Commission européenne, DG COMP MERGER REGISTRY, 1049 Bruxelles, BELGIQUE  
Europese Commissie, DG COMP  MERGER REGISTRY, 1049 Brussel,   BELGIË  
 
Tel: +32 229 -91111. Fax: +32 229 -64301. E -mail: COMP -MERGER -REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu . 
 EUROPEAN COMMISSION  
 
 
 
 
 
Brussels,  4.12.2018  
C(2018 ) 8387 final  
  
 
To the notifying party : 
 
Dear Sir or Madam,  
Subject : Case M. 9093 – DP World Investments/Unifeeder  
Commission decision pursuant to Article 6(1)(b) of Council 
Regulation No  139/20041 and Article 57 of the Agreement on the 
European Economic Area2 
(1) On 26 October 2018 , the European Commission received notification of a 
proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger Regulation , by which  
DP World Investments B.V., a Dutch company which is part of the DP World 
group ("DP World", United Arab E mirates), acquires within the meaning of 
Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation sole control of the whole of Unifeeder 
A/S ("Unifeeder", Denmark) by way of a purchase of shares ("the Transaction"). 
DP World and Unifeeder are collectively referred to as t he "Parties ".3  
1. THE PARTIES  
(2) DP World is the owner, operator and manager of 78 marine container terminals 
and other port infrastructure in over 40 countries, located across six continents. In 
Northern Europe and the Mediterranean , DP World operates 13 termi nals.4 Its 
                                                 
1  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the "Merger Regulation"). With effect fr om 1 December 2009,  the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU") has introduced certain changes, such as the 
replacement of "Community" by "Union" and "common market" by "internal market". The 
terminology of the TFEU will be used throughout  this decision.  
2  OJ L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3 (the "EEA Agreement").  
3  Publication in the Official Journal of the European Union No C 402 , 08.11.2018 , p. 7. 
4  Those terminals are located in Algeria (Algiers, and Djen -Djen), Belgium (Antwerp Gateway), Cyprus 
(Limassol), France (Marseille -Fos, and Le Havre), Germany (Germersheim), the Netherlands 
 In the published version of this decision, some 
information has been omitted pursuant to Article 
17(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004  
concerning non -disclosure of business secrets and 
other confidential information. The omissions are 
shown thus […]. Where possible the information 
omitted has been replaced by ranges of figures or a 
general description.  PUBLIC VERSION  
2 terminals handle general and bulk cargo, roll -on/roll -off and load -on/load -off 
vessels and passengers. However, c ontainer handling is the company's core 
business and generates more than three quarters of its revenue. DP World also 
provides cargo  handling and logistics services , that is to say  the discharging and 
loading of vessels and related activities such as handling of trucks/rail/barges, 
warehousing, container repair and container storage.  
(3) DP World does not participate in liner shipping ser vices but does provide certain 
maritime logistics and peripheral services at some of its terminals . Indeed, DP 
World has barge operations at its deep -sea terminals at Antwerp and Rotterdam, 
as well as at its inland terminals in Beverdonk (Belgium), Ge rmersheim 
(Germany), Man nheim (Germany) and Stuttgart  (Germany).5 In addition, DP 
World, through its wholly -owned subsidiary P&O Maritime, also provides certain 
maritime support solutions. More specifically, it is active in the provision of 
specialist vesse ls servicing offshore renewables, river barging, chartering, and 
port services.6  
(4) DP World  is majority -owned by the Government of Dubai , via Dubai World 
Corporation ("Dubai World").7 In line with its decisions in Case M.6060 – 
Citigroup/Public Sector Pensi on Investment Board/DP World/DP World 
Australia/JV  and Case M.6913  – DP World /Goodman /DP World Asia , the 
Commission considers DP World as an undertaking which operates on the market 
independently from Dubai World. The refore, the activities of entities belonging to 
the Dubai World Group – such as the services offered by P&O Ferries in the 
short -sea shipping market (namely in its load-on/load -off segment) on the 
Zeebrugge -Hull leg of trade and the freight forwarding serv ices provided by P&O 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Rotterdam), Romania (Constanta), Spain (Tarragona), Turkey (Yarimca), United Kingdom (London 
Gateway, and Southampton).  
5  DP World considers that those services are not relevant for the purposes of the assessment of the 
Transaction, as they comprise inland transportation; therefore, volumes carried on those routes are 
outside of the geographic scope of Unifeeder's activities (Form CO, paragraph 59). In any event, 
according to DP World, those activities are de minimis  and even if considered as part of the same 
geographic market as Unifeeder's activities, the total capacity of DP World's barging activities would 
amount to [0-5]% of the container transport market in North ern Europe (and [0-5]% of the inland 
transportation market in Northern Europe, in which Unifeeder is not active). As a consequence, DP 
World's barge operations will not be further considered for the purposes of assessing the Transaction.  
6  DP World considers that the maritime support solutions (e.g. tugging and harbour services) provided 
by P&O Maritime are fundamentally different activities and services to those of Unifeeder and hence 
do not give rise to a horizontal overlap. Furthermore, m ost of P&O Maritime's operations are outside 
of the EEA (Form CO, paragraph 59). There is nevertheless a (marginal) vertical link between the 
Parties' activities, since P&O Maritime supplies pilotage and tug services in Cyprus to shipping 
companies (includ ing to Unifeeder, which represents [0-5]% of P&O Maritime's revenue in Cyprus). 
Considering that the maritime support solutions provided by P&O Maritime are add -ons meant to 
complement and enhance DP World's container terminal services and that the effects  of the vertical 
link resulting from the Transaction between the upstream market for contained terminal services (in 
which DP World is active) and the downstream market for short -sea shipping services (in which 
Unifeeder is active) will be assessed in deta il in section 5 of this Decision, P&O Maritime's operations 
will not be further considered for the purposes of assessing the Transaction.     
7  DP World Limited, of which DP World Investments B.V. is an indirect wholly owned subsidiary, is 
80.45% indirect ly held by the Government of Dubai, via Dubai World. The remaining 19.55% of DP 
World Limited's shareholding is listed on NASDAQ Dubai.  
3 Ferrymasters – are not taken into account for the purpose s of assessing the 
Transaction.8 
(5) Unifeeder is active in the provision of maritime transportation services for 
containerised goods. Unifeeder primarily provides feeder services , that is to say 
the transport  of cargo between hub ports and (smaller) o utports . However , 
Unifeeder also provides short -sea services , that is to say the  transport of cargo 
from point to point, both on a port -to-port and door -to-door basis. Unifeeder 
operates primarily in Northe rn Europe with feeder and short -sea services and in 
the Mediterranean with feeder services only.9 It has a fleet of approximately 50-
60 chartered vessels.  
2. THE OPERATION  
(6) Pursuant to a share purchase agreement signed on  6 August 2018 , DP World will 
purchase  the entire issued share capital of Holdingselskabet af 10. januar 2013 II 
A/S, U nifeeder's sole indirect shareholder . As a conseq uence, post -Transaction 
DP World will acquire sole control over Unifeeder.   
(7) Therefore, the  Transaction constitutes a concentration within the meaning of 
Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation.  
3. UNION  DIMENSION  
(8) The undertakings concerned have a combined ag gregate world -wide turnover of 
more than EUR 5 000 million10 (DP World : EUR […] million; Unifeeder : EUR 
[…] million) . Each of them has a n EU-wide turnover in excess of EUR 250 
million  (DP World : EUR […] million; Unifeeder : EUR […] million) , but they do 
not achieve more than two -thirds of their aggregate EU-wide turnover within one 
and the same Member State.  
(9) The Transaction  therefore has a Union  dimension  pursuant to Article 1(2) of the 
Merger Regulation . 
4. MARKET DEFINITION  
(10) DP World provides  container terminal services  (also called stevedoring services) , 
which are  inputs to  container transport services , in particular container liner 
shipping services,  provided by operators like Unifeeder . 
                                                 
8  In any event, even if DP World, P&O Ferries and P&O Ferrymasters were considered as constituting a 
single economic un it, combining the activities of P&O Ferries and P&O Ferrymasters with the 
activities of DP World would not give rise to any additional affected market. As a consequence, the 
Transaction would not raise serious doubts even if P&O Ferries and P&O Ferrymaster s were 
considered as belonging to the same group as DP World.  
9  Northern Europe represents approximately [80-90]% of Unifeeder's activities in the EEA. The 
Mediterranean represents approximately [10-20]% of Unifeeder's activities in the EEA.  
10  Turnover c alculated in accordance with Article 5 of the Merger Regulation.  
4 4.1. Container terminal services  
4.1.1.  Relevant product market  
(11) The provision of container terminal services by terminal operators involves the 
loading, unloading, storage, and land -side handling for inland transportation  of 
containerised cargo.11  
(12) In its prior decision practice, the Commission has defined  a separate market for 
the provision of container terminal  services .12 The Commission has considered 
segmenting  container terminal services by traffic flows  to (i) hinterland traffic , 
that is to say containers transported directly onto/from a container vessel from/to 
the hinterland via barge, truck or train, and (ii) transhipment traffic , that is to say 
containers destined for onward transportation to other ports or other vessels. 
Transhipment traffic involves both feeder movements, where containers are 
shipped to an ad jacent market, and relay movements , where containers are moved 
from one ocean -going vessel to another ocean -going vessel to onward movement 
to another more distant market .13 
(13) DP World  consider s that the Commission does not need to reach a view on the 
exact s cope of the relevant product market, as in any event the Transaction does 
not give rise to competition concerns .14  
(14) In any case, f or the purposes of this Decision, the question of whether the market 
for container terminal services should be segmented betwee n hinterland and 
transhipment traffic can be left open, as  the Transaction would not raise serious 
doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market under any plausible product 
market definition.  
4.1.2.  Relevant geographic market  
(15) In its prior decisional pra ctice, the Commission has considered that the broadest 
possible geographic scope of the market for the provision of container terminal 
services is a region,  such as Northern Europe (for transhipment traffic), and its 
narrowest possible scope is  the catchme nt area of the ports in a certain range, 
such as Hamburg -Antwerp (for hinterland traffic) or possibly even narrower, 
comprising the ports of a single Member State only.15  
                                                 
