Commission européenne, DG COMP MERGER REGISTRY, 1049 Bruxelles, BELGIQUE  
Europese Commissie, DG COMP MERGER REGISTRY, 1049 Brussel,   BELGIË  
 
Tel: +32 229- 91111. Fax: +32 229- 64301. E -mail: COMP -MERGER -REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu.   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  
Brussels, 13.5.2022  
C(2022) 3233 final  
PUBLIC VERSION 
 
Etex NV  
PassPort Building,  
Luchthaven Brussel Nationaal,  
Gebouw 1K  
1930 Zaventem  
Belgium  
Subject : Case M.1 0645 – ETEX / XI (INSMAT) HOLDINGS  
Commission decision pursuant to Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation 
No 139/20041 and Article 57 of the Agreement on the European Economic 
Area2 
Dear Sir or Madam,  
(1) On 11 April 2022, the European Commission (hereinafter “Commission”) received 
notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger 
Regulation by which Etex NV (‘Etex’ or the Notifying Party) incorporated in 
Belgium, acquires sole control over URSA Insulation, S.A. and URSA 
Deutschland GmbH (t ogether with their subsidiarie s ‘Ursa’) ,3 by way of  a purchase 
                                                 
1  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘ Merger Regulation ’). With effect from 1 December 2009, the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union ( ‘TFEU ’) has introduced certain changes, such as the 
replacement of  ‘Community ’ by ‘Union’  and ‘common market’  by ‘internal market ’. The 
terminology of the TFEU will be used throughout this decision.  
2  OJ L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3 (the ‘EEA Agreement’). 
3  Publication in the Official Journal of the European Union No C 167, 21.4.2022, p. 36.  
In the published version of this decision, 
some information has been omitted 
pursuant to Article 17(2) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 concerning 
non-disclosure of business secrets and other  
confidential information. The omissions are shown thus […]
. Where possible the 
information omitted has been replaced by ranges of figures or a general description.
 
 
2 of shares  (‘the Transaction’). In this Decision, Etex and Ursa  are referred to as ‘the 
Parties ’. 
1. THE PARTIES  
(2) Etex is an international building materials company with a diverse product 
portfolio, including insulated plasterboards and prefabricated insulated plasterboards .
4 
(3) Ursa is an insulation materials provider;  its main products include  glass wool 
(‘GW ’) and extruded polystyrene (‘XPS ’) used for the insulation of residential and 
non-residential buildings.   
2. THE CONCENTRATION  
(4) Pursuant to a share sale and purchase agreement signed on 11 January 2022, at the 
closing of the transaction Etex will hold 100% of Ursa’s shares and solely control Ursa.  
(5) Therefore, the Transaction would result in a concentration within the mea ning of 
Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation.  
3. U
NION  DIMENSION  
(6) In 2020, t he undertakings concerned have a combined aggregate world- wide 
turnover of more than EUR 2 500 m illion  (Etex EUR […] million; Ursa EUR 
[…] million) and a combined aggregate turnove r in excess of EUR 100 million 
(Belgium EUR […] million; France EUR […] million; Germany EUR […] million; 
Italy EUR […] million and Spain EUR […] million) in three Member States.5  At 
least two of the undertakings concerned have a turnover in excess of EUR 
25 million  in these three Member States (in France: Etex EUR […] million and 
Ursa EUR […] million; in Germany: Etex EUR […] million and Ursa EUR […]  
million; in Italy: Etex EUR […] million and Ursa EUR […] million; and in Spain: 
Etex EUR […] million and Ursa EUR […] million) . 
(7) The Transaction therefore has a  Union dimension pursuant to Article 1(3) of the 
Merger Regulation.  
4. MARKET  DEFINITION  
4.1. Upstream market: Production and supply of insulation materials  
4.1.1. Product market  
(8) Insulation products reduce the thermal and acoustic exchange through a wall, roof or duct on which they are placed. They are usually produced either from mineral 
                                                 
4  Plasterboards to which an insulation material is glued to provide the board with additional thermal 
insulation properties . 
5  Turnover calculated in accordance with Article 5 of the Merger Regulation and the Commission 
Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice (OJ C 95, 16.4.2008, p. 1).   
 
