Commission européenne, DG COMP MERGER REGISTRY, 1049 Bruxelles, BELGIQUE  
Europese Commissie, DG COMP MERGER REGISTRY, 1049 Brussel,  BELGIË  
 
Tel: +32 229- 91111. Fax: +32 229 -64301. E -mail: COMP -MERGER -REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu.   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  
Brussels, 26.10.2020 
C(2020)  7540 final  
PUBLIC VERSION  
 
LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE 
22 avenue Montaigne  
75008 Paris  
France  
Subject : Case M. 9695 – LVMH/Tiffany  
Commission decision pursuant to Articl e 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation 
No 139/20041 and Article 57 of the Agreement on the European Economic 
Area2 
Dear Sir or Madam,  
(1) On 21 September 2020, the European Commission received notification of a 
concentration pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger Regulation resulting from a 
proposed transaction whereby LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton (‘LVMH’ or 
the ‘Notifying Party’, France) intends to acquire control, within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation, of the whole of Tiffany & Co. (‘Tiffany’, USA) by way of purchase of shares (the ‘Transaction’). LVMH and Tiffany are referred to hereinafter as the ‘Parties’
3.  
                                                 
1  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the “Merger Regulation”). With effect from 1 December 2009,  the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) has introduced certain changes, such as the 
replacement of “Community” by “Union” and “common market” by “internal market”. The 
terminology of the TFEU will be used throughout this  decision.  
2  OJ L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3 (the “EEA Agreement”).  
3  Publication in the Official Journal of the European Union No C 321, 29.9.2020 , p. 43. 
In the published version of this decision, 
some information has been omitted 
pursuant to Article 17(2) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 concerning 
non-disclosure of business secrets and other  
confidential information. The omissions are 
shown thus […] . Where possible the 
information omitted has been replaced by 
ranges of figures or a general description.  
 
2 1. THE PARTIES  
(2) LVMH  is active worldwide in the manufacture and supply of luxury goods and 
operates a portfolio of 75 brands in the following areas: (i) wines and spirits; 
(ii) fashion and leather goods; (iii) perfumes and cosmetics; (iv) watches and jewellery (with brands su ch as Bulgari, Fred, Chaumet, Repossi, TAG Heuer, 
Zenith, Hublot, Louis Vuitton, Christian Dior); and (v) selective retailing. LVMH 
also engages to a lesser extent in certain other activities, including the luxury yachts, 
media, and hospitality industries. Each LVMH business group includes a range of  
brands , known as  ‘Maisons ’. LVMH’s ultimate parent entity is Groupe Arnault 
SEDCS (France).  
(3) Tiffany  is active worldwide in the design, production, and distribution of luxury 
jewellery. Tiffany also has limited  activities in other luxury goods, including 
watches, fragrance products, leather goods, eyewear, as well as home products and 
accessories. No shareholder holds an interest in Tiffany that is sufficient to confer control.  
2. T
HE OPERATION  
(4) The Transaction will  be implemented pursuant to a n Agreement and Plan of Merger 
(the ‘Merger Agreement ’) entered into on 24 November 2019 according to which an 
indirect 100% subsidiary of LVMH will be merged with and into Tiffany,4 resulting 
in Tiffany as the surviving legal entity under LVMH’s sole indirect ownership, with 
Tiffany’s existing shareholders receiving a cash consideration of USD 135 per share. 
Upon completion of the Transaction, Tiffany will become a wholly- owned indirect 
subsidiary of LVMH.  
(5) As a result, the proposed Transaction qualifies as a concentration pursuant to Article  3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation.  
3. EU
 DIMENSION  
(6) The combined aggregate worldwide turnover of LVMH and Tiffany exceeded 
EUR 5 000 million in 2018 (LVMH: EUR […] , Tiffany: EUR […]). Each of the 
Parties had a Union wide turnover in excess of EUR 250 million in 2018 (LVMH:  EUR […], Tiffany: EUR […]), and the y did not achieve more than 
two-thirds of their aggregate Union -wide turnover within the same Member State.  
(7) As a result, the proposed Tran saction has a Union dimension pursuant to Article 1(2) 
of the Merger Regulation.  
                                                 
4  Pursuant to the Merger Agreement , upon consummation of the merger, at  the shareholder level, all 
Tiffany  shares (other than those owned by Tiffany or LVMH, or either of their respective wholly -
owned subsidiaries) will be converted into the right to receive an amount in cash equal to USD 135. 
At the corporate level, all shares of the indirect 100% subsidiary of LVMH merging  with and into 
Tiffany  will be converted into Tiffany shares (as the surviving corporation), which will then be the 
only outstanding Tiffany shares (because the original Tiffany shares were converted into cash). As a 
result, after the merger, Tiffany will become a wholly owned indirect subsidiary of LVMH . 
 
3 4. MARKET DEFINITION  
(8) LVMH and Tiffany are both active worldwide in the manufacture and supply of 
luxury goods, including jewellery, watches, perfumes, leather goods, eyewear, 
accessories and home products, although Tiffany mainly manufactures and sells luxury 
jewellery and has limited activities in other luxury good categories .5  
4.1. Product market definition  
(9) According to the Notifying Party, l uxury goods are products that can be defi ned by 
tangible characteristics like high quality, design, a rich creative content, high prices, 
as well as intangible characteristics, such as an aura of exclusivity and a prestigious 
image.6 
4.1.1. The Commission’s precedents  
(10) In the past,7 the Commission has co nsidered that luxury products should be 
distinguished from mass -market goods, as they do not share the same characteristics 
(luxury goods are characterized by relatively high prices, rich creative content and are marketed under a prestige trademark). The C ommission has also previously 
assessed whether the relevant market should be considered as encompassing all luxury products, whether a distinction should be made between different categories 
of luxury goods such as (i) fashion and leather goods, including accessories, 
(ii) perfumes and cosmetics and (iii) watches and jewellery, or whether these categories should be further subdivided into narrower distinct product markets.
8 The 
Commission has ultimately left the market definition open in this regard.  
(11) As to the production and sale of luxury jewellery, the following sub- segmentations 
have been considered by the Commission in the past:9 jewels, women high jewellery 
(≥ EUR 50 000), women jewellery ( EUR >5 000 - <50 000), bridal jewellery, 
women access jewellery (EUR > 600 -  <5 000)  and men jewellery.  
(12) As to the production and sale of luxury watches, the following sub- segmentations 
have been considered by the Commission in the past:10 watches, men watches 
(EUR <10 000), men watches ( EUR ≥10 000), women watches ( EUR <10 000), 
women watches (EUR ≥ 10 000) and unisex watches.  
(13) In De Beers/LVMH,11 respondents to the market investigation stated that the precise 
market definition could be  a market for fine jewellery, which would include jewels 
with precious gem set (diamond, ruby, emerald, sapphire in platinum or gold setting) 
                                                 
5  Tiffany’s revenues (EUR thousands) per product category for 2019 are: all luxury products (EUR  […] 
worldwide, EUR […]  in the EEA), watches and jewellery (EUR […]  worldwide, EUR […]  in the  
EEA), jewellery (EUR […]  worldwide, EUR […]  in the EEA) and watches (EUR […] worldwide, 
EUR […] in the EEA), perfumes and cosmetics (EUR  […] worldwide, EUR […] in the EEA), 
fashion and leather products (EUR […] worldwide, EUR […] in the EEA) and home prod ucts 
(EUR  […] worldwide, EUR […] in the EEA) (Source: Annex RFI1.4 to the Form CO – Parties 
Shares).  
6  Form CO, paragraph 6.46.  
7  Case M.6212 – LVMH /Bulgari , Commission decision of 29 June 2011, para. 15.  
8  Case M.6212 – LVMH /Bulgari , Commission decision of 29 June 2011, para. 17.  
9  Case M.6212 – LVMH /Bulgari , Commission decision of 29 June 2011, footnote 12.  
10  Case M.6212 – LVMH /Bulgari , Commission decision of 29 June 2011, footnote 12.  
11  Case M.2333 – De Beers /LVMH , Commission decision of 25 July 2001, para. 28.  
 
4 different from semi -precious jewels (such as amethyst, aquamarine, tourmaline in 
gold or silver setting) and costume jewellery (imitation stones in base metals, gold -
plated settings).12 Furthermore, the Commission assessed whether diamond jewellery 
manufactured using polished diamonds of higher quality represents a separate 
relevant market and whether there exists a separate relevant market for branded diamond jewellery within a wider market for diamond jewellery (but did not gather sufficient evidence to be able to reach a conclusion in that regard).
13 The 
Commission also considered whether there exists a separate relevant market for 
branded diamond jewellery but  finally concluded that the relevant product  market in 
that case was the retail of diamond jewellery  since the competition assessment would 
remain the same irrespective of the definition chosen  (branded/unbranded) . 
(14) Regarding the distribution of luxury products, the Commission has considered in 
past cases that the distribution of luxury products through selective travel retail 
outlets (retail outlets at airports, on -board aircraft, on- board ships) constitutes a 
separate product market distinct from other selective distribution networks.14 
4.1.2. The Notifying  Party’s view  
(15) According to LVMH, luxury goods should generally be distinguished from mass -
market products . The Notifying Party further submits that all luxury goods belong to 
the same product market as they present homogeneous characteristics and fulfil th e 
same function, i.e., to establish a relationship to the luxury universe.15 In addition, 
LVMH submits that l uxury goods are characterised by the same commercial 
strategies as : 
(a) all luxury goods are only marketed through directly owned stores or selective 
distribution channels presenting high- standard qualitative criteria, which 
preserve the exclusive image of the products;  
(b) luxury good are very qualitative in terms of the materials used, the creative design and craftsmanship;  and 
(c) all luxury goods are sold under distinguishing exclusive and prestige image and monetary value.  
(16) As a result , LVMH argues that, from a demand -side perspective, consumers always 
adhere to the luxury universe of the corresponding luxury goods player and perceive 
the same distinguishing values regardless of the specific type of good that they 
purchase, and regardless of their practical function. LVMH submits that consumers 
of luxury goods are driven by “emotional” and suggestive desires, rather than by practical needs.
16 
(17) LVMH further arg ues that, from a supply- side perspective, the different categories of 
luxury goods are complementary. According to LVMH, once a luxury player has 
                                                 
12  The difference being in the distribution and sales channels since fine jewellery or diamond jewellery 
is most ly exclusively sold through high -end independent sellers or exclusive jewellery chain stores.  
13  Case M.2333 – De Beers /LVM H, Commission decision of 25 July 2001, paras. 30 -31. 
14  Cases M.5068 L'Oréal /YSL Beauté , Commission's decision of 21 May 2008, para. 15 and M.6212 –  
LVMH /Bulgari , Commission decision of 29 June 2011, para. 20.  
15  Form CO, paragraph 6.46.  
16  Form CO, parag raphs 6.46 – 6.48.  
 
5 been established, extending the range of products is usually not very costly and most 
luxury goods players have indeed developed a wide range of heterogeneous products, including in particular watches and jewellery. Moreover, LVMH argues 
that there is consistency in luxury players’ marketing and distribution strategies 
across all luxury products offered , which ens ures that all their luxury goods are 
always sold pursuant to the same qualitative standards.
17 
(18) Accordingly, the Notifying Party submits that a single product market encompassing all luxury goods should be retained for the purposes of assessing the Transacti on. In 
any case, LVMH considers that the relevant product market can  be left open, as the 
Transaction would not raise any competitive concerns even if the market for luxury 
goods were to be sub- segmented.
18 
4.1.3. The Commission’s assessment  
4.1.3.1. Luxury goods   
(19) The mark et investigation conducted in the present case confirmed the Commission ’s 
findings in previous cases that luxury products should be distinguished from mass -
market  goods, as they do not share the same characteristics.  
(20) An overwhelming majority of the Parties’ customers19 and competitors who 
expressed an opinion in the market investigation on this point submitted that luxury 
goods are distinct from mass- market goods.20 As one competitor stated: ‘[l] uxury 
goods differ from mass market ones in terms of creation and design, nature and 
value of the materials used, high quality of the manufacturing, price level, brand’s image and prestige, customers’ expectations as well as level of service rendered to 
them . Luxury goods have thus a low level of substitutab ility with mass markets 
goods ’.
21 Another competitor indicated  that ‘[l]uxury goods, including luxury 
jewellery and watches, differ from mass market goods with regards to (i) price, 
(ii) quality and (iii) image. Luxury products are sold at relatively high prices, and 
this higher pricing as compared to mass market goods is the result of their high quality and cost - including the quality of materials used, manufacturing processes, 
and the uniqueness of designs and contents -, and the prestige and exclusivity aura 
of the trademarks under which these products are marketed ’.
22 
(21) Customers responding to the market investigation share the same view: ‘ [l]uxury 
goods market is represented with higher value and quality goods. Luxury goods 
brand positioning, visualisation and sales environment is clearly defined and highly 
organized. Personal service and personality of goods is very important ’; ‘[l] uxury 
goods are defined by their price, distribution channels, in -house, hand-  
                                                 
17  Form CO, paragraph 6.54.  
18  Form CO, paragraph 6.59.  
19  For the purposes of describing the results of the market investigation that led to this decision, 
references to the Parties’ customers are to independent retailers of luxury products.  
20  Questionnaire to competitors, question 4; questionnaire to customers, question 6.  
21  Questionnaire to competitors, question 4.2.  
22  Questionnaire to competitors, question 4.2.  
 
6 manufacturing, the use of precious materials, t heir design and overall 
technicity/high -quality ’.23 
(22) In addition, the majority of the Parties’ competitors and an overwhelming majority 
of customers consider that , from a demand- side perspective,  it is appropriate to 
distinguish separate product markets for:24 (i) luxury fashion and leather goods; 
(ii) luxury fashion accessories and eyewear; (iii) luxury watches and jewellery; 
(iv) luxury perfumes and cosmetics; and (v) luxury home products, due to their 
limited substitutability in terms of e.g. product charac teristics, function, purpose 
and/or prices.  
(23) At least as far as jewellery and watches are concerned, the outcome of the market 
investigation therefore does not support a finding of interchangeability across luxury 
products (bags, jewellery) , as advocated b y the Notifying Party,  or even between 
tangible luxury products and luxury experiences (fine dining, wine tasting, cruises  
and other luxury travels ) or art pieces.25 Rather, although there might be a diversity 
of individual preferences in that respect,26 consumers tend to view luxury jewellery 
and watches as a distinctive product category on its own. Moreover, as one 
competitor indicated:  ‘[t]he purchase experience is (…)  different across segments; 
traditionally, customers purchase ready -to-wear or leather goods for their own use, 
whereas purchases of jewellery and watches are also designed as gifts’ .27 
(24) From the supply- side perspective, the replies to the market investigation are mixed 
as to whether suppliers of luxury goods are generally capable of offering a wide 
range of heterogeneous products and/or are easily able to expand their existing 
product lines to other areas of the luxury industry.28 One competitor explained that 
‘[i]t is difficult for suppliers of luxury goods to expand to other areas of the luxury  
industry especially luxury jewellery and watches’.29 Another competitor explained 
that brands that originally sell leather or ready -to-wear fashion can  relatively easily  
expand their offering and cover most market segments within luxury, whereas 
brands with a different origin (shoes, jewellery) will typically experience more difficulty moving into other luxury categories  (such as leather or ready -to-wear 
fashion) .
30 The same competitor indicated that ‘ [j]ewellery and watchmaking are 
very specific activities and most luxury brands originally active in leather of ready -
to-wear that have tried to enter these markets have not had great success (…), as of 
now, consumers tend to favor pure player brands for hard luxury products, 
especially for watches ’.31 However, a third competitor explained that ‘[t]here are 
numerous examples of luxury goods suppliers which have been able to expand their 
offering to a wide range of heterogeneous products such as Chanel (from fashion, to 
                                                 
23  Questionnaire to customers, question 6.2.  
24  Questionnaire to competitors, question 7; questionnaire to customers, question 11.  
25  Minutes of a call with a competitor, 17 July 2020.  
26  Questionnaire to competitors, question 7.1: ‘ [w]hilst some purchasers’ primary objective is simply to 
purchase a luxury item (which may  be a designer handbag, a fashion item, a fashion accessory, a 
watch or a piece of jewellery), others specifically wish to purchase a piece of a certain product 
category (e.g. a piece of jewellery or a designer handbag) ’. 
27  Minutes of a call with a compet itor, 2 July 2020.  
28  Questionnaire to competitors, question 20.  
29  Questionnaire to competitors, question 20.1.  
30  Minutes of a call with a competitor, 2 July 2020.  
31  Questionnaire to competitors, question 20.1.  
 