11  See for example Cases M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 63; M.5398 – Hutchison/Evergreen , 
paragraph 9.  
12  See for example Cases M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 63; M.5398 – Hutchison/Ever green , 
paragraph 9.  
13  This possible segmentation mainly concerned deep -sea container ships (see for example Cases M.8330 
–  Maersk Line/HSDG , paragraph 29; M.8120 – Hapag -Lloyd/United Arab Shipping Company , 
paragraphs 21 and 24; M.7908 – CMA CGM/NOL , para graph 17; M.5450 – Kühne/HGV/TUI/Hapag -
Lloyd , paragraph 16; and M.5398 – Hutchison/Evergreen , paragraphs 9 and 10).  
14  Form CO, paragraph 94.  
15  This possible geographic definition mainly concerned deep -sea ports (see for example Cases M.8330 – 
Maersk Line/HSDG , paragraph 32; M.8120 – Hapag -Lloyd/United Arab Shipping Company , 
paragraphs 22 -24; M.7908 – CMA CGM/NOL , paragraph 18; M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 
 
5 (16) DP World  consider s that it is not necessary to consider the market more narrowly 
than on a regional basis  (that is, f or the purpose of the Transaction , Northern 
Europe , the Mediterranean and Eastern Mediterranean , and Black Sea ).16  
(17) With regard to the ports of Constanta (Romania), Marseille -Fos and Le Havre 
(France), in which DP World opera tes terminals, t he market investigation has not 
produced sufficient evidence to conclude on  the geographic scope of the market 
for the provision of container terminal services .17   
(18) In any case, f or the purposes of this Decision, the question of whether the market 
for container terminal services encompasses ports of a region, of a catchment 
area, or of one Member State  can be left open, as the Transaction would not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market under any plausible 
geogr aphic  market definition . 
4.1.3.  Conclusion  
(19) For the purpose s of this Decision , it is not necessary to conclude on the exact 
product  and geographic definition of the  market for the provision  of container 
terminal services, as the Transaction would not raise serious  doubts as to its 
compatibility with the internal market under any plausible market definition . 
(20) The Commission will therefore assess the effects of the Transaction on the 
following market s:  
(a) Product markets: (i) container terminal services (overall); (ii) container 
terminal services for hinterland traffic ; and (iii) container terminal services 
for transhipment traffic;  
(b) Geographic  market s: (i) regions  (such as Northern Europe or the 
Mediterranean) , (ii) catchment area s comprising  the ports in  a certain 
range  (such as Le Havre -Hamburg ), and (iii)  the ports of a single Member 
State (such as Romania or France) . 
4.2. Door-to-door multimodal transport services  
4.2.1.  Relevant product market  
(21) Door -to-door multimodal  transport services consist in taking up cargo at an 
agreed point and d elivering it to another agreed point. Customers decide where 
the point of loading and point of delivery are situated and transport services 
providers adapt to this. As the cargo is cont ainerised, it can travel on vessels, 
trucks, trains and barges .18 
(22) In a prior decision, the Commission noted that sea vessel operators, truck, rail and 
barge companies offering door -to-door transport ultimately compete on the 
                                                                                                                                                 
65; M.5450 – Kühne/HGV/TUI/Hapag -Lloyd , paragraph 16; M.5066 – Eurogate/APMM , paragraphs 
15-23). 
16  Form CO, paragraph 98.  
17  Replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to market participants, questions 3 and 4.  
18  Case M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 24.  
6 provision of multimodal transpor t services , as transport operators often need to 
combine different modes of transport in order to provide a full door -to-door 
service. Therefore, the Commission concluded that there is a market for door -to-
door transport services, including all modes of tr ansportation.19 
(23) DP World  submit s that the relevant market in which Unifeeder is active is the 
market for the provision of intra-European door -to-door multimodal transport 
services . According to DP World , different modes of transport for intra -European 
volumes are highly substitutable from the perspective of end customers ; therefore 
shipping services should be regarded as part of the intra -European door -to-door 
multimodal transport services market, which encompass es all modes of transp ort 
by sea, rail and road.20  
(24) In any case, for the purposes of this Decision , the question of whether there is a 
market for intra -European door -to-door multimodal transport services  can be left 
open, as the Transaction would not raise serious doubts as to i ts compatibility 
with the internal market under any plausible product  market definition . 
4.2.2.  Relevant geographic market  
(25) In a prior decision , the Commission considered that the market for door -to-door 
multimodal transport services could be defined either on a t rade basis, 
aggregat ing country pairs  (such as  Iberia to Northern Europe ), or on a country  
pair basis (e.g. Spain to Germany ). Ultimately, the Commiss ion left the 
geographic market definition open.21 
(26) DP World  considers  that geographic market for the transport of containers should 
be defined regionally (that is to say , in this case,  Northern Europe and the 
Mediterranean) .22 
(27) In any case, for the purposes of this Decision, the question of whether the market 
for door -to-door multimodal transport services s hould be defined on a trade  or 
country pair basis can be left open , as the Transaction would not raise serious 
doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market under any plausible 
geographic market definition . 
4.2.3.  Conclusion  
(28) For the purposes of this Dec ision, it is not necessary to conclude on whether there 
is an overall  market for the provision of door -to-door multimodal transport 
services and on its exact geographic definition, as the Transaction would not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility w ith the internal market under any plausible 
market definition.  
(29) The Commission will therefore assess the effects of the Transaction on the market 
for door -to-door multimodal transport services, defined on the basis of the 
                                                 
19  Case M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 31.  
20  Form CO, paragraphs 101 -106. 
21  Case M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPD R, paragraphs 35 and 36.  
22  Form CO, paragraphs 116 -118. 
7 following geographic scopes:  (i) tr ades (such as between countries within the 
Mediterranean) , and (ii) country pairs .  
4.3. Short -sea shipping services  
4.3.1.  Relevant product market  
(30) Short -sea container liner shipping involves the provision of regular, scheduled 
intra-continental (usually , costal trade ) services for the carriage of cargo by 
container liner shipping companies.  
(31) In its prior decisional practice, the Commission has left open whether shipping  
services  should be part of a broader door -to-door multimodal transport services 
market.23 Should a separate  market for exist, the Commission has concluded that 
(i) container shipping is distinct from bulk shipping (i .e. non -containerised 
shipping);24 (ii) short -sea container shipping  is distinct from long -sea container 
shipping (i.e. deep -sea shipping);25 and (iii) non-liner shipping services are not 
part of the short -sea container shipping market.26  
(32) The Commission has also considered , while ultimately leaving open,  the 
following  further possible distinctions  within the market for short -sea container 
liner shipping services: (i) between reefer (that is to say refrigerated) and dry (or 
non-reefer , that is to say not refrigerated ) services ;27 and (ii) between  roll-on/roll -
off ("Ro -Ro") and lift -on/lift -off ("Lo -Lo") services .28 The Commission has not 
examined t he possible existence of a separate market for feeder services . 
(33) DP World  consider s that shipping  services should be regarded as part of a broader 
market for door-to-door multimodal transport services , encompassing all modes 
of transport by sea , rail and ro ad.29 If a market for short -sea container liner 
shipping services were to exist , DP World submits that: (i) the distinction 
between reefer and dry transport is not of relevance for the Transaction;30 (ii) Ro-
                                                 