3 wools  (glass wools (‘GW’) or stone wools  (‘SW’)) or foams  (expanded 
polystyrene  (‘EPS’), extruded polystyrene (‘XPS’) and polyurethane) and may take 
many forms such as rigid panels for walls or elastic  mats for the insulation of pipes. 
These materials vary in terms of thermal and acoustic performance, filling 
properties, moisture and fire re sistance, structural stability, and cost.6  
(9) The Commission has previously found that  insulation products constitute a separate 
market from other building products.7 Further, the Commission has considered the 
possible sub -segmentation of insulation products  by insulation material, 
distinguishing  between a product market for mineral wools  and a product market 
for foams8, but left the market open.  
(10) The Notifying Part y agree s that insulation products constitute a separate product 
market from other building products. The Notifying Part y further agree s that 
a distinction should be made between mineral wools on the one hand and foams on 
the other hand since: (i)  from a supply side perspective, production processes are 
very different; (ii) while mineral wools have better fire protection qualities, foams 
are better at handling moisture; and (iii) from a demand side perspective, such 
differing technical characteristics lead to differing use cases.9 Based on technical 
specifications and prices, the Notifying Party indic ate that an even further 
sub-segmentation for both mineral wools and foams is conceivable.10 
(11) The Commission considers that, consistently with its past practice and absent 
indications to the contrary from the market investigation, plausible relevant product 
markets for the production and supply of insulation materials  can be defined 
distinguishing  between a product market for mineral wools  and a product market 
for foams .11  
(12) In any event, it can be left open whether the market for the production and supply 
of insulation materials  should be segmented into separate potential markets for 
mineral wools and foams , as the assessment of the Transaction’s compatibility with 
the internal market or the functioning of the EEA Agreement would not change 
under any plausible product market definition. Under a conservative approach, the 
Transaction will be assessed  under the sub-categories of (i) mineral wools 
(GW  and SW);  and (ii)  foams (EPS and XPS).12 
4.1.2. Geographic market  
(13) In its previous decisions, the Commission has considered that the market for the production and supply of insulation materials is at least national in scope.
13 In some 
                                                 
6  Form CO, paragraph 48.  
7  Case M.7457, CVC/PAROC (2015) , paragraph 14; Case M.6871 – Mohawk Industries/ Spano Invest , 
paragraphs 28 and 29.  
8  Case M.7457, CVC/PAROC (2015) , para 16 and 18; Case M.3943, Saint Gobain/BPB (2005), 
paragraph 28.   
9  Form CO, paragraph 50.  
10  Form CO, paragraph 51.  
11  Minutes of the call from 24 March 2022, paragraph 7; Minutes of the call from 28 March 2022, 
paragraph 6;  Minutes of the call from 29 March 2022, paragraph 5.  
12  Since Ursa is active only in the production and supply of GW and XPS, the Commission will not further assess the possible markets for SW and EPS.  
13  Case M.7457, CVC/PAROC (2015) , para graph 19. Case M.3943, Saint Gobain/BPB (2005), 
paragraph 30.  
 
4 decisions, the Commission has also indicated that the market could be wider, 
e.g. the Nordic region or European-wide but has ultimately left the exact market 
definition open.14  
(14) The Notifying Party submits that the relevant geographic market for both mineral 
wools and foams could be assessed at any level, from local to EEA -wide.15 
(15) The results of the market investigation support the fact that the relevant geographic 
market for the production and supply of both mineral wools and foams is national in scope as the market participants stated that the vast majority of the customers are 
wholesale distributors, such as general builders’ merchants, which usually have 
their own network of stores at national level.
16 
(16) In any event, for the purposes of this Decision, it can be left open whether the 
markets for the production and supply of both mineral wools and foams are 
national or wider  in scope as the assessment of the Transaction’s compatibility with 
the internal market or the functioning of the EEA Agreement would not change 
under any plausible product market definition.  Under a conservative approach, the 
Transaction will be assessed at a national level.  
4.2. Downstream markets: production and supply of prefabricated insulated plasterboards 
4.2.1. Product market  
(17) Prefabricated insulated plasterboards consist of normal plasterboard sheets that are 
fitted by the manufacturer with insulation material, to provide a product with 
thermal insulation properties. The advantage of this technique is that it provides 
customers with a readymade product that requires little work to be installed. Its 
main disadvantage is its l ack of flexibility with respect to the assembly of 
plasterboard and insulation on site: in the latter case, indeed, wire, cables and pipes 
can be fitted prior to the final assembly of the insulation layer.
17 
(18) In its previous decisions, the Commission ha s con sidered the existence of 
a separate product market for prefabricated insulated plasterboards18, but left the 
market definition open.  
(19) The Notifying Part y indicates that prefabricated insulated  plasterboards can be 
manufactured with any insulation material, but it would not make sense 
economically to change EPS (the material they are currently using for the majority 
of their products) for the more expensive materials like XPS .19 
                                                 
