Commission européenne, DG COMP MERGER REGISTRY, 1049 Bruxelles, BELGIQUE  
Europese Commissie, DG COMP MERGER REGISTRY, 1049 Brussel,   BELGIË  
 
Tel: +32 229- 91111. Fax: +32 229- 64301. E -mail: COMP -MERG ER -REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu.   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  
Brussels, 9.12.2019 
C(2019)  8979 final  
PUBLIC VERSION  
 
To the notifying part y 
Subject : Case M. 9413 – LACTALIS / NUOVA CASTELLI  
Commission decision pursuant to Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation 
No 139/20041 and Article 57 of the Agreement on the European Economic 
Are a2 
Dear Sir/Madam,  
(1) On 4 November 2019 the Commission received a notification of a proposed 
concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (the 
'Merger Regu lation') by which Gruppo Lactalis Italia S.r.l. (Italy), belonging to the 
Groupe Lactalis S.A. (together ‘Lactalis’, France) acquires within the meaning of 
Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation of the whole of Nuova Castelli S.p.A. 
(‘Nuova Castelli’ or the ‘Target’, Italy), a wholly -owned subsidiary of Nuova 
Castelli Group S.p.A (‘NC Group’, France), in turn controlled by Charterhouse 
Capital Partners (‘Charterhouse’, United Kingdom) by way of purchase of shares 
(Lactalis and Nuova Castelli are designate d hereinafter together as the ‘Parties’).3 
                                                 
1  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004 p. 1. With effect from 1 December 2009, the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (‘TFEU’) has introduced certain changes, such as the replacement of ‘Community’ 
by ‘Union’ and ‘common market’ by ‘internal market’. The terminology of the TFEU will be used 
throughout this decision.  
2  OJ L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3 (the ‘EEA Agreement’).  
3  Publication in the Official Journal of the Europea n Union No C 385, 13.11.2019, p. 9.  
In the published version of this decision, 
some information has been omitted 
pursuant to Article 17(2) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 concerning 
non-disclosure of business secrets and other  
confidential information. The omissions are 
shown thus […] . Where possible the 
information omitted has been replaced by 
ranges of figures or a general description.  
 
2 1. THE  PARTIES  
(2) Lactalis  produces and supplies cheese such as mozzarella, mascarpone and ricotta, 
as well as drinking milk, butter, cream and industrial dairy products (milk powder, 
whey, etc.). Lactalis focuses on br anded products, although it also achieves sales in 
relation to products sold under retailers’ private labels.  
(3) Nuova Castelli  is a wholly -owned subsidiary of the NC Group, […] . NC produces 
and sells various Italian cheeses, mostly hard cheeses and soft cheeses (mozzarella, 
Parmigiano Reggiano, Grana Padano, Pecorino , ricotta, etc.) and has trading 
activities in relation essentially to mascarpone, Feta and butter. Nuova Castelli  
specialises in the supply of cheeses to retailers to be resold under private labels.  
2. THE  OPERATION  
(4) The industrial and commercial activities of the NC Group are contained within the 
Target. Nuova Castelli is currently undergoing a legal reorganisation; how ever, this 
does not affect the structure of its ownership. Additionally, prior to the closing of 
the acquisition, Nuova Castelli will have acquired sole control over ILC La 
Mediterranea S.p.A. (‘Mandara’). These activities have been taken into account as 
part of the perimeter of the present Transaction for the purposes of its competitive 
assessment.  
(5) Pursuant to a Sale and Purchase Agreement (‘SPA’) signed on 29.5.2019, Lactalis 
will acquire all issued and outstanding shares of Nuova Castelli representing 1 00% 
of the share capital of the Target. Nuova Castelli will therefore be solely controlled 
by Lactalis (the ‘Transaction’).  
(6) The proposed Transaction therefore constitutes a concentration within the meaning 
of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation.4 
3. EU DIMENSION  
(7) The undertakings concerned have a combined aggregate world -wide turnover of 
more than EUR 5 000 million5 (Lactalis: […]; Nuova Castelli : […]). Each of them 
has an EU -wide turnover in excess of EUR 250 million (Lactalis: […]; Nuova 
Castelli : […]), but each does not achieve more than two -thirds of its aggregate EU -
wide turnover within one and the same Member State. The notified operation 
therefore has an EU dimension.  
4. MARKET  DEFINITION  
4.1. Introduction 
(8) Both Parties are active in the production and supply  of dairy products. Their 
activities overlap and give rise to affected markets in (i) the procurement of milk; 
(ii) the production and sale of cheese (notably the Italian -type cheese and Feta) to 
                                                 
4  The same concentration was already notified to the Commission on 9.9.2019, but the notification was 
subsequently withdrawn on 10.10.2019.  
5  Turnover calculated in accordance with Article 5(1) of the Merger Regulation  and the Commission 
Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice (OJ C95, 16.4.2008, p. 1).  
 
3 retailers6; (iii) the production and sale of other dairy products (dairy -based desserts) 
and (iv) the production and sale of butter.7 
4.2. Procure me nt of milk  
(9) Raw milk refers to milk which has not undergone any treatment (other than 
cooling) and has a perishable nature. It is produced by dairy farmers, who normally 
milk cows twice a day. Raw milk is subsequently stored in milk storage cool tanks 
at the farm which reduces its temperature to 4° C. Raw milk may be kept on the 
dairy farm for one or two days. It is then delivered to (or collected by) dairy 
companies like the Parties, where it is pasteurised. Once pasteurised, milk can be 
freely traded and transported over long distances.  
4.2.1. Commission’s precedents  
(10) In previous decisions, the Commission considered that the procurement of milk 
should be divided between conventional milk and organic milk.8 The Commission 
left the product market definition open in relation to Germany9 and Spain10, and 
assessed both segments together as a single market in relation to Italy.11 
(11) The Commission also considered a further segmentation of milk procurement by 
species (cow, goat and sheep) because of the limited substitutability of the 
downstream end products, but eventually left the product market definition open.12 
4.2.2. Notifying Party’s view  
(12) According to the Notifying Party, Lactalis procures almost exclusively 
conventional milk in Italy13 and that Nuova Castelli has just started collecting 
limited volume s of organic milk.14 
(13) The Notifying Party submits that segmenting milk procurement based on 
conventional or non -organic milk or by species is not releva nt,15 given that the 
Parties’ activities only overlap in the market for the procurement of conventional 
cow milk.   
                                                 
6  The Parties’ activities also overlap in the supply of Italian -type cheese and related products to the 
industrial customers/out -of-home (‘OOH’) retail channel; however, bas ed on the information 
submitted by the Parties, these overlaps would not lead to affected markets (see Form CO, 
Section  6-2.5) and thus are not further discussed in this Decision.  
7  The activities of the Parties overlap in other areas; however, according  to the data submitted by the 
Parties, these horizontal overlaps do not give rise to affected markets, and thus are not further 
discussed in this Decision.   
8  Commission Decision in Case M.7434 – Müller UK & Ireland/Dairy Crest Dairy Operations , 
recital  10; Commission Decision in Case M.6627 – Arla Foods/Milch -Union Hocheifel , recital 17; 
Commission Decision in Case M.6611 –  Arla Foods/ Milk Links , recital 10; Commission Decision in 
Case M.6441 – Senoble/Agrial/Senagral JV , recital 17.  
9  Commission Decis ion in Case M.6348 –  Arla Foods/Allgäuland , recitals 13; Commission Decision in 
Case M.6119 – Arla/Hansa , recital 11.  
10  Commission Decision in Case M.5875 – Lactalis/Puleva , recital 17.  
11  Commission Decision in Case M.6242 – Lactalis/Parmalat, recital 13 . 
12  Commission Decision in Case M.8549 – Lactalis/Omira , recital 11; Commission Decision in Case 
M.7573 – DMK/DOC KAAS , recital 15; Commission Decision in Case M.6441 – 
Senoble/Agrial/Senagral JV , recital 16.  
13  […]. 
14  […]. 
15  Form CO, paragraphs 120 and  121. 
 
4 (14) The Notifying Party submits that the product market definition may be left open as 
it has no bearing on the assessment of the Transaction.16 
4.2.3. Commission’s assessment  
(15) As the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the 
internal market with respect to the market for procurement of milk under any 
plausible product market definition, the question whether the market for t he 
procurement of milk should be further segmented can be left open.  
4.3. Supply of Italian -type cheese and Feta  
4.3.1. Distinction of Italian- type cheese and Feta by category  
(16) The Notifying Party refers to mozzarella, mascarpone and ricotta as Italian fresh 
cheese; to Gorgonzola as an Italian soft cheese; and Parmigiano Reggiano, Gran 
Castelli, Grana Padano, Pecorino and Pecorino Romano as Italian -type hard 
cheeses.17 Feta is a fresh Greek cheese made from ewe’s and goat’s milk.18 
(17) The Parties manufacture and trade seve ral cheeses that carry a protected 
designation  of origin label (‘PDO’). Nuova Castelli manufactures and sells: 
Mozzarella di Bufala Campana, Gorgonzola, Parmigiano Reggiano, and Grana 
Padano. Nuova Castelli also trades PDO Feta. Lactalis manufactures PDO 
Gorgonzola and PDO Feta, and it trades Mozzarella di Bufala Campana, 
Parmigiano Reggiano, and Grana Padano.  
4.3.1.1. Commiss io n’ s precedents  
(18) The Commission has previously distinguished between different categories of 
cheeses such as “fresh cheese”, “soft cheese”, “semi -hard cheese”, and “hard -
cheese” among others.19  
(19) According to Commission’s precedents, each cheese category could be further 
segmented by type of cheese due to consumers’ preferences20 or the unique 
characteristics of product.21 In this regard, the Comm ission assessed in previous 
decisions whether an Italian -type cheese, mozzarella, might constitute a separate 
market. The precise market definition was ultimately left open.22 
                                                 
16  Form CO, paragraph 121. 
17  Form CO, paragraph 342.  
18  Form CO, paragraph 288; Commission Decision in Case M.4135 – Lactalis/Galbani , fotenote 8.  
19  Commission Decision in Case M.6722 –  Friesland Campina/Zijerveld & Veldhuyzen and den 
Hollander , recital  20; Commission Decision in Case M.6611 – Arla foods/Milk link , recitals 36; 
Commission Decision in Case M.6242 – Lactalis/Parmalat, recitals 51-53. 
20  Commission Decision in Case M.4135 –  Lactalis/Galbani , recital 12; Commission Decision in Case 
M.7573 – DMK/Doc Kaas , recital 24; Commission Decision in Case M.6611 – Arla foods/Milk link , 
recital 36; Commission Decision in Case M.4761 – Bongrain/Sodiaal/JV , recital 23, Commission 
Decision in Case M.6242 –  Lactalis/Parmalat, recitals 52 -53. In previous  cases, the Commission also 
assessed and left open whether cheese categories could be further segmented by type of presentation 
(such as sliced cheese, cheese sold at variable and fix ed weight) (see for ex ample Commission 
Decision in Case M.6611 –  Arla foo ds/Milk link , recital 36). The sales of the Parties include variable 
and fix ed weight sales. In this Decision, a segmentation by type of presentation is unlikely to 
substantially change the assessment of the Transaction given that the majority of the sales  of Parties 
are in fix ed weight. Therefore, it will not be addressed further in this decision.  
21  Commission Decision in Case M.4135 – Lactalis/Galbani , recitals 12 and 13.  
22  Commission Decision in Case M.4135 –  Lactalis/Galbani , recital 12; Commission De cision in 
M.7573 – DMK/Doc Kaas , recital 24; Commission Decision in M.6611 – Arla foods/Milk link , 
 
 
5 (20) In Lactalis/Galbani , the Commission also considered whether each type of cheese 
could be further sub -segmented by the type of milk used for its production. In 
particular, the Commission analysed whether cow milk mozzarella and buffalo 
milk mozzarella might belong to separate product markets, notably due to 
differences in taste and pric e. The precise market definition was ultimately left 
open.23  
(21) Additionally, in a previous case, the Commission considered further sub-
segmentations of blue cheese by specialties; however, it ultimately left the precise 
market definition for blue cheese open .24 
(22) In previous cases, the Commission has considered whether segmentation by 
products protected by designation of origin could be warranted. The Commission 
noted such segmentation could be justified given that consumers may attach value 
to the designation o f origin, while producers are cons trained by specific rules 
(e.g. origin, ingredients, manufacturing process, etc.). However, the precise market 
definition was left open.25  
4.3.1.2. Notifying Party’s view  
(23) The Notifying Party argues that the relevant market could be segmented by cheese 
category , i.e. hard- cheese, fresh cheese, soft cheese; however, it submits that further 
segmentation by type of cheese  does not appear relevant for the supply to retailers 
of Italian -type branded and private label cheese products.26 
(24) As regards the supply of branded products to retailers, the Notifying Party argues 
that a segmentation based on the type of cheese does not always reflect consumer 
habits; in particular with regard t o Italian -type hard cheeses.27 The Notifying Party 
claims that, from a demand -side perspective based on consumers’ consumption 
habits across different European countries except most likely Italy, Italian -type 
hard cheeses, such as Grana Padano, Parmigiano R eggiano and Pecorino, are 
substitutable because all cheese types can be used for the same consumption 
occasion, i.e. in pasta dishes.28 The Notifying Party also explained that suppliers of 
Italian -type hard cheeses, such as Parmigiano Reggiano and Grana Pad ano with the 
PDO label, produce also their equivalents without the label.29 
(25) With regard to the supply of private label Italian -type cheese to retailers, the 
Notifying Party submits that the segmentation by type of cheese does not appear 
relevant.30 First, th e Notifying Party argues that in the supply of private label 
Italian -type cheese the relevant factor is the capabilities of suppliers to respond to 
requirements of the tenders and not consumer preferences.31 According to the 
Notifying Party, various types o f cheese can be easily manufactured by the same 
                                                                                                                                                      
recital  36; M.4761 –  Bongrain/Sodiaal/JV , recital 23, Commission Decision in M.6242 –  
Lactalis/Parmalat, recitals 52 -53. 
23  Commission Decision in Case M.4135 – Lactalis/Galbani , recital 13.  
24  Commission Decision in M.6611 – Arla foods/Milk link , recitals 39 -40. 
25  Commission Decision in Case M.4135 – Lactalis/Galbani , recitals 14 and 15.  
26  Form CO, paragraphs 207 and 258.  
27  Form CO, paragraph 258.  
28  Form CO, paragraph 258.  
29  Form CO, paragraph 300.  
30  Form CO, paragraph 207.  
31  Form CO, paragraph 188 et seq.  
 
6 producers and they could belong to the same market.32 Second, the Notifying Party 
also submits that some fresh cheese types are sold together to retailers under one 
contract and the same price (for example, ri cotta and mascarpone).33 
(26) As regards the segmentation of cheese based on the type of milk  used to produce 
that cheese, the Notifying Party submits that, from the point of view of consumers, 
buffalo milk mozzarella and cow milk mozzarella are substitutable be cause both 
products satisfy the same need and there is a correlation between their prices.34  
(27) Concerning geographical indications, t he Notifying Party explains that the labelling 
of PDO products is subject to stringent rules and requires that the product 
originates in a specific region and that the ingredients originate and the production 
takes place in the defined geographic area. Accordingly, only producers located in 
the specific regions are able to produce PDO cheese.  
(28) The manufacturers of Italian -type PD O cheeses are organized in consortia. These 
consortia require their members to manufacture PDO cheeses from Italian milk 
produced in specific Italian regions. For example, for Parmigiano Reggiano the 
milk must come from the provinces of Bologna to the left  of Reno river, Mantua to 
the right of the Po river, Modena, Parma and Reggio nell’Emilia.35 
(29) However, the Notifying Party argues that segmenting the market based 
geographical indications such as PDO  does not reflect the nature of competition on 
the market.36  
(30) The Notifying Party also submits that private label products  are substitutable 
irrespective of the place of where they are manufactured and the origin of milk 
used.37 The Notifying Party explains that mentioning the country of origin of the 
product is vol untary and submits that retailers procure mozzarella, mascarpone and 
ricotta without giving consideration to the country of origin.38 As regards the origin 
of milk, some products carry the indicatio n that milk is of “EU origin”. […].39 
4.3.1.3. Commiss io n’ s assessment  
(31) The market investigation confirmed the previous segmentation of supply of cheese 
by categories. The majority of responsive customers indicated that the different 
Italian -type cheese categories (e.g. fresh cheese, soft cheese, semi -hard cheese an d 
hard cheese) were not substitutable among each other.40  
(32) Moreover, the results of the market investigation also point to a further 
segmentation between types of cheese within these categories for most of the 
concerned products (Italian -type cheeses and Fe ta). 
                                                 
32  Form CO, paragraph 205.  
33  Form CO, paragraph 206.  
34  Form CO, paragaraph 261 et seq.  
35  Form CO, paragraph 2 44. 
36  Form CO, paragraph 271. The Notifying Party submits that the Parties “ do not manufacture and 
supply cheeses with the same PDO. Nuova Castelli supplies (as branded products) Mozzarella di 
Bufala Campana, under the Mandara brand, Parmigiano Reggiano, Grana Padano, Gorgonzola, 
Taleggio and Pecorino under the Nuova Castelli brand, none of which Lactalis manufactures or 
supplies as PDO products .” As regards G orgonzola, Lactalis sells only very small quantities.  
37  Form CO, paragraph 241 et seq.  
38  Form CO, pages 77 and 78.  
39  Form CO, pages 78 and 79.  
40  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 9.  
 
7 (A) Mozzarella  
(33) The vast majority of customers responding to the market investigation considered 
that mozzarella is not substitutable with any other type of cheese.41 Customer 
explained that “ [m]ozzarella is too specific and creates a specific market ”42 and 
that “[i]t is very hard to find the same taste and texture in another product”.43  
Cow and buffalo milk mozzarella 
(34) The results of the market investigation also indicate that, contrary to what the 
Notifying Party argues, cow and buffalo milk mozzarella are n ot substitutable.  
(35) First, the large majority of customers and competitors that responded to the market 
investigation indicated that cow milk and buffalo milk mozzarella are not 
substitutable at all or only partially substitutable in terms of price and prod uct 
characteristics.44 As a customer explained: “ The quality of the product is superior 
in buffalo milk. The taste is more pronounced. The price is higher. Many 
consumers of mozzarella di bufala do not buy mozzarella made of cow milk 
because they find the product tasteless and unattractive ”45  
(36) Second, the majority of customers and competitors that responded to the market 
investigation indicated that buffalo milk mozzarella commands a significant price 
premium (over 30% higher than cow milk mozzare lla).46  
(37) Third, the large majority of customers expressing their views submitted that even if 
the price of buffalo milk mozzarella increased by 5 -10% they would not switch to 
cow milk mozzare lla.47 The majority of responsive competitors agreed.48  
(38) Fourth, from a supply -side perspective and according to the market investigation, 
there is no substitutability between buffalo milk mozzarella and cow milk 
mozzare lla.49  
PDO and country of origin 
(39) First, with regard to buffalo milk mozzarella carrying a PDO label , i.e. Mozzar ella 
di Buffala di Campana, certain customers responsive to the market investigation 
indicated that PDO carries a certain premium value as it assures quality.50 
However, the large majority of the customers that responded to the market 
investigation indicate d that PDO and non -PDO mozzarella were alternatives in 
terms of price and product characteristics.51  
                                                 
41  Questionnaire to customers (Q2) , question 12.  
42  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 12.1.  
43  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 12.1.  
44  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 15; Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 19.  
45  Courtesy translation from French: “ La qualité du produit est supérieure en lait de bufflonne. Le gout 
est plus prononcé. Le prix est supérieur. Beaucoup de consommateurs de mozzarella di bufala 
n'achète pas de mozzarella au lait de vache car trouve le produit insipide et sans intérêt ”, 
Questio nnaire to customers (Q2), question 15.1.  
46 Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 17; Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 22.  
47  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 16.  
48  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), questions 20 and 21.  
49  Question naire to competitors (Q1), question 19; Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 15.  
50  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 37.1: “ DOP is a sort of quality insurance which customers 
pay attention to”, “Par exemple, l'origine de la matière première d u Lait de vache (Italie) est un 
critère important pour le client.”   
51  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 37.  
 
8 (40) Moreover, the majority of responsive customers indicated that if prices of PDO  
mozzarella increased by 5 -10% end- consumers will switch to non -PDO  
mozzare ll a.52 The responses from competitors were evenly split.53  
(41) Second , with regard to the country of origin of non-PDO Italian -type cheese 
products (including country of origin of the milk), the market investigation points 
at the fact that this is a factor of differentiation recognised by end -consumers 
particularly in certain countries (e.g. Italy); however, t he majority of respondents  
indicated that retailers do not impose any specifications as regard the origin of the 
milk of non -PDO Italian -type cheeses.54  
(42) Third, customers that responded to the market investigation were evenly split 
between those that considered that mozzarella labelled “made in Italy” was fully or 
largely substitutable by and mozzarella not labelled as made in Italy and those that 
considered  these products not or only partially substitutable.55 
Conclusion 
(43) In light of the results of the market investigation and for the purpose of this 
decision, the Commission considers that mozzarella constitutes a distinct product 
market from other Italian -type fresh cheeses and that it can be further segmented by 
type of milk species into buffa lo milk mozzare lla and cow milk mozzare lla.  
(B) Ricotta  
(44) Ricotta and mascarpone are different types of fresh cheese that tend to be used as 
cooking ingredients.56 The market  investigation confirmed that they belong to 
separate markets.  
(45) First, the results of the market investigation indicate that the large majority of 
customers consider that there are significant differences between ricotta and 
mascarpone in terms of consumpt ion occasions and prices.57 
(46) Second, the vast majority of customers indicated that ricotta is not substitutable at 
all or only partially substitutable with other type of cheeses in terms of price and 
product characteristics.58 Moreover, t he majority of compet itors that responded to 
the market investigation indicated that customers do not switch to other products 
when prices of ricotta increase.59  
(47) Third, from a supply -side perspective, ricotta is made from whey, a left over from 
the production of cheese (e.g. m ozzarella and mascarpone) and mascarpone is 
produced from milk fat.60 The majority of competitors that responded to the market 
investigation replied that producers of mozzarella could not start producing ricotta 
without incurring in significant costs and in  a short period of time.61  
                                                 
52  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 38.  
53  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 33.  
54  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), que stion 11; Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 35.  
55  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 13.  
56  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 21.1.  
57  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 21.  
58  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 18.  
59  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 23.  
60  Form CO, paragraphs 1054 et seq.; Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 22.1  
61  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 25.  
 
9 (48) Moreover, the majority of the respondents to the market investigation indicated that 
suppliers active in ricotta could not start producing and selling mascarpone without 
incurring in significant costs and swiftly.62  
(49) Fifth, with r egard to the country of origin of non-PDO Italian -type cheese products 
(including country of origin of the milk), as indicated in paragraph (41)  above, the 
majority of responsive customers do not impose any specifications as regard the 
origin of the milk of non -PDO Italian -type cheese products, including ricotta .63 
Conclusion 
(50) In light of the results of the market investigation and for the purpose of this 
decision, the Commission considers that ricotta constitutes a separate product 
market from other Italian -type fresh cheeses.  
(C) Mascarpone  
(51) As explained in Section (B) above, the market investigation confirmed that 
mascarpone and ricotta belong to separate markets.  
(52) First, the results of the market investigation indicate that the large majority of 
customers consider that there are significant differences between mascarpone and 
ricotta in terms of consumption occasions and prices.64 
(53) Second, the vast majority of customers indicated that mascarpone is not 
substitutable at all or on ly partially by other type of cheeses in terms of price and 
product characteristics.65 Moreover, t he majority of the customers and competitors 
that responded to the market investigation indicated that customers do not switch to 
other cheeses when prices of mascarpone increase.66  
(54) Third, from a supply -side perspective, mascarpone is produced from milk fat and 
ricotta is made from whey, a left over from  the production of cheese 
(e.g. mozzarella and mascarpone).67 The majority of competitors that responded to 
the market investigation replied that producers of mozzarella could not start 
producing mascarpone without incurring in significant costs and in a short period 
of time.68  
(55) Moreover, the majority of the respondents to the market investigation indicated that 
suppliers active in mascarpone could not start producing and selling ricotta without 
incurring in significant costs and swiftly.69  
(56) Fourth, with regard to the country of origin of non-PDO Italian -type cheese 
products (including country of origin of the milk), as indicated in paragraph (41) 
above, t he majority of responsive customers do not impose any specifications as 
                                                 
62  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 22 and 22.2; Questionnair e to competitors (Q1), 
question  26. 
63  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 11.  
64  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 21.  
65  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 19.  
66  Questionnaire to competitors (Q2), question 20; Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 24.  
67  Form CO, paragraphs 1054 et seq.; Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 22.1  
68  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 25.  
69  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 22 and 22.2; Questionnair e to competitors (Q1), 
question  26. 
 
10 regard the origin of the milk of non -PDO Italian -type cheese products, including 
mascarpone .70 
Conclusion 
(57) In light of the results of the market investigation and for the purpose of this 
decision, the Commission considers that mascarpone constitutes a separate product 
markets from other Italian -type fresh cheeses.  
(D) Feta 
(58) Feta is a fresh Greek cheese made from ew e and goat milk in the mainland Greece 
and its department of Lesbos bearing a PDO label.  
(59) First, the majority of customers expressing views in the market investigation 
considered that Feta is a distinct product from other fresh cheeses and Feta fulfils 
different needs.71  
(60) However, several customers indicated that there are alternatives to Feta for certain 
uses such as fresh salads. A Belgian customer indicated that “Many alternative 
products can be substituted for Feta, especially for salad uses ”;72 and French  
customers  pointed out “ Feta and mozzarella can be 2 alternatives in many 
consumption occasions for example in a composition of salad […]”73 and “ Feta is 
mainly used for salads. It is substitutable with other cheeses ”.74 
(61) Moreover, the majority of competitors  that responded to the market investigation 
indicated that customers would switch to other cheeses if the prices of Feta were to 
increase.75 
(62) Second, with regard to Feta carrying PDO labels, the majority of the customers that 
responded to the market investig ation indicated that PDO Feta and non -PDO 
products were not alternatives in terms of price and product characteristics.76  
(63) However, the majority of responsive customers and competitors submitted that 
end-customers would switch from PDO Feta to non -PDO produ cts if the price of 
the PDO Feta were to increase;77 
Conclusion 
(64) In light of the results of the market investigation and for the purpose of this 
decision, the precise market definition can be left open as the Transaction does not 
raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market  under any 
plausible product market  definitio n.  
                                                 
70  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 11.  
71  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 29.  
72  Courtesy translation from French: “Beaucoup de produits alternatifs peuvent être substitués à la 
Feta, notamment pour d es utilisations en salade”, Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 29.1.  
73  Courtesy translation from French: “[l]a Feta et la mo zzarella peuvent être 2 alternatives dans de 
nombreuses occasion de consommation comme par exemple dans la composition de sa lade. […]”, 
Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 29.1.  
74  Courtesy translation from French: “[l]a Feta est principalement utilisée pour les salades. Elle est 
substituable avec d'autres fromages”, Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 29.1.  
75  Ques tionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 31.  
76  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 37.  
77  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 38; Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 33.  
 
11 (E) Gorgonzola  
(65) Gorgonzola is a soft blue cheese carrying a PDO label. The production of PDO 
Gorgonzola follows the rules established by the consortium. Both Lactali s and 
Nuova Castelli are producers and members of the Consorzio per la Tutela del 
Formaggio Gorgonzola PDO .  
(66) First, the vast majority of customers responding to the market investigation have 
submitted that Gorgonzola is not substitutable or only partially substitutable with 
other type of blue cheeses in terms of price and product characteristics78 A 
customer explained that “In some way, we could consider other “blue cheese” as 
“Roquefort”, “Bleu” or “stilton” as substitutes. But, they are stronger than 
Gorgonzola and can’t fit to all consumers. Gorgonzola is quite unique in terms of 
taste and texture”.79 
(67) Second, the majority of competitors that responded to the market investigation 
submitted that customers would switch to other blue cheeses (in particular 
roquefort) if the price of Gorgonzola would increase.80 However, the majority of 
responsive customers indicated that, if prices of Gorgonzola were to increase, end -
consumers would not switch to other blue cheeses.81 
(68) Third, with regard to Gorgonzola carrying a PD O label, the majority of the 
customers that responded to the market investigation indicated that PDO and 
non-PDO Gorgonzola were not alternatives in terms of price and product 
characteristics.82  
(69) However, the majority of competitors responsive to the market  investigation 
submitted that end -customers would switch from PDO to non -PDO Gorgonzola if 
the price of PDO Gorgonzola were to increase; 83 while the majority of responsive 
customers indicated that if prices of PDO  Gorgonzola increased by 5 -10% 
end-consumer s will not switch to non -PDO  Gorgonzola.84  
Conclusion 
(70) In light of the results of the market investigation and for the purpose of this 
decision, the precise market definition can be left open as the Transaction does not 
raise serious doubts as to its compat ibility with the internal market under any 
plausib le product market definitio n.  
(F) Italian -type hard cheese  
(71) Both Parties sell different Italian -type hard cheeses, with and without PDO label, 
i.e. Parmigiano Reggiano PDO, Grana Padano PDO, Pecorino PDO, non -PDO 
Grana Padano -type and Parmigia no -type, as well as other hard cheeses.  
(72) The production of Parmigiano Reggiano PDO  and Grana Padano  PDO is organised 
by a relevant consortia. Consortia, while not producing or selling the cheese itself, 
attributes the production quotas and defines the rules that consortia members have 
to observe in order to use the PDO label and. These rules typically re late to the 
                                                 
78  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 23.  
79  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 23.1.  
80  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 27.  
81  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 24.  
82  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 37.  
83  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 33.  
84  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 38.  
 
12 origin of the milk used (e.g. determined by a specific geographic area), production 
methods and the packaging.85 Nuova Castelli is a member of the Consorzio del 
Formaggio Parmigiano Reggiano and Consorzio Tutela Grana Padano. Lactalis 
does not produce Parmigia no Reggia no PDO  and Grana Padano  PDO.86  
(73) First, the Commission’s market investigation found that the consumption habits of 
customers may be different across Member States, with the large majority of 
customers in most countries considering Par migiano Reggiano and Grana Padano 
to be substitutable or at least partially substitutable as Italian -type hard cheese for 
their main intended uses.87 For example, a customer explained regarding the 
alternatives for Parmigiano Reggiano: “there is pecorino, grana padano with 
similar characteristics and a lower price”88, or as another customer stated: 
“Substitutable only by Grana Padano or [I]talian Hard Cheese”.89 Furthermore, 
some customers considered that, for example Parmigiano Reggiano can be 
substituted als o with other hard cheeses: “could switch to non Italian  type hard 
cheese or Grano Padano” ,90 or as another customer submitted: “Grana Padano 
could be an alternative. Similarly as other hard cheeses for certain users who grate 
the cheese […]” .91 
(74) Second, the m ajority of customers and competitors expressing their views indicated 
that if prices of Parmigiano Reggiano or Grana Padano were to increase, end -
consumers would switch to other cheeses.92 The majority of competitors expressing 
their views indicated that in  case of price variation of Grana Padano or Parmigiano 
Reggiano customers will substitute one with the other.93 According to the market 
investigation, while the substitutability was particularly strong between Grana 
Padano and Parmigiano Reggiano, it was no t limited to these Italian -type hard 
cheeses.94  
(75) Third, with regard to substitutability between Parmigiano Reggiano and Grana 
Padano  carrying PDO labels, the majority of customers that responded to the 
market investigation indicated that PDO and non -PDO Parmigiano Reggiano and 
Grana Padano  were not alternatives in terms of price and product characteristics95 
and end -customers would not switch from PDO to non -PDO Parmigiano Reggiano 
and Grana Padano  if the price of the PDO products were to increase.96 
                                                 
85  Form CO, paragraphs 272 -274. 
86  Form CO, paragraph 279.  According to the Notifying Party, Lactalis has a residual role as a seasoner 
(i.e. for aging the cheese) in Consorzio Tutela G rana Padano .  
87  Questionnaire to customer s (Q2), questions 25, 25.1 and 27.  
88  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 25.1.  
89  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 25.1.  
90  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 25.1.  
91  Courtesy translation from French: “Le Grana Padano fournit une alternative. D'autres produits à 
pâte pressée également, pour certains utilisateurs (qui râpent le produit par exemple)”  ; 
Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 25.1.  
92  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 26 and 2 6.1; Questionnaire  to competitors (Q1), 
questions  28 and 28.1.; Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 28; Questionnaire to competitors 
(Q1), questions 29.  
93  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), questions 29.1 and 30.  
94  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 26.1 and 28.1; Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), 
questions 28.1 and 29.1.  
95  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 37 and 38.  
96  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 38.  
 
13 (76) Howeve r, the large majority of competitors expressing their views in the market 
investigation considered that, in case of a price increase of a PDO -type, the end -
customers would switch to the non -PDO equivalent.97 Moreover, when asked about 
alternatives for Grana  Padano, for example, some customers indicated that it would 
be substitutable: “With non PDO hard- cheese”98, or, as another customer 
explained, if the prices for Grana Padano were to increase: “Some customers could 
switch to similar cheeses non PDO, with characteristics close to Grana Padano”.99 
Conclusion 
(77) In light of, the results of this market investigation, the information provided by the 
Parties and for the purpose of this decision, the Commission considers that the 
relevant market is broader than a singu lar variety of an Italian -type hard cheese. 
For the purpose of this Decision, the Commission will carry out the assessment in 
relation to the plausible market for Italian -hard cheeses .   
4.3.2. Possible segmentation of the supply of private label and branded chee se 
(78) Both Parties supply branded and private label Italian -type cheeses to retailers. 
However, for the product markets considered, most of Lactalis’ sales are in 
branded products, while Nuova Castelli focuses mainly on the supply of private 
label products.  
4.3.2.1. Commiss io n’ s precedents  
(79) In previous decisions, the Commission considered the distinction between branded 
and private label products, and in some cases it came to the conclusion that they 
belong to the same, albeit differentiated market.100 
4.3.2.2. Notifying Party’s view 
(80) The Notifying Party submits that private label products and branded products 
compete head to head when they are sold to the end consumers; however, when 
they are sold to retailers, it is necessary to distinguish the supply of private label 
cheese from  the supply of branded cheese.101 
(81) The Notifying Party argues that private label and branded products are procured 
separately and differently by retailers.102 Moreover, the role played by suppliers 
and retailers in these procedures is different.103 The Notifying Party explains that 
retailers procure private label products through separate tender procedures and they 
have full control over product characteristics (e.g. origin of milk, quality, 
packaging), as well as volumes, sales and marketing.104 In contrast, retail ers and 
suppliers negotiate the supply of branded products bilaterally, in over the counter 
negotiations. These negotiations are done on the basis of product characteristics 
already determined by the supplier.105 
                                                 
97  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 33.  
98  Questionnai re to customers (Q2), questions 26.1 and question 25.1.  
99  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 27.1.  
100  Commission Decisions in Case M.6242 – Lactalis/Parmalat, recital 26; Commission Decisions in 
Case M.5046 – Friesland Foods/Campina , recital 529; Commission Decisions in Case M.4135 -  
Lactalis/Galbani , recital 16.  
101  Form CO, paragraph 182.  
102  Form CO, Section 2.1.1.  
103  Form CO, Section 2.1.2.  
104  Form CO, paragraphs 188 et seq.  
105  Form CO, paragraphs 190 et seq.  
 
14 4.3.2.3. Commission’s assessment  
(82) First, the Commission  notes that the results of the market investigation suggest that 
large majority of customers and competitors consider that branded and private label 
Italian -type cheeses compete.106 However, branded products can command a 
significant price difference even fo r products of very similar characteristics.107 As 
one customer explained: “In terms of texture, taste and smell, the private labels 
and branded labels are equivalent; the price of branded is generally higher.”108 
Given that the suppliers of branded products us ually also supply private label 
products, the price difference would apply even for products manufactured by the 
same company.  
(83) From a demand side perspective, in the perception of consumers, brand for fresh 
cheese products is an important and recognised e lement. The majority of customers 
expressing their views in the market investigation listed proprietary brands, such as 
Galbani (Lactalis), Zeta, Casa Azzur ra (Granarolo) as the strongest brand for 
different Italian -type cheeses.109 Only in few instances a p rivate label was 
mentioned as the strongest brand. For example, a French customer mentioned that 
retailer’s private label is the strongest brand for ricotta and Italian -type hard 
cheeses, or few Italian customers mentioned Italian -type hard cheeses.110   
(84) Furthermore, the majority of customers expressing their views in the market 
investigation also considered that at least one of the Parties’ has a “must have 
brand”.111 For example, a customer explained: “Galbani is a must for cow milk 
mozzarella […]. It is also  very important for buffalo milk mozzarella, ricotta and 
mascarpone”;112 or as another customer submitted: “Galbani Mozzarella 
(Lactalis) is the market leader in Brands and should be listed in every full -line food 
retailer”.113 The internal documents of the Notifying Party also refer to Galbani as 
the “Italians’ most loved cheese brand”  and the “strongest brand in Italian Cheese 
markets” .114  
(85) Second, while customer recognition driven by a brand identifies a specific 
producers and i s associated with specific qualitative expectation, which are driven 
by brand investment, advertising, packaging and indications; the private label 
products typically carry a retailer brand and are identified as a ‘less costly’ 
alternative which may be in a somewhat lower price segment.115 
                                                 
106  Questionnaire to cu stomers (Q2), questions 30 and 31; Questionnair e to competitors (Q1), 
question  32. 
107  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 33.  
108  Courtesy translation from French: “en termes de texture, goût et odeur les privat labels et branded 
labels sont équivalen ts; le prix des branded labels est généralement plus élevé”; Questionnaire to 
customers (Q2), question 31.1.  
109  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 50.  
110  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 50.  
111  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 51.  
112  Courtesy translation from French “Galbani est un incontournable de la mozzarella au lait de vache 
[…]. Il est aussi très important sur la mozzarella au lait de bufflonne, la ricotta et le mascarpone” ; 
Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 51.1.  
113  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 51.1.  
114 Form CO, Annex 5.2.D., slide 5. 
115  See, for ex ample, Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 32.1.  
 
15 (86) Third, the private label side of the market is also differentiated, with ‘entry’ 
products, or white label, carrying an alternative brand denomination and simpler 
packaging than retailer brands, possibly of lower qualitative  specifications and an 
even lower price.116  
Figure 1 - Branded and private label: chain of substitution  
 
Source: Commission’s figure  (e.g. Carrefour FR, 26/09/19)  
(87) Fourth, the procurement of branded and private label products is different. The 
majority of customers expressing views suggested that they have separate 
procedures for sourcing branded and private label products.117  
(88) Branded cheese products are procured through bilateral negotiations. Branded 
cheese products are less subs titutable and typically have to feature on shelves, 
particularly as regards the most recognised brands such as those held by Lactalis.118 
Private label cheese products are usually procured through tendering processes that 
are organised with concrete specific ations.119 Given that a supplier does not need to 
invest in brand development and marketing, there are lower barriers to entry. 
Similarly, given the regular competitive tendering processes based primarily on 
price as a selection criteria, switching barriers for retailers are likely also lower.120 
(89) Fifth, despite such differentiation in terms of pricing, brand and characteristics, 
there is evidence that such a differentiated offer may be a 'continuum' of options 
available to the customer and for which there would  be a chain of substitution. 121 
                                                 
116  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 5, 5.1, 33 and 34.1.  
117  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 35 and 36.  
118  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 51.  
119  See, for ex ample, Form CO, Annex  6.1.2.1.5.A; and Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 53.  
120  Questionnaire to customers (Q2b), question 4; see also Questionnai re to customers (Q 2), 
questions  75, 78, 78.2; Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 88.1.   
121  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 32. In addition, as tender specifications provided in the file 
indicate certain private label products seem to be benchmarked agains t a specific branded product, 
(Form CO, Annex 6.1.2.1.5 A). [. 

