Commission européenne, DG COMP MERGER REGISTRY, 1049 Bruxelles, BELGIQUE  
Europese Commissie, DG COMP MERGER REGISTRY, 1049 Brussel, BELGIË  
 
Tel: +32 229 -91111. Fax: +32 229 -64301. E -mail: COMP -MERGER -REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu .  EUROPEAN COMMISSION  
Brussels,  07.12.2021  
C(2021 ) 9267  final 
PUBLIC VERSION   
 
Thermo Fisher   
168 Third Avenue  
Waltham, MA 02451  
United States of America  
Subject : Case M. 10304 – THERMO FISHER / PPD  
Commission decision pursuant to Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation 
No 139/20041 and Article 57 of the Agreement on the European Economic 
Area2 
Dear Sir or Madam,  
(1) On 29 October  2021 , the European Commission received notification of a proposed 
concentrati on pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger Regulation by which the 
undertaking Thermo Fisher Scien tific Inc. (“Thermo Fisher” or the “Notifying Party” , 
United States ) acquires within the meaning of Article  3(1)(b) of the Merger 
Regulation control of the u ndert aking PPD, Inc. (“PPD” or the “Target” , United 
                                                 
1  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the “Merger Regulation ”). With effect from 1 December 2009,  the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union ( “TFEU ”) has introd uced certain changes, such as the replacement of  
“Community ” by “Union ” and “common market ” by “internal market ”. The terminology of the TFEU will 
be used throughout this decision.  
2  OJ L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3 (the “EEA Agreement”).  
In the published version of this decision, 
some information has been omitted 
pursuant to Article 17(2) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 concerning 
non-disclosure of business secrets and other  
confidential information. The omissions are 
shown thus […] . Where possible the 
information omitted has been replaced by 
ranges of figures or a general description.  
 
 
2 States ) by the way of purchase of shares  (the “Transaction”) .3 Thermo Fisher and PPD 
are designed hereinafter as the “Parties”.  
1. THE  PARTIE S  
(2) Thermo Fisher, a company listed on the New York Stock Exchange and 
headquartered in Waltham, Massachusetts, USA, is a global manufacturer and 
supplier of a broad range of analytical, research and bioprocessing products, and 
pharmaceutical contract development and manufacturing services. Thermo Fisher 
serves customers such  as pharmaceutical and biotech companies, hospitals and 
clinical diagnostic laboratories, universities, research institutions and government 
agencies, as well as customers in the areas of environmental, industrial quality and 
process control.  
(3) PPD, a compan y listed on the NASDAQ Global Select Market (“NASDAQ”) and 
headquartered in Wilmington, North Carolina, USA, is a contract research 
organi sation (“CRO”) that supports pharmaceutical and biotech companies (also 
referred to as sponsors) in the organi sation a nd evaluation of clinical trials. CROs 
offer customi sed strategies, covering certain aspects of clinical trials such as 
biostatistics, clinical data management, clinical trial monitoring, clinical trial project 
management, global clinical supplies, regulat ory affairs, pharmacovigilance, 
consulting and medical writing. Sponsors outsource these activities to CROs while 
remaining ultimately responsible for the (bio -)pharmaceutical products under 
development. In addition, PPD operates a small number of laborato ries where it offers 
a range of testing services, including bioanalytical, biomarker, central laboratory, 
good manufacturing practice (“GMP”), and vaccine science services.   
2. THE  CONCE NTRATION  
(4) The Transaction involves the proposed acquisition by Thermo Fish er of sole control 
of PPD within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation. The 
Transaction will be carried out as a so -called reverse triangular merger under the laws 
of Delaware, United States. Upon closing, Powder Acquisition Corp., a spec ial-
purpose subsidiary of Thermo Fisher, will be merged with and into PPD, with the 
latter being the surviving entity. As a result, PPD will be a wholly owned subsidiary 
of Thermo Fisher.  
3. EU DIME NSION   
(5) The undertakings concerned have a combined aggregate w orldwide turnover of more 
than EUR 5 000 million ( Thermo Fisher : EUR 28 249 million; PPD: EUR 4 104 
million ). Each of them has an EU -wide turnover in excess of EUR 250 million, 
(Thermo Fisher : EUR […]; PPD: EUR […]), and neither  achieves more than two -
thirds of its aggregate EU -wide turnover within  one and the same Member State. The 
notified Transaction therefore has an EU dimension . 
                                                 
3  Publication in the Official Journal of the European Union No C 451, 8.11.2021 , p. 8. 
 
 
3 4. INTRODUCTION TO THE  PARTIE S’ ACTIVITIE S  
(6) PPD  is active as a laboratory service provider  and a CRO service provider . 
(7) PPD’s laboratory services represent […] of PPD’s worldwide revenues. PPD operates 
eight laboratories worldwide, of which two in the EEA (Brussels, Belgium and 
Athlone, Ireland). Internally, PPD distinguishes between the following types of 
laboratory servic es: 
(a) Bioanalytical laboratory services: analysis of drug and metabolite 
concentrations in biological samples  to provide a quantitative measure of the 
active drug and/or its metabolites.  
(b) Biomarker laboratory services:  measurement of changes in biological fun ction 
or the concentration of desired biomarker molecule(s) to assess how a drug is 
working or measure disease progression.  
(c) Central laboratory services:  laboratory testing on human clinical trial samples, 
as well as provision of laboratory kits to clinical  sites that are operating 
clinical trials.  
(d) Good manufacturing practice (“GMP”) laboratory services:  analytical testing 
of pharmaceutical products and their inputs during the pharmaceutical product 
development and manufacturing process.  
(e) Vaccine science serv ices: testing services dedicated to vaccine development, 
with the goals of helping customers to determine how well a vaccine works 
and the type of immune response that a vaccine generates over time.  
(8) The main customers for PPD’s laboratory services are phar maceutical companies 
developing new products as well as other CRO service providers working on their 
behalf (or, in the case of GMP laboratory services, contract development and 
manufacturing organi sation  (“CDMO”) service providers).  
(9) CRO services represent  […] of PPD’s worldwide revenue. With its CRO services, 
PPD support pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, called sponsors, with 
running clinical trials to obtain regulatory approval for new medicine products. 
Sponsors can either outsource specific se rvices to PPD or outsource the entire clinical 
trial. PPD supports early clinical development (Phase I) as well as Phase II -Phase IV 
clinical trials. It also provides services such as consulting, patient recruitment, peri - 
and post -approval services and me dical communications.  
(10) CRO service providers provide a broad set of services over the course of a clinical 
trial, including , inter alia , protocol design, project management, site selection, patient 
recruitment, provision of medical supplies, data capture and management . 
(11) Depending on the preferences of the sponsor, a CRO such as PPD can either use its 
own laboratories  for testing in the cou rse of a clinical trial, or use third party 
 
 
4 laboratories. Some CRO service providers do not operate laboratories and outsource 
all testing to third party laboratories.4 
(12) Thermo Fisher manufactures and supplies a broad range of supplies for laboratories, 
such as  instruments, consumables, reagents  and plastics . Thermo Fisher also has a 
distribution business, which distributes its own and third party products.  
(13) PPD, as a laboratory service provider, sources a broad range of products from Thermo 
Fisher. By combining Thermo Fisher and PPD, the Transaction gives rise to a wide 
range of vertical links between Thermo Fisher’s products upstream, and PPD’s 
laboratory services downstream .5,6 
5. RE LE VANT MARKE TS  
(14) This section will set out the relevant product and geogra phic market definitions for the 
assessment of the Transaction. It will first cover the downstream markets, in which 
PPD is active, followed by the relevant upstream markets, in which Thermo Fisher is 
active.  
5.1. Downstream markets (PPD)  
(15) As set out in Section 4, PPD is active in two areas: (i) CRO services and (ii) 
laboratory services.  
5.1.1.  Clinical research organisation (“CRO”) services  
(16) CRO services consist in assisting pharma ceutical or biotech companies in conducti ng 
and evaluating clinical trials. This mainly involves organising the interaction between 
patients and doctors at clinical trial sites. CROs typically offer customised strategies, 
covering certain aspects of clinic al testing such as biostatistics, clinical data 
management, clinical trial monitoring, clinical trial project management, global 
clinical supplies, regulatory affairs, pharmacovigilance, consulting and medical 
writing. Sponsors outsource these services to CROs while remaining ultimately 
responsible for the product under development.  
                                                 
4  For example, Rho Inc. and Pharm -Olam only provide CRO services and not laboratory services.  
5  The Transaction also gives rise to very limited horizontal overlaps, of w hich two lead to technically 
affected markets: (i) comparator sourcing (combined market share worldwide and EEA -wide of [20-30]% 
including in -house sourcing and [30-40]% excluding in -house sourcing, increment brought by PPD of less 
than [0-5]%), and (ii) c linical trial packaging (combined market share worldwide and EEA -wide of [10-
20]% including in -house sourcing and [20-30]% excluding in -house sourcing, increment brought by PPD of 
less than [0-5]%). The Commission’s market investigation confirmed that thes e may constitute separate 
product markets. The combined market shares for the horizontal overlaps are modest, and the increments 
brought by PPD negligible. As such, these horizontal overlaps are extremely unlikely to lead to competitive 
concerns The Commis sion’s market investigation did not surface concerns for these horizontal overlaps . 
Therefore, these will not be further assessed in the present Decision.  
6  The Transaction gives rise to one vertical link that is not related to PPD’s laboratory services d ownstream, 
but rather to its CRO services, which are vertically related to Thermo Fisher’s upstream clinical trial 
support services. However, the Parties’ market shares are significantly below 30% both up - and 
downstream, so this vertical link is not affec ted by the Transaction and is not further discussed in the 
present Decision.  
 
 
5 5.1.1.1.   Relevant product  market definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(17) In the past , the Commission defined an overall market for CRO services, as the 
market definition did not sugges t a further segmentation based on spec ific services 
provided by CROs.7 
(B) Notifying Party’s view  
(18) The Notifying Party submits that CRO services consist of services provided for 
several  types of product s, customer s or types of trial s in different stages of a product’s 
lifecycle . However, the Notifying Party considers, in line with past practice, that such 
segmentation is not appropriate and that there is a single relevant market for CRO 
services, as CRO service providers would typical ly offer a similar range of services 
and customers would expect CRO  service provider s to do so . The Notifying Party 
submits that the market definition can be left open in any event, as PPD’s market 
shares would not exceed 30% under any plausible market def inition.8  
(C) The Commission’s assessment  
(19) The Commission notes that CRO services and laboratory services are related in the 
sense that both services are required in the context of clinical trials, and 
pharmaceutical and biotech companies frequently outsource both services  to third -
party providers . Some competitors, including PPD, offer both services to customers, 
while others act only as either CRO or laboratory service provider. In any event, the 
market investigation clearly indicated that CRO services and la boratory services are 
two separate product markets. From a demand -side perspective , sponsors consider 
these services separately and do not generally source both services in combination.9 
From a supply -side perspective , the Commission considers that both se rvices require 
very different expertise and infrastructure, and are therefore not substitutable.  
(20) The Commission also notes that the business activities of Thermo Fisher are 
predominantly upstream to the provision of laboratory services, but not to CRO 
services.  One exception may be products that  form part of testing kits to be sent to 
patients participating in the clinical trial. One customer who provides both CRO and 
laboratory services explained: “Thermo Fisher supplies all sorts of laboratory 
products, as well as contents of kits required for medical trials, e.g. reagents, gloves, 
band aids. However, [customer name]  considers Thermo Fisher primarily a supplier 
of laboratory equipment, consumables and reagents, more than a supplier of kit 
contents.”10 The Commission further notes  that all products discussed in the context 
of this decision11, i.e. products for which the Transaction would lead to affected 
markets, are products used in laboratories, such as machines and their consumables , as 
well as storage  equipment and equipment for cell growth.  
                                                 
7  Case M.8061 – IMS Health / Quintiles  – paragraph 39 et seq.  
8  Form CO, para graph  217 et seq.  
9  Response to questionnaire Q3 to pharmaceutical companies, question 5.  
10  Minutes of a call with a customer, 8 September 2021, paragraph 18.  
11  With the  exception discussed in  footnote 6 .  
 
 
6 (21) Based on the above, and in line with the Commission’s past practice, CRO services 
and laboratory services will be considered as two separate markets for the purpose of 
this Decision. The Commission notes that, in any event, vertically affected links only 
arise between products that are  upstream to laboratory services  and the latter .  
5.1.1.2.   Relevant geographic  market definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(22) In the past, the Commission has considered the market for CRO services to be EEA -
wide in scope.12 
(B) Notifying Party’s view  
(23) The Notifying Party appear to consider the market for CRO services as EEA -wide or 
global, as it provides market shares for both geographic market definitions.  
(C) The Commission’s assessment  
(24) In the mar ket investigation, the large majority of responding customers (i.e. 
pharmaceutical companies) of CRO services indicated that the geographic market for 
CRO services is global.13 
(25) For the purpose of this Decision, it can be left open whether the geographic mar ket for 
CRO services is EEA -wide or global, as the Transaction does not raise concerns under 
either market definition.  
5.1.2.  Laboratory services  
(26) PPD is active in the provision of laboratory testing services, primarily to 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology compani es, but also to other CROs as well as 
CDMOs. As set out in paragraph (7), PPD internally segments its laboratory services 
into (i) bioanalytical, (ii) biomarker, (ii i) central laboratories, (iv) GMP, (v) vaccine.  
5.1.2.1.  Relevant product  market definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(27) The Commission has not previously assessed laboratory testing services.  
(B) Notifying Party’s view  
(28) The Notifying Party submits that laboratory ser vices for diagnostic purposes are 
distinct from laboratory services related to clinical development. PPD is not active in 
laboratory services for diagnostic purposes. The Notifying Party submits the 
following arguments for this distinction:14 
                                                 
12  Case M.8061 – IMS Health / Quintiles  – paragraph 39 et seq . 
13  Response to questionnaire Q3 to pharmaceutical companies, question 7.  
14  Form CO, paragraphs 213 -214. 
 
 
7 (a) The customers for laboratory services for diagnostic purposes  are primarily 
hospitals and clinics, whereas customers for laboratory services related to 
clinical development are pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies;  
(b) A different footprint is required for both activi ties; a far more localised 
footprint is needed to provide laboratory services for diagnostic purposes to 
ensure geographic coverage and access to patients. In contrast, PPD only has 
eight laboratories globally;  
(c) Pricing is different, as laboratory services for diagnostic purposes are priced, 
sold and regulated in accordance with the different healthcare systems and 
government imposed standards, whereas laboratory services related to clinical 
development are bespoke and negoti ated on a case -by-case basis; and   
(d) While laboratory services for diagnostic purposes are mainly driven by an 
effort to “industrialise” services (large volumes, automated and standardised 
testing) to drive costs down, laboratory services related to clinical 
development contain more of an i ndividualised and case -by-case approach to 
tailor for the specific needs of each clinical trial.  
(29) The Notifying Party submits that there is no universally accepted segmentation of 
laboratory testing services  for clinical development . While PPD internally se gments 
its laboratory services into (i) bioanalytical, (ii) biomarker, (i ii) central labo ratories, 
(iv) GMP, (v) vaccine, and considers that each service meets different customer 
demands, it considers that there is significant supply -side substitutability between 
these segments.15 
(30) For the purpose of the present Transaction, the Notifying Party submits that the 
relevant product market  with respect to laboratory services for clinical development  
can be left open, as no competition concerns exist under any plau sible product market 
definition.16 
(C) The Commission’s assessment  
(31) The Commission’s market investigation confirmed that laboratory services for 
diagnostic purposes constitute a separate market from laboratory services related to 
clinical development. A majority  of laboratory and CRO service providers that replied 
to the Commission’s market investigation indicated to consider them separate 
markets.17 
(32) Respondents pointed out that the customers for the two services are different, as for 
laboratory services for clini cal development the customers are pharmaceutical 
companies, biotechnology companies, or CRO service providers, while for laboratory 
services for diagnostic purposes the customers are physicians or hospitals. The 
required footprint is different as well – laboratory service providers for  clinical 
development  typically have few laboratories globally (PPD has eight), while for 
                                                 
15  Form CO, paragraph 169.  
16  Form CO, paragraph 167.  
17  Replies to question 4 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
 
 
8 diagnostic purposes a more regional presence is required.  Respondents also pointed 
out that d ifferent accreditations and standards apply , and that instruments are more 
easily substitutable in diagnostics laboratories as there is not the same criticality 
associated with consistency of testing results and patient data.18 
(33) Therefore, while they may employ some of the same testing methods, the 
Commission considers that laboratory services for diagnostic purposes and laboratory 
services for clinical development (i.e. laboratory services in the context of  clinical 
trials and co mpliance with pharmaceutical GMP ) constitute separate product markets.  
(34) Within the area of laboratory services related to clinical development, it can be left 
open whether any further segmentation is required , as PPD’s market share is well 
under 30% for the overall market as well as for any plausible segmentation. 
Therefore, the Transaction does not give rise to affected vertical links by virtue of 
PPD’s downstream market position.  As mentioned previously, PPD is not active in 
laboratory services for diagnos tic purposes.  
5.1.2.2.   Relevant geographic  market definition  
(A) Notifying Party’s view  
(35) The Notifying Party submits that the relevant geographic scope for laboratory testing 
services related to clinical development is global or at least EEA -wide due to the 
following factors:19 
(a) Laboratories typically locate their laboratory testing facilities in a small 
number of locations, from which their services are provided to many countries;  
(b) There are no country -specific technical standards or regulatory differences 
within the EEA , and laboratories typically comply with regulatory and 
certification requirements in all major jurisdictions;  
(c) There are numerous competitors that offer analytical testing services 
worldwide; and  
(d) Price is negotiated on an individual customer basis or based  on a standard 
price list, but price dynamics are the same globally.  
(B) The Commission’s assessment  
(36) For the purpose of the present Decision, the relevant geographic scope of laboratory 
services related to clinical development can be left open between EEA -wide and 
worldwide, as PPD’s market share is well under 30% for either geographic scope. 
Therefore, the Transaction does not give rise to affected vertical links by virtue of 
PPD’s downstream market position.  
                                                 
18  Replies to question 4.1 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
19  Form CO, paragraph 173.  
 
 
9 5.2. Upstream markets (Thermo Fisher)  
(37) Thermo Fisher is a ctive in numerous markets that are upstream to laboratory services . 
This section sets out the markets that are affected as a result of the Transaction.  
5.2.1.  High -resolution (Sanger) capillary electrophoresis instruments and consumables   
(38) Electrophoresis is the differential movement of charged molecules in an electric field, 
used to separate molecules ( e.g. DNA, RNA and proteins)  based on size, density and 
charge. There are two major types of electrophoresis: gel electrophoresis and capillary 
electrophoresis.  Gel electrophoresis will be discussed in Section 5.2.5  of this 
Decision. Capillary electrophoresis employs a narrow capillary tube filled with a gel 
through which the mo lecules pass.  
(39) High-resolution (Sanger) capillary electrophoresis is used for DNA sequencing 
purposes, i.e. determining the order of base pairs in a given strand of DNA. 
Fluorescently labelled nucleotides are attached to the DNA fragment to be sequenced. 
When passed through the capillary, the fluorescent nucleotides are excited by a laser 
and the emitted light is detected.  The type of base ( adenine (A), cytosine (C), guanine 
(G), and thymine (T) ) can then be detected based on the colour of light emitted.  
5.2.1.1.  Relevant p roduct market definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(40) The Commission has not previously assessed high -resolution (Sanger) capillary 
electrophoresis.  In one decision, it has briefly addressed capillary electrophoresis in 
the context of analytical separation instruments. However, the market definition was 
ultimately left open.20 
(B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(41) The Notifying Party considers that capillary ele ctrophoresis  could be segmented into 
high-resolution (1 base pair) and lower resolution (3 -5+ base pairs ) instruments, on 
the basis of the lack of demand - and supply -side substitutability between the two 
types of instruments.21  
(42) Lower resolution capillary electrophoresis instruments have a significantly lower cost 
and are used for different purposes ( e.g. quality control fo r DNA or RNA, certain 
plant biology applications, understanding protein -ligand interactions). High -resolution 
capillary electrophoresis instruments are used where it is necessary to identify smaller 
fragments of DNA  (e.g. genotyping, mutation analysis, microsatellites variability, 
amplicon screening, splicing variants, loci mapping, genomic fingerprinting etc. ).22 
                                                 
20  Case M.6175 – Danaher / Beckman Coulter , paragraph 31.  
21  Form CO, paragraph 646.  
22  Form CO, paragraphs 647 -648. 
 