7 perfumes, to bags to jewellery), G ucci, Louis Vuitton, Christian Dior, etc .’ and 
‘[t]hey are typically able to do this thanks to having a strong brand equity (i.e. trust 
and desire in the eyes of the consumer) which is credibly applied to a range of 
products ’.32  
(25) On balance, taking also int o account the considerations summarized in the next 
section 4.4.2., the outcome of the market investigation points towards the existence 
of distinct markets  for luxury jewellery and/or watches. However, s ince the 
Transaction does not raise competition conc erns irrespective of the exact product 
market definition , it can be left open whether (i) luxury fashion and leather goods; 
(ii) luxury fashion accessories and eyewear; (iii) luxury watches and jewellery; (iv) luxury perfumes and cosmetics; and (v) luxury home products , should be 
considered as separate product markets within the luxury goods category . In any 
event , as 
Tiffany has limited activities in luxury fashion and leather goods, luxury 
fashion accessories and eyewear, luxury perfumes and cosmetics and luxury home products, these products are not further discussed in this Section .
33  
4.1.3.2. Luxury watches and jewellery  
(26) Within  luxury watches and jewellery, a predominant number of competitors and the 
majority of customers who expressed an opinion distinguish separate product 
markets for luxury jewellery , on the one hand, and luxury watches, on the other 
hand, due to their limited substitutability (in terms of  e.g. product characteristics, 
function, purpose and/or prices).34  
(27) From a demand- side perspective, luxury jewellery and watches have different 
functionalities, although they both can be high quality articles with a relatively high 
price and confer an aura of exclusivity and a prestigious image. From a supply- side 
perspective, the manufacturing skills and expertise required to produce luxury jewellery and watches seem to also differ significantly.  
(28) In this regard, a competitor explained that ‘[w]hile luxury watches and luxury 
jewellery are probably more closely related between themselves than with other ‘soft’ luxury products, they differ in several ways: [f] irst, the manufacturing skills 
and expertise required to produce them differ significantly (…)’ and ‘in 
watchmaking, a significant added value is linked to the movement, which is both a combination of high- tech industrial production processes to produce the different 
components of the movement and of craftsmanship when it comes to the assembly of 
the movement ’.
35 The same competitor further explained that  ‘watches have a 
functional and practical purpose that is absent in jewellery which are purely 
decorative and symbolical ’; ‘[jewellery]  is still a predominantly women product, 
while watches are s till more targeted towards men ’; ‘the watch market tends to be 
more brand driven in general than the jewellery one ’. In conclusion, this competitor 
                                                 
32  Questionnaire to competitors, question 20.1.  
33  Tiffany’s market shares in the EEA , based on the sales figures referred to in footnote 5,  for the 
respective product categories are: (i) [0 -5]% for luxury fashion and leather goods (including 
accessories and eyewear); (ii) [0-5]% for luxury perfumes and cosmetics; and (iii) [0-5]% for luxury 
home products. In 2019, these activities collectively accounted for c. […]% of Tiffany’s worldwide 
revenues, and l ess than […]% of its EEA revenues (Source:  Annex RFI1.4 to the Form CO –  Parties 
Shares ). 
34  Questionnaire to competitors, question 8; questionnaire to customers, question 12.  
35  Questionnaire to competitors, question 8.1.  
 
8 explained that  ‘[t]hese elements tend to indicate that the two types of product most 
probably cannot be cons idered as substitutes both from an offer and demand 
perspective.’  
(29) Customers have voiced similar considerations in response to the market 
investigation. As one customer explained,36 ‘[t]he intrinsic value may be driven by 
different elements in watches compa red to jewellery. For example, the materials 
used in jewellery (the underlying precious metals and gemstones), complexity of 
design and rarity of product all influence both the value and demand for particular 
products. For watches, the complexity and craft smanship involved in their 
manufacture, heavily influence the desirability – in many cases a non- precious metal 
(stainless steel) will be used. In some designs precious metals and gemstones will 
also be used, which adds further value ’. 
(30) In general, the Part ies’ customers that responded to the market investigation suggest 
that the supply of  luxury jewellery and watches is adjacent but separate for multiple 
reasons: the products are definitely different ; the targeted clients are also different  
(even if the target group remain s, for both, wealthy individuals, luxury watches are 
more focused on men and jewellery is more focused on women); buying occasions 
(i.e. the moments in life at which and reasons for which either product is bought) 
often  are different ; and finally, few brands have a well balanced portfolio between 
luxury watches and jewellery:  most are primarily  specialized on one of these two  
categories.37 
(31) The results of the market investigation therefore points towards the existence of 
distinc t markets for luxury watches, on the one hand, and luxury jewellery, on the 
other hand. However, since the Transaction does not raise competition concerns irrespective of any distinction between luxury watches and jewellery, the exact market definition can  be left open in the present case.  
4.1.3.3. Luxury jewellery  
(32) Customers generally consider that the main elements defining luxury jewellery  are 
the use of precious metals and gemstones, high prices, design, quality, as well as ‘[e]xclusivity of materials (gold alloy, 4C of diamonds, usage of gemstones) and 
craftsmanship ’ and ‘ [m]aterial, uniqueness, exclusivity, availability ’.
38 
(33) A majority of  customers that responded to the market investigation consider that the 
relevant price point above which jewellery can be considered as ‘luxury’ is EUR 1 000.
39  
(34) However, the responses of the Parties’ competitors are mixed  in this regard .40 One 
competitor explained that ‘ [w]hile luxury jewellery is priced higher than mass 
market jewellery, it is difficult to identify a specific  price point below which a 
jewellery piece cannot be considered as luxury’ .41 According to such competitor  
                                                 
36  Questionnaire to customers, question 12.1.  
37  Questionnaire to customers, question 12.1.  
38  Questionnaire t o customers, question 9.  
39  Questionnaire to customers, question 10.  
40  Questionnaire to competitors, question 6.  
41  Questionnaire to competitors, question 6.1.  
 
9 ‘[s]ome luxury pieces are sold at relatively low prices (e.g. below €500) ’ and ‘ [t]he 
main differentiator between luxury and mass market is the luxury positioning of the 
brand/supplier on the market, and this positioning has an impact on the price of the 
pieces, especially for branded jewellery ’. However, the same competitor also  
explained that ‘ there is clearly a distinct market for [jewellery] pieces above 
€50 000’.42 Another competitor explained that ‘ [t]here is no clearly identifiable 
price point above which jewellery can be considered as “luxury”  as ‘[w]hat is 
“luxury” is ultimately a matter of intangible consumer preferences and their 
perception of the aspirational nature of any brand and its positioning, including 
price’.43  
(35) According to the Notifying Party, LVMH’s brands selling luxury jewellery set out different entry price levels, all of which are nonetheless above EUR 600.
44 Unlike 
LVMH’s brands, Tiffany seem to have significant luxury jewellery sales below EUR 600 (c. […]% worldwide and c. […]% in the EEA in 2019). Internal reports of Tiffany show that Tiffany uses price thresholds around or below […]  in categorizing 
its competitors’ luxury goods offerings.
45 
(36) The market investigation also  revealed that there seems to be at least one  categor y of 
jewellery between mass- market and luxury jewellery , known as ‘demi -fine’, 
‘premium f ashion’ or ‘costume’ jewellery, with pieces made of gold vermeil, gold 
plated silver, pearls and semi -precious gemstones. However, the results of the 
market investigation are not conclusive as to the price points for such intermediate 
category  of products.46 
(37) The results of the market investigation also suggest that it is appropr iate to further 
segment the supply of luxury jewellery to better defi ne the specific competitive 
dynamics of different products included therein. However, the replies obtained from 
customers and competitors are not conclusive as to the most appropriate segmentation.
47 While some market participants suggest a market segmentation 
between branded/unbranded jewellery, others make a distinction according to price points (e.g. fine and high jewellery), bridal/non bridal, silver/gold/other and by end use (e.g. e arrings, bracelets, necklaces, rings, etc.).
48 
(38) As to the distinction between branded and unbranded jewellery, specifically , a 
majority of competitors and an overwhelming majority of customers consider that it 
is appropriate to distinguish separate product m arkets for branded luxury jewellery, 
on the one hand, and unbranded luxury jewellery, on the other hand.49  
(39) The market investigation has revealed that, f rom a supply- side perspective, the 
materials used and the quality of manufacturing may  be equivalent  in branded and 
unbranded jewellery . However, branded and unbranded luxury jewellery have 
                                                 
42  Minutes of a call with a competitor, 2 July 2020.  
43  Questionnaire to competitors, question 6.1.  
44  Form CO, paragraph 6.73.  
45  Form CO, paragraph 6.75 and Annex RFI1.30 to the Form CO, ‘Tiffany, RTT Competitive Analysis, 
August 5, 2019’.  
46  Questionnaire to competitors, question 6.2.  
47  Questionnaire to competitors, question 13, questionnaire to customers, question 16.  
48  Questionnaire to competitors, question 13.1, questionnaire to customers, question 16.1.  
49  Questionnaire to competitors, question 14, questionnaire to customers, question 17.  
 
10 different cost structures as manufacturers of unbranded luxury jewellery have lower 
expenses and fixed costs than brands , including those related to marketing support or 
operation of stores networks. In addition, the market dynamics seem to be different for branded and unbranded luxury jewellery: as one competitor explained,
50 ‘[w]hile 
non-branded luxury jewellery exerts some competitive pressure on similar branded 
jewellery, the consumption pattern is essentially not the same for somebody buying 
branded and unbranded jewellery ’; ‘the reality is that someone buying branded 
jewellery is buying the brand (…) ’. The same competitor explained that ‘ [b]randed 
products are mainly d riven by brand image through communication, marketing, 
retail locations and identifiable designs, whereas the demand of non- branded 
products is essentially driven by product characteristics and price’ and ‘ [t]here is 
also a difference in pricing power: for  branded products, higher prices can be 
charged because consumers will still want to buy the brand’.  Lastly, the same 
competitor added that ‘branded jewellery is operated by companies active on a 
regional or worldwide basis whereas unbranded jewellery is usually operated by individual stores with a local presence ’. For completeness, another competitor also  
explained that ‘ although brand is very important overall in luxury jewellery, what is 
a brand and what is not is becoming increasingly blurred and for some jewellery 
types, e.g. in bridal/diamond rings, brand has little influence ’.
51 
(40) As to whether a separate product market for luxury diamond jewellery should be 
identified, the majority of responding competitors and a significant number of 
customers consid ered that such distinction is not appropriate.52 
(41) As to whether a separate product  market for bridal jewellery should be identified, a 
predominant number of competitors and the majority of customers considered that 
such distinction is not appropriate.53 The r esults of the market investigation suggest 
that, although from a demand- side perspective bridal and non- bridal jewellery can be 
considered as distinct products, most suppliers of luxury jewellery offer both types of jewellery. On e competitor explained that  ‘[f]rom a purchase occasion point of 
view, bridal and non -bridal jewellery are generally considered as distinct 
segments’ .
54 However, according to the same competitor, ‘ luxury jewellery houses 
typically offer selections of both bridal and non -bridal jewell ery’ and ‘ [c]onsumers 
are increasingly choosing a wider range of jewellery types to mark a bridal occasion (e.g. same sex couples may choose a different look to the traditional heterosexual bridal jewellery ring) and purchasing both bridal and non- bridal pieces to 
complement the wedding wardrobe ’.  
(42) Finally, the results of the market investigation in the present case reveal that a 
predominant number of competitors and the majority of customers consider that, for the purpose of assessing the relevant competit ive dynamics, a segmentation of 
luxury jewellery according to price thresholds or brackets is relevant.
55 However, the 
                                                 
50  Questionnaire to competitors, question 14.1.  
51  Minutes of a call with a competitor, 17 July 2020.  
52  Questionnaire to competitors, question 15; questionnaire to customers, question 18.  
53  Questionnaire to competitors, question 16; questionnaire to customers, question 19.  
54  Questionnaire to competitors , question 16.1.  
55  Questionnaire to competitors, question 17; questionnaire to customers, question 20.  
 
11 views of the different market participants differ on  the most appropriate price 
points.56 
(43) In particular, one competitor explained that ‘ segmentations based on price points 
can be relevant for luxury jewellery, at least for the traditional distinction between 
‘high jewellery’ (usually priced above €50 000) and other pieces ’.57 However, 
‘[f]urther segmentations based on prices/entry points ar e not necessarily relevant ’. 
Another competitor explained that ‘ [t]he same consumers will generally shop across 
the different value thresholds as other factors also drive affordability and choice: the design, the emotional appeal of the piece, the type of gem, the size of the gem, etc.’ .
58 
(44) According to LVMH, the price points used internally by LVMH’s luxury jewellery 
brands to track their collections, as well as their competitors’ luxury jewellery 
offerings differ between brands. In internal reports benchmar king competitors’ 
products, Tiffany used the following price range classification: under […] , between 
[…] and […], between […] and […], between […] and […], between […] and […] 
and above […] . However, Tiffany does not systematically use such specific price  
ranges and instead uses a variety of price thresholds when  categorizing competitors’ 
luxury goods offerings according to their collections.  
Figure 1 – Tiffany’s internal reporting on LVMH’s Louis Vuitton brand fine jewellery 
by product type and price point  
[…] 
Source: Annex RFI1.30 to the Form CO, ‘Tiffany, RTT Competitive Analysis, August 5, 2019’, page 20.  
(45) The market investigation also  revealed that most luxury jewellery brands cover all 
price ranges from entry to high end, even though they may focus on some price 
ranges depending on their overall brand positioning.59 However, a predominant 
number of competitors indicated that it is mode rately difficult for a supplier of 
luxury jewellery to expand its portfolio across different price points  (in terms of, 
e.g. investment, know -how, time) .60 The reasons provided for this are several. While 
a competitor explained that ‘ the main barrier is the  provisioning of more expensive 
materials ’,61 another competitor explained that ‘ time and money need to have been 
invested in the brand (its positioning, target consumers, ability to address consumer 
needs, and demonstrating an ability to meet those needs) before any portfolio 
expansion’.62 
                                                 
56  While the questionnaires proposed, as an example, thresholds above/below EUR 5 000, EUR 10 000, 
EUR 50 000, and EUR 100 000, one competitor suggested thresholds above/below EUR 500 000; a 
second competitor suggested thresholds between EUR 1 000 -  3 000, EUR 3 000 -  10 000 and 
EUR  10 000 - 50 000 and over EUR 50 000; and a third competitor suggested a distinction between 
high jewellery priced above EUR 50 000 and other pieces. One customer indicated a threshold of EUR >5 000 for luxury jewellery and EUR >10 000 for high luxury jewellery. Other market 
participants did not specify any particular thresholds.  
57  Questionnaire to competitors, question 17.1.  
58  Questionnaire to competitors, question 17.1.  
59  Questionnaire to competitors, question 18; questionnaire to customers, question 21.  
60  Questionnaire to competitors, question 19.  
61  Questionnaire to competitors, question 19.1.  
62  Questionnaire to competit ors, question 19.1.  
 
