Commission européenne, DG COMP MERGER REGISTRY, 1049 Bruxelles, BELGIQUE  
Europese Commissie, DG COMP MERGER REGISTRY, 1049 Brussel,   BELGIË  
 
Tel: +32 229 -91111. Fax: +32 229 -64301. E -mail: COMP -MERGER -REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu . 
 EUROPEAN COMMISSION  
 
 
 
 
 
Brussels, 22.10.2018  
C(2018 ) 7028 final  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To the notifying party  : 
Subject : Case M. 9016 – CMA CGM / Container Finance  
Commission decision pursuant to Article 6(1)(b) of Council 
Regulation No  139/20041 and Article 57 of the Agreement on the 
European Economic Area2 
  
                                                 
1  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the 'Merger Regulation '). With effect from 1 December 2009,  the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union ( 'TFEU ') has introduced certain changes, such as the 
replacement of  'Commu nity' by 'Union ' and 'common market ' by 'internal market '. The terminology of 
the TFEU will be used throughout this decision.  
2  OJ L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3 (the 'EEA Agreement').  In the published version of this decision, some 
information has been omitted pursuant to Article 
17(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 
concerning non -disclosure of business secrets and 
other confidential information. The omissions are 
shown thus […]. Where possible the information 
omitted has been replaced by ranges of figures or a 
general description.  PUBLIC VERSION  
 
2 Table of Contents  
1. THE  PARTIES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  4 
2. THE CONCENTRATION  ................................ ................................ ..........................  4 
3. EU DIMENSION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........  4 
4. ACTIVITIES OF THE PA RTIES  ................................ ................................ ...............  5 
4.1. Container Finance  ................................ ................................ ..............................  5 
4.2. CMA CGM  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........  6 
5. MARKET DEFINITIONS  ................................ ................................ ..........................  8 
5.1. Intra -European door -to-door multimodal transport  ................................ ...........  8 
5.1.1.  Relevant product market  ................................ ................................ ...... 8 
5.1.2.  Relevant geographic market  ................................ ................................  8 
5.1.3.  Conclusion  ................................ ................................ ...........................  9 
5.2. Short -sea container liner shipping services  ................................ .......................  9 
5.2.1.  Relevant product market  ................................ ................................ ...... 9 
5.2.2.  Relevant geographic market  ................................ ..............................  11 
5.2.3.  Conclusion  ................................ ................................ .........................  12 
5.3. Container terminal services  ................................ ................................ .............  13 
5.3.1.  Relevant product market  ................................ ................................ .... 13 
5.3.2.  Relevant geographic market  ................................ ..............................  13 
5.3.3.  Conclusion  ................................ ................................ .........................  14 
5.4. Freight forwarding services  ................................ ................................ .............  14 
5.4.1.  Relevant product market  ................................ ................................ .... 14 
5.4.2.  Relevant geographic market  ................................ ..............................  15 
5.4.3.  Conclusion  ................................ ................................ .........................  15 
6. COMPETITIVE ASSESSME NT ................................ ................................ ..............  15 
6.1. Horizontal overlaps – Intra-European door -to-door multimodal 
transport  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........  15 
6.1.1.  Data sources  ................................ ................................ .......................  16 
6.1.2.  The Parties' view  ................................ ................................ ................  17 
6.1.3. Commission's assessment  ................................ ................................ .. 17 
6.1.4.  Conclusion  ................................ ................................ .........................  18 
6.2. Horizontal overlaps – Short -sea container liner shipping services  .................  18 
6.2.1.  Analytical Framework  ................................ ................................ ....... 18 
6.2.2.  General considerations on the market structure  ................................  21 
 
3 6.2.3.  Baltic States to Benelux -Germany  ................................ ....................  23 
6.2.4.  Baltic States to British Isles  ................................ ...............................  24 
6.2.5.  Baltic States to Scandinavia  ................................ ..............................  25 
6.2.6.  Benelux -Germany to Baltic States  ................................ ....................  26 
6.2.7.  Benelux -Germany to Russia  ................................ ..............................  26 
6.2.8.  Benelux -Germany to Scandinavia  ................................ .....................  27 
6.2.9.  British Isles to Russia  ................................ ................................ ........  28 
6.2.10.  British Isles to Scandinavia  ................................ ...............................  29 
6.2.11.  Iberia to Algeria  ................................ ................................ .................  30 
6.2.12.  Iberia to Scandinavia  ................................ ................................ .........  31 
6.2.13.  Poland to British Isles  ................................ ................................ ........  31 
6.2.14.  Russia to Benelux -Germany  ................................ ..............................  32 
6.2.15.  Russia to British Isles  ................................ ................................ ........  33 
6.2.16.  Russia to Scandinavia  ................................ ................................ ........  34 
6.2.17.  Scandinavia to Benelux -Germany  ................................ .....................  35 
6.2.18.  Scandinavia to British Isles  ................................ ...............................  36 
6.2.19.  Scandinavia to Iberia  ................................ ................................ .........  38 
6.2.20.  Scandinavia to Russia  ................................ ................................ ........  39 
6.2.21.  Conclusion  ................................ ................................ .........................  40 
6.3. Verti cal relationships  ................................ ................................ .......................  40 
6.3.1.  Container terminal services  ................................ ...............................  40 
6.3.2.  Freight forwarding services  ................................ ...............................  45 
7. CONCLUSION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  47 
 
  
 
4 Dear Sir or Madam,  
On 17 September 2018 , the European Commission received notification of a proposed 
concentration pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger Regulation by which CMA CGM 
acquir es within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation sole control of 
the whole of Container Finance. The concentration is accomplished by way of purchase 
of shares .3 CMA CGM  and Container Finance  are designated hereinafter as the  "Parties ". 
1. THE PARTIES  
(1) CMA CGM  is the parent company  of an international group of companies 
engaged in containerised liner shipping , container terminal services and freight 
forwarding services .  
(2) CMA CGM is currently jointly controlled by Merit, the holding company created 
by CMA CGM's founder , Mr Jacques R. Saadé, and BPIfrance Participations, an 
investment found controlled by the French public groupe Caisse des dépôts et 
Consignations.  
(3) Container Finance is a Finland -based holding company which owns inter alia , 
Cont ainerships, a carrier providing door -to-door services predominantly in North  
Europe, and to a lesser extent, the Mediterranean. Containerships also provides to 
a very limited extent freight forwarding services. Container Finance also owns a  
controlling min ority shareholding in Multi -Link Terminals Limited Ltd ("MLT") 
and CD Holding Oy ("CDH"), providing terminal handling services in Finland 
and Russia. Container Finance owns a non -controlling stake in MLT Logistics 
Kypros.  
2. THE CONCENTRATION  
(4) On 20 June 2018,  the Parties signed a framework purchase agreement 
("Framework Agreement"), pursuant to which CMA CGM could  acquire 
Container Finance’s businesses related to container liner shipping and terminal 
services , either by purchasing directly 100% of the share ca pital and voting rights 
of Container Finance , or by purchasing separately Containerships and the […] 
stakes in MLT, CDH and MLT Logistics Kypros.  
(5) It has subsequently been confirmed that CMA CGM will directly acquire 100% of 
the share capital and voting rights of Container Finance  (the "Transaction") . CMA 
CGM will therefore acquire sole control over Container Finance.  
(6) In light of the above, the Transaction constitutes a concentration under Article 
3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation . 
3. EU DIMENSION  
(7) The Transaction does not have an EU dimension w ithin the meani ng of Article 
1(2) and 1(3) of the Merger Regulation  as Container Finance achieved an EU 
                                                 
3  Publication in the Official Journal of the European Union No C 342, 25.09.2018 , p. 5. 
 
5 turnover of onl y EUR […] million  and it did not achieve a turnover of more than 
EUR 25 million in at leas t three Member States.  
(8) Nevertheless, the Transaction fulfilled the conditions set out in Article 4(5). On 9 
July 2018 , the Parties informed the Commission by means of a reasoned 
submission that the Transaction should be examined by the Commission pursuant  
to Article 4(5) of the Merger Regulation. A copy of that submission was 
transmitted to the Member States on 9 July 2018 . As none of the Member States 
competent to review the Transaction expressed its disagreement as regards the 
request to refer the case, the Transaction is deemed to have an EU dimension  
pursuant to Article 4(5) of the Merger Regulation.4  
4. ACTIVITIES OF THE PARTIES  
4.1. Container Finance  
(9) Container Finance, via its subsidiary Containerships, provides door -to-door 
services , including short -sea container shipping services . Containerships currently 
operates a fleet of […] vessels ( either owned or chartered) with a capacity varying 
from […] to […] TEUs.5 [INFORMATION RELATED TO CURRENT SUPPLY 
CONTRACT] .6  
(10) Contain erships is  predominantly active in the Baltic and North Sea regions , which 
account  for [80-90]% of its operations.  Containerships also has activities in the 
Mediterranea n region, which now account for [10-20]% of its operations. As far 
as the EEA is concer ned, in the Mediterranean region Containerships only calls in 
Spain  (Barcelona) . Containerships is mainly active in the following countries: 
Belgium , Denmark,  Finland, Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, Netherlands, Russia,  
Turkey , and  UK.7 
                                                 
4  The case would have been notifiable in Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia and Lithuania . 
  
5  TEU stands for the "twenty -foot equivalent unit" used to describe the capacity of one ship container.  
 
6  Form CO, paragraphs 61 -62. 
7  Form CO, paragraph 61, 62 and 65.  
 
6  
Source: Fo rm CO, paragraph 63 .  
(11) Containerships offers pure short -sea transport , as well as  door-to-door transport , 
to its customers. Door -to-door requires the provision of  the “extra mile” or “last 
leg” of land transport to the  final place of destination, as  a complement t o sea 
transport. It estimates that a pproximately […]% of the volumes shipped include 
an intermodal component.8  
(12) Containerships also provides inland transportation services in Finland, Russia , 
and the UK , where it operates its own truck fleet . Containership s does not operate 
trailers o r barges in these countries. In other countries, including the Baltics, 
Benelux, Denmark, and Poland , trucks, trailers , and spaces on barges are 
contracted with third -party service providers . 
(13) Containerships offers freight forwarding services  in Germany , Latvia, Lithuania, 
Russia, and the UK, although only  to a limited extent . In 201 7 it achieved a 
worldwide turnover of EUR […]. Containerships estimates that its market shares 
are below [0-5]% in every country where it operat es. 
4.2. CMA CGM  
(14) The CMA CGM Group is mainly active in the sectors of containerized liner 
shipping, container terminal and freight forwarding services.  
                                                 
8  Form CO, paragraph 64.  

 
7 (15) CMA CGM (11.8%) is currently the world’s fourth largest container liner 
company , after Maersk (18%), MSC (14. 5%), and COSCO (12.4%) since the 
latter finalized the acquisition of the carrier OOCL in July 2018. CMA CGM has 
worldwide operations. The group is present in more than […] countries through 
its network of over […] agencies. With a fleet of […] vessels, the  CMA CGM 
Group serves […] commercial ports. CMA CGM operates more than […] 
shipping lines on the main commercial trade routes.9 
(16) As Containerships, the CMA CGM Group provides door -to-door traffic to its 
customers , including short -sea container shipping services , notably via its 
specialized subsidiary MacAndrews .10 It is therefore  able to serve  the “ last leg” or 
the “extra mile” of land transport. It estimates that a t least […]% of the volumes 
shipped include an  intermodal component.  CMA CGM  is mainly active in the 
following countries across Europe:  the Baltic States , Belgium, France,  Germany, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland , Portugal, Scandinavia, Spain, and UK.11 
(17) In addition, for its door -to-door offers, CMA CGM purchases and re -sales inland 
transportatio n services to third -party customers. However, CMA CGM does not 
own or lease the operational assets necessary to provide inland transportation 
services, to the exception of Logistics Operator LLC (LogOper) , a […] 
undertaking  whose  activities have a very limited footprint in the EU .12 
(18) The CMA CGM Group, via its subsidiaries CMA Terminals and Terminal Link, 
is also active on the market for the provision of container terminal services, where 
Containerships is active on  the demand -side.13 
(19) The CMA CGM Group, through its wholly -owned subsidiary CMA CGM 
Logistics  (CCLog), has a limited activity as freight forwarder in Europe.  In 
Europe, CCLog offers services in the Baltic States, Belgium, the Czech Republic,  
France, Germany , Italy, the Nethe rlands, Poland, the UK. In 2017 it achieved a 
worldwide turnover of USD […] million and an EU-wide turnover of 
approximate ly USD […] million.  
                                                 
9  Form CO, paragraphs 74 -75. 
10  MacAndrews includes OPDR , see Case M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR,  
11  Form CO, paragraphs 78 and 83.  
12  LogOper is a logistics services provider which opera tes weekly block train services within the territory 
of the Russian Federation and neig hbouring countries. LogOper has a very small activity in the Baltic 
States, limited to Latvi a and Estonia, where it operates trains between Tallinn and Moscow, and 
betwe en Riga and Moscow.  
13  Form CO, paragraph 85.  
 
