REGULATION (EU) 2018/1862 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

of 28 November 2018

on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, amending and repealing Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular point (d) of the second subparagraph of Article 82(1), Article 85(1), Article 87(2)(a) and Article 88(2)(a) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure (1),

Whereas:

(1) The Schengen Information System (SIS) constitutes an essential tool for the application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis as integrated into the framework of the European Union. SIS is one of the major compensatory measures contributing to maintaining a high level of security within the area of freedom, security and justice of the Union by supporting operational cooperation between national competent authorities, in particular border guards, the police, customs authorities, immigration authorities, and authorities responsible for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of criminal offences or execution of criminal penalties.

(2) SIS was initially set up pursuant to the provisions of Title IV of the Convention of 19 June 1990 implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (2) (the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement). The development of the second generation of SIS (SIS II) was entrusted to the Commission pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 2424/2001 (3) and Council Decision 2001/886/JHA (4). It was later established by Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) and by Council Decision 2007/533/JHA (6). SIS II replaced SIS as created pursuant to the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement.

(3) Three years after SIS II was brought into operation, the Commission carried out an evaluation of the system in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and Decision 2007/533/JHA. On 21 December 2016, the Commission submitted the Report on the Evaluation of the Second Generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) in accordance with Articles 24(5), 43(3) and 50(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and Articles 59(3) and 66(5) of Decision 2007/533/JHA and an accompanying staff working document to the European Parliament and to the Council. The recommendations set out in those documents should be reflected, as appropriate, in this Regulation.

(4) This Regulation constitutes the legal basis for SIS in respect of matters falling within the scope of Chapters 4 and 5 of Title V of Part Three of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Regulation (EU) 2018/1861 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7) constitutes the legal basis for SIS in respect of matters falling within the scope of Chapter 2 of Title V of Part Three TFEU.

(5) The fact that the legal basis for SIS consists of separate instruments does not affect the principle that SIS constitutes one single information system that should operate as such. It should include a single network of national offices called SIRENE Bureaux for ensuring the exchange of supplementary information. Certain provisions of those instruments should therefore be identical.

(6) It is necessary to specify the objectives of SIS, certain elements of its technical architecture and its financing, to lay down rules concerning its end-to-end operation and use and to define responsibilities. It is also necessary to determine the categories of data to be entered into the system, the purposes for which the data are to be entered and processed and the criteria for their entry. Rules are also required to govern the deletion of alerts, the authorities authorised to access the data, the use of biometric data and to further determine data protection and data processing rules.

(7) Alerts in SIS contain only the information necessary to identify a person or an object and for the action to be taken. Member States should therefore exchange supplementary information related to alerts where required.

(8) SIS includes a central system (Central SIS) and national systems. The national systems might contain a complete or partial copy of the SIS database, which may be shared by two or more Member States. Considering that SIS is the most important information exchange instrument in Europe for ensuring security and effective border management, it is necessary to ensure its uninterrupted operation at central as well as at national level. The availability of SIS should be subject to close monitoring at central and Member State level and any incident of unavailability for end-users should be registered and reported to stakeholders at national and Union level. Each Member State should set up a backup for its national system. Member States should also ensure uninterrupted connectivity with Central SIS by having duplicated and physically and geographically separated connection points. Central SIS and the Communication Infrastructure should be operated in such a way that their functioning 24 hours a day, 7 days a week is ensured. For that reason the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (‘eu-LISA’), established by Regulation (EU) 2018/1726 of the European Parliament and of the Council (8) should implement technical solutions to reinforce the uninterrupted availability of SIS, subject to an independent impact assessment and cost-benefit analysis.

(9) It is necessary to maintain a manual setting out the detailed rules for the exchange of supplementary information concerning the actions called for by alerts (‘the SIRENE Manual’). The SIRENE Bureaux, should ensure the exchange of such information in a fast and efficient manner.

(10) In order to ensure the efficient exchange of supplementary information, including on the action to be taken specified in alerts, it is appropriate to reinforce the functioning of the SIRENE Bureaux by specifying the requirements concerning the available resources and user training and the response time to inquiries they receive from other SIRENE Bureaux.

(11) Member States should ensure that the staff of their SIRENE Bureau have the linguistic skills and knowledge of relevant law and procedural rules necessary to perform their tasks.

(12) In order to be able to fully benefit from the functionalities of SIS, Member States should ensure that end-users and the staff of the SIRENE Bureaux regularly receive training, including on data security, data protection and data quality. SIRENE Bureaux should be involved in the development of training programmes. To the extent possible, SIRENE Bureaux should also provide for staff exchanges with other SIRENE Bureaux at least once a year. Member States are encouraged to take appropriate measures to avoid the loss of skills and experience through staff turnover.

(13) The operational management of the central components of SIS are exercised by eu-LISA. In order to enable eu-LISA to dedicate the necessary financial and personal resources covering all aspects of the operational management of Central SIS and the Communication Infrastructure, this Regulation should set out its tasks in detail, in particular with regard to the technical aspects of the exchange of supplementary information.

(14) Without prejudice to the responsibility of Member States for the accuracy of data entered into SIS and to the role of the SIRENE Bureaux as quality coordinators, eu-LISA should be responsible for reinforcing data quality by introducing a central data quality monitoring tool, and should provide reports at regular intervals to the Commission and to the Member States. The Commission should report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the data quality issues encountered. To further increase the quality of data in SIS, eu-LISA should also offer training on the use of SIS to national training bodies and, insofar as possible, to the SIRENE Bureaux and to end-users.

(15) In order to allow better monitoring of the use of SIS and to analyse trends concerning criminal offences, eu-LISA should be able to develop a state-of-the-art capability for statistical reporting to the Member States, to the European Parliament, to the Council, to the Commission, to Europol, to Eurojust and to the European Border and Coast Guard Agency without jeopardising data integrity. Therefore, a central repository should be established. Statistics retained in or obtained from that repository should not contain any personal data. Member States should communicate statistics concerning exercise of the right of access, rectification of inaccurate data and erasure of unlawfully stored data in the framework of cooperation between supervisory authorities and the European Data Protection Supervisor under this Regulation.

(16) New data categories should be introduced in SIS to allow end-users to take informed decisions based upon an alert without losing time. Therefore, in order to facilitate identification and detect multiple identities, the alert should, where such information is available, include a reference to the personal identification document of the individual concerned or its number and a copy, if possible in colour, of the document.

(17) Competent authorities should be able, where strictly necessary, to enter into SIS specific information relating to any specific, objective, physical characteristics of a person which are not subject to change, such as tattoos, marks or scars.

(18) Where available, all the relevant data, in particular the forename of the individual concerned, should be inserted when creating an alert, in order to minimise the risk of false hits and unnecessary operational activities.

(19) SIS should not store any data used to carry out searches with the exception of keeping logs to verify whether the search is lawful, for monitoring the lawfulness of data processing, for self-monitoring and for ensuring the proper functioning of the national systems as well as for data integrity and security.

(20) SIS should permit the processing of biometric data in order to assist in the reliable identification of the individuals concerned. Any entry of photographs, facial images or dactyloscopic data into SIS and any use of such data should be limited to what is necessary for the objectives pursued, should be authorised by Union law, should respect fundamental rights, including the best interests of the child, and should be in accordance with Union law on data protection, including the relevant provisions on data protection laid down in this Regulation. In the same perspective, in order to avoid inconveniences caused by misidentification, SIS should also allow for the processing of data concerning individuals whose identity has been misused, subject to suitable safeguards, to obtaining the consent of the individual concerned for each data category, in particular palm prints, and to a strict limitation of the purposes for which such personal data can be lawfully processed.

(21) Member States should make the necessary technical arrangements so that each time end-users are entitled to carry out a search in a national police or immigration database, they also search SIS in parallel, subject to the principles set out in Article 4 of Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council (9) and Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (10). This should ensure that SIS functions as the main compensatory measure in the area without internal border controls and better addresses the cross-border dimension of criminality and the mobility of criminals.

(22) This Regulation should set out the conditions for use of dactyloscopic data, photographs and facial images for identification and verification purposes. Facial images and photographs should, for identification purposes, initially be used only in the context of regular border crossing points. Such use should be subject to a report by the Commission confirming the availability, reliability and readiness of the technology.

