EN Official Journal of the European Union L 260/1

COMMISSION DECISION (EU) 2016/1698

of 20 February 2014

concerning measures SA.22932 (11/C) (ex NN 37/07) implemented by France in favour of Marseille Provence Airport and airlines using the airport

(notified under document C(2014) 870)

(Only the French text is authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular the first subparagraph of Article 108(2) thereof,

Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and in particular Article 62(1)(a) thereof,

Having called on interested parties to submit their comments pursuant to those articles and having regard to their comments,

Whereas:

1. PROCEDURE

(1) On 8 May 2006, the Commission received a complaint, lodged by Ryanair, about unlawful aid due to different airport charges being applied to national flights and international flights respectively. By letter of 21 June 2006, the Commission asked France for information on the points raised by this complaint.

(2) On 27 March 2007, the Commission received a second complaint, dated 15 March 2007 and lodged by Air France, about unlawful aid granted by the Departmental Council of Bouches-du-Rhône (‘the Departmental Council’) to Marseille Provence Airport, and also about unlawful aid granted by the airport to Ryanair and other airlines. These advantages allegedly involved, in particular, reduced airport charges to encourage flights from the new ‘Marseille-Provence 2’ terminal (‘Terminal mp2’).

(3) By letter of 27 November 2009, Air France lodged a complaint about unlawful aid granted by several French regional and local airports, including Marseille Provence Airport.

(4) By letter of 13 July 2011, the Commission informed France that it had decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) (1).

(5) The Commission invited interested parties to submit their comments on the measures in question within one month of the publication date.

(6) The Commission received comments on 13 December 2011 from the Marseille-Provence Chamber of Commerce and Industry (‘CCIMP’) and on 15 December 2011 from Air France, Ryanair, AMS, Association of European Airlines and the CCIMP. It forwarded these comments to France by letter of 10 February 2012. France was given the opportunity to respond to them within one month. The Commission received comments from France by letter of 12 March 2012.

(7) It also received additional comments from Ryanair dated 13 April 2012, 10 April 2013, 20 December 2013, and 17 and 30 January 2014. These additional comments were forwarded by letter to France on, respectively, 13 July 2012, 3 May 2013, 9 January 2014 and 4 February 2014. By letters of 17 July 2012, 4 June 2013, 29 January 2014 and 5 February 2014, France informed the Commission that it had no response to make.

(8) France sent additional information to the Commission by letters of 26 March 2012, 10 April 2012, 20 September 2012, 30 October 2013 and 24 December 2013 after this was requested by the Commission by letters of 23 February 2012, 12 June 2012 and 20 November 2013.

2. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE FACTS

2.1. THE PARTIES CONCERNED

2.1.1. MARSEILLE PROVENCE AIRPORT

(9) Marseille Provence airport is one of the largest French airports, after those of Paris, Nice and Lyon. In 2012, the airport handled 8 295 479 passengers. Table 1 Development in the number of passengers 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Passenger traffic mp1 5 859 480 6 008 466 6 028 292 5 907 174 5 619 879 5 799 435 5 990 703 6 483 863 Passenger traffic mp2 0 107 478 934 481 1 058 703 1 670 240 1 722 732 1 372 164 1 811 616 Total traffic 5 859 480 6 115 944 6 962 773 6 965 877 7 290 119 7 522 167 7 362 867 8 295 479 Source: France's submission of 24 December 2013

2.1.2. MARSEILLE-PROVENCE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, CONCESSION-HOLDER FOR MARSEILLE PROVENCE AIRPORT

(10) In France, chambers of commerce and industry (‘CCI’) are public administrative bodies. They represent the general interests of trade, industry and services before public authorities. Their tasks and powers are laid down by law (2) and they come under the administrative supervision (3) of the government, through the regional prefect. The supervisory authority has automatic access to all general meetings of the chambers of commerce and industry and can have one or more items added to the agenda. The supervisory authority can, where applicable, suspend or dismiss a member of the CCI. At the very least, decisions on the budget, use of debt or signature of agreements with third parties are enforceable only after approval by the supervisory authority (4). The CCIMP manages its subsidiaries, in particular Marseille Provence Airport and several training bodies. Its subsidiaries do not have their own legal personality (5). However, separate accounts are kept for the airport activities. Acts are enforceable only if they have been addressed to the supervisory authority.

(11) Since 1934 the CCIMP has managed Marseille Provence Airport under a development, maintenance and operation concession granted by the French State, which owns the airport. In 1987 this concession was renewed for 30 years (6).

2.1.3. THE ECONOMIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF MARSEILLE PROVENCE AIRPORT

(12) The Departmental Council of Bouches-du-Rhône, the Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur Regional Council and the Marseille Provence Métropole Urban Community are consulted on the airport's management within the framework of the airport's Economic Advisory Committee (‘Cocoéco’). This committee's task is to give opinions on the development of investment, the airport's operation and charges for services provided by the airport.

(13) According to the Civil Aviation Code, this committee meets at least once a year to give an opinion on the rules for establishing and applying charges for airport services at the aerodrome in question, as well as on airport investment programmes. It can be consulted on any matter relating to the services delivered by the airport operator.

(14) Cocoéco consists of a users panel and an operators panel, with the latter comprising the President of the Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur (PACA) Regional Council or his or her representative, the President of the Departmental Council of Bouches-du-Rhône or his or her representative, and the President of the Marseille Provence Métropole Urban Community or his or her representative.

2.2. THE NEW ‘LOW-COST’ TERMINAL MP2

2.2.1. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF TERMINAL MP2

(15) Following the loss of over a million passengers since 2001, mainly due to competition from the TGV Méditerranée high-speed railway line between Marseille and Paris, the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the bankruptcies of several airlines (Sabena, SwissAir, etc.), Marseille Provence Airport was looking to revitalise its traffic and redirect its development towards European destinations. To this end, in 2004 the airport decided to set up a ‘low-cost’ terminal.

(16) The CCIMP therefore decided to convert the former cargo terminal No 1 into this new terminal. This building was inexpensively refurbished to handle low-cost customers. Work began in December 2005 and Terminal mp2 started operating in September 2006.

(17) The distribution of the number of passengers (actual figures) between Terminals mp1 and mp2 from 2006 to 2013 is indicated in the table in recital 9.

2.2.2. COMPANIES USING THE NEW TERMINAL MP2

(18) To assess the interest of airlines in using Terminal mp2, in 2004 the CCIMP launched a call for projects aimed at the airlines. Air France, Ryanair and easyJet responded. The total volume of the proposals made by these airlines did not exceed the terminal's planned capacity and no selection was therefore necessary.

(19) Ryanair is the main user of Terminal mp2, but France has also mentioned bmibaby.com, Condor, easyJet, Jet4you.com and Myair.com.

(20) On 12 July 2004 Air France submitted an application to the CCIMP with regard to Terminal mp2. It indicated that ‘La Navette’ shuttle passengers (Marseille/Paris-Orly connections) could potentially use Terminal mp2. Air France proposed a schedule of 19 flights per day from Monday to Friday, with 14 flights on Saturdays and 18 flights on Sundays to Paris-Orly. Negotiations between Air France and the CCIMP with regard to transferring the shuttle service failed. For Air France, there were two main obstacles: the restriction of Terminal mp2 traffic to ‘point-to-point’ flights, and the fact that the terminal was set to handle only national and intra-EU flights.

(21) According to the information provided by France, all airlines wanting to use Terminal mp2 were able to do so.

2.3. MEASURES UNDER INVESTIGATION

(22) The opening decision investigated the following measures: (a) over the 2001-2010 period, an investment subsidy of EUR 24,2 million to the CCIMP, including a subsidy for the construction of Terminal mp2, amounting to EUR 7,577 million; (b) over the 2001-2010 period, financial flows amounting to EUR […] (*) million between the CCIMP and the general arm of the CCI; (c) setting of the passenger charge amount for Terminal mp2; (d) reduced passenger charges for national flights; (e) reduction of airport charges in connection with the creation of new routes; (f) reduction of the overnight parking charge; (g) financing of marketing activities; (h) agreement to purchase advertising space concluded with Airport Marketing Services without prior publicity or competitive tendering; (i) profitability of Terminal mp2 revealed by the business plan presented by the CCIMP.

2.3.1. INVESTMENT SUBSIDIES FOR THE CCIMP

(23) According to the information available to the Commission, the investment in constructing the new Terminal mp2 was funded through a EUR 7,577 million subsidy from the Departmental Council of Bouches-du-Rhône.

(24) In addition, over the 2001-2010 period, the CCIMP received investment subsidies from the Departmental Council, Regional Council, Marseille Provence Métropole, State (Directorate-General for Civil Aviation — ‘DGAC’ — part of the Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy) and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which totalled EUR 16,624 million. It received three subsidies from the Departmental Council in order to extend and restructure the airport, which were respectively EUR 1,519 million, EUR 210 000 and EUR 2,997 million. The Regional Council granted it EUR 3,616 million to extend and develop the airport and EUR 255 000 to develop the cargo area. Marseille Provence Métropole granted it a subsidy of EUR 889 000 to develop international traffic. The State (DGAC) funded the screening of hold baggage to the tune of EUR 464 000, as well as the enhanced screening of baggage and the purchase of baggage screening equipment at EUR 5,032 million. Lastly, the ERDF subsidised the development of air cargo (cargo aircraft parking areas, cargo area road, redevelopment of cargo terminals, servicing of the area) in the amount of EUR 1,520 million.

(25) Under Articles 2(1o)(b) and 15(1o) of the schedule of conditions applicable to the Marseille aerodrome concession, the concession-holder must finance investments.

2.3.2. FINANCIAL FLOWS BETWEEN THE CCIMP AND THE GENERAL ARM OF THE CCI

(26) Between 2001 and 2010, the financial flows between the CCIMP and the general arm of the CCI appear to have totalled EUR […]* million.

