REGULATION (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

of 18 July 2018

on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular point (d) of Article 46, Article 149, point (a) of Article 153(2), Articles 164, 172, 175, 177 and 178, Articles 189(2), 212(2) and 322(1) and Article 349 thereof, in conjunction with the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and in particular Article 106a thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the Court of Auditors (1),

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee (2),

Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions (3),

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure (4),

Whereas:

(1) Following three years of implementation, further amendments should be made to the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (the ‘budget’) in order to remove bottlenecks in implementation by increasing flexibility, to simplify delivery for the stakeholders and the services, to focus more on results, and to improve accessibility, transparency and accountability. Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) should therefore be repealed and replaced by this Regulation.

(2) In order to reduce the complexity of the financial rules applicable to the budget and to include the relevant rules in one single regulation, the Commission should repeal Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012 (6). In the interest of clarity, the main rules from Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012 should be included in this Regulation, while other rules should be included in guidance for services.

(3) The fundamental budgetary principles should be maintained. Existing derogations from those principles for specific areas such as research, external actions and structural funds should be reviewed and simplified as far as possible, taking into account their continuing relevance, their added value for the budget, and the burden they impose on stakeholders.

(4) Rules on the carry-over of appropriations should be presented more clearly and a distinction should be made between automatic and non-automatic carry-overs. The Union institutions concerned should provide information to the European Parliament and to the Council on both automatic and non-automatic carry-overs.

(5) The carrying-over and use of external assigned revenue for the succeeding programme or action should be allowed with a view to using such funds efficiently. It should be possible to carry over internal assigned revenue only to the following financial year, except where this Regulation provides otherwise.

(6) With regard to internal assigned revenue, the financing of new building projects with the revenue from lettings and the sale of buildings should be allowed. To that end, such revenue should be considered as internal assigned revenue which can be carried over until it is fully used.

(7) Union institutions should be able to accept any donation made to the Union.

(8) A provision should be introduced to allow for in-kind sponsorship by a legal person of an event or activity for promotional or corporate social responsibility purposes.

(9) The concept of performance as regards the budget should be clarified. Performance should be linked to the direct application of the principle of sound financial management. The principle of sound financial management should also be defined, and a link should be established between objectives set and performance indicators, results and economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the use of appropriations. For reasons of legal certainty, while avoiding conflicts with existing performance frameworks of the different programmes, performance terminology, in particular output and results, should be defined.

(10) In accordance with the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making (7), Union legislation should be of high quality and should focus on areas where it has the greatest added value for citizens and is as efficient and effective as possible in delivering the common policy objectives of the Union. Making existing and new spending programmes and activities entailing significant spending subject to evaluation can help achieve those objectives.

(11) In accordance with the principle of transparency enshrined in Article 15 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Union institutions are to conduct their work as openly as possible. With regard to budget implementation, the application of that principle implies that citizens should know where, and for what purpose, funds are spent by the Union. Such information fosters democratic debate, contributes to the participation of citizens in the Union’s decision-making process, reinforces institutional control and scrutiny over Union expenditure, and contributes to boosting its credibility. Communication should be more targeted and should aim to increase the visibility of the Union contribution for citizens. Such objectives should be achieved by the publication, preferably using modern communication tools, of relevant information concerning all recipients of funds financed from the budget which takes into account those recipients’ legitimate interests of confidentiality and security and, as far as natural persons are concerned, their right to privacy and the protection of their personal data. Union institutions should therefore adopt a selective approach in the publication of information, in accordance with the principle of proportionality. Decisions to publish should be based on relevant criteria in order to provide meaningful information.

(12) Without prejudice to the rules on the protection of personal data, the utmost transparency regarding information on recipients should be sought. The information on recipients of Union funds implemented under direct management should be published on a dedicated website of Union institutions, such as the Financial Transparency System, and should include at least the name and the locality of the recipient, the amount legally committed and the purpose of the measure. That information should take into account relevant criteria such as the periodicity, the type and the importance of the measure.

(13) It should be possible for the Commission to implement the budget indirectly through Member State organisations. For reasons of legal certainty, it is therefore appropriate to define a Member State organisation as an entity established in a Member State as a public-law body, or as a body governed by private law entrusted with a public-service mission and provided with adequate financial guarantees by that Member State. Financial backing provided to such private-law bodies by a Member State in accordance with existing requirements set out in Union law, in a form decided by that Member State and not necessarily requiring a bank guarantee, should be considered as adequate financial guarantees.

(14) For prizes, grants and contracts awarded following the opening-up of a public procedure to competition, and in particular for contests, calls for proposals and calls for tenders, in order to respect the principles of the TFEU and in particular the principles of transparency, proportionality, equal treatment and non-discrimination, the name and locality of the recipients of Union funds should be published. Such publication should contribute to the control of the award procedures by the unsuccessful applicants in the competition.

(15) Personal data referring to natural persons should not be publicly available for longer than the period during which the funds are being used by the recipient and should therefore be removed after two years. The same should apply to personal data referring to legal persons whose official name identifies one or more natural persons.

(16) In most of the cases covered by this Regulation, the publication concerns legal persons. Where natural persons are concerned, the publication of personal data should respect the principle of proportionality between the importance of the amount granted and the need to control the best use of the funds. In such cases, the publication of the region on level 2 of the common classification of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) is consistent with the objective of publication of information on recipients and ensures equal treatment between Member States of different sizes while respecting the recipients’ right to private life and, in particular, the protection of their personal data.

(17) For reasons of legal certainty and in accordance with the principle of proportionality, the situations in which publication should not take place should be specified. For example, information should not be published with regard to scholarships or other forms of direct support paid to natural persons most in need, to certain contracts with a very low value or to financial support below a certain threshold provided through financial instruments, or in cases where disclosure risks threatening the rights and freedoms of the individuals concerned as protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union or causing harm to the commercial interests of the recipients. For grants, however, there should be no special exemption from the obligation to publish information on the basis of a specific threshold, in order to maintain the current practice and to allow for transparency.

(18) Where personal data of recipients is published for the purposes of transparency in relation to the use of Union funds and the control of award procedures, those recipients should be informed of such publication, as well as of their rights and the procedures applicable for exercising those rights, in accordance with Regulations (EC) No 45/2001 (8) and (EU) 2016/679 (9) of the European Parliament and of the Council.

(19) In order to ensure that the principle of equal treatment is respected for all recipients, the information related to natural persons should also be published, in line with the obligation for Member States to establish a large degree of transparency for contracts above the thresholds laid down in Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (10).

(20) In the case of indirect and shared management, the persons, entities or designated bodies implementing Union funds should make available information on recipients and final recipients. In the case of shared management, the information should be published in accordance with sector-specific rules. The Commission should make available information about a single website, including a reference to its address, where the information on recipients and final recipients can be found.

(21) In the interest of increased readability and transparency of data on financial instruments implemented under direct and indirect management, it is appropriate to merge all reporting requirements into one single working document to be attached to the draft budget.

(22) In order to promote best practices in the implementation of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF), as well as the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), the Commission should, for information purposes, be able to make available to bodies responsible for management and control activities a non-binding methodological guide setting out its own control strategy and approach, including checklists, and examples of best practice. That guide should be updated whenever necessary.

(23) It is appropriate to provide for the possibility for Union institutions to conclude service-level agreements with each other in order to facilitate the implementation of their appropriations and also for the possibility to conclude such agreements between departments of Union institutions, Union bodies, European offices, bodies or persons entrusted with implementation of specific actions in the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) pursuant to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Office of the Secretary-General of the Board of Governors of the European schools for the provision of services, supply of products or execution of works or of building contracts.

(24) It is appropriate to lay down the procedure for setting up new European offices and to distinguish between obligatory and non-obligatory tasks of such offices. A possibility for Union institutions, Union bodies and other European offices to delegate the powers of the authorising officer to the director of a European office should be introduced. European offices should also have the possibility to conclude service-level agreements for the provision of services, supply of products or execution of works or of building contracts. It is appropriate to set out specific rules for the drawing-up of accounting records, provisions authorising the accounting officer of the Commission to delegate some of his or her tasks to staff in those offices and operating procedures for bank accounts which the Commission should be able to open in the name of a European office.

