Commission européenne, DG COMP MERGER REGISTRY, 1049 Bruxelles, BELGIQUE  
Europese Commissie, DG COMP MERGER REGISTRY, 1049 Brussel,   BELGIË  
 
Tel: +32 229 -91111. Fax: +32 229 -64301. E -mail: COMP -MERGER -REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu . 
 EUROPEAN COMMISSION  
Brussels, 29.03.2019  
C(2019 ) 2642 final  
PUBLIC VERSION  
 
To the notifying part ies 
Subject : Case M. 9185 – LG ELECTRONICS / LUFTHANSA TECHNIK / JV  
Commission decision pursuant to Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation 
No 139/20041 and Article 57 of the Agreement on the European 
Economic Area2 
Dear Sir or Madam,  
1. INTRODUCTION  
(1) On 22 February 2019 , the European Commission received notification of a proposed 
concentration pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger Regulation by which LG Electronics 
Inc. ("LG Electronics ") and Lufthansa Technik AG (" Lufthansa Technik ") would 
acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) and 3(4) of the Merger Regulation joint 
control of a joint venture (the "JV"). LG Electronics and Lufthansa Technik  are 
collectively referred to as the "Parties".   
                                                 
1  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the 'Merger Regulation '). With effect from 1 December 2009,  the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union ( 'TFEU ') has introduced certain changes, such as the replacement of  
'Community ' by 'Union ' and 'common market ' by 'internal market '. The terminology of the TFEU will be 
used throughout this decision.  
2  OJ L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3 (the 'EEA Agreement').  In the published version of this decision, 
some information has been omitted  
pursuant to Article 17(2) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 concerning 
non-disclosure of business secrets and 
other  confidential information. The 
omissions are shown thus […]. Where 
possible the information omitted has been 
replaced by ranges of figu res or a general 
description.  
2 (2) This no tification concerns the following undertakings:  
— LG Electronics (South Korea),  
— Lufthansa Technik  (Germany),  
— newly created joint venture ("JV", Germany) . 
(3) LG Electronics and Lufthansa Technik will acquire  within the meaning of 
Article  3(1)(b) and 3(4) of the Merger Regulation  joint control of the JV.  
(4) The concentration is accomplished by way of a newly created joint venture.  
2. THE PARTIES  
(5) The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:  
— for LG Electronics : production and supply of electronics,  mobile communication 
devices and home appliances,  
— for Lufthansa Technik : provision of maintenance, repair and overhaul services for 
aircraft, engines and components, and the development, design and supply of 
cabin management and in -flight entertainment systems as well as CMS and IFE 
components,  
— for the JV : design, production, maintenance and sale of soft - and hardware for 
aircraft cabins, electronic equipment as well as lighting, sensor, camera and 
display systems (including in -flight entertainment, [… ], cabin management and 
[…] systems)  for commercial aircraft.  
3. THE CONCENTRATION  
(6) The creation of the JV constitutes a concentra tion in the meaning of Articles  3(1)(b) 
and 3(4) of the Merger Regulation.   
3.1. Joint control  
(7) Pursuant to a joint venture agreement da ted 23 October 2018, LG Electronics and 
Lufthansa Technik will incorporate the JV by establishing three joint venture 
companies ("JVCos"). Lufthansa Technik will hold 51% and LG Electronics will hold 
49% of the registered share capital in two of these JVCo s. […]3. 
(8) Each of the three JVCos will have its own management board, with LG Electronics 
and Lufthansa Technik each nominating one managing director for each of the JVCos. 
The two managing directors of each JVCo will be jointly responsible for the overall 
management of the respective JVCo and every decision would have to be taken 
unanimously by both directors. […]4.  
                                                 