12 (46) Ultimately, the definition of the relevant product market for the assessment of the 
competitive impact of the Transaction in the  luxury jewellery segment can be left 
open since serious doubts of its compatibility with the internal market do not arise  
irrespective of the exact product market definition.  
4.1.3.4. Luxury watches  
(47) Customers consider that design, quality, price, scarcity, uniqueness and brand image 
are among the features that define luxury watches : ‘[u]niqueness, [l]imited 
availability due to limited distribution, [h]igh quality and exclusive craftsmanship, [h]igh price points, [s]trong heritage and history, [s]trong branding, [s]mall 
[a]ssortments, [n]o [s]easonality, [l]imited number of novelties per year ’; ‘[h]i ghly 
skilled craftsmanship (including watchmaking and jewellery design/production), 
quality of materials (precious metals, gemstones); ‘[l]ongevity of individual pieces and limited nature of production’; ‘[g]oods tend to hold their value or appreciate over time’; ‘[g]oods will come with a warranty / guarantee and aftercare service’; 
‘[a]rtisans undergo extensive training and due diligence to become experts in their 
respective fields’.
63  
(48) When considering further segmentations within luxury watches, customers ’ opinions 
were divided but a predominant number of competitors consider that a further 
segmentation is appropriate ,64 mostly considering price: ‘ [s]hould separate 
categories be identified among luxury watches, we consider that it should be essentially made according to price levels ’.
65  
(49) In addition, when considering a further segmentation of luxury watches according to 
price thresholds or brackets, the views of a majority of responding customers and 
competitors in the market converged with the suggested thresholds  
(i.e., above/below EUR 5 000, 10 000, 50 000, 100 000) .66 As a competitor stated: 
‘[t]he segmentation defines the customer groups, their expectations in customer 
service (incl. after sales service) and the complexity of the watch. Hence, we consider such a segmentation relevant for the purpose of assessing competitive 
dynamics. EUR 1'000 to 5'000: Accessible luxury watches (brands like Hermès, 
Longines, Montblanc, Tag Heuer, Tudor etc.); EUR 5'000 to 10'000: Luxury watches 
(brands like Breitling, Cart ier, Chopard, Omega, Rolex etc.); and Above 
EUR  10'000: Prestige luxury watches (brands like Audemars Piguet, Breguet, 
Hublot, Patek Philippe, Vacheron Constantin etc.) ’.
67  
(50) In turn, t he results of the market investigation are inconclusive as to whether 
suppliers typically offer a portfolio of luxury watches covering all or a broad range of price points. On the competitors side, the same number of respondents consider 
that suppliers tend to focus on specific price points and that suppliers tend to cover a 
                                                 
63  Questionnaire to customers, question 6.2.  
64  Questionnaire to competitors, question 9; questionnaire to customers, question 13.  
65  Questionnaire to competitors, question 9.1.  
66  Questionnaire to competitors, question 10; questionnair e to customers, question 14.  
67  Questionnaire to competitors, question 10.1.  
 
13 broad price  range .68 Conversely, a n overwhelming majority of customers sell a 
portfolio of luxury watches covering all or a broad range of price points.69  
(51) In this regard, from a supply- side perspective, the majority of the Parties’ 
competitors consider that it is moderately to very difficult (in terms of, e.g. 
investment, know -how, and time) to expand their portfolio of luxury watches across 
different price points.70 The results of the market investigation suggest that, as one 
competitor stated, ‘[t]he difficu lty lies more with the brand perception than with the 
technical aspects. What makes the watches more expensive is the quality of the material used, like gold and diamonds. The brand has to be sufficiently legitimate to 
convince consumers to make such a sig nificant investment into a watch ’.
71 In 
addition, as another competitor indicated, ‘[t]he more the range price is high the 
more the models require technicality and therefore expertise which are difficult to 
find today as some professions and know -how are be longing to few groups of 
competitors or are currently disappearing ’.72 
(52) Ultimately, the definition of the relevant product market for the assessment of the 
competitive impact of the Transaction in the luxury watches segment can be left 
open since serious doubts of its compatibility with the internal market do not arise 
irrespective of the exact product market definition.  
4.1.3.5. Luxury goods  per sales channel  
(53) As part of the market investigation, a  majority of competitors and customers 
indicated that, for the supply of luxury goods, it is appropriate to distinguish between 
different sales channels, namely: (i) brick and mortar retail; (ii) online retail; 
(iii) travel retail; and (iv) wholesale/intermediaries, and particularly so for luxury 
watches and jewellery  because the competitive dynamics, service, reach and 
customer interaction are different.73  
(54) As o ne competitor explained, ‘[i]t is relevant to distinguish between (i) the 
wholesale sales and (ii) the retail sales of luxury products, including for jewellery 
and watches ’ and ‘ [w]ithin the retail sales channel, it may also be relevant to 
distinguish selective distribution networks (including brand directly operated stores 
and third- party authorized retailers) from travel retail (including retal outlets at 
airports,  on-board aircraft, on- board ships) as the latter channel specifically targets 
international travelers and usually offers a more limited range of products at more 
accessible price points ’.74  
(55) For completeness, certain respondents have voiced somewhat differ ent views and 
emphasised, e.g., the ‘ increasingly omnichannel ’ journey of luxury goods 
consumers,75 the prevalence of a distinction between ‘ own distribution network ’ (or 
‘direct to consumer ’ channel, including online) and ‘ third parties’ distribution’ 
                                                 
68  Questionnaire to competitors, question 11.  
69  Questionnaire to customers, question 15.  
70  Questionnaire to competitors, question 12.  
71  Questionnaire to competitors, question 12.1.  
72  Questionnaire to competitors, question 12.1.  
73  Questionnaire to competitors, question 21, questionnaire to customers, question 23.  
74  Questionnaire to competitors, question 21.1.  
75  Questionnaire to competitors, question 21.1.  
 
14 (including department stores),76 or the importance for brands of ensuring a 
consistency in image and experience regardless of the sales channel.77  
(56) Within the wholesale supply of luxury goods, specifically, the market investigation 
also revealed that a majority of competitors and customers consider it appropriate  to 
distinguish different product markets for different customer groups in view of the 
different supply- demand dynamics applicable .78 Thus, w hereas a smaller brand with 
reduced assortment may not different iate its product offering per channel, an 
established brand may have a wider range of products and differentiate the product offering for own stores/small local stores, department stores and travel retailers.
79 In 
addition, department stores usually offer a wider product range than travel retailers , 
which  usually carry fewer  products and at more accessible price points.80  
(57) Ultimately, the definition of the relevant product market for the assessment of the competitive impact of the Transaction in the differen t sales channel s can be left open 
since serious doubts of its compatibility with the internal market do not arise irrespective of the exact product market definition.  
4.1.4. Conclusion on product market definition  
(58) The Commission concludes that, as the Transaction  does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market irrespective of the exact product market 
definition, the question of whether luxury watches and jewellery constitute separate product markets within luxury goods can be left open. For the same reason, it can be 
left open whether further segmentations of each of luxury watches (by price points, 
branded/unbranded) and jewellery (by price points, branded/unbranded, bridal/non-bridal , silver/gold/other and by end use (e.g. earrings, bracelets, necklaces, rings, 
etc.)) are appropriate.  Similarly , the question of whether the supply of luxury goods, 
including luxury watches and jewellery , through different sales channels (brick and 
mortar retail, online retail, travel retail and wholesa le/intermediaries) constitute 
separate product markets can also be left open.  
4.2. Geographic market definition  
4.2.1. The Commission’s precedents  
(59) In previous cases, the Commission left open whether the geographic markets for the supply of  luxury products are national, EEA -wide or wider  in scope .
81  
(60) In De Beers /LVMH , the Commission concluded that the retail market for diamond 
jewellery is at most EEA -wide , if not national or local in scope, while the supply of 
branded diamond jewellery could be global  in scope .82  
                                                 
76  Questionnaire to  competitors, question 21.1.  
77  Questionnaire to customers, question 23.1.  
78  Questionnaire to competitors, question 22, questionnaire to customers, question 24.  
79  Questionnaire to competitors, question 22.1.  
80  Questionnaire to competitors, question 22.1.  
81  See for instance cases M.1780 –  LVMH /Prada /Fendi , Commission decision of 25 May 2000, 
paras.  13-14 and M.6212 – LVMH /Bulgari , Commission decision of 29 June 2011, para. 27.  
82  Case M.2333 – De Beers /LVMH , Commission decision of 25 July 2001, para. 39.  
 
15 (61) In L'Oréal /YSL Beauté , the Commission considered that the geographic scope of the 
travel retail distribution of luxury products was  at least EEA -wide.83 
4.2.2. The Notifying Party’s view  
(62) LVMH considers a worldwide geographic market for luxury goods (including for 
any plausible narrower product markets) as the most appropriate frame of reference 
for any competitive assessment. According to LVMH, from a demand -side 
perspective, the market for luxury goods is influenced by macro- economic factors 
such as the performa nce of worldwide financial markets, while foreign purchasers 
(in particular tourists) represent a considerable part of the demand for luxury goods and consumers tend not to have strong preferences for national/domestic brands. LVMH further argues that, fro m a supply- side perspective, the nature and 
characteristics of luxury goods do not vary according to geographic area and 
suppliers do not materially differentiate their offerings according to any perceived 
differences in customers’ preferences or taste in different geographies. In addition, LVMH argues that advertising strategies and  marketing campaigns are organis ed on 
a worldwide basis and many leading luxury goods players export on a worldwide or 
larger than national basis.
84  
(63) LVMH therefore conclude s that the Transaction should be reviewed on the basis of a 
worldwide market for luxury goods, but submits that the relevant geographic market 
definition can be left open as the Transaction will not give rise to any competitive concerns, irrespective of the mar ket definition.
85 
4.2.3. The Commission’s assessment  
4.2.3.1. Luxury goods  
(64) The market investigation revealed that , for a majority of competitors and customers , 
competitive conditions (suppliers, brands, prices, etc.) in the luxury industry are 
generally (and increasingly)  the same on a worldwide level.86 Moreover, l arge 
brands  tend to  develop a coherent approach globally to achieve homogenized 
perception. Alongside these global brands, there are local brands that may be relevant in a region but not at the global level.  
4.2.3.2. Luxury jewellery  
(65) In response to the market investigation, a n overwhelming majority of competitors 
indicated that their luxury jewellery activities extended worldwide.
87 In this regard, 
one competitor explained that ‘the markets for unbranded jewellery are local  and the 
branded side of the market is global ’, although ‘the market for branded jewellery 
could [also] be considered EEA -wide as there are some particularities in the 
preferences of Europeans’ .88  
                                                 
83  Case M.5068 L'Oréal /YSL Beauté , Commission's decision of 21 May 2008, para. 36.  
84  Form CO, paragraph 6.190.  
85  Form CO, paragraph 6.206.  
86  Questionnaire to competitors, question 23; questionnaire to customers, question 25.  
87  Questionnaire to competitors, question 27.  
88  Minutes of a call with a competitor, 2 July 2020.  
 
16 (66) In turn , when asked about whether end- consumers of luxury j ewellery have different 
preferences in different regions of the world, a predominant number of competitors 
and a majority of customers replied positively.89 Conversely, a majority of 
competitors and customers indicated that consumer preferences of luxury je wellery 
are not different across countries within the EEA.90 
4.2.3.3. Luxury watches  
(67) Regarding luxury watches , a majority of respondents to the market investigation, 
customers and competitors alike, consider  that the main geographic scope of their  
activities  is worldwide.91 However , a predominant number of competitors and a 
majority of customers consider that end- consumers have different preferences in 
different world  regions.92 For example, a  travel retailer explained that, depending on 
their origins, customers may prefer leather, precious skins or metal, gold or silver for 
the bracelet of their watch.93 In addition, several customers indicated  that materials , 
sizes, brands and price points are differen t across regions.94 Moreover , one  
competito r explained that Europea n customers do not demand yellow and pink gold 
as much as customers in other regions of the world .95  
(68) Conversely, the results of the market investigation were inconclusive as to whether 
suppliers of luxury watches typically offer a  similar product portfolio  across 
different regions of the world .96 In contrast, a majority of customers and competitors 
agree that watches portfolios  tend to be  similar across EEA countries.97 
4.2.3.4. Luxury goods per sales channel  
(69) As explained, t he outcome of the market investigation revea led that  for customers  
and competitors  alike , competitive conditions in the luxury industry, including in the 
luxury jewellery and watches segments,  are generally the same worldwide and at 
least at EEA  level.98 
(70) Conversely, no indication emerged as part of t he market investigation that 
competitive conditions in the luxury industry (respectively for travel retail, brick and 
mortar, and online sale s, or wholesale  supply ) would be different at country level  
within the EEA.  For instance, one brick and mortar customer explained that, 
although the company has brick and mortar  stores in one country only, its clientele is 
highly international .99 In addition, a travel retailer also explained that, although it 
may sometimes have  different  product  offer ings in differe nt airports across the same 
                                                 
89  Questionnaire to competitors, question 28, questionnaire to customers, question 30.  
90  Questionnaire to competitors, question 28.2, questionnaire to customers, question 30.2.  
91  Questionnaire to competitors, question 24; questionnaire to customers, question 26.  
92  Questionnaire to competitors, question 25; questionnaire to customers, question 27.  
93  Questionnaire to customers, question 27.1.  
94  Questionnaire to customers, ques tion 27.1.  
  Questionnaire to competitors, question 25.1.  
96  Questionnaire to competitors, question 26; questionnaire to customers, question 28.  
97  Questionnaire to competitors, question 26.2, questionnaire to customers, question 28.2.  
98  Questionnaire to competitors, question 23; questionnaire to customers, question 25.  
99  Questionnaire to customers, question 26.1 . 
 
17 world region,100 ‘luxury business is a global business, especially in travel retail ’ and 
‘consumers expect to see the same level of service and brands around the world ’.101  
(71) As a result, the Commission will not distinguish between s ales channels when 
referrin g to potential national markets  in this decision. Generally, irrespective of the 
applicable geographic market definition, a level of geographic differentiation in the 
conditions of competition prevailing in certain parts of the E EA or within specific 
Member States, e.g., at the retail level of trade, cannot be excluded . 
4.2.4. Conclusion on geographic market definition  
(72) As apparent from the above and in line with precedents, the outcome of the  market 
investigation carried out in the present case converges towards an at least EEA -wide 
scope of the supply of  luxury goods and jewellery and watches in particular , 
irrespective of the trade channel . However, the definition of the relevant geographic 
markets for the assessment of the competi tive impact of the Transaction can be left 
open since serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market do not arise irrespective of geographic scope in question.  
5. C
OMPETITIVE ASSESSMEN T  
(73) Generally, in addition to growing its presence in the US  (Tiffany generated […]% of 
its revenues in the US in 2019 compared to c. 8% for LVMH luxury jewellery and watches brands) , LVMH submits that the acquisition of Tiffany will enable it to 
strengthen its presence in luxury jewellery with a global luxury br and. According to 
LVMH, the area of luxury watches and jewellery is one of the fastest growing areas in the global luxury industry, with expected growth of c. […]% globally year -on-
year through 2024 according to Euromonitor estimates.
102 
(74) The competitive assessment of the Transaction is structured as follows:  
(a) Section 5.1 outlines the legal framework for the assessment;  
(b) Section 5.2 discusses the market structure, the horizontal and non -horizontal 
overlaps between the Parties’ activities, and the affected markets arising from 
the Transaction. It also provides a reasoning why certain affected markets do 
not need to be discussed furthe r; 
(c) Section 5.3 assesses horizontal non- coordinated effects with respect to luxury 
jewellery under any plausible market definition;  
(d) Section 5.4 assesses horizontal coordinated effects with respect to luxury 
jewellery under any plausible market definition;  
(e) Section 5.5 assesses non -horizontal effects.  
                                                 
100  Questionnaire to customers, question 28.2.1 . 
101  Minutes of a call with a customer, 29 June 2020.  
102  Form CO, paragraphs 1.4 and 1.5.  
 