2.3.3. REDUCED PASSENGER CHARGES FOR USERS OF TERMINAL MP2

(27) The passenger charges vary depending on the terminal used by the airlines. They are lower for those using the ‘low-cost’ Terminal mp2, and higher for those using Terminal mp1 (Halls 1-4). These charges are decided by the CCIMP. Air France challenged the original charges at Marseille Provence Airport for 2006, 2007 and 2008 and these were annulled by the Council of State.

(28) On 7 May 2008 the Council of State annulled (7) the approved passenger charges applicable to Terminal mp2 at Marseille-Provence airport as from 1 June 2006, as well as those applicable from 1 January 2007, due to the accounting information used to calculate the charge not providing sufficient justification. In this case, the Council of State did not annul the passenger charges applicable to the main terminal.

(29) On 26 December 2008 the Council of State annulled the passenger charges applicable to the main terminal and to Terminal mp2 at Marseille-Provence airport as from 1 January 2008.

(30) In a judgment of 15 May 2009, the Council of State upheld the refusal by the competent ministers to approve the charges applicable to Terminal mp2 as from 1 January 2009.

(31) Following the annulment of these charges, the DGAC commissioned the consultancy firm Mazars to carry out a study, delivered in November 2008, on the methods for allocating costs and revenues and on the charges at the two terminals. Based on this audit, the CCIMP decided on new passenger charges that were applicable retroactively. These retroactive charges applied to Terminal mp1 (Halls 1 to 4) for 2008, and to Terminal mp2 for 2006 to 2008. According to the CCIMP, these new charges were set such that the passenger cost coverage rates (8) were similar for Terminals mp1 and mp2.

(32) By decision of 25 May 2009, the CCIMP set the passenger charges applicable from 1 August 2009. As the supervisory authorities objected to the charges proposed by the CCIMP as from 1 July 2010, the charge from 1 August 2009 continued to apply.

(33) On 17 July 2009 Air France lodged an application with the Council of State seeking annulment of the CCIMP's decision of 25 May 2009 in so far as it set the passenger charges applicable retroactively to Terminals mp1 and mp2 as from 1 January 2008 and also the passenger charges applicable from 1 August 2009.

(34) On 17 July 2009 Air France also lodged an interim application. On 28 July 2009 the Council of State suspended payment of 20 % of the passenger charge due for 2008 and from 1 July 2009. Pending a judgment on the main action, this suspension was applied to the charges renewed in 2010 and from 1 January 2011.

(35) On 14 June 2010 Air France lodged an application with the Council of State seeking annulment of the CCIMP's decision of 2010, which renewed the previous charges as from 1 July 2010.

(36) On 27 July 2011 the Council of State (9) annulled the CCIMP's decision of 25 May 2009, which set the passenger charges for Terminal mp2 for 2008, 2009 and from 1 August 2009, on the basis that these charges were calculated taking into account a subsidy of EUR 2,4 million granted by the Departmental Council of Bouches-du-Rhône to fund part of the mp2 terminal construction work, of which Marseille Provence Airport was the direct beneficiary and the airlines were the indirect beneficiaries. According to the Council of State, this decision resulted in unlawfully granted State aid that vitiated the CCIMP's decision by unlawfulness. The Council of State also ruled that the fact of the charges for Terminal mp2 being annulled had no effect on the lawfulness of the charges set for Terminal mp1, which it underlined were justified by precise accounting studies. The Council of State stated in its decision that it was apparent from the evidence on record that communication costs of around EUR 800 000, which, according to the applicants (Air France and Britair), should have been charged only to Terminal mp2, had in fact been charged in full to overheads and were therefore split between the terminals according to a formula that had not been proven as being vitiated by a manifest error of assessment. The Council of State therefore confirmed the passenger charges for Terminal mp1. In the same decision, the Council of State annulled the landing charge for 2009 on the ground that it covered nearly three times the costs of providing this service and accounted for over a quarter of the total revenue from the airport charges. It did not therefore allow for limited offsetting between the revenue from this charge and the revenue from other charges, as required by national law (10). Lastly, the Council of State noted that the applicants had withdrawn their request for annulment of the traffic development incentive measures.

(37) On 15 December 2010 Air France lodged an application with the Council of State seeking annulment of the CCIMP's decision of December 2010, which renewed the previous charges as from 1 July 2011. Air France eventually withdrew in 2011 all its actions brought at national level.

(38) Throughout the period, the charges for Terminal mp2 were 57 % to 66 % lower for national traffic and 66 % to 80 % lower for intra-EU flights (11) compared with the charges for Halls 1-4, respectively for national traffic, intra-EU traffic and international traffic.

2.3.4. REDUCED PASSENGER CHARGES FOR NATIONAL FLIGHTS

(39) The passenger charges applicable for passengers departing from Halls 1-4 at the airport have traditionally differed according to the destination of flights, with one charge for national flights, one charge for flights to destinations within the European Union, and one charge for international flights.

(40) The charges applicable in 2006 and 2007 were originally set by a CCIMP decision of 26 July 2006. The charges were significantly lower for national flights, with a difference of over 50 %.

(41) Following a complaint by Ryanair, infringement proceedings were initiated. France informed the Commission in its note of 2 August 2007 that it had ‘reminded the operator on numerous occasions that it must end the difference between charges according to the destination of flights as this could not be justified by a difference in costs’.

(42) New charges were adopted for 2006 and 2007 and the differentiation in question was abandoned for the future.

2.3.5. REDUCTION OF CERTAIN AIRPORT CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE CREATION OF NEW ROUTES

(43) To encourage the creation of new routes or improvements in flight schedules, preferential charging conditions can be granted to airlines. This discount applies to the landing, lighting and parking charges for passenger flights and to the landing and lighting charges for cargo flights.

(44) An initial arrangement for the reduction of airport charges was introduced by the CCIMP by decision of 7 September 2004 and came into force on 1 March 2005. These measures were referred to the airport's Cocoéco for an opinion during its meeting of 6 December 2004 (12). This arrangement was applied until 31 July 2009.

(45) The discount applied was 90 % in the first year of operation and 50 % in the second year. These discounts were only granted for a new route meeting the following conditions (13). — the new route had to be operated to an airport without a regular service when the route was created; — the new route had to be operated to an airport at least 75 km away from an airport already served or with a substantially different catchment area from that of an airport already served; — the route's destination could not be within a 160 km radius of a destination served during the previous 12 months by the same airline, one of its subsidiaries, an airline belonging to the same group or an airline connected by commercial agreements (in particular franchise, code-sharing to said destination, etc.); — the route had to be operated at least once a week for a minimum of two consecutive months; — during the period that an airline was benefiting from the above reductions due to operating to a given destination, if one or more other airlines decided to operate a route to this same destination, the latter would benefit from the same measure for the same timescale as that set for the first airline.

(46) The discounts were granted to airlines operating from both Terminal mp1 and Terminal mp2.

(47) In a judgment of 30 June 2009, Marseille Administrative Court allowed Air France's application seeking annulment of the charge reduction arrangement adopted in 2005. The CCIMP did not appeal against this judgment as, in the meantime, the incentive arrangement had been partly renewed based on a new charging decision. Air France and its subsidiaries Britair et Regional then lodged an action for annulment with the Council of State against the CCIMP's decision setting the charges for 2008 and 2009, which included not only the aeronautical charges but also the arrangement incentivising the creation of new routes. This action for annulment was accompanied by an interim application for suspension, which the Council of State, in an interim ruling of 28 July 2009, partly allowed by ordering, in particular, the suspension of this incentive arrangement. In its decision on the main action of 27 July 2011 (14), the Council of State noted that the applicants had withdrawn their requests for annulment of the traffic development incentive measures for 2009 and 2010.

(48) From 1 February 2010 to 31 October 2011, the new discount in the landing, lighting and parking charges was applied to the benefit of all airlines meeting the objective conditions for this to be granted.

(49) The discount applied was: — 60 % in the first year of operation; — 45 % in the second year of operation; and — 20 % in the third year of operation.

(50) These discounts were only granted for a new route meeting the following conditions (15): — passenger fights and cargo flights were eligible; — the new route had to be operated at least once a week for a minimum of four consecutive months; — the new route had to be operated to an airport at least 50 km away from an airport already served or with a substantially different catchment area from that of an airport already served; — the new route could not have been operated during the previous 18 months by the same airline, one of its subsidiaries, an airline belonging to the same group or an airline connected by commercial agreements.

(51) In the event of seasonal suspension, the discount was re-applied when the route's operation resumed, as if it had never been suspended: the period of interruption was included in the discount period. This incentive measure applied to both terminals and all airlines at Marseille Provence Airport.

2.3.6. FREE OVERNIGHT PARKING

(52) In its submission of 28 December 2010, the CCIMP mentions the introduction of the ‘waived overnight parking charge’ measure as from 1 February 2010. As a result, parking between 22.00 and 06.00 is free under the following conditions: — passenger transport activity; — five weekly frequencies to the same destination during a minimum IATA season; — aircraft parking for at least six consecutive hours between 22.00 and 06.00.

(53) This incentive measure applied to both terminals and all airlines at Marseille Provence Airport.

2.3.7. FINANCING OF MARKETING ACTIVITIES

(54) By decision of 21 November 2005, the CCIMP introduced a financial incentive arrangement for the creation of new routes by partly paying the specific marketing and promotional costs incurred for media approved by Marseille Provence Airport. Under this arrangement, the beneficiary airline had to provide proof of the expenditure on promoting this route. The aid amount could not exceed 50 % of the proven expenditure.

