Commission européenne, DG COMP MERGER REGISTRY, 1049 Bruxelles, BELGIQUE   
Europese Commissie, DG COMP MERGER REGISTRY, 1049 Brussel,   BELGIË  
 
Tel: +32 229- 91111. Fax: +32 229 -64301. E -mail: COMP -MERGER -REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu.   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  
Brussels, 30.3.2021  
C(2021)  2380 final  
PUBLIC VERSION 
 
Coca- Cola HBC Romania S.R.L.  
Global City Business Park, Bucharest Nord 
St. 10, O23 Bui lding, 1st  floor,  
Ilfov  County  
077190 Voluntari  
Romania  
 Heineken Romania S.A.  
S-Park Building, Tipografilor St 11- 15, 4th 
floor, wing A2- L 
013714 Bucharest  
Romania  
Subject : Case M.10061 -  COCA- COLA HELLENIC BOTTLING COMPANY / 
HEINEKEN / STOCKDAY  
Commission decision pursuant to Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation No 139/2004
1 and Article 57 of the Agreement on the European Economic 
Area2 
                                                 
1  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the 'Merger  Regulation '). With effect from 1 December 2009,  the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union ( 'TFEU ') has introduced certain changes, such as the replacement of  
'Community ' by 'Union ' and 'common market ' by 'internal market '. The terminology of the  TFEU will be 
used throughout this decision.  
2  OJ L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3 (the 'EEA Agreement').  
In the published version of this decision, 
some information has been omitted 
pursuant to Article 17(2) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 concerning 
non-disclosure of business secrets and other  
confidential inform ation. The omissions are 
shown thus […]. Where possible the 
information omitted has been replaced by 
ranges of figures or a general description.  
 
2 Dear Sir or Madam,  
(1) On 24 February 2021, the  European Commission received notification of a proposed 
concentration pursuant to Article 4 of the  Merger Regulation by which Coca- Cola 
HBC Romania ( 'CCH Romania ') intends to acquire joint control over Stockday 
S.R.L. ( 'Stockday ') together with Heineken Romania S.A. ( 'Heineken Romania ' and, 
together with CCH Romania and Stockday, the ' Parties ') (the 'Transaction ').3 
Currently , Stockday is solely controlled by Heineken Romania.  
1. THE PARTIES  
(2) CCH Romania  is a wholly owned subsidiary of Coca -Cola HBC AG ( 'CCH '), an 
authorized bottler of The Coca -Cola Company ( 'TCCC' ). CCH Romania is active in 
the production and distribution of beverages bearing the TCCC brand as well as 
other beverages. In Romania, CCH Romania offers non- alcoholic beverages and 
spirits.  
(3) Heineken Romania  is a wholly owned subsidiary of Heineken N.V. ( 'Heineken '). 
Heineken Romania supplies a r ange of Heineken’s local and international brands of 
beer and cider in Romania.  
(4) Stockday  is an online distribution platform established by Heineken in 2017 that 
operates as an intermediary between producers of beverages and retailers.  
2. THE OPERATION  
(5) On 3 N ovember 2020, the Parties entered into a shares purchase agreement by means 
of which CCH Romania will acquire 50% of the shares of Stockday . Heineken 
Romania will retain the remaining 50% of Stockday’s shares. Post- Transaction, 
CCH Romania and Heineken Romania will have the same number of  voting rights in 
the shareholders’ meeting and in the governing board of Stockday. All decisions 
relating to the strategic commercial behaviour of Stockday, including the 
appointment of senior management at Stockday and the approval of Stockday’s business plan and budget, will require the agreement of both CCH Romania and Heineken Romania.   
(6) Moreover, post -Tran saction Stockday will operate as an autonomous entity with 
independent market access to and presence in the wholesale distribution of beverages and will have: (i) sufficient resources to operate independently on the market; (ii) activities beyond one speci fic function for its parents; (iii) sales or purch ase relations 
with its parents  at arms' length  basis ;
4 and (iv) a lasting basis nature.  
                                                 
3  Publication in the Official Journal of the European Union No C 74, 3.3.2021 , p. 8. 
4  The Parties submit that, post- Transaction, both CCH Romania and Heineken Romania will set the transfer 
prices in line with the prices set for wholesale customers. In addition, according to the Parties, under the 
current estimations, Stockday will generate approximately […]% of its turnover from the distribution of 
its parents ' products in 2021. As third party brands are added to the portfolio, this percentage is expected 
to decrease to less than [ Business secrets –  expected percentages by year until 2026 ]. 
 