(23) The introduction of an automated fingerprint identification service within SIS complements the existing Prüm mechanism on mutual cross-border online access to designated national DNA databases and automated fingerprint identification systems, as set out in Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA (11) and 2008/616/JHA (12). The SIS dactyloscopic data search allows an active search for the perpetrator. Therefore, it should be possible to upload the dactyloscopic data of an unknown perpetrator into SIS, provided that the owner of that data can be identified with a very high degree of probability as the perpetrator of a serious crime or act of terrorism. This is in particular the case if dactyloscopic data are found on the weapon or on any object used for the offence. The mere presence of the dactyloscopic data at the crime scene should not be considered as indicating a very high degree of probability that the dactyloscopic data are those of the perpetrator. A further precondition for the creation of such an alert should be that the identity of the suspect cannot be established on the basis of data from any other relevant national, Union or international database. Should a dactyloscopic data search lead to a potential match, the Member State should carry out further checks with the involvement of experts to establish whether the suspect is the owner of the prints stored in SIS, and should establish the identity of the person. The procedure should be subject to national law. Such identification could substantially contribute to the investigation and could lead to an arrest provided that all the conditions for an arrest are met.

(24) It should be allowed to search dactyloscopic data stored in SIS with complete or incomplete sets of fingerprints or palm prints found at a crime scene if it can be established to a high degree of probability that they belong to the perpetrator of the serious crime or terrorist offence, provided that a search is carried out simultaneously in the relevant national fingerprint databases. Particular attention should be given to the establishment of quality standards applicable to the storage of biometric data, including latent dactyloscopic data.

(25) Wherever the identity of a person cannot be ascertained by any other means, dactyloscopic data should be used to attempt identification. It should be allowed in all cases to identify a person by using dactyloscopic data.

(26) It should be possible to add a DNA profile to an alert in clearly defined cases where dactyloscopic data are not available. That DNA profile should only be accessible to authorised users. DNA profiles should facilitate the identification of missing persons in need of protection and particularly missing children, including by allowing the use of DNA profiles of direct ascendants, descendants or siblings to enable identification. DNA data should contain only the minimum information necessary for identification of the missing person.

(27) DNA profiles should only be retrieved from SIS where identification is necessary and proportionate for the purposes laid down in this Regulation. DNA profiles should not be retrieved or processed for any other purpose than those for which they were entered into SIS. The data protection and security rules laid down in this Regulation should apply. Additional safeguards, if necessary, should be put in place when using DNA profiles in order to avoid any risk of false matches, hacking and unauthorised sharing with third parties.

(28) SIS should contain alerts on persons wanted for arrest for surrender purposes and wanted for arrest for extradition purposes. In addition to alerts, it is appropriate to provide for the exchange of supplementary information through the SIRENE Bureaux which is necessary for the surrender and extradition procedures. In particular, data referred to in Article 8 of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA (13) should be processed in SIS. Due to operational reasons, it is appropriate for the issuing Member State to make an existing alert for arrest temporarily unavailable upon the authorisation of the judicial authorities when a person who is the subject of a European Arrest Warrant is intensively and actively searched and end-users not involved in the concrete search operation may jeopardise the successful outcome. The temporary unavailability of such alerts should in principle not exceed 48 hours.

(29) It should be possible to add to SIS a translation of the additional data entered for the purpose of surrender under the European Arrest Warrant and for the purpose of extradition.

(30) SIS should contain alerts on missing persons or on vulnerable persons who need to be prevented from travelling to ensure their protection or to prevent threats to public security or to public order. In the case of children, these alerts and the corresponding procedures should serve the best interests of the child in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989. Actions and decisions by the competent authorities, including judicial authorities, following an alert on a child should be taken in cooperation with child protection authorities. The national hotline for missing children should be informed, where appropriate.

(31) Alerts on missing persons who need to be placed under protection should be entered at the request of the competent authority. All children who have gone missing from Member States' reception facilities should be the subject of an alert on missing persons in SIS.

(32) Alerts on children at risk of parental child abduction should be entered into SIS at the request of competent authorities, including judicial authorities having jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility under national law. Alerts on children at risk of parental child abduction should only be entered in SIS where this risk is concrete and apparent and in limited circumstances. Therefore it is necessary to provide for strict and appropriate safeguards. In assessing whether a concrete and apparent risk exists that a child may be imminently and unlawfully removed from a Member State, the competent authority should take into account the child's personal circumstances and the environment to which the child is exposed.

(33) This Regulation should establish a new category of alerts for certain categories of vulnerable persons who need to be prevented from travelling. Persons who, due to their age, disabilities, or their family circumstances require protection should be considered vulnerable.

(34) Alerts on children who need to be prevented from travelling for their own protection should be entered into SIS if there is a concrete and apparent risk of them being removed from or leaving the territory of a Member State. Such alerts should be entered if the travel would put them at risk of becoming victims of trafficking in human beings or of forced marriage, female genital mutilation or other forms of gender-based violence, of becoming victims or being involved in terrorist offences, of being conscripted or enlisted into armed groups, or of being made to participate actively in hostilities.

(35) Alerts on vulnerable adults who need to be prevented from travelling for their own protection should be entered if travel would put them at risk of becoming victims of trafficking in human beings or gender-based violence.

(36) In order to guarantee strict and appropriate safeguards, alerts on children or other vulnerable persons who need to be prevented from travelling should, where required under national law, be entered into SIS following a decision by a judicial authority or a decision by a competent authority confirmed by a judicial authority.

(37) A new action to be taken should be introduced to allow a person to be stopped and interviewed in order for the issuing Member State to obtain detailed information. This action should apply in cases where, based on a clear indication, a person is suspected of intending to commit or of committing any of the offences referred to in Article 2(1) and (2) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, where further information is needed to execute a custodial sentence or detention order against a person convicted of any of the offences referred to in Article 2(1) and (2) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, or where there is a reason to believe that he or she will commit any of those offences. This action to be taken should also be without prejudice to existing mutual legal assistance mechanisms. It should supply sufficient information to decide upon further actions. This new action should not amount to searching the person nor to his or her arrest. The procedural rights of suspects and accused persons under Union and national law should be preserved, including their right to have access to a lawyer in accordance with Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (14).

(38) In the case of alerts on objects for seizure or use as evidence in criminal proceedings, the objects concerned should be seized in accordance with national law that determines if and in accordance with which conditions an object is to be seized, particularly if it is in the possession of its rightful owner.

(39) SIS should contain new categories of objects of high value, such as items of information technology which can be identified and searched with a unique identification number.

(40) As regards alerts entered into SIS on documents for seizure or use as evidence in criminal proceedings, the term ‘false’ should be construed as encompassing both forged and counterfeit documents.

(41) It should be possible for a Member State to add an indication, called a flag, to an alert, to the effect that the action to be taken on the basis of the alert will not be taken on its territory. When alerts are entered for arrest for surrender purposes, nothing in this Regulation should be construed so as to derogate from or prevent the application of the provisions contained in the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA. The decision to add a flag to an alert with a view to the non-execution of a European Arrest Warrant should be based only on the grounds for refusal contained in that Framework Decision.

(42) When a flag has been added and the whereabouts of the person wanted for arrest for surrender become known, the person's whereabouts should always be communicated to the issuing judicial authority, which may decide to transmit a European Arrest Warrant to the competent judicial authority in accordance with the provisions of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA.

(43) It should be possible for Member States to establish links between alerts in SIS. The establishment of links between two or more alerts should have no impact on the action to be taken, the review period for alerts or the access rights to the alerts.

(44) Alerts should not be kept in SIS longer than the time required to fulfil the specific purposes for which they were entered. The review periods for different categories of alerts should be appropriate in light of their purpose. Alerts on objects which are linked to an alert on a person should only be kept for as long as the alert on the person is kept. Decisions to retain alerts on persons should be based on a comprehensive individual assessment. Member States should review alerts on persons and objects within the prescribed review periods and should keep statistics on the number of alerts for which the retention period has been extended.

(45) Entering an alert into SIS and extending the expiry date of an alert in SIS should be subject to a proportionality requirement involving examination of whether a concrete case is adequate, relevant and important enough to warrant insertion of an alert in SIS. Where terrorist offences are concerned, the case should be considered adequate, relevant and important enough to warrant an alert in SIS. For public or national security reasons, Member States should be allowed exceptionally to refrain from entering an alert into SIS when it is likely that this would obstruct official or legal inquiries, investigations or procedures.

(46) It is necessary to establish rules concerning the deletion of alerts. An alert should be kept only for the time required to achieve the purpose for which it was entered. Considering the diverging practices of Member States in determining the point in time when an alert has fulfilled its purpose, it is appropriate to set out detailed criteria for each category of alert to determine when it should be deleted.