 
10 (43) From a supply -side perspec tive, it would be costly and difficult for a supplier of a 
standard capillary electrophoresis  instrument to develop an instrument with a 
resolution of 1 base pair .23 
(44) Therefore, the Notifying Party submits that the relevant product market consists of the 
market for high -resolution (Sanger) capillary electrophoresis  instruments, regardless 
of whether they are low, medium  or high throughput.24 
(45) Concerning consumables, the Notifying Party considers these constitute a separate 
market. Consumables can either be sold  separately as stand -alone items; or as pre -
packaged consumables for use in one specific instrument. Whether stand -alone or pre -
packaged, there is no substitutability between consumables for high -resolution 
(Sanger) capillary electrophoresis instruments an d lower -resolution capillary 
electrophoresis  instruments.  
(46) The Notifying Party submits that there is no need to distinguish between different 
types of consumables that are used for high -resolution (Sanger) capillary 
electrophoresis instruments because competitive conditions for these different 
consumables are largely similar and customers need several or the entire range of 
these consum ables in the testing workflow.  
(C) The Commission’s assessment  
(47) For the purpose of the current Decision, it can be left ope n whether the appropriate 
product market definition for capillary electrophoresis instruments is (i) all capillary 
electrophoresis instruments, (ii) high -resolution capillary electrophoresis instruments, 
or (iii) high -resolution capillary electrophoresis i nstruments further segmented by 
their throughput.  
(48) Thermo Fisher is not active in lower -resolution capillary electrophoresis instruments.. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this Decision, the Commission will assess the market on 
the basis of high -resolution cap illary electrophoresis instruments. As the Transaction 
does not give rise on serious doubts on this narrow market definition, it also does not 
give rise to serious doubt when including lower -resolution instruments in the product 
market definition – an area  in which Thermo Fisher is not active.  
(49) In the past, when the Commission has found that the markets for consumables and 
instruments was closed, meaning that Thermo Fisher instruments only worked with 
Thermo Fisher consumables, the Commission has defined a s ingle “systems” 
market.25  As Thermo Fisher’s high -resolution capillary electrophoresis instruments 
constitute an open system, meaning that third party manufacturers can supply 
consumables for use with Thermo Fisher devices , the Commission will assess the 
market for high -resolution capillary electrophoresis consumables separately from the 
one for high -resolution capillary electrophoresis instruments . Furthermore, 
                                                 
23  Form CO, paragraph 649.  
24  Form CO, paragraph 650.  
25  Case M.6175 – Danaher / Beckman Coulter , paragraph 20. 
 
 
11 consumables for high -resolution capillary electrophoresis are not substitutable with 
consumables  for lower resolution capillary electrophoresis.26 
(50) Finally, the Commission notes that high -resolution (Sanger) capillary electrophoresis 
instruments form a separate product market from next generation sequencing 
(“NGS”). NGS is a more recent development tha t allows massively parallel 
sequencing of DNA, and therefore has a cost per analysed base pair that is  
significantly lower (a difference that exceeds  an order of magnitude ) than high-
resolution (Sanger) capillary electrophoresis instruments . The devices th erefore serve 
different purposes and the supplier landscape is different. NGS is not affected as a 
result of the Transaction.27 
5.2.1.2.  Relevant g eographic market definition  
(A) The Notifying Party’s view  
(51) The Notifying Party submits that the relevant geographic marke t for the high -
resolution (Sanger) capillary electrophoresis  instruments and consumables  is global or 
at least EEA -wide in scope because high -resolution (Sanger) capillary electrophoresis  
instruments and consumables  are identical wherever customers are loca ted.28 
(B) The Commission’s  assessment  
(52) For the purpose of the current Decision, it can be left open whether the appropriate 
geographic scope of the markets for high-resolution capillary electrophoresis 
instruments and consumables is global or EEA -wide, as  this does not affect the 
outcome of the competitive assessment.  
5.2.2.  Laboratory in vitro diagnostic allergy and autoimmune disease systems  
(53) In vitro diagnostics (“IVD”) systems comprise analysers (instruments), tests (called 
reagents or assays) and accessories for the purpose of testing blood, urine or other 
samples outside the human or animal body. This section concerns IVD systems 
specifically for the testing of allergies and autoimmune diseases.  
5.2.2.1.  Relevant product market definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(54) In case M.7982  – Abbott / Alere , the Commission found a market for laboratory IVD 
systems separate from point -of-care (POC) IVD systems, used by healthcare 
professionals in a medi cal environment. The Commission further discussed whether 
analysers and reage nts would be consider ed separate markets, or would belong to a 
combined market for IVD systems. The Commission concluded that the latter was the 
                                                 
26  From CO, paragraph 653.  
27  Thermo Fisher is active in NGS with its Ion Torrent platform. However, its market share is low (around 
[10-20]%), and the market leader in NGS with by far the largest market share is Illumina. NGS is therefore 
not affected  as a result of the Transaction and not further discussed in the present Decision, except in the 
context of companion diagnostics (see Section 6.5.2). 
28  Form CO, pa ragraph s 655-656.  
 
 
12 case for POC IVD analysers and reagents, as they are typically supplied in closed 
systems so that customers need to purchase both from the same supplier. The 
Commission left open whether laboratory IVD analysers and reagents would 
constitute separate produ ct market s or a combined systems market.  
(55) With respect to laboratory IVD products, the Commission considered that a 
distinction can be made between six main categories, namely clinical chemistry, 
immune -chemistry, haematology / haemostasis / immunohaematol ogy / histology / 
cytology, microbiology culture, infectious diseases and genetic testing. It further 
considered a segmentation by test panels or specific tests.29  
(56) This approach is in line with previous decisions by the Commission, specifically 
M.6293 – Thermo Fisher / Phadia  and M.4865 – Siemens / Dade Behring. In both 
decisions, a potential further segmentation by test panels30 or specific tests was 
considered based on the classification of IVD tests used by the European Diagnostics 
Manufacturers’ Associat ion31 (“EDMA”).32 
(B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(57) The Notifying Party submits that Thermo Fisher’s IVD products are closed system s, 
meaning  that Thermo Fisher analysers have to be used with Thermo Fisher reagents 
and accessories, and Thermo Fisher reagents and ac cessories cannot be used with 
third-party instruments. It would therefore not be meaningful to look into analysers, 
reagents and accessories separately, and in any event, market shares would not differ 
significantly from market shares for overall systems m arkets.  
(58) The Notifying Party further submits that IVD products for which affected markets 
were identified, namely allergy and autoimmune disease tests, would all be classified 
under the category of immunochemistry . The Notifying Party further submits that no 
additional affected markets would arise if a further distinction would be made 
between specific test panels or specific tests.  
(59) Therefore, the Notifying Party submits that the exact product market definition can be 
left open in the present case.33 
(C) The Com mission’s assessment  
(60) First of all, t he Commission notes that the Transaction concerns laboratory IVD 
systems, but not POC IVD systems, as PPD is only active in the former.34  
                                                 
29  Case M.7982 – Abbott / Alere , para graph  19 et seq.  
30  Test panels refer to thematic panels of tests (for example for cardiac, cancer, allergy  or fertility  testing). 
Within each thematic panel, a number of different assay tests can be conducted; M.4865 – Siemens / Dade 
Behring , paragraphs 20  et seq . 
31  Since 2012 MedTech Europe.  
32  Case M.6293 – Thermo Fisher / Phadia , paragraphs 8 et seq., and  M.4865 – Siemens / Dade  Behring , 
paragraphs 7 et seq.  
33  Form CO, para graph  603 et seq.  
34  The Notifying Party further provides that it estimates its market shares for POC IVD systems globally  and 
at EEA level to be lower than [0 -5]%. 
 
 
13 (61) Secondly, results of the market investigation indicate the existence of a market f or 
IVD systems also for laboratories, including both instruments and reagents. From a 
demand -side perspective , a small majority of respondents confirmed that the market 
would indeed include both instruments and reagents.35 One customer explained that 
“immunological testing for allergy and autoimmune disease are performed using only 
vendor -approved reagents for that instrument.”36 From a supply -side perspective , this 
view was supported by the large majority of competitors to Thermo Fisher, i.e. 
manufactu rers of such products , that responded to the Commission’s market 
investigation .37 The Commission further notes that IVD products by Thermo Fisher 
are closed systems in the sense that instruments and reagents, as well as key 
accessories like calibrators and conjugate, have to be used in conjunction with each 
other , and cannot be used with third -party products.38 Therefore, the Commission 
considers it appropriate to assess the IVD laboratory products at system level for the 
purpose of this Decision.  
(62) Third ly, the Commission notes that both IVD allergy testing as well as IVD 
autoimmune disease testing can be performed on the same device. In the market 
investigation, the Commission received feedback that instruments for both IVD 
autoimmune and allergy testing are part of the same product market.39 The 
Commission still considers that IVD autoimmune disease systems on the one hand 
and IVD allergy testing systems on the other hand form two separate product markets. 
From the demand -side point of view , the Commission not es that Thermo Fisher’s 
instruments may be substitutes for both applications, but not the tests, which are sold 
under two different brands.40 From a supply -side point of view , the Commission notes 
that manufacturers of IVD autoimmune disease testing system are not necessary able 
to provide a similarly competitive IVD allergy testing system. This is indicated by the 
very different market structure for both products, which was confirmed in the market 
investigation. One competitor explained that for both tests there are “same customers 
but different application and market, different competitive landscape. In Allergy 
Thermo has a strong Monopoly, in Al there are many more major players ”.41  
(63) For the purpose of this Decision, the Commission will therefore conduct th e 
assessment for the market for IVD allergy testing systems , and notes that no 
competition concerns will arise in a market for IVD autoimmune disease testing 
systems.  
(64) Fourthly, the Commission note s that a further segmentation by test panels or specific 
tests would not change the outcome of the competitive assessment .42 
                                                 
35  Replies to question 22 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
36  Reply to question 22.1 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
37  Replies to question 17 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors . 
38  Form CO, footnote 396.  
39  Replies to question  20 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory  service providers; replies to question 15 
to Thermo Fisher competitors.  
40  ImmunoCAP Allergy Tests and EliA Autoimmune Disease Tests; Form CO, paragraph 599.  
41  Replies to question 15.1 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  
42  Form CO, footnote 400.  
 
 
14 (65) Fifthly, the Commission has indication that, for IVD laboratory instruments, a further 
segmentation by customer type may be appropriat e. From a supply -side point of view , 
the Commission notes indication that purchasing patterns of laboratory service 
providers for clinical development differ from those of diagnostics laboratories. As 
explained in Section 5.1.2  above, clinical development laboratories generally have 
fewer, centralised laboratories compared to diagnostics laboratory service providers. 
The Commission notes that the majority of PPD’s comp etitors do not operate any IVD 
allergy testing systems at all in the EEA.43 In the view of the Commission, this may 
explain why clinical development laboratories are willing to source IVD allergy 
testing systems over longer distances, and do no place the sa me value on sourcing 
locally as diagnostics laboratory providers did in previous cases.44 
(66) It has to be noted that PPD is only active in the provision of clinical development 
laboratory services. The Commission therefore considers appropriate to assess the 
narrower market of sales to such customer group for the purpose of this Decision.  
(67) Based on the above, the Commission will assess the market s for IVD allergy systems  
to clinical development laboratory service providers . It can be left open whether a 
further  segmentation by test panels or specific tests is appropriate, as it does not 
change the competitive assessment of this case.  
5.2.2.2.  Relevant g eographic market  definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(68) In the past, the Commission has considered markets for IVD products to be national in 
geographic scope. In M.4865 – Siemens / Dade Behring , the Commission found that 
most respondents to the market investigation consider markets to be national in scope, 
due to price differences, national reimbursement  schemes and the preference for local 
service.45 In M.6293 – Thermo Fisher / Phadia , it found that customers tend to source 
within the country, while some competitors pointed at an EEA -wide market from a 
supply -side of view. The geographic market definition was ultimately left open. In  
case M.7982  – Abbott / Alere , the Commission concluded that geographic markets for 
IVD products are national. The reason was that customers would predominantly use 
national sales to  source those products, as well as to a lesser degree national 
regulation and price differences. The Commission acknowledged, however, that 
“some elements of the market investigation point towards an increasingly broader 
than national scope of the IVD mark et as the most important IVD suppliers are active 
on a worldwide basis. ”46 
(B) Notifying Party’s view  
(69) The Notifying Party submits that the geographic markets for laboratory IVD allergy 
testing today is EEA-wide because the main competitors for IVD test systems supply 
the same equipment and reagents in identical form across the EEA and operate EEA -
                                                 
43  Replies to question 25 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
44  The Commission notes that this assessment would also apply for IVD autoimmune disease systems.  
45  Case M.4865 – Siemens / Dade Behring , paragraphs 36 et seq.  
46  Case M.7982 – Abbott / Alere , paragraph 62 et seq.  
 
 
15 wide sales and distribution networks. Thermo Fisher supplies allergy tests to all 
customers [Thermo Fisher’s product distribution ]. 
(70) The Notifying Party further argues t hat in M.7982  – Abbott / Alere, the Commission 
would have looked at a different customer group, including  blood banks and hospitals. 
The purchasing behaviour of companies as PPD, which offers laboratory services in 
the context of clinical trials, was not even mentioned in that decision. The Notifying 
Party is of the view that local sourcing is not relevant for PPD and its competitors, and 
that price differences as a result of national reimbursement regimes would not play a 
role as those would not apply in the context of clinical  trials.47 
(C) The Commission’s assessment  
(71) The results of the market investigation strongly suggest  that the market for IVD 
allergy systems  to laboratory service providers for clinical development is wider than 
national, i.e. EEA-wide or global.48 All such customers responding to the market 
investigation indicated that they would source IVD allergy and autoimmune 
instruments and reagents at global level.49 Similarly, all but one manufacturer or 
distributor of such products indic ated that markets were global or EEA -wide in 
geographic scope.50 The Commission further notes that all competitors of Thermo 
Fisher responding to the market investigation supply IVD allergy and autoimmune 
instruments and reagents in all EEA countries.51  
(72) Differently from the previous cases above mentioned, in the present case customers 
responding to the market investigation were laboratories providing services in the 
context of clinical trials (but not diagnostics customers such as doctors or hospitals). 
As d iscussed in the competitive assessment in Section 6.4.2  in more detail , IVD 
allergy testing instruments and reagents are not very frequently used in the context of 
clinical trials.52 The majority of customers ( i.e. PPD’s competitors in the provision of 
laboratory services in the context of clinical trials) responding to the market 
investigation do not operate any IVD allergy and autoimmune disease testi ng 
instrument within the EEA ,53 and those who do operate them only in a limited number 
of countries. Similarly, [PPD’s operations ].54  
(73) In light of the indication that laboratories use IVD allergy systems only infrequently, 
and operate them only in few geogra phic areas, and many of them outside the EEA, 
criteria such as national price differences, national reimbursement schemes and 
                                                 
47  Form CO, paragraph 608 et seq.  
48  This assessment would also apply for IVD autoimmune disease systems.  
49  Reply to question 24 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
50  Replies to question 19 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors . 
51  Replies to question 20 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors . 
52  The Notifying Party provides that of […] clinical trials in 2020 that PPD’s clinical trial services business 
was involved in. PPD estimates that […] required allergy testing and […] of those used PPD’s laboratories 
for the allergy testing; Form CO, paragraph 621.  
53  Replies to question 25 of questionnaire Q1 to CR O and laboratory service providers.  
54  Form CO, paragraph 601.  
 
 
16 national services55 may be less important compared to customers active in the field of 
diagnostics.  
(74) The Commission further notes t hat already in previous cases, competitors appeared to 
have pointed to a broader than national geographic market definition from a supply -
side point of view,56 which is in line with findings in this case.  
(75) In light of the above, the Commission considers app ropriate to define the geographic 
market for IVD allergy and autoimmune disease testing instruments and reagents 
specifically for clinical trial laboratories as EEA -wide or global  for the purpose of this 
Decision .57 
5.2.3.  CO2 incubators  
(76) CO2 incubators are basic metal containers that maintain a controlled environment 
above ambient temperature but below temperatures of laboratory ovens. CO2 
incubators are used to propagate or expand cell cultures.  
5.2.3.1.   Relevant product market definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(77) The Commission has not defined a product market for CO2 incubators  in the past . In 
M.4242  – Thermo Electron / Fisher Scientific , the Commission named CO2 
incubators as a product in the broader area of laboratory equipment and consumables, 
but did not invest igate this product specifically and therefore did not define a separate 
market for CO2 incubators.58 
(B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(78) The Notifying Party submits that CO2 incubators belong to a broader category of 
general laboratory equipment that also includes o ther cell growth, protection and 
separation equipment instruments. This is because customers would often purchase a 
variety of combinations of such products when outfitting or expanding a cell culture 
laboratory. Further more , there would be significant sup ply-side substitutability 
regarding these products, as key suppliers would be active across the broader segment 
of cell growths, protection and separation equipment instruments. For the purpose of 
the case, however, the exact product market definition can be left open, as no 
concerns arise under any plausible product market definition.59 
                                                 
55  The Commission notes that IVD allergy and autoimmune testing instruments need periodical maintenance 
services; see replies to question 26 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service pr oviders.  
56  Case M.6293 – Thermo Fisher / Phadia , paragraph 22; Case M.7982 – Abbott / Alere , paragraph 62 . 
57  The Commission notes further that in its market investigation, it has asked customers and competitors about 
potential concerns at national level and about relevant country -specific information. No such concerns or 
information were brought to the Commission ’s attention.  
58  Case M.4242 – Thermo Electron / Fisher Scientific , paragraph  11 et seq.  
59  Form CO, para graph  252 et seq.  
 