14  Case M.7457, CVC/PAROC (2015) , para 19. Regarding a  potential Nordic region market, see 
Case  M.3407, Saint Gobain/Dahl (2004) , para graphs 18. Regarding a potential European -wide 
market, see Case M.3142 – CVC/Danske Traelast , para graphs 14- 16.   
15  Form CO, paragraph 61.  
16  Minutes of the call from 24 March  2022, paragraph 9.  
17  Form CO, paragraph 54.  
18  Case M.3943, Saint Gobain/BPB (2005), paragraph 32; Case M.6395, Etex/Lafarge Gypsum Assets 
(2011), paragraph 11 footnote 7.   
19  Form CO, paragraph 56.  
 
5 (20) The market investigation indicates that the producers of plasterboards consider 
prefabricated insulated plasterboards as a distinct  product, also referred to as 
a ‘system’.20 
(21) In any event , for the purposes  of this Decision, it can be left open whether 
prefabricated insulated plasterboards are distinct from plasterboard as the 
assessment of the Transaction’s compatibility with the internal market or the 
functioning of the EEA Agreement would not change under any plausible product 
market definition. Under a conservative approach, the Transaction will be assessed  
for the possible market of prefabricated insulated plasterboards. 
4.2.2. Geographic market  
(22) In its previous decisions, the Commission has considered that the market for 
prefabricated insulated plasterboards is national in scope and possibly broader in 
some  areas such as Benelux and the Nordic Countries .21  
(23) The Notifying Part y agrees with previous Commission’s decisions  and indicates that 
the relevant geographic market should be national.22 
(24) The market investigation indicates that the relevant geographic market is nat ional in 
scope because the majority of customers are general builders’ merchants and are active at the national level.
23 
(25) In any event, for the purposes of this Decision, it can be left open whether the markets for the production and supply of prefabricated insulated plasterboards is  
national or wider  in scope as the assessment of the Transaction’s compatibility with 
the internal market or the functioning of the EEA Agreement would not change 
under any plausible product market definition. Under a conservative  approach, the 
Transaction will be assessed at a national level.  
5. C
OMPETITIVE ASSESSMEN T 
(26) When considering the narrowest plausible markets based on precedents (i.e. foams 
and mineral wool), the Parties’ combined market shares remain less than 20% (for 
horizontal relationships), and their combined or individual market shares less than 30% (for vertical relationships).  
(27) However, under a conservative approach considering narrower segments in the 
insulation materials market, t he Transaction results in:  (i) a horizontally affected 
market for the supply of GW in Romania; and (ii) vertical ly affected markets  in 
Belgium and Poland between Ursa’s upstream activity in the production and supply 
of XPS and GW and Etex’s downstream activity in the production and supply of 
prefabricated insulated plasterboards .  
                                                 
20  Minutes of the call from 24 March 2022, paragraph 6.  
21  Case M.3943, Saint Gobain /BPB (2005), para graph 34.   
22  Form CO, paragraph 62.  
23  Minutes of the call from 24 March 2022, paragraph 19.  
 
