Commission européenne, DG COMP MERGER REGISTRY, 1049 Bruxelles, BELGIQUE  
Europese Commissie, DG COMP MERGER REGISTRY, 1049 Brussel,   BELGIË  
 
Tel: +32 229 -91111. Fax: +32 229 -64301. E -mail: COMP -MERGER -REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu .  EUROPEAN COMMISSION  
Brussels, 30.10.2019  
C(2019 ) 7960 final  
PUBLIC VERSION  
 
 
To the notifying party  
Subject : Case M. 9538  – Broadcom  / Symantec Enterprise Security Business  
Commission decision pursuant to Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation 
No 139/20041 and Article 57 of the Agreement on the European Economic 
Area2 
Dear Sir or Madam,  
(1) On 26 September 2019 , the European Commission received notification of a 
proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger Regulation  by which 
Broadcom Inc. (“Broadcom” or the “Notifying Party”, United States  of America ) 
acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation sole control 
of parts  of Symantec Corporation (“Symantec”, U nited States of America ) (the 
“Trans action”) . The Transaction  only concerns Symantec’s Enterprise Security 
Business (“SESB” or “Target  Business ”). Broadcom  and Symantec  are collectively 
referred to as the “Parties ”.3 
                                                 
1  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the “Merger Regulation ”). With effect from 1 December 2009,  the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union ( the “ TFEU ”) has in troduced certain changes, such as the replacement 
of “Community ” by “Union ” and “common market ” by “internal market ”. The terminology of the TFEU 
will be used throughout this decision.  
2  OJ L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3 (the “EEA Agreement”).  
3  Publication in the Official Journal of the European Union No C 333 , 4.10.2019 , p. 18.  
In the published version of this decision, 
some information has been omitted 
pursuant to Article 17(2) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 
concerning non -disclosure of business 
secrets and other  confidential 
information. The omissions are shown 
thus […] . Where possible the 
information omitted has been replaced by 
ranges of figures or a general description.  
 
 
2 1. THE PARTIES  
(2) Broadcom , headquartered in San José, California, United States  of America , is a 
technology company that designs, develops, and supplies a broad range of 
semiconductors as well as infrastructure software solutions that enable customers to 
plan, develop, automate, manage and secure applications across mobile, cloud, 
distributed and mainframe platforms.  
(3) Symantec , headquartered in Mountain View, California, United States  of America , 
designs, manufactures , and provides security software, storage , and systems 
management solutions to consumers and enterprises.  
(4) SESB  offers  a mix of products, services, and solutions, unifying cloud and on -
premises security elements, to provide enterprises with advanced threat protection 
and information protection across their endpoints4, networks, email, and cloud 
applications.  
2. THE CONCENTRATI ON 
(5) The Transaction consists of the acquisition of sole control of SESB  by Broadcom , on 
the terms , and subject to the conditions , of an asset purchase agreement  (“APA”)  
entered into between Broadcom and Symantec  on 8 August 2019 . The acquisition 
concerns  Symantec’s business, operations and activities reported as the “Enterprise 
Security” segment5, which includes  making, marketing, selling and providing the 
related products and services.6 The APA includes a detailed list of asset s, such as 
employees, produc ts a nd services, customer contracts, property rights  and 
technologies belonging to SESB. After the Transaction, SESB  will be wholly owned 
by Broadcom.  
(6) The Transaction does not include Symantec’s Consumer Cyber Safety business  unit, 
over which Symantec wil l continue to exercise sole control.  
(7) The Transaction therefore constitutes a concentration pursuant to Article 3(1)(b) of 
the Merger Regulation.  
3. UNION DIMENSION  
(8) The undertakings concerned have a combined aggregate world -wide turnover of 
more than EUR 5 000  million  (Broadcom: EUR 21 185 million, SESB: EUR 2 006 
million ).7 Each of them has a n EU-wide turnover in excess of EUR 250 million  
(Broadcom: EUR […], SESB: EUR […]), but they do not achieve more than two -
thirds of their aggregate EU-wide turnover within one and the same Member State. 
                                                 
4  Endpoints are remote computing devices , such as laptops, tablets or smart phones, that connect to a 
network and communicate  with the network. Short Form CO, footnote 21.  
5  The Transacti on does not include Symantec’s LifeLock ID Analytics business  unit (providing identi ty 
theft protection solutions), which is currently reported as part of the enterprise security segment . Short 
Form CO, paragraphs 6 and 32 . 
6  Short Form CO, Annex 3.1.1 (A sset Purchase Agreement).  
7  Turnover calculated in accordance with Article 5 of the Merger Regulation . 
 
