 2003/37 and in the separate directives set out in Annex II, Chapter B, thereto (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 November 2010, Lahousse and Lavichy, C‑142/09, EU:C:2010:694, paragraph 27). Its objective is to guarantee and promote the operation of the internal market while safeguarding road safety, the environment and safety at work. Having regard to its characteristics, the system established by the directive is intended, in respect of vehicles manufactured within the European Union, to apply to new vehicles. All vehicles which, when new, came under Directive 2003/37 and were entered into service within the European Union were consequently covered by EC type-approval.

However, it must be pointed out, as the Advocate General observed in point 66 of his Opinion, that the system established by Directive 2003/37 has the aim of ensuring that all vehicles, new or used, which belong to specified categories and which are placed on the EU market for the first time, from 1 July 2009 in respect of vehicles in categories T1, T2 and T3, comply with the technical requirements laid down in that directive. Accordingly, it must be held that a second-hand vehicle imported from a third country which does not have EC type-approval and is intended to be used for the first time within the European Union is a ‘new vehicle’, within the meaning of Directive 2003/37.

(see paras 27, 30, 31, 36, 37, operative part 1)
Articles 3, 8 and 12 of Council Directive 2003/8/EC of 27 January 2003 to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes by establishing minimum common rules relating to legal aid for such disputes, read together, must be interpreted as meaning that legal aid granted by the Member State of the court hearing the particular case, in which a natural person domiciled or resident in another Member State has submitted a legal aid application in the context of a cross-border dispute, also covers the costs paid by that person for the translation of the supporting documents necessary for the processing of that application.

With regard to the procedure for the introduction of legal aid applications in order to ensure effective access to justice, Article 13(1) of Directive 2003/8 provides that a legal aid applicant has two options in so far as he may submit the legal aid application either to the competent authority of the Member State in which he is domiciled or habitually resident, which is designated, under Article 13(1)(a) of that directive, as the transmitting authority, or to the competent authority of the Member State in which the court dealing with the case is sitting or where the decision is to be enforced, which is designated, under Article 13(1)(b) of that directive, as the receiving authority. However, if the costs connected with the translation of the supporting documents necessary for the processing of a legal aid application were covered only when the legal aid applicant addresses them to the competent authorities in the Member State in which he is domiciled or habitually resident, that would incorrectly make securing legal aid in respect of those costs dependent on the procedural option chosen by the applicant and would render meaningless Article 13(1)(b) of Directive 2003/8, which offers the possibility of presenting the legal aid application directly to the receiving authority.

(see paras 29, 43, 47, operative part)
Case C‑465/15

Hüttenwerke Krupp Mannesmann GmbH

v

Hauptzollamt Duisburg

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Finanzgericht Düsseldorf)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Taxation — Taxation of energy products and electricity — Directive 2003/96/CE — Scope — Article 2(4)(b) — Electricity used principally for the purposes of chemical reduction — Concept)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber), 7 September 2017

Tax provisions — Harmonisation of laws — Taxation of energy products and electricity — Directive 2003/96 — Electricity used principally for the purposes of chemical reduction — Concept — Electricity used for the operation of turbo blowers intended to compress the air subsequently used in a chemical reduction production process — Not included

(Council Directive 2003/96, Art. 2(4)(b), third indent)

The third indent of Article 2(4)(b) of Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity must be interpreted as meaning that the electricity used for the operation of turbo blowers intended to compress the air subsequently used in a blast furnace in the process of producing pig iron by chemical reduction of iron ore is not ‘electricity used principally for the purposes of chemical reduction’ within the meaning of that provision.

(see para 32, operative part)
The second subparagraph of Article 1(9) of Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, as amended by Commission Regulation (EU) No 1251/2011 of 30 November 2011, must be interpreted as meaning that a company which, on the one hand, is wholly owned by a contracting authority whose activity consists of meeting needs in the general interest and which, on the other, carries out both transactions for that contracting authority and transactions on the competitive market must be classified as a ‘body governed by public law’ within the meaning of that provision, provided that the activities of that company are necessary for the contracting authority to exercise its own activity and, in order to meet needs in the general interest, that company is able to be guided by non-economic considerations, which it is for the referring court to ascertain. The fact that the value of the internal transactions may in future represent less than 90% or an insignificant part of the overall turnover of the company is irrelevant in that regard.

(see para. 48, operative part)
Article 107(1) TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the revenue of a public broadcaster deriving from the sale of its advertising space by another public undertaking constitutes State resources, provided that the entire distribution channel of that revenue ending with its transfer to that broadcaster is governed by the national legislation, under which public undertakings specially appointed by the State have the task of administering that revenue.

The concept of intervention ‘through State resources’, within the meaning of that provision, is intended to cover, in addition to advantages granted directly by a State, those granted through a public or private body appointed or established by that State to administer the aid. EU law cannot permit the rules on State aid to be circumvented merely through the creation of autonomous institutions charged with allocating aid

Further, since the resources of public undertakings are subject to the control of the State and are therefore at its disposal, those resources fall within the scope of the concept of ‘State resources’, within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. The State is perfectly capable, by exercising its dominant influence over such undertakings, of directing the use of their resources in order, as the occasion arises, to finance specific advantages in favour of other undertakings. The fact that the resources concerned may be administered by entities that are distinct from the public authorities or that the source of those resources may be private is of no significance in that regard.