23  Cases M.8330 – Maersk Line/HSDG , paragraph 19; M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 48.  
24  Case M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 49.  
25  See for example Cases M.8330 – Maersk Line/HSDG , paragraph 19; M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , 
paragraphs 49 and 51.  
26 See for example Cases M.8330 – Maersk Line/HSDG , paragraph 19; M.8120 – Hapag -Lloyd/United 
Arab Shipping Company , paragraph 10; M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 49. Non -linear 
shipping, such as  charter, tramp and specialised transport, distinguishes itself from linear shipping 
because of the regularity and frequency of the service.  
27 See for example Cases M.8330 – Maersk Line/HSDG , paragraph 19; M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , 
paragraph 48; M.7268 – CSAV /HGV/Kühne Maritime/Hapag -Lloyd AG , paragraphs 18 -20; M.3973 – 
CMA CGM/Delmas , paragraphs 6 -7; M.3829 – Maersk/PONL , paragraphs 7 -12. If reefer and non -
reefer services constitute one single market, the Commission has considered whether reefer containers 
and bulk reefer vessels should be included (see for example Cases M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , 
paragraphs 50 -52; M.7268 – CSAV/HGV/Kühne Maritime/Hapag -Lloyd AG , paragraph 20).  
28 See for example Cases M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 50; M.6305 – DFDS/C.RO 
Ports/Ä lvsborg , paragraphs 19 -21. Roll -on/roll -off ("Ro -Ro") shipping corresponds to the transport of 
wheeled cargo (lorries, cars, etc.) on ships. Ro -Ro vessels have built -in ramps for the "rolling -on" and 
"rolling -off" of the cargo. In Lo -Lo shipping, dock moun ted cranes lift and stack containers on vessels.  
29 Form CO, paragraph 106.  
30  Form Co, paragraph 109.  
8 Ro ferry and LoLo short -sea services  should be considered separately;31 and (iii)  
it is not necessary to consider feeder services as a separate market.32 
(34) The Commission notes that there is no need, for the purposes of assessing the 
Transaction, to distinguish between reefer and non -reefer serv ices, considering 
that the Transaction does not give rise to horizontal effects and that Unifeeder, 
like other short sea shippers, is equally able to transport either type of container.  
(35) As to the other plausible markets, the questions of whether there is a market for 
short -sea container liner shipping services and, if so, whether RoRo ferry 
services, LoLo short -sea services and feeder services should constitute separate 
markets can be left open, as the Transaction would not raise serious doubts as to 
its compatibility with the internal market under any plausible product market 
definition.  
4.3.2.  Relevant geographic market  
(36) In its prior decision practice, the Commission has considered that the relevant 
geographic market for short -sea container liner shipping  services  should be 
defined on the basis of (i) either single trades  or corridors , defined by the range of 
ports which are ser ved at both ends of the service;33 (ii) or single  legs of trade.34 
(37) DP World submits  that the geographic scope  of the market should b e considered 
as region al in the context of Unifeeder's services  (that is to say  Northern  Europe  
and the Mediterranean ).35  
(38) In any case, for the purposes of this Decision, the question of whether the market 
for short -sea container liner shipping services should be defined on a trade or leg 
of trade basis can be left open, as the Transaction would not raise serious doubts 
as to its compatibility with the internal market under any plausible geographic 
market definition .  
4.3.3.  Conclusion  
(39) For the purposes of this D ecision, it is not necessary to conclude on whether there 
is a market for the provision of short -sea container liner shipping services or 
whether it forms part of the overall market for the provision of door -to-door 
multimodal transport services, and on it s exact product and geographic definition, 
as the Transaction would not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the 
internal market under any plausible market definition.  
(40) The Commission will therefore assess the ef fects of the Transaction on the 
following markets : 
                                                 
31 Form CO, paragraph 111.  
32 Form CO, paragraph 115.  
33  Cases M.8330 – Maersk Line/HSDG , paragraph 20; M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 59.  
34  Cases M.8330 – Maersk Line/HSDG , paragraph 20; M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 60.  
35  Form CO, paragraph 119.  
9 (a) Product markets:  door-to-door multimodal transport services (see 
paragraph (29) above) and, in the absence of any horizontal overlap  
between the Parties' activities , on the narrowest plausible product markets 
in which Unifeeder is active,36 that is to say: (i) LoLo short -sea services, 
and (ii) feed er services;  
(b) Geographic markets: in the absence of any horizontal overlap between the 
Parties' activiti es, on the narrowest plausible geographic markets in which 
Unifeeder is active,37 that is to say legs of trade. In line with the 
geographic markets for door -to-door multimodal transport services (see 
paragraph (29) above), the legs of trade will be defined on the basis of the 
following geographic delineations : (i) trades (such as between countries 
within the Mediterranean), and (ii) country pairs.  
5. COMPETITIVE ASSESSM ENT  
(41) DP World is active in the market for container terminal services, while Unifeeder 
is active in the market for container liner services. In this context, the Parties' 
activities do not overlap. However, the Parties' activities are vertically related,38 
with DP World being active in the upstream market for  container terminal 
services and Unifeeder being active in the downstream market  defined as the 
provision of  (i) door -to-door multimodal transport services,  (ii) LoLo short -sea 
shipping services; or  (iii) feeder services.39 
5.1. Legal framework  
(42) According to the Non -Horizontal Merger Guidelines,40 foreclosure occurs when 
actual or potential rivals' access to markets is hampered, thereby reducing those 
                                                 
36  Those narrowest plausible product markets are indeed the ones in which Unifeeder's market share 
would be highest and Unifeeder's market positi on would be strongest. In the absence of serious doubts 
with the compatibility of the Transaction in relation to those markets, the Commission can reasonably 
conclude on the absence of serious doubts in relation to broader markets.  
37  Those narrowest plau sible geographic markets are indeed the ones in which Unifeeder's market share 
would be highest and Unifeeder's market position would be strongest. In the absence of serious doubts 
with the compatibility of the Transaction in relation to those markets, the  Commission can reasonably 
conclude on the absence of serious doubts in relation to broader markets.  
38  In its prior decision practice, the Commission has consistently considered container terminal services 
as an upstream market to the provision of contai ner liner shipping services (see for example M.8594 – 
COSCO SHIPPING/OOIL , paragraph 52; M.8459 – TIL/PSA/PSA DGD , section 4.2.; M. 7523 – CMA 
CGM/OPDR , paragraph 150; M.7248 – CSAV/HGV/Kü hne Maritime/Hapag -Lloyd AG , paragraph 198 
and following).  
39  The Co mmission has not identified any significant conglomerate effect in the present case. According 
to DP World, (i) the broadening of DP World’s product offering will not provide any meaningful 
competitive advantage; (ii) DP World would not have any meaningful  possibility of tying or bundling 
its services with those of Unifeeder; (iii) even if DP World were technically able to bundle/tie its 
services with those of Unifeeder, DP World would have no ability to engage in a tying/bundling 
foreclosure strategy; (iv)  DP World would, in any case, not have an incentive to engage in 
tying/bundling strategies; and (v) any hypothetical bundling/tying foreclosure strategy would have no 
anticompetitive effects (major shipping lines, such as Maersk and CMA CGM, are heavily ve rtically 
integrated with interests in liner, feeder and port operations) (Form CO, paragraphs (198) -(202)).  
40   Guidelines on the assessment of non -horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control 
of concentrations between undertakings, OJ C 265, 18.10.2008, p. 7.  
10 companies' ability and/or incentive to compete.41 Such foreclo sure can take two 
forms: (i) input foreclosure, when access of downstream rivals to supplies is 
hampered;42 and (ii) customer foreclosure, when access of upstream rivals to a 
sufficient customer base is hampered.43 
(43) For input or customer foreclosure to be a c oncern, three conditions need to be met 
post-transaction: (i) the merged entity needs to have the ability to foreclose its 
rivals; (ii) the merged entity needs to have the incentive to foreclose its rivals; and 
(iii) the foreclosure strategy needs to have a significant detrimental effect on 
competition on the downstream market (input foreclosure) or on customers 
(customer foreclosure).44 In practice, these factors are often examined together 
since they are closely intertwined.  
5.2. Overview of the vertically affe cted markets  
(44) Related markets in which  DP World holds a market share of at least 30% in the 
upstream market and/or Unifeeder holds a market share of at least 30% in the 
downstream market are considered to be vertically affected by the Transaction.  
(45) As regard s the upstream market for container terminal services, within the EEA, 
DP World operates terminals  at the following 10 ports : (i) A ntwerp  Gateway 
(Belgium),  (ii) Limassol  (Cyprus),  (iii) Marseille -Fos (France) , (iv) Le Havre  
(France), (v) Germersheim (Germ any),45 (vi) Rotterdam (the Netherlands),  (vii) 
Constanta (Romania),  (viii) Tarragona (Spain),  (ix) London Gateway (the United 
Kingdom), and (x) Southampton (the United Kingdom) . 
(46) DP World's  market share would exceed 30% only if the geographic scope of the 
market for container terminal services is defined narrowly as comprising the ports 
of a single Member State. In such a case, DP World's market share exceeds 30% 
in Romania (overall: [80-90]%; transhipment traffic: [90-100]%; hinterland 
traffic: [70-80]%) a nd France (overall: [40-50]%; transhipment  traffic : [40-50]%; 
hinterland  traffic : [40-50]%).46 
(47) The table below provides Unifeeder's share of the downstream markets related to 
France and Romania, where DP World's share of the upstream market exceeds 
30%.  
  