8 5. MARKET DEFINITIONS  
5.1. Intra -European door -to-door multimodal transport  
5.1.1.  Relevant product market  
(20) According to the Parties,  their business of intra -Europe container liner shipping is 
directly subject to competitive pressure from land transport (especially by truck).  
As a result,  the Parties submit that the relevant market is the market  for intra -
European door -to-door multimodal transport services .14 
(21) Door -to-door multimodal  transport services consist in taking up cargo at an 
agreed point and d elivering it to another agreed point. Customers decide where 
the point of loading and point of delivery are situated and transport services 
providers adapt to this. As the cargo is containerised, it can travel on vessels, 
trucks, trains and barges .15 
(22) In previous decision, the Commission noted that sea vessel operators, truck, rail 
and barge companies offering door -to-door transport ultimately compete on the 
provision of multimodal transport services and transport operators often need to 
combine different modes of transport in order to provide a full door -to-door 
service. The refore, the  Commission conclude d that there is a market for door-to-
door transport services, including all modes of transportation.16 
(23) In the present case, the Commission will assess the effects of the Transaction on 
the market for intra -European door -to-door multimodal transport services . 
5.1.2.  Relevant geographic market  
(24) The Parties claim that the geographic market should be delineated on the basis of 
points of origin (POO) and destination (otherwise reported as Final Place of  
Destination, FPD) rather than on the basis of ports of loading (POL) and delivery  
(POD).17 
(25) In this  respect, the Parties submit that the narro west relevant geographic market 
definition for intra -Europe an door-to-door multimodal transport service s is 
composed  by pairs of countries.18 
(26) In its prior decisional practice, while leaving the geographic market de finition 
open, the Commission has considered that this market could be defined as 
                                                 
14  Form CO, paragraph s 108 and  111. 
15  Case M.7523  – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 24.  
16  Case M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 31.  
17  Form CO, paragraph 1 31. 
18  Form CO, paragraph 13 2. 
 
9 consisting either on a country -by-country (e.g. Spain to Ireland)  or a trade basis  
(i.e. aggregated country pairs, e.g. Iberia to Northern Europe) .19  
(27) For the purpose of the a ssessment of the Transaction, the Commission will adopt 
a conservative approach and consider each country pair separately. Considering 
that the Transaction would not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the 
internal market under any plausible geographic market definition (country pairs or 
trades), the exact geographic scope of the markets can be left open.  
5.1.3.  Conclusion  
(28) The Commission concludes that there is a market for door -to-door transport 
services , in which providers compete for the same customers irrespective of the 
specific mode or modes of transportation . The geographic scope of the market 
may at its narrowest be defined as consisting of country pairs, but may be larger 
in scope.  As however this would not alter the present assessment, t he exact scope 
of the geographic market (country pairs or trades) can be left open.  
5.2. Short -sea container liner shipping services  
5.2.1.  Relevant product market  
(29) Short -sea container liner shipping involves the provision of regular, scheduled 
intra-continental (usual ly costal trade) services for the carriage of cargo by 
container liner shipping companies.  
(30) The Parties consider that short -sea container liner shipping services are part of a 
broader market encompassing alternative modes of transport (in particular 
trucks ).20 
(31) In its prior decisional practice related to container liner shipping services , the 
Commission has defined a separate product market for short -sea container  liner 
shipping , i.e. distinct from deep -sea container shipping , non -liner shipping21 and 
non-containerised shipping , such as bulk shipping .22   
(32) However, the Commission ultimately left open whether the transport of wheeled 
cargo23 should be considered as a different product market.24  
  
                                                 
19  Case M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph s 35 and 36 . 
20  Form CO, paragraph 113.  
21  E.g. tramp or specialised transport.  
22  Cases M.8330 – Maersk Line/HSDG , paragraph 19; M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , para graph  49. 
23  Roll on -roll off ("Ro -Ro") shipping c orresponds to the transport of wheeled cargo (lorries, cars, etc.) 
on ships.  
24  Cases M.8330 – Maersk Line/HSDG , paragraph 19; M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , para graph  50. 
 
10 (33) The Commission also left open whether there should be a sub -segmentat ion 
between reefer and dry transport .25 In the present case, the Parties' proportion of 
reefer activity out of their overall activity does not exceed 10% on the relevant 
legs of trade.  In line with the Commission decisional practice in the short -sea 
contain er liner shipping market, in trades with a share of reefer containers in 
relation to all containerized cargo below 10% in both directions, transport in 
reefer is not assessed separately but as part of the overall market for container 
liner shipping services.26 
(34) During pre -notification contact s, a competitor of t he Parties  indicated  that the 
market for short -sea shipping container liner shipping could be further segmented 
into a market for short -sea Euro Pallet Wide container liner shipping.  Euro Pallet  
Wide containers are 40ft or 45ft containers specifically designed  to optimise the 
transport of goods on Euro pallets  by being a few centimetres wider than standard 
container, thereby allowing for a third row of pallets . Compared  to standard 
containers , Euro Pallet Wide containers can  load about 20% more Euro pallets .  
(35) This competitor considered  that both CMA CGM and Containerships provide 
Euro Pallet Wide containers transport services and would have, post -Transaction, 
high market shares on some legs of tra de.27 On the contrary, the Parties do not 
consider that the transport of Euro Pallet Wide containers constitutes a separate 
market. The Parties  argue that transportation in Euro Pallet Wide containers is 
substitutable to transportation in standard container s, both from a demand -side 
and supply -side perspective.28  
(36) When asked about the possible existence of a sub -segment for the transport of 
cargo in Euro Pallet Wide containers  on short -sea liner shipping vessels , the 
majority of respondents to the market investigation having expressed a view 
indicated that th is is likely to be the case .29 However, the market investigation 
provides evidence of demand - and supply -side substitutability between the 
transport of cargo in Euro Pallet Wide containers and the trans port of cargo in 
standard containers.  
(37) From the demand -side perspective, only a minority of respondents having 
expressed a view considered  that customers have a preference for cargo being 
transported in Euro Pallet Wide containers and have tailored their s upply chain 
accordingly. In addition, only a minority of respondents having expressed a view 
indicated that customers of transport services on Euro Pallet Wide containers 
would not switch to transport services on standard containers in case of a 
                                                 
25  Cases M.8330 – Maersk Line/HSDG , paragraph 19; M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , para graph  48. 
26  Case M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , para graph  40. 
27  See non -confidential minutes of a conference call with a competitor of 7 September 2018.  
28  Reply of the Parties  to QP3 and Form CO, paragraphs 217 et seq .  
29  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, q uestion 11; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 6 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight  Forwarders, question 10.  
 
11 hypothetic al but permanent price increase of transport on Euro Pallet Wide of 5 -
10%.30  
(38) From the supply -side perspective, the market investigation shows that the 
transports of cargo in Euro Pallet Wide containers and on standard containers are 
substitutable. Indeed, a large majority of respondents to the market investigation 
indicated that Euro Pallet Wide containers do not need to be transported on 
specific vessels . Instead, these Euro Pallet Wide containers can be transported on 
standard vessels.31 Besides, it is unc lear whether there is a cost -advantage in 
having vessels designed to optimise the transport of Euro Pallet Wide containers, 
since the views of the market respondents having expressed a view are split.32   
(39) On the basis of the available evidence, the Commissi on considers that short -sea 
Euro Pallet Wide container liner shipping does not constitute a separate product 
market. The short -sea transport of Euro Pallet Wide containers will therefore be 
assessed as part of the overall market for short -sea container lin er shipping 
services.  
5.2.2.  Relevant geographic market  
(40) In prior decisions , the Commission considered that the relevant  geographic 
market for short -sea container liner shipping should be defined on the basis of 
single trades, defined by the range of ports which are served at both ends of the 
service.33  
(41) The market investigation confirmed that the geographic scope of the market for 
short -sea container liner shipping services should be defined on the basis of 
trades, because shipping companies can serve a range of p orts at both ends of a 
service.34 
(42) The Parties agreed with this geographic market definition and have suggested the 
following aggregations:  
- Benelux -Germany: Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Germany;35 
- British Isles: United Kingdom and Ireland;36  
                                                 
30  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 1 6; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 11 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight  Forwarders, question 15.  
31  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 1 4.3; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 9.3 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight  Forwarders, question 13.3.   
32  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 1 4.3.2 ; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 9.3.2  and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight  Forwarders, question 13.3.2.   
33  Cases M.8330 – Maersk Line/HSDG , paragraph 20 ; M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , para graph 59.  
34  See r eplies to Q1 – Question naire to Competitors, question 19 ; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 14 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight  Forwarders, question 18.   
35  As endorsed by the Commission in case M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , para graphs 56 and 58.  
 
12 - Iberia: Spain and Portugal;37 
- Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania;  
- Scandinavia: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden;  
- Other countries such as Algeria, Poland or Russia are treated on a 
standalone basis.  
(43) During the market investigation , no responden t expressed substantiated concerns 
about the trade delineations suggested by the Parties. In particular, concerning the 
suggested Scandinavian and Baltic trades , which  have not been examined by the 
Commission in its prior decisions, a majority of responden ts having expressed a 
view were of the opinion  that it is not necessary to consider Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Denmark, Finland, Norway or Sweden as separate ends of trades.38 
(44) In prior decisions, the Commission also considered a further delineation 
accordi ng to legs of trade but ultimately left the exact market definition open.39  
(45) For the purpose of the assessment of the Transaction, the  Commission will  adopt 
a conservative approach and  consider each leg of trade separately. Considering 
that the Transaction would not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the 
internal market under any plausible geographic market definition, the exact 
geographic scope of the markets can be left open.  
5.2.3.  Conclusion  
(46) The Commission concludes that, for the purpose of asse ssing the Transaction, a 
product market for short -sea container liner shipping services  should be 
considered.  
(47) The geographic scope of this market is delineated on the basis of single trades, 
defined by the range of ports which are called at both ends of s ervice. A  
narrowest geographic market definition (i.e. on the basis of legs of trade) might 
also be considered.  
(48) However, i t is not necessary to conclude on a precise definition of the relevant 
product and geographic markets as the Transaction does not rai se serious doubts 
as to its compatibility with the internal market, under any plausible definition of 
the markets for short -sea container  liner shipping  services .  
                                                                                                                                                 
36  As endorsed by the Commission in case M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , para graphs 56 and 58.  
37  As endorsed by the Commission in case M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , para graphs 56 and 58.  
38  See r eplies to Q1 – Question naire to Competitors, question 20 ; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 15 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight  Forwarders, question 19.   
39  Cases M.8330 – Maersk Line/HSDG , paragraph 20 ; M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , para graph  60. 
 