(47) The integrity of SIS data is of primary importance. Therefore, appropriate safeguards should be provided to process SIS data at central as well as at national level to ensure the end-to-end security of the data. The authorities involved in the data processing should be bound by the security requirements of this Regulation and be subject to a uniform incident reporting procedure. Their staff should be appropriately trained and be informed of any offences and penalties in this respect.

(48) Data processed in SIS and the related supplementary information exchanged pursuant to this Regulation should not be transferred or made available to third countries or to international organisations.

(49) It is appropriate to grant access to SIS to services responsible for registering vehicles, boats and aircraft in order to allow them to verify whether the conveyance concerned is being searched for in Member States for seizure. It is also appropriate to grant access to SIS to services responsible for registering firearms in order to allow them to verify whether the firearm concerned is being searched for in Member States for seizure or whether there is an alert on the person requesting the registration.

(50) Direct access to SIS should only be provided to competent government services. This access should be limited to alerts concerning the respective conveyances and their registration document or number plate or firearms and persons requesting the registration. Any hit in SIS should be reported by such services to the police authorities, who should take further action in line with the particular alert in SIS and notify the issuing Member State of the hit through the SIRENE Bureaux.

(51) Without prejudice to more specific rules laid down in this Regulation, the national laws, regulations and administrative provisions adopted pursuant to Directive (EU) 2016/680 should apply to the processing, including collection and communication of personal data under this Regulation by the national competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties. Access to data entered into SIS and the right to search such data by national competent authorities which are responsible for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties are to be subject to all relevant provisions of this Regulation and those of Directive (EU) 2016/680 as transposed into national law, and in particular to monitoring by the supervisory authorities referred to in Directive (EU) 2016/680.

(52) Without prejudice to more specific rules laid down in this Regulation for the processing of personal data, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 should apply to the processing of personal data by the Member States under this Regulation unless such processing is carried out by the national competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences.

(53) Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council (15) should apply to the processing of personal data by the institutions and bodies of the Union when carrying out their responsibilities under this Regulation.

(54) Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council (16) should apply to the processing of personal data by Europol under this Regulation.

(55) In cases when searches carried out in SIS by national members of Eurojust and their assistants reveal the existence of an alert entered by a Member State, Eurojust cannot take the requested action. Therefore, it should inform the Member State concerned to allow it to follow up the case.

(56) When using SIS, the competent authorities should ensure that the dignity and integrity of the person whose data are processed are respected. Processing of personal data for the purposes of this Regulation is not to result in discrimination against persons on any grounds, such as sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

(57) Insofar as confidentiality is concerned, the relevant provisions of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the Union, laid down in Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 (17) (‘Staff Regulations’) should apply to officials or other servants employed and working in connection with SIS.

(58) Both the Member States and eu-LISA should maintain security plans in order to facilitate the implementation of security obligations and should cooperate with each other in order to address security issues from a common perspective.

(59) The national independent supervisory authorities referred to in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive (EU) 2016/680 (‘supervisory authorities’) should monitor the lawfulness of the processing of personal data by the Member States under this Regulation, including the exchange of supplementary information. The supervisory authorities should be granted sufficient resources to carry out this task. The rights of data subjects to access, rectify and erase their personal data that is stored in SIS, and any subsequent remedies before national courts as well as the mutual recognition of judgments should be provided for. It is also appropriate to require annual statistics from Member States.

(60) The supervisory authorities should ensure that an audit of the data processing operations in their Member State's national systems is carried out in accordance with international auditing standards at least every four years. The audit should either be carried out by the supervisory authorities, or the supervisory authorities should directly order the audit from an independent data protection auditor. The independent auditor should remain under the control and responsibility of the supervisory authorities concerned which therefore should instruct the auditor themselves and provide a clearly defined purpose, scope and methodology for the audit as well as guidance and supervision concerning the audit and its final results.

(61) The European Data Protection Supervisor should monitor the activities of the Union institutions and bodies in relation to the processing of personal data under this Regulation. The European Data Protection Supervisor and the supervisory authorities should cooperate with each other in monitoring SIS.

(62) The European Data Protection Supervisor should be granted sufficient resources to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it under this Regulation, including assistance from persons with expertise in biometric data.

(63) Regulation (EU) 2016/794 provides that Europol is to support and strengthens actions carried out by the national competent authorities and their cooperation in combating terrorism and serious crime and to provide analysis and threat assessments. The extension of Europol's access rights to alerts on missing persons should further improve Europol's capacity to provide national law enforcement authorities with comprehensive operational and analytical products concerning trafficking in human beings and child sexual exploitation, including online. This would contribute to better prevention of those criminal offences, to the protection of potential victims and to the investigation of perpetrators. Europol's European Cybercrime Centre would also benefit from Europol having access to alerts on missing persons, including in cases of travelling sex offenders and child sexual abuse online, where perpetrators often claim that they have access to children or can get access to children who might have been registered as missing.

(64) In order to bridge the gap in information sharing on terrorism, in particular on foreign terrorist fighters — where monitoring of their movement is crucial — Member States are encouraged to share information on terrorism-related activity with Europol. This information sharing should be carried out through the exchange of supplementary information with Europol on the alerts concerned. For this purpose Europol should set up a connection with the Communication Infrastructure.

(65) It is also necessary to set out clear rules for Europol on the processing and downloading of SIS data to allow it to use SIS comprehensively, provided that data protection standards are complied with as provided for in this Regulation and Regulation (EU) 2016/794. In cases where searches carried out by Europol in SIS reveal the existence of an alert entered by a Member State, Europol cannot take the required action. Therefore it should inform the Member State concerned through the exchange of supplementary information with the respective SIRENE Bureau, to allow that Member State to follow up the case.

(66) Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council (18) provides for the purpose of that Regulation, that the host Member State is to authorise the members of the teams referred to in point (8) of Article 2 of that Regulation, deployed by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency to consult Union databases where this consultation is necessary for fulfilling operational aims specified in the operational plan on border checks, border surveillance and return. Other relevant Union agencies, in particular the European Asylum Support Office and Europol, may also deploy experts who are not members of the staff of those Union agencies as part of migration management support teams. The objective of the deployment of the teams referred to in points (8) and (9) of Article 2 of that Regulation is to provide technical and operational reinforcement to the requesting Member States, especially to those facing disproportionate migratory challenges. For the teams referred to in points (8) and (9) of Article 2 of that Regulation to fulfil their tasks, they require access to SIS through a technical interface of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency connecting to Central SIS. In cases where searches in SIS carried out by the teams referred to in points (8) and (9) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 or by the teams of staff reveal the existence of an alert entered by a Member State, the member of the team or the staff cannot take the required action unless authorised to do so by the host Member State. Therefore, the host Member State should be informed to allow it to follow up the case. The host Member State should notify the issuing Member State of the hit through the exchange of supplementary information.

(67) Certain aspects of SIS cannot be covered exhaustively by this Regulation given their technical, highly detailed and frequently changing nature. Those aspects include, for example, technical rules on entering data, on updating, deleting and searching data and on data quality and rules related to biometric data rules on the compatibility and order of priority of alerts, on links between alerts, setting the expiry date of alerts within the maximum time limit and on the exchange of supplementary information. Implementing powers in respect of those aspects should therefore be conferred on the Commission. Technical rules on searching alerts should take into account the smooth operation of national applications.

(68) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (19). The procedure for adopting implementing acts under this Regulation and Regulation (EU) 2018/1861 should be the same.

(69) In order to ensure transparency, two years after the start of operations of SIS pursuant to this Regulation, eu-LISA should produce a report on the technical functioning of Central SIS and the Communication Infrastructure, including their security, and on the bilateral and multilateral exchange of supplementary information. An overall evaluation should be issued by the Commission every four years.

(70) In order to ensure the smooth functioning of SIS, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of new sub-categories of objects to be sought under alerts on objects for seizure or used as evidence in criminal proceedings, and the determination of the circumstances in which photographs and facial images may be used for the identification of persons other than in the context of regular border crossing points. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making (20). In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

(71) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely the establishment and regulation of a Union information system and the exchange of related supplementary information, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can rather, by reason of their nature be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.

(72) This Regulation respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In particular, this Regulation fully respects the protection of personal data in accordance with Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union while seeking to ensure a safe environment for all persons residing on the territory of the Union and special protection for children who could be victim of trafficking or abduction. In cases concerning children, the best interests of the child should be a primary consideration.