(25) In order to improve the cost-effectiveness of executive agencies and in light of the practical experience gained with other Union bodies, it should be possible to entrust the accounting officer of the Commission with all or part of the tasks of the accounting officer of the executive agency concerned.

(26) For reasons of legal certainty, it is necessary to clarify that directors of executive agencies act as authorising officers by delegation when managing operational appropriations of programmes delegated to their agencies. To achieve the full effect of efficiency gains resulting from a global centralisation of certain support services, the possibility for executive agencies to implement administrative expenditure should be explicitly provided for.

(27) It is necessary to establish rules on the powers and responsibilities of financial actors, in particular authorising officers and accounting officers.

(28) The European Parliament, the Council, the Court of Auditors and the accounting officer of the Commission should be informed of the appointment or termination of the duties of an authorising officer by delegation, internal auditor and accounting officer within two weeks of such appointment or termination.

(29) Authorising officers should be fully responsible for all revenue and expenditure operations executed under their authority, and for internal control systems, and should be held accountable for their actions, including, where necessary, through disciplinary proceedings.

(30) The tasks, responsibilities and principles of the procedures to be observed by the authorising officers should also be laid down. Authorising officers by delegation should ensure that the authorising officers by subdelegation and their staff receive information and training concerning the control standards and the respective methods and techniques and that measures are taken in order to ensure the functioning of the control system. The authorising officer by delegation should report to his or her Union institution on the performance of the duties in the form of an annual report. That report should include the required financial and management information to support that officer’s declaration of assurance on the performance of his or her duties, including the information on the overall performance of the operations carried out. The supporting documents relating to the operations carried out should be kept for at least five years. The various forms of negotiated procedure for the award of public contracts should be the subject of a special report from the authorising officer by delegation to the Union institution concerned and of a report from that Union institution to the European Parliament and to the Council, since those procedures represent derogations from the usual award procedures.

(31) The double role of Heads of Union delegations, and of their deputies in their absence, as authorising officers by subdelegation for the European External Action Service (EEAS) and, as regards operational appropriations, for the Commission should be taken into account.

(32) The delegation of powers of budget implementation by the Commission concerning the operational appropriations of its own section of the budget to the deputy Heads of Union delegations should be restricted to situations where the performance of those tasks by the deputy Heads of Union delegations is strictly necessary in order to ensure business continuity during the absence of Heads of Union delegations. The deputy Heads of Union delegations should not be allowed to exercise those powers on a systematic basis or for reasons of internal work division.

(33) The accounting officer should be responsible for the proper implementation of payments, the collection of revenue and the recovery of amounts receivable. The accounting officer should manage the treasury, bank accounts and third-party files, keep the accounts and be responsible for drawing up the financial statements of Union institutions. The accounting officer of the Commission should be the only person who is entitled to lay down the accounting rules and the harmonised charts of accounts, while the accounting officers of all other Union institutions should lay down accounting procedures applicable in their institutions.

(34) The arrangements for the appointment and termination of the duties of the accounting officer should also be established.

(35) The accounting officer should set up procedures to ensure that the accounts opened for the requirements of treasury management and imprest accounts are not in debit.

(36) The conditions for the use of imprest accounts, a system of management which constitutes an exception to normal budgetary procedures and only concerns limited amounts, should be laid down, and the tasks and responsibilities of the imprest administrators, as well as those of the authorising officer and the accounting officer in connection with the control of imprest accounts, should be set out. The Court of Auditors should be informed of any appointment of an imprest administrator. For reasons of efficiency, imprest accounts should be set up in Union delegations for appropriations from both the sections of the budget relating to the Commission and to the EEAS. It is also appropriate to allow, under specific conditions, for the use of imprest accounts in the Union delegation for payments of limited amounts by budgetary procedures. As regards the appointment of imprest administrators, it should be possible to select them also from personnel employed by the Commission in the field of crisis-management aid and humanitarian aid operations whenever there is no available Commission staff covered by the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the Union, laid down in Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 (11) (‘Staff Regulations’).

(37) In order to take into account the situation in the field of crisis-management aid and humanitarian aid operations whenever there are no Commission staff covered by the Staff Regulations available and the technical difficulties to have all legal commitments signed by the authorising officer responsible, it should be allowed for the personnel employed by the Commission in that field to enter into legal commitments of a very low value up to EUR 2 500 which are linked to the payments executed from imprest accounts, and for Heads of Union delegations or their deputies to enter into legal commitments on the instruction of the authorising officer responsible of the Commission.

(38) Once the tasks and responsibilities of financial actors have been defined, it is only possible to hold them liable under the conditions laid down in the Staff Regulations. Specialised financial irregularities panels have been set up in Union institutions pursuant to Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012. However, due to the limited number of cases submitted to them and for reasons of efficiency, it is appropriate to transfer their functions to an interinstitutional panel established pursuant to this Regulation (‘the panel’). The panel should be set up to assess requests and issue recommendations on the need to take decisions on exclusion and imposition of financial penalties referred to it by the Commission or other Union institutions and bodies, without prejudice to their administrative autonomy in respect of members of their staff. That transfer also aims to avoid duplication and to mitigate the risks of contradictory recommendations or opinions, in cases where both an economic operator and a member of staff of a Union institution or body are involved. It is necessary to maintain the procedure by which it is possible for an authorising officer to seek confirmation of an instruction which that officer considers to be irregular or contrary to the principle of sound financial management, and thus be released from any liability. The composition of the panel should be modified when it fulfils this role. The panel should have no investigative powers.

(39) As regards revenue, it is necessary to address negative adjustments of own resources covered by Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 (12). Except in the case of own resources, it is necessary to maintain the existing tasks and controls falling within the responsibility of the authorising officers at the different stages of the procedure: establishment of the estimate of amounts receivable, issuing of recovery orders, dispatch of the debit note informing the debtor that the amount receivable has been established and the decision, where necessary, to waive an entitlement subject to criteria guaranteeing compliance with sound financial management in order to ensure an efficient collection of revenue.

(40) The authorising officer should be able to waive totally or partially the recovery of an established amount receivable when the debtor has entered into any of the insolvency proceedings as defined in Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council (13), in particular in cases of judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings.

(41) Specific provisions on procedures for the adjustment or the reduction to zero of an estimate of the amount receivable should be laid down.

(42) It is necessary to clarify the timing of the entry in the budget of amounts received by way of fines, other penalties and sanctions, and of any accrued interest or other income generated by them.

(43) Due to the recent developments on the financial markets and the interest rate applied by the European Central Bank (ECB) to its principal refinancing operations, it is necessary to review the provisions concerning the interest rate for fines or other penalties and to provide for rules in the case of a negative interest rate.

(44) To reflect the specific nature of amounts receivable consisting in fines or other penalties imposed by Union institutions under the TFEU or the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (the Euratom Treaty), it is necessary to introduce specific provisions on the interest rates applicable to amounts due but not yet paid, in the event that such amounts are increased by the Court of Justice of the European Union.

(45) The rules on recovery should be both clarified and strengthened. In particular, it should be specified that the accounting officer is to recover amounts by offsetting them also against amounts owed to the debtor by an executive agency when it implements the budget.

(46) In order to guarantee legal certainty and transparency, rules regarding the deadlines within which a debit note is to be sent should be laid down.

(47) In order to secure the management of assets whilst also aiming at yielding a positive return, it is necessary to have amounts relating to fines, other penalties or sanctions imposed under the TFEU or the Euratom Treaty, such as competition fines which are being contested, provisionally collected and invested in financial assets, and to determine the assignment of the return on them. Since the Commission is not the only Union institution which is entitled to impose fines, other penalties or sanctions, it is necessary to lay down provisions concerning such fines, other penalties or sanctions imposed by other Union institutions and to lay down rules for their recovery which should be equivalent to those applicable to the Commission.

(48) In order to ensure that the Commission has all the necessary information for the adoption of financing decisions, it is necessary to lay down the minimum requirements for the contents of financing decisions on grants, procurement, Union trust funds for external actions (‘Union trust funds’), prizes, financial instruments, blending facilities or platforms and budgetary guarantees. At the same time, in order to give a longer-term perspective to the potential recipients, it is necessary to allow for financing decisions to be adopted for more than one financial year while specifying that the implementation is subject to the availability of budget appropriations for the respective financial years. Furthermore, it is necessary to reduce the number of the elements required for the financing decision. In line with the aim of simplification, the financing decision should at the same time constitute an annual or multiannual work programme. Since contributions to the Union bodies referred to in Articles 70 and 71 are already established in the budget, there should be no requirement to adopt a specific financing decision in that respect.