 
17 (C) The Commission’s assessment  
(79) The Commission notes that the majority of customers responding to the market 
investigation indicate that CO2 incubators belong to the same produ ct market as 
biological safety cabinets, and may form a market for cell growth, protection and 
separation equipment.60 The Commission nevertheless considers this market 
definition as likely too broad in the light of the different product features , and doubt s 
that all products that may fall into such market would be indeed substitutable from a 
demand -side point of view.  This assessment  is supported by competitors of Thermo 
Fisher responding to the market investigation, of which a majority submit that 
biologic al safety cabinets and CO2 incubators belong to different product markets.61 
For the purpose of this case, this question can be left open in any event, as an affected 
market would only arise for the plausible narrower market of CO2 incubators, for 
which the  Commission has carried out an assessment.  
(80) Further, all customers expressing  an opinion in the market investigation consider all 
CO2 incubators part of the same product market.62 Responses from competitors, in 
turn, are mixed in this regard. One competitor  points at the existence of “specialty 
incubators that are not readily substituted for other types ”.63 Other than that, the 
Commission received no indication of plausible sub -segments of the CO2 incubator 
product market. Specifically, customers and competitors did not raise concerns related 
to specific types of CO2 incubators in the market investigation, which further supports 
the conclusion of a CO2 incubator product market without further segmentation.   
(81) In light of the above, the Commission conside rs appropriate to define the product 
market as CO2 incubators for the purpose of this Decision.  
5.2.3.2.  Relevant geographic market  definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(82) The Commission has not defined a geographic market for CO2 incubators in the past. 
In M.4242 – Thermo Electron / Fisher Scientific , the Commission assu med generally 
EEA-wide markets for the products covered by that decision, which includes 
laboratory equipment in general, but noted “it cannot be excluded that at least for 
some products affecte d by the transaction […], the relevant geographic market should 
be defined at national instead of EEA -wide level. ” The geographic market definition 
for all products was ultimately left open.64 The Commission did not discuss a 
geographic market for the produ ction of CO2 incubators specifically, nor did it 
suggest that CO2 incubators would be among the products for which the geographic 
market would be narrower than EEA -wide.65 
                                                 
60  Reply to question 38 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
61  Reply to question 29 of questionnaire Q2 t o Thermo Fisher competitors.  
62  Reply to question 39 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
63  Replies to question 30 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors . 
64  Case M.4242 – Thermo Electron / Fisher Scientific , paragraph  35 et seq.  
65  The decision lists market shares for the production of CO2 incubators at national level to discuss a potential 
input foreclosure of downstream laboratory equipment distributors, for which the Commission considered 
the geographic market to be national.  
 
 
18 (B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(83) The Notifying Party submits that the market for the produ ction of CO2 incubators, 
and more generally cell growths, protection and separation equipment instruments 
should be considered at least EEA -wide, because  (i) suppliers typically locate their 
manufacturing facilities in a small number of locations, from whi ch the products are 
shipped worldwide. Thermo Fisher typically manufactures these products at a small 
number or sites and ships globally;  (ii) there are no country -specific technical 
standards or regulatory differences within the EEA;  (iii) n umerous competitors to a 
global customer base;  (iv) price dynamics would be the sam e globally.66 
(C) The Commission’s assessment  
(84) The Commission notes that all customers expressing  an opinion in the market 
investigation submit t hat they  source CO2 incubators at either EEA or global level.67 
Similarly, competitors predominantly point at a global or EEA wide geographic 
market for CO2 incubators, and no competitor submitted that the market should be 
narrower than EEA -wide.68 
(85) In light of the a bove, the Commission considers that the market for CO2 incubators is 
EEA-wide or global in geographic scope.  
5.2.4.  Chromatography instruments and columns   
(86) Chromatography is a separation technique based on the different distribution of the 
constituents of a mixt ure between two phases, one of which moves relative to the 
other. The moving phase is referred to as the mobile phase, while the other is referred 
to as the stationary phase. This technique is therefore used to separate a mixture of 
compounds in analytical  chemistry and biochemistry so as to identify, quantify or 
purify the individual components of the mixture.  
(87) The chromatography process requires the use of instruments in combination with 
consumables. Key consumables used in chromatography are chromatograph y 
columns, which are containers holding the resin and/or silica (which is the stationary 
phase) in which the chromatography process takes place when plugged into the 
instrument. The resin can be of different material, depending on the nature of the 
separat ion. 
5.2.4.1.   Relevant product market definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(88) Concerning chromatography instruments, in previous decisions the Commission 
found that liquid chromatography instruments are to be assessed separately from gas 
chromatography instrument s. Within liquid chromatography instruments, the 
Commission found that ion chromatograph y instrument s form a separate product 
market. Furthermore, the Commission found that liquid chromatography could be 
                                                 
66  Form CO, para graph  260 et seq.  
67  Replies to question  
68  Replies to question 31 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors . 
 
 
19 further segmented in the following segments, but lef t the exact market definition 
open:69 
(a) High pressure liquid chromatography (“HPLC”), with possible sub -segments:  
– Analytical HPLC;  
– Nano -LC; 
– Ultra -HPLC;  
– Preparation HPLC;  
– Gel permeation / size exclusion chromatography; and  
– Amino acid analyser systems.  
(b) Low pre ssure liquid chromatography (“LPLC”);  
(c) Supercritical fluid chromatography; and  
(d) Flash chromatography.  
(89) The Commission found that chromatography consumables constitute a separate 
market from chromatography instruments, which include (i) columns, (ii) vials and  
(iii) reagents and consumables.70 Within columns, the Commission found that there 
are separate markets for pre -filled columns and non -pre-filled columns. Pre -filled 
columns are sold pre -filled with resins, while non -pre-filled columns are sold without 
resin and can be filled with resin by  the customer.71 Thermo Fisher is only active in 
pre-filled columns. Within resins, the Commission found that there are separate 
markets for (i) protein A resins, (ii) other affinity resins, (iii) ion -exchange resins and 
(iv) mixed mode resins.72 In the case  of columns pre -filled with resin, which are 
columns pre -filled with a specific resin, this distinction can be applied to the pre -filled 
columns.  
(B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(90) The Notifying  Party  follows the Commission’s previous decisional practice 
concerni ng chromatography instruments and columns, and submits that the exact 
scope of the relevant product markets can be left open.73  
(C) The Commission’s assessment  
(91) The Commission’s market investigation did not give reason to depart  from the 
Commission’s previous decisional practice with regard to the product market 
                                                 
69  Case M.6126 – Thermo Fisher / Dionex Corporation , paragraphs 10 -19. 
70  Case M.6126 – Thermo Fisher / Dionex  Corporation , paragraphs 32 -34. 
71  Case M.9331 – Danaher / GE Healthcare Life Sciences Biopharma , paragraph 370.  
72  Case M.9331 – Danaher / GE Healthcare Life Sciences Biopharma , paragraph  374. 
73  Form CO, paragraphs 454, 470 and 500.  
 
 
20 definition for chromatography instruments and columns. Applying these product 
market definitions, the Transaction gives rise to vertically affected markets for (i ) ion 
chromatography instruments and (ii) pre-filled ion chromatography columns , i.e. 
chromatography columns pre -filled with ion exchange resin . 
5.2.4.2.  Relevant g eographic market definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(92) In its previous decisions, the Commission found tha t the relevant geographic market 
for liquid chromatography instruments (which includes ion chromatography 
instruments) and chromatography consumables (which includes pre -filled ion 
chromatography columns) are EEA -wide or worldwide in scope. It left the exa ct 
market definition open.74 
(B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(93) The Notifying Party submits that the relevant geographic market for chromatography 
instruments and consumables and any of its relevant segments is at least EEA -wide 
because : 75  
(a) Suppliers typically locate their manufacturing facilities in a small number of 
locations, from which the products are shipped worldwide ; 
(b) There are no country -specific technical standards or regulatory differences 
within the EEA ; 
(c) There are numerous competitors that offer chrom atography consumables to a 
global customer base and supply different types of chromatography 
consumables worldwide and within the EEA in competition with Thermo 
Fisher ; 
(d) Price is negotiated on an individual customer basis or based on a standard 
price list, but price dynamics are the same globally . 
(94) The Notifying Party further submits that the exact scope of the relevant geographic 
market can be left open  between EEA -wide and worldwide, because the Transaction 
does not give rise to competitive concerns under e ither geographic scope .76 
(C) The Commission’s assessment  
(95) For the purpose of the present Decision, and in line with the Commission’s previous 
decisional practice, the relevant geographic product market can be left open between 
EEA-wide and worldwide for ion ch romatography instruments and pre -filled ion 
chromatography columns, as  this distinction does not affect the outcome of the 
competitive assessment . 
                                                 
74  Case M.6126 – Thermo Fisher / Dionex Corporation , paragraph 48 and case M.9331 – Danaher / GE 
Healthcare Life Sciences Biopharma , paragraph 381.  
75  Form CO, paragraphs 456 -457, 471 and 501 -502. 
76  Form CO, paragraph 457, 472 and 503.  
 
 
21 5.2.5.  Electrophoresis gels  
(96) Electrophoresis as a technique  is a nucleic acid purification technique, which  aims to 
separate molecules, such as DNA, RNA or proteins based on their size, density, and 
charge through the differential movement of charged molecules in an electric field. It 
is used for purification, quality control or analytical purposes within different 
applications. There are two major types of electrophoresis: gel electrophoresis and 
capillary electrophoresis.  In gel electrophoresis, samples are loaded into wells at one 
end of a gel slab, and by applying an electric field, molecules separate across the gel.  
Gel electrophoresis can be sub -divided into horizontal and vertical gel electrophoresis. 
While horizontal gel electrophoresis is typically used for DNA and RNA, vertical gel 
electrophoresis is typically used for proteins.  Gels can either be purchased prec ast by 
the supplier, or in self -pourable form, called DIY gels.  
(97) Supporting this process are molecular weight standards (also referred to as molecular 
weight size ladders or markers) which are used to identify the approximate size of a 
molecule ( e.g. DNA or  RNA) run on a gel during electrophoresis.  
5.2.5.1.  Relevant product market definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(98) Among nucleic acid purification techniques,  of which gel electrophoresis is an 
example , the Commission previously identified separate markets for (i ) liquid -based 
instruments, (ii) column -based instruments,  (iii) magnetic bead -based instruments , 
and (iv) electrophoresis gel boxes. Within  gel electrophoresis consumables, the same 
case identified a separate market for molecular weight standards (DNA ladders).77 The 
Commission has not reviewed the other main gel electrophoresis consumable, 
electrophoresis gels , in detail  in the past . 
(B) The Noti fying Party’s view  
(99) The Notifying Party submits that a distinction can be made between agarose gels, 
which  are the most used type  of horizontal electrophoresis gels,  and acrylamide gels, 
which are the most used type of gel for vertical gel electrophoresis. Both types can be 
sub-segmented in pre -cast gels and do it yourself (“DIY”) gels.78 
(100)  Despite  the above differences, the Notifying Party argues that there is significant 
supply -side substitutability, as most manufacturers supply consumables for both 
horizonta l and vertical gel electrophoresis. Ultimately, the Notifying Party considers 
that the exact market definition can be left open as the Transaction does not give rise 
to competitive concerns under any product market definition.  
(C) The Commission’s assessment  
(101)  The market investigation gave no reason to depart from the Commission’s previous 
decisional practice concerning a separate market for molecular weight standards  
within gel electrophoresis consumables . 
                                                 
77  Case M.6944 – Thermo Fisher / Life Technologies , paragraphs 178 -183. 
78  Form CO, paragraphs 556 -557. 
 
 
22 (102)  Concerning a di stinction  between gels and molecular wei ght ladders for horizontal 
and vertical gel electrophoresis, the product market definition can be left open, as this 
distinction does not affect the outcome of the competitive assessment . The same 
applies for a potential distinction between pre -cast and DI Y gels.  
(103)  For the purpose of the present Decision, the Commission will perform its assessment 
on the basis of the narrowe st product markets  in which Thermo Fisher is primarily 
active , i.e. (i) precast protein gels for vertical gel electrophoresis  and (ii) 
molecular weight standards for vertical gel electrophoresis . The Transaction does 
not give rise to any affected markets for horizontal gel electrophoresis or DIY gels  
and it can be left open whether the appropriate product market would be broader ( i.e. 
including precast and DIY gels, or including horizontal and vertical gels / molecular 
weight standards)  as this distinction does not affect the outcome of the competitive 
assessmen t. 
5.2.5.2.  Relevant g eographic market  definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(104)  In its previous decisional practice, the Commission considered that the appropriate 
geographic scope for DNA ladders and markers is at least EEA -wide.79 
(B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(105)  The Parties submit that any relevant product markets for gel electrophoresis 
consumables are global or at least EEA -wide in scope but considers that the exact 
geographic scope can be left open as the Transaction does not give rise to competitive 
concerns under either geographic scope.80 
(C) The Commission’s assessment  
(106)  For the purpose of th e current decision and in line with its previous decisional 
practice, the exact geographic scope for precast protein gels for vertical gel 
electrophoresis and molecular weight standards for vertical gel electrophoresis  can be 
left open between EEA -wide and  worldwide, as this distinction does not affect the 
outcome of the competitive assessmen t. 
5.2.6.  Cell culture sera  
(107)  Cell culture sera a re liquid blood -based animal products that are used to grow cells in 
both research and bio -production applications.  
                                                 
79  Case M.5263 – Invitrogen / Applied Biosystems , paragraph 68 and case M.6944 – Thermo Fisher / Life 
Technologies , paragraphs 184 -186. 
80  Form CO, paragraphs 560 -563. 
 
 
23 5.2.6.1.  Relevant product market definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(108)  In M.6944 – Thermo Fisher Scientific / Life Technologies , the Commission found a 
likely segmentation of the sera market on the basis of three criteria. First , on the basis 
of the customer groups to wh ich the product is supplied, sera can be divided into sera 
sold to bio -production customers and sera sold to the research sector, as differences 
exist in terms of purchasing patterns, pricing and expected quality. Second , a 
segmentation can be made on the basis of animal type, i.e. FSB (foetal bovine serum), 
calf sera, bovine adult sera and other species, as those sera would fulfil different 
needs.  
(109)  Third , sera can be segmented on the basis of their geographic origin, into (i) a 
potential product market enc ompassing sera from Australia, (ii) a potential product 
market encompassing sera from New Zealand, (iii) a potential product market 
encompassing sera from Australia and New Zealand, (iv) a potential product market 
encompassing sera from the US, (v) a poten tial product market encompassing sera 
from Canada, (vi) a potential product market encompassing sera from the US and 
Canada, and (vii) a potential product market encompassing sera from South American 
countries (EU approved).81 
(B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(110)  The Notifying Party submits that customers in the area of research would have, in 
many circumstances, the flexibility to substitute among sera from different 
geographies. However, it ultimately considers that the exact product market definition 
can be left op en, as no concerns arise under any plausible market definition.82 
(C) The Commission’s assessment  
(111)  The market investigation gave no reason to depart from the Commission’s previous 
decisional practice. The Commission notes that, for the assessment of this case, only 
sera for research purposes are relevant, as PPD uses sera exclusively for research 
purposes.83 For the purpose of this decision, the Commission will further consider a 
segmentation of sera based on animal type and based on geographic origin, as detaile d 
in paragraphs (108)  and (109) .  
                                                 
81  Case M.6944 – Therm o Fisher Scientific / Life Technologies , paragraphs  45 et seq. Based on this market 
definition, the Commission looked at cell culture sera and media in Case M.8541 - Thermo Fisher Scientific 
/ Patheon , paragraphs 12 et seq., where the exact market definition was left open.  
82  Form CO, paragraphs  298 et seq.  
83  Form CO, paragraph 297.  
 
 
24 5.2.6.2.  Relevant g eographic market  definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(112)  In M.6944 – Thermo Fisher Scientific / Life Technologies , the Commission 
considered EEA -wide or global markets for sera, but ultimately left the exact market 
definition open.84 
(B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(113)  The Notifying Party appears to consider sera markets to be either EEA -wide or global 
in scope, but submits th at the exact market definition can be left open, as no concerns 
would arise under any plausible market definition.85 
(C) The Commission’s assessment  
(114)  In the market investigation, manufacturers and distributors confirmed that the 
geographic market for sera is glo bal or at least EEA -wide in scope.86 Further, the 
market investigation did not give reason to depart from the Commission’s previous 
decisional practice. For the purpose of this decision, the geographic market for sera 
will therefore be defined as global or EEA-wide. 
5.2.7.  Cell culture media  
(115)  Cell culture media are water -based liquids that are used to facilitate the growth of 
cells. It can be provided in liquid or in dry powder format.  
5.2.7.1.  Relevant product market definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(116)  In M.6944 – Thermo Fisher Scientific / Life Technologies , the Commission found a 
likely segmentation of the cell culture media market on the basis of four criteria. First , 
on the basis of the customer groups to which the product is supplied, media can be 
divided into media sold to bio -production customers and media sold to the research 
sector, as differences exist in terms of purchasing patterns, pricing and expected 
quality. Second , a segmentation can be made between liquid and dry media, as there 
would be significant  differences between those two forms in terms of pricing, 
performance, suitability, purchasing patterns and equipment required for their 
production.  
(117)  Third , media can be divided into a potential product market encompassing standard 
basal media, a potential  market for custom media, and a potential market for 
proprietary media. Fourth , media can be divided into chemically defined and non -
chemically defined media. Finally, the Commission found that process liquids appear 
                                                 
84  Case M.6944 – Thermo Fisher Scientific / Life Technologies , paragraph  52 et seq.  
85  Form CO, paragraphs 300 and 301.  
86  Replies to question 70 of questionnaire Q2 t o Thermo Fisher competitors . 
 
 
25 to form a product market distinct from media for cell culture. The exact product 
market defin ition was ultimately left open.87 
(B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(118)  The Notifying Party follow the Commission’s past practice  and submit that the exact 
scope of the relevant product market can be left open.88 
(C) The Commission’s assessment  
(119)  The market investigation provided indication s that media for bio -production and 
media for research may be substitutable at least for some purposes, as submitted by a 
majority of customers.89 The Commission notes that business acti vities of respondents 
to this market investigation focus on research. As one customer pointed out that media 
for bio -production may need to fulfil higher quality standards90, it may be that media 
for research purposes can be substituted by media for bio -production, but not vice 
versa .  
(120)  The Commission notes that PPD uses media for research purposes,91 and that an 
assessment of media for bio -production is therefore not relevant. For the purpose of 
this Decision , and in line with past practice, the Commission will assess a separate 
market for research media, and a potential segmentation by liquid and dry media as 
well as by standard basal media, custom media, proprietary media, as well as 
chemically defined and non -chemically defined media. It will further asse ss a distinct 
product market for process liquids. In any event, the exact product market definition 
can be left open, as this does not affect the outcome of the competitive assessment.  
5.2.7.2.  Relevant geographic market  decisions  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(121)  In M.6944 – Thermo Fisher Scientific / Life Technologies , the Commission 
considered EEA -wide or global markets for media, but ultimately left the exact 
market definition open.92 
(B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(122)  The Notifying Party submits that the relevant geographic market for cell culture 
media was considered in Thermo Fisher Scientific  / Life Technologies and it was left 
open. The market investigation showed that manufacturers processed the relevant 
products a t centrali sed sites, and products were subsequently shipped from sites to 
regional distribution hubs around the world, and EEA and non -EEA customers had 
the same preferences and technical/commercial needs, thus, supporting a view that the 
market for media products is global or, in any event, at least EEA -wide. Since the 
                                                 
87  Case M.6944 – Thermo Fisher Scientific / Life Technologies , paragraph  20 et seq.  
88  Form CO, paragraph  321 et seq.  
89  Replies to question 89 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
90  Replies to question 89.1 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers . 
91  Form CO, paragraph 317.  
92  Case M.6944 – Thermo Fisher Scientific / Life Technologies , paragraph  31 et seq.  
 