18 5.1. Legal framework  
(75) Under Article 2(2) and (3) of the Merger Regulation, the Commission must assess 
whether a proposed concentration would significantly impede effective competition 
in the internal market or in a substantial part of it, in particular through the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. In this respect, a merger can entail horizontal and/or non- horizontal effects.  
5.1.1. Horizontal non -coordinated effects  
(76) Horizontal effects are those deriving from a concentration where the undertakings concerned are actual or potential competitors of each other in one or more of the relevant markets concerned. The Commission appraises horizontal effect s in 
accordance with the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
103 
(77) According to paragraph 26 of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, a non- exhaustive 
list of relevant factors need to be assessed in order to determine whether significant 
non-coordinated effects are likely t o result from a concentration.  
(78) Accordingly, Section 5.3.2 assesses market shares, closeness of competition between 
the Parties, important dynamics o f the markets where the Parties’ activities overlap, 
the alternatives to the Parties, barriers to entry, as well as evidence of new entrants 
and the constraint by competitors. Based on all these factors considered together, 
conclusions on horizontal non- coordinated effects are drawn in Section 5.3.3. 
5.1.2. Horizontal  coordinated effects  
(79) According to paragraph 39 of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, i n some m arkets the 
structure may be such  that firms would consider it possible, economically rational, 
and hence preferable, to adopt on a sustainable basis a course of action on the market aimed at selling at increased prices through a coordination of their behaviour.
104  
(80) A concentration may significantly impede effective competition by increasing the 
likelihood that firms are able to coordinate their behaviour and raise prices, even without entering into an agreement or resorting to a concerted practice within the 
meaning of Article 101 TFEU. A merger may also make coordination easier, more stable or more effective for firms that were already coordinating before the merger, 
either by making the coordination more robust or by permitting firms to coordinate 
on even hi gher prices.
105 
(81) In assessing the likelihood of coordinated effects, the Commission takes into account all available relevant information on the characteristics of the markets concerned , 
including both structural features and the past behaviour of firm.
106 
(82) The Commission’s assessment as to whether the Transaction raises serious doubts due to horizontal coordinated effects is discussed in Section 5.4.2, w ith conclusions 
drawn in Section 5.4.3.  
                                                 
103  Guid elines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (‘Horizontal Merger Guidelines’), OJ C 31, 5.2.2014.  
104  Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 39.  
105  Horizontal Merger Guide lines, paragraph 39.  
106  Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 43.  
 
19 5.1.3. Non-horizontal effects  
(83) Non-horizontal effects relate to the foreclosure of competitors that can arise from 
vertical or conglomerate integration. In general, vertical integration is the 
consequence of the combination of products, services or businesses  across different 
levels of the same supply chain. Conglomerate integration relates to the combination of complementary products  or services that are  generally purchased by the same set 
of customers.  
(84) Pursuant to the N on-Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
107 vertical integration may result 
in two forms of foreclosure: input foreclosure, where the concentration is likely to 
raise costs of downstream rivals by restricting access to an important input  or 
deteriorating supply conditions , and customer foreclosure, where the concentration is 
likely  to foreclose upstream rivals by restricting their access to a sufficient customer 
base.  
(85) In turn, foreclosure effects may arise from conglomerate integration when the combination of products in related markets may confer on the merged entity the ability a nd incentive to leverage a strong market position from one market to another 
closely related market by means of tying or bundling or other exclusionary practices.  
(86) In assessing the likelihood of foreclosure  scenario s, the Commission examines, first, 
whether  the merged firm would have the ability to foreclose its rivals, second, 
whether it would have the economic incentive to do so and, third, whether a foreclosure strategy would have a significant detrimental effect on competition, thus causing harm to consumers. In practice, these factors are often examined together as they are closely intertwined.  
(87) Eventually, f or foreclosure to lead to consumer harm, it is not necessary that the 
merged entity ’s rivals are forced to exit the relevant market  but it is sufficient that 
their costs are increased in a way that is likely to lead to higher prices for consumers.  
5.2. Market structure  
5.2.1. Horizontal overlaps  
(88) According to the information  provided by the Notifying Party, the Transaction 
would give rise to a num ber of horizontal overlaps in the supply of luxury goods, as 
well as in certain segments and sub -segments thereof, primarily in luxury jewellery  
and watches. In addition, there are a number of de minimis  horizontal overlaps  
between the Parties’ activities,  namely in the supply of (i) luxury perfumes and 
cosmetics; (ii) luxury fashion and leather goods, including accessories; and (iii) luxury home products.  
(89) Based on the data provided by the Notifying Party, the global supply of luxury goods is valued at EUR  [350- 400], including EUR [100-150] in the EEA.
108  
(90) The Notifying Party provided estimates of the Parties’ market shares for years 2017, 2018 and 2019 on a worldwide, EEA -wide and national basis. 
                                                 
107  Guidelines on the assessment of non- horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control 
of concentrations between undertakings. OJ C 265, 18.10.2008, p. 6.  
108  Annex to the F orm CO, Annex RFI1.4 (Revised Annex 6.1) – Parties Shares.  
 
20 (91) Table 1 below provides an overview of the Parties’ 2019 market shares based on the 
value of retail (including travel retail) sales in the EEA and worldwide.  
Table 1 – The Parties’ retail value market shares in the EEA and worldwide for 
year  2019 
Product market  Worldwide (2019)  EEA (2019)  
LVMH  Tiffany  Combined  LVMH  Tiffany  Combined  
Luxury goods  [10-20]% [0-5]% [10-20]%  [10-20]% [0-5]% [10-20]% 
Luxury watches and 
jewellery  [5-10]% [0-5]% [10-20]% [5-10]% [0-5]% [5-10]%  
Luxury jewellery [0-5]% [0-5]% [0-5]% [0-5]% [0-5]% [0-5]% 
Branded luxury 
jewellery  [0-5]% [5-10]% [10-20]% [5-10]% [0-5]% [5-10]% 
Luxury diamond 
jewellery  [0-5]% [0-5]% [0-5]% [0-5]% [0-5]% [0-5]% 
Branded luxury 
diamond jewellery  [0-5]% [10-20]% [10-20]% [0-5]% [5-10]%  [5-10]%  
Luxury engagement 
and bridal jewellery  [0-5]% [0-5]% [0-5]% [0-5]% [0-5]% [0-5]% 
Branded luxury 
engagement and bridal 
jewellery  [0-5]% [10-20]% [20-30]% [0-5]% [5-10]% [10-20]% 
Luxury watches  [5-10]% [0-5]% [5-10]% [5-10]% [0-5]% [5-10]% 
Luxury perfumes and 
cosmetics  [10-20]% [0-5]% [10-20]% [10-20]% [0-5]% [10-20]% 
Luxury fashion and 
leather goods and 
accessories  [10-20]% [0-5]% [10-20]% [10-20]% [0-5]% [10-20]% 
Luxury home  [0-5]% [0-5]% [0-5]% [0-5]% [0-5]% [0-5]% 
Source: LVMH’s estimates  - Annex to the Form CO, Annex RFI1.4 (Revised Annex 6.1) – Parties Shares  
(92) In addition to the overlaps listed in Table 1, the Parties’ activities also overlap in the 
United Kingdom and in the following Member States  where Tiffany is active:109 
Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands  and Spain .  
(93) However, on a national level , there is only one potentially affected market :– the 
market for the retail (including travel retail) of luxury watches in the Czech 
Republic, where the Parties’ combined market share amounts to [30 -40]%, with a 
marginal increm ent of [0 -5]% coming from Tiffany.110 
(94) As can be seen from Table 1, Tiffany’s activities in the manufacture and supply of 
luxury perfumes and cosmetics, luxury fashion and leather goods and accessories, and luxury home products are very limited. 
                                                 
109  Annex to the Form CO, Annex RFI1.4 (Revised Annex 6.1) – Parties Shares.  
110  Annex to the Form CO, Annex RFI1.4 (Revised Annex 6.1) – Parties Shares.  
 
21 (95) Tiffany’s mar ket share in the supply of luxury perfumes and cosmetics  and in the 
supply of luxury fashion and leather goods and accessories is [0-5]% in the EEA and 
only [0-5]% worldwide. Similarly, Tiffany’s market share in the supply of luxury 
home products is [0 -5]% in the EEA and only [0 -5]% worldwide. Thus, the  
increment brought about by the Tra nsaction in these segments is negligible.  
(96) Therefore, the horizontal overlaps in the supply of luxury perfumes and cosmetics, 
luxury fashion and leather goods and accessori es, and luxury home products are not 
discussed further  in this Section 5.  
(97) Moreover, the Notifying Party submitted estimates of the Parties’ market sh ares in 
the EEA and worldwide segmented by sales channel, distinguishing between 
(i) brick and mortar; (ii) online retail; and (iii) travel retail.111  
(98) Based on such sales channel segmentation, the Transaction would give rise to one 
affected market, namely i n the brick and mortar retail sale of branded luxury bridal 
and engagement jewellery worldwide, where the Parties’ combined market share 
would amount to [20 -30]% (LVMH [0-5]% and Tiffany [20 -30]%). In addition, the 
Parties would have a combined market shar e of [10-20]% (LVMH [5-10]% and 
Tiffany [10-20]%), i.e. just below the threshold of an affected market, in the travel 
retail sale of luxury diamond jewellery and branded luxury diamond jewellery worldwide.  
(99) In addition, w ith respect to  jewellery, the Notif ying Party provided more granular 
revenue data and estimates of the Parties’ market shares on a worldwide, EEA and 
national basis for the sub- segments of men’s jewellery and jewellery segmentation 
by the following price points: (i) jewellery below EUR 600; (ii) access jewellery (EUR 600 – EUR 5 000) ; (iii) fine jewellery (EUR 5 000 – 50 000); (iv) high 
jewellery (above EUR 50 000); and ( v) jewellery above  EUR 250 000.
112  
(100)  The Notifying Party also provided market share estimates on a worldwide, EEA and 
national basis in the overall luxury jewellery segmented by the following price 
points: (i) EUR 5 000 – 10 000; (ii) EUR 10 000 – 25 000; and (iii) above 
EUR 250 000.113  
(101)  Based on a segmentation according to the above -mentioned price points , the 
Transaction would give rise to additional horizontal overlaps and several  plausible 
affected markets listed in Table 2 below .  
                                                 
111  Annex to the Form CO, Annex RFI 2.6 - Brick and Mortar, Online, Travel Retail Shares Estimates.  
112  Annex to the Form CO, Annex RFI 3.2 (Revised Annex RFI1.6 and Annex 6.2) – Parties Sales – 
Jewelry.  
113  Annex to the Form CO, Annex RFI 3.2 (Revised Annex RFI1.6 and Annex 6.2) – Parties Sales – 
Jewel ry. 
 
22 (102)  Finally, as regards the Parties’ activities at  the wholesale level, Tiffany 
predominantly sells its products through directly owned stores ( i.e., at  retail level) 
and only marginally via selective distributors (i.e. , at wholesale level). Based on the 
data provided by the Parties, of Tiffany ’s total 2019 revenues, only […]% of its EEA 
revenues and […]% of its worldwide revenues were from wholesale sales of luxury 
end-products . More specifically, Tiffany’s 2019 wholesale jewellery sales in the 
EEA  amounted to EUR […] while its total EEA jewellery revenues amounted to 
EUR […]. Thus, Tiffany’s 2019 wholesale sales of jewellery in the EEA are limited 
to […]% of Tiffany’s overall jewellery revenue.114  
(103)  Therefore, the data underlying the horizontal assessment of the Transaction rela tes to 
retail sales, which is where competition between the Parties primarily takes place. 
However,  the market investigation was also directed at wholesale customers and  
most of the qualitative evidence gathered over the course of the investigation, and 
the resulting findings drawn from them, are equally valid for the retail and wholesale 
level s of trade.  
5.2.2. Horizontal affected markets  
(104)  As apparent from Table 1, the Transaction would lead to an affected market in the 
retail (including travel retail) supply of branded luxury engagement and bridal jewellery worldwide where the Parties’ combined market share amounts to [20 -30]% 
(LVMH [10-20]% and Tiffany [0 -5]%). In contrast, in the EEA  the Parties’ 
combined market share is limited to [10 -20]% (LVMH [0 -5]% and Tiffany 
[5-10]%).  
(105)  If a distinction was to be made among the sales channels , the Transaction would give 
rise to one affected market, namely in the brick and mortar retail sale of branded luxury bridal and engagement jewellery worldwide, where the Parties’ combined market share would amount to [20 -30]% (LVMH [0 -5]% and Tiffany [20 -30]%). In 
the EEA, however, the Parties’ combined market share is limited to [10-20]% 
(LVMH [0 -5]% and Tiffany [5 -10]%).
115 
(106)  Moreover, if a narrower market definition were  to be considered for luxury jewellery 
based on price points, the Transaction would lead to the additional affected markets 
listed in Table 2.  
                                                 
114  Form CO, paragraph 6.150, Table RFI1.5 and Table RFI1.6.  
115  Annex to the Form CO, Annex RFI 2.6 - Brick and Mortar, Online, Travel Retail Shares Estimates.  
 
23 Table 2 – Affected markets in the retail116 of luxury jewellery based on a segmentation 
by price points  for years 2017- 2019  
Affected product market  Country  Year  LVMH 
share  Tiffany 
share  Combined 
share  
Retail of b randed high jewellery 
(above EUR 50 000)  France  2017  [20-30]% [0-5]% [20-30]%  
Retail of branded high jewellery 
(above EUR 50 000)  France  2018  [20-30]%  [0-5]% [20-30]%  
Retail of branded jewellery 
below EUR 600  UK 2017  [0-5]% [20-30]%  [20-30]%  
Retail of branded jewellery 
below EUR 600 UK 2018  [0-5]% [20-30]%  [20-30]%  
Retail of branded jewellery 
below EUR 600 UK 2019  [0-5]% [20-30]%  [30-40]% 
Retail of branded fine jewellery 
(EUR 5 000 – 50 000)  UK 2017  [10-20]% [10-20]% [20-30]% 
Retail of branded fine jewellery 
(EUR 5 000 – 50 000)  UK 2018  [10-20]% [5-10]% [20-30]%  
Retail of branded fine jewellery 
(EUR 5 000 – 50 000)  UK 2019  [10-20]% [5-10]% [20-30]%  
Retail of branded fine jewellery 
(EUR 5 000 – 10 000)  UK 2017  [5-10]% [10-20]% [20-30]%  
Retail of branded fine jewellery 
(EUR 5 000 – 10 000)  UK 2019  [10-20]% [10-20]% [20-30]%  
Retail of branded fine jewellery 
(EUR 10 000 – 25 000)  UK 2017  [10-20]% [10-20]% [20-30]%  
Retail of branded fine jewellery 
(EUR 10 000 – 25 000)  UK 2018  [10-20]% [5-10]% [20-30]%  
Retail of branded fine jewellery 
(EUR 10 000 – 25 000)  UK 2019  [10-20]% [5-10]% [20-30]%  
Retail of branded high jewellery 
(above EUR 50 000)  UK 2017  [20-30]% [0-5]% [20-30]%  
Source: LVMH’s estimates, Annex to the Form CO – Annex RFI 3.2 (Revised Annex RFI1.6 and Annex 6.2) –  
Parties Sales – Jewelry.  
(107)  As can be seen from the figures in Table 2, while the Transaction gives rise to a 
number of plausible affected markets in different price points in the r etail of luxury 
jewellery  in France and the UK for years 2017 -2019, the 2019 market shares only 
                                                 
116  The retail shares include all forms of retail sales, including travel retail. The Notifyin g Party did not 
provide travel retail shares separately on national basis.  
 