(49) As regards expenditure, the relationship between financing decisions, global budgetary commitments and individual budgetary commitments as well as the concepts of budgetary and legal commitment should be clarified in order to establish a clear framework for the different stages of budget implementation.

(50) In order to take into account in particular the number of legal commitments entered into by Union delegations and Union representations and the exchange-rate fluctuations experienced by them, provisional budgetary commitments should be possible also in cases where the final payee and the amount are known.

(51) As regards the typology of payments which it is possible for authorising officers to make, clarification of the various types of payments should be provided, in accordance with the principle of sound financial management. The rules for clearing of pre-financing payments should further be clarified, in particular for situations where no interim clearing is possible. To that effect, appropriate provisions should be included in legal commitments entered into.

(52) This Regulation should stipulate that payments are to be made within specified time limits and that, in the event of failure to respect such time limits, creditors will be entitled to default interests to be charged to the budget, except in the case of Member States, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Investment Fund (EIF).

(53) It is appropriate to integrate the provisions concerning validation and authorisation of expenditure in one article and to introduce a definition of ‘decommitments’. Since the transactions are carried out in computerised systems, the signing of a ‘passed for payment’ voucher in order to express the validation decision should be replaced by an electronically secured signature, except in a limited number of cases. It is also necessary to clarify that the validation of expenditure applies to all eligible costs, including, as is the case for the clearing of pre-financing, costs which are not associated with a payment request.

(54) In order to reduce complexity, streamline existing rules and improve the readability of this Regulation, rules common to more than one budget implementation instrument should be established. For those reasons, certain provisions should be regrouped, the wording and scope of other provisions should be aligned and unnecessary repetitions and cross-referencing should be removed.

(55) Each Union institution should establish an internal audit progress committee tasked with ensuring the independence of the internal auditor, monitoring the quality of the internal audit work and ensuring that internal and external audit recommendations are properly taken into account and followed up by its services. The composition of that internal audit progress committee should be decided by each Union institution, taking into account its organisational autonomy and the importance of independent expert advice.

(56) More emphasis should be put on performance and results of projects financed from the budget. It is thus appropriate to define an additional form of financing not linked to costs of the relevant operations in addition to the forms of Union contribution already well established (reimbursement of the eligible costs actually incurred, unit cost, lump sums and flat-rate financing). The additional form of financing should be based on the fulfilment of certain conditions ex ante or on the achievement of results measured by reference to previously set milestones or through performance indicators.

(57) Where the Commission carries out assessments of the operational and financial capacity of recipients of Union funds or of their systems and procedures, it should be able to rely on the assessments already conducted by itself, other entities or donors such as national agencies and international organisations, in order to avoid duplicating assessments of the same recipients. The possibility for cross-reliance on assessments conducted by other entities should be used where such assessments were made in compliance with conditions equivalent to those set out in this Regulation for the applicable method of implementation. Therefore, in order to foster cross-reliance on assessments among donors, the Commission should promote the recognition of internationally accepted standards or international best practices.

(58) It is also important to avoid situations in which recipients of Union funds are audited several times by different entities on the use of those funds. It should therefore be possible to rely on audits already carried out by independent auditors provided that there is sufficient evidence of their competence and independence and provided that the audit work is based on internationally accepted audit standards providing reasonable assurance, and that they have been conducted on the financial statements and reports setting out the use of the Union contribution. Such audits should then form the basis of the overall assurance on the use of Union funds. To that end, it is important to ensure that the report of the independent auditor and the related audit documentation is made available on request to the European Parliament, the Commission, the Court of Auditors and the audit authorities of Member States.

(59) For the purpose of relying on assessments and audits and in order to reduce the administrative burden on persons and entities receiving Union funds, it is important to ensure that any information already available at Union institutions, managing authorities or other bodies and entities implementing Union funds, is reused to avoid multiple requests to recipients or beneficiaries.

(60) In order to provide for a long-term cooperation mechanism with recipients, the possibility of signing financial framework partnership agreements should be provided for. Financial framework partnerships should be implemented through grants or through contribution agreements with persons and entities implementing Union funds. For that purpose, the minimum content of such contribution agreements should be specified. Financial framework partnerships should not unduly restrict access to Union funding.

(61) The conditions and procedures for suspending, terminating or reducing a Union contribution should be harmonised across the different budget implementation instruments such as grants, procurement, indirect management, prizes, etc. The grounds for such suspension, termination or reduction should be defined.

(62) This Regulation should establish standard periods for which documents relating to Union contributions should be kept by recipients so as to avoid divergent or disproportionate contractual requirements while still providing the Commission, the Court of Auditors and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) with sufficient time to obtain access to such data and documents and perform the ex post checks and audits. In addition, any person or entity receiving Union funds should be obliged to cooperate in the protection of the financial interests of the Union.

(63) In order to provide adequate information to participants and recipients and to ensure that they have the possibility to exercise their right of defence, participants and recipients should be allowed to submit their observations before adoption of any measure adversely affecting their rights and they should be informed of the means of redress available to them for challenging such a measure.

(64) In order to protect the financial interests of the Union, a single early-detection and exclusion system should be set up by the Commission.

(65) The early-detection and exclusion system should apply to participants, recipients, entities on whose capacity the candidate or tenderer intends to rely, subcontractors of a contractor, any person or entity receiving Union funds where the budget is implemented under indirect management, any person or entity receiving Union funds under financial instruments implemented under direct management, participants or recipients on which entities implementing the budget under shared management have provided information, and sponsors.

(66) It should be clarified that, where a decision to register a person or entity in the early-detection and exclusion system database is taken on the basis of an exclusion situation relating to a natural or legal person that is a member of the administrative, management or supervisory body of that person or entity, or that has powers of representation, decision or control with regard to that person or entity, or to a natural or legal person that assumes unlimited liability for the debts of that person or entity or to a natural person who is essential for the award or for the implementation of the legal commitment, the information registered in the database is to include the information concerning those persons.

(67) The decision on the exclusion of a person or entity from participation in award procedures or the imposition of a financial penalty on a person or entity and the decision on the publication of the related information should be taken by the authorising officers responsible, in light of their autonomy in administrative matters. In the absence of a final judgment or final administrative decision and in cases related to a serious breach of contract, the authorising officers responsible should take their decision on the basis of a preliminary classification in law, having regard to the recommendation of the panel. The panel should also assess the duration of an exclusion in cases where the duration has not been set by the final judgment or the final administrative decision.

(68) The role of the panel should be to ensure the coherent operation of the exclusion system. The panel should be composed of a standing chair, two representatives of the Commission and a representative of the requesting authorising officer.

(69) The preliminary classification in law does not prejudge the final assessment of the conduct of the person or entity concerned by the competent authorities of Member States under national law. The recommendation of the panel, as well as the decision of the authorising officer responsible, should therefore be reviewed following the notification of such a final assessment.

(70) A person or entity should be excluded by the authorising officer responsible where it has been established by a final judgment or a final administrative decision that the person or entity is guilty of grave professional misconduct, of non-compliance, whether intentional or not, with the obligations relating to the payment of social security contributions or taxes, of the creation of an entity in a different jurisdiction with the intent to circumvent fiscal, social or any other legal obligations, of fraud affecting the budget, of corruption, of conduct related to a criminal organisation, of money laundering or terrorist financing, of terrorist offences or offences linked to terrorist activities, of child labour or other offences concerning trafficking in human beings or of the commitment of an irregularity. A person or entity should also be excluded in the event of a serious breach of a legal commitment or of bankruptcy.

(71) When taking a decision on the exclusion of a person or entity, or the imposition of a financial penalty on a person or entity, and on the publication of the related information, the authorising officer responsible should ensure compliance with the principle of proportionality, in particular by taking into account the seriousness of the situation, its budgetary impact, the time which has elapsed since the relevant conduct, the duration of the conduct and its recurrence, whether the conduct was intentional or the degree of negligence shown and the degree of collaboration of the person or entity with the relevant competent authority and the contribution of that person or entity to the investigation.