13 5.3. Container terminal services  
5.3.1.  Relevant product market  
(49) Container terminal services (also called stevedoring services) are "input services" 
to container liner shipping. In previous cases the p rovision of container 
stevedoring services by terminal operators has been defined as involving the 
loading, unloading, storage, and land -side handli ng for inland transportation of 
containerised cargo.40 
(50) The Parties consider that in the present case the relevant product market is the 
market for the provision of stevedoring services to container shipping lines and 
that it is not necessary to address whet her hinterland and transhipment traffic 
constitute  separate markets .41  
(51) In previous decisions the Commission has delineated container terminal services 
by traffic flows, and has considered separate markets for container terminal 
services for hinterland traf fic and container terminal services for transhipment 
traffic , ultimately leaving the product market definition open .42 
(52) In the present case, the Commission will assess the effects of the Transaction on 
the market for container terminal  services  for hinterlan d traffic and for 
transhipment traffic .  
(53) Considering that the Transaction would not raise serious doubts as to its 
compatibility with the internal market under any plausible product market 
definition, the exact delineation of the market can be left open.  
5.3.2.  Relevant geographic market  
(54) In its prior decisional practice, the Commission considered that the relevant 
geographic dimension of container terminal services is, in its broadest scope, 
regions, such as Northern Europe (for transhipment traffic), or, in its narrowest 
possible scope, the catchment area of the ports in a certain range, such as 
Hamburg -Antwerp (for hinterland traffic) or possibly even narrower, comprising 
the ports of a single Member State only.43  
                                                 
40  Cases M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , para graph 63; M.5398 – Hutchison/Evergreen , paragraph 9.  
41  Form CO, paragraph 1 25. 
42  Cases M.8330 –  Maersk Line/HSDG , paragraph 29; M.8120 – Hapag -Lloyd/United Arab Shipping 
Company , paragraphs 21 and 24; M.7908 – CMA CGM/NOL , paragraph 17; M.5450 – 
Kühne/HGV/TUI/Hapag -Lloyd , paragraph 16 , and M.5398 – Hutchison/Evergreen , paragraphs 9 
and10.  
43  Cases M.8330 – Maersk Line/HSDG , paragraph 32; M.8120 – Hapag -Lloyd/United Arab Shipping 
Company , paragraphs  22-24; M.7908 – CMA CGM/NOL , paragraph 18; M. 7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , 
paragraph 65; M.5450 – Kühne/HGV/TUI/Hapag -Lloyd , paragraph 16; and M.5066 – 
Eurogate/APMM , paragraphs  15-23. 
 
14 (55) The Parties agree with the Commission's prior de cisional practice . In line with a 
recent decision, 44 the Parties submit that the geographic dimension of container 
terminal services for transhipment traffic could be Saint -Nazaire – Rotterdam, 
while the geographic scope of container terminal services for hinterland traffic 
would be Le Havre -Rotterdam .45 
(56) In the present case the Commission will assess the effects of the Transaction on 
the markets for container terminal services both in its broadest scope  (regions, 
such as Northern Europe  for transhipment traffic), and in its narrowest possible 
scope  (the catch ment area of the ports in a certain range, for hinterland traffic) . 
(57) Considering that the Transaction would not raise serious doubts as to its 
compatibility with the internal market under any plausible geographic market 
definition (regions or catchment area s), the exact geographic scope of the markets 
can be left open.  
5.3.3.  Conclusion  
(58) For the purpose of this Decision, it is not necessary to conclude on a precise 
definition of the relevant product and geographic market since the Transaction 
would not raise serious  doubts  as to its compatibility with the internal market 
under any of the plausible definitions of the markets for container terminal 
services . 
5.4. Freight forwarding services  
5.4.1.  Relevant product market  
(59) The Commission  has defined freight forwarding as " the organi sation of 
transportation of items (possibly including activities such as customs clearance, 
warehousing, ground services, etc.) on behalf of customers according to their 
needs ".46 
(60) In its prior decisional practice, the Commission  subdivided the market into 
domestic freight forwarding and cross -border freight forwarding, and , on the basis 
of the mode of transport, into freight forwarding by air, land, and sea.47 
  
                                                 
44  Case M.8459 – TIL/PSA/PSA DGD , para graph 21.  
45  Form CO, paragraph s 146, 253 and 255 . For tr anshipment traffic, the Parties have taken a conservative 
approach by including Saint -Nazaire, which increases CMA CGM share.  
46  Cases M.8594 – COSCO SHIPPING/OOIL , paragraph 23; M.8120 –Hapag -Lloyd/United Arab 
Shipping Company , para graph  26; M.7268 – CSAV/HGV/Kühne  Maritime/Hapag -Lloyd , paragraph 3; 
M.6059 – Norbert Dentressangle/Laxey Logistics , paragraph  17.  
47  Cases M.8594 – COSCO SHIPPING/OOIL , para graph  23; M.8330 – Maersk Line/HSDG , paragraph 
38; M.8120 – Hapag -Lloyd/United Arab Shipping Company , paragraphs 2 6-27, M.7630 – 
FEDEX/TNT EXPRESS , paragraphs 24 -25; and M.6059 – Norbert Dentressangle/Laxey Logistics , 
paragraph 18.  
 
15 (61) In the present case , the Commission will assess the effects of the Transaction on 
the market for freight forwarding services, subdivided into domestic freight 
forwarding and cross -border freight forwarding, and , on the basis of the mode of 
transport, into freight forwarding by air, land, and sea . 
(62) However , considering that the Transaction would not rai se serious doubts as to its 
compatibility with the internal market under any plausible product market 
definition, the exact delineation of the market can be left open.  
5.4.2.  Relevant geographic market  
(63) The Parties submit that the market for freight forwarding is at least national in 
scope .48 
(64) In past decisions, the Commission  has left open whether the geographic scope of 
the market is national or wider than national .49 Specifically, the Commission 
defined the market for sea freight forwarding as at least national .50 
(65) In the present case, the Commission will adopt a conservative approach and 
consider each country as a separate market. Since  the Transaction would not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market under any plausible 
geographic mark et definition, the exact geographic scope of the markets can be 
left open.  
5.4.3.  Conclusion  
(66) The Commission concludes that, for the purpose of assessing the Transaction,  the 
precise relevant product and geographic market definition for freight forwarding 
services  can be left open as the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its 
compatibility with the internal market under any plausible definition .  
6. COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT  
6.1. Horizontal overlaps – Intra -European door -to-door multimodal transport  
(67) The Parties are active on a number of Intra -European markets for the provision of 
door-to-door multimodal transport services delineated on the basis of country 
pairs , which is the most conservative approach that the Commission has adopted 
so far  as indicated in Sectio n 5.1.3 .51 If the Commission were to assess the impact 
                                                 
48  Form CO, paragraph 148. 
49  Case s M.8330 – Maersk Line/HSDG , paragraph 39;  M.8120 – Hapag -Lloyd/United Arab Shipping 
Company , paragraphs  26-27; M.7630 – FEDEX/TNT EXPRESS , paragraph s 24-25; and  M.6059  – 
Norbert Dentressangle/Laxey Logistics , paragraph s 20 and  22. 
50  Cases M.8594 – COSCO SHIPPING/OOIL , para graph  24; M.8120 – Hapag -Lloyd/United Arab 
Shipping Company , paragraph 26 , M.5450 – Kühne/HGV/TUI/Hapag -Lloyd , para graph 18; M.5480 – 
Deutsche Bahn/PCC Logistics , para graphs 12-17. 
51  According to the data provided by the Parties, […]% and […]% of the volumes shipped in 2017  by 
CMA CGM and  Container Finance , respectively , include d an intermodal component. Form  CO, 
paragraphs 78 and 64 . 
 
16 of the Transaction on this product market on the basis of a broader geographic 
market definition, the Parties' market shares would be further (significantly) 
lower.  According to the Parties’ estimates,  which are based on the most 
conservative approach,  four affected markets arise from t he Transaction, as listed 
in Table 1 below.  
Table 1 - Parties' combined market shares – Intra -European door -to-door multimodal transport services 
in 201752 
From  To Total 
size 
market 
(TEU)  CMA 
CGM 
(TEU)  CMA 
CGM  
(%) Container ships 
(TEU)  Containerships  
(%) CMA CGM  
+ 
Container -
ships  
Netherlands  Finland  [50 000 - 
100 000]  […] [0-5]% […] [20-30]% [20-30]% 
Russia  UK [10 000  - 
50 000]  […] [0-5]% […] [40-50% [40-50]% 
UK Russia  [10 000  - 
50 000]  […] [0-5]% […] [20-30]% [20-30]% 
Lithuania  Ireland  [0 -  
10 000]  […] [0-5]% […] [40-50]% [40-50]% 
Source: Fo rm CO, paragraph 204 .  
6.1.1.  Data sources  
(68) The Parties commissioned [External Consultant]  to de termine the total market 
size.53 [External Consultant]  defines the overall market as that between shippers 
and receivers in individual countries which includes cargo moved overland by 
road or rail in competition with shipping. [External Consultant]  estimates  this 
volume by reference to trade and intrastate data by commodity . It then converts 
that data to the equiva lent TEU , if cargo is carried entirely by container.  
(69) The difficulty in collecting reliable data relating to door -to-door multimodal 
transport was already acknowledged by the Commission in a prior decision.54 
During the market investigation, t he Commission a sked com petitors to provide an 
estimate of the overall size of the markets , as well as their volumes shipped on the 
relevant country pairs . Competitors did not always confirm the Parties' 
submission  as regards total market size. It therefore appears  that the Parties' 
estimation of the total market size  might  be either underestimated or 
overestimated.55  
                                                 
52  Form CO, Table under paragraph 161.  
53  [External Consultant]  is a consultancy which provides and advises on strategic, commercial and 
economic issues mainly related to cargo transport and logistics . [External Consultant]  estimated the 
total market based on its own internal database ( […]). 
54  Case M.7523  – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragrap h 78.  
55   Form CO, table at paragraph 161. See replies  to Q1 – Questionnaire to Co mpetitors, question 41.  
 
17 6.1.2.  The Parties' view  
(70) The Parties claim that i n all four affected markets the increment is negligible. It is 
therefore unlikely that competition concerns would arise as a result of the 
Transaction.  
(71) More specifically, in two of the four country pairs , namely  United Kingdom to 
Russia and the Netherlands to Finland , the Parties’  market shares slightly exceed 
20% and the increment is less than [0-5]% with a HHI delta  below […].56 The 
increment brought by CGM CMA in actual volume transported  - equal to […] 
TEUs  - represents less than an average short -sea vessel.  
(72) In the remaining two country pairs , namely  Lithuania to Ireland and Russia 
to United Kingdom , the Parties’ ma rket shares reach [40-50]% for each country 
pair. However, the increment brought by the Transaction is  negligible 
(respectively [0-5]% and [0-5]%). In addition to that , the overall size of the 
market  is very small, below 3 000 TEUs.  
(73) Moreover, in all four country pairs, post -Transaction the Parties  will face 
competition from both,  transportation by road, and several other large and well -
established shipping companies.  Indeed, competition from trucks represents a 
significant competitive constraint.57 The Part ies also claim that barriers to entry 
are not significant as both ships and port slots are easily accessible.58 
(74) Therefore, the Parties argue that  the Transaction does not raise any competition 
concerns in any of the above country pairs.  
6.1.3.  Commission's assessm ent  
(75) The Commission's market investigation has confirmed that the Transaction  is 
unlikely to raise competition concerns in any of the four affected markets.  
(76) Having regard to volume figures, the increment brought about by CMA CGM is 
marginal  in each of the relevant  country pairs . Furthermore,  and in line with the 
Commission decisional practice , country pairs where one end is outside the EEA , 
such as the UK to Russia and Russia to UK  country pair s, can be considered as a 
non-substantial part of the internal m arket.59 
(77) All the four country pairs may also be partially reached by land  transport . It is 
therefore probable that trucking companies do , and will continue to , exert a 
significant competitive constraint on the Parties and other shipping companies on 
the four affected country pairs. The market investigation has confirmed that, 
depending on the country pairs considered, truck companies represent one  of the 
main competitors of carriers that provided intra -European multimodal transport 
                                                 
56  Form CO, p aragraphs 307 and 313 . 
57  Form CO, paragraph 320.  
58  Form CO, paragraphs 323 -324. 
59  Case M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 88.  
 