 
26 Transaction does not raise competitive concerns under any plausible geographic 
delineation, the Parties submit that the exact scope of the relevant geographic market 
can be left open .93 
(C) The C ommission’s assessment  
(123)  In the market investigation, manufacturers and distributors confirmed that the 
geographic market for media  is global or at least EEA -wide in scope.94 Further, the 
market investigation did not give reason to depart from the Commission’ s previous 
decisional practice. For the purpose of this Decision , the geographic market for media 
will therefore be left open between  global and EEA-wide.  
5.2.8.  Plastics for magnetic bead -based instruments  
(124)  As discussed in paragraph (98), magnetic bead -based instruments are a technique for 
nucleic acid purification.  In magnetic bead -based purification, a liquid sample is 
combined with magnetic beads. The separation solutio n causes the desired particle to 
bind to the beads. The beads are then separated from the liquids by magnetic force. 
The beads containing the bound particles are then washed and the desired particles are 
released from the beads. Finally, the magnetic beads  are removed and discarded.  
(125)  Magnetic bead -based instruments require consumables, primarily reagents and plastic 
consumables. The primary plastic consumables used with magnetic bead -based 
instruments are microplates and tip combs. Plastic microplates are in teroperable with 
magnetic bead -based instruments of different manufacturers as well as other 
laboratory instruments.  
5.2.8.1.  Relevant product market definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(126)  As set out in paragraph (98), the Commission has previously found a separate market 
for magnetic bead -based instruments.95 The Commission has never specifically 
assessed the area of plastics for magnetic bead -based instruments. However, in a 
previous decision  it concluded that there was a p roduct market for microplates,96 
without distinguishing the type of instrument the microplates could be used with.97 
(B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(127)  The Notifying Party submits that the definition of the relevant  product market for 
plastic for magnetic bead -based inst ruments can be left open.98 
                                                 
93  Form CO, paragraph  324 et seq.  
94  Replies to question 70 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors . 
95  Case M.6944 – Thermo Fisher / Life Technologies , paragraphs 178 -180. 
96  Microplates and tip combs are plastic trays that hold samples.   
97  Case M.4242 – Thermo Electron  / Fisher Scientific , paragraph 23. 
98  Form CO, paragraph 408.  
 
 
27 (C) The Commission’s assessment  
(128)  For the purpose of the current Decision, the exact product market definition for 
plastics for magnetic bead -based instruments  can be left open, a s the Transaction does 
not give rise to competitive concerns with respect to this market for any plausible 
product market definition. For the purpose of the current Decision, the Commission 
will analyse the narrower market of plastics for magnetic bead -based instruments . 
A broader product market for all consumables for magnetic bead -based instruments 
would not be affected . 
5.2.8.2.  Relevant g eographic market  definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(129)  In the Thermo Electron / Fisher Scientific decision, the Commission left open the 
relevant geographic market definition for microplates and tip combs.99 In a more 
recent  decision, the Commission concluded that the appropriate geographic scope for 
the relevant markets related to nucleic acid purification  are at least EEA -wide, but left 
the exact market definition open.100  
(B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(130)  The Notifying Party further submits that the appropriate geographic market definition 
is most likely global as  (i) prices for plastics for magnetic bead -based i nstruments do 
not differ substantially by region, (ii) transport costs are low, and (iii) customers in the 
EEA often source plastics for magnetic bead -based instruments from other 
geographies . However, as it considers that  the Transaction does not raise co mpetitive 
concerns under any plausible geographic delineation, the Notifying Party submit s that 
the exact scope of the relevant geographic market can be left open .101 
(C) The Commission’s assessment  
(131)  For the purpose of the current Decision and in line with its pr evious decisional 
practice, the exact geographic scope for plastics for magnetic bead -based instruments  
can be left open between EEA -wide and worldwide, as this distinction does not affect 
the outcome of the competitive assessmen t. 
5.2.9.  Mass spectrometers  
(132)  Mass spectrometry products are used to separate compounds into their separate 
component parts and to detect the separated components . Mass spectrometers can be 
used in conjunction  with methods that separate the constituent molecules of a sample 
before they  are introduced in the mass spectrometer, including liquid chromatography 
and gas chromatography instruments .102 High-resolution accurate mass (“HRAM”) 
spectrometers are used primarily for qualitative research characterising complex 
                                                 
99  Case M.4242 – Thermo Electron  / Fisher Scientific , paragraph 40.  
100  Case M.5264 – Invitrogen / Applied Biosystems , paragraphs 67 -68. 
101  Form CO, para graphs  409-413. 
102  Form CO, paragraphs 521 et seq.  
 
 
28 molecules or identifying proteins, for example in th e discovery of new drug targets , 
because of their high resolution .103 
5.2.9.1.  Relevant product market definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(133)  In M.5611 – Agilent / Varian , the Commission found that within the mass -
spectrometry (“MS”) field, a segmentation can be made based on the respective 
analytical technic used, i.e. gas chromatography (“GC”) and liquid chromatography 
(“LC”), and has considered combined GC -MS and LC -MS markets.104 In M.6126 – 
Thermo Fisher / Dionex Corporations , the Commi ssion found appropriate to assess 
chromatography and spectrometry instruments separately, but noted again that mass 
spectrometry instruments used with liquid chromatography are not substitutable with 
those used in gas chromatography.105 In M.8541 - Thermo Fi sher Scientific / Patheon,  
the Commission left the market definition open in this regard.106 In none of the 
decisions cited in this paragraph, the Commission discussed a separate market for 
HRAM spectrometers.  
(B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(134)  The Notifying Party indicates that there may be a separate market for HRAM 
spectrometers.107 It further submits that HRAM spectrometers used with liquid 
chromatography would generally not be interchangeable with HRAM spectrometers 
used with gas chromatography, and that both dev ices would be technically different. 
On this basis, it may be possible to define separate product markets for HRAM LC 
and HRAM GC spectrometers.108 The Notifying Party submits that the precise market 
definition for mass spectrometry instruments can ultimately be left open .109  
(C) The Commission’s assessment  
(135)  Qualitative feedback from the market investigation substantiates the Notifying Party’s 
claim that within the market for all mass spectrometers, there may be a distinct market 
for HRAM spectrometers, as  the level of analytical capability of such device may play 
an important role in their suitability to laboratories.110 
(136)  Further, the market investigation did not provide reason to deviate from past practice 
to define separate product markets for LC and GC mas s spectrometers. In the view of 
the Commission, this differentiation may also apply to HRAM spectrometers, which 
is confirmed by the Notifying Party.  
                                                 
103  Form CO, paragraph 525.  
104  Case M.5611 – Agilent/Varian , paragraphs 10 et seq.  
105  Case M.6126 – Thermo Fisher/Dionex Corporation , paragrap hs 22 et seq.  
106  Case M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific / Patheon , paragraph 29.  
107  Form CO, paragraph 533.  
108  Respon se to RFI 13, paragraph 1.  
109  Form CO, paragraph  533. 
110  Replies to question 56.1 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers . 
 
 
29 (137)  Based on the above, the Commission considers that mass spectrometry instruments 
for LC and GC f orm differe nt product market s, and considers a likely existence of a 
separate HRAM market  for both products for the purpose of this Decision. The 
Commission notes that affected markets would only arise for LC HRAM 
spectrometers111, but not for LC or GC mass spectromete rs, and not on an overall 
market for mass spectrometry instruments.  
5.2.9.2.  Relevant g eographic market  definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(138)  In M.5611 – Agilent / Varian , the Commission concluded that markets for mass 
spectrometry instruments are EEA -wide in geographic scope.112 In Thermo 
Fisher/Dionex  and M.8541 - Thermo Fisher Scientific / Patheon , the Commission left 
the precise geographic market open, but considered markets to be at least EEA -wide. 
113 
(B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(139)  The Notifying Party submits that the exact scope of the relevant geographic market 
can be left open since no competitive concerns arise under any plausible geographic 
definition.114 
(C) The Commission’s assessment  
(140)  In the market investigation, a majority of customers and competitors indicat ed that the 
geographic market definition for mass spectrometers is global, and all other 
respondents considered markets to be EEA -wide.115 For the purpose of this Decision, 
the geographic market definition can be left open between global and EEA -wide.  
5.2.10.   Cryo genic storage tubes  
(141)  Storage tubes are a piece of consumable laboratory equipment that are used to store or 
keep samples. Cryogenic storage tubes (also freezers storage tubes) are small, capped 
tubes designed to withstand ultra -low temperatures.  
5.2.10.1.  Relevant product market definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(142)  The Commission has not defined a product market for cryogenic storage tubes, or 
storage tubes in general, in the past. In M.4242  – Thermo Electron / Fisher Scientific , 
the Commission made reference to “cryogenic storage” as a product in the broader 
                                                 
111  PPD [PPD’s operations ], response to RFI 13, paragraph 4.  
112  Case M.5611 – Agilent/Varian , paragraphs 51 et seq. 
113  Case M.6126 – Thermo Fisher/Dionex Corporation , paragraph 42; Case M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific 
/ Patheon , paragraph 34.  
114  Form CO, paragraph 535.  
115  Replies to question 52 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers; Replies to question 41 
of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors . 
 
 
30 area of laboratory equipment and consumables, but did not consider this product any 
further .116 
(B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(143)  The Notifying Party submits storage tubes could be d ifferentiated according to various 
characteristics, such as size, durability and ability to withstand ultra -low 
temperatures .117 There would be, however, a significant degree of supply and 
demand -side substitutability between different storage tubes. In the Notifying Parties 
view, the primary feature on which storage tubes can be meaningfully distinguished is 
the tubes’ ability to withstand ultra -low temperatures. Therefore, a potential 
segmentation may be made between cryogenic storage tubes and transport tu bes. 
However, for the present case, the exact market definition can be left open, as neither 
a potential segment for transport tubes, nor a potential wider market including 
cryogenic storage tubes and other types of tubes, would be affected.  
(C) The Commissio n’s assessment  
(144)  The market investigation confirmed that cryogenic storage tubes are a product market 
separate from other storage tubes because they cannot be substituted with other tubes 
due to their product specifies, i.e. their ability to withstand ultra -low temperatures. 
Market feedback did not suggest a further segmentation of cryogenic storage tubes  to 
be appropriate . All customers responding to the market investigation agree that 
cryogenic storage tubes form a separate product market from other storage  tubes 
without further segmentation.118 All but one manufacturer or distributor of such tubes 
confirm that view.119 Based on the above, the Commission considers a separate 
market for cryogenic storage tubes without further segmentation for the purpose of 
this Decision.  
5.2.10.2.  Relevant g eographic  market  decisions  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(145)  The Commission has not defined a product market for cryogenic storage tubes, or 
storage tubes in general, in the past.  
(B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(146)  The Notifying Party submits that the relevant market for cryogenic storage tubes is 
global, or at least EEA -wide in scope  because  cryogenic storage tubes are identical 
wherever customers are located. There are no country -specific or region -specific 
products and there is no regional branding or packaging.120 
                                                 
116  Case M.4242 – Thermo Electron / Fisher Scientific , paragraph 11 .  
117  Form CO, paragraph  709 et seq.  
118  Replies to question 104 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service pro viders.  
119  Replies to question 83 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors; one respondent point at a 
potentially narrower product market definition, without suggesting a clear further segmentation.  
120  Form CO, paragraph  713 et seq.  
 
 
31 (C) The Commission’s assessment  
(147)  The market investigation indicated that the market for cryogenic storage tubes is 
global or at least EEA -wide in geographic scope. A majority of customers consider 
global market for such tubes, and all ot her customers responding to the market 
investigation submit geographic markets to be EEA -wide.121 This view is confirmed 
by all manufacturers or distributors responding to the market investigation who 
formed an opinion about this question.122 Therefore, the Co mmission concludes that 
the geographic market for cryogenic storage tubes is global or EEA -wide, and leaves 
the exact market definition open between the two.  
5.2.11.  General purpose benchtop centrifuges  
(148)  A laboratory centrifuge is a piece of laboratory equipment, driven by a motor, which 
spins liquid samples at high speeds, to separate substances of greater and lesser 
density. Centrifuges may differ with respect to parameters such as size, sample 
capacity or speed.  
5.2.11.1.  Relevant product market definition  
(A) Previous Commis sion decisions  
(149)  The Commission did not define markets for  laboratory centrifuges in the past.  
(B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(150)  The Notifying Party submits that laboratory centrifuges can be differentiated 
according to various characteristics, such as size, spee d or space requirements. It 
considers that three main centrifuges can be distinguished, namely benchtop, floor and 
large scale continuous flow centrifuges, for which there would be limited demand -
side substitutability, but a significant degree of supply -side substitutability.  
(151)  The Notifying Party considers that benchtop centrifuges are an established category of 
laboratory equipment and well understood  by market participants. In any event, the 
exact product market definition can be left open, as no affected  market would arise in 
a potential broader market compris ing all laboratory centrifuges.123 
(C) The Commission’s assessment  
(152)  The market investigation confirmed that general purpose benchtop centrifuges form a 
product market separate from other centrifuges such as floor centrifuges or large scale 
continuous flow centrifuges, as these would typically not be substituted with each 
                                                 
121  Replies to q uestion 105 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
122  Replies to question 84 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  
123  For completeness, the Notifying Party notes that Thermo Fisher manufactures other types of centrifuges f or 
which market shares exceed 30% on global and/or EEA wide level, but remain in any case below 50% 
market share, namely large capacity centrifuges, super speed centrifuges, which are all floor centrifuges, 
and industrial centrifuges, which are ultra -speed  centrifuges with a higher capacity. The Notifying Party 
provides that PPD [PPD’s operations ]. In any event, during the market investigation, the Commission asked 
customers or competitors for their view on any other type of centrifuges, and no market participant raised 
any concern. In  the light of the above, those products will not be further discussed in the present Decision.  
 
 
32 other. All customers responding to the market investigation agree to this product 
market definition, and do not suggest that the market for general purpose benchtop 
centrifuges should be further segmented.124 All but one manufacturer or distributor of 
such ce ntrifuges confirm that view. One competitor suggest s that the market may be 
further segmented by capacity and/or intended use, for example blood sample 
centrifuges, cell culture or mini -spin centrifuges.125 
(153)  Based on market feedback on balance, the Commission  considers a separate market 
for general purpose benchtop centrifuges without further segmentation. Th is 
conclusion is further supported by the fact that customers or competitors did not raise 
concerns related to a specific type of general purpose benchtop  centrifuges.  
5.2.11.2.  Relevant g eographic market  definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(154)  The Commission did not define geographic markets for general purpose benchtop 
centrifuges in the past.  
(B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(155)  The Notifying Party submits that the relevan t market for general purpose centrifuges, 
and in general, all laboratory centrifuges, is global, or at least EEA -wide in scope.126 
General purpose centrifuges are identical wherever customers are located and similar 
models of general purpose centrifuges are being marketed globally.127 
(C) The Commission’s assessment  
(156)  The market investigation indicated that the market for general purpose benchtop 
centrifuges  is EEA-wide or even global in geographic scope. A small majority of 
customers consider an EEA-wide market for such centrifuges , and all other but one 
customers responding to the market investigation submit geographic markets to be 
global .128 A majority of responding manufacturers or distributors responding to the 
market investigation who formed an opinion about this question propose global 
markets for such centrifuges, and all other respondents point at EEA -wide markets.129 
Therefore, the Commi ssion concludes that the geographic market for general purpose 
benchtop centrifuges  is EEA -wide or even global, and leaves the exact market 
definition open between the two.  
5.2.12.   Thermal cyclers  
(157)  Thermal cyclers are used in a process called nucleic acid amplifi cation, which refers 
to the technologies designed for amplifying (copying) targeted DNA or RNA 
                                                 
124  Replies to question 99 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
125  Replies to question 78 of questionna ire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  
126  Form CO, paragraph 693.  
127  Form CO, paragraphs 694 et seq.  
128  Replies to question 100 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers; the other customer 
did not provide clear indication for an alternative geographic market definition.  
129  Replies to question 79 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  
 
 
33 sequences to allow further analysis. Nucleic acid  amplification is most commonly 
achieved by a technique called  polymerase chain reaction ( “PCR ”).  
(158)  There are var ious types of PCR including  conventional (or  end-point) PCR ( “ePCR ”), 
quantitative PCR ( “qPCR ”) and digital PCR ( “dPCR ”).130 
(159)  A thermal cycler (also known as an ePCR instrument) comprises a heating block with 
holes into which tubes holding the reagents can be  placed. The cycler increases and 
lowers the temperature of the block in discrete, pre -programmed steps, each of which 
aligns with a cycle of the reaction. The cycle is the repeated multiple times to create 
the required sample size.131 
5.2.12.1.   Relevant product mark et definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(160)  In a previous decision, the Commission defined separate markets for nucleic acid 
amplification for research and diagnostic applications.132 Furthermore, the 
Commission found that there are separate markets for PCR reagents and instruments, 
and that within instruments, there are separate markets for thermal cyclers (ePCR 
instruments)  and qPCR instruments.133 
(B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(161)  For the purposes of the Transaction, the Notifying Party agrees with the 
Commission’s  previous decisional practice as concerns thermal cyclers.134 
(C) The Commission’s assessment  
(162)  The Commission’s market investigation did not give any reasons to depart from the 
Commission’s previous decisional practice with respect to the product market 
definitio n for PCR instruments. Applying this product market definition, the 
Transaction gives rise to an affected market for thermal cyclers (ePCR 
instruments) . 
5.2.12.2.   Relevant g eographic  market  definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(163)  In its previous decisions, the Commission considered that the appropriate geographic 
scope for thermal cyclers is at least EEA -wide, but left the exact market definition 
open.135 
                                                 
130  qPCR, also  called real -time or quantitative PCR, m onitors the amplification of a targeted DN A molecule 
during the reaction and not at its end,  as in conventional PCR  (ePCR) . Digital PCR or dPCR digitally 
measures the number of individual target molecules.  
131  Form CO , paragraph 747  et seq.  
132  Case M.5264 – Invitrogen / Applied Biosystems , paragraph 51.  
133  Case M.5264 – Invitrogen / Applied Biosystems , paragraph 51 and case M.6944 – Thermo Fisher / Life 
Technologies , paragraph 125 . 
134  Form CO, paragraph 754.  
 