 
16 (90) Sixth, in this context, the different procurement mechanisms may not be sufficient 
to sustain a finding that pricing dynamics would significantly differ across the 
different products. Thus, even if, according to precedent, a separate market for 
procurement of private label products to be supplied under retailer brands may be 
considered, anti -competitive effects on such market, by affecting the constraint 
exerted by private label products in on -shelf competition, may eventually  also lead 
to higher overall prices on the spectrum of products available including branded 
products.  
(91) Seventh, consistent with this, the Parties’ internal documents show that they track 
the market shares for both branded and private label products as comp eting in the 
same market.122 In addition, the Notifying Party’s internal document produced in 
the regular course of business reads for mascarpone market “Galbani competes 
with minor brand and PL that are more aggressive in terms of price and 
distribution”123. A further example regarding  the SWOT124 analysis for the ricotta 
market also shows that private label products exert direct competitive constraint on 
the branded products: Lactalis presents continuously growing private label as a 
‘threat’, while Galbani - a leader brand – as a ‘strength’.125  
(92) Eighth, the Notifying Party explained that it considers private label when making 
strategic pricing and marketing decisions in order to avoid losing market shares to 
private label products.126 Accordingly, if Lactalis takes into account the prices of 
the competing products, it would indicate that private label exert a competitive 
constraint on the supply of branded products, too.  
(93) Furthermore, the Notifying Party’s internal documents suggest that, as regards 
specifically the Italian -type cheeses, the share of private label supplies has been 
increasing over the last years and represents in many geographic markets an 
important part of the overall market.127 The Commission notes that the market data 
submitted by the Notifying Party also indicate that for some Italian -type cheeses in 
certain countries, the increasing share of private label is achieved at the cost of 
branded products supplies.128 This in turn may  indicate that retailers gain a stronger 
negotiation position vis - à -vis branded label suppliers, which have to compete for 
smaller available shelf space and the risk that it may further shrink because of 
retailers’ ability to increase volumes in private label segment. As the Notifying 
Party submits, the retailers decide on the amount of shelf space that they will 
                                                 
122  Parties’ response to the Commission’s request for information RFI 13, annex es 13 -7-5, slide 14; 
13-6-4, slide 12.  
123  Parties’ response to the Commission’s request for information RFI 13, annex  13 -7-5, Slide 7.  
124  Strengths -weaknesses -opportunities -threats analysis.  
125  Parties’ response to the Commission’s request for information RFI 13, annex  13 -7-5, Slide 26.  
126  Form CO, paragraph 122, Parties’ response to the Commission’s request for inf ormation RFI 13, 
question 7, ex plaining “ This is proof that Lactalis is under stringent competitive pressure from the 
private label products”.  Given that private labels are considered “competitors” in the internal 
documents, see for ex ample Annex  13 -7-1, slide 14, “ careful price management considering 
competitors’ index ”, and 13 -7-3, slide 10, “reducing our price gap Vs. competitor” . 
127  Form CO, Annex  5.4.G , referring to the multiple European countries, for ex ample, slide 6 (mozzarella 
with reference to Ger many, France, UK, Poland, Belgium, Spain, Sweden, Portugal, etc.: “[Private 
label]  MS growing everywhere ”); slide 10 (mascarpone with reference to Germany, France, Portugal, 
Sweden, etc.: to the advantage of [Private labels] that reaches 69% MS).  
128  Third -party data show that the share of private label in the overall market was increasing in the period 
of 2016- 2018, in some countries, for ex ample, regarding cow mozzarella in G ermany, Sweden; ricotta 
in France, the UK, Italy; Italian -type hard cheeses in France, the UK, Sweden; Parties’ response to the 
Commission’s request for information RFI 23.   
 
17 allocate to branded products and on the amount of shelf space they will allocate to 
private label products.129 
(94) Ninth, the Commission also observes  that manufacturers of branded products, such 
as Italian suppliers Casa Azzurra, Lactalis and Nuova Castelli, as well as German 
suppliers Zott and Goldsteig, also feature on the Notifying Party’s list as the main 
private label suppliers.130 The Commission do es not have evidence, which would 
indicate that manufacturers of Italian -type cheese would exclusively produce 
private label products. Accordingly, as manufacturing facilities for producing 
private and branded label products are the same, the suppliers wou ld be able to 
switch from supplying branded to private label products and the other way around.  
(95) Tenth, the Notifying Party also explained that for producers focusing on branded 
cheese supply the private label orders are important “in terms of valuing idle  
capacities”131. Accordingly, a shift in the output volumes of private label of the 
manufacturer focusing on branded products supplies would have an effect on the 
capacity utilisation and ultimately also on the cost structure and competitiveness of 
its suppl ies of branded products.  
(96) In light of the findings and the results of the market investigation, the Commission 
considers that while private label products exert a constraint on branded products, 
this may not be sufficient to exclude that branded products p rimarily compete in a 
different market. In any event, for the purposes of the present case, the exact 
market definition can be left open as the Transaction does not raise serious doubts 
as to its compatibility with the internal market under any plausible market 
definitio n.  
4.4. Production and sale of fresh dairy products  
4.4.1. Commission’s precedents  
(97) In previous decisions, the Commission held that, within the supply of basic dairy 
products, a distinction ought to be made between fresh dairy products and long -life 
dairy products.132 
(98) With regard to fresh dairy products, these are generally produced from dairy 
products such as milk and cream, in which, among others, eggs, thickening agents 
(such as starch), sugar, flavours and/or fruits are added.133 Within fresh dairy 
products, the Commission has distinguished different products categories, namely 
fresh milk, fresh buttermilk  or yoghurt.134  
(99) Concerning fresh dairy desserts, they represent a variety of ready -made sweet dairy 
desserts including custard, portion packs such as mo usse, (rice) puddings, 
profiteroles, tiramisu and porridges. The Commission considered that fresh custard 
                                                 
129  Form CO, paragraph 192.  
130  […]. 
131  Form CO, paragraph 85.  
132  Commission Decision in Case M.6522 –  Groupe Lactalis/Skanemejerier , recital 9 ; M.5046 –  
Friesland Fo ods/Campina, recital 141.  
133  Commission Decision in Case M.6441 –  Senoble/Agrial/Senagral JV , recital 45; Commission 
Decision in Case M.5046 – Friesland Foods/Campina , recitals 1225 - 1228.  
134  Commission Decision in Case M.6522 – Groupe Lactalis/Skanemejer ier, recital 139; Commission 
Decision in Case M.5046 – Friesland Foods/Campina , recital 167.  
 
18 in gable top, porridge and portion pack dairy desserts constitute separate relevant 
product markets.135 
4.4.2. Notifying Party’s view  
(100)  The Notifying Party submi ts that, in many cases, consumers consider all types of 
desserts as substitutable. However, in the absence of any significant overlapping 
activities, the Notifying Party takes the view that the precise market definition may 
be left open.136 
4.4.3. Commission’s asse ssment  
(101)  According to the information provided by the Parties, Lactalis manufactures 
different types of fresh dairy desserts under its brand Galbani, including 
tiramisu;137 and that (ii) Nuova Castelli sells in limited volumes one type of fresh 
dairy desserts,  namely tiramis u.138  
(102)  As the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the 
internal market with respect to the production and sale of fresh dairy desserts 
(including tiramisu) under any plausible product market definition, the 
Commiss io n considers that the precise  market definitio n may  be left open.  
4.5. Production and sale of butter  
4.5.1. Commission’s precedents  
(103)  In previous decisions, the Commission held that separate product markets exist for 
butter sold in bulk and butter sold in packet s.139 Moreover, bulk butter constitutes a 
separate product market, different from the market for bulk yellow fats including 
margarine and liquid vegetable oils.140 
(104)  The Commission also came to the conclusion that dairy bulk butter can also be 
divided into (i) basic butter (with a 82% fat content); (ii) butter oil (or non -
fractionated butter oil, i.e., with a 99,8% fat content) and (iii) fractionated butter oil 
(or fractionated butter).141 
(105)  In addition, the Commission held that vegetable fats (namely, margarine) ar e not in 
the packet butter market.142 The Commission, however, left open the question 
whether plain packet butter and packet butter with additives constituted separate 
markets.143 
                                                 
135  Commission Decision in Case M.6722 –  Frieslandcampina/Zijerveld & Veldhuyzen And Den 
Hollander , recital 101 et seq.; Commission Decision in Case M.6522 –  Groupe  
Lactalis/Skanemejerier , recital 14; Commission Decision in Case M.5046 – Friesland 
Foods/Campina , recital1272.  
136  Form CO, paragraphs 390 -394.  
137  Form CO, paragraph 390.  
138  Form CO, paragraph 391.  
139  Commission Decision in Case M.6722 – Frieslandcampina/Zijerveld & Veldhuyzen And Den 
Hollander , recitals 109 -112. 
140  Commission Decision in Case M.6119 –  Arla/Hansa , recital 29; Commission Decision in Case 
M.5046 – Friesland Foods/Campina , recitals 824 - 825. 
141  Commission Decision in Case M. 5046– Friesland Foods Campina , recital 834.  
142  Commission Decision in Case M.6119 – Arla/Hans , paragraph 30.  
143  Commission Decision in Case M.6722 –  FrieslandCampina/Zijerveld & Veldhuyzen and Den 
Hollander , paragraph 112.  
 
19 4.5.2. Notifying Party’s view  
(106)  The Notifying Party submits that the Parties are active o n the market for the 
production and sale of butter and that the Parties’ overlap is very limited.144 
Therefore, the Notifying Party takes the view that that the precise market definition 
may be left open.145 
4.5.3. Commission’s assessment  
(107)  As the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the 
internal market with respect to the market for the production and sale of butter 
under any plausible definition, the precise product market definition may be left 
open.  
4.6. Geographic market definition  
4.6.1. Procurement of milk  
4.6.1.1. Commiss io n’ s precedents  
(108)  In previous cases,146 the Commission left open whether the geographic scope of the 
markets for the procurement of raw milk could be national or narrower, i.e., 
regional or even local. As regards the Italian market, th e Commission left open 
whether the relevant market for the procurement of raw milk should be defined as 
narrower than national because raw milk is perishable in nature and the maximum 
storage duration prior to further processing is limited.147 
4.6.1.2. Notifying Part y’s view  
(109)  The Notifying Party submits that the markets for the procurement of milk are at 
least national, if not wider, comprising clusters of countries.148 The Notifying Party 
submits that this is particularly the case for Italy due to the fact that (i) proc urement 
of milk may take place throughout Italy; (ii) milk can be easily transported from 
one region to another; (iii) imports of milk are frequent due to the insufficient level 
of Italian domestic milk production; and (iv) pricing conditions are broadly 
consistent throughout Italy.149 
4.6.1.3. Commission’s assessment  
(110)  The Parties’ activities only overlap in the procurement of raw cow’s milk in certain 
regions of Italy. Therefore, the competitive assessment of the Transaction will be 
carried out at a national level and  to a certain extent in narrower areas in Italy.  
(111)  However, for the purpose of this decision, the precise geographic market definition 
can be left open the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility 
with the interna l market under a ny plausib le  market definitio n.  
                                                 
144  Form CO, paragraphs 402 -403. 
145  Form CO, paragraph 407.  
146  Commission Decision in Case M.6119 – Arla/Hansa , recital 35; M.6611 – Arla Foods/Milk Link , 
recital 54.  
147  Commission Decision in Case M.6242 – Lactalis/Parmalat, recital 30 et seq..  
148  Form CO, paragraph 130.  
149  Form CO, para graphs 131 -140. 
 
20 4.6.2. Supply of Italian- type cheese and Feta to retailers  
4.6.2.1. Commiss io n’ s precedents  
(112)  In previous cases, the Commission concluded that the markets for the supply of 
cheese are  nationa l in scope.150 
4.6.2.2. Notifying Party’s view  
(113)  In line with the Commission’s precedents, the Notifying Party argues that the 
markets for the supply of branded cheeses are national due to consumer 
preferences, price differences between Member States, and to the importance of 
local brands and strong national trademarks.151 
(114)  However, the Notifying Party argues that the market for the supply of private -label 
cheese to retailers is wider than national because (i)  customers are the retailers, 
therefore making consumer preferences and brands less relevant; (ii) retailers 
organise  European -wide calls for tenders and some European retailers have 
regrouped their activities in buying alliances; (iii) suppliers from various Member 
States have the ability to supply cheeses across Europe; (iv) imports and exports of 
cheese are significan t in the EU; (v) the labelling products does not constraint 
competition between suppliers from various Member States, and (vi) prices for 
private -label cheeses are homogenous across various Member States.152 
4.6.2.3. Commission’s assessment  
(115)  The market investigation c onfirms that the markets for the supply of cheese are 
nationa l.  
(116)  First, the large majority of customers that responded to the market investigation 
indicated that they negotiate contracts for the supply of branded and private label 
cheese at national level.153  
(117)  Second, the vast majority of responsive customers indicated that the relevant 
geographic market for the supply of mozzarella, ricotta, mascarpone, hard Italian -
type cheeses (Grana Padano, Parmigiano Reggiano) and Feta is national in 
scope.154 
(118)  Third, seven  customers that responded to the market investigation indicated that 
customers’ demand of Italian -type cheeses is substantially the same across EEA 
countries, while six customers indicated that it was different.155 However, the 
majority of responsive competi tors indicated that end -customers’ demand for 
Italian -type cheeses and Feta are substantially different in terms of brands, 
customer preferences and product characteristics across EU countries.156  
                                                 
150  Commission Decision in Case M.7232 –  Charterhouse/Nuova Castelli , recital 15; Commission 
Decision in Case M.6522 – Groupe Lactalis/Skanemejerier , recital 28; Commission Decision in Case 
M.4135 – Lactalis/Galbani , recital 18; Commission D ecision in Case M.6242 –  Lactalis/Parmalat, 
recital  55. 
151  Form CO, paragraph 305.  
152  Form CO, paragraphs 219 et seq.  
153  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 41 and 42 . 
154  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 43.  
155  Questionnaire to customers (Q 2), question 44.  
156  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 40.  
 
21 (119)  Fourth, the majority of customers and competitors that responded to the market 
investigation indicated that prices of Italian -type cheeses are substantially different 
across different EEA countries. 157  
(120)  For the purpose of this decision, the competitive assessment of the supply of 
Italian -type cheese and Feta to  retailers will be carried out at the narrowest level, 
i.e. a national level; however, the precise geographic market definition can be left 
open as the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with 
the internal market under any pla usible geographic market definition.  
4.6.3. Production and sale of fresh dairy products  
4.6.3.1. Commiss io n’ s precedents  
(121)  In previous cases, the Commission considered that the relevant market for fresh 
dairy desserts would be national but the exact market definition was left open.158 
(122)  Regarding portion pack dairy desserts, the Commission considered that it could be 
wider than national in scope.159 
4.6.3.2. Notifying Party’s view  
(123)  The Notifying Party takes the view that, in the absence of any significant 
overlapping activities, the preci se geographic definition may be left open.160 
4.6.3.3. Commission’s assessment  
(124)  For the purpose of this decision, the competitive assessment of the Transaction will 
be carried out at a national level; however, the precise geographic market definition 
can be left open as the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its 
compatibility with the internal market under any plausible geographic market 
definitio n.  
4.6.4. Production and sale of butter  
4.6.4.1. Commiss io n’ s precedents  
(125)  In previous cases, the Commission considered the geographic market for bulk 
butter, fractionated butter oil and non -fractionated butter oil to be EEA -wide.161 
(126)  With regard to packet butter, the Commission considered in previous decisions that 
the relevant geographic market was wider than national and left o pen whether it 
was EEA -wide but deemed to be at least regional (i.e. including more than one 
Member State).162 
4.6.4.2. Notifying Party’s view  
(127)  The Notifying Party considers that the markets for butter is EEA -wide, or at least 
regional. However, in the absence of sign ificant overlapping activities of the 
                                                 
157  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 45. Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 41.  
158  Commission Decision in Case M.6119 –  Arla/Hansa , recital  36; Commission Decision in Case 
M.5046 – Friesland Foods/Campina , recital 230.  
159  Commission Decision in Case M.6722 –  Frieslandcampina/Zijerveld & Veldhuyzen And Den 
Hollander , recitals 106 -108. 
160  Form CO, paragraph 295.  
161  Commission Decision in Case M .6627 – Arla Foods/Milch -Union Hocheifel , recital 88.  
162  Commission Decision in Case M.6627 – Arla Foods/Milch -Union Hocheifel , recital  88. 
 
22 Parties on these markets, the Notifying Party submits that this question may be left 
open.163 
4.6.4.3. Commission’s assessment  
(128)  For the purposes of this decision, the competitive assessment of the Transaction 
will be carried out a t the narrowest level possible, i.e. at a national level. However, 
the precise geographic market definition can be left open as the Transaction does 
not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market under any 
plausib le geographic ma rket definition. 
5. COMPETITIVE  ASSESSMENT  
5.1. Legal framework  
(129)  Article 2 of the Merger Regulation requires the Commission to examine whether 
notified concentrations are compatible with the internal market, by assessing 
whether they would significantly impede effe ctive competition in the internal 
market or in a substantial part of it.  
(130)  The Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the 
Merger Regulation (the "Horizontal Merger Guidelines") distinguish two main 
ways in which mergers between actual or potential competitors on the same 
relevant market may significantly impede effective competition, namely non -
coordinated effects and coordinated effects.164  
(131)  Non-coordinated effects may significantly impede effective competition by 
eliminating the competitive constraint imposed by one merging party on the other, 
as a result of which the merged entity would have increased market power without 
resorting to coordinated behaviour. According to recital (25) of the preamble of the 
Merger Regulation, a sig nificant impediment to effective competition can result 
from the anticompetitive effects of a concentration even if the merged entity would 
not have a dominant position on the market concerned. In this regard, the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines consider not only the direct loss of competition 
between the merging firms, but also the reduction in competitive pressure on non -
merging firms in the same market that could be brought about by the merger.165  
(132)  The Horizontal Merger Guidelines list a number of factors, wh ich may influence 
the rise of substantial non -coordinated effects from a merger, such as: the large 
market shares of the merging firms; the fact that the merging firms are close 
competitors; the limited possibilities for customers to switch suppliers; or t he fact 
that the merger would eliminate an important competitive force. The list of factors 
applies equally if a merger would create or strengthen a dominant position, or 
would otherwise significantly impede effective competition due to non -coordinated 
effects. Furthermore, not all of those factors need to be present to make significant 
non-coordinated effects likely and the list itself is not an exhaustive list.166 
                                                 
163  Form CO, paragraph 307.  
164  OJ C 31, 05.02.2004, p. 5. The remainder of this decision focuses on non -coordinated e ffects.  
165  Horizontal Merger G uidelines, paragraphs 24 -38.  
166  Horizontal Merger G uidelines, paragraphs 24 -38. 
 
23 5.2. Methodology for market shares data  
5.2.1. The market shares submitted by the Notifying Party  
(133)  According to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the Non -Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, market shares constitute useful first indications of the market structure 
and of the competitive importance of the market players.  
(134)  The Notifying Party submitted market shares in volume and value, when available, 
for each plausible product and geographic market. The market shares were based 
on the Parties’ actual sales of the Italian -type cheese and Feta -type cheese products 
as recorded internally at the wholesale level.  
(135)  The Notifying Party used retail data as a proxy for the total market size. Subject to 
availability, the market size for volume market shares was  based on the Nielsen or 
IRI panel data providers, who record the total volumes of cheese sold to end -
consumers  at retail level nationally. Similarly, subject to availability, the market 
size for value market shares was based on the total value recorded by the 
panels.167168  For the plausible product markets where panel data for 2018 was 
unavailable, the Notifying Party  used 2016 or 2017 panel data.169 For the plausible 
product markets where panel data was not available to the Notifying Party for any 
years, the Notifying Party used market size estimates based on (i) Nuova Castelli’s 
estimates recorded in internal documents170; (ii) Eurostat trade data171; (iii) per 
capita consumption approach172. Finally, for the plausible markets where no 
estimates for the market size were available, the Notifying Party confirmed that 
                                                 
167  In order to estimate the total market size at wholesale level, the Notifying Party removed the retailers’ 
margin from the total retail value, as recorded by the panels. The Notifying Party assumed that the 
retailers’ margins on Parties’ products are representative of their margins for the same cheese 
category. Briefing Memorandum, submitted by Analysis G roup on 2019 October 23.  
168  Panel data was  missing for a number of markets. The Notifying Party claimed that given the lack of 
information, market value estimations were uncertain, and the value market shares provided for these 
markets are less reliable than volume market shares. The Commission on ly took into account the 
value market shares based on third -party panel data. Parties’ response to Commission’s request for 
information RFI 26, question 1.1.  
169  For ex ample, this concerns Italian -type hard cheese in Poland (Parties’ response to Commission’s 
request for information RFI 14); cow milk mozzarella, Feta, Italian -type hard cheese in Finland 
(Parties’ response to Commission’s request for information RFI 22).  
170  This concerns Buffalo Mozzarella in Denmark, Poland; Italian -type hard chees e in Germany, Parties’ 
response to Commission’s request for information RFI 14.  
171  The Notifying Party counted the consumption as a difference between imports and ex ports under the 
conservative assumption that no production takes place internally in the co untry of interest. The 
Notifying Party then assumed that 50% of all consumption takes place OOH, which provides a market 
size estimate for retail sector. This assumption is conservative; a 2018 document prepared for the 
French parliament indicates that OOH  consumption represents 40% of all cheese volumes. The 
following methodology was applied to: Feta in Poland and Portugal; cow milk mozzarella in Bulgaria 
and Greece; buffalo mozzarella, Italian -type hard cheese, ricotta and mascarpone in Greece; Italian -
type hard cheese in Bulgaria, Hungary and Malta. Parties’ response to Commission’s request for 
information RFI 22, Annex  RFI 22 -1-I. 
172  The Notifying Party used the per capita consumption in other countries as a prox y. For ex ample, 
missing markets for Finlan d were estimated using the per capita consumption in Denmark and 
Sweden. The following methodology was applied to buffalo milk mozzarella, G orgonzola, 
mascarpone, ricotta in Finland; Italian -type hard cheese in the Netherlands, Bulgaria and Hungary. 
Partie s’ response to Commission’s request for information RFI 22, Annex  RFI 22 -1-I. 
 
24 their combined market shares would be below 20% for these mar kets due to low 
sales.173 
(136)  The Notifying Party argued that panels tend to underestimate the real size of the 
market, as they do not cover all outlets active the retail sector  and do not capture 
small sales , and proposed to increase the market size by […] for branded cheese, 
and branded and private cheese when accounted together174. This methodology was 
applied for the market size estimates derived from the panel data. Moreover, the 
Notifying Party stated that panels tend to underestimate the market size for priv ate 
label products to a greater extent that for branded products. This is because private 
label cheese products are also used internally by retailers to sell in their on -
premises restaurants or are used as ingredient for the sale of deli foods, such as 
lasagne, and such sales would not be captured by panels.175 Therefore, the 
Notifying Party proposed to amend the market size for the plausible markets of 
private label products by multiplying the total volume of private label products sold 
downstream by […]  for mozzarella and by […] for mascarpone, ricotta and 
Gorgonzola due to the fact that such cheeses are more widely used as ingredients in 
deli dishes than mozzarella.176 The Commission noted that although multipliers for 
the market size of private label supply were introduced, the Notifying Party’s 
market shares are still likely overstated, as in some instances they are larger than 
100% and are not in line with the market share estimates of other active players 
provided by the Notifying Party or the results from  the market investigation.177 The 
Commission notes that because different multipliers were used to adjust market 
sizes, the sum of estimated market sizes separately for branded (multiplied by […]) 
and private label (multiplied by […]or […]) does not fully ma tch the estimated size 
for branded and private label combined (multiplied by […]).178  
(137)  The Commission examined the methodology and the market shares provided by the 
Notifying Party, and used the market shares in volume as a primary tool for 
determining the c ompetitive strength of the Parties.179 Moreover, in cases of 
differentiated products, sales in value and their associated market share also reflect 
the relative position and strength of each supplier. This notion does not apply to 
private label products, whi ch are not differentiated. However, for branded goods, 
                                                 
173  For ex ample, this concerns Italian -type hard cheese in Belgium. Parties’ response to Commission’s 
request for information  RFI 22.  
174  Parties’ response to Commission’s request for information  RFI 11, question 1.  
175  Parties’ response to Commission’s request for information  RFI 11, question 1.10.  
176  Parties’ response to Commission’s request for information  RFI 11, question 1.11.  
177  For ex ample, this concerns private label supply o f ricotta in the UK, where the combined market 
shares provided by the Notifying Party are ex ceeding 100%, but the Notifying Party submitted that 
other players are active in private label supply of ricotta, and another private label supply provider 
was iden tified during the market investigation.  
178  This is a conservative assumption because the assessment of the private and label markets combined 
disregards the fact that some of the private sales are used by retailers internally. Although they are not 
reflect ed in the estimated market size, all private label sales of the Parties are included when 
determining the market shares.  
179  In line with the product market definition, the Commission assessed Italian -type hard cheeses as one 
market. The market shares were based on all the Parties’ sales of Italian -type hard cheese. For 
Lactalis, they include Parmigiano Reggiano DOP, G rana Padano DOP, G ran G usto (Parmigiano - and 
Gran a -type cheese, without DOP) and other Hard Cheese. For Nuova Castelli, they include 
Parmigian o Reggiano DOP, G rana Padano DOP, G ran Castelli (Parmigiano - and G rana -type cheese, 
without DOP), Pecorino Romano DOP, Pecorino and other Hard Cheese. Parties’ response to 
Commission’s request for information  RFI 14, question 1.1.  
 
25 the Commission used market shares in value to supplement the examination of the 
Parties’ competitive position in addition to market shares in volume.  
5.2.2. Market share analysis developed by the Commission 
(138)  The Commission has conducted a further quantitative analysis to verify the 
accurateness of the volume market shares provided by the Notifying Party. Subject 
to availability, the Commission used the panel sales data as the basis for analysing 
the market stru cture and other competitors in the market for the calendar year 
2018.180 Typically, panel data records the sales of various brands and the total 
volume and value data per type of product in a given year. Although the sales of 
private label are recorded under  one entry and do not specify the wholesale 
supplier, the sales information on branded goods allows further examination on the 
Parties’ market share and evaluation of their competitors for the plausible markets 
of branded goods. 
(139)  The Commission undertook th is approach as the Notifying Party also uses panel 
data in order to track their own and competitors’ developments in the market in the 
ordinary course of business.181 The panel data was provided by Lactalis, which 
noted that they request granular per -brand data only concerning their largest 
competitors. As a result, in some instances the sales of Nuova Castelli were 
included in the total sales captured by the panels, but were not specified under a 
stand -alone brand due to its insignificant sales share. To add ress this, the 
Commission identified such instances where the Parties had internal sales recorded, 
but no entry for these sales appeared in the panel. Based on the Parties’ internal 
wholesale sales data182, the Commission introduced sales of branded products  in 
such instances, scaled down by […] .183 The Commission did not make any other 
adjustments to total market size and the sales that were actually recorded by the 
panels and allocated to various competitors, including Lactalis and Nuova Castelli.  
(140)  The Commiss ion reconstructed market shares based on the Parties’ sales and total 
sales recorded by the panel at retail level for branded products.  
(141)  Moreover, the Commission also used the panel data to determine the Parties’ sales 
share in the combined markets of brand ed and private label goods. Given that panel 
data does not recognize the supplier at wholesale level for private label products, 
the Commission introduced the actual sales data of the Parties, scaled down by 
[…], and reported the remaining share of private  label for other unspecified 
competitors. This approach follows the same methodology as the one introduced by 
the Notifying Party for the market shares calculations. In some instances, the 
adjusted Parties’ sales of private label goods were still larger th an the total private 
label sales recorded by the panels. This confirms the Notifying Party’s allegation 
that panels tend to  underestimate the total market size for private label.  
(142)  By following this approach, the Commission used third -party data to evaluat e the 
Parties share in the Italian -type cheese and Feta -type cheese products with the 
adjustments discussed in the paragraphs above.  
                                                 
180  Parties’ response to C ommission’s request for information  RFI 23, Annex RFI 23 -1. 
181  Parties’ response to Commission’s request for information  RFI 11, question 1.2.  
182  Parties’ response to Commission’s request for information  RFI 22, Annex 2019 -11-18 - Country 
volume market sh ares.  
183  The multiplier of […] was used to account for the fact the panels do not cover all market. The 
Commission used the same multiplier as suggested by the Notifying Party for the market share 
estimation, as ex plained above.  
 
26 (143)  The Commission finds that the market shares as recomputed ( Adjusted  market 
shares) are in principle a more reliable metric of overall market interaction as they 
rely on all available data, including third party data, adopt a credible approach 
concerning underlying assumptions, provide results which are consistent with the  
estimated total size of the market and do not result in shares higher than 100%, and 
are corroborated by qualitative evidence gathered in the market investigation.  
(144)  For the above principle, in principle, and subject to data availability, the 
Commission wil l use the Adjusted  market shares based on panels as the primary 
and most reliable source of quantitative information to assess the Parties’ position 
for the plausible markets of branded goods as well as branded and private label 
combined. When data is not available, reference will be made to shares as 
submitted by the Notifying Party.  
5.3. Horizontal non -coordinated effects  
(145)  Based on the market share data submitted by the Parties, the concentration would 
give rise to putative horizontally affected markets in Ita ly (Section 5.4), France 
(Section 5.5), Belg ium (Section 5.13), Denmark (Section 5.10), Finland 
(Section  5.12), Germany (Section 5.7), the Netherlands (Section 5.14), Poland 
(Section 5.8), Portugal (Section 5.11), Spain (Section 5.15), Sweden (Section 5.9), 
and the United Kingdom (Section 5.6).  
5.4. Italy  
(146)  Based  on the market share data submitted by the Parties and in light of the 
methodology used by the Commission (see Section 5.2), the Transaction gives rise 
to the following horizontally affected markets in Italy: cow milk mozzarella 
(Section 5.4.1); buffalo milk mozzarella (Section 5.4.2); ricotta (Section 5.4.4) and 
Gorgonzola (Section 5.4.3);.  
5.4.1. Cow milk mozzarella  
(147)  Both Lactalis and Nuova Castelli supply branded and private label cow milk 
mozzarella to retailers in Italy. As outlined by the market shares (see Table 1 
below), the main overlap between the Parties is in the supply of private label cow 
milk mozzare lla.   
(A) Branded cow milk mozzarella 
(148)  For branded products, based on the Adjusted market shares, the Parties have a 
combined share of [40 -50]% in the supply of branded cow milk mozzarella to 
retailers in Italy in 2018, with a limited increment of [0-5]%.184  
(149)  First, as regards branded cow milk mozzarella, the Transaction results in an 
affected market only because of Lactalis’ large market presence with branded 
products, with strong and widely recognised brands, in particular Galbani, 
Vallelata, and Invernizzi.185   
(150)  Second, this is consistent with th e fact that, in Italy, Nuova Castelli does not enjoy 
strong brand presence in cow milk mozzarella, but focuses primarily on private 
label supplies of this product to retailers. Thus, t he Transaction will bring a limited 
increment to Lactalis’ market share of [0-5]%. 
                                                 
184  The combined value marke t shares for branded segment are lower than the volume shares provided by 
the Parties, but both still overstate the Parties’ position compared to panel data.  
185  Parties’ response to Commission’s request for information  RFI 7, question 1.  
 
27 (151)  Third, several other strong competitors of Lactalis are active in the branded space, 
for instance Granarolo, Sabelli and Brimi. Overall, the Parties’ competitors in the 
branded segment have a strong presence with important brands, which account for 
over [50-60]% of this market segment in Italy.  
(152)  Fourth, the Adjusted market shares point at a fragmented set of suppliers of 
branded cow milk mozzarella in Italy, which are as large as or larger than Nuova 
Castelli.  
(153)  Moreover, the results of the market  investigation reveal that a number of credible 
competitors can and do offer volumes of branded cow milk mozzarella to retailers 
in Italy and compete in the negotiations organised by retailers. Data collected from 
retailers show that a majority of them sou rce from a relatively wide range of 
suppliers of branded cow milk mozzarella. In par ticular, the data shows that 
in 2018 most retailers have sourced from one or more suppliers other than the 
Parties.186 
(154)  Therefore, the branded segment of cow milk mozzarella w ill continue having a 
multitude of credible suppliers with established commercial relations with retailers 
in Italy.  
(155)  The Commission has also considered in its assessment the arguments presented in 
the below section as regards the overall market, and in pa rticular concerning the 
absence of significant barriers to entry and expansion, the availability of other 
suppliers, the ability to switch suppliers and the impact of the Transaction that also 
apply to the assessment of branded cow milk mozzarella.  
(156)  In conc lusion, based on the information available to the Commission and provided 
by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts 
as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the plausible market 
of branded cow milk mozzare lla in Italy.  
(B) Private label cow milk mozzarella  
(157)  For private label, the Parties have a combined share in the supply of private label 
cow milk mozzarella to retailers in Italy of [20 -30]%, with an increment of 
[10-20]% . 
(158)  First, in the private l abel segment, based on the Notifying Party’s estimates, there is 
a significant number of alternative private label suppliers in Italy: Caseificio 
Pugliese: [10 -20]%; Granarolo: [5 -10]%; Centro Latte Bressanone: [5 -10]%; 
Trevisanalat: [5 -10]%; Caseificio Vi lla: [0 -5]%; Caseificio Morozzese: [0 -5]%; 
Palazzo S NC [0 -5]%; Sabelli: [0 -5]%; Sanguedolce: [0 -5]%; Ecolat: [0 -5]%; 
Alimenta SpA: [0-5]% and Bustaffa: [0 -5]%.187 These are viable competitors that 
currently offer volumes of cow milk mozzarella to retailers a nd will continue to 
compete with the merged entity in Italy in tenders organised by retailers. This is in 
line with the data collected from retailers that show that a majority of them source 
from a relatively wide range of suppliers of cow milk mozzarella.  In particular, the 
data shows that a majority of retailers have sourced from two or more suppliers 
other than the Parties in 2018.188 
                                                 
186  Questionnaire t o customers (Q2), question 66.  
187  Parties’ response to Commission’s request for information RFI 22.  
188  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 70.  
 
28 (159)  The Commission has also considered in its assessment of this plausible market the 
arguments presented in the below section as regards the overall market, and in 
particular concerning the absence of significant barriers to entry and expansion, the 
availability of other suppliers, the ability to switch suppliers and the impact of the 
Transaction that also apply to the assessment  of private label cow milk mozzare lla.  
(160)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction 
does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with 
regard to t he plausib le market of private label cow milk mozzare lla in Italy.  
(C) Overall market for cow milk mozzarella in Italy  
(161)  On the overall market for the supply of branded and private label cow milk 
mozzarella to retailers in Italy, based on the Commission’s Adju sted market shares, 
the Parties have a combined market share in 2018 of [40 -50]%, with a moderate 
increme nt of [5-10]%. 
Table 1 
Italy 2018, Cow milk mozzarella189 
Branded and private label – Adjusted  market shares  
Competitor  Sales, tons Marke t Share  
Lactalis – branded  […] [20-30]% 
Lactalis – private label  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  […] [5-10]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [40-50]% 
Granarolo  […] [5-10]% 
Brimi  […] [0-5]% 
Sabelli  […] [0-5]% 
Trevisanalat Spa  […] [0-5]% 
Others – branded  […] [20-30]% 
Others – private label  […] [20-30]% 
Total sales  112464  100%  
 
(162)  First, the Transaction will bring a moderate increment to Lactalis’ market shares. 
This increment mainly relates to the supply of products to be resold under private 
label by retailers.  
(163)  Second, the Commission observes the overall market for branded and pr ivate label 
cow milk mozzarella in Italy appears to be extremely fragmented (see Table 1 
below) with several active players both in the branded and priva te label  and the 
production evenly distributed throughout the Italian territory.190 
                                                 
189  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5. 2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the p lausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
190  Parties’ submission “ Briefing Memorandum on Mozzarella ”, dated  23.10. 2019, Annex 4 -A. 
 
29 (164)  Third, as outlined in Section 4.3.2, the market for the supply of cow milk 
mozzarella to retailers is a differentiated market across sales channels, where 
suppliers can compete in branded and in private label cheese. Although the 
presence of suppliers in the same sales channel could be indicative of closeness of 
competitio n between them, the pricing of private label products has some effect on 
the pricing ability in the branded segment of the market.  
(165)  Beside the considerations concerning the structure and shares of the cow milk 
mozzarella market, the Commission considers tha t the Transaction does not  raise 
serious doubts for the following reasons. 
(166)  First, the Commission finds, based on the results of the market investigation, that 
barriers to entry are not high for suppliers of cow milk mozzarella in Italy.  
(167)  Second, as regards  barriers to expansion, the results of the market investigation 
suggest that a number of suppliers active in Italy could increase supply in the short 
term without incurring in significant cost.  
(168)  When market conditions are such that competitors have sufficie nt capacity and find 
it profitable to expand output sufficiently, the Commission is unlikely to find that 
the merger would significantly impede effective competition.191 Conversely, when 
market conditions are such that the competitors of the merged entity ar e unlikely to 
increase their supply significantly should prices increase, the merged entity may 
have an incentive to reduce output below the combined pre -merger levels thereby 
raising market prices.192 
(169)  The Notifying Party argues that at the EEA level the pro duction capacity for cow 
milk mozzarella is almost double than the total EEA supply.193 The Commission 
was not able to verify the estimates of the Parties in its market investigation. 
However, the evidence in the file indicates that several competitors, incl uding non -
Italian manufacturers with production assets in the Italian territory, could profitably 
expand output with their current production assets.  
(170)  Some competitors have referred to their recent and on -going investments in 
capacity expansion.194 Several m arket respondents indicated that the cost and time 
required to build additional lines to expand production are not significant.195 In 
particular  the majority of competitors that expressed a view in the market 
investigation indicated that they are able to qui ckly expand production in Italy of 
Italian -type cheese and, thus, can decide to enter another EEA market for Italian -
type cheeses in a relatively short timeframe.196   
(171)  Moreover, the potential expansion of production capacity is not merely 
hypothetical but corroborated by specific examples relating to the Italian market. In 
particular, the Commission found that a number of the Parties’ competitors in Italy 
                                                 
191  Horizontal Merger G uidelines, paragraph 33.   
192  Horizontal Merger G uidelines, paragraph 32.   
193  Parties’ submission “ Briefing memorandum No 3 ” dated 20 November 2019 , paragraph 23, which 
includes dry mozzarella and mozzarella in brine.  
194  Non-confidential minutes of a call with a competitor , 23 October 2019; Non-confidential minutes of a 
call with a competitor , 5 November 2019. 
195  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 78.  
196  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 60.  
 