(72) The authorising officer responsible should also be able to exclude a person or entity where a natural or legal person assuming unlimited liability for the debts of the economic operator is bankrupt or in a similar situation of insolvency or where that natural or legal person fails to comply with its obligations to pay social security contributions or taxes, where such situations have an impact on the financial situation of that economic operator.

(73) A person or entity should not be subject to a decision on exclusion when it has taken remedial measures, thus demonstrating its reliability. That possibility should not apply in cases of the most severe criminal activities.

(74) In light of the principle of proportionality, a distinction should be made between cases where it is possible to impose a financial penalty as an alternative to exclusion, on the one hand, and cases where the gravity of the conduct of the recipient concerned in respect of attempting to unduly obtain Union funds justifies the imposition of a financial penalty in addition to the exclusion so as to ensure a deterrent effect, on the other. The maximum amount of the financial penalty which can be imposed by the contracting authority should also be defined.

(75) A financial penalty should only be imposed on a recipient and not on a participant given that the amount of the financial penalty to be imposed is calculated on the basis of the value of the legal commitment at stake.

(76) The possibility to take decisions on exclusion or to impose financial penalties is independent from the possibility to apply contractual penalties, such as liquidated damages.

(77) The duration of an exclusion should be limited in time, as is the case under Directive 2014/24/EU, and should be in accordance with the principle of proportionality.

(78) It is necessary to determine the commencement date and the duration of the limitation period for taking decisions on exclusion or imposing financial penalties.

(79) It is important to be able to reinforce the deterrent effect achieved by the exclusion and the financial penalty. In that regard, the deterrent effect should be reinforced by the possibility to publish the information related to the exclusion and/or to the financial penalty in a manner that satisfies the data-protection requirements set out in Regulations (EC) No 45/2001 and (EU) No 2016/679. Such publication should contribute to ensuring that the same conduct is not repeated. For reasons of legal certainty and in accordance with the principle of proportionality it should be specified in which situations a publication should not take place. In its assessment, the authorising officer responsible should have regard to any recommendation of the panel. As far as natural persons are concerned, personal data should only be published in exceptional circumstances justified by the seriousness of the conduct or its impact on the financial interests of the Union.

(80) Information related to an exclusion or to a financial penalty should only be published in certain cases such as grave professional misconduct, fraud, a significant deficiency in complying with the main obligations of a legal commitment financed by the budget, or an irregularity, or where an entity is created in a different jurisdiction with the intent to circumvent fiscal, social or any other legal obligations.

(81) The criteria for exclusion should be clearly separated from the criteria leading to a possible rejection from an award procedure.

(82) The information on the early detection of risks and on decisions on exclusion and the imposition of financial penalties on a person or entity should be centralised. For that purpose, related information should be stored in a database set up and operated by the Commission as the owner of the centralised system. That system should operate in compliance with the right to privacy and the protection of personal data.

(83) While the setting-up and the operation of the early-detection and exclusion system should be the responsibility of the Commission, other Union institutions and bodies, as well as all persons and entities implementing Union funds under direct, shared and indirect management, should participate in that system by transmitting relevant information to the Commission. The authorising officer responsible and the panel should guarantee the right of defence of the person or entity. The same right should be given to a person or entity, in the context of an early detection, where an act envisaged by an authorising officer could adversely affect the rights of the person or entity concerned. In cases of fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union which are not yet subject to a final judgment, it should be possible for the authorising officer responsible to defer the notification of the person or entity and for the panel to defer the right of the person or entity to submit its observations. Such deferral should only be justified where there are compelling legitimate grounds to preserve the confidentiality of the investigation or of national judicial proceedings.

(84) The Court of Justice of the European Union should be given unlimited jurisdiction with regard to decisions on exclusion and financial penalties imposed pursuant to this Regulation, in accordance with Article 261 TFEU.

(85) In order to facilitate the protection of the financial interests of the Union across all methods of budget implementation, it should be possible for the persons and entities involved in budget implementation under shared and indirect management to take into account, as appropriate, exclusions decided upon by the authorising officers at Union level.

(86) This Regulation should foster the objective of e-government, in particular the use of electronic data in the exchange of information between Union institutions and third parties.

(87) Progress towards the electronic exchange of information and the electronic submission of documents, including e-procurement, where appropriate, which constitute a major simplification measure, should be accompanied by clear conditions for the acceptance of the systems to be used, so as to establish a legally sound environment while preserving flexibility in the management of Union funds for the participants, recipients and the authorising officers as provided for in this Regulation.

(88) Rules on the composition and tasks of the committee in charge of evaluating application documents in procurement procedures, grant award procedures and in contests for prizes should be laid down. It should be possible for the committee to include external experts where that possibility is provided for in the basic act.

(89) In line with the principle of good administration, the authorising officer should request clarifications or missing documents while respecting the principle of equality of treatment and without substantially changing the application documents. The authorising officer should have the possibility to decide not to do so only in duly justified cases. In addition, the authorising officer should be able to correct an obvious clerical error or request the participant to correct it.

(90) Sound financial management should require that the Commission protects itself by requesting guarantees at the time of paying pre-financing. The requirement for contractors and beneficiaries to lodge guarantees should not be automatic, but should be based on a risk analysis. Where, in the course of implementation, the authorising officer discovers that a guarantor is not or is no longer authorised to issue guarantees in accordance with the applicable national law, the authorising officer should be able to require replacement of the guarantee.

(91) The different sets of rules for direct and indirect management, in particular as regards the concept of ‘budget implementation tasks’, have created confusion and entailed risks of errors of qualification both for the Commission and for its partners and should thus be simplified and harmonised.

(92) The provisions on the ex ante pillar assessment of persons and entities implementing Union funds under indirect management should be revised to enable the Commission to rely as much as possible on the systems, rules and procedures of those persons and entities which have been deemed equivalent to the ones used by the Commission. In addition, it is important to clarify that, where the assessment reveals areas in which the procedures in place are not sufficient to protect the financial interests of the Union, the Commission should be able to sign contribution agreements while taking appropriate supervisory measures. It is also important to clarify in which cases it is possible for the Commission to decide not to require an ex ante pillar assessment in order to sign contribution agreements.

(93) Remuneration of persons and entities implementing the budget should, where relevant and possible, be performance-based.

(94) The Commission enters into partnerships with third countries by means of financing agreements. It is important to clarify the content of such financing agreements, in particular for those parts of an action that are implemented by the third country under indirect management.

(95) It is important to recognise the specific nature of blending facilities or platforms where the Commission blends its contribution with that of finance institutions and to clarify the application of the provisions on financial instruments and budgetary guarantees.

(96) Procurement rules and principles applicable to public contracts awarded by Union institutions on their own account should be based on the rules set out in Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (14) and Directive 2014/24/EU.

(97) In the case of mixed contracts, the methodology of the contracting authorities for determining the applicable rules should be clarified.

(98) The ex ante and ex post publicity measures necessary to launch a procurement procedure should be clarified for contracts equal to or greater than the thresholds set out in Directive 2014/24/EU, for contracts below those thresholds and for contracts falling outside the scope of that Directive.

(99) This Regulation should include an exhaustive list of all the procurement procedures available to Union institutions regardless of the thresholds.

(100) In the interests of administrative simplification and in order to encourage the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), negotiated procedures for middle-value contracts should be provided for.

(101) As is the case in Directive 2014/24/EU, this Regulation should allow for market consultation prior to the launch of a procurement procedure. In order to ensure that an innovation partnership is used only when the desired works, supplies and services do not exist on the market or as a near-to-market development activity, an obligation to carry out such preliminary market consultation before using an innovation partnership should be laid down in this Regulation.

(102) The contribution of contracting authorities to the protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable development, while ensuring that they obtain the best value for money for their contracts, in particular through requiring specific labels or through the use of appropriate award methods, should be clarified.

(103) In order to ensure that, when executing contracts, economic operators comply with the applicable environmental, social and labour law obligations established by Union law, national law, collective agreements or the international social and environmental conventions listed in Annex X to Directive 2014/24/EU, such obligations should be part of the minimum requirements defined by the contracting authority and should be integrated in the contracts signed by the contracting authority.