(73) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the Position of Denmark annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Regulation and is not bound by it or subject to its application. Given that this Regulation builds upon the Schengen acquis, Denmark shall, in accordance with Article 4 of that Protocol, decide within a period of six months after the Council has decided on this Regulation whether it will implement it in its national law.

(74) The United Kingdom is taking part in this Regulation in accordance with Article 5(1) of Protocol No 19 on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU and Article 8(2) of Council Decision 2000/365/EC (21).

(75) Ireland is taking part in this Regulation in accordance with Article 5(1) of Protocol No 19 annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU and Article 6(2) of Council Decision 2002/192/EC (22).

(76) As regards Iceland and Norway, this Regulation constitutes a development of provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latters' association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (23), which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point (G) of Council Decision 1999/437/EC (24).

(77) As regards Switzerland, this Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (25), which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point (G), of Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/149/JHA (26).

(78) As regards Liechtenstein, this Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (27), which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point (G), of Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2011/349/EU (28).

(79) As regards Bulgaria and Romania, this Regulation constitutes an act building upon, or otherwise relating to, the Schengen acquis within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the 2005 Act of Accession and should be read in conjunction with Council Decisions 2010/365/EU (29) and (EU) 2018/934 (30).

(80) As regards Croatia, this Regulation constitutes an act building upon, or otherwise relating to, the Schengen acquis within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the 2011 Act of Accession and should be read in conjunction with Council Decision (EU) 2017/733 (31).

(81) Concerning Cyprus this Regulation constitutes an act building upon, or otherwise relating to, the Schengen acquis within the meaning of Article 3(2) of the 2003 Act of Accession.

(82) This Regulation should apply to Ireland on dates determined in accordance with the procedures set out in the relevant instruments concerning the application of the Schengen acquis to this State.

(83) This Regulation introduces a series of improvements to SIS which will increase its effectiveness, strengthen data protection and extend access rights. Certain of those improvements do not require complex technical developments, while others do require technical changes of varying magnitude. In order to enable improvements to the system to become available to end-users as soon as possible, this Regulation introduces amendments to Decision 2007/533/JHA in several phases. A number of improvements to the system should apply immediately upon entry into force of this Regulation, whereas others should apply either one or two years after its entry into force. This Regulation should apply in its entirety within three years after its entry into force. In order to avoid delays in its application the phased implementation of this Regulation should be closely monitored.

(84) Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council (32), Decision 2007/533/JHA and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU (33) should be repealed with effect from the date of full application of this Regulation.

(85) The European Data Protection Supervisor was consulted in accordance with Article 28(2) of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council (34) and delivered an opinion on 3 May 2017,

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

CHAPTER I

General provisions

Article 1 General purpose of SIS The purpose of SIS shall be to ensure a high level of security within the area of freedom, security and justice of the Union including the maintenance of public security and public policy and the safeguarding of security in the territories of the Member States, and to ensure the application of the provisions of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of Title V of Part Three TFEU relating to the movement of persons on their territories, using information communicated through this system.

Article 2 Subject matter 1. This Regulation establishes the conditions and procedures for the entry and processing of alerts in SIS on persons and objects and for the exchange of supplementary information and additional data for the purpose of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 2. This Regulation also lays down provisions on the technical architecture of SIS, on the responsibilities of the Member States and of the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA), on data processing, on the rights of the persons concerned and on liability.

Article 3 Definitions For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply: (1) ‘alert’ means a set of data entered into SIS allowing the competent authorities to identify a person or an object with a view to taking specific action; (2) ‘supplementary information’ means information not forming part of the alert data stored in SIS, but connected to alerts in SIS, which is to be exchanged through the SIRENE Bureaux: (a) in order to allow Member States to consult or inform each other when entering an alert; (b) following a hit in order to allow the appropriate action to be taken; (c) when the required action cannot be taken; (d) when dealing with the quality of SIS data; (e) when dealing with the compatibility and priority of alerts; (f) when dealing with rights of access; (3) ‘additional data’ means the data stored in SIS and connected with alerts in SIS which are to be immediately available to the competent authorities where a person in respect of whom data has been entered in SIS is located as a result of conducting a search in SIS; (4) ‘personal data’ means personal data as defined in point 1 of Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679; (5) ‘processing of personal data’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, logging, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction; (6) a ‘match’ means the occurrence of the following steps: (a) a search has been conducted in SIS by an end-user; (b) that search has revealed an alert entered into SIS by another Member State; and (c) data concerning the alert in SIS match the search data; (7) a ‘hit’ means any match which fulfils the following criteria: (a) it has been confirmed by: (i) the end-user; or (ii) the competent authority in accordance with national procedures, where the match concerned was based on the comparison of biometric data; and (b) further actions are requested; (8) ‘flag’ means a suspension of the validity of an alert at the national level that may be added to alerts for arrest, alerts on missing and vulnerable persons and alerts for discreet, inquiry and specific checks; (9) ‘issuing Member State’ means the Member State which entered the alert into SIS; (10) ‘executing Member State’ means the Member State which takes or has taken the required actions following a hit; (11) ‘end-user’ means a member of staff of a competent authority authorised to search directly CS-SIS, N.SIS or a technical copy thereof; (12) ‘biometric data’ means personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical or physiological characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, namely photographs, facial images, dactyloscopic data and DNA profile; (13) ‘dactyloscopic data’ means data on fingerprints and palm prints which due to their unique character and the reference points contained therein enable accurate and conclusive comparisons on a person's identity; (14) ‘facial image’ means digital images of the face with sufficient image resolution and quality to be used in automated biometric matching; (15) ‘DNA profile’ means a letter or number code which represents a set of identification characteristics of the noncoding part of an analysed human DNA sample, namely the particular molecular structure at the various DNA locations (loci); (16) ‘terrorist offences’ means offences under national law referred to in Articles 3 to 14 of Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council (35), or equivalent to one of those offences for the Member States which are not bound by that Directive; (17) ‘threat to public health’ means a threat to public health as defined in point (21) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council (36).

Article 4 Technical architecture and ways of operating SIS 1. SIS shall be composed of: (a) a central system (Central SIS) composed of: (i) a technical support function (‘CS-SIS’) containing a database (the ‘SIS database’), and including a backup CS-SIS; (ii) a uniform national interface (‘NI-SIS’); (b) a national system (N.SIS) in each of the Member States, consisting of the national data systems which communicate with Central SIS, including at least one national or shared backup N.SIS; and (c) a communication infrastructure between CS-SIS, backup CS-SIS and NI-SIS (‘the Communication Infrastructure’) that provides an encrypted virtual network dedicated to SIS data and the exchange of data between SIRENE Bureaux, as referred to in Article 7(2). An N.SIS as referred to in point (b) may contain a data file (a ‘national copy’) containing a complete or partial copy of the SIS database. Two or more Member States may establish in one of their N.SIS a shared copy which may be used jointly by those Member States. Such shared copy shall be considered as the national copy of each of those Member States. A shared backup N.SIS as referred to in point (b) may be used jointly by two or more Member States. In such cases, the shared backup N.SIS shall be considered as the backup N.SIS of each of those Member States. The N.SIS and its backup may be used simultaneously to ensure uninterrupted availability to end-users. Member States intending to establish a shared copy or shared backup N.SIS to be used jointly shall agree their respective responsibilities in writing. They shall notify their arrangement to the Commission. The Communication Infrastructure shall support and contribute to ensuring the uninterrupted availability of SIS. It shall include redundant and separated paths for the connections between CS-SIS and the backup CS-SIS and shall also include redundant and separated paths for the connections between each SIS national network access point and CS-SIS and backup CS-SIS. 2. Member States shall enter, update, delete and search SIS data through their own N.SIS. The Member States using a partial or a complete national copy or a partial or complete shared copy shall make that copy available for the purpose of carrying out automated searches in the territory of each of those Member States. The partial national or shared copy shall contain at least the data listed in points (a) to (v) of Article 20 (3). It shall not be possible to search the data files of other Member States' N.SIS except in the case of shared copies. 3. CS-SIS shall perform technical supervision and administration functions and have a backup CS-SIS, capable of ensuring all functionalities of the principal CS-SIS in the event of failure of that system. CS-SIS and the backup CS-SIS shall be located in the two technical sites of eu-LISA. 4. eu-LISA shall implement technical solutions to reinforce the uninterrupted availability of SIS either through the simultaneous operation of CS-SIS and the backup CS-SIS, provided that the backup CS-SIS remains capable of ensuring the operation of SIS in the event of a failure of CS-SIS, or through duplication of the system or its components. Notwithstanding the procedural requirements laid down in Article 10 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1726 eu-LISA shall no later than 28 December 2019, prepare a study on the options for technical solutions, containing an independent impact assessment and cost-benefit analysis. 5. Where necessary in exceptional circumstances, eu-LISA may temporarily develop an additional copy of the SIS database. 6. CS-SIS shall provide the services necessary for the entry and processing of SIS data, including searches in the SIS database. For the Member States which use a national or shared copy, CS-SIS shall: (a) provide online updates for the national copies; (b) ensure synchronisation of and consistency between the national copies and the SIS database; and (c) provide the operation for initialisation and restoration of the national copies. 7. CS-SIS shall provide uninterrupted availability.