                                                 
41  Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraphs 20 -29. 
42  Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 31.  
43  Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 58.  
44  Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraphs 32 and 59.  
45  Germersheim is an inland terminal, which therefore does not interact with Unifeeder's activities.  
46  DP World submits that the total market data that it has been able to gather is not a comprehensive list 
of all terminal capacity/volume in the relevant co untries and, as a result, the market shares provided 
likely overstate the position of DP World. Form CO, paragraph 127.  
11 Table 1  – Vertically affected markets  
(DP World's market shares exceeding 30%)  
Upstream 
affected market  DP World 's 
share  of the 
upstream 
affected market   Unifeeder 's share of the downstream affected market  
Door-to-door 
multimodal 
transport  
services  LoLo short -sea 
shipping 
services  Feeder services  
Container 
terminal 
services in 
Romania  Overall: [80-
90]% 
Transhipment: 
[90-100]% 
Hinterland: [70-
80]% Mediterranean: 
[0-5]%  
Georgia to 
Romania: <10%  
Greece to 
Romania: <10%  
Malta to 
Romania: <10%  
Romania to 
Bulgaria: <10%  
Romania to 
Turkey: <10%  
Russia to 
Romania: <10%  
Turkey to 
Romania: <10%  
Ukraine to 
Romania: <10%  Not active47  Mediterranean: 
[10-20]%  
Georgia to 
Romania: <10%  
Greece to 
Romania: <10%  
Malta to 
Romania: <10%  
Romania to 
Bulga ria: <10%  
Romania to 
Turkey: <10%  
Russia to 
Romania: <10%  
Turkey to 
Romania: <10%  
Ukraine to 
Romania: <10%  
Container 
terminal 
services in 
France  Overall: [40-
50]% 
Transhipment: 
[40-50]% 
Hinterland: [40-
50]% Mediterranean: 
[0-5]%  
France to Spain: 
<10%  
Spain to France: 
<10%  Not active48 Mediterranean: 
[10-20]%  
France to Spain: 
<10%  
Spain to France: 
<10%  
Source : Form CO, Annex 9  
(48) As regards the downstream market, Unifeeder's market share  would not exceed 
30% if the market is defined as door-to-door multimodal transport services,  under 
any plausible geographic market definition. It would nevertheless exceed 30% in 
relation to LoLo short -sea shipping services and feeder services.  
(49) Unifeeder's market share would exceed 30% if the geographic scope of the market 
for LoLo short -sea shipping services is defined narrowly on the basis of country 
pair legs of trade. In such a case, Unifeeder' s market share  exceed s 30% in the 
following legs of trade : (i) from Germany to the United Kingdom ( [70-80]%); (ii) 
from the United Kingdom to Germany ( [60-70]%); (iii) from  Poland to the United 
Kingdom ( [40-50]%); and (iv) from the United Kingdom to Poland ( [40-50]%). 
(50) The table below provides DP World's share of the upstream markets related to the 
legs of trade, where Unife eder's share of the downstream market exceeds 30%.  
                                                 
47  As indicated in paragraph (5) of this Decision, Unifeeder does not provide short -sea services in the 
Mediterranean.  
48  As indicated i n paragraph (5) of this Decision, Unifeeder does not provide short -sea services in the 
Mediterranean.  
12 Table 2 – Vertically affected markets  
(Unifeeder 's market shares exceeding 30%)  
Downstream 
affected market  Unifeeder's 
share of the 
downstream 
affected market  DP World's share of the upstream affected market  
Overall 
container 
terminal 
services  Transhipment  
traffic  Hinterland  
traffic  
LoLo short -sea 
shipping 
services from 
Germany to the 
UK  Multimodal 
transport: <10%  
Short -sea: [70-
80]% 
Feeder:  <10%  Northern Europe: 
[10-20]%  
Le Havre -
Hamburg: [10-
20]%  
UK and Ireland: 
[20-30]%  
UK: [20-30]%  
Germany: Not 
active49 Northern Europe: 
[5-10]%  
Le Havre -
Hamburg: [5-
10]%  
UK and Ireland: 
[20-30]%  
UK: [20-30]%  
Germany: Not 
active50 Northern Europe: 
[10-20]%  
Le Havre -
Hamburg: [10-
20]%  
UK and Ireland: 
[20-30]%  
UK: [20-30]%  
Germany: Not 
active51 
LoLo short -sea 
shipping 
services from 
the UK to 
Germany  Multimodal 
transport: <10%  
Short -sea: [60-
70]% 
Feeder:  10-30% Northern Europe: 
[10-20]%  
Le Havre -
Hamburg: [10-
20]%  
UK: [20-30]%  
Germany: Not 
active52 Northern Europe: 
[5-10]%  
Le Havre -
Hamburg: [5-
10]%  
UK: [20-30]%  
Germany: Not 
active53 Northern Europe: 
[10-20]%  
Le Havre -
Hamburg: [10-
20]%  
UK: [20-30]%  
Germany: Not 
active54 
LoLo short -sea 
shipping 
services from 
Poland to the 
UK Multimodal 
transport: <10%  
Short -sea: [40-
50]% 
Feeder:  <10%  Northern Europe: 
[10-20]%  
UK and Ireland: 
[20-30]%  
UK: [20-30]%  
Poland: Not 
active  Northern Europe: 
[5-10]%  
UK and Ireland: 
[20-30]%  
UK: [20-30]%  
Poland: Not 
active  Northern Europe: 
[10-20]%  
UK and Ireland: 
[20-30]%  
UK: [20-30]%  
Poland: Not 
active  
LoLo short -sea 
shipping 
services from 
the UK to 
Poland  Multimodal 
transport: <10%  
Short -sea: [40-
50]% 
Feeder:  <10%  Northern Europe: 
[10-20]%  
UK: [20-30]%  
Poland: Not 
active  Northern Europe: 
[5-10]%  
Le Havre -
Hamburg: [5-
10]%  
UK: [20-30]%  
Poland: Not 
active  Northern Europe: 
[10-20]%  
Le Havre -
Hamburg: [10-
20]%  
UK: [20-30]%  
Poland: Not 
active  
Source : Form CO, Annex 9  
                                                 
49  Germersheim is an inland terminal, which therefore does not interact with Unifeeder's activities.  
50  Germersheim is an inland terminal, which therefor e does not interact with Unifeeder's activities.  
51  Germersheim is an inland terminal, which therefore does not interact with Unifeeder's activities.  
52  Germersheim is an inland terminal, which therefore does not interact with Unifeeder's activities.  
53  Germersheim is an inland terminal, which therefore does not interact with Unifeeder's activities.  
54  Germersheim is an inland terminal, which therefore does not interact with Unifeeder's activities.  
13 (51) Unifeeder's market shares would exceed 30% if the geographic scope of the 
market for feeder services with respect is defined narrowly on the basis of legs of 
trade defined as: (i) country to region, or (ii) country to country. In such cases, 
Unifeeder's market share  exceed s 30% in the following legs of trade : (i) from 
Denmark to Northe rn European hub ports and vice versa ([30-40]% on the 
trade ),55 (ii) from  Sweden to Northern European hub ports and vice versa ([30-
40]% on the  trade ),56 (iii) from the Netherlands to Norway ( [30-40]%); (iv) from 
Norway to the Netherlands ( [30-40]%); (v) fro m the Netherlands to Latvia  ([40-
50]%); (vi) from Latvia to the Netherlands ( [40-50]%); (vii) from the Netherlands 
to Lithuania ( [40-50]%); (viii) from Lithuania to the Netherlands ( [40-50]%); (ix) 
from Cyprus to Egypt ( [60-70]%); and (x)  from Egypt  to Cyprus  ([70-80]%). 
Table 3 – Vertically affected markets  
(Unifeeder's market shares exceeding 30%)  
Downstream 
affected market  Unifeeder's 
share of the 
downstream 
affected market  DP World's share of the upstream affected market  
Overall 
container 
term inal 
services  Transhipment  
traffic  Hinterland  
traffic  
Feeder services  
between  
Denmark and 
hub ports  Multimodal 
transport: [10-
20]% 
Short -sea: [0-
5]% 
Feeder: [30-
40]% Northern Europe: 
[10-20]%  
Le Havre -
Hamburg: [10-
20%  
Belgium: [20-
30]%  
Netherlands: [10-
20]%  
Denmark: Not 
active  Northern Europe: 
[5-10]% 
Le-Havre -
Hamburg: [5-
10]% 
Belgium: [5-
10]% 
Netherlands: [10-
20]% 
Denmark: Not 
active  Northern Europe: 
[10-20]%  
Le Havre -
Hamburg: [10-
20]%  
Belgium: [20-
30]%  
Netherlands: [10-
20]%  
Denmark: Not 
active  
Feeder services  
between  
Sweden  
and hub ports  Multimodal 
transport: [10-
20]% 
Short -sea: [0-
5]% 
Feeder: [30-
40]% Northern Europe: 
[10-20]%  
Le Havre -
Hamburg: [10-
20]%  
Belgium: [20-
30]%  
Netherlands: [10-
20]%  
Denmark: Not 
active  Northern Europe: 
[5-10]% 
Le Havre -
Hamburg: [5-
10]% 
Belgium: [5-
10]% 
Netherlands: [10-
20]% 
Denmark: Not 
active  Northern Europe: 
[10-20]%  
Le Havre -
Hamburg: [10-
20]%  
Belgium: [20-
30]%  
Netherlands: [10-
20]%  
Denmark: Not 
active  
Feeder services 
from the 
Netherlands to 
Norway  Multimodal 
transport: <10%  
Short -sea: 10-
30% 
Feeder: [30-
40]% Northern Europe: 
[10-20]% 
Le Havre -
Hamburg:  
[10-20]% 
Netherlands: [10-
20]% 
Norway: Not 
active  Northern Europe: 
[5-10]% 
Le Havre -
Hamburg:  
[5-10]% 
Netherlands: [10-
20]% 
Norway: Not 
active  Northern Europe: 
[10-20]% 
Le Havre -
Hamburg: [10-
20]% 
Netherlands: [10-
20]% 
Norway: Not 
active  
                                                 