(55) The decision to introduce a ‘marketing’ payment was made, without prior authorisation by France, before the publication of the Communication from the Commission — Community guidelines on financing of airports and start-up aid to airlines departing from regional airports (‘the 2005 Guidelines’) (16). By letter of 22 August 2006, France asked the CCIMP to end this arrangement no later than 1 June 2007 on the basis that this type of ‘marketing’ payment did not meet the criteria laid down by the 2005 Guidelines.

(56) The CCIMP confirmed that the marketing expenditure contribution initially envisaged had not been applied, except for one contribution [of less than EUR 300 000]* to bmibaby.

2.3.8. AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE ADVERTISING SPACE WITH AMS

(57) On 19 May 2006 the CCIMP concluded, for a term of five years, without prior publicity or competitive tendering, an agreement to purchase advertising space with the company Airport Marketing Services (‘AMS’), a wholly-owned subsidiary of the airline Ryanair.

(58) According to the provisions of this agreement, the CCIMP was to pay AMS: — EUR […]* per month between November 2006 and October 2007, — EUR […]* per month between November 2007 and May 2008, — EUR […]* per month from June 2008.

(59) It was indicated in the Cocoéco decision of 18 February 2009 on the charges that were set in the decision of 25 May 2009 that ‘the cost of the AMS agreement over the agreed term, i.e. October 2006-October 2011, is EUR […]*, i.e. EUR […]* per year’.

(60) The information provided by France also allows the cost of the AMS agreement to be determined, as indicated in Table 2: Table 2 Costs of the AMS agreement according to the information provided by France (EUR '000) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]*

(61) According to the CCIMP, the objective of this agreement was to publicise Marseille as a destination in order to attract high passenger numbers. This would ensure the sustainability of Terminal mp2 and a good return on the services offered by the airport operator.

(62) In this respect, the CCIMP considered that the pursuit of this objective relied on a combination of two factors: — a high volume of internet users; — European internet users open to the low-cost model.

(63) The CCIMP justifies the conclusion of this agreement with AMS by the fact that only the latter's website met the CCIMP's needs in 2006, as it offered the following services: — a unique and exclusive Ryanair ticket marketing system, with Ryanair being the only operator to undertake to establish a significant aircraft base at the new Terminal mp2; — a large audience of internet users targeted by the CCIMP's promotional policy; — marketing services appropriate to the purchase of flight tickets to Provence as a destination.

(64) The complainant takes the view that this agreement concluded with AMS represents aid to Ryanair in order to attract the latter to Marseille Provence Airport. In this respect, it provides evidence in support of its position, based on the preparatory dossier for the CCIMP ‘airport advisory committee’ meeting on 15 November 2005.

2.3.9. BUSINESS PLAN FOR TERMINAL MP2 AND APPLICATION OF THE MARKET ECONOMY OPERATOR PRINCIPLE

(65) In November 2004 the CCIMP drew up a business plan to prove the profitability of Terminal mp2. This plan was updated in 2005. Further updates of this business plan were assessed by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) at the request of Air France in February 2005, November 2005 and May 2006.

(66) The business plan submitted by France compares, for the 2004-2020 period, a scenario with Terminal mp2 and a scenario without Terminal mp2. According to France, the total of the annual cash flows for the 2004-2020 period and the net book value in 2020 are: — EUR […]* million in the scenario without Terminal mp2; — EUR […]* million in the scenario with Terminal mp2.

(67) France therefore concludes that the scenario with Terminal mp2 is EUR […]* million more beneficial than the scenario without Terminal mp2, which would correspond to a rate of return of […]* %.

(68) The business plan also contains a sensitivity analysis for different traffic and charging assumptions. The ‘traffic’ scenarios studied were a scenario ‘without transfer of the Air France shuttle’ and a ‘lower growth in Terminal mp2 traffic’ scenario. The ‘charging’ scenarios studied involved charges of EUR […]* and EUR […]* per passenger for Terminal mp2.

(69) The business plan was updated in 2005. On this occasion, three scenarios were simulated as follows: — First simulation: the 2005 traffic forecasts became the basis for the calculations, transfer of the Air France shuttle to Terminal mp2 was no longer included in the base scenario, and the calculations were made for the 2005-2021 period. Based on these assumptions, the internal rate of return was put at [in excess of 7,5 %]*. — Second simulation: the internal rate of return was set at 7,5 % and the number of passengers corresponding to this internal rate of return was calculated. The simulation concluded that the number of passengers over the 2007-2021 period could be 1,32 million less than in the first simulation. — Third simulation: if Terminal mp2 traffic in 2010 was only 1 million passengers (instead of the 1,65 million used in the first simulation), what additional charges would have to be applied per passenger from 2011 to maintain an internal rate of return of 7,5 %? The simulation concluded that the charges would need to be increased by EUR […]*.

(70) The assessments made by PwC at the request of Air France in the action before the Council of State involve simulations from February 2005, September 2005 and May 2006 produced by the CCIMP and aimed at establishing the internal rate of return and net present value (NPV) of the Terminal mp2 project based on expected cash flows. In this respect, PwC makes several remarks and criticisms about the business plan in question.

3. FRANCE'S COMMENTS

3.1. INVESTMENT SUBSIDIES FOR THE CCIMP

3.1.1. SOME OF THE SUBSIDIES GRANTED ARE SUBJECT TO LIMITATION

(71) France contests the Commission's view that the EUR 7,577 million allocated between 2005 and 2007 for construction of Terminal mp2 and the EUR 16 million granted from 2001 for investment in the airport constitute in their entirety State aid that may be analysed by the Commission.

(72) Pursuant to Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (17), France maintains that the subsidies indicated below in Table 3 are subject to limitation: Table 3 Body Date and signature of agreement Description of subsidy Total amount paid (EUR '000) Departmental Council 14 December 1999 Work to extend and restructure the airport facilities 3 064 Regional Council 24 October 1997 Work to extend and develop the airport 8 032 Regional Council 8 July 1994 Development of the cargo area 1 372 State 26 April 2000 Upgrading of instruction and information signs 290 State 23 June 1999 Screening of hold baggage 579

(73) France maintains that the subsidies subject to limitation cannot be included in a recovery order and are therefore necessarily excluded from the scope of the Commission's investigation.

3.1.2. SOME OF THE SUBSIDIES GRANTED WERE USED TO FUND NON-ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURES AND DO NOT THEREFORE CONSTITUTE STATE AID

(74) France maintains that some subsidies were used to fund activities or infrastructures connected with the exercise of powers in respect of public safety, firefighting and operational safety, namely: — the subsidy granted by the State on 19 December 2001, given that this was allocated to improve the aviation safety arrangements, and in particular to finance the random search of a certain percentage of hand baggage, the systematic inspection of staff entering restricted areas and the acceleration of the hold baggage screening programme to achieve a rate of 100 % by the start of the second half of 2002, in a total amount of EUR 5 032 000; — the subsidy granted by the Departmental Council on 27 September 2002, given that this was allocated to cable runway 2, improve the computer backup room and a space within the TFE building, renovate the façade of the technical unit within the air navigation premises, replace the central low-voltage distribution board at substation B, and upgrade the terminal alarm system and the fire safety system in the computer room, in a total amount of EUR 209 885; — the subsidy granted by the Departmental Council on 26 April 2003, given that this was allocated to renew the lighting equipment, enlarge and improve access to the car park, reconfigure the border police booth, create a care unit, improve the perimeter road in the southern zone, replace fan coil units, install a CCTV camera network, and replace the boiler in the TFE building, the firefighting system in the western zone and the digital protection equipment, in a total amount of EUR 2 111 542,82; — the subsidy granted by the Departmental Council on 19 May 2005 to partly finance Terminal mp2, which was partly allocated to fund non-economic infrastructures in a total amount of EUR 2 273 258,64. France points out that the tasks identified as being non-economic are carried out within an area representing 16,96 % of Terminal mp2 and considers that an equivalent part of the work involved the areas allocated to these tasks. France consequently maintains that 16,96 % of the cost of the work after deducting the investments associated with the non-economic activities, i.e. EUR 1 416 238,75, must also be deducted from the Commission's assessment; — the subsidy granted by Marseille Provence Métropole on 26 July 2004, given that this was allocated to runway lighting, in an amount of EUR 72 095; — the ERDF subsidy granted on 22 August 2002, given that this was allocated to carry out lighting work in the cargo aircraft parking areas, in a total amount of EUR 587 350,53.

(75) According to France, the sums concerned must be deducted from the amount assessed by the Commission.

3.1.3. COMPATIBILITY OF THE INVESTMENT SUBSIDIES WITH THE 2005 GUIDELINES

(76) France maintains that, under the principle of protection of legitimate expectations, the Commission must assess whether the subsidies granted before publication of the 2005 Guidelines constitute State aid under the guidelines on State aid in the aviation sector of 10 December 1994, and consequently conclude that these subsidies do not constitute State aid.

(77) In the alternative, France takes the view that the subsidies granted are compatible with the 2005 Guidelines.

3.1.3.1. Compatibility of the Departmental Council subsidy for investment in Terminal mp2

(78) France maintains that this subsidy meets a clearly defined objective of general interest involving the creation and maintenance of direct jobs in a region with an unemployment rate higher than the national average, regional economic development in an area eligible for regional aid under the derogation in Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, airport capacity-building given a risk of saturation (18), and improvement of local connectivity in relation to new traffic that was not served by the TGV line or Terminal mp1 and that benefited from the increased number of destinations served.