Article 5 Costs 1. The costs of operating, maintaining and further developing Central SIS and the Communication Infrastructure shall be borne by the general budget of the Union. Those costs shall include work done with respect to CS-SIS, in order to ensure the provision of the services referred to in Article 4(6). 2. The costs of setting up, operating, maintaining and further developing each N.SIS shall be borne by the Member State concerned.

CHAPTER II

Responsibilities of the Member States

Article 6 National systems Each Member State shall be responsible for setting up, operating, maintaining and further developing its N.SIS and connecting it to NI-SIS. Each Member State shall be responsible for ensuring the uninterrupted availability of SIS data to end-users. Each Member State shall transmit its alerts through its N.SIS.

Article 7 N.SIS Office and SIRENE Bureau 1. Each Member State shall designate an authority (the N.SIS Office), which shall have central responsibility for its N.SIS. That authority shall be responsible for the smooth operation and security of the N.SIS, shall ensure the access of the competent authorities to SIS and shall take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with this Regulation. It shall be responsible for ensuring that all functionalities of SIS are made available to the end users appropriately. 2. Each Member State shall designate a national authority which shall be operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and which shall ensure the exchange and availability of all supplementary information (the SIRENE Bureau) in accordance with the SIRENE Manual. Each SIRENE Bureau shall serve as a single contact point for its Member State to exchange supplementary information regarding alerts and to facilitate the requested actions to be taken when alerts on persons or objects have been entered in SIS and those persons or objects are located following a hit. Each SIRENE Bureau shall, in accordance with national law, have easy direct or indirect access to all relevant national information, including national databases and all information on its Member States' alerts, and to expert advice, in order to be able to react to requests for supplementary information swiftly and within the deadlines provided for in Article 8. The SIRENE Bureaux shall coordinate the verification of the quality of the information entered in SIS. For those purposes they shall have access to data processed in SIS. 3. The Member States shall provide eu-LISA with details of their N.SIS Office and of their SIRENE Bureau. eu-LISA shall publish the list of the N.SIS Offices and the SIRENE Bureaux together with the list referred to in Article 56(7).

Article 8 Exchange of supplementary information 1. Supplementary information shall be exchanged in accordance with the provisions of the SIRENE Manual and using the Communication Infrastructure. Member States shall provide the necessary technical and human resources to ensure the continuous availability and timely and effective exchange of supplementary information. In the event that the Communication Infrastructure is unavailable, Member States shall use other adequately secured technical means to exchange supplementary information. A list of adequately secured technical means shall be laid down in the SIRENE Manual. 2. Supplementary information shall be used only for the purpose for which it was transmitted in accordance with Article 64 unless prior consent for another use is obtained from the issuing Member State. 3. The SIRENE Bureaux shall carry out their tasks in a quick and efficient manner, in particular by replying to a request for supplementary information as soon as possible but not later than 12 hours after the receipt of the request. In case of alerts for terrorist offences, of alerts on persons wanted for arrest for surrender or extradition purposes, and in cases of alerts on children referred to in point (c) of Article 32(1) the SIRENE Bureaux shall act immediately. Requests for supplementary information with the highest priority shall be marked ‘URGENT’ in the SIRENE forms, and the reason for the urgency shall be specified. 4. The Commission shall adopt implementing acts to lay down detailed rules for the tasks of the SIRENE Bureaux pursuant to this Regulation and the exchange of supplementary information in the form of a manual entitled the ‘SIRENE Manual’. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 76(2).

Article 9 Technical and functional compliance 1. When setting up its N.SIS, each Member State shall comply with common standards, protocols and technical procedures established to ensure the compatibility of its N.-SIS with Central SIS for the prompt and effective transmission of data. 2. If a Member State uses a national copy, it shall ensure, by means of the services provided by CS-SIS and by means of automatic updates referred to in Article 4(6), that the data stored in the national copy are identical to and consistent with the SIS database and that a search in its national copy produces a result equivalent to that of a search in the SIS database. 3. End-users shall receive the data required to perform their tasks, in particular, and where necessary, all the available data allowing for the identification of the data subject and for the requested action to be taken. 4. Member States and eu-LISA shall undertake regular tests to verify the technical compliance of the national copies referred to in paragraph 2. The results of those tests shall be taken into consideration as part of the mechanism established by Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 (37). 5. The Commission shall adopt implementing acts to lay down and develop common standards, protocols and technical procedures, referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 76(2).

Article 10 Security — Member States 1. Each Member State shall, in relation to its N.SIS, adopt the necessary measures, including a security plan, a business continuity plan and a disaster recovery plan, in order to: (a) physically protect data, including by making contingency plans for the protection of critical infrastructure; (b) deny unauthorised persons access to data-processing facilities used for processing personal data (facilities access control); (c) prevent the unauthorised reading, copying, modification or removal of data media (data media control); (d) prevent the unauthorised input of data and the unauthorised inspection, modification or deletion of stored personal data (storage control); (e) prevent the use of automated data-processing systems by unauthorised persons using data communication equipment (user control); (f) prevent the unauthorised processing of data in SIS and any unauthorised modification or erasure of data processed in SIS (control of data entry); (g) ensure that persons authorised to use an automated data-processing system have access only to the data covered by their access authorisation, by means of individual and unique user identifiers and confidential access modes only (data access control); (h) ensure that all authorities with a right of access to SIS or to the data processing facilities create profiles describing the functions and responsibilities of persons who are authorised to access, enter, update, delete and search the data and make those profiles available to the supervisory authorities referred to in Article 69(1) without delay upon their request (personnel profiles); (i) ensure that it is possible to verify and establish to which bodies personal data may be transmitted using data communication equipment (communication control); (j) ensure that it is subsequently possible to verify and establish which personal data have been input into automated data-processing systems, when, by whom and for what purpose (input control); (k) prevent the unauthorised reading, copying, modification or deletion of personal data during the transmission of personal data or during the transport of data media, in particular by means of appropriate encryption techniques (transport control); (l) monitor the effectiveness of the security measures referred to in this paragraph and take the necessary organisational measures related to internal monitoring to ensure compliance with this Regulation (self-auditing); (m) ensure that, in the event of interruption, installed systems can be restored to normal operation (recovery); and (n) ensure that SIS performs its functions correctly, that faults are reported (reliability) and that personal data stored in SIS cannot be corrupted by means of the system malfunctioning (integrity). 2. Member States shall take measures equivalent to those referred to in paragraph 1 as regards security in respect of the processing and exchange of supplementary information, including by securing the premises of the SIRENE Bureaux. 3. Member States shall take measures equivalent to those referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article as regards security in respect of the processing of SIS data by the authorities referred to in Article 44. 4. The measures described in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 may be part of a generic security approach and plan at national level encompassing multiple IT systems. In such cases, the requirements set out in this Article and their applicability to SIS shall be clearly identifiable in and ensured by that plan.

Article 11 Confidentiality — Member States 1. Each Member State shall apply its rules of professional secrecy or other equivalent duties of confidentiality to all persons and bodies required to work with SIS data and supplementary information, in accordance with its national law. That obligation shall also apply after those persons leave office or employment or after the termination of the activities of those bodies. 2. Where a Member State cooperates with external contractors in any SIS-related tasks, it shall closely monitor the activities of the contractor to ensure compliance with all provisions of this Regulation, in particular on security, confidentiality and data protection. 3. The operational management of N.SIS or of any technical copies shall not be entrusted to private companies or private organisations.