(104) It is appropriate that different cases usually referred to as situations of conflict of interests be identified and treated distinctly. The notion of a ‘conflict of interests’ should be solely used for cases where a person or entity with responsibilities for budget implementation, audit or control, or an official or an agent of a Union institution or national authorities at any level, is in such a situation. Attempts to unduly influence an award procedure or obtain confidential information should be treated as grave professional misconduct which can lead to the rejection from the award procedure and/or exclusion from Union funds. In addition, economic operators might be in a situation where they should not be selected to implement a contract because of a professional conflicting interest. For instance, a company should not evaluate a project in which it has participated or an auditor should not be in a position to audit accounts it has previously certified.

(105) In accordance with Directive 2014/24/EU, it should be possible to verify whether an economic operator is excluded, to apply selection and award criteria, as well as to verify compliance with the procurement documents in any order. As a result, it should be possible to reject tenders on the basis of award criteria without a prior check of the corresponding tenderer with regard to exclusion or selection criteria.

(106) Contracts should be awarded on the basis of the most economically advantageous tender in line with Article 67 of Directive 2014/24/EU.

(107) In the interests of legal certainty, it is necessary to clarify that the selection criteria are strictly linked to the evaluation of candidates or tenderers and that the award criteria are strictly linked to the evaluation of the tenders. In particular, the qualifications and experience of staff assigned to perform the contract should only be used as a selection criterion and not as an award criterion, as this would introduce a risk of overlap and double evaluation of the same element. Furthermore, if such qualifications and experience were used as an award criterion, any change in the staff assigned to perform the contract, even where justified through illness or a change in position, would call into question the conditions under which the contract was awarded and thereby create legal uncertainty.

(108) Union procurement should ensure that Union funds are used in an effective, transparent and appropriate way, while reducing administrative burden on recipients of Union funds. In that regard, e-procurement should contribute to the better use of Union funds and enhance access to contracts for all economic operators. All Union institutions conducting procurement should publish clear rules on their websites regarding acquisition, expenditure and monitoring, as well as all contracts awarded, including the value thereof.

(109) The existence of an opening phase and an evaluation for any procedure should be clarified. An award decision should always be the outcome of an evaluation.

(110) When notified of the outcome of a procedure, candidates and tenderers should be informed of the grounds on which the decision was taken and should receive a detailed statement of reasons based on the content of the evaluation report.

(111) Given that criteria are applied in no particular order, rejected tenderers who submitted compliant tenders should receive information on the characteristics and the relative advantages of the successful tender if they so request.

(112) For framework contracts with reopening of competition, there should be no obligation to provide information on the characteristics and the relative advantages of the successful tender to an unsuccessful contractor, on the basis that the receipt of such information by parties to the same framework contract each time a competition is reopened might prejudice fair competition between them.

(113) A contracting authority should be able to cancel a procurement procedure before the contract is signed, without the candidates or tenderers being entitled to claim compensation. This should be without prejudice to situations where the contracting authority has acted in such a way that it is possible to hold it liable for damages in accordance with the general principles of Union law.

(114) As is the case in Directive 2014/24/EU, it is necessary to clarify the conditions under which it is possible to modify a contract during its performance without a new procurement procedure. In particular, a new procurement procedure should not be required in the event of administrative changes, universal succession and application of clear and unequivocal revision clauses or options that do not alter the minimum requirements of the initial procedure. A new procurement procedure should be required in the case of material modifications to the initial contract, in particular to the scope and content of the mutual rights and obligations of the parties, including as regards the distribution of intellectual property rights. Such modifications demonstrate the parties’ intention to renegotiate the essential terms or conditions of that contract, in particular if the modifications would have had an influence on the outcome of the procedure had the modified terms or conditions been part of the initial procedure.

(115) It is necessary to provide for the option of requiring a performance guarantee in relation to works, supplies and complex services in order to guarantee compliance with substantial contractual obligations and to ensure proper performance throughout the duration of the contract. It is also necessary to provide for the option of requiring a retention money guarantee to cover the contract liability period, in line with customary practice in the sectors concerned.

(116) In order to determine the applicable thresholds and procedures, it is necessary to clarify whether Union institutions, executive agencies and Union bodies are deemed to be contracting authorities. They should not be deemed to be contracting authorities in cases where they purchase from a central purchasing body. In addition, Union institutions form a single legal entity and their departments cannot conclude contracts, but only service-level agreements, between themselves.

(117) It is appropriate to include a reference in this Regulation to the two thresholds set out in Directive 2014/24/EU applicable to works and to supplies and services, respectively. Those thresholds should also be applicable to concession contracts for reasons of simplification, as well as sound financial management, considering the specificities of the contracting needs of Union institutions. The revision of those thresholds as provided for in Directive 2014/24/EU should therefore be directly applicable to procurement under this Regulation.

(118) For harmonisation and simplification purposes, the standard procedures applicable to procurement should also be applied to purchases provided for under the light regime for contracts for social and other specific services referred to in Article 74 of Directive 2014/24/EU. Therefore, the threshold for light regime purchases should be aligned with the threshold for service contracts.

(119) It is necessary to clarify the conditions of application of the standstill period to be observed before signing a contract or framework contract.

(120) The rules applicable to procurement in the field of external actions should be consistent with the principles laid down in Directives 2014/23/EU and 2014/24/EU.

(121) In order to reduce complexity, streamline existing rules and improve the readability of the procurement rules, it is necessary to regroup the general provisions on procurement and the specific provisions applicable to procurement in the field of external actions and to remove unnecessary repetitions and cross-referencing.

(122) It is necessary to clarify which economic operators have access to procurement under this Regulation depending on their place of establishment and to provide explicitly for the possibility of such access also for international organisations.

(123) In order to achieve a balance between the need for transparency and greater coherence of procurement rules on the one hand, and the need to provide flexibility on certain technical aspects of those rules on the other, the technical rules on procurement should be set out in an annex to this Regulation and the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of amendments to that Annex.

(124) It is necessary to clarify the scope of the Title on grants, particularly with regard to the type of action or body eligible for a grant, as well as with regard to legal commitments that can be used to cover grants. In particular, grant decisions should be phased out due to their limited use and the progressive introduction of e-grants. The structure should be simplified by moving the provisions on instruments which are not grants to other parts of this Regulation. The nature of bodies which can receive operating grants should be clarified by no longer referring to bodies pursuing an aim of general Union interest since those bodies are covered by the notion of bodies having an objective forming part of and supporting a Union policy.

(125) In order to simplify procedures and improve the readability of this Regulation, provisions related to the content of the grant application, of the call for proposals and of the grant agreement should be simplified and streamlined.

(126) In order to facilitate the implementation of actions financed by multiple donors where the overall financing of the action is not known at the time of commitment of the Union contribution, it is necessary to clarify the way the Union contribution is defined and the method of verifying its use.

(127) Experience gained in the use of lump sums, unit costs or flat-rate financing has shown that such forms of financing significantly simplify administrative procedures and substantially reduce the risk of error. Regardless of the field of Union intervention, lump sums, unit costs and flat rates are suitable forms of financing, in particular for standardised and recurrent actions, such as mobility or training activities. Moreover, as institutional cooperation between public administrations of Member States and of beneficiary or partner countries (institutional twinning) is implemented by Member State institutions, the use of simplified cost options is justified and should foster their engagement. In the interest of increased efficiency, Member States and other recipients of Union funds should be able to make more frequent use of simplified cost options. In this context, the conditions for using lump sums, unit costs and flat rates should be made more flexible. It is necessary to provide explicitly for the establishment of single lump sums covering the entire eligible costs of the action or the work programme. In addition, in order to foster focus on results, priority should be given to output-based funding. Input-based lump sums, unit costs and flat rates should remain an option where output-based ones are not possible or appropriate.

(128) The administrative procedures for authorising lump sums, unit costs and flat rates should be simplified by vesting the power for such authorisation in the authorising officers responsible. Where appropriate, such authorisation can be given by the Commission in light of the nature of the activities or of the expenditure or in light of the number of authorising officers concerned.

(129) In order to bridge the gap in the availability of data used to establish lump sums, unit costs and flat rates, the use of an expert judgement should be allowed.

(130) While the potential of more frequent use of simplified forms of financing should be realised, compliance with the principle of sound financial management, and in particular the principles of economy, efficiency and no double funding, should be ensured. For that purpose, simplified forms of financing should ensure that the resources employed are adequate to the objectives to be achieved, that the same costs are not financed more than once from the budget, that the co-financing principle is respected and that overall overcompensation of recipients is avoided. Therefore, simplified forms of financing should be based on statistical or accounting data, similar objective means or expert judgement. In addition, suitable checks, controls and periodic assessments should continue to apply.