18 services.60 In addition,  besides transportation by road, the Parties will face the 
competition from other established sea carriers on the relevant country pairs. As 
confirmed by the market investigation, the individual or combined volumes 
transported by Evergreen, Maersk, OOCL, S amskip and Unifeeder on the relevant 
country pairs are at least equal to the increment brought about by the 
Transaction.61  
(78) With respect to all affected country pairs, the number of respondents to the 
market investigation who believe that, should price increase post-Transaction, 
capacity on the said country pairs could be easily increased, is twice as high as the 
number of those who think that capacity could not be increased easily.62 
(79) Furthermore, the country pairs are served by either CMA CGM or both CMA 
CGM  and Containerships, indirectly, i.e. through transhipment. Similar services 
could be therefore also offered by other carriers serving one of the two ends of the 
country pair and a European hub.63 
(80) Finally, the majority of the respondents to the market inves tigation having 
expressed a view indicate that the Transaction will have a neutral or positive 
impact on their company and on competition.64 No respondent to the market 
investigation expressed substantiated concerns about the Transaction in relation to 
the market for door -to-door multimodal transport services.65 
6.1.4.  Conclusion   
(81) In light of the above, the Commission concludes that the Transaction does not  
raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with respect to 
Intra -Europe door -to-door multimodal transport services , under any plausible 
geographic market definition . 
6.2. Horizontal overlaps – Short -sea container liner shipping services  
6.2.1.  Analytical Framework  
Consortia  
(82) In its prior decisions, t he Commission has considered that consortium members 
jointly agree on the capacity that will be offered by the service, on its schedule 
and ports of call. Generally, each party provides a number of vessels for operating 
                                                 
60  See non -confidential minutes of the conference call with a competitor of 11 September 2018 and reply 
of a competitor to eQ1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 44.1 " Still other modes of 
transportation is the main competitor ". 
61  See replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 41.  
62  See repl ies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 42.  
63  Case M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph  96. 
64  See repl ies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, questions 44 and 46.  
65  See repl ies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, questions 44 and 46.  
 
19 the joint service and in exchange receives a number of container slots across all  
vessels deployed in the joint service based on the total vessel capacity it 
contributes. The allocation of container slots is usually predetermined  and 
shipping companies are not compensated if the slots attributed to them are not 
used. The costs for the operation of the service are generally borne by the vessel 
providers individually so that there is limited to no sharing costs between the 
participants in a consortium.66 
(83) The Commission has considered that it was not appropriate to assess the effects of 
the concentration only on the basis of the Parties' individual market shares.  Such 
an approach would not adequately take into account that a member of an 
alliance/consortium can have a significant influence on operational decisions 
determining service charact eristics. This influence can have a dampening effect 
on competition on the trades served by the alliance/consortium in question. 
Hence , the competitive assessment should also be based on the aggregate shares 
of the Parties' consortia.67  
(84) CMA CGM has entered  into a consortia/vessel sharing agreement (VSA)68 on one 
of the trades where the Parties' short -sea activities overlap. CMA CGM is party to 
a VSA with Fesco Line on the trade Benelux -Germany to Russia.69 By contrast, 
Containerships is not a party to any ves sel sharing agreement on the overlap 
trades. Therefore, the VSA with Fesco Line on the trade Benelux -Germany to 
Russia is the only consortium that is relevant for the assessment of the 
Transaction.  
(85)  In line with the prior decisional practice, the Commissio n will assess the effects 
of the Transaction on the trade Benelux -Germany to Russia by taking into 
account the aggregate market shares of the Parties and Fesco, CMA CGM's 
consortium partner on that overlap trade.  
Data sources  
(86) In order to determine the tota l size of the market, the Parties have primarily used 
Container Trade Statistics (CTS) from which it is possible to extract volumes 
transported on a country by country basis.70  
(87) However, the data extracted from CTS on total volume transported led to 
inconsi stent results on some legs of trade, wh ere Parties' market shares would 
exceed 100%. The Parties explain that these inconsistencies are linked to the fact 
                                                 
66  Cases M.8594 – COSCO SHIPPING /OOIL , paragraph 28.  
67  See for instance Cases M.8594 – COSCO SHIPPING /OOIL , paragraphs 32 -33; M.8330 – Maersk 
Line/HSDG , paragraph 60; M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph  33. 
68  A VSA is an agreemen t between two of more carriers in which a number of container positions 
("slots") equal in space are reserved on particular vessels for each of the participants (Form CO, 
footnote 61).  
69  Form CO, paragraph 195.  
70  Form CO, paragraph 173.  
 
20 that most short -sea carriers active in intra -Europe , in particular in the Baltic and 
Scandinavia regi ons, do not report to CTS. CTS itself estimates the volumes of 
these non -contributing lines. The Parties submit that CTS underestimates, 
sometimes significantly, the volumes transported by these competitors.71  
(88) For the legs of trade where the market shares exceeded 100% based on CTS data, 
the Parties have commissioned [External Consultant] to estimate the total volume 
of maritime traffic based on Eurostat data.72 However, the Parties indicate that for 
the trades where cargo is principally transported via indirect services (e.g. 
between Iberia to the Baltic region), the market shares based on [External 
Consultant] data might be underestimated.73 
(89) As a result, the mar ket shares provided by the Parties might be overestimated for 
trades where CTS data is used, while they might be underestimated where 
[External Consultant] data is used. The Commission has therefore used in its 
assessment either CTS or [External Consultant ] data provided by the Parties, 
depending on which data was closer to market reality as checked during the 
market investigation.  
(90) During the market investigation , the Commission has asked competitors to 
provide the ir volumes shipped on the relevant legs of  trade, as well as their best 
estimates of the total volumes shipped on these legs. Where  no reliable estimates 
of the total size of the market could be established , market shares will be viewed 
critically , for the purpose of the assessment of the Transact ion. The Commission 
will also base its assessment on the actual volumes shipped and more broadly on 
the functioning of the market.  
Overview of the affected markets  
(91) As explained in paragraph (45) above, the Commission will adopt a conservative 
approach and consider each leg of trade separately. If the Commission were to 
assess the impact of the Transaction on this market on the basis of a broader 
geographic market d efinition (i.e. assess the effects of the Transaction on the 
trade), the Parties' market shares would be (significantly) lower.  
(92) On the basis of the most conservative market shares and taking account of the 
Parties' consortia, the Transaction gives rise to 18 affected markets. Those are: 
Baltic States to Benelux -Germany, Baltic -States to British Isles, Baltic States to 
Scandinavia, Benelux -Germany to Baltic States, B enelux -Germany to Russia, 
Benelux -Germany to Scandinavia, British Isles to Russia, British Is les to 
Scandinavia, Iberia to Algeria, Iberia to Scandinavia, Poland to British Isles, 
Russia to Benelux -Germany, Russia to British Isles, Russia to Scandinavia, 
Scandinavia to Benelux -Germany, Scandinavia to British Isles, Scandinavia to 
Iberia and Scandi navia to Russia.  
                                                 
71  Form CO, paragraph 174.  
72  Form CO, paragraph 176.  
73  Form CO, paragraph 177.  
 
21 (93) The Parties submit that the leg of trade Benelux -Germany to Russia constitutes an 
affected market only when taking account of the market shares of CMA CGM's 
consortium partner.74 However, in line with its decisional practice, the 
Commissio n aggregated the market shares of the consortium members and 
consequently consider the leg of trade as an affected market.  
(94) The Parties have also treated the legs of trade Baltic States to Benelux -Germany, 
Benelux -Germany to Scandinavia  and Scandinavia to Benelux -Germany as 
affected markets, even though the combined market shares are below 20% on the 
basis of [External Consultant] data.75 The Parties have also analysed Scandinavia -
Russia as an affected market, despite the fact that neither [External Consultant] 
nor CTS data on the total market size seem reliable, resulting in a combined 
market share exceeding 100%.76  
6.2.2.  General considerations on the market structure  
Barriers to entry  
(95) The Parties suggest that the market for short -sea container l iner shipping services 
is characteris ed by non -significant barriers to entry . Indeed, the Parties indicate 
that the two elements needed in order to enter the short -sea container liner 
shipping market, that is ships and port slots, are easily accessible .77 In addition, 
the Parties argue that there is no need to own vessels to operate a service, since it 
is possible to purchase capacities from third party vessel operators . This  is 
common practice in the industry.78 In that regard, the Parties submit that their 
vessel utilisation rate vary between […]% and […]%, which indicates that the 
Parties could for instance sell capacity to third parties.79  
(96) The market investigation shows that the re are no major barriers to entry or 
expansion. However,  costs of entry or expa nsion vary according to the chosen 
way of entry. Although some competitors highlight that entering individually a 
new trade can be costly, other competitors submit that other way s of entry, for 
instance via slot chartering or joining a consortium, are less  capital intensive.80  
                                                 
74  Form CO, paragraph 198.  
75  Form CO , paragraph 206.  
76  Form CO , paragraph 207.  
77  Form CO, paragraph s 323 et seq .  
78  Form CO, paragraph 325.  
79  Form CO, Annex 15 "Parties Average Vessel Utilisation Rate".  
80  See replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, questions 32 and 33. For instance, a competitor 
submits that " A slot charter is the least capital intensive way to enter […]. Jointing or f orming a 
consortium constitutes a middle course to individually operating a service with own vessels ".  
 
22 (97) In terms of time, competitors consider that entry or expansion could be achieved 
within 3 to 12 months.81 
(98) Besides, all the competitors having expressed a view indicate that the Transaction 
does not have any impact on their entry or expansion plans.82  
(99) In its prior decisions, the Commission has acknowledged that barriers to entry 
appear to be rather low on intra -Europe short -sea shipping markets.83 As 
confirmed by the market investigation, the Commission considers  that the market 
for in tra-European short -sea container liner shipping is characterised by low 
barriers to entry  and that entry could take place within a relatively short time 
frame.  
Switching costs  
(100)  The Parties argue that, from the demand -side perspective, customers may 
seamlessly change carrier.84  
(101)  The market investigation confirmed this finding. A majority of customers 
consider that it would be easy to switch from one sea carrier to another.85 Direct 
customers also indicated that switching would usually take between a few  days to 
a few months.  
(102)  In its prior decisions, the Commission has acknowledged that switching costs do 
not appear to be prohibitively high on intra -Europe short -sea shipping markets.86 
The Commission considers that in the present case switching costs do no t appear 
to be prohibitively high.  
Competition from other modes of transport  
(103)  The Parties consider that other modes of transport, especially road transportation , 
constitute  a powerful competitive constraint.87 They further submit that  customers 
are also abl e to switch easily from maritime transportation to road 
transportation.88 
                                                 
81  See replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 32.2.  
82  See repl ies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 36.  
83  Cases M.8330 – Maersk Line/HSDG , paragraph 209; M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 109.  
84  Form CO, paragraph 330.  
85  See repl ies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight Forwarders, question 24 and Q2  – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 19.  
86  Cases M.8330 – Maersk Li ne/HSDG , paragraph 209; M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 113.  
87  Form CO , paragraph 320.  
88  Form CO, paragraph 331.  
 
23 (104)  Respondents  to the market investigation confirmed that , on the trades where the 
Parties' activities overlap, other modes of transport (e.g. trucks, train, deep -sea 
vessels) may exert a competitive constraint on short -sea container liner services 
providers .89  
(105)  The outcome of the market investigation as to whether switching into a different 
mode of transport would be easy is rather inconclusive. The majority of direct 
customers having exp ressed a view consider switching into a different mode of 
transport somewhat difficult, while none of the freight forwarders having 
expressed a view consider switching as difficult.90  
(106)  In its prior decisional practice, the Commission has acknowledged that s hort-sea 
container liner shipping services are exposed to competitive pressure from other 
modes of transportation.91 The Commission therefore considers that, on certain 
intra-European trades, short -sea container liner shipping services might be subject 
to competition from other modes of transport.  
6.2.3.  Baltic States to Benelux -Germany  
(107)  The following table show s the Parties' transported volumes  on the leg of trade 
Baltic States to Benelux -Germany.  
 Volumes transported  (TEUs)  Market shares  in actual volume 
transported (MDS)  
CMA CGM  […] [0-5]% 
Containerships  […] [0-5]% 
Parties combined  […] [0-5]% 
Total market  [250 000  - 500 000] 100%  
Source: Form CO, paragraphs 181, 209 and 3 90.  
(108)  According to the [External Consultant] database, the Parties' combined market 
share would be below 20% . As a result, that market would not be considered as 
an affected market.  
(109)  In any event, the increment brought about by the Transaction is not significant. 
Indeed, the volume transported by CMA CGM represents less than [0-5]% of the 
volume transported by Containerships in 2017. In that regard, the Parties submit 
that CMA CGM tran sported less than the equivalent of a ship in 2017.92  
                                                 
89  See replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 40 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight 
Forwarders, question 28.   
90  See replies to Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct Customers, question 20 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight 
Forwarders, question 2 4.   
91  Case M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 62.  
92  Form CO, paragraph 390.  
 