3  Form CO, paragraph 30.  
4  Form CO, paragraphs 31 -32. 
3 (9) Where a decision that requires unanimity  cannot be reached, a deadlock mechanism 
[applies] . No shareholder has a casting vote5. 
(10) A number of matters are subject to prior shareholder approval. These include the usual 
minority protection rights, as well as strategic rights relating to senior management 
appointments and removals, and the approval of the annual business plan. […]6.  
(11) For these reasons, decisions cannot be taken by one parent company without the 
consent of the other parent company. The JV will therefore be jointly controlled by 
Lufthansa Technik and LG Electronics.  
3.2. Full functionality  
(12) The concentration will lead to the creation of a full function joint venture.  
(13) The JV will have dedicated management, workforce and assets to run its activities.7 It 
will have a long -lasting and autonomous presence on the market going beyond a 
specific function for the Parties8 and will main tain an arm’s length commercial 
relationship with them.9  
4. EU DIMENSION  
(14) The undertakings concerned have a combined aggregate world -wide turnover of more 
than EUR 5 000 million10. Each of them has a n EU-wide turnover in excess of EUR 
250 million, but they do not achieve more than two -thirds of their aggregate EU-wide 
turnover within one and the same Member State. The notified operation therefore has 
an EU dimension.  
5. RELEVANT MARKETS  
5.1. Introduction  
(15) The Transaction concerns the creation of a green -field joint vent ure for design, 
development and supply of Cabin Management System s (CMS) and In -flight 
entertainment ( IFE) systems for commercial aircrafts.11 CMS is an integrated system 
of controls for the aircraft cabin, such as temperature, lights, water level, passenge r 
announcements , and other cabin crew functions. An IFE system provides 
entertainment to aircraft passengers during the flight and may include displays, video 
on demand service, moving –map systems, in -flight games,  teleconference equipment, 
and visual content rights.  
                                                 
5  Form CO, paragraph 36.  
6  Form CO, paragraph 39.  
7  Form CO, paragraph 40.  
8  Form CO, paragraph 41.  
9  Form CO, paragraphs 42 -44.  
10  Turnover calculated in accordance with Article 5 of the Merger Regulat ion.  
11  […] 
4 (16) In the aviation industry, a distinction between supplier -furnished equipment (SFE) and 
buyer -furnished equipment (BFE) is traditionally made in the procurement of aircraft 
systems (avionics and non -avionics products).12  
(17) SFE products are selected  and purchased  by the  airframe OEMs at the design and 
development phase of an aircraft platform based on the supplier's technical 
compliance (the airframe OEM defining the technical requirements), cost, schedule 
and risk . 
(18) BFE products are selected and purchased by the airlines  after acquiring the aircraft.  
Whilst BFE suppliers need to be certified by the airframe OEM , the airline selects the 
BFE equipment supplier, negotiates and buys directly from the BFE supplie r. 
(19) As regards the procurement of CMS , which is a SFE , airframe OEMs , such as Airbus 
and Boeing , have major influence over the choice and functionalities of the system  to 
be provided with the aircraft .13 Accordin gly, it is the airfr ame OEM that buys CMS 
directl y from CMS manufacturers (or has in -house production)14 and t hen delivers t he 
system integrated with the air craft to the customer . However, an ai rline may cooperat e 
with t he airfr ame OEM  to have a  limited level of CMS customization to match their 
individual needs  (e.g. to adapt CMS to specific cabin layout  and service procedures) .15 
(20) Conversely, as regards the procurement of an IFE system , which is a BFE,  the 
customer of an aircraft , e.g. an airline,  chooses the supplier of the IFE system and 
customises it to  its needs (such as  cabin configuration, features, price, and 
delivery/installation timeframe) separately from the purchase of the aircraft from the 
airframe OEM.16 IFE systems have a life cycle of typically 10 -15 years .17 A change of 
a system on an operating aircraft requires a high capital investment, concerns complex 
certification and time -consuming installation, with the aircraft being offline for weeks 
or even months whilst installation is ongoing.18 Accordingly , the IFE system is 
usually changed only during a complete cabin retrofit.  
(21) Lufthansa Technik designs, produces and supplies CMS and IFE systems to customers 
operating business jets. Through the IDAIR, a joint venture between Panasonic and 
Lufthansa Technik, Lufthansa Technik supp lies CMS and IFE systems for use in the 
(V)VIP segment .  
(22) Lufthansa Technik is active in other non -avionics aerospace products, and in 
particular components for IFE system,  such as wireless access points  (WAP) . 
Lufthansa Technik is also active to a very lim ited extent in cabin lighting systems19, 
while one of the activities of the JV will concern the electric cabin lighting systems. 
Since this potential overlap does not give rise to an affected market, the Commission 
will not discuss it  further.  
                                                 