24 give rise to four additional plausible affected markets in the UK based on price 
points . 
(108)  The assessment of the plausible affected markets in luxury jewellery is  further 
discussed in Section 5.3.2.  
(109)  In addition, the Transaction gives rise to an affected market in the retail (including travel retail) sales of luxury watches in the Czech Republic. However, as Tiffany’s 2019 sales of luxury watches in the Czech R epublic amounted to only EUR  […]
117 
the increment brought about by the Transaction in the retail sales of luxury watches in the Czech Republic is very limit ed, namely less than [0 -5]%. Thus , it is unlikely 
that with an increment of this magnitude  the Transaction could lead to a significant 
impediment to effective competition in the plausible market for the retail sales of 
luxury watches in the Czech Republic.  
(110)  Therefore, the horizontal  affected market in the retail (including travel retail) sales of 
luxury watches in the Czech Republic is not discussed further in this Decision.   
5.2.3. Non-horizontal overlaps  
(111)  In addi tion, the proposed Transaction gives rise to vertic al relations due to LVMH’s 
activity as a purchaser at the luxury goods wholesale level through its travel retail 
subsidiaries Duty Free Shoppers  (‘DFS’) and Starboard Cruise Services, as well as 
its department stores business (e.g., Le Bon Mar ché and La Samaritaine in Paris).  
(112)  For completeness, the Commission also notes that 
Tiffany, but not LVMH, is active 
upstream  in sales of rough and polished diamonds. However, on the basis of the data 
provided by the Parties, this potential vertical relation is of a de minimis  character and 
thus is not discussed further in this Decision .118  
5.2.4. No non- horizontal affected markets  
(113)  According to the data provided by the Parties and presented in Table 1, the merged 
entity’s upstream market shares do not exceed 30% under any plausible market 
definition. Thus, the Transaction does not give raise to any vertically affected markets.  
(114)  With regard to downstream activities, LVMH, through DFS and Starboard, is active in the travel retail business, with 2019 sales of EUR […] worldwide (of which just 
EUR […], i.e., less than […]% , in the EEA).
119 As reflected in  Table 3, LVMH’s  
shares in the travel retail segment of luxury goods are estimated to be well below 30%, 
including on the narrow potential sub-segment for the travel retail of luxury watches and 
jewellery.   
                                                 
117  Form CO, footnote 288 and Annex RFI1.4 (Revised Annex 6.1) – Parties Shares.  
118  Form CO, paragraph 7.147, ‘ In 2019, Tiffany had worldwide sales of just EUR […]  of rough 
diamonds and EUR […] of polished diamonds, whereas the total worldwide market for rough 
diamonds is estimated to be roughly USD 15 -16 billion, and the worldwide polished diamond market 
size is estimated to be even larger.543 Tiffany’s upstream sh are for the supply of rough and polished 
diamonds is therefore less than [0-5]%.’ The market investigation did not give rise to any concerns or 
comments in that regard.  
119  Form CO, paragraph 7.145.  
 
25 Table 3 -  LVMH Travel Retail Shares (2019)120  
Geography Travel Retail Segment  LVMH Share  
Worldwide  Luxury Goods  [5-10]%  
Worldwide  Luxury Watches & Jewelry  [10-20]%  
EEA  Luxury Goods  [0-5]% 
EEA  Luxury Watches & Jewelry  [0-5]% 
Source: LVMH: Revenues; Generation Research: Segment Size estimates  
(115)  With regard to the remaining selective retail activities of LVMH in the supply of luxury 
goods, they are limited to the operation of a single department store (Le Bon Marché in 
Paris , since La Samaritaine has not reopened yet121) and an online retailer with limited 
revenues (24S).122  
(116)  The Notifying Party submits that the LVMH ’s selective retailing entities -  Le Bon 
Marché and 24S do not sell any Tiffany products.123 In fact , only a small portio n of 
Tiffany’s overall sales are wholesales to third -party retailers.124 In 2019, wholesale 
sales of luxury goods accounted for around […] % (around EUR […]) of Tiffany’s 
worldwide revenues, only around […]% (EUR […]) of which were to LVMH retail 
entities (DFS and Starboard).  
5.3. Horizontal non -coordinated effects 
(117)  In view of the above and the de minimis  nature of the other overlaps, t his Section 
focuses on the horizontal non- coordinated effects of the Transaction in the luxury 
jewellery segment and all plausibl e sub -segments.  
5.3.1. The Notifying Party’s view  
(118)  The Notifying Party submits that the Transaction will not give rise to any 
competitive concerns regardless of market definition.125 In particular, it argues that 
the Transaction will not lead  to any horizontal non-coordinated effects  due to the 
following reasons:126 
(a) The Transaction will not result in material market shares on any plausible 
market. The Parties’ activities overlap in the EEA market for the retail sale of 
luxury goods, as well as in certain segments and sub- segments, primarily in 
the luxury watches and jewellery segment and the luxury jewellery sub-segment. However, the Parties’ combined shares are negligible to low and only slightly exceed 20% base on a narrow market sub- segmentation (with an 
increment b elow 5%) ; 
                                                 
120  Form CO, Table RFI 1.15, page 233. The table contains worldwide and EEA -wide shares, as 
estimated by the Notifying Party, on the segment of travel retail of luxury goods that include 
LVMH’s sales of DFS and Starboard and LVMH’s Maisons  sales from directly operated travel retail 
stores.  
121  La Samaritaine is a department store owned by LVMH. It has been closed since 2005 and it is 
currently undergoing renovation.  
122  Form CO, footnote 528.  
123  Form CO, paragraph 7.135.  
124  Form CO, paragraph 7.135.  
125  Form CO, paragraph 6.206.  
126  Form CO, paragraph 1.10.  
 
26 (b) Post-Transaction, the Parties will continue to face pressure from established 
players in the EEA luxury sector, including in the luxury watches and 
jewellery segment, and the further sub- segment for luxury jewellery, which 
are highly fragmented and composed of both several international players and numerous independent companies ; 
(c) The Parties are not  particularly close competitors.  
(119)  In addition, the Notifying Party submits that the Transaction cannot plausibly raise any competitive concerns in bran ded luxury bridal and engagement  jewellery 
because: (i) the Parties’ market shares are low; (ii) the Parties are not particularly close competitors; (iii) the Parties are, and will remain, constrained by the plethora of competitors active across the globe;  (iv) barriers to entry are moderate to low; and 
(v) customers can switch easily to other suppliers.
127 
(120)  Regarding the affected markets in the retail sale of fine jewellery and jewellery below EUR 600 in the UK, the Notifying Party submits that a further segm entation 
of the luxury jewellery segment by price points does not correspond to plausible relevant markets. To LVMH’s knowledge, no industry reports provide off -the-shelf 
share data for jewellery by price points and there are no commonly agreed price point s in the industry, including internally at LVMH and Tiffany.
128  
(121)  Nevertheless, the Notifying Party submits that competitive concerns can be excluded for each of the four UK hypothetical sub- segmentations because they reflect the 
same dynamic competition as o bserved in the luxury jewellery market overall and in 
the other luxury jewellery segments , such as the segment for branded luxury bridal 
and engagement  jewellery .
129  
(122)  Finally, as regards ‘premium’ jewellery, to the extent that some of LVMH Maisons’  
costume jewellery would qualify as ‘premium’ jewellery, Tiffany considers that these jewellery items would compete with Tiffany’s lower -range products. However, 
the Notifying Party submits that opening the scope of the market to ‘premium’ and/or ‘fashion’  jewellery at the lower- end of the jewellery spectrum would in any 
event only decrease the Parties’ market shares given the larger market volume and higher market fragmentation for these lower -end segments. According to the 
Notifying Party, this would not have any material impact on the assessment of the Transaction. Furthermore, the Notifying Party argues that there are no grounds to support a segmentation between premium and luxury jewellery. In any event, the 
Transaction will not give rise to competitive  concerns on any of the by- price 
segmentation s considered (with just a limited number of hypothetically affected 
segments at national level) .
130 
5.3.2. The Commission’s assessment  
(123)  As explained further in this Section, t he Commission finds that the Transaction does  
not raise serious doubts  as to its compatibility with the internal market in relation to 
horizontal non- coordinated effects in the production and supply of luxury jewellery, 
                                                 
127  Form CO , paragraph 7.4.  
128  Form CO, paragraph 6.217.  
129  Form CO, paragraph 6.218.  
130  Form CO, paragraphs 6.68 - 6.70.  
 
27 including branded luxury bridal and engagement jewellery, under any plausible 
market definition because of the following reasons:  
(a) The Transaction will lead to low to moderate market shares and the 
increment brought about by the Transaction is limited;  
(b) While the Parties are considered close competitors in some categories of 
luxury jew ellery , a number of competitors are equally close or even closer to 
each of the  Parties;  
(c) There  will remain numerous  competitors  capable of  exercis ing competitive 
constraint on the merged entity post -Transaction ;  
(d) Customers will retain a number of alternat ives available post -Transaction;  
(e) In the past three years, several new competitors entered the market(s) for 
luxury jewellery  in different segments and new players are likely to enter 
during the next three years;  
(f) The market investigation confirmed that the Transaction is unlikely to lead to harmful effects on prices, innovation, choice, and other factors.  
(124)  First, the Transaction will lead to low to moderate market shares and  the 
increment brought about by the Trans action is limited .  
(125)  The Transaction gives rise to a number of horizontal overlaps in luxury jewellery. 
However,  as can be seen from the market shares presented in Section 5.2, the 
Parties’ combined market shares remain low or moderate and/or the increment 
brought about by the Transaction is limited under any plausible market definition.  
(126)  As shown in Table 1, the Transaction does not give rise to affected markets with 
respect to luxury jewellery in the EEA or worldwide under the following plausible product market definitions: (i) the overall luxury goods market, (ii) the luxury watches and jewellery market, (ii i) luxury jewellery market consisting of both 
branded and unbranded luxury jewellery, (iv) branded luxury jewellery, (v) luxury diamond jewellery, (vi) branded luxury diamond jewellery, or (vii) luxury bridal and engagement jewellery.  
(127)  As already mentioned in Section 5.2.2, according to the Notifying Party’s market 
share estimates for the last year available (2019), the Transaction gives rise to affected market s with respect to luxury jewellery  under the following plausible 
market definitions : 
(a) Retail (including travel retail) sale of branded luxury bridal and engagement 
jewellery worldwide , where t he Parties’ combined markets shares amount to 
[20-30]%, with an  increment of  [0-5]% brought about by LVMH ; 
(b) Brick and mortar retail sale of branded luxury bridal and engagement 
jewellery worldwide, where the Parties’ combined market share amount to [20-30]%, with an increment of [0 -5]% brought about by LVMH;  
 
28 (c) Retail of jewellery below EUR 600 in the United Kingdom , where t he 
Parties’ combined market shares amount to [30 -40]%, with an increment of 
[0-5]% brought about by LVMH;  
(d) Retail of fine jewellery (EUR 5 000 – EUR 50 000) in the United Kingdom , 
where the  Parties’ combined market shares amount to [20 -30]%, with an 
increment of [5 -10]% brought about by Tiffany;  
(e) Retail of fine jewellery (EUR 5 000 – EUR 10 000) in the United Kingdom , 
where t he Parties’ combined market shares amount to [20 -30]%, with an 
incre ment of [10- 20]% brought about by Tiffany;  
(f) Retail of fine jewellery (EUR 10 000 – EUR 25 000) in the United Kingdom , 
where t he Parties’ combined market shares amount to [20 -30]%, with an 
increment of [5 -10]% brought about by Tiffany.  
(128)  Nevertheless, the Parties’ market position in the affected markets remains modest 
and only slightly above the threshold of affected markets  (the Parties’ combined 
shares are under [20 -30]%) in all but two of the plausible affected markets .  
(129)  While in retail of jewellery belo w EUR 600 in the UK the Parties’ combined market 
shares amount to [30-40]%, the increment brought about by the Transaction is only 
[0-5]% in that potential market.  
(130)  In brick and mortar retail sale of branded luxury bridal and engagement jewellery worldwide  the Partiers’ market share are moderate amounting to [20 -30]%, with an 
increment of [0 -5]%. 
(131)  Therefore, the Parties’ market shares with respect to luxury jewellery are not indicative of the merged entity holding or gaining market power post -Transaction 
that could result in a significant impediment of effective competition under any 
plausible market definition.  
(132)  Second, while the Parties are considered close competitors in some categories of 
luxury jewellery, a number of competitors are equally close or even  closer to 
each Party . 
(133)  LVMH’s activities in luxury jewellery are mainly carried out through the jewellery Maisons  that are part of the LVMH group. The LVMH  jewellery Maisons  
predominantly active in  the production and sale of luxury jewellery include Bulgari, 
Chaumet, Fred and Repossi. In addition, two of LVMH’s fashion brands , namely 
Louis Vuitton and Christian Dior, also have an offering of  luxury jewellery products  
as part of their product portfolio. However, Louis Vuitton and C hristian Dior are 
fashion brands  predominantly focused on the production and sale of luxury fashion 
and leather goods and accessories
131  
(134)  Tiffany’s core activity, representing about 92% of its worldwide revenues in 2019, is 
the production and distribution of luxury jewel lery. Tiffany’s product portfolio 
                                                 
131  Form CO, paragraph 6.5.  
 
29 includes bridal and engagement jewellery, jewellery collections, and designer 
jewellery.132  
(135)  Based on the information provided by the Notifying Party, LVMH and Tiffany’s 
geographic presence seems to be focused on different r egions of the world. Tiffany’s 
home territory is the United States, where LVMH has a more limited presence. Tiffany’s revenues achieved in Europe represent only c. […]% of its total worldwide revenues.
133 On the other hand, LVMH’s sales seem to be focused on  Asia and the 
EEA.134  
(136)  The feedback received during the Commission’s market investigation with respect to 
the competition between LVMH’s brands (Bulgari, Chaumet, Fred, Repossi, Louis Vuitton and Christian Dior) and Tiffany in luxury jewellery has been mixed.  
(137)  While the majority of competitors considers LVMH’s brands such as Bulgari, Chaumet, Fred, Repossi, Louis Vuitton and Christian Dior to closely compete with Tiffany,
135 a significant number of customers responding to the Commission’s 
market investigation d o not consider LVMH’s brands to compete directly with 
Tiffany in luxury jewellery or they consider them to compete only marginally.136  
(138)  The diverging views are also evident from the comments provided by market 
participants. One competitor stated that “They don’t compete in the brand 
positioning clearly differentiating from each other, yet some product offerings, 
which by nature have little potential for design adaptations may compete (e.g. engagement and bridal offerings – solitaire rings and alliances/weddi ng 
bands.” , while another competitor commented: “ Bulgari may be a competitor of 
Tiffany as far as product's characteristics, segmentation, distribution model and 
general look and feel are concerned. ” A different competitor considered “All LVMH 
brands activ e in the luxury jewellery market compete with Tiffany. However, ‘pure 
jewellers’ (Most notably Bulgari and Chaumet) compete more closely with Tiffany. ”
137 
(139)  On the customer side, a customer active in duty free retail explained: “Tiffany is 
considered as a fine  jewellery brand – therefore no direct competition with luxury 
Maisons such as Bvlgari or/and Fashion Luxury brands as LV [Louis Vuitton] and 
CD [Christian Dior]. ” However, a different customer active in duty free retail 
considered that “ Bvlgari, Chaumet, Fred compete with Tiffany on certain categories 
and price brackets.” In addition, a  customer active in retail noted: “ Based on the 
products in LTR's portfolio, Tiffany competes only marginally with LVMH, because 
Tiffany’s products are overall more affordab le (in particular its access range) and 
do not target the same customers: Tiffany has a US approach to luxury products, that is more demure, less colourful and arty and LVHM’s European approach of the 
same .” On the other hand, another customer active in re tail was of the opinion that 
                                                 
132  Form CO, paragraph 6.23.  
133  Form CO, paragraph 6.27.  
134  Form CO, paragraph 7.10.  
135  Questionnaire to competitors, question 31.  
136  Questionnaire to customers, question 33.  
137  Questionnaire to competitors, question 31.1.  
 