55  DP World does not offer terminal services at outpor ts in Northern Europe (Form CO, paragraph 162).  
56  DP World does not offer terminal services at outports in Northern Europe (Form CO, paragraph 162).  
14 Feeder services 
from Norway to 
the Netherlands  Multimodal 
transport: <10%  
Short -sea: 10-
30% 
Feeder: [30-
40]% Northern Europe: 
[10-20]% 
Le Havre -
Hamburg:  
[10-20]% 
Netherlands: [10-
20]% 
Norway: Not 
active  Northern Europe: 
[5-10]% 
Le Havre -
Hamburg:  
[5-10]% 
Netherlands: [10-
20]% 
Norway: Not 
active  Northern Europe: 
[10-20]% 
Le Havre -
Hamburg: [10-
20]% 
Netherlands: [10-
20]% 
Norway: Not 
active  
 
Feeder  services 
from the 
Netherlands to 
Latvia  Multimodal 
transport: <10%  
Short -sea: <10%  
Feeder: [40-
50]% Northern Europe: 
[10-20]% 
Le Havre -
Hamburg:  
[10-20]% 
Netherlands: [10-
20]% 
Latvia: Not 
active  Northern Europe: 
[5-10]% 
Le Havre -
Hamburg:  
[5-10]% 
Netherlands: [10-
20]% 
Latvia: Not 
active  Northern Europe: 
[10-20]% 
Le Havre -
Hamburg: [10-
20]% 
Netherlands: [10-
20]% 
Latvia: Not 
active  
Feeder services 
from Latvia to 
the Netherlands  Multimodal 
transport: <10%  
Short -sea: <10%  
Feeder: [40-
50]% Northern Europe: 
[10-20]% 
Le-Havre -
Hamburg:  
[10-20]% 
Netherlands: [10-
20]% 
Latvia: Not 
active  Northern Europe: 
[5-10]% 
Le Havre -
Hamburg:  
[5-10]% 
Netherlands: [10-
20]% 
Latvia: Not 
active  Northern Europe: 
[10-20]% 
Le Havre -
Hamburg: [10-
20]% 
Netherlands: [10-
20]% 
Latvia: Not 
active  
Feeder services 
from the 
Netherlands to 
Lithuania  Multimodal 
transport: <10%  
Short -sea: <10%  
Feeder: [40-
50]% Northern Europe: 
[10-20]% 
Le Havre -
Hamburg:  
[10-20]% 
Netherlands: [10-
20]% 
Lithuania: Not 
active  Northern Europe: 
[5-10]% 
Le Havre -
Hamburg:  
[5-10]% 
Netherlands: [5-
10]% 
Lithuania: Not 
active  Northern Europe: 
[10-20]% 
Le Havre -
Hamburg: [10-
20]% 
Netherlands: [10-
20]% 
Lithuania: Not 
active  
Feeder services 
from Lithuania 
to the 
Netherlands  Multimodal 
transport: <10%  
Short -sea: <10%  
Feeder: [40-
50]% Northern Europe: 
[10-20]% 
Le Havre -
Hamburg:  
[10-20]% 
Netherlands: [10-
20]% 
Lithuania: Not 
active  Northern Europe: 
[5-10]% 
Le Havre -
Hamburg:  
[5-10]% 
Netherlands: [10-
20]% 
Lithuania: Not 
active  Northern Europe: 
[10-20]% 
Le Havre -
Hamburg: [10-
20]% 
Netherlands: [10-
20]% 
Lithuania: Not 
active  
Feeder services 
from Cyprus to 
Egypt  Multimodal 
transport: <10%  
Short -sea: 0%  
Feeder: [60-
70]% East 
Mediterranean:  
[5-10]% 
Cyprus: [0-5]% 
Egypt: Not 
active  East 
Mediterranean:  
[0-5]% 
Cyprus: Not 
active  
Egypt: Not 
active  East 
Mediterranean: 
[5-10]% 
Cyprus: [0-5]% 
Egypt: Not 
active  
Feeder services 
from Egypt to 
Cyprus  Multimodal 
transport: <10%  
Short -sea: [0-
5]% 
Feeder: 70%  East 
Mediterranean:  
[5-10]% 
Cyprus: [0-5]% 
Egypt: Not 
active  East 
Mediterranean:  
[0-5]% 
Cyprus: Not 
active  
Egypt: Not 
active  East 
Mediterranean: 
[5-10]% 
Cyprus: [0-5]% 
Egypt: Not 
active  
Source : Form CO, paragraph 121 and Annex 9  
15 5.3. Assessment of the vertically affected markets in relation to container 
terminal services in Romania  and in France   
(52) The Com mission will assess in this section whether the Transaction could lead to 
(i) input foreclosure, pursuant to which DP World would foreclose Unifeeder's 
competitors by restricting access to or deteriorating the quality of the container 
terminal serv ices that it provides to Unifeeder's competitors in Romania  or in 
France ; or (ii) customer foreclosure, pursuant to which Unifeeder would foreclose 
DP World's competitors by sourcing its container terminal services requirements 
in Romania or in France most ly or exclusively from DP World . 
5.3.1.  Input foreclosure  
5.3.1.1.  DP World's views  
(53) DP World submits that, despite DP World's relatively high share in respect of 
Romanian  and French  ports, the Transaction does not give rise to any input 
foreclosure concerns.57 
5.3.1.2.  The Commission's assessment  
Ability to foreclose  
(54) For input foreclosure to be a concern, the vertically integrated firm resulting from 
the merger must have a significant degree of power in the upstream market and 
thus, possibly, on prices and supply conditions in the downstream market.58 
(55) The Commission notes that  DP World's operations at Constanta lead to very high 
shares of the market for container terminal services in Romania  ([80-90]% 
overall; [90-100]% for transhipment  traffic ; [70-80]% for hinterland  traffic ),59 
despite a competing terminal at Constanta with spare capacity.60 
(56) DP World's operations at Marseille -Fos and Le Havre also lead to significant  
market shares in France ( [40-50]% overall; [40-50]% for transhipment traffic; 
                                                 
57  Form CO, Annex 9, paragraphs (6)(a) and (7)(a).  
58  Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 35.  
59  Nevertheless, DP World's market shares on the basis of the catchment area comprising ports within a 
certain range drop significantly. For example, in the Piraeus -Odessa range, they would be: [5-10]% 
overall; [0-5]% for transhipment traffic and [10-20]% for  hinterland traffic (Form CO, paragraph (127) 
and Annex 9, paragraph (6)).  
60  According to DP World, the Socep terminal at Constanta is expected to have approximately [70-80]% 
spare capacity in 2018 (Form CO, Annex 9, paragraph (6)).  
16 [40-50]% for hinterland traffic),61 although DP World is in direct competition 
with a number of operators of other terminals.62  
(57) In addition, a number of respondents to the market investigation point to the 
advantages that DP World could grant to Unifeeder  at the ports where both 
operate , such as preferred berthing and operational priority.63  
(58) Nevertheless, two elements may question the ability of DP World's to foreclose 
Unifeeder's competitors.  
(59) First, the majority of transhipment traffic takes place at hub ports.64 At hub ports, 
in most case s, feeder providers do not have a direct contractual relationship with 
terminal owners and operators. T ypically  terminal operators negotiate  directly 
with deep -sea liners both the volume of transhipment cargo handled  by them and 
the cost of th e service s provided . Hence, w hen terminal operators  agree  with 
deep -sea liners on the price for the  provision of transhipment services  at a given  
port, they are not aware of the identity of the feeder provider  that will transport 
cargo from/to hub ports .65 It is therefo re unlikely that the merged entity will be in 
the position to discriminate against competing feeder providers  and refuse or 
deteriorate the services offered to them .  
(60) Second, according to DP World, DP World operates as a common user terminal 
and based on the open access regulations, it must provide services to main liners 
and feeder operator s on a non -discriminatory basis .66  
(61) In light of the above, the Commission considers that, on balance, it cannot be 
excluded that DP World  has the ability to engage in an input foreclosure strategy 
in Romania and in France post -Transaction.  
Incentive to foreclose  
(62) The incentive to foreclose depends on the degree to which foreclosure would be 
profitable. The vertically  integrated firm will take into account how its supplies of 
inputs to competitors downstream will affect not only the profits of its upstream 
activities , but also of its downstream activities . Essentially, the merged entity 
faces a trade -off between the pr ofit lost in the upstream market due to a reduction 
of input sales to (actual or potential) rivals and the profit gain, in the short or 
longer term, from expanding sales downstream or, as the case may be, being able 
to raise prices to consumers.  The incent ive for the integrated firm to raise rivals' 
                                                 