(131) The scope of checks and controls as opposed to the periodic assessments of lump sums, unit costs or flat rates should be clarified. Those checks and controls should focus on the fulfilment of the conditions triggering the payment of lump sums, unit costs or flat-rates, including, where required, the achievement of outputs and/or results. Those conditions should not require reporting on the costs actually incurred by the beneficiary. Where the amounts of lump sums, unit costs or flat-rate financing have been determined ex ante by the authorising officer responsible or by the Commission they should not be challenged by ex post controls. This should not prevent the reduction of a grant in the event of poor, partial or late implementation or of irregularity, fraud or a breach of other obligations. In particular, a grant should be reduced where the conditions triggering the payment of lump sums, unit costs or flat rates have not been fulfilled. The frequency and scope of the periodic assessment should depend on the evolution and the nature of the costs, in particular taking into account substantial changes in market prices and other relevant circumstances. The periodic assessment could lead to adjustments of the lump sums, unit costs or flat rates applicable to future agreements, but should not be used for questioning the value of the lump sums, unit costs or flat rates already agreed upon. The periodic assessment of lump sums, unit costs or flat rates might require access to the accounts of the beneficiary for statistical and methodological purposes and such access is also necessary for fraud-prevention and detection purposes.

(132) In order to facilitate the participation of small organisations in the implementation of the Union policies in an environment of limited availability of resources, it is necessary to recognise the value of the work provided by volunteers as eligible costs. As a result, such organisations should be able to rely to a greater extent on volunteers’ work for the sake of providing co-financing to the action or the work programme. Without prejudice to the maximum co-financing rate specified in the basic act, in such cases, the Union grant should be limited to the estimated eligible costs other than those covering volunteers’ work. As volunteers’ work is a work provided by third parties without a remuneration being paid to them by the beneficiary, the limitation avoids reimbursing costs which the beneficiary did not incur. In addition, the value of the volunteers’ work should not exceed 50 % of the in-kind contributions and any other co-financing.

(133) In order to protect one of the fundamental principles of public finances, the no-profit principle should be retained in this Regulation.

(134) In principle, grants should be awarded following a call for proposals. Where exceptions are allowed, they should be interpreted and applied restrictively in terms of scope and duration. The exceptional possibility to award grants without a call for proposals to bodies with a de facto or de jure monopoly should only be used where the bodies concerned are the only ones capable of implementing the relevant types of activities or have been vested with such a monopoly by law or by a public authority.

(135) In the framework of moving towards e-grants and e-procurement, applicants and tenderers should be asked to provide a proof of their legal status and financial viability only once within a specific period and should not be required to resubmit supporting documents in each award procedure. It is therefore necessary to align the requirements for the number of years for which documents will be requested under grant award procedures and procurement procedures.

(136) As a valuable type of financial support not related to predictable costs, the use of prizes should be facilitated and the applicable rules should be clarified. Prizes should be seen as complementing, not substituting, other funding instruments such as grants.

(137) In order to allow for the more flexible implementation of prizes, the obligation under Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 to publish contests for prizes with a unit value of EUR 1 000 000 or more in the statements accompanying the draft budget should be replaced by an obligation to submit prior information to the European Parliament and to the Council and to explicitly mention such prizes in the financing decision.

(138) Prizes should be awarded in accordance with the principles of transparency and equal treatment. In that context, the minimum characteristics of contests should be laid down, in particular the arrangements for paying the prize to the winners after its award, and the appropriate means of publication It is also necessary to establish a clearly defined award procedure, from submission of the applications to the provision of information to applicants and notification of the winning applicant, which mirrors the grant award procedure.

(139) This Regulation should lay down the principles and conditions applicable to financial instruments, budgetary guarantees and financial assistance and the rules on the limitation of the financial liability of the Union, the fight against fraud and money laundering, the winding down of financial instruments and reporting.

(140) In recent years the Union has increasingly used financial instruments that allow a higher leverage of the budget to be achieved but, at the same time, they generate a financial risk for the budget. Those financial instruments include not only the financial instruments covered by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012, but also other instruments, such as budgetary guarantees and financial assistance, that previously have been governed only by the rules established in their respective basic acts. It is important to establish a common framework to ensure the homogeneity of the principles applicable to that set of instruments and to regroup them under a new Title in this Regulation, comprising sections on budgetary guarantees and on financial assistance to Member States or third countries in addition to the existing rules applicable to financial instruments.

(141) Financial instruments and budgetary guarantees can be valuable in multiplying the effect of Union funds when those funds are pooled with other funds and include a leverage effect. Financial instruments and budgetary guarantees should only be implemented if there is no risk of distortion of competition in the internal market or inconsistency with State aid rules.

(142) Within the framework of the annual appropriations authorised by the European Parliament and by the Council for a given programme, financial instruments and budgetary guarantees should be used on the basis of an ex ante evaluation demonstrating that they are effective for the achievement of the policy objectives of the Union.

(143) Financial instruments, budgetary guarantees and financial assistance should be authorised by means of a basic act. Where in duly justified cases financial instruments are established without a basic act, they should be authorised by the European Parliament and by the Council in the budget.

(144) The instruments that potentially fall under Title X, such as loans, guarantees, equity investments, quasi-equity investment and risk-sharing instruments, should be defined. The definition of ‘risk-sharing instruments’ should allow for the inclusion of credit enhancements for project bonds, covering the debt service risk of a project and mitigating the credit risk of bond holders through credit enhancements in the form of a loan or a guarantee.

(145) Any repayment from a financial instrument or budgetary guarantee should be used for the instrument or guarantee which produced the repayment with a view to enhancing the efficiency of that instrument or guarantee, unless otherwise specified in the basic act, and should be taken into account when proposing future appropriations to that instrument or guarantee.

(146) It is appropriate to recognise the alignment of interests in pursuing policy objectives of the Union and, in particular, that the EIB and the EIF have the specific expertise to implement financial instruments and budgetary guarantees.

(147) The EIB and the EIF, acting as a group, should have the possibility to transfer part of the implementation to each other, where such transfer might benefit the implementation of a given action and as further defined in the relevant agreement with the Commission.

(148) It should be clarified that, where financial instruments or budgetary guarantees are combined with ancillary forms of support from the budget, the rules on financial instruments and budgetary guarantees should apply to the whole measure. Such rules should be complemented, where applicable, by specific requirements set out in the sector-specific rules.

(149) The implementation of financial instruments and budgetary guarantees financed by the budget should adhere to the Union policy on non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes, and updates thereto, as laid down in relevant legal acts of the Union and in Council conclusions, in particular the Council conclusions of 8 November 2016 on the criteria for and process leading to the establishment of the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (15) and the Annex thereto, as well as the Council conclusions of 5 December 2017 on the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (16) and the Annexes thereto.

(150) Budgetary guarantees and financial assistance to Member States or third countries are generally off-budget operations that have a significant impact on the balance sheet of the Union. While remaining generally off-budget operations, their inclusion in this Regulation provides a stronger protection of the financial interests of the Union and a clearer framework for their authorisation, management and accounting.

(151) The Union has recently launched important initiatives based on budgetary guarantees such as the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) or the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD). The characteristics of those instruments are that they generate a contingent liability for the Union and imply the provisioning of funds to make available a liquidity cushion that allows the budget to respond in an orderly manner to the payment obligations that might arise from those contingent liabilities. In order to guarantee the credit rating of the Union and, hence, its capacity to deliver effective financing, it is essential that the authorisation, provisioning and monitoring of contingent liabilities follow a robust set of rules that should be applied to all budgetary guarantees.

(152) The contingent liabilities arising from budgetary guarantees can cover a wide range of financing and investment operations. The possibility of a budgetary guarantee being called cannot be scheduled with full certainty on a yearly basis as in the case of loans that have a defined schedule for repayment. It is, therefore, indispensable to set up a framework for the authorisation and monitoring of contingent liabilities ensuring full respect, at any moment, for the ceiling for annual payment appropriations set out in Council Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom (17).