(79) France takes the view that the infrastructure was necessary and proportional to the objectives pursued. Although part of Terminal mp1 had overcapacity after 2001, Terminal mp2, which was a new product offering a different service, was created as a complementary offer to that of the main terminal. Moreover, given the traffic forecasts, Marseille Provence Airport needed to confront congestion problems that would have necessitated the opening of new departure areas in 2008 and 2018. According to France, construction of Terminal mp2 enabled the necessary infrastructure improvements to be postponed (to 2016 and after 2020), while offering better prospects for profitability. In addition, the new Terminal mp2 was in direct line with the airport's strategy of attracting low-cost airlines, which could not have established themselves at Terminal mp1 given its significantly higher charges and the fact that it does not lend itself to the need for the rapid boarding and disembarkation of passengers. France maintains that in 2007, the first full year of operation of Terminal mp2, the terminal's usage rate was 68 %, which proves that there was no real overcapacity. It adds that the spare capacity of Terminal mp1 from 2007 to 2011, linked to the creation of Terminal mp2, allowed Air France's new needs to be met in terms of opening its base on 2 October 2011 for the creation of 13 new routes and an increase in frequencies. Lastly, the construction of Terminal mp2 within a former cargo terminal, as also the reduced comfort offered to passengers at this terminal, have enabled the investment and maintenance costs to be minimised.

(80) France maintains that the long-term prospects for the use of Terminal mp2 are satisfactory. The construction of this terminal was in line with the desire to develop new traffic at the airport, which was not served by Terminal mp1 and which enabled the airport to avoid opening routes already served by the TGV. The increase in the number of destinations offered, from 100 in 2005 to 119 in 2010, has further boosted the attractiveness of this new service, and therefore its long-term prospects for use. France underlines that the traffic forecasts for Terminal mp2, which have been confirmed by real traffic figures for 2007 to 2010, indicate that 50 % of its capacity should be in use after five years. Lastly, the increase in Air France traffic from Terminal mp1 as of 2 October 2011 proves that the additional capacity provided by Terminal mp2 does not constitute competition for the main terminal, but an asset for the airport, having enabled it to respond favourably to Air France's demand.

(81) France maintains that the subsidies granted have had only a limited effect on intra-Community trade. As regards Avignon Airport, which is less than 60 minutes away from Marseille Provence Airport, France observes that the low-cost traffic at this airport has remained stable since 2007, that further improvements have been made to the airport since 2007, with new routes having been opened, and that none of the destinations served are accessible from Marseille Provence Airport. If the area is expanded to include Nîmes and Toulon Airports, France notes that these fall under the category of small regional airports and do not therefore have the same vocation as Marseille Provence Airport, where the traffic exceeds 5 million passengers. The fact that the destinations served are not all (except for London and Brussels) accessible from Marseille Provence Airport proves that there is no competition between these airports.

(82) France maintains that the Departmental Council subsidy was necessary to achieve the break-even point usually demanded by operators. As the May 2006 business plan indicated an internal rate of return of […]* % if the Departmental Council subsidy were deducted, France maintains that the project's profitability would have been reduced to […]* % in the absence of this subsidy. France also maintains that the subsidy was proportional as it enabled a satisfactory internal rate of return to be achieved, in the absence of a less onerous option that would have allowed the same results to be achieved. It points out that the work on the terminal was subject to public procurement, which may confirm that the costs were minimised. Lastly, France notes that the subsidy granted covered only 50 % of the total amount of the Terminal mp2 project, i.e. 80 % of the work in respect of aircraft and 30 % of the work in respect of the terminal.

3.1.3.2. Compatibility of the ERDF subsidies of 22 August 2002 for the development of air cargo

(83) As a preliminary point, France notes that part of the subsidy was for investments in non-economic activities and that only the remainder of the aid granted therefore needs to be recognised as compatible with the TFEU rules (19).

(84) France points out that the application for financing for Marseille Provence Airport was made to the ERDF under the programming for Objective 2 of the Structural Funds for the 2000-2006 period, for which the Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur region was eligible, and which was approved by the European Commission on 22 March 2001.

(85) According to France, the aid granted met a clearly defined objective of general interest: optimisation of the existing infrastructure in order to develop the cargo activity, in response to the fall in tonnage transported and in connection with the pool of jobs provided by the airport (20) in an area affected by a particularly high unemployment rate.

(86) France maintains that the infrastructure concerned was necessary and proportional to the objective. It explains that this infrastructure involved the construction of a new ring road and roundabout to manage road traffic flows with a view to increased traffic, redevelopment of the cargo terminals in premises left vacant, creation of aircraft parking areas close to the cargo terminals to reduce handling time, and expansion of the cargo area to increase its attractiveness.

(87) France maintains that the traffic results (21) prove that the infrastructure had satisfactory long-term prospects for use, and points out that the infrastructure is available to all operators.

(88) Lastly, France maintains that a subsidy justified by the need to develop an area facing structural difficulties, and which financed only 28 % of the total project cost, could not have affected intra-Community trade. It believes that the project financing cannot be called into question as the ERDF eligibility criteria were met. France underlines that the financing granted helped to improve road access to the airport infrastructure and remedy the issues preventing the free movement of goods.

3.1.3.3. Compatibility of the subsidy of 26 June 2003 for the extension and restructuring of the airport

(89) As a preliminary point, France notes that part of the subsidy was for investments in non-economic activities and that only the remainder of the aid granted, i.e. EUR 888 457,18, therefore needs to be recognised as compatible with the TFEU rules.

(90) France maintains that this subsidy met a clearly defined objective of general interest involving the economic development of the Bouches-du-Rhône department and Provence.

(91) France believes that the investments concerned were necessary and proportional to that objective as they aimed to increase the number of hourly aircraft movements by renovating runway 1, constructing ramps and creating quick exits.

(92) France maintains that the investments were essential in order to handle additional traffic. As a result, the work carried out increased the runway capacity to 140 000 commercial aircraft movements per year. However, in its response, France cites traffic targets of 113 909 movements in 2015 and 122 449 movements in 2020. The improvements made therefore meant that runway capacity work would not have to be envisaged for the next 10 years, while benefiting from satisfactory medium-term prospects for use according to France.

(93) France confirms that the infrastructure is accessible to all users and maintains that the only commercial airport less than 60 minutes away by road is Avignon Airport. As this is a Category D airport, with which Marseille Provence Airport is not in competition, the aid in question has not affected intra-Community trade.

3.1.3.4. Compatibility of the subsidy of 26 July 2004 for the development of the airport

(94) As a preliminary point, France notes that part of the subsidy was for investments in non-economic activities and that only the remainder of the aid granted, i.e. EUR 816 535, therefore needs to be recognised as compatible with the TFEU rules.

(95) France maintains that this subsidy met a clearly defined objective of general interest involving the development of the Marseille metropolis and region, by consolidating national traffic and developing international traffic at Marseille Provence Airport, as well as its rail connection.

(96) France asserts that meeting this objective necessitated the work carried out, namely an increase in the capacity of Hall 1 and its upgrading in line with international standards, optimisation of runway 1 and reconstruction of runway 2, and construction of a railway station accessible to the TGV.

(97) France maintains that the increase in passenger traffic proves that these facilities have satisfactory long-term prospects for use. It adds that the planned construction of the railway connection could only increase use of the airport.

(98) According to France, the infrastructure is accessible to all users without discrimination. It underlines that the allocation of the halls to national, Schengen and international flights is necessary for the smooth management of passenger flows in line with the rules on border control, and that the location of flights at one or other of the terminals does not alter the fact that all airlines are free to access both terminals according to the flights that they operate.

(99) France notes its belief that the work carried out has not affected intra-Community trade, given the absence of any airport in the same category located within the same area of activity, and it also stresses that the investments covered by the subsidy of 26 July 2004 were not directly intended to increase the airport's capacity.

(100) France maintains that the conditions for the granting of the subsidy in question were such that they guaranteed compliance with the principle of proportionality (22). It notes that the public authority's commitment was limited to EUR 1 million over three years.

3.2. MARKET ECONOMY OPERATOR TEST APPLIED TO TERMINAL MP2

(101) France maintains that PwC's criticism that deducting a proportion of the investment subsidy from the depreciation of the Terminal mp2 infrastructure distorts the market economy operator test is unfounded. According to France, the accounting rules in force require equipment subsidies attributable to future years to be deducted from the net book values of fixed assets. Moreover, the treatment of subsidies has been the same for Terminals mp1 and mp2, which have both benefited from a subsidy amounting to 30 % of the cost of the work on the terminal. Lastly, if the gross flows had been taken into account in the basis for the passenger charge costs, this would have led the operator to invoice users for costs that it had not actually incurred. More broadly, as France has judged that the subsidy received from the Departmental Council was compatible with French and EU law, it considers that the CCIMP acted as a market economy operator by not including, in the business plan produced, any costs that it may not have actually incurred.

(102) As regards the inclusion in the business plan of the net book value (NBV) amount of the investments made during the period according to the cash flow taken into account, France asserts that this simply expresses, in accounting terms, the provisions of the schedule of conditions of the 1987 concession agreement. France maintains that this type of provision is common in concession agreements and seeks to take account of the respective durations of the investment project and concession agreement.

(103) To justify the value of 7,5 % used to reflect the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), France maintains that this is consistent with the average estimate of the WACC for French airports (23), although it is slightly higher due to the airport's regulated scope and due to the fact that the estimate was made in a period (2004) prior to the referenced estimates. France points out that the Mazars consultancy uses, in its study, the same WACC assumption as the operator of Marseille Provence Airport.

(104) France maintains that the Commission has wrongly highlighted the absence of any increase in external costs associated with modulations for objectives of general interest (incentive for the creation of new routes), as these modulations were in fact taken into account, not in the costs, but as discounts on the landing, lighting and parking charges in all the cases studied. France adds that these modulations benefited users of both Terminal mp2 and Terminal mp1 and that their application between 2005 and 2010 reveals that, overall, the discounts granted were balanced between the two terminals (EUR […]* million for Terminal mp1 and EUR […]* million for Terminal mp2). France has also submitted a business plan produced ex post for the years 2005-2010, which confirms that the business plans presented in September 2005 and May 2006 were based on forecast figures close to the actual figures, and that the profitability of Terminal mp2 has proved to be better than that envisaged at the time of the investment decision.