61  Nevertheless, DP Wo rld's market shares on the basis of the catchment area comprising ports within a 
certain range drop significantly. For example, in the Hamburg -Le Havre range, they would be: [5-
10]% for transhipment traffic and [10-20]% for hinterland traffic; in the Marse ille-Livorno range, they 
would be: [10-20]% for transhipment traffic and [10-20]% for hinterland traffic (Form CO, paragraph 
(127)).  
62  Those competing terminals include: Terminal Normandie MSC (Le Havre), MED Europe Terminal 
(Marseille -Fos), Fos 2XL (Mars eille-Fos), APM Terminals France SAS (Marseille -Fos).  
63  Replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to market participants, question 8.1.  
64  Form CO, paragraph (65).  
65  Form CO, paragraphs (83) -(84).  
66  Form CO, paragraph (166).  
17 costs further depends on the extent to which downstream demand is likely to be 
diverted away from the foreclosed rivals.67 
(63) In this context , the Commission finds that, even if DP World had the ability to 
engage in  an input  foreclosure strategy, it would  likely  lack the incentive to do so.   
(64) First, t he profit  margins that  terminal operators obtain from the provision of 
container terminal services are usually higher than those  that vessel operators in 
the downstream m arkets derive from their (liner) shipping activities . This has 
been confirmed by th e majority of the respondents to the market investigation 
who have expressed an opinion .68  
(65) Second,  as indicated in paragraph (59) above,  deep -sea liners, who autonomously 
choose to which operator to entrust the provision of feeder services, are DP 
World's main customers. By engaging in an input foreclosure strategy, DP World 
would therefore face the risk of jeopardising its commercial relationship with 
operators which represent its primary source of revenue.  
(66) Third, with regard to France, Unifeeder does not currently call at Le Havre and 
does not generally call at Marseil le-Fos either.69 Therefore, any input foreclosure 
strategy by would be unlikely to result in increased volumes for Unifeeder.  
(67) As a result, even if post -Transaction DP World  decided to engage in a n input 
foreclosure strategy , this would likely be unprofitab le. Any attempt by the merged 
entity to make the conditions of supply less favourable than they were pre -
Transaction  would lead to losses in the upstream market, with no possibility  of 
offset ting those losses  through an expansion of sales in the downstream  markets .  
(68) The market investigation has confirmed the above conclusions  with regard to DP 
World's lack of ability or incentive to successfully implement an input foreclosure 
strategy . The majority of the respondents who have expressed an opinion have 
eithe r stated that DP World would not have the ability and incentive to foreclose 
Unifeeder's rivals from its container terminal services in the EEA , or specified 
that DP World's  ability and incentive  to foreclose Unifeeder's rivals  depend on 
different factors, such as the possible negative reactions of liner shipping 
companies to any attempt to foreclose.  
(69) In that regard, l iner shipping companies, being at the same time customers of 
terminal operators and of feeder providers, might indeed react badly  to any 
attempt of DP World to disrupt container terminal services or to force them to 
procure feeder services from Unifeeder .  
(70) As an example, a mong the operators wh ich have replied to the market 
investigation by stating that post -Transaction the Parties c ould and would engage 
in an input foreclosure strategy , one has pointed out that the possible benefits 
stemming from such a strategy would nonetheless have to be balanced against the 
                                                 
67  Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, par agraphs 40 and 41.  
68  Replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to market participants, question 5.  
69  Form CO, Annex 9, paragraph (7). Unifeeder's volumes at Marseille -Fos in 2017 represented [number 
of containers] . 
18 inability of the Parties to capture and carry all downstream volumes. Oth er 
shipping companies would still have " significant volumes " at their disposal.70 
This opinion underpins the conclusion that any such foreclosure strategy would 
be defeated by shifting these volumes elsewhere , in the case of Romani a to the 
half empty other terminal  at Constanta , in the case of France to competing 
terminals, including those at Marseille -Fos and Le Havre .  
(71) In light of the above, the Commission considers th at DP World  will likely not 
have an incentive to engage in an input foreclosure strategy in Romania or in 
France post -Transaction.  
Overall effect of  foreclos ure 
(72) In general, a merger will raise competition concerns because of input foreclosure 
when it would lead to increased prices in the downstream market thereby 
significantly impeding effective competition.71 
(73) In that respect, the Commission notes that  some major global container liners 
operate their own port operations and feeder services, and are thus unlikely to be 
foreclosed.72 Even if some (non -integrated) feeder service providers wer e 
foreclosed post -Transaction from routes to/from Romania or France, these 
providers would remain active on other routes and could easily re -enter in the 
event of a price increase by Unifeeder, for example by calling at competing 
terminals in Romania and F rance or in neighbouring countries.   
(74) When asked about the possible impact of the Transaction on  their business , the 
majority of  the respondents to the market investigation  who have expressed an 
opinion have stated that they do not foresee any negative o r significant impact on 
their company .73 Moreover, none of the respondents ha ve raised substantial 
concerns regarding the overall impact of the Transaction on the provision of 
container terminal services or container shipping services in the EEA.74  
(75) In light o f the above, the Commission considers that the implementation of an 
input foreclosure strategy by DP World in Romania or in France post -Transaction 
would be un likely to have a negative effect on competition.  
Conclusion  
(76) Based on the above considerations and all evidence available to it, the 
Commission concludes that an input foreclosu re strategy post -Transaction by  DP 
World  in order to exclude Unifeeder's competitors purchas ing container terminal 
services in Romania and F rance is unlikely.  
                                                 
70  Replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to market participants, questions 8 and 8.1.  
71  Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 47.   
72  Form CO, paragraph (198); and Replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to market participants, questions 1 and 
10.  
73  Replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to market participants, question 10.  
74  Replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to market participants, question 11.  
19 5.3.2.  Customer foreclosure  
5.3.2.1.  DP World's views  
(77) DP World submits that the Transaction does not give rise to any customer 
foreclosure concern in Romania or France.75 
5.3.2.2.  The Commission's assessment  
(78) Customer foreclosure may occur when a supplier integra tes with an important 
customer in the downstream market. Because of this downstream presence, the 
merged entity may foreclose access to a sufficient customer base to its actual or 
potential rivals in the upstream market (the input market) and reduce their ability 
or incentive to compete. In turn, this may raise downstream rivals' costs by 
making it harder for them to obtain supplies of the input under similar prices and 
conditions as absent the merger. This may allow the merged entity profitably to 
establis h higher prices on the downstream market.76  
(79) The Commission notes that Unifeeder's volumes account for a minimal proportion 
of the cargo handled on all legs of trade involving Romania and France  
(Unifeeder's shares of door -to-door multimodal transport servi ces and feeder 
services are below 10% on all legs of trade ).77 More generally, Unifeeder's 
volumes loaded and discharged in Romania in 2017 accounted for less than [0-
5]% of the total volume for container terminal services in Romania.78 In France, 
Unifeeder' s volumes account for close to [0-5]% of the total business of terminal 
service operators.79 
(80) Based on the above considerations and all evidence available to it, the 
Commission concludes that a customer  foreclosu re strategy post -Transaction by 
Unifeeder  in order to reduce  the ability or incentive of DP World's rivals to 
compete on the market for container terminal services in Romania and France is 
unlikely.  
5.4. Assessment of the vertically affected markets in relation to LoLo short -sea 
shipping services  betw een Germany and the United Kingdom, and between 
Poland and the United Kingdom  
(81) The Commission will assess in this section whether the Transaction could lead to 
(i) input foreclosure, pursuant to which DP World would foreclose Unifeeder's 
competitors by rest ricting access to or deteriorating the quality of the container 
terminal services that it provides to Unifeeder's competitors in Germany, Poland 
or the United Kingdom; or (ii) customer foreclosure, pursuant to which Unifeeder 
would foreclose DP World's com petitors by sourcing its container terminal 
services requirements in Germany, Poland or the United Kingdom mostly or 
exclusively from DP World.  
                                                 
75  Form CO, Annex 9, paragraphs (6)(b) and (7)(b).  
76  Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 58.  
77  See Table 1 above.  
78  Form CO, Annex 9, paragraph (6)(b) .  
79  Form C O, Annex 9, paragraph (7)(b) .  
20 5.4.1.  Input foreclosure  
5.4.1.1.  DP World's views  
(82) DP World submits that the merged entity does not have the ability or incenti ve to 
attempt to restrict or deteriorate services to Unifeeder's short -sea rivals at its 
United Kingdom ports.80 
5.4.1.2.  The Commission's assessment  
(83) First, DP World does not own or operate container termina ls in Poland or 
Germany .81 It would therefore be impossible for the merged entity to foreclose 
access of Unifeeder's rivals  to container terminal services  in those countries.  
(84) In the United Kingdom  (the narrowest plausible geographic scope) , where DP 
World operates the London Gatew ay London and Southampton terminals, DP 
World holds a share for the market for container terminal services of no more 
than [20-30]%, under any plausible product market definition . Therefore, DP 
World  likely  lacks market power  on the upstream market  and wou ld thus likely be 
unable to engage in an input foreclosure strategy  post-Transaction .  
(85) In addition, according to DP World, short -sea liners rarely call at London 
Gateway and Southampton, which are large transhipment hub ports, due to 
[information relating to DP World’s ports].82  
(86) As a consequence, i f DP World  were to put in place an input foreclosure strategy , 
Unifeeder's short -sea shipping  rivals could and would start calling at alternative 
ports in the United Kingdom , such as  Felixstowe, Hull, Teesport, Im mingham, or 
Gran gemouth.  
(87) Based on the above considerations and all evidence available to it, the 
Commission concludes that an input  foreclosu re strategy post -Transaction by DP 
World in order to exclude Unifeeder's competitors purchasing container terminal 
services in Germany, Poland or the United Kingdom is unlikely . 
5.4.2.  Customer  foreclosure  
5.4.2.1.  DP World's views  
(88) DP World submits that the merged entity does not have the ability or incentive to 
attempt to foreclo se DP World's terminal services rivals by shifting Unifeeder's 
volumes to DP World's ports.83 
                                                 