 
34 (B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(164)  The Notifying Party submits that the relevant market for thermal cyclers is global,  or 
at least EEA -wide in scope. As they are identical around the world, there is no 
regional branding or packaging, they are not generally subject to national regulatory 
requirements and most manufacturers are able to supply globally.136 
(C) The Commission’s ass essment  
(165)  For the purpose of the current decision and in line with its previous decisional 
practice, the exact geographic scope for plastics for thermal cycler s can be left open 
between EEA -wide and worldwide, as this distinction does not affect the outcome of 
the competitive assessment . 
5.2.13.  Infrared spectrometers  
(166)  Spectrometers are used for recording and measuring spectra as a method of analysis. 
There are broadly three types of spectrometers, namely (i) mass spectroscopy, (ii) 
molecular spectroscopy, and (iii) atomic spectroscopy. One technology within 
molecular spectroscopy is infrared spectroscopy (“IR”). In IR spectrometry, a beam of 
infrared radiation intersects with and is absorbed by an unknown sample. The 
absorption rates are unique to the properties of t he chemical group being analysed, 
and the results can be compared to a library of known IR spectra . FT-IR (also Fourier 
Transform IR) are a type of IR spectrometers with a high degree of efficiency .137 
5.2.13.1.  Relevant product market definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(167)  In M.5611 – Agilent / Varian , the Commission identified nine sectors  within the 
analytical and life science instrumentation field, one of th em being molecular 
spectroscopy, without further discussing this product area.138 In M. 6175 – Danaher / 
Beckman Coulter , the Commission noted that molecular spectroscopy can be further 
segmented into visible and ultraviolet -visible (Vis and UV -Vis), near -infrared (NIR), 
infrared (IR) fluorescence & luminescence, colour measurement, nuclear m agnetic 
resonance (NMR), raman, polarimetry & refractometry, and ellipsometry.139 
(B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(168)  The Notifying Party submits that the market for IR spectrometers should not be 
further segmented . It further notes , however,  that FT-IR spectrometers  are the 
dominant form in the IR spectrometers field, and that market shares of Thermo Fisher 
                                                                                                                                                        
135  Case M.5264 – Invitrogen / Applied Biosystems , paragraph 68 and case M.6944 – Thermo Fisher / Life 
Technologies , paragraph 140 . 
136  Form CO, paragraphs 756 -758. 
137  Form CO, paragraphs 726 et seq.  
138 Case M. 5611 – Agilent / Varian, paragraphs 9 et seq.  
139  Case M.617 5 – Danaher / Beckman Coulter , paragraph 25.  
 
 
35 would be higher specifically for F T-IR spectrometers compared to an overall IR 
spectrometer market .140 
(C) The Commission’s assessment  
(169)  The market investigation did not produce arguments that contradict the Commission ’s 
past practice to define a market for molecular spectroscopy , and within it, a market for 
IR spectroscopy. Market feedback further did not suggest that that the product market 
would be narrower than IR spec trometers . Therefore, the Commission considers  in 
line with past findings, that a product market definition at the level of IR 
spectrometers as appropriate. For the purpose of this Decision, it can be left open 
whether FT-IR spectrometers would form a separate product market, as this would not 
change the competitive assessment.  
5.2.13.2.  Relevant geographic  market  definition  
(A) Previous Commission decisions  
(170)  In previous decisions, the Commission considered markets for analytical and li fe 
science instruments EEA -wide or global in geographic scope.141 
(B) The Notifying Party’s view  
(171)  The Notifying Party submits that the relevant market for IR spectrometers is global , or 
at least EEA -wide in scope .142 
(C) The Commission’s assessment  
(172)  In the market investigation, the Commission received limited responses from 
customers as to the appropriate geographic market for IR spectrometers, and those 
customers that did provide a view indicated markets would be either EEA -wide or 
global.143 A majority of respondin g manufacturers and distributors indicated for IR 
spectrometers would be global in geographic scope, and all other respondents active 
in this product area indicated EEA -wide markets.144 Based on past practice and 
market feedback, the Commission considers geo graphic markets for IR spectrometers 
to be either EEA -wide or global in scope, and leaves the exact market definition open 
between the two.  
                                                 
140  Form CO, paragraphs 732 et seq.  
141 M.5611 – Agilent / Varian, paragraphs 51 et seq.  ; M.6126 - Thermo Fisher/Dionex Corporation , paragraphs 
42 et seq.  ; M.6175 – Danaher / Beckman Coulter , paragraph 32.  
142  Form CO, paragraphs 735 et seq.  
143  Replies to question 52 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
144  Replies to question 41 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  
 
 
36 6. COMPE TITIVE ASSE SSME N T 
6.1. Analytical framework  
(173)  Article 2 of the Merger Regulation requires the Commission to examine whether 
notified concentrations are compatible with the internal market, by assessing whether 
they would significantly impede effective competition in the internal market or in a 
substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strength ening of a 
dominant position.  
(174)  In the assessment of non -horizontal mergers, the Commission distinguishes between 
two broad types of such mergers: vertical mergers and conglomerate mergers.  
(175)  Vertical mergers involve companies operating at different levels of the supply chain. 
For example, when a manufacturer of a certain product (the “upstream firm”) merges 
with one of its distributors (the “downstream firm”), this is called a vertical merger.145  
(176)  Conglomerate mergers are mergers between firms that are in a rela tionship that is 
neither horizontal (as competitors in the same relevant market) nor vertical (as 
suppliers or customers). In practice, the Commission focusses on mergers between 
companies that are active in closely related markets (e.g. mergers involving suppliers 
of complementary products or products that belong to the same product range).146 The 
Transaction does not lead to markets where a conglomerate effects assessment is 
warranted.  
(177)  In assessing potential vertical effects of a merger, the Commission ana lyses whether a 
merger results in foreclosure so that actual or potential rivals' access to supplies or 
markets is hampered or eliminated as a result of the merger, thereby reducing these 
companies' ability and/or incentive to compete. Such foreclosure may  discourage 
entry or expansion of rivals or encourage their exit. Foreclosure thus can be found 
even if the foreclosed rivals are not forced to exit the market: it is sufficient that the 
rivals are disadvantaged and consequently led to compete less effecti vely. Such 
foreclosure is regarded as anti -competitive where the merging companies — and, 
possibly, some of its competitors as well — are as a result able to profitably increase 
the price charged to consumers.147  
(178)  Two forms of foreclosure can be distinguishe d. The first is where the merger is likely 
to raise the costs of downstream rivals by restricting their access to an important input 
(input foreclosure). The second is where the merger is likely to foreclose upstream 
rivals by restricting their access to a  sufficient customer base (customer 
foreclosure).148  
(179)  In assessing both types of foreclosure, the Commission applies the ability, incentive, 
effects framework. This implies the assessment of whether (i) the merged entity 
would have the ability to engage in f oreclosure, (ii) it would have the incentive to do 
                                                 
145  OJ C 265, 18.10.2008, p. 6 -25 (the ’Non -horizontal Merger  Guidelines’), paragraph 4.  
146  Non-horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 91.  
147  Non-horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 29.  
148  Non-horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 30.  



 
 
40 (181)  All vertical relationships are affected by virtue of Thermo Fisher’s market position in 
the upstream market.  
(182)  PPD’s market share in the downstream market is always well under 30%. As set out 
in the Commission’s Non -Horizontal Merger Guidelines,  the Commission is unlikely 
to find concern in non -horizontal mergers where the market share post -Transaction is 
below thi s level.152 Therefore, the Transaction does not give rise to any customer 
foreclosure concerns.  
(183)  The Commission’s assessment will focus on the possibility of an input foreclosure 
scenario.  
6.3.  Market investigation feedback by pharmaceutical companies (clinical trial 
sponsors)  
(184)  In its market investigation, the Commission sent requests for information to CRO and 
laboratory service providers competing with PPD as well as laboratory equipment 
suppliers competing with Thermo Fisher on each of the product markets ident ified 
above ; this is discussed in the below sections . In addition, the Commission sent 
requests for information to pharmaceutical companies, who ultimately are the sponsor 
of clinical trials and the primary customer of PPD’s CRO and laboratory services, to  
obtain their views on the Transaction.  
(185)  The large majority of pharmaceutical companies that responded to the Commission’s 
market investigation did not consider that access to Thermo Fisher products is 
essential for CRO or laboratory service providers to pr ovide services to them.153 The 
large majority did not consider that Thermo Fisher would have the ability or incentive 
to engage in input foreclosure vis -à-vis PPD’s competitors post -Transaction, and did 
not consider that such strategy would have a major impa ct.154 
(186)  Concerning a potential input foreclosure strategy, pharmaceutical companies also 
point out the broad reputational harm on Thermo Fisher this would entail, explaining: 
“It would be unlikely that this would happen as the pharmaceutical companies 
represe nt much more market share than the clinical labs/CROs, and this would not be 
tolerated by the industry ” and “ This sounds unlikely. Since the services and products 
that Thermo Fisher offers for the most part have competition, sponsors of the services 
and pr oducts have alternatives. While PPD may be able to leverage some additional 
business by a unique offering they would likely do this without aggressive action by 
services/product withdrawal to Thermo Fisher’s client base. If they were to take this 
approach,  they would also have to consider the adverse effect on any industry 
relationships in terms of good business practices & relationships. ”155 
(187)  The majority of pharmaceutical companies that responded to the Commission’s 
market investigation also indicated that i n the event of such foreclosure, they would 
employ their buying power vis -à-vis Thermo Fisher, either by themselves procuring 
                                                 
152  Non-horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 25.  
153  Repli es to questions 9 and 10 of questionnaire Q3 to pharmaceutical companies.  
154  Replies to questions 13, 14 and 15 of questionnaire Q3 to pharmaceutical companies.  
155  Replies to question 14.1 of questionnaire Q3 to pharmaceutical companies.  


 
 
43 (e) CROs or clinical trial sponsors can outsource high-resolution (Sanger) 
capillary electrophoresis  to third party laboratories, as is often done today.  
(194)  The Notifying Party submits that the merged entity would not have the incentive  to 
engage in input foreclosure for the following reasons:160 
(a) High-resolution (Sanger) capillary electrophoresis  has very limited relevance 
for CROs such as PPD; Thermo Fisher’s sales of high -resolution (Sanger) 
capillary electrophoresis  instruments and consumables made up less than [a 
very small percentage]  of product sales to PPD and competitors and less than 
[a very small percentage]  of PPD’s  clinical trials involve  the testing method ; 
(b) High-resolution (Sanger) capillary electrophoresis  is primarily relevant in 
areas where PPD does not compete, such as diagnostic testing. As Thermo 
Fisher cannot discriminate between use cases for the device, it would have to 
foreclose all these customers and incur significant losses. Furth ermore, these 
laboratories procure a broad range of other products from Thermo Fisher, 
which they could shift to other suppliers in retaliation ; 
(c) The losses described above could not be recouped downstream; the Notifying 
Party estimates that this would requ ire PPD’s profit and revenues for services 
using high -resolution (Sanger) capillary electrophoresis to grow by a factor of 
[…] for the instruments and a factor […] for the consumables – excluding any 
broader retaliation ; and  
(d) Given the limited relevance of high-resolution (Sanger) capillary 
electrophoresis  to CRO service providers, being foreclosed would not affect 
their ability to compete.  
6.4.1.3.  The Commission’s assessment  
(195)  For high -resolution (Sanger) capillary electrophoresis instruments and consumables, 
the Co mmission’s market investigation will separately assess the scenarios of (i) total 
foreclosure, i.e. foreclosing all Thermo Fisher customers  (including customers such as 
diagnostic laboratories, pharmaceutical companies and research laboratories) , and (ii) 
targeted foreclosure, i.e. foreclosing only PPD’s direct competitors  in laboratory 
services for clinical development . 
(196)  Concerning total foreclosure , the Commission considers it is likely that Thermo 
Fisher would have the ability  to implement such a strategy . Considering its market 
share of essentially [90-100]% for high -resolution (Sanger) capillary electrophoresis 
instruments  globally and in the EEA , customers would have limited alternatives to 
turn to. While the Notifying Party argues the devices have a lo ng life span (15 -20 
years), a majority of respondents to the Commission’s market investigation indicated 
that the instruments require regular maintenance by Thermo Fisher.161 For the 
consumables, contrary to the Notifying Party’s arguments, a majority of respondents 
to the Commission’s market investigation did not consider that they could use third 
                                                 
160  Form CO, paragraph 670 et seq.  
161  Replies to question 10 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
 
 
44 party consumables with Thermo Fisher’s devices.162 Outsourcing of high -resolution  
(Sanger) sequencing would also no longer be an option in case Thermo Fisher would 
foreclose its entire customer base, as there would be […]. Finally, while the majority 
of respondents to the Commission’s market investigation did confirm that they can 
use NGS devices instead for their applications, this was not seen as equivalent, as it 
would be more expensive and labour intensive.163 
(197)  However, even if Thermo Fisher has the ability to engage in total input foreclosure in 
the areas of high -resolution (Sanger) c apillary electrophoresis instruments and 
consumables,  it would not have the incentive to do so. Considering the very limited 
relevance of the technique in the context of clinical trials (PPD only used it in […] out 
of […] trials since 2018, and in […] of those cases it outsourced the technique to a 
third party laboratory), Thermo Fisher would not be able to recoup its losses upstream 
with any potential gains downstream. Thermo Fisher’s revenues for high-resolution 
(Sanger) capillary electrophoresis instrume nts and consumables  in 2020 amounted to 
EUR […] in 2020 with a margin of […] for the instruments and […] for the 
consumables. By contrast, PPD’s revenues in services for which it used the technique 
only amounted to EUR […].  
(198)  Furthermore, Thermo Fisher can expect broader retaliation on other product groups if 
it were to engage in such strategy, both by CRO / laboratory providers and their 
sponsor s (pharmaceutical companies), leading to further upstream losses. The 
majority of pharmaceutical companies that re plied to the Commission’s market 
investigation indicate that in the event of their CRO or laboratory service providers 
being foreclosed, they would consider to use their buyer power in response, for 
example by moving business for other products away from t he merged entity. 164 In 
line with the above, respondents to the Commission’s market investigation did not 
indicate that they consider Thermo Fisher’s incentive to foreclose to increase as a 
result of the Transaction.165 
(199)  Considering a targeted foreclosure strategy, which specifically targets PPD 
competitors in the area of clinical development, Thermo Fisher would not have the 
ability to engage in such strategy. It would have to foreclose both PPD’s direct 
competitors, as well as distributors that make up […] of EEA instrument sales and 
[…] of consumables sales in 2020. However, the majority of respondents to the 
Commission’s market investigation indicated that they can outsource their needs for 
high-resolution (Sanger) capillary electrophoresis .166 PPD itself also  outsource s the 
activity […] (out of the […] times it was required since 2018, it outsourced […] 
times). Therefore, to implement an input foreclosure strategy  successfully, Thermo 
Fisher would have to implement it broader, which, as discussed above, it doe s not 
have the incentive to do.   
(200)  Even if the merged entity were to implement a  total or targeted  input foreclosure 
strategy, such strategy would likely have a limited impact  on PPD’s competitors in 
                                                 
162  Replies to question 8 of que stionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
163  Replies to question 7 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
164  Replies to question 12 of questionnaire Q3 to pharmaceutical companies.  
165  Replies to question 16 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
166  Replies to question 15 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  


 
 
47 source IVD autoimmune disease systems from other suppliers, which is confirmed by 
the market investigation, as explained below in this section. Therefore, the 
Commission will conduct the competitive assessment on the narrower market for IVD 
allergy systems, where Thermo Fisher has a significantly stronger market position.  
6.4.2.2.  The Notifying  Party’s view  
(208)  The Notifying Party submits that the merged entity would not have the ability  to 
engage in input foreclosure , because customers of laboratory IVD allergy systems 
could turn to another manufacturer.  Furthermore, a llergy testing is not an essen tial 
input for the activity of a company like PPD, and it is not critical to have in -house 
testing capabilities. If competitors to PPD  did not have access to testing products, 
testing can be outsourced to  large laboratory companies , which is already an everyday 
practice. 174 
(209)  The Notifying Party submits that the merged entity would not have the incentive  to 
engage in input foreclosure . Most sales in the EEA and globally in the area of allergy 
testing would be generated by providers of diagnostic testing. Given that allergy 
testing accounts for only a small part of testing undertaken in clinical trials, PPD 
could not gain additional revenues that would compensat e for the sales that the 
Notifying Party  would lose if they wold sto p selling to PPD’s competitors.175 
6.4.2.3.  The Commission’s assessment  
(210)  Market shares of Thermo Fisher exceed 30% significantly in a potential global or 
EEA-wide market for IVD allergy systems  to clinical development laboratories , as 
well as for specific tests . A potential concern arising from th ese market share levels is 
therefore input foreclosure  of IVD allergy systems . However, it is unlikely that 
Thermo Fisher would have the ability to foreclose PPD’s competitors of IVD allergy 
systems  (targeted foreclosure) , but it would need to foreclose a significant part of 
other market participants  as well , e.g. laboratories active in the field of diagnostics. It 
is unlikely that Thermo Fisher would have the incentive to pursue such broad market 
foreclosure strategy. Further , it is unlikely that input for eclosure of IVD allergy 
systems would have a significant impact on the downstream market of laboratory 
services for clinical development , as it is questionable whether such products are 
important inputs for downstream competitors.  
(211)  Firstly, Thermo Fisher h as a very strong position in the market for IVD allergy testing 
systems  with very high market shares of [80-90]% at global level and [70-80]% in the 
EEA, which may be at a similar or, in instances even higher, level for specific tests , as 
well as to clinical development laboratories , and which is indicative of dominance . 
Customers176 rate other manufacturers of IVD allergy testing systems, such as Micro 
Array, Siemens and Hycor, as being  clearly less competitive than Thermo Fisher, 
which is in line with  the market structure.177 The Commission received mixed 
                                                 
174  Form CO, paragraph 617 et seq.  
175  Form CO, paragraph 619 et seq.  
176  The Commission notes that customers responding to the market investigation are l aboratories active in the 
field of clinical development, in line with the market definition.  
177  Replies to question 28 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
 
 
48 responses by customers  as regards the ability to switch suppliers of IVD allergy 
testing systems in a scenario in which Thermo Fisher increases prices or restrict 
access to those products. In any event,  three downstream customers indicated they 
would not be able to switch suppliers.178 The Commission understands from 
qualitative feedback that switching is especially difficult once a clinical trial has 
started.179 Further, Thermo Fisher’s IVD allergy testing devices require regular 
maintenance by Thermo Fisher.180 Therefore, it is likely that Thermo Fisher has the 
ability to foreclose inputs to PPD’s competitors at least by way of a broad market 
foreclosure , which would also apply for specific tests.  
(212)  However, it  is unlikely that Thermo Fisher would have the ability to target such 
foreclosure strategy specifically to PPD’s customers. The Commission takes note of 
the fact that a majority of responding customers consider IVD allergy testing systems 
as essential inpu ts for laboratory services in the context of clinical trials, and that they 
would use such products often in the context of clinical trials.181 However, when 
quantifying the use of IVD allergy testing systems, those customers who provided a 
response indicate  that they would use such products only in a small number of 
instances ( i.e. below 1% of the total number of trials), or described the number of 
trials where IVD allergy testing systems are used as “several globally ”.182 The 
Commission further takes note of the Notifying Party’s submission that, according to 
PPD’s estimation, […] of all allergy testing takes place during respiratory and 
dermatology trials, which represent less than […] of the clinical trials space, and that 
allergy testing would be expected to feature in approximately […] of these types of 
trials. Of the […] clinical trials in 2020 that PPD’s clinical trial services business was 
involved in, PPD estimates that […] requi red allergy testing. Out of the […] clinical 
trials in 2020 for which tests were  carried out in PPD’s laboratories globally, allergy 
testing was required in […] studies.183 These numbers would be equal or even smaller 
if a further segmentation by specific te sts was made. The Commission finally notes 
that some significant competitors to PPD in laboratory services in clinical trials , and 
in fact the majority of customers responding to this question in the market 
investigation,  do not operate any IVD allergy tes ting devices within the EEA.184 
Similarly, PPD owns […] Thermo Fisher allergy (and autoimmune testing ) device 
located in the US, [PPD’s operations ].185 
(213)  Against this background, the Commission takes note of the fact that a majority of 
responding competitors of PPD, though not all,  indicate that they would be able to 
outsource IVD allergy testing to third -party laboratories if these services were 
                                                 
178  Replies to question 30 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service  providers. The Commission notes 
that this number appears to be higher for autoimmune disease testing systems, where customers have the 
ability to source from other suppliers.  
179  Replies to question 30.1 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers. The Commission 
notes that this barrier likely also exist for IVD autoimmune testing products.  
180  Replies to question 26 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service  providers.  
181  Replies to question 31 and 32 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
182  Replies to question 31.1 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
183  Form CO, paragraph 621.  
184  Replies to question 25 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
185  Form CO, paragraph 601.  
 