(153) That framework should also provide for management and control, including regular reporting on the financial exposure of the Union. The rate of provisioning of financial liabilities should be set on the basis of a proper risk assessment of the financial risks arising from the related instrument. The sustainability of the contingent liabilities should be assessed annually in the context of the budgetary procedure. An early warning mechanism should be established to avoid a shortage of provisions to cover financial liabilities.

(154) The increasing use of financial instruments, budgetary guarantees and financial assistance requires a significant volume of payment appropriations to be mobilised and provisioned. In order to deliver leverage while ensuring an adequate level of protection against financial liabilities, it is important to optimise the amount of provisioning required and to achieve efficiency gains by pooling those provisions into a common provisioning fund. In addition, the more flexible use of those pooled provisions permits an effective global provisioning rate that delivers the protection requested with an optimised amount of resources.

(155) In order to ensure the proper functioning of the common provisioning fund for the post-2020 programming period, the Commission should, by 30 June 2019, submit an independent external evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of entrusting the financial management of the assets of the common provisioning fund to the Commission, to the EIB, or to a combination of the two, taking into account the relevant technical and institutional criteria used in comparing asset management services, including the technical infrastructure, comparison of costs for the services given, institutional set-up, reporting, performance, accountability and expertise of each institution and the other asset management mandates for the budget. The evaluation should be accompanied, where appropriate, by a legislative proposal.

(156) The rules applicable to provisioning and to the common provisioning fund should provide a solid internal control framework. The guidelines applicable to the management of the resources in the common provisioning fund should be established by the Commission after having consulted the accounting officer of the Commission. The authorising officers of the financial instruments, budgetary guarantees or financial assistance should actively monitor the financial liabilities under their responsibility and the financial manager of the resources of the common provisioning fund should manage the cash and the assets in the fund following the rules and procedures set out by the accounting officer of the Commission.

(157) Budgetary guarantees and financial assistance should follow the same set of principles established for financial instruments. Budgetary guarantees, in particular, should be irrevocable, unconditional and on demand. They should be implemented under indirect management or, only in exceptional cases, under direct management. They should only cover financing and investment operations and their counterparts should contribute their own resources to the operations covered.

(158) Financial assistance to Member States or third countries should take the form of a loan, of a credit line or any other instrument deemed appropriate to ensure the effectiveness of the support. To that end, the Commission should be empowered in the relevant basic act to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions, avoiding the involvement of the Union in any transformation of maturities that would expose it to an interest risk or to any other commercial risk.

(159) The provisions related to financial instruments should apply as soon as possible in order to achieve the simplification and effectiveness sought. The provisions related to the budgetary guarantees and to financial assistance, as well as to the common provisioning fund, should apply as from the post-2020 multiannual financial framework. That calendar will allow a thorough preparation of the new tools for managing contingent liabilities. It will also permit an alignment between the principles set out in Title X and, on the one hand, the proposal for the post-2020 multiannual financial framework and, on the other hand, the specific programmes related to that framework.

(160) Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (18) lays down rules for, inter alia, the funding of political parties and political foundations at European level, in particular with regard to funding conditions, the award and distribution of funding, donations and contributions, financing of campaigns for elections to the European Parliament, reimbursable expenditure, the prohibition of certain funding, accounts, reporting and audit, implementation and control, penalties, cooperation between the Authority for European political parties and foundations, the Authorising Officer of the European Parliament and Member States, and transparency.

(161) Rules should be included in this Regulation on contributions from the budget to European political parties as envisaged by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014.

(162) The financial support given to European political parties should take the form of a specific contribution, to match the specific needs of those parties.

(163) Although financial support is awarded without an annual work programme being required, European political parties should justify ex post the sound use of Union funding. In particular, the authorising officer responsible should verify if the funding has been used to pay reimbursable expenditure as established in the call for contributions within the time limits laid down in this Regulation. Contributions to European political parties should be spent by the end of the financial year following that of their award, after which, any unspent funding should be recovered by the authorising officer responsible.

(164) Union funding awarded to finance the operating costs of European political parties should not be used for other purposes than those established in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014, in particular to directly or indirectly finance third parties such as national political parties. European political parties should use the contributions to pay a percentage of current and future expenditure and not expenditure or debts incurred before the submission of their applications for contributions.

(165) The award of contributions should also be simplified and adapted to the specificities of European political parties, in particular by the absence of selection criteria, the establishment of a single full pre-financing payment as a general rule, and by the possibility to use lump sums, flat-rate financing and unit costs.

(166) The contributions from the budget should be suspended, reduced or terminated if European political parties infringe Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014.

(167) Penalties that are based both on this Regulation and on Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 should be imposed in a coherent way and should respect the principle of ne bis in idem. In accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014, administrative and/or financial penalties provided for by this Regulation are not to be imposed in one of the cases for which penalties have already been imposed on the basis of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014.

(168) This Regulation should establish a general framework under which budget support can be used as an instrument in the field of external actions including the obligation for the third country to provide the Commission with adequate and timely information to evaluate the fulfilment of the agreed conditions and provisions ensuring the protection of the financial interests of the Union.

(169) In order to reinforce the role of the European Parliament and of the Council, the procedure for establishing Union trust funds should be clarified. It is also necessary to specify the principles applicable to the contributions to Union trust funds, in particular the importance of securing contributions from other donors which justify their establishment with regard to added value. It is also necessary to clarify the responsibilities of the financial actors and of the board of the Union trust fund and to define rules ensuring a fair representation of the participating donors on the board of the Union trust fund and a mandatory vote in favour by the Commission for the use of the funds. It is also important to set out in more detail the reporting requirements applicable to Union trust funds.

(170) In line with the streamlining of the existing rules and in order to avoid undue repetition, the special provisions set out in Part Two of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012, applicable to the EAGF, to research, to external actions and to specific Union funds, should only be introduced in the relevant parts of this Regulation, provided that the provisions are still used and relevant.

(171) The provisions on the presentation of accounts and accounting should be simplified and clarified. It is therefore appropriate to group together all provisions on annual accounts and other financial reporting.

(172) The manner in which Union institutions currently report on building projects to the European Parliament and to the Council should be improved. Union institutions should be allowed to finance new building projects with the revenue received for buildings already sold. Consequently, a reference to the provisions on internal assigned revenue should be introduced in the provisions on building projects. This would allow meeting the changing needs in the building policy of Union institutions, while saving costs and introducing more flexibility.

(173) In order to adapt the rules applicable to certain Union bodies, the detailed rules on procurement and the detailed conditions and the minimum ratio for the effective provisioning rate, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of the framework financial regulation for bodies set up under the TFEU and the Euratom Treaty, the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies, amendments to Annex I to this Regulation, the detailed conditions and methodology for the calculation of the effective provisioning rate and the amendment of the defined minimum ratio of the effective provisioning rate, which should not be set at a level lower than 85 %. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

(174) In order to ensure that the European Union Programme for Employment and Social Innovation (EaSI), established by Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (19), swiftly provides adequate resources to support changing political priorities, the indicative shares for each of the three axes and the minimum percentages for each of the thematic priorities within each axis should allow for a greater flexibility, while maintaining an ambitious deployment rate for EURES cross-border partnerships. This should improve the management of EaSI and allow for the focusing of budgetary resources on actions that produce better employment and social results.

(175) In order to facilitate investments in cultural and sustainable tourism infrastructure, without prejudice to the application of legal acts of the Union in the environmental field, in particular Directives 2001/42/EC (20) and 2011/92/EU (21) of the European Parliament and of the Council, as appropriate, certain restrictions as regards the scope of support under Regulation (EU) No 1301/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (22) for such investments should be clarified. It is therefore necessary to introduce clear restrictions as regards limiting the scale of the contribution of the ERDF to such investments from 2 August 2018.

(176) In order to respond to the challenges posed by increasing flows of migrants and refugees, the objectives to which the ERDF can contribute in its support of migrants and refugees should be spelled out with a view to enabling Member States to provide investments focusing on legally staying third-country nationals, including applicants for asylum and beneficiaries of international protection.

(177) With a view to facilitating the implementation of operations under Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (23), the scope of potential beneficiaries should be enlarged. Therefore, it should be allowed for managing authorities to consider natural persons as beneficiaries and a more flexible definition of beneficiaries in the context of State aid should be set out.