6 5.1. Analytical Framework  
(28) Under Article 2(2) and (3) of the Merger Regulation,24 the Commission must assess 
whether a proposed concentration would significantly impede effective competition 
in the internal market or in a substantial part of it, in particular through the creation 
or strengthening of a dominant position. Depending on the position of the parties in 
the supply chain, a concentration may entail horizontal and/or non-horizontal effects. 
(29) Horizontal effects arise when the parties to a concentration are actual or potential 
competitors in one or more of the relevant markets conc erned. The Commission 
appraises horizontal effects in accordance with the guidance set out in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
25 
(30) Non-horizontal effects arise when the parties to a concentration operate on different 
levels of the supply chain (vertical effe cts) or in neighbouring markets 
(conglomerate effects). The Commission appraises non-horizontal effects in accordance with the guidance set out in the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
26 
(31) Both the Horizontal and Non- Horizontal Merger Guidelines distinguish between two 
main ways in which mergers may significantly impede effective competition, namely non-coordinated and coordinated effects.  
(32) In horizontal mergers, non-coordinated effects may significantly impede effective 
competition by eliminating the competitive constraint imposed by each party to the 
merger on the other, as a result of which the merged entity would have increased 
market power, without resorting to coordinated behaviour. In that regard, the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines consider not onl y the direct loss of competition 
between the merging firms, but also the reduction in competitive pressure on 
non-merging firms in the same market that could be brought about by the merger.
27  
(33) The Horizontal Merger Guidelines list a number of factors, which may influence 
whether or not significant non-coordinated effects are likely to result from a merger. In particular, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines refer to the large market shares of 
the merging firms, the fact that the merging firms are close competitors, the limited 
possibilities for customers to switch suppliers or the fact that the merger would 
eliminate an important competitive force.
28 Not all these factors need to be present 
for significant non-coordinated effects to be likely. The list of factors is also not exhaustive.  
(34) Concentrations which, by reason of the limited market share of the undertakings 
concerned, are not liable to impede effective competition may be presumed to be 
compatible with the internal market. An indication to this effect exist s, in particular, 
                                                 
24  As regards the assessment in relation to the EEA, s ee also Annex XIV to the EEA Agreement.  
25  Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (OJ C 31, 5.2,2014, p. 5) . 
26  Guidelines on the assessment of non- horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control 
of conc entrations between undertakings  (OJ C 265, 18.10.2008, p. 6). 
27  Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 24 . 
28  Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 26. 
 
7 where the market share of the undertakings concerned does not exceed 25% either in 
the internal market or in a substantial part of it.29  
(35) In non-horizontal mergers, non-coordinated effects may arise when the concentration 
gives rise to foreclosure. In vertical mergers, foreclosure can take the form of input 
foreclosure, where the merger is likely to raise costs of downstream rivals by restricting their access to an important input; and/or the form of customer 
foreclosure, where the merger i s likely to foreclose upstream rivals by restricting 
their access to a sufficient customer base.
30  
(36) In assessing the likelihood of an anticompetitive foreclosure scenario, the 
Commission examines whether the merged entity would have post -transaction the 
ability to foreclose access to either inputs or customers, whether the merged entity 
would have the incentives to do so and whether such foreclosure strategy would have 
a detrimental effect on competition.31 
(37) This Decision will examine whether the Transaction gives rise to serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market in relation to (i) the horizontal overlap 
arising  in the market for the production and supply of GW; and (ii) the vertical 
relationships arising between the upstream production and supply of XPS and GW 
and the downstream production and supply of prefabricated insulated plasterboards . 
5.2. Horizontal relationships  in the market for the production and supply of glass 
wool  
(38) Based on the market shares communicated by the Notifying Party, the  Transaction 
would give rise to a horizontally affected market for the production and supply of GW in Romania.  
(39) While the Parties’ combined market shares in the GW sub-segment in Romania 
is [20-30]% with a [0-5]% increment by value and [10-20]% by volume in 2021; 
the HHI  delta resulting from the concentration is below 150. Therefore, the 
production and supply of GW in Romania satisfies the conditions set out in point 6 
of the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain 
concentrations  under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, and is unlikely to raise 
competition concerns in relation to this market.  
(40) In any event , the merger specific increment is minimal and unlikely to significantly 
affect the structure of the market. Several other competitors would remain active on 
the market including Isover with [40-50]% and Knauf with [20-30]% market shares 
in volume.
32  
(41) In light of the above, the Commission concludes that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market in relation to 
horizontal non-coordinated effects in the production and supply of GW in Romania . 
                                                 
29  Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 18. 
30  Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 30. 
31  Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 30.  
32  Form CO, Table 7.1.  
 