 
49 required in the context of a clinical trial.186 The Commission notes that in 2020, PPD 
outsourced […] of the allergy tes ting, and performed such services in -house in […] of 
the […] clinical trials for which it carried out tests in its laboratories and of the […] 
trials its clinical trial service business was involved in.187 Consequently, Thermo 
Fisher would not have the abili ty to target a potential foreclosure strategy to 
customers of PPD, which still could outsource IVD allergy testing to third -party 
laboratories, but would need to foreclose a broad spectrum of the market to prevent 
PPD’s competitors from accessing such serv ices.  
(214)  In the market investigation, the Commission received concerns by customers 
specifically also for IVD autoimmune diseases testing systems,188 and notes that 
Thermo Fisher supplies a device that can be used for both IVD allergy and IVD 
autoimmune disease testing. As for IVD autoimmune testing systems, however, the 
Commission notes that customers rate at least one other supplier (Bio -Rad) as very  
suitable for the demand of their company, and other competitors as generally suitable, 
even though to a significantly lesser degree then Thermo Fisher. The Commission 
further notes that a majority of customers indicate they would be able to switch to 
other suppliers for autoimmune testing systems in case of a foreclosure strategy by 
Thermo Fisher.189 This is in line with the market shares as presented in Table 5. One 
customer explained: “The auto immune panel can be moved to BioPlex 200 from 
Biorad. For alle rgy, Thermo Fisher is the leader, trusted by clients and 
physicians” .190 Responses to the market investigation did not suggest that such 
assessment would change for any specific test. Against this background, and in light 
of Thermo Fisher’s moderate market s hares for autoimmune disease testing systems, 
it is unlikely that Thermo Fisher would have the ability to foreclose downstream 
competitors of this product.  
(215)  Secondly, the Commission takes note of the Notifying Party’s submission regarding 
the loss of upstr eam revenue it would need to recoup by winning additional 
downstream business for PPD. In 2020, Thermo Fisher generated a turnover of 
approximately EUR […] with sales to CROs and laboratories in the area of clinical 
development and diagnostics, the latter to which PPD’s customers could potentially 
outsource allergy testing services.191 As Thermo Fisher’s upstream margin for allergy 
testing systems was […], those sales equal a profit of approximately EUR […] that 
Thermo Fisher would lose upstream in the event of such foreclosure. Further , the 
Notifying Party notes that the total revenues for clinical trials that used IVD allergy 
systems and in which PPD was involved in 2020 amount to approximately EUR […]. 
As PPD’s downstream margin for clinical trial and labor atory services is 
approximately […], the corresponding profit was approximately EUR […] in 2020 . 
Therefore, PPD would need to increase its business from clinical trials using IVD 
                                                 
186  Replies to question 33 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers; this assessment also 
applies to IVD autoimmune disease testing.  
187  Form CO, paragrap hs 621 and 623.  
188  Replies to question 36 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
189  Replies to question 27 and 30 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
190  Replies to question 30.1 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
191  The figure does not include sales to, for example, hospitals, to which PPD’s competitors would likely not 
outsource allergy testing services.  
 
 
50 allergy testing by approximately […] times to make up for its upstream losses .192 In 
the view of the Commission, it appears unlikely that the merged entity would be able 
to recoup upstream losses by additional downstream business in the event of input 
foreclosure to CRO’s and laboratories in the area of clinical development and 
diagn ostics. Therefore, the merged entity will likely not have the incentive for such 
strategy.  
(216)  Thirdly, it is questionable whether input foreclosure of IVD allergy testing products 
would indeed have an impact on the laboratory service market for clinical 
development . Three customers raised concerns in relation to allergy testing systems in 
the context of the market investigation . One customer ( i.e. competitor of PPD) 
substantiates these concerns  with the access to information PPD may obtain via 
Thermo Fish er as regards the business of a competitor. The concern of information 
sharing is further discussion in Section 6.5.1  of this Decision. A second custo mer 
submitted that switching suppliers would entail additional costs, but also explains that 
“there are alternatives to Thermo Fisher”  and that it would therefore be “not 
particularly concerned” . A third customer explained its concerns inter alia  with a 
potential impact of input foreclosure on ongoing trials. However, the customer also 
provides that Thermo Fisher’s incentive to sell IVD allergy disease testing products to 
its company would likely remain the same, unless there were issues in the supply 
chain  or manufacturing of such products, in which case Thermo Fisher may grant 
PPD preferential treatment .193 The Commission considers that, on balance, these 
concerns, while considered carefully in the assessment of the Transaction, may not 
suggest a strong and direct impact on the laboratory service market in the context of 
clinical development linked to the supply of IVD allergy systems.  
(217)  Further, the Commission notes the fact that IVD allergy systems, for which Thermo 
Fisher has high market shares, are not frequently used in the context of clinical 
development , as explained in paragraph (212) . The number of use cases would be 
equal or even lower for specific tests. Therefore, input foreclosure may have an 
impact on competition between laboratory service providers for few specific clinical 
trials. However, it is questionable whether not havi ng access to such products would 
in fact drive costs of downstream rivals upwards and thereby harm competition in an 
overall laboratory service market for clinical development .  
(218)  Furthermore, as set out Section 6.3 of this Decision, sponsors of clinical trials, i.e. 
pharmaceutical companies, indicated that that they do not consider Thermo Fisher 
products as essential for laboratory service providers to p rovide services for the m. 
Neither would, in their view, Thermo Fisher have the incentive to engage in input 
foreclosure, nor would such strategy have an impact on the downstream market. 
Pharmaceutical companies pointed at potential reputational harm Thermo  Fisher 
                                                 
192  Form CO, paragraphs 619 et seq. The Notifying Party notes that this calculati on does not include potential 
retaliation by PPD’s competitors or other market participants ( e.g. sponsors of clinical trials), which would 
make an input foreclosure strategy even less profitable.  
193  Replies to question 36, 36.1 and 37 of questionnaire Q1  to CRO and laboratory service providers. The 
Commission notes that no customer and no competitor has experienced any significant shortages in IVD 
allergy or IVD autoimmune testing devices in the past three years, and only one customer, forming a clear 
minority, and no competitor, has experienced shortages in IVD allergy and autoimmune testing reagents; 
replies to question 29 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers, and to question 23 of 
questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  
 
 
51 would suffer if it would foreclose PPD’s downstream competitions, and indicate that 
they would consider taking  counter -measures in such event.  
(219)  Lastly, the Commission notes that, during the market investigation, three upstream 
competitors of Thermo Fisher, forming the minority of all such respondents, raised 
concerns with regard to IVD allergy and autoimmune testing instruments, and two of 
them also on the respective reagents .194 All three  companies substantiated their 
concerns with potential customer foreclosure, i.e. PPD not sourcing IVD allergy and 
autoimmune testing products from third parties.  While the potential loss of a 
theoretical or actual customer may be a commercial concern, the Commission 
considers it highly unlikely that the merged entity will have the ability to impede 
effective competition by engaging in customer foreclosure. This is because PPD’s 
market shares in the market for l aboratory services for clinical development  are small 
at both global ( [5-10]%) and EEA -wide ( [0-5]%) level. It  has to be noted that IVD 
allergy and autoimmune testing products are  not only used for clinical development, 
but also in other areas of laboratory services, where PPD is not active , such as 
diagnostics, and that, as explained above, PPD [PPD’s operations ] only accounts for a 
negligible share of the overall demand for such products.  
6.4.2.4.  Conclusion  
(220)  For the reasons set out above, the Transaction does not give rise to serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market or a substantial part thereof in  relation to 
vertical effects for  IVD allergy testing systems195, or any specific tests, in an EEA -
wide or global market.  
6.4.3.  CO 2 incubators  
6.4.3.1.  Market structure  
(221)  The table below show s the Notifying Party’s market share estimates for CO2 
incubators.  
                                                 
194  Replies to question 27 and 27.1 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  
195  The Commission notes that, as explained in this section, no such concerns would arise neither for IVD 
autoimmune diseases testing systems under any plausible market defini tion.  

 
 
53 (225)  Firstly, Thermo Fisher holds a  very strong position in the market for CO2 incubators 
both at global and EEA -wide level  with market shares of [60-70]% and [50-60]% 
respectively, as shown in Table 6 above , which is indicative of dominance . Even 
though two sig nificant competitors (Panasonic and Eppendorf) would remain 
available to downstream customers, the market power of Thermo Fisher suggests that 
it may have the ability for input foreclosure.  
(226)  On the other hand, downstream customers responding to the market investigation 
submit that they would not depend on the supply of CO2 incubators by Thermo 
Fisher. Apart from Thermo Fisher, customers rate a number of other manufacturers as 
equally suitable supplier to their company, namely Eppendorf, Esco , NuAire and 
Binder.199 In line with this, all customers providing an opinion on this question 
indicate that they would be able to switch suppliers if Thermo Fisher were to increase 
prices or restrict access to CO2 incubators post -Transaction. One reason for this view 
may b e that CO2 incubators appear to be easier to exchange compared to other 
products, as they may not have a potential impact on the testing results in clinical 
trials. One customer explained: “CO2 incubators are part of sample processing and 
do not generate p atient results. As long as the specifications are the same, and they 
are suitable qualified they can be substituted.”200 All upstream competitors active in 
the supply of CO2 incubators responding to the market investigation indicate that they 
would be able to significantly increase supply of CO2 incubators in case of increased 
demand, but submit at the same time that entry into the market for CO2 incubators 
would be difficult or very difficult.201 
(227)  On balance, the Commission considers that the market structure indicate s that Thermo 
Fisher may have the ability for input foreclosure. However, in the light of the clear 
market feedback, it appears questionable if Thermo Fisher would , in practice , be able 
to use its market power upstream for such a strategy, and more  likely that downstream 
customers would be able to switch away to other suppliers, who would be able to take 
market shares f rom Thermo  Fisher.  
(228)  Secondly, the Commission takes note of the Notifying Party’s submission that […] of 
Thermo Fisher’s sales of CO2  incubators would be made through third -party 
distributors.202 In the light of this, Thermo Fisher would not have the ability for a 
targeted foreclosure of PPD’s competitors, as it does not control to what end customer 
its products are supplied to, but would  need to foreclose independent distributors as 
well, which would result in a loss of sales to other end -customers for CO2 incubators, 
for example laboratories active in areas other than clinical development . However, it 
is unlikely that Thermo Fisher would  have the incentive for such broad foreclosure. In 
such scenario, Thermo Fisher would lose upstream profit of approximately EUR […]. 
PPD’s downstream profit associated with clinical trial services using CO2 incubators 
was EUR […] approximately. The Notifyi ng Party submits that this calculation was 
highly conservative, as CO2 incubators would only be an incremental input to such 
services.203 Even in such scenario, PPD would have to grow its profit connected to 
                                                 
199  Replies to questions 41 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
200  Replies to questions 44 and 44.1 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
201  Replies to questions 32 and 34 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  
202  Form CO, paragraph 269.  
203  Form CO, paragraphs 275 et seq.  


 
 
56 chromatograph y instruments  need to grow by a factor of […] and pre-filled ion 
chromatography columns by a factor of […] to recoup upstream cost; and  
(c) PPD competitors and the ir pharmaceutical and biotechnology clients source a 
wide variety of products from Thermo Fisher, and could retaliate in response 
to any attempt at input foreclosure.  
6.4.4.3.  The Commission’s assessment  
(235)  The Commission notes that in the markets for ion chromatogra phy instruments and 
consumables, Thermo Fisher  faces one competitor with a similar market share, 
Metrohm, as well as several smaller competitors.  
(236)  CRO and laboratory service providers that responded to the Commission’s market 
investigation rated these alte rnative competitors as suitable options to supply their 
company.210 Furthermore, respondents indicated that they are able to switch suppliers 
for ion chromatographs and pre-filled ion chromatography columns.211 
(237)  Considering the pre-filled ion chromatography columns specifically, a significant 
number of Thermo Fisher competitors that responded to the Commission’s market 
investigation indicated to be able to supply pre-filled ion chromatography columns 
that are compatible with Thermo Fisher’s instruments.212 Furthermore, the majority of 
Thermo Fisher competitors active in ion chromatography that responded to the 
Commission’s market investigation indicated that they are able to significantly 
increase supply in case of surging demand.213 
(238)  Based on the above, it is unli kely that the merged entity will have the ability to engage 
in input foreclosure with respect to ion chromatography instruments and pre-filled ion 
chromatography columns post -Transaction.  Even if Thermo Fisher did have the 
ability to do so, it likely would  not have the incentive, and impact of such foreclosure 
would be limited.  Ion chromatography only enjoys limited use in the context of 
clinical trials. PPD estimates that it used ion chromatography in less than [a very 
small percentage]  of its laboratory a ctivities by revenue, and that ion chromatography 
makes up less than [a very small percentage]  of annual procurement cost.214 Several 
CRO and laboratory service providers that responded to the Commission’s market 
investigation indicated that while they do us e chromatography in their business, they 
do not frequently use ion chromatography. One explains: “ Our labs typically use 
HPLC and UPLC analytical columns but rarely have applications that need ion 
chromatography. ”215 Furthermore, respondents indicate that so me ion 
chromatography analyses can also be performed on h igh pressure liquid 
chromatographs .216 
                                                 
210  Replies to questions 57 and 58 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
211  Replies to question 56 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
212  Replies to question 40 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  
213  Replies to question 42 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  
214  Form CO, paragraph 517.  
215  Replies to question 49 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
216  Replies to question 51 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
 
 
57 (239)  Consistent with the above, the large majority of respondents to the Commission 
market investigation indicate that they do not expect Thermo Fisher’s incentive to 
engage in input foreclosure with respect to ion chromatography instruments and 
consumables to change post -Transaction.217 Furthermore, the large majority of 
respondents did not express any concerns for these markets in response to the 
Commission’s market inv estigation.218 A minority of Thermo Fisher competitors 
indicated concern about losing PPD as a customer for ion chromatography 
instruments and pre-filled ion chromatography columns. However, in view of PPD’s 
limited market share on the downstream market and its limited purchases of ion 
chromatography instruments (EUR […] globally and EUR […] in the EEA) and pre-
filled ion chromatography columns (EUR […] globally and EUR […] in the EEA) 
customer foreclosure concerns cannot arise.  
(240)  Furthermore, as set out Sectio n 6.3 of this Decision, sponsors of clinical trials, i.e. 
pharmaceutical companies, indicated that that they do not consider Thermo Fisher 
products as essential for laboratory service providers to provide services for the m. 
Neither would, in their view, Thermo Fisher have the incentive to engage in input 
foreclo sure, nor would such strategy have an impact on the downstream market. 
Pharmaceutical companies pointed at potential reputational harm Thermo Fisher 
would suffer if it would foreclose PPD’s downstream competitions, and indicate d that 
they would consider taking counter -measures in such event.  
6.4.4.4.  Conclusion  
(241)  For the reasons set out above, the Transaction does not give rise to serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market or a substantial part thereof in relation to 
vertical effects for (i ) ion chromatography  instruments and (ii) prefilled ion 
chromatography columns  globally and in the EEA . 
6.4.5.  Electrophoresis gels  
6.4.5.1.  Market structure  
(242)  Below tables show the Notifying Party’s market share estimates for precast 
electrophoresis gels for vertical gel electr ophoresis and molecular weight standards 
for vertical gel electrophoresis.  
                                                 
217  Replies to question 61 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers and question 46 of 
questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  
218  Replies to question 62 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers and question 47 of 
questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  

 
 
59 (d) Thermo Fisher’s precast protein gels for vertical gel electrophoresis are not a 
critical input to any downstream service offered by a PPD competitor; and  
(e) PPD’s competitors could switch to an alternative supplier of vertical gel 
electrophoresis instrumen ts, which also provide all consumables.  
(245)  The Notifying Party submits that the merged entity would not have the incentive  to 
engage in input foreclosure for the following reasons:222 
(a) Lost sales upstream would far outweigh any potential gains downstream. 
Stoppi ng to supply PPD competitors would not lead to increased sales 
downstream as they have other options for vertical gel electrophoresis 
consumables; and  
(b) PPD competitors and their pharmaceutical and biotechnology clients source a 
wide variety of products from  Thermo Fisher, and could retaliate in response 
to any attempt at input foreclosure.  
6.4.5.3.  The Commission’s assessment  
(246)  The Commission notes that Thermo Fisher faces a strong competitor, Bio -Rad, in the 
areas of precast protein gels for vertical gel electrophore sis and molecular weight 
standards for vertical gel electrophoresis . Bio -Rad is the market leader on global basis 
in terms of market share. This reduces Thermo Fisher’s ability to successfully engage 
in input foreclosure for these products.  
(247)  CRO and laboratory services providers that responded to the Commission’s market 
investigation rated Bio -Rad, as well as other suppliers such as Lonza and Merck 
Millipore Sigma, as strong suppliers.223 Additionally, they indicated that they would 
be able to switch aw ay to alternative suppliers if Thermo Fisher were to increase 
prices or restrict access to these products.224 
(248)  Even if Thermo Fisher would have the ability to foreclose access to precast protein 
gels for vertical gel electrophoresis and molecular weight stand ards for vertical gel 
electrophoresis , it would likely not have incentive to do so and impact on the 
downstream markets would remain limited. PPD […], showing that they do not play a 
significant role in the downstream markets. Thermo Fisher’s total sales o f the 
upstream product amounted to EUR […] for precast protein gels for vertical gel 
electrophoresis  and EUR […] for molecular weight standards for vertical gel 
electrophoresis . Consistent with this, respondents to the Commission’s market 
investigation did  not anticipate that Thermo Fisher’s incentive to engage in input 
foreclosure would change as a result of the Transaction.225 
(249)  In line with the above, the vast majority of respondents to the Commission’s market 
investigation did not express any concerns with respect to precast protein gels for 
                                                 
222  Form CO, paragraph 572 et seq.  
223  Replies to question 69 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
224  Replies to question 73 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
225  Replies to question 74 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers  and question 57 of 
questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors . 