24 (110)  In addition, the market investigation confirmed that the Parties will face 
significant competition from other sea carriers such as  Samskip , Team Lines and 
Unifeeder .93  
(111)  Furthermore, a majority of respondents to the market investigation having 
expressed a view consider that the competitive constraints on the merged entity 
would be sufficient to prevent the Parties from raising prices on the leg Baltic 
States to Benelux -Germany.94  
(112)  In view of the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the 
Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal 
market with respect to the leg of trade Baltic States to Benelux -Germany, under 
any plausible  market definition.  
6.2.4.  Baltic States to British Isles  
(113)  The following table shows the  Parties' transported volumes on the leg of trade 
Baltic States to British Isles .  
 Volumes transported (TEUs)  Market shares in actual volume 
transported ( MDS ) 
CMA CGM  […] [0-5]% 
Containerships  […] [70-80]% 
Parties 
combined  […] [70-80]% 
Total market  [10 000 – 50 000]  100%  
Source: Form CO, paragraphs 181, 209 and 3 38.  
(114)  As explained in paragraph s (86) et seq.  above, there is no reliable information on 
the total volume transported on this leg of trade. Therefore, the market shares 
should be viewed  critically.  
(115)  According to the [External Con sultant]  database, the Parties' combined market 
share would be [70-80]%, with an increment of [0-5]%.  
(116)  In terms of volumes transported,  the increment brought about by the Transaction 
is not significant. Indeed, the volume transported by CMA CGM represents less 
than [0-5]% of the volume transported by Containerships in 2017.  
(117)  In addition, the market investigation confirmed that the Parties  will face 
significant competition from other sea carriers such as Samskip , Seago (Maersk), 
and Unifeeder .95  
                                                 
93  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, questio n 21.   
94  See replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 39; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 23 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight Forwarders, question 27.   
95  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question  21.   
 
25 (118)  Furthermore, a majority of respondents to the market investigation having 
expressed a view consider that the competitive constraints on the merged entity 
would be sufficient to prevent the Parties from raising prices on the leg Baltic 
States to British Isl es.96  
(119)  In view of the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the 
Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal 
market with respect to the leg of trade Baltic States to British Isles, under any 
plausible mar ket definition.  
6.2.5.  Baltic States to Scandinavia  
(120)  The following table shows the Parties' transported volumes  on the leg of trade 
Baltic States to Scandinavia.  
 Volumes transported  (TEUs)  Market shares  in actual volume 
transported (CTS)  
CMA CGM  […] [0-5]% 
Containerships  […] [10-20]% 
Parties combined  […] [20-30]% 
Total market  [5 000 – 10 000]  100%  
Source: Form CO, paragraphs 181, 209 and 3 70.  
(121)  Post-Transaction, the Parties will have a combined market share of [20-30]% with 
an increment of [0-5]%.  
(122)  Besides this limited combined market share, the market investigation confirmed 
that the Parties will face significant competition from other short -sea container 
liner shipping services providers, such as Hapag -Lloyd, Seago (Maersk) and  
Unifeeder .97   
(123)  A majo rity of respondents to the market investigation having expressed a view 
consider that the competitive constraints on the merged entity would be sufficient 
to prevent the Parties from raising prices on the leg Baltic States to Scandinavia .98  
(124)  In view of the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the 
Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal 
market with respect to the leg of trade Baltic States to Scandinavia, under any 
plausible market definition.  
                                                 
96  See replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 39; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 23 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight Forwarders, question 27.   
97  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question  21.   
98  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 39; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 23 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight  Forwarders, question 27.   
 
26 6.2.6.  Benelux -Germany to Baltic States  
(125)  The following table shows the Parties' transported volumes  on the leg of trade 
Benelux -Germany to Baltic States .  
 Volumes transported (TEUs)  Market shares  in actual volume 
transported (CTS)  
CMA CGM  […] [0-5]% 
Containerships  […] [40-50]% 
Parties combined  […] [40-50]% 
Total market  [10 000 - 50 000]  100%  
Source: Form CO, paragraphs 181, 209 and 3 48.  
(126)  Post-Transaction, the Parties will have a combined market share of [40-50]% with 
a negligible increment of [0-5]%.  
(127)  Besides the se moderate  combined market share  and increment , the market 
investigation confirmed that the Parties will face significant competition from 
other short -sea container liner shipping services providers, such as Samskip, 
Seago (Maersk) , Team Lines  and Unifeeder.99   
(128)  A majority of respondents to the market investigation having expressed a view 
consider that the competitive constraints on the merged entity would be sufficient 
to prevent the Parties from raising prices on the leg  Benelux -Germany to  Baltic 
States.100  
(129)  In view of the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the 
Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal 
market with respect to the leg Benelux -Germany to Baltic States , under any 
plausible market definition . 
6.2.7.  Benelux -Germany to Russia  
(130)  The following table shows the Parties' transported volumes  on the leg of trade 
Benelux -Germany to Russia .   
                                                 
99  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question  21.   
100  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 39; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 23 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight  Forwarders, question 27.   
 
27  
 Volumes transported (TEUs)  Market shares  in actual volume 
transported (CTS)  
CMA CGM  […] [0-5]% 
Containerships  […] [10-20]% 
Parties combined  […] [10-20]% 
Fesco (consortium 
member)  n/a [5-10]% 
Total market  [100 000 – 250 000]  100%  
Source: Form CO, paragraphs 181, 209 and 3 35. 
(131)  As explained in paragraphs (82)-(85) above, the Commission aggregates the 
market shares of the Parties and their consortia members . When taking account of 
CMA CGM's consortium member, the combined market share reaches [20-30]% 
post-Transaction . However, when only taking into account the Parties ' individual  
market share , the combined market share post -Transaction is  [10-20]%. The 
Tran saction would therefore not give rise to an affected market.  
(132)  Besides the se limited combined market share  and increment , the market 
investigation confirmed that the Parties will face significant competition from 
other short -sea container liner shipping serv ices providers, such as OOCL, Seago 
(Maersk) , Samskip and Unifeeder .101   
(133)  A majority of respondents to the market investigation having expressed a view 
consider that the competitive constraints on the merged entity would be sufficient 
to prevent the Parties from raising prices on the leg Benelux -Germany to 
Russia .102  
(134)  Furthermore, one end of the leg of trade is outside the EEA. The leg of trade 
could therefore be considered as a non -substantial part of the internal market.103 
(135)  In view of the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the 
Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal 
market with respect to the leg of trade Benelux -Germany to Russia , under any 
plausible market definit ion.  
6.2.8.  Benelux -Germany to Scandinavia  
(136)  The following table shows the  Parties' transported volumes on the leg of trade 
Benelux -Germany to Scandinavia.  
                                                 
101  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question  21.   
102  See r eplies to  Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 39; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 23 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight  Forwarders, question 27.   
103  See Article 2 of the Merger Regulation and, by analogy, Case M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragra ph 
88 (where, in the market for door -to-door multimodal transport services, one end is outside the EEA, 
the country -pair has been considered as a non -substantial part of the internal market).   
 
28  Volumes transported  (TEUs)  Market shares  in actual volume 
transported (MDS)  
CMA CGM  […] [0-5]% 
Containerships  […] [0-5]% 
Parties combined  […] [0-5]% 
Total market  [500 000 – 1 000 000]  100%  
Source: Form CO, paragraphs 181, 209 and 3 88. 
(137)  According to the [External Consultant] database, the Parties' combined market 
share would be below 20% . As a result, that market would not be considered as 
an affected market.  
(138)  In any event, the increment brought about by the Transaction is negligible. 
Indeed, the volume transported by CMA CGM represents less than [0-5]% of the 
volume transported by Containerships in 2017.  
(139)  In addition, the market investigation confirmed that the Parties will face 
significant competition from other sea carriers such as Samskip , Team Lines and 
Unifeeder .104  
(140)  Furthermore, a majority of respo ndents to the market investigation having 
expressed a view consider that the competitive constraints on the merged entity 
would be sufficient to prevent the Parties from raising prices on the leg Benelux -
Germany  to Scandinavia .105  
(141)  In view of the above consi derations, the Commission concludes that the 
Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal 
market with respect to the leg of trade Benelux -Germany to Scandinavia, under 
any plausible market definition.  
6.2.9.  British Isles t o Russia  
(142)  The following table shows the Parties' transported volumes  on the leg of trade 
British Isles to Russia.  
 Volumes transported (TEUs)  Market shares  in actual volume 
transported (CTS)  
CMA CGM  […] [0-5]% 
Containerships  […] [40-50]% 
Parties combined  […] [40-50]% 
Total market  [10 000 – 50 000]  100%  
Source: Form CO, paragraphs 181, 209 and 3 56. 
                                                 
104  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question  21.   
105  See replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 39; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 23 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight Forwarders, question 27.   
 
29 (143)  Post-Transaction, the Parties will have a combined market share of [40-50]% with 
a limited  increment of [0-5]%.  
(144)  The market investigation confirmed that the Parties will face significant 
competition from well-established  short -sea container liner shipping services 
providers, in particular  Hapag -Lloyd, Samskip, Seago (Maersk)  and Unifeeder .106   
(145)  A majority of respondents to  the market investigation having expressed a view 
consider that the competitive constraints on the merged entity would be sufficient 
to prevent the Parties from raising prices on the leg British Isles to Russia .107  
(146)  Furthermore, one end of the leg of trade is outside the EEA. The leg of trade 
could therefore be considered as a non -substantial part of the internal market.108 
(147)  In view of the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the 
Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility w ith the internal 
market with respect to the leg of trade British Isles to Russia , under any plausible 
market definition.  
6.2.10.  British Isles to Scandinavia  
(148)  The following table shows the Parties' transported volumes  on the leg of trade 
British Isles to Scandinav ia.  
 Volumes transported (TEUs)  Market shares  in actual volume 
transported (CTS)  
CMA CGM  […] [20-30]% 
Containerships  […] [20-30]% 
Parties combined  […] [40-50]% 
Total market  [10 000 – 50 000]  100%  
Source: Form CO, paragraphs 181, 209 and 3 53. 
(149)  Post-Transaction, the Parties will have a combined market share of [40-50]%.  
(150)  Besides, the market investigation confirmed that the Parties will face significant 
competition from other well-established short -sea container liner shipping 
services providers , in particular Samskip, Seago (Maersk) and Unifeeder . The 
combined transported volume of  these three competitors  in 2017  was equivalent 
to the volume transported by the Parties .109   
                                                 
106  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question  21.   
107  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 39; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 23 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight  Forwarders, question 27.   
108  See Article 2 of the Merger Regulation and, by analogy, Case M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 
88 (where, in the market for door -to-door multimodal transport services, one end is outside the EEA, 
the country -pair has been considered as a non -substantial part of the internal market).   
109  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Compe titors, question  21.   
 
30 (151)  All the respondents to the market investigation having expressed a view cons ider 
that the competitive constraints on the merged entity would be sufficient to 
prevent the Parties from raising prices on the leg British Isles to  Scandinavia .110  
(152)  In view of the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the 
Transaction does not  raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal 
market with respect to the leg of trade British Isles to Scandinavia , under any 
plausible market definition.  
6.2.11.  Iberia to Algeria  
(153)  The following table shows the Parties' transported volumes  on th e leg of trade 
Iberia to Algeria .  
 Volumes transported  (TEUs)  Market shares  in actual volume 
transported (CTS)  
CMA CGM  […] [30-40]% 
Containerships  […] [0-5]% 
Parties combined  […] [30-40]% 
Total market  [50 000 – 100 000]  100%  
Source: Form CO, paragraphs 181, 209 and 3 92. 
(154)  Post-Transaction, the Parties will have a combined market share of [30-40]% with 
a negligible increment of less than [0-5]%.  
(155)  Besides  these limited combined market share  and increment , the market 
investigation confirmed that th e Parties will face significant competition from 
other short -sea container liner shipping services providers, such as Arkas, MSC, 
Seago (Maersk) and Sloman.111   
(156)  A majority of respondents to the market investigation having expressed a view 
consider that the competitive constraints on the merged entity would be sufficient 
to prevent the Parties from raising prices on the leg Iberia to Algeria.112  
(157)  Furthermore, one end of the leg of trade is outside the EEA. The leg of trade 
could therefore be considered as a non -substantial part of the internal market.113 
(158)  In view of the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the 
Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal 
                                                 
110  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 39; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 23 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight  Forwarders, question 27.   
111  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, q uestion s 21 and 30.   
112  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 39; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 23 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight  Forwarders, question 27.   
113  See Article 2 of the Merger Regulation and, by analogy, Case M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 
88 (where, in the market for door -to-door multimodal transport services, one end is outside the EEA, 
the country -pair has been considered as a non -substantial par t of the internal market).   
 