Article 12 Keeping of logs at national level 1. Member States shall ensure that every access to and all exchanges of personal data within CS-SIS are logged in their N.SIS for the purposes of checking whether the search was lawful, monitoring the lawfulness of data processing, self-monitoring, ensuring the proper functioning of N.SIS, as well as for data integrity and security. This requirement does not apply to the automatic processes referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 4(6). 2. The logs shall show, in particular, the history of the alert, the date and time of the data processing activity, the data used to perform a search, a reference to the data processed and the individual and unique user identifiers of both the competent authority and the person processing the data. 3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2 of this Article, if the search is carried out with dactyloscopic data or a facial image in accordance with Article 43, the logs shall show the type of data used to perform the search instead of the actual data. 4. The logs shall only be used for the purpose referred to in paragraph 1 and shall be deleted three years after their creation. The logs which include the history of alerts shall be deleted three years after deletion of the alerts. 5. Logs may be kept for longer than the periods referred to in paragraph 4 if they are required for monitoring procedures that are already underway. 6. The national competent authorities in charge of checking whether searches are lawful, monitoring the lawfulness of data processing, self-monitoring and ensuring the proper functioning of N.SIS and data integrity and security, shall have access, within the limits of their competence and at their request, to the logs for the purpose of fulfilling their duties. 7. Where Member States, in accordance with national law, carry out automated scanned searches of the number plates of motor vehicles, using Automatic Number Plate Recognition systems, Member States shall maintain a log of the search in accordance with national law. If necessary, a full search may be carried out in SIS in order to verify whether a hit has been achieved. Paragraphs 1 to 6 shall apply to any full search. 8. The Commission shall adopt implementing acts to establish the content of the log, referred to in paragraph 7 of this Article. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 76(2).

Article 13 Self-monitoring Member States shall ensure that each authority entitled to access SIS data takes the measures necessary to comply with this Regulation and cooperates, where necessary, with the supervisory authority.

Article 14 Staff training 1. Before being authorised to process data stored in SIS and periodically after access to SIS data has been granted, the staff of the authorities having a right to access SIS shall receive appropriate training on data security, on fundamental rights including data -protection, and on the rules and procedures for data processing set out in the SIRENE Manual. The staff shall be informed of any relevant provisions on criminal offences and penalties, including those provided for in Article 73. 2. Member States shall have a national SIS training programme which shall include training for end-users as well as the staff of the SIRENE Bureaux. That training programme may be part of a general training programme at national level encompassing training in other relevant areas. 3. Common training courses shall be organised at Union level at least once a year to enhance cooperation between SIRENE Bureaux.

CHAPTER III

Responsibilities of eu-LISA

Article 15 Operational management 1. eu-LISA shall be responsible for the operational management of Central SIS. eu-LISA shall, in cooperation with the Member States, ensure that at all times the best available technology is used for Central SIS, subject to a cost-benefit analysis. 2. eu-LISA shall also be responsible for the following tasks relating to the Communication Infrastructure: (a) supervision; (b) security; (c) the coordination of relations between the Member States and the provider; (d) tasks relating to implementation of the budget; (e) acquisition and renewal; and (f) contractual matters. 3. eu-LISA shall also be responsible for the following tasks relating to the SIRENE Bureaux and communication between the SIRENE Bureaux: (a) the coordination, management and support of testing activities; (b) the maintenance and updating of technical specifications for the exchange of supplementary information between SIRENE Bureaux and the Communication Infrastructure; and (c) managing the impact of technical changes where it affects both SIS and the exchange of supplementary information between SIRENE Bureaux. 4. eu-LISA shall develop and maintain a mechanism and procedures for carrying out quality checks on the data in CS-SIS. It shall provide regular reports to the Member States in this regard. eu-LISA shall provide a regular report to the Commission covering the issues encountered and the Member States concerned. The Commission shall provide the European Parliament and the Council with a regular report on data quality issues that are encountered. 5. eu-LISA shall also perform tasks related to providing training on the technical use of SIS and on measures for improving the quality of SIS data. 6. The operational management of Central SIS shall consist of all the tasks necessary to keep Central SIS functioning 24 hours a day, 7 days a week in accordance with this Regulation, in particular the maintenance work and technical developments necessary for the smooth running of the system. Those tasks shall also include the coordination, management and support of testing activities for Central SIS and the N.SIS that ensure that Central SIS and the N.SIS operate in accordance with the requirements for technical and functional compliance set out in Article 9. 7. The Commission shall adopt implementing acts to set out the technical requirements for the Communication Infrastructure. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 76(2).

Article 16 Security — eu-LISA 1. eu-LISA shall adopt the necessary measures, including a security plan, a business continuity plan and a disaster recovery plan for Central SIS and the Communication Infrastructure in order to: (a) physically protect data, including by making contingency plans for the protection of critical infrastructure; (b) deny unauthorised persons access to data-processing facilities used for processing personal data (facilities access control); (c) prevent the unauthorised reading, copying, modification or removal of data media (data media control); (d) prevent the unauthorised input of data and the unauthorised inspection, modification or deletion of stored personal data (storage control); (e) prevent the use of automated data-processing systems by unauthorised persons using data communication equipment (user control); (f) prevent the unauthorised processing of data in SIS and any unauthorised modification or erasure of data processed in SIS (control of data entry); (g) ensure that persons authorised to use an automated data-processing system have access only to the data covered by their access authorisation by means of individual and unique user identifiers and confidential access modes only (data access control); (h) create profiles describing the functions and responsibilities of persons who are authorised to access the data or the data processing facilities and make those profiles available to the European Data Protection Supervisor without delay upon its request (personnel profiles); (i) ensure that it is possible to verify and establish to which bodies personal data may be transmitted using data communication equipment (communication control); (j) ensure that it is subsequently possible to verify and establish which personal data have been input into automated data-processing systems, when and by whom (input control); (k) prevent the unauthorised reading, copying, modification or deletion of personal data during the transmission of personal data or during the transport of data media, in particular by means of appropriate encryption techniques (transport control); (l) monitor the effectiveness of the security measures referred to in this paragraph and take the necessary organisational measures related to internal monitoring to ensure compliance with this Regulation (self-auditing); (m) ensure that, in the event of interrupted operations, installed systems can be restored to normal operation (recovery); (n) ensure that SIS performs its functions correctly, that faults are reported (reliability) and that personal data stored in SIS cannot be corrupted by means of the system malfunctioning (integrity); and (o) ensure the security of its technical sites. 2. eu-LISA shall take measures equivalent to those referred to in paragraph 1 as regards security in respect of the processing and exchange of supplementary information through the Communication Infrastructure.

Article 17 Confidentiality — eu-LISA 1. Without prejudice to Article 17 of the Staff Regulations, eu-LISA shall apply appropriate rules of professional secrecy or other equivalent duties of confidentiality of a comparable standard to those laid down in Article 11 of this Regulation to all its staff required to work with SIS data. That obligation shall also apply after those persons leave office or employment or after the termination of their activities. 2. eu-LISA shall take measures equivalent to those referred to in paragraph 1 as regards confidentiality in respect of the exchange of supplementary information through the Communication Infrastructure. 3. Where eu-LISA cooperates with external contractors in any SIS-related tasks, it shall closely monitor the activities of the contractor to ensure compliance with all provisions of this Regulation, in particular on security, confidentiality and data protection. 4. The operational management of CS-SIS shall not be entrusted to private companies or private organisations.

Article 18 Keeping of logs at central level 1. eu-LISA shall ensure that every access to and all exchanges of personal data within CS-SIS are logged for the purposes stated in Article 12(1). 2. The logs shall show, in particular, the history of the alert, the date and time of the data processing activity, the data used to perform a search, a reference to the data processed and the individual and unique user identifiers of the competent authority processing the data. 3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2 of this Article, if the search is carried out with dactyloscopic data or facial images in accordance with Article 43, the logs shall show the type of data used to perform the search instead of the actual data. 4. The logs shall only be used for the purposes referred to in paragraph 1 and shall be deleted three years after their creation. The logs which include the history of alerts shall be deleted three years after deletion of the alerts. 5. Logs may be kept longer than the periods referred to in paragraph 4 if they are required for monitoring procedures that are already underway. 6. For the purposes of self-monitoring and ensuring the proper functioning of CS-SIS, data integrity and security, eu-LISA shall have access to the logs within the limits of its competence. The European Data Protection Supervisor shall have access to those logs on request, within the limits of its competence and for the purpose of fulfilling its tasks.

CHAPTER IV

Information to the public

Article 19 SIS information campaigns At the start of the application of this Regulation, the Commission, in cooperation with the supervisory authorities and the European Data Protection Supervisor, shall carry out a campaign informing the public about the objectives of SIS, the data stored in SIS, the authorities having access to SIS and the rights of data subjects. The Commission shall repeat such campaigns regularly, in cooperation with the supervisory authorities and the European Data Protection Supervisor. The Commission shall maintain a website available to the public providing all relevant information concerning SIS. Member States shall, in cooperation with their supervisory authorities, devise and implement the necessary policies to inform their citizens and residents about SIS generally.