 
 
62 pharmaceuti cal and biotech clients have various possibilities to punish or pressure 
Thermo Fisher if they were dissatisfied with Thermo Fisher’s sera supply policy to 
PPD competitors.233 
6.4.6.3.  The Commission’s assessment  
(255)  Market shares of Thermo Fisher exceed 30% in a market  for all cell culture sera, and 
in ten potential segments of sera at worldwide level, and in three of such segments at 
EEA-level. A potential concern arising from these market share levels is therefore 
input foreclosure of cell culture sera overall and som e types of sera.  However, 
Thermo Fisher would likely  not have the  ability or incentive  to engage in such a 
strategy , and such strategy would likely not have an impact on competition.  
(256)  Firstly, the Commission notes that Thermo Fisher’s upstream market shares  for all 
types of sera combined [amount to 40 -50%]  at global level, and [amount to 30 -40%]  
in an EEA -wide market. There are at least two other significant competitors in the 
market ( Merck Millipore Sigma and Danaher -Cytiva), while other non -negligible 
comp etitors remain present. For some types of sera, Thermo Fisher’s market shares 
[amount to 40 -50%] . In the view of the Commission, such market structure as 
presented in Tables 11 and 12 above  indicates significant market power by Thermo 
Fisher in some segments of the sera market, but also the presence of credible 
competitors.  
(257)  In the market investigation, customers of Thermo Fisher indicated Merck Millipore 
Sigma and VWR as a more suitable supplier for sera to their company than Thermo 
Fisher, and attributed a still favourable rating to Corning.234 All customers that formed 
an opinion in the market investigation responded that they would be able to switch to 
other suppliers if Thermo Fisher would restrict access to cell culture sera.235 The 
Commission notes,  however, that there are some barriers to switching a sera provider, 
as new products may need to be tested as to their suitability.236 All but one customer 
expressing  an opinion in the market investigation further submit to be able to source 
Thermo Fisher ce ll culture sera via third -parties, e.g. distributors or sponsors of the 
respective clinical trial.237 Based on the above, and especially on market feedback, 
Thermo Fisher would likely  not have the ability to foreclose downstream competitors 
of cell culture s era, despite considerable market shares especially for some segments 
of this market.  
                                                 
233  In the Form CO, the Notifying Party provided equivalent and/or similar arguments for South American FBS 
sera for which Thermo Fisher holds [50 -60]% market share, paragraph 312 et seq.  
234  The C ommission received mixed reviews for Danaher -Cytiva based on only two responses for this 
particular competitor.  
235  Replies to questions 94 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers. The Commission 
notes that one customer who indicated to  not know whether the company could switch or not, provided in 
response to a different question concerning sera that, to the best if its knowledge, it would only be able to 
obtain cell culture sera from Thermo Fisher, and would not be able to source sera f rom a third party or 
sponsors of a clinical trial. The Commission notes that this particular respondent did not indicate to have 
concerns as regards the Transaction in relation to cell culture media, and that its view forms, in any event, a 
clear minority opinion among all customers responding to the market investigation.  
236  Replies to question 94.1 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
237  Replies to question 92 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
 
 
63 (258)  Secondly, because downstream competitors would have alternatives available to 
source cell culture sera  from, as explained in paragraph s (256)  and (257)  above , the 
merged entity would likely not be able to recoup upstream losses by additional gains 
downstream, and therefore would likely not have the incentive for input foreclosure.  
(259)  Particularly with respect to South American FBS, for which Thermo Fisher’s market 
shares reach [50-60]% in an EEA -wide market, the Comm ission takes note of the 
Notifying Party’s submission that PPD’s profit associated with laboratory services 
that use South American FBS sera was approximately EUR […] globally, while 
Thermo Fisher’s upstream profit from sales to PPD’s competitors amounted to EUR 
[…]. Consequently, PPD would approximately  need to […] its profit associated with 
the use of South American FBS to recoup upstream losses by Thermo Fisher.238 The 
Commission acknowledges that this scenario appears unlikely, given the fact that 
other s uppliers are available for PPD’s competitors.  
(260)  Thirdly, the Transaction is unlikely to have an impact on the competitiveness on 
downstream companies competing with PPD or potential entrants into the 
downstream market with regard to the supply of cell cultu re sera or any particular 
type thereof . In the market investigation, no responding customers expressed concerns 
with regard to cell culture sera or any potential market segment .239 Similarly , the 
majority of upstream competitor s to Thermo Fisher indicated to  have no concerns as 
regards to any type of sera .240 
(261)  The Commission notes that potential concerns based on customer foreclosure are 
likely not substantiated because of PPD’s small downstream market shares in the 
market for l aboratory services for clinical de velopment  both at global ( [5-10]%) and 
EEA-wide ( [0-5]%) level. Furthermore, cell culture sera may not only be used for 
clinical development, but also in other areas of laboratory services, where PPD is not 
active.  
(262)  Furthermore, as set out Section 6.3 of this Decision, sponsors of clinical trials, i.e. 
pharmaceutical companies, indicated that that they do not consider Thermo Fisher 
products as essential for laboratory service providers to p rovide services for the m. 
Neither would, in their view, Thermo Fisher have the incentive to engage in input 
foreclosure, nor would such strategy have an impact on the downstream market. 
Pharmaceutical companies pointed at potential reputational harm Thermo  Fisher 
would suffer if it would foreclose PPD’s downstream competitions, and indicate d that 
they would consider  taking counter -measures in such event.  
6.4.6.4.  Conclusion  
(263)  For the reasons set out above, the Transaction does not give rise to serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market or a substantial part thereof in relation to 
                                                 
238  Form CO, paragraph 312.  
239  Replies to questions 97 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
240  Replies to questions 76 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors. One upstream competitor 
submitted that Thermo Fisher may raise pr ices for downstream competitors, while acknowledging that this 
may provide other suppliers with the opportunity to win business. For the reasons set out in this section, 
however, such input foreclosure is an unlikely scenario.  


 
 
66 6.4.7.3.  The Commission’s assessment  
(267)  Market shar es of Thermo Fisher exceed 30% in a market for all cell culture media , 
and in seven  potential markets of media  both at global  and EEA level. A potential 
concern arising from these market share levels is therefore input foreclosure of cell 
culture media  overall and some types of such media . However, Thermo Fisher would 
likely not have the ability or incentive  to engage in this foreclosure strategy , and such 
strategy would likely not have an impact on competition.  
(268)  Firstly, the Commission notes that Thermo  Fisher’s upstream market shares for all 
types of cell culture media  combined [amount to 40 -50%]  at global level, and [amount 
to 30 -40%]  in an EEA -wide market. However, Thermo Fisher is  [based on market 
shares the market leader] in the market for cell cult ure media, with […] the sales 
volume of the next biggest competitor. Still, the Commission notes that a number of 
competitors with non -negligible market shares are active in the market . For some 
types of media , Thermo Fisher’s market shares are well above 40%, but do not exceed 
50%. Such market structure indicates significant market power by Thermo Fisher in 
some segments of the cell culture media market  as well as the overall market for such 
media , but also the presence of available alternative suppliers .  
(269)  In the market investigation, customers of Thermo Fisher indicated , somewhat contrary 
to what market shares suggest,  Merck Millipore Sigma to be  a more suitable supplier 
for media  to their company than Thermo Fisher.247 All customers that expressed an 
opinio n in the market investigation responded that they would be able to switch to 
other suppliers if Thermo Fisher would restrict access to cell culture media .248 The 
Commission notes, however, that there are some barriers to switching a media 
provider, as new pr oducts may need to be tested as to their suitability.249 Further, there 
appear to be occurrences of shortages in the supply of media in the past three years, 
which may make switching more difficult.250 On the other hand, all  but one customer 
expressing an opinion in the market investigation further submit to be able to source 
Thermo Fisher cell culture media  via third -parties, e.g. distributors or sponsors of the 
respective clinical trial.251 Based on the above, and especially on market feedback, 
Thermo Fi sher would likely not have the ability to foreclose downstream competitors 
of cell culture media , despite having considerable market shares especially for some 
segments of this market.  
(270)  Secondly, because downstream competitors would have alternatives avail able to 
source cell culture media from, as explained in paragraph (269)  above, the  merged 
entity would likely not be able to recoup upstream losses by  additional gains 
downstream, and therefore would likely not have the incentive for input foreclosure.  
                                                 
247  Replies to questions 90 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
248  Replies to questions 94 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers. As explained in 
footnote 235 in more detail,  the Commission rec eived mixed feedback from one respondent in this regard. 
The respondent did not indicate concerns with respect to cell culture media, and its explanation on potential 
to switch would in any event form a minority opinion among respondents.  
249  Replies to question 94.1 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
250  Replies to question 93 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
251  Replies to question 92 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service provi ders.  
 
 
67 (271)  Particularly with respect to standard basal media , for which Thermo Fisher’s market 
shares reach [50-60]% in an global  market , but not at EEA -level, the Commission 
takes note of the Notifying Party’s submission that PPD’s profit associated with 
laboratory services that make use of this product  was approximately EUR […] 
globally, while Thermo Fisher’s upstream profit from sales to PPD’s competitors 
amounted  to EUR […]. Consequently, PPD would need to win significant additional 
business downstream  to recoup upstream losses by Thermo Fisher.252 The 
Commission acknowledges that this scenario appears rather unlikely, given the fact 
that customers consider that the y could switch away from Thermo Fisher . As for 
process liquids, where market shares reach equally [50-60]% at global level, [PPD 
purchase data ].253 
(272)  Thirdly, the Transaction is unlikely to have an impact on the competitiveness o f 
downstream companies competing with PPD or potential entrants into the 
downstream market with regard to the supply of cell culture media  or any particular 
potential segment of the market . In the market investigation, no responding customers 
expressed conc erns with regard to cell culture media  or any type of media .254 
Similarly , the large majority of upstream competitor s to Thermo Fisher indicated to 
have no concerns as regards to any type of media .255 
(273)  Furthermore, as set out Section 6.3 of this Decision, sponsors of clinical trials, i.e. 
pharmaceutical companies, indicated that that they do not consider Thermo Fisher 
products as essential for laboratory service providers to provide services for the m. 
Neither would, in their view, Thermo Fisher have the incentive to engage in input 
foreclosure, nor would such strategy have an impact on the downstream market. 
Pharmaceutical companies pointed at potential re putational harm Thermo Fisher 
would suffer if it would foreclose PPD’s downstream competitions, and indicate d that 
they would consider taking counter -measures in such event.  
(274)  The Commission notes that potential concerns based on customer foreclosure , which 
were indicated by a small minority in the market investigation,256 are likely not 
substantiated because of PPD’s small downstream market shares in the market for 
laboratory services for clinical development  both at global ( [5-10]%) and EEA -wide 
([0-5]%) level. Furthermore, cell culture media  may not only be used for clinical 
development, but also in other areas of laboratory services, where PPD is not active.  
6.4.7.4.  Conclusion  
(275)  For the reasons set out above, the Transaction does not give rise to serious doub ts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market or a substantial part thereof in relation to 
vertical effects for cell culture media or any potential segment of this market  in an 
EEA-wide or global market . 
                                                 
252  Form CO, paragraph 336.  
253  Form CO, paragraph 335.  
254  Replies to questions 97 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
255  Replies to questions 76 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  
256  Replies to question 76.1 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  

 
 
69 instruments and plastics. Furthermore, many of the uses of these plastics relate 
to activities that PPD does not compete in; and  
(b) PPD competitors and their pharma ceutical and biotechnology clients source a 
wide variety of products from Thermo Fisher, and could retaliate in response 
to any attempt at input foreclosure.  
6.4.8.3.  The Commission’s assessment  
(280)  The Commission notes that Thermo Fisher has a meaningful market share in the area 
of plastics for magnetic -bead based instruments in 2020, but that the market would 
not be affected on the basis of its market share in 2018 and 2019. Thermo Fisher faces 
comp etitors with significant market shares, such as Greiner and Corning . 
(281)  The Notifying Party’s position that third party suppliers are a competitive alternative 
for magnetic bead -based plastics usable with Thermo Fisher’s KingFisher instruments  
is not consiste nt with the information on its website. On Thermo Fisher’s website, it 
claims: “ Use of KingFisher plastics ensures proper KingFisher instrument function 
and application performance and avoids costly repairs that may be caused by using 
third -party plastics,  even if marketed as ‘KingFisher compatible.’ Use of third -party 
plastics may void instrument service contracts. ”260 In the frequently asked questions 
section about the product, it answers the question “ Can I use plates from other 
manufacturers with the King Fisher Flex Magnetic Particle Processor? ” with “ No, we 
strongly recommend that you use the MagMAX plates or KingFisher plates since they 
were specifically designed to be used with KingFisher Flex tip combs to attain 
maximal performance. Plates from other m anufacturers may not be compatible with 
the KingFisher Flex heating blocks. They may also cause unexpected problems, such 
as cross -contamination, due to the divergent well volume and bottom height of the 
plate. ”261 
(282)  CRO and laboratory service providers that r esponded to the Commission’s market 
investigation gave inconclusive responses on whether they were able to use third party 
plastics with Thermo Fisher’s devices, with some saying they can and others saying 
they cannot.262 However, a significant amount of The rmo Fisher competitors indicates  
that they are able to supply plastics compatible with Thermo Fisher’s magnetic bead -
based devices.263 […].264 
(283)  A large majority of CRO and laboratory service providers that replied to the 
Commission’s market investigation indicated that they would be able to switch away 
                                                 
260  Thermo Fisher’s website, https://www.thermofisher.com/lu/en/home/life -science/dna -rna-purification -
analysis/automated -purification -extraction/kingfisher -systems/accessories.html . Accessed on 17 November 
2021.  
261  Thermo Fisher’s website, https://www.thermofisher.com/search/results?query=5400610& persona= Doc
Support &type=Product+FAQs . Accessed on 17 November 2021.  
262  Replies to question 68 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
263  Replies to question 52 of questionnaire Q 2 to Thermo Fisher competitors . 
264  Form CO, paragraph 401.  
 
 
70 from Thermo Fisher for both magnetic -bead based instruments as well as plastics for 
magnetic -bead based instruments,265 showing that there are competitive alternatives.  
(284)  Therefore, Thermo Fisher is unlikely to have the ability to engage in input foreclosure 
for plastics for magnetic bead -based instruments. Even if it were to do so, its incentive 
and the  impact of such strategy would be very limited. PPD only purchased EUR […] 
worth of these plastics globally in 2020 (none in the EEA), of which approximately 
EUR […] from Thermo Fisher. They therefore clearly only make up a very small part 
of the cost base  of CRO and laboratory service providers. Consistent with this, 
respondents to the Commission’s market investigation do not expect Thermo Fisher’s 
incentive to engage in foreclosure to change post -Transaction.266 
(285)  In line with the above, the vast majority of respondents to the Commission’s market 
investigation did not express any concerns with respect to plastics for magnetic bead -
based instruments.267 
(286)  Furthermore, as set out in Section 6.3 of this Decision, sponsors of clinical trials, i.e. 
pharmaceutical companies, indicated that that they do not consider Thermo Fisher 
products as essential for laboratory service providers to provide services for the m. 
Neither would, in their view, Thermo Fisher have the incentive to engage in input 
foreclosure, nor would such strategy have an impact on the downstream market. 
Pharmaceutical companies pointed at potential reputational harm Thermo Fisher 
would suffer if it wou ld foreclose PPD’s downstream competitions, and indicate d that 
they would consider to take counter -measures in such event.  
6.4.8.4.  Conclusion  
(287)  For the reasons set out above, the Transaction does not give rise to serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the inte rnal market or a substantial part thereof in relation to 
vertical effects for plastics for magnetic bead -based instruments  globally and in the 
EEA. 
6.4.9.   High -resolution accurate mass spectrometers  
6.4.9.1.  Market structure  
(288)  Below table shows the Notifying Party’s market share estimates for high -resolution 
accurate mass (‘HRAM’) spectrometers for the use with LC.  
                                                 
265  Replies to question 70 of questionnaire Q1 to CR O and laboratory service providers.  
266  Replies to question 74 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers  and question 57 of 
questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors . 
267  Replies to question 76 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers  and question 58 of 
questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors . 

 
 
72 6.4.9.3.  The Commission’s assessment  
(292)  Market shares of Thermo Fisher exceed 30% on the upstream market for LC HRAM 
and overall HRAM spectrometers both at global and EEA -wide level. A potential 
concern due to the Transaction is therefore input foreclosure of such spectrometers by 
Thermo Fisher. However, it is unlikely that Thermo Fisher would have the ability and 
the incentive to engage in input foreclosure, and such strategy would li kely not have 
an impact on competition.  
(293)  Firstly, Thermo Fisher would likely not have the ability to foreclose PPD’s 
competitors of  HRAM and  LC HRAM spectrometers . Even though market shares are 
high, [30-40]% under any plausible geographic market definitio n, as shown in Table 
16 above, alternatives with a significant market presence, namely at least Bruker, 
Waters and Sc iex, are present in the market .272 In the market inve stigation, responding 
customers confirm that products of those three manufacturers would be comparably 
suitable as Thermo Fisher HRAM spectrometers for the use of the company, with 
Shimadzu as a fifth supplier considered generally suitable.273 The Commission  notes 
that two customers submit that they would not be able to switch HRAM spectrometers 
in case Thermo Fisher were to increase prices or restrict access. The Commission 
understands, however, that one respondent is concern ed for a particular assay, not th e 
device. In any event, market feedback is inconclusive in this regard, as two other 
customers submit that they would be able to switch to other suppliers.274 One 
customer explained for products including HRAM mass spectrometry: “There are 
multiple vendors f or products that we currently source from Thermo Fisher such that 
any change in what Thermo Fisher sell or don’t sell us has no material impact to our 
business.”275 The Commission acknowledges that switching suppliers of HRAM 
products may entail significant costs, and may have an impact on ongoing clinical 
trials. On balance, however, based on the market shares level and the confirmation by 
other customers that other suppliers would be suitable alternatives, the Commission 
considers that Thermo Fisher would l ikely not have the ability to foreclose 
downstream competitors  of HRAM mass spectrometers, including LC HRAM 
spectrometers , as customers would generally be able to source from other suppliers.   
(294)  Secondly, because downstream competitors would have alternatives available to 
source HRAM mass spectrometers, including LC HRAM spectrometers  from, as 
explained in paragraph (293)  above, the merged  entity  would likely not be able to 
recoup upstream losses by additional gains downstream, and therefore would likely 
not have the incentive for input foreclosure.  The Commission further notes that 
Thermo Fish er’s gross margin on LC HRAM spectrometers upstream is […], and 
therefore significantly higher than PPD’s downstream margin of […].276 The merged 
entity would therefore need to win significant business downstream to make up for 
upstream sales losses, which a ppears unlikely given that other suppliers are available 
in the market.  
                                                 
272  Replies to question 57 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers . 
273  Replies to question 59 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
274  Replies to questions 56 and 56.1 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
275  Reply to question 61.1 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and lab oratory service providers.  
276  Reply to RFI 14, paragraph 5.  
 