12  M.8305 – Rockwell Collins/BE Aerospace , recital 36 et seq.  
13  Responses to RFI 4, question 7b, and RFI 8, question 3c.  
14  Form CO, paragraph 102; Response to RFI 4, question 7b.  
15  M.8305 – Rockwell Collins/BE Aerospace , recital 40; response  to Commission’s request for information 
of 15 March 2019 by a market participant . 
16  Form CO, paragraphs 79 -80, see also Commission decision in case M .8305 – Rockwell Collins/BE 
Aerospace , recital  39. 
17  Minutes of a call of 1 March 2019 with a ma rket participant.  
18  Minutes of a call of 1 March 2019 with a market participant.  
19  Lufthansa  Technik has a market share of [0 -5]% on the worldwide market for cabin lighting systems.  
5 (23) There  are som e other components that can potentially be used for IFE/CMS systems 
that the JV will produce and supply, however, with the exception of one component –
WAP , no affected markets would arise.20  
5.2. Relevant product market definition  
5.2.1.  In-flight entertainment (IFE) systems  and Cabin management system s (CMS)  
(24) In previous cases, the Commission considered that both IFE systems and CMS  belong 
to non-avionics aerospace products category.21 The Commission considered these two 
systems separately and in both cases left the mar ket definition open.22  
(25) In a previous case ,23 the Commission explained that CMS generally cover utility 
control of various cabin environmental functions such as temperature , lighting, in -
flight entertainment, galley services, wastewater, window shades as wel l as access to 
long-range satellite communications and internet connectivity.  
(26) In the Part ies’ view, the relevant market for the development and supply of the IFE 
and CMS  should be further segmented by customer type:  (i) commercial aircraft , (ii) 
business j ets, and (iii) ( V)VIP jets . The Parties note that the Commission has not 
previously considered the latter category  in relation to non -avionics aerospace 
products.  The Parties submit that , for commercial aircraft, IFE and CMS are procured 
separately, howeve r, for business jets and, in particular, for (V)VIP jets, these two 
systems are offered as a single integrated and largely customised system. The Parties 
argue that from the demand -side and supply -side perspective, the markets could 
potentially be segmented as follows:  IFE systems for commercial aircrafts ; CMS for 
commercial aircrafts; IFE and CMS as an integrated solution for business jets; and 
IFE and CMS as an integrated solution for (V)VIP jets.  More generally, the Notifying 
Parties consider tha t the precise definition of the markets may be left open, as the 
Transaction does not give rise to competition concerns under any possible market 
definition.  
(27) The results of the market investigation provided some indications that CMS and IFE 
products differ  depending on whether the system is developed for a commercial 
aircraft, business jet or (V)VIP jets.24  
(28) First, CMS and IFE systems for commercial aircraft may not be substitutable with the 
CMS/ IFE systems for business jets  and (V)VIP jets  because of differ ent technical 
requirements (e.g. aircraft’s architecture) and different functionalities25 (e.g., CMS 
features for customized window shades or zone temperature controls in the (V)VIP 
jets would not be available in a commercial aircraft) .  
                                                 
20  LG Electronics intends to supply display modules to the JV, howeve r, currently it has no activities in 
relation to suppliers of IFE/CMS; as regards other components for the IFE, the market share of Lufthansa 
Technik is [0-5]% (Form CO, paragraph 173 , response to RFI 8, question 2 ). 
21  Commission decisions in case s M.1601 – Allied Signal/Honeywell , recital 56; M.2220 – General 
Electric/Honeywell , recital s 268 and  275; M.8305 – Rockwell Collins/BE Aerospace . 
22  Commission decision in case M.8305 – Rockwell Collins/BE Aerospace . 
23  See Commission decision in case M.83 05 – Rockwell Collins/BE Aerospace . 
24  Minutes of a call of 4 March 2019 with a market participant, minutes of a call of 11 March 2019 with 
another market participant, Response to the Commission’s request for information  of 12 March 2019  by a 
market partic ipant.  
25  Response to the Commission’s request for information of 12 March 2019 by a market participant; minutes 
of a call of 11 March 2019 with another market participant.  
6 (29) Second, s ome respon dents to the market investigation also explained that certification 
requirements for CMS and IFE systems differ across the sectors, with the most 
stringent certification requirements applicable to the systems for commercial 
aircraft.26 For example,  an IFE s ystem developed for a business jet may not be 
transferrable to a commercial aircraft  because of certification requirements.27  
(30) Third , scalability of a system may also present a challenge: “ if the system is only 
capable to support 20 seats, it may be difficult to scale the system up to fit more than 
100 seats. ”28 Another respondent to the market investigation has further explained the 
differences in competition conditions across the sectors: “ The more screens, the 
higher system and servers’ capacity is needed. Second, in commercial aircrafts the 
back -seat screens concern a big up -front cost. ”29  
(31) Fourth , in line with the Notifying Parties’ view, some  respondents note d that in 
business jets and ( V)VIP jets, suppliers typically offer IFE systems  and CMS as a n 
integrated solution, while in commercial aircraft the two systems are sourced  
separately.30 Furthermore, the market investigation ha s shown  that different suppliers 
for CMS and IFE systems are active in each of  the segments.31 
(32) The Commission also considere d whether CMS and IFE systems for commercial 
aircraft should be further segmented by type of a class (firs t, business, and coach 
classes). The Notifying Parties submitted that such segmentation is not warranted 
because IFE systems for commercial aircraft a re purchased as a single package and 
that the system is connected to the same server and use the same central power supply, 
with only the components visible to the passenger being possibly different (e.g. the 
size of the screen).32 The respondents to the ma rket investigation also were of the 
view that within the aircraft there is one CMS and IFE system across all classes and 
that beyond the visual components between classes, there are no major differences.33  
(33) As regards aircraft WAP,  it is a non -avionics component used as an input for the 
IFE/CMS systems. Aircraft WAP is a device that allows wireless devices to connect to 
a wired network of the aircraft . Aircraft WAP can be used, for example, for high -
speed Wi -Fi for in -flight web bro wsing, real -time communications, multimedia 
streaming. The Parties submit that the same technology of an aircraft WAP is used 
across  the segments, irrespective of the type of the aircraft or the customer.  
                                                 