 
3 The not ified operation therefore has a  Union  dimension  pursuant to Article 1(2) of 
the Merger Regulation . 
4. RELEVANT MARKETS  
4.1. Introduction  
(9) Both Parties are active in the supply of software. The relevant market (s) will be 
examined in section 4.2. In line with previous decisions8 relating to the software 
industry, in order to identify the narrowest possible product markets, the 
Commission relied on market  segmentations set by  the market intelligence company 
Gartner Inc. (“Gartner”).9 Gartner is a well -known market intelligence source for 
software markets and provides  very granular  sub-segmentations and corresponding 
market share information .  
(10) Broadcom is  also active in the supply of a broad range of semiconductor  products . 
As there is no plausible relationship between Broadcom’s activities in the market for 
the supply of semiconductor s (or any potential sub -markets  thereof ) and SESB’s 
activities in the market  for the supply of software  (or any potential sub -markets  
thereof ), the Transaction does not give rise to a significant impact on any other 
markets .10,11 Therefore, for the purpose of the present decision, the Commis sion will 
                                                 
8  See, for instance, Commission decision of 8 March 2017 in case M.8223 – Micro Focus/HPE Software 
Business .  
9  The market intelligence company IDC also provides market data and analysis about the information 
technology sector and has also been used by the Commission in previous decisions. See, for instance, 
Commission decision of 26 January 2011 in case M.5984 – Intel/McAfee . However, for the purpose of the 
present decision, Gartner’s segmentation provides the most granular segmentation s. For instance, for the 
enterprise security software segment , Gartner provides nine sub -segments while IDC lists only seven sub -
segments for security software and does not provide separate data for enterprise security software 
solutions. Based on the IDC segmentation, there are no affected possible markets resulting from the 
Transaction.  
10  In the cour se of the market investigation, t he software supplier Trend Micro mentioned the existence of a 
commercial agreement that it has with Broadcom that enables Broadcom to run certain Trend Micro 
software on certain of its semiconductors. Th is agreement concerns Broadcom’s application -specific  
standard products (“ASSPs”) with on -chip processors ( i.e. systems -on-a-chip (“SoCs”)) used in consumer 
devices such as residential  gateway units ( e.g. cable modem s, DSL gateway s, consumer router s) or set -top 
boxes . Broadcom’s SoCs used in the central proc essing units of these devices may contain Trend Micro’s 
consumer software products. This commercial agreement relates to non -enterprise security software ( i.e. 
consumer security software that runs on consumer devices), a separate product market based on th e end -
use segmentation considered in  paragraph (14), section 4.2.1  below . In any event , information provided by 
the Notifying Party show s that SESB’s software solutions do not run  on Broadcom’s SoCs such that they 
cannot be considered “closely related” to Bro adcom’s SoC products within the meaning of paragraph 91 
(relating to possible conglomerate effects) of the Commission’s  Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
(Guidelines on the assessment of non -horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
conc entrations between undertakings, OJ C 265, 18.10.2008). As it is technically not possible to combine 
the two products, they cannot be considered to be complementary products that are generally purchased by 
the same set of customers for the same end use . Consequently, Trend Micro’s agreement with Broadcom 
will not be impacted  by the  Transaction. Similarly, application -specific integrated circuits (“ASICs”) – the 
main semiconductor type sold by Broadcom – are not “closely related” to SESB’s software. ASIC s are 
used for analogue processing  or adjacent tasks. Given their application -specific nature, ASICs are not able 
to run any general -purpose software such as enterprise security software . Notifying Party’s reply of 13 
October 2019 to RFI 3, question 1.  
11  In the course of the market investigation, the software supplier McAfee indicated that it relies on 
Broadcom’s ASSPs used in IP/Ethernet switches/routers (in particular Broadcom’s StrataXGS product 
 
 
 