CHAPTER V

Categories of data and flagging

Article 20 Categories of data 1. Without prejudice to Article 8(1) or to the provisions of this Regulation providing for the storage of additional data, SIS shall contain only those categories of data which are supplied by each Member State, as required for the purposes laid down in Articles 26, 32, 34, 36, 38 and 40. 2. The categories of data shall be as follows: (a) information on persons in relation to whom an alert has been entered; (b) information on objects referred to in Articles 26, 32, 34, 36 and 38. 3. Any alert in SIS which includes information on persons shall contain only the following data: (a) surnames; (b) forenames; (c) names at birth; (d) previously used names and aliases; (e) any specific, objective, physical characteristics not subject to change; (f) place of birth; (g) date of birth; (h) gender; (i) any nationalities held; (j) whether the person concerned: (i) is armed; (ii) is violent; (iii) has absconded or escaped; (iv) poses a risk of suicide; (v) poses a threat to public health; or (vi) is involved in an activity referred to in Articles 3 to 14 of Directive (EU) 2017/541; (k) the reason for the alert; (l) the authority which created the alert; (m) a reference to the decision giving rise to the alert; (n) the action to be taken in the case of a hit; (o) links to other alerts pursuant to Article 63; (p) the type of offence; (q) the person's registration number in a national register; (r) for alerts referred to in Article 32(1), a categorisation of the type of case; (s) the category of the person's identification documents; (t) the country of issue of the person's identification documents; (u) the number(s) of the person's identification documents; (v) the date of issue of the person's identification documents; (w) photographs and facial images; (x) in accordance with Article 42(3), relevant DNA profiles; (y) dactyloscopic data; (z) a copy of the identification documents, in colour wherever possible. 4. The Commission shall adopt implementing acts to lay down and develop the technical rules necessary for entering, updating, deleting and searching the data referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article and the common standards referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 76(2). 5. Technical rules shall be similar for searches in CS-SIS, in national or shared copies and in technical copies made under Article 56(2). They shall be based on common standards.

Article 21 Proportionality 1. Before entering an alert and when extending the period of validity of an alert, Member States shall determine whether the case is adequate, relevant and important enough to warrant an alert in SIS. 2. Where a person or an object is sought under an alert related to a terrorist offence, the case shall be considered adequate, relevant and important enough to warrant an alert in SIS. For public or national security reasons, Member States may exceptionally refrain from entering an alert when it is likely to obstruct official or legal inquiries, investigations or procedures.

Article 22 Requirement for an alert to be entered 1. The minimum set of data necessary in order to enter an alert into SIS shall be the data referred to in points (a), (g), (k) and (n) of Article 20(3), except for in the situations referred to in Article 40. The other data referred to in that paragraph shall also be entered into SIS, if available. 2. The data referred to in point (e) of Article 20(3) of this Regulation shall only be entered when this is strictly necessary for the identification of the person concerned. When such data are entered, Member States shall ensure that Article 10 of Directive (EU) 2016/680 is complied with.

Article 23 Compatibility of alerts 1. Before entering an alert, the Member State shall check whether the person or the object concerned is already the subject of an alert in SIS. To check whether the person is already the subject of an alert, a check with dactyloscopic data shall also be carried out if such data are available. 2. Only one alert per person or per object per Member State shall be entered into SIS. Where necessary, new alerts may be entered on the same person or object by other Member States, in accordance with paragraph 3. 3. Where a person or an object is already the subject of an alert in SIS, a Member State wishing to enter a new alert shall check that there is no incompatibility between the alerts. If there is no incompatibility, the Member State may enter the new alert. If the alerts are incompatible, the SIRENE Bureaux of the Member States concerned shall consult each other by exchanging supplementary information in order to reach an agreement. Rules on the compatibility of alerts shall be laid down in the SIRENE Manual. Departures from the compatibility rules may be made after consultation between the Member States if essential national interests are at stake. 4. In the case of hits on multiple alerts on the same person or object, the executing Member State shall observe the priority rules for alerts laid down in the SIRENE Manual. If a person is subject to multiple alerts entered by different Member States, alerts for arrest entered in accordance with Article 26 shall be executed as a priority, subject to Article 25.

Article 24 General provisions on flagging 1. Where a Member State considers that to give effect to an alert entered in accordance with Article 26, 32 or 36 is incompatible with its national law, its international obligations or essential national interests, it may require that a flag be added to the alert to the effect that the action to be taken on the basis of the alert will not be taken in its territory. The flag shall be added by the SIRENE Bureau of the issuing Member State. 2. In order to enable Member States to require that a flag be added to an alert entered in accordance with Article 26, all Member States shall be notified automatically of any new alert of that category through the exchange of supplementary information. 3. If in particularly urgent and serious cases, an issuing Member State requests the execution of the action, the executing Member State shall examine whether it is able to allow the flag added at its behest to be withdrawn. If the executing Member State is able to do so, it shall take the necessary steps to ensure that the action to be taken can be carried out immediately.

Article 25 Flagging related to alerts for arrest for surrender purposes 1. Where Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA applies, a Member State shall request the issuing Member State to add a flag preventing arrest as a follow-up to an alert for arrest for surrender purposes where the competent judicial authority under national law for the execution of a European Arrest Warrant has refused its execution on the basis of a ground for non-execution and where the addition of the flag has been required. A Member State may also require that a flag be added to the alert if its competent judicial authority releases the subject of the alert during the surrender process. 2. However, at the behest of a competent judicial authority under national law, either on the basis of a general instruction or in a specific case, a Member State may also require the issuing Member State to add a flag to an alert for arrest for surrender purposes if it is obvious that the execution of the European Arrest Warrant will have to be refused.

CHAPTER VI

Alerts on persons wanted for arrest for surrender or extradition purposes

Article 26 Objectives and conditions for entering alerts 1. Alerts on persons wanted for arrest for surrender purposes on the basis of a European Arrest Warrant, or alerts on persons wanted for arrest for extradition purposes, shall be entered at the request of the judicial authority of the issuing Member State. 2. Alerts for arrest for surrender purposes shall also be entered on the basis of arrest warrants issued, in accordance with agreements concluded between the Union and third countries on the basis of the Treaties, for the purpose of surrender of persons on the basis of an arrest warrant, which provide for the transmission of such an arrest warrant through SIS. 3. Any reference in this Regulation to provisions of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA shall be construed as including the corresponding provisions of agreements concluded between the Union and third countries on the basis of the Treaties, for the purpose of surrender of persons on the basis of an arrest warrant which provide for the transmission of such an arrest warrant through SIS. 4. In the case of an ongoing operation, the issuing Member State may temporarily make an existing alert for arrest entered in accordance with this Article unavailable for searching by the end-users in the Member States involved in the operation. In such cases the alert shall only be accessible to the SIRENE Bureaux. Member States shall only make an alert unavailable if: (a) the purpose of the operation cannot be achieved by other measures; (b) a prior authorisation has been granted by the competent judicial authority of the issuing Member State; and (c) all Member States involved in the operation have been informed through the exchange of supplementary information. The functionality provided for in the first subparagraph shall only be used for a period not exceeding 48 hours. However, if operationally necessary, it may be extended by further periods of 48 hours. Member States shall keep statistics on the number of alerts in relation to which this functionality has been used. 5. Where there is a clear indication that the objects referred to in points (a), (b), (c), (e), (g), (h), (j) and (k) of Article 38(2) are connected with a person who is the subject of an alert pursuant to paragraph 1 and 2 of this Article, alerts on those objects may be entered in order to locate the person. In such cases, the alert on the person and the alert on the object shall be linked in accordance with Article 63. 6. The Commission shall adopt implementing acts to lay down and develop rules necessary for entering, updating, deleting and searching the data referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 76(2).

Article 27 Additional data on persons wanted for arrest for surrender purposes 1. Where a person is wanted for arrest for surrender purposes on the basis of a European Arrest Warrant, the issuing Member State shall enter into SIS a copy of the original of the European Arrest Warrant. A Member State may enter the copy of more than one European Arrest Warrant in an alert for arrest for surrender purposes. 2. The issuing Member State may enter a copy of a translation of the European Arrest Warrant in one or more other official languages of the institutions of the Union.