26  Minutes of a call of 11 March 2019 with another market participant ; response to the Commission’s request 
for information of 12 March 2019 by a market participant.   
27  See for example, minutes of a call of 1 March 2019 with a market participant.  
28  Minutes of a call of 1 March 2019 with a market participant , see also m inutes of a call  of 11  March  2019 
with a market participant .  
29  Minutes of a call of 11 March 2019 with a market participant.   
30  Minutes of a call of 4 March 2019 with a market participant;  minutes of a call of 11 March 2019 with 
another  market participant ; Response to the Commission’s request for information  of 12 March 2019  by a 
market participant.   
31  Form CO, paragraph 170 et seq.; minutes of a call of 4 March 2019 with a market participant; minutes of a 
call of 11 March 2019 with another market participant.  
32  RFI 4, question 4.  
33  Minutes of a call of 1 March 2019 with a market participant; response to the Commission’s request for 
information of 12 March 2019 by  a market participant.  
7 (34) In light of the fact that the concentration does n ot give rise to competition concerns 
under any plausible market definition, the exact scope of market definition for IFE and 
CMS systems may be left open for the purposes of this decision.  
5.3. Geographic market definition  
(35) In line with the Parties’ view , past d ecisional practice34, and the results of the market 
investigation in the present case35, the Commission considers that the relevant 
geographic markets  for avionics and non -avionics products for civil aircrafts , 
including the CMS and IFE systems,  are w orldwid e in scope.  
6. COMPETITIVE ASSESSMEN T 
6.1. Legal f ramework  
(36) The Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the 
Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the 
"Horizontal Merger Guidelines")36 distinguish between two main ways in which 
mergers between actual or potential competitors on the same relevant market may 
significantly impede effective competition, namely non -coordinated and coordinated 
effects.  
(37) Non-coordinated effects may significant ly impede effective competition by 
eliminating important competitive constraints on one or more firms, which 
consequently would have increased market power, without resorting to coordinated 
behaviour. In that regard, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines consid er not only the 
direct loss of competition between the merging firms, but also the reduction in 
competitive pressure on non -merging firms in the same market that could be brought 
about by the merger.37 
(38) The Horizontal Merger Guidelines list a number of facto rs, which may influence the 
rise of substantial non -coordinated, effects from a merger, such as: the large market 
shares of the merging firms; the fact that the merging firms are close competitors; the 
limited possibilities for customers to switch supplier s; or the fact that the merger 
would eliminate an important competitive force. That list of factors applies equally if 
a merger would create or strengthen a dominant position, or would otherwise 
significantly impede effective competition due to non -coordin ated effects. 
Furthermore, not all of those factors need to be present to make significant non -
coordinated effects likely and this is not an exhaustive list.38 
(39) Vertical mergers involve companies operating at different levels of the same supply 
chain. Pursua nt to the Commission Guidelines on the assessment of non -horizontal 
mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the “Non -Horizontal Merger Guidelines”),39 vertical mergers do not 
                                                 