4 not discuss further Broadcom ’s activities in the market  (or any potential sub -
market s) for the supply of semiconductors . 
4.2. Software supply  
(11) The Transaction concerns the market for the supply of software. More specifically, 
the Parties are both active in the supply of infrastructure software , which  refers to a 
wide category of software products that : (i) provide the infrastructure for 
applications to run on a server ; (ii) can be accessed from a variety of c lients over a 
network ; and (iii)  are cap able of connecting to a variety of information sources.12 
(12) Within infrastructure software, the Parties’ activities only overlap in the supply of (i) 
enterprise security software ; and (ii) IT operations management (“ ITOM ”) software 
for enterprise  use (as illu strated in Table 1 of section 5.1). Therefore, for the purpose  
of the present decision, the Commission will focus on these two areas within 
infrastructure software . 
(13) Further more , the Commission considered whether the Transaction could give rise to 
a significant impact on any other enterprise software markets in which Broadcom 
has a market share above 30%, i.e. the potential markets for ITOM mainframe tools 
and for application development mainframe tools. Therefore,  the Commission will 
also examine these two areas . 
4.2.1.  Product market definition  
(14) The Commission has in the past classified software products on the basis of 
functionality, the end -user ( enterprise  software  vs. consumer software) and the 
specific sector13 in which the software is used ( e.g. healthcare software).14 
                                                                                                                                                      
line a s well as Broadcom’s corresponding software developm ent kit  (“SDK”)  suite) for McAfee’s network 
security platform (“NSP”) product offering. While McAfee stressed the importance of ensuring 
interoperability going forward, McAfee did not observe any merger -specific impact resulting from the 
Transaction (Reply  of McAfee to  questionnaire Q1 to competitors and customers, questions 7.1 and 8.1; 
McAfee’s email response of 16 October 2019 ). Indeed, the  Notifying Party confirms that McAfee’s NSP 
does not compete with any SESB products and belongs to Gartner’s overall  data center systems market 
segment  and that it is technically imp ossible to integrate such software directly  in IP/Ethernet 
switches/routers as they run at different layers of the OSI Model ( i.e. the reference model for how 
applications communicate over a network, breaking down data transmission into seven layers) . Notifying 
Party’s reply of 13 O ctober 2019 to RFI 3, question 8; Notifying Party’s reply of 22 October 2019 to RFI 
6, question 1. Ther efore, there is also no theoretical vertical relationship between SESB and Broadcom’s 
activities in the supply of ASSPs used in IP/Ethernet swit ches/routers. In any event , according to the 
Notifying Party, there is no potential for a degradation of interop erability . Broadcom’s SDK suite is 
provided to all customers purchasing Broadcom’s devices  and any degradation of the SDK provided to 
Broadcom’s customers would impair the ability of the IP/Ethernet switch /router to operate for any purpose 
(not simply with  respect to McAfee’s NSP product ). Notifying Party’s reply of 1 3 October 2019 to RFI 3, 
questions 7 -9. The merged entity will therefore have no ability or incentive to deteriorate or stop 
providing access to interoperability information to McAfee . 
12  Commi ssion decision of 29 April 2008 in c ase M.5080 – Oracle/Bea , paragraph 8 and Commission 
decision of 8 March 2017 in case M.8223 – Micro Focus/HPE Software Business , paragraph  16. 
13  The segmentation by sector in which the software is used is not relevant i n the context of the Transaction. 
Both Parties supply their enterprise software to a wide range of sectors and do not focus on sector -specific 
software solutions (Short Form CO, Annexes 5.3.25 and 5.3.26). Therefore, the Commission will not 
discuss further  a potential segmentation by sector for the purpose of the present decision.  
 