3 (7) On the basis of the above, the Transaction constitutes an acquisition of joint control 
over a full -function undertaki ng, within the meaning of Articles 3(1)(b) and 3(4) of 
the Merger Regulation.  
3. UNION  DIMENSION  
(8) The undertakings concerned have a combined aggregate worldwide  turnover of more 
than EUR 5 000 million5 in 2019 (CCH: EUR 7 026 million; Heineken: EUR 23 894 
million; Stockday: [individual turnover] ) and the aggregate Union- wide turnover of 
each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 250 million ([individual turnover s]). The undertakings concerned do not achieve more than two-
thirds of thei r Union- wide turnover within the same Member State.  
(9) Therefore, the Transaction has a Union dimension pursuant to Article 1(2) of the 
Merger Regulation.  
4. M
ARKET DEFINITION  
4.1. Product market definition  
(10) In past decisions regarding the production and supply of beverages ,6 the 
Commission has distinguished between alcoholic beverages ( 'ABs ') and non-
alcoholic beverages (' NABs '). As to ABs, in the past the Commission has identified 
separate product markets for the production and distribution of (i) beer and (ii) ci der. 
With regard to spirits,  the Commission has concluded in previous decisions that 
spirits should be distinguished from other beverages and that the spirit market should 
be segmented by spirit type. As to NABs, the Commission has previously considered 
that the production and bottling of carbonated soft drinks ( 'CSDs ') and non-
carbonated soft drinks ( 'NCSDs ') constitute two separate product markets. Within 
CSDs, the Commission has in the past established  that there was a separate product 
market for cola- flavoured CSDs and left open whether other CSDs formed a single 
product market or should be further subdivided by flavour groups . Within NCSDs, 
the Commission has distinguished between packaged/bottled water, iced/ready -to-
drink tea, iced/ready -to-drink coff ee, coffee, juices and energy drinks , but ultimately 
left the segmentation open . In addition, the Commission has considered 
distinguishing the market for plant -based milk from the market from dairy -based 
milk, while it ultimately left this question open .  
(11) In the past, the Commission has identified7 a separate product market for the 
wholesale distribution of beverages including ABs and NABs , which is downstream 
from production. Moreover, the Commission has considered, but ultimately left 
open, a potential distinction of the market for the wholesale distribution of beverages 
                                                 
5  Turnover calculated in accordance with Article 5 of the Merger Regulation . 
6  See Cases M.2268 – Pernod Ricard/ Diageo/ Seagram Spirits , paragraph 17, M.2276 – The Coca -Cola 
Company /Nestlé /JV, paragraphs  17 to 21, M.2504 – Cadbury Schweppes /Pernod Ricard, paragraphs 7 and 
8, M.3182 – Scottish & Newcastle /Hp Bulmer , paragraphs  8 to 14, M.5114 – Pernod Ricard/ V&S , 
paragraph  8, M.7292 – Demb /Mondelez /Charger Opco,  paragraphs  43 to 45, M.8150 – Danone /The 
Whitewave Foods Company , paragraph  50 and M.9369 -  Pai Partners/Wessanen , paragraphs 116 and 117.  
7  See Case M.5560 –  Carlsberg Deutschland/ Nordmann/ JV Nordic Getränke, paragraph 10.  
 