34  Commission decision s in cases M.2220 – General Electric/Honeywell , recital 240;  M.8305 – Rockwell 
Collins/BE Aerospace .  
35  Minutes of a call of 1 March 2019 with a market participant; response to the Commission’s request for 
information  of 12 March 2019  by a market participant . 
36  OJ C 31, 5.2.2004, p. 5.  
37  Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 24.  
38  Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 26.  
39  OJ C 265, 18.10.2008, p. 6.  
8 entail the loss of direct comp etition between merging firms in the same relevant 
market and provide scope for efficiencies. However, there are circumstances in which 
vertical mergers may significantly impede effective competition. This is in particular 
the case if they give rise to for eclosure.40 
(40) The Non -Horizontal Merger Guidelines distinguish between two forms of vertical 
foreclosure: input foreclosure, where the merger is likely to raise costs of downstream 
rivals by restricting their access to an important input, and customer foreclo sure, 
where the merger is likely to foreclose upstream rivals by restricting their access to a 
sufficient customer base.41 
(41) Input foreclosure arises where, post -merger, the new entity would be likely to restrict  
access to its actual or potential rival in the  downstream market  to the products or 
services that it would have otherwise supplied absent the merger, thereby raising its 
downstream rivals' costs by making it harder for them to obtain supplies of the input 
under similar prices and conditions as absent the merger .42 
(42) Customer foreclosure may occur when a supplier integrates with an important 
customer in the downstream market and because of this downstream presence, the 
merged e ntity may foreclose access to a sufficient customer base to its actual or 
potent ial rivals in the upstream market (the input market) and reduce their ability or 
incentive to compete which in turn, may raise downstream rivals' costs by making it 
harder for them to obtain supplies of the input under similar prices and conditions as 
absent the merger. This may allow the merged e ntity profitably to establish higher 
prices on the downstream market .43 
6.2. Horizontal effects  
(43) The concentration does not give rise to any horizontal overlap between the activities 
of the parent companies of the JV, Luf thansa Technik and LG Electronics . Regarding 
the production and supply of IFE and CMS systems specifically, Lufthansa Technik is 
mostly active  in the  business jet segment  and, through its participation in IDAIR, in 
the (V)VIP segment . Lufthansa Technik als o has minimal sales of IFE to the 
commercial aircraft segment. LG Electronics however is currently not active in the 
production and supply of  IFE or CMS systems .  
(44) The only possible horizontal overlap to which the concentration would give rise is  
between Lufthansa Technik and the newly created  JV itself. While it is intended that  
the JV will be active in the production and supply of IFE and CMS systems ( albeit for 
commercial aircraft  only), Lufthansa  Technik is also active in the production and 
supply of IFE and CMS systems  (albeit predominantly for business jets  and, through 
its participation in IDAIR, for (V)VIP jets , as well as to a very limited extent for 
commercial aircraft ), with an estimated market share on the overall market for the 
product ion and supply  of IFE and CMS systems for aircraft  (commercial  aircraft , 
business and (V)VIP jets  combined) of [0-5]% for IFE and  [0-5]% for CMS . 
                                                 
40 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 18.  
41 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 30.  
42 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph  31. 
43 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 58.  
9 (45) At the level of IFE and CMS systems  specifically for commercial aircraft , […], 
Lufthansa Technik’s  market share for IFE systems is very limited at ca. [0-5]%. 
Lufthansa Technik does not sell CMS systems to the commercial segment . […]44, 
[…]. Finally, several significant competitors remain active in the commercial 
segment, in particular Thales and Panaso nic.  
(46) In the context of the Commission’s market investigation, none of the respondents 
raised any concerns regarding possible horizontal effects of the concentration. On the 
contrary , several  respondents considered that the creation of the JV would be a 
positive development  for competition on the market. For instance, one market 
respondent stated: “[…] overall there are not a lot of options for IFE systems on the 
market. Therefore, entry of a new player providing new features, such as the proposed 
JV by LG Electronics and Lufthansa Technik, would be a positive development on the 
market ”.45 
(47) In light of the above, the concentration does not give rise to any competition concerns 
in relation to a horizontal overlap.  
6.3. Vertical effects  
(48) The Commission’s investigation  has shown that the concentration will not give rise to 
vertical input or customer foreclosure effects . 
(49) Two types of vertical relationships give rise to affected markets in this case:  
a. upstream from the JV , LG Electronics produces display modules and other 
components , and Lufthansa Technik  produces  WAPs and other components,  both 
of which the JV could  at least in theory  use for the production of its IFE and CMS 
systems  for use in commercial aircraft46; 
b. downstream from the JV , one of  the JV ’s parent  companies , Lufthansa Technik, 
belongs to the broader Lufthansa airline group, which purchases IFE systems to 
be installed in  its aircraft s.  
6.3.1.  Input foreclosure  
(50) As mentioned above in recital (49)a , each of the JV’s parents produces some 
components which the JV may use for the  produc tion of its IFE and CMS systems.  
(51) First, in the future, LG Electronics may supply certain components  (in particular 
display modules ) to the JV  and to other Tier 1 manufacturers of IFE/CMS systems . 
However, considering that LG Electronics has not previously been active in the sale of  
any products  to customers  active  in the production of IFE or CMS systems47, it is 
reasonable to conclude that these are  not products which the merged entity would 
have supplied to the JV’s competitors absent the merger. Therefore, there does not 
appear to be any scope for input foreclosure strategies in this regard.  
                                                 