8 5.3. Vertical re lationships between the upstream production and supply of XPS and 
GW and the downstream production and supply of prefabricated insulated 
plasterboards 
(42) Based on the market shares communicated by the Notifying Party, the Transaction 
would give rise to a vert ical relationship between Ursa’s activities upstream, in the 
production and supply of GW and XPS, and Etex’s activities downstream in the production and supply of prefabricated insulated plasterboards. 
(43) As per Table 1 below, the Parties’ activities give ris e to vertically affected markets 
for XPS in Belgium and GW in Poland. 
Table 1  
 Upstream (URSA)  Downstream (ETEX)  
Country  Product  Market 
share (value)  Product  Market 
share 
(value)  
Belgium  XPS [30-40]% Prefabricated insulated plasterboards  [0-5]% 
Poland  GW [30-40]% Prefabricated insulated plasterboards  [5-10]% 
 
5.3.1. Input foreclosure  
(44) The Transaction is not likely to lead to input foreclosure as, post -Transaction, the 
Parties would likely have neither the ability nor the incentive to foreclose the 
Merged Entit y’s downstream competitors for the following reasons.  
5.3.1.1. Ability  
(45) First, Ursa’s upstream market shares are moderate and strong competitors like Isover 
and Knauf would remain in the market. Market participants that responded in the 
market investigation pointed out that Isover and Knauf are Ursa’s main competitors 
across the Member States.33 In Belgium, a sufficient number of alternative suppliers 
of XPS would remain post -Transaction: BASF ([5-10]% in volume and [5-10]% in 
value), Ravago ([10-20]% in volume and [10-20]% in value), Austrotherm ([0-5]% 
in volume and [0-5]% in value), Soprema ([30-40]% in volume and [30-40]% in 
value), and others ([10-20]% in volume and [10-20]% in value).34 In Poland, a 
sufficient number of alternative suppliers of GW would remain post -Transaction: 
Isover ([40-50]% in  volume and [30-40]% in value); Knauf ([20-30]% in volume 
and [20-30]% in value) and others ([0-5]% in volume and [0-5]% in value).35 
Moreover, the market participants contacted in the investigation also indicated that 
the insulation materials market is growing and smaller players are present in a 
number of countrie s.36  
                                                 
33  Minutes of the call from 29 March 2022, paragraph 9; Minutes of the call from 24 March 2022, 
paragraph 12.  
34  Form CO, Table 7.5 and Table 7.6. 
35  Form CO, Table 7.1 and Table 7.2. 
36  Minutes of the call from 29 March 2022, paragraphs 9 and 10; Minutes of the call from 24 March 2022, paragraph 12.  
 
9 (46) Second, the market investigation confirmed that there are alternatives to XPS and 
GW for the insulation of walls (e.g. wood wool, stone wool, EPS37) and the market 
participants point to a larger insulation market than GW and XPS taken individually .
38 Moreover, Etex uses GW and XPS for the production of insulated 
plasterboards only in Italy, where […].39 For the rest of the countries, including 
Belgium and Pola nd, Etex uses EPS to produce its prefabricated insulated 
plasterboards. Moreover, Etex argues that to replace EPS by XPS would 
economically not make sense, given that XPS is much more expensive than EPS 
while the special qualities of XPS are not needed for the use cases of such 
prefabricated insulated plasterboards.40 
(47) Third, the market investigation point ed to the fact that builders usually prefer to buy 
the insulation material and the plasterboard separately and install them on the spot.41 
Depending on the i nsulating properties of the final application and the price, builders 
prefer to mix and match the chosen insulation material with the plasterboard 
themselves at the construction site. 
5.3.1.2. Incentive  
(48) As regards the incentive, the very limited presence of the merged entity on the 
downstream market would make  it unlikely that it could profitably recoup lost sales 
from a foreclosing conduct on the upstream markets.  
5.3.1.3. Impact  
(49) The market participants contacted in the market investigation indicated no negative 
impact of the Transaction for their business or markets.42 
5.3.1.4. Conclusion  
(50) In conclusion, in light of the above, the Commission considers that the Merged Entity  would have neither the ability nor the incentive to engage in a foreclosure 
strategy and that; in any event,  a foreclosure strategy would not have a significant 
impact o n effective competition. 
(51) In light of the above, the Commission considers that the new entity would have 
neither the ability nor the incentive to engage in a n input  foreclosure strategy against 
its downstream competitors in the production and supply of prefabricated insulated 
plasterboards  in Belgium and Poland.  
                                                 