3.3. OPERATING CONTRIBUTION GRANTED TO THE CCIMP

(105) With regard to the contributions totalling EUR […]* million paid by public authorities to the CCIMP, France maintains that they do not constitute operating subsidies, but rather compensation for services rendered by the general arm of the CCI to Marseille Provence Airport. France explains that, given the accounting separation between the airport arm of the CCI and its other arms, the sums covered by this Decision correspond to the rebilling of services rendered by the general arm to the airport, and therefore constitute contributions corresponding to services billed for the 2001-2010 period.

(106) France highlights that a certificate issued by the CCIMP's auditor confirms the absence of financial flows from the central services of the CCIMP to Marseille Provence Airport.

(107) France has also explained how the airport tax system works in order to show that there is no State aid involved in this mechanism. France states that the airport tax is provided for in Article 1609 quatervicies of the General Tax Code (code général des impôts — CGI), which stipulates that it is collected for the benefit of public or private persons operating aerodromes, that it is payable by any public air transport undertaking and that it is exclusively used to reimburse costs incurred by airport operators in carrying out sovereign tasks such as fire-rescue-safety services, control of bird hazards and security. France further states that the airport tax amount is set annually, airport by airport, according to the services provided under the regulations in force and the expected trends in traffic figures, costs and other income received by the operator. Aerodrome operators therefore produce an annual declaration of costs and traffic, which is sent to the local civil aviation safety directorate for validation. The tax is calculated by the national government's Directorate-General for Civil Aviation, based on the cumulative results from previous years.

(108) France disputes the finding that this mechanism could involve elements of State aid. First of all, it underlines that this general system is applicable to all French airports according to the same rules.

(109) It further states that, given the fact that the tax rate is set according to forecast cost and traffic figures, it is difficult to ensure that the tax revenue perfectly matches the costs in any given year, but disputes that there may be overcompensation.

(110) France points out in this respect that airport operators are reimbursed for costs only ex post according to the depreciation charge and that, when a positive balance is recorded, this is added to the cumulative accounts from previous years and carries financial charges payable by the operator, which gives rise to a tax adjustment in the following year. France notes that the airport tax system has been in overall deficit for a number of years (by around EUR 110 million at the end of 2010), meaning that part of the safety and security costs borne by airports is not compensated, with this part being allocated to financial costs payable by the State. France underlines that tax increases occurring ex post have to take account of the effects on airlines, which prevents the deficit from being clawed back too quickly.

(111) Lastly, France refers to the ‘reset’ mechanism that applies if an airport operator changes, which requires the operator to reimburse any positive balance recorded at the end of its term.

(112) With regard to Marseille Provence Airport, France states that the cumulative deficit in the airport tax system was EUR 2,7 million at the end of 2000, that the balance was restored in 2010 with a tax rate set at EUR 8,20 and that the rate for 2011 was adjusted downwards (EUR 7,774) so that a surplus was not generated.

3.4. SETTING OF PASSENGER CHARGES FOR TERMINALS MP1 AND MP2

(113) France maintains that the differentiation in charges between Terminals mp1 and mp2 is in line with the provisions of Directive 2009/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (24) and points out that Terminal mp2 is open to all airlines. It explains that this differentiation in charges between Terminals mp1 and mp2 is due to the underlying cost difference between the passenger functions of these terminals. France states that, in its decision of 26 July 2011, the Council of State accepted that the charges for Terminal mp1 were valid, which, according to France, therefore means that it incidentally accepted the validity of the accounting rules allocating the costs and revenues between Terminals mp1 and mp2. Lastly, France stresses that, due to the ‘single till’ principle that is applied at Marseille Provence Airport, the difference between the cost price of the passenger charge and the actual passenger charge consists of non-aeronautical resources specific to the terminal in question, which a prudent operator would take into account when determining the charge applicable to the terminal.

(114) France disputes that the CCIMP took into account only the additional costs that were directly linked with the commissioning and operation of Terminal mp2. It alleges that, as the two terminals are geographically separated, it is possible to separate out all the investments needed for Terminal mp2, i.e. EUR 8,95 million. France notes that the cost structure of an airport essentially consists of fixed costs.

(115) France then details the elements used to determine the operating costs attributed to Terminal mp2: — as Terminal mp2 represents only 8,9 % of the airport's total terminal area, it accounts for only 9,8 % of the total for the ‘tax and insurance’ cost item; — as the servicing and maintenance costs essentially involve the repair of mechanical parts such as lifts, travellators and escalators, the simplified-service terminal, which does not have any travellators or escalators, accounts for only 5 % of the ‘servicing and maintenance’ cost item; — as Terminal mp2 is new and better insulated, has a significantly lower ceiling height than Terminal mp1 and represents 8,9 % of the airport's terminal area, it accounts for only 8,6 % of the ‘fluids’ (energy) costs; — 7,8 % of the cleaning costs are allocated to Terminal mp2, given the proportion of the area occupied (8,9 %) and the floor covering (tiling in Terminal mp2, carpeting in Terminal mp1), with an identical cleaning frequency in the two terminals; — the creation of Terminal mp2 has not resulted in any additional staff costs, except for one hiring at the terminal coordination unit (poste de coordination de l'aérogare — PCA) in 2007, one hiring at the operational coordination unit (poste de coordination d'exploitation — PCE) and one hiring at the information office (bureau d'information — BI) in 2010, which are shown in the table produced by France, with the latter having also detailed in its response the formulas used to allocate the operating costs between the two terminals.

(116) France therefore maintains that, as the operating costs were allocated at constant staffing levels, the costs allocated to Terminal mp2 are as economical with regard to the passenger charge as for Terminal mp1. France further notes that the costs allocated to Terminal mp2 in fact correspond to the additional costs that would have been borne by Terminal mp1 if the second terminal had not been constructed (Annex 44 and Annex 25).

(117) France also disputes PwC's conclusion that investments not directly allocated to the terminals must be indirectly allocated, and details the investments that are not included in the passenger charge and how they are taken into account in the accounting plan (investments in buildings separate from the terminals for which separate rental income is received, one-off investments to replace obsolete facilities that are allocated to specific cost centres, and road infrastructure, IT and walkway investments that are allocated to a specific cost centre and, where applicable, included in the overheads). France further disputes PwC's argument that, as Terminal mp2 passengers may use the facilities of Terminal mp1, 10 % of Terminal mp1's depreciation should be allocated to Terminal mp2. It maintains that the clear separation between the airport's infrastructures makes this use very unlikely, that this would involve allocating an area equivalent to the total area of Terminal mp2, and that this would require the commercial revenues of Terminal mp1 to be allocated in the same proportion to Terminal mp2, i.e. a reduction in the margin of the main terminal of EUR […]* million.

(118) France further underlines that the traffic assumptions used by PwC in its 2006 and 2007 reports are based on forecasts from the November 2004 business plan and do not take account of the downgrading of the traffic figures in the September 2005 and May 2006 business plans, following Air France's decision not to transfer its shuttle service to Terminal mp2, and the six-month delay in the decision to open the new terminal, which significantly reduced the traffic in 2006 and 2007. France disputes the finding in the PwC report that Terminal mp1's traffic was ‘cannibalised’ by Terminal mp2. It stresses in this respect that Air France did not in the end implement its plan to transfer the Orly shuttle flights to Terminal mp2 and that Air France's traffic over the 2008-2011 period remained stable for each of the two destinations for which Ryanair operated competing routes from Terminal mp2 from 2009 onwards.

(119) France maintains that, as PwC's arguments are unfounded, the charge of EUR 3,84 per passenger is also unfounded, and points out that this is higher than the charge applied to Terminal mp1 in 2007.

(120) France notes that, following annulment by the Council of State of the charges applied to Terminal mp2 for 2006, 2007 and 2008 and the charges applied to Terminal mp1 for 2008, the airport operator set new charges for each of the terminals. The justification for an increase in the charges at Terminal mp2 lies in the requirement imposed by the regulator (Ministers for the Economy and Civil Aviation) for the AMS advertising agreement costs to be allocated to this terminal alone, without the formulas for allocating costs between the terminals having been called into question.

(121) According to France, the CCIMP set the charges at a level to achieve an identical cost coverage rate for each terminal (i.e. […]* %). France maintains that Directive 2009/12/EC provides that the level of airport charges may be differentiated according, inter alia, to their costs and that, to ensure that this differentiation in charges is justified by a difference in costs, the coverage rate of these costs by the passenger charge for each terminal should be equivalent. France adds that this coverage rate can be less than 100 % if the ‘single till’ regulation regards the overall economic equilibrium of the airport as including non-aeronautical revenues. France notes that the Mazars consultancy estimated in its report that, for 2007, the coverage of passenger costs by the income from the passenger charge was […]* % for Terminal mp1 and […]* % for Terminal mp2.

(122) France concludes that the passenger charges at Terminal mp2 cannot constitute an economic advantage in favour of an undertaking pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU as they were set in relation to the costs involved in constructing and operating Terminal mp2, that the difference between the passenger charges for using each of the terminals is objective, transparent and justified by the costs allocated to each terminal, and that the differentiation is, in this respect, expressly provided for by Article 10 of Directive 2009/12/EC.

(123) The selectivity of the measure is also not proven in this case, as the charges were applicable without distinction to any airline using Terminal mp2.

(124) As regards the reduced passenger charges for national flights, France states that the Order of 16 October 2009 thereafter prohibited any differentiation in charges for countries in the Schengen area and notes that, in its decision of 28 January 2009, the Commission considered that it was not necessary to propose additional measures.

3.5. REDUCTIONS IN THE CHARGES FOR CREATING NEW ROUTES

(125) As a preliminary point, France maintains that all state airports and a very large number of decentralised airports in France agree to the modulation of charges for airlines, as assessed by the Commission in recitals 116 to 137 of its opening decision.