30 “Tiffany is the biggest independent player in this category and clearly compete with 
Bulgari, Chaumet and Fred.”138  
(140)  Moreover, the market investigation revealed that a majority of competitors and  
customers consider Cartier to be the closest competitor of Tiffany in luxury 
jewellery and its sub -segments, including in luxury branded jewellery overall, luxury 
branded diamond jewellery and luxury branded bridal and engagement jewellery.139 
According to the customers and competitors that  responded to the Commission’s 
market investigation, the second closest competitor of Tiffany in luxury jewellery 
would be Van Cleef &  Arpels, and according to some competitors, also Harry 
Winston in luxury branded bridal and engagement jewellery.140  
(141)  As reg ards the LVMH brands, taken together, Cartier appears to be the closest 
competitor of LVMH in luxury jewellery according to the competitors and 
customers that responded to the Commission’s market investigation.141  
(142)  More specifically, a  majority of competitors consider Cartier to be the closest 
competitor of Bulgari in luxury jewellery and its sub- segments, followed by 
Tiffany.142 From the customers’ perspective, Cartier is also the closest and second 
closest competitor of Bulgari in luxur y jewellery and its sub -segments, with the 
exception of luxury branded bridal and engagement jewellery, where the majority of customers expressing a view considered Tiffany to be the closest competitor of Bulgari.
143  
(143)  With respect to LVMH’s brand Chaumet, the majority of competitors consider Cartier to be the closest competitor of Chaumet in luxury jewellery and its sub -
segments, followed by Tiffany.
144 The majority of customers expressing a view also 
consider Cartier to be the closest competitor of Chaumet in luxury jewellery, with the exception of luxury branded bridal and engagement jewellery, where the majority of customers expressing a view considered Tiffany to be the closest competitor of Chaumet (and Cartier as number two). In addition, customers view Piaget and Chopard as the number two competitor of Chaumet in some jewellery 
categories.
145  
(144)  Competitors also consider Cartier to be the closest competitor of Fred, and LVMH brand, in luxury jewellery, while Van Cleef &  Arpels seems to be the number two 
compet itor of Fred in luxury branded bridal and engagement jewellery according to 
competitors.
146 The customers’ feedback with respect to Fred did not reveal clear 
results. Brands like Repossi, Cartier and Tiffany seem to be among the top competitors of Fred accor ding to the customers that expressed a view.
147  
                                                 
138  Questionnaire to customers, question 33.1.  
139  Questionnaire to competitors, question 32; questionnaire to customers, question 34.  
140  Questionnaire to competitors, question 32; questionnaire to customers, question 34.  
141  Questionnaire to competitors, questions 33.1 -33.6; questionnaire to customers, question 35.1 -35.6.  
142  Questionnaire to competitors, question 33.1.  
143  Questionnaire to customers, question 35.1.  
144  Questionnaire to competitors, question 33.2.  
145  Questionnaire to customers, question 35.2.  
146  Questionnaire to competitors, question 33.3.  
147  Questionnaire to customers, question 35.3.  
 
31 (145)  As regards LVMH’s brand Repossi, competitors view Messika, Cartier and Tiffany 
among the top two competitors of Repossi, but the overall feedback received was mixed with other brands being considered by differ ent respondents.
148 The feedback 
from customers did not reveal a single competitor that would be the clear number 
one competitor of Repossi in luxury jewellery.149 
(146)  The market investigation also seems to have underlined the somewhat  different 
nature of two of L VMH’s Maisons  - Louis Vuitton and Christian Dior – them being 
luxury fashion houses not predominantly focused on luxury jewellery. It seems that 
the close competitors of these two brands in luxury jewellery are not only luxury 
jewellery brands, but also ot her fashion houses such as Chanel. A significant number 
of competitors that expressed a view considered Dior, Cartier and Chanel to be the 
top competitors of Louis Vuitton in luxury jewellery.150 A significant number of 
customers thought Chanel, Dior, Bulgar i and Tiffany were among the closest 
competitors of L ouis Vuitton in luxury jewellery.151 As regards Christian Dior, a 
significant number of competitors that expressed a view considered Chanel, Louis 
Vuitton, Cartier and Van Cleef &  Arpels as the closest competitors of Christian Dior 
in luxury jewellery.152 The customers’ feedback was less clear, but the majority of 
customers that expressed a view thought that Chanel, Louis Vuitton, Cartier and Tiffany were among the top close competit ors of Christian Dior in luxury 
jewellery.
153 
(147)  The feedback from the market investigation also seems to be in line with market analysts’ reports. For instance, as shown in Figure 2 below, the top players in the 
luxury jewellery segment according to a […] analysis include the players that the 
respondents to the Commission’s investigation identified among the closest 
competitors of the Parties.  
Figure 2 – […]  analysis of the top players in the (luxury) jewellery industry  
[…] 
Source: Notifying Party’s submission of 13 December 2019, “ […] “, slide 4.  
(148)  Finally, for completeness, the feedback from the market investigation suggests that 
both Tiffany and LVMH brands are significant  suppliers of premium (non- luxury) 
jewellery. The majority of customers and competitors that expressed a view considered the Parties as important supplier s of premium (non- luxury) jewellery.
154 
However, a majority of customers that expressed a view did not consider the Parties and their brands to compete in the supply of premium (non- luxury) jewellery.
155 
Conversely, a majority of competitors thought the Parties and their brands did 
compete in pre mium jewellery.156 One customer explained: “The price point of 
fashion jewellery from Dior etc., i.e. predominantly fashion brands, will sometimes 
                                                 
148  Questionnaire to competitors, question 33.4.  
149  Questionnaire to customers, question 35.4.  
150  Questionnaire to competitors, question 33.5.  
151  Questionnaire to customers, question 35.5.  
152  Questionnaire to competitors, question 33.6  
153  Questionnaire to customers, question 35.6.  
154  Questionnaire to competi tors, question 34.1.2; questionnaire to customers, question 36.1.2.  
155  Questionnaire to customers, question 36.1.  
156  Questionnaire to competitors, question 34.1.  
 
32 compete with the entry price point jewellery from Tiffany (e.g.  sterling silver 
jewellery). ”157 
(149)  However, taking into account the feedback from the market investigation and the 
fact that the Parties’ combined market shares in jewellery below EUR 600 are limited,
158 it seems that while the Parties both offer jewellery pieces that could be 
categorized as ‘premium’, they are unlikely to be considered as close competitors.  
(150)  Therefore , the Commission’s market investigation and the evidence available to it 
showed that  while LVMH’s luxury brands and Tiffany are considered to compete 
closely in some segments of luxury jewellery , a number of competitors are equally 
close, if not closer, competitors to each Party. In particular, Cartier seems to be the closest competitor of the Parties and brands like Van Cleef & Arpels, Harry 
Wins ton, Piaget, Chopard, Chanel  and Messika are also considered to be close 
competitors .  
(151)  Third, there will remain numerous  competitors capable of exercis ing a 
competitive constraint on the merged entity post -Transaction . 
(152)  Based on the information provided by the Notifying Party, there are a number of 
large international luxury groups offering a wide selection of luxury jewellery, as 
well as numerous independent jewellery houses and artisan boutique jewellers,  
which may exercise competitive constraint on the merged entity post -Transaction.  
(153)  The main competitors of the Parties with a portfolio of branded luxury jewellery  
include  the following companies :
159  
(a) Compagnie Financière Richemont SA (Richemont) – one of the leading 
luxury goods groups globally with luxury jewellery brands such as Cartie r, 
Van Cleef & Arpels, as well as Piaget. Richemont’s 2019 revenues from 
luxury jewellery represented EUR 6.5 billion.  
(b) Kering – a French luxury goods group active globally with luxury jewellery 
brands such as Boucheron, Pomellato and Gucci.  
(c) Chopard – priva tely owned Swiss luxury watches and jewellery manufacturer 
with a global footprint.  
(d) Graff – a British -based luxury jeweller with a global footprint, with a luxury 
jewellery offerings characterised by the use of diamonds and rare gemstones.  
                                                 
157  Questionnaire to customers, question 36.1.1.  
158  Affected market only arises in the UK, whe re the Parties’ combined share amounts to [30 -40]% with 
an increment of [0-5]% (see Table 2). Under all other plausible geographic market definitions 
(worldwide, EEA, national), the Parties’ combined market shares remain below 10% with a low 
increment of [0-5]% - [0-5]%. The only exception is Italy, where the Parties’ combined market share 
amounts to [10-20]% with an increment of [0-5]%, yet well below the threshold of an affected 
market; (source: Annex to the Form CO, Annex RFI 3.2 (Revised Annex RFI1.6 a nd Annex 6.2) –  
Parties Sales – Jewelry).  
159  Form CO, paragraph 7.24.  
 
33 (e) De Beers Group – one of the world’s leading diamond companies, active in 
the exploration and sale of diamonds as well as in the production and sale of 
diamond- based luxury jewellery products.  
(f) Harry Winston – an American luxury goods provider that is part of the 
Swatch Gr oup and offering a portfolio of luxury jewellery characterised by 
the use of diamonds and gemstones.  
(g) Hermès – a French manufacturer of luxury goods with a global footprint and 
active also in luxury jewellery.  
(h) Damiani – an Italian manufacture of luxury je wellery and watches active 
globally.  
(i) Messika – a luxury boutique jeweller founded in 2005 in Paris, which has 
since expanded internationally.  
(j) Asian luxury jewellery groups such as Chow Tai Fook, Lao Feng Xiang, Laomiao, Chow Sang Sang and Luk Fook. H owev er, the activities of these 
groups seem to be focused on Asia and North America.  
(154)  The feedback from the Commission’s market investigation  also suggests that  the 
merged entity will continue facing competition from several competitors active in 
the production and supply of luxury jewellery. In effect , a majority of competitors 
responding to the Commission’s market investigation view  the level of competition 
in luxury branded jewellery as well as luxury branded diamond jewellery as very 
competitive. Moreover, a  strong majority of competitors consider the luxury branded 
bridal and engagement jewellery market/segment to be very competitive.
160  
(155)  The customers’ feedback echoes that of the competitors. A predominant number of 
customers expressing a view stated that lux ury branded jewellery, luxury branded 
diamond jewellery as well as luxury branded bridal and engagement jewellery are 
very competitive markets.161  
(156)  The feedback from the market investigation is  also in line with market analysts’ 
reports. For instance, according to […], the branded jewellery market is fragmented 
[…].  
Figure 3 – […] analysis of market shares of players active in the branded jewellery 
market  
[…] 
Source: Notifying Party’s submission of 13 December 2019, “ […]“, slide 11.  
(157)  Therefore, the Commission’s market investigation and the evidence available to it confirmed that there would remain numerous  competitors, including international 
luxury brands, independent jewellery houses and artisan boutique jewellers that may constrain the merged entity post -Transaction. Moreover , unbranded luxury jewellery 
producers may also  exercise some level of competitive constraint on the merged 
entity , at least in certain segments.  
                                                 
160  Questionnaire to competitors, question 35.  
161  Questionnaire to customers, question 37.  
 
34 (158)  Fourth, customers will retain a  number of alternatives available post -
Transaction .  
(159)  In its market investigation, the Commission also verified whether the end customers, 
i.e. consumers, of luxury jewellery would have a sufficient number of comparable 
alternatives available post -Transaction. The feedback from market participants on 
this point was very clear. All competitors and an overwhelming majority of 
customers that expressed a view submitted that consumers wo uld have access to a 
sufficient number of comparable alternatives of luxury jewellery products to those offered by the Parties post -Transaction.
162 
(160)  One competitor explained: “Consumers of luxury branded jewellery will have a 
sufficient number of (comparable)  alternatives available post- Transaction: (i) [t]he 
market in which luxury branded jewellery is sold is very fragmented, as such a multitude of brands are, and will remain, available to consumers; (ii) LVMH being a house of brands, and Tiffany being a brand with strong consumer appeal worldwide, it is to be expected that LVMH will retain Tiffany’s own brand identity and product 
development process post -Transaction, and hence will be able to continue delivering 
quality and innovative products to its consumer s.”
163 Another competitor added: 
“Other players in the jewellery and watch markets like the brands belonging to the 
groups Richemont and Kering are able to compete with LVMH.”164 
(161)  In addition, a customer active in department store retail stated: “ There is so much 
consumer choice across the jewellery and watch sectors, including within the luxury 
groups -  i.e. brands within LVMH and Richemont groups all offer distinct collections 
for their clients, despite being within the same overall group .”165 In effect, diffe rent 
sources converge to also  highlight the competitive nature of the relationships 
between brands belonging to the same group.166  
(162)  Therefore, based on the results of the Co mmission’s market investigation, consumers 
will likely retain access to a sufficient number of comparable alternatives post-
Transaction.  
(163)  Fifth, in the past three years, several new competitors entered the market(s) for 
luxury jewellery in different segments and new players are likely to enter over 
the next three years.  
(164)  As regards barriers to entry, the majority of competitors that expressed a view 
consider there to be moderate barriers to entry or expansion in branded luxury 
jewellery.167  
(165)  As one competitor explained: “ There are two main difficulties: [(i)] [t]he know how 
needed to be acquir ed in order to manufacture internally the products. Nevertheless, 
as already indicated contract manufacturing is always available (with the 
                                                 
162  Questionnaire to competitors, question 36; questionnaire to customers, question 38.  
163  Ques tionnaire to competitors, question 36.1.  
164  Questionnaire to competitors, question 36.1.  
165  Questionnaire to customers, question 38.1.  
166  See, e.g., Form CO, paragraph 7.63 and minutes of a call with a customer, 13 October 2020.  
167  Questionnaire to competitors, question 38.  
 
35 constraints identified […]); [(ii)] [t]he brand image and notoriety in order to be 
perceived as a luxury player.”168 
(166)  A different  competitor noted that “ […] it is difficult for a supplier to enter/expand 
into the luxury branded jewellery market. It is a long- term strategy that requires 
time and investment. […] luxury jewellery require notably technicality, experts and 
know -how.”169 
(167)  On the other hand, another  competitor’s view was that the barriers to entry in general 
were low, but the barriers to expand and grow globally remained relatively high: “Barriers to enter into the luxury branded jewellery sector are generally low – and 
have become even lower with the increase of e- commerce, digital marketing and 
social media. However, barriers to expand and grow globally remain relatively high, such as: [(i)] [b]uilding a strong brand equity – this takes time and investment 
behind communication and promotion; [(ii)] [ d]eveloping a presence at retail, in the 
right locations, through own stores or through franchise, and wholesale distribution; [(iii)] [b]uilding an international presence, either through physical store locations, websites or both; [(iv)] [h]aving access to the right raw materials and product 
development capabilities with global and aspirational appeal .”
170 
(168)  From a customer perspective, however, the barriers to entry are high. An 
overwhelming majority of those expressing a vi ew consider there to be high barriers 
to entry or expansion in branded luxury jewellery.171  
(169)  A customer active in duty free retail noted that “history, brand recognition, 
craftsmanship, retail network and available capital ” are the pre- requisites necessary 
for a company to establish itself in the branded luxury jewellery market.172 Another 
customer commented: “[d]epending [on] the brand history for each segment a 
certain legitimacy needs to be developed and this can take decades .”173 
(170)  Nevertheless, despite the per ception of moderate to high barriers of entry or 
expansion to the branded luxury jewellery market, an overwhelming majority of both 
customers and competitors responding to the Commission’s market investigation 
confirmed that there has been an entry of new suppliers in branded luxury jewellery 
over the last three years.174  
(171)  One competitor provided an extensive list of  recent entrants into luxury branded 
jewe llery,  luxury branded diamond jewellery and luxury branded bridal and 
engagement jewellery , including CELINE, KOVA Jewels, Maison Dauphin, Dolce 
& Gabbana, Gucci, Vashi, Milamore, Prounis, Katkim, Maison coco and 
Auverture .175 
                                                 
168  Questionnaire to competitors, question 38.1.  
169  Questionnaire to competitors, question 38.1.  
170  Questionnaire to competitors, question 38.1.  
171  Questionnaire to customers, question 40.  
172  Questionnaire to cust omers, question 40.1.  
173  Questionnaire to customers, question 40.1.  
174  Questionnaire to competitors, question 39; questionnaire to customers, question 41.  
175  Questionnaire to competitors, question 39.1.  
 