30 have expanded t heir production of cow milk mozzarella in the last 3 years without 
having to incur into any significant capital investments.197   
(172)  Furthermore, the Commission has assessed whether credible and imminent 
expansion of the existing production of cow milk mozzarel la from the Parties’ 
rivals would be likely to occur. The market investigation has revealed that more 
than one of the Parties’ competitors in Italy is planning to expand significantly and 
structurally their production capability of cow milk mozzarella over  the course of 
the next 3 years and have already mobilised funds to this effect.198 The 
Commission, therefore, finds that there are no significant barriers to entry or 
expansion in cow milk mozzarella in  Italy and that alternative suppliers seem to 
have suff icient capacity and incentives to expand the production volume, should 
the merged entity increase prices in Italy.  
(173)  Third, as regards logistics and distribution, competitors and customers in Italy 
confirmed in the market investigation that distribution on the Italian territory is 
already fragmented and organised in a way that it is possible to distribute fresh 
products on the Italian territory without incurring in significant costs, even for 
smaller manufacturers.  
(174)  Fourth, with regard to the use of milk from Italy in the production of cow milk 
mozzarella, this is regarded by many Italian customers as an important element  of 
consumer preference, and it is the object of specific on -label indications. In this 
regard, however, the competitive constraint exerted by Nuova Castelli is low 
because the company sources most of the milk used to manufacture mozzarella 
from outside of  Italy.199  
(175)  Fifth, the Italian market is also characterised by low barriers to switching for the 
products mainly supplied by Nuova Castelli. While the branded position of Lactalis 
seem to command customer loyalty, the vast majority of the retailers who 
respo nded to the Commission’s requests for information stated that it is possible to 
switch to different suppliers of mozzarella for the type of cow milk mozzarella 
products supplied by Nuova Castelli.200 Most of the retailers noted that they have 
switched to a d ifferent supplier of mozzarella over the past 3 years.201 This 
suggests that customer switching costs for the supply of cow milk mozzarella in 
Italy are not significant. This also indicates that there is a dynamic and fragmented 
range of viable suppliers of cow milk mozzare lla in Italy.  
(176)  Sixth, as regards the impact of the Transaction, the majority of retailers in Italy that 
expressed a view during the market investigation held that there will be no change 
post-Transaction with respect to the competitive cond itions in relation to the supply 
of cow -milk mozzarella.202 Moreover, the majority of responsive retailers in Italy 
believe that the Transaction will have no impact on the market or on their 
companies.203   
                                                 
197  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1b), question 10.  
198  Non-confident ial minutes of a call with a competitor , 23 October 2019; Non-confidential minutes of a 
call with a competitor , 5 November 2019. 
199  Form CO, paragraphs 435 and 436.  
200  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 73.  
201  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questio n 72. 
202  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 123.  
203  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 125.  
 
31 (177)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction do es not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible markets for private 
label cow milk mozzarella in Italy as well as branded cow milk market mozzarella 
in Italy.  
(178)  Based on the above considerations and in the light of the results of the market 
investigation, the Commission considers that the concentration does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market as regards the overall 
market for  cow milk mozzare lla in Italy . 
5.4.2. Buffalo milk mozzarel la 
(179)  Lactalis supplies only small volumes of branded buffalo milk mozzarella to 
retailers in Italy, whereas Nuova Castelli supplies both branded and private label 
mozzare lla.   
(180)  The Parties’ activities in buffalo milk mozzarella in Italy result in an affected  
market when considering the supply of branded buffalo milk mozzarella to retailers  
in Italy , as well as the overall market for buffalo milk mozzarella  in Italy.  
(A) Branded buffalo milk mozzarella. 
(181)  For branded products, based on the Commission’s market share analysis, the 
combined Adjusted market shares for branded buffalo milk mozzarella are 
[20-30]%, with a moderate increment of [5 -10]% due to Lactalis’ moderate 
branded presence204 As pointed out by the moderate increment  in the market for 
branded buffalo milk mozzarella , in Italy Lactalis trades limited volumes of 
branded buffalo milk mozzarella produced by third parties through its brand 
Galbani (Vallelata). Conversely, in Italy Nuova Castelli enjoys brand presence in 
relation to buffalo milk mozzarella throu gh its subsidiary Mandara. Additionally, 
Nuova Castelli supplies private label buffalo milk mozzare lla to retailers.  
(182)  Second, the results of the market investigation point toward a fragmented market. 
Market participants named a broad number of potential sup ply options for buffalo 
milk mozzarella, in particular Fattorie Garofalo, Caseificio Tre Stelle, Spinosa, 
Cilento, Pettinicchio, Francia Latticini, Caseificio Cirigliana, Diano Casearia, 
Caseificio Principe and Podere dei Leoni.205  
(183)  This extremely diversifie d picture is evidenced by the fact that the combined share 
of the Parties’ competitors in branded buffalo milk mozzarella exceeds [50-60]%, 
with Francia’s and Spinosa’s shares each approximately equivalent to the 
increment triggered by the Transaction.  
(184)  The Commission has also considered in its assessment of this plausible market  the 
arguments presented in the below section as regards the overall market, and in 
particular concerning the absence of significant barriers to entry and expansion, the 
availability  of other suppliers, the ability to switch suppliers and the impact of the 
Transaction that also apply to the assessment of branded buffalo milk mozzarella.  
(185)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and p rovided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction 
does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with 
regard to the plausible market of branded buffalo milk mozzarella in Italy.  
                                                 
204  The combined value market shares for branded segment are in line with the volume shares provided 
by the Parties, and both underestimate the Parties ’ position compared to panel data.  
205  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 66 and 70.  
 
32 (B) Overall market for buffalo milk m ozzarella in Italy  
(186)  Based on the Commission’s Adjusted market shares, the Parties’ combined market 
shares are [20-30]%, with a moderate increment of [0-5]%. 
Table 2 
Italy 2018, Buffalo milk mozzarella 206 
Branded and private label – Adjusted  market shares  
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [10-20]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  […] [10-20]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [20-30]% 
Francia  […] [5-10]% 
Spinosa  […] [0-5]% 
Others - branded  […] [40-50]% 
Others – private label  […] [10-20]% 
Total sales  13603  100%  
 
(187)  First, the Transaction will bring a moderate increment to Nuova Castelli’ market 
shares, due to Lactalis moderate branded presence.  
(188)  Second, the presence of the Parties’ competitors is strong and a significant number 
of producers are active in the market for buffalo milk mozzarella with access to 
retailers in Italy, for instance Francia and Spinosa’s shares each approximately 
equivale nt  to the increment triggered by the Transaction (see Table 2 above).  
(189)  The above finding, based on the Parties’ and their competitors’ shares on the 
overall market for buffalo milk mozzarella, was corroborated in the market 
investigation, which pointed at multiple supplier options. As an illustration, an 
Italian retailer indicated that “ the market for buffalo milk mozzarella is extremely 
fragmented.”207 This was confirmed by the Parties’ competitors, a number of 
which qualified the market for buffalo milk mozzarella as particularly 
fragmented.208   
(190)  As indicated in paragraph (182)  above, market participants named a broad number 
of potential supply options for buffalo milk mozzarella, in particular Fattorie 
Garofalo, Caseificio Tre Stelle, Spinosa, Cilento, Pettinicchio, Francia Latticini, 
Caseificio Cirig liana, Diano Casearia, Caseificio Principe, Podere dei Leoni.209 In 
view of the Parties’ activities, these competitors are closer to Nuova Castelli as 
manufacturers of their own product, as opposed to Lactalis which does not have 
manufacturing activities for  buffalo milk mozzarella and only trades.  
                                                 
206  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the bran ded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ pres ence in private label products.  
207  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 78.2.  
208  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 78.2.  
209  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 66 and 70.  
 
33 (191)  In both branded and private label, the existence of a number of credible 
competitors offering volumes of buffalo milk mozzarella to retailers in Italy and 
competing in the negotiations organised by retailers is no t only confirmed by 
qualitative descriptions of market interaction by such customers, but also 
confirmed by actual sourcing information. Data collected from retailers shows that 
a majority of them source from a relatively wide range of suppliers of buffalo  cow 
milk mozzarella. In particular, the data shows that most retailers have sourced from 
one or more suppliers other than the Parties in 2018.210 
(192)  Third, as outlined in Section 4.3.2, the market for the supply of buffalo milk 
mozzarella to retailers is a differentiated market across sales channels, where 
suppliers can compete in branded and in private label cheese. Although the 
presence of suppliers in t he same sales channel will be indicative of closeness of 
competition between them, the pricing of private label products will have some 
effect on the pricing ability in the branded side of the market.  
(193)  Beside the considerations concerning the structure and shares of the buffalo milk 
mozzarella market, the Commission considers that the Transaction does not  raise 
serious doubts for the following reasons. 
(194)  First, the Commission finds that retailers do not fa ce significant barriers to 
switching across suppliers in Italy. The vast majority of the retailers who responded 
to the Commission’s requests for information stated that it is possible to switch to 
different suppliers of mozzarella.211 More importantly, most  of these retailers noted 
that they have switched to a different supplier of any type of mozzarella over the 
past 3 years.212 This suggests that customer switching costs for private label supply 
of buffalo milk mozzarella in Italy are not significant. This a lso indicates that there 
are little barriers to switching across the fragmented range of viable suppliers of 
buffalo milk mozzarella in Italy.  
(195)  Second, as regards barriers to entry, the market investigation suggested that a 
potential barrier could be the m ore limited availability of buffalo milk, which is 
scarcer than cow milk. However, and mainly in view of the range of players 
already active on the market, this is not regarded as particularly problematic by the 
Parties’ competitors as well as retailers re sponding on the issue of barriers to entry 
or expansion to the market of buffalo milk mozzarella in Italy.213  
(196)  Third, and consistent with the above, Italian retailers responding to the market 
investigation generally did not express concerns as to the impact of the Transaction 
on the market for buffalo milk mozzarella in Italy. A majority of customers that 
expressed a view during the market investigation states that, post -Transaction, 
there will be no change with respect to the competitive conditions in relati on to the 
supply of buffalo milk mozzarella.214   
(197)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible market for branded 
buffalo milk mozzarella in Italy.  
                                                 
210  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 66 and 70.  
211  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 73.  
212  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 72.  
213  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 88; Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 78.  
214  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 123. See also non -confidential version of minutes of a call 
with a strategic market participant, 22 July 2019.  
 
34 (198)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission considers that the 
Transaction does not  raise serious doubts in the overall market for buffalo milk 
mozzare lla in Italy.  
5.4.3. Gorgonzola  
(199)  Lactalis supplies both branded and private label Gorgonzola to retailers in Italy, 
whereas Nuova Castelli supplies branded Gorgonzola and very limited volumes of 
private label Gorgonzola.  
(A) Branded gorgonzola in Italy  
(200)  In the supply of branded Gorg onzola to retailers in Italy, the Parties have a 
combined Adjusted market share of [40-50]%, with a limited increment of [0-5]%. 
(201)  First, as regards branded Gorgonzola, the Transaction results in an affected market 
only because of Lactalis’ large market pres ence with branded products, with strong 
and widely recognised brands of Gorgonzola, and in particular Galbani and Gim 
Invernizzi.215  
(202)  Second, this is consistent with the fact that, in Italy, Nuova Castelli does not enjoy 
strong presence in Gorgonzola, in whi ch Nuova Castelli is a much smaller player 
than Igor or Lactalis.216 Thus, t he Transaction will bring a limited increment to 
Lactalis’ market share of [0 -5]%. 
(203)  Third, several other strong competitors of Lactalis are active in branded 
Gorgonzola, including Igo r, the market leader, as well as Mauri, Biraghi and Bassi, 
all of them enjoying market shares in the overall Gorgonzola market similar to that 
of Nuova Castelli (see Table 3 below). Overall, the Parties’ competitors in the 
branded segment have a strong presence with important brands, which account for 
over [30-40]% of the overall Gorgonzola market in Italy (see Table 3 below).  
(204)  Consistent with these Adjusted market shares, which point at a fragmented set of 
suppliers that are as large as or, even larger than Nuova Castelli in the branded 
segment, the market investigation supports the finding that a number of credible 
competitors can and do offer volumes of branded Gorgonzola to retailers in Italy 
and compete in the negotiations organised by retailers.  Data collected from retailers 
show that a majority of them source from a relatively wide range of suppliers of 
branded Gorgonzola. In particular, the data shows that most retailers have sourced 
from one or more suppliers other than the Parties in 2018.217 
(205)  The Commission has also considered in its assessment of this plausible market  the 
arguments presented in the below section as regards the overall market, and in 
particular concerning the availability of other suppliers and the impact of the 
Transaction that also apply to the assessment of branded Gorgonzola.  
(206)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction 
does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with 
regard to the plausible market of branded G orgonzola in Italy.  
                                                 
215  The combined value market shares for branded segment are higher (by less than 7 percentage points) 
than the volume shares provided by the Parties, and both over state the Parties’ position compared to 
panel data.  
216  Non-confidential version of minutes of a call with a third party, 24 July 2019.  
217  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 98.  
 
35 (B) Private label Gorgonzola in Italy  
(207)  First, Nuova Castelli had very limited sales of priva te label Gorgonzola in Italy 
in 2018. 
(208)  Second, in light of the above, the Transaction will bring a very limited incr ement to 
Lactalis’ market share ( [0-5]% of the overall market, see Table 3 below) in relation 
to this segment in Italy, therefore it is unlikely to affec t the existing structure of the 
market.  
(209)  Third, the Commission observes that the private label segment of the market for 
Gorgonzola in Italy is rather fragmented and the production distributed among a 
number of producers throughout the PDO  territory.  
(210)  The C ommission has also considered in its assessment of this plausible market  the 
arguments presented in the below section as regards the overall market, and in 
particular concerning the availability of other suppliers and the impact of the 
Transaction that also apply to the assessment of private label Gorgonzola.  
(211)  In conclusion, in  light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction 
does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with 
regard to the plausible mark et of private label Gorgonzola in Italy.  
(C) Overall market for gorgonzola in Italy  
(212)  Based on the Commission’s methodology, Adjusted market shares for the overall 
market for Gorgonzola in Italy are as follows.  
Table 3 
Italy 2018, Gorgonzola218 
Branded and private label – Adjusted market shares  
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [20-30]% 
Lactalis – private label  […] [5-10]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  […] [0-5]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [30-40]% 
Igor […] [30-40]% 
Mauri Emilio  […] [0-5]% 
Biraghi  […] [0-5]% 
Bassi Spa  […] [0-5]% 
Others – private label  […] [30-40]% 
Total sales  6354 100%  
Note: Internal branded sales were inserted for Nuova Castelli as there 
was no entry in the panel. The sales were reduced to match the 
unspecified branded difference in the panel.  
                                                 
218  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports t he Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the bas is of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products . 
 
36 (213)  First, as explained in Section  4.3.1.3(E) , the market fo r Gorgonzola is strictly 
regulated by the Consorzio Gorgonzola PDO , on the overall market for branded 
and private label, the Commission observes that it is rather fragmented and the 
production is distributed throughout the PDO  territory, which includes the  
10 provinces of Lombardy and 5 provinces in Piedmont.219  
(214)  Moreover, Italy enjoys the presence of a number of alternative suppliers of both 
branded and private label Gorgonzola, namely – among others – Igor: [30-40]%; 
Emilio Mauri: [0-5]%; Biraghi: [0-5]%; B assi SpA: [0-5]% (see Table 3 above).  
(215)  Second, as outlined in Section 4.3.2, the market for the supply of Gorgonzola to 
retailers is a differentiated market across sales channels, where suppliers can 
compete in branded and in private label cheese. Although the presence of suppliers 
in the same sales c hannel will be indicative of closeness of competition between 
them, the pricing of private label products will have some effect on the pricing 
ability in the branded side of the market.  
(216)  Beside the considerations concerning the structure and shares of the Gorgonzola 
market, the Commission considers that the Transaction does not  raise serious 
doubts for the following reasons. 
(217)  First, the Commission finds, based on the market investigation, that barriers to 
entry and expansion are not high for suppliers of Gorgonzola in Italy.  
(218)  When market conditions are such that competitors have sufficient capacity and find 
it profitable to expand output sufficiently, the Commission is unlikely to find that 
the merger would significantly impede effective competition.220  Conversely, when 
market conditions are such that the competitors of the merged entity are unlikely to 
increase their supply sign ificantly should prices increase, the merged entity may 
have an incentive to reduce output below the combined pre -merger levels thereby 
raising market prices.221  
(a) From the demand side, the market investigation suggested that the majority 
of retailers respondents  do not believe that there are barriers to entry or 
expansion  in terms of cost and time.222  
(b) From the supply side, the majority of market respondents indicated that the 
cost and time required to enter or expand production in Italy are not 
signific ant.223 
(219)  The Commission therefore considers that alternative suppliers have sufficient 
capacity and incentives to expand the production volume, should the merged entity 
increase prices in Italy.  
(220)  Second, as regards logistics and distributions, competitors and customers in Italy 
confirmed in the market investigation that distribution in the Italian territory is 
already fragmented and organised in a way that it is possible to distribute fresh 
products on the Italian territory without incurring on significant cost s, even for 
smaller manufacturers.  
                                                 
219  Non-confidential version of minutes of a call with a third party, 24 July 2019.  
220  Horizontal Merger G uidelines, paragraph 33.   
221  Horizontal Merger G uidelines, paragraph 32  
222  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 105.  
223  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 124.  
 
37 (221)  Third, the Italian market is also characterised by low barriers to switching for the 
products mainly supplied by Lactali through Gim Invernizzi. While the branded 
position of Lactalis seems to command customer loyalty, t he majority of the 
retailers who responded to the Commission’s requests for information stated that it 
is possible to switch to different suppliers of Gorgonzola. This indicates there is a 
dynamic and fragmented range of viable suppliers of Gorgonzola in I taly.  
(222)  Fourth, with regard to the impact of the Transaction, a third party stated that the 
Transaction “ will not have a negative impact on […] the overall market of 
Gorgonzola in Italy .”224 Furthermore, the same third party described Nuova 
Castelli as a comp any “ rather small when it comes to Gorgonzola.”225   
(223)  Moreover, the majority of responsive retailers in Italy held the view that there will 
be no change post -Transaction with respect to the competitive conditions in 
relation to the supply of Gorgonzola.226 More over, the majority of responsive 
retailers in Italy believe that the Transaction will have no impact on the market or 
on their companies.227    
(224)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible market for branded 
Gorgonzola as well as private label Gorgonzola.  
(225)  Based on the above considerations and in light of the results of the market 
investigation, the Commission considers that the concentration does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market as regards the overall 
market for Gorgonzola in Italy . 
5.4.4. Ricotta  
(226)  Lactalis and Nuova Castelli are active in the market for ricotta in Italy. Both Parties 
manufacture and sell branded  and priv ate label ricotta .   
(A) Branded ricotta in Italy  
(227)  For branded ricotta, the combined Adjusted market share of the Parties in 2018 in 
Italy was [60 -70]% (in volume), with a limited increment of [0-5]% in view of 
Nuova Castelli’s limited brand presence. 228 
(228)  First, Nuova Castelli had limited sales of branded ricotta in Italy in 2018. The 
Transaction will bring a limited increment to Lactalis’ market share of [0 -5]%. 
Moreover, Nuova Castelli does not enjoy strong brand presence.  
(229)  Second, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from the strongest branded competitor to Lactalis, Granarolo. 
According to the data provided by the Parties and based on the Commission’s 
analysis (see Section 5.2 above), in 2018 Granarolo represented a stronger 
competitive constraint than Nuova Castelli with regard to branded ricotta in Italy. 
                                                 
224  Courtesy translation from Italian: “…non ritiene che l’Acquisizione avra’ un impatto negativo […] 
sul mercato del Gorgonzola”, Non-confidential version of minutes of a c all with a third party, 
24 July 2019. 
225  Courtesy translation from Italian: “…ma una piccola impresa per quanto riguarda i l gorgonzola”, 
Non-confidential version of minutes of a call with a third party, 24 July 2019.  
226  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 123.  
227  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 125.  
228  The combined value market shares for branded segment are i n line with the volume shares provided 
by the Parties, but both still slightly overstate the Parties’ position compared to panel data.  
 
38 Granarolo’s recorded sales of brand ed ricotta were five times higher than Nuova 
Castelli’s sales and accounted for [5-10]% of the overall ricotta market in Italy (see 
Table 4 below).  
(230)  Third, the merged entity will also continue to face significant competitive 
constraints from three other branded suppliers (Caseificio Elda, Campo Dei Fiori 
and Caseificio Sabelli) which in 2018 had individual sales of branded ricotta 
comparable to those of N uova Castelli. Moreover, several additional smaller 
suppliers of branded ricotta will remain in the Italian market post -Transaction. 
These suppliers accounted for [10-20]% of the overall  market for ricotta in Italy 
in 2018 (see Table 4 below). 
(231)  Fourth, with regard to the ability of customers to switch suppliers of ricotta, the 
majority of customers that responded to the market investigation considered they  
could not quickly switch to an alternative supplier of branded ricotta with a 
comparable range and sufficient quantities;229 however, the majority of responsive 
competitors and customers that expressed a view indicated that it was possible and 
even easy to switch suppliers of ricotta.230  
(232)  Finally, t he Commission has also considered in its assessment of this plausible 
market  the a rguments presented in the below section as regards the overall market, 
and in particular concerning the absence of significant barriers to entry and 
expansion, the availability of other suppliers and the impact of the Transaction that 
also apply to the ass essment of branded ricotta.  
(233)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction 
does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the inte rnal market with 
regard to the plausible market of branded ricotta in Italy.  
(B) Private label ricotta in Italy  
(234)  First, b oth Parties ha ve moderate sales of private label ricotta  in Italy in 2018  and 
the combined market share remains modest,  slightly above [20 -30]%. The 
combined market share of the Parties in 2018 in Italy was [20 -30]% (in volume), 
with a moderate increment of [5-10]%. 
(235)  Second, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from several supplie rs of private label ricotta that in 2018 
accounted for more than […] tons of private la bel ricotta sold in Italy 
(i.e. [30-40]% of the overall market, see Table 4 below). These suppliers will 
continue to exercise competitive pressure on the merged entity after the 
Transaction.  
(236)  Third, with regard to the ability of customers to switch suppliers of ricotta, half of 
the responsive customers that expressed a vi ew indicated that they could quickly 
switch to an alternative supplier of private label ricotta with a comparable range 
and sufficient quantities.231  
(237)  Finally, t he Commission has also considered in its assessment of this plausible 
market  the arguments presented in the below section as regards the overall market, 
and in particular concerning the absence of significant barriers to entry and 
                                                 
229  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 84.1.  
230  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 100; Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 83.  
231  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 84.2.  
 
39 expansion, the availability of other suppliers and the impact of the Transaction that 
also apply to t he assessment of private label ricotta.  
(238)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction 
does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility w ith the internal market with 
regard to the plausible market of private label ricotta in Italy.  
(C) Overall market for ricotta in Italy  
(239)  Based on the Commission’s methodology, Adjusted market shares for the overall 
market for ricotta in Italy are as follows.  
Table 4 
Italy 2018, Ricotta232 
Branded and private label – Adjusted market shares  
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [30-40]% 
Lactalis – private label  […] [5-10]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  […] [0-5]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [40-50]% 
Granarolo  […] [5-10]% 
Caseificio Elda Snc  […] [0-5]% 
Campo Dei Fiori  […] [0-5]% 
Caseificio Sabelli  […] [0-5]% 
Others - branded  […] [10-20]% 
Others – private label  […] [30-40]% 
Total sales  25 125 100%  
Note: Internal branded sales were inserted for Nuova Castelli as there 
was no entry in the panel.  
 
(240)  The Transaction results in an affected market because of Lactalis’ large market 
presence with branded products, with strong and widely recognised brands, such as 
Galbani. Nuova Castelli has a more limited presence in the overall market for 
ricotta in Italy , bringing a moderate increment of [0-5]%. 
(241)  Beside the considerations concerning the shares of the market for ricotta in Italy, 
the Commission considers that the Transaction does not  raise serious doubts for the 
following reasons.  
(242)  First, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from Granarolo as well as from more than three branded and 
private label competitors, which accounted for [50 -60]% of the overall market for 
                                                 
232  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and priv ate label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in priv ate label products.  
 
40 ricotta in I taly (see Table 4 above). These competitors are likely to continue 
exercising competitive pressure on the merged entity comparable to the pressure 
exerc ised by Nuova Castelli on Lactalis pre -Transaction.  
(243)  Second, with regard to the ability of customers to switch suppliers of ricotta, while 
the majority of customers that responded to the market investigation had not 
switched suppliers of branded or private  label ricotta in the last three years,233 the 
majority of responsive competitors and customers that expressed a view indicated 
that it was possible and even easy to switch suppliers of ricotta.234  
(244)  Third, concerning barriers to entry and expansion, different from other fresh cheese 
products discussed above for which access to milk has been assessed as a potential 
barrier to entry, ricotta is produced from a by -product of other cheese production. 
In particular, as explained by the Notifying Party, ricotta is ma nufactured by 
heating whey to 80° C. The market investigation confirmed that ricotta is by -
product of whey,235 which is a liquid derived from the production of soft and fresh 
cheese (e.g. mozzarella)236. The Parties use their leftovers of whey to produce 
ricotta as well as milk powder. Nuova Castelli also sells part of its whey to third 
parties.  
(245)  Moreover, the market investigation also indicated that (i) there has been at least 
one entrant in the market for ricotta in Italy in the last 5 years, Valcolatte;237 and 
(ii) two Italian competitors indicated that they could substantially increase their 
production of ricotta without incurring in significant additional costs.238 In 
addition, the majority of customers that responded to the market investigation 
indicated that there were not significant barriers to entry or expansion for ricotta in 
terms of costs and time. 239 
(246)  Fourth, the majority of the Italian competitors and customers that responded to the 
market investigation indicated that the Transaction will not have impact  on prices 
for the supply of ricotta in their countries.240 Moreover, a competitor indicated that 
it expected prices for ricotta to decrease in Italy.241 
(247)  Fifth, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility wit h the internal market on the plausible markets for branded  
ricotta in Italy as well as private label ricotta in Italy.  
(248)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission considers that the 
Transaction does not  raise serious doubts in the overall  market for ricotta in Italy.   
                                                 
233  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 81 and 82.  
234  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 100; Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 83.  
235  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 15.  
236  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 15.1.  
237  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), questions 101 and 101.1.   
238  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 102.1.  
239  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 87.  
240  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 124; Questi onnaire to competitors (Q1), question 104.  
241  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 104.  
 
41 5.4.5. Milk procurement  
(249)  Lactalis only procures cow milk in Italy, and does not procure buffalo nor sheep 
milk there. Conversely Nuova Castelli procures cow mil k, buffalo milk and sheep 
milk in Italy.242  
(250)  For conventional cow milk, the market share of the Parties in 2018 for procurement 
of raw and pasteurised cow milk in Italy was below [10 -20]%, with a limited 
increme nt of approximate ly [0-5]%.243 
(a) For conventional c ow raw milk, the market share of the Parties in 2018 for 
procurement of conventional raw cow milk in Italy was [10-20]%, with a 
limited increme nt of [0-5]%.244 
(b) For conventional pasteurised cow milk, the market share of the Parties in 
2018 for procurement of conventional cow pasteurised milk in Italy was 
[10-20]%, with a negligible increment of [0-5]%.245 
(251)  For completeness, the Commission notes that the  market share of the Parties 
in 2018 for procurement of conventional cow raw milk in Italy was [30-40]% in 
Lazio, with a negligible increment of less than [0 -5]%; and [50-60]% in Sicily, 
with a moderate increment of [0-5]%.246 
(252)  With regard to Sicily, the milk collected by Lactalis in Sicily is only for fresh milk 
consumption, and not for cheese production. Nu ova Castelli is not present as such 
in Sicily but procures indirectly milk that is collected in Sicily for its production 
plants located in […]  and in […] . Limiting the market for the procurement of milk 
from farmers (excluding traded milk) would entail th at there is no overlap in Sicily. 
The overlap exists only when assessing a market that includes milk from Sicily that 
is traded. In any event, the increment is minimal.247 
(253)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction 
does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with 
regard to the market of milk procurement in Italy.  
5.5. France  
(254)  Based  on the market share data submitte d by the Parties and in light of the 
methodology used (see Section 6.3), the Transaction gives rise to the following 
horizontally affected markets in France: Cow milk mozzarella (Section 5.5.1); 
buffalo milk mozzarella (Section 5.5.2); ricotta (Section 5.5.3); mascarpone 
(Section 5.5.4); Gorgonzola (Section 5.5.5); Feta (Section 5.5.6) ; Italian -type hard 
cheese (Section 5.5.7)  and other affected markets (Section 5.5.8) . 
5.5.1. Cow milk mozzarella  
(255)  Lactalis and Nuova Castelli are active in the market for cow milk mozzarella in 
France. Both Parties sell branded and private label cow milk mo zzarella.  
                                                 
242  Form CO, paragraph 435.  
243  Form CO, paragraph 436.  
244  Form CO, paragraph 436.  
245  Form CO, paragraph 436.  
246  Form CO, paragraph 441.  
247  Form CO, paragraph 444. 
 
42 (256)  In view of the fact that in France both Parties sell branded and private label cow 
milk mozzarella, the Commission also considered the impact of the Transaction on 
the market structure for the supply of branded products, and for the supply of 
private label  products, as well as the impact on the overall market.  
(A) Branded cow milk mozzarella 
(257)  Focusing on branded products only the combined Adjusted  market share would be 
[40-50]% (Lactalis: [40 -50]%; Nuova Castelli: [0 -5]%).248 Although the Parties’ 
combined shares  in the branded segment are high, these are largely due to the very 
high share of Lactalis, which is active on the market through a brand which is 
consistently referred to as the strongest, and in many cases as a 'must have' brand 
by retailers. However, th e increment from Nuova Castelli is modest.  
(258)  The market investigation confirmed the submission by the Notifying Party that 
Nuova Castelli specializes in the supply of private labels, its brands are little 
known, whereas Lactalis specializes in the supply of branded products with well -
known brands.  In particular, multiple retailers confirmed that the Nuova Castelli 
brand enjoys little to none brand awareness: ‘ On the French market the Castelli 
brand enjoys little to none brand awarness' ’249, ‘Galbani enjoys a f ar superior 
brand awareness that Castelli which is not know in France as a brand.’ ;250 and 
‘The Nuova Castelli brand (Alival) has little relevance for the consumer compared 
to Lactalis brand (Santa Lucia and Vallelata) ’. This is reflected in the small 
increm e nt of [0-5]% brought by Nuova Castelli.  
(259)  As regards closeness of competition, the market investigation points at the fact that 
Nuova Castelli and Lactalis are not closely competing in the branded product 
market. There  are bigger competitors such as Granarolo which is active both with a 
strong brand as further developed in paragraph (260)  and in private label. There ar e 
also alternative similar sized players as Nuova Castelli such as Ambrosi, which, 
similarly, do not have a strong brand but are present with limited sales in the 
branded cow milk mozzarella segment. On the specific question of closeness, 
Nuova Castelli is  not seen as a real competitor to Lactalis. As an illustration, 
retailers indicated that Galbani and Nuova Castelli are not close competitors : ‘They 
are not close competitors in our opinion. Castelli is rather in competition with 
Granarolo or Am brosi. ’251 confirming that the competitive pressure exerted on 
Lactalis by Nuova Castelli brand is currently very limited.  
(260)  The market investigation further confirmed the presence of stronger brands than 
Nuova Castelli as competing closer with Lactalis. In particular, t here are better -
known brands such as Casa Azzurra of Granarolo which is confirmed by market 
investigation. When asked for the strongest brands , the retailers cited most often 
                                                 
248  The combined value market shares for branded segment are higher (by 5 percentage points) than the 
volume shares provided by the Parties, and both overstate the Parties’ position compared to panel 
data.  
249  Courtesy translation from French : " La marque Castelli est sur le marché français confidentielle",  
Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 59.  
250  Courtesy translation from French : "Galbani a une notoriété bien supérieure à celle de Castelli qui 
n'est pas connu en France en Marque Nationale ", Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 67.1.  
251 Courtesy translation from French : "Ce ne sont pas de réels concurrents pour nous. Castelli est plutôt 
en concurrence avec des fournisseurs comme Granarolo ou Ambrosi ."; Questionnaire to customer s 
(Q2), question 67.1.  
 
43 Galbani (Lactalis), followed by Casa Azzur ra (Granarolo) and Ambrosi (Ambrosi), 
Nuova Castelli is never cited252. 
(261)  The Commission has also considered in its assessment that the arguments presented 
in the below section as regards the overall market, and in particular concerning the 
absence of significant barriers to entry and expansion, t he availability of other 
suppliers, evidence of switching and lack of barriers to switching with respect to 
this plausible market also apply to the assessment of branded cow milk mozzarella.  
(262)  In view of the above, the Commission finds that the Transaction d oes not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the 
branded cow milk mozzarella  in France . 
(B) Private label cow milk mozzarella  
(263)  Considering the private label procurement segment and using downstream market 
share at  retail level as a proxy to estimate market shares at procurement level the 
Parties have [60-70]% combined  share of supply in volume (Lactalis: [40 -50]%; 
Nuova Castelli: [20-30]%). 
(264)  In France, more than half of the cow milk mozzarella market is private lab el 
([50-60]%).253 All biggest retailers in France carry their own private label 
products254. Most of them also offer different qualities ranging from low -tier 
(“premier prix”) to conventional, organic or high-end private label mozzarella.255  
(265)  For the private lab el procurement market, using downstream market share at retail 
level as a proxy to estimate market shares at procurement level, the increment 
brought by Nuova Castelli is more significant , with Nuova Castelli adding 
[20-30]% to Lactalis [40-50]% market share considering 2018 figures. 
(266)  The Commission has also considered in its assessment that the arguments presented 
in the below section as regards the overall market, and in particular concerning the 
absence of significant barriers to entry and expansion, t he availability of other 
suppliers, and evidence of switching / lack of barriers to switching with respect to 
this plausible market also apply to the assessment of private label cow milk 
mozzare lla  in France . 
(267)  In view of the above, the Commission finds that  the Transaction does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the 
private label cow milk mozzarella  in France . 
(C) Overall market for cow milk mozzarella in France  
(268)  Both Lactalis and Nuova Castelli supply branded  and private label cow milk 
mozzarella in France. Lactalis is the largest supplier of branded and of private label 
cow milk mozzarella. Nuova Castelli is the second largest private label supplier, 
and has significantly lower volumes in branded segment. As outlined by the 
Adjusted  market shares, most of the overlap between the Parties in cow milk 
mozzarella in France occurs in the private label market for the supply of cow milk 
mozzarella to retailers in France. Based on the market share data submitted by th e 
Parties and in light of the methodology described in Section 5.2, the combined 
                                                 
252  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 50.  
253  Based on panel data, Parties’ response to Commission’s request for information RFI 23.  
254   Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 4.1.  
255   Questionnaire to customers (Q2), quest ion 5.1.  
 
44 Adjusted  market shares in branded and private of  the Parties in volu me terms 
in 2018 were: [50-60]% (Lactalis: [40-50]%; Nuova Castelli: [10-20]%). 
Table 5 
France 2018, Cow milk mozzarella 256 
Branded and private label – Adjusted  market shares  
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [10-20]% 
Lactalis  private label  […] [20-30]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  […] [10-20]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [50-60]% 
Granarolo  […] [5-10]% 
Ambrosi  […] [0-5]% 
Others - branded  […] [10-20]% 
Others – private label  […] [10-20]% 
Total sales  25373  100%  
 
(269)  Overall, during the market investigation a majority of customers in the French 
market expressing their views expressed concerns about the possible impact of the 
Transaction on prices for Italian -type cheeses, and in particular in view of the loss 
of a comp etitor on the cow milk mozzarella market.  
(270)  Beside the considerations concerning the concentration of the competitive 
landscape and shares of the market for cow milk m ozzarella in France, the 
Commission considers that the Transaction does not  raise serious doubts, as to its 
compatibility with the internal market on the overall market for cow milk 
mozzarella in France , for the reasons highlighted below.  
(271)  First, as explained above , the Parties are not close competitors on the branded 
segment as Lactalis is active on branded cow milk mozzarella in particular through 
its flagship and widely recognised brand Galbani in France. Conversely, Nuova 
Castelli does not enjoy strong brand presence in cow milk mozzarella, but focuses 
primarily on private lab el supplies of this product to retailers. 
(272)  The only element of differentiation on which the companies may be identified as 
close competitors in the private label market in France by some retailers concerns 
the fact both companies have facilities in Italy an d can respond to tenders for 'made 
in Italy' mozzarella. Out of all respondents which expressed a view half of them do 
not consider that this was an important criteria and the other half does257. 
                                                 
256  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private lab el is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
257   Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 63.1.  
 
45 (273)  For example, a retailer submitted: ‘ To have mozzarella "made in Italy" is important 
to compete on the premium market […]258’; another one explained ‘ It is an Italian 
typical product for it to be made in Italy is a clear advantage.’259 On the other 
hand, this view is not shared by a number of retailers, which do not seem  to 
consider this criteria as critical : ‘The made in Italy label is not important on cow 
milk mozzarella ’.260 
(274)  However, the assessment of the tender behaviour show that a large majority of the 
French retailers that replied to the market investigation are sourcing both made in 
Italy and non -made in Italy cow milk mozzare lla261.  
(275)  The Parties  also provided evidence that even when a tender is specifically issued 
for made in Italy cow milk mozzarella, th ere is still competition and price pressure 
from suppliers o f cow milk mozzarella not produced in Italy. As an example, the 
Parties provided evidence that even tenders issued for made in Italy mozzarella 
may ultimately result in the selection of a German manufacturer for price 
considerations.262 
(276)  This is consistent wi th the overall data on import trends of mozzarella. On a 
national basis the evolution of imports of mozzarella in various Member States 
shows that , in France, the share of Italian imports fell from 60 to 56 % from 2015 
to 2018, while the share of mozzarell a manufactured in Germany’s gained 11 
points between 2016 and 2018.263 
(277)  All these elements further suggest that mozzarellas from different origins are 
substitutable to some extent from the point of view of retailers and end -consumers.  
(278)  Second, the Commission's  finding confirms that the re is a number of other players  
with manufacturing facilities in Italy capable to supply the French market.  
(279)  Market investigation data shows that at least 4 Italian based companies other than 
the Parties actively supply retailers. The other Italian based companies actively 
supplying retailers are described by the Parties as follows:  
(a) Granarolo is one of the leading groups on the Italian fresh cheese markets. 
It runs 14 plants in Italy and 7 abroad. Active both in branded cow 
mozzare lla through the Casa Azzur ra brand and private label. Granarolo 
exports cheese in 35 European countries through 2 large commercial hubs 
in France and in the UK.  
(b) Ambrosi , exports part of its production to France, Germany, USA and 
Japan. It has a distribution company in France (ETS Schöpfer SAS);  
(c) Zanetti  is active in the supply of cow milk mozzarella, ricotta, mascarpone 
and Gorgonzola, both in France and the UK. Zanetti works with Disgroup 
which is an external service provider engaged in the provi sion of logistics 
                                                 
258  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 63.1.  
259 Courtesy translation from French:  "C’est un produit typique et le made in italy offre un avantage 
certain ",Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 63.1.  
260   Courtesy translation from French: " Le "made  in Italy" n'est pas important sur la mozzarella de 
vache",  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 63.1.  
261   Questionnaire to customers (Q2b), question 9.  
262  Form CO, paragraph 215.  
263  Form CO, paragraph 232.  
 