80  Form CO, Annex 9, paragraph 10.  
81  Form CO, Annex 9, paragraph 11.  
82  Form CO, Annex 9, paragraph 12.  
83  Form CO, Annex 9, paragraph (19).  
21 5.4.2.2.  The Commission's assessment  
Ability to foreclose  
(89) For customer foreclosure to be a concern, it must be the case that the vertical 
merger involves a company which is  an important customer with a significant 
degree of market power in the downstream market. If, on the contrary, there is a 
sufficiently large customer base, at present or in the future, that is likely to turn to 
independent suppliers, the Commission is unl ikely to raise competition concerns 
on that ground.84 
(90) The Commission notes that Unifeeder's market share for LoLo short -sea shipping 
services exceeds 30% on legs of trade from Germany to the United Kingdom 
([70-80]%) and vice versa ( [60-70]%); and from Pola nd to the United Kingdom 
([40-50]%) and vice versa ( [40-50]%).85 Nevertheless, Unifeeder's short -sea 
volumes at any port in the United Kingdom competing with DP World's ports are 
small .86 Even considering Unifeeder's total volumes (not only short sea volumes ), 
Unifeeder account s for [proportion]  of the total volumes at any port  in the United 
Kingdom.  
(91) In light of the above, the Commission considers that Unifeeder will likely not 
have the ability to engage in  a customer foreclosure strategy in the United 
Kingdo m post -Transaction.  
Incentive  to foreclose  
(92) The incentive to foreclose depends on the degree to which it is profitable. The 
merged entity faces a trade -off between the possible costs associated with not 
procuring products from upstream rivals and the possible gains from doing so, for 
instance, because it allows the merged entity to raise price in the upstream or 
downstream markets.87 
(93) As explained in paragraph (85) above, according to DP World , [information 
relating to DP World’s ports ]. It is hence unlikely that post -Transaction the 
merged entity would try to switch all of Unifeeder's volumes to DP World's 
terminals . Indeed, in  doing so, the merged entity would, on the one hand,  risk 
losing  customers  of short -sea shipping services , as the latter would be unwilling 
[information relating to DP World’s ports ]. In that regard, with respect to the legs 
of trade between Germany and the United Kingdom, and between Poland  and the 
United Kingdom, the majority of respondents to the market investigation have 
indicated that it is relatively easy for customers of short -sea services to switch to 
                                                 
84  Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 61.  
85  See Table 2 above.  
86  Unifeed er's short -sea volumes account for [0-5]% of the total port volumes at Felixstowe (which 
primarily competes with the nearby ports where DP World operates terminals), [0-5]% at 
Grangemouth, [20-30]% at Immingham, [0-5]% at South Shields/Tyne and [5-10]% at Teesport (Form 
CO, Annex 9, paragraph 23).  
87  Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 68.  
22 other short -sea providers, but also to alternative  transport  services, such as  truck , 
and potentially rail.88    
(94) On the other hand,  the merged entity would have limited benefit s (such as 
increased volumes) on the upstream market, because Unifeeder's short sea 
volumes are very small .  
(95) It is therefore likely that , in pursuing a customer foreclosure strategy in the United 
Kingdom, the merged entity would incur losses  on the downstream market , 
without corresponding benefit, hence  profit, in the upstream market.  
(96) The market investigation has confirmed the above conclusions with regar d to 
Unifeeder's lack of ability or incentive to successfully implement a customer 
foreclosure strategy. The majority of the respondents who have expressed an 
opinion stated that Unifeeder would not have the ability and the incentive to 
foreclose DP World' s rivals from a sufficient customer base in the EEA , by, for 
example, sourcing all the container terminal services it needs from DP World and 
stopping or reducing its purchases of container terminal services from DP World's 
rivals .89  
(97) In light of the above,  the Commission considers that Unifeeder is un likely to have 
an incentive to engage in a customer foreclosure strategy in the United Kingdom  
post-Transaction.  
Overall effect of foreclosure  
(98) It is only when a sufficiently large fraction of upstream output is  affected by the 
revenue decreases resulting from the vertical merger that the merger may 
significantly impede effective competition on the upstream market. If there 
remain a number of upstream competitors that are not affected, competition from 
those firm s may be sufficient to prevent prices from rising in the upstream market 
and, consequently, in the downstream market.90  
(99) The Commission considers that, even Unifeeder's short -sea volumes were re -
routed to DP World's terminals in the United Kingdom, this wou ld have a limited 
impact on the level of use of the capacity of DP World's terminal rivals, hence on 
their competitiveness and on the competitiveness of short -sea shipping providers 
competing with Unifeeder.  
(100)  When asked about the possible impact of the Tran saction on  their business , the 
majority of  the respondents to the market investigation  who have expressed an 
                                                 
88  Replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to market participants, question 6.  
89  Replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to market participants, question 9. One respondent neverthel ess 
indicated that "access to Unifeeder's contracts with its competitors would give DP World knowledge of 
their competitor's pricing as well as commercial terms of business giving them an advantage when 
competing for contestable business not enjoyed by the  competing terminal"  and, as a consequence, the 
Transaction will have a negative impact (higher prices, lower quality of services, less innovation, etc.) 
on the provision of container terminal services in the EEA (reply of a market participant to Q1 – 
Ques tionnaire to market participants, question 9.2). The Commission considers that, on balance, access 
of DP World to confidential information held by Unifeeder will not give DP World a sufficient 
advantage to foreclose competing container terminal operators.     
90  Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 72.   
23 opinion have stated that they do not foresee any negative or significant impact on 
their company.91 Moreover, none of the respondents have raised su bstantial 
concerns regarding the overall impact of the Transaction on the provision of 
container terminal services or container shipping services in the EEA.92 
(101)  In light of the above, the Commission considers that the implementation of a 
customer foreclosure  strategy by Unifeeder in the United Kingdom post -
Transaction would likely have no overall negative effect on effective competition.  
Conclusion  
(102)  Based on the above considerations and all evidence available to it, the 
Commission concludes that a customer  foreclosu re strategy post -Transaction by  
Unifeeder  in order to exclude DP World 's competitors selling  container terminal 
services in Germany, Poland or the United Kingdom is unlikely.  
5.5. Assessment of the vertically affected markets in relation to feeder ser vices  
between Denmark and hub ports, between Sweden and hub ports, between 
Norway and the Netherlands, between Latvia and the Netherlands, between 
Lithuania and the Netherlands, and between Egypt and Cyprus  
(103)  The Commission will assess in this section whethe r the Transaction could lead to 
(i) input foreclosure, pursuant to which DP World would foreclose Unifeeder's 
competitors by restricting access to or deteriorating the quality of the container 
terminal services that it provides to Unifeeder's competitors a t Northern European 
hub ports, in Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands , or Cyprus; or (ii) 
customer foreclosure, pursuant to which Unifeeder would foreclose DP World's 
competitors by sourcing its container terminal services requirements at Northern 
European hub ports, in Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, or Cyprus 
mostly or exclusively from DP World.  
5.5.1.  Input foreclosure  
5.5.1.1.  DP World's views  
(104)  DP World submits that the merged entity does not have the ability or incentive to 
attempt to restrict or de teriorate services to Unifeeder's feeder rivals at any 
Northern European hub ports, in Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, or 
Cyprus.93 
                                                 
91  Replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to market participants, question 10.  
92  Replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to market participants, question 11.  
93  Form CO, paragraph 180, and Annex 9, paragraphs 31 and 34. 
24 5.5.1.2.  The Commission's assessment  
(105)  First, DP World does not own or operate container terminals in Norway, Latvia or 
Lithuania.94 It would therefore be impossible for the merged entity to foreclose 
access of Unifeeder's rivals to container terminal services in those countries.  
(106)  In Northern Europe, DP World operates five terminals receiving feeder volumes: 
(i) A ntwerp  Gateway (Belgium), (ii) Le Havre  (France), (iii) Rotterdam (the 
Netherlands), (iv) London Gateway (the United Kingdom), and (v) Southampton 
(the United Kingdom). In Cyprus, DP World operates a terminal at Limassol. In 
relation to these terminals, DP World's market  shares never exceed 30%  under 
any plausible product or market definition,  even under  the narrowest geographic 
market  definition , that is  to say  the catchment area comprising national ports 
only.95 In that respect, for Northern Europe, DP World faces compet ition from a 
number of alternative terminals and ports with spare capacity in Belgium, France, 
and the Netherlands.96 For Cyprus, DP World's terminal processes [0-5]% of 
volumes going to and from Cyprus.97 Hence, if DP World decided to foreclose 
Unifeeder's rivals, the latter could and would start procuring container terminal 
services from those competing terminals.  
(107)  Therefore, DP World  likely lacks market power on the upstream market and 
would thus likely be unable to engage in an input foreclosure strategy p ost-
Transaction .  
(108)  Moreover, a s explained in paragraph (59) above , at hub ports, DP World does not 
have a direct relationship with feeder services providers, which l imits DP World's 
ability to favour Unifeeder or to disadvantage third -party feeder operators.98  
(109)  Besides, as explained in paragraphs (62) to (71) above, DP World has likely  no 
incentive to foreclose Unifeeder's rivals .  
(110)  In addition, according to DP World, a number of liners and feeder providers do 
not currently call at DP World 's terminals. They would therefore not be 
disadvantaged by an input foreclosure strategy.99 As a consequence, sufficient 
competition would remain on the downstream market for feeder services to 
prevent Unifeeder from raising prices or degrading the quality of its services post -
Transaction.   
                                                 