4 depending on whether beverages  are sold to retail outlets ( 'off trade ' channel) or to 
points of sale for direct consumption, e.g. restaurants or hotels ( 'on trade ' channel).  
(12) The market investigation conducted in the present case confirmed the Commission’s 
findings in previous cases that  (the production of) : (i) CSDs ; (ii) iced /ready -to-drink  
tea; (iii) iced/ ready -to-drink coffee; (iv) packaged/ bottled water; (v) energy drinks; 
(vi) juices; (vii) coffee; (viii) spirits; (ix) plant- based beverages /milk ; (x) beer; and 
(xi) cider can be distinguished ,8 since they ‘[address] different customer needs’.9 
(13) Regarding wholesale distribution, although each distributor follows a somewhat different distribution model, the majority of distributors  sell a range of products both 
in the beverages and non- beverages category. It follows that from a supply 
perspective, the split by beverage type that is appropriate  in the  upstream production 
of be verages is not appropriate downstream  for wholesale distribution. 
(14) Because the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market under any plausible product market definition, the exact product 
market definition can be left open for the purpose of this case. For the purpose  of 
this Decision, the Commission will consider  the market s for the production and 
supply  (to wholesalers ) of: (i) CSDs  (including cola and non- cola flavoured CSDs ); 
(ii) iced /ready -to-drink tea; (i ii) iced/ ready -to-drink coffee; (iv) packaged/ bottled 
water; (v) energy drinks; (vi) juices; (vii) coffee; (viii) spirits; (ix) plant- based 
beverages /milk ; (x) beer; and (xi) cider , where either CCH Romania or Heineken 
Romania is active; as well as the mar kets for the  on trade and off trade  wholesale 
distribution of beverages, where Stockday is active.  
(15) In line with past Commission’s  decisions ,
10 a segmentation of the market s for the 
production and supply of beverages  between sales to retailers and wholesalers by 
producers does not seem to be justified, since producers  compete for the overall 
supply of beverages  in Romania . 
4.2. Geographic market definition  
(16) In past cases , the Commission has concluded that the relevant geographic markets 
for the  production and supply of NABs (including CSDs and NCSDs)  and ABs  
(including spirits, beer and cider ) are national in scope. Moreover, the Commission 
has considered the market for the wholesale distribution of beverages to be nati onal 
in scope.11 
                                                 
8  Questionnaire to distributors, question 6; questionnaire to indirect customers, question 5; and 
questionnaire to competitors, question 4.  
9  Questionnaire to indirect customers, question 5.1.  
10  Case M.7220 –  Chiquita Brands International /Fyffes , paragraphs 95 -98. 
11 See Cases M.2276 –  The Coca -Cola Company /Nestlé /JV, paragraph 23, M.3182 –  Scottish & 
Newcastle /Hp Bul mer, paragraphs 15 to 16, M.5114 –  Pernod Ricard/ V&S , paragraph 43, M.7292 – 
Demb /Mondelez /Charger Opco,  paragraph 157, M.8150 –  Danone /The Whitewave Foods Company  
paragraph 51 and M.9369 -  Pai Partners / Wessanen , paragraphs 116 and 117.  
 
5 (17) The market investigation generally confirmed that the  market for the wholesale 
distribution of beverages is national in scope. The majority of market participants 
who expressed an opinion shares this view .12  
(18) For the purpose of the present case, the Commission will look at the wholesale 
distribution  of beverages in Romania. 
5. COMPETITIVE ASSESSMEN T 
5.1. Introduction 
(19) On the basis of the market definition described above, CCH Romania is active in the Romanian markets fo r the production and supply of: (i) CSDs; (ii) packaged/ bottled 
water, (iii) iced /ready -to-drink tea, (iv) iced /ready -to-drink  coffee, (v) coffee, (vi) 
energy drinks, (vii) juices, (viii) spirits, and (ix) plant -based beverages/milk . 
Heineken Romania is active in the Romanian markets for the production and supply 
of beer and cider. Stockday is active as on -trade and off -trade distributor of NABs  
(CSDs,  packaged/bottled water, iced /ready -to-drink  tea, etc.) , beer and cider with 
plans to expand its portfolio [to other products]  in the course of [Business secrets –  
details on timing to expand portfolio] . CCH Romania’s and Heineken  Romania ’s 
portfolios  are complementary, therefore there are no horizontal overlaps between 
their activities.  In addition, CCH Romania and Heineken Romania do not compete 
with Stockday , as they are not active on the market for the on trade or off trade 
wholesale distribution of beverages in Romania . 
(20) The Transaction gives rise to vertically affected markets between, on the ups tream 
level , CCH Romania’s  production and supply of  (i) CSD s, (ii) iced /ready -to-drink  
tea, and (iii) iced /ready -to-drink coffee;  and, on the downstream level , Stockday’s 
wholesale on -trade and off -trade distribution of beverages.
13  
                                                 
12  Questionnaire to distributors, question 8, questionnaire to competitors, question 6 and  questionnaire to 
indirect customers, question 6.  
13  Form CO, paragraph 216.  