46 and delivery services active in France. Zanetti outsources at least part of its 
distributio n in particula r in France;  
(d) Sabelli  identifies itself as “ one of the most important players in the 
Mozzarella market ”.264 Its focus is mainly on expor t, especially to the 
French market. In 2016, it acquired Trevisanalat.  
(280)  The market investigation also points to a number of other alternative suppliers. 
When asked for available viable alternatives , the respondents  pointed at a number  
of suppliers , such as Alliance Eurofood, Zott, Jager, Bayernland, Colla, Rivaldi, 
Morsillo, and Valcolatte.265 
(281)  Moreover, the limited market power of Lactalis and Nuova Castelli in private label 
can be illustrated by the fact that Nuova Castelli lost important private label c ow 
milk mozzarella sales volumes with retailers while  Lactalis captured only part of 
these quantities. As seen in the graph below, in 2019 Nuova Castelli lost significant 
volumes of private label cow milk mozzarella with […] , […], and […] .266 As 
regards […], the graph shows that Lactalis’ volumes to […]  have significantly 
increased and likely substituted the volumes previously supplied by Nuova Castelli. 
Given that Lactalis did not increase their private label sales at […]  and […], it is 
likely that these volumes were attributed to other suppliers. However, it is to be 
noted that a large share of the volumes lost by Nuova Castelli concern s […].267  
Figure  2 – [Figure comparing the parties’ sales volume s in the  first nine months of 
2019 compared to their sales volumes in the  first nine months of 2018, by customer] . 
[…] 
Source: […] 
(282)  As explained by the Parties : “The parties’ market share decreased by […].”268 
Most importantly this provides a strong indication that there are alternative 
suppliers.  
(283)  This evolution underlines that French retailers can find  alternative suppliers to 
produce their private label c ow milk mozzarella. S ince January 2018 , there has 
been a substitution away from Nuova Castelli which only partially shifted towards 
Lactalis , confirming that there are available alternatives as evidenced in the graph 
below. 
Figure  3 – [Figure showing the evolution of the parties’ mark et shar es on the m ar ket 
for the supply of private label cow milk mozzarella in France]  
[…] 
Source: […] 
(284)  Third, the competition for the supply of private label products to retailers takes 
place through tenders, which are generally organised yearly.  
                                                 
264   http://www.grupposabelli.it/il -gruppo.ph p. 
265   Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 70.  
266  Parties’ submission “Briefing Memorandum No 3”, dated 20.11.2019.  
267  Form CO, paragraph 360.  
268  Parties’ submission “Briefing Memorandum No 3”, dated 20.11.2019  
 
47 (285)  Retailer s usually issue tender for different typ es of cow milk mozzarella 
(e.g. mozzarella in brine 125 g, mozzarella in brine 250g, dry mozzarella 400g, 
organic mozzarella) and indicate the volumes required for each of these categories. 
Market investigation indic ate that retailers issue multiple tenders depending on 
packaging, weight, specificities (e. g., first price, organic)  with requested volumes 
ranging from less than 25 tons to almost 1000 tons depending on the type of 
product .269 
(286)  Based on the information provi ded by retailers on participants in tender procedures, 
it also regularly happens that private label tenders in France are allocated among 
different suppliers.  
(287)  Suppliers answer calls for tenders, and the selection of suppliers is carried out on a 
reference by reference basis. A supplier might win a tender for a given format or 
packaging (e.g. for mozzarella  in brine 125g ) and another supplier for another 
format o f mozzarella. Therefore, when participating in a tender, suppliers offer 
their best price for each individual reference.  
(288)  Fourth, according to Lactalis, ‘ any competitor with sufficient production capacity 
must be regarded as a significant competitive constr aint for the Parties on the 
French market since logistics and distribution cannot be considered as a barrier to 
entry or expansion’270. 
(289)  Lactalis submitted, in particular, that (i) Granarolo and Savencia distribute their 
products in France using in -house/subs idiary assets, (ii) Emi and Ambrosi 
distribute in France through their own joint venture (Diprola, France) and (iii) eight 
other competitors outsource (at least) their transportation services in France.271 
(290)  In the course of its market investigation, the Commi ssion assessed whether 
distribution and logistics could be considered as a significant barrier to entry in 
France. While a number of suppliers considered distribution and logistics as a 
barrier to entry in France272 or as a competitive advantage for companie s who own 
their own distribution platforms273, the Commission was ultimately able, on the 
basis of distribution patterns of many existing and potential suppliers, to establish 
that there exists a sufficient number of suppliers with a viable route to market t o 
distribute their products.  
(291)  While some market participant s mentioned logistics as a barrier to entry analysing 
the current structure of the supply market, a significant amount of supplier s do rely 
on outsourcing for their distribution and logistics. In F rance, the majority of 
suppliers that responded to the market investigation fully or partially outsourced 
their distribution process, while only 2 respondents did their distribution fully in -
house. 274 
(292)  Lactalis identified nine providers of transportation ser vices (including refrigerated 
transportation) and nine providers of warehousing services for fresh food that 
operated in France and provided these services on a non -exclusive basis275.  
                                                 
269  Questionnaire to customers (Q2b), qu estion 9.  
270   Form CO, paragraph 993.  
271   Parties ’ submission “Briefing Memorandum No 1” , dated 17.10.2019.  
272   Questionnaire to competitors (Q1b), question 16. 
273  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1b), question 16.1.  
274   Questionnaire to competitors (Q1b), question 17.  
275   The Parties submissions “Briefing Memorandum No 1” dated 17.10.2019 . 
 
48 (293)  Finally, the majority of suppliers use wholesale agreements, “groupage” and/or 
joint distribution agreements as part of their distribution strategy in several 
countries including France.276 
(294)  From the retailer’s perspective, according to the Notifying Party, four retailers have 
developed so- called “consolidation warehouses” to min imise the number of 
delivery points for the suppliers. In France, according to the Notif ying Party 
8 customer delivery locations account for 60% of the market.277  
(295)  The market investigation confirmed that several French retailers have warehouses 
or consolidation warehouses to which the suppliers deliver the products and from 
which the retailers distribute to their network of stores278.   
(296)  Accordingly , the results of the market investigation  suggest that  suppliers of 
Italian -type cheeses are able to dist ribute their products in France through third 
parties (outsourcing).  
(297)  Even if owning logistics assets in France , in some cases, seem s to provide a 
competitive advantage, following the Transaction, at least four other suppliers will 
own distribution/logisti cs assets in France, besides the Parties279: Granarolo, 
Savencia, the joint venture of Emi and Ambrosi (Diprola), and Zanetti. These 
companies active amongst others on the market for cow mozzarella,  are likely to be 
able to exercise significant competitive p ressure on the Parties in France.   
(298)  Fifth, there ha ve been recent new entrants in the cow milk mozzarella market in 
France. Namely Giovanni Ferrari entered the French market in 2011 , mainly with 
hard cheeses and started producing m ozzarella in 2019 while p reviously specialised 
in the production of Parmigiano Reggiano. Although this company remains a 
family owned business, Savencia Fromage & Dairy holds a 49% shareholding in 
Giovanni Ferrari. Savencia is a French publicly listed dairy company active 
worldwid e.  
(299)  In 2019, Giovanni Ferrari started selling branded cow -milk mozzarella in France.  
(300)  On the supply side, existing players are increasing their production capacity to 
accompany the growth of mozzarella consumption in the EEA.  
(301)  According to the Parties the following competitors have made investments in 
mozzarella production280: 
(a) Granarolo recently invested to increase the production capacity of its 
mozzare lla plant in Usmate  (Italy) ; 
(b) Valcolatte  recently acquired a new line for the production of mozzarella 
cubes;  
(c) Bayerland recently acquired three lines for the production of mozzarella 
cubes.  
(d) In July 2018, Glanbia announced setting up an entire new plant in Portlaoise 
(Ireland) and investing EUR 130 million for this project. The new plant is 
expected to start  the production in 2020, with a capacity of 45,000 tons per 
                                                 
276  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1b), question 21.  
277   Form CO, paragraph 941.  
278  Questionnaire to customers (Q2b), question 13.   
279  Parties’ submission “Briefing Memorandum No 1”, dated 17.10.2019.  
280  Form CO, paragraphs 1043 to 1045.  
 
49 annum; (as an indicative comparison panel data for sales of cow mil k 
mozzarella in France estimated the market size to be 25 373 tons as reported 
in Table 5) 
(e) In April 2018, Berglandmilch announced its decision to invest 
EUR 17.5 million to open a new plant in Aschabch (Austria). The plant is 
planned to produce m ozzarella in 3 shifts on 6 days, to be able to produce 
20,000 tons of Mozzarella per annum;  
( f) In November 2017, BMI  announced setting up a new plant in Jessen 
(Germany) which is expected to expand the company’s production capacity 
by around 2.5 tons per hour;  
(g) In July 2017, DMK  announced that it invested EUR 15 million in its 
Nordhackstedt plant to be able to provide Arla with 35,000 tons of 
mozzarella each year. Nordhackstedt site h as a capacity of approx. 
70,000 tons, of which half is dedicated to mozzarella. The aim with this 
investment is c onvert the site into a pure mozzarella plant (and thus double 
its production) by 2020. 
(302)  The market investigation suggested low barriers to switching, and provided 
evidence that customers appear to be able to switch suppliers. As mentioned in 
paragraph s (281)  to (283)  Nuova Castelli lost important private label cow milk 
mozzarella sales volume s with retailers and Lactalis captured only part of these 
quantities. This tends to show that retailers have other sources of supply for their 
private label products than Nuova Castelli and Lactalis.  
(303)  A majority of retailers expressing views submitted that they have not switched their 
private label supplier in the last 3 years281. However , there were several instances 
where retailers indicated that they have switched suppliers, either by awarding a 
low-tier segment to a German supplier, or by contacting altern ative suppliers, 
which are already present on the market282.   
(304)  The retailers confirm that they have the ability to switch between suppliers with the 
majority of French retailers expressing views submitting that they have three or 
more than three viable suppl iers of private label cow milk mozzarella at any given 
time283. 
(305)  […]. 
(306)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission considers that the 
Transaction does not raise serious d oubts in the market for cow mil k mozzarella in 
France under any plausible product market definition.  
5.5.2. Buffalo milk mozzarella  
(307)  Lactalis supplies only branded buffalo milk mozzarella, whereas Nuova Castelli 
supplies private label buffalo milk mozzarella in France.  
                                                 
281 Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 72.  
282  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 72.1.  
283  Questionnaire to customers (Q2b), question 10.  
 
50 (A) Branded buffalo milk mozzarella in France  
(308)  For branded buffalo milk mozzarella  the combined Adjusted  market share of the 
Parties in 2018 in France was [20-30]% (in volume), with Nuova Castelli adding an 
increme nt of [0-5]% to Lactalis’ [20-30]% mark et share.284 
(309)  First, Nuova Castelli ha d limited sales of branded buffalo milk mozzarella in 
France in 2018 and thus does not enjoy strong brand presence.  
(310)  Second, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from the strongest competitor to Lactalis, Granarolo. 
According to the data provided by the Parties and based on the Commission’s 
analysis (see Section 5.2), in 2018 Granarolo represented a stronger competitive 
constraint than Nuova Castelli with regard to branded buffalo milk mozzarella in 
France. Granarolo’s sales of branded buffalo milk mozzarella were significantly 
higher than Lactalis’ and Nuova Ca stelli’s sales and accounted for [10-20]% of the 
overall buffa lo milk mozzare lla market in France.  
(311)  Third, the merged entity will also continue to face significant competitive 
constraints from other branded suppliers which in 2018 had combined sales of 
branded buffalo milk mozzarella that accounted for [20 -30]% of the overall buffalo 
milk mozzarella market in France.  
(312)  The Commission has also considered in its assessment that the arguments presented 
in the below section as regards the overall market, and in particular concerning the 
absence of significant barriers to entry and expansion and the availability of other 
suppliers with respect to this plausible market also apply to the assessment of 
branded buffalo milk mozzarella  in France . 
(313)  In view of the above, the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the 
branded buffalo milk mozzarella  in France . 
(B) Overall market of buffalo milk mozzarella in France  
(314)  Based on the market share data submitted by the Parties and in light of the 
methodology described in Section 5.2, the combined market shares of the P arties in 
branded and private label in volume terms in 2018 were: [50-60]% (Lactalis: 
[10-20]%; Nuova Castelli: [40-50]%). 
                                                 
284  The combined value market shares for branded segment are higher (by less than 5 percentage points) 
than the volume shares provided by the Parties, and both overestimate the Parties’ position compared 
to panel data.  
 
51 Table 6 
France 2018, Buffalo milk mozzarella285 
Branded and private label – Adjusted  market shares  
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [10-20]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  […] [40-50]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [50-60]% 
Granarolo  […] [10-20]% 
Ambrosi  […] [0-5]% 
Others - branded  […] [20-30]% 
Others – private label  […] [0-5]% 
Total sales  5338 100%  
Note: Parties private sales higher than the total of private label. They 
were reduced proportionally to match all private label sales recorded.  
 
(315)  The Parties' activities in relation to buffalo milk mozzarella in France give rise to 
an affected market if the overall market including branded and private label was 
considered. Although, post -Transaction the Parties will have large combined 
market shares,  the Commission considers that the concentration does not raise 
serious doubts for the supply of buffalo milk mozzarella in France for the following 
reasons.  
(316)  First, there are several strong competitors already supplying the retailers in France.  
(317)  As can be s een from the market structure in the Table provided above, in France, 
branded buffalo milk mozzarella covers a significant share of demand (more than 
[50-60]%). There are other players in the branded segment . For example , sales of  
Granarolo exceed Lactalis’ sales significantly and it exerts a much more significant 
competitive constraint than Nuova Castelli , which has  very limited sales in the 
branded segment.  
(318)  As regards the private label segment, Nuova Castelli is likely the large st supplier of 
private label buffalo milk mozzarella. However, based on the data provided by the 
Parties, other important suppliers of private label buffalo milk mozzarella are 
Granarolo with an estimated market share of [10-20]%; Caseificio Principe 
([5-10]%), Spinosa ( [0-5]%) and Ambrosi ( [0-5]%) in the overall market of 
branded and private label goods combined. 
(319)  Second, the Commission considers that the Parties are not close competitors for the 
supply of buffalo milk mozzarella in France. The Commission n otes that Nuova 
Castelli produces and trades buffalo milk mozzarella .286 However, Lactalis does 
not produce buffalo milk mozzarella but only trades a limited volume under its own 
brand.  
                                                 
285  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavai lable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
286  Form CO, paragraph 360.  
 
52 (320)  Third, based on the data provided by the Parties, Lactalis trades buffa lo milk 
mozzarella manufactured by […], […], and […].287 The Notifying Party submits 
that its contracts with these suppliers, including volumes, are negotiated on […] 
basis.288 The Commission notes that one of the listed suppliers already ha s access 
to the Fre nch retailers and for the others, their contracts with Lactalis are not long -
term. Accordingly, if post -Transaction, the merged entity increased prices these 
companies could likely increase supplies or try to enter the market directly.  
(321)  Fourth, the Commissi on considers that there are no significant entry or expansion 
barriers to the market for buffalo milk mozzarella in France.  
(322)  The market investigation suggested that a potential barrier could be the more 
limited availability of buffalo milk, which is scarce r than cow milk as explained in 
paragraph (195) . However, there is a  range of players already active on the market 
and this is not regarded as particularly problematic by the Parties' competitors ,289   
(323)  Similarly distribution and logistics are  not regarded as particularly problematic by 
the Parties' competitors as explained in paragraphs (288)  to (297) for cow milk 
mozzarella where the organization of distribution through third parties is  a viable 
alternative , and given the similarity of the products this would apply also in 
relation t o buffa lo milk mozzare lla .  
(324)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible market for branded 
buffalo milk mozzarella in France.  
(325)  Based on the above consider ations and in the light of the results of the market 
investigation, the Commission considers that the concentration does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market as regards the overall 
market for the supply of buffalo milk mozzare lla in France . 
5.5.3. Ricotta  
(A) Branded ricotta in France  
(326)  For branded ricotta, the combined Adjusted  market share of the Parties in 2018 in 
France was [30 -40]%, with a marginal increment of [0 -5]% in view of Nuova 
Castelli’s very limited brand presence.290  
(327)  First, Nuova Castelli had very limited sales of branded ricotta in France in 2018 
([…]). The Transaction will bring a marginal increment to Lactalis’ market share of 
[0-5]%.  
(328)  Second, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significan t 
competitive pressure from the strongest branded competitors to Lactalis, 
e.g. Granarolo . According to the data provided by the Parties and based on the 
Commission’s analysis (see Section 5.2), in 2018 Granarolo represented a superior 
competitive constraint than Nuova Castelli with regard to branded ricotta in France. 
Granarolo’s recorded sales of branded ricotta were […]  and accounted for 
[10-20]% of the overall ricotta market in France (see Table 7 below).  
                                                 
287  Form CO, paragraph 360.  
288  Form C O, paragraph 365.  
289  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 88.  
290  The combined value market shares for branded segment are higher (by 5 percentage points) than the 
volume shares provided by the Parties, but both still overstate the Parties’ position compared to panel 
data.  
 
53 (329)  Third, the merged entity will also continue to face significant competitive 
constraints from other branded suppliers, such as Ambrosi, which in 2018 had 
combined sales of branded rico tta significantly above those of Nuova Castelli. 
These suppliers of branded ricotta will remain in the French market post -
Transaction. These suppliers accounted for [5-10]% of the overall market for 
ricotta in France in 2018 (see Table 7 below). 
(330)  Fourth, with regard to the ability of customers to switch suppliers of ricotta, the 
majority of customers that responded to the market investigation considered th ey 
could not quickly switch to an alternative supplier of branded ricotta with a 
comparable range and sufficient quantities;291 however, the majority of responsive 
competitors and customers that expressed a view indicated that it was possible and 
even easy t o switch suppliers of ricotta.292  
(331)  The Commission has also considered in its assessment the arguments presented in 
the below section as regards the overall market, and in particular concerning the 
absence of significant barriers to entry and expansion, the a vailability of other 
suppliers and the impact of the Transaction that also apply to the assessment of 
branded ricotta.  
(332)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission fin ds that the Transaction 
does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with 
regard to the plausible market of branded ricotta in France.  
(B) Private label ricotta in France  
(333)  Both Parties ha d sales of private label ricotta in Fra nce in 2018 and their combined 
market share in 2018 in France was [70 -80]% (in volume), with an increment of 
[20-30]% due to Nuova Castelli’s increase of sales of private label ricotta in 2018.  
(334)  First, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from several suppliers of private label ricotta that in 2018 
accounted for […]  of private label ricotta sold in France (i.e. [10-20]% of the 
overall mark et, Table 7 below). These suppliers will continue to exercise 
competitive pressure on the merged entity after the Transaction. Although the 
actual sales of private label of other competitors are not available, the Notifying 
Party estimates that Granarolo has a significant share of [ 20-30]%, and Fior di 
Maso [0 -5]%293 is also active on the private label market for ricotta in France.  
(335)  Third, with regard to the  ability of customers to switch suppliers of ricotta, half of 
the responsive customers that expressed a view indicated that they could quickly 
switch to an alternative supplier of private label ricotta with a comparable range 
and sufficient quantities.294  
(336)  The Commission has also considered in its assessment the arguments presented in 
the below section as regards the overall market, and in particular concerning the 
absence of significant barriers to entry and expansion, the availability of other 
suppliers an d the impact of the Transaction that also apply to the assessment of 
private label ricotta.  
                                                 
291  Questionna ire to customers (Q2), question 84.1.  
292  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 100; Questionniare to customers (Q2), question 83.  
293  Parties’ response to Commission’s request for information RFI 22, Annex  RFI  22-2. 
294  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 84.2.  
 
54 (337)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction 
does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with 
regard to the plausible market of private label ricotta in France.  
(C) Overall market for ricotta in France  
(338)  Based on the Commission’s methodology, Adjusted  market shares for the overall 
market for ricotta in France are as follows.  
Table 7 
France 2018, Ricotta295 
Branded and private label – Adjusted  market shares  
Competitor  Sales, tons  Market Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [10-20]% 
Lactalis – private label  […] [30-40]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli  private label  […] [20-30]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [60-70]% 
Granarolo  […] [10-20]% 
Ambrosi  […] [0-5]% 
Others - branded  […] [5-10]% 
Others  private label  […] [10-20]% 
Total sales  1739 100%  
 
(339)  The Transaction results in an affected market due to the Parties’ sales of private 
label ricotta, bringing an increment of Lactalis’ market share of [20-30]%.  
(340)  Beside the shares of the market for ricotta in France, the Commission considers 
that the Transaction does not  raise serious doubts for the following reasons.  
(341)  First, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pre ssure from Granarolo ( [10-20]%). According to the data provided 
by the Parties and based on the Commission’s analysis (see Section 5.2 above), in 
2018 Granarolo represented a comparable competitive constraint to Nuova Castelli 
with regard to the overall market for ricotta in France. Granarolo’s recorded sales 
in the overall market of ricotta were slightly below Nuova Castelli’s sales and 
accounted for [10-20]% of the overall ricotta market in France (see Table 7 above)  
(342)  Second, the merged entity will also continue to face significant competitive 
pressu re from several branded and private label competitors, including Ambrosi. 
These suppliers accounted for [10 -20]% of the overall market for ricotta in France 
in 2018 (see Table 7 above). These competitors together with Granarolo are likely 
to continue exercising competitive pressure on the merged entity comparable to the 
pressure exercised by Nuova Castelli on Lactalis pre -Transaction.  
                                                 
295  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
 
55 (343)  Third, with regard to the ability of customers to switch suppliers of ricotta, while 
the majority of customers that responded to the market investigation had not 
switched suppliers of branded or private label ricotta in the last three years,296 the 
majority of responsive compe titors and customers that expressed a view indicated 
that it was possible and even easy to switch suppliers of ricotta.297  
(344)  Fourth, concerning barriers to entry and expansion, different from other fresh 
cheese products discussed above for which  access to milk has been assessed as a 
potential barrier to entry, ricotta is produced from a by -product of other cheese 
production. In particular, as explained by the Notifying Party, ricotta is 
manufactured by heating whey to 80° C. The market investigat ion confirmed that 
ricotta is a by -product of whey,298 which is a liquid derived from the production of 
soft and fresh cheese (e.g. mozzarella).299 The Parties use their leftovers of whey to 
produce ricotta as well as milk powder. Nuova Castelli also sells par t of its whey to 
third parties . 
(345)  Moreover, the market investigation also indicated that there has been one entrant in 
the market for ricotta in France in the last 5 years300 and the majority of responsive 
customers indicated that there were not significant ba rriers to entry or expansion 
for ricotta in terms of costs and time in their countries.301 
(346)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible markets for branded 
ricotta in France as well as private label ricotta in France.  
(347)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission considers that the 
Transaction does not raise serious doubt s in the overall market for ricotta in France.  
5.5.4. Mascarpone  
(348)  At the outset it should be noted Nuova Castelli does not produce, but only trades, 
mascarpone. It purchases […] % of its requirements from […]  and resells it as 
further developed in paragraphs (368)  to (369) . 
(A) Branded mascarpone in France  
(349)  First, Nuova Castelli had limited sales of branded mascarpone in France in 2018. 
The Transaction will bring a limited increment to Lactalis’ market share. Based o n 
the Adjusted  market shares for 2018, the combined market share of the Parties 
would be [50-60]% with [5-10]% increme nt.302 
(350)  Second, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from Granarolo. According to the data provided by the Parties 
and based on the Commission’s analysis (see Section 5.2), in 2018 Granarolo 
represented a superior competitive const raint than Nuova Castelli with regard to 
branded mascarpone in France. The recorded Granarolo’s sales of branded 
                                                 
296  Questionn aire to customers (Q2), questions 81 and 82.  
297  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 100; Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 83.  
298  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 15.  
299  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 15.1.  
300  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), questions 101 and 101.1.   
301  Questionn aire to customers (Q2), question 87.  
302  The combined value market shares for branded segment are higher (by less than 5 percentage points) 
than the volume shares provided by the Parties, and both are in line with the Parties’ position 
compared to panel data.  
 
56 mascarpone were significantly  higher than Nuova Castelli’s sales and accounted 
for [5-10]% of the overall mascarpone market in France.  
(351)  Third, the merged entity will also continue to face significant competitive 
constraints from four other branded suppliers (Granarolo, Ambrosi, Galileo, and 
Sterilgarda) which have been identified as top 3 suppliers of branded mascarpone 
by at least one French ret ailer in the market investigation303. In addition branded 
mascarpone will continue facing competition from private label mascarpone w hich 
represent s three quarters of the mascarpone market.  
(352)  The Commission has also considered in its assessment that the arguments presented 
in the below section as regards the overall market, and in particular concerning the 
absence of significant barriers to entry and expansion, the availability of other 
suppliers, evidence of switching and lack of barriers to switching wi th respect to 
this plausible market also apply to the assessment of branded mascarpone.  
(353)  In view of the above, the Commission finds that the transaction does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the 
plausi ble market for branded mascarpone  in France . 
(B) Private label mascarpone in France  
(354)  First, both Parties ha d sales of private label mascarpone in France in 2018 and the 
combined market share  in terms of volume  is [40-50]% (Nuova Castelli [30-40]%, 
Lactalis [10-20]%).  
(355)  Second, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from several suppliers of private label mascarpone that in 
2018 accounted for more than […] of private label mascarpone sold in France 
(i.e. [30-40]% of the overall market based on the panel data). These suppliers will 
continue to exercise competitive pressure on the merged entity after the 
Transaction.  
(356)  The Commission has also considered in its assessment that the arguments presented 
in the below section as regards the overall market, and in particular concerning the 
absence of significant barriers to entry and expansion, the availability of other 
suppliers, evidence of switching and lack of barriers to switching with respect to 
this plausib le mark et also apply to the assessment of private label mascarpone.  
(357)  In view of the above, the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the 
private label mascarpone  in Franc e. 
(C) Overall market for mascarpone in France  
(358)  Based on the Commission’s methodology, Adjusted  market shares for the overall 
market for mascarpone in France are as follows.  
                                                 
303  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 89 and 89.1.  
 
57 Table 8 
France 2018, Mascarpone 304 
Branded and private label – Adjusted  market shares  
Competitor  Sales, tons  Market Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [10-20]% 
Lactalis – private label  […] [5-10]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  […] [20-30]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [50-60]% 
Granarolo  […] [5-10]% 
Ambrosi  […] [0-5]% 
Others - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Others – private label  […] [30-40]% 
Total sales  9404 100%  
 
(359)  The Transaction mainly results in an affected market because of Lactalis’ market 
presence with branded products, with strong brands, such as Galbani and Nuova 
Castelli 's presence in the private label market for mascarpone in France.  
(360)  Beside the considerations concerning the competitive landscape and shares of the 
market for mascarpone in France, the Commission considers t hat the Transaction 
does not raise serious doubts for the following reasons.  
(361)  First, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from Granarolo and other brands as well as from private label 
competitors. These competitors are likely to continue exercising competitive 
pressure on the merged entity comparable to the pressure exercised by Nuova 
Castelli on Lactalis pre -Transaction.  
(362)  Second, with regard to the ability of customers to switch suppliers of mascar pone, a 
majority of  customers that responded to the market investigation considered that it 
was possible to switch to  a different supplier of mascarpone305. Moreover one 
customer switched  in the last 3 years its branded mascarpone suppl ier 'Switched for 
a new, cheaper mascarpone produced in [S]pain'306. 
(363)  Moreover, in relation to the fact that Nuova Castelli distributes […] products, there 
was at least one example of switching which concerned […]  being capable to 
directly supply its products in c ompetition with the Parties. In particular, one 
customer indicated that ' This year we contracted directly with […] .'307 
                                                 
304  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible m arket of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. Th ey are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
305  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 92.  
306  Courtesy translation from French: " Switch pour un nouveau mascarpone fabriqué en Espagne et plus 
économique  ", Questionnaire  to customers (Q2), question 90.1.  
307  Courtesy translation from French: " Cette année nous avons contractualisé directement avec […] .", 
Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 91.1.  
 
58 (364)  The Commission further observes, as further explained below, that the possibility 
for […] to establish a direct presence on the market would potentially entail that, 
beside the shares for 2018, in the near future there may no longer be an overlap 
between the Parti es' activities on this market.  
(365)  Third, the Commission notes that, according to the Notifying Party, to produce 
mascarpone, dair y companies can use the milk fat either to produce either cream or 
mascarpone. Manufacturing mascarpone is a way to add value to the left overs of 
the production of cheese. Dairy companies in Italy have a particular incentive to 
manufacture mascarpone: the  market for cream is very small in Italy .  
(366)  In view of this, the market investigation confirmed that investment to enter 
mascarpone production is relatively low. According to the N otifying Party 
investments for the production of 1,000 tons of mascarpone wou ld amount to 
roughly EUR 1 million. By way of comparison, the entire Lactalis private label 
mascarpone sales in France are […] .308 
(367)  This finding was confirmed also by retailers responding to the market 
investigation. With regards to potential barriers to entr y when asked if there are any 
significant barriers to the entry or expansion for mascarpone in terms of costs and 
time a majority of French retailers answered that there aren't  any. Among the few 
French retailers which indicated that there would be barriers, the qualitative 
analysis of their answers shows that the barriers mainly relate to economies of scale 
for logistics in general or for marketing in branded products specifically.  For 
example one retailer submitted :'It is necessary to rely on an existing logistic to 
reduce transport costs in France..309'; and the other one further specifies on 
branded mascarpone : 'It would be difficult to deliver exclusively mascarpone for 
logistics and brand interest reasons. It is preferable to have a full range of 
products including mozzarella and/or ricotta and/or hard cheeses' .310 
(368)  Fourth, there has been a new entrant in the mascarpone market in France. As 
mentioned in paragraph (348) , Nuova Castelli does not produce, but only trades, 
mascarpone. As explained by the Parties, Nuova Castelli procured the mascarpone 
from […] (approx. […]) and conclu ded contracts with retailers to sell that 
mascarpone as private label. However , […] has unilaterally indicated that it does 
not wish to continue this commercial relationship.  In […], […] put an end to its 
contractual relationship with Nuova Castelli.311 The Parties expect that […] will try 
and contract directly with the retailers, in effect taking over Nuova Castelli’s 
market share.  
(369)  In France, for instance, according to the N otifying Party , […] has taken over 
Nuova Castelli’s market share in relation to  the […], or at least to the […] brand.312 
The fact that […]  is distributing directly its own products to French retailers is 
further confirmed by market investigation. One retailer confirmed : 'This year we 
                                                 
308  As ex plained in Section 5.3.private label sales were reduced by […]  for computing the Adjusted  
market shares.  
309  Courtesy translation from French: "  Il faut s'appuyer sur une logistique existante pour réduire les 
coûts de transport et de stockage en France  ", Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 96.1.  
310  Courtesy tra nslation from French : "Il serait très compliquer de livrer uniquement du mascarpone 
pour des raison logistique et d’intérêt de marque. Il est préférable d'avoir une gamme également de 
mozzarella et/ou ricotta et/ou pâtes dures " Questionnaire to customers (Q 2), question 96.1.  
311  Form CO, paragraph 726.  
312  Form CO, paragraph 727.  
 
59 contracted directly with […]''313, while  another reta iler specifically mentionned 
[…] as an alternative to the Parties.314 
(370)  Given the uncertain contractual relationship of Nuova Castelli with its supplier of 
mascarpone, Nuova Castelli's presence on the private label market segment is also 
uncertain , at least un til it finds a new alternative producer.  However,  in light of the 
explanations of the Parties and the retailers responding to the market investigation, 
it is likely that […] market share will significantly increase. Most importantly this 
shows that enterin g the market for mascarpone is possible , as indicates the example 
of […], a company operating a plant with 10 production lines dedicated to 
mascarpone, ricotta and other spreadable cheeses.  
(371)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible markets for branded 
mascarpone in France as well as private label mascarpone in France.  
(372)  In conclusion, in li ght of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission considers that the 
Transaction does not  raise serious doubts in the overall market for mascarpone in 
France.  
5.5.5. Gorgonzola 
(373)  Lactalis supplies both  branded and private label Gorgonzola to retailers in France, 
whereas Nuova Castelli supplies private label Gorgonzola to retailers in France , as 
well as very limited volumes of branded Gorgonzola. Therefore, the Commission 
will assess the likely effects o f the Transaction on each of the branded and private 
label segments, as well as on the overall market for Gorgonzola  in France . 
(A) Branded Gorgonzola in France  
(374)  First, as regards branded Gorgonzola, the T ransaction results in an affected market 
only because of  Lactalis’ market presence with branded products, with strong and 
widely recognised brands of Gorgonzola, and in particular Galbani and Gim 
Invernizzi.  
(375)  The shares submitted by the Parties, however, may overstate the Parties' presence 
on this market, as su ggested by the fact that, when using Adjusted  shares based on 
panel data, the market would not be affected, with a combined market shares of the 
Parties on such a plausible market at [10 -20]%, with a negligible increment of 
merely [0-5]%.  
(376)  Second, this is consistent with the fact that, as a producer , Nuova Castelli does not 
enjoy strong presence in Gorgonzola, as this type of cheese is exclusively produced 
in the PDO  territory in northern Italy. As confirmed by a third party , Nuova 
Castelli is a much smaller member of the consortium than players like Igor or 
Lactalis.315 
(377)  Third, several other strong competitors of Lactalis supply  branded Gorgonzola, 
such as , Igor, the undisputed market leader, as well as Ambrosi and Vivaldi, all  of 
them enjoying market shares similar to that of Nuova Castelli. Overall, the Parties’ 
                                                 
313   Courtesy translation from French: " Cette année nous avons contractualisé directement avec […] .", 
Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 91.1.  
314  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 91 1. 
315  Non-confidential version of minutes of a call with a third party, 24 July 2019.  
 
60 competitors in the plausible branded market have a strong presence with important 
brands, which account for over 3 times the Parties’ share of this market in France.  
(378)  Consistently with these market shares, which point at a fragmented set of suppliers 
which are as large as, or  even larger than , Nuova Castelli in the branded market, 
the market investigation supports the finding that a number of credible competitors 
can an d do offer volumes of branded Gorgonzola to retailers in France and compete 
in the negotiations organised by retailers.  
(379)  A majority of customers expressing views indicated that they source from a 
relatively wide range of suppliers of branded Gorgonzola. In particular, the data 
shows that many of those retailers have sourced from one or more other players 
independent from the Parties in 2018.316 
(380)  Therefore, the increment brought about by the Transaction is minimal and  several 
credible manufacturers with establis hed commercial relations with retailers in 
France  will remain following the Transaction .  
(381)  The Commission has also considered in its assessment the arguments presented in 
the below section as regards the overall market, and in particular concerning the 
absence of significant barriers to entry and expansion, the availability of other 
suppliers, and the impact of the Transaction  with respect to this plausible market 
also apply to the assessment of branded Gorgonzola. 
(382)  In conclusion, in light of the above and ba sed on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction 
does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with 
regard to the plausible market of branded Gorgonzola in France..  
(B) Private label Gorgonzola in France  
(383)  Nuova Castelli focuses in France on the supply of Gorgonzola to retailers to be 
resold under private label. In this plausible market, the position of Nuova Castelli is 
stronger.  
(384)  Based on the data provided by the Parties, their combined share in the supply 
(including variable weight) of private label Gorgonzola to retailers in France in 
terms of volume in 2018 was [30-40]%, with an increment of [5-10]%. Therefore, 
the increment res ulting from the Transaction also on the private label side of the 
market is moderate .  
(385)  Moreover, a number of viable competitors offer volumes of Gorgonzola to retailers 
in France and compete in the tenders organised by retailers for private label 
Gorgonzol a. A majority of customers expressing views in the market investigation 
indicated that they source from a relatively wide range of suppliers of Gorgonzola, 
Igor being the most important. In particular, the data shows that many retailers  
expressing views  sourced from other players indep endent from the Parties 
in 2018.317 
(386)  The Commission has also considered in its assessment the arguments presented in 
the below section as regards the overall market, and in particular concerning the 
absence of significant barrier s to entry and expansion, the availability of other 
suppliers, and the impact of the Transaction.  
                                                 
316  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 98.  
317  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 70.  
 
61 (387)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transacti on 
does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with 
regard to the plausible market of private label Gorgonzola in France.  
(C) Overall market for  Gorgonzola in France  
(388)  Based on the Commission’s Adjusted market shares, the comb ined market share of 
Lactalis and Nuova Castelli is [20-30]%, with an increment of [10 -20]%. In line 
with the findings for the separate segments for branded and private label products, 
the increment of the T ransaction mainly relates  to the supply of branded products .  
Table 9 
France 2018, Gorgonzola - incl. variable weight 318 
Branded and private label – Adjusted  market shares  
Competitor  Sales, tons  Market Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [5-10]% 
Lactalis – private label  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli - private label  […] [10-20]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [20-30]% 
Others - branded  […] [40-50]% 
Others – private label  […] [20-30]% 
Vivaldi  […] [0-5]% 
Igor […] [0-5]% 
Ambrosi  […] [0-5]% 
Total sales  1879 100%  
(389)  The Commission observes that the market for Gorgonzola appears to be rather 
fragmented with several active players both in the branded and private label 
segments.319 The Commission considers that following the Transaction, several 
credible competitors will continue to exert effective competitive pressure on the 
Parties, in particular, Igor, Vivaldi, Ambrosi, but also other manufacturers  of 
Gorgonzola (e.g. Emilio Mauri , Biraghi Bassi) .   
(390)  Beside the considerations concerning the market structure of Gorgonzola, the 
Commission finds, based on the market investigation, that barriers to entry and 
expansion are not high for suppliers of Gorgonzola in France.  
(391)  When market cond itions are such that competitors have sufficient capacity and find 
it profitable to expand output sufficiently, the Commission is unlikely to find that 
the merger would significantly impede effective competition.320 Conversely, when 
market conditions are suc h that the competitors of the merged entity are unlikely to 
increase their supply significantly should prices increase, the merged entity may 
                                                 
318  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Com mission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are pre sented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
319  Non-confidential version of minutes of a call with a third party, 24 July 2019.  
320  Horizontal Merger G uidelines,  paragraph 33.   
 
62 have an incentive to reduce output below the combined pre -merger levels thereby 
raising market prices.321  
(392)  First, fr om the point of view of customers, the market investigation suggested that 
the majority of retailers expressing views did  not indicate  that there are barriers in 
terms of cost and time.322  
(393)  Second, from the point of view of production, the majority of market  respondents 
indicated that the costs and delays to incur to enter or expand production are not 
significant.323 
(394)  Third, it should be recalled that the market for Gorgonzola is strictly regulated by 
the Consorzio Gorgonzola PDO . The production of Gorgonzola is  affected by 
quotas of membership in the consortium a nd that  the consortium controls the 
production levels. While both Parties are members of this consortium, Lactalis 
share amounts to [10-20]%, and Nuova Castelli’s share is much smaller. A large 
majority of consortium quotas remains in the hands of other producers, including 
leading member Igor which represents [40-50]% of the consortium.  
(395)  The Notifying Part y explain ed that the production of Gorgonzola for the domestic 
market, as well as the exports of Gor gonzola outside of Italy, are largely dominated 
by the market leader Igor, which accounts for [40-50]% of the total production of 
Gorgonzola and [60 -70]% of the total exports outside of Italy. By comparison, 
Lactalis and Nuova Castelli respectively account  for [10-20]% and [0 -5]% of the 
total production of Gorgonzola. Likewise, they respectively account for only 
[10-20]% and [0-5]% of the total exports outside of Italy.324  
(396)  As a consequence, the Parties only account for a limited part of the production and 
exports outside of Italy, so that retailers in France could likely find alternative 
sources of supply for Gorgonzola .  
(397)  Consistent with the above findings, the majority of c ustomers in France responding 
in the market investigation  do not consider  that the Transaction will have an impact 
on the supply of Gorgonzola.325    
(398)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility wit h the internal market on the plausible markets for branded 
Gorgonzola in France as well as private label Gorgonzola in France.     
(399)  Based on the above considerations and in the light of the results of the market 
investigation, the Commission considers that the Transaction  does not raise serious 
doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market on the overall market  for the 
supply of Gorgonzola in France . 
5.5.6. Feta 
(400)  At the outset it should be noted that Nuova Castelli does not produce, but only 
trades Feta. I t purchases […]% of its requireme nts from third parties such as […]. 
                                                 
321  Horizontal Merger G uidelines, paragraph 32  
322  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 105.  
323  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 124.  
324  Parties’ submission “Briefing Memorandum No 1”, dated 17.10.2019, paragraph 61.  
325  Quest ionnaire to customers (Q2), question 124.  
 