(126) It adds that these measures are intended to encourage the creation of new air routes. They meet an objective of general interest involving improvement of the area's service and connectivity, regional development and integration in the European market.

(127) According to France, the claimed objective of general interest must be taken into account by the Commission in its analysis of the compatibility with European law of the aid granted in this respect.

(128) France also maintains that the modulation of charges is annually approved by the State through an approval procedure applicable to all state aerodromes, which ensures that the measures are non-discriminatory. According to France, the annual approval procedure for charges is therefore sufficient to meet the requirement that the Member State must have an appeal mechanism to remedy any discrimination in the granting of aid, which is one of the compatibility criteria for the aid under investigation.

(129) France points out that the national law (Article R.224-2-2 of the Civil Aviation Code) establishing the possibility of the modulation of charges requires the person responsible for setting charges to define monitoring indicators corresponding to the objective of general interest pursued. France maintains that the monitoring indicators chosen ensure each year that the measure is being correctly implemented and identify any needs for adjustment, and are sufficient to meet the aid compatibility criterion involving the existence of a penalty mechanism if a carrier fails to fulfil its undertakings towards the airport.

(130) France explains that the assessment of the modulation of charges, since 2005 when this system came into operation, has been regularly included in the dossiers for Cocoéco meetings, which proves that the measures granted have been made public to representatives of airport users, and is sufficient to meet the aid compatibility criterion involving publication of the measures concerned.

(131) France underlines that the modulation of charges under review complies with the provisions of Directive 2009/12/EC allowing Member States to modulate airport charges for issues of public and general interest. France therefore concludes that the airport operator is not required to act as a market economy operator when applying such a modulation. It stresses that other modulations of charges for issues of general interest exist under French law, particularly environmental issues, such as the modulation of the landing charge according to the aircraft category and the time of day in relation to noise pollution.

(132) France disputes that such measures constitute start-up aid and maintains that they aim to internalise certain components of public interest (offsetting of environmental damage, improvement of local connectivity, etc.), which would not otherwise be taken into account in the charges.

(133) France maintains that a business plan showing that the modulations granted are not profitable would not, however, mean that the operator should not grant those modulations as this business plan would not take account of the externalities generated by those measures, such as savings made in terms of pollution and noise emissions or improvement of local connectivity and service. According to France, the difficulty in putting a monetary value on those externalities has meant that a different assumption has been used for these incentive measures under Directive 2009/12/EC.

(134) France rejects the Commission's methodological approach, which involves applying the market economy operator test, as it claims that this is inappropriate for analysing measures where the object is allow the public interest to benefit from positive externalities.

(135) France maintains that the information produced in recital 124 of the Commission's opening decision is incorrect. The charges indicated refer to a variable part of the landing charge per passenger. In reality, the variable part of the landing charge is calculated based on the number of tonnes of the aircraft and not on the number of passengers.

(136) In the alternative, France maintains that the modulated charges for creating new routes are economically profitable for Marseille Provence Airport. With its response, France has produced an ex post study of the profitability of the measures granted. According to France, the calculations made using commercial revenues from 2008 prove that the average discount granted for a route operated using the type of aircraft that use Terminals mp1 and mp2 is less than the revenues generated by the revenues allocated to each of these terminals, and results in a net income of EUR […]* per passenger for Terminal mp1 and EUR […]* per passenger for Terminal mp2. France maintains that 83 % of the traffic created by this measure continued after the three years, resulting in additional profit. France states that a further profitability study on the modulations approved by Cocoéco on 6 December 2004 was conducted using the September 2005 business plan, updated in May 2006, based on a 67-tonne B737 aircraft using Terminal mp2 and an A319 aircraft using Terminal mp1. Two traffic assumptions were studied: in the first, the increase in traffic from the third year of the modulations stemmed only from an increase in frequencies on existing routes; in the second, the increase in traffic stemmed exclusively from the new routes. The first assumption results in a net income/turnover ratio of […]* % and an NPV of EUR […]*; the second assumption gives a net income/turnover ratio of […]* % and an NPV of EUR […]*.

(137) France maintains that the modulations were non-discriminatory and were applied to all airlines meeting the eligibility conditions. It therefore disputes that the measure can be characterised as State aid under the selectivity criterion.

(138) France points out that, in its decision on Manchester Airport (25), cited in its Charleroi decision (26), the Commission recognised that the granting of reductions on landing charges constituted a measure of limited duration and formed part of an arrangement open to all airlines starting a new route from Manchester, such that it precluded any distortion of competition and fell outside the scope of Article 107 TFEU. France therefore concludes that an arrangement accessible to all airlines and granted for a limited duration falls outside the scope of Article 107 TFEU.

(139) France presents the modulated charge arrangement in force from 15 February to 31 July 2009 and explains that 24 airlines benefited from this. It notes that the arrangement was annulled by Marseille Administrative Court in its judgment of 30 June 2009, on the ground that the modulation was too large, and was replaced from 1 February 2010 by an arrangement under which the proposed discount rates were reduced and the conditions for granting these discounts were made stricter. France maintains that the conditions laid down by the Manchester decision were met in the case of both modulated charge arrangements, with the modulations in question not falling within the scope of Article 107 TFEU. According to France, the Commission therefore wrongly examined, in its opening decision, the modulations in question with regard to the market economy operator principle.

3.6. REDUCTIONS GRANTED ON THE OVERNIGHT PARKING CHARGE

(140) France maintains that this discount was introduced, like the one for new routes, for general interest issues. Modulation of the overnight parking charge enabled Marseille Provence Airport to increase flight flows at the start and end of the day, ensuring that optimum use was made of the infrastructure. France underlines that the impact of this measure was limited to […]* % of the parking charge turnover, excluding the effects of modulations for creating new routes.

(141) France states that, in its view, modulations for general interest issues should not be assessed strictly in terms of their profitability. However, it also points out that compliance with the market economy operator principle has been proven in this case, based on the ‘calculation of additional costs generated by overnight parking’ study resulting from the 2004 accounts. The modulated charges encouraged airlines to base their aircraft at the airport, where the parking areas were unused at night and therefore available at limited additional cost to the airport. The time slots available under the measure were most popular with business customers, who generate the highest commercial revenues. A large proportion of the costs associated with the parking charge consists of depreciation and financial costs, the useful life of which is not affected by stationary overnight parking, and business tax, which is unconnected with the use of parking areas. The additional costs generated by the overnight parking were therefore limited to labour, maintenance, repair and consumable costs, i.e. EUR […]* per night and per aircraft. France explains that the profitability calculations for these modulated charges for overnight parking were based on financial margin per flight studies presented in the September 2005 business plan, updated in May 2006, which reveal turnovers per rotation of EUR […]* for Terminal mp1 and EUR […]* for Terminal mp2. For Terminal mp1, only the medium-haul national flights (Orly shuttle) were regarded as generating additional rotations. For Terminal mp2, each of the aircraft of those low-cost airlines not operating single daily return flights from their base was regarded as likely to generate an additional daily rotation. For the sake of prudence, a weighting factor of 50 % was taken into account to reduce the impact of these additional margins per rotation on each of the terminals. Using these assumptions, France has produced, with its response, a document according to which the average net income/turnover ratio was […]* % and the net present value (NPV) updated to 7,5 % was EUR […]* over the 2005-2021 period. A sensitivity study on the weighting factor shows that the average profit margin remains above […]* % up to a factor value of 35 %, which means that the discount would generate a profit for the airport even when only one aircraft out of three parking overnight generated an additional rotation. Table 4 Profitability simulation of the overnight parking modulation 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Income (EUR '000) […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* Costs (EUR '000) […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* Margin (EUR '000) […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* Net margin (EUR '000) […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* Ratio […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* […]* Average ratio [> 7,5 %]* NPV at […]* % over […]* years (EUR '000) […]* NPV at […]* % over […]* years (EUR) […]*

(142) Based on a study conducted using the 2008 accounts, the variable costs of the overnight parking charge were EUR […]* per aircraft per night, with the 2004 estimate being EUR […]*. In the case of a B737-800 with a load factor of 80 %, these costs represent EUR […]* per passenger and, in the case of an A319 with a load factor of 70 %, they are EUR […]* per passenger. However, based on the accounts submitted to Cocoéco on 18 February 2009, the shop and parking activities covered [between 100 % and 150 %] of the passenger costs for Terminal mp1, i.e. a net margin of EUR […]* per passenger, and [between 100 % and 150 %] of the passenger costs for Terminal mp2, i.e. a net margin of EUR […]* per passenger. These net margins broadly covered the additional costs of the overnight parking.

(143) Lastly, France points out that the Commission did not make any criticism of the airport charges system organised at Charleroi Airport.

3.7. FINANCING OF MARKETING ACTIVITIES

(144) As regards the aid scheme established by the CCIMP decision of 21 November 2005, which resulted in a single payment [of less than EUR 300 000] to bmibaby, France states in its submission of 28 December 2010 that this amount, even if it did constitute State aid, would in any event be covered by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1998/2006 (27) (de minimis aid). Furthermore, it stresses that, following the announcement of this company's sale, the CCIMP may not have been able to obtain a sworn statement regarding aid received from other European airports.

3.8. AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE ADVERTISING SPACE WITH AMS

(145) As regards the agreement to purchase advertising space concluded with AMS on 19 May 2006, France maintains that this agreement was awarded, in accordance with public procurement regulations, without any prior competition due to the existence of a single supplier.

(146) France notes that the promotional policy has a direct effect on an airport infrastructure's profitability due to the revenues generated through airport and non-aeronautical charges. It explains that the advertising carried out by airlines is insufficient and underlines that, in 2006, AMS was the only service-provider offering the combination of a unique and exclusive Ryanair ticket marketing system, with Ryanair being the only airline to undertake to establish an aircraft base at the new Terminal mp2, a large audience of internet users targeted by the promotional policy, and marketing services appropriate to the purchase of flight tickets to Provence as a destination.