 
7 in the internal market or in a substantial part of it, in particular through the creation  
or strengthening of a dominant position. In this respect, a merger can entail  
horizontal and/or non- horizontal effects.  
(23) As regards non- horizontal effects,  the Commission Non- Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines19 distinguish between the effects of vertical mergers, which involve 
companies operating at different levels of the supply chain, and of conglomerate 
mergers, which involve companies that are active in closely related markets.  
(24) According to paragraph 29 of the Non- Horizontal Merger Guidelines, a vertical  
merger is said to result in foreclosure where actual or potential rivals' access to supplies or markets is hampered or eliminated as a result of the merger, thereby reducing these companies' ability and/or incentive to compete.  
(25) Paragraph 30 of the Non- Horizontal Merger Guidelines  distinguishes t wo forms of 
foreclosure. The first is where the merger is likely to raise the costs of downstream rivals by restricting their access to an important input (input foreclosure). The second is where the merger is like ly to foreclose upstream rivals by restricting their access 
to a sufficient customer base (customer foreclosure) . 
(26) The present Section 5.3 assesses whe ther the Transaction is likely to raise vertical 
effects on the affected markets identified  in Section  5.1. 
5.3.2. Input  foreclosure  
(27) The Commission considers  that, post -Transaction, the Parties are unlikely to have 
the ability or the incentive to engage in an input foreclosure strategy  by restricting 
competitors’  access to an important input . Moreover,  any hypothetical input 
foreclosure strategy from the Parties would be unlikely to have an impact on 
competition . This is  for the following reasons . 
(28) First , even though CCH Romania’s upstream market shares are above 50%  for the 
affected markets identified  (i.e. CSD, iced /ready -to-drink tea and iced/ready -to-drink  
coffee ), CCH Romania  would not have the ability to restrict independent 
distributors ’ access to an important input  as CCH Romania’s products are only a 
relatively small percentage of the portfolio of its distributors. In particular, according to the Parties, the CCH Romania portfolio weighs on average for about […] % of the 
total sales of its independent distributors.
20 A m ajority of independent distributors 
and indirect customers that expressed a view indicated that less than 20% of their revenues corresponds to sales from CCH Romania’s and Heineken Romania’s 
products.
21 Therefore, independent distributors active in the downstream  wholesale 
distribution of beverages (both on trade and off trade)  have alternative sources for 
their portfolio. 
(29) In this regard, although CCH Romania’s and, to a lesser extent, Heineken Romania’s 
products are considered a “must -have ”,22 market partici pants have indicated that 
                                                 
19  Guidelines on the assessment of non -horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (‘Non -Horizontal Merger Guidelines’) (2008/C 265/07).  
20  Form CO, paragraph 224.  
21  Questionnaire to direct distributors, question 4.1.  
22  Questionnaire to distributors, questions 10 and 11.  
 
8 they could procure the categories of products supplied by CCH Romania (including 
CSD, iced /ready -to-drink  tea and iced/ready -to-drink coffee ) from numerous  other 
competitors.23 In addition, most distributors purchase a wide range of beverages  in 
terms of brands and categories covered .24 
(30) Second , CCH Romania  would not have the ability or incentive to foreclose 
independent distributors  by exclusively  supplying Stockday , as Stockday is currently 
active in only 15 out of 41 Romanian counties . Therefore , it cannot fully replace 
CCH Romania’s existing independent distribution network, which includes 
independent distributors that operate across all Romania n counties . In this regard, 
sever al of CCH Romania’s independent distributors indicated that, although 
Stockday could expand the geographic scope of its activities , they do not consider 
Stockday’s digital platform as an appropriate distribution channel outside of 
Romania’s main cities , because in rural areas customers still prefer  in person 
interaction and are more reluctant to use digital platforms.25 This applies indistinctly 
for on trade and off trade supplies of CSD, iced /ready -to-drink tea and iced/ready -to-
drink coffee ; and is consistent with the Parties’ view that Stockday’s operations 
would be complementary to their existing indirect sales distribution via independent 
wholesale distributors  
(31) In addition, during the market investigation respondents  highlighted26 some 
limitations of Stockday’s  online platform  to reach all customers , including ‘ (…) time 
consuming operations (ordering process) transferred from suppliers to customer, 
less interactions with trained sales/distribution professionals, more rigid supply 
chain (…) ’ and that ‘ it will be difficult for some customers to place orders ’. In 
addition, one competitor explained that ‘ the order shall be paid before delivery ’.27 
On the other hand, the use of Stockday has  positive effects such as  ‘(…) price 
transparency, the easy tracking of orders, payments, returns and rec ycled packaging 
such as bottles ’.  
(32) Moreover, Stockday  currently  contracts logistic and delivery services from  
independent partners  as it does not currently own any logistics assets (trucks or 
warehouses).28 There fore, Stockday  would not have the capabilities to replace its 
distributors  post-Transaction and, according to the  information provided by the  
Parties, it is not planning to develop such capabilities .29 
                                                 