63 (401)  With regard to Feta PDO , the Notifying Party indicates that:  
(a) Nuova Castelli does not produce Feta PDO , it only acts as a trader. Nuova 
Castelli has a distribution agreement with the producer […] (and other 
various small producers). Nuova Castelli sells […] of Feta PDO  across the 
EEA, and more precisely in France, the UK, Poland and Portugal;  
(b) Lactalis prod uces Feta PDO  in Greece (Volos) and sells […]  of Feta PDO  
across the EEA, and more precisely in Germany and Austria326 but not in 
France.  
(402)  It follows from these elements that the Transaction  does not raise serious doubts in 
the French market for the supply of  branded Feta PDO .  
(403)  However considering all plausible market definitions, there would be an overlap 
considering the market for Feta and Feta -type cheese such as Lactalis brand 
Salakis . 
(A) Branded Feta- type cheeses in France  
(404)  First, Nuova Castelli had de minimi s sales of branded Feta -type cheeses in France 
in 2018. The Transaction will bring a limited increment to Lactalis’ market share of 
under [0-5]%327.  
(405)  Second, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from  Bel. According to the data provided by the Parties and 
based on the Commission’s analysis (see Section 5.2), in 2018 Bel represented a far 
superior competitive constraint than Nuova Castelli with regard to Feta -type 
cheeses in France.  
(406)  The Commission has also considered in its assessment that the arguments presented 
in the below section as regards the overall market, and in particular concerning the 
absence of significant barriers to entry, the availability of other suppliers, lack of 
barriers to switching with respect to this plausible market also apply to the 
assessment of branded Feta -type cheeses.  
(407)  In view o f the above, the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the 
plausib le market for branded Feta -type cheeses  in France . 
(B) Private label Feta -type cheeses in France  
(408)  First, both Parties ha d sales of private label Feta -type cheese in 2018 and the ir 
combined market share was  [40-50]%. (Lactalis: [20 -30]%, Nuova 
Castelli:  [10-20]%). 
(409)  Second, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competiti ve pressure from several suppliers of private label Feta -type cheeses that 
in 2018 accounted for […] of private label Feta -type cheeses sold in France 
(i.e. [20-30]% of the overall market). These suppliers will continue to exercise 
competitive pressure on the merged entity after the Transaction.  
(410)  The Commission has also considered in its assessment that the arguments presented 
in the below section as regards the overall market, and in particular concerning the 
absence of significant barriers to entry, the av ailability of other suppliers, lack of 
                                                 
326  Lactalis also produces fresh cheese in brine (such as Salakis), which is not Feta DOP.  
327  The combined value market shares for branded segment are lower than the volume shares provided by 
the Parties, and both understate the Parties’ position compared to panel data.  
 
64 barriers to switching with respect to this plausible market also apply to the 
assessment of private label Feta -type cheeses.  
(411)  In view of the above, the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise 
serious doubt s as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the 
plausib le market for private label Feta -type cheeses  in France . 
(C) Overall market for Feta -type cheeses in France  
(412)  Based on the Commission’s methodology, Adjusted  market shares for the overa ll 
market for ‘Feta -type’ cheeses in France are as follows.  
Table 10 
France 2018, Feta -type cheeses328 
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [30-40]% 
Lactalis – private label  […] [10-20]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  […] [10-20]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [50-60]% 
Bel […] [5-10]% 
Eurial  […] [0-5]% 
Others - branded  […] [60-70]% 
Others - private  […] [20-30]% 
Total sales  11488  100%  
Note: Internal branded sales were inserted for Nuova Castelli as there 
was no entry in the panel  
 
(413)  The Transaction results in an affected market because of Lactalis’ large market 
presence with branded products, with strong and widely recognised brands, such as 
Salakis. Nuova Castelli has a more limited presence in the overall market for Feta -
type cheese s in France, brining an increment of [10-20]% to Lactalis’ market share 
almost exclusively from private label sales . 
(414)  Beside the considerations concerning the competitive landscape and shares of the 
market for Feta- type cheeses in France, the Commission considers that the 
Transaction does not raise serious doubts for the following reasons.  
(415)  First, after the Transaction, t he merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from Bel with the Syrtos Brand on the branded side. On the 
private label side there are several credible alternatives. The Parties listed the 
competitors and indicated an estimation of  their private label market share in 
France as follows: Arla: [ 10-20]%; LA Farm: [10 -20]%; Tyras: [ 5-10]%; 
Hochland: [ 5-10]%. These competitors are likely to continue exercising 
competitive pressure on the merged entity comparable to the pressure exercised  by 
Nuova Castelli on Lactalis pre -Transaction.  
                                                 
328  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
 
65 (416)  In view of the Parties' activities, moreover, some competitors are also closer to 
Lactalis as manufacturers of their own product, as opposed to Nuova Castelli which 
does not have manufacturing activities for  Feta-type cheeses.  
(417)  In both branded and private label, the existence of a number of credible 
competitors offering volumes of Feta -type cheeses to retailers in France and 
competing in the negotiations organised by retailers is not only confirmed by 
qualita tive descriptions of market interaction by such customers, but also 
confirmed by actual sourcing information. Data collected from retailers shows that 
a majority of customers expressing views  source from a relatively wide range of 
suppliers.  
(418)  The market inv estigation suggests  that there is a significant number of suppliers 
able to supply the French market. When asked for their suppliers the French 
retailers  expressing views   listed the following companies329 : Pierre Meyer 
GMBH, Icewind, Dodoni, Granarolo, Oly mpus, Alliance Eurofood, Per'Inter 
Chirag .  
(419)  Second, with regard to the ability of customers to switch suppliers of Feta -type 
cheeses, the market investigation confirmed that it was possible. When asked for 
their ability to switch to a different supplier of  Feta large majority of French 
retailers that expressed a view considered that the switch was possible for Feta -type 
cheeses.330 Out of those respondents one said that it would be easy and the rest 
confirming that it would not be easy but possible. It is to be noted that the one 
saying that it would be easy confirmed that it ha d actually switched supplier for 
Feta in the last 3 years.331  
(420)  Third, concerning barriers to entry and expansion, the results of the market 
investigation were not conclusive. Half of the French retailers that expressed a 
view in the market investigation indicated that there were significant barriers to 
expansion in terms of costs and time , whereas others indicated that there were no 
such barriers.332  
(421)  However, market investigation confirms t hat entry and expansion is possible in this 
market as there have been new players expanding and continuing to expand on this 
market. When asked if there has been some new entrants in the last three years , a 
French retailer explain ed: 'Olympus is very activ e on the French market, 
specifically on private label with very low prices. This competitor will continue to 
grow in France in the coming three years.'333 
(422)  It is also to be noted that Nuova Castelli is only a distributor of the Feta -type 
cheese products and t hat one its main suppliers […] has been mentioned as an 
alternative supplier by two French retailers. 334 
                                                 
329  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 115.  
330  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 117.  
331   Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 116.1 . 
332  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 121.  
333  Courtesy translation from French: “' Olympus démarche assez fortement le marché français, en 
particulier les MDD, avec des prix très bas. Il va continuer à gagner du terrain en France dans les 3 
prochaines années ”, Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 122.1.  
334  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), q uestion 115.  
 
66 (423)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible marke ts for branded 
feta-type cheeses in France as well as private label feta -type cheeses in France.  
(424)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission considers that the 
Transa ction does not  raise serious doubts in the overall market for Feta- type 
cheeses in France . 
5.5.7. Italian -type hard cheeses  
(425)  Lactalis supplies only branded Italian -type hard cheese, whereas Nuova Castelli 
supplies both branded and private label hard cheese in France.  
(A) Branded Italian- type hard cheeses in France  
(426)  First, Nuova Castelli had de minimis  sales of branded Italian -type hard cheeses in 
France in 2018. The Transaction will bring a limited increment of [0-5]%335 to 
Lactalis’ market share of [10 -20]%.  
(427)  Second,  after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from other competitors. According to the data provided by the 
Parties and based on the Commission’s analysis (see Section 5.2), in 2018 
Granarolo and Parmareggio represented a far superior competitive constraint than 
Nuova Castelli with regard to  branded  Italian -type hard cheeses in France.  
(428)  The Commission has also considered in its assessment that the arguments presented 
in the below section as regards the overall market, and in particular concerning the 
availability of other suppliers, lack of barriers to switching with respect to this 
plausib le market als o apply to the assessment of branded Italian -type hard cheeses.  
(429)  In view of the above, the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the 
branded Italian -type hard chee ses. 
(B) Overall market for Italian- type hard cheeses in France  
(430)  Based on the market share data submitted by the Parties and in light of the 
methodology described in Section 5.2, the combined Adjusted  market shares of the 
Parties in volume terms in 2018 were: [20-30]% (Lactalis: [0-5]%; Nuova 
Castelli:  [20-30]%).  
                                                 
335  The combined value market shares for branded segment are lower than the volume shares provided by 
the Parties, and both understate the Parties’ position compared to panel data.  
 
67 Table 11 
France 2018, Italian -type hard cheese 336 
Branded and private label – Adjusted  market shares  
Competitor  Sales, tons  Market Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli  private label  […] [20-30]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [20-30]% 
Granarolo  […] [10-20]% 
Parmareggio  […] [5-10]% 
Ferrari  […] [0-5]% 
Ambrosi  […] [0-5]% 
Others - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Others  private  label […] [40-50]% 
Total sales  9155 100%  
 
(431)  First, Lactalis  depends on the supply from other manufacturers, such as […] or 
[…], for its trading activity of Italian -type hard cheeses.337 The Notifying Party 
explained […].338 
(432)  Second, the Commission also observes that the branded segment in the overall 
market for Italian -type hard cheeses has around [30 -40]% share, which would 
indicate that the m ain competitive constraint in the market comes from private 
label Italian -type hard cheeses, irrespective of whether it belongs to the same 
market or it is assessed as a constraint from outside the market.  
(433)  Third, the very low increment due to Lactalis' sa les of traded products shows that, 
even if in shares terms the increment for branded products is nominally higher;  it is 
representative of very limited volumes.  
(434)  Fourth, competition for Italian -type hard cheeses, which encompass products 
covered by a Prote cted Denomination of Origin, is less affected by brand presence 
in view of the predominant role carried, with respect to customer recognition and 
quality perception, by such denominations (Parmigiano Reggiano, Grana Padano). 
Therefore, it makes the assessm ent of a market only consisting of branded product 
much less significant in this context. In particular, the Parties submitted that brands 
carry little weight as the selling point is mostly the PDO  branding. And the 
presence of the PDO  logos on a cheese wheel or bag of Parmigiano Reggiano 
ensures and indicates to the consumer that this cheese is produced, and the milk 
collected, exclusively in the PDO  area, delivering recognition and quality 
perception expected from a brand. In line wit h this one competitor also explained: 
                                                 
336  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented o n the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
337  Form CO, paragraph 360, see also Parties’ response to the Commission’s request for information 
RFI 14, questions 1 and 5 . 
338  Form CO, paragraph 365.  
 
68 “The PDO brands enjoy high notoriety that it takes away “space” from private 
brands and indirectly attracts attention of private labels” .339 
(435)  Fifth, with reference to the limited quantities supplied by Lactalis as a trade r of 
these products in France, there exist several other competitors who compete not 
only in the trading, but also as producers of PDO cheeses within Italian -type hard 
cheeses because they either have quotas in consortia (Grana Padano) or obtain milk 
from consortia (Parmigia no Reggiano ).  
(436)  The Parties do not overlap in this respect, as Lactalis is not active in the production, 
and Nuova Castelli has limited overall shares of production in relation to PDO 
cheeses.  
(437)  Sixth, also in view of this, Lactalis and Nu ova Castelli are not close competitors.  
(438)  Seventh, different from other Italian -type cheeses, Lactalis is not recognised as an 
important player with respect to these products. In the market investigation while 
Lactalis is mentioned by two retailers among mai n suppliers of Italian -type hard 
cheese in France, numerous other suppliers are also mentioned, Nuova Castelli, 
Granarolo, Sodiaal, Savencia, Trentin, Latteria Soerisina, Colla, Ambrosi, 
Fromagers associés, virgilio  and Soster.340 The fact that there are a lot of 
competitors on this market is confirmed and explained by a French retailer : ‘There 
are a lot of competitors. Those are high value products with limited transport cost  
and large volumes.’ 341 
(439)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible markets for branded 
Italian -type hard cheeses as well as private label Italian -type hard cheeses.  
(440)  Based on the above considerations and in the light of the results of the market 
investigation, the Commission considers that the Transaction  does not raise serious 
doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market on the overall market for the 
supply  of Italian -type hard cheeses  in France . 
5.5.8. Other markets 
(441)  The Transaction results in additional affected markets in France, and in particular 
in the plausible markets for fresh dairy desserts and butter.  
(442)  However, in all these markets the Transaction results in a negligible increment due 
to the small presence of Nuova Castelli, bringing a limited increment to Lactalis’ 
shares.  
(443)  On this basis the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise serious 
doubts concerning these markets.  
                                                 
339  Courtesy translation from Italian: “Il valore del brand DOP è talmente forte che toglie "spazio" ai 
Brand privati e, indirettamente, stimola l'attenzione delle private labels”,  Questionnaire (Q1), 
question 128.1.  
340  Questio nnaire to customers (Q2), question 107.  
341  Courtesy translation from French: "I l y a beaucoup d'intervenants. Ce sont des produits valorisés 
dans lequel le coût de transport est faible. Il y a de gros volumes. ", Questionnaire to customers (Q2), 
question 109. 
 
69 5.6. The United Kingdom  
(444)  Based on the market share data submitted by the Parties and in light of the 
methodology used (see Section 5.2), the Transaction gives rise to the following 
horizontally affected plausible markets in the United Kingdom (the UK): Cow milk 
mozzarella (Section 5.6.1); Buffalo milk mozzarella (Section 5.6.2); ricotta 
(Section 5.6.3); mascarpone (Section 5.6.4); Gorgonzola (Section 5.6.5); Italian -
type hard cheese (Section 5.6.6).  
5.6.1. Cow milk mozzarella  
(445)  Both Lactalis and Nuova Castelli supply branded and private label cow milk 
mozzarella in the UK. Lactalis is the largest supplier of branded and second largest 
of private  label cow milk mozzarella. Nuova Castelli is the largest private label 
supplier and has some very limited sales of branded cow milk mozzarella. In light 
of this, the Commission will assess the likely effects of the Transaction on each of 
the branded and p rivate label segments, as well as on the overall market for cow 
milk mozzare lla in the UK.  
(A) Branded cow milk mozzarella in the United Kingdom  
(446)  First, the Commission notes that the third party data relied on by the Commission 
to establish the Adjusted  market shares of the Parties and their competitors does not 
indicate an overlap for the supply of branded cow milk mozzarella . 
(447)  An overlap between the Parties’ activities was only identified because actual 
supply data from the Parties suggested an actual delivery of very minor quantities 
by Nuova Castelli to the UK in 2018 ( […]) of branded cow milk mozzarella.342 
Accordingly, based on the market share data submitted by the Parties, if potentially 
relevant segment for branded cow milk mozzarella was considered, the co mbined 
market shares of the Parties would be [90-100]% (Lactalis: [90-100]%; Nuova 
Castelli [0-5]%).343 
(448)  However, third party data, as explained in Section 5.2, does not specify small sales 
and also does not track all outlets in the retail channel. This is why, in the Adjusted  
market shares table Nuova Castelli appears not to have any presence in branded 
products. In light of this, the market shares as su bmitted by the Parties are likely 
overestimated. In particular, similarly to Nuova Castelli, other suppliers, which 
constitute a competitive pressure on the Parties, are likely not recorded by the same 
data sources that do not record Nuova Castelli. Simila rly, other suppliers recorded 
and specified by the third -party panel data (see Table 12) would likely have higher 
sales than Nuova Castelli, are Granarolo, Daiya, and Valcolatte.  
(449)  Second, the very low increment of [0-5]% to the market shares corresponds, as 
explained above, to […] in the entire year 2018.  
(450)  Third, Nuova Castelli does not enjoy strong brand presence. As the Parties 
explained, Nuova Castelli specializes in the supply of private labels, its brands are 
little known.344 In contrast,  the majority of the UK customers express ing views in 
the market investigation mentioned Lactalis’ brand Galbani as the strongest brand 
                                                 
342  Parties’ response to Commission’s request for information RFI 22.  
343  The value market shares for branded segment are in line with the volume shares provided by the 
Parties and both overstate the Parties’ position compared to panel data.  
344  Parties’  submission “Briefing Memorandum No 3”, dated 20.11.2019.  
 
70 for cow  milk mozzarella.345 In addition, none of the respondents from the UK 
responding in the market investigation submitted that Nuova Castelli and Lactalis 
are close competitors.346 The Commission considers that this also supports the 
finding that Nuova Castelli has only very limited importance as a competitive 
constraint for the competition in the branded segment.  
(451)  Fourth, several additional smaller suppliers of br anded cow mozzarella will remain 
in the UK market following the Transaction. These suppliers would account for at 
least [5-10]% of the branded cow  milk mozzare lla supplies in the UK.  
(452)  Fifth, t he Commission observes that the branded segment in the overall m arket for 
cow milk mozzarella has only approximately [10 -20]% share  of the overall market . 
For example, some retailers in the UK do not even carry branded products and 
cover the whole demand for cow milk mozzarella with private label Italian 
cheese.347 The Commission considers that very small share of branded segment 
indicates that the main competitive constraint in the market comes from the 
suppliers of private label cow milk mozzarella, irrespective of whether it would be 
assessed as belonging to the overall market or if it was assessed as an exogenous 
constraint on the hypothetically relevant market for branded cow milk mozzarella.  
(453)  In light of the above and given the limited  increment, the Commission considers 
that the Transaction will not substantia lly modify the market structure and will not 
remove a significant competitive constraint for bra nded cow milk mozzarella in 
the UK.  
(454)  In its assessment of this plausible market, the Commission also considered the 
arguments presented in the below section on the overall market, and in particular 
concerning the absence of significant barriers to entry and expansion and the 
availability of other suppliers.   
(455)  In conclusion and based on the information available to the Commission and 
provided by Parties, the Commis sion finds that the Transaction does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the 
plausible market of branded cow milk mozzare lla in the UK.  
(B) Private label cow  milk  mozzarella in the United Kingdom  
(456)  For the su pply of private label cow milk mozzarella, based on the Parties’ estimates 
using downstream market share at retail level as a proxy to estimate market shares 
at procurement level,348 their combined market shares in volume terms in 2018 
would be [30-40]% (Lac talis : [10-20]%; Nuova Castelli: [20-30]%).  
(457)  While following the Transaction the Parties would have moderate shares for the 
supply of private label cow  milk mozzarella, the Commission considers that the 
Transaction does not  raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal 
market on the plausible market for private label cow milk mozzarella in the UK for 
the reasons set out below.  
                                                 
345  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 50.  
346  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 67.  
347  Non-confidential version of minutes of a call with a customer, 26 September 2019; see also 
Quest ionnaire to customers (Q2), question 68.1.  
348  Parties’ response to the Commission’s request for information RFI 22.  
 
71 (458)  First, the merged entity will continue to face significant competitive pressure from 
several other suppliers, which in 2018 accounted for more than […] (i.e. [50-60]% 
of the overall market). The Commission notes that based on the Parties’ estimates 
the mai n alternative supplier of private label cow milk mozzarella in the UK is Zott 
with a market share between [20-30]%; other suppliers, such as Spezialitäten -
Käserei Wiegert Jäger, Goldsteig Käsereien Bayerwald are present with each 
having an estimated market  share of [5-10]%, while Caseificio Villa, Capurso, 
Caseificio Palazzo, Bayerische Milchindustrie, and Granarolo are present with each 
having an estimated market share of [0-5]%.349 The respondents to the market 
investigation listed only few companies as thei r actual or potential private label 
suppliers of cow milk mozzarella, such as Zott and Glanbia.350 
(459)  Second, as explained above, in the UK, private label covers approximately 
[90-100]% of the demand for cow milk mozzarella. Some of the UK customers 
expressing their views indicated that they offer different qualities ranging from 
low-tier to top tier private label mozzarella.351 In addition, all UK customers 
expressing their views indicated that it is important for a mozzarella supplier to 
have mozzarella “made in  Italy”.352 However, from the explanations submitted it 
appears that origin criterion likely applies only in relation to certain part of demand 
commanding higher price.353 As one customer explained: "Price matters for some 
customers, origin for others" .354 Furth ermore, the majority of UK customers 
expressing their views also submitted that mozzarella “made in Italy” is either fully 
or largely substitutab le with mozzare lla without specific origin indicatio n.355 
(460)  Third, as regards the alternative suppliers of private label cow milk mozzarella, the 
list provided by the Parties indicates that there are a number of Italian 
manufacturers (Caseificio Villa, Capurso, Caseificio Palazzo, and Granarolo) 
alongside non -Italian manufacturers (e.g. Zott, Spezialitäten -Käserei Wieg ert Jäger, 
Goldsteig Käsereien Bayerwald), that could cater for the differentiated demand for 
private label cow milk mozzarella.  
(461)  Fourth, the UK customers expressing their views submitted, however, that while it 
may not be easy, it is possible to switch to a different private label supplier of cow 
milk mozzarella.356 As one  UK retailer explained: “ there are alternative 
suppliers ”.357 More particularly, half of the UK customers expressing views 
indicated that they had switched private label suppliers of cow milk  mozzarella in 
the last three years in a competitive process.358  
                                                 
349  Parties’ response to the Commission’s request for information RFI 22, see also Annex  RFI 22 -2-4, 
paragraph 56.  
350  Questionnaire to custo mers (Q2), question 70; Questionnaire to com petitors (Q1), question 73; 
Non-confidential version of minutes of a call with a customer, 26 September 2019.  
351  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 5.  
352  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 63.  
353  See, for ex ample, Non -confidential version of minutes of a call with a customer, 26 September 2019.  
354  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 63.1.  
355   Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 13.  
356  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question73.  
357  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 73.1.  
358  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 72.  
 
72 (462)  Fourth, even though one retailer expressed concerns that there are few alternative 
suppliers for  the supply of mozzarella “ made in Italy ” : “Lactalis and Nuova 
Castelli are currently the only 2 viable options in terms of cost, quality and 
services offered to the customer”,359 the Commission notes that overall the results 
of the market investigation suggest that the market for private label cow milk 
mozzarella is competitive and the price is a sig nificant factor for determining the 
choice of suppliers in tenders .360 Furthermore, none of the UK customers 
responding to the market investigation indicated that, if the m erged entity increased 
prices, they could not quickly switch to an alternative supplie r with a comparable 
product range and sufficient quantities.361 
(463)  Fifth, given that competitive selection process for private label supply is driven by 
retailers, the Commission notes that the majority of the retailers in the UK 
expressing their views submitte d that they select their private label suppliers once a 
year or even less than once a year.362 Furthermore, the results of the market 
investigation suggest that retailers in the UK do not commit to the specific volumes 
and generally have price adjustment -mechanisms in their contracts with suppliers 
of private label cow milk mozzarella, which would indicate that retailers likely 
have a strong negotiation position.363 
(464)  In its assessment of this plausible market, t he Commission also considered the 
arguments present ed in the below section as regards the overall market, and in 
particular concerning the absence of significant barriers to entry and expansion and  
the availability of other suppliers.  
(465)  In conclusion and based on the information available to the Commission and 
provided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the 
plausible market of private label cow  milk mozzare lla in the UK.  
(C) Overall market for cow mozzarella in the United Kingdom  
(466)  Based on the market share data submitted by the Parties and in light of the 
methodology described in Section 5.2, the combined Adjusted  market shares of the 
Parties in branded and private label in volume terms in 2018 were: [40 -50]% 
(Lactalis : [20-30]%; Nuova Castelli: [10-20]%).  
                                                 
359  Non-confidential version of minutes of a call with a customer, 26 September 2019.  
360  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 75.2, all respondents ex press ing views mentioned price as 
the first criterion, followed by quality.  
361   Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 74.2.  
362  Questionnaire to customers (Q2b), question 4.  
363  Questionnaire to customers (Q2b), questions 7 and 8.  
 
73 Table 12 
United Kingdom 2018, Cow milk mozzarella 364 
Branded and private label – Adjusted  market shares  
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [10-20]% 
Lactalis - private label  […] [10-20]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  […] [10-20]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [40-50]% 
Bella (Tertiary Brand)  […] [0-5]% 
Granarolo  […] [0-5]% 
Daiya  […] [0-5]% 
Valcolatte  […] [0-5]% 
Others – private label  […] [50-60]% 
Total sales  12689  100%  
Note: Internal branded sales of Nuova Castelli were recorded 
internally by Nuova Castelli but were not inserted in this table as the 
total of all recorded brands matched the market size  
 
(467)  Overall, during the market investigation customers in the UK expressing their 
views  were concerned about Italian -type cheeses including cow milk mozzarella.365 
In contrast, the majority of competitors expressing the views suggested that the 
Transaction will not have an effect on prices or that the prices will decrease for 
cow milk mozzare l la in the UK.366 
(468)  However, even though the concentration gives rise to moderate combined market 
shares of the Parties,  the Commission considers that the Transaction does not  raise 
serious doubts for the supply of cow milk mozzarella to retailers in the UK for the 
reasons set out in Sections (A) and (B) above, and for the following reasons.  
(469)  First, despite large market shares of the Parties, after the Transaction, the m erged 
entity will continue t o face significant competitive pressure from several private 
label suppliers and branded products suppliers, such as Zott, Valcolatte, Granarolo 
and others.  
(470)  Second, the competitors of the Parties are likely to have ability and incentive to 
sufficiently exp and capacity and supply larger volumes of cow milk mozzarella, 
should the merged entity increase prices.  
(471)  When market conditions are such that rival firms have sufficient capacity and find 
it profitable to expand output sufficiently, the Commission is unli kely to find that 
the merger would significantly impede effective competition.367 Conversely, when 
market conditions are such that the competitors of the merged entity are unlikely to 
                                                 
364  For the reasons ex plained  in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate share s for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
365  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 124 and 125.1.  
366   Questionnaire to compet itors (Q1), question 92.3.  
367  Horizontal Merger G uidelines, paragraph 33.   
 
74 increase their supply significantly should prices increase, the merged ent ity may 
have an incentive to reduce output below the combined pre -merger levels thereby 
raising market prices.368  
(472)  The Notifying Party has argued that at the EEA level the production capacity for 
cow milk mozzarella is almost double than the total EEA supply .369 The 
Commission was not able to verify the estimate provided by the Parties in its 
market investigation. However, the evidence in the file indicates that several 
competitors, including the manufacturers with Italian production assets, could 
profitably ex pand the output with their current production assets, while other 
competitors have also indicated their recent and on -going investments in capacity 
expansion.370 For example, an Italian manufacturer, which is already present in the 
UK market, has submitted i ts capacity expansion plans and the intention to become 
“a serious partner in the private label business”.371 Another manufacturer with 
Italian production facilities also explained that they are currently considering 
expanding the production of their fresh I talian cheeses and have set aside 
investment for this purpose.372 In addition, the Notifying Party suggested that 
expanding production capacity for cow milk mozzarella is not associated with high 
investment and can be done relatively quickly.373 
(473)  Second, the ba rriers to enter or expand into the UK national market appear to be 
low. The Commission has assessed whether it would be possible for alternative 
suppliers of cow milk mozzarella to enter the UK where they are not active or to 
expand supply if they are alre ady present; or if such repositioning of the offering 
would entail risks and large sunk costs that would act as a disincentive against such 
entry or expansion.  
(474)  While fresh cheese is a good with a short shelf life, the results of the market 
investigation su ggest that in order to be active in the UK, a supplier does not 
necessarily have to own a distribution system and warehouses in the country. The 
Commission notes that one retailer explained that while having a local presence is 
important, “it can be a pers on who speaks English and knows the UK market”374. 
This customer further explained that for larger volumes of private label it “does not 
try to reach out to Italian producers directly because of language and distribution 
barriers which would make difficult to manage the supply and the forecast”.375 
However, for smaller volume supplies of other Italian -type cheeses,  the customer 
works with an agent from Germany.376 Another customer of the Parties also 
indicated to receive bids for “made in Italy”  mozzarella from several UK based 
agents  that have expertise and logistics to supply private label products to 
customers.377 This is in line with the results of the market investigation suggesting 
                                                 
368  Horizontal Merger G uidelines, paragraph 32.   
369  Parties’ submission “Briefing memorandum No 3”, dated 20.11.2019, paragraph 23.  
370  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1b), questions  9-11. 
371  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1b), questions 11.4 and 11.3.  
372  Non-confidential version of minutes of a call with a competitor, 23 October 2019; Non -confidential 
version of minutes of a call with a competitor, 5 November 2019.  
373  Form CO, parag raphs 1061 -1062. See also Questionnaire to competitors (Q1b), question 10, where 
several manufacturers of cow mozzarella indicated having increased production of cow milk 
mozzarella significantly without capital ex penditure in the last three years.  
374  Non-confidential version of minutes of a call with a customer, 26 September 2019.  
375  Non-confidential version of minutes of a call with a customer, 26 September 2019.  
376  Non-confidential version of minutes of a call with a customer, 26 September 2019.  
377  Questionnaire to customers (Q2b), question 9.  
 
75 that large majority of suppliers expressing views fully outsource the distribu tion of 
Italian -type cheeses in the UK to a third -party service provider.378 In certain 
instances, the suppliers submitted that they rely on distributors, while in other 
instances they can rely on logistics companies.379 Based on the results of the 
market inve stigation, the Commission considers that distribution and logistics 
likely would not constitute a significant barrier to entry or expansion in the UK 
with regard to Italian -type cheeses.380 
(475)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise se rious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible markets for branded 
cow milk mozzarella in the UK as well as private l abel cow milk mozzarella in 
the UK. 
(476)  Based on the above considerations and in the light of the results of th e market 
investigation, the Commission considers that the Transaction does not  raise serious 
doubts in the overall market for cow milk mozzare lla in the UK.  
5.6.2. Buffalo milk mozzarella  
(477)  As outlined in the Market Definition section in section 4.3.2, the market for the 
supply of buffalo milk mozzarella to retailers is a differentiated market across sales 
channels, where suppliers can compete in branded and in private label cheese. 
Although the presence of suppliers in the same sales channel will be i ndicative of 
closeness of competition between them, the pricing of private label products will 
have some effect on the pricing ability in the branded side of the market.  
(478)  Lactalis supplies only branded buffalo milk mozzarella, whereas Nuova Castelli 
suppli es private label buffalo milk mozzarella in the UK. Accordingly, the Parties' 
activities in relation to buffalo milk mozzarella in the UK give rise to an affected 
market only if the overall market including branded and private label was 
considered. In ligh t of this, the Commission will assess the likely effects of the 
Transaction on the overall market for buffalo milk mozzarella in the UK.  
(479)  Based on the market share data submitted by the Parties and in light of the 
methodology described in Section 5.2, the combined market shares of the Parties in 
branded and private label in volume terms in 2018 were: [50-60]% 
(Lactalis:  [0-5]%; Nuova Castelli: [40-50]%). 
                                                 
378  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1b), question 18.  
379  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1b), question 18.1.  
380  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1b), questions 17 and 18.  
 
76 Table 13 
United Kingdom 2018, Buffalo milk mozzarella 381 
Branded and private label – Adjusted  market shares  
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  […] [40-50]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [50-60]% 
Garofalo  […] [20-30]% 
Laverstoke Park  […] [10-20]% 
La Contadina  […] [0-5]% 
Others - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Others – private label  […] [10-20]% 
Total sales  293 100%  
(480)  Although, post -Transaction the Parties will have large combined market shares, the 
Commission considers that the concentration does not  raise serious doubts for the 
supply of buffalo milk mozzarella in the UK for the following reasons. 
(481)  First, the increment  brought by the Transaction ( [0-5]%) is not significant. T he 
limited importance of Lactalis presence in the market for buffalo milk mozzarella 
in the UK as suggested by its market share can be further supported by the finding 
that none of the UK customers responding in the market investigation indicated 
that Lactalis has the strongest or the next to strongest brand for buffalo milk 
mozzare lla.382 
(482)  Second, there are several strong competitors both in branded and in private label 
segments already supplying the r etailers in the UK.  
(483)  As can be seen from the market structure in the Table provided above, in the UK, 
branded buffalo milk mozzarella covers a significant share of demand (just a little 
bit below [50 -60]%). There are several strong players in the branded se gment with 
sales exceeding recorded Lactalis sales by over 3 (Laverstok Park) to 8 (Garofalo) 
times. Notably, Lactalis has only larger sales than La Contadina, an Italian 
manufacturer specialised in production of buffalo milk mozzarella PDO  with 
recorded s ales of […] in 2018.  
(484)  Third, as regards the private label segment, Nuova Castelli is likely the largest 
supplier of private label buffalo milk mozzarella. However, based on the data 
provided by the Parties, other important suppliers of private label buffalo milk 
mozzarella are Garofalo with an estimated overall market share of [30-40]%, 
Casaro del re sociera ( [10-20]%), Laverstoke park ( [10-20]%), and Sori ( [0-5]%).  
(485)  Fourth, the Commission considers that the Parties are not close competitors for the 
supply of buffalo milk mozzar ella in the UK. The Commission notes that Nuova 
Castelli produces and trades private label buffalo milk mozzarella,383 whereas 
                                                 
381  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavai lable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
382   Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 50.  
383  Form CO, p aragraph 360 . 
 
77 Lactalis trades limited volumes under its own brand Galbani or Vallelata.384 Given 
the presence of several branded buffalo milk mozza rella suppliers in the UK 
market, the Commission considers that Lactalis brands compete closer to other 
brands, such as Garofalo, than to private label buffalo milk mozzarella.   
(486)  Fifth, based on the data provided by the Parties, Lactalis trades buffalo mil k 
mozzarella manufactured by […], […], and […].385 The Notifying Party submits 
that its contracts with these suppliers, including volumes, are negotiated on a […]  
basis.386 The Commission notes that all listed suppliers already have access to the 
UK retailers and their contracts with Lactalis are not long -term. Accordingly, if 
following the Transaction, the m erged entity increased prices; these companies 
could likely quickly increase their supplies to the UK.  
(487)  Sixth, in line with the arguments set out in paragra ph (474) , the Commission 
considers that there are no significant entry or expansion barriers to the market for 
buffalo milk mozzarella in the UK, in particular as it is a small and rather 
fragmented market (see Table 13 ) and where the organization of distribution 
through agents is even easier than for  larger volumes.387 Accordingly, in addition to 
suppliers that are already active in the UK market, also the suppliers of buffalo 
milk mozzarella in other EEA countries388, such as Zanetti (active e.g. in France, 
Belgium and Spain), Ambrosi (e.g. France), coul d likely quickly and without 
incurring significant cost enter the UK market.  
(488)  While overall, during the market investigation few customers in the UK expressing 
their views were concerned about Italian -type cheeses, no substantiated concerns 
were formulated in relation to the supply of buffalo milk mozzare lla.389 
(489)  Based on the above considerations and in the light of the results of the market 
investigation, the Commission considers that the Transaction  does not raise serious 
doubts as to its compatibility with t he internal market on the overall market  for the 
supply of buffalo milk mozzarella. 
5.6.3. Ricotta  
(490)  Lactalis and Nuova Castelli are active in the market for ricotta in the United 
Kingdom . Both Parties manufacture and sell branded and private label.  
(A) Branded ricotta in the United Kingdom  
(491)  Based on the Commission’s Adjusted market shares methodology, the Parties  
appear  to be the only suppliers currently selling branded ricotta in the United 
Kingdom.  
(492)  However, this third party data, as explained in Section 5.2, does not always specify 
small sales and also does not track all outlets in the retail channel. Therefore, it 
cannot be excluded that this data source does not record other smaller suppliers of 
ricotta in the UK.  
                                                 
384   Form CO, paragraph 359.  
385  Form CO, paragraph 360.  
386  Form CO, paragraph 365.  
387  Non-confidential version of minutes of a call with a customer, 26 September 2019.  
388  Parties’ response to the Commission’s request for information RFI 23. Questionnaire to customers 
(Q2), question 3.1.  
389   Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 124 and 125.1.  
 
78 (493)  Despite the large combined market shares as recorded , first, Lactalis had limited 
sales of branded ricotta in 2018 ( […]). These sal es have decreased in the last 
3 years (e.g. Lactalis sales in 2016 were […] and […] in 2017) and in 2018 they 
amounted to less than […].  
(494)  Second, Nuova Castelli’s sales of brande d ricotta in the United Kingdom were very 
limited in 2018 ( […] with amounted to approximately […] ); as a result the panel 
data used by the Commission to conduct the analysis of the market shares (see 
Section 5.2.2 above) indicates that Nuova Castelli has no sales of branded ricotta in 
the United Kingdom. Therefore, it is likely that this  methodology results in the 
same outcome  for other small suppliers.   
(495)  Third, Nuova Castelli’s sales have remained stable in the last three years ( […] 
in 2016 and 2017), thus Nuova Castelli’s is not capturing Lactalis’ lost sales. 
Therefore, it is likely that there are additional suppliers of branded ricotta in the 
United K ingdom that have been exercising competitive pressure on Lactalis pre -
Transaction and will continue to do so vis -a-vis the merged entity.  
(496)  In its assessment of this plausible market the Commission has also considered in its 
assessment the arguments present ed in the below section as regards the overall 
market, and in particular concerning the absence of significant barriers to entry and 
expansion and the availability of other actual and potential suppliers.  
(497)  In conclusion, based on the information available t o the Commission and provided 
by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts 
as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the plausible market 
of branded ricotta in the United Kingdom.  
(B) Private label ricotta in the United Kingdom  
(498)  According to the market shares provided by the Notifying Party, the Partie s appear  
to be the only suppliers currently selling private label ricotta in the United 
Kingdom.  
(499)  However, first, the Notifying Party believes that other players are also active in 
private label supply of ricotta in the United Kingdom, such as Caseificio Elda and 
Latte Carso.390  
(500)  Moreover, one customer identified Eurilait as a supplier of private label ricotta in 
the United Kingdom.391 Thus, the market st ructure and market shares proposed by 
the Notifying Party are likely to be overstated.  
(501)  Second, Nuova Castelli had moderate sales of private label ricotta in 2018 ( […]), 
which amounted to less than […]  in 2018, and Lactalis’ sales of private label 
ricotta in the United Kingdom were limited ( […]) amounting to less than […]  
in 2018. 
(502)  Third, with regard to the ability of customers to switch suppliers of ricotta, half of 
the responsive customers that expressed a view indicated that they could quickly 
switch to a n alternative supplier of private label ricotta with a comparable range 
and sufficient quantities.392  
                                                 
390  Parties’ response to Commission’s request for information RFI 22, Annex  RFI 22 -2-4, paragraph 56.  
391  Questionnairere to customers (Q2), question s 82 and 82.1.  
392  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 84.2.  
 
79 (503)  In its assessment of this plausible market t he Commission has also considered in its 
assessment the arguments presented in the below section as regards the  overall 
market, and in particular concerning the absence of significant barriers to entry and 
expansion and the availability of other actual and potential suppliers that also apply 
to the assessment of private label ricotta.  
(504)  In conclusion, based on the in formation available to the Commission and provided 
by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts 
as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the plausible market 
of private label ricotta in the Unit ed Kingdom.  
(C) Overall market for ricotta in the United Kingdom  
(505)  Based on the Commission’s methodology, Adjusted  market shares for the overall 
market for ricotta in the United Kingdom are as follows.  
Table 14 
United Kingdom 2018, Ric otta393 
Branded and private label – Adjusted  market shares  
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [5-10]% 
Lactalis – private label  […] [10-20]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  […] [70-80]% 
Combined  Parties PL + B  […] [90-100]% 
Others – private label  […] [0-5]% 
Total sales  848 100%  
 
(506)  The Transaction results in an affected market because of Nuova Castelli’s moderate 
sales of private label products in the United Kingdom. Lactalis has a more limited 
presence in the overall market for ricotta. However, the Commission considers that 
the Tra nsaction does not  raise serious doubts for the following reasons.  
(507)  First, as discussed in paragraphs (499)  and (500)  above, although  the Notifying 
Party’s  market shares indicate that Lactalis and Nuova Castelli cover  the market for 
private label supply of  ricotta394, the Notifying Party submits that other players are 
also active in private label supply of ricotta in the United Kingdom, such as 
Caseificio Elda and Latte Carso, and the market investigation confirmed the 
presence of another supplier of private label ricotta in the United Kingdom, 
Eurila it.  
                                                 
393  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label good s market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label prod ucts.  
394  As ex plained in Section 5.2.2 , the Notifying Party used third -party panel data to establish the market 
size for private label supply. However, given that such panel data does not capture all retailers, and 
the Notifying Party considers that it is even less reliable for small product markets, it is likely that the 
market shares of Lactalis and Nuova Castelli are overstated. In view of this and despite high market 
shares, the Notifying Party submitted that based on their knowledge, other players are active in the 
private label supply of ricotta in the United Kingdom.  
 