(147) France maintains that the CCIMP acted as a market economy operator by concluding the agreement with AMS, such that this agreement does not contain any form of aid.

(148) France firstly considers that the agreed price was in line with market practices, particularly given the results of the prior comparative study conducted using the viamichelin.com website. France therefore disputes that the marketing services were provided by AMS under preferential conditions and points out that the European Commission, in its decision on Ostend Airport (28), accepted that the promotional programme involving a tour operator's catalogue did not constitute State aid.

(149) Moreover, France maintains that the marketing services agreement concluded with AMS represented a profitable investment for Marseille Provence Airport, particularly with regard to the development of Terminal mp2. France explains that the terms of the agreement were determined based on a profitability study of the financial margins generated by a flight operated by Ryanair, which was conducted prior to the agreement being concluded and which has been produced in support of its claims. This study showed that the contractual arrangement would become profitable from the fourth year of operation, with a margin of EUR […]* per flight after advertising. France emphasises that the same study shows that the profitability of all the modulations for the creation of new routes and the AMS agreement, with regard to Ryanair flights alone in the 2007-2021 period, results in an average profit margin ([…]* %) that is in line with the standard profitability in the sector, estimated by the European Commission at 7,31 % in its decision on Bratislava Airport (29).

(150) The profitability simulation updated using actual traffic figures and costs audited by the Mazars consultancy indicates a profit margin from the third year of EUR […]* per flight.

(151) France points out that the costs associated with the AMS agreement were taken into account in the September 2005 business plan, updated in May 2006, which indicated an overall profitability for Terminal mp2 [in excess of 7,5]* % over the 2005-2021 period. Based on the 2006 charges, the average net income/turnover ratio of the AMS agreement in relation to Ryanair traffic was [in excess of 7,5]* % and the NPV was EUR […]* million.

(152) France further maintains that, taking into account not only the revenue from airport charges, non-aeronautical charges and airport tax, but also the revenue from other charges, the margin per outbound passenger was calculated, before the agreement was signed (30), at EUR […]*. With the estimated average amount of the marketing measures (including AMS in particular) being EUR […]* per outbound passenger, the net margin of the marketing costs was therefore EUR […]* per passenger. According to France, it should therefore be concluded that each passenger at Terminal mp2 was financially beneficial to the airport.

(153) As a result, between 2006 and 2012 the airport recorded an average billing rate per passenger between EUR […]* per passenger and EUR […]* per passenger, with a seven-year average slightly below expectations, but still sufficient at EUR […]* per passenger.

(154) France adds that the agreement concluded with AMS contained various undertakings on the part of Ryanair with regard to the number of aircraft based at Marseille Provence Airport and the number of daily frequencies and passengers per year.

(155) Accordingly, adding the costs of the AMS agreement per Ryanair passenger to the total incremental cost per Ryanair passenger results in a total cost of EUR […]* per passenger, with the incremental margin associated with Ryanair's presence, taking into account the costs associated with the AMS agreement, therefore sitting at a satisfactory level of EUR […]* per passenger.

(156) Lastly, France maintains that Marseille Administrative Court, in an interim ruling of 20 October 2009, found that the annual amounts stipulated by the agreement concluded with AMS, when compared with the services to be provided by the latter and the size of the audience reached by the promotional arrangement, were not devoid of purpose or an adequate quid pro quo.

3.9. BUSINESS PLAN FOR TERMINAL MP2 AND APPLICATION OF THE MARKET ECONOMY OPERATOR PRINCIPLE

(157) France maintains that the market economy operator criterion is met where the policy adopted by the airport has positive financial effects on the airport's operation. To this end, the analysis should be based on multiannual business plans in the light of certain criteria such as the net present value (NPV) and internal rate of return (IRR), accompanied by sensitivity tests. In this respect, two principles underlie the analysis of the airport's investments: ‘genuine’ cash flows must be used, and the effect of time must be taken into account by updating those cash flows.

(158) France considers that the construction of Terminal mp2 has had the following effects in particular: — Certain costs have been pooled between the two terminals, thus reducing the costs of the main terminal. — Certain investments with a cost affecting the IRR have been postponed, such as the construction of the Europe check-in area and the Europe/International departure hall.

(159) The pooling of costs and the delay of certain investments as a result of the new Terminal mp2 have had an effect on the charges adopted for the latter and the turnover included in the IRR calculation.

(160) France therefore takes the view that the approach adopted by the airport corresponds to the choice that would have been made by a private operator. Accordingly, it considers that the analysis conducted by PwC is incorrect in so far as the latter criticises France for not having produced a business plan ‘built on assumptions specific to mp2’, although this phrase is not explained by PwC. France notes in this respect that the allocation of costs between the various users of the different terminals is covered by the airport's differentiated charges analysis, and not by the profitability study for the new terminal project.

4. COMMENTS BY THIRD PARTIES

4.1. AIR FRANCE

4.1.1. INVESTMENT SUBSIDIES FOR THE CCIMP

(161) Air France maintains that, although the subsidies granted for upgrading the airport's infrastructure have benefited all carriers present at Marseille Provence Airport, the investment subsidies specifically for Terminal mp2 have had the potential to distort competition between the airlines using each of the two terminals.

(162) Air France disputes the Commission's assessment in the opening decision that access to Terminal mp2 has been equal and non-discriminatory. The CCIMP's decision to reserve Terminal mp2 for ‘point-to-point’ traffic would have forced Air France, which also operates international flights and in particular carries connecting passengers, to split its operations from Marseille between the two terminals, as a result of which Air France refrained from using Terminal mp2. According to Air France, the launch in October 2006 of international flights operated by Ryanair from Terminal mp2 proves the preferential treatment given to this operator by the CCIMP. Moreover, Air France notes that Terminal mp2 offered services only for aircraft with fewer than 200 seats, which excluded the Airbus A321, and that an application was lodged by Air Méditerranée with Marseille Administrative Court seeking recognition of the arbitrary and discriminatory nature of this clause in the rules governing use of Terminal mp2.

(163) Air France maintains that the eligibility conditions for Terminal mp2 imposed initially by the CCIMP seem to have been solely intended to prevent it from seeking to use the new terminal, even though the economic equilibrium of the platform would have no doubt been assured if Air France could have transferred all its operations to Terminal mp2, where the level of charges was significantly lower.

4.1.2. OPERATING SUBSIDIES FOR THE CCIMP

(164) Air France claims that the level of airport tax, collected on behalf of the State but paid back in full to the airport operator, may not have corresponded to the costs actually incurred by the airport in financing measures falling under the responsibility of the public authorities, and may therefore have constituted an operating subsidy for Marseille Provence Airport.

4.1.3. AID GRANTED BY MARSEILLE PROVENCE AIRPORT TO CERTAIN AIRLINES

4.1.3.1. Reduced passenger charges for national flights

(165) Air France does not dispute the Commission's finding in its opening decision that the creation of a low-cost terminal may meet a market demand. However, Air France notes that the airport operator must ensure that this project is profitable.

(166) Air France disputes the Commission's assertion that it seems normal for a private airport operator to try and demand higher charges for the transport of passengers of those airlines that choose to offer a more comfortable service, whose customers are characterised as having a greater ‘willingness to pay’. Air France maintains that it has played no part in determining the service quality level offered in the ‘comfortable’ terminal, and wonders whether the criteria applied by the airport operator for access to the new terminal dedicated to the new low-cost operators have been truly non-discriminatory. Air France claims that airlines having historically used certain terminals are often captives of these infrastructures. Air France takes the view that, as airport operators have a monopoly over their airports, they can unfairly increase their charges to such captive customers in order to offer lower charges to customers using the low-cost terminals, with the latter being capable of easily moving their operations from one airport platform to another.

(167) Air France considers that the charges applied at Marseille Provence Airport stem from accounting treatment choices that have the sole logic of favouring those airlines using Terminal mp2. According to Air France, the method of allocating the overheads allows the passenger charge applicable to Terminal mp2 to be artificially reduced. Air France would like the Commission to include in its reasoning the fact that airports are ‘essential infrastructures’ as far as airlines are concerned and that, as a result, an airport operator must apply charges reflecting the cost of the service provided (obligation also imposed by Directive 2009/12/EC).

(168) Air France underlines that, to its knowledge, the CCIMP has never taken any steps to recover the additional charges due as a result of the retroactive reassessment of the passenger charges at Terminal mp2. Air France notes that, although, through its interim ruling of 28 July 2009, the Council of State suspended payment of 20 % of the passenger charge applied to Terminal mp1, the CCIMP did not, however, increase the passenger charge applicable to Terminal mp2. Air France points out that, as the Council of State did not annul the charges applicable to Terminal mp1 (decision of 27 June 2011), the entire 20 % suspended under the interim ruling was eventually paid to the CCIMP.

(169) Air France notes that, in an earlier decision (31), the Commission concluded that an aid scheme involving a system for differentiating between airport charges according to the flight destination (national/international) was incompatible with the internal market. Air France points out that, as France took steps to abolish this system, the Commission did not want to adopt any further appropriate measures. Air France therefore concludes that the Commission's earlier decision means that any new investigation into this aid scheme is pointless.

4.1.3.2. Charges in relation to new routes

(170) Although Air France accepts that every airport has to adopt this type of approach, the airline points out, however, that the airport must prove that it has acted as a market economy operator. In this respect, it must prove that the measure aims to achieve an eventual return on investment. The objective must therefore be to improve its own revenues and not to increase the region's tourist numbers.

(171) Air France adds that, in order to be acceptable, this type of measure must be transparent, non-discriminatory, degressive and time-limited so that it does not constitute public financing of the operating costs of the carrier benefiting from the measure.