31 market with respect to the leg of trade Iberia to Algeria, under any plausible 
market definition.  
 
6.2.12.  Iberia to Scandinavia  
(159)  The following table shows the Parties' transported volumes  on the leg of trade 
Iberia to Scandinavia . 
 Volumes transported  (TEUs)  Mark et shares  in actual volume 
transported (CTS)  
CMA CGM  […] [30-40]% 
Containerships  […] [0-5]% 
Parties combined  […] [30-40]% 
Total market  [10 000 – 50 000]  100%  
Source: Form CO, paragraphs 181, 209 and 3 73. 
(160)  Post-Transaction, the Parties will have a combined market share of [30-40]% with 
a negligible increment of [0-5]%.  
(161)  Besides  these limited market share and increment , the market investigation 
confirmed that the Parties will face significant competition from  other short -sea 
container liner shipping services providers , such as Samskip, Seago (Maersk) and 
CLdN (Evergreen).114 
(162)  A majority of respondents to the market investigation having expressed a view 
consider that the competitive constraints on the merged entit y would be sufficient 
to prevent the Parties from raising prices on the leg Iberia to Scandinavia.115  
(163)  In view of the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the 
Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal 
market with respect to the leg of trade Iberia to Scandinavia, under any plausible 
market definition.  
6.2.13.  Poland to British Isles  
(164)  The following table shows the Parties' transported volumes  on the leg of trade 
Poland to British Isles .  
  
                                                 
114  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question  21.   
115  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 39; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 23 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight  Forward ers, question 27.   
 
32  
 Volumes transported  (TEUs)  Market shares in actual volume 
transported ( MDS ) 
CMA CGM  […] [50-60]% 
Containerships  […] [0-5]% 
Parties combined  […] [50-60]% 
Total market  [50 000 – 100 000]  100%  
Source: Form CO, paragraphs 181, 209 and 3 65. 
(165)  Post-Transaction, the Parties will have a combined market share of [50-60]% with 
a low increment of [0-5]%.  
(166)  The outcome of the market investigation was inconclusive as to whether the 
competitive constraints on the merged entity would be sufficient to prev ent the 
Parties from raising prices on the leg Poland to British Isles.116  
(167)  However,  the market investigation confirmed that the Parties will face significant 
competition from other sizeable short -sea container liner shipping services 
providers, in particula r Unifeeder , Samskip  and Seago (Maersk) , which together 
account for more than  40% of the market.117 
(168)  Furthermore, a s explained in paragraphs (95) - (102)  above, barriers to entry are 
relatively low and customers have the ability t o switch to other sea carriers. 
Customers could also switch to al ternative modes of transportation, given that 
maritime transport accounts for 1 6% of the total market (including all modes of 
transport).118 In that regard, the Parties consider that  Maersk, which operates a 
direct service between Poland and British Isles, a nd the intra -European maritime 
specialist Unifeeder, exert a significant competitive constraint on the Parties .119  
(169)  In view of the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the 
Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal 
market with respect to the leg of trade Poland to British Isles, under any plausible 
market definition.  
6.2.14.  Russia to Benelux -Germany  
(170)  The following table shows the Parties' transported volumes  on the leg of trade 
Russia to Benelux -Germany.  
                                                 
116  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 39; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 23 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight  Forwarders, question 27.   
117  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question  21.   
118  Form CO, paragraph 396.  
119  Form CO, paragraph 366.  
 
33  Volu mes transported  (TEUs)  Market shares  in actual volume 
transported (CTS)  
CMA CGM  […] [10-20]% 
Containerships  […] [10-20]% 
Parties combined  […] [20-30]% 
Fesco (consortium 
member)  n/a [5-10]% 
Total market  [100 000 – 250 000]  100%  
Source: Form CO, paragraphs 181, 209 and 3 41. 
(171)  On the leg Russia to Benelux -Germany, the combined market share of the Parties 
slightly exceeds [20-30]. Only when a dding  the consortium member Fesco, the 
combined market shares reach [20-30]%. 
(172)  Besides the se limited combined ma rket share, the market investigation confirmed 
that the Parties will face  significant  competition from other short -sea container 
liner shipping services providers such as Hapag Lloyd, OOCL, Seago (Maersk) , 
Sea Connect, Team Lines  and Unifeeder.120 
(173)  A majority  of respondents to the market investigation having expressed a view 
consider that the competitive constraints on the merged entity would be sufficient 
to prevent the Parties from raising prices on the leg Russia to Benelux -
Germany.121  
(174)  Furthermore, one end o f the leg of trade is outside the EEA. The leg of trade 
could therefore be considered as a non -substantial part of the internal market.122 
(175)  In view of the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the 
Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal 
market with respect to the leg of trade Russia to Benelux -Germany, under any 
plausible market definition.  
6.2.15.  Russia to British Isles  
(176)  The following table shows the Parties' transported volumes  on the leg of trade 
Russia to British Isles.  
  
                                                 
120  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question  21.   
121  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 39; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 23 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight  Forwarders, question 27.   
122  See Article 2 of the Merger Regulation and, by analogy, Case M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 
88 (where, in the market for door -to-door multimodal transport services, one end is outside the EE A, 
the country -pair has been considered as a non -substantial part of the internal market).   
 
34   
 Volumes transported  (TEUs)  Market shares  in actual volume 
transported  (CTS)  
CMA CGM  […] [5-10]% 
Containerships  […] [40-50]% 
Parties combined  […] [40-50]% 
Total market  [10 000 – 50 000]  100%  
Source: Form CO, paragraphs 181, 209 and 344. 
(177)  Post-Transaction, the Parties will have a combined market share of [40-50]%, 
with an increment of [5-10]% brought about by CMA CGM .  
(178)  The outcome of the market investigation is inconclusive as to whether post-
Transaction the Parties will have the ability to increase prices on that leg of 
trade.123 
(179)  However , the market investigation confirmed that the Parties will face significant 
competition from other  well established  short -sea container liner shipping 
services providers, such as  Hapag -Lloyd, Samskip , Seago (Maersk) and  
Unifeeder.124 The Parties also submit that they will face competition from 
Finnlines and Transfennica on that leg of trade.125 
(180)  Furthermore, one end of the leg of trade is outside the EEA. The leg of trade 
could therefore be considered as a  non-substantial part of the internal market.126 
(181)  In view of the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the 
Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal 
market with respect to the leg of trade Russia to Bene lux-Germany, under any 
plausible market definition.  
6.2.16.  Russia to Scandinavia  
(182)  The following table shows the Parties' transported volumes  on the leg of trade 
Russia to Scandinavia.  
  
                                                 
123  See replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 39; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 23 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight Forwarders,  question 27.   
124  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question  21.   
125  Form CO, paragraph 346.  
126  See Article 2 of the Merger Regulation and, by analogy, Case M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 
88 (where, in the market for door -to-door multimodal transport services, one end is outside the EEA, 
the country -pair has been considered as a non -substantial part of the internal market).   
 
35  
 Volumes transported  (TEUs)  Market shares  in actual volume 
transported  (CTS ) 
CMA CGM  […] [5-10]% 
Containerships  […] [30-40]% 
Parties combined  […] [40-50]% 
Total market  [10 000 – 50 000]  100%  
Source: Form CO, paragraphs 181, 209 and 3 62. 
(183)  Post-Transaction, the Parties' combined market share would be well below [40-
50]% with an increment of [5-10]%.   
(184)  The market investigation confirmed that  Parties will face competition from other  
sizeable  sea carriers such as Unifeeder, Hapag -Lloyd, Samskip and Seago 
(Maersk) , which together account for more than 50% of the market .127  
(185)  In addition, a ll the respondents to the market investigation having expressed a 
view consider that the competitive constraints on the merged entity would be 
sufficient to prevent the Parties from raising prices on the leg Russia to 
Scandinavia.128 
(186)  Furthermore , one end of the leg of trade is outside the EEA. The leg of trade 
could therefore be considered as a non -substantial part of the internal market.129 
(187)  In view of the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the 
Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal 
market with respect to the leg of trade Russia to Scandinavia , under any plausible 
market definition.   
6.2.17.  Scandinavia to Benelux -Germany  
(188)  The following table shows the  Parties' transported volumes  on the leg of trade 
Scandinavia to Benelux -Germany . 
  
                                                 
127  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question  21.   
128  See replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 39; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 23 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight Forwarders, question 27.   
129  See Article 2 of the Merger Regulation and, by analogy, Case M.7523 – CMA  CGM/OPDR , paragraph 
88 (where, in the market for door -to-door multimodal transport services, one end is outside the EEA, 
the country -pair has been considered as a non -substantial part of the internal market).   
 
36  
 Volumes transported  (TEUs)  Market shares  in actual volume 
transported (MDS)  
CMA CGM  […] [0-5]% 
Containerships  […] [0-5]% 
Parties combined  […] [0-5]% 
Total market  [1 000 000 – 2 000 000]  100%  
Source: Form CO, paragraphs 181, 209 and 3 86. 
(189)  According to the [External Consultant] database , the Parties' combined market 
share post-Transaction would be below 20% . As a result, that market would not 
be considered as an affected market.  
(190)  In any event, the increment brought about by the Transaction is not significant. 
Indeed, the volume transported by CMA CGM represents less than [0-5]% of the 
volume transpo rted by Containerships in 2017.  
(191)  In addition, the market investigation confirmed that  Parties will face competition 
from other sea carriers such as Samskip, Team Lines, Unifeeder  and Viasea 
Shipping.130  
(192)  Furthermore, a majority of respondents to the market i nvestigation having 
expressed a view consider that the competitive constraints on the merged entity 
would be sufficient to prevent the Parties from raising prices on the leg 
Scandinavia to Benelux -Germany.131  
(193)  In view of the above considerations, the Commiss ion concludes that the 
Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal 
market with respect to the leg of trade Scandinavia  to Benelux -Germany, under 
any plausible market definition.  
6.2.18.  Scandinavia to British Isles  
(194)  The foll owing table shows the  Parties' transported volumes on the leg of trade 
Scandinavia to British Isles.  
  
                                                 
130  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Comp etitors, question  21.   
131  See replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 39; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 23 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight Forwarders, question 27.   
 
37  
 Volumes transported  (TEUs)  Market shares  in actual volume 
transported (MDS)  
CMA CGM  […] [5-10]% 
Containerships  […] [10-20]% 
Parties combined  […] [20-30]% 
Total market  [50 000 – 100 000]  100%  
Source: Form CO, paragraphs 181 , 209 and 351 .  
(195)  The Parties' combined market share post-Transaction would be [20-30]%.  
(196)  As explained in paragraph (90) above, the Commission checked during the 
market investigation whether the market shares provided by the Parties could be 
considered as accurate. However, the market investigation was inconclu sive in 
that regard. In particular, the Commission was unable to confirm  whether , in 
2017,  one or more  competitor s transported a volume of cargo equivalent to the 
Parties' combined transported volume .132 Therefore , the Commission further 
investigate d whether  the Transaction would raise serious doubts as to its 
compatibility with the internal market.  
(197)  The Parties submits that the volume transported by CMA CGM in 2017 ([…] 
TEUs) was exceptionally high, in comparison to the volumes transported in 2015 
and 2016, as well as in the first part of year 2018 (about […] TEUs per year).133 
The Parties also suggest looking at market shares in terms of capacity deployed. 
Under this approach, the Parties' combined market share would be [10-20]%, with 
Maersk as market leader w ith [20-30]% of the capacities deployed on that 
market.134   
(198)  As explained in paragraphs (95) - (102)  above, barriers to entry are relatively low 
and customers have the ability to switch to other sea carriers. Customers could 
also switch to alternative modes of transportation, given that maritime transport 
accounts for [10-20]% of the total market (including all modes of transport).135 In 
that regard, the Parties consider that Ro -Ro carriers, such as DFDS, represent a 
major source of competition and prevent sea -carriers, including the Parties, to 
raise prices.136  
(199)  The unlikeliness of price increase post -Transaction is confirmed by the market 
investigation. A majority of respondents to  the market investigation having 
expressed a view consider that the competitive constraints on the merged entity 
                                                 
132  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question  21.   
133  Reply of the Parties to RFI 2 of 4 October 2018.  
134  Form CO, paragraph 353.  
135  Form CO, paragraph 396.  
136  Reply of the Parties to RFI 2 of 4 October 2018.  
 