36 (172)  According to another competitor, Prada, Gucci and Giorgio Armani also entered the 
luxury jewellery segment  (including diam ond jewellery) in the last three years.176 
(173)  Customers also identified a number of new entrants in luxury jewellery, mainly Messika, Gucci, and Maria Tash. One customer active in department store retail noted that they have stocked a number of new brands over the last three years, such as Fred and Eera in luxury jewellery.
177  
(174)  As regards expected entry of new suppliers in luxury jewellery, an overwhelming majority of customers as well as competitors are of the view that there will be new 
suppliers entering the br anded luxury jewellery market over the next three years. 
Similarly, a majority of competitors expect an entry of new suppliers in the luxury 
branded diamond jewellery as well as the luxury branded bridal and engagement 
jewellery. The majority of customers also expect entry of new suppliers in the luxury 
branded bridal and engagement jewellery segment in the next three years.
178 
(175)  One competitor explained: “ Certain consumers of luxury jewellery increasingly 
prefer personalization, customization, distinctiveness and a closer relationship with 
the jeweller. Given the accessibility of social media and online channel distribution, 
barriers to entry for luxury jewellery are lower. As such, and given the highly 
competitive nature of luxury retail, [the company] anticipates that there will be new 
suppliers in each of the three categories crossed above in the next three years. In addition, fashion brands that already have a fashion jewellery offer will likely extend 
their range to fine jewellery. However, [the company] is  currently unable to 
specifically identify new entrants.”
179 
(176)  A customer active in department store retail noted: “Based again on [the company] 
only, we anticipate that additions will be made in luxury jewellery, whereas the 
watches and diamond/bridal jewelle ry portfolios are more established and unlikely 
to change .”180 
(177)  Thus, even though the market participants view the barriers to entry and expansion to be moderate to high, there is evidence that several new players did enter the luxury jewellery market in the last three years and that more players are expected to 
enter in the course of the next three years.   
(178)  Therefore, in addition to being constrained by competitors already active in the luxury jewellery industry today, the merged entity is also likely to face competition 
from recent new entrants and additional new players expect ed to enter the market in 
the next three years.  
(179)  Sixth, the market investigation confirmed that the Transaction is unlikely to 
lead to harmful effects on prices, innovation, choice, and other factors . 
(180)  As regards the potential impact of the Transaction in the EEA or a particular 
Member State, market participants expect the Transaction to have a neutral impact as 
                                                 
176  Questionnaire to competitors, question 39.1.  
177  Questionnaire to customers, question 41.1.  
178  Questionnaire to competitors, question 40; questionnaire to customers, question 42.  
179  Questionnaire to competitors, question 40.1.  
180  Questionnaire to customers, question 42.1.  
 
37 regards the prices, quality, choice and innovation in the branded luxury jewel lery 
market and its sub -segments.  
(181)  More specifically, an overwhelming majority of competitors see the potential impact 
on prices of branded luxury jewellery as neutral, and a majority of competitors expect a neutral impact also on quality, choice and innovation in branded luxury jewellery.
181 One competitor noted that the Transaction “ will in any case not affect 
(or only marginally) the EEA market for luxury branded jewellery which will remain 
highly competitive post -transaction.”182  
(182)  Customers echo the sa me view. A n overwhelming majority of customers that 
expressed a view expect a neutral impact on prices and quality of branded luxury 
jewellery and a majority of customer respondents who expressed a view also view 
the potential impact on choice and innovati on in branded luxury jewellery as 
neutral.183 
(183)  Moreover, a  majority of competitors and a majority of  customers also do not expect 
the Transaction to have any impact on their company regarding the procurement and sale (customers) , and production and supply (competitors) of luxury goods, 
including luxury jewellery.
184 
(184)  On balance, the market investigation confirmed that the impact of the Transaction on branded luxury jewellery market(s) in the EEA and the Member States will be neutral. Moreover, the majority of competitors and customers do not expect the Transaction to have an impact on their company’s business in luxury goods, including luxury jewellery. Therefore, the majority of market participants do not think the Transaction would lead to a negative impact a s regards prices, quality, 
choice, and innovation with respect to luxury jewellery. In fact, some market participants expect an increase in innovation, choice and quality of luxury jewellery post-Transaction.  
(185)  Finally, the assessment set forth in this Sect ion 5.3.2 also applies to the plausible 
affected markets in the UK.  
(186)  As regards the plausible affected markets in the UK  listed in paragraph (127) , the 
market investigation did not reveal evidence suggesting  that the competitive 
conditions in the UK are appreciably different from the rest of Europe or the EEA.   
(187)  In the first place, the market investigation showed that a  majority of competitors and 
customers considered the competitive conditions in terms of suppliers, brands, prices and other factors to be generally the same across the world.
185 A UK- based cust omer 
explained: “ Luxury brands tend to operate globally and therefore generally align 
their prices globally, so there is parity across different markets, given the international nature of the luxury consumer. Whilst there may be minor trend 
                                                 
181  Questionnaire to competitors,  question 52.  
182  Questionnaire to competitors, question 52.1.  
183  Questionnaire to customers, question 54.  
184  Questionnaire to competitors, question 50; questionnaire to customers, question 52.  
185  Questionnaire to competitors, question 23; questionnaire to  customers, question 25.  
 
38 differences by market, luxury brands tend to create homogeneity of range across all 
markets.”186  
(188)  In the second place, a  majority of competitors and customers did not observe 
different consumer preferences regarding luxury jewellery across countries within 
the EEA, includi ng the UK.187 As o ne competitor explained : “In contrast with world 
regions, it is difficult to identify different consumer preferences across countries 
within the EEA. ”188  
(189)  In the third place, the combined market shares of the Parties in the UK in the various 
affected price segments do not suggest that the Transaction will enable the Parties to  
gain or strengthen market power ( combined market shares of the Parties are only 
slightly above 20%, each Party having about [10-20]% in each of the segments 
except for j ewellery under EUR 600, where the combined market share of the Parties 
is [30-40]%, but with a small increment of [0 -5]%). On the contrary, market shares 
suggest that between [70-80]-[80-90]% of the respective segments is covered by the 
offering of other players. Thus, the merged entity will be constrained in the UK by 
other luxury jewellery suppliers , including large international groups, local  players, 
as well as independent artisan jewellers.  
(190)  In the fourth place, UK -based customers confirmed that a sufficient number of 
comparable alternative  luxury jewellery supplier s would remain available to 
consumers post -Transaction . One UK- based customer stated: “There is so much 
consumer choice across the jewellery and watch sectors, including within the luxury 
groups -  i.e. brands within LVMH and Richemont groups all offer distinct collections 
for their clients, despite being within the same overall group.”, while another UK -
based customer commented: “ We believe that the market will remain competitive. ”189 
(191)  Moreover, UK department stores also seem to add new brands to their portfolio of 
luxury jewellery as new players enter the market. One department store active in the 
UK explained: “ Specifically in relation to new brands that we have stocked at [the 
company]  over the last three years, we have introduced small new brands into […]  
the luxury jewellery department, including FRED and Eera.”190 UK customers also 
expect  the entry of new players in the next three years . One department store 
explained:  “[…] we anticipate th at additions will be made in luxury jewellery  
[…]. ”191 
(192)  Finally, as regards the potential impact of the Transaction in the EEA or a particular 
Member State, including the UK as a former Member State, the market participants 
expect the Transaction to have a ne utral impact as regards the prices, quality, choice 
and innovation in the branded luxury jewellery market and its sub- segments.192 None 
of the respondents singled out the UK as a country where the Transaction could have 
a negative impact.  
                                                 
186  Questionnaire to customers, question 25.1.  
187  Questionnaire to competitors, question 28.2; questionnaire to customers, question 30.2.  
188  Questionnaire to competitors, question 28.2.  
189  Questionnaire to customers, question 38.1.  
190  Questionnaire to customers, question 41.1.  
191  Questionnaire to customers, question 42 and 42.1.  
192  Questionnaire to competitors, question 52; questionnaire to customers, question 54.  
 
39 5.3.3. Conclusion on horizontal non- coordinated effects  
(193)  Based on the considerations presented in paragraphs (92) - (96), (109)  - (110) , 
(123)  - (192)  and in view  of the results of the market investigation and of all 
evidence available to it, the Commission considers that the Transaction  under any 
plausible market definition  is unlikely to  significantly impede effective competition 
in the internal market or in the EEA, in particular as a result of the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position, with respect to horizontal non -coordinated 
effects under any plausible market definition.  
5.4. Horizontal coordinated effects  
5.4.1. The Notifying Party’s view  
(194)  The Notifying Party submits that the Transaction will not give rise to coordinated 
effects in the branded luxury jewellery market due to the following reasons.  
(195)  First, according to the Notifying Party, there is no evidence of coordination currently  
at play  in the luxury jewellery segment. At the outset, LVMH does not currently 
enable coordination of its own Maisons  selling luxury jewellery. If such coordination 
was possible and profitable, LVMH would ha ve every incentive to ensure such 
coordination within LVMH. The fact that it does not highlights the lack of incentives to coordinate in the luxury jewellery  segment .
193 
(196)  Second, the Notifying Party argues that there is no evidence that Tiffany plays a 
signif icant role in disrupting potential coordination between LVMH and other large 
competitors such as, e.g., Richemont currently , such that its removal as a stand -alone 
competitor would allow coordinated effects to arise.194 
(197)  Third, the Notifying Party submits tha t the luxury jewellery segment is not prone to 
coordination as it is characterised by low concentration, a high number of 
asymmetric competitors, strong competition across many non- price factors. The 
Transaction will not change any of these features of the  luxury jewellery segment.195 
(198)  Fourth, according to the Notifying Party, post -Transaction, large luxury jewellery 
groups  will continue to be heavily constrained by the broad range  of branded and 
unbranded luxury jewellery competitors.196 
(199)  Fifth, according to the  Notifying Party, post -Transaction, the substantial 
heterogeneity in the product offerings across luxury jewellery firms, along with very low levels of price transparency and substantial competition across a number of non -
price dimensions would render any attempt to monitor a coordinated outcome impossible.
197 
                                                 
193  Form CO, paragraph 7.131.  
194  Form CO, paragraph 7.131.  
195  Form CO, paragraph 7.131.  
196  Form CO, paragraph 7.131.  
197  Form CO, paragraph 7.131.  
 
40 (200)  Sixth, the Notifying Party submits that post -Transaction, deviation from a 
hypothetical coordinated outcome would be profitable and any punishment for such 
deviation would cause substantial long- term ha rm to the retaliating firm.198 
5.4.2. The Commission’s assessment of horizontal coordinated effects  
(201)  The Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts in relation 
to coordinated effects because of the following reasons.  
(202)  First, the Commission did not come across evidence of existing coordination in 
luxury jewellery pre -Transaction.  
(203)  Second, the increment brought about by the Transaction in luxury jewellery and its sub-segments does not seem to suggest that the structure of the market would change 
to an appreciable extent as a result of the Transaction , so as to change the incentives 
of LVMH. A customer responding to the Commission’s market investigation noted 
that LVMH  had not engaged in coordination following their (numerous) past 
acquisitions. Th erefore, that customer does not expect the current Transaction to  
enable or facilitate upward pricing coordination.
199 
(204)  Third, the luxury jewellery market consists of differentiated products where , in 
addition to different prices, the products also differ in their characteristics, precious 
metals and stones used, quality, design, as well as brand image.  As explained by a 
competitor, “ [p]ricing for luxury branded jewellery lies in the emotional value  that 
the product has for the consumer, mostly a factor of the brand equity and image built 
up over time. ”200 As acknowledged by the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, r eaching 
the terms of coordination in differentiated product markets is more difficult than in 
markets with homogeneous products.201  
(205)  Fourth, the market investigation showed that while customers consider retail prices to be transparent in the luxury branded jewellery industry, competitors’ view is more 
nuanced.
202 One competitor explained: “ Retail prices are fairly transparent, 
especially with the development of e- commerce. Wholesale prices are not 
transparent as they are only known by the brand and its customer(s).”203Moreover , 
even with respect to retail prices of luxury jewellery, one competitor noted that “many times, prices are communicated upon request only to potential customers ” 
and another competitor added that prices are transparent for “ product categories with 
comparable and generic design, not for unique design collections.”
204 
(206)  In addition, an ove rwhelming majority of customers expressing a view do not 
consider there to be pricing benchmarks/reference points used by suppliers across the luxury branded jewellery industry.
205 The competitor’s feedback was less clear, but 
one competitor noted “ The prices of precious metals and stones used to manufacture 
                                                 
198  Form CO, paragraph 7.131.  
199  Questionnaire to customers, question 47.1.  
200  Questionnaire to competitors, question 45.1.  
201  Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 45.  
202  Question naire to customers, question 46; questionnaire to competitors, question 44.  
203  Questionnaire to competitors, question 44.1.  
204  Questionnaire to competitors, question 44.1.  
205  Questionnaire to customers, question 45.  
 
41 luxury jewellery constitute obvious reference points for the pricing of jewellery 
pieces. ”206 
(207)  Finally , an overwhelming majority of customers and competitors expressing a view 
in response to the market investigation dismissed the possibility  that the Transaction 
could change the structure of the luxury branded jewellery industry so as to enable or 
facilitate upward pricing coordination between (the main) suppliers.207  
5.4.3. Conclusion on horizontal coordinated effects  
(208)  Based on the considerations presented in paragraphs (201)  - (207)  and in light of the 
results of the market investigation and of all evidence available to it , the 
Commission considers that , the Transaction  is unlikely to significantly impede 
effective competition in the internal market or in  the EEA, in particular as a result of 
the creation or strengthening of a dominant position,  with respect to horizontal 
coordinated effects under any plausible market definition.  
5.5. Non-horizontal effects  
(209)  As stated in Section 5.2.3 (Non-horizontal overlaps ), the Transaction  gives rise to 
limited vertical relations between LVMH’s retail activities ( travel retail and 
department stores) and Tiffany’s  manufacture and wholesale supply of luxury 
jewellery and watches, in particular. Based on the market shares submitted by the Parties and discussed in Section 5.2.4, none of these relations gives rise to affected 
markets.  
(210)  Nonetheless, LVMH is one of the worldwide leaders in the supply of luxury goods  
overall , including watches and jewellery, with renowned brands such as Bulgari, 
Fred, Chaumet, Repossi , TAG Heuer, Zenith, Hublot, Louis Vuitton and Christian 
Dior.  Moreover, the Transaction will enable LVMH to acquire an additional sizeable 
and iconic independent jewellery brand. Hence, the merged entity will control a 
large portfolio of successful and sought after luxury brands  translating into a 
significant market position , especially  towards certain intermediate customer groups  
including, e.g. , independent retailers  such as department stores.
208 
5.5.1. The Notifying Party’s view  
(211)  The Notifying Party submits that the merged entity will have no ability to engage in 
input foreclosure.209 Tiffany represents a limited share of sales of luxury goods  
overall and luxury jewellery in particular , with shares below [10 -20]% globally and 
in the EEA. Moreover, there are numerous  other players, e.g. Richemont and Kering, 
to which retailers could turn to if the Notifying Party were to foreclose access to 
Tiffany products. The Notifying Party further submits that is has no incentive to engage in input foreclosure – on the contrary, LVMH will be incentivised to grow 
                                                 
206  Questionnaire to competitors, quest ion 43.  
207  Questionnaire to competitors, question 45; questionnaire to customers, question 47.  
208  In its response to the pre -notification Request for Information 3 of 28 August 2020, the Notifying 
Party submitted that ‘ […].’ However, the Commission has col lected data from a number of 
department stores pointing to shares of sales by LVMH and Tiffany that are materially higher than 
their overall market share.   
209  Form CO, paragraph 7.136.  
 
42 the successful and profitable Tiffany business, including through sales to competing 
retails (as it is the case for other LVMH brands).  
(212)  Likewise, the Notifying Party submits that the merged entity will have no ability or incentive to engage in customer foreclosure.
210 The fact that LVMH may potentially 
purchase more Tiffany products will not  restrict  competing luxury companies’ 
access to an important customer, pushing them out from the retail segment. LVMH’s 
sales of third party luxury jewellery at the retail level, amounting to  around  EUR […] 
globally  and EUR […]  in the EEA , represent less than [0 -5]% of the total luxury 
jewellery segment size globally, and less than [0 -5]% in the EEA. Thus, LVMH does 
not constitute an essent ial route to market for suppliers of luxury jewellery, whether 
globally or in the EEA.  
(213)  In addition, LVMH submits that it would have no incentive to foreclose its upstream 
or downstream competitors post -merger because the presence of multiple competing 
products/brands at independent retailer points of sales is a factor contributing to its own sales as it ensures consumer attractiveness and generates traffic.
211 In that 
respect, LVMH represents that its department store Le Bon Marché offers a large selection of non- LVMH brands, with around […]% of Le Bon Marché’s luxury 
jewellery revenue in 2019 originating from non- LVMH brands. Moreover, the 
increment brought about by the Transaction is small and Tiffany is not a must have product in the offering of department stores.  
(214)   Finally, the Notifying Party submits that there is no scope for any conglomerate concerns resulting from the Transaction because the Parties’ prod ucts are 
substitutable with, not complementary to, one another, LVMH would not have the ability or incentive to bundle or tie products, and LVMH has no history of implementing bundling or tying strategies.
212 
5.5.2. The Commission’s assessment  
(215)  Over the course of the  market investigation, the Commission investigated in 
particular possible  non-horizontal effects arising from dete riorations in supply 
conditions  of LVMH’s brands (including Tiffany) to competing retailers and a 
related risk of LVMH leveraging the strengt h of its brand por tfolio  in, e.g., 
negotiating commission rates and brand positioning. 
(216)  Concerns emerged over the course of the market investigation about  a risk of 
foreclosure arising from LVMH’s increased market position and a  possible change in 
incentive s towards independent retailers, as follows:213  
(a) the proposed acquisition will further strengthen LVMH’s position and affect 
independent retailers’  ability to freely decide on the brand offering available 
in their retail stores due to the centralisation of price and assortment 
negotiations, including beyond the jewellery/watches category, leading to an 
                                                 
210   Form CO, paragraph 7.137.  
211  Form CO, paragraph 7.155.  
212   Form CO,  paragraphs 7.148 – 7.170.  
213   Non-confidential version of the observations submitted by an independent retailer on 28 August 2020. 
Non-confidential version of the minutes of a call of 1 September 2020 with this independent retailer.  
 
