ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
(10)

Based on the assessment of the Stability Programme pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, the Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the Programme is plausible. It is broadly in line with the Commission services 2012 spring forecast, although the latter assumes somewhat higher real GDP growth in 2012. The stated objective of the budgetary strategy outlined in the Stability Programme is to ensure the long-term sustainability of public finances. The intermediary steps defined to reach this are a rigorous implementation of the 2012 budget and a reduction of the headline deficit below 3 % of GDP in 2013, the deadline for correction of the excessive deficit set by the Council. The achievement of the headline deficit target in 2013, however, may fall short of plans. The Stability Programme has changed the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) from a close-to-balanced budget to a structural deficit of 0,5 % of GDP, which is not foreseen to be achieved within the programme period. The new MTO adequately reflects the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. Based on the (recalculated) structural budget balance (5), the average annual fiscal effort in 2010-2013 amounts to 1,3 % of GDP, well above the required value recommended by the Council, whereby the residual fiscal effort is somewhat back loaded to 2013. The target for 2013 is subject to risks, as suggested revenue measures may fall short of the objective; simultaneous implementation of all small-scale measures can be difficult to implement; and in light of upwards revisions of the deficit targets that took place in the past. In addition, further across-board expenditure cuts may prove unsustainable in the medium term. In 2014 and 2015, the average fiscal effort stands at 0,3 % of GDP annually, which is below the required adjustment of 0,5 % of GDP for countries which have not yet reached the MTO. Nevertheless, according to the Stability Programme the growth rate of government expenditure, taking into account discretionary revenue measures, is in line with the expenditure benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact in the outer years of the Stability Programme. Government debt would remain well below 60 % of GDP. While Slovakia passed legislation establishing the Fiscal Council, so far it has not been set up and the legislation on expenditure ceilings has not yet been adopted.
(7)

According to Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, the correction of the excessive deficit should be completed in the year following its identification, unless there are special circumstances. A correction of the excessive deficit by 2014 is therefore justified. In particular, a credible and sustainable adjustment path would require Malta to reach a headline general government target of 3,4 % of GDP for 2013 and 2,7 % of GDP in 2014, which is consistent with an annual improvement of the structural balance of 0,7 % of GDP in 2013 and 0,7 % of GDP in 2014. The 2014 target ensures that the required reduction in the differential between the debt-to-GDP level and the 60 %-of-GDP Treaty reference value will occur over the two years following the correction of the excessive deficit procedure. To reach the above mentioned structural targets, Malta would need to adopt additional consolidation measures of around 0,4 % of GDP in 2013, on top of the measures already included in the baseline scenario, and around 0,75 % of GDP in 2014. These targets take into account the need to compensate for the negative second-round effects of fiscal consolidation on public finances, through its impact on GDP growth. The baseline scenario on which this adjustment path is built incorporates the Commission 2013 spring forecast and extends it up to 2016 relying on standard assumptions about the closure of the output gap and the sensitivity of the budget to the cycle; it does not include, however, the additional capital injection into Air Malta that is planned in 2015 according to the 2013 stability programme. It is thus assumed that the capital injection will not take place or be offset by measures in the opposite direction.
(9)

Based on the assessment of the Convergence Programme pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, the Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the Programme is plausible and broadly in line with the assessment in the Commission services 2013 spring forecast. Following an ambitious fiscal consolidation since 2009, the general government deficit was brought down to 3,2 % of GDP in 2012, which is considered sufficient for the abrogation of the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit, taking into account the cost of the systemic pension reform. The deficit reduction was to some extent also based on robust economic growth and temporary expenditure freezes. The Convergence Programme has changed the medium-term objective (MTO) from 0,5 % to – 1,0 %, which is still in line with the objectives of the Stability and Growth Pact. The budgetary strategy outlined in the Convergence Programme aims to reach the MTO by 2016. Based on the (recalculated) structural budget balance, annual progress towards the MTO in structural terms is higher than 0,5 % of GDP. The expenditure benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact over the Programme period is met. The adjustment is slightly front-loaded and relies mainly on expenditure restraint, but is only partially supported by concrete measures, including one-offs that are not always specified. According to the Commission services 2013 spring forecast, the structural adjustment in 2013 and 2014 is expected to be at 0,3 % and 0,0 % of GDP respectively and thus below the required progress of 0,5 % of GDP, which also casts doubt on the Convergence Programme’s adjustment path. Further consolidation measures have yet to be specified, and structural reforms including a shift to revenue based measures, should be considered. General government debt remains below 60 % of GDP with 40,7 % in 2012 and is expected to drop slightly over the Programme period. While the Convergence Programme expects debt to ease to 39,7 % in 2013 and to decline further to 34,5 % by 2016, the Commission services 2013 spring forecast projects a drop to 40,1 % of GDP in 2013 and 39,4 % in 2014. Differences are above all the result of lower assumed deficits in the Convergence Programme.
(6)