80 (508)  Second, there are several producers of other fresh cheeses such as Granarolo and 
Valcolatte that currently sell their products in the United Kingdom. These suppliers 
also sell ricotta in other EU countries (e.g. France and Italy). If the Parties were to 
increase prices, Granarolo, Valcolatte and other producers of ricotta currently 
active in other EU countries could potentially enter the market in the United 
Kingdom, in particular given that, as explained in paragraph (474) , the market 
investigation indicates that to be active in the United Kingdom a supplier does not 
necessarily have to own a distribution system and warehouses in the country. The 
finding for ricotta is particularly informed by the circumstance that even limited 
deliveries of the product by these suppliers would result in an important decrease in 
shares for the Parties combined.  
(509)  Third, with regard to the ability of customers to swit ch suppliers of ricotta, half of 
the responsive customers indicated that the switch to an alternative supplier was 
possible for private label ricotta.395 In addition, the majority of responsive 
competitors and customers that expressed a view indicated that i t was possible and 
even easy to switch suppliers of ricotta.396 Moreover, a British customer switched 
to Eurilait in the last three years in the United Kingdom. 397 
(510)  Fourth, concerning barriers to entry and expansion, different from other fresh 
cheese products discussed above for which access to milk has been assessed as a 
potential barrier to entry, ricotta is produced from a by -product of other cheese 
production. In particular, as explained by the Notifying Party, ricotta is 
manufactured by heating whey to 80°  C. The market investigation confirmed that 
ricotta is by -product of whey,398 which is a liquid derived from the production of 
soft and fresh cheese (e.g. mozzarella)399. The Parties use their leftovers of whey to 
produce ricotta as well as milk powder. Nuova Castelli also sells part of its whey to 
third parties.  
(511)  Moreover, as discussed in paragraphs (473)  and (474)  above, the barriers to enter 
or expand into the UK national market appear to  be low and, based on the results of 
the market investigation, the Commission considers that distribution and logistics 
likely would not constitute a significant barrier to entry or expansion in the United 
Kingdom  with regard to Italian -type cheeses.  
(512)  Furthermore, the majority of customers that responded to the market investigation 
indicated that there were not significant barriers to entry or expansion for ricotta in 
terms of costs and time.400 
(513)  Fifth, during the market investigation customers in the United Kingdom expressing  
their views were concerned about the impact of the concentration on competition 
for the supply of Italian -type cheeses, which would include ricotta.401 However, a 
competitor indicated to the contrary that prices for ricotta would decrease i n the 
United Kingdom  following the Transaction.402 
                                                 
395  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 84.2.  
396  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 100; Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 83.  
397  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), q uestion 82.1.  
398  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 15.  
399  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 15.1.  
400  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 87.  
401  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 124 and 125.1.  
402  Questionnaire to competit ors (Q1), question 104.  
 
81 (514)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible markets for private 
label ricotta in the UK as well as brand ed ricotta in the UK.  
(515)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission considers that the 
Transaction does not  raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the intern al 
market on the overall market for ricotta in the United Kingdom.   
5.6.4. Mascarpone  
(516)  Both Lactalis and Nuova Castelli supply branded and private label mascarpone in 
the UK. In light of this, the Commission will assess the likely effects of the 
Transaction on eac h of the branded and private label segments, as well as on the 
overall market for mascarpone in the UK.  
(517)  As outlined in the Market Definition section in section 4.3.2, the market for the 
supply of mascarpone to retailers is a differentiated market across sales channels, 
where suppliers can compete in branded and in private label cheese. Although the 
presenc e of suppliers in the same sales channel will be indicative of closeness of 
competition between them, the pricing of private label products will have some 
effect on the pricing ability in the branded side of the market.  
(A) Branded mascarpone in the United Ki ngdom  
(518)  First, the Commission notes that the third party data relied on by the Commission 
to establish the market shares of the Parties and their competitors does not indicate 
an overlap for the supply of branded mascarpone . 
(519)  An overlap between the Parties ac tivities was only identified because actual supply 
data from the Parties suggested an actual delivery of very minor quantities by 
Nuova Castelli to the UK in 2018 ( […]) of branded mascarpone.403 Accordingly, 
based on the market share data submitted by the Pa rties, if potentially relevant 
segment for branded mascarpone was considered, the combined market shares of 
the Parties would be [150- 160]% (Lactalis: [130- 140]%; Nuova 
Castelli  [20-30]%).404 
(520)  However, the Commission notes that third party data, as explained in Section 5.2, 
does not specify small sales and does not track all outlets in the retail channel. In 
light of this and the calculated figure by the Parties which exceeds 100%, the 
market shares of the Parties are likely overestimated. In particular, similarly to 
Nuova Castelli, other suppliers, which constitute a competitive pressure on the 
Parties, are likely not recorded by the same data sources tha t do not record Nuova 
Castelli. There are no other suppliers of branded mascarpone recorded by the third-
party data.  
(521)  Moreover, the very low increment to the market shares, which corresponds, as 
explained above, to de minimis sales of […] in the entire yea r 2018, further 
corroborates the very limited importance of Nuova Castelli as a constraint in the 
plausible branded product market. 
(522)  The Commission also observes that the branded segment in the overall market for 
mascarpone has less than [5-10]% share, whic h would indicate that the main 
                                                 
403  The Parties response to the Commission’s request for information RFI 22.  
404  The value market shares for branded segment are in line with the volume shares provided by the 
Parties, and both overstate the Parties’ position compared  to panel data.  
 
82 competitive constraint in the market comes from private label mascarpone, 
irrespective of whether it belongs to the same market or it is assessed as a 
constraint from outside the market. For example, some retailers in the UK do not 
even carry branded products and cover the whole demand with private label Italian 
cheese.405 
(523)  In light of the above, the Commission considers that the Transaction will not 
substantially modify the market structure and will not remove a significant 
comp etitive constraint for branded mascarpone in the UK.  
(524)  In its assessment of this plausible market the Commission also considered the 
arguments presented in the below section as regards the overall market, and in 
particular concerning the absence of significa nt barriers to entry and expansion , as 
well as the Nuova Castelli’s competitive position limited to trading activity, other 
available suppliers , and the impact of the Transaction . 
(525)  In conclusion and based on the information available to the Commission and 
provided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the 
plausible market of branded mascarpone  in the UK.  
(B) Private label mascarpone in the United Kingdom  
(526)  For the supply of private label mascarpone, based on the Parties’ estimates using 
downstream market share at retail level as a proxy to estimate market shares at 
procurement level406, their combined  market shares in volume terms in 2018 would 
be [50 -60]% (Lactalis: [20-30]%; Nuova Castelli: [30-40]%).  
(527)  The Commission considers that despite large market shares of the Parties post -
Transaction, it is not likely that the Transaction will give rise to serious doubts for 
the following reasons. 
(528)  First, as explained above, in the UK, private label covers almost all the demand for 
mascarpone ( [90-100]%). While the Parties post -Transaction will likely be the 
leading suppliers of private label mascarpone, the m erged entity will continue to 
face significant competitive pressure from other private label suppliers, which, 
according to the third party data, accounted for more than […] (or for over 
[40-50]% of the overall demand). The Parties estimate that the leadi ng supplier of 
private label mascarpone in the UK is Sterilgarda with a market share of 
[60-70]%,407 Latte Montagna Alto Adige ( [10-20]%), and Lattebusche -
Latteria  ([0-5]%).408 
                                                 
405  Non-confidential version of minutes of a call with a customer, 26 September 2019; see also 
Questionnaire Q2, question 99.1.  
406  Parties’ response to Commission’s request for information RFI 22.  
407  As ex plained in Section 5.2.2 , the Notif ying Party used third -party panel data to establish the market 
size for private label supply. However, given that such panel data does not capture all retailers, and 
the Notifying Party considers that it is even less reliable for small product markets, it is likely that the 
market shares of Lactalis and Nuova Castelli are overstated. In view of this and following the market 
share methodology proposed by the Notifying Party, the combined market share is [50-60]%. 
However, the Notifying Party believes that th eir market share is overstated and estimates that 
Sterilgarda is likely to have a leading market position, which is not in line with the estimated market 
share of other players (remaining [40- 50]% of the market) using the Notifying Party’s market share 
methodology. Parties’ response to Commission’s request for information The Parties response to the 
Commission’s request for information RFI 22 and Annex  RFI 22 -2-4, paragraph 62 . 
408  Parties’ response to Commission’s request for information RFI 22 and Annex  RF I 22- 2-4, 
paragraph  62.  
 
83 (529)  Second, while one UK customer indicated that, in case of a price increase 
following  the Transaction, it could not quickly switch to an alternative supplier 
with a comparable product range and sufficient volumes of private label 
mascarpone, the same customer also submitted that it is possible to switch to a 
different supplier of mascarpon e.409 In addition, the finding that switching is 
possible can also be supported by the response of another UK customer that 
indicated to have switched a private label supplier in the last three years in a 
competitive process.410  
(530)  In its assessment of this plau sible market, the Commission also considered the 
arguments presented in the below section as regards the overall market, and in 
particular concerning the absence of significant barriers to entry and expansion , as 
well as the Nuova Castelli’s competitive po sition limited to trading activity, and the 
impact of the Transaction . 
(531)  In conclusion and based on the information available to the Commission and 
provided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compati bility with the internal market with regard to the 
plausible market of branded mascarpone in the UK.  
(C) Overall market for mascarpone in the United Kingdom  
(532)  As outlined by the market shares, the overlap between the Parties in mascarpone in 
the UK occurs in th e segment for the supply of private label products. Based on the 
market share data submitted by the Parties and in light of the methodology 
described in Section 5.2, the combined market shares of the Parties in branded and 
private label in volume terms in 2018 were: [60 -70]% (Lactalis: [20-30]%; Nuova 
Castelli: [30-40]%).  
Table 15 
United Kingdom 2018, Mascarpone 411 
Branded and private label – Adjusted  market shares  
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  [...] [0-5]% 
Lactalis – private label  [...] [20-30]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  [...] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  [...] [30-40]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [60-70]% 
Others – private label  […] [40-50]% 
Total sales  1370 100%  
Note: Internal sales were inserted as there was no entry in the panel. 
The sales were reduced to match the unspecified difference in the 
panel  
                                                 
409   Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 92 and 93.2.  
410  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 91  and 91.1. 
411  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the N otifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
 
84 (533)  However, even though the concentration gives rise to large combined market 
shares of the Parties,  the Commission considers that the Transaction does not  raise 
serious doubts for the supply of mascarpone to retailers in the UK for the following 
reasons.  
(534)  First, following the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from several private label suppliers, which, based on 2018 
data, accounted for [40-50]% of the overall demand for mascarpone.  
(535)  Second, none of the customers responding  to the Commission's market 
investigation suggested that it was not possible to switch to different supplier of 
mascarpone.412 When asked if there are any significant barriers to the entry or 
expansion for mascarpone in terms of costs and time, none of the c ustomers from 
the UK indicated that there were any barriers.413  
(536)  Third, as outlined above Nuova Castelli does not produce mascarpone but only 
trades mascarpone produced by a third -party manufacturer […], which indicates 
that the position of Nuova Castelli on the UK market may easily change as it 
depends on whether Nuova Castelli’s supplier will be willing to extend the 
contract. […] (See paragraph (363) ). 
(537)  Fourth, in line with the arguments set out in paragraph (474) , the Commission 
considers that  there are no significant entry or expansion barriers to the market for 
mascarpone in the UK, in particular as it is a small market (see Table 15) and 
where the organization of distribution through agents is even easier for smaller than 
for larger volumes414.  
(538)  Accordingly, given that the main competitive interaction is in the private label 
segment for the supply of mascarpone and that the entry into private  label segment 
does not entail risk comparable to the entry into branded segment, does not incur 
brand development cost, the suppliers of mascarpone in other EEA countries415, 
such as Granarolo (active e.g. in France, Portugal, the Netherlands), Ambrosi 
(e.g. France), could likely quickly and without incurring significant cost enter the 
UK market. The finding for mascarpone is particularly informed by the 
circumstance that even limited deliveries of the product by these suppliers would 
result in an important decrease in shares for the Parties.  
(539)  Fifth, while overall, during the market investigation few customers in the UK 
expressing their views were concerned about Italian -type cheeses, no substantiated 
concerns were formulated in relation to the supply of masc arpone.416 
(540)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible markets for branded 
mascarpone in the UK as well as private label mascarpone in the UK.  
(541)  Based on the above considerations and in the light of the results of the market 
investigation, the Commission considers that the Transaction  does not raise serious 
doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market on the overall market of  
mascarpone in the UK . 
                                                 
412  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 92.  
413  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 96.  
414  Non-confidential version of minutes of a c all with a customer, 26 September 2019.  
415  Parties’ response to Commission’s request for information RFI 23.  
416   Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 124 and 125.1.  
 
85 5.6.5. Gorgonzola 
(542)  Lactalis supplies branded Gorgonzola to retailers in the United Kingdom, whereas 
Nuova Castelli supplies only private label Gorgonzola to retailers in the United 
Kingdom. The Parties’ activities in relation to Gorgonzola in the United  Kingdom 
give rise to an affected market only if the overall market including branded and 
private label was considered.   
(A) Overall market for Gorgonzola in the United Kingdom  
(543)  Based on the market share data submitted by the Parties and in light of the 
method ology described in Section 5.2, the combined Adjusted  market shares of the 
Parties in branded and private label in volume terms in 2018 were [50 -60]% 
(Lactalis : [40-50]%, Nuova Castelli: [10-20]%).  
Table 16 
United Kingdom 2018, Gorgonzola - incl. variable417 
Branded and private label – Adjusted  market shares  
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [40-50]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  […] [10-20]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [50-60]% 
Granarolo  […] [0-5]% 
Arrigoni  […] [0-5]% 
Deli Co  […] [0-5]% 
Others – private label  […] [30-40]% 
Total sales  510 100%  
 
(544)  Although, following the Transaction the Parties will have large combined market 
shares, the Commission considers that the concentration does not  raise serious 
doubts for the supply of Gorgonzola in the UK for the following reasons. 
(545)  First, the private label  Gorgonzola has a large share in the overall market in the UK 
([50-60]%) with several strong suppliers, which exerts a competitive constraint on 
the branded label suppliers.  
(546)  As regards the private label supply of Gorgonzola, the Commission notes that othe r 
private label suppliers put on the market more than double the volumes supplied by 
Nuova Castelli. Based on the Parties data, the main competitors in the private label 
segment are Igor ( [50-60]% of the overall market), Arrigoni Battista ( [10-20]%), 
Acqui stapace ( [5-10]%), and Emilio Mauri ( [0-5]%).  
(547)  Second, the Commission notes that the Parties are active in different segments of 
the market, which would indicate that they are not close competitors. While 
Lactalis is the leading supplier of branded Gorgonz ola it competes closer to other 
suppliers of branded Gorgonzola products than for the supply of private label 
cheese.  
                                                 
417  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Not ifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
 
86 (548)  Third, the production of Gorgonzola is regulated by quotas of membership in the 
consortium and consortium controls the production levels.418 The Notifying Part y 
explain s that the production of Gorgonzola in Italy and the exports of Gorgonzola 
outside of Italy are largely dominated by the market leader Igor, which accounts for 
[40-50]% of the total production of Gorgonzola and [60-70]% of the total exports 
outside of Italy. By comparison, Lactalis and Nuova Castelli respectively account 
for [10-20]% and [0-5]% of the total production of Gorgonzola. Likewise, they 
respectively account for only [10 -20]% and [ 0-5]% of the total exports ou tside of 
Italy.419  
(549)  As a consequence, the Parties account for a limited part of the production and 
exports outside of Italy, so that any retailer located in the UK can find alternative 
sources for the supply of Gorgonzola. 
(550)  Fourth, in line with the arguments set out in paragraph (474) , the Commission 
considers that there are no significant entry or expansion barriers to t he market for 
Gorgonzola in the UK, in particular as it is a small market  and where the 
organization of distribution through agents is even easier for smaller than for larger 
volumes420. In particular, given that entry into private label segment does not en tail 
risk comparable to the entry into branded segment because the supplier would not 
incur brand development costs, the suppliers of Gorgonzola in other EEA 
countries, such as Vivaldi and Ambrosi (both active e.g. in France) could likely 
quickly and witho ut incurring significant cost enter the UK market. The finding for 
Gorgonzola is particularly informed by the circumstance that even limited 
deliveries of the product by these suppliers would result in an important decrease in 
shares for the Parties combin ed.  
(551)  While overall, during the market investigation few customers in the UK expressing 
their views were concerned about Italian -type cheeses, they have not raised any  
substantiated concerns in relation to the supply of Gorgonzola.421 In addition, a 
third par ty stated that the Transaction “ will not have a negative impact on […] the 
overall market of Gorgonzola.”422   
(552)  Based on the above considerations and in the light of the results of the market 
investigation, the Commission considers that the concentration does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market on the overall market 
for Gorgonzola  in the UK . 
5.6.6. Italian -type hard cheese  
(553)  Lactalis supplies only branded Italian -type hard cheeses, whereas Nuova Castelli 
supplies mainly private  label and to some limited extent branded Italian -type hard 
cheeses to retailers in the United Kingdom (the UK). In light of this, the 
Commission will assess the likely effects of the Transaction on the branded 
segment, as well as on the overall market for  Italian -type hard cheese in the UK.  
                                                 
418  Non-confidential version of minutes of a call with a third party, 24 July 2019.  
419  Parties’ Briefing Memorandum of 17October 2019 – Paragraph 61. 
420  Non-confidential version of minutes of a call with a customer, 26 September 2019.  
421  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 124.  
422  Courtesy translation from the Italian: “ …non ritiene che l’Acquisizione avra’ un impatto negativo 
[…] sul mercato del Gorgonzola” , Non -confidential version of minutes o f a call with a third party, 
24 July 2019.  
 
87 (A) Branded Italian- type hard cheeses in the United Kingdom  
(554)  First, if only the segment of branded Italian -type hard cheese was considered, 
where the only overlap is, based on the Commission’s Adjusted  market shares 
methodol ogy, the Parties’ combined market shares in volume terms in 2018 would 
be [30-40]% (Lactalis: [ 5-10]%; Nuova Castelli: [20 -30]%).423 The low increment 
of [5-10]% to the market shares represents minimal recorded sales of Lactalis of 
[…] in the entire year 201 8 and also indicates low significance of Lactalis as a 
competitive constraint in the plausible branded product market . 
(555)  Second, following the Transaction the Parties will continue to face competitive 
constraints from several credible competitors. Based on t he third -party data (see 
Table 17), there are several other suppliers of branded Italian -type hard cheese in 
the UK: Napolina, Colla, Trentin among others. While these suppliers do not have 
a large presence in the market (market shares of each of them is below [0 -5]%), the 
recorded volume s of Lactalis are nonetheless the smallest ( […] per year, less than 
half compared to other Italian -type cheese manufacturers Trentin and Col la). This 
would further support the finding that Lactalis has a very limited importance as a 
constraint in the brand ed product segment, as well as in the overall market.  
(556)  Third, competition for Italian -type hard cheeses, which encompass products 
covered by a Protected Denomination of Origin, is less affected by brand presence 
in view of the predominant role carried by s uch denominations (Parmigiano 
Reggiano, Grana Padano). Therefore, it makes the assessment of a market only 
consisting of branded product much less significant in this context. In particular, 
the Parties submitted that brands carry little weight as the sell ing point is mostly 
the PDO  branding. The presence of the PDO  logos on a cheese wheel or bag of 
Parmigiano Reggiano ensures and indicates to the consumer that this cheese is 
produced, and the milk collected, exclusively in the PDO  area, delivering 
recognit ion and quality perception expected from a brand. In line with this one 
competitor also explained: “The PDO brands enjoy high notoriety that it takes 
away “space” from private brands and indirectly attracts attention of private 
labels” .424 
(557)  In light of the ab ove and in particular given the very limited activities of Lactalis, 
the Commission considers that the Transaction will not substantially modify the 
market structure and will not remove a significant competitive constraint for 
branded Italian -type-hard che ese in the UK.  
(558)  In its assessment of this plausible market, the  Commission also considered the 
arguments presented in the below section as regards the overall market, and in 
particular concerning the market structure, availability of alternative suppliers, 
absence of significant barriers to entry and expansion , and the limited competitive 
position of Lactalis . 
                                                 
423  The combined value market shares for branded segment are slightly higher (by less than 5 percentage 
points) the volume shares provided by the Parties and ov erstate the Parties’ position compared to 
panel data.  
424  Courtesy translation from the Italian: “Il valore del brand DOP è talmente forte che toglie "spazio" ai 
Brand privati e, indirettamente, stimola l'attenzione delle private labels” ; Questionnaire (Q1) , 
question 128.1.  
 
88 (559)  In conclusion and based on the information available to the Commission and 
provided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the 
plausible market of branded Italian -type hard cheeses in the UK.  
(B) Overall market for Italian- type hard cheese in the United Kingdom  
(560)  On the overall m arket for Italian -type hard cheese in the UK, based on the market 
share data submitted by the Parties and in light of the methodology described in 
Section 5.2, the combined market shares of the Parties in volume terms in 2018 
were: [40-50]% (Lactalis: [0-5]%; Nuova Castelli: [40 -50]%), with a very limited 
increme nt of [0-5]%.  
Table 17 
United Kingdom 2018, Italian -type hard chee se425 
Branded and private label – Adjusted  market shares  
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  […] [40-50]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [40-50]% 
Napolina  […] [0-5]% 
Cook Italian  […] [0-5]% 
Colla  […] [0-5]% 
Trentin  […] [0-5]% 
Bio […] [0-5]% 
Others – private label  […] [50-60]% 
Total sales  4845 100%  
Note: Internal branded sales were inserted for Nuova Castelli as there 
was no entry in the panel. The branded sales were reduced to match 
the unspecified difference in the panel  
 
(561)  Although, post -Transaction the Parties will have moderate combined market 
shares, the Commission considers that the Transaction does not  raise serious doubts 
for the supply of It alian-type hard cheese in the UK for the following reasons.  
(562)  First, as the market shares indicate ( Table 17), Lactalis has only very limited 
activities in the UK for the supply of Italian -type hard cheeses. Therefore, the 
increment brought by the Transaction ( [0-5]%) is negligible and would likely not 
affect the market structure.  
(563)  Second, the market structure for the supply of Italian -type hard cheeses in the UK 
suggests that the main competitive constraints come from the private label 
segment, which has a [90 -100]% share of the overall market. The Parties activities 
do not overlap in this segment. Furthermore, even though Nuova Castelli is a big 
supplier of private label products (estimated market share of [40 -50]%), there are 
                                                 
425  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for p rivate label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
 
89 other important and viable suppliers of  private label products covering [50-60]% of 
the overall demand. Based on the Parties data, the other suppliers are Consorzio 
Virgilio [ 20-30]%; Colla: [ 10-20]%;  Latteria Sociale Mantova: [ 10-20]%; 
Parmareggio [0 -5]%; and Agriform: [0 -5]%. 
(564)  Third, Lactalis  depends on the supply from other manufacturers, such as […] or 
[…], for its trading activity of Italian -type hard cheeses.426 The Notifying Party 
explained that it does not have any written agreement or volume commitment for 
buying Italian -type hard cheeses  from its suppliers and relies on a long -term 
partnership.427 
(565)  Fourth, the Commission notes that Lactalis traded volumes of Italian -type hard 
cheeses in the UK are very small and decreased by [20 -30]% over the last three 
years.428 The Commission also notes that , for example, […]  is already present in 
the UK, and could therefore expand its presence with the retailers at the expense of 
Lactalis.  
(566)  Fifth, with reference to the limited quantities supplied by Lactalis as a trader of 
these products in the UK, there exis t several other competitors who compete not 
only in the trading, but also as producers of PDO cheeses within Italian hard 
cheeses because they either have quotas in consortia (Grana Padano) or obtain milk 
from consortia (Parmigiano Reggiano). The Parties d o not overlap in this respect, 
as Lactalis is not active in the production of PDO cheese and Nuova Castelli has 
limited overall shares of production in relation to PDO cheeses. Accordingly, also 
in view of this, Lactalis and Nuova Castelli are not close co mpetitors . 
(567)  Sixth, different from other Italian -type cheeses, Lactalis is not recognised as an 
important player with respect to Italian -type hard cheese. No customers from the 
UK or competitors responding to the market investigation mentioned Lactalis 
among  main or alternative suppliers of Italian -type hard cheese in the UK.429 
Competitors responding to the market investigation mentioned Nuova Castelli, 
Zanetti, Colla and Dalter, Cascine Emiliane.430 The Commission notes that the 
internal document of the Notifyi ng Party also suggests that Lactalis does not exert 
an effective competitive constraint on the market for Italian -type hard cheese. For 
example, Lactalis in one of the presentations considers: "Out of Italy the most 
important category is Parmesan where Gal bani has low market share due to its 
limited competitiveness in terms of Price" .431 
(568)  Seventh, the Commission considers that it cannot be excluded that companies 
active in othe r national markets could  potentially expand their activities in the UK. 
In this regard, the Parties submitted that competitors in Italian -type hard cheese 
could easily expand and gain market shares in national markets, in particular 
referring to companies such as Zanetti, Ambrosi , Colla, Parmareggio.432 The 
majority of all customers expressing their views in the market investigation 
suggested that there are no significant entry or expansion barriers in terms of cost 
                                                 
Form CO, paragraph 360, see also Parties’  response to the Commissio n’s request for information 
RFI 14, question 1, 5.  
427  Form CO, paragraph 365.  
428  Form CO, paragraph 359.  
429  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 107; Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 130.  
430  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 130.  
431  Form CO, Annex 5.2.H. 
432  Form CO, paragraph 1060.  
 
90 and time.433 The Commission notes that in the market investigation a third-party  
has also indicated that in recent years there indeed have been several new entries 
into the national markets of companies who previously only had been active in 
Italy.434  
(569)  Eighth, while during the market investigation few customers in the UK expr essing 
their views were overall concerned about Italian -type cheeses, no substantiated 
concerns were formulated in relation to the supply of Italian -type hard cheese.435 
Further, one UK customer explained that it does not expect the Transaction to have 
any i mpact in relation to the supply of Italian -type hard cheese: “However, Lactalis 
have a limited presence in the Italian Hard Cheese market, so one would anticipate 
there being only marginal impact on this area of Italian cheese sales and most this 
would mai ntain it's existing framework.”436 
(570)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible market for branded 
Italian -type hard cheeses in the UK.  
(571)  Based on the above c onsiderations and in the light of the results of the market 
investigation, the Commission considers that the Transaction does  not raise serious 
doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market on the overall market for 
Italian -type hard cheeses.  
5.7. Germany  
(572)  Based  on the market share data submitted by the Parties  and in light of the 
methodology used (see  Section 5.2), the Transaction gives rise to the following 
horizontally affected plausible markets in Germany: Buffalo milk mozzarella 
(Section  5.7.1); ricotta (Section 5.7.2) and mascarpone (Section 5.7.3).  
5.7.1. Buffalo milk m ozzarella  
(573)  Lactalis supplies only branded buffalo milk mozzarella, whereas Nuova Castelli 
supplies branded and private label buffalo milk mozzare lla in Germany.  
(A) Branded buffalo milk mozzarella in Germany  
(574)  For branded buffalo milk mozzarella, following the Co mmission’s methodology 
described in Section 5.2, the Adjusted  combined  market share of the Parties 
in 2018 in Germany was [30-40]% (in volume), with a moderate increment of 
Lactalis’ market share of [5-10]% due to Nuova Castelli’s moderate brand 
presence.437  
(575)  First, Nuova Castelli had moderate sales of branded buffalo milk mozzarella in 
Germany in 2018 ( […]) and thus does not enjoy strong brand presence. The 
Transaction will bring a moderate increment to Lactalis’ market share of [5-10]%.  
(576)  Second, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from the strongest competitor to Lactalis, Sori. According to 
the data provided by the Parties and based on the Commission’s analysis (see 
Section 5.2), in 2018 Sori represented a stronger competitive constraint than Nuova 
                                                 
433   Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 113  
434   Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 135.1.  
435   Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 124 and 125.1.  
436   Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 18.  
437  The combined value market shares for branded segment are slightly higher (less than 5 percentage 
points) the volume shares provided by the Parties.  
 
91 Castelli with regard to branded buffalo milk mozzarella in Germany. Sori’s sales of 
branded buffalo milk mozzarella  were significantly higher than Nuova Castelli’s 
sales and accounted for [30 -40]% of the overall market of buffalo milk mozzarella 
in Germany  (see Table 18 below).  
(577)  Third, the merged entity will also continue to face competitive constraints from 
several smaller suppliers of branded buffalo mil k mozzarella that will remain in the 
German market post -Transaction. These suppliers accounted for [10-20]% of the 
overall market for buffalo milk mozzarella in Germany in 2018 (see Table 18 
below). 
(578)  In its assessment of this plausible market the Commission has also considered the 
arguments presented in the below section as regards the overall market, and in 
particular concerning the availability of other s uppliers and the lack of closeness 
between the Parties that also apply to the assessment of branded buffalo milk 
mozzare lla.  
(579)  In conclusion, based on the information available to the Commission and provided 
by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transact ion does not raise serious doubts 
as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the plausible market 
of branded buffalo milk mozzarella in Germany.  
(B) Overall market of buffalo milk mozzarella in Germany  
(580)  Based on the market share data submitted by the Parties and in light of the 
methodology described in Section 5.2, the combined Adjusted  market shares  of the 
Parties in branded and private label buffalo milk mozzarella in Germany in 2018 
were: [20-30]% (in volume, Lactalis : [20-30]%; Nuova Castelli: [0-5]%).  
Table 18 
Germany 2018, Buffalo milk mozzarella438 
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [20-30]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [20-30]% 
Private label  […] [30-40]% 
Sori […] [30-40]% 
Others - branded  […] [10-20]% 
Total sales  2740 100%  
Note: Internal branded sales were inserted for Nuova Castelli as there 
was no entry in the panel  
 
(581)  The Transaction results in an affected market because of Lactalis’ market presence 
with branded products, with brands such as Galbani. Nuova Castelli has a more 
limited presence in the o verall market for buffalo milk mozzarella in Germany, 
bringing a moderate increment of [0-5]% to Lactalis’ market share . 
                                                 
438  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commiss ion reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are present ed on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
 
92 (582)  Beside the considerations concerning the competitive landscape and shares of the 
market for buffalo milk mozzarella in Germany , the Commission considers that the 
Transaction does not  raise serious doubts for the following reasons. 
(583)  First, the merged entity will also continue to face competitive constraints from Sori 
and several branded and in private label competitors that already  supply retailers in 
Germany . These suppliers accounted for [70 -80]% of the overall market for 
branded buffalo milk mozzarella in Germany in 2018 (see Table 18 above ).  
(584)  Second, the Commission considers that the Parties are not close competitors for the 
supply of buffalo milk mozzarella in Germany. The Commission notes that Nuova 
Castelli produces and trades private label buffalo milk mozzarella.439 However,  
Lactalis does not manufacture buffalo milk mozzarella but merely trades under its 
own brand. 
(585)  Third, based on the data provided by the Parties, Lactalis trades buffalo milk 
mozzarella manufactured by third parties, including […].440 The Notifying Party 
submi ts that its contracts with these suppliers, including volumes, are negotiated on 
a yearly basis.441 The Commission notes that […]  already has access to German 
retailers and its contract with Lactalis is not long -term. Accordingly, if post -
Transaction, the merged entity increased prices , […] could likely quickly increase 
supplies to Germany.  
(586)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible market for branded 
buffalo milk mozzarella in Germany.  
(587)  Based on the above considerations and in the light of the results of the market 
investigation, the Commission considers that the Transaction  does not raise serious 
doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market on the overall market for  
buffalo milk mozzarella in Germany . 
5.7.2. Ricotta  
(588)  Lactalis and Nuova Castelli are active in the market for ricotta in Germany. Both 
Parties sell branded ricotta but only Nuova Castelli also sells private label ricotta.  
(A) Branded ricotta in Germany  
(589)  For branded ricotta, the combined Adjusted  market share of the Parties in 2018 in 
Germany was [70-80]% (in volume), with a moderate increment of Nuova 
Castelli’s market share of [5 -10]% in view of Nuova Castelli’s moderate brand 
presence .442 
(590)  First, Nuova Castelli had moderate sales of branded ricotta in Germany in 2018 
([…]) and thus does not enjoy strong brand presence. The Transaction will bring a 
moderate increment of [5-10]% to Lactalis’ market share.  
                                                 
439  Form CO, paragraph 360.  
440  Form CO, paragraph  360. 
441  Form CO, paragraph  365. 
442  The combined value market shares fo r branded segment are slightly higher (by less than 5 percentage 
points) than the volume shares provided by the Parties, and both overstate the Parties’ position 
compared to panel data.  
 
93 (591)  Second, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from the strongest competitor to Lactalis, Trentin. According 
to the data provided by the Parties and based on the Commission’s analysis (see 
Section 5.2), in 2018 Trentin represented a stronger competitive constraint than 
Nuova Castelli with regard to branded ricotta in Germany. Trentin’s sales of 
branded ricotta were significantly higher than Nuova Castelli’s sales and accounted 
for [5-10]% of the overall ricotta market in Germany (see Table 19 belo w).  
(592)  Third, the merged entity will also continue to face significant competitive 
constraints from two other branded suppliers: Goldsteig and Bustaffa which in 
2018 had combined sales of branded ricotta comparable to those recorded for 
Nuova Castelli  (see Table 19 below). Moreover, several additional smaller 
suppliers of branded ricotta will remain in the German market post -Transaction. 
These suppliers acc ounted for [0 -5]% of the overall market for ricotta in Germany 
in 2018 (see Table 19 below). 
(593)  Fourth, with regard to the ability of customers to switch su ppliers of ricotta, the 
majority of customers that responded to the market investigation considered they 
could not quickly switch to an alternative supplier of branded ricotta with a 
comparable range and sufficient quantities;443 however, the majority of com petitors 
and customers that expressed a view indicated that it was possible and even easy to 
switch suppliers of ricotta.444  
(594)  In its assessment of this plausible market the Commission has also considered the 
arguments presented in the below section as regards the overall market, and in 
particular concerning the absence of significant barriers to entry and expansion, the 
availability of other suppliers and the impact of the Transaction that also apply to 
the assessment of branded ricotta.  
(595)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction 
does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with 
regard to the plausible ma rket of branded ricotta in Germany.  
(B) Overall market for ricotta in Germany  
(596)  Based on the Commission’s methodology, Adjusted  market shares for the overall 
market for ricotta in Germany are as follows.  
                                                 
443  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 84.1.  
444  Questionnaire to  competitors (Q1), question 100; Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 83.  
 
94 Table 19 
Germany 2018, Ricotta445 
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [40-50]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  […] [0-5]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [50-60]% 
Trentin  […] [5-10]% 
Goldsteig  […] [0-5]% 
Bustaffa  […] [0-5]% 
Others - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Others – private label  […] [30-40]% 
Total sales  1296 100%  
 
(597)  The Transaction results in an affected market because of Lactalis’ large market 
presence with branded products, with strong and widely recognised brands, such as 
Galbani. Nuova Castelli has a more limited presence in the overall market for 
ricotta in Germa ny, bringing a moderate increment of Nuova Castelli’ market share 
of [5-10]%. 
(598)  Beside the considerations concerning the shares of the market for ricotta in 
Germany, the Commission considers that the Transaction does not  raise serious 
doubts for the following reasons.  
(599)  First, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from Trentin as well as from more than two branded and 
private label competitors, which accounted for [40 -50]% of the overall market for 
ricotta in Germany. These competitors are likely to continue exercising competitive 
pressure on the merged entity comparable to the pressure exercised by Nuova 
Castelli on Lactalis pre -Transaction.  
(600)  Second, with regard to the ability of customers to switch suppl iers of ricotta, while 
the majority of customers that responded to the market investigation had not 
switched suppliers of branded or private label ricotta in the last three years,446 the 
majority of competitors and customers that expressed a view indicated t hat it was 
possible and even easy to switch suppliers of ricotta.447  
(601)  Third, concerning barriers to entry and expansion, the majority of the respondents 
to the market investigation that expressed a view indicated that there were not 
significant barriers to e ntry or expansion in terms of costs and time.448 
                                                 
445  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and priva te label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in priva te label products.  
446  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 81 and 82.  
447  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 100; Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 83.  
448 Questionnaire to Competitors (Q1), questions 87 and 102.  
 
95 (602)  Moreover, different from other fresh cheese products discussed above for which 
access to milk has been assessed as a potential barrier to entry, ricotta is produced 
from a by -product of other cheese production . In particular, as explained by the 
Notifying Party, ricotta is manufactured by heating whey to 80° C. The market 
investigation confirmed that ricotta is by -product of whey,449 which is a liquid 
derived from the production of soft and fresh cheese (e.g. moz zarella)450. The 
Parties use their leftovers of whey to produce ricotta as well as milk powder. 
Nuova Castelli also sells part of its whey to third parties.  
(603)  Furthermore, in 2018, there were more than four competitors (besides the Parties) 
active in the overa ll market for ricotta and at least one competitor indicated that it 
could increase its production of ricotta without incurring in significant additional 
costs.451  
(604)  Fourth,  one competitor indicated that as a result of the Transaction, it expects 
prices for ri cotta to decrease in Germany.452 With regard to German customers, the 
market investigation was inconclusive.453 
(605)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible m arket for branded 
ricotta in Germany.  
(606)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission considers that the 
Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibilit y with the internal 
market on the overall  market for ricotta in Germany.  
5.7.3. Mascarpone  
(607)  Both Parties supply branded mascarpone in the Germany , but only Lactalis 
supplies private label. Based on the information provided by the Notifying Party, 
Nuova Castelli does not produce, but only trades, branded mascarpone. It 
purchases […] of its requirements from […]  and resells it as further developed in 
paragraphs (368)  to (369) .  
(A) Branded mascarpone in Germany  
(608)  First, Nuova Castelli had very limited sales of b randed mascarpone in Germany 
in 2018. The Transaction will bring a limited increment to Lactalis’ market share.  
(609)  Second, the Commission notes that the th ird party data relied on by the 
Commission to establish the Adjusted  market shares of the Parties and their 
competitors point at a very minimal overlap for the supply of branded mascarpone. 
(610)  Based  on the Adjusted  market share data, if potentially relevant s egment for 
branded mascarpone was considered, the combined Adjusted  market shares of the 
Parties would be [50-60]% (Lactalis : [40-50]%; Nuova Castelli [5-10]%).454 
                                                 
449  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 15.  
450  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 15.1.  
451  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 102.1.  
452  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 104.  
453  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 123 and 124.  
454  The combined value market shares for branded segment are higher (by less than 10 percentage 
points), but result in a smaller increment than the volume shares provided by the Parties, and both 
overstate the Parties’ position compared to panel data.  
 