43 overrepresentation of LVMH brands to the detriment of independent houses 
and a corollary limitation of customer ch oice; and  
(b) a weakening of independent retailers’  competitive position vis -à-vis LVMH 
retail arm  due to pressures  exercised at the level of the financial conditions 
available from LVMH for the supply of luxury jewellery and other luxury 
products, enabled by exchanges of information among LVMH supply and 
retail businesses and central ised negotiations across brands.  
(217)  The remainder of this section assesses successively the ability and incentives of LVMH to engage into such foreclosure strategies, and the likely e ffects thereof.  
(218)  At the outset, however, the results of the market investigation reveal that, for an 
overwhelming majority of responding customers, the Transaction will not give LVMH the ability and incentive to restrict competing retailers’ access to Tiff any and 
other LVMH luxury branded jewellery products.
214 Likewise, a majority of 
consumers considers that the Transaction will not give LVMH the ability and incentive to condition/bundle the supply of products of certain of its other luxury brands to/with th e supply of Tiffany products towards , e.g., retail distribution 
customers.
215 Hence, at l east at a general level, the outcome of the market 
investigation does not point to a significant risk of non-horizontal effects.   
5.5.2.1. Ability  to foreclose  
(219)  In spite of the merged entity’s relatively modest market position in all plausible luxury goods and luxury jewellery markets, as apparent from the overall limited 
number of horizontally affected markets,  as well as its limited p resence in retail 
distribution,  a majority o f both customers and competitors who responded to the 
Commission’s market investigation finds that LVMH does derive  a competitive 
advantage  due to its  large portfolio of luxury brands ,
216, notably in terms of  brand 
management and negotiating power vis -à-vis third parties, including independent  
retailers.217  
(220)  For instance, one customer points that through successive brand acquisitions, LVMH has been increasing its commercial weight , which it can later benefit from.
218 
Another customer  explains  that its brand port folio ‘could give LVMH a preference 
for the best locations in department stores for example’.219 Similarly, competitors 
also mention advantages in the form of , e.g., greater negotiating power  and point to 
benefits relating to ‘scouting of best locations in s hopping malls ’.220 Overall, the 
Commission notes that  statements conveying concerns gathered over the course of 
the market investigation  have  originate d mainly from either department stores or 
independent brands  (brands not belonging to any group) .  
                                                 
214  Questionnaire to customers, question 48.  
215  Questionnaire to customers, question 51.  
216  Questionnaire to customers, question 50 and Questionnaire to competitors, question 48.  
217   Questionnaire to customers, question 50.1 and Questionnaire to competitors, question 48.1.  
218  Non-confidential version of the minutes of a call of 13 October 2020 with a department stores group.  
219  Questionnaire to customers, question 50.1.  
220  Questionnaire to competitors, question 48.1.  
 
44 (221)  However, in practice, it is unclear whether these concerns are current or likely to 
materialise. In particular, independent retailers that expressed concerns generally  
acknowledge that negotiations with LVMH are, in normal circumstances,  undertaken 
at the level of each Maison or brand.221 Conversely, instances of cross- branding 
strategies appear to have been relatively limited up until now and it is unclear 
whether and to what extent the Transaction is likely to materially modify this reality, 
in particular g iven Tiffany’s market position in the EEA . Moreover, data collected 
over the course of the market investigation indicates that , in spite of  the group’s size 
and important brand portfolio, commission rates secured by LVMH luxury jewellery 
brands with depart ment stores are not  particularly advantageous.222 In contrast, the 
data tends to demonstrate that particularly prestigious and exclusive independent brands are capable of securing equally favourable commercial conditions from 
retailers, including from LVMH retail businesses.
223  
(222)  In line with these observations , several submissio ns of the Notifying Party state  that 
the independence of its brands  or Maisons  lays at the heart of  LVMH ’s corporate 
philosophy224 and that the group’s ‘operating model [is] based in particular on an 
agile decentralized organization which allows and guarantees that each of its 
Maisons stays autonomous and which favours competition between them .’225 In 
particular, LVMH’s Universal Registration Document states that ‘[t] he structu re and 
operating principles adopted by LVMH ensure that Maisons are both autonomous 
and responsive. As a result, they are able to build close relationships with their customers, make fast, effective and appropriate decisions, and motivate Group employees f or the long term by encouraging them to take an entrepreneurial 
approach.’
226 Further, ‘[t]he commercial, distribution, marketing, and other 
strategic decisions of each Maison are defined and implemented at the Maison 
level ’.227  
(223)  According to the Noti fying Party’s submissions, the group -level involvement is 
limited to generating synergies, which ‘aim at giving each Maison the means to support their autonomous development .’
228 These synergies relate to ‘ […]’.229 
Importantly, ‘none of the synergies created at Grou p level involve the LVMH Group 
                                                 
221  Non-confidential version of the observat ions submitted by an independent retailer on 28 August 2020. 
Non-confidential version of the minutes of a call of 1 September 2020 with this independent retailer. 
Non-confidential version of the minutes of a call of 13 October 2020 with a department stores  group.  
222  Reply to the Request for Information of 7 October of an independent retailer;  Non-confidential 
version of the minutes of a call of 13 October 2020 with a department stores group.  
223  Reply to the Request for Information 3 of 25 September 2020;  Reply to the Request for Information 
of 7 October of an independent retailer;  Non-confidential version of the minutes of a call of 
13 October 2020 with a department stores group.  
224  Form CO, paragraph 7.151, Reply to the Request for Information 3 of 25 Sept ember 2020 and 
Supplementary Paper for the European Commission submitted by the Notifying Party on 
13 October  2020.  
225  Supplementary Paper for the European Commission submitted by the Notifying Party on 13 October  2020, paragraph 2. 1.  
226  Supplementary Paper for the European Commission submitted by the Notifying Party on 
13 October  2020, paragraph 2.2.  
227  Reply to the Request for Information 3 of 25 September 2020, paragraph 1.4.  
228  Supplementary Paper for the European Commission submitted by the Notifying Party on 
13 October  2020, paragraph 2.5.  
229  Supplementary Paper for the European Commission submitted by the Notifying Party on 13 October  2020, paragraph 2.5  
 
45 defining or influencing the Maisons’ commercial, distribution, and marketing 
(including retail) strategies .’230 
(224)  In addition, the Notifying Party explains that the aforementioned independence and 
autonomy of brands within the LV MH group also apply to its retail activities and the 
latter’s relations with the Maisons . In its submissions, LVMH confirms that ‘ there is 
no scope for the exchange of confidential information between LVMH’s selective distribution businesses and the Maisons engaged in the design, production, and sale 
of luxury goods ’,
231 with such exchanges being contractually prohibited. The 
Notifying Party further submits that also for its own retail activities ‘[n] egotiations 
with the Maisons on terms and conditions are (…) made at arms’ length ’.232  
(225)  The operational autonomy of the different LVMH brands is confirmed by several 
market participants, including a travel retailer ,233 a department stores group,234 as 
well as a competing luxury brands group.235 It appears moreover  corro borated  by 
data on the different commission rates negotiated by LVMH individual brands with 
different retailers . Even LVMH’s own department store , Le Bon Marché, applies 
different commission rates to individual LVMH brands .236 Thus, as illustrated by the 
example of Bulgari developed in Table 4 - Current commission rates negotiated by 
Bulgari with department stores in the EEA , individua l LVMH brands enjoy  different 
commercial conditions in dealings with different retailers, without the conditions 
offered by Le Bon Marché automatically being the most favourable ones.  
Table 4 - Current commission rates negotiated b y Bulgari with department stores in 
the EEA237 
[…] 
(226)  Finally,  over the course of the market investigation, LVMH produced a recent 
internal group communication reflecting  its commitment to a decentralised 
organisational model , referred to as ‘ one of the key pillars of the LVMH Group  
business philosophy ’, and the operational independence of each Maison, ‘ in 
particular with regards to their product, distribution, commercial and marketing 
strategy, so that each one can make the choices they feel right for their business.’238 
That communication also restated the relevant rules prohibiting the exchange of 
‘product development, communication or commercially sensitive information between the Maisons ’, including ‘in particular absence of sharing of commercially 
sensitive information between LVMH’s selective retailing Maisons and the other 
LVMH Maisons .’
239 It further reiterates  the requirements applicable to these selective 
                                                 
230  Supplementary Paper for the European Commission submitted by the Notifying Party on 
13 Octobe r 2020, paragraph 2.7.  
231  Supplementary Paper for the European Commission submitted by the Notifying Party on 
13 October  2020, paragraph 1.1.  
232  Reply to the Request for Information 3 of 25 September 2020, paragraph 5.2.  
233  Non-confidential minutes of the call of 29 June 2020 with a travel retailer.  
234  Non-confidential minutes of the call of 13 October 2020 with a department stores group.  
235  Questionnaire to competitors, question 49.1  
236  Reply to the Request for Information 3 of 25 September 2020, paragraph 4.6 (e.g., […]% for Celine and […]% for Louis Vuitton).  
237  Reply to the Request for Information 3 of 25 September 2020, paragraph 5.4.  
238  See Annex to email from LVMH counsel, 15 Octob er 2020.  
239  Ibid. 
 
46 retailing  businesses to preserve the confidentiality of commercially sensitive 
informat ion of non- group clients and to ensure the arms’ length nature of 
negotiations with  LVMH’s  Maisons . 
5.5.2.2. Incentive s to foreclose  
(227)  The Notifying Party submits that its decentralised operational model founded upon 
independence and autonomy of individual Maisons does not resul t from ‘ any legal 
or internal restraint, but because LVMH is convinced that this is the most optimal 
way to structure its operations.’240  
(228)  This lack of incentive  for the Notifying Party to move towards centralisation and 
leverage its group strength is further  corroborated by the results of the Commission’s 
market investigation.  In particular, a s stated in paragraph (218) , responding 
customers see no  incentive  for LVMH  to restrict competing retailers’ access to 
Tiffany and other LVMH luxury branded jewellery products  post-Transaction241 or 
to condition/bundle the  supply of products of certain of its other luxury brands 
to/with the supply of Tiffany products towards e.g. retail distribution customers.242 
(229)  For instance, when asked about the risk of bundling/tying, one customer states that 
‘LVMH already owns a strong portfolio of brands and does not apply this 
strategy.’243 Considering the modest  presence of Tiffany in Europe, including  in 
terms of sales to independent retailers,  the Transition is unlikely to change LVMH’s 
incentives  and thus alter its current policies .  
(230)  Similarly, one competitor, while acknowledging a potential ability of LVMH to 
implement bundling/tying strategies  and impossibility of excluding a future change 
in its behaviour , notes  that ‘LVMH will not have an incentive to do so, due to the 
independent strength of each of its brands.’244  
(231)  Furthermore , one  department stores group also confirms that in normal market 
conditions, maintenance of independence of brands is the strategy that is  the most 
beneficial for all parties , i.e. groups, brands and retailers .245 Importantly, this 
department stores group  further reports that it does not consider the Transaction to  
endanger  its busin ess model , consisting of providing brands with a sales platform 
that is considerably less costly than an own retail network.246 Anothe r department 
stores group  also adds that its flagship store is ‘one of the most productive (in terms 
of turnover per square meter) point of sales worldwide for certain brands and a very 
attractive one in terms of brand positioning and image ’.247 
(232)  As for the  customer  foreclosure concerns , the Notifying Party submits that ‘ LVMH’s 
selective retailers would have no incentive to favour LVMH’s Maisons as this would 
undermine their business model which is to present an offer which includes an as 
                                                 
240  Supplementary Paper for the European Commission submitted by the Notifying Party on 
13 October  2020, paragraph 2.9.  
241  Questionnaire to consumers, question 48.  
242  Questionnaire to consumers, question 51.  
243  Questionnaire to consumers, question 51.1.  
244  Questionnaire to competitors, question 49.1.  
245  Non-confidential version of the minutes of a call of 13 October 2020 with a department stores group.  
246  Ibid. 
247  Non-confidential version of the minutes of a call of 1 September 2020 with an independent retailer.  
 
47 large as possible portfolio of luxury brands with a view to increase their legitimacy, 
traffic drivers and attractiveness. ’248 
(233)  The lack of incentive to limit the range of brands offered by its selective retailing 
Maisons  is also reflected in the data submitted by the Notifying  Party , demonstrating 
that the majority of LVMH’s own retail businesses’ revenues are generated from 
non-LVMH products.  
Table 5 -  Selective Retailing Maisons ’ % of revenue from non -LVMH products249 
Geography  Maison  Product Category  Revenue % from Non -
LVMH Products  
WORLDWIDE  DFS TOTAL  […] 
WORLDWIDE  DFS FASHION + LEATHER GOODS  […] 
WORLDWIDE  DFS HOME  […] 
WORLDWIDE  DFS PERFUMES + COSMETICS  […] 
WORLDWIDE  DFS WATCHES + JEWELLERY  […] 
EEA  LE BON MARCHE  TOTAL  […] 
EEA  LE BON MARCHE  FASHION + LEATHER GOODS  […] 
EEA  LE BON MARCHE  HOME  […] 
EEA  LE BON MARCHE  PERFUMES + COSMETICS  […] 
EEA  LE BON MARCHE  WATCHES + JEWELLERY  […] 
EEA  DFS TOTAL  […] 
EEA  DFS FASHION + LEATHER GOODS  […] 
EEA  DFS HOME  […] 
EEA  DFS PERFUMES + COSMETICS  […] 
EEA  DFS WATCHES + JEWELLERY  […] 
Source:LVMH  
5.5.2.3. Effects on competition  
(234)  While based on the considerations developed in Sections 5.5.2.1 and 5.5.2.2, the 
merged entity will have limited ability and incentive to engage in foreclosure 
strategies, such conduct is unlikely to have material effects on  competition due to its  
limited share  of sales through department stores and other intermediary customers  
and to the fragmented nature of the industry, as pointed above in the section 5.3 on 
horizontal non- coordinated effects.  
5.5.3. Conclusion on non- horizontal effects  
(235)  Based on the considerations set out  in Section 5.5.2 and in view  of the results of the 
market investigation  and all evidence available to it,  the Commission considers that , 
on balance, the Transaction is unlikely to significantly impede effective competition 
in the internal market or in the EEA, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position,  with respect  to non- horizontal effects.  
                                                 
248  Supplementary Paper for the European Commission submitted by the Notifying Party on 
13 October  2020, paragraph 1.1.  
249  Supplementary Paper for the European Commission submitted by the Notifying Party on 
13 October  2020,  paragraph 3.17.  
 
48 6. CONCLUSION  
(236)  For the above reasons, the Commission has decided not to oppose the notified 
operation and to declare it compatible with the internal market and with the EEA 
Agreement. This decision is adopted in application of Article 6( 1)(b) of the Merger 
Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement.  
For the Commission  
  (Signed)  
Margrethe VESTAGER  
Executive Vice -President