Taking into account the conclusions of the scientific opinion, together with the large year to year variation in occurrence of T-2 and HT-2 toxin, it is appropriate to collect more data on T-2 and HT-2 in cereals and cereal products and more information on the effects of food processing (i.e. cooking) and agronomic factors on the presence of T-2 and HT-2 toxin. Furthermore, it is necessary to obtain more information on the different factors which lead to relative high levels of T-2 and HT-2 toxin in cereals and cereal products in order to be able to identify the measures to be taken to avoid or to reduce the presence of T-2 and HT-2 toxin in cereals and cereal products. Investigations have to be undertaken in order to collect information on the factors resulting in relative high levels of T-2 and HT-2 toxin in cereals and cereal products and on the effects of feed and food processing. Based on the available data, T-2 and HT-2 do not occur or only in very low levels in rice and rice products and therefore it is appropriate to exclude these products from the scope of this Recommendation.
22.

The conditions under which a restructuring plan can be confirmed by a court should be clearly specified in the laws of the Member States and should include at least the following: (a) the restructuring plan has been adopted in conditions which ensure the protection of the legitimate interests of creditors; (b) the restructuring plan has been notified to all creditors likely to be affected by it; (c) the restructuring plan does not reduce the rights of dissenting creditors below what they would reasonably be expected to receive in the absence of the restructuring, if the debtor’s business was liquidated or sold as a going concern, as the case may be; (d) any new financing foreseen in the restructuring plan is necessary to implement the plan and does not unfairly prejudice the interests of dissenting creditors.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 66/2

COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION

of 17 February 2015

concerning the discharge to be given to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the operations of the European Development Fund (ninth EDF) for the financial year 2013

(2015/C 66/02)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (1) and amended by the Agreement signed in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005 (2),

Having regard to the Internal Agreement between Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the Financing and Administration of Community Aid under the Financial Protocol to the Partnership Agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the European Community and its Member States signed in Cotonou (Benin) on 23 June 2000 and the allocation of financial assistance for the Overseas Countries and Territories to which Part Four of the EC Treaty applies (3) (the ‘Internal Agreement’) setting up, amongst others, the ninth European Development Fund (ninth EDF), and in particular Article 32(3) thereof,

Having regard to the Financial Regulation of 27 March 2003 applicable to the 9th European Development Fund (4), and in particular Articles 96 to 103 thereof,

Having examined the revenue and expenditure account and the balance sheet relating to the operations of the ninth EDF as at 31 December 2013 and the Annual Report of the Court of Auditors on the activities funded by the 8th, 9th and 10th European Development Funds (EDFs) concerning the financial year 2013, together with the Commission’s replies contained in that Annual Report (5),

Whereas:

(1) Pursuant to Article 32(3) of the Internal Agreement, the discharge for the financial management of the ninth EDF is to be given to the Commission by the European Parliament on the recommendation of the Council.

(2) The overall implementation by the Commission of the operations of the ninth EDF during the financial year 2013 has been satisfactory,

HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the European Parliament give the Commission a discharge in respect of the implementation of the operations of the ninth EDF for the financial year 2013.

Done at Brussels, 17 February 2015. For the Council The President J. REIRS

(1) OJ L 317, 15.12.2000, p. 3.

(2) OJ L 287, 28.10.2005, p. 4.

(3) OJ L 317, 15.12.2000, p. 355.

(4) OJ L 83, 1.4.2003, p. 1.