 
5 (15) In relation to functionalit y, in previous cases, the Commission classified software 
products in to: (i) infrastructure software ; (ii) middleware ( i.e. integration 
platforms); (iii) application software and office software; and (iv) operating/browser 
software .15 
(16) Within infrastructure software, the Commission has considered the following 
additional sub-segmentation: (i) security software ; (ii) ITOM software ; (iii) 
application development  software ; and (iv) storage management software .16 
(17) Enterprise security software  seeks to reduce the risk of unauthori sed access to the 
data and IT systems of organi sations. It is designed to improve the security of 
enterprise network infrastructures through security management, access control, 
authentication, encryption, data loss pre vention, intrusion detection and prevention, 
vulnerability assessment, and perimeter defence, among others.17 
(18) The overall enterprise security software category is divided by  Gartner  into the 
following nine sub -segments: (i) application security testing (dyn amic and static) ; 
(ii) data loss prevention; (iii) enterprise endpoint protection; (iv) identity governance 
and administration; (v) secure e -mail gateways; (vi) secure web gateways; 
(vii) security information and event management; (viii)  (web) access management; 
and (ix) other security software .18 
(19) ITOM software  for enterprise  use monitors and controls the manner a company ’s IT 
department approaches IT services, deployment, and support to ensure consistency, 
reliability, and quality. It rep resents all tools necessary to manage the provisioning, 
capacity, performance, and availability of the computing, networking and application 
environment.19 
(20) Gartner delineates the overall ITOM software segment  into the following sub -
segments: (i) delivery au tomation, which is further subdivided into (a) general and 
(b) application release orchestration; (ii) experience management, which is further 
subdivided into (a) IT Services Management (“ITSM”) and (b) software asset 
management (“SAM”), IT asset managemen t (“ITAM”), and IT Financial 
Management (“ITFM”); (iii) performance analysis, which is further subdivided into 
(a) artificial intelligence for operations, IT infrastructure monitoring and other 
monitoring tools, (b) application performance management, and (c) network 
performance monitoring and diagnosis; and (iv) other  ITOM software not 
specifically covered within the above -named categories , including (a) ITOM 
mainframe tools and (b) other ITOM.  
                                                                                                                                                      
14  Commission decision of 20 June 2011 in case M.6237 – Computer Sciences Corporation/iSoft Group , 
paragraphs 22 -25 and Commission decision of 8 March 2017 in case M.8223 – Micro Focus/HPE 
Software Business , paragraph  17. 
15  Commission decision of 20 June 2011 in case M.6237 – Computer Sciences Corporation/iSoft Group , 
paragraph 23; Commission decision of 15 December 2014  in case M.7458 – IBM/INF Business of 
Deutsche Lufthansa, paragraph 35 ; and Commission decision of 8 March 2017 in case M.8223 – Micro 
Focus/HPE Software Business , paragraph  18. 
16  Commission decision of 8 March 2017 in case M.8223 – Micro Focus/HPE Software Business , paragraph 
19. 
17  Short Form CO, paragraph 46.  
18  Consumer security software solutions are not part of Gartner’s enterprise security software segment. Short 
Form CO, paragraph 43, footnote 19.  
19  Short Form CO, paragraph 48.  
 
 
6 (21) Application development  (“AD”) software  for enterprise  use includes tools that 
represent each phase of the software development life cycle (including planning, 
creating and verification). Within this category, Gartner’s sub -segment ation  for AD 
mainframe tools covers  specialised AD tools used to develop and maintai n 
applications that run on mainframe computers.20  
(22) The Commission has not examined  AD mainframe tools in prior decisions, but it has 
reviewed  the broader category of AD software  and considered whether different 
types of AD software constitute separate produ ct markets, ultimately leaving the 
exact  market definition open.21 In line with Gartner’s segmentation, a possible 
product market for AD m ainframe tools can be identified.  
(23) The Notifying Party agrees with the Commission precedents that differentiate 
between software  according to  functionality and end -user. Consequently, t he 
Notifying Party  consider s that the relevant product market s for the purpose  of the 
Transaction are security software , ITOM software  and AD software for enterprise 
use.22  
(24) The Commission has  not identified any reasons  in this case  to deviate from its 
precedents in which it defines the software industry market by reference to 
functionality and end -users  as well as identifies  the narrowest possible product  
markets . Among existing market intelli gence reports which have been provided by 
the Notifying Party and have been used by the Commission in prior decisions, 
Gartner provides the most granular segmentations and will therefore be used in this 
decision . The potential markets for security software , ITOM software and AD 
software for enterprise end use may thus be further segmented  on that basis, as 
described in paragraphs (18) to (21). Finally, the market investigation did not 
suggest alternative product market definitions.  
(25) The Commission considers that, i n any event, for the purposes of this decision, the 
exact product mar ket definition with regard to the supply of infrastructure software 
can be left open, as the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its 
compatibility with the internal market or the functioning of the EEA Agreement 
under the narrowest possible product market definition , for which market share data 
is available, based on the Gartner segmentation .  
4.2.2.  Geographic market definition  
(26) In previous cases , the Commission concluded that the geographic market for 
infrastructure software (as well as  any potential segmentations of that market ) was 
worldwide or at least EEA -wide in scope , since customers consider offers from 
vendors from all parts of the world, there are no technological barriers that restrict 
                                                 