96 (611)  However, the Commission notes that third party data, as explained in Section 5.2, 
does not record small sales and does not track all outlets in the retail channel. In 
particular, similarly to Nuova Castelli, other suppliers, which constitute a 
competitive pressure on the Parties, are likely underestimated by the same data 
sources that record very minimal sales from Nuova Castelli.  
(612)  Third, the Commission also observes  that the branded segment in the overall 
market for mascarpone has below [20-30]% share  of the overall market , which 
would indicate that the main competitive constraint in the market comes from 
private label mascarpone, irrespective of whether it belongs t o the same market or 
it is assessed as a constraint from outside the market.  
(613)  Fourth, the merged entity will continue to face significant competitive constraints 
from four other branded suppliers (Goldsteig, Minus L, De Lucia, and Exquisa). 
Considering rep orted sales three of them are roughly the same size as Nuova 
Castelli and one of them, Goldsteig, is 3 times bigger.  
(614)  The Commission has also considered in its assessment that the arguments presented 
in the below section as regards the overall market, and i n particular concerning the 
absence of significant barriers to entry and expansion, the availability of other 
suppliers and lack of barriers to switching with respect to this plausible market also 
apply to the assessment of branded mascarpone.  
(615)  In view of t he above, the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the 
branded mascarpone.  
(B) Overall market for mascarpone in Germany  
(616)  Based on the Commission’s methodology, Adjust ed market shares for the overall 
market for mascarpone in Germany are as follows.  
Table 20 
Germany 2018, Mascarpone455 
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [5-10]% 
Lactalis – private label  […] [10-20]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [20-30]% 
Goldsteig  […] [0-5]% 
Minus L  […] [0-5]% 
De Lucia  […] [0-5]% 
Exquisa  […] [0-5]% 
Others - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Others – private label  […] [70-80]% 
Total sales  8450 100%  
Note: Internal branded sales for Nuova Castelli were inserted as there was no entry 
in the panel  
                                                 
455  For the r easons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, th e separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
 
97 (617)  Nuova Castelli had very limited sales of branded mascarpone in Germany in 2018. 
The Transaction will bring a limited increment to Lact alis’ market share in 
Germany.  
(618)  Beside th e considerations concerning the competitive landscape and shares of the 
market for mascarpone in Germany , the Commission considers that the Transaction 
does not raise serious doubts for the following reasons.  
(619)  First, after the Transaction, the merged entit y will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from other brands as well as from private label competitors. 
These competitors are likely to continue exercising significant competitive pressure 
on the merged entity compared to the limited pressure  exercised by Nuova Castelli 
on Lactalis pre -Transaction.  
(620)  Second, with regard to the ability of customers to switch suppliers of mascarpone, 
none of German retailers that responded to the market investigation considered that 
it was not possible to switch to different supplier of mascarpone456.  
(621)  Moreover, in relation to the fact that Nuova Castelli distributes […] products, one 
German retailer mentioned […]  as an alternative supplier for mascarpone457. As 
further explained in paragraphs (368)  to (369)  […] could become an alternative in 
the short term, supplying its own products. 
(622)  Third, the Commission notes that, according to the Notifying Party, to produce 
mascarpone, dairy companies can us e the milk fat either to produce either cream or 
mascarpone. Manufacturing mascarpone is a way to add value to the left overs of 
the production of cheese. Dairy companies in Italy have a particular incentive to 
manufacture mascarpone: the market for cream is very small in Italy,  
(623)  In view of this, the market investigation confirmed that investment to enter 
mascarpone production are relatively low. According to the notifying party 
investments for the production of 1,000 tons of mascarpone would amount to 
roughly EUR 1 million. By way of comparison, the entire Lactalis private label 
mascarpone sales in Germany are […] .458 
(624)  This finding was confirmed also by retailers responding to the market 
investigation. With regards to potential barriers to entry when asked if there are any 
significant barriers to the entry or expansion for mascarpone in terms of costs and 
time all of German retailers answered that there aren't. 459 
(625)  Fourth, there has been a new entrant in the mascarpone market in Germany. As 
explained by a German retailer a new competitor Fude&Serran entered the market 
in 2015 as private label supplier. 460 
(626)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible market for bran ded 
mascarpone in Germany.  
                                                 
456  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 92.  
457  Questionnaire to cus tomers (Q2), question 89.  
458  As ex plained in Section 5.3.private label sales were reduced by […]  for computing the Adjusted  
market shares.  
459  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 96 . 
460  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 95.1 . 
 
98 (627)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission considers that the 
Transaction does not raise serious doubts for  the overall market for mascarpone in 
Germany.  
5.7.4. Other markets 
(628)  The Transaction results in additional affected markets in Germany, and in 
particular in the plausible markets for branded cow milk mozzarella and 
Gorgonzola, and for the overall (branded and private label) Gorgonzola.  
(629)  However, in all these markets the Transaction results in a negligible increment due 
to the small presence of Nuova Castelli, bringing a limited or moderate increment 
to Lactalis’ shares, and the presence of other competitors in these markets.  
(630)  On this basi s the Commission finds that the T ransaction does not raise serious 
doubts concerning these markets.  
5.8. Poland  
(631)  Based on the market share data submitted by the Parties and in light of the 
methodology used (see Section 5.2), the Transaction gives rise to the following 
horizontally affected plausible markets in Poland : Cow milk mozzarella 
(Section  5.8.1; ricotta (Section 5.8.2), Gorgonzola (Section 5.8.3) and Italian -type 
hard cheeses (Section 5.8.4).  
5.8.1. Cow milk mozzarella  
(632)  Both Lactalis and Nuova Castelli supply branded and private label cow milk 
mozzarella to retailers in Poland. As outlined by the market shares, the main 
overlap between t he Parties in cow milk mozzarella is in the supply of private label 
cow milk mozzare lla to retailers in Poland.  
(A) Branded cow milk mozzarella in Poland  
(633)  For branded cow milk mozzarella, following the Commission’s methodology 
described in Section 5.2, the combined market share of the Parties in 2018 in 
Poland was [40 -50]% (in volume), with a limited increment of Nuova Castelli’s 
market share of [0 -5]% in v iew of Nuova Castelli’s limited brand presence .461 
(634)  First, Nuova Castelli had limited sales of branded cow milk mozzarella in Poland 
in 2018 ( […]) and thus does not enjoy strong brand presence. The Transaction will 
bring a limited increment to Lactalis’ market share of [0-5]%.  
(635)  Second, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from several suppl iers of branded cow milk mozzarella, 
including Zottarella, Formagia, Bakoma, Jager and Osm Skierniewice. According 
to the data provided by the Parties and based on the Commission’s analysis (see 
Section 5.2), in 2018 each of these suppliers represented a stronger competitive 
constraint than Nuova Castelli with regard to branded cow milk mozzarella in 
Poland. Their individual sales of branded cow milk m ozzarella were significantly 
higher than Nuova Castelli’s sales and accounted for [10-20]% of the overall 
market for cow milk mozzare lla in Poland (see Table 21 below).  
                                                 
461  The combined value market shares for branded segment are lower than the volume shares provided by 
the Parties, but both still overstate the Parties’ position compared to panel data.  
 
99 (636)  Third, the merged entity will also continue to face significant competitive 
constraints from several additional smaller suppliers of branded cow milk 
mozzarella that will remain in the Polish market post -Transaction. These suppliers 
accoun ted for [0 -5]% of the overall market for cow milk mozzar ella in Poland 
in 2018 (see Table 21 below). 
(637)  In its assessment, t he Commission has also considered the arguments presented in 
the below section as regards the overall market, and in particular concerning the 
absence of significant barriers to entry and expansion, the availability of other 
suppliers, customers’ ability to multi -source and the impact of the Transaction that 
also apply to the assessment of branded cow milk mozzarella.  
(638)  In conclusion, based on the information available to the Commission and provided 
by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts  
as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the plausible market 
of branded cow milk mozzarella in Poland.  
(B) Private label cow milk mozzarella in Poland  
(639)  For private label cow milk mozzarella, based on the market shares provided by the 
Parties, the combined market share of the Parties in 2018 in Poland was [50-60]% 
(in volume), with a moderate increment of Nuova Castelli’s market share of [5-
10]% in view of Nuova Castelli’s moderate brand presence . 
(640)  First, Nuova Castelli had moderate  sales of private label cow milk mozzarella in 
Poland in 2018 ( […]) bringing a moderate increment of [5-10]% to the combined 
market share.  
(641)  Second, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from several suppliers of private label cow milk mozzarella . 
According to the data provided by the Parties and based on the Commission’s 
analysis (see S ection 5.2), in 2018 these suppliers combined represented a stronger 
competitive constraint than Nuova Castelli with regard to private label cow milk  
mozzarella  in Poland. Their combined sales of private label cow milk mozzarella  
were significantly higher than Nuova Castelli’s sales and accounted for [20-30]% 
of the overall market for cow milk mozzarella in Poland (see Table 21 below).  
(642)  In its assessment , the Commission has also considered the arguments presented in 
the below section as regards the overall market, and in particular concerning the 
absence of significant barriers to entry and expansion, the availability of other 
suppliers, customers’ ability to multi -source and the impact of the Transaction that 
also apply to the assessment of private label cow milk mozzarella.  
(643)  In conclusion, based on the information available to the Commission and provided 
by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts 
as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the plausible market 
of pri vate label cow milk mozzare lla in Poland.  
(C) Overall features of the cow milk mozzarella market in Poland 
(644)  Based on the Commission's methodology, Adjusted  market shares for the overall 
market for cow milk mozzare lla are as follows.  
 
100 Table 21 
Poland 2018, Cow milk mozzarella462 
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [10-20]% 
Lactalis – private label  […] [30-40]% 
Nuova Castelli -branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  […] [5-10]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [50-60]% 
Zottarella  […] [5-10]% 
Formagia  […] [0-5]% 
Bakoma  […] [0-5]% 
Jager  […] [0-5]% 
Osm Skierniewice  […] [0-5]% 
Others - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Others – private label  […] [20-30]% 
Total sales  12389  100%  
Note: Internal branded sales were inserted for Nuova Castelli as there 
was no entry in the panel  
 
(645)  The Transaction results in an affected market because of Lactalis’ sales of private 
label cow milk mozzarella. Nuova Castelli has a moderate presence in the overall 
market for cow milk mozzar ella in Poland, bringing a moderate increment of 
[5-10]% to Lactalis’  market share . 
(646)  Beside the considerations concerning the competitive landscape and shares of the 
market for cow milk mozzarella  in Poland, the Commission considers that the 
Transaction does not  raise serious doubts for the following reasons. 
(647)  First, the Commission observes that the overall market of cow milk mozzarella in 
Poland appears to be fragmented (see Table 21 above) with competitors 
comparable to Nuova Castelli. Moreover, a Polish customer indicated that there 
were more than three viable suppliers of cow milk mozzarella in Poland.463  
(648)  Second, after t he Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from several branded and private label suppliers that in 2018 
accounted for [40-50]% of the overall cow milk mozzarella market in Poland. 
These competitors are likely to continue exercising competitive pressure on the 
merged entity comparable to the pressure exercised by Nuova Castelli on Lactalis 
pre-Transaction.  
                                                 
462  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notif ying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
463  Questionnaire to customers (Q2b), question 10.  
 
101 (649)  Third, with regard to multi -sourcing, the majority of customers that responded to 
the market investigation indicated that they source cow milk mozzarella from two 
or more suppliers in 2018.464 A Polish customer indicated that it awards its required 
volumes of cow milk mozzarella to one supplier but it runs selection procedures for 
the procurement of cow milk mozz arella more than once a year.465 
(650)  Fourth, as regards barriers to expansion, the market investigation suggested that at 
least one Polish supplier would be able to increase its existing production capacity 
and another one would be able to increase the amount of  cow milk mozzarella that 
it trades in case there would be an increase in demand in Poland.466 
(651)  Fifth, with regard to the impact of the Transaction and based on the market 
investigation, a Polish customer indicated that competition would decrease;467 
however, t he majority of Polish competitors that provided a view indicated that the 
Transaction would not have a significant impact in any market for Italian -type 
cheeses or on their companies.468  
(652)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise seri ous doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible markets for branded 
cow milk mozzarella in Poland as well as private label cow milk mozzarella in 
Poland.  
(653)  Based on the above considerations and in the light of the results of the market 
investigation, the Commission considers that the concentration does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market on the overall market 
for cow milk  mozzarella in Poland . 
5.8.2. Ricotta  
(654)  Lactalis and Nuova Castelli are active in the market for ricotta in Poland. Both 
Parties sell branded ricotta and Nuova Castelli also sells private label ricotta.  
(A) Branded ricotta in Poland 
(655)  For branded ricotta, following the Commission’s methodology described in 
Section  5.2, the combined Adjusted  market share of the Parties in 2018 in Poland 
was [30-40]% (in volume), with a limited increment of Nuova Castelli’s market 
share of [0-5]% in view of Nuova Castelli’s very limited brand presence .469 
(656)  First, in this plausible market, the Transaction results in a negligible increment due 
to the very limited sales ( […]) and presence of Nuova Castelli.   
(657)  Second, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from the strongest branded competitor to Lactalis, Ceko, as 
well as Talma and Biraghi. According to the data provided by the Parties an d based 
on the Commission’s analysis (see Section 5.2 above), in 2018 each of these 
suppliers individually represented a stronger competitive constrai nt than Nuova 
Castelli with regard to branded ricotta in Poland. Ceko accounted for [20-30]%, 
                                                 
464  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 66 and 70; Questionnaire to customers (Q2b), questi on 3.  
465  Questionnaire to customers (Q2b), questions 4 and 5.  
466  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1b), question 9.  
467  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 18.  
468  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1b), questions 26.1 and 26.2.  
469  The combined value market shares for branded segment are higher (by less than 10 percentage 
points), but result in the smaller increment compared to the volume shares provided by the Parties, 
and both overstate the Parties’ position compared to panel data.  
 
102 Talma for [10 -20]% and Biraghi for [0-5]% of the overall ricotta market in Poland 
(see Table 22 below).  
(658)  Third, the merged entity will also continue to face competitive constraints from 
other smaller suppliers of branded ricotta that will remain in the Polish market 
post-Transaction and that accounted for [0 -5]% of the overall market for ricotta in 
Poland in 2018 (see Table 22 below). 
(659)  In its assessment , the Commission has also considered the arguments presented in 
the below section as regards the overall market, and in particular concerning the 
absence of significant barriers to entry and expansion, the availability of other 
suppliers, the ability of customers to switch suppliers and the impact of the 
Transaction  that also apply to the assessment of branded ricotta.  
(660)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction 
does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with 
regard to the plausible market of branded ricotta in Poland.  
(B) Overall market for ricotta in Poland 
(661)  Based on the Commission’s methodology, Adjusted  market shares for the overall 
market for ricotta in Poland are as  follows.  
Table 22 
Poland 2018, Ricotta470 
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [20-30]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  […] [20-30]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [50-60]% 
Ceko  […] [20-30]% 
Talma  […] [10-20]% 
Biraghi  […] [0-5]% 
Others - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Others – private label  […] [0-5]% 
Total sales  204 100%  
Note: Parties private sales higher than the total of private label. 
Reduced proportionally  
 
(662)  The Transaction results in an affected market because of Lactalis’ market share in 
branded products and Nuova Castelli’s market presence with private label products, 
bringing an increment to  Lactalis’ market share of [20 -30]% in the overall market 
for rico tta in Poland (see Table 22 above) . 
                                                 
470  For the reasons ex plai ned in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate sh ares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
 
103 (663)  Beside the considerations concerning the competitive landscape and shares of the 
market for ricotta in Poland, the Commission considers that the Transaction does 
not raise serious doubts for the following reasons. 
(664)  First, after the Transaction, the merged e ntity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from the strongest competitor to Lactalis, Ceko. According to 
the data provided by the Parties and based on the Commission’s analysis (see 
Section 5.2), in 2018 Ceko represented a stronger competitive constraint than 
Nuova Castelli with regard to the overall market for ricotta in Poland. Ceko’s sales 
of ricotta were significantly higher than N uova Castelli’s sales and accounted for 
[20-30]% of the overall ricotta market in Poland.  
(665)  Second, the merged entity will also continue to face significant competitive 
constraints from more than two additional competitors, which accounted for 
[10-20]% of th e overall market for ricotta in Poland. These competitors, together 
with Ceko, are likely to continue exercising competitive pressure on the merged 
entity comparable to the pressure exercised by Nuova Castelli on Lactalis pre -
Transaction.  
(666)  Third, with regar d to the ability of customers to switch suppliers of ricotta, the 
majority of customers that responded to the market investigation had not switched 
suppliers of branded or private label ricotta in the last three years;471 however, the 
majority of competitors and customers that responded to the market investigation 
indicated that it was possible to switch suppliers of ricotta.472  
(667)  Fourth, concerning barriers to entry and expansion, the majority of competitors that 
responded t o the market investigation indicated that there were significant barriers 
to expansion in terms of costs and time, including a Polish competitor.473 However, 
the majority of customers that responded to the market investigation indicated that 
there were not s ignificant barriers to entry or expansion for ricotta in terms of costs 
and time in their countries. 474 
(668)  Moreover, different from other fresh cheese products discussed above for which 
access to milk has been assessed as a potential barrier to entry, ricotta is produced 
from a by -product of other cheese production. In particular, as explained by the 
Notifying Party, ricotta is manufactured by heating whey to 80° C. The market 
investigation confirmed that ricotta is by -product of whey,475 which is a liquid 
derive d from the production of soft and fresh cheese (e.g. mozzarella)476. The 
Parties use their leftovers of whey to produce ricotta as well as milk powder. 
Nuova Castelli also sells part of its whey to third parties. In addition, the majority 
of customers that r esponded to the market investigation indicated that there were 
not significant barriers to entry or expansion for ricotta in terms of costs and 
time.477 
                                                 
471  Questionniare to customers (Q2), question 81.  
472  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1) , question 100; Questionniare to customers (Q2), question 83.  
473  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 102.  
474  Questionniare to customers (Q2), question 87.  
475  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 15.  
476  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), ques tion 15.1.  
477  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 87.  
 
104 (669)  Fifth, the majority of customers that responded to the market investigation 
indicated that the Transactio n will not have impact on prices for the supply of 
ricotta in their countries.478 Moreover, a competitor indicated that it expected prices 
for ricotta to decrease in Poland.479 
(670)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as  
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible market for branded 
ricotta in Poland.  
(671)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission considers that the 
Transaction does not raise  serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal 
market on the overall market for ricotta in Poland . 
5.8.3. Gorgonzola 
(672)  Lactalis supplies branded Gorgonzola to retailers in Poland, whereas Nuova 
Castelli supplies a very limited v olume of branded Gorgonzola and moderate 
volumes of private label Gorgonzola to retailers. The Parties’ activities in relation 
to Gorgonzola in Poland give rise to an affected market if the overall market 
including branded and private label was considered , as well as if branded 
Gorgonzola is considered.  
(A) Branded Gorgonzola in Poland 
(673)  For branded Gorgonzola, following the Commission’s methodology described in 
Section 5.2, the combined market share of the Parties in 2018 in Poland was 
[50-60]% (in volume), with a limited increment of Nuova Castelli’s’ market share 
of [0-5]% in view of Nuova Castelli’ s very limi ted brand presence .480  
(674)  The Commission observes that Nuova Castelli's limited significance in the 
plausible market for branded Gorgonzola in Poland can be demonstrated by the de 
minimis sales of […] in the entire year 2018.  
(675)  In light of the above, the Commiss ion considers that the Transaction will not 
substantially modify the market structure and will not remove a significant 
competitive constraint for branded Gorgonzola in Poland.  
(676)  In its assessment of this plausible market, the Commission also considered the  
arguments presented in the below section as regards the overall market, and in 
particular concerning other available suppliers , and the impact of the Transaction  
(677)  In conclusion and based on the information available to the Commission and 
provided by Partie s, the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible 
market of branded Gorgonzola in Poland. 
(B) Overall market for Gorgonzola in Poland 
(678)  Based on the Commission’s methodology, Adjusted  market shares for the overall 
market for Gorgonzola market in Poland are as follows.  
                                                 
478  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 124; Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 104.  
479  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 104.  
480  The combined value market shares for branded segment are lower than the volume shares provided by 
the Parties, and both understate the Parties’ position compared to panel data.  
 
105 Table 23 
Poland 2018, Gorgonzola481 
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [20-30]% 
Nuova Castelli -branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  […] [10-20]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [30-40]% 
Igor […] [10-20]% 
Biraghi  […] [0-5]% 
Formagia  […] [0-5]% 
Others - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Others – private label  […] [40-50]% 
Total sales  437 100%  
 
(679)  In the overall market for the supply of Gorgonzola to retailers in Poland, the Parties 
have a combined Adjusted  market share of [30-40]% (in volume), with a moderate 
increme nt of [10-20]% due to Nuova Castelli’s moderate presence.  
(680)  First, the T ransaction results in an affected market because of Lactalis’ large 
market presence with branded products, with strong and widely recognised brands 
of Gorgonzola, and in particular Galbani. Nuova Castelli had moderate sales of 
Gorgonzola in Pol and in 2018 ( […]) and thus does not enjoy strong brand 
presence. The Transaction will bring a moderate increment of [10-20]% to 
Lactalis’ market share.  
(681)  Second, this is consistent with the fact that Nuova Castelli does not enjoy strong 
presence in Gorgonzol a. As confirmed to the Commission by a third party ,482 the 
market for Gorgonzola is strictly regulated by the Consorzio, there are several 
active players both in branded and private label and Nuova Castelli is a much 
smaller member player than Igor or Lactal is.483 A third party  described Nuova 
Castelli as “rather small when it comes to Gorgonzola.”484  
(682)  Third, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from the strongest competitor to Lactalis, Igor. According t o 
the data provided by the Parties and based on the Commission’s analysis (see 
Section 5.2), in 2018 Igor represented a stronger competitive constrai nt than Nuova 
Castelli with regard to Gorgonzola in Poland. Igor’s sales of Gorgonzola were 
significantly higher than Nuova Castelli’s sales and accounted for [10 -20]% of the 
overall Gorgonzo la market in Poland.  
                                                 
481  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. T hey are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
482  Non-confidential version of minutes of a call with a third party, 24 July 2019.  
483  Non-confidential version of minutes of a call with a third party DOP, 24 July 2019.  
484  Courtesy translation from the Italian: “ …ma una piccola impresa per quanto riguarda il gorgonzola” , 
Non-confidential version of minutes of a call with a third party, 24 July 2019.  
 
106 (683)  Fourth, the merged entity will also continue  to face significant competitive 
constraints from several other branded and private label suppliers  which in 2018 
accounted for [40 -50]% of the overall market for Gorgonzola in Poland. These 
competitors are likely to continue exercising competitive pressur e on the merged 
entity comparable to the pressure exercised by Nuova Castelli on Lactalis pre -
Transaction  
(684)  Beside the considerations concerning the structure and shares of the Gorgonzola 
market in Poland, the Commission considers that the Transaction does n ot raise 
serious doubts for the following reasons. 
(685)  First, from the point of view of customers, the market investigation suggested that 
the majority of retailers do not believe that there are barriers in terms of cost and 
time.485  
(686)  Second, the majority of respondents indicated that it was easy or possible to switch 
to a different supplier of Gorgonzola.486 
(687)  Third, the majority of the customers and two P olish competitors that responded to 
the market investigation indicated that the Transaction will have no impa ct on the 
prices of Gorgonzola in their countries.487  
(688)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible market for branded 
Gorgonzola in Poland.  
(689)  Based on the above considerations and in light of the results of the market 
investigation, the Commission considers that the concentration does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market on the overall market 
for Gorgonzola in Poland. 
5.8.4. Italian-type hard cheese  
(690)  Lactalis supplies only branded Italian -type hard cheeses, whereas Nuova Castelli 
supplies mainly private label and to some limited extent branded Italian -type hard 
cheeses to retailers in Poland. The Commission notes that the main ov erlap giving 
rise to an affected market is in the segment for branded Italian -type hard cheese. In 
light of this, the Commission will assess the likely effects of the Transaction on the 
branded segment and the overall market for the Italian -type hard chees e in Poland.  
(691)  As a preliminary remark, the Commission notes that the Parties did not provide 
third-party panel data to substantiate their estimates for the total market size and 
their market shares. Therefore, for this part, the Commission will rely on the 
volume market shares data as submitted and substantiated by the Parties.488 
(A) Branded Italian- type hard cheeses in Poland 
(692)  If only the potentially relevant branded segment was considered, the Parties ’ 
combined market shares in terms of volume in 2018 would be [60-70]% 
(Lactalis:  [50-60]%, Nuova Castelli: [5-10]%). First, the relatively small increment 
indicates that Nuova Castelli has only limited activities in the branded segment, 
which correspond to […] of actual sales through the full year of 2018.  
                                                 
485  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 105.  
486  Questionnaire to customers  (Q2), question 101; Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 122.  
487  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 124; Questionnaire to competitors (Q1b), questions 26.1 
and 26.2.  
488  Parties’ response to Commission’s request for information RFI 22.  
 
107 (693)  Second, following the Transaction the Parties will continue facing effective 
competitive constraints from other branded products suppliers that in 2018 
accounted for [30-40]% of the relevant segment. In this regard, one customer 
submitted in the market inv estigation that in Poland Ambrosi enjoys a strong 
position (was referred to for Parmigiano Reggiano as the next strongest brand to 
Zarpellon , and for Grana Padano as the next strongest brand to Lactalis’ brand 
Galbani).489  
(694)  Third, the Commission observes tha t the demand for branded Italian -type hard 
cheeses concerns about [50 -60]% of the overall market. Given the important share 
of the private label segment in the overall market, the Commission considers that it 
is likely that private label, at least to some extent, exerts competitive pressure on 
the branded segment. In particular, since the competition for Italian -type hard 
cheeses, which include products covered by a Protected Denomination of Origin, is 
less affected by brand presence in view of the predomin ant role carried by such 
denominations (Parmigiano Reggiano, Grana Padano). Therefore, it makes the 
assessment of a market only consisting of branded product much less significant in 
this context. In this regard, the Parties submitted that brands carry lit tle weight as 
the selling point is mostly the PDO  branding. The presence of the PDO  logos on a 
cheese wheel or bag of Parmigiano Reggiano ensures and indicates to the consumer 
that this cheese is produced, and the milk collected, exclusively in the PDO  area, 
delivering recognition and quality perception expected from a brand. In line with 
this one competitor also explained: “The PDO brands enjoy high notoriety that it 
takes away “space” from private brands and indirectly attracts attention of private 
labels ”.490 
(695)  In its assessment of this plausible market, t he Commission also considered the 
arguments presented in the below section as regards the overall market, and in 
particular availability of other suppliers , and the impact of the Transaction . 
(696)  In conclusion a nd based on the information available to the Commission and 
provided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the 
plausible market of branded Italian -type hard cheese in Poland.  
(B) Overall market for Italian- type hard cheese in Poland 
(697)  On the overall market for Italian -type hard cheeses in Poland, based on the market 
shares data submitted by the Parties, their combined market shares in volume terms 
in 2018 would be lower: [50-60]% (Lactalis : [30-40]%; Nuova Castelli: [20-30]%).  
(698)  Although , post -Transaction the Parties will have large combined market shares, the 
Commission considers that the concentration does not  raise serious doubts for the 
supply of Italian -type hard cheeses in Poland for the following reasons. 
(699)  First, the Parties have su bmitted that following the Transaction, the merged entity 
will continue to face credible competitive constraints from the remaining 
competitors. The other companies active in this hypothetically relevant market are, 
for example, Ambrosi491 and Zanetti492.  
                                                 
489   Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 50.  
490  Courtesy translation from Italian: “Il valore del brand DOP è talmente forte che toglie "spazio" ai 
Brand privati e, indirettamente, stimola l'attenzione delle private labels” ; Questionnaire to 
competitors (Q1), question  128.1.  
491  Form CO, paragraph 1196.  
 
108 (700)  Third, in the private label segment, based on the Parties’ data, more than half of the 
demand is covered by other suppliers. The Parties have indicated that the following 
companies are active in Poland in private label segment: Euroser (Formagia), 
Zarpellon, and Brazzale.493  
(701)  Fourth, Lactalis depends on the supply of Italian -type hard cheese from other 
manufacturers, such as […] or […], for its trading activity.494 While Nuova Castelli 
has limited overall shares of production in relation to PDO cheeses, it compete s 
closer with those companies that are also active in production of PDO cheeses 
rather than only trading them.  
(702)  Fifth, the Commission considers that it cannot be excluded that companies active in 
other national markets could potentially expand their activit ies in Poland. In this 
regard, the Parties submitted that competitors in Italian -type hard cheese could 
easily expand and gain market shares in national markets, in particular referring to 
companies such as Zanetti, Ambrosi, Colla, Parmareggio.495 The majori ty of all 
customers expressing their views in the market investigation suggested that there 
are no significant entry or expansion barriers in terms of cost and time.496  The 
Commission notes that in the market investigation a third -party  has also indicated 
that in recent years there indeed have been several new entries into the national 
markets of companies who previously only had been active in Italy.497  
(703)  Sixth, the majority of customers and competitors expressing their views in the 
market investigation indicated that the Transaction will not have impact on prices 
for the supply of Italian -type hard cheeses in their countries.498  
(704)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible market for branded 
Italian -type hard cheeses in Poland.  
(705)  In light of the above and based on the information available to the Commission and 
provided by Parties, the Commission considers that the Transaction does not  raise 
serious dou bts on the overall market for Italian -type hard cheeses in Poland.  
5.8.5. Milk procurement  
(706)  Lactalis and Nuova Castelli only procure conventional cow milk in Poland, and do 
not procure buffalo nor sheep milk there. In particular, the Parties procure both raw 
and p asteurised cow milk in the country.  
(707)  For conventional cow milk, the market share of the Parties in 2018 for procurement 
of combined raw and pasteurised cow milk in Poland was below [0-5]%, with an 
increme nt of approximate ly [0-5]%.499 
                                                                                                                                                      
492  Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 133.  
493   Parties’ response to Commission’s request for information RFI 22.  
494   Form CO, paragraph 360.  
495   Form CO, paragraph 1060.  
496   Questionna ire to cus tomers (Q2), question 113  
497   Questionna ire to competitors (Q1), question135.1.  
498  Questionna ire to customers (Q2), question 124; Questionnaire to comp etitors (Q1), questions 140 
and 141. Only one customer in Poland was concerned about the overall negative  impact of the 
Transaction, however no substantiated concerns were formulated in relation to Italian -type hard 
cheeses (Questionnaire to customers (2b), question 18).  
499  Form CO, paragraph 436.  
 
109 (708)  For conventional raw co w milk, the market share of the Parties in 2018 for 
procurement of conventional raw cow milk in Poland was below [0 -5]%, with an 
increme nt of [0-5]%.500 
(709)  For conventional pasteurised cow milk, the market share of the Parties in 2018 for 
procurement of convent ional pasteurised cow milk in Poland was [20-30]%, with a 
small increment of [5-10]%.501 
(710)  In light of the above, the Commission’s analysis will focus on the market for 
conventional pasteurised cow milk in Poland.   
(711)  First, the overall market for pasteurised co w milk in Poland is much smaller than 
that of raw milk (approximately 82 times).  
(712)  Second, the Notifying Party used imports of bulk pasteurized milk in Poland (as 
indicated by CLAL)502 as a proxy. Therefore, the Notifying Party submits that this 
underestimate s the total size of the market, given that it is frequent that dairy 
companies buy pasteurized milk that is not imported (but merely traded within one 
and the same Member State). Accordingly, the market shares presented are 
conservative.503  
(713)  Third, in Poland , Lactalis operates a plant in […] , whereas Nuova Castelli runs a 
production plant in […] , which is located in a different part of the country. Nuova 
Castelli also imports milk from Germany for its Polish plant of […].504  
(714)  Fourth, Nuova Castelli procures very limited volumes of milk in Poland, i.e., […]  
in 2018, which represents a [0-5]% market share.505 
(715)  Based on the above considerations and in light of the results of the market 
investigation, the Commission considers that the  concentration does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market as regards the 
plausib le market  for the procurement of conventional cow milk in Poland . 
5.8.6. Other markets 
(716)  The Transaction results in additional affected markets in Po land, and in particular 
in the plausible markets for branded and overall (private label and branded) buffalo 
milk mozzare lla.  
(717)  However, in this market the Transaction results in a negligible increment due to the 
small presence of Nuova Castelli based on it s limited volume of sales or shares, 
and/or the presence of other competitors in this market.  
(718)  On this basis the Commission finds that the T ransaction does not raise serious 
doubts concerning these markets.  
5.9. Sw eden  
(719)  Based on the market share data submitted b y the Parties and in light of the 
methodology used (see Section 5.2), the Transaction gives rise to the following 
horizontally affected plausible mark ets in Sweden : Cow milk mozzarella 
(Section  5.9.1) and Italian -type hard cheese (Section 5.9.2).  
                                                 
500  Form CO, paragraph 436.  
501  Form CO, paragraph 436.  
502  https://www.clal.it/en/index .php?section=quadro_europa&country=PL.  
503  Form CO, paragraph 437.  
504  Form CO, paragraph 174.  
505  Form CO, paragraph 174.  
 
110 5.9.1. Cow milk mozzarella  
(720)  Lactalis supplies mainly branded cow milk mozzarella, whereas Nuova Castelli has 
limited sales of both branded and private label cow milk mozzarella in Sweden. 
While the data available to the Commission indicates that Lactalis had very limited 
recorded sales of private label cow milk mozzarella in Sweden ( […] in 2018), the 
Commission notes that the overlap giving rise to a plausible affected market is in 
the segment for br anded cow milk mozzarella. In light of this, the Commission will 
assess the likely effects of the Transaction on the branded segment and the overall 
market for cow milk mozzare lla in Sweden.   
(A) Branded cow milk mozzarella in Sweden 
(721)  If only the potentially r elevant branded segment was considered, the Parties 
combined Adjusted  market shares would be: [30-40]% (Lactalis: [30-40]%, Nuova 
Castelli: [5-10]%).506 The Commission notes that the low increment of [5-10]% to 
the market shares represents recorded sales of Nuova Castelli of less than […] in 
the entire year 2018 and indicates low significance of Nuova Castelli as a 
competitive constraint in the plausible branded product market for cow milk 
mozzare lla . 
(722)  Second, following the Transaction the Parties will continu e to face effective 
competitive constraints from several credible competitors. B ased on the third -party 
data (see  Table 24), the Commission considers that the supply of branded cow milk 
mozzarella in Sweden is rather fragmented with several strong competitors present 
in this plausible market. The Commission observ es that the leading supplier of 
branded cow milk mozzarella is Michelangelo, followed by Lactalis and Zeta. 
There is also a further company Wernersson that competes in this segment and 
supplies slightly larger volumes than recorded volumes of Nuova Castell i, which 
are the smallest from all branded products suppliers.  
(723)  Third, the small presence of Nuova Castelli on the branded segment can be 
explained by low notoriety of its brands Di Vittorio and Castelli.507 None of the 
customers from Sweden responding in th e market investigation listed Nuova 
Castelli’s brands among the strongest brands for cow milk mozzarella.508  
(724)  Fourth, the Commission observes that although both Lactalis and Nuova Castelli 
are active in the branded segment, they are not the closest competito rs because of 
different strength of their brands. According to the customers from Sweden 
expressing views, the strongest brands for cow milk mozzarella are Michelangelo 
and Lactalis’ brand Galbani.509 The Commission notes that this is directly reflected 
in their market shares.  
(725)  Fifth, the customers from Sweden responding to the market investigation also 
indicated that it is possible to switch to a different supplier for branded cow milk 
mozzarella.510 However, as one customer explained that switching is possibl e “if 
the brands are equally strong” .511 The Commission considers that given different 
                                                 
506  The combined value market shares for branded segment are slightly higher (by less than 5 percentage 
points)  than the volume shares provided by the Parties, and both overestimate the Parties’ position 
compared to panel data.  
507  Form CO, paragraph 347.  
508  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 50.  
509  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 50.  
510  Questionnai re to customers (Q2), question 69.  
511  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 69.1.  
 
111 level of strength of the Parties’ brands, the Transaction will likely not remove an 
effective competitive constraint in this segment.  
(726)  In its assessment of this plausible market,  the Commission also considered the 
arguments presented in the below section as regards the overall market, and in 
particular concerning the market structure, availability of alternative suppliers, and 
the impact of the Transaction.  
(727)  In conclusion an d based on the information available to the Commission and 
provided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the 
plausib le market of branded cow milk  mozzarella in Sweden.       
(B) Overall market for cow milk mozzarella in Sweden 
(728)  On the overall market for cow milk mozzarella in Sweden, based on the market 
share data submitted by the Parties and in light of the methodology described in 
Section 5.2, the combined Adjusted  market shares of  the Parties in volume terms 
in 2018 were [20-30]% (Lactalis : [10-20]%, Nuova Castelli: [5-10]%). 
Table 24 
 
 
(729)  Although, post -Transaction the Parties will have moderate combined market 
shares, the Commission considers that the Transaction does not  raise serious doubts 
for the supply of cow milk mozzarella under any plausible market definition for the 
following reasons. 
(730)  Further to the considerations provided in relation to the branded segment of the 
overall market, the Commission observes that the d emand for branded cow milk 
mozzarella concerns [50 -60]% of the overall market  (see Table 24). The 
                                                 
512  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded an d private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence i n private label products.  Sweden 2018, Cow milk mozzarella512 
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [10-20]% 
Lactalis – private label  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  […] [5-10]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [20-30]% 
Others – private label  […] [40-50]% 
Michelangelo  […] [10-20]% 
Zeta […] [10-20]% 
Wernersson  […] [0-5]% 
Total sales  4014 100%  
Note: Internal branded sales were inserted for Nuova Castelli as there 
was no entry in the panel. The sales were reduced to match the 
unspecified difference in the panel  
 
 
112 Commission notes that the share of the private label s egment has been growing in 
the last three years (from [40-50]% in 2016 to [50 -60]% in 2018).513  
(731)  Given the growing importance of the private label segment in the overall market, 
the Commission considers that it is likely that private label, at least to some extent, 
exerts competitive pressure on the branded segment. The Commission notes that 
Nuova Castelli has only a small presence in the private label segment ( [5-10]% of 
the overall market514) as recorded in Table 24), in which other suppliers cover most 
of the demand. Based on the Parties’ submitted data, the main players in the private 
label segment in Sweden are Bayernland: [ [10-20] of the overall market]%; 
Zott: [5-10]%; Latteria Tinis : [5 -10]%; Granarolo [ 10-20]%; and Villa : [0 -5]%.515  
(732)  In line with the above, the Commission considers that the market for cow milk 
mozzarella is fragmented with several credible players both in the branded and  
private label segments. As one customer in Sweden explained referring to entry 
barriers for cow milk mozzarella: “It is a tough market with strong brands as Zeta 
and Galbani and a lot of price fighting brands” .516 
(733)  The results of the market investigation als o support the finding that customers in 
Sweden have credible suppliers other than the Parties and that it is possible to 
switch suppliers.517 Accordingly, the Commission considers that following the 
Transaction, the m erged entity will continue to face compet itive constraints from  
credible competitors.  
(734)  Overall, none of the customers from Sweden taking part in the market investigation 
expressed concerns related to the Transaction.518 
(735)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubt s as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible market for branded 
cow milk mozzare lla in Sweden.  
(736)  Based on the above considerations and in the light of the results of the market 
investigation, the Commission considers that the Transact ion does not raise serious 
doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market on the overall  market for cow 
milk mozzare lla in Sweden . 
5.9.2. Italian -type hard cheese  
(737)  Lactalis supplies only branded Italian -type hard cheeses, whereas Nuova Castelli 
supplies mainly private label and to some limited extent branded Italian -type hard 
cheeses to retailers in Sweden. In light of this, the Commission will assess the 
likely effects of the Transaction on the branded segment and the overall market for 
the Italian -type hard cheeses in Sweden.  
                                                 
513   Parties’ response to the Commission’s request for information RFI 23.  
514  Based on the market shares submitted by the Parties, the Nuova Castelli’s share in the plausible 
private label segment would be [5 -10]%, while Lactalis would bring an increment of less than  [0-5]%, 
thereby not giving rise to an affected plausible market and indicating very limited presence of the 
Parties.  
515  Parties’ response to Commission’s request for information RFI 22.  
516  Questionnaire to customers (2 ), question 78.1.  
517  Questionnaire to customers (2), questions 70, 73.  
518  Questionnaire to customers (2) , question 123.  
 