37  EPS is the most used material because of its low cost (Minutes of the call from 24 March 2022, 
paragraph 15).  
38  Minutes of the call fr om 24 March 2022, paragraph 7; Minutes of the call from 29 March 2022, 
paragraph. 5; Minutes of the call from 28 March 2022, paragraph 6.  
39  Form CO, paragraphs 87 and 95.  
40  Form CO, paragraph 95.  
41  Minutes of the call from 24 March 2022, paragraph 16; M inutes of the call from 28 March 2022, 
paragraph 10.  
42  Minutes of the call from 24 March 2022, paragraph 24; Minutes of the call from 29 March 2022, paragraph 15; Minutes of the call from 28 March 2022, paragraph 12.  
 
10 5.3.2. Customer foreclosure  
(52) The Transaction is not likely to lead to customer foreclosure as, post -Transaction, 
the Parties would likely not have the ability to foreclose the Merged Entity’s 
upstream competitors for the following reasons.  
5.3.2.1. Ability  
(53) First, considering Etex’s low market shares for the supply of insulated plasterboards 
in Belgium and Poland, there will remain a sufficiently large customer base in the 
downstream market for Ursa’s competitors to provide their products post -
Transaction. In Belgium, Etex faces competition from Saint -Gobain (around 
[10-20]%), Knauf ([10-20]%), Recticel ([20-30]%), Gorstal and others. In Poland, 
Etex faces co mpetition from Saint -Gobain, Knauf, Recticel ([50-60]%), Gorstal 
([30-40]%) and others.43 
(54) Second, the market investigation point ed to the fact that the builders usually 
purchase the insulation material s separately and install them on the plasterboards 
thems elves. In any event, even if prefabricated insulated plasterboards were 
a separate market, builders could switch to the components of competitors 
separately , if the merged entity  would increase  prices .44 
5.3.2.2. Incentive  
(55) As regards the incentive, the very limited presence of the merged entity on the 
downstream market would make  it unlikely that it could profitably recoup lost sales 
from a foreclosing conduct on the downstream markets.  
5.3.2.3. Impact  
(56) Third, the market participants contacted in the market investigation indi cated no 
negative impact for their business or the markets .45 
5.3.2.4. Conclusion  
(57) In light of the above, the Commission considers that the new entity would have 
neither the ability nor the incentive to engage in a customer foreclosure strategy 
against its upstream c ompetitors in the markets for the production and supply of XPS 
and GW in Belgium and Poland. 
(58) Based on the considerations above, and in light of the results of the market investigation and of the evidence available to it, the Commission considers  that the 
Transaction does not give rise to serious doubts as to its compatibility with the 
internal market or the functioning of the EEA Ag reement because of vertical 
non-coordinated effects in the upstream markets of the production and supply of 
XPS and GW and the downstream markets of the production and supply of 
prefabricated insulated plasterboards  in Belgium and Poland. 
                                                 
43  Form CO, Table 7.12.  
44  Ide m footnote 41.  
45  Minutes of the call from 24 March 2022, paragraph 24; Minutes of the call from 29 March 2022, 
paragraph 15; Minutes of the call from 28 March 2022, paragraph 12.  
 
11 5.3.3. Conclusion on the competitive assessment  
(59) In light of the above considerations and of all evidence available to it, the 
Commission considers that  the Transaction does not give rise to serious doubts as to 
its compatibility with the internal market or the functioning of the EEA Agreement 
due to potential vertical non-coordinated effects  or horizontal non-coordinated 
effects  under any plausible marke t definition.  
6. CONCLUSION  
(60) For the above reasons, the Commission has decided not to oppose the notified 
concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal  market and with the EEA 
Agreement. This decision is adopted in application of Article  6(1)(b) of the Merger 
Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement .  
For the Commission  
 
 
(Signed)  
Margrethe VESTAGER  
Executive Vice -President