4.2. RYANAIR

4.2.1. INVESTMENT SUBSIDIES FOR THE CCIMP

(172) Ryanair maintains that the investment subsidies granted for the construction of Terminal mp2 reflect the conduct of a market economy operator.

(173) According to Ryanair, the Commission's analysis should take into account the non-aeronautical revenue generated by Terminal mp2 through vehicle rentals, car park charges and additional commercial revenue generated by sales to Terminal mp2 passengers, who are likely to go to the shops in the main terminal, which is situated less than one minute's walk from Terminal mp2. Ryanair concludes that the non-aeronautical revenue generated by Terminal mp2 passengers makes a significant contribution to the profitability of the main terminal.

(174) The airport's closure, which would have resulted in additional costs (redundancy and decontamination costs, opportunity costs of investments already made) when the airport's sale price was likely to be low if not negative, was not an economically appropriate alternative in 2006.

(175) The strategy pursued by the airport, which has increased traffic and revenues and reduced the airport's unused capacity, has helped to improve its market value. Ryanair maintains that the assets of Terminal mp2 and the investments made could increase the value in the event of a sale, contrary to PwC's argument.

4.2.2. SETTING OF THE PASSENGER CHARGES FOR TERMINAL MP2

(176) Ryanair maintains that the decision setting the passenger charge applicable to Terminal mp2 is not imputable to the State, in accordance with the criteria explained by the Stardust Marine judgment (32). Ryanair underlines that the CCIs are regarded by French law as belonging to a specific category of public entities, characterised by a lack of subordination to the State (33). Ryanair therefore challenges the Commission's view, which simply presumes that the measures in question are imputable to the State due to the fact that the CCIMP is under state control, and points out that the Commission should examine, in each case, the specific circumstances determining whether or not the measure is imputable to the State.

(177) Ryanair adds that, in the case of the CCIMP, France could not have initiated, or acted in such a way as to encourage, the adoption by the airport of the measures in question. Ryanair maintains that, on the contrary, the DGAC repeatedly rejected the charges adopted by the CCIMP (34).

(178) In the alternative, Ryanair maintains that the passenger charges for Terminal mp2 were set in accordance with the market economy operator test. Ryanair claims that, in its analysis, the Commission did not correctly apply the prudent operator test, as required by the Court of Justice (35), for a number of reasons.

(179) Firstly, the Commission omitted to make a primary comparison between the charges applicable at Marseille Provence Airport and the market price. Ryanair has submitted a study that maintains that the market price for airport services can be established on the basis of a comparison with the prices paid at comparable private airports throughout Europe. The airline uses a comparison with Luton, East Midlands, Prestwick and Liverpool airports. It alleges that those airports are operated without State aid or public intervention and that the prices that it pays at those airports are, on average, three times lower than those at Marseille Provence Airport. Ryanair therefore concludes that the price that it pays at Marseille Provence Airport for the airport services is not below the market price for those services and that the price paid does not therefore include elements of State aid.

(180) Secondly, the Commission included sunk costs in its calculations, instead of basing its assessment on incremental costs alone. Ryanair notes in this respect that Marseille Provence Airport was constructed in 1922 and was used in particular, before the liberalisation of air transport, for regional traffic funded by the State in the form of a public service and as a base for forest firefighting aircraft. Ryanair adds that, in order to address the drop in traffic recorded between 2001 and 2003, the airport implemented a strategy to open up to low-cost airlines by creating a terminal specifically designed for their use. Ryanair points out that, for a number of years, it has accounted for over 40 % of the traffic at Terminal mp2. Ryanair maintains that regional airports are less attractive to airlines, which can legitimately expect to negotiate lower charges with the airport given the high volume of passengers that they bring. Ryanair notes that, when deciding on the existence of aid, the Commission is required to take into account the situation that prevailed at the time when the measure was granted to the beneficiary. Ryanair maintains in this case that, on the date when it started to operate from Marseille Provence Airport, given the contractual undertakings that it had made regarding the volume of passengers carried, the airport operator could legitimately have expected a significant increase in traffic due to Ryanair's presence at the airport. Ryanair asserts that, as the economic situation at small regional airports with overcapacity is different from that analysed by the Court of Justice in the Charleroi judgment, the cost analysis, if applicable to them, must be adapted. Taking into account only the incremental costs and revenues associated with the agreements concluded with Ryanair would reflect the conduct of a prudent market economy operator. Ryanair adds that the costs associated with investments made before its arrival and fixed operating costs must not be taken into account. Ryanair further states that whether the airport in general is profitable or loss making is irrelevant in terms of the existence of aid for the benefit of the airline.

(181) Ryanair maintains that the cost analysis conducted by the Commission for the prudent operator test is incorrect as it fails to take account of the service level offered at Terminal mp2, which is below the level of the services offered to traditional airlines and is therefore in line with the applicable level of charges. Ryanair asserts that Terminal mp2 offers only basic infrastructures (36) and has a considerably smaller area per passenger compared with the main terminal (1,66 m2 as opposed to 6,06 m2). Ryanair argues that low-cost airlines should not pay charges for services that they do not use, or that they use to a lesser extent than traditional airlines (37). Ryanair points out that it applies baggage fees to encourage its passengers not to check luggage, which has had the result that only one-third of Ryanair passengers check baggage. Moreover, Ryanair passengers take their baggage themselves from the check-in desks to security, which eliminates the need for any infrastructure at the terminal. By comparison, Ryanair notes that Air France makes extensive use of the ground handling services associated with baggage at the airport.

(182) Ryanair maintains that its aircraft are the largest operating at Marseille Provence Airport, which means that the airport does not have to incur the opportunity costs associated with the operation of small aircraft in relation to the number of passengers carried. Ryanair stresses that it operates on the basis of 25-minute rotations, whereas the traditional airlines, such as Air France, have rotation times between 45 and 60 minutes. A reduced rotation time limits the amount of time that ground areas are used by aircraft and passengers. Ryanair also notes that the criteria for using Terminal mp2 include the requirement to use C-type aircraft that can accommodate up to 200 seats and operate with reduced rotation times.

(183) Lastly, Ryanair criticises the fact that the Commission has not taken into account in its decision the positive externalities associated with Ryanair's presence at the airport, namely the fact that the infrastructure's value has increased due to its presence, bearing in mind the risks inherent in operating the initial routes from the airport. Moreover, Ryanair claims that the presence of an airline at an airport creates a ripple effect leading to an increase in passenger numbers at that airport, and therefore an improvement in its commercial and transport infrastructures, which makes the airport more attractive. Ryanair underlines that it contractually undertook to carry a certain number of passengers to and from Marseille Provence Airport, which has therefore helped to generate these externalities, as apparently proven, firstly, by the increase in traffic at the airport, and particularly at Terminal mp2, and secondly by the increase in the number of airlines operating from the airport. Ryanair also highlights that this type of undertaking means that it is the airline that bears all the risk associated with operating the route, which proves that the airport is in a position to accept a lower rate of return than it would have required in the absence of such undertakings.

(184) Ryanair encourages the Commission to adopt the ‘single till’ approach in its analysis, which involves taking joint account of both the aeronautical revenue and the commercial revenue generated by the presence of an airline at an airport. Ryanair notes in this respect that it carries more passengers per flight than Air France and that it operates ‘point-to-point’ flights where the passengers, in its opinion, are more likely to generate commercial revenue than transit passengers. Ryanair underlines that, since it started operating at Marseille Provence Airport, numerous businesses and several vehicle rental companies have set up in Terminal mp2 and that the non-aeronautical revenue generated by these activities contributes to the terminal's profitability.

(185) Ryanair argues further that the fact that the charges set for Terminal mp2 meet the market economy operator test proves that there has been no redistribution to Ryanair of the public resources allocated to the airport operator. Even if it is proven that the airport has benefited from aid, Ryanair claims that it cannot be concluded that it has been the final beneficiary of that aid.

(186) Next, Ryanair maintains that the charges applied at Terminal mp2 are not in any way selective, as the Commission has not proven that Ryanair has benefited from more favourable conditions than other airlines at Marseille Provence Airport. Ryanair underlines that it is not enough to find that different levels of charges are applied to different airlines in order to reach this conclusion, but that the Commission should take account of the cost of the services offered to each airline by the airport as well as the positive externalities and non-aeronautical revenue generated by each airline. Ryanair notes that its business model means that it carries, on each flight, a higher number of passengers than other airlines and that this saving made by the airport in the opportunity costs thus avoided must be reflected in the level of charges applied to Ryanair.

(187) Lastly, Ryanair claims that the differentiation of charges between national flights and international flights constitutes abusive discrimination pursuant to Article 102 TFEU as it results from a decision made by the airport, given its dominant position in terms of the infrastructure's availability. Ryanair maintains that the services provided to passengers do not fundamentally differ according to their destination (domestic, national or international flight) and that the checking of international passengers' travel documents is a state responsibility and should not therefore be funded through the airport charges. Ryanair regrets that France has not extended the finding made on the differentiation between national flights and Schengen flights to non-Schengen flights, which has resulted in the application of a charge that is 56 % higher than at the main terminal. Ryanair also maintains that this differentiation mechanism constitutes State aid. Ryanair points out that Air France and its affiliated companies operate most of the domestic flights and therefore benefit from the system of differentiated charges. Consequently, Ryanair asks the Commission to include, in the measures covered by this investigation, the advantage granted to Air France resulting from the differentiation of charges between Schengen flights and non-Schengen flights so that it can seek damages before the French courts.

(188) Ryanair has submitted additional information on the subject of AMS and the analysis to be conducted by the Commission. Ryanair maintains that the existence of aid in the AMS agreement should be assessed separately from the other measures. However, if the Commission decides to assess this together with the conditions from which Ryanair has benefited at the airport, Ryanair has submitted an economic analysis and concludes on this basis that the AMS agreemen