113 (A) Branded Italian- type hard cheeses in Sweden  
(738)  First, if only the segment of branded Italian -type hard cheeses was considered, 
based on the Adjusted  market share data, the Parties’ combined Adjusted  market 
shares in volume terms in 2018 would be: [20-30]% (Lactalis: [20 -30]%; Nuova 
Castelli: [0-5]%).519 The low increment of [0 -5]% to the market shares represents 
minimal recorded sales of Nuova Castelli of […]  in the entire year 2018 and also 
indicates low significance of Nuova Castelli as a competitive constraint in the 
plausible branded product market. 
(739)  Second, following the Transaction the Parties will continue to face competitive 
constraints from several credible competitors. In the branded segment in  Sweden, 
Zeta is the leading supplier with […] , which is double than the Parties’ combined 
recorded sales of branded products. The Commission notes that further [5-10]% of 
the overall demand is covered by sales under other brands, which would 
correspond to almost four times larger sales than the recorded volume of Nuova 
Castelli.  
(740)  Third, one customer from Sweden also explained that Sweden is a small market 
and Zeta and Galbani enjoy brand notoriety in Sweden.520 None of the customers 
responding listed Nuova Ca stelli as their supplier. Accordingly, the Commission 
considers that this further supports the finding that Nuova Castelli is not exerting 
an effective competitive constraint for the supply of branded Italian -type hard 
cheese in Sweden.  
(741)  Fourth, competition  for Italian -type hard cheeses, which encompass products 
covered by a Protected Denomination of Origin, is less affected by brand presence 
in view of the predominant role carried by such denominations (Parmigiano 
Reggiano, Grana Padano). Therefore, it make s the assessment of a market only 
consisting of branded product much less significant in this context. In particular, 
the Parties submitted that brands carry little weight as the selling point is mostly 
the PDO  branding. The presence of the PDO  logos on a cheese wheel or bag of 
Parmigiano Reggiano ensures and indicates to the consumer that this cheese is 
produced, and the milk collected, exclusively in the PDO  area, delivering 
recognition and quality perception expected from a brand. In line with this one 
competitor also explained: “The PDO brands enjoy high notoriety that it takes 
away “space” from private brands and indirectly attracts attention of private 
labels” .521 
(742)  In light of the above and in particular given the very limited activities of Nuova 
Castelli , the Commission considers that the Transaction will not substantially 
modify the market structure and will not remove a significant competitive 
constraint for branded Italian -type-hard cheese in Sweden.  
(743)  In its assessment of this plausible market,  the Commission also considered the 
arguments presented in the below section as regards the overall market, and in 
particular concerning the market structure, availability of alternative suppliers, 
limited competitive position of Lactalis and the impact of  the Transaction.  
                                                 
519  The combined value market shares for branded segment are lower than the volume shares provided by 
the Parties, and are in line with the Parties’ position compared to panel data.  
520  Questionnaire to customers (2), Question 113.1.  
521  Courtesy translation from the Italian: “Il valore del brand DOP è talmente forte che toglie "spazio" ai 
Brand privati e, indirettamente, stimola l'attenzion e delle private labels” ; Questionnare to 
competitors (Q1), question 128.1.  
 
114 (744)  In conclusion and based on the information available to the Commission and 
provided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the 
plausible market of branded Italian -type hard cheeses in Sweden.  
(B) Overall market for Italian- type hard cheese in Sweden  
(745)  On the overall market for Italian -type hard cheeses in Sweden, based on the market 
share data submitted by the Parties and in light of the  methodology described in 
Section 5.2, the combined Adjusted  market shares of  the Parties in volume terms 
in 2018 were: [20-30]% (Lactalis: [5-10]%; N uova Castelli: [10-20]%).  
Table 25 
Sweden 2018, Italian -type hard cheese522 
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [5-10]% 
Nuova Castelli – branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  […] [10-20]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [20-30]% 
Others - branded  […] [5-10]% 
Others – private label  […] [40-50]% 
Zeta […] [20-30]% 
Total sales  1689 100%  
Note: Internal branded sales were inserted for Nuova Castelli as there 
was no entry in the panel  
 
(746)  Although, following the Transaction the Parties will have moderate combined 
market shares, the Commission considers that the concentration does not  raise 
serious doubts for the supply of Italian -type hard cheeses in Sweden for the reasons 
already discussed  above and the following reasons. 
(747)  First, as observed in other countries, the market structure for the supply of Italian -
type hard cheeses in Sweden suggests that strong competitive constraints come 
from private label segment, which has approximately [60 -70]% share in the overall 
market in 2018 compared to [40-50]% in 2016.523 The Parties activities do not 
overlap in this segment. Based on the data in Table 25, other private label suppliers 
than Nuova Castelli account for a significant part ( [40-50]%) of the overall demand 
for Italian -type hard cheese in Sweden. The Parties have indicated that following 
companies are active in private label supply in Sweden:  Soresina, Ferrari, Zanetti, 
Wernersson, and Colla.524  
(748)  Second, following the Transaction the Parties will continue to face effective 
competitive constraints from several credible competitors  in branded, as well as in 
private segments. Further to comp etitors listed in paragraphs (739)  - (740) , 
                                                 
522  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
523   Parties’ response to the Commission’s request for information RFI 23.  
524   Parties’ response to the Commission’s request for information RFI 22.  
 
115 and (747) , in the market investigation , a customer from Sweden indicated further 
companies Di Luca and Gennaro Auricchio as its top suppliers for private and 
branded label Italian -type hard cheeses.525 
(749)  Third, Lactalis depends on the supply of Italian -type hard cheeses from other 
manufacturers, su ch as […] or […], for its trading activity.526 While Nuova Castelli 
has limited overall shares of production in relation to PDO cheeses, it competes 
closer with those companies that are also active in production of PDO cheeses 
rather than only trading them.   
(750)  Fourth,  the Commission considers that it cannot be excluded that companies active 
in other national markets could potentially expand their activities in Sweden . In this 
regard, the Parties submitted that competitors in Italian -type hard cheese could 
easily expand and gain market shares in national markets, in particular referring to 
companies such as Zanetti, Ambrosi, Colla, Parmareggio.527 The majority of all 
customers expressing their views in the market investigation suggested that there 
are no significa nt entry or expansion barriers in terms of cost and time.528  The 
Commission notes that in the market investigation the Consortia for Parmigiano 
Reggiano has also indicated that in recent years there indeed have been several new 
entries into the national mar kets of companies who previously only had been active 
in Italy.529  
(751)  Fifth, none of the customers from Sweden expressed concerns related to the 
Transaction.530 As one customer explained: “On the Swedish market, Castelli is a 
very small brand, and will not have any impact on the market situation”.531 
(752)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible market for branded 
Italian -type hard cheese in Sweden.  
(753)  Based on the above considerations and in the light of the results of the market 
investigation and the information submitted by the Parties, the Commission 
considers that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility 
with the interna l market on the overall market for  Italian -type hard cheese in 
Sweden . 
5.9.3. Other markets 
(754)  The Transaction results in additional affected markets in Sweden, and in particular 
in the plausible markets for branded ricotta, mascarpone and Gorgonzola, and the 
overal l (private label and branded) Gorgonzola.  
(755)  However, in this market the Transaction results in a negligible increment due to the 
small presence of Nuova Castelli based on its limited volume of sales or shares, 
and the presence of other competitors in this m arket.  
(756)  On this basis the Commission find s that the Transaction does not raise serious 
doubts concerning these markets.  
                                                 
525  Questionnaire to customers (2) , question 107.  
526   Form CO, paragraph 360.  
527   Form CO, p aragraph 1060.  
528   Questionn aire to customers (Q2), question 113  
529   Questionn aire to competitors (Q1), question 135.1.  
530  Questionnaire to customers (2), question 123.  
531  Questionnaire to customers (2), question 123.1.  
 
116  
5.10. De nmark  
(757)  Based on the market share data submitted by the Parties and in light of the 
methodology used (see Section 5.2), the Transaction gives rise to the following 
horizontally affected plausible markets in Denmark : Cow milk mozzarella 
(Section  5.10.1); mascarpone (Section  5.10.2) and Italian -type hard cheeses 
(Section 5.10.3).  
5.10.1. Cow milk mozzarella  
(758)  Both Lactalis and Nuova Castelli supply branded and private label cow milk 
mozzarella to retailers in Denmark.  
(A) Branded cow milk mozzarella in Denmark  
(759)  For branded cow milk mozzarella  the combined Adjusted  market share of the 
Parties in 2018 in Denmark was [30-40]% (in volume), with Lactalis’ adding an 
increme nt of [5-10]% to Nuova Castelli [20-30]% market share.532 
(760)  First, Lactalis has moderate sales of branded co w milk mozzarella in Denmark 
in 2018 and thus does not enjoy strong brand presence contrary to other markets.  
(761)  Second, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pre ssure from the alternative branded suppliers. According to the data 
provided by the Parties and based on the Commission’s analysis (see Section 5.2), 
in 2018 the competitors for branded mozzarella represented [70-80]% of the 
market.  
(762)  Third, market investigation shows that retailers in Denmark have the ability to 
switch branded mozzarella suppliers. As explained by a retailer: ‘ Due to difference 
of opini on regarding buying prices made us delist Galbani and list Trentin. This 
has been reversed in 2019’ .533 
(763)  Therefore, given the market shares, and given that the increment brought about by 
the transaction is moderate , the plausible branded market will continue having a 
multitude of credible suppliers with established commercia l relations with retailers.  
(764)  The Commission has also considered in its assessment that the arguments presented 
in the below section as regards the overall marke t, and in particular concerning the 
availability of other suppliers, lack of barriers to switching  and the impact of the 
Transaction  with respect to this plausible market also apply to the assessment of 
branded cow milk mozzarella.  
(765)  In view of the above, th e Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the 
branded cow milk mozzarella.  
(B) Private label cow milk mozzarella in Denmark  
(766)  In the private label segment there seem to be a number of viable competitors that 
offer volumes of cow milk mozzarella to retailers in Denmark. Based on the 
Notifying Party’s estimates, there is a significant number of alternative private 
                                                 
532  The combined value market shares for branded segment are slightly higher (by less than 5 percentage 
points) than the volume shares provided by the Parties, but both underestimate the Parties’ position 
compared to panel data.  
533  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 68.1  
 
117 label supplier in  Denmark: Bayerische Milchindustrie eG: [5 -10]%; Spezialitäten -
Käserei Wiegert GmbH: [5 -10]%; Caseificio Villa srl: [5 -10]%; Goldsteig 
Käsereien Bayerwald GmbH: [0 -5]%;  
(767)  The Commission has also considered in its assessment that the arguments presented 
in the below section as regards the overall market, and in particular concerning the 
availability of other suppliers, lack of barriers to switching  and the impact of the 
Transaction  with respect to this plausible market also apply to the assessment of 
private label cow milk mozzarella.  
(768)  In view of the above, the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the 
private label cow milk mozzarella.  
(C) Overall marketfor  cow milk mozza rella in Denmark  
(769)  On the overall market for the supply of branded and private label cow milk 
mozzarella to retailers in Denmark, and in light of the methodology described in 
Section 5.2, the Parties ha d a combined market share in 2018 of [40 -50]%, with an 
increme nt of [10-20]%. 
Table 26 
Denmark 2018, Cow milk mozzarella534 
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis -branded  […] [5-10]% 
Lactalis – private label  […] [5-10]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [20-30]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  […] [5-10]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [40-50]% 
Others - branded  […] [50-60]% 
Others – private label  […] [0-5]% 
Trentin  […] [0-5]% 
Total sales  2508 100%  
Note: Parties private sales higher than the total of private label. 
Reduced proportionally  
 
(770)  Beside the considerations concerning the competitive landscape and shares of the 
market for cow milk mozzarella  in Denmark, the Commission considers that the 
Transaction does not  raise serious doubts for the following reasons. 
(771)  First, the Commission observes that the overall market of cow milk mozzarella in 
Denmark appears to be fragmented with several credible competitors. A Danish 
retailer indicated that it had three viable suppliers of cow milk mozzarella .535 The 
                                                 
534  For the rea sons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
535  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 66.  
 
118 results of the  market investigation indicate that there are further additional 
suppliers of branded and private label cow milk mozzarella in Denmark.536  
(772)  Second, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from several branded and private label suppliers that in 2018 
accounted for [50-60]% of the overall cow milk mozzarella market in Denmark. 
These compet itors are likely to continue exercising competitive pressure on the 
merged entity comparable to the pressure exercised by Nuova Castelli on Lactalis 
pre-Transaction.  As an illustration of this competitive interaction, a Danish 
customer indicated that for a  given tender of private label mozzarella issued 
recently there were four participant s.537 
(773)  Third, the two Danish retailers that expressed a view in the market investigation 
indicated that it was easy to switch to a different supplier of cow milk 
mozzare lla .538  
(774)  Fourth, with regard to the impact of the Transaction and based on the market 
investigation, out of the Danish customers that provided a view , one indicated that 
this will lead to less supplier options. However, t he other two indicated that the 
Transactio n would not have a significant impact in any market for Italian -type 
cheeses.539 
(775)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible markets for branded 
cow milk m ozzarella in Denmark as well as private label cow mozzarella in 
Denmark.  
(776)  Based on the above considerations and in the light of the results of the market 
investigation, the Commission considers that the Transaction does not raise serious 
doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market on the overall market for  cow 
milk mozzare lla in Denmark . 
5.10.2. Mascarpone  
(777)  Both Parties supply branded mascarpone in the Denmark , but only Lactalis 
supplies private label. Based on the information provided by the Notifying Party, 
Nuova Castelli does not produce, but only trades, mascarpone. It purchases […] of 
its requireme nts from […]. 
(A) Branded mascarpone in Denmark  
(778)  Both Lactalis and Nuova Castelli supply branded mascarpone to retailers in 
Denmark.  
(779)  For branded mascarpone  the combined Adjusted  market share of the Parties 
in 2018 in Denmark was [40 -50]% (in volume), with Lactalis adding an increment 
of [10-20]% to Nuova Castelli [20-30]% market share.540 
(780)  First, Lactalis ha d moder ate sales of branded mascarpone in Denmark in 2018 and 
thus does not enjoy strong brand presence contrary to other markets.  
                                                 
536  Questionnaire to custo mers (Q2b), questions 9.  
537  Questionnaire to customers (Q2b), questions 9.  
538  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 69.  
539  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), questions 123; Questionnaire to customers (Q2b), question 18.1.  
540  The combined value market sh ares for branded segment are higher (by less than 7 percentage points) 
than the volume shares provided by the Parties, and both overestimate the Parties’ position compared 
to panel data.  
 
119 (781)  Second, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from the alternative brande d suppliers. According to the data 
provided by the Parties and based on the Commission’s analysis (see Section 5.2), 
in 2018 the competitors for branded mascarpone represented [50 -60]% of the 
market.  
(782)  Third, the merged entity will continue to face significant competitive constraints 
from Trentin which roughly is as big as Nuova Castelli , as well as from other 
branded suppliers which together represent more than [20-30]% of the overall 
market for mascarpone in Denmark .  
(783)  The Commission has also considered in its assessment that the arguments presented 
in the below section as regards the overall market, and in particular concerning the 
availability of other suppliers, the absence of significant barriers to entry and 
expansion, lack of barriers to switching  with respect to this plausible market also 
apply to the assessment of branded mascarpone.  
(784)  In view of the above, the Co mmission finds that the Transaction does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with regard to the 
branded mascarpone.  
(B) Overall market for mascarpone in Denmark  
(785)  Based on the Commission’s methodology, Adjusted  market shares  for the overall 
market for mascarpone in Denmark are as follows.  
Table 27 
Denmark 2018, Mascarpone541 
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [10-20]% 
Lactalis – private label  […] [20-30]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [20-30]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [50-60]% 
Others - branded  […] [20-30]% 
Others – private label  […] [0-5]% 
Trentin  […] [20-30]% 
Total sales  173 100%  
Note: Parties private sales were higher than the total of private label. 
They were reduced proportionally.  
 
(786)  Beside the considerations concerning the competitive landscape and shares of the 
market for mascarpone in Denmark , the Commission considers that the Transaction 
does not  raise serious doubts for the following reasons.  
(787)  First, after the Transaction, the merged entity will continue to face significant 
competitive pressure from other brands as well as from private label competitors.  
                                                 
541  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission report s the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plausible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market shares. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
 
120 (788)  According  to sales data provided by the Parties, Lactalis  in light of the 
methodology descr ibed in Section 5.2 appears  to have higher sales in private label 
than the private label market size as reported by third parties providers. However 
based on the Notifying Party’s estimates, there is a significant number of 
alternative private label supplier in Denmark: Trentin: [20 -30]%; Centrale del Latte 
di Brescia: [ 10-20]%. These competitors are likely to continue exercising 
significant competitive  pressure on the merged entity.  
(789)  Second, with regard to the ability of customers to switch suppliers of mascarpone, 
Danish retailers that responded to the market investigation considered that it was 
easy to switch to different supplier of mascarpone542. Marke t investigation shows 
that retailers in Denmark have the ability to switch branded mascarpone suppliers. 
As explained by a retailer: ‘ We switched from Lactalis to Trentin and back again 
due to difference of opinion regarding buying prices’ .543 
(790)  Therefore, the  branded side of the market will continue having a multitude of 
credible suppliers with established commercia l relations with retailers.  
(791)  Third, the Commission notes that, according to the Notifying Party, to produce 
mascarpone, dairy companies can use the  milk fat either to produce cream or 
mascarpone. Manufacturing mascarpone is a way to add value to the left overs of 
the production of cheese. Dairy companies in Italy have a particular incentive to 
manufacture mascarpone: the market for cream is very smal l in Italy .  
(792)  In view of this, the market investigation confirmed that investment to enter 
mascarpone production are relatively low. According to the Notifying Party 
investments for the production of 1,000 tons of mascarpone would amount to 
roughly EUR 1 mi llion. By way of comparison, the entire Danish market is 
reported by third party data to be 173 tons.  
(793)  This finding was confirmed also by retailers responding to the market 
investigation. With regards to potential barriers to entry when asked if there are any 
significant barriers to the entry or expansion for mascarpone in terms of costs and 
time none of the Danish retailers replied that there were barriers to entry.544 
(794)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its  compatibility with the internal market on the plausible market for branded 
mascarpone in Denmark.  
(795)  Based on the above considerations and in the light of the results of the market 
investigation, the Commission considers that the Transaction does not raise serious 
doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market on the overall market for  
mascarpone  in Denmark . 
5.10.3. Italian -type h ard cheese  
(796)  Lactalis supplies only branded Italian -type hard cheese in Denmark, whereas 
Nuova Castelli supplies mainly branded and to some limited extent private label 
Italian -type hard cheeses to retailers in Denmark. Given that the main overlap is in 
the supply of branded Italian -type hard cheese, the Commission will assess the 
effects of the Transaction in relation to t he branded segment and the overall 
market.  
                                                 
542  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 92.  
543  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 90.1.  
544  Questionnaire to customers  (Q2), question 96.  
 
121 (A) Branded Italian- type hard cheese in Denmark  
(797)  First, if only the segment of branded Italian -type hard cheese was considered, 
based on the Commission’s Adjusted  market shares methodology, the Parties’ 
combined market  shares in volume terms in 2018 would be just above the 
threshold: [20-30]% (Lactalis: [0 -5]%; Nuova Castelli: [10-20]%).545 The low 
increment of [0 -5]% to the market shares represents minimal recorded sales of 
Lactalis of […] in the entire year 2018 and als o indicates low significance of 
Lactalis as a competitive constraint in the plausible branded product market.  
(798)  Second, several credible competitors remain  for the supply of branded Italian -type 
hard cheese , which would continue to exert competitive pressure  on the Parties 
following the Transaction  see (see Table 28). As recorded by this third- party data, 
Lactalis supplies several times smaller quantities than the number 1 supplier 
Zanetti and number 2 supplier Ambrosi. The results of the market investigation 
support the finding that Zanetti is an important competitive force.546 In addition, 
Italian -type cheese manufacturers Granarolo and Trentin were mention ed as 
alternative suppliers.547  
(799)  Third,  competition for Italian -type hard cheeses, which encompass products 
covered by a Protected Denomination of Origin, is less affected by brand presence 
in view of the predominant role carried by such denominations (Parmi giano 
Reggiano, Grana Padano). Therefore, it makes the assessment of a market only 
consisting of branded product much less significant in this context. In particular, 
the Parties submitted that brands carry little weight as the selling point is mostly 
the PDO  branding. The presence of the PDO  logos on a cheese wheel or bag of 
Parmigiano Reggiano ensures and indicates to the consumer that this cheese is 
produced, and the milk collected, exclusively in the PDO  area, delivering 
recognition and quality percepti on expected from a brand. In line with this one 
competitor also explained: “The PDO brands enjoy high notoriety that it takes 
away “space” from private brands and indirectly attracts attention of private 
labels” .548 
(800)  In light of the above and in particular gi ven the very limited activities of Lactalis, 
the Commission considers that the Transaction will not substantially modify the 
market structure and will not remove a significant competitive constraint for 
branded Italian -type hard cheese in Denmark.  
(801)  In its a ssessment of this market, the Commission also considered the arguments 
presented in the below section as regards the overall market, and in particular 
concerning the market structure, availability of alternative suppliers, absence of 
significant barriers t o entry and expansion, and the limited competitive position of 
Lactalis.  
(802)  In conclusion and based on the information available to the Commission and 
provided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise 
                                                 
545  The combined value market shares for branded segment are in line with the volume shares provided 
by the Parties, and are also in line with the Parties’ position compared to panel data.  
546  Questionna ire to customers (Q2), question 107 , where it is considered as top 1 supplier for Italian -
type hard cheese by a customer from Denmark  ex pressing the views.  
547   Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 107.  
548  Courtesy translation from Italian: “Il valore del brand PDO è talmente forte che toglie "spazio"  ai 
Brand privati e, indirettamente, stimola l'attenzione delle private labels” ; Questionnaire to customers 
(Q1), question 128.1.  
 
122 serious doubts as to its compa tibility with the internal market with regard to the 
plausible market of branded Italian -type hard cheeses in Denmark.  
(B) Overall market for Italian- type hard cheese in Denmark  
(803)  On the overall market for Italian -type hard cheeses in Denmark, based on the 
mark et share data submitted by the Parties and in light of the methodology 
described in Section 5.2 (see Table 28), the combined market shares of the Parties 
in volume terms in 2018 were: [20-30]% (Lactalis: [0-5]%; Nuova 
Castelli:  [10-20]%). 
Table 28 
Denmark 2018, Italian -type hard cheeses549 
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [10-20]% 
Nuova Castelli – private label  […] [0-5]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [20-30]% 
Others - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Others – private label  […] [10-20]% 
Zanetti  […] [40-50]% 
Ambrosi  […] [10-20]% 
Total sales  1049 100%  
 
(804)  Since post -Transaction the Parties will have moderate combined market shares, the 
Commission considers that the Transaction does not  raise serious doubts for the 
supply of Italian -type hard cheeses in Denmark under any plausible market 
definitio n  for the reasons set out above, and also for the following reasons.  
(805)  First, given that the Transaction brings about a small increment in market share 
([0-5]%), the Commission considers that the concentration will not substantially 
modify the market structure for the  supply of Italian -type hard cheese in Denmark.  
(806)  Second, overall the large majority of customers in the market investigation 
indicated that it was possible to switch suppliers of Italian -type hard cheese.550 One 
Danish customer also explained that it is poss ible to switch suppliers for Italian -
type hard cheeses : “I haven't tried but I suppose that it will be quite easy.” 551  
(807)  Third, Lactalis depends on the supply from other manufacturers, such as […] or 
[…], for its trading activity of Italian -type hard cheeses . While Nuova Castelli has 
limited overall shares of production in relation to PDO cheeses, it competes closer 
with those companies that are also active in production of PDO cheeses rather than 
only trading them.   
                                                 
549  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plau sible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market sha res. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
550   Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 109.  
551  Questionnaire Q2, question 109.1.  
 
123 (808)  Fourth, in contrast to other countries, the demand for Italian -type hard cheeses  in 
Denmark concerns primarily branded products, while private label covers 
approximately [30-40]% of the overall demand. Nonetheless, based on the Parties’ 
submitted data, the Commission observes the same, albeit not to  the same extent, 
trend in Denmark of increasing share of private label segment (from [5-10]% 
in 2016 to [10 -20]% in 2018). Based on the data provided by the Parties, Zanetti 
and Ambrosi are also active in the private label segment in Denmark.552 Given the 
very limited activities of Nuova Catelli in this segment  (the recorded sales volumes 
of […], see Table 28), the Commission considers that it cannot be excluded that 
private label suppliers, at least to some extent, would continue to exert competitive 
pressure on the branded products su ppliers.  
(809)  Fifth, the Commission considers that it cannot be excluded that companies active in 
other national markets could potentially expand their activities in Denmark . In this 
regard, the Parties submitted that competitors in Italian -type hard cheese co uld 
easily expand and gain market shares in national markets, in particular referring to 
companies such as Zanetti, Ambrosi, Colla, Parmareggio.553 The majority of all 
customers expressing their views in the market investigation suggested that there 
are no s ignificant entry or expansion barriers in terms of cost and time.554  The 
Commission notes that in the market investigation the Consortia for Parmigiano 
Reggiano has also indicated that in recent years there indeed have been several new 
entries into the nati onal markets of companies who previously only had been active 
in Italy.555  
(810)  Sixth, considering the impact of the Transaction, from all Danish customers that 
provided a view in the market investigation one indicated that the Transaction may 
lead to less suppl ier options. This customer has, however, also indicated that it is 
“confident that it can procure the desired quantities and quality from other 
suppliers”, as well as that it is  “not concerned about logistics and distribution 
regarding other suppliers”.556 The other two customers expressing views indicated 
that the Transaction would not have a significant impact in any market for Italian -
type cheeses.557 
(811)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility w ith the internal market on the plausible market for branded 
Italian -type hard cheeses in Denmark.  
(812)  Based on the above considerations and in the light of the results of the market 
investigation, the Commission considers that the Transaction does not raise se rious 
doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market on the overall market for  
Italian -type hard cheese in Denmark . 
5.10.4. Other markets 
(813)  The Transaction results in additional affected markets in Denmark, and in 
particular in the plausible markets for bra nded buffalo milk mozzarella, ricotta, 
mascarpone and Gorgonzola, and for the overall (private label and branded) buffalo 
milk mozzarella, overall ricotta and overall Gorgonzola markets.  
                                                 
552   Parties’ response to Commission’s request for information RFI 22.  
553   Form CO,  paragraph 1060.  
554   Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 113  
555   Questionnaire to competitors (Q1), question 135.1.  
556  Non-confidential version of minutes of a call with a customer, 2 August 2019.  
557  Questionnaire to customers (Q2), question 123; Que stionnaire to customers (Q2b), question 18.1.  
 
124 (814)  However, in all these markets the Transaction results in a negligibl e increment due 
to the small presence of Nuova Castelli based on its limited sales volume and the 
presence of other competitors in these markets.  
(815)  On this basis the Commission find s that the Transaction does not raise serious 
doubts concerning these market s.  
5.11. Portugal  
(816)  Based on the market share data submitted by the Parties and in light of the 
methodology used by the Commission (see Section 5.2), the Tr ansaction gives rise 
to an affected market in Portugal in cow milk mozzarella.  
5.11.1. Cow milk mozzarella  
(817)  Lactalis supplies branded cow milk mozzarella to retailers in Portugal. Conversely, 
Nuova Castelli supplies very small volumes of branded, as well as privat e label 
cow milk mozzare lla.  
(A) Branded cow milk mozzarella in Portugal  
(818)  For branded cow milk mozzarella, first the combined Adjusted market shares of the 
Parties is [70 -80]%, with a moderate increment of [5-10]%.558 The Transaction 
results in an affected market only because of Lactalis’ large market presence with 
branded products, sold under Galbani brand.559  
(819)  Second, this is consistent with the fact that, in Portugal, Nuova Castelli does not 
enjoy strong brand presenc e in cow milk mozzarella, but focuses primarily on 
private label supplies of this product to retailers.  
(820)  Third, several other credible competitors of Lactalis are active in the branded 
segment, for instance Zanetti, Solo Italia, Lago Maggiore and Valgrande . Overall, 
the Parties’ competitors in a plausible branded market have a solid presence in 
Portugal with competitive brands.  
(821)  The market investigation supports the finding that a number of credible competitors 
can and do offer volumes of branded cow milk m ozzarella to retailers in Portugal 
and compete in the negotiations organised by retailers. Data collected from retailers 
show that they have sourced from one or more supp liers other than the Parties 
in 2018.560 
(822)  Therefore, the branded segment of the market wi ll continue having a reasonable 
number of credible suppliers with established commercial relations with retailers in 
Portugal.  
(823)  In its assessment of this plausible market, t he Commission has also considered in 
its assessment the arguments presented in the below section as regards the overall 
market, and in particular concerning the availability of other suppliers and the 
impact of the Transaction that also apply to the assessment of branded cow milk 
mozzare lla.  
                                                 
558  The combined value market shares for branded segment are slightly higher (by less than 5 percentage 
points) than the volume shares provided by the Parties, and both overestimate the Parties’ position 
compare d to panel data.  
559  Parties’ response to Commission’s request for information RFI 7, question 1.  
560  Questionnaire to customers (Q2c), question 3.  
 
125 (824)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction 
does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with 
regard to t he plausib le market of branded cow milk mozzare lla in Portugal.  
(B) Overall market for cow milk mozzarella in Portugal  
(825)  On the overall market for branded and private label cow milk mozzarella in 
Portugal, the combined Adjusted market shares of the parties is [30-40]%. (see 
Table 29 below). 
Table 29 
Portugal 2018, Cow milk mozzarella561 – Adjusted market shares  
Competitor  Sales, tons  Marke t Share  
Lactalis - branded  […] [10-20]% 
Nuova Castelli - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Nuova Castelli – private  label […] [10-20]% 
Combined Parties PL + B  […] [30-40]% 
Others - branded  […] [0-5]% 
Others – private label  […] [50-60]% 
Solo Italia  […] [0-5]% 
Lago Maggiore  […] [0-5]% 
Granarolo  […] [0-5]% 
Negrini  […] [0-5]% 
Total sales  962 100%  
 
(826)  The Commission observes that the overall market for cow milk mozzarella in 
Portugal appears to be fragmented , with several active players both in the branded 
and private label.  
(827)  Beside the considerations concerning the structure and shares of the cow milk 
mozzarella market, the Commission considers that the Transaction does not  raise 
serious doubts for the following reasons.  
(828)  First, the Commission finds, based on the market investigation, that barriers to 
entry are not high for suppliers of cow milk mozzarella in Portugal, and that these 
barriers are mainly linked to the presence of relationships with local distri butors.562 
(829)  Second, as regards expansion, the market investigation suggested that a number of 
suppliers active in Italy and Germany could increase supply in the short term 
without incurring significant cost.  
(830)  Third , as regards the impact of the Transaction, the vast majority of responsive 
retailers in Portugal believe that the Transaction will have no impact on their 
companies.563   
                                                 
561  For the reasons ex plained in Section 5.2.2., the Commission reports the Adjusted  market shares for 
the plau sible market of branded goods, as well as for the branded and private label goods market 
combined. As detailed panel data for private label is unavailable, the separate shares for private label 
are presented on the basis of the Notifying Party’s market sha res. They are likely to overestimate the 
Parties’ presence in private label products.  
562   Questionnaire to customers (Q2c), question s 11 and 12 . 
563  Questionnaire to customers (Q2c), question 18.2.  
 
126 (831)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on  the plausible market for branded 
cow milk mozzare lla in Portugal.  
(832)  Based on the above considerations and in the light of the results of the market 
investigation, the Commission considers that the concentration does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compat ibility with the internal market on the overall market 
for cow milk mozzarella  in Portugal . 
5.11.2. Other markets 
(833)  The Transaction results in additional affected markets in Portugal, and in particular 
in the plausible markets for branded buffalo milk mozzarella, ri cotta and 
mascarpone; for private label Gorgonzola and for the overall (branded and private 
label) ricotta, mascarpone, Gorgonzola and Italian -type hard cheeses .  
(834)  However, in all these markets the Transaction results in a negligible increment due 
to the small presence of Nuova Castelli based on its limited volume of sales or 
shares, and/or the presence of other competitors in these markets.  
(835)  On this basis the Commis sion finds that the T ransaction does not raise serious 
doubts concerning these markets.  
5.12. Finland 
(836)  Based on the market share data submitted by the Parties and in light of the 
methodology used (see Section 5.2), the Transaction gives rise to horizontally 
affected plausible market in Finland for cow milk mozzarella (Section 5.12.1)  and 
other affected markets (Section 5.12.2) . 
5.12.1. Cow milk mozzarella  
(837)  Lactalis supplies only branded cow milk mozzarella, whereas Nuova Castelli 
supplies mainly private label and branded cow milk mozzarella to retailers in 
Finland. The Commission notes that the main overlap giving rise to an affected 
market is in the segment for branded cow milk mozzarella. In light of this, the 
Commission will assess the l ikely effects of the Transaction on the branded 
segment and the overall market for the cow milk mozzarella in Finland.  
(838)  The Commission notes that the Parties did not provide third- party panel data for the 
year 2018 to substantiate their estimates for the to tal market size and their market 
shares. Therefore, for this part, the Commission will rely on the volume market 
shares data as submitted and substantiated by the Parties.  
(A) Branded cow milk mozzarella in Finland 
(839)  For branded cow milk mozzarella, the Parties combined market shares would be 
[40-50]% (Lactalis: [20-30]%, Nuova Castelli: [20-30]%).564  
(840)  First, considering panel data from 2017 provided by the Parties there were several 
competitors with higher market shares than Nuova Castelli , such as Granarolo or 
Juustoportti .565 
                                                 
564  The combined value market shares for branded segment are  slightly higher (by less than 5 percentage 
points) than the volume shares provided by the Parties.  
565   Parties’ response to the Commission’s request for information RFI 20, Annex  RFI 20 -1 - Panel data.  
 
127 (841)  Second, the market investigation has indicated the presence of a significant number 
of alternatives for retailers in relation to the supply of branded cow milk mozzarella 
in Finland.566  
(842)  In its assessment of this plausible market , the Commission has also considered in 
its assessment the arguments presented in the below section as regards the overall 
market, and in particular concerning the availability of other suppliers and the 
impact of the Transaction that also apply to the asses sment of branded cow milk 
mozzare lla.  
(843)  In conclusion, in light of the above and based on the information available to the 
Commission and provided by Parties, the Commission finds that the Transaction 
does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility wit h the internal market with 
regard to the plausible market of branded  cow milk mozzare lla in Finland.  
(B) Overall market for cow milk mozzarella in Finland  
(844)  For the overall market for cow milk mozzarella in Finland, based on the market 
shares data submitted by  the Parties, their combined market share in 2018 does not 
amount to an affected market ( [10-20]% in volume, Lactalis: [5-10]% and ; Nuova 
Castelli: [10-20]%), However, for the sake of completeness, the Commission will 
assess this plausible overall market.  
(845)  The Commission considers that the Transaction does not  raise serious doubts for 
the supply of cow milk mozzarella under any plausible market definition for the 
following reasons.  
(846)  First, according to the data submitted by the Parties, following the Transa ction the 
merged entity will continue to face credible competitive constraints from the 
remaining competitors.  Based on the Notifying Party’s estimates , there appears to 
be a significant number of alternative suppliers for private label cow milk 
mozzarella  in Finland: Bayerische Milchindustrie: [ 30-40]% and Pirkka: [20 -30]%. 
These competitors, in addition to the competitors active  in branded products are 
likely to continue exercising significant competitive pressure on the merged entity.  
(847)  Second, the Commiss ion observes that, according to 2017 panel data, the demand 
for private label cow milk mozzarella represented [ 60-70]% of the overall market. 
Given that private label accounts for an important share of the overall market and 
the very limited activities of one of the Parties (Nuova Castelli: [5-10]% market 
share  in 2017) on that segment, the Commission considers that it cannot be 
excluded that other private label suppliers, at least to some extent, would continue 
to exert competitive pressure on branded products suppliers. 
(848)  Third, a Finish retailer that expressed its views during the market investigation 
indicated that the T ransaction will have no impact on competition in relation to the 
supply of Italian -type cheese. 567 
(849)  Finally, the Commission found that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market on the plausible market for branded 
cow milk mozzare lla in Finland.  
(850)  In light of the above and based on the information available to the Commission and 
provided by Parties, the Commission considers that the Transaction does not  raise 
                                                 
566  Questionnaire to customers (Q2c), question 3.  
567  Questionnaire to customers (Q2c), question 18.1.  
 
128 serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market on the overall market 
for cow milk mozzarella in Finland  
5.12.2. Other markets 
(851)  The Transaction results in additional affected markets in Finland, and in particular 
in the plausible markets for branded buffalo milk mozzarella, ricotta, mascarpone 
and Italian -type hard cheese.  
(852)  However, in al l these markets the Transaction results in a negligible increment due 
to the small presence of Nuova Castelli based on its limited volume of sales or 
shares, and the presence of other competitors in these markets.  
(853)  On this basis the Commission finds that th e Transaction does not raise serious 
doubts concerning these markets.  
5.13. Belgium  
(854)  The Transaction results in additional affected markets in Belgium, and in particular 
in the plausible markets for the overall (private label and branded) cow milk 
mozzarella, o verall buffalo milk mozzarella, overall ricotta and overall mascarpone 
markets.  
(855)  However, in all these markets the Transaction results in a negligible increment due 
to the small presence of Nuova Castelli, which bring a very limited increment to 
Lactalis’ shares, and the presence of other competitors in these markets.  
(856)  On this basis the Commission finds that the T ransaction does not raise serious 
doubts concerning these markets.  
5.14. The Netherlands  
(857)  The Transaction results in additional affected markets in The Netherlands, and in 
particular in the plausible markets for branded cow milk mozzarella, buffalo milk 
mozzarella, ricotta and mascarpone, and for the overall (branded and private label) 
cow milk mozzarella, buffalo milk mozzarella, ricotta and mascarpone.  
(858)  However, in all these markets the Transaction results in a negligible increment due 
to the small presence of Nuova Castelli based on its limited volume of sales or 
shares and the presence of other competitors in these markets.  
(859)  On this basis the Commission  finds that the T ransaction does not raise serious 
doubts concerning these markets.  
5.15. Spain  
(860)  The Transaction results in additional affected markets in Spain, and in particular in 
the plausible markets for branded cow milk mozzarella, buffalo milk mozzarella 
and mascarpone, and for the overall (branded and private label) cow milk 
mozzarella and mascarpone.  
(861)  However, in all these markets the Transaction results in a negligible increment due 
to the small presence of Nuova Castelli, bringing a very limited increm ent to 
Lactalis’ shares, and the presence of other competitors in these markets.  
(862)  On this basis the Commission finds that the Transaction does not raise serious 
doubts concerning these markets.  
 
129 6. CONCLUSION  
(863)  For the above reasons, the European Commission has d ecided not to oppose the 
notified operation and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This 
Decision is adopted in application of Article 6(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation  and 
Article 57 of the EEA Agreement .  
For the Commission 
 
 
(Signed)  
Margrethe VE STAGER  
Executive Vice -President