20  Mainframe computers differ fro m standard PCs in several ways such as using  different processor 
instruction sets . Notifying Party’s reply of 22 October 2019 to RFI 5 , question 1.  
21  Commission decision of 8 March 2017 in case M.8223 – Micro Focus/HPE Software Business , paragraph 
32; Commission decision of 5 March 2008 in case M.4747 – IBM/Telelogic , paragraph 122; Commission 
decision of 20 February 2003 in case M.3062 – IBM/Rational , paragraphs 11, 16, 20, and 23.  
22  Short Form CO, paragraphs 51 -52; Notifying Party’s r eply of 22 October 2019 to RFI 5, question 1.  
 
 
7 vendors from supplying customers globally , and infrastruc ture software  are broadly 
identical across different countries .23 
(27) The Notifying Party agrees with the Commission’s precedents  defining a worldwide 
market , arguing that, from a supply -side perspective, suppliers participate in projects 
regardless of the proj ect’s location . In particular, by removing the physical presence 
of the software in a company  premises , it is possible to supply companies  located 
across the world  through cloud computing . From a demand -side perspective, the 
Notifying Party submits that companies  compare the effectiveness of different global 
manufacturers and source their infrastructure software products globally.24 
Nevertheless, the Notifying Party also p rovided EEA -wide  market shares.  
(28) In any event, for the purposes of this decision, the exact geographic market 
definition with regard to the supply of infrastructure software  (as well as  any 
potential segmentations of that market ) can be left open, as the Transaction does not 
raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal mar ket or the functioning 
of the EEA Agreement under any plausible geographic market definition.  
5. COMPETITIVE ASSESSMEN T 
5.1. Affected markets  
5.1.1.  Horizontally affected markets  
(29) As stated above, the Parties’ product portfolios only overlap with regard to  the 
possible ma rkets for enterprise security software and ITOM software for enterprise 
use and certain potential segmentations  of that market . In line with the approach set 
out in paragraph (25), the narrowest p ossible markets  in this regard correspond to the 
sub-segment ation s provided by   Gartner .25 
                                                 
23  Commission decision of 29 April 2008 in case M.5080 – Oracle/Bea , paragraphs 14 -15; Commission 
decision of 21 October 2010 in case M.5529 – Oracle/Sun Microsystems , paragraphs 767 -769 and 
Commission decisio n of 8 March 2017 in case M.8223 – Micro Focus/HPE Software Business , paragraph  
36. 
24  Short Form CO, paragraph 55.  
25  Based on the IDC segmentation, the Parties overlap in the  following security software sub -segments: (i) 
identity  and digital trust softwa re, (ii) endpoint security software, and (iii) security  analytics, intelligence, 
response, and orchestration.  None of these sub -segments are affected as a result of the Transaction. Short 
Form CO, Annex 6.1.1.  

 
 