38 would be sufficient to prevent the Parties from raising prices on the leg 
Scandinavia to British Isles.137  
(200)  Lastly, none of the respondents to th e market investigation has raised any 
substantiated concern as regards the effects of the Transaction  on this market .  
(201)  In view of the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the 
Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal 
market with respect to the leg of trade Scandinavia to British Isles , under any 
plausible market definition.  
6.2.19.  Scandinavia to Iberia  
(202)  The following table shows the Parties' transported volumes  on the leg of trade 
Scandinavia to Iberia.  
 Volumes transported (TEUs)  Market shares in actual volume 
transported  (CTS)  
CMA CGM  […] [30-40]% 
Containerships  […] [0-5]% 
Parties combined  […] [30-40]% 
Total market  [10 000 – 50 000]  100%  
Source: Form CO, paragraphs 181, 209 and 3 78. 
(203)  Post-Transaction, the Parties will have a combined market share of [30-40]% with 
a negligible increment of [0-5]%.  
(204)  Besides these limited market share and increment, the market investigation 
confirmed that the Parties will face significant competition from  other short -sea 
container liner shipping services providers, such as  CLdN (Evergreen),  Samskip, 
Seago (Maersk) and  Unifeeder .138 
(205)  A majority of respondents to the market investigation having expressed a view 
consider that the competitive constraints on the m erged entity would be sufficient 
to prevent the Parties from raising prices on the leg Scandinavia to Iberia.139  
(206)  In view of the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the 
Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with th e internal 
market with respect to the leg of trade Scandinavia to Iberia , under any plausible 
market definition.  
                                                 
137  See replies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 39; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 23 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight Forwarders, question 27.   
138  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question  21.   
139  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 39; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 23 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight  Forwarders, question 27.   
 
39 6.2.20.  Scandinavia to Russia  
(207)  The table below shows the Parties' transported volumes as well as their  market 
shares in terms of capacity deployed.  
 Volumes transported  (TEUs)  Market shares in capacity 
deployed  
CMA CGM  […] [10-20]% 
Containerships  […] [10-20]% 
Parties combined  […] [20-30]% 
Total market  *** 100%  
Source: Form CO, paragraphs 181, 209 and 383.  
(208)  As explained in paragraph (94) above, the Parties submit that there is no reliable 
data concerning the total size of the market. The Parties suggest estimating their 
shares o n that leg based on the capacity deployed. Under this approach, the 
Parties would have a combined market share of [20-30]% and would face 
competition from notably COSCO and Hapag -Lloyd, which respectively account 
for [10-20]% and [5-10]% of the capacity deployed on the leg Scandinavia to 
Russia.140  
(209)  Based on the outcome of the market investigation, it appears that the Parties will 
also face competition from Hapag -Lloyd, Seago (Maersk) and Unifeeder , whose 
combined transported volume largely exceeds the incr ement brought about by the 
Transaction .141   
(210)  A majority of  respondents  to the market investigation having expressed a view 
consider that the competitive constraints on the merged entity would be sufficient 
to prevent the Parties from raising prices on the le g Scandinavia to Russia .142  
(211)  Furthermore, one end of the leg of trade is outside the EEA. The leg of trade 
could therefore be considered as a non -substantial part of the internal market.143 
(212)  In view of the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the  
Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal 
market with respect to the leg of trade Scandinavia to Russi a, under any plausible 
market definition.  
                                                 
140  Form CO, paragraph 383.  
141  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question  21.   
142  See r eplies to Q1 – Questionnaire to Competitors, question 39; Q2 – Questionnaire to Direct 
Customers, question 23 and Q1 – Questionnaire to Freight  Forwarders, question 27.   
143  See Article 2 of the Merger Regulation and, by analogy, Case M.7523  – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 
88 (where, in the market for door -to-door multimodal transport services, one end is outside the EEA, 
the country -pair has been considered as a non -substantial part of the internal market).   
 
40 6.2.21.  Conclusion  
(213)  In light of the above, the Commission concludes that the Transaction does not 
raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with respect to 
short -sea container liner shipping services  in the following 18 affected legs of 
trade: (i) Baltic States to Benelux -Germany, (ii) Baltic -States to B ritish Isles, (iii) 
Baltic States to Scandinavia, (iv) Benelux -Germany to Baltic States, (v) Benelux -
Germany to Russia, (vi) Benelux -Germany to Scandinavia, (vii) British Isles to 
Russia, (viii) British Isles to Scandinavia, (xix) Iberia to Algeria, (xx) I beria to 
Scandinavia, (xi) Poland to British Isles, (xii) Russia to Benelux -Germany, (xiii) 
Russia to British Isles, (xiv) Russia to Scandinavia, (xv) Scandinavia to Benelux -
Germany, (xvi) Scandinavia to British Isles, (xvii) Scandinavia to Iberia and 
(xviii) Scandinavia to Russia .  
6.3. Vertical relationships  
(214)  CMA CGM and Containerships are  active on markets that are vertically related to 
the container liner shipping business, namely the markets for the provision of 
container terminal services  and freight forwarding services.144  
(215)  The Transaction would thus create actual or potential  vertical links between the 
Parties' operations in the market for container liner shipping services, on the one 
hand, and the Parties' operations in (i) the upstream market for container terminal 
services, and (ii) the downstream market for freight forward ing services, on the 
other hand.  
(216)  If CMA CGM or Containerships h old a 30% share in  the upstream or downstream 
markets mentioned in the preceding paragraph, or if the Parties h old a 30% share 
in the container liner shipping markets, these markets are conside red to be 
vertically affected.  
6.3.1.  Container terminal services  
Description of the Parties' activities  
(217)  Container terminal services have consistently been considered as an upstream 
market to the provision of container liner shipping services.145 
(218)  Within the EEA , CMA CGM, via its subsidiaries, holds […] interest s in the 
following terminals:  
 Intramar (Marseille, France),  
 Générale de Manutention Portuaire (Le Havre, France),  
 Terminal des Flandres SAS (Dunkirk, France),  
                                                 
144  Form CO, paragraphs 243 and 279.  
145  M.8594 – COSCO SHIPPING/OOIL , paragraph 52; M.8459 – TIL/PSA/PSA DGD , section 4.2.; M. 
7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 150; M.7248 – CSAV/HGV/Küne Maritime/Hapag -Llyoyd AG , 
paragrap hs 198 and following.  
 
41  Terminal du Grand Ouest (St Nazaire , France),  
 Eurofos (Marseille, France),  
 Marseille Manutention (Marseille, France),  
 Terminal Maritima del Guadalqivir (Seville, Spain), and  
 Malta Freeport Terminals (Marsaxlokk, Malta).146 
(219)  CMA CGM is a small player i n, both, the overall market for the provision of 
container terminal services, and its sub -segments, that is, hinterland traffic and 
transhipment  traffic .147 As indicated in Table 2 below , CMA CGM's market 
shares never exceed [5-10]%, even  when adopting the narrowest poss ible 
geographic market definition for stevedoring services, that is, the catchment area 
comprising the ports in a certain range , such as Le Havre and Rotterdam (for 
hinterland traffic) .148 
Table 2 - CMA CGM's market shares for contain er terminal services at regional level in 2016 and 2017.  
 CMA CGM's market shares at regional level  
Region  
(range between)   Hinterland and 
Transshipment   Hinterland   Transshipment  
Le Havre and 
Rotterdam  [5-10]% [5-10]% - 
St Nazaire a nd 
Rotterdam  - - [0-5]% 
Source: Form CO, paragraphs 252, 254 and 256. 
(220)  As regards the downstream market for short -sea container liner shipping services, 
Containerships' individual market shares on trades in Northern Europe are below 
30%, except for the leg of trade Benelux -Germany to Baltic States ( [40-50]%).149 
The Parties' combined market shares exceed 30% on the following legs of trade: 
Russia to Benelux -Germany and Benelux -Germany to Baltic States. Taking the 
most conservative data, the combined market shares of the parti es on trades in 
Northern Europe also exceed 30% for the legs of trade Benelux -Germany to 
Scandinavia, Baltic States to Benelux -Germany and Scandinavia to Benelux -
Germany.150  
                                                 
146  Form CO, paragraph 243.  
147  M.5398 – Hutchison/Evergreen , paragraphs 9 -10. 
148  M.7523 – CMA CGM/OPDR , paragraph 65.  
149  Form CO, paragraph 260.  
150  As d iscussed in Section 6.2. above, in these three  legs of trade, the Parties combined market shares 
exceed 100% on the basis of CTS data. Market sh ares based on [External Consultant]  data would be 
well be low 30%. However, in order to adopt a conservative approach, the Commission will consider 
these three  legs of trade as affected markets for the purpose of assessing the vertical links created by 
the Transaction .  
 
42 (221)  The Transaction wo uld therefore give rise to affected markets  between the Parties' 
activities in the container terminal services market  (upstream market) , and the 
following legs of trade : Russia to Benelux -Germany; Baltic States to Benelux -
Germany; Benelux -Germany to Baltic States; Benelux -Germany to Scandinavia; 
and Scandinavia to Benel ux-Germany  (downstream, market) . 
(222)  Containerships holds a minority controlling share in a container terminal operator 
which operates container terminals in Helsinki, Kotka, and Saint Petersburg.151 As 
indicated in Table 3 below , Container Finance's market shar es never exceed [5-
10]%, even when adopting a geographic market definition for stevedoring 
services narrower than the catchment area comprising the ports in a certain range, 
that is, the catchment area comprising national ports only . 
Table 3 - Container Finances' market shares for container terminal services at national ports' level in 
2017  
 Container Finance 's market shares at national ports'  level 
National ports  Hinterland and Transshipment  
Saint Petersburg 
(Russia)  [5-10]% 
Finland 
(Helsinki+Kotka)  [5-10]% 
Source: Form CO, paragraph 268. 
(223)  On the downstream market for short -sea container liner shipping services from 
Russia or Scandinavia, CMA CGM's individual market shares or the Parties' 
combined market shares are above 30% on the followings legs of trade: Russia to 
Benelux -Germany, Russia to British Isles, British Isles to Scandinavia, British 
Isles to Russia, Russia to Scandinavia, Iberi a to Scandinavia, Scandinavia to 
Iberia.152 Taking the most conservative data, the combined market shares of the 
parties on trades in Russia or Scandinavia also exceed 30% for the legs of trade 
Benelux -Germany to Scandinavia, Scandinavia to British Isles, Sc andinavia to 
Benelux -Germany and Scandinavia to Russia.153  
(224)  The Transaction would therefore give rise to affected markets between the Parties' 
activities in the container terminal services market, and the following legs of 
trade: Benelux -Germany to Scandinav ia; British Isles to Scandinavia; British Isles 
to Russia; Iberia to Scandinavia; Russia to Benelux -Germany; Russia to British -
                                                 
151  Form CO, paragraph 266.  
152  Form CO, paragraph 209.  
153  As d iscussed in Section 6.2. above, in these four legs of trade, the Parties combined market shares 
exceed 100% on the basis of CTS data. Market shares based on [External Consultant]  data would be 
well below 30%, except for the leg Scandinavia to Russia where no accurate market size data is 
available. However, in order to adopt a conservative approach, the Commission will consider these 
four legs of trade as affected markets for the p urpose of assessing the vertical links created by the 
Transaction.  
 