44  Form CO, paragraph 147.  
45  Minutes of a call with a market respondent of 1 March 2019.  
46  […].  
47  Response to RFI  4. […]. 
10 (52) Second, Lufthansa Technik supplies some components to IF E/CMS system 
manufacturers48. In light of the available market share estimates, it would appear that  
there is only one component for which Lufthansa Technik would have  a market share 
([…] ) in excess of  [30-40]%, i.e. Wireless Access Points ( “WAPs ”)49, with a  market 
share of [30-40]%50.  
(53) […]. In practice therefore, after the concentration, Lufthansa Technik will no longer 
be a relevant supplier of WAPs to the JV’s competitors ( i.e. manufacturers of IFE 
systems for the commercial segment), independently of any input foreclosure strategy.  
(54) […]51. […]. Sufficient alternative sources of supply would remain available to these 
customers, with Honeywell as the leading supplier with a [40-50]% market share for 
WAPs worldwide. Other  suppliers such as Miltope  ([10-20]%), Kontron ( [10-20]%) 
and Zebra (ca. [5-10]%) will remain active on the market as well.  
(55) Finally , in the context of the Commission’s market investigation, none of the 
respondents raised any concerns regarding possible input foreclosure effects arising 
from the concentration52.  
(56) In light of the above, the Commission concludes that the concentration is unlikely to  
give rise to any input foreclosure effects.  
6.3.2.  Customer foreclosure  
(57) In th e present case, as mentioned above in recital (49), the Lufthansa Group , to which 
Lufthansa Technik belongs , purchases IFE systems for its aircraft  (but not CMS) . In 
line with the Parties’ view, the Commission considers that  it is Lufthansa’s p osition as 
a buyer of IFE  systems that is decisive for the assessment of potential vertical 
customer foreclosure concerns53. In that regard , the purchasing volume of the 
Lufthansa Group airlines represented [0-5]% of the total IFE systems  market , as 
estimat ed on the basis of its share in aircraft purchases compared to rival airlines . In 
light of this estimate, it cannot be considered that the Lufthansa Group is a significant 
customer with the type of downstream market power that would enable it to engage in 
any sort of customer foreclosure strategy.   
(58) In addition, in  the context of the Commission’s market investigation, none of the 
respondents raised any concerns regarding possible customer foreclosure effects 
arising from the concentration.  
(59) Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the concentration is unlikely to give rise 
to any customer foreclosure effects.  
                                                 
48  […], Form CO paragraph 140.  
49  As explained by the Notifying Party in response to RFI 4, WAP technologies for commercial, business or 
(V)VIP aircrafts do not differ very much and WAPs can be used with minor changes for all types of 
aircraft.  
50 Response  to RFI  4. 
51  Response  to RFI  8. 
52  The only possible issue that was rais ed by a market respondent regarding a possible vertical relationship 
arising from the concentration was based on a misunderstanding that was subsequently clarified: minutes 
of a call with a market respondent on 11 March 2019.  
53  The Lufthansa Group’s down stream market shares  on individual flight routs does not appear relevant for 
this assessment, in particular because aircrafts (and the IFE and CMS systems they are equipped with) are 
not dedicated to any specific flight routes.  
11 7. CONCLUSION  
(60) For the above reasons, the European Commission has decided not to oppose the 
notified operation and to declare it compatible with the internal  market and with the 
EEA Agreement. This decision is adopted in application of Article 6(1)(b) of the 
Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement . 
For the Commission  
 
 
(Signed)  
Margrethe VESTAGER  
Member of the Commission