 
73 (295)  Thirdly, the Transaction is unlikely to have an impact on the competitiveness on 
downstream companies competing with PPD or potential entrants into th e 
downstream market with regard  to the supply of HRAM mass spectrometers and LC 
HRAM spectrometers . In the market investigation, the majority of responding 
customers did not raise concerns regarding HRAM spectrometers and did not indicate 
that their view would be different for LC HRAM spe ctrometers .277 The Commission 
notes that two customers, however, showed concerns regarding the Transaction 
forming, however, the minority of respondents. Similarly, the clear majority of 
upstream competitors to Thermo Fisher did  not raise concerns with regar d to HRAM 
spectrometers, and no indication was made that concerns specifically for LC HRAM 
spectrometers would exist .278 
(296)  Furthermore, as set out Section 6.3 of this Decision, sponsors of clinical trials, i.e. 
pharmaceutical companies, indicated that that they do not consider Thermo Fisher 
products as essential for laboratory service providers to p rovide services for the m. 
Neither would, in their view, Thermo Fisher have the incentive to engage in input 
foreclosure, nor would such strategy have an impact on the downstream market. 
Pharmaceutical companies pointed at potential reputational harm Thermo  Fisher 
would suffer if it would foreclose PPD’s downstream competitions, and indicate d that 
they would consider taking  counter -measures in such event.  
(297)  The Commission notes that  two competitors of Thermo Fisher raised concerns with 
regard to HRAM spectrome ters in relation to potential customer foreclosure .279 The 
Commission considers it highly unlikely that the merged entity will have the ability to 
impede effective competition by foreclosing upstream competitors from a significant 
part of its customer base . This is because PPD’s market shares in the market for 
laboratory services for clinical development  are small at both global ( [5-10]%) and 
EEA-wide ( [0-5]%) level. Further, HRAM spectrometers  may not only used for 
clinical development, but also in other are as of laboratory se rvices, where PPD is not 
active .  
6.4.9.4.  Conclusion  
(298)  For the reasons set out above, the Transaction does not give rise to serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market or a substantial part thereof in relation to 
vertical effe cts for HRAM spectrometers and specifically LC HRAM spectrometers  in 
an EEA -wide or global market . 
6.4.10.   Cryogenic storage tubes  
6.4.10.1.  Market structure  
(299)  The b elow table shows the Notifying Party’s market share estimates for cryogenic 
storage tubes.  
                                                 
277  Replies to questions 63 and 64 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
278  Replies to questions 47, 47.1 and 48 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  
279  Replies to question 47 and 47.1 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  

 
 
75 (303)  Firstly, Thermo Fisher would likely not have the ability to foreclose PPD’s 
competitors of cryogenic storage tubes. As presented in Table 17, market shares 
exceed 30%, but remain still moderate at [30-40]% at global level. Four significant 
competitors (FluidX / Brooks, Corning, Micronic and Greiner) would remain present 
in the mark et post -Transaction. All but one customer that expressed an opinion in the 
market investigation confirmed that they would be able to switch to alternative 
suppliers if Thermo Fisher were to increase prices or restrict access to cryogenic 
storage tubes.283 Two companies noted that switching of storage tubes may have an 
impact of ongoing clinical trials, as it would require some time and would entail 
certain costs, as the replacing products would need to be assessed first as to their 
suitability.284 The Commissio n notes that, these concerns mainly concern ongoing 
clinical trials, but not the companies’ ability to compete for new business. Further, a 
majority of respondents did not raise such concerns. Lastly, the Commission notes 
that the merged entity would unlik ely benefit directly from a foreclosure of ongoing 
clinical trials, as sponsors would not likely replace the existing CRO or laboratory 
service provider with PPD, which would likely constitute a more severe interruption 
of the ongoing trial  than only repla cing the type of storage tube used .  
(304)  Secondly, because downstream competitors would have alternatives available to 
source cryogenic storage tubes  from, as explained in paragraph (303)  above, the 
merged entity would likely not be able to recoup upstream losses by additional gains 
downstream,  especially by winning new clinical trials,  and therefore would likely not 
have the incentive for input foreclosure . 
(305)  Thirdly, the Transaction is unlikely to have an impact on the competitiveness on 
downstream companies competing with PPD or potential entrants into the 
downstream market with regard to the supply of cryogenic storage tubes . In the 
market investigation, all but one285 responding customers expressed no concerns with 
regard to cryogenic storage tubes or any other form of storage tubes .286 Similarly, no 
upstream competitors to Thermo Fisher raised  concerns with regard to cryogenic 
storage tubes or any other form of storage tubes .287 
(306)  Furthermore, as set out Section 6.3 of this Decision, sponsors of clinical trials, i.e. 
pharmaceutical companies, indicated that they do not consider Thermo Fisher 
products as essential for laboratory service providers to provid e services for the m. 
Neither would, in their view, Thermo Fisher have the incentive to engage in input 
foreclosure, nor would such strategy have an impact on the downstream market. 
Pharmaceutical companies pointed at potential reputational harm Thermo Fish er 
would suffer if it would foreclose PPD’s downstream competitions, and indicate d that 
they would consider to take counter -measures in such event.  
                                                 
283  Replies to questions 106 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and labor atory service providers.  
284  Replies to question 106.1 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
285  One respondent reiterated its concerns as discussed in paragraph (303)  of this Decision.  
286  Replies to questions 107 and 108 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
287  Replies to questions 86 and 87 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  

 
 
77 various possibilities to punish or pressure Thermo Fisher to supply general purpose 
benchtop centrifuges to PPD competitors. 290 
6.4.11.3.  The Commission’s assessment  
(311)  Market shares of Thermo Fisher exceed 30% in a potential global upstream market for 
general purpose benchtop centrifuges, but not in a potential EEA -wide upstream 
market. A potential concern arising from these market share levels is therefore input 
foreclosure of such centrifuges  by Thermo Fisher. However, it is unlikely that Thermo 
Fisher would have the ability and the incentive to engage in input foreclosure, and 
such strategy would likely not have an impact on competition.  
(312)  Firstly, Thermo Fisher would likely not have  the abilit y to foreclose PPD’s 
competitors of general purpose benchtop centrifuges. As presented in Table 18, 
market shares of Thermo Fisher [amount to 30 -40%]  at global level. At least two 
strong competitors (Hettich and Eppendorf) would remain present in the market post -
Transaction, as well as a number of other competitors with non -negligible market 
shares.  All but one customers responding to the market invest igation confirmed that 
they would be able to switch to alternative suppliers if Thermo Fisher were to increase 
prices or restrict access to general purpose benchtop centrifuges.291 
(313)  Secondly, because downstream competitors would have alternatives available to  
source general purpose benchtop centrifuges from, as explained in paragraph (312)  
above, the merged entity would likely not be able to recoup upstre am losses by 
additional gains downstream, and therefore would likely not have the incentive for 
input foreclosure.  
(314)  Thirdly, the Transaction is unlikely to have an impact on the competitiveness on 
downstream companies competing with PPD or potential entrant s into the 
downstream market with regard to the supply of general purpose benchtop 
centrifuges . In the market investigation, no responding customers expressed concern s 
with regard to general purpose benchtop centrifuges or any other type of centrifuge .292 
Similarly  no upstream competitor  to Thermo Fisher raised  concerns with regard  to 
general purpose benchtop centrifuges or any other type of centrifuge .293 
(315)  Furthermore, as set out Section 6.3 of this Decision, sponsors of clinical trials, i.e. 
pharmaceutical companies, indicated that they do not consider Thermo Fisher 
products as essential for laboratory service providers to provide services for the m. 
Neither would, in their view, Thermo Fisher have the incentive to engage in input 
foreclosure, nor would such strategy have an impact on the downstream market. 
Pharmaceutical companies pointed at potential reputational harm Thermo Fisher 
would suffer if  it would foreclose PPD’s downstream competitions, and indicate d that 
they would consider to take counter -measures in such event.  
                                                 
290  Form CO, paragraph 702 et seq.  
291  Replies to questions 101 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
292  Replies to questions 102 and 103 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
293  Replies to questions 81 and 82 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  

 
 
79 6.4.12.3.  The Commission’s assessment  
(320)  The Commission notes that in the market for thermal cyclers, Thermo Fisher’s market 
share is […] above 30% globally, and under 30% in the EEA.  Furthermore, Thermo 
Fisher faces competitors with significant market shares, such as Bio -Rad, which has a 
similar mar ket share to Thermo Fisher, and Eppendorf. In view of this market 
structure, it is unlikely that Thermo Fisher has the ability to engage in input 
foreclosure.  
(321)  Respondents to the Commission’s market investigation indicated that they are able to 
switch away  from Thermo Fisher in case it were to increase prices or restrict access to 
thermal cyclers post -Transaction.297 Furthermore, respondents rated Bio -Rad and 
Eppendorf as strong competitors in the area of thermal cyclers.298 The majority of 
Thermo Fisher’s comp etitors that responded to the Commission’s market 
investigation indicated that they are able to increase supply significantly in case of 
increased demand.299 
(322)  In line with the above, respondents to the Commission’s market investigation 
considered that Thermo Fisher’s incentive to foreclose its customers in the market for 
thermal cyclers would not change as a result of the Transaction, and did not voice any 
concerns about the Transaction for the market for thermal cyclers.300 
(323)  Furthermore, as set out Section 6.3 of this Decision, sponsors of clinical trials, i.e. 
pharmaceutical companies, indicated that they do not consider Thermo Fisher 
products as essential for laboratory service providers to provide services for the m. 
Neither would, in their view, Thermo Fisher have the incentive to engage in input 
foreclosure, nor would such strategy have an impact on the downstream market. 
Pharmaceutical companies pointed at potential reputational harm Thermo Fisher 
would suffer if it would foreclose PPD’s downstream competitions, and indicate d that 
they would consider to take counter -measures in such event.  
6.4.12.4.  Conclusion  
(324)  For the reasons set out above, the Transaction does no t give rise to serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market or a substantial part thereof in relation to 
vertical effects for thermal cyclers  globally and in the EEA . 
6.4.13.   Infrared spectrometers  
6.4.13.1.  Market structure  
(325)  The b elow table shows the Notifying Party’s market share estimates for FT-IR 
spectrometers.  As explained in the market definition Section 5.2.13 , the Commi ssion  
considers FT -IR spectrometers as a plausible segment of the IR spectrometer market. 
The Notifying Party submits market shares for FT -IR spectrometers, and notes that 
                                                 
297  Replies to question 82 of quest ionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers . 
298  Replies to question 83 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers . 
299  Replies to question 62 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  
300  Replies to questions 85 and 86  of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers  and questions 
66 and 67 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  

 
 
81 (329)  Firstly, Thermo Fisher would likely not have the ability to foreclose PPD’s 
competitors of F T-IR and IR spectrometers. As presented in Table 20 above,  market 
shares of Thermo Fisher do not exceed [30-40]% in the upstream market under any 
plausible market definition. At least two strong competitors (Bruker and 
PerkinElmer), as well as a number of other competitors with non -negligible mark et 
shares, would remain available to downstream competitors. While receiving limited 
feedback from customers with respect to the competitive strengths of alternative IR 
spectrometers providers, the Commission did not receive indication that any of those 
suppliers would not be a suitable provider of IR or FT -IR spectrometers.306 Lastly, it 
is at least questionable to what exten t IR and F T-IR spectrometers are important 
inputs for PPD’s downstream business in the sense that it is a significant cost -factor, a 
critical component of a source for differentiation, in the light of the Notifying Party’s 
submission that PPD bought […] FT-IR instrument in the last […] years, and […] for 
operations in the EEA  in the last […] years.307 
(330)  Secondly, because downstream competitors would have alternatives available to 
source IR and FT -IR spectrometers from, as explained in paragraph (329)  above, the 
merged entity would likely not be able to recoup upstream losses  by additional gains 
downstream, and therefore would likely not have the incentive for input foreclosure.  
(331)  Thirdly, the Transaction is  unlikely to have an impact on the competitiveness on 
downstream companies competing with PPD or potential entrants into the 
downstream market with regard to the supply of IR or F T-IR spectrometers. In the 
market investigation, no responding customers expr essed concern s with regard to IR 
spectrometers , and did not indicate that their view would differ for F T-IR 
spectrometers.308 Similarly, the majority of upstream competitors to Thermo Fisher 
did not raise concerns with regard to IR -spectrometers, and did not  indicate that their 
view would differ for F T-IR spectrometers.309 
(332)  Furthermore, as set out Section 6.3 of this Decision, sponsors of clinical trials, i.e. 
pharmaceutical companies, indicated that that they do not consider Thermo Fisher 
products as essential for laboratory service providers to p rovide services for the m. 
Neither would, in their view, Thermo Fisher have the incentive to engage in input 
foreclosure, nor would such strategy have an impact on the downstream market. 
Pharmaceutical companies pointed at potential reputational harm Thermo  Fisher 
would suffer if it would foreclose PPD’s downstream competitions, and indicate d that 
they would consider to take counter -measures in such event.  
(333)  The Commission notes that, during the market investigation, two competitors of 
Thermo Fisher raised con cerns with regard to IR spectrometers. Both companies 
substantiated their concerns with the claim that post -Transaction, PPD may stop 
buying instruments by manufacturers other than Thermo Fisher, and thereby limiting 
the customer base for competitors.310 While the potential loss of a theoret ical or actual 
customer may be a  commercial concern, the Commission considers it highly unlikely 
                                                 
306  Replies to question 57 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and l aboratory service providers . 
307  Form CO, paragraph 731.  
308  Replies to questions 63 and 63.1 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
309  Replies to questions 47 and 47.1 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  
310  Replies to question 47 and 47.1 of questionnaire Q2 to Thermo Fisher competitors.  
 
 
82 that the merged entity will have the ability to impede effective competition by 
engaging in customer foreclosure. This is bec ause PPD’s market shares in the market 
for laboratory services for clinical development  are small at both global ( [5-10]%) and 
EEA-wide ( [0-5]%) level. It has to be noted that IR spectrometers may not only be 
used for clinical development, but also in othe r areas of laboratory services, where 
PPD is not active. The Notifying Party submits that in the past five years, PPD has 
only purchased [PPD purchase data ].  
(334)  The Commission therefore concludes that PPD has no significant market power in the 
downstream mar ket, and is not an important customer for IR spectrometers. 
Therefore, the Transaction is unlikely to lead to an impediment of effective 
competition due to customer foreclosure.  
6.4.13.4.  Conclusion  
(335)  For the reasons set out above, the Transaction does not give rise to serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the internal market or a substantial part thereof in relation to 
vertical effects for IR or FT -IR spectrometers  in an EEA -wide or global market . 
6.5. Observations on the Transaction not related to specific markets  
(336)  This section covers additional feedback the Commission received in the course of its 
market investigation not related to specific product markets.  
6.5.1.  Concerns relating to information exchange  
(337)  A few CRO and laboratory service providers that responded to the C ommission’s 
market investigation voiced the concern that the Thermo Fisher obtains competitively 
sensitive information, such as purchasing volumes, about their business through its 
supplier relationship. Post -Transaction, this information could constitute a 
competitive advantage for the merged entity when bidding for clinical trials, as it may 
have a view on the input cost of competitors.  
(338)  Based on available information, the Commission does not consider that such eventual 
information exchange concern poses a  competitive concern. The information that 
Thermo Fisher might  obtain about PPD competitors as a supplier is limited and would 
likely not be a major competitive advantage. First , many of Thermo Fisher’s products 
have a variety of use cases, and it is not v isible to Thermo Fisher for what purpose a 
product is purchased. Second, for most products competitive alternatives to Thermo 
Fisher are available, which CRO and / or laboratory service providers will typically 
use for at least part of their products. Ther efore, any information Thermo Fisher might 
receive would be incomplete. Third, the ultimately quoted price of clinical trial 
services is dependent o n many factors, of which input cost are only a minor one. PPD 
submits that the largest elements of its cost base are employee costs and investigator 
grants ( i.e. payments to third party clinical trial sites and physicians involved in the 
trial) and that inputs in which Thermo Fisher is active constitute less than […] of the 
total price.311 
                                                 
311  Reply to request for information 12, question 2.  
 
 
83 6.5.2.  Concerns relating to com panion diagnostics  
(339)  A small minority of CRO and laboratory service providers voiced concerns relating to 
companion diagnostics (“CDx ”). CDx are tests developed for a specific drug, to test 
whether the drug will work for a patient and / or whether a patient is likely to suffer 
side effects from a pharmaceutical. Thermo Fisher is active in the development of 
CDx in collaboration with pharmaceutical companies, and today has one approved 
CDx product. PPD’s activities in CDx are minimal: in the past […], it was i nvolved in 
the development of […] CDx product as a CRO and laboratory service provider.  
(340)  PPD’s competitors that expressed some level of concern in the Commission’s market 
investigation indicated that post -Transaction, the merged entity may (i) reduce other 
CROs’ / labs’  ability to bid competitively on companion diagnostic work for tests 
developed by Thermo Fisher and (ii) create the incentive to restrict selling certain 
products required for CDx development.  
(341)  Based on available information, the Commission con siders that the Transaction is 
unlikely to result in competitive concerns relation to CDx .  
(342)  Regarding the concern that the Transaction may reduce other CRO or  laboratory 
service providers’  ability to bid competitively on companion diagnostic work for tests  
developed by Thermo Fisher , the Commission notes that Thermo Fisher only has one 
approved CDx product, and that the impact of such scenario would therefore be 
limited. Furthermore, there are various competitors active in CDx, such as Illumina, 
Roche, Myri ad, Guardant health and others. Furthermore, it is unlikely that 
pharmaceutical companies for which CDx are developed would tolerate such 
restrictions on CDx testing.  
(343)  Regarding the concern that the Transaction may create the incentive to restrict selling 
certain produc ts required for CDx development, the Commission notes that it has 
investigated the products affected by the Transaction (see the sections  above ), 
including those that are used in CDx development  (e.g. DNA sequencing instruments 
and consumables ), and did not identify such foreclosure risk.  
(344)  Furthermore, one of the main technologies used for CDx is next generation 
sequencing ( “NGS ”). Thermo Fisher’s sole marketed CDx , the Oncomine Dx Target 
Test, is an NGS -based CDx. However, Thermo Fisher’s market shares for NGS are 
low, an estimated [10-20]% in the EEA and [5-10]% globally. Illumina is the clear 
market leader within NGS. The large majority CRO and laboratory service providers 
that responded to the Commission’s market investigation indicated that they are able 
to use Illumina’s NGS devices instead of Thermo Fisher’s devices for their 
purposes.312 Therefore, input foreclosure with respect to NGS systems , either globally 
or in the EEA,  cannot arise a s a result of the Transaction.  
7. CONCLUSION  
(345)  For the above reasons, the European Commission has decided not to oppose the 
notified operation and to declare it compatible with the internal  market and with the 
                                                 
312  Replies to question 11 of questionnaire Q1 to CRO and laboratory service providers.  
 
 
84 EEA Agreement. This Decision is adopted in application of Article 6(1)(b) of the 
Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement .  
For the Commission  
 
 
(Signed)  
Margrethe VESTAGER  
Executive Vice-President