23  Questionnaire to distributors, question 5, questionnaire to competitors, question 8. T he following suppliers 
seem to r emain available to independent distributors in Romania: (i) for CSDs: Pepsico, European 
Dreanks, Romaqua Group, Alconor and Gama & Gama; (ii) for iced /ready -to-drink  tea: Pepsico, Maspex, 
San Benedetto, Phanner and Rauch; (iii) for iced /ready -to-drink  coffee: Nestle, Hell, Molkerei, Allois 
Muller, Illy, Arlafoods; (iv) for bottled water: Romaqua Group, Borsec, Carpathian Springs, European 
Drinks, Maspex, San Benedetto, Perla Harghitei and Apemin tusnad; (v) for juices: Tymbark, Maspex, 
Pepsico, Pfanner , Romaqua Group, Eckes -Granini Group and European Drinks  ; and (vi) for beer 
Asahi/Ursus, Bergenbier/Molson Coors, Tuborg URB and Carlsberg.  
24  Form CO, paragraph  342. 
25  Minute s from 11.03.2021 from a call with a distributor, q uestionnaire  to distributors, questions 19.2 and 
20.1.  
26  Questionnaire to indirect customers, question 8.2.1.  
27  Questionnaire to competitors, question 19.1.  
28  Form CO, paragraph 332.  
29  Form CO, paragraph s 7 and 52.  
 
9 (33) Third , Stockday’s market share in the on- trade and off -trade wholesale distribution 
of beverages in Romania is very limited, [0 -5]% and [0 -5]% respectively (2019).30 
Such market share is expected to  increase in the coming years  and to stabilize at a 
relatively low  level . In fact , the expected market share for Stockday for the on- trade 
and off -trade beverages segments in Romania is expected to be  only [0-5]% by 
2023.31 Therefore, it appears unlikely that it will replace CCH Romania’s  
independent distribut ion network. Moreover, post -Transaction, Stockday will 
continue to be constrained by strong competitors such as Interbrands, Aquila Part 
Prod Com, Luzan Logistic, Macromex and Punctual Comimpex.32 
(34) Fourth , a majority of the independent  distributors who expressed a view  consider 
that the T ransaction may have negative or mixed impact on their business  due to the 
loss of turnover and clients .33 However, CCH Romania and Heineken Romania  
submit that their sales through Stockday will remain limited ( [10-20]% by 2023 in 
the case of Heineken Romania34 and [10-20]% by 2023 in the case of CCH 
Romania)35 and that they will continue to strongly rely on independent distributors.36 
In addition, when asked about the past impact on their business  of the launch of 
Stockday , a majority of independent  distributors that expressed a view  on this point 
said that they did not experience any negative impact .37 In particular, in the three 
counties (Arges, Cluj and Dambovita) where CCH Romania implemented a pilot 
program me with Stockday  for the sale of its products , the majority of distributors , 
indirect customers and  competitors  active in these counties that expressed a view did 
not experience any impact after the launch of th is pilot programme.38 It is worth 
noting that the majority of indirect customers of Heineken Romania’s products who expressed a view experienced no impact or a positive impact from the establishment of Stockday in 2017.
39 Indeed , until 2023 CCH  Romania 's sales through independent  
distributors are expected to remain substantially stable (and to go from EUR […]  
million in 2019 to EUR […] million  in 2023) whereas CCH  Romania 's direct sales 
are expected to materially decrease (from EUR […]  million in 2019 to EUR […] 
million  in 2023).40 
(35) Stockday will mainly take over some of CCH Romania’s direct sales to end customers  and indirect sales distribution via independent distributors ( 'ISD') will 
continue to play an important role  in CCH Romania’s distribution system . CCH 
Romania is expected to continue to use ISD via independent distributors in parallel to Stockday. CCH Romania’s sales through Stockday are expected to be relatively 
limited and to have a low growth after the launch phase . The need for CCH Romania 
and Heineken Romania  to continue to rely on independent distributors seems to be in 
line with the nature of the wholesale distribution market in Romania. Namely, the 
                                                 