(see paras 36, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45)
16

Since it considers that the Court’s case-law does not contain all the information it considers necessary in order to rule on the dispute before it, the markkinaoikeus (Market Court) stayed the proceedings and referred the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) When assessing where there has been an “evocation” within the meaning of Article 16(b) of Regulation [No 110/2008], should reference be made to an average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect? (2) When assessing whether to prohibit the use of the name Verlados used to market nationally a spirit drink distilled from apples in order to protect the geographical indication “Calvados”, what importance should be given to the following facts in the interpretation of the concept of “evocation” in Article 16(b) of Regulation No 110/2008 and the application of that regulation: (a) the first part of the name Verlados, Verla, is a village in Finland whose name may be recognised by Finnish consumers; (b) the first part of the name Verlados, Verla, refers to the producer of Verlados, Viiniverla Oy; (c) Verlados is a local product produced in Verla village of which a few hundred litres on average are sold each year in the winery’s own restaurant and a limited amount by order from the State-owned alcohol business referred to in the Law on alcohol; (d) the words Verlados and Calvados have only one syllable in common (“dos”) out of three, although the last four letters (“ados”) of the words, that is, half of the total number of letter in each word, are identical? (3) If there is considered to be an “evocation” within the meaning of Article 16(b) of Regulation No 110/2008, may the use of the name Verlados nevertheless be authorised on one of the grounds mentioned above or on other grounds, such as that Finnish consumers at least are unlikely to imagine that Verlados is produced in France?’
10

Article 28 of Directive 2013/32, entitled ‘Procedure in the event of implicit withdrawal or abandonment of the application’, provides, in paragraphs 1 and 2: ‘1. When there is reasonable cause to consider that an applicant has implicitly withdrawn or abandoned his or her application, Member States shall ensure that the determining authority takes a decision either to discontinue the examination or, provided that the determining authority considers the application to be unfounded on the basis of an adequate examination of its substance in line with Article 4 of Directive 2011/95/EU [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9)], to reject the application. Member States may assume that the applicant has implicitly withdrawn or abandoned his or her application for international protection in particular when it is ascertained that: ... (b) he or she has absconded or left without authorisation the place where he or she lived or was held, without contacting the competent authority within a reasonable time, or he or she has not within a reasonable time complied with reporting duties or other obligations to communicate, unless the applicant demonstrates that this was due to circumstances beyond his or her control. For the purposes of implementing these provisions, Member States may lay down time limits or guidelines. 2. Member States shall ensure that an applicant who reports again to the competent authority after a decision to discontinue as referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article is taken, is entitled to request that his or her case be reopened or to make a new application which shall not be subject to the procedure referred to in Articles 40 and 41. ... Member States may allow the determining authority to resume the examination at the stage where it was discontinued.’
4

The first part of the CN, relating to the ‘Preliminary provisions’, includes Section I, on ‘General Rules’, part A of which, entitled ‘General rules for the interpretation of the Combined Nomenclature’, provides inter alia as follows: ‘Classification of goods in the [CN] shall be governed by the following principles. 1. The titles of sections, chapters and sub-chapters are provided for ease of reference only; for legal purposes, classification shall be determined according to the terms of the headings and any relative section or chapter notes and, provided such headings or notes do not otherwise require, according to the following provisions. 2. ... (b) Any reference in a heading to a material or substance shall be taken to include a reference to mixtures or combinations of that material or substance with other materials or substances. Any reference to goods of a given material or substance shall be taken to include a reference to goods consisting wholly or partly of such material or substance. The classification of goods consisting of more than one material or substance shall be according to the principles of rule 3. 3. When, by application of rule 2(b) or for any other reason, goods are prima facie classifiable under two or more headings, classification shall be effected as follows: ... (b) mixtures, composite goods consisting of different materials or made up of different components, and goods put up in sets for retail sale, which cannot be classified by reference to 3(a), shall be classified as if they consisted of the material or component which gives them their essential character, in so far as this criterion is applicable; (c) when goods cannot be classified by reference to 3(a) or (b), they shall be classified under the heading which occurs last in numerical order among those which equally merit consideration. ... 6. For legal purposes, the classification of goods in the subheadings of a heading shall be determined according to the terms of those subheadings and any related subheading notes and, mutatis mutandis, to the above rules, on the understanding that only subheadings at the same level are comparable. For the purposes of this rule, the relative section and chapter notes also apply, unless the context requires otherwise.’
4

Article 67 of that regulation, entitled ‘Aggregation of periods of insurance or employment’, is worded as follows: ‘1. The competent institution of a Member State whose legislation makes the acquisition, retention or recovery of the right to benefits subject to the completion of periods of insurance shall take into account, to the extent necessary, periods of insurance or employment completed as an employed person under the legislation of any other Member State, as though they were periods of insurance completed under the legislation which it administers, provided, however, that the periods of employment would have been counted as periods of insurance had they been completed under that legislation. 2. The competent institution of a Member State whose legislation makes the acquisition, retention or recovery of the right to benefits subject to the completion of periods of employment shall take into account, to the extent necessary, periods of insurance or employment completed as an employed person under the legislation of any other Member State, as though they were periods of employment completed under the legislation which it administers. 3. Except in the cases referred to in Article 71(1)(a)(ii) and (b)(ii), application of the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be subject to the condition that the person concerned should have completed lastly: — in the case of paragraph 1, periods of insurance, — in the case of paragraph 2, periods of employment, in accordance with the provisions of the legislation under which the benefits are claimed. 4. Where the length of the period during which benefits may be granted depends on the length of periods of insurance or employment, the provisions of paragraph 1 or 2 shall apply, as appropriate.’