(178) As a matter of practice, macroregional strategies are agreed upon the adoption of Council conclusions. As the case has been since the entry into force of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013, such conclusions can, where appropriate, be endorsed by the European Council, taking into account the powers of that institution laid down in Article 15 TEU. The definition of ‘macroregional strategies’ set out in that Regulation should therefore be amended accordingly.

(179) With a view to ensuring sound financial management of the ERDF, the ESF, the Cohesion Fund, the EAFRD and the EMFF (‘the European Structural and Investment Funds’ – ‘ESI Funds’) which are implemented under shared management, and to clarify Member States’ obligations, the general principles set out in Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 should refer to the principles set out in this Regulation concerning internal control of budget implementation and avoidance of conflicts of interests.

(180) With a view to maximising the synergies between all Union funds to address the challenges of migration and asylum in an effective way, it should be ensured that, when the thematic objectives are translated into priorities in the Fund-specific rules, such priorities cover the appropriate use of each ESI Fund for those areas. Where appropriate, coordination with the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund should be ensured.

(181) In order to ensure coherence of programming arrangements, an alignment between Partnership Agreements and the amendments of programmes approved by the Commission in the preceding calendar year should be carried out once per year.

(182) In order to facilitate the preparation and implementation of community-led local development strategies, the lead Fund should be allowed to cover preparatory, running and animation costs.

(183) In order to facilitate the implementation of community-led local development and integrated territorial investments, the roles and responsibilities of local action groups as regards community-led local development strategies, and of local authorities, regional development bodies or non-governmental organisations as regards integrated territorial investments (ITIs), in relation to other programme bodies should be clarified. Designation as an intermediate body in accordance with the Fund-specific rules should only be required in cases where the relevant bodies carry out additional tasks that fall under the responsibility of the managing or certifying authority or of the paying agency.

(184) Managing authorities should have the possibility to implement financial instruments through a direct award of a contract to the EIB and to international financial institutions.

(185) Many Member States have established publicly-owned banks or institutions that operate under a public policy mandate to promote economic development activities. Such publicly-owned banks or institutions have specific characteristics which differentiate them from private commercial banks in relation to their ownership, their development mandate and the fact that they do not primarily focus on maximising profits. The primary role of such publicly-owned banks or institutions is to mitigate market failures where in certain regions or for certain policy areas or sectors financial services are underprovided by commercial banks. Those publicly-owned banks or institutions are well-placed to promote access to the ESI Funds while maintaining competitive neutrality. Their specific role and characteristics can allow Member States to increase the use of financial instruments in order to maximise the impact of the ESI Funds in the real economy. Such an outcome would be in line with the Commission policy to facilitate the role of such publicly-owned banks or institutions as fund managers both in the implementation of ESI Funds as well as in the combination of the ESI Funds with EFSI financing, as set out in particular in the Investment Plan for Europe. Without prejudice to contracts already awarded for the implementation of financial instruments in compliance with applicable law, it is justified to clarify that it is possible for managing authorities to award contracts directly to such publicly-owned banks or institutions. Nevertheless, in order to ensure that the possibility of direct award remains consistent with the principles of the internal market, strict conditions to be fulfilled by publicly-owned banks or institutions should be laid down. Such conditions should include that there is to be no direct private-capital participation, with the exception of non-controlling and non-blocking forms of private-capital participation in line with the requirements set out in Directive 2014/24/EU. Moreover, and strictly limited to the scope of application of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013, a publicly-owned bank or institution should also be allowed to implement financial instruments where the private-capital participation confers no influence on decisions regarding the day-to-day management of the financial instrument supported by the ESI Funds.

(186) In order to maintain the possibility for the ERDF and EAFRD to contribute to joint uncapped guarantee and securitisation financial instruments in favour of SMEs, it is necessary to provide that it is possible for Member States to use the ERDF and EAFRD to contribute to such instruments during the entire programming period and to update relevant provisions relating to that option, such as those on ex ante assessments and evaluations and to introduce for the ERDF the possibility of programming at priority axis level.

(187) The adoption of Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 of the European Parliament and of the Council (24), was intended to enable Member States to use the ESI Funds to contribute to the financing of eligible projects supported under the EFSI. A specific provision should be inserted in Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 setting out the terms and conditions to allow for better interaction and complementarity that will facilitate the possibility to combine the ESI Funds with EIB financial products under the EFSI’s EU Guarantee.

(188) In carrying out their operations, the bodies implementing financial instruments should adhere to the Union policy on non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes, and updates thereto, as laid down in relevant legal acts of the Union and in Council conclusions, in particular the Council conclusions of 8 November 2016 and the Annex thereto, as well as the Council conclusions of 5 December 2017 and the Annexes thereto.

(189) In order to simplify and harmonise the control and audit requirements and to improve the accountability of the financial instruments implemented by the EIB and other international financial institutions, it is necessary to amend the provisions on management and control of financial instruments to facilitate the assurance process. That amendment should not apply to financial instruments referred to in point (a) of Article 38(1) and Article 39 of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 which were established by a funding agreement signed before 2 August 2018. For such financial instruments, Article 40 of that Regulation as applicable at the moment of the signature of the funding agreement should continue to apply.

(190) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 in respect of the models for the control reports and the annual audit reports referred to in Article 40(1) of that Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (25).

(191) In order to ensure consistency with the treatment of financial corrections during the 2007-2013 programming period, it is necessary to clarify that, in the case of financial instruments, it should be possible to allow for a contribution cancelled as a result of an individual irregularity to be reused for regular expenditure within the same operation so that the related financial correction will not have the consequence of a net loss for the financial instrument operation.

(192) In order to provide more time for the signature of funding agreements allowing for use of escrow accounts for payments for investments in final recipients after the end of the eligibility period for equity-based instruments, the deadline for signature of such funding agreements should be extended until 31 December 2018.

(193) In order to incentivise investors operating under the market economy principle to co-invest in public policy projects, the concept of differentiated treatment of investors, which allows under specific conditions for the ESI Funds to take a subordinated position to an investor operating under the market economy principle and to EIB financial products under the EFSI’s EU Guarantee, should be introduced. At the same time, the conditions for application of such a differentiated treatment when implementing the ESI Funds should be laid down.

(194) Given the protracted low-interest environment and in order not to unduly penalise bodies implementing financial instruments, it is necessary, subject to active treasury management, to enable financing of negative interest generated as a result of investments of the ESI Funds pursuant to Article 43 of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 from resources paid back into the financial instrument.

(195) In order to align reporting requirements with the new provisions on differentiated treatment of investors and to avoid duplication of certain requirements, Article 46(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 should be amended.

(196) In order to facilitate the implementation of the ESI Funds, it is necessary to grant Member States the possibility to implement technical assistance actions through the direct award of a contract to the EIB, other international financial institutions and publicly-owned banks or institutions.

(197) In order to further harmonise the conditions for operations generating net revenue after their completion, the relevant provisions of this Regulation should apply to already selected but still ongoing operations and to operations which are still to be selected under that programming period.

(198) In order to give a strong incentive for the implementation of energy-efficiency measures, cost-savings that result from improved energy efficiency by an operation should not be treated as net revenue.

(199) With a view to facilitating the implementation of revenue-generating operations, the reduction of the co-financing rate should be allowed at any time during the implementation of the programme, and possibilities for the establishment of flat-rate net-revenue percentages at national level should be provided for.

(200) Due to the late adoption of Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (26) and the fact that aid intensity levels have been established by that Regulation, it is necessary to set out certain exemptions in Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 for the EMFF as regards revenue-generating operations. As those exemptions provide more favourable conditions for certain revenue-generating operations for which amounts or rates of support are defined in Regulation (EU) No 508/2014, it is necessary to establish a different date of application for those exemptions to ensure equal treatment of operations supported on the basis of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013.

(201) In order to reduce administrative burden for beneficiaries, the threshold which exempts certain operations from the requirement to calculate and take into account revenue generated during their implementation should be raised.

(202) In order to facilitate synergies between the ESI Funds and other Union instruments, it should be possible for expenditure incurred to be reimbursed from different ESI Funds and Union instruments based on a proportion agreed in advance.

(203) In order to promote the use of lump sums, and given the fact that lump sums are to be based on a fair, equitable and verifiable calculation method which ensures sound financial management, the applicable upper limit for their use should be removed.

(204) In order to reduce the administrative burden of the implementation of projects by beneficiaries, a new simplified cost option for financing based on conditions others than the costs of the o