(b)

help build a consensus for a successful outcome of the Second Review Conference, on the basis of the framework established by the First Review Conference, and shall promote, inter alia, the following essential issues: (i) reaffirmation of the comprehensive nature of the prohibition of chemical weapons as laid down in the General Purpose Criterion by: — reconfirming that the Convention’s prohibitions apply to any toxic chemical, except where such a chemical is intended for purposes not prohibited by the Convention and as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes, and thus take into account the developments in science and technology since the First Review Conference, — underlining the obligation of States Parties to reflect the General Purpose Criterion in their national implementation legislation and administrative enforcement practice, — emphasising the obligation of States Parties to declare riot control agents; (ii) reaffirmation of the obligation of chemical weapons possessor states to destroy their chemical weapons within the deadlines of the CWC, through: — welcoming the progress made and the efforts undertaken by possessor states to meet the deadlines while urging them to overcome delays in destruction, — underlining the importance of systematic verification through continuous on-site inspection of chemical weapons destruction, — assessing progress in the destruction of chemical weapons, taking into account, inter alia, the results of visits by representatives of the Executive Council in accordance with the decision of the 11th Session of the Conference of the States Parties, — emphasising the responsibility of the policy-making organs to consider States Parties' compliance with agreed destruction deadlines at the appropriate time; (iii) further strengthening of the verification regime with regard to activities not prohibited under the Convention, with a view to enhancing confidence in the non-proliferation of chemical weapons and to further promoting cooperation with industry, through: — continued awareness-raising of the Convention’s prohibitions throughout Government, industry, academia and non-governmental organisations, — emphasising the need to increase the number of inspections in Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPF) and to improve the effectiveness of the regime where necessary, giving priority to those sites which are of high relevance to the Convention, and to the improvement of declarations by States Parties on OCPF sites; (iv) implementation of the provisions of the Convention on consultations, cooperation and fact-finding, in particular the challenge-inspection mechanism, which remains an indispensable and readilyavailable instrument as well as a viable and usable tool of the OPCW’s verification regime, stressing the legal right of States Parties to request a challenge inspection without prior consultation and encouraging the use of the mechanism as a matter of course where appropriate; (v) development of tailored strategies on achieving the universality of the CWC, in particular with regard to the Middle East, including regional workshops in the areas concerned; (vi) continuous improvement of national implementation measures and recalling that full compliance with Article VII is a vital factor for the present and future efficiency of the CWC regime, including through: — offering assistance to States Parties in need, as exemplified by the Joint Actions of the European Union; and — strengthening national export controls which are required to prevent the acquisition of Chemical Weapons; (vii) ensuring the OPCW’s capability to provide assistance and protection; (viii) fostering international cooperation in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, and in particular contributing to capacity building activities by the OPCW in States Parties developing their chemical industry and trade; (ix) beginning work to ensure that, following the completion of the destruction of all chemical weapons, the OPCW is wellplaced to focus on its remaining activities, in particular its non-proliferation role; (x) compliance with obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006), in particular to call for practical cooperation between OPCW and the UN 1540 Committee as well as other forums with the aim of eliminating the risk of chemical weapons being acquired or used for terrorist purposes, including possible terrorist access to materials, equipment, and knowledge that could be used in the development and production of chemical weapons; (xi) the G8 Global Partnership programmes targeted at preventing proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction through support for disarmament, control and security of sensitive materials, facilities and expertise.