(5) OJ C 398, 12.11.2014, p. 289.
(5)

Malta is currently in the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact and subject to the debt rule. In its 2016 Stability Programme, the Government plans the headline balance to improve to a surplus of 0,1 % of GDP by 2019. The structural balance will gradually improve so that Malta's medium-term budgetary objective — a balanced budgetary position in structural terms — is reached by 2019. According to the Stability Programme, the general government debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to fall to 62,6 % in 2016 and decrease further to 55,5 % in 2019. The macroeconomic scenario underpinning these budgetary projections is plausible for 2016 and cautious for 2017-19. However, the measures needed to support the planned deficit targets from 2017 onwards have not been sufficiently specified. Based on the Commission 2016 spring forecast, there is a high risk of a significant deviation from the recommended adjustment towards the medium-term objective in 2015 and 2016 taken together, essentially stemming from the slippage in 2015 which needs to be corrected in 2016, and under unchanged policies in 2017. The slippage in 2015 is partly explained by the surge in investment largely due to the exceptionally high absorption of EU funds in the run up to the conclusion of the 2007-2013 programming period. In order to reduce the deviation over the two-years 2015-2016, the 2016 Stability Programme includes additional measures for 2016 that could not yet be included in the Commission 2016 spring forecast. These measures are targeted at reducing primary expenditure (by 0,16 % of GDP), especially in the areas of compensation of employees, intermediate consumption and capital transfers. In addition, the estimates of some of the revenue measures for 2016-2019 have been revised to reflect more up-to-date information, as well as the actual impact of the measures for 2015. Taken together, these measures have a net deficit-reducing impact of 0,2 % of GDP. Compared to the Commission forecast, factoring in these measures would improve the structural effort, and the structural balance pillar would point to some deviation on average over the two years 2015-2016, whereas a risk of a significant deviation would remain in 2017. Malta is forecast to comply with the debt reduction benchmark both in 2016 and 2017. Based on its assessment of the Stability Programme and taking into account the Commission 2016 spring forecast, the Council is of the opinion that there is a risk that Malta will not comply with the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. Therefore, further measures will be needed to ensure compliance in 2016 and 2017.
(1)

Potential growth in the euro area and in the Union as a whole has slowed down considerably since 2000. The downward trend in potential output growth is notably due to a steady decline in the contribution of total factor productivity. Since 2008, economic growth has been further weakened by a fall in investment. Looking forward, economic growth will ultimately depend on increasing productivity. Raising productivity is a multi-faceted challenge which requires a set of well-balanced policies aimed, in particular, at supporting innovation, increasing skills, reducing rigidities in the labour and product markets, as well as allowing a better allocation of resources. While there is a need to improve the productivity and competitiveness performance within the Union, the recent crisis showed that Member States whose currency is the euro (‘euro area Member States’) can be particularly subject to the possible build-up and sudden unwinding of macroeconomic imbalances that may spill-over into other euro area Member States and non-euro area Member States. In the absence of flexible nominal exchange rates, they need adequate adjustment mechanisms to country-specific shocks. Productivity and competitiveness dynamics are of relevance both for the accumulation and correction of macroeconomic imbalances (for example trade and current account deficits, stocks of domestic and external liabilities) and for the effective adjustment to asymmetric shocks. Research and analysis of policies having a bearing on productivity and competitiveness dynamics should provide a basis for developments compatible with the objective of a smooth functioning of the economic and monetary union.
EN Official Journal of the European Union C 58/1

COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION

of 21 February 2017

concerning the discharge to be given to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the operations of the European Development Fund (eighth EDF) for the financial year 2015

(2017/C 58/01)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to the fourth ACP-EEC Convention, signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989 (1) and amended by the Agreement signed in Mauritius on 4 November 1995 (2),

Having regard to the Internal Agreement between the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the financing and administration of the Community aid under the Second Financial Protocol to the fourth ACP-EC Convention (3) (the ‘Internal Agreement’) setting up, amongst others, the eighth European Development Fund (eighth EDF), and in particular Article 33(3) thereof,

Having regard to the Financial Regulation of 16 June 1998 applicable to development finance cooperation under the fourth ACP-EC Convention (4), and in particular Articles 66 to 74 thereof,

Having examined the revenue and expenditure account and the balance sheet relating to the operations of the eighth EDF as at 31 December 2015 and the Annual Report of the Court of Auditors on the activities funded by the 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th European Development Funds (EDFs) concerning the financial year 2015, together with the Commission’s replies (5) contained in that Annual Report,

Whereas:

(1) Pursuant to Article 33(3) of the Internal Agreement, the discharge for the financial management of the eighth EDF is to be given to the Commission by the European Parliament on the recommendation of the Council.