94  Form CO, Annex 9, paragraph 31. With regard to Egypt, DP World does have a port in Egypt 
(Sokhna), but it is located on the other side of the Suez Canal. Accordingly, it does not receive feeder 
volumes travelling between Cyprus and Egypt (Form CO, A nnex 9, paragraph 34).  
95  See Table 3 above.  
96  Form CO, paragraph 160, and Annex 9, paragraph 31.  
97  Form CO, Annex 9, paragraph 34.  
98  With regard to the possibility for DP World to grant Unifeeder operation priority as referred to in 
paragraph (57) abov e, DP World notes that, among the Northern European hub ports where it operates, 
it faces congestion issues only at Rotterdam and, to a lesser extent, at Antwerp Gateway (Form CO, 
paragraph (167)).  
99  Form CO, paragraph 173, and Annex 9, paragraph 34.  
25 (111)  Based on the above considerations and all evidence available to it, the 
Commission concludes that an input  foreclosu re strategy post -Transaction by DP 
World in order to exclude Unifeeder's competitors purchasing containe r terminal 
services at Northern European hub ports, in Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, or Cyprus is unlikely . 
5.5.2.  Customer foreclosure  
5.5.2.1.  DP World's views  
(112)  DP World submits that the merged entity does not have the ability or incentive to 
attempt to foreclose DP World's terminal services rivals by shifting Unifeeder's 
volumes to DP World's ports.100 
5.5.2.2.  The Commission's assessment  
Ability to foreclose  
(113)  As indicated in paragraph (89) above, i n assessing the ability to engage in a 
customer foreclosure strategy, the Commission takes into account whether there 
are sufficient operators in the downstream markets to which upstr eam 
undertakings could offer their services.101  
(114)  The Commission notes  that t he Unifeeder's market shares for feeder services 
remain moderate (between [30-40]% and [40-50]%) on legs of trades between 
Denmark and hub ports ( [30-40]%), Sweden and hub ports ( [30-40]%), Norway 
and the Netherlands ( [30-40]%), Latvia and the Netherlands  ([40-50]%), 
Lithuania and the Netherlands ( [40-50]%). On the legs of trade from Cyprus to 
Egypt and from Egypt to Cyprus , Unifeeder's market shares are higher  ([60-70]% 
and [70-80]%, respectively).102 Nevertheless, Unifeeder's feeder volumes only 
account for a very small proportion of the container terminal business of DP 
World's rivals. Based on an assessment by DP World of Unifeeder's volumes at 
competing terminals located at hub port s in Northern Europe, Unifeeder 
accounted in 2017 for [10-20]% of the total volumes at all relevant ports.103 In 
Cyprus, Unifeeder's volumes account for a small proportion of rival terminal 
capacity ( [10-20]% of the total volumes at the Eurogate terminal).104 
(115)  In addition, as pointed out by DP World, Unifeeder does not have discretion or 
control over which terminal it calls at: the origin or destination hub port is 
determined by deep sea liners, not feeder providers, while the origin or 
destination outport is de termined by the freight forwarder or the beneficial cargo 
owner.105 In that respect, one respondent to the market investigation confirmed 
that "generally the main line operator drives the feeder calls rather than the other 
                                                 
100  Form CO, paragraph (180), and Annex 9, paragraphs (33) and (35).  
101  Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines , paragraph 61.  
102  See Table 3 above.  
103  Form CO, paragraph 185.  
104  Form CO, Annex 9, paragraph 35.  
105  Form CO, paragraph 187.  
26 way around ". Another underlined tha t Unifeeder does not carry  "enough volumes 
to dictate where [its] customers should go, especially the deep -sea liners carriers 
will have enough leverage ."106    
(116)  In light of the above, the Commission considers that Unifeeder is un likely to have 
the ability to  engage in a customer foreclosure strategy in Belgium, France, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, or Cyprus post -Transaction.  
Incentive to foreclose  
(117)  As indicated in paragraph (92) above, the incentive to foreclose depends on the 
degree to which it is profitable.107 
(118)  Should Unifeeder  decide to procure container terminal services only from DP 
World  post-Transaction , it is likely that l iner shipping companies would simply 
stop procuring feeder services from Unifeeder and either bring feeder volumes in -
house or switch to other feeder providers . This has been confirmed, overall, by 
the majority of the respondents to the market investigatio n who have exp ressed an 
opinion .108  
(119)  Some respondents nevertheless indicated that it would be relatively difficult for 
customers of feeder services in the EEA (liner shippers) to switch providers or to 
bring the feeder volumes in -house on the legs from Denmark to Northern  
European hub ports and from Sweden to Northern European hub ports. However, 
the Commission notes that, o n the Denmark to /from  hub ports trade , Unifeeder 
compet es on the market for feeder services with notably MSC ( [20-30]% in 2017) 
and SeaGo ( [10-20]% in 2017) . On the Sweden to/from  hub ports trade, 
Unifeeder mainly co mpetes with MSC ( [30-40]% in 2017 ), and X-Press ( [10-
20]%).109 In addition, o ne of the respondents to t he market investigation  
confirmed that post -Transaction there will be enough feeder operat ors to ensure 
healthy competition in the market.110  
(120)  It is therefore likely that , in pursuing a customer foreclosure strategy in Belgium, 
France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, or Cyprus, the merged entity 
would likely incur losses in the downstream market, with no prospect of 
increasing volumes and revenues in the upstream market . 
(121)  Moreover, a s highlighted in paragraph (96) above , the majority of the respondent s 
to the market investigation who have expressed an opinion stated that Unifeeder 
would not have the ability and the incentive to foreclose DP World's rivals from a 
sufficient customer base in the EEA, by, for example, sourcing all the container 
                                                 
106  Replies to Q1 – Questionna ire to market participants, questions 9 and 9.1.  
107  Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 68.  
108  Replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to market participants, question 7.1.  
109  Form CO, paragraph 219.  
110  Reply of a market participant to Q1 – Questionnaire to market participants, question 10.  
27 terminal s ervices it needs from DP World and stopping or reducing its purchases 
of container terminal services from DP World's rivals.111 
(122)  In light of the above, the Commission considers that Unifeeder will likely not 
have an incentive to engage in a customer foreclosu re strategy in Belgium, 
France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, or Cyprus post -Transaction . 
Overall effect of foreclosure  
(123)  As indicated in paragraph (98) above, i f there remain a number of upstream 
competitors that are not affected, competition from those firms may be sufficient 
to prevent prices from rising in the upstream market and, consequ ently, in the 
downstream market.112  
(124)  The Commission considers that, even Unifeeder's feeder  volumes were re -routed 
to DP World's terminals in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, or Cyprus , this would have a limited impact on the level of us e of the 
capacity of DP World's terminal rivals, hence on their competitiveness and on the 
competitiveness of feeder  providers competing with Unifeeder.  
(125)  When asked about the possible impact of the Transaction on  their business , the 
majority of  the responde nts to the market investigation  who have expressed an 
opinion have stated that they do not foresee any negative or significant impact on 
their company.113 Moreover, none of the respondents have raised substantial 
concerns regarding the overall impact of the Transaction on the provision of 
container terminal services or container shipping services in the EEA.114 
(126)  In light of the above, the Commission considers that the implementation of a 
customer foreclosure strategy by Unifeeder in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom, or Cyprus post-Transaction would likely have no overall 
negative effect on effective competition.  
5.6. Conclusion  
(127)  Based on  the above  considerations  and all evidence available to it , the 
Commission concludes that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its 
compatibility with the internal market due to vertical effects.  
  
                                                 
111  Replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to market participants, question 9. One respondent nevertheless 
indicated that "access to Unifeeder's contracts with its competitors would give DP World knowledge of 
their competitor's pric ing as well as commercial terms of business giving them an advantage when 
competing for contestable business not enjoyed by the competing terminal"  and, as a consequence, the 
Transaction will have a negative impact (higher prices, lower quality of services , less innovation, etc.) 
on the provision of container terminal services in the EEA (reply of a market participant to Q1 – 
Questionnaire to market participants, question 9.2). The Commission considers that, on balance, access 
of DP World to confidential in formation held by Unifeeder will not give DP World a sufficient 
advantage to foreclose competing container terminal operators.     
112  Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 72.   
113  Replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to market participants, question 10.  
114  Replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to market participants, question 11.  
28 6. CONCLUSION  
(128)  For the above reasons, the European Commiss ion has decided not to oppose the 
notified operation and to declare it compatible with the internal  market and with 
the EEA Agreement. This Decision is adopted in application of Article 6(1)(b) of 
the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement . 
For the Commission  
(Signed ) 
Margrethe VESTAGER  
Member of the Commission