9 (34) Broadcom has a market share above 30% in two Gartner sub -segments : (i) ITOM 
mainframe tools ,31 where Broadcom has a [20-30]% market share in the EEA and 
[30-40]% worldwide and (ii ) AD mainframe tools ,32 where Broadcom has a [30-
40]% market share in the EEA and [40-50]% worldwide.33 
(35) However, n either  ITOM mainframe tools  nor AD mainframe tools  are closely related 
to SESB’s activities.34 First, the Parties indicate that  SESB software products cannot 
be used on mainframe computer systems where Broadcom’s ITOM mainframe tools 
and its AD mainframe tools are used. Second, even if there are customers that 
purchase both Broadcom ’s and SESB’s products , these purchases are intend ed for 
different purposes, as Broadcom’s products are used for mainframe computers and 
SESB’s products are used for other types of systems within the company or the 
company’s network as a whole . Accordingly , such customer s do not quali fy as 
common customer s for the “same end use ”, within the meaning of paragraph 91 of 
the Non -Horizontal Merger Guidelines . Third, even for overlapping customers, the 
two sets of products are not susceptible to bundling or tying practices, given that the 
products are not sold together to the same division within a customer organi sation, or 
on the same timetables. While respondents to the market investigation mentioned 
Broadcom’s general tenden cy to employ bundling or tying strategies, no concerns 
were voiced as regards a possible bundling of Broadcom’s ITOM mainframe tools 
and/or AD mainframe tools  with SESB’s software solutions. Moreover, all 
respondents confirmed that there are sufficient cre dible alternative suppliers to 
Broadcom in these two market segments. Likewise, all respondents, including 
competing suppliers of enterprise security software, indicated that they do not 
require access to Broadcom’s ITOM mainframe tools and/or AD mainframe  tools in 
order to ensure interoperability.35 
(36) This general view conforms to Broadcom’s internal documents assessing the 
Transaction , which do not envisage  Broadcom’s  ITOM mainframe tools  or its AD 
mainframe tools  or any conglomerate strategy in relation to these products .36 
5.2. Horizontal non-coordinated effects  
5.2.1.  The Notifying Party’s view  
(37) According to the Notifying Party , the Transaction will not raise any competition 
concerns in the (potential ) market for the supply of data loss prevention software . 
                                                                                                                                                      
30  As explained in footnote 10, there is no conglomerate r elationship either between SESB and Broadcom’s 
activities in the supply of certain semiconductor products ( i.e. ASSPs for residential gateway units  and 
set-top boxes).  
31  ITOM mainframe tools include tools for managing and monitoring mainframe implementations, including 
application performance monitoring, monitoring, database management, systems management, 
automation, workload automation and IT process automation. Short Form CO, paragraph 44, footnote 31.  
32  AD mainframe tools include tools tha t represent each phase of the software development life cycle 
(including planning, creating and verification). AD mainframe tools are specialised AD tools used to 
develop and maintain applications that run on mainframe computers, which differ from standard  PCs in 
several ways (such as using different processor instruction sets). Notifying Party’s reply of 22 October 
2019 to RFI 5, question 1.  
33  Short Form CO,  paragraphs 109 -110. 
34  Short Form CO, paragraphs 109-111. 
35  Replies to questionnaire Q1 to compet itors and customers, questions 3 -5 and 9 -11.  
36  Short Form CO, Annexes 5.3.1 -5.3.24.  

 
 
11 (41) The Commission also notes  that the Transaction will not have a significant effect on 
the market structure  in the EEA or worldwide for the supply of data loss prevention 
software . As shown in Table 2, the market share increment brought about by the 
Transacti on is very limited ( below [0-5]% worldwide  and in the EEA  throughout  the 
last three years ). 
(42) Furthermore , there is a large number of alternative suppliers of data loss prevention 
software active both worldwide and in the EEA. All of these suppliers , includi ng 
McAfee, Digital Guardian, Fidelis Cybersecurity and Venustech,  as well as 
Forcepoint and RSA,  will continue to compete effectively with the merged entity 
post-Transaction.  
(43) Finally, the evidence on file suggests that the Parties are not particularly clos e 
competitors in this market. While SESB is the market leader, Broadcom is a small 
player on this market and its “CA Data Protection ” product is a legacy solution, 
[…].40 Therefore, Broadcom currently does not seem to constitute an important 
competitive constraint in this market . 
(44) Further, the Commission notes that similar  arguments  equally apply to the 
potentially broader market for enterprise security software . In any event, the Parties’ 
combined market share for 2018 was [5-10]% worldwide and [5-10]% in the EEA, 
which is well below  20%.  
5.2.2.1.  Conclusion  
(45) In light of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that the Transaction does not 
raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market  or the functioning 
of the EEA Agreement in the (potent ial) market for the supply of data loss 
prevention software  or the broader market for enterprise security software , in the 
EEA or worldwide.  
6. CONCLUSION  
(46) For the above reasons, the European Commission has decided not to oppose the 
notified operation and to d eclare it compatible with the internal  market and with the 
EEA Agreement. This decision is adopted in application of Article 6(1)(b) of the 
Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement .  
For the Commission  
 
 
(Signed)  
Margrethe VESTAGER  
Member of t he Commission  
 
                                                 
40  Short Form CO, paragraph 73.