(2) The overall implementation by the Commission of the operations of the eighth EDF during the financial year 2015 has been satisfactory,

HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the European Parliament give the Commission a discharge in respect of the implementation of the operations of the eighth EDF for the financial year 2015.

Done at Brussels, 21 February 2017. For the Council The President E. SCICLUNA

(1) OJ L 229, 17.8.1991, p. 3.

(2) OJ L 156, 29.5.1998, p. 3.

(3) OJ L 156, 29.5.1998, p. 108.

(4) OJ L 191, 7.7.1998, p. 53.

(5) OJ C 375, 13.10.2016, p. 287.
Official Journal of the European Union

COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION

of 12 February 2019

on the appointment of a member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank

(2019/C 60/01)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 283(2) and 139(2) thereof,

Having regard to Protocol No 4 on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, and in particular Article 11.2 thereof,

HEREBY RECOMMENDS TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL THAT:

Mr Philip R. LANE be appointed as a member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank for a term of office of eight years with effect from 1 June 2019.
(12)

The integrated energy and climate plans provide the opportunity to coherently define long-term policies and measures, taking into account resulting interlinkages between dimensions in terms of potential synergies or risks. While the policies and measures described in the draft plan seem to consider some interlinkages, their assessment across the five dimensions should be further reinforced in the final plan. The analysis could include quantitative estimates and should also cover possible negative interactions between policies and measures and show how Bulgaria intends to address them. In particular, the synergies between the decarbonisation, energy security and the internal market dimensions and the energy efficiency first principle warrants further assessment. Similarly, the role of energy efficiency in addressing energy poverty should be further looked at. An important element to be further assessed in the final plan, including from the costs and competitiveness angles, is the interaction between the planned continuation of coal based power generation and enhanced use of gas with the decarbonisation dimension. Another element is the impact of biomass use on the accounted removals in the land use and forestry sector. The link between electricity production and the deployment of low-carbon technologies should be further addressed under the research innovation and competitiveness dimension.
6.

Intensify the already good regional cooperation arrangements with Bulgaria and Cyprus as well as with the Central and South Eastern Europe Energy Connectivity (CESEC) countries. In the context of the ‘Clean Energy for EU Islands’ initiative, enhance cooperation with Member States and island regions facing similar geographic, climatic and infrastructure related challenges and opportunities in their energy transition. Explore the cross-border potential and the macro-regional aspects of a coordinated energy and climate policy notably in the Adriatic-Ionian with the aim of reducing the region's carbon footprint and implementing an ecosystem approach. The focus of the regional exchanges could be on internal energy market and energy security areas, in view to the changes in the electricity systems accommodating higher shares of renewable electricity, which will increase electricity import and export and enhance the need for system flexibility. In addition, make use of bilateral cooperation and flexibilities to use the opportunities presented by reducing greenhouse gas emissions for the modernisation of the Greek economy.
(6)

Wastewater monitoring should be considered as a complementary and independent approach to COVID-19 surveillance and testing strategies. As highlighted in Commission Recommendation of 28 October 2020 on ‘COVID-19 testing strategies, including the use of rapid antigen tests’ (4), robust testing strategies and sufficient testing capacities are essential aspects of preparedness and response to COVID-19. As also highlighted in the Commission’s Communication of 2 December 2020 on ‘Staying safe from COVID-19 during winter’ (5) and of 19 January 2021 on ‘A united front to beat COVID-19’ (6), testing remains a crucial element for monitoring, containing and mitigating the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, national testing strategies need to be urgently updated to take into account new variants, as they are central to COVID-19 control strategies. Surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 in wastewater can provide important complementary and independent information to public health decision-making process in the context of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. As a consequence, waste water monitoring needs to be included more systematically in the national testing strategies for the detection of the SARS-CoV-2 virus.