43 Isles; Russia to Scandinavia; Scandinavia to Benelux -Germany; Scandinavia to 
Iberia; Scandinavia t o British Isles and Scandinavia  to Russia.  
Commission's assessment  
(225)  The Commission considers that post -Transaction the merged entity would neither 
have the ability, nor the incentive to engage in  any input and/or customer 
foreclosure strateg y. 
Vertical relationship between CMA CGM's cont ainer terminal services and 
Containerships' short -sea container liner shipping services  
(226)  Post-Transaction, t he market shares of CMA CGM on the market for the 
provision of container terminal services will be low, below [5-10]% (see Table 1 
above ). These low market shares  would make  any input foreclosure  strategy , 
aimed at preventing competing shipping companies from procuring the Parties' 
terminal services,  unlikely .  
(227)  The Parties would have no ability to engage in such a strategy. Post-Transaction , 
the Partie s will not have a dominant position in the market for container terminal 
services, and  competing container liner shipping companies would continue to be 
able to source  container terminal services from alternative providers in the ports  
belonging to  the sam e catchment area  as the one  where the Parties will control 
terminals . By way of example, the following container terminals are situated in 
this same catchment area and can thus be considered in direct  competition with 
the Parties' terminals : Antwerp, Belgi um; Zeebrugge , Belgium; and Rotterdam , 
the Netherlands.   
(228)  In addition to the above, C MA CGM controls  container terminals in Norther n 
Europe [with another undertaking] . It is reasonable to assume that post -
Transaction t he latter would oppose an y attempt  by the Parties to engage in a n 
input  foreclosure strategy which could  adversely  impact the joint -venture 
revenues . 
(229)  The Parties w ould also lack the incentive to engage in an input foreclosure 
strategy. The margins from the provision of container terminal s ervice are usually 
higher than the margins that short -sea container shipping companies derive from 
the provision of their services. It would hence  be unprofitable for them to forego 
the revenues from the upstream market , by restricting or deteriorating the  
provision of container terminal services to competing short -sea container shipping 
companies at their terminals.  
(230)  Any customer foreclosure  strategy of the merged entity  would  also be unlikely. 
Customer foreclosure may occur when a supplier integrates with  an important 
customer in the downstream market.154 In the present case, the merged entity 
cannot be considered as an important customer of container terminal services  in 
Northern Europe . Indeed, the merged entity's market shares on t he relevant  legs of 
trade remain limited. Post-Transaction , on each relevant leg of trade there will be 
                                                 
154  Commission's Guidelines on the assessment of non -horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation 
on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C265C/07), paragraph 58.  
 
44 a sufficient  number of potential con tainer terminal services' custo mers, which  are 
competing short -sea container liner shipping companies . These are:  Hapag -Lloyd , 
Samskip, Maersk, Team Lines, and Unifeeder .155 In addition, Containerships 
represents a very limited share of demand for container  terminal services in 
Northern Europe (less than [0-5]%).156 Therefore, the Transaction cannot be 
considered as changing in any way the inc entives of CMA CGM in engaging in a 
hypothetical customer foreclosure strategy.  
(231)  The Commission therefore considers that Parties w ill lack the ability and the 
incentive to engage in a customer foreclosure strategy.  
Vertical relationship between Container Finance's container terminal services and 
CMA CGM's short -sea container liner shipping services  
(232)  With respect to the possible vertical relationships with Container Finance's 
terminals, the Commission first observes that Container Finance's market shares 
never exceed [5-10]%. Once again,  post-Transaction the Parties will not have the 
dominant position in the markets for container terminal services  necessary to 
successfully  engage in any input foreclosure  strategy.   
(233)  Should the merged entity try to deteriorate or restrict the provision  of container 
terminal services to  competing  container liner shipping companies , the latter  
would be able to procure those  services from competing container terminal 
services providers, for instance, in the ports of Gdansk, Poland,  and Klaipeda, 
Lithuania.  In addition to that, Container Finance only owns […] of the shares of 
the container terminals in Helsinki, Kotka, and Saint Petersburg. The remain ing 
shares are  held [by another undertaking] , who would in all  likelihoo d oppose any 
of Container Finance's attempts to engage in foreclosure strategies  that would 
impair or reduce  the revenues from th e upstream market .  
(234)  More importantly,  the Parties will lack the incentive to engage in an input 
foreclosure strategy since, as pointed out in paragraph (229)  the margins from the 
provision of container terminal service are usually higher than the margins that 
short -sea container shipping companies derive from the provision of their 
services.  
(235)  Any customer foreclosure  strategy  of the merged entity is also unlikely to be 
deployed .  
(236)  Customer foreclosure may occur when a supplier integrates with an important 
customer in the downstream market.157 In the present case, the merged entity 
cannot be considered as an important customer of container terminal services in 
Scandina via and Russia. Indeed, the merged entity's market shares on the relevant 
legs of trade remain limited . Post-Transaction, on each relevant leg of trade a 
sufficient number of potential container terminal services' customers (e.g. 
                                                 
155  See Section 6.2  of this Decision .  
156  Form CO, paragraph 264.  
157  Commission's Guidelines on the assessment of non -horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation 
on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C265C/07), paragraph 58.  
 
45 competing short -sea contai ner liner shipping companies ) will be present. These 
are, for instance : CLdN (Evergreen), Hapag Lloyd, Samskip, Seago (Maersk), 
Team Lines, Unifeeder, and Via sea Shipping.158 Even if post -Transaction the 
merged entity decided to source container terminal se rvices only from its 
terminals, a significant number of providers could still decide to call at competing 
terminals.  
(237)  In addition, the Parties  would lack the incentive to adopt a similar  course of 
conduct . It is indeed doubtful that the merged entity will be able to make this 
course of conduct profitable . It is indeed doubtful that the potential additional 
revenues on the downstream market would compensate the lost profits in the 
upstream terminal services market , by increas ing prices either in the upstream  or 
in the downstream market.  
(238)  The Commission therefore considers that the Parties will lack the ability and 
incentive to engage in a customer or input foreclosure strategy.  
Conclusion  
(239)  In light of the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the 
Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal 
market as regards the vertical links between  the Parties' activities , on the one 
hand, in container terminal services  in (i) the Le Havre and Rotterdam  region, (ii)  
the St Nazaire and Rotterdam  region, (iii) Russia ( Saint Petersburg ), and (iv)  
Finland ( Helsinki+Kotka ), on the other hand,  in short -sea container liner shipping 
services  in the following 18 affected legs of trade: (i) Baltic States to Benelux -
Germany, (ii) Baltic -States to British Isles, (iii) Baltic States to Scandinavia, (iv) 
Benelux -Germany to Baltic States, (v) Benelux -Germany to Russia, (vi) Benelux -
Germany to Scandinavia, (vii) British Isles to Russia, (viii) British Isles to 
Scandinavia, (xix) Iberia to Algeria, (xx) Iberia to Scandinavia, (xi) Poland to 
British Isles, (xii) Russia to Benelux -Germany, (xiii) Russia to British Isles, (xiv) 
Russia to Scandinavia, (xv) Scandinavia to Benel ux-Germany, (xvi) Scandinavia 
to British Isles, (xvii) Scandinavia to Iberia and (xviii) Scandinavia to Russia .  
6.3.2.  Freight forwarding services  
(240)  Freight forwarders are among the most important customers of container liner 
shipping companies.  
Description of the  Parties' activities  
(241)  CMA CGM, via its subsidiary CCLog, provides freight forwarding services 
worldwide, including to a limited extent in Europe, namely in: the Baltic 
countries, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, the 
Netherlan ds, Poland, and the UK .  
                                                 
158  See S ection 6.2 of this Decision.  
 
46 (242)  Containerships provides freight forwarding services in Germany, Latvia, 
Lithuania , and the UK.159   
(243)  The Transaction will therefore give rise to potential vertical ly affected  markets 
between the Parties ' activities in container liner shipping activities (upstream 
market) and freight forwarding services (downstream market), as well as between 
the Parties' activities  in the markets for  door-to-door multimodal transport 
services (upstream market) and freight forwarding services (downstream market).  
(244)  As explained in paragraph (65), the Commission w ill adopt a conservative 
approach and assess the effects of the Transaction on the national basis. If the 
Commission were to assess the impact of the Transaction on the basis of a 
broader geographic market definition, the Parties' market shares would be 
(significantly) lower.  
Affected markets  
(245)  On the upstream market for freight forwarding services, CCLog's market share in 
the Baltic countries, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Latvia, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, and the UK is below [0-5]%, under any 
plausible definition of the relevant market. Containerships' market share is below 
[0-5]% in Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, and the UK, under any plausible relevant 
market definition.  
(246)  In relation to the downstream markets for door -to-door, o n the  basis of the 
individual and  combined market shares of the Parties, the Transaction will give 
rise to vertically affected markets in excess of 30% between, on the one hand, the 
provision of freight forwarding services, on the other hand, the provision of d oor-
to-door multimodal transport services  on the following country pairs: Netherlands 
to Finland; Russia to UK; UK to Russia; Lithuania to Ireland.  
(247)  In relation to the downstream markets for short -sea container liner shipping  
services , the Transaction will  give rise to vertically affected markets on the 
following  legs of trade:  Baltic States to Benelux -Germany ; Baltic States to British 
Isles; Baltic States to Scandinavia ; Benelux -Germany to Baltic States ; Benelux -
Germany to Scandinavia ; British Isles to Rus sia; British Isles to Scandinavia ; 
Poland to British Isles ; Russia to Benelux -Germany ; Russia to British Isles ; 
Scandinavia to Benelux -Germany.  
Commission's assessment  
(248)  The Parties are minor players in freight forwarding services. In light of the low 
market shares that the Parties hold in the freight forwarding services market, 
irrespective of the market definition  retained , it is unlikely that post-Transaction 
the merged entity would have the ability and incentive to engage in fore closure 
strategies.  
(249)  Given its low market share, the Commission considers it unlikely that the merged 
entity will have the ability and the incentive to engage in a customer foreclosure  
                                                 
159  Form CO, paragraph 279.  
 
47 strategy. Even if the merged entity foreclos ed access to its customer ba se to  its 
actual or potential competitors in the upstream market s for door -to-door 
multimodal transport services and container liner shipping services , those 
competitors would still be able to revert to numerous competing freight 
forwarders companies .  
(250)  Likewise, as regards input foreclosure , post-Transaction a number of competitors 
will remain  active on the markets for the provision of door -to-door multimodal 
transport services and container liner shipping services . It is hence  unlikely that 
the merged enti ty's rival freight forwarders will be foreclosed  from access to 
door-to-door multimodal transport services or short -sea container liner shipping 
services, on any of the relevant geographic markets listed in paragraphs (246)  and 
(247) . 
Conclusion  
(251)  In light of the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the 
Transaction would not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal 
market as regards the vertical links between  the activities of the Parties , on the 
one hand, in the market for freight forwarding services , on the other hand, in the 
market for door-to-door multimodal transport services  – in the  Netherlands to 
Finland, Russia to UK, UK to Russi a and Lithuania to Ireland country pairs – and 
in the market for short -sea container liner shipping services  in the following 18 
affected legs of trade:  i) Baltic States to Benelux -Germany, (ii) Baltic -States to 
British Isles, (iii) Baltic States to Scandi navia, (iv) Benelux -Germany to Baltic 
States, (v) Benelux -Germany to Russia, (vi) Benelux -Germany to Scandinavia, 
(vii) British Isles to Russia, (viii) British Isles to Scandinavia, (xix) Iberia to 
Algeria, (xx) Iberia to Scandinavia, (xi) Poland to Britis h Isles, (xii) Russia to 
Benelux -Germany, (xiii) Russia to British Isles, (xiv) Russia to Scandinavia, (xv) 
Scandinavia to Benelux -Germany, (xvi) Scandinavia to British Isles, (xvii) 
Scandinavia to Iberia and (xviii) Scandinavia to Russia . 
7. CONCLUSION  
(252)  For t he above reasons, the European Commission has decided not to oppose the 
notified operation and to declare it compatible with the internal  market and with 
the EEA Agreement. This decision is adopted in application of Article 6(1)(b) of 
the Merger Regulation  and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement . 
For the Commission  
(Signed)  
Margrethe VESTAGER  
Member of the Commission