Article 28 Supplementary information on persons wanted for arrest for surrender purposes The issuing Member State of an alert for arrest for surrender purposes shall communicate the information referred to in Article 8(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA to the other Member States through the exchange of supplementary information.

Article 29 Supplementary information on persons wanted for arrest for extradition purposes 1. The issuing Member State of an alert for extradition purposes shall communicate the following data to all other Member States through the exchange of supplementary information: (a) the authority which issued the request for arrest; (b) whether there is an arrest warrant or a document having the same legal effect, or an enforceable judgment; (c) the nature and legal classification of the offence; (d) a description of the circumstances in which the offence was committed, including the time, place and the degree of participation in the offence by the person on whom the alert has been entered; (e) insofar as possible, the consequences of the offence; and (f) any other information useful or necessary for the execution of the alert. 2. The data listed in paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be communicated where the data referred to in Article 27 or 28 have already been provided and are considered sufficient for the execution of the alert by the executing Member State.

Article 30 Conversion of an action to be taken concerning alerts for arrest for surrender or extradition purposes Where an arrest cannot be made, either because the Member State requested to do so refuses to make it in accordance with the procedures on flagging set out in Article 24 or 25, or because, in the case of an alert for arrest for extradition purposes, an investigation has not been completed, the Member State requested to make the arrest shall act on the alert by communicating the whereabouts of the person concerned.

Article 31 Execution of an action based on an alert for arrest for surrender or extradition purposes 1. An alert entered in SIS in accordance with Article 26 and the additional data referred to in Article 27 shall together constitute and have the same effect as a European Arrest Warrant issued in accordance with Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA where that Framework Decision applies. 2. Where Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA does not apply, an alert entered in SIS in accordance with Articles 26 and 29 shall have the same legal force as a request for provisional arrest under Article 16 of the European Convention on Extradition of 13 December 1957 or Article 15 of the Benelux Treaty concerning Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 27 June 1962.

CHAPTER VII

Alerts on missing persons or vulnerable persons who need to be prevented from travelling

Article 32 Objectives and conditions for entering alerts 1. Alerts on the following categories of persons shall be entered in SIS at the request of the competent authority of the issuing Member State: (a) missing persons who need to be placed under protection: (i) for their own protection; (ii) in order to prevent a threat to public order or public security; (b) missing persons who do not need to be placed under protection; (c) children at risk of abduction by a parent, a family member or a guardian, who need to be prevented from travelling; (d) children who need to be prevented from travelling owing to a concrete and apparent risk of them being removed from or leaving the territory of a Member State and: (i) becoming victims of trafficking in human beings, or of forced marriage, female genital mutilation or other forms of gender-based violence; (ii) becoming victims of or involved in terrorist offences; or (iii) becoming conscripted or enlisted into armed groups or being made to participate actively in hostilities; (e) vulnerable persons who are of age and who need to be prevented from travelling for their own protection owing to a concrete and apparent risk of them being removed from or leaving the territory of a Member State and becoming victims of trafficking in human beings or gender-based violence. 2. Point (a) of paragraph 1 shall apply in particular to children and to persons who have to be institutionalised following a decision by a competent authority. 3. An alert on a child referred to in point (c) of paragraph 1 shall be entered following a decision by the competent authorities, including judicial authorities of the Member States having jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility, where a concrete and apparent risk exists that the child may be unlawfully and imminently removed from the Member State where the competent authorities are situated. 4. An alert on persons referred to in points (d) and (e) of paragraph 1 shall be entered following a decision by the competent authorities, including judicial authorities. 5. The issuing Member State shall regularly review the need to maintain the alerts referred to in points (c), (d) and (e) of paragraph 1 of this Article in accordance with Article 53(4). 6. The issuing Member State shall ensure all of the following: (a) that the data it enters in SIS indicate which of the categories referred to in paragraph 1 the person concerned by the alert falls into; (b) that the data it enters in SIS indicate which type of case is involved, wherever the type of case is known; and (c) that, in relation to alerts entered in accordance with points (c), (d) and (e) of paragraph 1, its SIRENE Bureau has all relevant information at its disposal at the time of the creation of the alert. 7. Four months before a child who is the subject of an alert under this Article reaches the age of majority in accordance with the national law of the issuing Member State, CS-SIS shall automatically notify the issuing Member State that either the reason for the alert and the action to be taken have to be updated or the alert has to be deleted. 8. Where there is a clear indication that the objects referred to in points (a), (b), (c), (e), (g), (h), and (k) of Article 38(2) are connected with a person who is the subject of an alert pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, alerts on those objects may be entered in order to locate the person. In such cases, the alert on the person and the alert on the object shall be linked in accordance with Article 63. 9. The Commission shall adopt implementing acts to lay down and develop rules on the categorisation of the types of cases and the entering of data referred to in paragraph 6. The types of cases of missing persons who are children shall include, but not be limited to, runaways, unaccompanied children in the context of migration and children at risk of parental abduction. The Commission shall also adopt implementing acts to lay down and develop technical rules necessary for entering, updating, deleting and searching the data referred to in paragraph 8. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 76(2).

Article 33 Execution of action based on an alert 1. Where a person referred to in Article 32 is located, the competent authorities of the executing Member State shall, subject to the requirements in paragraph 4, communicate his or her whereabouts to the issuing Member State. 2. In the case of persons who need to be placed under protection referred to in points (a), (c), (d) and (e) of Article 32(1), the executing Member State shall immediately consult its own competent authorities and those of the issuing Member State through the exchange of supplementary information in order to agree without delay the measures to be taken. The competent authorities in the executing Member State may, in accordance with national law, move such persons to a safe place in order to prevent them from continuing their journey. 3. In the case of children, any decision on the measures to be taken or any decision to move the child to a safe place as referred to in paragraph 2 shall be made in accordance with the best interests of the child. Such decisions shall be made immediately and not later than 12 hours after the child was located, in consultation with relevant child protection authorities, as appropriate. 4. The communication, other than between the competent authorities, of data on a missing person who has been located and who is of age shall be subject to that person's consent. The competent authorities may, however, communicate the fact that the alert has been deleted because the missing person has been located to the person who reported the person missing.

CHAPTER VIII

Alerts on persons sought to assist with a judicial procedure

Article 34 Objectives and conditions for entering alerts 1. For the purposes of communicating the place of residence or domicile of persons, Member States shall, at the request of a competent authority, enter into SIS alerts on: (a) witnesses; (b) persons summoned or persons sought to be summoned to appear before the judicial authorities in connection with criminal proceedings in order to account for acts for which they are being prosecuted; (c) persons who are to be served with a criminal judgment or other documents in connection with criminal proceedings in order to account for acts for which they are being prosecuted; (d) persons who are to be served with a summons to report in order to serve a penalty involving a deprivation of liberty. 2. Where there is a clear indication that the objects referred to in points (a), (b), (c), (e), (g), (h), and (k) of Article 38(2) are connected with a person who is the subject of an alert pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, alerts on those objects may be entered in order to locate the person. In such cases the alerts on the person and the alert on the object shall be linked in accordance with Article 63. 3. The Commission shall adopt implementing acts to lay down and develop the technical rules necessary for entering, updating, deleting and searching of the data referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 76(2).

Article 35 Execution of the action based on an alert Requested information shall be communicated to the issuing Member State through the exchange of supplementary information.

CHAPTER IX

Alerts on persons and objects for discreet checks, inquiry checks or specific checks

Article 36 Objectives and conditions for entering alerts 1. Alerts on persons, on the objects referred to in points (a), (b), (c), (e), (g), (h), (j), (k) and (l) of Article 38(2) and on non-cash means of payment shall be entered in accordance with the national law of the issuing Member State, for the purposes of discreet checks, inquiry checks or specific checks in accordance with Article 37(3), (4) and (5). 2. When entering alerts for discreet checks, inquiry checks or specific checks and where the information sought by the issuing Member State is additional to that provided for in points (a) to (h) of Article 37(1), the issuing Member State shall add to the alert all the information that is sought. If that information relates to special categories of personal data referred to in Article 10 of Directive (EU) 2016/680, it shall only be sought if it is strictly necessary for the specific purpose of the alert and in relation to the criminal offence for which the alert has been entered. 3. Alerts on persons for discreet checks, inquiry checks or specific checks may be entered for the purposes of preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting criminal offences, executing a criminal sentence and preventing threats to public security in one or more of the following circumstances: (a) where there is a clear indication that a person intends to commit or is committing any of the offences referred to in Article 2(1) and (2) of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA; (b) where the information referr