30  Form CO, paragraph 207, Table 3.  
31  Form CO, paragraph 306.  
32  Form CO, paragraph 192.  
33  Questionnaire to distributors, question s 15 and 15.1.  
34  Form CO, paragraph 265.  
35  Form CO, paragraph 239.  
36  Form CO, paragraphs 242 and 265.  
37  Questionnaire to distributors, question 12.2.  
38  Questionnaire t o distributors, question 14, questionnaire to indirect customers, question 10 and 
questionnaire to competitors, question 15.  
39  Questionnaire to indirect customers, question 12.  
40  Form CO, paragraph 240.  

 
11 5.3.3. Customer  foreclosure  
(39) The Commission considers that, post -Transaction, the Parties are unlikely to have 
the ability or the incentive to engage in a customer foreclosure strategy. Moreover, 
any hypothetical customer foreclosure strategy from the Parties would be unlikely  to 
have an impact on competition. This is for the following reasons.  
(40) First , despite CCH Romania’s market shares above 50%  in the supply of CSD, 
iced/ready -to-drink tea and iced/ready -to-drink  coffee , given Stockday’s limited  
market  shares46 downstream ([0-5] % for on -trade and [0 -5] % for off- trade 
distribution ), it is highly unlikely  that the Parties  would have the ability to foreclose 
competitors by restricting access to a sufficient customer base in Romania  post-
Transaction . As already mentioned, such  market share is expected  to increase in the 
coming years  but to stabilize at a relatively low level (to only [0 -5]% in Romania in  
2023) .47  
(41) Second , Stockday operates in a highly competitive market, where numer ous 
independent distributors  compete for sales to a fragmented customer base of small 
retailers (e.g. grocery shops, convenience shops)  and Horeca outlets. The 
competitors of CCH Romania and Heineken Romania will have access to wholesale 
distributors  like Aquila, Luzan, Macromex, Punct ual and Interbran ds which 
distribute  all the major consumer goods  brands like Danone, Nestle’, Mars, Procter 
& Gamble, Henkel, Barilla in both the on- trade and off -trade channel.48  
(42) Third,  according to the information provided by the Parties, Stockday plans to 
expand its  distribution to third -party products [Business secrets – details on timing to 
expand portfolio]   and to start distributing also  beverages from other suppliers 
[Business secrets – details on timing to expand portfolio] .49 
(43) In view of the considerations in par agraphs (39) to (42) above and all evidence  
available to it, the Commission considers that it is unlikely that customer foreclosure  
concerns  will arise from the Transaction.  
5.3.4. Other concerns raised during the market investigation 
(44) During the market investigation, one competitor50 raised the risk of ‘ a possible 
leveraging strategy based on the data that the platform would provide to the owners ’ 
post-Transaction . However, as most independent distributors  offer  a wide range of 
beverage products, the Commission considers that  they could equally  collect  and 
leverage information on customers ’ purchase patterns  or share it with the Parties' 
competitors . Therefore , the Commission considers that it is unlikely that the 
Tran saction would negatively affect competition i n this regard.  
5.3.5. Conclusion of the Commission’s assessment  
(45) In light of the above and all  evidence available to it, the Commission considers that 
the Transaction does  not give  rise to serious doubts as to its compatibility with the 
                                                 
46  Form CO, paragraph 207, Table 3.  
47  Form CO, paragraph 306.  
48  Form CO, paragraph 278.  
49  Form CO, paragraph s 10 and 333, Annex 7  to the Form CO.  
50  Questionnaire to competitors, question 19.1.  
 
12 internal market or the  functioning of the EEA Agreement due to vertical non-
coordinated effects under any  plausible market definition.  
6. CONCLUSION  
(46) For the above reasons, the Commission has decided not to oppose the notified 
operation and to declare it compatible with the internal  market and with the EEA 
Agreement. This decision is adopted in application of Article 6(1)(b) of the Merger 
Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement .  
For the Commission 
 
 (Signed)  
Margrethe VESTAGER  
Executive Vice -President